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RUSSIA AND ENGLAND
IN
CENTRAL ASIA.
BY
COLONEL TERENTIEF, OF THE TURKESTAN STAFF,
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Translated by Robert Michell.

CHAPTER XI.

Effect of our Conquests on the Army of East India.—Retirement of Sir John Lawrence.—English Policy influenced by public opinion and by the personal motives of the Ministry.—View of affairs by the new Viceroy, Lord Mayo.—Could any marked change have been expected in the Russian proceedings?—The English form a friendship with the Ameer Shere-Ali.—Opinions of the London and Calcutta Papers on the Umballa Meeting.—Shere-Ali's Insurance Office.—Cute policy of the Viceroy.—Shere-Ali, Defender and Patron of England, appears as Petitioner.—Distinction between present and former Tributes to Afghanistan.—English aims, according to Von Hellwald.—Have the English cause for apprehension?—Opinion of the Sixth Estate: The Times.—Question of Herat.—Routes to India.—Treaty with Dost Mahommed in 1857.—Warning to the Russians not to go to India, and advice to occupy themselves with Wild Tribes.—The world at large and England herself benefited by Russian Conquests in Central Asia.

It is beyond dispute that public opinion in India has also been seriously affected by our rapid advances in Central Asia. The military class, doomed to inactivity by prolonged peace, watches with jealousy and impotence the successes of our arms. A simple, disinterested policy will never be to the taste of the English nation. The truth of this observation is more particularly acknowledged in the ranks of the East Indian Army. The past glories of the first English legions on the Indian peninsula, the really heroic feats of some of the arms of the service, their historical traditions and ambition, help to keep up in the Indian Army a yearning for military action. Our Russian
legions, placed face to face with a still more warlike antagonist, have in an incredibly short period performed several brilliant campaigns. The fresh laurels of the Russian troops have been the means of arousing the envy and hatred of those of East India. Even in England, public opinion is reconciling itself to the idea that it is sometimes more profitable to give occupation to the army than leave it inactive and discontented. The Abyssinian expedition, owing to its short duration, to the poor trophies, and to the barrenness of its results, did not wholly satisfy the instincts of the Indian Army. At the same time, we know that many of those captives whose release cost so much money have returned to Abyssinia, and King Theodore's treasure, being of no value whatever, hardly excites the curiosity of the visitors to the Kensington Museum. In a word, England has arrived at the conviction that the capture of Magdala was not worth the five million pounds sterling which were spent upon it.

The English press, influenced by its Indian correspondence, has magnified our forces in Asia to 100,000 men, and has credited us with forming the most impracticable plans; it has condemned Sir John Lawrence for his inactivity in face of our successes, and has urged the Queen to assume a more definite and a firmer attitude in regard to Russia.

"Under the influence of such ideas," wrote Baron Brunnow, on the 20th October 1867, "the ulterior motive is imputed to us of making ready for a successful advance to the frontiers of India, in order to be in a position to create a diversion on that side when the yet open Eastern question produces a rupture between Russia and England."

As regards the English Government, it does not, indeed, in the opinion of Baron Brunnow, display its agitation in officious manifestations, as in Palmerston's time, but giving ear to public opinion, it takes careful note of events and silently prepares for possible contingencies.
Sir John Lawrence's view was that India has nothing to fear from without, and that internal dangers can alone menace her. Herat is not the key of India, because Asterabad, Kluva, Meshed, and Balkh are also keys in the same sense. The real key is the Hindoo-Kush, and if a Russian army should stray up to that range of mountains, it would be destroyed to the last man on emerging from the passes. Therefore no attention need be paid to any conquests made by Russia beyond that range.

The series of brilliant Russian conquests nevertheless agitated the English, and their press sounded the alarm.

Deferring to public opinion, the Government determined to recall Sir John Lawrence.

