SOME NOTES
ON
TIBETAN AFFAIRS.

BY
CAPTAIN H. BOWER, 17TH B. C.,
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH,
QUARTER MASTER GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT IN INDIA.

CALCUTTA:
OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA.
1893.
SOME NOTES
ON
TIBETAN AFFAIRS.

CAPTAIN H. BOWER, 17TH B. C.,
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH,
QUARTER MASTER GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT IN INDIA.

CALCUTTA:
OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA.
1893.
Intelligence Branch Diary No. 10 of 1893.
Tibet.
NOTE.

THE account of Captain Bower's adventurous journey has been published as a non-confidential issue and is available to the public.

The present pamphlet contains his remarks on the government, commerce, etc., of Tibet and China, which it is politically undesirable to publish and it is therefore issued confidentially.

E. R. ELLES, Colonel,

Assistant Quarter Master General,

Intelligence Branch.

SIMLA,

2nd February 1893.
NOTES ON TIBET.

GOVERNMENT.

The head of the Tibetan Government, both in things spiritual and in things temporal is the Talai Llama; but in order that he may the better attend to spiritual matters and have ample time for undisturbed contemplation and meditation he is assisted by a Governor, to whom a great part of his power is delegated; this Governor may be regarded as the most powerful man in the country. He is assisted by a Chasag, or Secretary, who also carries great weight in the State, as all communications for the Governor go through him, and he decides many matters without reference to his superior.

Unfortunately Talai Llamas, who are supposed to come of age at eighteen, almost invariably die before attaining their majority. Since the beginning of the present century, all of them, disgusted with the sins of the world, have retired to the mansion of joy before the time came for taking over the seals of office. I am afraid that a post-mortem would demonstrate that the retirement, though undoubtedly owing to the sins of the world, was not entirely voluntary. The prevalence of poisoning in Tibet, a fact of which there is no doubt whatever, added to the abnormally high rate of mortality obtaining amongst them, is pretty conclusive circumstantial evidence against the Gyalpos (literally "kings") or regents with whom the power remains.

After death the Talai Llama once more becomes incarnate in a child, and the priests go to look for him. Assisted in their search by divine inspiration they fix on some child, who, on reaching four years of age, is tested by being called upon to identify property belonging to the deceased; he is almost invariably successful, and is then removed to the monastery of Potala, where he spends the remainder of his life; should he by any chance be unsuccessful, the monks recommence their search, and when the matter is finally settled intimation is sent to the Emperor of China, not for confirmation, but simply for information. The parents never object to having their child taken away from them.

Two interpretations of the word "Talai" are given, some identifying it with the Mongolian word for "ocean" and others holding that it is derived from the Chinese, the root being the word "ta great." In Tibet the commonest term used for the Talai Llama, viz. Deva Zhung, or "happiness centre," is applied both to him personally and the central Government. The Talai Llama, the Gyalpo, and the Tashi Lmpo Llama all belong to the reformed monks of the Gelookspa (virtuous ones) or yellow order, though the name 'yellow order' usually applied by Europeans to the sect founded by the great reformer Tsong Kharpa in the
fourteenth century is apt to be misleading, as ordinarily they dress in the
same dingy red garments as the unreformed monks, their caps only
being yellow.

Next to the Gyalpo comes the council of Kahlons, or ministers; up
to quite recently there were only four of them, all chosen from the
laity, but latterly, in accordance with the ever-increasing power of
the church, a fifth member, chosen from the priesthood, has been added,
nominally to look after the interest of the church.

Subordinate to the Kahlons are sixteen officials, of whom four are
charged with the civil administration, four with the military admini-
stration, four with the administration of justice, and the remaining
four concern themselves with financial matters.

The position of the Amban at Lhassa I take to be exactly the same
as that of his fellow-countryman in Chiamdo; treated outwardly with
much respect, before strangers at least, the bearing of the Tibetan
authorities towards him is almost servile, but in reality he has no
authority whatever and lives in continual dread of the powerful
priesthood. Even in Chinese Tibet, a country in no way to be confused
with Independent Tibet, the Chinese power is merely nominal. In
Lithang, for instance, the mandarin was quite pathetic in his complaints
of his position: how he had no power whatever and dare not do any-
thing for fear of the monks, how they were a turbulent lot, and a
deal more to the same effect.

