Tibet, China and Great Britain

Notes on the Present Status of the Relation Between These Countries

By Grover Clark

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The following series of articles dealing chiefly with some political aspects of the Tibetan situation were first published in "The Peking Leader" beginning in the issue for August 20, 1924. Part of the material was gathered from books on the subject, but the articles contain a good deal of information which is new—information which has been secured from Chinese and foreigners who have been participants in or eye-witness of the events along the Tibetan borders and in Lhasa during the past twelve years and more.—G.C.

1. Introduction

A new chapter in the long history of the relations between China and Tibet probably will begin with the coming to Peking this autumn of the Panchen Lama. His visit easily may create many difficulties for the Chinese Government in its dealings with China's former dependency, by involving this country in the quarrels between the Tibetan factions. At the same time, it will give an opportunity to establish closer connections with at least one of those factions, and to get some much-needed information about precisely what is going on in that far-distant land.

It is quite probable, too, that written into the early pages of this fresh chapter will be a new agreement between China, Britain and the Tibetan leaders as a result of which the channels of trade between China and Tibet will be reopened and the obstacles in the way of Indo-Tibetan trade removed.

Trade the Keynote

For, after all, it is the possibilities of trade which are of most vital interest to both China and Britain in connection with Tibet. China naturally wishes to bring Tibet back into the sphere of her influence, and to insure that there shall be no improper control by any other Power over Tibetan affairs or territory. But these intangible political considerations sink into comparative unimportance, in the minds of many Chinese, beside
the very real fact that at present the Tibetan markets are almost completely closed to Chinese merchants.

Britain, on the other hand, equally naturally wants to see order preserved along her Indian border, and to have the opportunity to trade with the Tibetans as freely as circumstances will permit.

The Tibetans on their part are beginning to feel the stirrings of national consciousness and they are increasingly unwilling to submit to autocratic control by any outsider. They also are beginning to appreciate the advantages of having some of the things which they can get only through trade with the outside world.

In Tibet, to put it briefly, the same thing is happening that has happened so many times before when active, trading peoples have found on their borders nations with less highly developed political and economic organizations.

**Chinese Trade Handicapped**

As things stand now, China exercises no political authority over her former dependency and the group in power at Lhasa is on friendly terms with the Indian rather than the Chinese Government, though Chinese merchants who succeed in getting into Tibet are well treated. The overland distances and the difficulties of travel, however, together with the disturbances along the border until the last month or so, made access to Tibet from the Chinese side virtually impossible. And, from the Indian side, Chinese merchants—or Chinese of any other description—are prohibited from entering Tibet by the British authorities, in accordance with their interpretation of an agreement reached some years ago with the Dalai Lama.

**Tibetans Come Out to Buy**

Virtually all the Chinese trade that there is with Tibet, therefore, is carried on outside of Tibetan territory, either at Batang and other points in China or at various points in India near the Tibetan border. The Tibetans come out to these places to carry on the trade—and the British authorities in India neither make objection to this trade nor place obstacles in the way of the Chinese merchants who carry it on.

There is, however, a certain amount of trading done by Chinese merchants inside of Tibet. There are for example, about five hundred of these
merchants in Lhasa. And these merchants are left undisturbed, as long as they confine themselves strictly to business and keep out of politics. But the bulk of the buying and selling inside of Tibet is in the hands of Tibetans.

**British Influence Strong**

The British have been more fortunate than China in maintaining relations with Tibet. There have been no British troops in Lhasa itself since the Young husband expedition of 1904—of which more later—and Britain has had no regular resident representative there at any time, though there have been several visits to Lhasa by high British officials and other British subjects. The British, however, have sold a fairly large quantity of arms and ammunition to the Tibetans, and an Indian British subject has been called in by the Dalai Lama to reorganize the police force.

This man not only is head of the police but he is commander of the Tibetan forces and the dominant figure in the telegraph and postal services. His influence with the Dalai personally also is very great. Other Indian British subjects also are connected with the customs administration.

Annexation Not Sought

On the whole, the relations between the Dalai's Government and the Indian authorities are close and distinctly friendly—far more so than the relations between the Lhasa Government and China. In the course of establishing and maintaining these relations, the British have done things which looked very much like attempts to annex all or part of Tibet to India or to establish a British protectorate over the Tibetan Government—particularly in the case of the Young husband expedition of 1903-04—but at the present time there seems to be no evidence of any desires beyond insuring peace and order along the Indian border and keeping open...
the opportunity for trade with Tibet.

**Situation Is Unsettled**

The present situation in Tibetan affairs is distinctly unsatisfactory to the Tibetans as well as to the Chinese and British. This is partly because of the absence of any clear agreement between the three parties concerned as to just what the status of each is to be. There has been no agreement which was ratified by all three parties since the revised Trade Regulations of 1908. In 1914, however, a new convention was drawn up at Simla between Chinese, Tibetan and British representatives, which the Chinese Government at Peking refused to ratify. The British and Tibetan authorities insist that this convention is binding, since it was signed by the Chinese representative. China's refusal to ratify left the whole question suspended in the air, and thus added to the uncertainty because it was not clear whether the 1908 agreement had or had not been superceded by that of 1914.

Furthermore, the Chinese have not been able to exercise any authority in Tibet since 1912, inspite of the fact that Tibet internationally is recognized as under China's suzerainty and the further fact that there have been and still are members of China's Parliament who nominally represent Tibet.

**New Negotiations Refused by China**

Since 1914 the proposal has been made from various quarters that formal negotiations should be resumed in order to get the whole Tibetan question cleared up. Britain and Tibet have been ready to do this, but China has refused to enter into any formal conference. The question was quietly shelved at the Washington Conference, after some informal discussion, because it was felt that too many complicated issues were involved and, that the matter was not sufficiently serious to justify taking the time that could more profitably be devoted to the discussion of other more important matters.

**Chinese Merchants Want Settlement**

Especially of late, however, there has been a growing demand from the Chinese merchants—particularly from those who are directly interested in trading with Tibet—that the Chinese Government should take up the Tibetan question and re-establish Chinese authority.
in this part of the Republic, so that trade could be resumed. The growing national consciousness in China, too, has found expression in the demand that what is felt in some quarters to be improper British penetration into Tibet should be stopped so that the territory may not be definitely and irrevocably lost to China.

The coming of the Panchen Lama, particularly in view of the circumstances which surround his visit and the disagreement with the Dalai Lama which caused it, is bringing the whole issue to life, and from now on it is likely that the Tibetan question will form an increasingly important addition to the many problems which the Government will find itself called on to solve.

To understand the present situation, however, it is necessary to review briefly the events out of which this situation has developed.

II. Early Agreements

China made her first treaty with Tibet early in the ninth century A.D. Kublai Khan brought the country into the Chinese Empire in the thirteenth century. Allegiance to the Manchus was tendered by the Tibetan leaders in 1642; a little before the Manchu Dynasty was definitely established in China. In 1725 there was a Tibetan revolt against Chinese control, but this was quickly suppressed. Twenty-five years later another revolt led to the suppression of the temporal power in Tibet and the establishment of a system of administration nominally headed by the Dalai and Panchen Lamas with a Tibetan council, but really controlled by two Chinese Resident Commissioners.

During the last part of the eighteenth century trouble developed between the Sino-Tibetan Government and the bordering peoples in Nepal. These were duly cleared up and in 1856 a treaty between Tibet and Nepal was signed in which both acknowledged dependence on China.

The British Get Interested

About this time the possibilities of trade with Tibet began to interest the British authorities in India. After various attempts to get that trade started, a Sino-British agreement was signed at Chefoo in 1876, which among
other things gave permission for a British exploring expedition to go into Tibet. It happens that the expedition, which was supposed to start the next year, never materialized. Tibet thus remained the Land of Mystery, as far as westerners were concerned.

But this Chefoo agreement is important for two reason. In the first place, it indicates Britain's recognition of Chinese authority in Tibet, since the agreement was made with the Chinese not the Tibetan officials. (Britain on several subsequent occasions re-affirmed this recognition of China's suzerainty over Tibet, and in spite of the fact that in recent years there has been considerable direct dealing between the Tibetans and British, there never has been any formal withdrawal of recognition of China's nominal rights).

In the second place, this Chefoo agreement, giving the British the right to make an exploring expedition into Tibet, for the first time brought Tibet into the treaties between China and the modern foreign countries.

**Trade Is Authorized in 1890**

Ten years later another agreement was signed: the "Burma Convention" of 1886 which dealt with Burma and Tibet. Soon after this agreement was made, there was trouble along the Sikkim border of Tibet, which finally was settled by the Calcutta agreement of 1890 which defined the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet and authorized trade between the two territories.

The question of trade was further dealt with in an agreement reached on December 5, 1893, which supplemented the 1890 agreement and opened Yatung, in Tibet, as a place where British subjects could carry on business. This was the first definite opening up of Tibet to foreigners.

**China's Authority Weakened**

But during the years when Britain had been negotiating with China for an opportunity to get into Tibet, the gradual disintegration of the power of the Manchu rulers in China itself had been reflected in a weakening of the Chinese authority in this far-away region. Nominally China still remained suzerain, but practically more and more of the power had passed into the hands of the Dalai Lama, located at Lhasa, and his followers. The Panchen Lama, located 150 miles to the west of Lhasa at Tashi-
lumpo, also had been losing to the Dalai Lama what temporal power he had exercised.

**Lhasa Turns to Russia**

The Lhasa authorities, feeling themselves gradually increasing in independence, began to look around for someone whom they could play off against both the British and the Chinese in their effort to get complete control of their own affairs. Off to the north they found Russia, then in the full career of carrying out its policy of expansion in the Orient, pushing across Siberia, trying to get a firm grasp on Manchuria and far from unwilling to have a way opened down into India—especially if that way lay through a land that was rich in gold and other valuable metals.

**Tibet Becomes the Pawn**

At the beginning of the twentieth century, therefore, the situation had become exceedingly complicated. After twenty-five years of more or less active discussion China had given to Britain the right to trade in certain specified towns in Tibet, though not to enter Lhasa. The Chinese authority in Tibet had not been sufficiently strong, however, to enforce the British rights as against the opposition of the Tibetan temporal powers. These temporal powers, centering around the Dalai Lama at Lhasa, had secured a large measure of independent control of Tibetan affairs and were inclined to make their independence complete. Particularly they disliked the efforts of the British to get into their country. They therefore had begun to turn to the Russians for support in anti-British and anti-Chinese efforts. Russia was entirely willing to help the Tibetans against the British and Chinese, because such help gave a chance for further expansion and, especially, for a thrust down into India.

Briefly, that is, while the Tibetans may have thought they were approaching complete independence, in reality by the end of the nineteenth century Tibet had definitely become a pawn in the game between China, Britain and Russia. Nominally China held control. In reality no one was in full authority, while Russia and Britain were maneuvering to get the power each for itself, or at least to keep the other out and secure the exclusive right to trade and develop the resources of Tibet.
Britain so far had kept several moves ahead of Russia in the game, but she was anxious to make her hold complete, for protection in India if for no other reason.

III. The 1904 Aggression

Not long after the opening of the twentieth century, conditions in Tibet and along the Indo-Tibetan border were such that the British authorities felt called on to take more active measures to secure order and the carrying out of their rights under the 1893 agreement with China. This agreement had never been put into effect, simply because China did not have sufficient influence in Tibet to see that the provisions were carried out, and the Tibetans were opposed to any opening of their country. Also, there had been occasional trouble along the border between the Tibetans and the tribes nominally under British control.

