Turkestan in the Nineteenth Century

A Brief History of the Khanates of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva

By

MARY HOLDSWORTH

Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with St. Antony's College (Oxford) Soviet Affairs Study Group.

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This study of Bukhara, Kokand and Khorezm in the nineteenth century was undertaken for two main reasons. First, as a contribution to the histories of territories and peoples who, by the end of the nineteenth century or earlier, found themselves to be parts of western empires. The contemporary approach is to study such histories not solely as an extension of that of the metropolitan country concerned, but in their own right. Work has been and is being done on South-East Asian and African countries and a similar beginning of the Turkestan khanates, which became part of the Russian Empire, seemed appropriate if only for comparative purposes. The second reason was to make available to English-speaking readers some of the material now being published in Soviet journals and monographs. This material supplements and in certain respects corrects the mass of descriptive matter produced in the nineteenth century, when the cities, oases and deserts of Turkestan became the magnet of travellers, soldiers and oriental scholars from Europe. As a preliminary it was necessary to bring together existing material in French and English, the entries in the Encyclopaedia of Islam and the two Russian nineteenth century Encyclopaedias, Brockhaus and Efron, and Granat, and notably the extensive and scholarly studies of Professor V.V. Barthold. The value of the new Soviet material is that it provides data on current problems relating to customary law, land tenure, administrative organization, and the practical processes of economy. In studying the contact of cultures, whether brought about by an imperial situation or otherwise, historians and administrators have come more and more to regard customary law (adat) as part of jurisprudence, the sanctions and limitations of a khan's rule as part of the general study of government, and the exchange arrangements of subsistence and transitional economies as integral parts of economic history. The data for discussing such questions, so far as the countries of Soviet Central Asia are concerned, can now only be obtained from Soviet sources (the question of interpretation and handling of such material by Soviet scholars is beside the immediate point), and I have therefore found it interesting and useful to select from it and to reproduce it in manageable form for English readers.

Mary Holdsworth

August 1959
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The following general principles have been observed in the transliteration of Russian and Central Asian names of places, persons and items of source material:

1. All Russian names have been transliterated in accordance with the system advocated by the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for Official Use (PCGN).

2. Central Asian personal names relating to the pre-Russian, and to some extent the Tsarist, periods are transliterated according to traditional usage followed in English historical works. Personal names relating to the Soviet period are transliterated from the Russian spelling according to the PCGN system, e.g. Khodzhayev.

3. Geographical names are transliterated according to the PCGN system from the Russian spelling used in Soviet maps except where the actual name has been changed, e.g. Shakhrisabz, and not Shahr-i-Sabz; but Khojent when used in relation to the pre-Soviet period, and not Leninabad, the present-day name.
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I

THE THREE KHANATES:

Political History - Institutions - Land Tenure - Economic Development

Emirs of Bukhara

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Haidar</td>
<td>1800-1826</td>
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<td>Nasrullah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muzaffar ud-Din</td>
<td>1860-1885</td>
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<td>Abd al Ahad</td>
<td>1885-1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mir Alim</td>
<td>1910-1920</td>
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</tbody>
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Khans of Kokand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Khan</th>
<th>Reign</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alim Khan</td>
<td>1798-1808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Khan</td>
<td>1808-1821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sons of Narbuta, founder of nineteenth century Kokand dynasty)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madali Khan</td>
<td>1821-1842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sher Ali</td>
<td>1842-1845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khudayar Khan</td>
<td>1845-1858</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1865-1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mallia</td>
<td>1858-1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(established by Nasrullah)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibn Murad</td>
<td>1862-1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(nephew of Mallia)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Khans of Khorezm (Khiva)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Khan</th>
<th>Reign</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inak Iltuzer</td>
<td>1804-1806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Rahim</td>
<td>1806-1825</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allah Quli</td>
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<td>Rahim Quli</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madamin (Muhammad Emir)</td>
<td>1846-1855</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sayid Muhammad Khan</td>
<td>1856-1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayid Muhammad Rahim III</td>
<td>1864-1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Asfandiyar</td>
<td>1910-1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayid Abdallah</td>
<td>1918-1920</td>
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The three khan dynasties established by the end of the eighteenth century enjoyed a certain degree of stability, symbolized by the renewed use of traditional enthronement ceremonies. The Mangit dynasty ruled in Bukhara, the Min in Kokand, and in Khorezm the family of the Inak Iltuzer discarded the figurehead khans from the Genghis Khan dynasties in 1767 and ruled as khans in their own name. As compared with the previous two hundred years, this led to internal centralization and administrative strength, and to some institutional cohesion; it did not produce stable boundaries either with each other, with Persia, Afghanistan and Kashgar or vis-à-vis the advance of Russia. (1) It would also be misleading to think of the khanates, even during this re-emergence of three strong ruling
houses, in terms of the European "nation-state". All three, throughout the period, still exhibited the age-long characteristics of the area. The oasis populations had their intensive agriculture, town life, trade, organized crafts and beginnings of home industries; the adjacent nomad and semi-settled peoples, made up of small units each with strong inner political cohesion, still had no permanent overriding political loyalty or constant affiliations. Their adherence had to be cajoled, bargained for or secured by force. It continued to be an uncertain element, since they acknowledged no external power master for any definitive period of time. Whether one can say that they regarded Russia and the terms and bargains she had to offer no differently from the khans of Bukhara, Kokand or Khorezm who were their religious and racial kin, is to open argument. But on the face of it, bargains of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Central Asia, do not present an alignment of "Russians against non-Russians"; the individual hordes accepted Russian overlordship as well as that of Kokand, Khorezm or Bukhara. The main difference was that once having submitted to Russia it was far more difficult to back out.

The external political relations of the khanates can be considered first in relation to each other and to the nomad and semi-nomad hordes, both within and adjacent to their borders; secondly in relation to neighbouring Afghanistan and to Chinese Kashgar, Herat and the Persian territories; and thirdly to Russia. Eventually, of course, Russia overwhelmed and engulfed the three khanates; the definitive boundaries with Afghanistan, Chinese Kashgar and Persia were drawn by Russia; the administrative boundaries of Bukhara and Khorezm were settled by Russia (Kokand disappeared altogether), and the treaty relationships entered into with Bukhara and Khorezm specifically forbade either of them to carry on external relations.

It was not only the three khanates which had no stable frontiers; none of the countries surrounding them had them either. Persia disputed Khorasan and Herat not only with Khorezm but with Afghanistan. The latter in addition disputed Balkh, Gissar, Kulyab, Badakhshan and the Pamir vilayets with Bukhara, and the Pamir vilayets with both Bukhara and Chinese Kashgar. Chinese Turkestan had increasingly frequent Muslim minority movements, supported from Afghanistan and from Kokand, if not necessarily by the khan himself, at any rate by powerful and adventurous hakims, such as Muhammad Yaqub, beg of Tashkent, who nominally acknowledged Kokand's overlordship.

The internal areas of conflict were the settled lands of Merv and Chardzhou between Khorezm and Bukhara, Khojent, Ura-Tyube and Karategin between Bukhara and Kokand, and the lower Syr-Dar'ya between Kokand and Khorezm. The main nomad and semi-settled areas, whose peoples did not regard themselves as subjects to anyone, were those of the Kazakhs along the northern border, and of the Teke Turkmen in Transcaspia, running diagonally from south-west to north-west.

It is true that Russia had no firm frontier either, but she had the sense of frontier, and throughout the century her efforts were directed to establishing "lines", defined and held by military posts. A lack of awareness on the
part of the successive emirs and khans that they had to fight against something intrinsically different from themselves, namely, a nation-state, was at the root of their failure to apprehend their common danger, and led them to allow their old patterns of internal rivalries and shifting alignments to absorb their energies until it was too late to take a different course. Local and Muslim, or anti-Russian, sentiments were powerful here and there and showed their desperate strength in the Keneary rising in the steppes, at Ak Mechet', in the defence of Andizhan and Namangan, at Geok Tepe, but an overall anti-Russian alignment was something that had to be inculcated and to be consciously created; it did not begin to emerge prior to 1870.

The changes in internal boundaries - the breaking-off or the adhesion of a vilayet from one khanate to another - though at first sight kaleidoscopic, have coherent significance. It is nearly always the same vilayets which change hands and allegiances - the ones that tip the local balance of power and rock precariously established stability. Certain mountain vilayets always remained unabsorbable, whether by Bukhara, Kokand, Afghanistan, or Russia - Tsarist or Soviet. The last strongholds of Enver Pasha, the districts which the partisan Basmachi held until nearly 1930, were the same eastern vilayets whose begs in the nineteenth century merely presented gifts to the Emir of Bukhara and who never remained under either Kokand or Bukhara for more than a dozen years at a time. They were probably as much a nuisance and an enigma to Bukharan officials as they were eventually to Russian ones. The Soviet dismemberment of the Bukharan and Khorezmian republics and the subsequent redrawing of the boundaries of the Soviet Central Asian republics in 1924 was carried out extremely thoughtfully and was based on scrutiny of political history and administrative records as much as on ethnographic considerations. The new boundaries did much to split up and weaken potential trouble centres.

The Emirate of Bukhara

The Bukhara Emirate in mid-nineteenth century comprised the valleys of the Zeravshan, Kashka-Dar'ya and Surkhan-Dar'ya, the upland vilayets in Eastern Bukhara of Kulyab, Darvaz, Karategin, Baljuan, the right bank of the Amu-Dar'ya with the vilayets of Karshi and Kerki. This was the heartland. As in Kokand, there was an outer ring of vilayets, some disputed with Kokand, some on the borders between Bukhara and Persia (Shakhrisyabz, Darvaz), some disputed with Khiva. The population of about 3,000,000 contained some 55 per cent Uzbekas (in the Zeravshan, Kashka and Surkhan Dar'ya valleys), 33 per cent Tadzhiks (in the uplands of the eastern vilayets), and 10 per cent Turkmen along the Amu-Dar'ya; the town population was mixed and included Indians, "Bukhara Jews", Persians etc.

Although the rulers of the Mangit dynasty made serious attempts at centralization - perhaps more ruthless and certainly more sustained than those of the khans of Kokand - nevertheless the emirate even at its core was hardly a homogeneous nation-state. The process of centralization went on throughout the century, often overlaid with external wars and internal rivalries, but in the
event it was overtaken by Russian domination. The hold the emir had over the vilayet was through the hakim. Hence, the normal action on conquest or suppression of a vilayet was the appointment of a new hakim, or the reappointment of one attached to the emir either by family or by other ties. The vilayets of Gissar, Shakhrisyabz and Kitab were particularly self-assertive; the hakims of Darvaz, Karshi and Karategin, too, did not remit regular taxes to the emir at Bukhara, but presented only periodic "gifts".

The political history of the emirate in the nineteenth century is similar to that of Kokand and is mainly a struggle by the Mangit dynasty to maintain and centralize power in the face of the strong separatist tendencies of the Uzbek clans and of the individual principalities. The first Mangit khan (1753-8) tried seriously to break the power of the Uzbek clans and was on the whole supported by the town inhabitants. He added the vilayets of Shakhrisyabz, Gissar and Kulyab to the emirate, without being able to bring about their integration, and they always remained a rather doubtful "outer fringe". (Shakhrisyabz at the time of the Bukharan treaty with Russia in 1868 was actually independent of the emirate and was returned by Russia to Bukhara in lieu of the vilayet of Samarkand.) The nineteenth century Mangits had pretensions to re-establish the ascendancy of Transoxania throughout Turkestan; and they added to the centralizing policy at home, efforts to control the eastern fringe vilayets and the Merv oasis to the south. The former brought clashes with Kokand, the latter with Khorezm; the campaigns against Kokand, Khorezm and Merv recur throughout the hundred years before the establishment of the Russian protectorate. Emir Haidar (1800-26) did not pursue this aggressive policy and in the first quarter of the century it was Khorezm who attacked Bukhara and took possession of Merv. This was also the period of Kokand ascendancy. Furthermore, the Kitay-Kipchak vilayets of Katta-Kurgan, and Yangi-Kurgan mounted a separatist movement against the emirate in the last years of the reign.

Emir Nasrullah was a far more ambitious character and the thirty years of his rule was the period of Bukhara's greatest ascendancy, of her struggle and partial triumph over Kokand, her counter attacks against Khiva and the sack and annexation of Merv. Nasrullah was entirely ruthless in the elimination of potential rivals and in his efforts to break the separatist ambitions of the Uzbek clans. His policy was to build up the professional section of his armed forces and to establish at least some officers who owed their position and allegiance to the emir. He relied on the clergy and made some capital out of the religious pre-eminence of Bukhara. He also granted certain privileges to the people of Bukhara and carried through irrigation schemes and a measure of administrative reform. For the latter and for the army increases he had inevitably to raise more revenue, and this together with his cruelty and ruthlessness earned him the hatred and dread of his subjects and the reputation for despotism and opportunism among his fellow rulers. His centralizing struggles continued throughout his reign. He did not come into conflict with Russia mainly because the immediate cause of the latter's first conflicts with both Khiva and Kokand was rivalry for the control of the nomad
and semi-nomad populations who straddled both the path of Russia's expansion along the steppe and the territories within those two khanates between the valleys. The case did not arise with Bukhara until after Russia's conquest of Turkestan and Tashkent and her wedge into the riverine territories. Nasrullah's interventions in Kokand affairs, including two entries into Kokand itself, were part of his ambition to re-establish a semblance of the Timurid Empire. How far these activities, by seriously misusing the resources of both khanates made Russian conquest easier, or on the contrary brought about the more favourable terms which Bukhara secured from Russia as compared to the other two khanates, is an interesting speculation.

In the reign of Muzaffar ud-Din (1860-85) Bukhara became a protectorate of Russia. With that the political history of the emirate as a focus of power in its own region ceased. It did not emerge again until the brief but potentially promising period of 1917-22. Between 1868 and 1917 Bukhara was a chapter in Russian, and an outpost in European political and imperial, history; its destinies were decided in St.Petersburg, London, Paris and Berlin, and one must study the views and characteristics of Kaufman and Vrevskiy, Gorchakov and Annenkov to see trends and policies which affected the daily lives of her citizens.

The Khanate of Kokand

The Khanate of Kokand existed as such from 1798 to 1876, under khans of the Min dynasty. The Fergana valley was its kernel, made up by the vilayets of Margelan, Andizhan, Kokand and Namangan, with a population of some three-quarters of a million. The expansionist objectives of its nineteenth century rulers were the vilayets of Ura-Tyube, Khojent, Osh, Tashkent and at times that of Turkestan. At Ura-Tyube and Khojent these ambitions clashed with those of the Bukhara emirs. From the 1850s along all these lines of expansion Russia became the all-powerful and all-embracing adversary, until finally the khanate disappeared as a political entity in 1876 as a result first of its defeat at Ak Mechet' by the Russians and the subsequent taking by them of the cities of Turkestan, Namangan and Tashkent. The khanate was finally incorporated into the governor-generalship of Turkestan as the Fergana Province.

Alim Khan in 1798 had inherited from his father, Narbuta, an independent and more or less centralized kingdom. He took the title of khan and felt himself ready to challenge the supremacy in the region of the Emir of Bukhara. The indigenous chroniclers of his reign record a series of campaigns directed to this end, mainly to capture Ura-Tyube, Khojent and Tashkent. He followed traditional policy, when successful, of establishing a hakim in each provincial centre: it then became the Emir of Bukhara's aim to dislodge this latter and to re-establish one from among the families whose allegiance he himself commanded. Within the khanate itself, Alim's efforts to establish a strong dynasty made him ruthless in exterminating relatives and potential rivals. His
repeated campaigns and consequent extractions of money and men, together with a
more than usual, or perhaps merely more successful, ruthlessness, earned him a
name for cruelty and harshness among his contemporaries. His successor, Omar
Khan, benefited to some extent by what Alim had achieved, and though he still
had to kill rivals in order to hold his throne, he nevertheless also used
embassies and pilgrimages. His campaigns were directed against the Kazakh semi-
nomads in the North-West steppe (i.e. beyond Turkestan) and in defence of the
Southern caravan route to Kashgar. Though his chroniclers claimed (and this
claim was endorsed by Nalivkin)(2), that the whole steppe was under his
sovereignty (he built Ak Mechet' to maintain this hold), his hold on the steppe
khan's was precarious and the Kazakh khans were in open revolt by the end of his
reign. Omar took the title of Emir el Muslemin, and struck coins showing himself
with the traditional insignia on his head. He is described as "taking on
the airs of Timur" and his reign saw the peak of Kokand's territorial expansion,
and the establishment of a seemingly centralized and stable state machinery of
judicial and administrative civil servants dependent on the khan.

Madali Khan was a domineering and perverted boy when he succeeded Omar in
1821. His rule ended with the sack of Kokand by the Emir of Bukhara, Nasrullah,
in 1842. Apart from the perennial struggle for the allegiance of Ura-Tyube and
Khojent, Madali's territorial adventures were more widespread than those of his
immediate predecessors, and included a half-hearted attempt to restore the
Muslim Khojar Jahangir in Kashgar, thereby ousting Chinese domination (in which
he was not successful), and the conquest of the province of Karategin on the
Persian border. Madali, through his personal excesses, earned the disapproval
and active opposition of the Muslim clergy and lawyers, and he seems not to have
shared in the cultural or intellectual life of his capital as Omar and to some
extent Alim had done.

Nevertheless, the people of the Fergana valley did not wish to accept a
ruler from the Mangit dynasty, placed over them by Nasrullah, and a member of
the Min family who had lived many years quietly among the Kazakhs, Shir Ali Khan,
was able to collect an army of supporting begs, become installed as khan in the
traditional manner, and retake Kokand. He was able, in the face of opposition
from Bukhara, to re-establish himself over the old Fergana territories, and his
chroniclers comment on his efforts to keep power without bloodshed. It was in
this period that the latent rivalries between the Kipchaks (a powerful sub-group
of the Uzbeks, occupying the northern part of the Fergana valley) and the old-
established, very much Persianized city populations broke out into an overt
struggle for the control of Kokand and of the khanate's administration. The
Uzbek Kipchaks had for some generations been turning over to settled agriculture;
they still maintained their sense of unity and the heads of their great families
had been pressing for administrative and political powers with ever increasing
insistence as against the established administrative hierarchy. The Kipchaks
had their first triumph in Kokand in the early 1840s, established young Khudayar
as khan, with a Kipchak regent and removed the former Persianized administrators.
Chroniclers report that the Kipchaks through ignorance burnt books, cut down the
poplars lining town streets and failed to keep up the water courses.
Tashkent, as well as Kokand, had an internal upheaval in 1846 when the artisans rose against the hakim who had imposed supplementary taxes on gold coins, leather and draught animals. Khudayar reasserted Kokand's authority over Tashkent, marched in and replaced the hakim. Another disruptive element, as already mentioned, was provided by marches into Chinese Turkestan, by a sub-group of the Fergana Uzbeks, the Kitay-Kipchaks, in support of risings by Muslim minorities, which took place almost every decade during the middle years of the century. These expeditions varied in success. In 1826 Khojah Jahangir's rising was supported by Kokand and for a while the khan was permitted by the Chinese to collect taxes in Kashgar itself and in certain other towns. In 1856 Valikhan Ture occupied Kashgar; Muhammad Yaqub, originally beg of Tashkent, whose activity in the Kazakh steppe had provoked the Russian seizure of Ak Mechet', held and ruled Kashgar between 1865 and 1876. In every instance, however, the Chinese re-established their authority. (3) Returning armies and settler groups of varying sizes and types of husbandry left Kashgar at the end of the campaign and settled in territories south-east of the Fergana valley.

Thus, at the time of Russia's wave of expansion into Central Asia, the khanate was suffering from the long-standing weakness of the indefinite connection between the vilayets and the khan at Kokand, from rivalry between the Uzbek families and the old Persianized town population which had become acute at this vital period, and the repeated forays, and more than forays, into Kashgar, which created instability in the territories of the khanate. The rivalry between Bukhara and Kokand filled the political horizon of both protagonists almost to the exclusion of all else; this in its turn exacerbated all three internal weaknesses. (4) In the initial stage of the Russian dismemberment of Kokand, not only was there no concerted effort by Bukhara and Kokand to face jointly what was clearly going to become their common enemy (indeed, in 1853 at the opening of the Russian march on Ak Mechet', when the hakims of Tashkent and Ura-Tyube prepared to resist them, Khudayar thought that their preparations were against him, marched into Tashkent and Ura-Tyube, replaced the begs by his brothers, and sent these against the Russians), but Margelan, Andizhan and Namangan were not under Khudayar's control. The second and decisive decade of the Russian advance into the Fergana valley saw a more homogenous anti-Russian grouping, in that the Emir of Bukhara supported Khudayar in Kokand and also resisted the Russian advance on his own account. Furthermore, both the Kipchaks and the Kitay-Kirgiz declared a holy war against the Russians but attempted to conduct it by establishing their own Min Khan as khan of Kokand. The hakims of Tashkent and Khojent also made serious efforts to withstand the Russian advance and several of the cities only fell into Russian hands after fierce resistance. By the autumn of 1866 the Russians had taken Auliye-Ata, Turkestan and Chimkent, Tashkent, Ura-Tyube and Khojent and had defeated the Emir of Bukhara at Injar. This meant primarily that the Fergana valley, i.e. the heart of the Kokand emirate, was now separated from Bukhara by Russian conquered and Russian administered territory.

The last ten years of the khanate was a period of uneasy truce. Khudayar
turned his attention to home affairs, since the Russians now had a firm grip on the outer circle of vilayets. With the help of a Kashgari administrator he tightened up taxation and tried to impose additional levies. In 1873 Namangan (whose kadi had been one of the sternest opponents to some of Khudayar's taxes), put up a candidate for the khanate. He was defeated, but not so much by Khudayar as by the Uzbek Kipchak's beg, Abdurrahman, who had risen to a position of eminence in Kokand. The following year Khudayar fled from his capital to Russian territory (where he lived in exile and died in Orenburg) in the face of a Kipchak rising led by Abdurrahman. The latter, on establishing himself in Kokand itself, tried to retake Khojent from the Russians.

In spring 1875 the Russians, under Kaufman and Skobelev, gained a decisive victory at Makhram, as a result of which the territory on the right bank of the Syr-Dar'ya, including the city of Namangan, was ceded to Russia, under a treaty by which Khudayar was reinstated in a still more depleted khanate. That same autumn there were Kipchak risings in Andizhan and Namangan under Abdurrahman, which were quelled only after fierce resistance and with Russian help. In January 1876 Abdurrahman rose again in Andizhan and maintained himself against what had by now clearly become Russian annexation. He was forced to surrender and was banished to Russia as well as Khan Nasruddin (Khudayar's son). In March Russia finally annexed the whole of the Fergana valley, abolished the khanate, and incorporated the territory into the government of Turkestan, as the Fergana Province under the administration of General Skobelev.