At Bathang some slight signs of Chinese authority are to be seen,
but everywhere else right up to Ta Chen Lu the whole power is in the
hands of the monks, and though in some places the presence of a
petty Chinese mandarin is tolerated, he is not allowed to interfere in
the administration of the country. When such is the state of Chinese
Tibet, it can easily be conceived that any claims the celestials may
have over Tibet Proper are of the most shadowy description, and
all the Tibetans with whom I spoke utterly denied that there was any
connection other than friendship between the two countries, and the
presence of the Amban at Lhassa was only allowed as testifying to
that friendship. That Tibet Proper is looked upon as a different
country from Chinese Tibet, though inhabited by people of identically the
same race and language, was shown in so many different ways that
to my mind no possible shadow of doubt can remain on the subject.

Here and there strips of country are found inhabited by people
owing allegiance neither to China nor Lhassa. These people are
invariably a lawless thieving lot, and owe their position to the weakness
of the two powers between whose dominions they are sandwiched in.
The few wandering nomads and Chukpas to be found on the Chang
may also be classed with them. Comparing the state of the two coun-
tries, Tibet Proper and Chinese Tibet, I should say that the former was
the best administered and contained the strongest government. Gene-
really there appeared to be more respect shown to the authorities, and
more law and order. Between some of the outlying districts under
Lhassa and Chinese Tibet the difference was not so marked as it was
between the more central parts and the nominally Chinese-administered
country. In both countries the great mass of the people are simply
the bond-slaves of the Llamas, but the Llamas under the Deva Zhung
appear to consider themselves more in the light of responsible rulers
than the others do, and no doubt the central Government of Lhassa, being primarily an ecclesiastical body, is quite content to see unlimited power in the hands of the priesthood, but at the same time is strong enough to insist upon the priests keeping their parishioners, subjects, slaves, or whatever they should be called in proper order, whereas those across the frontier appear to be quite irresponsible.

POPULATION.

The population of Tibet proper, i.e. the country under the rule of the Deva Zhuung, may be estimated at four millions. Chinese Tibet, including the province of Amdo, together with Kham, which is really governed by its own chiefs and owns only a nominal allegiance to Lhassa, may be taken as holding another four millions, thus giving a total of eight million Tibetans, of whom probably nearly half a million are monks. When one regards the size of the country in which these 8 million people are contained, it is evident that it is very sparsely populated.

There are several reasons for this: the first is the custom of polyandry, which is largely, though not universally practised; the second is the large number of monks, who, though probably only nominally celibate, are forbidden to marry; and thirdly, although the country, especially in the east, could support a larger population than it does at present, still the greater part is only capable of supporting wild yak and antelope. The whole of central and northern Tibet, and almost the whole of western Tibet is known as the Chang; it consists of a high tableland with hills mostly of a rounded character, but here and there sharply defined snowy ranges are met with. The mountains have a general east and west tendency, but no defined watershed exists; rivers may be met flowing in almost any direction, and all terminate in large salt lakes. These lakes appear to have been at one time much bigger than they now are, as unmistakeable signs that they are drying up are to be seen. An idea of the physical configuration of the country may be gathered from the fact that for five months we never once camped at a lower altitude than 15,000 feet, and all the enormous stretch of country we covered in that time contained not a single tree. The greater part of this Chang is of course uninhabitable for many months in the year, and most of the places that would afford grazing in summer are too far distant from suitable winter quarters to be availed of by the nomads, but round the edges a few are to be met with, living almost entirely on meat and dairy produce; very rarely do they get anything in the way of flour, a very little “tsampa” being the only starchy food their tents ever boast, and that is regarded as a luxury to be partaken of sparingly.

In south-eastern Tibet the country is of quite a different character; deeply cut valleys, steep well-wooded hills, and rivers that eventually find their way to the sea being the characteristics. The population is a settled one, living in houses and growing crops, but in character there is little difference between them and the nomads, faithless, immoral, cowardly, and untruthful; to those they are afraid of they are servile, but to those they are not afraid of insolent. Their faithlessness and unreliability has often been shown in the way they have deserted the French missionaries to
whom they owed so much, whenever there was any sign of a disturbance. Their physique is distinctly good, and they appear to be able to stand almost any amount of cold and hunger; less industrious and skilful than the Chinese, they are still an active, lively people, and at first one is inclined to regard them as simple and light-hearted, but they are only simple as compared to their neighbours the Chinese.