Tibetans Resist—British Fight

In 1903, therefore, the British made arrangements to send an expedition into Tibet to get directly in touch with the authorities at Lhasa. Permission for the expedition was not secured from the Chinese Government, nor did the Tibetans welcome the coming of the British. This expedition was commanded by Colonel F. E. Younghusband.

Instead of welcoming the expedition, the Tibetans put up a somewhat determined resistance, so that the Younghusband expedition was forced to fight a more or less continuous battle most of the way through to the Tibetan capital. Equipped with modern arms as they were, the British did not have any serious difficulty in advancing against the primitively-armed Tibetans, but the advance was made at the expense of a large number of Tibetan lives.

A New Convention

Before the expedition had reached Lhasa, the Dalai Lama fled into Mongolia. Negotiations were entered into, however, between the British and the high Tibetan officials who remained. These resulted in the signing on September 7, 1904, of a "Convention between the Governments of Great Britain and Tibet".

This Convention opens with a brief reference to the Anglo-Chinese agreements of 1890 and 1893, stating that "doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity" of these agreements and "as
to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government" under them. Article I further provides that "the Government of Tibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890..." Britain, that is declares that she has taken it on herself to assume China's place in forcing the Tibetan Government to act in accordance with an Anglo-Chinese agreement—although she had previously recognized Tibet as being under Chinese suzerainty, and always previously had dealt exclusively with the Chinese Government on Tibetan matters.

**Far Beyond Old Agreements**

But in subsequent articles of this 1904 Convention, Britain, on her own account and without any pretence of acting for China, insisted on pledges from the Tibetan Government which went far beyond anything provided for in the Anglo-Chinese agreements; pledges which on the basis of an ordinary reading of the text created virtually a British protectorate over Tibet, and even with the most strained interpretation secured for Britain an equal voice with China in the management of Tibetan affairs.

In the matter of trade opportunities, for example, though reference is made to the Anglo-Chinese agreements of 1890 and 1893 as the basis for the rules to be applied in governing the trade relations, Tibet is forced to open two new places to British trade, one of them—Gyantze, the most important—being within 144 miles of Lhasa and well into Tibetan territory. China was not consulted on the opening of these new trade marts.

But this is a minor point compared with what follows in Articles VI to IX of the 1904 Convention. These Articles are difficult to explain except on the assumption that the British intended to establish a protectorate over Tibet and secure part of Tibetan territory. Apparently, however, Colonel Young-husband went further than the Viceroy of India approved, for when the latter came to ratify the agreement he altered one of the more important provisions distinctly in favor of the Tibetans.

**Indemnity Demanded**

The provision relative to an indemnity from Tibet was the one altered. Article VI provides that "As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the
despatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Tibetan Government engages to pay a sum of pounds five hundred thousand—equivalent to rupees seventy-five lakhs—to the British Government.

"The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate whether in Tibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five instalments of rupees one lakh each on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January 1906."

Article VII provides for the "sanctions" as follows: "As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfillment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi valley until the indemnity has been paid and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be later."

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The Viceroy Reduces the Indemnity

When this Convention was referred to the Viceroy of India for ratification, he reduced the indemnity from 7,503,000 rupees to 2,500,000 rupees and declared that "the British occupation of the Chumbi valley shall cease after the due payment of three annual instalments of the said indemnity as fixed by the said Article, provided, however, that the trade marts as stipulated in Article II of the Convention shall have been effectively opened for three years as provided in Article VII of the Convention; and that, in the meantime, the Tibetans shall have faithfully complied with the terms of the said Convention in all other respects." (The final installment of the indemnity was paid by the Tibetans on January 27, 1908, and the Chumbi valley was evacuated by the British on February 8, 1908. It is pleasant to be able to record this much of justice.)

But even with this "act of grace" as it was called, the case against the British is very strong.
The British Excuse

The Younghusband expedition, according to the Convention itself, went into Tibet to "exact reparation for breaches of treaty obligations". But no treaty with Britain was in existence to which Tibet was a party, and the only Anglo-Chinese treaty dealing with Tibet which had been violated was the 1893 agreement which included a provision for opening a trade mart. This mart had not been opened and there had been some slight disturbances along the border.

On this excuse—and taking on themselves what was properly China's task of forcing the Tibetans to comply with the treaties—the British sent a fairly large and strongly armed expedition into Tibet. This expedition was opposed by the Tibetans, naturally enough, and it had to fight its way through to the capital of the country. After which, the Tibetan Government was forced to agree to pay to Britain what, for Tibet, amounted to an enormous indemnity—to pay the expenses of this expedition and "for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort"—inspite of the fact that the expedition had no treaty justification for entering Tibet and the further fact that it not only was not asked for but was definitely opposed by the Tibetans.

Planned to Hold Territory for Seventy-five Years

Furthermore, in order to get something out of the expedition even if the indemnity were not paid regularly, Britain was to occupy part of Tibetan territory "until the indemnity has been paid and until the trade mart[s] have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be later". But the Convention as signed provides only for annual instalments of payment, running through a period of seventy-five years.

But that is not all. In order to make sure that there would be less trouble in getting into Lhasa in the future, Tibet was forced, by Article VIII, to "raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantze and Lhasa". Tibet, that is, was not to be allowed to defend herself against any British expedition in the future.

"Without the Consent of the British Government"

The extent of the domination
over Tibetan affairs which the British intended to set up is made clear in Article IX. The Tibetan Government engages that "without the previous consent of the British Government.

"(a) no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation to any Foreign Power;

"(b) no such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs;

"(c) no Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet;

"(d) no concessions for railways, roads, telegraph, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government;

"(e) no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power."

**Exclusive or Joint Protectorate**

The precise meaning of the term "Foreign Power" in this Article is not clear. In view of the fact that the agreement was signed between the British and Tibetan Governments—as the Convention itself states—the presumption is that any other nation, even China, would by a "Foreign Power". On this basis, Britain was trying to set up a protectorate of her own over Tibet. But since in the beginning of the Convention reference is made to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government under the Anglo-Chinese agreements of 1890 and 1893, it is possible to stretch the interpretation so as to exclude China from the category of Foreign Powers. Even on this basis, Britain was securing for herself an equal voice with China in Tibetan affairs, since Tibet was not to take any one of a series of important steps "without the previous consent of the British Government".

Britain, that is, tried to get either an exclusive protectorate over Tibet for herself, or a joint protectorate with China—and China was given no voice in the matter at the time, though she was allowed to confirm thefait accompli a year and a half after the signing of the 1904 Convention.
Colonel Younghusband, in other words, “in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty’s Government and on behalf of that said Government” as the Convention has it, was writing once more the same old sordid story that has been written so many times when strong nations dealt with weak and undeveloped peoples. The gleam of light in the affair was the action of the Indian Viceroy in cutting down the indemnity and providing for the evacuation of Tibetan territory within three years.

Conditions Were Unsatisfactory

In justice this subject should not be left without the remark that the situation along the Indo-Tibetan border was unsatisfactory, that there were occasional disturbances, and that the right to trade in Tibet given by the Anglo-Chinese agreement in 1893 could not be exercised because Chinese authority in Tibet was practically nil. If Britain were to get what she wanted, therefore, she was almost forced to take it direct from Tibet. But one wonders if even that justified the British action; a nice consideration for the rights of other peoples is not conspicuously present in the dealings of the Indian Government with Tibet at this time.

It might be remarked, too, that in demanding the veto power over such Tibetan actions as would tend to give any Foreign Power rights in Tibet, the British Commissioner had Russia rather than China chiefly in mind, and that he felt urgently the need of protecting the Indian border from Russian aggression through Tibet.

IV. China Re-Recognized

A year and a half after the signing of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904, the relations between Britain, China and Tibet were made somewhat more regular by the signature, on April 27, 1905, of an another Anglo-Chinese Convention, to which the 1904 Convention was made an annexe.

In the preamble to this 1905 agreement it is explained that the 1904 incident was the result of Tibet’s refusal to recognize the 1890 and 1893 Anglo-Chinese agreements and that this refusal “placed the British Government under the necessity of taking steps to secure their rights and interests under the said Convention and Regula-
tions”. It is not explained, however, just why Britain should have taken it on herself to send, without first consulting China, an armed expedition into what she had formally recognized as Chinese territory. Nor is anything said about what justification the British had, when that expedition was resisted, for fighting their way through to their goal. The fact that the expedition was sent to Lhasa instead of, for example, to Kalgan does not alter the criticisms of the case, even though the relative isolation of Lhasa meant that only comparatively little general interest was aroused in its doings.

1904 Agreement Confirmed

The 1906 agreement itself gives official Chinese approval to the fail accompli of the 1904 Convention and re-affirms the 1890 and 1893 agreements. It also gives Britain the right to construct telegraph lines connecting India with the trade marts provided for. (These lines were built not long after). And in Article II “The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign State to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.”

Thus from both Tibet and China Britain had secured agreements enabling her to trade in Tibet and—as far as agreements could be effective in such matters—guaranteeing her against Russian aggression through Tibet.

Britain and Russia Pledge Non-Interference

In 1907 still another agreement was signed, this time between Britain and Russia and dealing with Tibet, Persia and Afghanistan. In this agreement, Britain was seeking assurance direct from Russia that she would not try to press down into India. In return for that she was ready to give a pledge, on her part, not to try to annex Tibet. China was not a party to this agreement, but in it both Britain and Russia specifically recognized her suzerainty over Tibet. After this agreement was signed, the Tibetan leaders gave up hope of securing Russian support in their attempts to achieve independence.

Besides recognizing China's suzerainty, “The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to
abstain from all interference in its internal administration”. And “Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government”, though the British Trade Agents may have direct relations with the Tibetan local authorities and Buddhist subjects of either Britain or Russia may discuss religious matters with the Dalai Lama and other Buddhist leaders in Tibet.

Also: “Article III: The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send Representatives to Lhasa.

“Article IV: The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Tibet.

“Article V: The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Tibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.”

The Agreement Cancelled

The whole tone of this Anglo-Russian agreement is very different from that of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904 and, on paper, amounts to a surrender by Britain of any desire for influence in Tibet, or any wish for rights other than that to trade at three places named in the Anglo-Chinese agreement of 1906.

(This 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement was formally cancelled in Article II of the Anglo-Russian Treaty signed at London on August 7, 1924, but not yet ratified by Britain or Russia.)

The Dalai Visits Peking

But neither the Chinese nor the Tibetans were satisfied. The Chinese, aroused by British activities in Tibet, had begun military measures to regain control of their former dependency. The Tibetans on the one side were resisting the Chinese and on the other were fearful of further British penetration. The Dalai Lama, who had fled before the British in 1904, was still away.

He had gone first to Urga, where he spent a year before starting home again. Reports reaching him as to conditions in Tibet caused him to delay his return. He spent two years in the Kokonor region, some months at Wu T’ai Shan, and then journeyed to
Peking at the earnest invitation of the Chinese Government. He arrived at the Capital late in September, 1908. Here he hoped to come to an understanding with China as to Tibetan affairs.