Two descriptions of Kokand by travellers about a hundred years apart give contours to the bare narrative of events. In the first SI YU T'ON TCHE, a Chinese emissary writing in the mid-eighteenth century(5) described the country as flat, fertile and heavily populated. The towns, which were all walled, were governed by begs, but the beg of Kokand was chief among them and they all obeyed him. The account gives individual descriptions of Kokand, Namangan, Andizhan and Margelan as well as of Tashkent, and records embassies to China from Tashkent and Bukhara.

A.P. Khoroshkhin, an officer under Skobelev, wrote a detailed account for Kaufman's archives of a reconnaissance journey in 1867.(6) According to this, Kokand, built about 1700, is a city of 80,000 people with 600 mosques and 15 madrasahs where about 15,000 students are taught. Good buildings, including a bridge and a spacious and clean bazaar, were erected under Madali Khan. Besides the Sarts (old-established town dwellers) there are Uzbeks, subdivided into Kipchaks, Kirgiz, Kara-Kirgiz and Kara-Kalpaks. The khanate exports wool, fruit, hides, silk, opium, indigo; opium and silks are imported from Bukhara, and opium, pottery, silver, Chinese silks, felts and carpets from Kashgar. Factories make silks and cloths in Namangan, Kokand, Margelan and Khojent. Mining could be developed but is not. Khudayar has a mechanical turn of mind and mends his own clocks. His passions are falconry and horses.
Institutions, Economic Development

The administrative systems of Bukhara and Kokand were very similar and a description of one does reasonably well for both. Khorezm (Khiva) was different. In Bukhara and Kokand the emirate or khanate was composed of principalities, called vilayets (though most often described as bekstvo by Russian historians and in Russian reports), ruled over by hakims or begs (the holders of this title as territorial rulers must be distinguished from the holders of it as members of the families of khans), who maintained relations with the khan or emir. The vilayets were sub-divided into tumens in Bukhara and bekliks in Kokand, each under a beg from among the local ruling families. These in turn were sub-divided into smaller administrative units (known variously as kents and amlakadarstvo), which as well as being tax-collecting units were above all water administrative ones. The aksamal or mirab was the executive functionary, but also the most important local person, as being in closest contact with the people and in control of the administration of irrigation channels. Bukhara and its environs formed a special administrative unit, under a qush-begi. He was not an independent head of a local family but a functionary of the emir's and usually his chief minister for all internal matters. The emir's relations with the vilayets were conducted through the hakims. The two normal sinews of centralization - taxation and a standing army - were in a transitional stage. Taxes were prescribed by the emir, but collected and handed over by the hakims who, since receiving no fixed revenue or pay, withheld a portion of the tax for the use of their court and their administration. Some hakims did not carry out even this minimal degree of organized subordination: in Bukhara, as has been said above, it was recognized that the hakims of certain vilayets gave "gifts" from time to time. In Kokand, the khans went on "progresses" round the cities and received "gifts" in kind and in money on the occasion of their entry.

The customary taxes were levied both in kind and in cash. The latter were of two principal kinds - the zekat on merchandise, movable property and cattle, and the tanap on land property. In addition there was an intermittent levy imposed on a locality or village which was assigned to the administrator or court functionary and its incidence determined by him. Additional taxes were imposed by the emir for campaigns and other extra purposes and were met with greater or less resentment. The land tax formed the bulk of the income of the emir's treasury. Gradations varied from one-tenth of the yield to one-fifth; on certain waqf lands it was one-third. Certain landholders were altogether exempt (see pp.12-13 infra). Only in some districts was the tax levied in terms of a money sum per area unit. The tax, even when levied as a percentage of harvest, was payable predominantly in money. Calculations were based on winter and spring Bukhara prices - i.e. when they were at their maximum. This was hardest on the poorer peasants since they were nearly always forced to realize their produce in the autumn, both through need and through lack of storage facilities.

It is impossible to draw a tidy diagram of administration, since the
systems were not tidy or uniform. Moreover emirate functionaries duplicated the vilayet functionaries. The following may, however, be helpful:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emirate Functionaries</th>
<th>Emir</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divan-begi</td>
<td>Kazi-kalian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zekatchi</td>
<td>Kazi (throughout the bekstvo(s))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rais (police functions, etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bekstvo or Vilayet Functionaries</th>
<th>Beg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dastarkhanchi</td>
<td>Finance secretary (originally steward)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Zekatchi(s)</td>
<td>Tax officers, one resident at beg's court, one travelling round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naukar</td>
<td>Executives and police officials, including a special official on duty at night</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daroga</td>
<td>Executives and police officials in villages; measure harvest yields and collect tax</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Territorial Sub-Divisions

- Bekstvo or vilayet
- Tumen or Beklik
  - Amlakadari or Kent or Tumen, administered by Mirab or Aksakal
  - Villages or kishlak, administered by headmen; water administered by daroga responsible to Mirab.

At the end of the century (i.e. when Bukhara was already under Russian tutelage) the Bukhara annual cash budget was reckoned at around five to six million rubles (i.e. £500,000 to £600,000). The currency was the tilla and the tanka, the former a gold coin. The khans minted their own coins, the last of the Bukhara mint being those of 1877, and of Kokand 1871. The coinage was not finally linked to Russian currency until 1901 when the tanka was tied to the 15 kopek (silver) piece, though Russian coinage and banking facilities became officially valid in 1892. Bukhara was included in the Russian customs and postal boundary in 1895.

Military organization was also in a transitional form. The sipah (cavalry) was the most decentralized since the cavalry levies were raised locally by the individual hakims and their loyalty was to their chief. They were raised as necessary, received no maintenance and inadequate pay consisting of annual amounts
of wheat and oilseed husk, some clothing and a small sum of money. They owned their horses and horse-furniture; horses which fell in service were replaced by the emir. The sarbaz (infantry) comprised both local militia and the nucleus of a regular army, in that some infantry units formed a standing army, under a commander appointed by the emir and equipped and paid by the latter. They were used as garrison troops, personal bodyguard, and as units which could be detailed for special duty (as for instance when Muzaffar left a portion of his army in Kokand to support Khudayar in 1865). The topchi (artillery) again were a fairly regular formation, commanded by a more permanent, almost professional, officer, responsible directly to the khan or emir. Cannon were cast locally; random pieces of information give some indication as to numbers. Nasrullah had 80 cannon at his disposal; in 1864, 60 cannon were cast to supplement the defence of Tashkent against the Russians. Small fire-arms were made in Gissar. In the last quarter of the century, the Bukhara emir imported Russian berdyanki (breech-loading rifles in use in the Russian army until about 1890). Ayni records that as a boy he used to watch the infantry drilling: troops had to drill on alternate days as there were not enough rifles to equip them all. The permanent military strength vested in the emir or the khan was extremely irregular. The Bukharan army was said to number 36,000 in mid-century; the forces at Ikjan (1866) were estimated at 40,000; the garrison defending Tashkent at 30,000 by Russian generals; the forces against Skobelev at Namangan and Andizhan were said to be 25-30,000; the Turkmen at Geok Tepe 30,000. The Bukharan and Khivan troops were not held in very high esteem either by the Russians or the Persians. Ignatyev commented both on the technical backwardness and on the lack of military spirit in the Bukharians when on his mission in 1859. The Kokandian military formations were more irregular still than those of Bukhara. They were raised and paid by the begs of the individual cities and gave allegiance only to them. There were about 100 copper cannon in the khanate, cast mainly in Tashkent. The Kokandians, however, were very much tougher as enemies, both in their resistance to Russia and in regional wars. The Turkmen were the best and most determined fighters of all; they owed their reputation to their personal qualities and to the fact that they fought always on their own terrain, rather than to any superiority of equipment.

A book could be written on land tenure in the three khanates. Much contemporary Soviet research is devoted to this subject, both in historical perspective and by the publication of documents showing purchase transactions, share-cropping agreements, outright gifts by emirs and so on. A sizeable literature of contemporary studies beginning from 1874 and carried on until about 1927 includes both detailed sample studies in selected localities in Zeravshan and in the eastern vilayets, and more general accounts connected mainly with plans for cotton growing, the provision of small credit facilities, irrigation extension. Much of the early material was brought together and analysed by the Pahlen Commission of 1909-10, whose report gives a balanced and informative overall picture of the subject. Recent Soviet work on the immediate pre-1917 and early Soviet period is in the form of short monographs whose chief merit are their excellent bibliographies of source material.
There was no standard universally accepted form of share-cropping for either emirate as a whole. Arrangements were based on the division of the harvest as between the land-owner and the cropper in relation to the five essentials of agricultural output; land, water (i.e. in irrigation channels), seed, draught animals, labour. Several variations would be found in one locality, depending mainly on what inventory and animals the land-owner lent to the cropper. A common form was for the land-owner to supply draught animals, seed and food; the cropper then worked the land and received one-fourth, one-fifth or sometimes even less of the harvest. This is also applied to land surrounding towns where officials and khan's relatives often acquired garden holdings. Deals were made in the spring, i.e. the season of the peasant's greatest need. If the cropper had one bullock and some tools, the land-owner supplemented this with another bullock and the cropper received one-fourth of the produce. This arrangement was probably the most common (as opposed to Azerbaydzhan or Armenia where one-half shares were common). In places it was customary to deduct from the one-fourth share, a one-fourth share of the total land-tax and of the expense of harvesting. Alternatively, the cropper did not pay towards these additional costs, but then received only a one-fifth share. More well-to-do peasants practised the one-half share system; here only the land and the seed were the holder's. In certain districts a cooperative method (shirkat) of using draught animals was practised; households joined together to produce a yoked pair (sometimes of a bullock and horse) and then worked the partners' fields in turn. In southern and eastern vilayets personal service was still practised to some extent, and peasants had to work several days in each season on the owner's estate, not only in field work, but in repairs and building. This was done by share-cropping peasants and not only by the landless peasants who worked as agricultural labourers (mard-i-kar). These latter were hired by the year and were paid partly in kind, partly in money. Certain additional charges were recognized varying in amount according to the locality. Such were: charges for the use of threshing-floors, fees for measuring the amount of harvest and for sealing it; a levy each spring on each pair of draught animals; a rental in kind each summer for the mirab (the senior local official responsible for irrigation); an annual money tax per household towards the maintenance of the naukar.(12) These taxes represented a rudimentary method of maintaining functionaries and were originally related to their services. Their very multiplicity, the ease with which they could be abused by the beneficiaries from them, and above all the fact that they all in effect fell on the peasant who had no way of redress other than petitions to the beg or qush-begi, formed a vicious circle and made it impossible for the peasant to improve his lot. Russian officials at the end of the century found little evidence of attempts at land or tax reforms or of sustained land betterment, particularly in the outlying districts.

Land throughout the Bukhara emirate was the pre-eminent commodity and sign (as well as the acknowledged source) of wealth. Land was what wealthy merchants sought to acquire, what officials, soldiers and beg's servants wished their services to be recognized in, what the emir handed out as rewards to individuals, what pious men left to religious organizations. Titles and rights to land were
governed by adat or customary law, markedly localized and passionately clung to. (It was said by Russian officials that the attempted settlement by Mallia Khan of the land disputes between the Uzbeks and the Tadzhiks referred to earlier led to litigation which went on for twenty years after Russian annexation.) In all three khanates throughout the nineteenth century religious lands (waqf) and gift lands (mulk and tankh wah) increased; a substantial proportion of the latter was exempt from taxes as well as some of the former, which meant that any inordinate or sudden increase in either of them increased the burden of obligations on other land. Tankh wah lands increased considerably in both Bukhara and Khiva during the century, in the former as part of the building of the emir's authority; Nasrullah is recorded as having made 36,000 such gifts. The extent of waqf lands in Bukhara and Kokand, as well as their economic function (i.e. as maintaining the madrasah and the Koran schools which were after all the only educational establishments) is difficult to assess. Soviet publicists (as distinct from the more serious researchers) reiterate that they were very extensive or formed a large proportion of the irrigated lands without much statistical support either of overall percentages or in actual areas in sample surveys. The compilers of the Russian encyclopaedias and socio-geographical surveys at the beginning of the present century (among them such leading authorities as Professor Barthold and Prince Masal'skiy) are not very definite either, merely recording the existence of waqf lands as one of the features of land-holding. In the eastern vilayets of Bukhara waqf lands made up 24 per cent of the total; this is probably higher than the overall percentage for Bukhara and Kokand.

In the nineteenth century Uzbek and even Turkmen settlement was progressing very rapidly, with the consequent increasing pressure on irrigated and more easily cultivable lands. By the end of the century rather less than one-fourth of the population in each of the three khanates remained nomad. Increasing land acquisition by purchase (particularly in the vicinity of towns), the gathering up of titles to land-holdings by wealthy individuals in country districts, was a perpetual encroachment on common grazing lands, whose effects were particularly felt in the upland eastern regions where irrigation cultivation and cattle grazing were practised simultaneously. The following table gives land-holdings in Shugnan and Rushan at the end of the century. These eastern vilayets were the poorest in land; the western ones were richest in irrigated land, on condition that the irrigation was properly maintained.
The evidence, both that sifted by the Pahlen Commission of 1909-10 (for the Fergana valley, Tashkent, Ura-Tyube, i.e. the old Kokand khanate) and that for other vilayets subsequently examined by Soviet researchers, shows a growing degree of landlessness among the peasants. This process began before, and independently of, the increase in cotton cultivation due to Russian trade pressure, though it was accentuated by this pressure at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Irrigation, in spite of sporadic efforts by individual khans, did not keep up with increasing settlement; resources and manpower were too often deflected from it to campaigning, even when military operations did not actually destroy vital systems, as in the Bukhara campaign against Merv in 1862. The first generations of settling Uzbeks were not skilled in maintaining irrigation and above all drainage channels, and land was constantly being lost to cultivation for this reason. The life and death struggle between the Uzbek Kipchak families and the Tadzhiks in Kokand in the middle of the century was to a considerable extent concerned with the land-ownership. At the other end of the social scale, peasant risings were a recurring feature throughout the century, more frequent in its last quarter. It is not altogether safe to accept Soviet historians' use of the expression "peasant rising", but the Kitay-Kipchaks' rising in Katta-Kurgan and Yangi-Kurgan in 1824-5 against the emirate were in part caused by land-hunger among the Miankuli tribe who found themselves without adequate grazing for nomadic cattle-breeding and with insufficient land for the transitional phase of extensive settled cultivation. The series of risings in the 1880s (1885, 1888, 1889) in Baljuan, Kulyab and Kelif were occasioned by an effort to make the grain tax on the good harvest of 1885 retroactive to cover the deficits of the preceding bad harvest years. The leader of the Baljuan rising was a peasant named Vosse, who was executed in Shahrizyabz.(15)

It has been loosely stated that the nomad and semi-settled populations lived by adat while the old river populations lived by shariat; this is not altogether the case. Shariat governed civil and criminal obligations and penalties, religious observance, family life and inheritance, while customary law was pre-eminent in land-holding and agricultural practices.

+ 1 desyatina = 2.70 acres
Justice in Bukhara and Kokand was governed by the shariat and was administered by kazis. The bottom functionary was the rais, who attended to morals and mosque observance, as well as to weights and measures. The aglian (probably 'aqlian) were lawyers, assistants to the kazi, while the muftis were the supreme exponents of the shariat. The chief mufti was the legal and spiritual head and as such the emir's chief counsellor. The imam was the head and teacher in the mosque; the mudaris a teacher in the madrasah or higher theological school, and the ulema, theological scholars and exponents. The ishan was a spiritual teacher with an individual following of pupils and novices; often they were the heads of religious orders or dervishes. Though the preponderant Muslim sect in Central Asia, particularly in all Uzbek clans was Sunni, there were greater or smaller communities of Shiis in the towns depending on whether the Persian influence was stronger or weaker. Communalism certainly exacerbated rivalries which had arisen in the first instance from political and economic causes between Shiis and the Sunni Uzbek majorities. The very bloody Bukhara communal riots of 1910 were probably a case where communal issues were uppermost; nineteenth century Asia was certainly no exception to the general pattern that religious fervour could be whipped up to turn a political or social issue into cruel bloodshed. The emir called in Russian troops to put down the riots of 1910. The perennial question put to all imperial powers as to whether their presence exacerbated this situation or on the contrary alleviated it has to be raised here. (17)

The city of Bukhara was not only the old-established centre for the whole region, but also in several respects the distributing centre for a well-developed internal regional trade. The market was open every day and also on moonlight nights, and handled about ten times as much goods as that of Tashkent. The emirates traded with Afghanistan, India, Persia, Khiva, the Turkmen steppe and Russia. Imports from Afghanistan included shawls, pottery, metal goods, wool, karakul, tea, indigo and some manufactured goods from British India; from India came green tea, muslin, indigo, some English cottons, sugar, metal goods and books; from Persia, dyes, Meshed cottons, pepper, saltpetre, silver, Islamic books and manuscripts, furs, nuts, almonds, contraband opium and some English manufactured goods. Russia exported pottery, iron pots and pans, sugar, paper, tin, fur, mercury, candles, and eventually paraffin and manufactured goods and textiles. Turkmen horses were brought in from Merv. Bukhara exported manufactured goods, including Russian worsted, gold, silk, camel hair cloth, velvet, satm, silk materials, sweetmeats, horses, mules to Afghanistan. To Persia she sent karakul, some textiles (including Russian worsted), velvet, gold; to India embroidered cloths and hangings, carpets, Russian worsted and some cotton textiles, and furs. Exports to Russia consisted mainly of cotton, silk, wool, hides, karakul. Until the late 1880s their volume was not very big. Several of the other big towns shared in this trade to a large extent - Samarkand, Andizhan, Kokand in the Fergana valley, Kulyab, and Gissar in the eastern vilayet. Some of the frontier entrepots had a sizeable transit trade and their records are an interesting study. (18) But there was something special about Bukhara in that her merchants concentrated in their hands wholesale import-export transactions. A large proportion of
the goods which came in from outside the country came to Bukhara first and changed hands there to be sold in the markets of the other big towns. In Bukhara also small-scale traders and pedlars stocked up with foreign produce and then took their goods to outlying districts, so that a trickle of foreign goods, including some manufactured articles found its way over much of both the khanates. A section of the karakul trade was also managed from Bukhara, whose merchants collected skins from the eastern vilayets and exported them to Russia and Persia: they sold them in Russia to the dealers at the Nizhniy-Novgorod fair. Bukhara merchants also tried to keep the regional silk trade very much in their own hands, not just of raw silk but of made up silk and semi-silk materials. Pazukhin commented on this as far back as 1669. (19) Though no modern study of the nineteenth century Bukharan silk trade has yet appeared, most references point to its fairly organized and concentrated nature. The export, too, to Afghanistan was handled by Bukhara merchants, and Russian goods began to reach Afghanistan through their intermediary.

From this trading and business community arose the small group of entrepreneurs who in the second half of the century promoted "home industries" based on the larger scale organizations of local crafts on the one hand, and on the establishment of cotton-gins and other elementary processing undertakings on the other. These families were found in Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent, Merv and Namangan. In May 1900 there occurred in Bukhara the financial failure of two Bukharan bankers. Their trading activities included partnership with a big Russian merchant trading company, while the banking side of their business was made up of small savings entrusted to their handling by a very wide circle of Bukharans. At the time of their bankruptcy they owed the trading company 500,000 rubles, and about 300,000 rubles to the trading agent of the Afghan emir and about the same to Bukhara merchants. This bankruptcy caused widespread anger and some hardship; it is an interesting illustration of the size and type of organization which Bukharan merchant banking could and did attain. (20)

Internal trade was well-developed and embraced the whole region, though rather patchily. Its roots lay in the age-old exchange between nomad and semi-settled communities and the valley city-dwellers. By the middle of the century there was of course a far more complex and variegated pattern of regional interchange. The eastern vilayets sent grain (wheat, barley, millet, rice) to Bukhara and to the Zeravshan valley. The movement of grain was effected partly through tax in kind and partly through town middlemen. The eastern vilayets also grew and sold certain cash crops - some cotton, flax, silk, walnuts, pistachios and walnut wood. They were one of the main karakul producing regions; the skins were bought up mainly by agents of Bukhara merchants. In spite of these potentialities, the vilayets remained poor, largely on account of their remoteness and the lack of mountain roads. The Bukhara middlemen on the whole bothered little to supply textiles and other consumer goods, relying to a large extent on the pressure of taxes and dues to extract the grain and cash crops from the poor and frugal peasants. The latter were also good craftsmen; Gissar, Karshi and Kulyab were noted for fine silks, and other fine cloths (one particularly used for the khalats of khans' households), embroidery, leather-
work and very fine metal-work in Gissar. This, too, was an initial barrier to the penetration of consumer goods. But the potentialities of these vilayets were very much appreciated by the Russians and immediately became the objective of Russian trade enterprise, once Russian business was able to enter the emirate under the 1868 treaty. This Russian competition aroused Bukharan resentment, since it threatened their established and rather easily held position.

From Khiva the Bukhara emirate and the Fergana towns imported hemp, oil, animal fats, sheep, wheat, rice and apples, fur coats and trimmings, poppy seed-boxes (from which an intoxicant liquor was brewed), and Russian earthenware pots and pans and sugar. The basic trade between the cattle-breeding and the oasis communities continued, as over the ages, in all the towns and at established regional fairs.(21) An emirate tax was levied on the breeders and dealers by transit dues levied at certain points along the recognized drove routes.(22)

Although in the mid-nineteenth century there was no mining industry as such in Bukhara or Kokand, gold-washing and gold-extracting was carried on in the Upper Pyandzh; this was a long-established occupation of the local inhabitants, handed down within families.(23) Silver had been mined in the past at Angren, but the mines had been worked out and abandoned and the tradition lost. Silver was imported from Persia. The gold workings on the Pyandzh were not on a big scale and were carried on with the minimum equipment. Nevertheless, they were a source of revenue to the local inhabitants, and evidently to Bukhara middlemen, for the latter consistently opposed applications for gold-working concessions from Russians in the eighties and nineties made to the emir via the Russian Political Agent. Opposition to Russian entry into gold extraction also came from the local begs, since some of them were themselves extractors. The qush-begi, too, confirmed that the inhabitants of certain villages held valid claims to the land in question which could not be taken away from them, since gold extraction was their only means of livelihood and their title deeds were valid. In a report to the Political Agent one of the most serious Russian prospectors wrote: "The work on the sites suffers mainly from shortage of labour. This does not arise as a result of a real lack of labour from among the local population, but because of the influence on them of several important native gold-extractors, who aim in this way to half the work of the concessionaire on the concession and then to make use of the cuttings made by him which have already reached a layer rich in gold."(16.2.1900.)(24) The Russian authorities were on the whole chary of supporting applications from would-be Russian concessionnaires before the emir. On the whole, too, the Political Agent supported the local complaints, both those of the inhabitants on the spot and those of the emir's officials when they were accused of trying to thwart labour recruitment illegally. In the controversy referred to above, Count Cherkasov, First Secretary of the Political Agency, who had been sent to investigate, took the view that the Russian concessionnaire had brought much of his troubles on himself through interfering with local administrative and judicial matters. He also drew attention to the fact that workmen had not been
paid fully in cash, and local peasants not fully compensated for cutting down some nut-trees. On the general subject he wrote that the Standing Regulations had obviously been drawn up by people who had no knowledge of local conditions. Nearly all concessions had in fact harmed the interests of the local inhabitants.(25)

Russian entry into the Bukhara economy had certain immediately obvious repercussions, which can be ascribed directly to it in the sense that they would otherwise not have occurred; it also accelerated certain processes which were already in motion, and it stimulated the development of latent natural resources in one direction rather than in another. It did not create a cash economy, introduce cash crops or business entrepreneurs, since all these were already there, though with local peculiarities and limitations. Likewise, it did not disrupt an integrated and secure rural society, since the disruption of such a society (if it had ever existed in Central Asia) was already under way. The two major railways were the most far-reaching direct results. With them went a certain development of roads, and the establishment of postal and telegraph services. Besides links with Russia, the railways became the link with Europe, not only for trade purposes but for travel and oriental studies as well. Adjustment to the new situation was not altogether smooth, partly through Russian reluctance to allow foreign enterprises to apply for land or to own property within the emirate, and partly through resentment by Bukharan dealers against foreign dealers in commodities in which they themselves were firmly established, such as the karakul trade.(26)

The influx of new "entrepreneurial" skills, including wider and more skilled banking and credit facilities, served to increase and develop the scope of such services. Here again all was not plain sailing: in gold extracting, established interests, both local and Bukharan, did not welcome Russian concessionnaires, in spite of better techniques and the opportunity of local alternative employment. The quartermasters of Russian frontier posts in the border vilayets met opposition in their attempts to purchase grain locally because of the established routine of collecting grain and sending it to Bukhara, in spite of the obvious increased turnover offered to local trade by the garrisons, particularly as the latter were punctilious in paying in cash and in trying to meet their needs through proper methods. Difficulties in the karakul trade have been mentioned; those in raw cotton will be discussed later.