The dress of the common people consists generally of a long sheepskin robe very dirty and greasy; this is hitched up by a waist-belt during the day, so that the upper part is very full, and the lower part hangs down like a kilt; at night they take off the belt and allow the robe to come down to their feet; it thus serves the double purpose of clothes by day and bedding by night. In warm weather, or what they consider warm weather, the right arm is bare, being thrust out of the coat; in the front of the waist-belt thrust across the body a straight sword, in a scabbard ornamented with silver and inlaid with turquoises, is carried. On their feet they have boots made of brightly striped woollen cloth, coming up to the knee and kept there by garters. The love of ornaments and jewellery is a very marked trait in their character, the amount of the precious metals used up in the country in that way must be very great.

The richer people affect red woollen cloth, and various coloured silks.

As the Chinese in the country, not being allowed to bring their own women with them, take unto themselves wives of the country, there must be a certain admixture of races, particularly on the main route to Lhassa, where there are a few Chinese stationed at each of the rest-houses, but the children seem to grow up thoroughly Tibetan, and travelling through the country one does not see any people who strike one as being half-breeds, though on enquiry people who are the result of these mixed marriages are pointed out.

The fact that the Tibetans do not allow Chinese women into the country is of itself enough to show how shadowy are any claims the Chinese may have to the supreme sovereignty. I don't suppose any one will advance the theory that the order is the wish of the Pekin Government.

The army has a nominal strength of about six thousand, of whom half are supposed to keep themselves ready for service and half engage in agricultural or other pursuits. When called upon by the Government every house in the country is obliged to provide an armed man for the ranks. What would provide a much more efficient reserve is the great army of monks who fatten on the country, physically, as well as mentally. They are enormously superior to the ordinary peasantry, but it is not in accordance with the tenets of Buddhism that they should engage in any way in military matters.

The weapons are sword, spear, and matchlock; the latter has a prong attached to serve as a rest when being fired.

Transport is abundant in all inhabited districts owing to the great number of yaks and ponies owned by the people, but the country is quite unsuited for wheeled traffic. A small force ought to be able to march for nearly a month in most places without taking any provision for feeding animals and simply turning them out to graze at the end of each march.

So far as meat goes there would be an abundant supply, but starchy food would be difficult to procure in large quantities.
Looking at Tibet from a military point of view, we may say that it is quite feasible to coerce the Lhassa Government by an invasion either from the south or west, as with the exception of the passes the general elevation is not very great; the difficulty of crossing these passes is entirely dependent on the amount of fresh snow that has fallen. As a general rule, it may be said that they can all be crossed at any time from midsummer to Christmas.

The south and south-west also being populated, supplies sufficient for a very small force could be procured in the country, and a very small force is all that would be required to coerce the Lhassa Government. It may be assumed that such a force would have entered from India; so, it would always have the great advantage of being able to strike the enemy in his most vital part without being cut off from its base. To invade Tibet from the north would, however, be a very different matter. Coming from that direction, there are three routes, 1st from Hami via Sining, a distance of about 1,700 miles, most of it through uninhabited country, where a considerable stretch of the Gobi Desert has to be crossed. Sining in Kansuh is a place of some small importance as being an emporium for trade with the neighbouring Mongol tribes. Thence to the neighbourhood of Lhassa it is nearly 1,000 miles over a country more or less desert all the way, supplies unprocurable, and the cold during the greater part of the year intense.

A second route is that taken by Mr. Bonvalot on his recent journey from Kurla down the banks of the Kashgar river to Lobnor, and thence south across the great Tibetan plateau; on that road practically nothing can be obtained after leaving Kurla, and the physical difficulties are immense.

The third route, probably the least impracticable of them all, runs from Polu diagonally across the central tableland to Shigatze; it is the shortest route, and abundance of supplies could be procured from Khoten, a week's march from Polu. As yet, however, it has not been explored either by European or native. Colonel Grombcheffski ascended the plateau a short distance from Polu and reported the utter unfeasibility of crossing, but I cannot help thinking he was too early in the year, and had he tried it two months later his experiences would have been different. The Chinese forbid any one to travel by that route; so, of late years it has been quite unused, but a Pathan merchant, who had resided for many years in Polu, told me he had often heard the natives say that it was not very difficult; grass is procurable all the way, and water can always be got by digging.

All these three roads in any case are difficult, and we may be certain that, however feasible it may be for exploring parties to cross them, no army could possibly do so, and a force destined to operate against anything more formidable than the Lhassa Army would assuredly come to grief. The Tibetan northern frontier is the strongest in the world, but the military strength of Tibet is nil. "A very small armed party will suffice to open the gates to the capital of the Dalai Lama"—(Prejvalsky.)