All through his trip to Peking he was given most courteous treatment by the Chinese, but after he reached the city there was a slight contretemps. The Emperor insisted on a k'ow-t'ow. The Dalai objected, on the ground that he was a god while the Emperor was only a man. It finally was agreed that the Dalai should bow only, instead of prostrating himself.

Less Friendly Feeling

At the beginning of November, 1908, an Imperial Decree was issued conferring a new title—that of "Loyal and Submissive Vice-Regent"—on the Dalai. But the same edict instructed him to be careful to obey the orders of the Chinese Government, and to make any communications with the throne through the Imperial Amban stationed in Lhasa. Having sent in his memorial he was to wait for instructions from the Emperor.

The Dalai thus was put in the position simply of one of the heads of a subordinate part of the Chinese Empire, instead of the position he desired: that of head of an autonomous state acknowledging Chinese suzerainty but substantially independent. Inspite of the elaborate formal courtesies which were shown to the Dalai, therefore, his visit to Peking lessened rather than increased his friendly feeling toward China.

There was no suggestion, however, of a desire to sever all connections with China. That step did not come until 1912, and then was due entirely to the blundering and highhanded methods of the Chinese in Tibet and on its border, together with the break-down of Chinese authority at the time of the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty.

The Dalai finally left Peking shortly after the death of the Emperor and Empress Dowager in 1908. In November, 1903, he was back in Lhasa, after an absence of nearly five and a half years.

Two New Developments

In the meantime, there had been important developments in two directions. The Chinese, beginning in 1904, had started their movement to
regain control of Tibet by military means. And, in 1908, a tri-partite conference took place at Calcutta, which resulted in the signing by Chinese, Tibetan and British representatives of a new agreement nominally dealing with trade regulations but in reality covering many other points.

V. The 1908 Regulations

The tri-partite agreement of 1908 is of considerable importance because it is the last formally ratified agreement between China and any foreign Power which deals with Tibetan affairs and because, nominally at least, it is still in force and so is the latest formal outline of the principles to be followed in the relations between China, Britain and Tibet.

The 1904 Anglo-Tibetan Convention provided for a subsequent conference to amend the 1893 trade regulations. The confirmation by China of this Convention, in 1906, brought China into the field again. The conference provided for was held at Calcutta, and resulted in the signing of an agreement by the representatives of China, Tibet and Great Britain on April 20, 1908. Ratifications were exchanged between China and Britain at Peking on October 14 of the same year.

The 1908 Trade Regulations go more into detail than any of the earlier agreements, but introduce nothing new as far the places where British subjects might trade is concerned. Many important additions to the previous agreements are made, however, in connection with the relations between the various authorities that would be involved.

Direct Indo-Tibetan Dealings

Rules are laid down, for example, for the relations between the British Trade Agents and the local authorities. In all such cases the Chinese officials, whenever they are present, are to be recognized as superior to the Tibetan. But "Questions which cannot be decided by agreement between the Trade Agents and the Local Authorities shall be referred for settlement to the Government of India and the Tibetan High Authorities at Lhasa."

And only in case the Indian Government and Lhasa cannot agree is the Chinese Government to be consulted. "Questions which cannot be decided by agreement between the Government of
India and the Tibetan High Authorities at Lhasa shall, in accordance with the terms of Article I of the Peking Convention of 1906, be referred for settlement to the Governments of Great Britain and China”.

**China Merely to Be Informed**

Tibet and Great Britain, that is, both recognized a nominal Chinese suzerainty, and granted China a voice in Tibetan affairs in case they could not come to an agreement between themselves. But for all ordinary transactions, and even for all except the most serious disputes, the dealings were to be direct between the Indian Government and the Government at Lhasa. China’s only share in these dealings was that of being informed of what had been done: “The purport of a reference by the Government of India shall be communicated to the Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa”.

This clause makes it clear that the Chinese Amban was not considered to be a part of the Tibetan Government which was to deal with the Indian Government, for if he were a part obviously it would not be necessary to put in a special provision that he should be informed of matters referred to the Tibetan Government by the Indian Government.

**Conflict With British Pledge to Russia in 1907**

It has never been satisfactorily explained just how these provisions of the 1908 Trade Regulations were to be squared with the pledge in the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 that “Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government”. Technically, of course, the Indian and not the British Government would be negotiating with Tibet, under the 1908 Regulations, but the distinction is technical rather than real.

The 1907 agreement it is true permitted the British Trade Agents to deal with the local Tibetan authorities, presumably as a matter of necessary convenience. This, however, scarcely can be interpreted as permitting the sort of dealings between the “Government of India and the Tibetan High Authorities at Lhasa” mentioned in the 1908 Regulations—especially since the 1907 agreement contained a further pledge that neither Britain nor Russia would send Representatives to Lhasa.
The "Duty" of Carrying "Enlightenment"

The right to deal direct with Tibet was one of things for which the British had been striving. British apologists argue that such direct negotiations were necessary if normal trade relations between Tibet and India were to be established and maintained — and the Youngusband expedition in 1904 is explained as being not only justified but essential as a move to establish such direct contact.

It is not entirely clear, however, why the British should have felt it was their duty to get into direct contact with the Lhasa authorities — except on the basis of the old theory that it is part of the "White Man's Burden" to carry "enlightenment" (and trade goods) to the "dark corners" of the world, and to take whatever means may be necessary to overcome any opposition which the peoples of those "dark corners" might make to being "enlightened".

However that may be, and whatever methods may have been used, by the 1904, 1906 and 1908 agreements with Tibet and China Britain got the treaty right to extend her trade in Tibet and to deal directly with the Tibetan authorities.

Extraterritoriality Established

There are certain other important provisions in the 1908 agreement.

Article 4 lays down substantially the same rules with regard to consular jurisdiction and extraterritorial rights as apply elsewhere in China. In Article 5 "Great Britain agrees to relinquish her rights of extraterritoriality in Tibet whenever such rights are relinquished in China", but with the qualification "and when she is satisfied that the state of Tibetan laws and the arrangements for their administration and other considerations warrant her in so doing".

One is inclined to wonder what "other considerations" were contemplated. One wonders, too, just how this distinction between Tibet and other parts of Chinese territory — since Tibet is to be treated differently from the rest of China in the matter of the withdrawal of extraterritoriality — is to be reconciled with Britain's formal recognition of China's suzerainty over Tibet.

Further Articles of the 1908 Trade Regulations provide for the protection — by China not Tibet presumably since Chinese authority is supposed to be...
supreme—of the telegraph lines in Tibet connecting the trade marts with India, and also give the British Trade Agents the right to establish a mail courier system connecting with the Indian postal service. But "When efficient arrangements have been made by China in Tibet for a Postal Service", the abolition of the Trade Agents' couriers is to be discussed between Britain and China.

The "British Post Office" Story

(Incidentally, it might be remarked that the existence of the courier service—still legitimately maintained because China has not established an efficient Postal Service in Tibet; China now has no postal or telegraph service of any kind in Tibet, as a matter of fact—no doubt explains the reports that the British have set up a Tibetan postal administration maintaining a service through to Lhasa. There is a Tibetan postal system, with some British subjects as employees, but the control is in the hands of the Tibetan authorities.)

The British, travelling in Tibet, must confine themselves to the regular trade routes to and from the trade marts, except where special permission is given and except that natives of the border tribes may go where custom has allowed them in the past. And "Tibetan subjects trading, travelling or residing in India shall receive equal advantages to those accorded by this Regulation to British subjects in Tibet."

Still Nominally in Force

The agreement is to remain in force for ten years, and to be continued for ten-year periods unless a demand for revision be made by either side within the first six months after the end of each period. No such demand having been made in 1918, and no further agreement having been made between China and Britain since 1908, the Trade Regulations of that year are still in force and stand as the latest and most complete formal statement of the relations between China, Tibet and Britain.

Practically, however, the 1908 regulations, in so far as China is concerned at least, have been nullified by subsequent events.
VI. China Tries Force

The series of events which ended, on January 6, 1913, with the complete expulsion of all Chinese official representatives and troops from Lhasa began soon after the Younghusband expedition had resulted in the signing of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904. As long as Tibet was left alone by outsiders, the Chinese Government was apparently content to let matters drift along, exercising scarcely even a nominal authority in Lhasa. But when there began to be signs that a foreign Power was actively interested in opening up Tibet, the Chinese were aroused and started measures to regain real control in their distant dependency.

The first step came late in 1904, with an attempt to reassert effective Chinese authority in the territory along the Tibeto-Szechuan border inhabited chiefly by peoples of Tibetan stock. An Imperial Resident at Chamdo was appointed, and an attempt was made to re-organize the administration of the semi-independent districts along the border so as being it into line with Chinese practice.

The Fighting Begins

The new Resident promptly got into difficulties with the Tibetan lamas who did not want to lose their control of affairs. The upshot of this clash was that the Resident was driven out of Batang and eventually killed when the Tibetans, led by the lamas of the Batang monastery, revolted early in 1905. Revolts all along the Szechuan-Yunnan-Tibet border followed, with the expulsion or killing of the small Chinese garrisons.

The revolts led to the organization of a punitive expedition, which was sent by the Chinese Government from Chengtu. Batang was reached in the fall of 1905, the monastery there was razed, and Chinese authority in that district was re-established.

Chao Erh-feng Appears

In charge of this expedition, and later in entire charge of the task of restoring Chinese authority along the border and in Tibet, was Chao Erh-feng. Chao was successful in subduing the border, and even in pushing it some distance into what had previously been recognized as part of Tibet proper. But he used such stern measures that he was given the nick-name of “Butcher Chao”—though others that followed him in command of the Chinese troops
were so much more bloody that the period of his control came to be looked back on as almost a golden age; for however stern Chao may have been in dealing with those who opposed him, he was equally stern with his own soldiers, so that there was none of the indiscriminate butchery and butting which characterized later periods. (Chao stepped off the Tibetan scene when he was made Viceroy of Szechuan early in 1911, and was completely eliminated when the Republican leaders in Chengtu executed him in the fall of that year.)

**Lhasa not Seriously Angered**

Between 1905 and 1911 Chao had subdued the Tibeto-Szechuan frontier, though at the cost of a good deal of bloodshed and many conflicts with the Tibetan lamas in the monasteries scattered throughout this region. Apparently, however, during the first part of this period the Government at Lhasa was not seriously offended by the doings along the border. At least the Dalai Lama was willing to proceed to Peking—having fled from Lhasa in 1904—where he arrived in 1908 while Chao's campaigns were at their height. It was not until the first few days of 1913 that the Chinese finally were driven from Lhasa, and even this came only as the direct result of the scandalous actions of the Chinese soldiers and officials in the Tibetan capital.

**The One Bright Spot**

Before telling of the events in Lhasa, however, it is worth while to record the one bright spot in all the Chinese dealings with the Tibetans during these troubled years.

In 1906 Chang Yin-tan was sent from Peking as a Special Commissioner to Tibet, to make a general investigation and work out such reforms as might be needed. He was in Lhasa only some ten months, but during that time he succeeded in winning the hearty friendship of the Tibetans and the bitter enmity of most of the Chinese officials already in Tibet. He was the prime factor in the introduction of a military training school, of financial reform, of agricultural reform, of a salt administration. He also made many recommendations for re-organization of the Tibetan Government, most of which have been adopted since his time.
Chang Yin-tan vs. the Chinese Officials

But he got into hot water with the Chinese officials because he exposed their gross corruption. He even went so far as to memorialize the throne recommending the dismissal and punishment of all the Chinese officials in Tibet on the ground of malfeasance in office. Naturally this roused those who were attacked to a storm of agitation against Chang. Lien Yu, an old Manchu official who had been in Lhasa for some time as Deputy Resident Commissioner, was the leader in the anti-Chang movement. (And he took a prominent part in the intriguing which marked the following years.)