As regards trade, what happened in the forty years of the Bukhara-Russia association was much the same as happened in other comparable situations. The emirate's total volume of foreign trade increased, but it increased in turnover with Russia, while diminishing or at best remaining stationary in turnover with its former other clients (with the exception of Afghanistan, with whom the turnover did not decrease, though its composition tended to change and to contain a higher proportion of transit trade from Russia). The volume of exports and imports to and from Russia began to rise towards the end of the 1880s and to rise steeply from 1895, the date of Bukhara's inclusion in the Russian customs boundary. The import of English manufactured goods through British India was
particularly hit by the latter measure. (27)

Internal trade was obviously affected by the influx of Russian manufactured goods, though their impact varied from region to region. In many instances Russian goods were in fact distributed by Bukharan traders and local pedlars and enhanced total turnovers of bazaars and increased the wealth of indigenous trading circles. Russians introduced certain widely needed consumer goods, such as paraffin, candles, tin and iron pots and pans. But inevitably Russian economic contacts brought manufactured textiles, particularly cheap cottons, and other workshop or factory produced consumer goods, which in certain areas gradually killed the home crafts. Some of the latter, notably carpets and Samarkand silks, re-emerged as speciality and luxury trades. Though the entry of Russian trade enterprise into both Bukhara and Khorezm was obtained by force, available evidence on balance seems to show that indigenous middlemen adapted themselves to the new competition and to the increased possibilities to which they became simultaneously exposed. This did not come without friction and economic casualties, particularly where superior equipment needing capital outlay was decisive (as, for example, in Russian river transport on the Amu-Dar’ya). Also, the Russian Government by its tariff policy tried to exclude foreign competitive goods from the khanates, which was clearly in her own interest and not in theirs. In the process of adjustment much depended on the Political Agent who by limiting the policy on concessions and by trying to safeguard existing practices could do much to make economic contact harmonious while facilitating the spread of more up-to-date methods and skills.

The major question remains, namely, the extent to which the linking of Bukhara's and the Fergana valley's economy to that of Russia pushed it irrevocably over into a cash crop economy dependent predominantly on the one crop, cotton. Russia's need for raw cotton was imperative at the period; her textile industry was her oldest and best established (28): at the end of the century she was fourth textile manufacturing country after Britain, USA and Germany, with some 6,000,000 spindles and 200,000 power looms, 3,728,336 and 109,810 of which respectively were in the Moscow region; her textile industry was localized and employed 325,100 operatives. A supply of suitable raw cotton from Central Asia, which obviated both political difficulties and the economic difficulties involved with supplies from America or Egypt, was a solution overwhelmingly to Russia's advantage. Bukhara, Khorezm and the Fergana valley already grew cotton, though not to a disproportionate extent; already there existed a degree of regional agricultural specialization within the territory as a whole. To step up both these factors became the objective. The following figures show the extent to which it was being achieved:
Fergana valley total raw cotton production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>1,015,687 puds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>1,800,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>3,896,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bukhara raw cotton export to Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>410,000 puds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>1,359,099 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>2,624,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total cotton freight carried by Trans-Caspian railway

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Freight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>873,092 puds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>1,470,503 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>2,673,267 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>2,626,110 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>3,026,518 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>3,588,025 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The area of agricultural regional trade was extended to include South Russia and later south-western Siberia, mainly by means of the new railways. No direct administrative compulsion was used in the khanates or in Fergana to force cotton cultivation. It was done mainly through tax adjustments (particularly by tax incentives to grow American strains), credit policy, high prices and hence the energetic activities of brokers, dealers and middlemen who bought up crops in advance, and through a few commercial plantations. Little was effectively done to ensure that a reasonable and stable proportion of the proceeds from their valuable crop reached the peasants. On the other hand, better seeds, grading, pest control and experimental ideas in cultivation came in with the Russians.

Much material covering the nineteenth century imperial period of the khanates' and Fergana's economic life has still to be examined so as to estimate quantitatively and qualitatively the effects of the drawing of their economy increasingly into that of Russia. Such a study would include the economic effect of Russian peasant settlement, the question of whether industrial development (apart from ginning and other processing) was seriously retarded rather than promoted by Russia's preoccupation with raw cotton (in 1801, for example, Bukhara's exports to Russia of spun and woven cotton were higher in value than her exports of raw cotton), and to what extent the railway planning considered regional economic needs. Much preliminary, particularly bibliographical, work has been done, and some area studies have been made, but no satisfactory detailed economic history of the region has yet appeared.
The Khanate of Khorezm

The khanate of Khorezm (or Khiva as it was called in nineteenth century Russia) entered the century with a new dynasty from the Uzbek inaqs or powerful nobles who had held administrative power during the eighteenth century under shadow khans descended from Genghis Khan ("playing at khans" in the phrase used by Barthold).

The population was around 700,000, of which the 40,000 Uzbeks formed the ruling classes and provided the administration. The towns, besides Uzbeks, contained the original oasis inhabitants, with strong admixtures notably of Persians captured in raids. Khiva had become the capital since the late sixteenth century when old Urgench had lost its water supply through a change in course of the Amu-Dar'ya.

The Persian slaves worked predominantly in agriculture. Riza Quli Khan, a Persian emissary who visited Khiva in 1851(30), describes the customary three-day holiday for slaves at the end of Ramazan, when the Persian slaves from all over the country gathered in Khiva and met their friends and relations. Riza estimated the total numbers as being about half the allogênes (i.e. indigenous settled population) and also pointed to the considerable admixture of Persian blood through children of mixed parentage. As negotiations for freeing the Persian slaves was one of the main objectives of his embassy, he was probably inclined to exaggerate the total numbers. One of the stock Khivan answers when approached on this question was that the slaves were captured by the Turkmen and then sold in Khiva and were probably better off there than being dragged about the arid country of their nomad captors.(31) This is how Riza Quli described the slaves' holiday: "On the occasion of the holidays following the month of Ramazan, the Persians and other slaves scattered in the villages and settlements of Khorezm where they work as household servants, carters and labourers, enjoy three days of freedom. They come to Khiva from all parts and spend their time in strolling round and amusing themselves. They meet their fellow-countrymen, their companions in misfortune; they talk of their situation; they tell each other of their captive condition and complain one to the other of the rigours of exile and of the misery to which they are reduced."(32)

Between the old oasis areas of intensively irrigated and fertilized cultivation, semi-nomad Turkmen carried on a cattle economy with subsidiary agriculture. In the north at Kungrad and the Amu-Dar'ya delta the Kara-Kalpaks practised a mixed sedentary agriculture, divided between crops and cattle. The nomad Kazakh cattle-breeders stretched from Kunya-Urgench to the east and north. The effort of successive khans to establish authority over the Turkmen and Kazakhs brought the clashes both with Kokand and with Russia, since the latter was trying to do the same thing on a wide though somewhat haphazard scale.

Khiva differed from Bukhara and Kokand in that it did not consist of
principalities with strong local and separatist traditions (with the exception of Kungrad which was often quite autonomous), and for that reason and because it was smaller and isolated by deserts, the problem of creating a compact and viable state was made easier. On the other hand, the towns exhibited intense local loyalty; the names of four at least being derived from that of their leading family. It had the other perennial problem - that of nomads and semi-nomads along two borders.

Merv and Khorasan were the two objectives of Khiva's outside campaigns. The first occasioned clashes with Bukhara; the latter did not cease until Khiva's virtual annexation by Russia. The boundary (on which a Soviet-Persian boundary commission concluded work as recently as 1955) was never established between Khiva and Persia, but was drawn eventually between Russia and Persia in 1894-5 and confirmed by the comprehensive treaty of 1907 along the southern edge of Russia's Transcaspian possessions.

Though not composed of semi-independent principalities, Khiva, nevertheless, in the nineteenth century had to struggle for internal consolidation since throughout the eighteenth century there had been no established dynasty. When the Inaq Iltuzer assumed supreme power (1804) he had to establish his authority and that of his succession. Muhammad Rahim, who succeeded him in 1806, reigned until 1825 and carried through reforms designed throughout with this end in view. He concentrated administration under the khan's own direction and sought to establish regular taxation and stable duties on merchandise. He restarted minting gold coins bearing his own head. The most troublesome vilayet as always was Kungrad, the Kara-Kalpak province at the Amu-Dar'ya delta on the Aral Sea. Rahim's outside campaigns consisted of an unsuccessful one against Bukhara, the capture of Merv and an indeterminate campaign into Khorasan. All these were repeated in the years 1840-60. Almost more costly were expeditions against the Turkmen, who formed about a third of the population on the khanate's territory, and who were still largely nomad and the most warlike and intransigent people of the whole region, as their subsequent trial of strength with the Russians and the fantastic slaughter of Geok-Tepe proved. The same Riza Quli, who travelled through Turkmen country to and from Khiva (a journey of 22 days) crossing the river Gurgan near its mouth in the Caspian Sea, testifies to their independence and to the uncertainty concerning their loyalty or treachery felt both by the Shah of Persia and by the Khan of Khiva. He enumerated the Turkmen clans and told how he and his companions escaped capture for ransom by sowing discord among them.(33) The abortive Russian campaign against Khiva under Perovskiy took place (1839) in Allah Quli's reign. Perovskiy pleaded the need to establish peace in the steppes and to put an end to the alleged encouragement given by the Khiva khans to the Turkmen. Russia next assembled and launched two corvettes in the Aral Sea (commented on by Riza Quli) and established the fort of Krasnovodsk on the Caspian in 1869 - the basic prerequisite for the domination of the Turkmen territories.

Riza Quli recorded in his journal that the palaces and gardens he found in Khiva were equal to anything found in Persia and that this new capital city (it
had had to be rebuilt in 1770) had been much embellished by the recent khans. In general, the oasis country was prosperous with small walled cities and had seemingly recovered from the devastations of the Mongol conquest. He was scornful of the Khorezmians' criticisms of Persian deviations from Islam and quoted some of the former's practices as not being very orthodox. He was surprised to find no doctor in Khiva and pointed out that in Persia there were medical practitioners in every city and in the army. His main business was to obtain the release of Persian slaves (in which he failed) and he consequently stressed the power and splendour of the Shah and the might of his army as compared with that of Khorezm. He maintains that 10 old cannon with Persian crews was the total size of Khiva's artillery. The army actually was made up from some 1,000-1,500 regular khan's bodyguard, a mixed foot and horse militia raised for campaigns, and a Turkmen horse militia. By such an arrangement there was about eight times more cavalry than infantry, including a number of "falconers". Soldiers were paid in grain; the Turkmen's liability for military service was considered as an exemption from tax. Riza Quli also described the enthronement rites. In his random notes of the return journey, he recorded the ruins in various parts of the Turkmen desert of settlements laid waste by the Mongol invasions. His journal, unfortunately, does not contain his private reports to the Shah on the Khorezmian army, diplomacy and merchant practices, in which Pazukhin's report to Tsar Alexis of Muscovy two hundred years earlier is so rich.

By the middle of the century about 75 per cent of the population was sedentary and carried on an irrigated cultivation in which crop rotation was practised and developed more than in the Zeravshan valley. There were over two million acres of agricultural land; irrigated land was heavily fertilized and carried two crops annually (a grain crop plus a fodder or melon crop). The northern districts grew wheat and millet; the southern, wheat, cotton and mulberries, as well as fruit, including melons and water melons. About 60 per cent of the population lived in the southern provinces. Towards the end of the century about 44 per cent of the cultivable land was under food crops and about 32 per cent under cash crops. Hay and lucerne were grown and used as winter fodder so that apart from the wholly nomad Kazakh, the Kara-Kalpaks of mixed farming habits did not rear their cattle entirely on grazing. Irrigation channels were maintained by compulsory peasant service. The canals were fed from the water resources of the Amu-Dar'ya; there were six main canals from 70 to 160kms. in length. Water wheels were worked by draught animals. Large scale irrigation works were undertaken from time to time by the khans. Fishing, carried on by Kara-Kalpaks, was an important subsidiary food supply, both from the Aral Sea and the river delta.

Land tenure arrangements were similar to those in Bukhara and Kokand (see pp.11-15 above), except that certain features were more accentuated. The proportion of "gift" lands - handed over by the khan to his servants and thus free from all tax - was very high. Modern Soviet historians estimate that as much as half of the agricultural land belonged to the khan and to the beneficiaries under his gift. Waqf lands are estimated at 45 per cent of all
irrigated lands. Land-tax was levied at three different rates, depending on the size of the holding. The tax in kind (diak) was gradually being replaced by a tax in money per desyatina (salgyt), though both existed simultaneously throughout the last quarter of the century. Landless peasants were automatically included in the bottom group for tax. They formed 31 per cent of the total in some areas, ranging down to about 15 per cent in others. The landlessness was masked by a wide range of share-cropping arrangements which at the bottom of the scale was nothing else than personal service to the land-owner. Land-hunger, land-tax and the exigencies of the obligations to the land-owner caused sporadic peasant risings as in Bukhara and Kokand. Peasant craftsmen in the villages sold their products or their services to their neighbours and received payment usually in kind but also in cash. In the towns craftsmen formed guilds. Certain crafts were highly organized and there existed communities of metal-workers, hide- and leather-workers, potters, rope-makers and rug weavers. With the introduction of Russian goods craft production began to decline, notably that of dyers and potters. Tradition and rituals were jealously maintained within the guilds; these took on a semi-religious character with observances going back to pre-Islamic days. Some of these survived far into the Soviet period and were described by a contemporary ethnographer in SOVETS'KAYA ETNOGRAFIYA in 1957. (34)

Internal trade in the khanate was not so well developed as in Bukhara and the Fergana valley. It was done on fixed market days in the towns. External trade was with Afghanistan, Persia and Russia; Khiva merchants took their own goods to Russian fairs. Goods were carried by flat-bottomed boats with sails down the Amu-Dar'ya to Urgench or up to Chardzhou, then by caravan route. The Khivan river trade handled cargo of some 2½ to 3 million puds annually. Coinage was similar to that of Bukhara, i.e. the golden tilla and the silver tanka, both minted in Khiva.

By the Russian treaty of 1873, besides the tutelage terms on foreign policy, the territory on the right bank of the Amu-Dar'ya was incorporated directly into Russia as the Amu-Dar'ya district of the Turkestan governor-generalship. The military officer in command of the district became Russia's senior representative to the khan and the supervisor of his activities. The Amu-Dar'ya district was mainly Kara-Kalpak and Kazakh land, semi-settled or still nomad. The heart of the old Khorezm was on the whole less affected either economically or socially by Russian penetration and tutelage than either Kokand or Bukhara, and the administrative, economic and social relationships observed and described at the end of the century were to a considerable extent those pertaining to the middle of it. A progressive and energetic minister of Khan Isfandiyar, Islam-Khoja, built a post office, hospital and school in Khiva, and had ideas on simplifying taxation on the basis of income, but he was murdered before he could consolidate his reforms. Communities of Russian Cossacks settled on the sea coast in fishing guilds and evolved original forms of cooperatives which survived for a time into the Soviet period. Apart from that, there was very little Russian settlement, a total of 1,000 Russians being recorded in the khanate itself by 1900. According to the treaty terms with Russia, Khiva was supposed to
repatriate some 20,000 male slaves to Persia. There seems no published material so far on how its agriculture stood the loss of this considerable labour force. Another reform was the substitution of a tent tax on the Turkmen in place of their obligation to military service.

The economic changes brought about by Russia's advent were the greatly increased emphasis on raw cotton, the increase of Russia's share in Khiva's external trade, the penetration of Russian money and wholesale trade facilities into Khivan merchandizing and shipping. The leap forward of cotton did not occur until the turn of the century, when the percentage of the cash crop acreage under raw cotton rose from 9 per cent to 16.3 per cent. Raw cotton exported to Russia amounted to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pud</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>320,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was no sudden transition of the financing of cotton growing into Russian hands. Small local middlemen lent money and seeds to share-cropping peasants. They themselves then came gradually to borrow from Russian merchant bankers and wholesalers. The local trading bourgeoisie developed cotton interests and there arose several local well-to-do cotton merchandizing families, some of whom also handled silk and cultivated their own mulberries. By 1890 a number of steam-driven gins were in operation. Though ginning plants generally remained small, by 1913 there were 13 large ones and 50 small. Some 10 plants were owned by local wholesalers.

The following table shows the growth of total trade with Russia:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Volume in puds</th>
<th>Value in rubles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Export to Russia</td>
<td>Import from Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>278,166</td>
<td>238,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891 (average)</td>
<td>278,166</td>
<td>238,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898 (&quot; )</td>
<td>482,750</td>
<td>230,905</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Goods were carried by river to Chardzhou, then by the Transcaspian railway. Russian wharves and vessels entered the Amu haulage trade (a concession long sought after and at last extracted by the treaty). In 1887 the Amu-Dar'ya shipping company was established and in 1900 Russian steamboat and tug shipping on the Aral Sea. This shorter alternative route immediately enhanced the total
Trade turnover by waterway and rail. It is difficult to establish on available evidence whether indigenous boat owners were able to maintain their proportionate share. A fish export trade was developed by a Russian merchant of Orenburg.

In the change of pattern in favour of a cash crops trade, hardship arose from the rise of grain prices, mainly because there was no alternative local supply (such as the eastern vilayets had been in the case of Bukhara). Cattle rearing and sheep maintained their importance because they too produced meat, hides and by-products bought by Russia and still to some extent by Persia. The problem of adequate grain supplies had not been satisfactorily solved by 1914; it figured in the discussions for a new main railway line in the years preceding the Revolution; these later resulted in the Turksib.

Socially and culturally Russian impact and the impact of the outside world through Russia was less felt than in Bukhara, in the Fergana valley or in the steppes. The article in SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA on craft guilds already quoted describes the persistance of social forms and family organization far into the 1930s. The author points to the comparatively swift decline of orthodox Muslim practices during the Soviet period as a consequence both of the deliberate cutting away of Islam in the political and cultural life of the khanates and of the diminution in each generation of persons with a knowledge of Arabic. But on a par with this decline of orthodox religion, he points to the re-emergence of old syncretic practices, themselves survivals from the ancient faiths of the days before Islam, characterized by the "women's religions of amulets, charms, incantations, concerned with fertility, death, marital taboos". The author also describes his field researches on ilats - extended family communities, living in a self-enclosed group within the collective farms. These stemmed from extended family communities which formerly practised mutual aid and division of labour, not only in major undertakings such as house building, blanket making etc., but also in field work. The economic and religious life of the ilat was governed by its elders, in conjunction with the mulla and the aksakal. Ceremonials at marriages, circumcision, etc. were its outward manifestations. Each ilat had its own burial ground. Something very similar was found by the field research team (in 1954-6) within the craft and trade guilds of the towns. For example, blacksmiths, coppersmiths, potters, wood-workers, shoemakers and barbers. All these groups had kept alive some of the traditional ceremonies associated with initiation as "master", such as customary presents by the pupil to his old master, and the gift by the latter to the newly accepted craftsman of a tool or tools of his trade. All the craftsmen seemed to know the name of their traditional patron saint, and new professions, for instance, motor vehicle drivers, had acquired one for themselves; the drivers had a spanner as the symbolic gift at initiation. Some degree of economic dependence on the master still existed - living in the master's household, the customary obligation to pay over to him a portion of casual earnings and so on.

The rich local bourgeoisie and the intellectuals on the whole remained outside the sphere of Russian contact to a much greater extent than those of the Fergana valley and even of Bukhara. For instance, no Khivan youths were sent to
Russian schools. As there was no Russian settlement as such (not even in a railway zone, as in Bukhara), there was no opportunity for contact in building, street layout, furnishing of the home. Whereas in Tashkent all but two very early small Russian churches were built by local stone-masons, who thus acquired new ideas and skills, local traditions remained intact in Khiva, and the madrasah Islam Khoja built in 1910 by the local master, Qurban Niaz Khivaki, was entirely in the distinctive local mid-nineteenth century style. The same holds good in regard to skilled crafts - Khivan jewellers, miniaturists, pottery designers were the last in Central Asia to be touched by Russian and Russo-Tatar influences. This isolationism was almost equally marked in culture. National Muslim modernist movements, notably Jadidism, made as little headway in Khiva as contemporary western life represented by Russia.

Notes

(1) Barthold, V. V. ISTORIYA KUL'TURNOY ZHIZNI TURKESTANA, AN/SSSR, Leningrad, 1927. Also ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, Leiden, 1913 (in which several of the relevant entries are by Barthold). Nalivkin, V. P. HISTOIRE DU KHANAT DE KOKAND, Paris, 1887, École des Langues Orientales Vivantes.

(2) Nalivkin, V. P., op. cit.


(4) Nasrullah, Emir of Bukhara, made several attempts to dislodge Khudayar and succeeded in doing so and establishing Mallia Khan who, to do him justice, tried to settle the feud between the Kipchaks and the Tadzhiks by making the latter return half the Kipchak properties. Mallia also sent troops against the Russians and toured his cities before being killed in 1862.

(5) SI YU T'ON TCHE. (See Note (3)), Books XLIV-XLVI, p.168.


(7) ISTORIYA UZBEKSKOY SSR., bibliog., chronological table. AN/Uzb.SSR, Tashkent, 1956; Iskandarov, B. I. IZ ISTORII BUKHARSKOGO EMIRATA, AN/SSSR, Institut Vostokovedeniya, Moscow, 1958, Ch.1, Sec.5.