“However rational may be the policy of a country like England, which is dictated by public opinion, it cannot” observes the same diplomatist in his Despatch of the 20th December 1867, “be maintained when it becomes unpopular. Such has been the fate of Sir John Lawrence’s administration. He has been accused of facilitating our advances in Central Asia by his masterly inactivity. Under the influence of this opinion, the Viceroy’s successors will doubtless feel convinced of the necessity of displaying greater energy and activity, in order to re-establish the English influence over the native population of British India alone.” It appears to us that Sir John Lawrence was unjustly attacked, for he did indeed do various things; in proof of this it is quite enough for us to call to mind the Europeans who were killed at Jizzakh; the circumstances were, unfortunately, not elucidated at the time, and we know nothing of the mystic antagonists to Russia who sacrificed their lives for Bokhara.

What other measures could Sir John Lawrence have adopted at that distance which lends such enchantment to the view?
Had he advanced to meet us once more through Afghanistan, he could not have done us any injury, for he would not have reached us.

Notes and agents were then the only means available; and of these it would appear there was no lack.

Lord Mayo was appointed to the vacated Viceregal post.

Seeing that the policy of England is conducted mainly in accordance with the indications of public opinion, and seeing that the latter declared itself opposed to non-intervention, it was to have been expected that a sudden turn would be given to the operations of the Indian Government.

The private opinions of the members of the English Government hold good and exercise an influence on the policy of the Cabinet only at the instance of individuals, therefore there is no guarantee that the opinion of to-day will be the opinion of to-morrow. If Lord Stanley, an advocate of peace, prefers even a troublesome neighbour to the danger of acquiring an unruly and faithless people with their territory, and cannot entertain even the idea of extending the frontiers of India, at the expense of Afghanistan, it has for us an importance only so long as Lord Stanley is a member of the Ministry, for his successors may inaugurate views of a totally different kind.

In the same way the policy of England might have been influenced by the private opinion of the new Viceroy. According to Lord Stanley Lord Mayo was not a Russophobist by conviction, but he was brought to act in the midst of the Anglo-Indian beaurocracy of Calcutta, which had become inoculated with mistrust and jealousy of Russia.

In these circumstances, Lord Mayo's private opinions should naturally have interested our own Government. Baron Brunnow acquainted our Foreign Minister with those opinions in his Despatch of the 17th (29th) November 1868. According to our Ambassador in London,
Lord Mayo did not impute to us any preconceived design against the security of the British possessions in India, which were so far remote from our frontiers. He considered, on the other hand, that railways were the best safeguards of India, for by their means the English could concentrate 40,000 troops at any given point in six weeks' time, while the enemy, however well organized, would reach the theatre of war overcome by fatigue after a march across desert countries. In addition to this the hostile army, away from its supplies, would, of course, be obliged to suffer from a want of provisions and ammunition, from which the English army would be spared, since it would command a network of Railways.

Lord Mayo therefore directed his attention to the completion of the railway system by laying down branch lines from the centre of India to the North-West frontier, a proceeding which, in his opinion, was calculated to prove the best defence of the country committed to his care.

The almost simultaneous recall of Cherniayef and Lawrence were seemingly bound to have the effect of checking the energies and enterprise of the Russians and of stimulating those of the English.

In such case we apparently lost fourfold.

The fever of conquest, however, raged among our troops; the disease did not give way to the treatment, for the medicine administered to them contained the strengthening ingredients of elevated ranks and decorations.

Common Subaltern Officers as well as Generals raved of conquests. And Captains, on being entrusted with the command of detachments, lost no time in realising their "dreams." Thus, for instance, did Abramof seize Yani-Kurgan, when he was senior Officer in the camp at Jizzakh.

How was it possible to resist such temptations, when in four years' time there was a chance of rising from a Lieutenant of Artillery to the rank of General.
Abramof was a Lieutenant in the beginning of the year 1864, and in the middle of 1868 he was promoted to a Generalship.

This condition of affairs was apparently well known to the English, for in one of the official documents it was directly stated that the English Cabinet were thoroughly convinced of the sincerity of the assurances of the Russian Government to the effect that it did not desire any extension of dominion in Central Asia, yet that they feared that the ambition of subordinate Officers eager for glory and rewards would be only too easily induced to encroach further.