The attacks on him proved too strong and Chang Yin-tan left Lhasa late in 1906. Subsequently he was China's representative at the Calcutta negotiations which resulted in the revised Tibetan Trade Regulations of 1908, which already have been discussed.

China's Lack of Unified Policy

While Chang was attempting to work out his conciliatory and re-organization measures in Lhasa, Chao Erh-feng was pushing his military campaign along the border, using measures that were exactly the reverse of conciliatory.

This sharp divergence between the methods of the two Chinese authorities illustrates admirably one of the serious faults in China's dealings with Tibet from 1904 onward. First the Manchu Government and then the Republic had too many troubles at home to be able to pay serious attention to Tibet. The consequence was a complete lack of any coordinated effort and a complete absence of any consistent policy.

There is no doubt that Chao Erh-feng and those who succeeded him went much further in their "strong measures" than Peking wished. But Peking was not in a position to exercise any real control. Besides this considerable confusion was created by the serious discrepancies between the reports which reached Peking from the several Chinese officials dealing with Tibetan affairs. Each leader apparently sent in reports which would help him in his game of intrigue, and injure everyone else. As a result, Peking seems never to have known precisely what was going on.
The Expedition from Chengtu

But to return to the sorry tale of the Chinese troops in Tibet:

After Chang Yin-tan had been ousted from Lhasa, Lien Yu, the Manchu Acting Am- ban, remained more or less in control of Chinese interests. Chao Erh-feng's campaigns along the border, however, were making the Tibetans in Lhasa uneasy, and Lien became worried. He sent out reports of actual and prospective disturbances although conditions in Lhasa were quiet enough, and asked for money from Peking to meet the expenses of the troops in Lhasa.

Finally, partly as a result of these reports and partly in connection with Chao Erh-feng's general campaign of conquest, a special detachment of some 1500 men, accompanied by a small detachment of cavalry and another of artillery, was sent from Chengtu early in 1909, under orders to penetrate to Lhasa. The so-called "Southern Road" into Lhasa from Szechuan was heavily guarded by Tibetan troops, who were trying to protect their borders against Chao Erh-feng. The new detachment from Chengtu, therefore, went in through the much more difficult "Northern Route".

The tale of that march from Chengtu to Lhasa as told recently to me by men who accompanied the troops and who remained in Lhasa during the succeeding years would be a fit subject for an Ossendowski tale — what with the days of weary work cutting roads for the artillery, the weeks with food running extremely short, the months of struggling through the bitter cold and snow.

But this is not the place for that story.

VII. Angering the Dalai

The expedition from Chengtu finally reached Lhasa on February 12, 1910, after having fought their way through several small detachments of Tibetan troops that had been sent out hurriedly when word of the coming of the Chinese was received. (Incidentally, this special detachment was organized, trained and financed by a group of Szechuanese, independently of the Peking Government. The leader in the organization, and the commander of the expedition, now
is a member of China's Parliament.)

The principal lama festival of the year was in progress when the Chinese troops reached Lhasa. A detachment from the bodyguard of Lien Yu was sent out to meet them, but this detachment got into difficulties with the Tibetan police, and there was some shooting as a result of which two of the police were killed. Under such auspices the men from Chengtu entered Lhasa—an appropriate introduction to what was to follow.

**The Dalai Flees Again**

The Dalai Lama—who finally had returned to Lhasa late in 1909 after five and a half years of absence—and the other Tibetan officials had been very much worried by the approach of this new Chinese expedition. The troops were coming in at the request of Lien Yu, and the Tibetan authorities were afraid that he intended to use them to establish himself in complete control.

Whether or not this was Lien's intention, he seems to have thought it would be good policy to get the Dalai Lama into his hands, and just before the Chinese troops entered Lhasa an attempt was made to seize the Dalai. He succeeded in escaping, however—though only by a hair's breadth—and fled to India where he was welcomed, and most kindly treated by the British authorities until he returned to Lhasa in January, 1913, after the Chinese had been driven out. (While he was in India, the Dalai spent much of his time with Sir Charles Bell, and a friendship between these two was formed which had a great deal of influence in the later developments of Tibetan affairs.)

**Dalai's Titles Cancelled**

Immediately after the Dalai's flight from Lhasa, Lien sent word to Peking of what had happened. In response to his message, an Imperial Decree was issued on February 25, 1910, depriving the Dalai of all his titles, ordering that henceforth he should be treated as an ordinary individual no matter where he might be, and directing the Amban to search for suitable male children from whom another Dalai could be selected by the regular method of choosing lots.

This Decree also remarks that the Dalai had not been properly submissive during the years after he fled from Lhasa in 1904, though this was for-
given and new honors and titles were given to him in 1908. Now, it continues, he has once more proved guilty of treachery and refusal to obey his superiors. Therefore he no longer is fit to be a re-incarnation of the Buddha.

Why the Dalai is Pro-British

Since early in 1913 the Dalai has been residing peacefully in Lhasa. But he lived a somewhat hectic life during the previous eight years. In 1904 he had fled from Lhasa at the approach of the British troops. The next five years he spent wandering in Mongolia and China, including a few months in Peking. During this period the Chinese treated him personally with sufficient formal courtesy, but there does not seem to have been any unified attempt to establish through the Dalai closer and more friendly relations with Tibet.

Instead, during practically all of the time that the Dalai was in Chinese territory, Chinese troops were carrying on a bloody campaign of conquest along the Tibetan border. Then, in 1910, less than six months after he had returned to Lhasa, the Dalai fled again—this time from a Chinese army and into India. Upon his flight he was deprived of his title and honors by the Chinese Emperor, which certainly hurt his pride and the feelings of the Tibetans, though it seems to have had little effect on his standing with the lamas. At any rate, no attempt to choose a new Dalai was made at that time, either by the Tibetan Buddhists or by the Chinese officials in Tibet.

After this sort of treatment from the Chinese, the Dalai received a cordial and most courteous welcome in India. Thus the foundations were laid for the friendly relations which have existed between India and Tibet since the Dalai's return to Lhasa in 1913.

But that is a digression.

British Protest

The British took occasion, in a note on February 26, 1910, to protest against the sending of the Chinese troops into Lhasa, on the ground that this action involved a violation of the arrangements made in the 1904 and 1906 conventions. They argued that an effective Tibetan Government with which they could deal was implied in those agreements, so that China's action in threatening to overthrow the Tibetan Government was a violation of the conventions.
The 1906 Sino-British convention, however, specifically states that "the Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet"; and the British right to deal with a Tibetan Government, secured in the 1904 Anglo-Tibetan convention, was got by force and in direct violation of China's rights. Also, Britain had made a joint pledge with Russia in 1907 to deal with the Tibetan Government only through the intermediary of the Chinese Government.

The justification for the British protest thus is not entirely clear—since there was no treaty provision barring China from making any settlement she chose with the Tibetan Government and Britain had pledged herself not to interfere in Tibetan affairs—except under the assumption that the Chinese granted a joint protectorate over Tibet to the British by recognizing the convention of 1904.

No Control by Peking

There was fault on China's side, however. The Peking Government had assured British intention of altering the status created by the 1904 and 1906 conventions. Also, Lien Yu, with his peculiar gift for intrigue, had persuaded the Tibetan authorities that the Chinese troops were coming solely for policing purposes and to preserve order. He had told Peking and Szechuan, too, that troops were needed for this purpose, though as a matter of fact there was no disturbance in Lhasa.

The probabilities are that Peking really had no serious intention of doing more than help Lien re-establish his position as Amban, the Chinese Government having been told—by Lien—that assistance was needed. No one ever knew what Lien's own purpose in asking for the troops was. But in this case as in that of the fighting along the Tibetan border, Peking's influence was extremely small, and it disappeared entirely with the fall of the Empire, so that practically no outside control was exercised over the soldiers in Lhasa.
VIII. Driven from Lhasa

Since the expedition from Chengtu had come into Lhasa at the direct request of Lien Yu, it would have been reasonable to expect that the Acting Amban would have treated its members well. This he failed to do. The men who had gone through such hardships to come to his aid were given no presents or rewards of any kind,—to say nothing of being kept without their regular pay—and even had considerable difficulty in getting from him enough money to buy food. It was not long, therefore, until talk of mutiny against Lien began.

Fuel was added to the fire when, within a month of the arrival of the expedition, Lien trumped up a charge of withholding the pay for the soldiers against the man who had led the troops into Lhasa, had him given eighty blows with the bamboo and then deported from Tibet. The commander was exceedingly popular with the troops; and quite aside from that they resented the complete failure of Lien to show the slightest sign of appreciation for his or their efforts in coming into Lhasa—especially since the expedition was a purely voluntary one, organized and financed by private Szechuanese for the sole purpose of meeting Lien's specific request for assistance.

Chung Yin Keeps Order

Upon the deportation of the chief of the expedition, Chung Yin, a brigade commander, came into command of the troops. He worked strenuously to prevent a mutiny. Among other things, out of his own funds he bought presents for the men, saying they were given by Lien. The troops learned the real facts, however, and their enmity against Lien increased. Other incidents followed, with the soldiers of the expedition growing increasingly mutinous but still remaining under discipline through the influence of Chung Yin.

On several occasions the men armed themselves in their barracks and insisted that Chung give the order for them to arrest Lien. Instead, Chung plead with the men not to disgrace themselves and China by revolting against the established authorities. He went down on his knees and k'ow-t'owed to the soldiers.

Thus things dragged along until the fall of 1911. Then, from Chengtu, came the report that the Republic had been
established. With the fall of the Emperor's power, fell the prestige of Lien Yu, a Manchu and an appointee of the Emperor. Chung Yin could keep his men in hand no longer.

The Chaos Begins

On November 13, 1911, those who were left of the expedition and most of Lien's own body guard announced their mutiny against Lien. The next day the Amban's treasury was looted, and the day after Lien himself was imprisoned by Chung Yin—partly as a means of protecting him from the mutinous soldiers.

In its inception, this mutiny was directed solely against Lien Yu. But, as was to be expected, the soldiers got out of hand. The looting of the yamen treasury was followed by more or less general looting of the Chinese residents. Although the looters were Chinese, they victimized their fellow-nationals first, and the Tibetans were not attacked for several days. When it came their turn, the Tibetans resisted and they were not much disturbed. At this time none of the monasteries were attacked.

After quiet had been restored, the soldiers insisted that Chung Yin should become Amban. Lien was forced to give up the seals of office and on November 28, Chung formally assumed the Amban-ship.

For a month or two things were quiet in Lhasa. New trouble started when word came that Yuan Shih-kai had taken office as the first President of China.

Soldier "Government" Started

Upon receipt of this information, the Chinese soldiers in Lhasa—apparently carrying out their idea of republicanism—turned themselves into a Parliament, and proceeded to organize a Government with Finance, Military and Civil Departments. Chung Yin seems to have kept fairly well out of this affair.