(8) ISTORIYA UZBEKSKOY SSR., ibid.

The Tashkent Khan's army was described in 1796 by Captain Telyatnikov, who was the first Russian emissary to Tashkent:

"4. The khan's forces in Tashkent and the whole region number about 2,000 men, and are made up for the most part of escaped people of various nationalities thus: Kalmyks, Uzbeks, Kokandians, Khojentians and Bukharans; there are very few natives of Tashkent. This army has three kinds of weapons. Some are armed with Turkish muskets, which are as usual without locks but with slow matches, others have bows and arrows, and yet others only spears and swords. They are maintained by the khan.

5. The Tashkent Khan also has some light artillery, about twenty cast iron and iron small cannon, which are used against any enemy which might occur; they are mounted on camels.

6. Gunpowder is made by the Tashkent people themselves and there is plenty of saltpetre and of very good quality; lead is obtained from Turkestan; although it is smelted in Tashkent itself it is only smelted there in small quantity."

Sokolov, Yu.A. "Pervoye Russkoye Posol'stvo v Tashkente", VOPROSY ISTORII, 1959, No.3. Texts quoted by Sokolov are given by him in TRUDY SAGU, Ser.Ist., v.140, kniga 28, Tashkent, 1958. He also gives an account of the return visit of Tashkent envoys to Russia, received by Paul I. The envoys, as well as asking for trade concessions, asked for mining engineers, and for Russian help against China in case of need. This was the first direct contact of the Tashkentbekstvo as such with Russia.


Iskandarov, B.I., op.cit. Also his OB NEKOTORYKH IZMENENIYAKH V EKONOMIKE VOSTOCHNOY BUKHARY NA RUBEZHE XIX-XX VEKA Stalinabad, 1958.


Iskandarov, B.I., op.cit. (Note (7)). Quoted by him from TsGIAUSSR, "Politagentstvo v Bukhare". Some compilers estimated average holdings of .3 desyatinas per person in the eastern, 1.4 in the central, .5 in the northern, .8 in the western and .5 in the southern provinces.

Iskandarov, B.I., op.cit.(Note (7)), has a chapter on the Vosse rising.

ISTORIYA UZBEKSKOY SSR, ibid. Also glossary of terms in Hamza, IZBERANNNOYE, ed. Sabitova, S., var.trans., Moscow, 1954.
Khamrayev, A.Kh., op.cit., gives his interpretation of the riots as being used "for their own purposes by the feudal and clerical hierarchy" in their struggle for domination.

E.g. those of Saray on the Amu-Dar'ya, an entrepot for the Afghan trade, have been quoted by Iskandarov, B.I., op.cit.


"And Boris being in Bukhara and Khiva spoke of this to the silk-dealers and merchants that with the said silk they should come to Astrakhan and to Moscow and sell and exchange it for merchandise as much as the price would fetch. And in Bukhara they make raw silk for carrying away, since they have a large turnover in Bukhara. And in Khiva about 1,000 puds of silk grows or more; and they buy a pud at 34 rubles or a little less. But they themselves will not take it to Astrakhan, because many come for the silk from Bukhara."

Quoted by Iskandarov, B.I., op.cit. (Note (7)), from TsGIA, diplomatic office of Turkestan Governor-General, No.1, s/z. op.1, d.37.

Barthold, V.V., op.cit., on the inter-action of the sedentary and semi-nomad ways of life:

"It is also questionable to what extent the disintegration of a nomad way of life and of the cattle-breeding bound up with it corresponded to the economic and political interests of Turkestan and Russia. The settled populations of Turkestan also benefited from the nomad husbandry of its neighbours, buying there the products of cattle-breeding cheaper than would otherwise have been possible. Some of the representatives of Russia's authority, e.g. Perovskiy, attached great importance to Kirgiz cattle-breeding. . . others such as Katenin (1857-60) on the contrary encouraged arable farming, considering the settlement of nomads to be an essential pre-requisite of the peace of the steppes. . . Kirgiz agriculture hardly added much to the total agricultural output of Turkestan; the harm felt from such factors as the diminution of herds, greater cost of meat, deterioration of horse breeds. . . out-weighed benefits. . . Besides this, settlement and the loss thereby of their national characteristics by the nomads facilitated the merging of the Kirgiz (Kazakh) and Turkmen, not with the Russians, but with Sarts and Tatars, their kindred by blood and religion; it led to the loss of pure Turkic forms of speech and of the unique forms of national life, and its replacement by a false and hybrid literary language with many Arab and Persian words, and a pan-Muslim
scholastic rhetoric and education, which only made more difficult the penetration of Russian and European culture."

On this last point, Barthold quotes a cri de coeur of an ethnographer: "It looks as if cotton has driven all your stories and songs out of your heads".

(22) Ak Mechet' on the Syr-Dar'ya was one of the recognized points for the collection of this toll.

(23) Iskandarov, B.I., OB NEKOTORYKH IZMENENIYAKH V EKONOMIKE VOSTOCHNOY BUKHARY NA RUBEZHE XIX-XX VEKA Stalinabad, 1958, Ch.2, "Vozniknovenyiye zolotpromyslashennosti v vostochnoy Bukhare".

(24) Ibid., quoted by him from TsGIA, "Politagentstvo v Bukhare", fo.2.

(25) Ibid., fo.3, doc.255.

(26) Iskandarov, B.I., OB NEKOTORYKH IZMENENIYAKH V EKONOMIKE VOSTOCHNOY BUKHARY NA RUBEZHE XIX-XX VEKA Stalinabad, 1958, quotes petitions by Bukhara dealers to the Russian Political Agent asking for limitation of foreign dealers or at any rate for an imposition of tax on them. TsGIAUSSR, fo.2, op.1, d.199.


(28) Raw cotton used in Russian textile undertakings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1900</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Central Asia (inc. Bukhara, Khiva, Russian Turkestan, i.e. Fergana)</td>
<td>4,110,000</td>
<td>4,483,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From USA</td>
<td>5,543,000</td>
<td>7,749,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Egypt</td>
<td>2,472,000</td>
<td>1,619,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCYCLOPAEDIA BROCKHAUS & EFRON, St.Petersburg.

(29) ISTORIYA UZBEKSKOY SSR, idem.


(31) A similar answer was given two centuries earlier, concerning Russian slaves to the emissary of Tsar Alexis, B. Pazukhin, except that the nomads named were the Bashkirs and Kalmyks; cf. Truvorova, A.N. op.cit.
(32) Riza Quli Khan, op.cit., p.85.

(33) Idem, MESHEDI-MISSRIAN ET RETOURS A ESTERABAD.

(34) Snesarev, G.P. "O nekоторikh prichinakh sokhraneniya religiosno-
       bytovykh perezhitov u uzbekov Khorezma", SOV.ETNOGRAFIYA, 1957,
       No.2. (English version in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1958, Vol.VI,
       No.1.)
The three constant factors of Central Asian political and cultural life - settled oasis communities, nomad khanates, and the threat of outside invaders, powerful because holding more modern techniques - still existed throughout the nineteenth century. What was different, however, was that the Central Asian valleys and passes as well as the northern steppe route were no longer the links between China and the west, and hence Transoxania and Khorezm were no longer countries where Buddhist, Hindu, Christian and Muslim faiths and Chinese, Indian, Persian, Turkic and Arabic civilizations met and intermingled. This ebbing away of the main streams of civilization coincided with the aftermath of the Mongol conquests; thus the area had to recover after these devastations, not, indeed, in total isolation from the rest of the world, but no longer as one of its commercial crossroads, or meeting places of its great religions. Thus, Tonfato l'Chani(1) reports in 1752 that Samarkand was desolate and its madrasah empty and used as a corn store, whereas almost any of the descriptions of Samarkand between the ninth century and the thirteenth century would read like this: "De Kishsh à la capitale de Sughd il y a quatre journées de marche. Samarkande est une ville des plus magnifiques, des plus importantes, des mieux défendues, des plus peuplées en hommes valeur et en héros, très endurante à la guerre; elle est située à la frontière des Turcs. . ."(2)

The history of the region grew more and more localized; the last nomad empire, that of the Kalmuks, never recovered from its defeat by the Chinese in 1755 and broke up into two semi-settled entities, one on the Lower Volga in Russia. The nomad khanates actually inhabiting the region (Kazakh and Turkmen) were only of local significance. Cultural isolation was more marked than political or economic isolation, since as the nineteenth century advanced, Central Asian rulers gradually became aware of the possibilities of their strategic positions as states marginal to two expanding empires; in somewhat the same way, Turkmen or Kazakh khans contracted or broke alliances with Khorezm or Bukhara, Persia or Russia according to the necessities of the moment. Trade ties with Kashgar, Persia, Afghanistan, Russia and India had never been severed; the gradual drawing in of Turkestan as a cotton supplier to European Russia provided another link with the contemporary capitalist world.

Cultural isolation, though pronounced, did not mean stagnation; the lowest ebb had been touched in the eighteenth century, and in fact the nineteenth century saw some revival. Barthold wrote that although Turkestan as a whole had fallen to being one of the most backward places of the Muslim world, yet Bukhara had kept its tradition as a centre of theological culture.(3) The Mangit dynasty had renewed the life of the Samarkand madrasah, and new madrasahs had been
built in Kokand and Andizhan. Khudayar Khan built himself a palace (a rather bad imitation of Timurid buildings). Irrigation networks in all three khanates were repaired from time to time and new ones undertaken in Fergana by the Kokand khans, and in Khorezm by the Khorezm khans. The gardens on the outskirts of cities were commented on with admiration by Russian, other European and Persian visitors (as well as serving as cover for resistance fighters against Russian regular troops). This, however, was only true of the Zeravshan and Fergana valleys and Khorezm; the town life of the Chu and Talass regions and of the Transcaspian Turkmen steppe had gone for good.

Theological studies were picking up in Bukhara and Samarkand. The Emir Haidar was a scholar and theologian with a reputation beyond Bukhara. Literature kept mostly to traditional moulds and was largely repetitive. Mirkhond’s World History (fifteenth century) was translated from Persian into Chagatay by Minis.(4) In Kokand, an anthology of 25 contemporary poets was published and several compendiums of local history. A lyric poet, Mukimi (1851-1903), who tried to bring literary Chagatay nearer the popular tongue, was famous also for his satires which were written by personal request and passed from hand to hand. Khorezm, which had maintained an almost unbroken tradition of scholarship and history, thanks to its formidable natural barriers against invasions, kept the tradition of scholar-cum-official in the person of the Mirza Bashi of the last khan, who was also a poet and a historian. Barthold gives an interesting note concerning libraries: the library in Khorezm had been preserved and in fact enriched by Muhammad Rahim and Russian scholars given access to its collections. The Bukhara and Samarkand libraries had been greatly impoverished already in Khan Nasrullah’s time and Russian scholars were finding difficulty in tracing sources and restoring collections. This work of research and restoration had been taken up particularly keenly by Professor N.P. Ostroumov, editor of TURK ESTANSKIYE VEDOMOSTI from 1883-1917, with the collaboration of indigenous scholars.

The newer events in literature took place not within the cities at all but among the nomad khanates both within and outside the overlordship of Kokand, Khorezm or Bukhara. The Turkmen lyric poet, Mulla Nepes, wrote lyrics in Turkic using an original rhyme arrangement. He also gave a variant of the epic KERI-OGIJU. Oral epics were still sung by indigenous bards. (The veteran Kazakh bard, Dzhambul, born in about 1846 on the river Chu continued well into the post-Soviet era.) Toktogul Satylganov, a Kirgiz bard, was nearly contemporary with him. MANAS, the fourteenth century Kirgiz epic, was first written down by the orientalist V.V. Radlov. Abay Kunanbayev, the son of a powerful bey, born in 1845, is regarded as the founder of Kazakh written literature. As a boy he was sent from his traditional camping grounds to study at the madrasah at Semipalatinsk, where he also studied in a Russian school and read Russian poets and writers. He wrote and translated both verse and prose. He developed and varied Kazakh oral poetry.(5)

This literary and cultural activity throughout Central Asia, though it belies the general view held in the west of almost complete stagnation, is never-
theless eclipsed by the verve and promise of writers, poets and thinkers in the Tatar circles of Kazan and Ufa and Azerbaydzhan circles in Baku. The cultural ferment at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century was much more marked there. The Jadid movement when it reached Central Asia was a much paler and more anaemic growth both in its cultural and political manifestations than among the Tatars and the Azerbaydzhan. Whether the strength of the Kazan and Azerbaydzhan movement was due to proximity to Turkey, or, on the contrary, to the stimulus of closer contact with Russian intellectual life (Kazan university had been founded in 1804) and to Georgian or Armenian intellectual life (where, particularly in the former, a parallel renaissance was in flower); or to a nationalism made strong in antipathy to Russian nationalism, and intermittent russification programmes; or to cross-currents of all these is not immediately relevant to the present study. All these elements were much more remote and less pressing in the nineteenth century in Central Asia and a renaissance, for these reasons, was likely either to be derivative or else not to come to full flower until half a century later.

Kazan and Baku were not the only places from which ideas came to Bukhara and Khorezm. India was another source, and though in Muslim India cultural cross-currents were less strong, they nevertheless existed and through cultural and historical affinity as well as geographical proximity, it is these which were the more likely to influence thought in Turkestan. But in nineteenth century Central Asia its effects were still embryonic. In Kazan the two streams, defined for convenience as that of Gasprinskiy (pan-Turkic) and Il'minskiy (symbiosis based on russification) were in full flood, while in Bukhara they appeared as tentative efforts to establish modern method schools, as intermittent struggles with the emir and the conservative Muslim clergy. In Muslim India, the pull of traditionalist revival and that of "westernizing" inspiration is exemplified by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Iqbal, whose political and social writings were an important influence on the adaptation of Islam to the contemporary world.(7) How much of this penetrated to Bukhara by the traditional trade route is hard to assess. Lithographed and printed books and pamphlets from India reached the bazaars of Bukhara and Kokand in relatively large numbers.(8) But it is difficult in present circumstances to weigh the direct evidence of cultural contacts. Soviet research students are not likely to stress it even if they found it, since the present political trend is to magnify all evidence of contact between India or Afghanistan and Russia, rather than to study independent contacts between Islam in India and Islam in old Turkestan.

Who formed the intellectual classes in Bukhara, Khorezm, Kokand and Tashkent and where were they educated? Nearly all of the available biographies show that the indigenous publicists were educated in the first instance in the madrasahs of Samarkand, Kokand or Khorezm (as contrasted to the intelligentsia of the steppes). The tradition of the educated civil servant in the emir's entourage, as well as that of the ruler-scholar, was continued in the nineteenth century at least in Khorezm. These were isolated cases and found in Khorezm rather than in Bukhara; in the latter, intellectuals were to be increasingly found outside court and administrative circles rather than inside them. Mikimi was educated at madrasahs in
Kokand, Bukhara and Tashkent. Firkat (1858-1909) a poet, travelled and lived in Egypt, India and China, where he died; he learnt and read Russian easily and read the Russian poets in the original. Hamzah Hakim-zadeh (1889-1929), poet, publicist and playwright of Kokand, was educated at the madrasahs of Kokand, Namangan and Tashkent. Ahmad Kalla (1827-97), writer, scholar and satirist of Bukhara, spoke Russian and travelled with the emir's son on his visit to Russia in 1885.

In the story of his childhood and boyhood Ayni gives an account of the life and curriculum at the madrasah in Bukhara which he attended from 1889-93. The curriculum of compulsory subjects comprised Arabic, morphology and syntax, logic, rhetoric, sciences in theological interpretation, rules of ablution, fasting, burial, pilgrimage to Mecca, of purification, alms-giving, regulations for buying and selling, slave-owning and the release of slaves, marriages and divorce and analogous sharia rules. Mathematics and literature could be studied outside. Among the textbooks he mentions were the Aqaid of Umar al Nasafi (Karshi) (dating from the sixteenth century), the Sharh of Mulla Abdurrahman Jam (fifteenth century philologist and poet from Herat), the Tahdhib for logic and metaphysics, the Shamsiyah (a manual of logic by Najm ud-Din Umar ibn Ali al-Qazvini (d.1294). The preliminary, mainly linguistic, courses took three years and were studied with a master's senior pupils. The main courses, which covered interpretation, logic, metaphysics and law took up from five to ten years, and were done with the selected teacher himself. Ayni's first knowledge of Russian came from copying in secret words from a Mulla Turab's notebook and learning them with another boy from the madrasah. (His reminiscences of the discussions concerning Mulla Turab's squeaky shoes, which ended in the Mulla's being put to death as an infidel from the gossip that the leather shoes he bought in Samarkand had been made by Russian shoemakers in Kazan' who sew pig bristles into the soles, illustrate the resentments aroused by an innovator's ways even in the educated circles of the time.)

Was there a reading public and how extensive was it? What did it read and to what extent did local writers supply its needs? It is possible to give some pointers for an answer. First, as to the reading public. The above mentioned study on printed and lithographed publications in Turkestan in local languages between 1868-1917 gives statistics of presses (letterpress and lithographic) and of the book trade (the latter rather fragmentary)(10). These, since they are compiled from Russian licences and registrations, give a minimum rather than a total picture and in particular leave out the bulk of texts used in madrasahs (whether hand-copied or lithographed). Bearing this fact in mind and further remembering that these presses and undertakings were commercial undertakings (i.e. in no way subsidized either by state or clerical moneys) which had to pay their way, the emergent picture is imposing. The first printing press was established in Tashkent in 1868; this by 1870, besides Russian and Arabic, printed supplements to the TURKESTANSKIE VEDOMOSTI in Chagatay. In 1877 the first private press was established in Tashkent; both that and the official one had lithographic departments. In 1874 a Court lithographer to the Khiva Khan, Muhammad Rahim, was appointed. The lithography was run by a local printer, Atajan Adbalov
(b.1856), who had studies at a school run by Russians, and who was taught lithography by a Persian who visited Khiva in 1874-8. The first production from his press was Alisher Navai's KHAMSA. There were lithographic presses established by local lithographers in old Tashkent (established 1906), Samarkand (1894), Andizhan (1904), Namangan (1909), Bukhara (1901). A table of presses for the period in Tashkent, Andizhan, Kokand and Namangan shows as many as 50 in some years (with a maximum of 25 in Tashkent), with a maximum total of 453 workers. In 1907-9, 45 booklets in local tongues were published in Bukhara alone. A report by N.P. Ostroumov of 1881 urges the need for better censorship arrangements; censorship was in St. Petersburg which meant a long delay and hampered growth. The requirement that a considerable number of copies must be deposited in central libraries and ministries was also a difficulty. (It was not until 1911 that the Russian censorship for Eastern languages was moved to Tiflis.)

Several studies were made by Russian orientalists and officials on the reading matter available in Turkestan in the early years of the twentieth century (Andreyev in 1909, A.N. Samoylovich 1908, A. Kalmykov in 1909 on Khiva, L. Zimin in 1912). These, though far from complete, give indications of what was sold and read.(11) Andreyev classified reading matter as:

1. Translations of Arabic religious literature.
2. Secular literature, subdivided into:
   (a) Translations from the Persian.
   (b) Local authors (of the latter, Sufi Allah Yar, Khoja Ahmad Turk estani, Alisher Navai, Fizuli (Fuzuli), Divanaini, Khuvaio "and many other contemporary poetic imitators").
   (c) Historical literature.

The Khiva lithographers published the Divans of Munis, Ahmad Tabib's (Court physician) works, Muhammad Rahim's own poems, "as well as those of thirty others, including princes, state servants, clergy of all ranks including madrasah students", and translations from Persian. Licence applications give the lists of authors. Another list gives books published in Tashkent in 1912-14. The first local translation of a Russian classic was Tolstoy's WHAT MEN LIVE BY in 1887 by Firkat, followed by some Pushkin centenary translations in 1899 by Muki mi. More translations from the Russian followed slowly, including Zhukovskiy and Krylov. Two more interesting lists are available, namely a Muslim bibliography in the 1913 MIR ISLAMA, and A. Semenov's catalogue of the lithographed books in the Turkestan public library.(12)

The following table of licensed bookshops in various Turkestan centres is interesting, not so much for accurate numbers but for showing the leading place taken by Kokand and Namangan. It confirms that it was not by chance that Mustafa Chokayev chose Kokand for the seat of his national republic in 1918:
Kashfiyah (revelation) run by I.K. Sharipov (1909-17) won a reputation as a bookshop in Kokand; he also opened a Russian kiosk called "Sun", and a branch of Kashfiyah in Namangan. In 1914 a successful shop, Chagatay, was run in Kokand by the pan-Turkist Abijan Mahmud; this sold Russian and Muslim books. The sale of books from Turkey in the early years of the century was promoted by the society of Young Turks for spreading education in Central Asia. N. Likoshin's study of foreign books on sale since 1896 testifies to the predominance of books from Turkey, selling widely in villages. He quotes a customs declaration of one bookseller in old Margelan for 55 parcels of books from Turkey in one year (1905), but mentions that these were mostly old rubbish dating back to 1876-96. Logofet mentions Turkish, Indian, Bombay and Calcutta editions in Samarkand, and again in old Bukhara, as well as Persian editions. Much the same was reported by an observer in 1912. In 1913 another observer reckoned that there were over 2,000 religious texts in Arabic and Tadzhik on sale in Kokand from India; local lithographers tried to get some of this trade and so also produced religious tracts.

The foregoing quantitative summary, while proving the fact that books and pamphlets were in far greater demand in Turkestan in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than it is usual to assume, is disappointing in that it gives little insight into the contents of the contemporary writers as opposed to the classical ones. One would like to see what reflections, if any, of the contemporary Indian Islamic movements there were in Central Asia. Can one draw worthwhile comparisons and contrasts between the Russian-speaking writers and scholars (stemming largely not from the old Fergana valley centres or from Khorezm) and Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, or his contemporary and admirer the poet Hali, who was more rooted in the people? Was any scholar of the Kokand or Khiva circle groping after a restatement of Islam (similar to Amir Ali's in the 1920s)? Was there a Turkestan Iqbal? What features did Dukchi Ishan's movement in Andizhan in 1898 have in common with the Wahabi movement? What were the specifically local characteristics of communalism displayed in Central
Asia?

An account of the Jadid movement in Turkestan and of its specifically local representatives - the Young Bukharans - is long overdue and much needed. This is specially difficult to do at present since Soviet history students are hampered at any rate in publishing their findings by the extremely inimical view of "bourgeois nationalism" within the non-Russian Soviet republics, which is still dominant in official Party historical interpretation. This attitude was only very slightly modified in the post-Stalin partial intellectual "thaw" and seems to have stiffened again. The archive material is there, however, and has evidently been sorted and indexed. Until scholars from outside have had access to this or until one has reason to believe that Soviet historians dealing with the immediate pre-revolutionary years are able to publish their findings freely, any conclusions are of an interim character.