And so the foretaste given to the troops by Cherniayef had the lasting effect of keeping up our energies to a point of excitement. And as regards India no very abrupt change was to be expected there.

As the policy of non-intervention, which was so consistently followed by Sir John Lawrence, was blamed by the public, and the present English Cabinet are opposed to an armed interference, it was natural to expect that some medium course would be adopted which would probably satisfy both parties. And such was the support of Shere-Ali Khan, the best disposed towards the British interests.

With reference to the famous Umballa meeting between the late Lord Mayo and the Ameer of Afghanistan in 1869, the Times preached as follows: "At every step the Ameer beheld impressive proofs of our power in India. He travelled along our railways, by which, in case of necessity, troops and munitions of war can be speedily transported to the frontier of Peshawur; at various places he would observe at least four times as many troops as the Russians have in all Turkestan. There could have been no place in his mind for doubt of the immeasurable superiority in Asia of the English power over that of the Russians. . . . . . . . . . . he cannot possibly mistake the side from which the greatest dangers threaten Afghanistan."

Since, then, Russia is far remote, her anger being
imperceptible from the distance, while England, on the contrary, is at the very gates and can make herself felt at any moment, it is plain to whom Shere-Ali should give in his submission. It is, indeed, so very plain that to all appearance the English might dispense with the payment of an annual subsidy of 800,000 roubles which she has pledged herself to make to Afghanistan.

Such is the argument used even in England. The islanders fear not, and boast. In India it is otherwise; there it is well understood that, if the English were ten times as numerous as the Russians, their position would even then be precarious in the midst of two hundred millions of oppressed and disaffected natives. It is well known there that Shere-Ali is not so complete a simpleton as not to realize and appreciate the situation in which he is placed. Afghanistan is, of course, not to be measured with British India, but if the British tradesmen were to be brought to a reckoning for their tricks, their barbarous executions and extortions, and that, too, on the balances of the account books of the natives of Hindostan, supported by the advocacy of Russia, it may well be questioned as to which of the litigants will be favoured by fate in the settlement of the case.

From the time when the "English public experienced some disappointment on learning that no treaty had been concluded with the Ameer of Afghanistan, and that England had seemingly gained nothing for its generous subsidy of 120,000L.," this matter has been looked upon in India in a totally different light. "The subsidy is doubtless a heavy burden for the finances of India, but we may reconcile ourselves to sacrifice it as a premium for the security of the north-west frontiers of India."

Our readers will recognize in this the tradesmanlike dealing in policy. But the English do not see any degradation in it; and they pay willingly not to the Afghans alone; they purchase their peace with gold; a simple commercial transaction. England, it may be said, has ensured her East Indian possessions in Shere-
Ali’s insurance office, and pays an annual premium. At the same time, England secretly exults in having imposed upon the Afghan, who has, indeed, struck a bad bargain. How could he have undertaken for only roubles 800,000 to guarantee the safety of India on the north-west? He will either cheat the English in his turn, or he will make a pretext of some Russian advance,—such, for instance, as the occupation of the mouths of the Oxus,—for a demand for more money.

In order to induce Shere-Ali to agree to a meeting which should lower him in his own estimation, as having the semblance of a propitiation of the stronger by the weaker power, the English resorted to the following device: they first promised him money, arms, and guns, and then they declined to send an agent to negotiate with him. Seduced by the promised benefits, he consented to a journey of 500 miles from his own frontier, and showed himself in the eyes of his subjects a monarch pleading for the support of Great Britain. . . . In justice to the policy of the English it must be admitted that they contrived to preserve their own dignity in the presence of a short-sighted people; having made up their mind to pay a yearly tribute, they made their ally come to make his obeisance as a supplicant for aid.

It is not customary among Asiatic potentates to make journeys for the purpose of holding interviews. He who undertakes a journey to a foreign country for the sake of an interview with its ruler, recognizes thereby his vassalage. For this reason neither the Khan of Kokand nor the Amir of Bokhara ever dream of taking advantage of all the written invitations of the Governor General of Turkestan to enjoy the great honour of a personal interview. They do, indeed, send their sons occasionally, but this they consider a great concession, and a special favour to the Russians. Yet these Khans are held, not alone by the English press but also by ourselves, to be subjects of Russia. . . .