The Finance Department was a great success—until all the money that had been looted was gone. When this stage was reached, however, there still were some of the soldiers who had money of their own—presumably those who had been a little less reckless than the others in squandering what they received.

The "Capitalists" Executed

The other soldiers decided that these capitalists should be made to divide their wealth—and the division was accomplished by the summary ex-
execution of between three and four hundred of the less beggared soldiers and the confiscation of their holdings. This execution, it should be noticed, was carried out by the fellow soldiers of the men who were executed.

But the money thus acquired soon ran out. About the same time word reached Lhasa that a small detachment of Chinese troops along the border wanted help against the Tibetans. The Chinese troops in Lhasa asked the Tibetan authorities for permission to go to their relief. The Tibetans refused—and this refusal was made the excuse for looting the Dalai Lama’s principal monastery. The looting took place on March 24, 1912.

The Tibetans Rise

This was the first direct attack by the Chinese troops on the monasteries in Lhasa, and it was the signal for a general rising of the lamas and Tibetan authorities against the Chinese. The fighting lasted in and around Lhasa more or less consecutively until July 19, when a truce was established. An agreement was drawn up whereby the Chinese troops were to withdraw, but Lien Yu was to remain with a bodyguard of 500 men, all of whom he had trained and part of whom were Chinese.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Republicans were trying to persuade the Tibetans that the blame for all the trouble rested on Lien Yu and the Manchus. Yuan Shih-kai had given back all his titles to the Dalai, had cashiered Lien and confirmed Chung Yin’s assumption of the Ambanship, in an attempt to regain some of the lost Tibetan friendship.

But the Tibetans still insisted that the Chinese must go, and neither they nor the Chinese in Lhasa were satisfied with the settlement. Chung Yin refused to abide by the agreement which was reached in July—it had been signed on behalf of the Chinese by some of his officers—because he was the officially-appointed Amban. Lien had been ordered out by Yuan Shih-kai and was virtually a prisoner in Chung’s hands.

Most of the Chinese Withdraw

There were more negotiations, and a compromise was reached. Chung was to remain with a bodyguard of only 200 troops, while Lien was to depart with all the rest of the Chinese soldiers in Lhasa. (Later Lien found his way to Pek-
ing, where by giving his own story of the events in Lhasa he persuaded Yuan Shih-kai that Chung was the chief culprit. Yuan, on this basis, had Chung executed in 1915. The withdrawal was duly effected, arrangements having been made with the British for the passage of the two thousand odd Chinese soldiers through India.

But even this was not the end. The Tibetans still refused to recognized Chung as Amban. There was further friction. Finally, on September 25, 1912, Chung and his soldiers were besieged in the Amban’s yamen. Here they put up a stubborn resistance, which lasted until December 31. By this time their ammunition was practically exhausted, and they were reduced for food to chewing the ragged ends of their fur garments.

The Final Withdrawal

Through negotiations it was arranged that the siege would be lifted on condition that Chung and every single Chinese soldier and official left Lhasa and Tibet at once. There was a slight hitch over the question of taking out the rifles of the Chinese soldiers. It finally was agreed that the rifles could be taken, but that the breech blocks must first be extracted and left in Lhasa. On January 6, 1913, Chung Yin and his men marched out of Lhasa, eventually to find their way back to China through India—the last of the Chinese soldiers or officials to be in that city. Three weeks later the Dalai Lama returned to his capital.

Thus ended an episode in the relations between Tibet and China which was marked by the most disgraceful sort of conduct on the part of the Chinese soldiers — conduct which brought the inevitable result of bitter antagonism among the Lhasa officials against the Chinese authorities. The responsibility for these scandals, however, does not rest heavily on Peking, because Peking had practically no control over the troops in Tibet.

The British, with a more unified administration and a shrewder sense of values, had taken advantage of the reaction against China to win the friendship of the Tibetan leaders.
IX. The Last Fighting

But the expulsion of the Chinese troops from Lhasa did not mark the end of the Chinese military activities on Tibetan soil. For a short time following the execution of Chao Erh-feng in 1911 and during the establishment of the Republic there was a let-up of the active fighting along the Tibeto-Szechuan border. But hostilities were renewed by the despatch of another force of 5,000 men from Chengtu in 1912. Then followed, through the rest of that year and most of the next, a new series of attacks and ruthless barbarities along the frontier.

The 1914 Agreement

Hostilities were temporarily suspended when, in the latter part of 1913, arrangements were made for a new series of negotiations between China, Tibet and Britain. The conferences were held at Simla, and finally resulted in a tripartite agreement which was signed April 27, 1914, by the representatives of the three countries.

Even at this stage, the Tibetans were ready to recognize Chinese suzerainty over their country, though Outer Tibet was to be autonomous and free from interference by China as well as by Great Britain.

The Boundary Dispute

Considering the actual military and political situation, China would have done well to ratify this agreement. But the Peking authorities refused, because of a disagreement over the question of the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet. The boundary agreed on at the conference was substantially that which had been recognized under the Manchus. The Chinese insisted that the boundary should be that layed down by Chao Erh-feng at the height of his penetration into Tibet. The Tibetans wanted the boundary put much further east, so as to include all the territory occupied by people of Tibetan race. Through the efforts of the British, the compromise had been reached.

China's refusal to ratify the Simla Convention, left the whole Tibetan question unsettled. The proposal has been made several times that there should be further negotiations, but the Chinese have persistently refused. There were some informal discussions in 1919, but again the border question caused a break. Since then nothing has been done.
Fighting Renewed in 1918

The truce which was established during the Simla negotiations was maintained more or less effectively for four years. Then, in 1918, fighting started again. This time the Tibetans, who had been improving their army, were more successful than in the earlier campaigns. They succeeded in driving the Chinese troops back even beyond the historical border. The Chinese on their part were handicapped by the general military and political disorganization of the country.

The fighting continued somewhat actively during 1918 and 1919, with both sides none too scrupulous in the matter of cruelties. Then came something of a lull; the Tibetans had pushed forward so far that they were in danger of losing touch with their base, and the Chinese were not prepared to conduct a vigorous campaign. There were short periods of activity—such as the siege of Batang late in 1923—and small skirmishes from time to time. But there was no prolonged fighting.

During this later period, the entire Sino-Tibetan border was seriously disturbed by bandits. Most of these bandits were ex-soldiers who had gone into the country with the various Chinese armies and then deserted or been cast adrift when supplies and money failed. Even those that still remained as soldiers were little better than bandits. This disturbance and banditry cut off practically all the trade across the Sino-Tibetan border.

The Tibetans, however, established order on their side of the border, and, according to all the reports available, have maintained it for the past two years and more.

Trade Through India

During the past ten years such small Chinese trade as there has been with Tibet has been carried on from the Indian side. (The Tibetans themselves, however much they may dislike the Chinese troops and officials, do not seem to have had any antagonistic feeling against the Chinese merchants. Some five hundred of these latter have been residing peacefully in Lhasa for years, and their only serious difficulties have come from the Chinese soldiers who were there.)

The Indian authorities have permitted quite a number of Chinese merchants to settle in Darjeeling and neighboring towns, and no objection is made when the Tibetans come across
Chinese Marchants Kept Out
The Chinese merchants themselves, however, according to statements made by a number of them, are prevented by the British authorities from entering Tibet across the Indian border. Disguised as Tibetans, some do get through. Put if they are caught they are fined. In explanation of this situation, the Chinese merchants state that an agreement was made between the Dalai and the Indian authorities, following the Dalai's flight from Lhasa in 1910, whereby the Indian Government would prevent the entrance of any Chinese solders into Tibet from the general extending their influence into Tibet from the general extending their influence into Tibet from the Indian side. The Dalai Lama and his supporters made an agreement with the Indian Government, whereby an Indian force would be stationed between the Indian and Chinese troops. In March 1923, an Indian force was sent into Tibet, and the Chinese troops were evicted from the territory. However, the Chinese merchants claim that the agreement was never intended to apply to traders only, but the supplies and advice has been secured from the British. They say, therefore, that the agreement was intended to apply to traders only, but the supplies and advice has been secured from the British.
plies from either the Peking or the Szechuan Governments.

As a result of the defeats and the lack of support, a large proportion of the nominal soldiers turned to banditry, and the whole border country became hopelessly disorganized. Trade of any sort with Tibet from the Chinese side has been practically out of the question for some years.

In June and July, 1924, what were left of the Chinese soldiers along the border were withdrawn into Szechuan. The Tibetan troops pushed forward, extending their control even as far as Tachienlu, the chief city in border territory which for centuries has been nominally Chinese but which is occupied by people of Tibetan nationality. With the withdrawal of the Chinese, some measure of order was restored and trade has begun to revive across the Sino-Tibetan border.

Meanwhile, a small amount of trade between Chinese and Tibetans has been carried on across the Indo-Tibetan border and, while the Chinese merchants have not been allowed to enter Tibet from that side, those that were in Tibet before the trouble arose or have succeeded in getting through since have been well treated by the Tibetans.

X. Recent British Activities

For the past decade and more there has been a steady growth in the national self-consciousness of the Tibetans, particularly among those that make up the Dalai Lama's "Young Party". This group contains a number of progressive men, anxious to see their country developed. In looking for assistance in that development they have turned, naturally enough in view of all the circumstances, to the British. And the British, wishing to see their trade with Tibet develop and to have peace preserved along the Indo-Tibetan border, have responded readily enough to the advances.

British Opinion Divided

There is no doubt that in the Indian Government there are a number who would like to see British sway extended over Tibet, as it was extended over Nepal and other of the border districts which formerly, like Tibet, were Chinese dependencies. But there is good reason to believe that the influence of these men has been small in recent years, Even as long ago as at the time of the Younghusband expedition of 1904, there were marked dif-
ferences of opinion as to how far British penetration should go. As has been suggested, it is hard to explain the whole Younghusband affair as anything but a deliberate attempt to seize control of Tibet. But the Viceroy of India, backed up by the Government at London, made it clear that they felt Colonel Younghusband had gone too far.

It is worth while to review briefly just what the British have and have not done in Tibet itself in the past twenty years.

Arms Supplied

Since 1904 there have been no British troops in Lhasa, nor has Britain at any time maintained an official representative there, though a number of prominent British officials have at one time or another visited Lhasa and other parts of Tibet.

The British have sold to the Tibetan authorities fairly large quantities of arms and ammunition. They have, at the Dalai’s request, trained a number of Tibetans in the Indian army so that these men might go back to act as drill-masters for the Tibetan troops. They have sold many British uniforms to the Tibetans.

Help on Telegraphs and Posts

The British have assisted in many ways in the establishment of the Tibetan postal and telegraph services, supplying materials and lending trained members of the Indian postal and Telegraph Administration for the purpose. These materials have been paid for by Tibet. The men lent have been given extended leave for service in Tibet, and it is understood that when the Tibetans have been sufficiently trained to take complete charge the British subjects will return to their work in India. Among other things, the British built for the Tibetan Government the telegraph line from Gyantze to Lhasa, completing the work in March 1923.