The Jadid movement was far richer among the Tatars in Kazan', among the Crimean Tatars and in Azerbaijan than in Turkestan and it consequently received greater attention in the former, to the detriment of the rather shaky and perhaps abortive beginnings in Bukhara and Kokand. Nevertheless, its features, contradictions and perplexities can be found in the latter. The religious and intellectual basis of Jadid thinkers was to go back to the original tenets of Islam, to prune it of accretions, abuses and injustices and to demonstrate it as a belief and a way of life which can meet the challenge of the contemporary world. They had this in common with intellectuals in the Arab world, Turkey and Muslim India. Whether to look back to the fountain-head or look forward to modern knowledge varied as between one writer and teacher and another, or indeed between the phases of a single individual's intellectual development. How, in the looking back process, did the seekers fare at the hands of the established clerical hierarchies, of popular dervish orders, of rulers and of caste aristocracy? What were the main perplexities of modernizing? The one clear answer for the Bukhara and Kokand intellectuals, as it had been for Gasprinskii, was that knowledge was the key. One must learn and teach, and start schools and push the basic secular subjects through Korean schools. Hamza gave thought and energy to establishing schools; he founded and taught in one of his own in Kokand and in Margelan in 1911-15, and wrote a series of instructive poems to exhort children to seek and apply themselves to learning. For example: "Seek knowledge" (this is a retranslation from the Russian which is itself a translation from Uzbek: (17))

Who would have known what are men, animals and nature,  
If curious man had not seen the gleam of knowledge?  
Whatever you touch, if you wish to probe its mystery,  
You must first learn the findings of knowledge.  
As the sun shines on the world, so understanding shines to the mind,  
Just as night is the darkness of the world, your darkness is lack of knowledge.
If you wish to reach the goal which you have set yourself,
Wake up and lift your lashes, having felt the breath of knowledge.
If you wish to reflect that truth which you have glimpsed,
You must become a scholar and build the edifice of knowledge.

While all the intellectuals agreed on the need for enlightenment, controversies arose as to where it should be sought. And, as elsewhere, some turned to the imperial power, i.e. to Russia, others, on the contrary, to the progressive tendencies in specifically Muslim or Turkic lands, i.e. to Turkey herself, to Asia Minor, to Muslim India. These pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic currents came to Turkestan either by way of Kazan' and Baku or direct from North India. A sidelight on the tenacious effects of the Persian literary tradition is the fact that often these ideas were expressed by the Central Asian writers in Persian literary idiom.

Schools became both centres of new ideas, and a main bone of contention between progressives and traditionalists and between progressives and authority. Inevitably the progressives' position was complicated by the imperial issue: "new method" schools could easily be accused of disseminating an alien, i.e. Russian, culture. Mention has already been made of Hamza's schools in Kokand and Margelan; the Jadid reformers, when meeting with official (i.e. that of the emir and conservative clergy) opposition to the reform of the Koran schools, in 1900 opened their own schools using "new method" teaching. The schools were often ephemeral but even so, the following figures given by Ayni in 1911 are impressive: Samarkand 2; Bukhara 5; Tashkent 12; Gissar 2; Semirech'ye territory 17; Kokand and district 13; Bukhara, Kokand and Tashkent were the three main centres of reform; one of the most active minds behind it was Munavvar Qari, who propagated reformist ideas from Turkey and used Gasprinskiy's paper TARJUMAN (The Interpreter) as an auxiliary textbook in schools. Another element propagated "new method" schools, but predominantly in the Russian administered territories of Turkestan, namely, the Tatars from Kazan' and the middle Volga, and the Azerbaydzhanis from Baku. These brought with them the same efforts at modernization, together with certain experience, the backing of a long-established indigenous press, and a business capacity. The first Tatar schools started in 1873; "new method" teaching was introduced in them in 1895. The schools spread rapidly; Barthold gives a total of 89 in 1911, with 16 in Tashkent and 8 in Kokand, with a total of 530 pupils. (It is probable, however, that a high proportion of the two sets of figures given by Ayni and Barthold cover the same schools.)

The Russian educationalists' dream was the 'Russo-indigenous' schools, which had a progressively devised curriculum for primary education and, after a tussle with those who supported a straight Christian missionary education, Muslim religious instruction. Such schooling was first proposed by Sayyid Azim, a merchant of Tashkent, in 1867. The schools were effectively started in 1884, the first in Sayyid Ghani's house, son of the above. V.P. Nalivkin(18) was its teacher. These schools, however, did not flourish, in spite of sincere efforts.
on the part of Russian educationalists, such as Ostroumov (who took over many of Il'minskiy's ideas), and Nalivkin in his early period, and of administrators who saw in them the main road to fruitful symbiosis. The arguments and evidence produced at the main educational commissions (1873 and 1905) show all shades of approach, from that of extreme russification to an awareness of the potentially valuable contribution of a liberalized Islamic culture.

Before leaving the controversies, hopes and disappointments over schools, two interpretations of the conservative, clerical attitude must be recorded. First, that of the established Muslim clergy: Dr. Hayit in his recent study TURKESTAN IM XX. JAHRHUNDERT (20) (in which much of his historical and cultural argument is drawn from Ayni), thinks that the strong conservatism of the clerical castes was evolved through the need in Central Asia to withstand the repeated attacks on Islam—the Kalmyks (1634-1755); the Dungans at the beginning of the eighteenth century; the Russians from 1717 onwards. Nevertheless, among the religious teachers and lawyers there were some distinguished supporters of the reformers, such as Ahmad Masum Kalla at the end of the nineteenth century, and Badruddin, a sharia scholar of Bukhara in the twentieth century. Of the seven Young Bukharans condemned to death by the emir in 1918 as dangerous reformers and "unbelievers", two were kazis, two mudarris, two muftis and one a rais. In Dr. Hayit's view, clerical animosity to the reforms and the progressive groups resulted largely from Russian policy, through the encouragement given to its intransigent elements by Russian conservative and high clerical circles who distrusted all progressive and reformist movements. Dr. Hayit admits, however, that self-interest, the urge to guard secured personal positions and careers were additional motives.

The second concerns the attitude of the Russians involved in these things which, though perhaps not so decisive as seemed at the time, is nevertheless very relevant since it reacted both on the emir and on the ruling circles of Bukhara. The "Kaufman attitude" which regarded Islam and Muslim instruction as something which, when confronted with the progressive civilization of the west, would of itself gradually die out and be superseded, and hence as something that, purged of its most retrograde features, could be used conveniently for government ends, was in the event superseded by advocates of a coercive and restrictive policy and more active russification. This attitude in its turn was contradicted by those who came to see in the conservative elements of Islamic Bukhara stabilizing influences which were likely to help rather than to hinder Russian autocracy, itself based on the close spiritual alignment of Church and Monarchy. (21)

Dr. Hayit, in his assessment of nationalist intellectuals, confirms what was on the whole Barthold's and other Russian scholars' impression, that though intense and varied, this literary activity did not bring about a cultural renaissance, mainly because established religion and the established social order proved too strong. But although it did not amount to a renaissance, nevertheless the intellectual stirrings were substantial and have their place in the study of Eurasian history in the decades prior to 1917. Here, as in Muslim India, there was no clear cut issue; Dr. Hayit argues that the progressive cause was weakened
since it was always misrepresented as "pro-Russian" by its detractors, both in
the nationalist and in the Russian camps. This duality is almost always
inherent in "imperial" or near-imperial situations. One cannot even tentatively
make two lists and say: "these were Russophils; these were nationalists";
since individuals turned to Russia in one phase of their development, and to
the Young Turks in another. Moreover, the idea of a Muslim state within the
Russian Empire attracted many progressive and sincere Muslims in Russia,
particularly among the intellectual Tatars of Kazan' and Transcaucasia. It
was Russia's loss that she did not possess a Macaulay or a Lord Durham, or
rather that she could not have listened to one even if she had.

With this reservation, one can follow for convenience the alignments made
by Ayni and Dr. Hayit, who give decisive emphasis to the Turkish and Egyptian
influence, and those of Dr. Barthold and the older generation of Russian
orientalists, who were inevitably more aware of the Russian, both for itself
and as introducing European culture. For those who looked mainly to Turkey,
Dr. Hayit singles out the Emir Haidar's ambassador in Istanbul, Mir Abdul Karim,
who tried to strengthen Turkish cultural and commercial links; Hakim Khan
(d.1843), vizier of the Khan of Kokand, who visited Russia, Turkey, Persia and
the Hejaz and who had to flee to Bukhara from Kokand as a penalty for his
modernist ideas. Shahabuddin Merjani (1815-89) studied in Bukhara and Samarkand
and acquired and propagated reformist ideas. Mirza Azam Sami travelled
in Asia Minor and while in Egypt wrote a book under the title CURIOUS HAPPENINGS
containing criticisms of the administration of Bukhara and of teaching methods
in the madrasas. His followers tried to introduce newspapers from Egypt, in
contravention of the emir's orders. The real political leader of the Young
Bukharans and the most unequivocal protagonist of reforms on the Young Turks
pattern was Munavvar Qari, the heyday of whose political and educational
activity was 1901-6. He advocated a pan-Turkic state, separate from Russia, in
which "the new manners of thought and the old spiritual culture must be closely
linked". He and his followers produced newspapers - ephemeral indeed, but
nevertheless some achieving a respectable number of issues, in Tashkent,
Bukhara, Samarkand and Kokand. (22) The papers were sharply critical of Russian
cultural policy and administration. A contemporary and fellow-thinker of
Qari's, Abdu'r-ruf Fitrat, published the following series of pamphlets, whose
titles are indicative of matters discussed at the time:

1. Discussion: conceptions of traditionalists and reformers.

2. The Traveller Inder - a novel, written in Istanbul, containing
an observer's criticisms of Bukhara.

3. A collection of revolutionary poems.

4. The Leader of Salvation.

5. The Family - for radical reform in family and social life.
Of the intellectuals who at one stage or another turned towards Russia, the one nearest a modern evolue was Chokan Vali Khan (i.e. Valikhanov, see infra pp.57,71 note (14)) (1827-65), who had a Russian education, visited St. Petersburg, exchanged letters with Dostoyevskiy(23), and served in the Russian army. Hasan Mirza Tahirol, Ali Muhammad Seidalin and Tokhtamychev, all from Turkestan, attended the International Orientalists' Congress in St. Petersburg in 1876. Just as in Kazan', Il'minskiy had enlisted the cooperation of Kaum Nasiri and Altynsaryn in his educational work, so both Mukimi and Firkat worked with Ostroumov on TURKESTANSKIE VEDOMOSTI and in his school activities.

It was on the whole through Russia that Turkestan and Bukhara became more easily accessible to European travellers, scholars and, under Russian cover names, to mining undertakings. This access was increased when the Transcaspian (1889), and the Central Asian (1905) railways were built. The old routes from Russia and from Afghanistan were not entirely superseded (the Afghan route particularly was still used as a trade entry for British goods), but European culture contacts came in the main through Russia.

One cannot assess the political significance of the Young Bukharans since their movement was cut short by the overthrow of the Bukhara emirate by the Red Army and by the subsequent building up of Central Asian territories as Soviet republics. What began as a movement of internal regeneration and reform on a Muslim and Turkic pattern foundered first on the apparent incompatibility of reform with the maintenance of traditional society. Subsequently, the Communist Party, once it had secured power, picked up the left-wing elements of indigenous reformist parties, used them in gaining political control, and then discarded them. Dr. Hayit's view is that the nineteenth century cultural revival prepared the way for the twentieth century national liberation movement. He traces its continuity in its anti-Russian character, manifested in the Basmachi and other partisan anti-Russian movements which survived uninterruptedly in Central Asia until the beginning of the 1930s. This seems an over simple view. Chauvinism was not the decisive element in the reform movement, and in certain early phases played little part in it. Reformists had to contend with national fanatics and with conservative traditional elites; the Young Bukharans were persecuted, and some condemned to death, by the emir and not by the Russians. Moreover, in the last phase, several of the younger generation were able for a considerable time sincerely to believe that the new Russia of Lenin and the NarKomNats could genuinely respect the needs of reformed national communities, and would leave them to carry through land, water and tax reforms, and solve the problem of religion and state in their own way. Thus Faizullah Khodzhayev, who came from a liberal and respected Bukhara family, was a reformer of the second generation. He played an important part in the overthrow of the emirate, and was chairman of the Council of People's Nazirs of the republic, as well as secretary of the newly-formed Bukhara Communist Party. He held this post until, with Ikramov, he was tried and condemned in the Bukharin trial of 1936, the purge which effectually put an end for many years to come to any national, cultural revival, as well as to any political "national deviationism" in the USSR. By contrast Hamza, pretty well a contemporary of Khodzhayev's and
of similar political background, was killed at the hands of his own fanatical countrymen in 1929 in the village of Shakhimardan, where he had gone to found a school, open an adult literacy campaign and fight religious superstitions.

This is the aspect of recent history on which the least light is thrown at present by Soviet historical research. At the same time, this research increasingly reveals the wealth of available material. Another difficulty is that a great deal of the more ephemeral local literature is not, and never was, available in Russian. This has to some extent been overcome by the work of Professor Togan and of Dr. Hayit; the pressing need, however, to have access to the archives still remains.

Notes


(2) Yakubi. LES PAYS, trans. Wiet, Gaston, Cairo, 1937. Imprimerie de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale.

(3) Barthold, V.V. ISTORIYA KUL'TURNY ZHIZNI TURKESTANA, Ch.5, AN/SSSR, Leningrad, 1927.

(4) Sher Muhammad (1778-1829) known as Minis. Historian and poet, living in Khorezm; commissioned as historian by successive khans. Barthold, op.cit., p.112. His history chronicle of Khorezm continued by his nephew, Ogekhi.


(7) Cantwell Smith, W. MODERN ISLAM IN INDIA, London, 1946, examines intellectual ideas in nineteenth and twentieth century Muslim India.

Ayni, S. BUKHARA, trans. Borodin, S., Moscow, 1952. It is interesting to compare Ayni's account with Heyworth Dunne, J., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN MODERN EGYPT, London, 1938, Ch.1. Ayni's textbooks references are not always easy to trace. Thus the Tahdhib were discourses on morals and manners, while he refers to it as to a textbook on logic and metaphysics.

Chabrov, op.cit.


Likoshin, N. "Yeshche o knigakh dlya tuzentsev", TURKESTANSKIYE VEDOMOSTI, No.13, 1901. Also Archive Dept., Ministry of Interior, Uzb.SSR, fo.19, doc.15003, both quoted by Chabrov, op.cit.

Logofet, D.N. NA GRANITSAKH SREDNEY AZII, St.Petersburg, 1909.

 Archive Dept., Ministry of Interior, Uzb.SSR, fo.19, doc.29398, quoted by Chabrov, op.cit.

Soviet orientalists have recently shown interest in Iqbal's writings: e.g. Anikeyev, N.P. "Muhammad Iqbal's social and political theories", SOVETSKOE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE, 1958, No.3.


Nalivkin, V.P. Orientalist and philologist; inspector of indigenous schools in Turkestan from 1873; towards the end of his life he "went native" and died in Fergana early in the twentieth century; author of HISTOIRE DU KHANAT DE KOKANDE (Paris, 1887, ́École des Langues Orientales Vivantes), and with his wife, OCHERKI BYTA ZHENSCHINY OSEDELOGO TUZEMNOGO NASELENTIYA FERGANY, St.Petersburg, 1886.

Barthold, V.V., op.cit., Ch.7, Barthold discusses the potential rivalry between the Tatar "new method" schools and the Russo-indigenous schools, and inclines to the view of some contemporary Russian educationalists that the Tatar influence in Turkestan was a not altogether unmixed blessing.
Hayit, B. TURKESTAN IM XX. JAHRHUNDERT, Darmstadt, 1956.

Barthold, V.V. op.cit. Chs.7 and 10; also Savitskiy, A.P. TRUDY SAGU, vypusk LXXVIII, 1956. (English analysis in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1958, Vol.VI, No.3.)

Hayit, B. op.cit. gives a footnote listing the papers, their editors, and collaborators, the number of issues and the dates. Also some details of negotiations with the emir and the Russian Political Agent. Much of this information is taken from Zeki Velidi, i.e. Professor Togan, BÜGÜNİ TURKİSTAN VE YAKIN MAZİSİ, Istanbul, 1943.

Dostoyevskiy, F. PIS'MA, Vol.1, Moscow, 1927.
RUSSIA'S ENTRY

To look back on the completed pattern of Russian expansion into Central Asia and the Far East is to see a process apparently planned, logical, and inexorable, in which the volition of its artificers coincided with compelling geographical and historic factors. Prince Gorchakov's despatch of November 1864(1), pointing out that one step in imperial expansion inevitably compelled the next, was more literal in the Russian-Asian context, than in the context of the overseas empires of the western European powers, though its relevance to Britain in India was present in his mind. In an empire expanding overland the imperial government is mainly concerned with promoting a modicum of safety and order on its own frontiers and in achieving stability over an ever widening area. The terms most often used in the despatches of the Russian governors of border territories, in reports of emissaries, traders, and in discussions of ministers etc. mean, to arrange, stabilize, organize, settle, quieten, suppress, pacify. These evoke overtones of deliberate decision. They are not the conceptions of the sixteenth and seventeenth century maritime empires. Russia's historical examples were land empires - Chinese, Mongol, Arab, Persian, Moghul, Kalmik. That two of these were empires of nomads does not affect the similarity of attitudes to the borders - border territories were unsettled, vulnerable, unreliable and these inherent characteristics made them a threat to the empire as a whole. Hence walls were built (or lines of fortifications), strong governors were appointed who were either soldiers or who had some special link with the imperial ruling house, tax or tribute were extracted as a sign of authority as much as a contribution to the central exchequer. But the consistency of the pattern can and has been greatly exaggerated. Russian expansion into Siberia(2) was different from her advance down the Don and the Volga and from her conquest of Central Asia. The policy and attitudes of her rulers towards expansion in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries were different from those of the seventeenth and eighteenth. Even if one narrows the field to Central Asia in the nineteenth century, the seemingly inexorable process is subject not only to the contradictions between central government and administrators on the spot, when the line between decision and execution is obliterated(3), and to the differing approaches of successive foreign ministers in their appraisal of the Central Asian sphere in relation to Russia's relations to the European powers, but also to pressures from the emergent business and industrial community, which do not always coincide with those of the political ministers.

It is helpful to note some of the distinctive elements in Russian colonization. A unique feature was the part played in colonization and expansion by the Cossack communities, who were a social and not an ethnic group, whose adventurous and non-conformist disposition led them to break away from the restrictions of
caste and status and to settle where possession of land was unrestricted. They fought as a community, under their own elected leaders. They defended borders, penetrated into unknown territory, cultivated land on a wasteful system without giving it priority over their military and pioneering exploits. Cossack communities settled first down the middle and south Volga and the Don, next beyond the Urals and gradually along the river ways in Central, South and finally far Eastern Siberia. They were joined in the border lands over the period of years by people who as individuals had broken away from the crystallized social groups (peasants, clergy, merchants, landed gentry): the Russian word denoting them, raznochintsy (lit. heterogeneous ranks) describes their self-created position in the society of their day.

The merchants are a more familiar phenomenon. They moved along defined routes into the Asian countries, established trade fairs, encouraged merchants from Bukhara, Persia, Kazakh and Kalmyk hordes to come to fairs in Russian towns, sought entry and permission to establish their stalls in Asian trade centres. The fur trade took them into Siberia; there the stockade (ostrog), usually established on a waterway, became the trade entrepot, and the administrative and defence centre. (4) Peasant settlement on any substantial scale did not come until the nineteenth century, and by that time it was no longer into a "no man's land" but into territories acquired by the state through annexation or treaty and protected by the state's armed forces and administration. The missionary is missing from this panorama, though even this statement needs qualification. In the story of Russian expansion there were, exceptionally, some influential prelates (5); there were devoted missionary priests and missions (particularly in north-eastern Siberia); certain monasteries played an important frontier role (6); there was a sustained and scholarly attempt at educational symbiosis with non-Slav traditions on a Christian foundation which was centred in Kazan', itself a great centre of Orthodox scholarship and evangelization. But the missionary in the building of the Russian Empire was never a figure as typical and familiar as that of the missionary, trader, or soldier in the growth of the western empires.

Russia's "open frontiers" stretched in a semicircle round the south and east of her domain; her government thus had to face frontier conditions on three sides. The outward contacts of her colonists were with nomad or semi-settled peoples, many of whom in turn formed the border territories of China, with the result that it was not until direct contiguity seemed imminent with China, and with British India that "hard" frontiers were negotiated. Russian merchants needed security for their long overland journeys through turbulent areas, and sought favours and concessions from rulers of oriental countries which themselves had a long tradition of trade negotiation. What navies and control of harbours did for the British and French mercantile empires, soldiers and stockades on river-ways had to contribute to the establishment of the Russian. Settlement along the land gave a sense of a physical extension of Russian soil. With one seventeenth century exception in the Far East (curiously repeated in 1919-22), the conception that one took one's group rights and liberties to transplant them in "fresh woods and pastures new" was suppressed
in the victory of the eighteenth century centralist policies in the Ukraine and lower Volga. Socially Russian colonization is interesting because at all stages settlers were from all social groups. This factor was important in contact with indigenous inhabitants since on the one hand it did not harden race divisions by super-imposing economic divisions mainly along racial lines, while on the other it immediately and inevitably produced the problems of land alienation.(7)

It is usual to comment on race contacts within the Russian Empire and to isolate where possible their main characteristics. The much smaller difference in material standards of living at the point of contact is important. In the Russian situation it was and is possible, for instance, to compare peasants and peasants; one did not even subconsciously juxtapose peasants with administrators, entrepreneurs and technicians. Secondly, religion contributed largely to the Russian sense of solidarity and hence unreasoning antagonisms were religious rather than ethnic. There was no visible or invisible bar to racially mixed marriages with converted and baptized Muslims or animists; this facilitated assimilation and in its turn further weakened racial demarcations. Apart from isolated manifestations to the contrary, a genuine tolerance for Islam, Buddhism, and Animism (except in regard to ritual human sacrifices) in Asia was combined with intolerance for non-Orthodox forms of Christianity in European Russia and on her western borders. In the former, Christian and non-Christian communities could live peaceably side by side; this could not be said of communities of differing Christian denominations or of Christians and Jews in the latter. Thirdly, there was no period of traffic in slaves in the history of the Russian Empire. The personal ownership or traffic in a member of an indigenous community was forbidden from the start of expansion into Siberia, and efforts were made by the administration to prevent individuals being incorporated as personal serfs.(8) Finally, Asian peoples had been a constant presence in Russian history and, for the long period of the Mongol conquests, the overlords of the Slav principalities. Thus even in the period of Russia's greatest military and technical ascendancy, there grew up no deep-rooted conviction that the Slavs were inherently superior to Asian peoples. Russian messianism developed in a different direction.