COMMERCCE.

The people of Tibet have undoubtedly strongly developed mercantile talents. All classes of the population do a little trading—officials, Llamas,
peasants, and nomads. All are ever ready to seize an opportunity of making money. The higher officials, more particularly, devote themselves to commerce; the emoluments appertaining to their offices are exceedingly small, but the position gives them great opportunities, and these opportunities none fail to avail themselves of. Formerly tea was a Government monopoly, and even yet I believe it is compulsorily sold to the people in some parts, the pressure being put on by members of the Government engaged in the trade. The monasteries contain any amount of money, and this is utilised by the astute Llamas to trade with.

The peasantry divide their attentions between commerce and agriculture, and the nomads are always willing to meet a demand for wool and hides.

Formerly, the whole trade along the main road from China to Lhassa was in the hands of the Chinese, but now-a-days the Tibetans are competing successfully with them, and many go themselves to Ta Chen Lu to make purchases.

Should Tibet be opened to commerce, of all articles in which we can hope to do a profitable trade, tea easily ranks first; in a former note written on the subject I estimated the probable consumption at ten million pounds annually; further investigations have led me to consider that I under-estimated it.

The population of Tibet, that is Tibet proper, has been estimated at four millions. If they drank as much tea as is drunk in England, viz. 5lb per head, the annual consumption would be twenty million pounds. In order to be on the safe side let us presume that they drink less tea than is drunk in England, and say they only drink 3lb per head; then the consumption would be twelve million pounds, and that I feel must be well within the mark. So far as one can judge going through the country, the consumption per head appears much greater than in England. At all hours and in all houses tea is en evidence; mixed with butter and salt it forms a most unpalatable concoction to European tastes, but the Tibetans of all classes drink enormous quantities of it. During all discussions, whether it is a meeting of the Kahlons to settle affairs of State or some mendicants crouching over a fire each man has a cup, which is continually being replenished in front of him. A stranger entering a house or tent most probably finds the inhabitants drinking tea and is promptly offered some; if by any chance they are not drinking it, some is got ready.

From Lhassa to Ta Chen Lu the string of animals carrying brick tea to meet this enormous demand is continuous. These bricks are made of what appears to be the prunings of neglected bushes of extreme age. I used to think that some of the tea imported into Chinese Turkestan was the worst in the world, but since visiting Tibet I have changed my opinion. Nowhere else can such thoroughly bad tea be seen as that met with on the Ta Chen Lu road being taken to Lhassa; a lot of sticks, twigs, and other vegetable matter stuck together, it appears to the uninitiated to be designed for no other purpose than to be used as fuel.

It is ordinarily packed in bamboo matting, but finer qualities are generally also enclosed in hide. Tibet is much more accessible from the gardens of India than from those of China, and in the event of the country being thrown open the Darjeeling planters would have a grand market, more particularly for disposing of inferior leaf worthless for the European market. But to meet the demand for it, they ought to make a cou-
siderable amount of brick-tea. Amongst a nomadic people, and a large proportion of the people of Tibet are more or less nomadic, brick tea is always more in favour than loose; it carries better and weathers less. It is very easily made into bricks by being first damped with rice-water and then pressed; each brick should be of about 4lb in weight and enveloped in paper and matting. A small market for a superior quality of tea, which should be made into bricks of smaller size, would also be thrown open. Indian tea is quite capable of ousting Chinese. The officials who came out from Lhasssa to interview us mentioned that some Indian tea had been imported, but the Amban and the Governor, alarmed by the fear that the trade with China would be ruined, decided to forbid its sale, and it was all sent back again. They said they had tried some and found it excellent, and one of them mentioned that he generally managed to procure a little, smuggled for his own consumption. One has only got to look at the map to see that it must be a much easier matter to put Indian tea into Lhasssa than Chinese, and once the Tibetans understood that Indian tea could be got cheaper and better than Chinese the trade would grow enormously. But the planters, if they want the trade to grow rapidly, must be content with small profits at first: cheapness is what will appeal to the people much more than superiority of quality, and thus their sympathies will be enlisted on the side of Indian tea against the opposition it will experience from the Llamas and Chinese.