British Subject Heads Police and Army

The British have allowed a former British police official—an Indian who is a British subject—to be put in charge of the Tibetan police. This man’s Chinese name is Lien Chen. He formerly was in the police service at Darjeeling. He first met the Dalai when the latter was staying with Sir Charles Bell in India; he visited Tibet with Sir Charles in 1919; he returned to Lhasa in November,
In March, 1924, he was formally appointed head of the Tibetan police. This is, officially, his only post under the Tibetan Government. In actual practice, however, he is one of the two or three closest to the Dalai, and is practically the head of the Tibetan army as well as of the postal and telegraph services.

Incidentally, Lien Chen has recently asked for the despatch of some 600 British troops to Lhasa, nominally to act as a bodyguard for the Dalai. In reality, it is stated, he wanted the men to protect himself in case of trouble should anything happen to the Dalai. The request has not been granted by the Indian Government.

**Trade Developed**

The British have encouraged with considerable success the development of trade at the trade marts opened by the various agreements with China and Tibet. Many Indian and a few British merchants are now residing at Gyantze, the principal one of these trade marts. A small guard of British troops is kept at Gyantze, for the protection of the British Trade Agent residing there.

**Full Information Secured**

Various British travellers in Tibet have taken occasion to make as full notes of the topography and resources of the country as conditions permitted.

The most recent of these exploring expeditions was that headed by the late General Pereira, who went into Tibet from the Mongolian side in 1922. He secured very full records of his trip, which included a visit to Lhasa. After spending some time in India, part of it in the hospital, he started back for Tibet in 1923, going in through Yunnan. Near the Tibetan border, on this return trip, he was taken sick again and died. The British authorities took extraordinary pains to get hold of his papers promptly after his death and to keep anyone else from seeing just what they contained.

It is a fair presumption that, through the efforts of the Youngusband expedition, Sir Charles Bell, the Mount Everest Expedition, Dr. William M. McGovern, Mr. Eric Teichman, Mr. Louis King, General Pereira and other Britishers who between them have covered Tibetan territory pretty thoroughly, the British now have in their possession fairly complete records of Tibet's topography and resources.
Chinese Permission not Sought

Most of the recent British travellers in Tibet have made no attempt to secure Chinese authorization for their trip, in the form of passports or visas, though Britain formally recognizes Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and though it is the regular British practice to secure such authorization for travel elsewhere in China. The Mount Everest expedition, for example, never made formal application to China for permission to pass through Tibet, and it never has acknowledged in any way that it was passing through Chinese territory.

This is a technical point—and it is true that China has had no control in Tibet since 1912—but this neglect of the British even to ask for formal Chinese visas for travel in Tibet has aroused a good deal of comment to the effect that the neglect amounts to a British repudiation of Chinese suzerainty in that country.

Facts Behind the Gossip

There are countless other stories of British doings in Tibet, and gossip gives many more details about the actions mentioned. Altogether, one group of these tales offers plenty of material for a most lurid attack on the British, while another makes of the British in their dealings with Tibet a set of amazingly self-restrained Galahads without the slightest touch of imperialistic desires.

The British, like the rest of us, being human, the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes. When, in a spirit of strict impartiality and an honest desire to get at that truth, the mass of rumor and gossip that has grown up around events in Tibet is cut away, so much of solid fact remains as has been given.

On the basis of this much of fact, it seems entirely fair to say that the British are anxious to maintain their friendly relations with the Tibetan Government, and have been ready to co-operate with the Dalai in the development of a strong administration at Lhasa without too scrupulous a consideration of China's nominal rights in the matter.

No Proof of Annexation Desire

Whether these things imply a deep-laid scheme to prepare the way for the annexation of Tibet to India is another question. The charge that annexation is planned is frequently made; but there is no clear
proof of any such desire among responsible British officials in recent years and the logic of the situation all points the other way.

British official statements on the subject of Tibet emphatically state that all Britain wants is peace along the border and the opportunity to trade. British officials in touch with the situation admit—though not in official documents—that there is a strong British feeling that peace can be maintained only so long as Tibet is left to manage her own affairs, since all recent attempts on the part of China to assert her authority have brought nothing but disturbance.

**Tibetans Fear Annexation**

On the other hand, there unquestionably is a strong feeling in Tibet—even among the Dalai’s immediate circle—against annexation by Britain. Because of their growing national self-consciousness, the Tibetans are eager for control of their own affairs, without interference by anyone—British or Chinese. Any action by the British which looked like a serious move toward annexation, therefore, would promptly arouse a storm of protest and, for one thing, probably would lead directly to a marked cutting down of the Indo-Tibetan trade. Very probably, too, the peace along the Indian border would be seriously disturbed. Britain thus would gain little and lose much by trying to annex Tibet.

**Britain Wants no New Troubles**

Nor should it be forgotten that as things are now Britain has a most difficult problem on her hands in India itself. No one, therefore, is likely to favor adding to the British troubles by trying to seize Tibet.

In this connection, it might be remarked that one of the causes for the Panchen Lama’s departure from Tibet and visit to China is exactly the growing feeling in Tibet that there may be danger of British domination as a result of the great friendliness of the Dalai for the British. But of that more later.

**Many Stories**

Inspite of all these presumptions against there being any British desire to annex Tibet, there are many stories—some most detailed and circumstantial—of this and that and the other British move toward annexation. And certain ill-advised public statements by prominent British authorities—notably the one by General Bruce, commander of the Mount Everest Expedition, last winter—lent color to the charge. A
careful tracing down of the stories, however, shows that practically without exception they are either entirely groundless or based on extremely flimsy evidence.

The Supplying of Arms

It is a fact, for example, that the Tibetan soldiers are armed with British rifles of an old pattern; that within the past couple of years well over 6,000 rifles, a number of machine guns, several pieces of artillery and large supplies of ammunition for all these arms have gone from India to Tibet; that Tibetans have been trained in the British army in India; that the ordinary maneuver commands of the Tibetan army are given in English not in Tibetan; that the Tibetan army is fitted out with British-style uniforms. All this is used as a basis for the charge that Britain is preparing to incorporate the Tibetan army into the British forces after annexation, and meanwhile is familiarizing the Tibetan soldiers with British arms and army practice.

But there is no definite evidence that the transfer of arms was other than a legitimate sale—assuming that it is legitimate for Britain to sell arms to Tibet in the face of the arms embargo that prohibits such sale elsewhere in China—or that the training of some Tibetan drill-masters with the British troops, the use of British-style uniforms and of the English language for commands are any more than normal results of the friendly relations between Tibet and India. The Tibetans wanted to develop their army; they turned to the British for help—that, from an impartial point of view, is all.

Might Have Been China

There is every reason to believe that the Tibetans would have turned for this help to the Chinese instead of to the British if China had been able to establish and maintain close and friendly relations with Tibetan leaders—as the ready acceptance by the Tibetans of the suggestions made by Chang Yin-tan in 1906 clearly shows.

The Road and the 3,000 Troops

Then there is the story that the British have constructed a motor road from the Indian border across Tibet to near the Szechuan-Yunnan frontier, so that the trip can be made in two days instead of twenty-four, and have stationed some 3,000 troops along the road for use in case of another Chinese armed attack on Tibet. Chinese reports state most emphatical-
ly that the road has been built—they say it was completed two years ago—and the troops stationed as reported.

The existence of the road and the stationing of the troops is emphatically denied by responsible British authorities, though it is admitted that the Tibetans have been doing some road-improvement work in various parts of the country. The British denial is confirmed by the obvious fact that there has been no hint from any of the various foreigners other than British who in recent years have been in the general vicinity of where the road is supposed to be—and certainly someone would have mentioned the matter if the story of the road and the troops were correct.

The British Subjects in Government Service

Further charges of British penetration are based on the close association between various Indian British subjects and the Dalai's party, and the presence of several Indians in the postal, telegraph and other services while no foreigners of non-British nationality are employed (though there are a few Chinese privates and petty officers in the Tibetan army). It is remarked that the situation thus is different from that in China, since the foreigners in the Government service in this country are of various nationalities.

But the situation in Tibet is the inevitable result of the friendly relations with the Indian Government and the lack of contacts with any other outsiders. In this case, as in that of the supplying of arms, China herself might have given the assistance if a different Tibetan policy had been pursued.

The Postal and Telegraph Services

So, too, in connection with the fact the telegraph and postal services between Lhasa and India are reasonably satisfactory while there is no telegraphic or postal communication direct between China and Tibet. China formerly had post-offices in Tibet, as a regular part of the Chinese postal system, though no through telegraph service to Lhasa was established. But her postoffices there were closed when the fighting along the border and in Tibet itself prevented any sort of normal communication from the Chinese side.

The Way Is Open But....

In brief, there is no question but that the British have close connections with the
present Tibetan authorities, that they have reasonably full information as to the topography, resources, etc. of the country, that they are well-established in the trade of Tibet. The way certainly is open to make these connections gradually more close until a British protectorate over Tibet is established.

But there is no clear evidence that responsible British officials now want to see British authority extended over Tibet. Britain now has the treaty right to deal direct with the Tibetan authorities, she has ample opportunities for trade with Tibet and there is peace along the Indo-Tibetan border. Also, Britain has serious troubles on her hands in India. And there is a growing national feeling in Tibet which, in case of a British annexation move, would break out against domination by any outsider and so would take from Britain the trade and border peace which she wants.

Rests with China

If China handles the situation wisely, she can re-establish friendly relations with the Tibetans and remove all danger of British annexation. If she continues her old bungling — particularly if she make any attempt to subdue Tibet by force — Tibet will be still more alienated than at present or it may even feel forced to seek British protection.

XI. Dalai vs. Panchen

The coming visit to Peking of the Panchen Lama, as was suggested in the beginning of this series of articles, brings the whole Tibetan question prominently to the fore. It also creates a somewhat difficult situation for the Peking Government in its attempt to deal with Tibet, because it virtually forces Peking to take sides in a serious factional quarrel in Tibetan politics.

Constant Friction

Tibet for many centuries has been dominated by the Buddhist lamas, and such government as existed was administered by the religious authorities. The temporal as well as the spiritual authority has been held by the chief saints in the lama hierarchy. The two lama "popes" are the Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama. The system of having two spiritual heads was introduced as the result of a reform movement in the fifteenth century.

At first both the Dalai and the Panchen had their headquarters at Lhasa. But the followers of the two constantly
quarrelled, and before many years it was arranged that the Panchen Lama should yield a measure of temporal authority, be recognized as the Dalai's spiritual superior—and move 150 miles west to Tashilumpo. There he has been ever since.

Each of the two, however, has had many thousands of followers, and inspite of the distance between the two headquarters there has been more or less constant friction between the two groups, breaking out into active fighting at various times during the past five hundred years. Theoretically, the Dalai has been the official temporal head and the Panchen the spiritual superior. Practically, sometimes one, sometimes the other group has secured the political superiority—and neither has given overly scrupulous attention to the official pronouncements as to what its power should be.

The Dalai Gains Control

During the past half century, however, the group around the Dalai Lama at Lhasa has steadily increased its temporal superiority. This is partly due to the fact that it had the advantage of being at the place recognized by China and Britain as the official seat of the Tibetan Government, and partly to the circumstance that a fairly able man has been Dalai for an exceptionally long period.

The twelfth Dalai died in 1875. There was a prompt "reincarnation" in a young boy—who has held the position ever since. Many of the earlier Dalais had died while still comparatively young; this one succeeded in escaping the perils of youth—and of the ambitions of those who could retain their power as regents only so long as the Dalai was a minor. The fact that he survived shows that he must have been above the average in ability. And, in addition, his forced trips to China and India doubtless broadened his vision.