Though in the nineteenth century Russia's imperial policy in Central Asia appears at its most coherent, yet even here the story is not straightforward, or devoid of checks, clashes of opinion and the pulls of individual personalities and groups. The main difference between trying to deal with it from the Russian end seeing it as far as possible from the standpoint of the khanates, is that the latter's considerations were almost entirely bounded by their local horizons, while for Russia it was but one sphere of an enormously complicated process of growth and strain at home and penetration into great-power politics abroad. There is an outer ring of the powers concerned - Russia, Great Britain (acting directly or through the Government of India), China and, towards the end, Germany. Within that outer ring comes the local ring - Persia, Afghanistan, the small khanates on the north slopes of the Hindu Kush, Sinkiang, Kashgar, the Turkmen, the Kirgiz, the Kazakhs.
Throughout the nineteenth century the Russian Government had no minister charged exclusively with colonial, Asian or Siberian affairs. Policy on these matters was decided by the Foreign Minister and the Tsar. Asian affairs were handled by the "Asian table" at the Foreign Ministry. Military administration, as well as the conduct of military affairs, was under the Ministry of War, while the establishment of civil provinces in territories which had wholly passed under Russian rule came under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The point at which all three converged was precisely the Central Asian territories which, qua border regions, were under military governors-general. These in their turn were charged with a sizeable share of negotiations with and advice on the independent khanates, adjacent countries, and nomad peoples. The views of the three Foreign Ministers who spanned the nineteenth century between them, Count K.V. Nesselrode (1816-56), Prince A.M. Gorchakov (1856-82) and Baron N.K. Girs (1882-95), are all relevant to the Central Asian story. To these names must be added those of the heads of the "Asian table" at decisive periods: there Girs was trained in 1838-48, and was head of it in 1875-8; Ye.P. Kovalevskiy led it in 1856-61, and Count N.F. Ignat'yev in 1861-4. P.N. Stremoukhov succeeded him in 1864. (9) Of the governors-general, General K.P. Kaufman (first governor-general of Turkestan 1867-81) remains the acknowledged creator of Russia's Central Asian Empire, just as Count N. Murav'yev-Amurskiy (1847-61) was the creator of her Far Eastern domains. But there were other soldier-administrators in command, first at Orenburg and later in Tashkent, who played a pro-consular role and created policy while ostensibly administering it, or giving advice. (10)

Public opinion on imperial matters was formed and information on the territories themselves was fairly consistently given from the middle of the century onwards through the Imperial Geographical Society, through two or three journals devoted mainly to descriptive ethnography (11), through some of the political journals, notably RUSSKIY VESTNIK (1856-1917), and by individual service officers commissioned to produce reports on trade, communications, and the strategic significance of borders. Much of this material was collected and edited in 1901 in a series "A Collection of Materials for the History of the Conquest of Turkestan" commissioned by the Minister of War, Prince A.N. Kuropatkin (who had long served in Central Asia), and the then governor-general of Turkestan, General N.A. Ivanov. (12)

Stages of Russian advance into Central Asia

The occasion of Russia's armed conflict with the three khanates was the need to establish once and for all who was to have mastery over the peoples of the steppe - both of its north-western areas, i.e. those contiguous with Russia's new trans-Ural lands, and of its southern areas, i.e. the Transcaspian semi-desert inhabited by the Teke-Turkmen. The conflict did not become decisive until just before the Crimean war, partly because, under Nesselrode's cautious and extremely Europe-directed foreign policy, the Russian Government preferred to keep the fluid and favourable situation in Central Asia as unob-
trusive as possible, and partly because the Orenburg-Siberia line of forts, established in 1717 still served this purpose. Penetration into the Kazakh steppe was gradual and carried out by Cossack communities. The Teke-Turkmen steppe (eastern shore of the Caspian), after the disasters of the Bekovich-Cherkassy expedition (1716) was left severely alone until the establishment of Alexandrovsk in 1834, and of Krasnovodsk in 1869, except for an expedition to the south-east Caspian coast by N. Murav'yev in 1819. On two or three occasions the Turkmen had asked for Russian overlordship in their efforts to retain freedom from Khiva and Persia. Trade with Bukhara and Khiva was carried on over inland caravan routes; it had developed again after the Mongol conquests from small beginnings made by Moscow in the seventeenth century. Consistent efforts were made to extend it regularly to Herat, Afghanistan and Kashgar. Trade with the semi-settled and nomad hordes was gradually concentrated in the Russian fairs. The fresh stages of penetration into Siberia took place in 1847; penetration into the Caucasus and over into Trans-Caucasia had hardly begun.

It was only gradually that the Russian governors of Orenburg (i.e. of the border province) emancipated themselves from the diplomats at the centre and evolved an active Asian policy. Their main task was to persuade the minister that this was purely a Russian affair. In 1833 Count V.A. Perovskiy became governor of Orenburg. In his first period of office he began extending the line of steppe forts and established navigation on the Aral Sea, with boats brought down overland and assembled in a harbour on its northern, i.e. Russian shore. He undertook a full-scale military expedition against the khanate of Khiva in November 1839, with the fourfold purpose of:

1. stopping raids on recently acquired steppe territories;
2. ensuring safety of caravan routes through nomad lands;
3. the release of Russian prisoners kept as slaves, and
4. obtaining rights of navigation for Russian vessels up the Amu-Dar'ya.

This policy was intended to meet two needs - security on the borders, which was being badly shaken by the Kazakh Kenesary's guerrilla warfare in the northwestern steppe, and the growing trade potentialities of the Russian business and manufacturing community. The belief in rivers as the trade routes par excellence is consonant with all the traditions of Russian commercial and imperial history, and the navigation difficulties of the Amu-Dar'ya, being at that time largely unknown, the idea of opening it for Russian vessels was very attractive. It is interesting to compare Perovskiy's expedition with that 170 years earlier of Pazukhin. The objects of the two were much the same, including the freeing of Russian slaves. But it is a commentary on the difference in the climate of opinion and in the comparative military and economic strength of Russia that the latter was sent off by Alexis, Tsar of Muscovy, with four companions and an escor
of two streltsy (bodyguard) to guard the "treasury", and ten camels to be bought in Astrakhan to take them to the first Kalmyk camping site. Perovskiy's expedition consisted of 4,000 soldiers, 20 pieces of artillery and 10,000 camels. [It is also interesting to read that Pazukhin in 1669 was instructed to find out accurately and in detail the local routes to India and the length of the caravan journey there.]

Perovskiy's Khiva expedition failed, through an unseasonal start, faulty planning and some harassing attacks by the Turkmen. But he did not desist from his policy and between 1847-50 established the Syr-Dar'ya line, as a springboard and defence against Khiva's unruly vassals. He then turned his attention to Kokand, where he had a similar set of problems further west along the Kazakh steppe. In 1853 he stormed and took the Kokand fortress of Ak Mechet' on the Syr, which opened the way to the rich and important bektvos of Chimkent and Tashkent.

The Crimean war brought a lull in active expansionist policy, but it resulted in the Central Government recognizing the possibilities of Russia's Asian policy as a counterweight to her recessions in eastern Europe and the Near East. Kovalevskiy, followed by Count Ignat'yev, was in the Asian department, and Prince Gorchakov had begun as Foreign Minister. Three Asian missions were indicative of the new turn of affairs: N.V. Khanykov to Khorasan, Count N.P. Ignat'yev to Khiva and Bukhara, and Captain Ch.Ch. Valikhanov to Kashgar. They all took place in the years 1857-9, and the points of view of their participants and sponsors, as well as the official instructions which their leaders received, give a good picture both of the sectional interests most concerned and of official policies. (14)

The more positive encouragement of Russian trade eastwards was argued by economists and pressed for by trade and financial interests, both on general terms and as a matter of urgency, since England was pushing her commercial interests with new vigour following the crisis of 1857. Russian industrialists and bankers realized that it was difficult for Russia, which was well behind western European countries in her industrial revolution, to compete in Europe or in Europe's markets for the sale of manufactured goods, and that the Central Asian markets were the only ones where Russia could appear as a manufacturing country. This was the conclusion of a varied number of people - not only bankers and industrialists, but service personnel charged with making studies and reports. It was a theme much discussed in RUSSKIY VESTNIK in the sixties and seventies. At the same time, when these ideas led to the recommendation of active military or governmental pioneering measures (e.g. Prince Baryatinskiy's project for a railway from the eastern shore of the Caspian to the Aral Sea, in 1856; Baryatinskiy at that time (1856-62) was Viceroy in the Caucasus), Nesselrode, and even Gorchakov advocated caution and postponement. The economic arguments were summarized by U.A. Gageyemester, head of the Finance Minister's department, approximately thus:
"With Russia's industrial development, the need for export markets had become pressing and 'while Russia is not in a position to compete with the products of western Europe, she can nevertheless count on the superiority of her products over the uniform Asian goods; the markets of Central Asia must represent an all the more guaranteed outlet for Russian goods since it is Russia alone that has need of their products'. While so far trade with Central Asia forms only a small portion of Russia's total trade turnover, nevertheless it is developing on the right lines since the export of manufactured goods to those markets is growing."

Gagemeyster went on to argue that this trade development still needed political stability and a rising in the standard of living of the local populations. He therefore advocated the following policy:

"Therefore, bearing in mind on the one hand the obligation taken on itself by the Government to protect the Kirgiz-Kazakhs, who have become Russian subjects, and on the other the advantages which one must expect from the development of our commercial relations with Central Asia, it would be useful:

1. To occupy upper Syr-Dar'ya with troops sufficient in number
   (a) to ensure free navigation for the whole length of this river;
   (b) to enable the Russian garrisons at the forts to obtain timber, fuel and all necessary food supplies from the upper reaches of the river;
   (c) to ensure that the fighting between Kokand and Bukhara should cease, so that goods can be freely transported between these two territories;
   (d) to protect the Kirgiz from the Kokandians and to stop the latter from erupting into the provinces of Lesser Bukhara.

2. To consolidate on the Amu-Dar'ya so as to stop the slave trade in the Khiva khanate, and to pacify thereby the Turkmen tribes roaming on the eastern side of the Caspian.

3. To connect the Syr-Dar'ya line with the Kirgiz-Siberian line by the establishment of a few further forts.

4. To move the customs posts to this line from the present Orenburg and Siberian lines.
5. To establish as soon as necessary and possible state-backed steam shipping on the Syr-Dar'ya.

6. To send consuls to those Central Asian states with which Russia has, or is going to have, commercial relations and promote the establishment there of Russian factories (warehouses).

7. To encourage grain cultivation among the Kirgiz.

Sinkiang, as well as the khanates and Afghanistan, was one of the "Central Asian states" in which Russia sought to strengthen commercial relations. This motivated her advance along the northern borderlands - the establishment of Kopal, and Vernyy as military bases, and the Kuld'zha treaty (1851) with China concerning Sinkiang trade, as a commercial instrument. On the basis of the latter, the "Rules of Trade with Western China" were signed in 1852 on Russia's behalf by Nesselrode. These forbade the export to Sinkiang of gold, silver, and bank notes, firearms and gunpowder. A special clause forbade the export into China of opium. Russian consuls were specially instructed to respect China's laws, customs and moral views. Russo-Chinese trade in Sinkiang developed quickly in the next four years, to fall sharply during the challenge to Chinese sovereignty through Valikhan-Ture's attempt (supported by Kokand) to re-establish a Turkic dynasty in Kashgar in 1856. Kovalevskiy, as head of the Asian Department, considered what line Russia should take in this situation, and presented a memorandum to the War Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kovalevskiy commented cautiously on certain views that Russia should be aggressive in Dzungaria (Western Sinkiang) and in Kashgar, and seek to take advantage of the anti-Chinese minority movements. The War and Foreign Ministers passed the following resolutions:

"1. To send a well grounded officer to Kashgar to collect information.

2. To strengthen Russian border detachments on the Kashgar border, if this is deemed necessary by the Governor-General of Western Siberia.

3. If the former Turkic dynasty succeeds in re-establishing itself in Kashgar and becomes fully independent of China and should seek recognition and help from the Governor-General of Western Siberia, then the latter should receive them well, temporize, and seek the permission of the Government for acting further in the matter." (17)

The Governor-General immediately prepared a plan for far more energetic measures, namely, to strengthen Russia's military position south-east of the River Ili so as to support the establishment of an independent Kashgar under a Muslim dynasty. Tsar Alexander II's minute on this report read: "I find all these propositions premature, with the exception of the one concerning the
Valikhanov's mission to Kashgar was sent as a direct result of Kovalevskiy's memorandum.

The other component of Russian Central Asian policy in the middle of the century was of course the potential rivalry with Britain, and though this subject has been well aired by British historians and in contemporary memoirs and biographies, it is worth while filling in the gaps and modifying some firmly rooted conceptions in the light of Russian evidence. Baryatinskiy, the Viceroy of the Caucasus, feared the entry of Britain into the Caspian, through Herat; the War Ministry prepared a memorandum (1857), headed "On the possibilities of an inimical clash between Russia and Britain in Central Asia", in answer to Baryatinskiy's letter setting out his fears. A.O. Sukhozanet (the War Minister) was of opinion that Britain did not intend to occupy any territory in Persia or on the Caspian, but that she would press for commercial advantages and seek to harm Russia politically, making "secret endeavours in our Muslim provinces and among the Caucasian mountain tribes, and interfering in the affairs of states bordering with ours". Thus Russia must be watchful and prepared for a struggle - this would avoid or at any rate delay war. The memorandum then examined the numerous projects of a Russian "Indian campaign" and, after enumerating the immense difficulties, concluded that all this proved "not merely the difficulty, but the utter impossibility of carrying through such a risky undertaking". Thus at present, Russian policy "in Central Asia as in Europe must be temporizing and not aggressive". Two things emerge from this memorandum: first, that the responsible ministry was against any active schemes concerning India, and secondly that the Russian Government was particularly anxious about British threats to Russian trade in Central Asia and the border countries. This latter is repeated in detail throughout reports on British activities in Sinkiang and Kashgar by Russian consuls and officers commanding border positions, and again by Ignat'yev both prior to and in the course of his Khiva and particularly Bukhara mission. The latter's note to Prince Gorchakov of September 1857, stressed the view that Russia's strengthening of her position in Central Asia was not to be regarded as a step towards India, but as a means of keeping peace with Britain, through making her respect Russia's friendship: "In the event of a breach with Britain, it is only in Asia that we can enter into conflict with her with some probability of success and damage the existence of Turkey. In time of peace, the difficulties brought about by Britain in Asia and the increase of our prestige in countries separating Russia from British possessions will serve as the best guarantee of preserving peace with Britain. Besides, Asia is the only sphere left for our trade and the development of our industry, since they are both too weak to enter into successful competition with Britain, France, Belgium, America, and other countries."

This policy of building up trade and prestige as a means of achieving parity of esteem with Britain was attempted on Ignat'yev's advice in Persia, and by him in person in his mission to China (1859-60) for the ratification of the Argun Treaty and negotiation of the Pekin Treaty; in the four-part (China, Britain, Fran
Russia) negotiations for the latter, Ignat'yev's Asian policy was probably at its most effective as far as Russian interests were concerned.

Whether the "Indian project" ever came any nearer to becoming accepted policy is still a point of controversy. It probably loomed far larger in British-Indian eyes than in Russian. Chimera or not, it gave an added edge to Russia's advances in Trans-Caucasia and Transcaspia, hence over Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Kashgar, Sinkiang. It impinged particularly on Britain's attitude to Russian policy towards Khiva and hence the Transcaspian Turkmen, and again on her dealings with Afghanistan and the Hindu Kush Khanates. The system of buffer states and more or less openly acknowledged spheres of influence, which became the modus vivendi between Great Britain and Russia in Central Asia, was something which both Gorchakov and Girs sought to establish throughout the latter half of the century. This precarious balance was inevitably threatened with every step of Russia's advance, and it was this kind of consideration which restrained and postponed the more aggressive plans of the soldier-administrators, not only those in responsible posts in Turkestan and Western Siberia, but also those in the Caucasus.

Of the three mid-century Russian missions, Ignat'yev's to Khiva and Bukhara is of most direct relevance to this study. His official instructions (dated 12.4.1858) were(22):

(i) To study the existing situation in Central Asia.

(ii) To strengthen Russia's influence in the Bukhara and Khiva khanates, and extend and improve Russia's trade position.

(iii) "The destruction of the harmful influence of the British, who are endeavouring to penetrate into Central Asia and to draw her on to their side".

(iv) To establish friendly relations with Khiva and Bukhara and above all obtain permission for Russian trading vessels to navigate freely up the Amu-Dar'ya. ("The opening up of this river for Russian shipping is the most important of all the matters committed to you. You will seek to achieve it by all possible means.")

(v) If successful over (iv), Ignat'yev was given latitude not to insist on the next proposal, namely, to reduce the standard customs duty on Russian goods from 10 per cent to 5 per cent.

(vi) To endeavour to persuade the Khiva Government not to foment Turkmen, Kazakh and Kara-Kalpak tribes against Russia. From Bukhara Ignat'yev was mainly to demand the freeing of Russian prisoners, used as slaves. If the negotiations turned out well, both khanates were to be assured that Russia "will as far as possible defend them from
The mission was charged with the study of British aggressive activity in the khanates and its methods of trade (at the time Britain was accused in the Russian press of "dumping" in Central Asian markets and to find the means of keeping for Russia "the lead which was essential for her in Central Asian markets". Ignat'yev was authorized to make contact with Khanykov's Khorasan mission for the purpose of studying Britain's activity. (23) As a quid pro quo, Khivans who married in Russia were to be allowed to bring their wives and families to live in Khiva, and Bukharan merchants were to be empowered to trade in all Russian towns and fairs and to have permanent sites in Nizhniy Novgorod.

The mission set out from Orenburg. It carried with it bulky gifts for the Khivan khan (e.g. an organ) so as to have the excuse of needing to bring them by Russian ships up the Amu-Dar'ya. Its departure was delayed by General Katenin (Governor of Orenburg) who wished it to coincide with his tour of his province and thus enhance his own vice-regal position. The mission, 190 strong counting porters and escort, took from May 31st to July 18th, 1858, to reach Khiva from Emba, with a stay at Kungrad on the way. (These dates become relevant when tied up with the Khiva campaign of 1873.) At the time of the mission, the Khiva khan was in the middle of a typical war with the Turkmen, with the result that Ignat'yev's original route via Kunya-Urgench (the old capital) was blocked by the Turkmen Khan, Ata Murad. At Khiva the mission was received with scarcely veiled hostility; this was chiefly aroused by the requests for permission to navigate the Amu-Dar'ya, and by the attempt of the Russian ships to enter and map some of its outlets into the Aral Sea. However, a fairly reasonable trade treaty (excluding any possibility of navigation up the Amu-Dar'ya) seemed on the point of being agreed, when negotiations were broken off by the khan, following the escape of a Persian slave on to a Russian vessel and the payment by the Russian naval officer of a ransom but without surrender of the slave.

Two documents illustrate Ignat'yev's views at the time: his correspondence while on the journey with Ye. Kovalevskiy, head of the Asian Department, and a more general report by Ignat'yev to General Katenin, made just before leaving Khiva. (24) The salient point of the former (25) was that Ignat'yev questioned the wisdom of the section of his "Instructions" which enjoined him to avoid any promise to the Bukharan emir in the event of the latter asking for help in his
struggle against Kokand. Ignat'yev referred to the openly hostile attitude of Kokand to Russia and considered it unprofitable from the point of view of Russian interests to refuse help to the emir and "not to take advantage of this occasion to tie up the Syr-Dar'ya line with the Siberian, by occupying Turkestan and Tashkent". Ignat'yev thought that Bukhara would not be unduly strengthened thereby since its people were not very warlike and the emir would find it difficult to hold the occupied part of Kokand. The other point was a suggestion to offer the Khiva khan a transit excise of $2.5 per cent on Russian goods being taken through the khanate in return for permission to navigate up the Amu-Dar'ya: this would be an interim step, leading to the request for free navigation. In the reply, the Minister informed Ignat'yev that his proposals had been considered by the Tsar. The suggested Russo-Bukharan cooperation against Kokand was rejected in its entirety: the Russian Government did not wish to extend her Asian possessions by force of arms, and moreover did not consider the emir a reliable ally and hence did not wish to participate in his war against Kokand. The proposal for transit tariffs on Russian goods shipped up the Amu-Dar'ya was to be left open and would be considered by the Minister of Finance.

Ignat'yev's report to General Katenin(26), written in exasperated terms, discusses the uselessness of treaties in this instance since none of the leading personalities in the khanate have any conception of abiding by them: "If one aims at the drawing up of treaties, which in the majority of cases lead to nothing. . . one could conclude such a treaty now, since the Khivan's present concessions are more substantial than any to which we have agreed hitherto. I considered it a duty to my conscience not to continue negotiations or sign a friendly paper, as the khan did not agree to the free navigation on the Amu for our vessels. Treaties with Khiva are useless until the Khivans are convinced of the need to obey us and solemnly keep their promises; this is impossible. . . for us to achieve merely by discussion and arguments. . ."

The mission reached Bukhara by the end of September. Here the situation turned out to be much more favourable to the Russians, since Nasrullah was fighting Kokand and feared a Russo-Kokand alliance. Much of the mission's time was taken up in ascertaining Britain's trade position, as well as her political intentions particularly in Afghanistan and in regard to Dost Muhammad.(27) These discussions were carried on by Ignat'yev with the Qush-begi, pending the emir's return from the Kokand wars. The Russian proposals were:

1. To reduce by half customs duties levied on Russian merchants.

2. To introduce a fair estimate for goods and protect Russian merchants from the whims of Bukhara officials.

3. To request permission for a temporary Russian commercial official to reside in Bukhara.
4. To ask for a permanent caravanserai for Russian merchants in Bukhara and permission for them freely to circulate throughout the khanate.

5. To obtain free transit navigation for Russian vessels on the Amu-Dar'ya.

6. To free Russian prisoners.

Nasrullah on his return acceded to the Russian proposals. (28) His representatives told Ignat'yev that in the event of resistance by Khiva to the entry of Russian vessels into the Amu-Dar'ya, the emir was ready to cooperate with Russia in "removing this obstacle" and that it might not be amiss to come to some agreement in advance concerning any eventual division of the Khiva khanate between Russia and Bukhara. Ignat'yev's authority did not extend thus far and he declined to discuss the question, although in his report to the Foreign Minister he noted that in fact Russia could occupy the Amu-Dar'ya delta and Kungrad, and "make the Kara-Kalpaks, Kirgiz (Kazakhs) and Turkmen submit to her" leaving Khiva proper to Bukhara. (29) The emir also declared that he would not receive British emissaries and would express the wish to Dost Muhammad not to let them through Afghanistan; he feared encroachments on his southern borders and suspected that these were encouraged by the British.