Amongst the articles that Tibet can export wool takes the foremost place; the capabilities of the country as regards the amount that could be supplied are practically unlimited; a large proportion of the people are essentially pastoral, and in places it would be possible to travel for weeks together and have sheep in sight every day and nearly all day. Musk also is cheap and plentiful, and in India finds a ready market, Yak's tails are saleable and can be supplied to meet any probable demand. There appears to be a great accumulation of the precious metals in the country; the women, dressed in dirty greasy sheepskins, often wear several hundred rupees worth of silver ornaments, while a gold bead here and there is not uncommon. A man may often be seen drinking tea out of a cup of extremely inferior Chinese pottery with a saucer, cover and spoon of silver. The silver saucer and cover denote a taste for luxury that with facilities for purchase might develop to the benefit of our trade. The ratio between silver and gold varies considerably in different localities; the place at which gold was cheapest was Lithang, where a large amount of washing is carried on; there one part of gold could be procured for only 1½ of silver. The gold is the dust in its natural state.

Besides tea other articles that would find a market are sugar, tobacco, rice, knives, crockery, tinted glare glasses, red and yellow broadcloth, brass buttons, brightly-stamped doosootie and coral.

But tea is the article on which we must primarily pin our faith as a means of opening Tibet to commerce. The trade in other articles imported from China is simply an adjunct of the great tea trade; as soon as that is diverted to Darjeeling the other will assuredly follow. Unfortunately great opposition will be brought to bear, primarily from the Chinese, who, I believe, would almost as soon give up all their shadowy claim to Tibet as their monopoly of the supply of tea, and, secondly from the large number of Lhasssa dignitaries, who, besides being in many cases interested in the Chira
trade, are opposed to anything tending towards the opening of the country. What I much fear is that eventually if we insist on tea being admitted, the Chinese may sign the treaty, and then go in for that species of passive resistance in which they are past masters that annuls all treaties, and will do all in their power to induce the Lhasa people to levy unauthorised duties and discourage or forbid its sale, sheltering themselves all the while behind protestations of friendliness mixed with regrets at their weakness. The great hope is, that within a very short time of the treaty being signed, the Tibetans may become sufficiently alive to the profits to be made by trading with India to refuse to listen to anything the Chinese may have to say on the matter. The Sikhim expedition taught the Tibetans a pretty rough lesson; at present they are fully alive to their own helplessness against a British force, and would, I believe, be quite ready to conclude a treaty admitting Indian tea, if once assured that it was the only way of settling the present state of affairs in an amicable and friendly manner. But whatever may be seen on the surface, we may be absolutely certain that the Chinese are secretly urging them never to give in on the tea question, and endeavouring to assure them that we are a poor race of barbarians that never could stand for a moment before the braves of the celestial Empire. As we have begun treating through the Chinese we must, I suppose, go on a little longer with it, but they might be informed that as endeavours to arrange matters recognising their sovereignty have been futile, we would now try ignoring it.

A general wish to keep on good terms with China in the hopes that she may be of possible use as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

As regards the advisability of directing our policy into lines judged suitable in order to secure China as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

As regards the advisability of directing our policy into lines judged suitable in order to secure China as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

A general wish to keep on good terms with China in the hopes that she may be of possible use as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

As regards the advisability of directing our policy into lines judged suitable in order to secure China as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

As regards the advisability of directing our policy into lines judged suitable in order to secure China as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

A general wish to keep on good terms with China in the hopes that she may be of possible use as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

As regards the advisability of directing our policy into lines judged suitable in order to secure China as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

A general wish to keep on good terms with China in the hopes that she may be of possible use as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

As regards the advisability of directing our policy into lines judged suitable in order to secure China as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

A general wish to keep on good terms with China in the hopes that she may be of possible use as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

As regards the advisability of directing our policy into lines judged suitable in order to secure China as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

As regards the advisability of directing our policy into lines judged suitable in order to secure China as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

A general wish to keep on good terms with China in the hopes that she may be of possible use as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

As regards the advisability of directing our policy into lines judged suitable in order to secure China as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

A general wish to keep on good terms with China in the hopes that she may be of possible use as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

As regards the advisability of directing our policy into lines judged suitable in order to secure China as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.