The "Young Party" Increases its Power

However that may be, through the rapid succession of events since 1904, there has been no question as to who was the temporal head of Tibet. And the Dalai has gathered around himself, particularly in the last few years, a group of young and ambitious men who have been hard at work building up an army, a police force, a customs administration and all the other parts of a working Government—except
anything like a Parliament. As has been suggested, in doing this the Dalai's "Young Party" has worked on most friendly terms with the British.

The Nationalistic Boomerang

But two factors have entered into the situation, the effects of which do not appear to have been fully foreseen.

One of these is the growth of national self-consciousness among the Tibetans, to which reference already has been made. The members of the Young Party themselves are ardent advocates of autonomy for Tibet, and much of their effort has been directed toward putting the Lhasa Government in a position to resist outside pressure — particularly from China. Others outside of that Party also are becoming patriotic, however, and they look with considerable misgiving on the close association between the Dalai's group and the British. If Tibet must be subordinate to someone, they say, let China not Britain be the suzerain. These others, therefore, have been seeking for some way to check what they consider the dangerously pro-British tendencies of the Young Party.

Thus the growth of the nationalistic feeling which at first was a help to the Dalai in his political ambitions is now proving an increasing hindrance.

React Against Modernization

The second unanticipated factor is the reaction of many of the lamas against the modernization which the Dalai is introducing in Lhasa. Tibet for many centuries has lain unquestioning under the rule of the lamas. But that sort of domination through religious superstition cannot continue in the face of the introduction of new ideas and new ways of doing things. This many of the leading lamas realize, and they see the authority of the lamas as a class disintegrating before the innovations introduced by the Young Party. Therefore they are sounding the cry against modernization.

Besides these shrewder lamas there are, of course, those who in honest conservatism deplore change of any kind.

Thus a fear of losing their prestige or an honest desire to follow in the old ways are turning many against the Dalai and his group.

The Self-seeking "Outs"

In addition to all these there are the men who have tried unsuccessfully to join the.
Young Party and share in its perquisites. Whatever the reason for their failure to enter the magic circles of the "Ins", many of them from purely selfish motives are quite prepared to rally around any man who looks as though he might be made into an effective leader of the "Outs".

Many Motives

Thus a large variety of motives are urging many of the Tibetans to unite against the Dalai's administration at Lhasa. Honest and disinterested patriotism, sincere religious conservatism, shrewd politico-religious foreight, disappointed personal ambitions and plain cupidity all are at work driving men into an anti-Dalai faction in Tibetan politics.

And the man around whom that faction is forming is the Panchen Lama, who is officially the Dalai's spiritual superior but temporal subordinate.

The Old Struggle Revived

The first steps are being taken, that is, in a revival of the centuries-old struggle for political power between the two great groups of Tibetan lamas. The Dalai's group has held practically undisputed sway for half a century and more; now a challenge to its power is developing.

The principal difference between the situation today and that at the time of the previous conflicts is that now for the first time disagreements on other than points of religious observance are of great importance. Inspite of herself, Tibet is passing out of the Hermit Nation class, and that passing is almost sure to be marked by more or less serious conflicts between the old and the new such as the experience of other awakening nations has made so familiar.

The Danger Realized

The Dalai's party at Lhasa during the past year or so has begun to realize the growing strength of the group being formed around the Panchen at Tashilumpo. The matter came conspicuously to the Dalai's attention last summer when one of the Mongolian Princes, while on a visit to Tibet, made much larger gifts to the Panchen than to the Dalai, because the former treated him well and the latter discourteously, it is said.

Getting the Panchen's Funds

This incident aroused the Dalai and the Young Party. Before the disaffection of the Panchen's group could reach a stage of active opposition, therefore, the
Lhasa authorities took steps to deprive the Panchen of effective power by the device of taking from him any surplus funds which he might have on hand.

The Dalai's method was simple but effective. He issued a decree accusing the Panchen of being too actively in connivance with the British (a somewhat amusing charge since it was on the score of pro-British tendencies at Lhasa that the opposition at Tashilumpo was developing) and ordering him to pay a heavy fine. The Dalai declared he was justified in taking this course because he, as the elder brother, had the duty as well as the right to punish his younger brother the Panchen for misbehavior.

The first decree was issued early last fall. The first fine was promptly paid.

**Fined Some More**

Finding that the method worked, the Dalai made several more drains on the Panchen's treasury by imposing further fines for the same alleged offence. Finally the Panchen's money began to run low. He despatched four representatives to Lhasa carrying part payment for the most recent fine and an explanation that the rest could not be paid because he had no more money. This was late last year.

At no time did the Panchen formally question the right of the Dalai to inflict the fine. He thus officially admitted his subordinate temporal position.

The Panchen's four representatives who went to Lhasa with part of the last fine were promptly seized by the Dalai and brought to trial on the charge of conspiracy with the British. They were jailed and their property confiscated. The Panchen made a mild protest, but all four of the men were still in jail when he left Tibet early this year.

**The Panchen Leaves**

The series of fines, the imprisonment of his representatives and various reports of further designs against him on the part of the Dalai's group considerably disturbed Panchen. In response to the Dalai's demand that the rest of the last fine be paid, therefore, he wrote a reply saying that his funds at Tashilumpo were exhausted and that he thus was forced to pay a visit to the faithful in Mongolia and China in order to collect money to meet the payments required by his elder brother.
This letter was, by intention, not delivered to the Dalai until after the Panchen was safely outside of Tibetan territory. There is no authentic record of what the Dalai said when he got it and learned that the Panchen had fled.

**The Case Of Loa Sang**

But that he was not pleased is indicated by what happened to Loa Sang, one of the Panchen's principal lieutenants, who came to China via India shortly after the Panchen had gone out of Tibet into Mongolia. When he heard that Loa Sang was near the Indian border, the Dalai telegraphed to the Indian authorities asking that he be detained. Loa, however, got through to Calcutta.

Here he stayed at a Chinese inn kept by one Wang Ching-ting. He got wind of his being in danger of arrest, secured a horse and departed during the night. The next morning the police arrived. Innkeeper Wang, in reply to questions, said it was his business to keep an inn and take in anyone who came. He declared that he knew nothing as to the identity of his late guest. The owner of the horse was located, however, and given a small fine. Lao himself escaped by boat to China, where he arrived in the early part of April. His present whereabouts are not being made public.

**Domestic Problems Developing**

So much for the story of the development of the factional differences in Tibetan politics, and of how these differences led to the flight from Tibet of the leader of one of the factions. The fundamental causes for these factional differences are the desire of the Dalai and his group to extend their control of Tibetan affairs even beyond its present sphere, and the combination of newly-awakened patriotism, religious conservatism and the general dislike of the "Outs" for the "Ins" which is building up a political group around the Panchen. As a result of these causes, a pretty crop of problems is developing in Tibetan internal affairs just as though the problems growing out of the relations of Tibet with China and India were not enough.

And China, as has been suggested, is being put in a very difficult position by the Panchen's prospective visit to Peking because that visit virtually forces China to take sides in Tibet's domestic political squabbles.

**The Courtesy Dilemma**

The Dalai came to Peking in 1908, and was treated with much
ceremony. That set a standard. If the Panchen is given equally ceremonious treatment, it will imply a recognition of him by China as the Dalai's equal. This will highly gratify the Panchen's party no doubt—but at the same time it is almost sure to anger the Dalai.

On the other hand, if the Panchen be treated with small courteously his group will be offended. And the Dalai may or may not be pleased. He may be gratified that China recognizes the Panchen's inferiority to himself. Or he may take the attitude that while it is permissible enough for him to quarrel with the Panchen since it is all in the family, any lack of respect to the Panchen by any outsider is an insult to Tibet as a whole.

Altogether, the situation is a delicate one. Either too much or too little courtesy may lead to an increase of ill feeling toward China among the Tibetans.

Intrigue Charge Likely

In any case, after the Panchen has come to Peking and talked with the authorities here and after more or less valuable presents have been exchanged there will be plenty around the Dalai to tell him that the Panchen's group has come to a secret understanding with Peking which provides for the overthrow of the Dalai and the establishment of the Panchen as the temporal head of Tibet. The Dalai and most of his followers are themselves adepts at intrigue, so talk of this sort would seem to them quite convincing because, given the opportunity, they probably would do much as the Panchen is likely to be accused of doing.

Officially......

Officially, of course, none of this has appeared or will appear. Officially, as he announced in his letter to the Dalai, the Panchen left Tibet solely to collect funds from the faithful in Mongolia and China so that he could make certain payments demanded by the Lhasa ruler. Officially, no suggestion of taking sides in Tibetan quarrels will be implied in whatever welcome the Chinese give to the Panchen Lama; he is the highest spiritual authority in the Buddhism of Tibet and Mongolia and so of course should be shown every possible courtesy.

That is the beginning and the end of the matter—officially. But not in fact.
XII. The Next Steps

No one is satisfied with the present status of the relations between Tibet and her two principal neighbors. One of the chief causes of that dissatisfaction is the uncertainty due to the absence of any clear definition of just what that status is. The last agreement defining the relations between Tibet, China and Great Britain to be formally ratified by all three parties—the Trade Regulations of 1908—though nominally still in force has been almost entirely nullified by the actions of all of those concerned.

Yet it should not be unduly difficult to work out a new agreement which would be satisfactory to everyone, provided the legitimate rights and wishes of all are taken into due account, since there is no real clash between those rights or wishes. It is worth while to summarize briefly what those rights and wishes are and the conditions affecting their fulfillment.

Tibet Wants Autonomy

The great majority of the Tibetans neither know nor care much about questions connected with relations between their country and others; the political thinking and acting is all in the hands of a comparatively small number. Long-established precedent has given Tibet the right to practically complete local autonomy. The politically-minded Tibetans of today want that right to be recognized. But they realize that, under present conditions, it probably is advisable that in foreign relations Tibet should work with some more powerful country.

Unquestionably, if it came to a choice, they would prefer to be under a nominal Chinese suzerainty rather than a British protectorate, provided they received from China guarantees of local autonomy and the assurance that there would be no attempt by China to reassert her control by force. Even the politically-unthinking large majority of the Tibetans feel a vague sort of leaning towards the racially-allied Chinese as opposed to the British.

In controlling their own affairs, the Tibetans would want to have the right to carry on trade with whomever they chose. Questions of tariff regulations, consular jurisdiction, etc. they probably would be ready to work out in conjunction with a nominally suzerain China.
Britain Wants Trade

The British want two things in Tibet: trade and peace along the border. On the assumption that Tibet is part of Chinese territory—an assumption which the British have repeatedly recognized and never officially repudiated—the British could make no legitimate objection, under the Open Door doctrine, to the extension to other foreigners of the same trading rights as they enjoy, though for geographical and other reasons no other foreigners could possibly have the same opportunities for doing business with the Tibetans as the Indo-British.

Given the assurance of trading rights in Tibet, even if there were no extension of the rights provided in the 1908 Regulations, and the maintenance of peace along the Indian border, the British should be satisfied. Nor could they legitimately object to the extension to Tibet of the arms embargo which applies elsewhere in China, though the sale of arms to the Lhasa authorities has been one of the more important items in the Anglo-Tibetan trade.