In his book on the mission, Ignat'yev summarized his views and impressions; these were to a large extent shared by other members of his mission, notably N.G. Zalesov: the relevant passage reads: "The information obtained by our mission and the conscientious dispersal of the former mirage brought about a sharp change in our relations with these treacherous and crafty neighbours, and a more correct view of the significance and foundation of their power, on the real strength and particularly on the position which we must and can occupy in Central Asia... as well as of the objectives we must pursue for a more real and powerful protection of our essential interests." (30)

The next phase of Russia's advance (1860-5) is well known. Lt.-Col. Chernyayev was sent to Orenburg in 1858 to serve under Katenin. He disagreed with Katenin's successor, General Bezak, over Bashkir and Crown lands, and was temporarily withdrawn. He returned and carried through the campaigns of Pishpek and Auliye-Ata along the north-eastern line, then advanced into Kokand proper and captured Turkestan and Chimkent. This brought the Russians up to the bekstvo of Tashkent, which was one of the key points of Bukhara's interests. Chernyayev's orders were not to precipitate matters by besieging Tashkent. However, he saw a strategic opportunity to do so, and entered and captured the city in 1865 with very little loss of life. His occupation of the city, in contrast for instance to Skobelev's of Namangan and Andizhan in 1875, was fairly peaceful and free of reprisals. For carrying through such a major operation contrary to instructions, Chernyayev was recalled to St.Petersburg. His military and administrative career was broken and he took up law and journalism. (31)
Although Chernyayev was officially disgraced for overstepping his instructions and taking Tashkent, nevertheless the Turkestan province was formed in 1865 out of the Orenburg governor-generalship and the newly captured territories. The Russian advance continued, and the ever-disputed bekstvos of Khojent and Ura-Tyube were annexed, which brought a Russian wedge right into the riverine territories and separated Bukhara from Kokand. The Turkestan governor-generalship was formed in 1867 from the Turkestan province and the bekstvo of Khojent and Ura-Tyube, and General Kaufman became the first governor-general. He continued Russia’s effort to ensure her supremacy and in the next year entered Samarkand and Katta-Kurgan. In 1868 a first territorial treaty with Bukhara was concluded, whereby Russia kept the Zeravshan valley (i.e. Katta-Kurgan, Samarkand) and the adjoining mountain bekstvos. This left Kokand virtually with only the Fergana valley, ruled by the Bukhara candidate, Khudayar Khan. The uneasy situation lasted five years, interrupted by two struggles with rivals for the khanate, the last put down with the help of Russian troops. Finally, in 1875, a formidable rising against Khudayar arose in Kokand, and turned into a "holy war" against Russia. Russian forces were sent in to restore order at Khudayar’s request. They were commanded by Lt.-Col. Skobelev, who took Namangan and Andizhan, after very fierce resistance and protracted guerrilla fighting, and finally entered Kokand. In 1876 the Kokand khanate was abolished, the whole of the Fergana valley was incorporated into the governor-generalship of Turkestan as the Fergana province, and Skobelev appointed its Governor. There was considerable resistance, armed risings, and short but extremely brutal reprisals carried out by General Skobelev, who advocated a policy of breaking resistance by an overwhelming display of force and then using generous and paternal measures. The mountain bekstvos of the Upper Zeravshan were finally joined to Russia by two marches carried out in 1870 and 1875 by General Abramov over extremely inaccessible and empty country. These bekstvos were important because they commanded the watershed of the Syr-Dar'ya and the Kashgar borders; their annexation completed the subjugation of the north-eastern border territories, where Turkestan merged into Eastern Siberia.

Penetration from the north-west was supplemented by a renewed effort to stabilize the Transcaspian region. This was undertaken from the Caucasus and began with the establishment of Krasnovodsk in 1869 as a fort and harbour on the south-east coast of the Caspian. The promoters of an energetic Asian policy had long realized that Khiva was the key to the intractable situation of Persia, Khiva and Russia and the turbulent Teke-Turkmen in southern Transcaspia. They urged as a justification for action Khiva’s intransigence concerning Amu-Dar'ya navigation, her inability to control the Turkmen, the latter’s repeated offers of loyalty to Russia, and Khiva’s use of captured Persians and Russians as agricultural slaves. Gorchakov, however, did not wish to be precipitate in the matter, pending negotiations with Britain on a possible demarcation of spheres of influence, begun by Lord Clarendon in 1869 and foreshadowed in the Queen’s speech of February 1873, whereby the Syr-Dar'ya was taken as the dividing line between British and Russian interests.
On news of the preparation of the Transcaspian campaign of that year, the British Foreign Office asked for explanations, and Russia's special envoy, Count P.A. Shuvalov (later Ambassador in London 1874-9), explained that this was a punitive expedition and that according to official orders Khiva must not be annexed. Gorchakov himself had in fact voted against annexation, as opposed to the majority of the Council of State, including the Grand Duke Michael, Viceroy of the Caucasus. The Khiva campaign, planned by General Kaufman, was undertaken in May 1873. It was based on a four-pronged advance (from Turkestan, Krasnovodsk, Mangyshlak and Orenburg) and involved 13,000 men. The two latter columns, under General Verevkin, besieged Khiva from the Shah gates; in the meantime, Kaufman, with the Turkestan column, approached from the other side. He entered into negotiations with the khan and prepared for a triumphal entry into the city, ordering General Verevkin to join him. The latter only partially carried out these orders and called on the Khivans to open the Shah gates. This the Khivans refused to do, so that Verevkin entered the city by storm just as Kaufman was about to effect an entry by surrender. The khan fled to the Turkmens, but surrendered to Kaufman three days later.

The treaty with Khiva drawn up at the khan's surrender restored him to his capital but established an advisory council of seven members, four to be appointed by the Turkestan governor-generalship. The khan's foreign relations were in future to be conducted only through Russia; these included commercial as well as political concessions. All major measures of internal policy required the confirmation of the governor-general of Turkestan. In addition, the territory on the right (north) bank of the Amu-Dar'ya (inhabited mainly by Turkmens and Kazakhs) was incorporated directly into the Turkestan governor-generalship as the Amu-Dar'ya province. Eight clauses dealt with commercial arrangements, very favourably to Russia. Persian slaves were to be repatriated. As a distinction in status, the khan was referred to as "the humble servant of the Emperor of Russia" in contrast to "his Eminence the Emir of Bukhara" used in the case of the Bukhara treaties of 1868 and 1873.

In the following year the Transcaspian province was created out of the territory between Khiva and the Persian border. This had been the traditional ground of the Turkmen, some of whose clans had intermittently acknowledged allegiance to Khiva. The province formed part of the Caucasian military region and came under military administration, subordinate to the viceroy of the Caucasus. This was done partly in answer to renewed pressure from the business and trading community since it would shorten caravan routes to Bukhara, Herat, and Kabul by some 900 km., and partly in extension of the activities of the Caucasian viceroy since the general pacification of Transcaspia and the building up of Krasnovodsk in particular had been an objective of Caucasian policy since General Baryatinskiy's days. The Turkmen, however, had little intention of accepting a peaceable and prosaic way of life under Russian domination, though some of the clans had asked for Russian overlordship as recently as 1865. In 1877 Kizyl-Arvat was occupied by a Russian border force and two years later the Akhal-Teke campaign was undertaken by General Lomakhin against the main oasis
stronghold of Teke-Turkmen. The Russians were defeated. But in January 1881 General Skobelev (who had served under Lomakhin) renewed the attack and broke Turkmen resistance after fantastic slaughter at Geok-Tepe. Thereafter Russian sovereignty and administration were established; until 1891 the province remained under the Caucasian military district and army command. A civilian province, as part of the Turkestan governor-generalship, was not created until 1898. The Transcaspian railway, begun in 1880 from Krasnovodsk, was pushed through by General Annenkov (C-in-C of the Caucasus) much against the influence and opinion of St. Petersburg. N.K. Girs, who had been head of the Asian Department from 1873-8, was by then deputising for Prince Gorchakov as Foreign Minister and was against an aggressive attitude. General Skobelev, who while on leave abroad in January 1882 had made a provocative Slavophil speech in Paris on the anniversary of Geok-Tepe, was recalled from leave and advised to be more restrained.

Russia's advance along the Persian border ended with the occupation of Merv in 1884. This was actually brought about without bloodshed by an agreement between Lessar (later Russian Political Agent in Bukhara) and Ali Khan. But it was this action which revived in full force both informed and popular indignation and anxiety in Britain, since Merv was the nearest point to the Persian border and to Herat yet reached by Russia. Merv was at the cross-roads of the Meshed-Bukhara and the Herat-Khiva routes; its occupation revived all the latent fears of an approach to India from the Caucasus - a much more possible feat than any approach from Orenburg along the vast land lines of Turkestan. As far as Khiva was concerned, the firm Russian hold over Transcaspia effectively cut the khanate off from all borders other than those controlled by Russia.

This definitive entry into Transcaspia meant for Russia the need to replace the "open" frontier by a firm border with Persia. This was effected by stages in the Russo-Persian treaties of 1869 and 1881, and the telegraph line and railway agreements of 1879 and 1890. The 1869 treaty confirmed the sovereignty of Persia up to the Atrek river and declared that Russia did not intend to construct any forts there. It did not confirm the Shah's request for "an assurance that the Russian authorities would in no way interfere with the affairs of the Yomut Turkomans, and of those living on the Atrek and Gurgan rivers". The 1881 treaty drew the boundary in detail, along the Atrek river and along the southern edge of the Ashkhabad valley. It provided for the non-interruption by Persia of the water supply from the headwaters of the Akhal, and for the improvement of trade routes between Akhal and Khorasan. It forbade the supply of arms either by Persia or by Russia to the Turkmen and appointed Russian agents to keep tranquillity among the Turkmen "in the districts contiguous to the possessions of the high contracting parties".

The establishment of a Russo-Afghan border was inevitably a far more complex manoeuvre, since it involved India and Britain, as well as three successive emirs of Afghanistan and their relations with Persia (over Herat) to the west, and China (over Kashgar) to the east. Essentially the problems for Russia were
the same as those discussed after the Crimean War: the need to replace disputed territories by stable frontiers, now that the borders were no longer those of Afghanistan with Bukhara or Kokand but with Russia; the need to secure markets; the possibility of improving Russia's status in Europe through oblique pressure on Britain in India. Anglo-Russian relations in Asia were at their most interlocked over Afghanistan; the theme of spheres of influence, a policy inaugurated by Nesselrode in 1838, recurred more and more often and culminated in the 1907 treaty between Britain and Russia on zones of influence in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. In 1837 a Russian political mission, led by Vitkevich, was in Kabul. In the first Afghan war (1838-42) Dost Muhammad took refuge in Bukhara. In the War Ministry's report of March 1857 "On the possibilities of an inimical clash between Russia and England in Central Asia", referred to earlier, Sukhozanet examined in detail Baryatinskiy's views on the alternative threats to Russia from Britain, i.e. from the Persian Gulf and from Afghanistan. As stated above, both the War Minister and Prince Gorchakov rejected the advisability or possibility of an Indian campaign. Specifically in Afghanistan, Lieut.-Gen. Neverskoy and Gen. Lieven (who drew up the original document) argued that "only then should one raise the question of an Indian campaign if and when England undertakes the capture of Afghanistan and in particular of Herat, which latter would be an undoubted threat to Central Asia. But even in that case it would be more sensible to defeat the British nearer Herat, to weaken their position in Central Asia, but no more". "However," he concluded, "it is unlikely that Britain will decide to seize Afghanistan. She will try and find new markets for herself in Central Asia and increase her influence there. We must counteract this by the same weapons". During Dost Muhammad's rule (1826-62) Anglo-Afghan relations were embodied in a treaty of friendship and non-interference, dated 1855, negotiated by Lawrence and ratified by Lord Dalhousie. Herat had twice been invaded by Persia (evicted each time with the help of British pressure) but finally retaken by Dost Muhammad. In the struggle for the succession on his death, Lawrence, now Governor-General, did not interfere, since he continued to regard the Indus as the boundary of British India. It was not until Sher Ali had approached Russia for help and backing (the years 1864-8 had seen Russia established as the effective power over Kokand and Bukhara, i.e. over Afghanistan's former northern neighbours) that Lawrence gave effective aid to Sher Ali who, with this help, mastered Afghanistan, Kandahar and Herat, without, however, becoming any more friendly to the British. These were the years of the Granville-Clarendon-Gorchakov discussions on spheres of influence, when the latter hoped to secure an agreement with the Gladstone Cabinet - the administration least inimical to Russia, in contrast to the Palmerston Ministry which preceded and the Disraeli Ministry which followed it. Clarendon proposed that Afghanistan be regarded as a neutral zone. Gorchakov agreed that Russia looked upon Afghanistan as outside the sphere within which Russia might be called upon to exercise her influence. A boundary was agreed in January 1873. In Central Asia, nevertheless, Kaufman had Abdur Rahman (nephew of Sher Ali and grandson of Dost Muhammad), under his hand in Tashkent, and was in touch with Sher Ali. Disraeli's tougher Indian policy and more particularly the occupation of Quetta in 1876 and the request for a British agent to be established in Herat, were followed by more specific offers to Sher Ali by both
Kaufman and Lord Lytton (now Viceroy) for a treaty of alliance. Kaufman's emissary Colonel Stoletov, was received in Kabul in the summer of 1878; entry to Lord Lytton's emissary was refused, thereby giving provocation for open hostilities, and the Cabinet was persuaded by both Lord Lytton and the Secretary of State for India to send an ultimatum to the emir. Whatever encouragement or assurance Kaufman had given to Sher Ali by letter, he was no longer able to implement them by open support since Russia and Britain were negotiating over the differences between them at the Congress of Berlin, and consequently Kaufman urged caution on Stoletov and withdrew the flying columns which he had sent towards the border. During the second Afghan war (1878-81) Sher Ali retired to Turkestan, and the British concluded the treaty with his son, Yaqub, in 1879, whereby British ascendancy in Afghanistan was definitely established, his foreign policy put into British hands, and a British agent established in Kabul. In the event the treaty had to be remade with Abdur Rahman two years later by Lord Ripon, Lytton's successor on the coming into power of the Gladstone Government, since Yaqub Khan failed to keep his throne. With Britain in control of Afghan foreign affairs and in possession of Kurram, Pishin and Bihi, and Russia in control of Bukhara's foreign affairs and in possession of the Upper Zeravshan, and with the Liberal Government in power in Great Britain, the time seemed appropriate for negotiating firm borders along the remaining open areas. Though this took six Anglo-Russian boundary protocols, much detailed work on head-waters and crop irrigation, and occupied the years 1884-95, it was nevertheless achieved, in spite of one major political incident at the Panjdeh oasis (March 1885), which marked and marks Russia's and the Transcaspian railway's most southerly point on the Afghan border (including the bridge over the Amu at Kuska). Lord Kimberley's letter of 11th March 1895 to Baron de Staal (the Russian Ambassador in London) defined the current phase on the spheres of influence issue, while the 1907 treaty recapitulated the whole position.(39), (40)

The two treaties with the emirates of Bukhara and Khiva did not end the organizational story of Central Asia. A series of administrative and politico-administrative measures taken in the fifty years prior to 1917 had the cumulative effect of integrating Bukhara, Khiva, the border khanates and the Fergana valley more fully into the administrative and economic life of the Russian Empire. First, the politico-administrative measures: by the treaties (which surrendered foreign relations to Russia), Russian troops were to man posts in the frontier khanates, although several of these under the Russo-British Afghan delimitation agreements and the Russian-Persian agreements were in fact in Bukharan territory. This meant dual control; with the best will and understanding in the world, in the frontier khanates of the Pamirs it was impossible to separate clearly what pertained to the emir as "internal administration" and what to the officer in charge of the border garrisons, particularly since local inhabitants were inclined to invoke his authority (and through him that of the Russian Political Agent in Bukhara) to defend them against Bukharan tax demands, as well as threatening to leave the khanates and cross over into Afghan territory. This kind of situation lasted for ten years in the khanates of the western Pamirs (Shugnan, Rushan, and Vakhan, exchanged for the "Trans-
Pyandzh Darvaz" in the Afghan boundary settlement of 1895). As late as 1899 the Governor-General of Turkestan, Dukhovskiy, stated that it was not in Russia's interests to extend her territories in the Pamirs. At the beginning of 1905 these khanates were nevertheless transferred to Russia proper by administrative measures "without any formal handing over".(41)

The garrisoning of the Afghan-Bukhara borders by Russians, besides resulting in the eventual integration of small khanates into Russia, as in the case of Shugnan, Rushan and Vakhan, gave rise also to calls for the intervention of Russian troops in clearing up disorders and suppressing sporadic insurrections against the emir's administration, which occurred mainly in the khanates of eastern Bukhara. The position in each individual case is difficult to assess fairly. At what stage this or that officer overstepped the line between keeping peace on the border and participating in restoring internal order; in which cases individual officers seized rather quickly on opportunities to interfere and in which they participated only as a last resort and at the repeated insistence of the emir's representative. The changes in the attitudes of successive governors-general between avoiding interference at all costs in the difficulties between the emir and the progressive, subversive, or simply still unreconciled elements of his emirate, or on the contrary seizing every chance to do so, need a study in themselves. Such decisions, in the case of Vrevskiy for example, were coloured by his fears of the Afghan Emir, Abdur Rahman, and the possibilities that he might stir up a "holy war" against the Russians. This inclined Vrevskiy to support the emir of Bukhara and his more reactionary clerical party. The episodes which have to be studied are the recurring risings in Kulyab, Gissar, etc., notably that led by Vosse in 1886, and the Bukhara riots in the city itself in 1910.(42) The subject of unrest, among the peasants particularly, recurred again and again in the discussions of the Turkestan governors-general with their own subordinates and with the ministers in St. Petersburg, when outright annexation of Bukhara was mooted, on the genuine grounds of putting an end to maladministration, easing the tax and corvée burdens of the peasants, and improving agriculture. Two general conclusions can be formed: first, Russian armed interference when it occurred was on the side of the emir, i.e. on that of established authority, though this did not preclude the Russian Political Agent in Bukhara (a post established in 1885) from advising and sometimes securing administrative and tax reforms(43); and secondly, small actions by soldiers were resorted to sooner rather than later. In regard to the latter, one of the tragedies of Russia's administration of her border territories was the persistence of military or quasi-military administration. Furthermore, though there were two or three enlightened soldier-administrators and soldier-scholars, there were not enough of these to meet the demands made on them. Even in the French Empire, Gallieni was a rare phenomenon.(44) Thus, to the risk inherent in the system, though at that time and place the system itself was demanded by circumstances, were added the absence of effective counter-balancing opinion at home.

Economic measures facilitated fuller integration with Russia. The building of the Transcaspian railway was undoubtedly the chief of these. This began from
Krasnovodsk on the Caspian shore, and ran through the emirate, creating a "railway track zone" of Russian settlement at first mainly connected with railway works and maintenance, but gradually expanded into a more general trading and semi-industrial community. (45) In 1888 formal conditions for the administration of this zone were drawn up between Russia and the emir. The Russians inhabiting it enjoyed extra-territorial rights, and the Political Agent in Bukhara became their administrative head, under the general supervision of the Turkestan governor-general. Agreements of 1889 and 1893 defined and circumscribed the agent's juridical functions and laid down procedure for cases involving Russians and subjects of the emir. (46) In 1892 the Russian customs boundary was moved to the Afghan border and in 1895 the whole of Bukhara was included within the Russian customs line. In the same year the khanate was included in the Russian postal union, and Russian postage stamps were introduced. The customs line protected Russian firms in Bukhara markets not only against the penetration of British goods via Afghanistan, but also the Russian-carried tea trade against teas from India. However, under the customs regulations, the emir was allowed to import 2¹⁄₂ m. rubles' worth of goods free of duty. The railway of course enormously reduced the cost of transport of merchandise to and from Russian markets; freight charges were soon as low as 70 kopeks per pud. This immediately stimulated cash crop agriculture in the emirate, not only cotton but karakul, hides, fruit and silk. Agricultural credit banks and producer cooperatives were introduced; the latter had over 80,000 non-Russian members by 1913. Russian coinage was made legal tender throughout Bukhara and Khiva in 1892; Russian banks opened branches in the main towns. About ten Russian banking firms gradually acquired controlling interests in raw cotton production.

The trade clauses of the Khiva treaty gave Russian vessels the right of free navigation up the Amu-Dar'ya and caused Khivan and Bukharan merchants to have their craft licensed by Russian licensing authorities. Russians could also establish wharves and warehouses and were freed from zekat, the tax on merchandise and trade tools and animals. Russian transit trade was also to be free of tax, thus anticipating in Russia's favour in the case of Khiva the inclusion of the khanate in the Russian customs boundary. It is difficult to find published material on whether the Khivan merchants and wharf-owners benefited from the increase in total trading turnovers, or whether the Russian vessels and undertakings squeezed out the indigenous river trade other than that for local needs. Khivan towns were also opened to Russian trade agents by the treaty, and by 1900 branches of several large Russian trading firms were established there. In 1901 Bukharian and Khivan coinage was officially linked to Russian coinage (a tanka becoming equivalent to the 15 kopek silver piece). Cossack fishing settlements sprang up on the Aral shores and in the Amu-Dar'ya delta, similar to those on the Caspian. Apart from that, there was not much Russian settlement in the old oasis parts of the khanate, or any sizeable Russian business communities in the towns.
In the 1917 Russian Revolution the possibility of independent existence for the two khanates and for Fergana emerged once more. In Khorezm this lasted until the Red Army victory in February 1920, when the khan was overthrown and the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic created. Khorezm's chance of success as an entity distinct from Russia was determined by what happened in similar circumstances in Bukhara. In both khanates the Russian Political Agent was transformed at the February Revolution into a Resident accredited to the ruler, with the task of maintaining liaison with the Provisional Government. When the Bolsheviks seized power in November 1917 the old Residents were replaced by Party members with duties to foster Bolshevik majorities in the soviets of the Russian groups and to create indigenous Bolshevik organizations. In Khorezm, since there were practically no Russian groups, the latter made no headway whatever, and the overthrow of the khan was a military operation. In October 1923, after three and a half years of Red Army activity and of intense political warfare, the Khorezm People's Republic became the Khorezm Soviet Socialist Republic, only to lose the last shreds of its identity next year in the new boundary delineations of Soviet Central Asia.

In Bukhara, in April 1917 the emir (with advice from the Russian Political Agent) issued a manifesto promising limited reforms. To steer a reasonable middle course was extremely difficult for him, since on the one hand he had his own intransigent clergy and officials to contend with, and on the other, sizeable Russian artisan settlements along the "railway track" zone. (Cf. p. 65 above.) At the beginning of 1918 he mobilized an army, proclaimed a holy war, tore up the railway tracks, and marched against the Red Army. A truce in March between the emir and the Soviets at Tashkent lasted until the following spring. In this period, Bolshevik activity was concentrated on building up joint Russo-Bukharan party organizations; the emir meanwhile was in contact with various anti-Bolshevik fronts, including White Russians, the British, the Idel-Ural leaders and eventually Enver Pasha. In the summer the Red Army gained more ground and two leading Bolsheviks, Kuybyshev and Frunze, arrived in Tashkent. The former stepped up Bolshevik organizations, which it was possible to do with the Russian artisan nuclei within the emirate; the latter made a fighting force of the Red Army. In September 1920 old Bukhara was captured and the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic proclaimed. The emir maintained himself in the eastern vilayet until the spring of 1921, when he crossed into Afghanistan. In 1924, the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic too disappeared in the new delineation of Soviet Central Asia.