A general wish to keep on good terms with China in the hopes that she may be of possible use as an ally at some future date has largely influenced our dealings with her of late years; nothing could be more misplaced than the nervous consideration for China's feelings that has guided our policy. The first thing to remember in dealing with China is that the Chinese hate all foreigners and will always hate them; no amount of courtesy will ever cause them to change on that point, but will cause them to lose the fear of us by means of which alone peace may be preserved and our relations remain on a satisfactory basis.
principally on information derived from that organ. In it we find that Kashgar fell to a Chinese army of 24,000 men, armed with Berdan rifles, manoeuvring on the principles of Von Moltke and Manteuffel, and thoroughly equipped even to such minor matter as field glasses. The said army in reality consisting of about 200 men, who were fed as a charity by the people of the town, and whose armament consisted of flags, tridents, and mediaeval fire-arms in about equal proportions. That they never possessed Berdan rifles I proved myself in the most effectual manner possible, by simply testing them to find out if any man knew how to load one, and in the whole garrison of Kashgaria found not one man capable of performing the feat. That they once possessed them, but never learnt to load them, is the only alternative solution; in that case their modern equipment would not render them more formidable than the bows and arrows, with which part of the army is still armed. Mr. Boulger’s writings have gone a considerable way towards the forming of public opinion in England as regards the Chinese, and the above may be taken as a very fair sample of his reliability. To take the Pekin Gazette seriously as a guide to contemporaneous events is to me inconceivable. Its value is on a par with Aesop’s Fables as an authoritative work on zoology. Why we should ever have allowed the Chinese to have any say in Tibetan affairs I cannot understand. The country is either an integral part of China or it is not. In the former case we should have retaliated for the violation of our territory by active measures elsewhere against China proper, a method which would have prevented undue diplomatic procrastination. But our action being what it has been, then we should have treated direct with the Lhassa Government, absolutely ignoring the Chinese claims of suzerainty, which, as a matter of fact, are purely shadowy, and absolutely denied by the Tibetans, though their rulers may in their dislike to having dealings with Europeans, shelter themselves behind the Tsungli Yamen when it suits them to do so. Treating on our present footing nothing will ever be arranged; the Chinese kept Mr. Hart for many years on a somewhat similar errand, viz. “Masterly inactivity” in Formosa, and they don’t care how long they keep him in Darjeeling. It might expedite matters to raise our demands and a threat to treat direct with Lhassa, coupled with a proposition for establishing a consulate at Shigatze, would possibly have a wholesome effect. At present China and Lhassa are playing a game that suits both; the Chinese are keeping up an appearance of dominating Tibet, while the Lhassa Government are avoiding having to treat with a foreign power.

The admitting of a Chinese emissary to the Durbar in which the Ruler of Hunza was installed will, as regards the Central Asians, give an appearance of truth to the oft-told tale that the King of England is a small prince tributary to the son of Heaven.

In the year 1647 the ships Dragon, Sun, Katherine, and Anne sailed up the Canton river under the command of stout Master Weddel, and requested permission to trade. The mandarins while professing friendship, procrastinated until a number of guns were in position, and then suddenly and treacherously opened fire. “Herewith the whole fleet, being instantly incensed, did on the sudden display their bloody ensigns.” The result being the capturing of the fort and the establishment of a mutual understanding, resulting in a profitable interchange of commodities. That incident may be taken as a sample of all our dealings with China; their
action is invariably the same. But on the supposition that China is a great power a conciliatory tone is adopted; we spare mobs who commit outrages against Europeans, and when the Chinese plead fear of their own subjects as a reason for not administering punishment that would be deterrent in its effect, the excuse is gravely accepted and things remain in statu quo. That the outrages against Europeans committed by what some are disposed to consider as this great and civilised nation are often instigated by the mandarins has been most plainly demonstrated, yet the Chinese Government endeavour to assure the representatives at Pekin that they are the work of the Kalao Hui and other secret societies; if the Chinese Government cannot protect our countrymen and countrywomen from these secret societies, then the only thing is to do it ourselves.

As for fears of upsetting the present dynasty, if it exists only by allowing the mob to do what they like against Europeans, the sooner it is upset the better. To quote from Mr. Bonvalot, "It is difficult to understand why we regard seriously the Emperor of China, who is not obeyed, either because he does not wish to be, or because he lacks the power to enforce his will. A power which is incapable of protecting any one or of applying the most insignificant rules of police does not deserve the name of a Government, and I cannot understand the course taken by the nations of Europe." That Mr. Bonvalot writes strongly on the subject is not to be wondered at, considering that while he was at Ta Chen Lu the mandarin did his best to rouse the people against him, a drum was beaten round the town, while the crier announced that the tribunal was in danger from the Europeans. Owing to the large Tibetan element in the place the proclamation had not the desired effect, but the mandarin thoroughly understood the wishes of his superiors and received the usual promotion for his praiseworthy endeavours to carry them out.