China's Four Wants

China, in connection with Tibet, perfectly legitimately can seek four things: the opportunity for trade, peace along the border, the recognition of Tibet as a part of China and the assurance that no foreign Power will seek to take part of Tibetan territory or interfere in Tibetan affairs.

Difficulties of communication and the exclusive trading privileges of Chinese officials in Tibet kept Sino-Tibetan trade from developing to any great extent in the past. With the awakening in Tibet in recent years, however, there has been a gradual growth of that trade, in spite of the difficulties created by the military operations. As the opening up of Tibet continues, the trade possibilities will be increasingly important, and certainly the Chinese should have the fullest opportunity to share in that trade, including freedom from the application of tariff or other dues which would be applicable to foreign goods entering this or any other part of Chinese territory.

In this connection, too, the possibilities from the opening up of the rich mineral resources of Tibet should not be overlooked. It can properly be argued that the Tibetans themselves have first
claim to these resources. But China certainly has a better claim than any foreign Power.

**Peace Rests With China**

During the past twenty-odd years, China herself has been chiefly responsible for the disturbances along the Sino-Tibetan border. At the present moment there is peace, partly at least because the Chinese troops have been withdrawn. If China makes no move to use force, it is probable that peace will continue; certainly the Tibetans, if they are not encouraged by some foreign group, are not likely to start a war of aggression on China.

**Tibet Recognized as Part of China**

Ever since the beginning of the Manchu Dynasty, Chinese suzerainty over Tibet has been formally recognized by the Tibetans and by all others. There was a time when it looked as though either Britain or Russia might try to take Tibet away from China, as various other of her dependencies were taken by foreign Powers. But that danger seems to be past.

Nor have the Tibetans ever taken steps to repudiate their formal connection with China. The expulsion of the Chinese troops from Lhasa in 1912 and the resistance against the Chinese campaigns from 1905 to 1919 were in the nature of opposition to what the Tibetans considered unwarranted interference in their internal affairs—opposition made more emphatic by the scandalous conduct of the soldiers—and not a formal declaration of independence from China. Even as late as 1914, when they ratified the Simla Convention, and while the fighting along the border was stopped only by a temporary truce, the Tibetans were ready to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty.

**Foreign Non-interference Assured**

Britain at various times, in her agreements with China and Russia, has formally declared that she would not annex Tibetan territory or interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet. All her official statements on the subject confirm this declaration. It is reasonable to presume that she would be ready to repeat it in a new agreement and, under present conditions, such a pledge probably would be kept. The only cause likely to lead to British aggression on Tibetan territory would be more disturbances along the Indian border or serious fighting such as would interfere
with British trade in Tibet itself. As long as China does not attempt another armed invasion of Tibet, however, there seems little prospect of such disturbances. No other Power is at all likely to take an active interest in Tibetan affairs.

No Insurmountable Obstacle

There thus is no insurmountable conflict of interest or right in the way of an agreement between Tibet and China which would establish on a new and mutually satisfactory basis the relations between these two. Nor is there any serious obstacle in the way of an agreement between China and Tibet on one side and Britain on the other which would cover to the satisfaction of all concerned the matter of British trade with Tibet.

Tibet’s Special Position

The signing of an agreement between Tibet and China would imply, of course, a recognition by China that Tibet stood in at least a semi-independent position and not on the same footing as one of the provinces. Such recognition would be entirely in line with the actual facts of the case; it also would be in accordance with the provisions of China’s constitution.

The provisional constitution adopted in 1912 defines the territory of the Chinese Republic as consisting of “the 18 provinces. Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet and Chinghai”. The permanent constitution adopted in 1923 simply defines the territory of the Republic as including “all the dominions in the possession of China”. But Article 135 of the permanent constitution provides that as regards Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet and Chinghai, “pending the creation of Province and District their administrative system shall be prescribed by law.”

There is thus ample constitutional justification for the Chinese Government to make any special arrangement with the Tibetan authorities which it might choose, so long as that arrangement did not include a definite surrender of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.

Must Assume Equality

In the attempt to come to an agreement with Tibet, the Chinese authorities would need to keep clearly in mind that the Tibetans no longer can be treated as an inferior people to be brought into line by force, nor as naughty children who must be punished for disobedience. Any further attempt to put military pressure on Tibet
would be worse than useless; China lost what little hold she had on Tibet because the soldiers who had Tibetan affairs in hand acted on the assumption of Tibetan inferiority; a new attempt to use force inevitably would drive the Tibetans to seek protection from the British and thus would end in the permanent alienation of Tibet from China.

The only method which the Chinese can use with any possible hope of re-establishing even a semblance of authority in Tibet is that of friendly discussion on the basis of mutual equality and a mutual desire to come to an understanding which will remove the causes of friction and open the way to mutually beneficial relations. Chao Erh-teng used the force method—and failed completely. Chang Yin-tang, in 1906, used the friendly method and, in spite of the fighting under Chao along the border at the time, he won the sincere friendship of the Lhasa authorities for himself and the sort of China that he represented. Had he been able to remain as China's representative in Tibet, and to stop the attacks on that country, there is no doubt that the history of the years since then would have been utterly different.

**Tibet Is Armed and Self-Conscious**

If the force method failed so dismally, in spite of its continuous trial from 1905 to 1919, it would be even more disastrous now. The Tibetans during those years had practically nothing in the way of a modern-trained or efficiently equipped army. There were scarcely the faintest beginnings of any national self-consciousness. Today the Tibetan army numbers over 10,000 well-trained and reasonably well-equipped men—not a large force, to be sure, but quite sufficient to hold off any Chinese attack along the mountain roads until the Tibetans could get assistance from outside. And such assistance probably would be forthcoming readily enough, from Russia if not from Britain.

Moreover, an armed Chinese attack now would arouse a storm of popular feeling in Tibet such as would have been unthinkable even five years ago. Such an attack would be the surest way to turn against China all the Tibetans who now are ready to come to an understanding with the country to
which they are connected by long-standing ties.

Assuming, therefore, that the Chinese Government will seek to win Tibet's friendship by dealing with the Tibetans as one of the five equal races that go to make up the people of the Chinese Republic, what properly could be the main provisions of an agreement covering Sino-Tibetan relations?

**Boundary Question Important**

It would be necessary to agree on a boundary between the territory to be administered from Peking and that to be administered from Lhasa. Quite a stretch of territory lying chiefly on the Chinese side of the historical Szechuan-Tibet border is inhabited by people of Tibetan rather than Chinese stock. This region for centuries has been under the control of semi-independent local chieftains, acknowledging a nominal Chinese overlordship. It is the district that has come to be known as Inner Tibet.

For many years the Chinese authority in Inner Tibet has been more effective than in Outer. An approximate frontier line between the two, running slightly west of Batang, has been recognized since early in the eighteenth century. But Chao Er-h-feng succeeded in extending a measure of Chinese control far to the west of this boundary. On the other hand, in the last few months the Tibetans have succeeded in pushing their authority as far east as Tachienlu—practically to the limit of the territory occupied by people of Tibetan stock.

When the question of the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet came up at the Simla Convention in 1914, the Chinese demanded that Chao's boundary be recognized, while the Tibetans wanted control of all territory occupied by Tibetan peoples. A compromise was finally reached, which put the border roughly along the line of that which had been recognized since the eighteenth century. The Chinese Government refused to ratify the Simla agreement because it did not recognize this boundary as correct.

**China Should Be Generous**

Probably if the question were raised with Lhasa now, the Tibetans would want to include in their sphere all of Inner as well as of Outer Tibet—i.e. to extend that sphere to Tachienlu. And China now would have a much weaker case for refusing such a demand than she had in 1914. But if the Tibetans were con-
vinced that China really meant friendship, and if they were satisfied on other points, a reasonable compromise probably could be reached. In any case, it is much more important that an agreement be secured giving Tibet a proper place in the Chinese Republic and insuring peace and the opportunity to trade than that the boundary between Tibet and China should be a few miles to the east or the west. China could well afford to be generous on this point, especially as the danger that part of her territory would pass under British control through the annexation of Tibet by Britain one of the Chinese fears in 1914—is now practically over.

**Local Autonomy Advisable**

In determining the relations between the Lhasa and Peking Governments, it would be necessary to grant to Tibet a large measure of local autonomy.

China very properly could ask that Tibet should take no action in dealing with foreign Powers without Peking's consent—though the dealings between the foreign Trade Agents and the local authorities on purely local matters could be left to the Tibetans. China could ask, too, that a Chinese Commissioner—with a very small detachment of guards—be maintained at Lhasa, so that Peking might be kept fully informed of what was going on, that China could render advice and assistance when they were needed and that questions involving foreign relations could be discussed authoritatively.

**Reciprocal Free Trade**

China also could ask for assurances that there would be no special tariff or other duties on the Sino-Tibetan trade, and that there should be freedom of travel between the two countries. She should be ready to give corresponding pledges to Tibet.

And suitable arrangements should be made for the representation of Tibet in China's Parliament. The permanent constitution contains no special provisions as to representation from Tibet, and men who nominally sit for that region in both the House and the Senate are taking part in the sessions of the present Parliament.

This much, there is every reason to believe, the Tibetan authorities would be ready to give. More than this would not be required, nor would it be wise to ask for more. Certainly China should not insist on
maintaining a large armed force in Tibet.

An agreement between China and Tibet along some such lines having been reached, the two Governments together could take up with Great Britain the question of a new understanding.

**Britain Should Repeat Pledges**

In this new Sino-British agreement on Tibet, Britain could be asked to repeat in unequivocal terms her pledges not to attempt to annex Tibetan territory and not to interfere in any way in Tibetan affairs. The new agreement properly could include, too, a provision similar to that in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 requiring an engagement "not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government", except for purely local matters in which the Trade Agents would be concerned.

These points having been settled, the provisions of the 1908 Trade Regulations relative to trade marks, rights of trade, consular jurisdiction, etc. could well be made apart of the new agreement—with such minor changes as the new conditions might require and with the distinct understanding that Tibet was to be dealt with as any other part of Chinese territory in the matter of the withdrawal of consular jurisdiction, post offices, the sale of arms, etc. It would be well, too, to include a statement to the effect that China might at any time extend to any other nation the same trading rights as those given to Britain in Tibet, though this point is technically covered by the "most favored nation" clause in Chinese treaties with other Powers.

Britain would have no legitimate ground for objecting to such an agreement, since it would in substance be simply a confirmation of her previous pledges not to annex Tibetan territory, not to interfere in Tibetan affairs and to deal with Tibet only through the intermediary of the Chinese Government, and since it would in no way militate against the legitimate trade interests which she has developed under previous agreements.

**Initiative Rests with China**

Just how soon it will be possible to make another attempt to settle the Tibetan question is uncertain. But the sooner such a settlement can be made the better it will be for all concerned. As things stand, every day that passes weakens China's
position vis-a-vis Tibet, and loses for China many opportunities for the development of what is potentially a valuable trade. The situation is unsatisfactory to Britain and Tibet also just because of its uncertainty.

It is China's place to take the initiative in seeking a new settlement. But, as has been said and as cannot be repeated with too much emphasis, in seeking that settlement China must be ready to deal with the Tibetans on a basis of honest friendliness and recognition of full equality in the sisterhood of peoples that make up the Republic.