In September 1917 Mustafa Chokayev, a young radical nationalist leader, set up an independent government in Kokand, hopefully based on a modernized conception
of Islam and permeated with ideas of economic and administrative reform. It
looked as if it might become the embodiment in Central Asia of the political
theories of the Jadid movement, and not being encumbered by the antiquated
structure of an existing emirate, it was more attuned to the liberal national
movements for autonomy which came to political life in 1917 throughout the
Russian Empire. Chokayev shared in the Idel-Ural hopes and plans of the Tatar
and Bashkir intellectuals, who worked for some kind of pan-Muslim, pan-Turkic
autonomous federation in alliance with democratic Russian and Trans-Caucasian
republics. In February 1918 the Red Army’s Transcaspian front began to take
shape and the Kokand Government was wiped out. Chokayev escaped to Bukhara,
where he tried to guide the emir’s internal policy along more liberal lines. He
finally left the country to settle in Paris.

This venture, though so short, was in certain ways more significant than
the course of events in Bukhara and Khorezm. It showed that a more forward-
looking nationalism had grown up in Central Asia in the middle of an old,
independent tradition which had nevertheless not become rigid and unsusceptible
to change. Chokayev, in the heart of the Fergana valley, had tried to create a
political focus for nationalist, but progressive, ideas which had been penetrat-
ing intermittently from different sources into Turkestan in the previous fifty
years. It looked for a time as if a unifying link of nationalism might have
emerged and maintained itself in the vacuum which had suddenly been created by
the Revolution; a link forged by the realization that Turkestan’s entry into the
modern world need not be as an appendage to Russia, or at least not on unequal
terms with her. These new nationalist aspirations were not consummated, but
they deserve to be recorded.

. . . .

Notes

(1) Extracts from Prince Gorchakov’s despatch, dated 21st November 1864.
(English version as quoted in Krausse, A. RUSSIA IN ASIA, London,
1899, p.224):
"The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized
states which are brought into contact with half-savage nomad popula-
tions possessing no fixed social organization. . . In order to put
a stop to this state of permanent disorder, fortified posts are
established in the midst of these hostile tribes, and an influence
is brought to bear upon them which reduces them by degrees to a
state of submission. But other more distant tribes beyond this
outer line come in turn to threaten the same dangers, that necessi-
tate the same measures of repression. The State is thus forced to
choose between two alternatives: either to give up this endless
labour, and to abandon its frontier to perpetual disturbances, or to
plunge deeper and deeper into barbarous countries, when the difficulties and expenses increase with every step in advance. Such has been the fate of every country which has found itself in a similar position. The United States in America, France in Algeria, Holland in her Colonies, England in India; all have been forced by imperious necessity into this outward march, where the greatest difficulty is to know where to stop. . . "

Cf. Lord Curzon, 25 years later in RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA IN 1889, London, 1889, p. 318:
". . . yet it is also clear that, once having embarked upon a career of Transcaspian conquest, she could not possibly stop either at Geok-Tepe, or at Baba Durmaz, or at Sarakhs, or at Merv. Each link in the chain as it has been forged has already found itself intertwined with its successor; and just as the first forward move into the steppe from Orenburg was bound to culminate in the possession of Tashkent, whatever assurances to the contrary might be given by that master of the Russian epistolary style, Prince Gorchakov — so the first Transcaspian muddles of Lomakhin were the inevitable forerunners of Russian barracks at Merv, and a Russian bridge over the Oxus. . . The fact remains that in the absence of any physical obstacle, and in the presence of an enemy whose rule of life was depredation, and who understood no diplomatic logic but defeat, Russia was as much compelled to go forward as the earth is to go round the sun. . . . "

Kerner, R.J. THE URGE TO THE SEA, University of California Press, 1942; Lantzeff, P.G.V., SIBERIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, California, 1943; Bakhrushkin, S.B., OCHERKI PO ISTORII KOLONIZACII SIBIRI, 16 AND 17 WW., Moscow, 1928.

Lord Curzon's commentary, made in 1889, was:
"I am not one of those who hold that Russian policy has, either for a century or half a century. . . been animated by an unswerving and Machiavellian purpose, the object of which is the overthrow of British rule in India, and to which every forward movement is strictly subordinated. . . So far from regarding the foreign policy of Russia as consistent or remorseless, or profound, I believe it to be a hand-to-mouth policy, a policy of waiting upon events, or profiting by the blunders of others, and as often of committing the like herself. . . Nor can I imagine any other policy as possible under a regime where there is no united counsel or plan of action; but where the independence of individual generals or governors is modified only by the personal authority of the Emperor. The Russian Government has often been as surprised at its own successes as rival States have been alarmed, and there is reason to believe that the Kushk episode in 1885, so far from being, as was supposed in England, part of a deep-laid design, was an impromptu on the part of Komarov and Alikhanov that burst with as much novelty upon the Foreign Office of St. Petersburg as it did upon that of

(4) Semenov, Y. *THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA*, Berlin, 1937, has contemporary prints of some of the Siberian stockades.

(5) Bakhrushkin, op.cit.

(6) Kerner, op.cit.

(7) A study of legislation concerning Bashkir lands (on the middle Volga) is a good example of the long and contradictory history of indigenous lands and Russian settlement.

(8) Lantzeff, op.cit. has made a detailed study of both these subjects as regards Russia in Siberia.

(9) Biographies of some heads of Asian Department:


**Khanykov, N.V.** (1822-78). Studied oriental languages as student; served as mining engineer in Butenev's expedition to Bukhara 1841-2; published *DESCRIPTION OF BUKHARA KHANATE* in 1843; served on diplomatic staff of Viceroy of Caucasus; founded Caucasus Branch of Imperial Geographical Society; 1853 Consul in Tabriz, where he opened a meteorological station; 1857 dragoman in Asian Department, serving with Viceroy of Caucasus. Organized expedition to Khorasan under auspices of Imperial Geographical Society this included botanist, zoologist and a geologist.

**Zinov'evyev, I.A.** (b. 1835). Entered Foreign Ministry 1861; Envoy to Rome 1871; Envoy to Shah of Persia 1876; negotiated Russo-Persian boundary 1881; Head of Asian Department 1883-91; 1887 Russo-Afghan boundary negotiations with England; 1891-8 Ambassador to Norway, then Sweden; 1898-1909 Ambassador to Constantinople.
Girs, N.K. (1820-95). Entered Asian Department of Foreign Ministry 1838; Envoy to Jassy 1841; Envoy to Constantinople 1850; Egypt 1853; Bucharest 1858; Tehran 1863; Berlin 1867; 1875-8 Head of Asian Department; 1878 Deputy Foreign Minister then Foreign Minister 1882-95.

Heads of Asian Department of Foreign Office:

- Rodofinikin, K.K. 1819-33 (then Deputy Head, Foreign Ministry)
- Kovalevskiy, Ye.P. 1856-61
- Ignat'yev, N.P. 1861-4
- Stremoukhov, P.N. 1864-
- Girs, N.K. 1875-8
- Zinov'yev, I.A. 1883-91
- Kapnist, D. 1894-8

Governors of Orenburg and, from 1867, Governors-General of Turkestan:

- Perovskiy, Count V.A. 1833-42; 1851-7
- Katenin, Gen. A.A. 1857-60
- Bezak, Gen. A.P. 1860-5
- Kryzhanovskiy, Gen. N.A. 1865-81
- Kaufman, Gen. K.P. 1867-82
- Chernyayev, Gen. M.G. 1882-4
- Rozenbakh, Gen. N.O. 1884-9
- Vrevskiy, Gen. A.B. 1889-98
- Dukhovskiy, Gen. S.M. 1898-1900 (Amur Gov.-Gen. 1890-8)
- Ivanov, Gen. N.A. 1901-3 (formerly Governor Amu-Dar'ya Prov.)
- Teviashov, Gen. N.N. 1903-5 (formerly Astrakhan Gov.-Gen.)
- Sakharov, Gen. 1905
- Subotich, Gen. D.I. 1905-6

Perovskiy, V.A. (1794-1857). Taken prisoner after Borodino (1812); wounded in Turkish war 1828; Governor of Orenburg. Biography in RUSSKAYA STARINA, 1896, Nos.5 and 6.

Chernyayev, M.G. (1828-98). Served in Turkestan under Katenin and Bezak 1858-65; disagreed with latter over Bashkir lands; campaigns of Auliye-Ata, Chimgent and Tashkent where he advocated official recognition by the Russian Government of the Chief Kadi in his judicial functions, and other pro-native measures. Recalled, left army and became lawyer and journalist; became extreme Slavophyl; served in Balkan wars as Serbian Army Commander 1876. Turkestan Governor-General 1883-4 where as an administrator he was a failure. During his governorship he allowed the emir's library to be dispersed and many books and MSS. to be sold.
Kryzhanovskiy, N.A. (1818-88). Served in Caucasus; defended Sebastopol. Warsaw Governor-General; 1865 Orenburg Governor-General (with the creation of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship the importance of this post declined); expropriation of Bashkir lands and commission of enquiry on this in 1881 led to his resignation. Wrote memoirs and a novel.

Skobelev, M.D. (1843-82). Participated in suppression of Polish rising 1863; Lomakhin's Khiva expedition 1873; 1875-6 Kokand campaign, Governor of Namangan and of Fergana province; 1877 Turkish campaign; 1881 Akhal-Teke campaign. Two provocative Slavophil speeches on anniversary of Geok-Tepe, one to Serbian students while on leave in Paris; recalled and died immediately in peculiar circumstances in St. Petersburg. (The text of the Paris speech, 17.2.1882, given in KRASNYY ARKHIV, Vol.27, also Pobedonostsev's letter to Alexander III on Skobelev, French press reports and Bismark's comment.)

Notably RUSSKAYA STARINA (1870-1917), RUSSIY ARCHIV (1863-1917), OTECHESTVENNYE ZAPISKI (1820-84), VOLZHSKIY VESTNIK.

Khalfin, N.A. TRI RUSSKIE MISSII, Tashkent, 1956, Izd. SAGU, gives references to much mid-nineteenth century archive material on the history of Central Asia.


Khalfin, N.A. op.cit., is a study of these three missions, based on source material, some of it hitherto unpublished. Some of Valikhanov's diary of his 1856 journey to Kuldzha has been published in DRUZHBA NARODOV, 1958, No.12.

Quoted by Khalfin, op.cit., p.16, RUSSIY VESTNIK, 1862, No.10, "On the Commercial Significance of Central Asia in Regard to Russia".

Khalfin, op.cit., p.27, quoted from TsGIAUSSR, fo.1, 32, doc.366.

Khalfin, op.cit., p.66, quoted from TsGIAUSSR, fo.715.18, doc.102, "Report to H.M. of the War Minister", dated 23.8.1857.

Khalfin, op.cit., p.68, quoted from TsGIA, fo.715.18, doc.131. Letter from Gasford to N.O. Sukhozanet, 30.10.1857.

Khalfin, op.cit., p.20, quoted from TsGVTIA, fo.ll, doc.3, Military Research Archive.
Ibid., p.22, quoted from same document.

Khalfin, op.cit., p.41, quoted from N. Ignat'yev, MISSIYA V KHIVU I BUKHARU V. 1858, St.Petersburg, 1837.

Khalfin, op.cit., p.43, TsGIAUSSR, fo.715.19, doc.63.

Ibid., p.45.

Khalfin, op.cit., pp.49, 55, quoted from RUSSKIY VESTNIK, 1871, No.3.

Khalfin, op.cit., p.50, quoted from RUSSKIY VESTNIK, as above.

Ibid., p.55, quoted from RUSSKIY VESTNIK, as above.

Ibid., pp.57-58.

Khalfin, op.cit., quoted from TsGIAUSSR, fo.715.20, doc.195; cyphered dispatch from Ignat'yev to Gorchakov, 6.10.1858.

Khalfin, op.cit., p.59, quoted from RUSSKIY VESTNIK, as above.

Khalfin, op.cit., p.62, quoted from RUSSKIY VESTNIK, as above.

See short biography, note (10) above.

Krausse, op.cit.

Text in Krausse, op.cit., Appendix.


Text in Aitchison, op.cit., pp.119-25.

Khalfin, op.cit., p.20, quoted from TsVIA, Ser.II, doc.3.


Krausse, op.cit., Russo-Afghan frontier correspondence, 1872-3, given in Appendix. Both the letters are amicable and restrained.

Texts, given in Aitchison, op.cit., as follows:

"The Earl of Kimberley to M. de Staal, Foreign Office, March 11th, 1895"
Your Excellency,

As a result of the negotiations which have taken place between our two Governments in regard to the spheres of influence of Great Britain and Russia in the country to the east of Lake Victoria (Zor Koul), the following points have been agreed upon between us:

1. The spheres of influence of Great Britain and Russia to the east of Lake Victoria (Zor Koul) shall be divided by a line which, starting from a point on that lake near to its eastern extremity, shall follow the crests of the mountain range running somewhat to the south of the latitude of the lake as far as the Bendersky and Orta-Bel passes...

2. The line shall be marked out, and its precise configuration shall be settled by a Joint Commission of a purely technical character, with a military escort not exceeding that which is strictly necessary for its proper protection. The Commission shall be composed of British and Russian Delegates, with the necessary technical assistance. Her Britannic Majesty's Government will arrange with the Amir of Afghanistan as to the manner in which His Highness shall be represented on the Commission.

3. The Commission shall also be charged to report any facts which can be ascertained on the spot bearing on the situation of the Chinese frontier, with a view to enable the two Governments to come to an agreement with the Chinese Governments as to the limits of Chinese territory in the vicinity of the line, in such manner as may be found most convenient.

4. Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia engage to abstain from exercising any political influence or control - the former to the north, the latter to the south - of the above line of demarcation.

5. Her Britannic Majesty's Government engage that the territory lying within the British sphere of influence between the Hindu Kush and the line running from the east of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier shall form part of the territory of the Amir of Afghanistan; that it shall not be annexed to Great Britain; and that no military posts or forts shall be established on it.

The execution of this agreement is contingent upon the evacuation by the Amir of Afghanistan of all the territories now occupied by His Highness on the right bank of the Panja, and on the evacuation by the Amir of Bukhara of the portion of Darwaz which lies to the south of the Oxus, in regard to which Her Britannic Majesty's
Government and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia have agreed to use their influence respectively with the two Amirs."

"Anglo-Russian Convention, regarding Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, 1907 (contracted by the plenipotentiaries, Sir Arthur Nicolson, H.M. Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and Mr. A. Izwolsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 31st August 1907):

H. M. The King of the United Kingdom... and H. M. the Emperor of All the Russians, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement the different questions concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit:

Arrangement concerning Persia

The Governments of Great Britain and Persia have mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantage for the trade and industry of all other nations;

Consider that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighbourhood of the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the above-mentioned provinces of Persia;

Have agreed on the following terms:

Convention concerning Afghanistan

The High Contracting Parties, in order to ensure perfect security on their respective frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain in these regions a solid and lasting peace, have concluded the following convention:

Article 1 His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan. His Britannic Majesty's Government further engage to exercise their influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense, and they will not themselves take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take, any
measures threatening Russia.

The Russian Government on their part declare that they recognize Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty's Government; they further engage not to send any Agents into Afghanistan. . .

**Article 2**  His Britannic Majesty's Government having declared in the Treaty signed at Kabul on 21st March 1905 that they recognize the Arrangement and engagements concluded with the late Amir Abdurrahman and that they have no intention of interfering in the internal administration of the territory of Afghanistan, Great Britain undertakes not to annex or occupy contrary to the said Treaty any part of Afghanistan, and not to interfere in the internal administration of that country provided that the Amir fulfills the engagements already entered into by him with respect to His Britannic Majesty by virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty.

**Article 3**  The Russian and Afghan authorities specially designated for this purpose on the frontier in the frontier provinces, may establish direct relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of a non-political character.

**Article 4**  His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Russian Government affirm their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan, and they agree that any facilities which may have been, or shall be hereafter obtained for British and British-Indian trade and traders, shall be equally enjoyed by Russian trade and traders. Should the progress of trade establish the necessity for Commercial Agents, the two Governments will agree as to what measures shall be taken, due regard, of course, being had to the Amir's sovereign rights. . .

**Arrangement concerning Thibet**

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognizing the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain by reason of her geographical position has a special interest in the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations of Thibet, have made the following arrangement:

**Article 1**  The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in the internal administration.
Article 2   In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Thibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Thibetan authorities provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet of 7th September 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April 1906; nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Budhism in Thibet; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, as far as they are concerned not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present engagements.

Article 3   The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send representatives to Lhassa."

See also, Churchill, R.P. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION OF 1907, Iowa, 1939; good bibliography of published material.

Soviet historians, mainly in Tashkent, have recently published several studies on Russo-Afghan relations in the late nineteenth century, drawing to some extent on unpublished archive material. This work has been summarized and published with a critical commentary in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.VI, No.2, 1958. The Soviet authors have a political rather than historical approach to their material, which greatly impairs its usefulness. KRASNYY ARKHIV published a number of relevant documents and minutes, viz. Vol.10, 1925, Russo-British Convention 1907, note by Reysner, I., and docs.; Vol.56, 1933, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Persia, 1890-1906, note and docs.; Vol.69/70, The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, note by Pashukanis, secret memo. by Zinov'yev and other docs.

An Indian post-graduate student at Oxford is writing a thesis on India's frontiers from 1885-1907 which covers some of this ground in detail. It should be available in 1960.

Iskandarov, B.I. IZ ISTORII BUKHARSKOGO EMIRATA, AN/SSR., Institut Vostokovedeniya, Moscow, 1958, Ch.8, gives a detailed account of these khanates from 1895 and of their transfer to Russia.
The Vosse rising is analysed by Iskandarov, op.cit., Ch.4; the Bukhara riots by Khamrayev, A.Kh. in TRUDY SAGU, Vol.LVII, Istoricheskiye nauki, kniga 7, Tashkent, 1954. Both writers treat their subjects from Marxist positions; the quotations they give from contemporary sources are so short as to make an independent judgment difficult.

E.g., new tax decree applicable to Pamir khanates, 1900; text quoted by Iskandarov, op.cit. in Appendix.


These Russian settlements along the railway played an important part in 1917-24, as well as a vital strategic part in Frunze's campaign of 1919-20.

Yakunin, A.F. "Ekonomicheskiye dannyye konsolidatsii Uzbekskoy natsii", VOPROSY ISTORII, 1956, No.5.
1. Russian archives

The following archives are used by Soviet historians in recently published work on Central Asia:

- Central State Historical Archive : TsGIA
- Central State Military-Historical Archive : TsGVIA
- Archive of Foreign Policy of Russia : AVPR
- Central State Historical Archive Uzbek SSR : TsGIAUSSR
- Central State Archive Tadzhik SSR : TsGATSSR

2. Archives of the khanates

Besides the Russian archives, certain archive material from the khanates themselves is to be found in the USSR and is listed in the hand-book on historical material, ISTOCHNIKOVEDENTYE ISTORII SSSR, Vol.II, OGIZ, Moscow, 1940, edited by S.A. Nikitin. Vol.II covers the nineteenth century from 1830. The material from the khanates consists of:

(a) collections of documents from the khans' administrative offices
(b) chronicles.

The former includes the archives of the Khiva khan, found practically intact in 1937. These contain tax documents, papers concerning granting of waqf lands, variations of leasehold arrangements concerning them, lists of officials, their salaries, petitions and complaints.

Bukhara documents are of three types:

(a) **State documents**: decrees, title deeds conferring honours or land, commissions of appointment to office, decrees in reply to reports or complaints;

(b) **Personal documents**: buying, selling, rent transactions, placing of property as security, testimonies of indebtedness;

(c) **Documents from spiritual authorities**: bequeathing or accepting waqf, marriage certificates, divorce certificates, and so on.
The documents were mostly written on Russian paper, in Persian. (This analysis is given by O.D. Chekovich in ISTORICHESKIE ZAPISKI, successor to Krasnyy archiv, new series, Vol.16, AN/SSSR, 1945.)

In Khiva the chronicles were continued until 1872, by Munis (1778-1829) Court poet and historian, and his nephew Agehi who carried on his work. These, true to tradition, are in the main an account of military and dynastic events, and of the khan's doings, including buildings erected by him.

3. Travels and memoirs

While the names of European travellers are familiar to many readers and appear in bibliographies, the works of the following Russian travellers may be less known:

Nazarov, F. - expedition to Kokand, 1813
Murav'yev, N.N. - expedition to Turkmen steppes and Khiva, 1819
Middendorf, A.F. - expeditions to West and South Siberia, 1840s
Khanykov, N.V. - expedition to Bukhara, 1841-2
Danilevskiy, G.I. - expedition to Khiva, 1842
Galkin, M.N. - expedition to East Caspian, Turkmen steppes, 1859
Przheval'skiy, N.M. - expeditions to Central Asia, Tibet, Mongolia, 1871-2.

The following memoirs, published at various dates, deal mainly with campaigns:

Maksheyev, A.I. Central Asian campaigns, including Ak Mechet' and Aral Sea (St.Petersburg, 1896)

Turgan-Mirza Baranovskiy, V.A.
First Teke expedition of 1879 (St.Petersburg, 1881)

Maslov, A.N. Served as General Skobelev's ADC in Teke campaign, 1881.
4. Reports of Service officers

These varied in quality but several of them were detailed and circumstantial. Some were published in the collection commissioned by General Kuropatkin referred to on p.49.

5. Use of archive and other unpublished or rare material by Soviet scholars

It is difficult to generalize on this matter. The author's experience has been that up to the end of the 1920s, much valuable material on Russian Central Asia was published, particularly surveys of land tenure, cropping, ethnography, customary law, russification policies and opposition to them. It is not until the middle 1950s that Soviet historians once again use archive material in their published studies.

The detailed footnotes which now appear with historical studies are evidence that archives have been assembled, indexed, and to some extent at least opened to history students. As regards Russian Central Asia, it is also evident that archivist and bibliographical work is being done with local texts and collections, in Persian, Arabic, or Chagatay as the case may be, thus following on the work of Barthold and Ostroumov. For the student outside the Soviet Union three things have to be taken into consideration when using the studies and the footnotes: first, the normal difficulty of being one stage removed from one's basic material, and thus having to assess it through another person's selection and presentation. The second and third are specific to the present period of historical work in the Soviet Union. These are that one does not know whether research students have access to the complete archives or whether they have to apply for files and documents by number and see them only; in other words, to what extent, if any, material available to them is pre-selected. Thirdly, it is necessary to assess the limits of freedom within which Soviet historians are able to publish their findings; these limits vary from time to time.

6. Bibliographies

The following short list of selected bibliographies in English and the two or three most comprehensive ones in Russian will be of use:

Curzon, G.N. RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA IN 1889 AND THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN QUESTION, London, 1889

Pierce, R.A. RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA, 1867-1917: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY, Berkeley, California, 1953
Vitkind, N.Ya. BIBLIOGRAFIYA PO SREDNEY AZII, Moscow, 1929, vyp. 4