However this may be, the object of the English was
achieved. The occupation of Samarcand by the Russians in 1868 produced so great an effect in Central Asia, and so great a panic among the Anglo-Indians, that it was natural to expect that the English would take some step in order to neutralise the importance attaching to the Russians and to re-establish the overawing influence of British power.

This step was the Umballa meeting. The English deployed; they had made ready for a review which they had themselves originated in order to parade their forces,—was not all Central Asia looking at them with the eyes of Shere-Ali?

The review was meant to convey a warning "He that hath eyes to see, let him see, he that hath ears to hear, let him hear." Whether the review was a success; whether the eyes saw and the ears heard what the English desired, is a different question.

The presents given to the Amir by the English are valued at roubles 700,000.*

Lord Mayo presented him with his own sword as a pledge, as it were, that it should never be drawn against Afghanistan; such, at least, is the interpretation to be put on the words uttered by the Viceroy on the occasion,—"The English shall always be your friends."

With reference to the Umballa meeting, the Times however, declared "that Afghanistan of itself is of no consideration and is only important as a barrier against Russian schemes of aggrandisement.† Treaties are out of the question with a country where law has no force where, besides the Amir, there are so many independent chieftains dwelling in inaccessible mountains and living by raids upon the plains,‡ where the death of

* The Times estimates them even at Roubles 840,000, but this probably includes rifles and guns which cannot be said to have become the private property of the Amir.—(Times, 8th April 1869.)
† "Afghanistan, for itself and by itself, is nothing to Great Britain."—(Times, 8th April 1869.)
‡ "A barrier against possible Russian encroachment."—(Times, 8th April 1869.)
“each Ameer is the signal for internecine feuds.” We share this opinion, but not alone with reference to Afghanistan, but to all the Asiatic Khanats. We may also add that no Khan has ever considered himself bound by any treaty concluded by his predecessor, and those entered into by any particular Khan have been observed by him only under compulsion, and in so far as it has been advantageous to himself.

There was a time during the Whig administration when the Governor Generals of India were in the habit of paying subsidies to the Afghans, thus purchasing peace of their warlike neighbours. The custom is now renewed, but the object now is to purchase an alliance. The difference in the practice is that, formerly, the English gave money while they prohibited the supply of arms and elephants to Afghanistan,—the latter being indispensable for the transport of artillery in the mountains; now, however, the English, while they pay in money, not only allow munitions of war to pass into Afghanistan, but even present the Ameer with great quantities of rifles and guns, having, moreover, bound themselves to maintain, at their own cost, a portion of the Afghan army, to instruct it, and to provide it with gunsmiths, founders, and with every kind of war material.

When we recollect that all this is being done for a people who thirty years ago annihilated an English army of 48,000 men—for a people who, in the bulk, detest the English even to this day, then the sudden change in the English policy will appear still more significant. It is evident some exceptional circumstances must have actuated the English.

These exceptional circumstances have indeed an existence—in the minds of the East Indian bureaucracy. Apprehensions for the morrow stimulate the brain of the East Indian official and unnerve him; hence the Calcutta papers cry out for the adoption of measures against a Russian invasion.

If this invasion is only the product of the extravagant fancy of a particular party, the gravity of the measures
which are adopted by England is, none the less, significant, proving, in the first place, the practicability of an invasion, and in the second place, that it would be fraught with injury to the English.

The objects which England laboured to achieve are excellently set forth by Von Hellwald, in his "Russians in Central Asia."

Referring to the Umballa Meeting, he adduces the following opinion, which is evidently of "English extraction":—

"Shir-Ali consented to travel 500 miles beyond his own frontier, and, in the eyes of the Asiatic world, appeared as a monarch soliciting the support of Great Britain; but the reception given to him was so magnificent that he was deemed by his own subjects to be exalted and strengthened, notwithstanding his attitude of a petitioner. It is to be presumed that Shir-Ali returned to Cabul a friend to England, and if he is our friend, let us only consider what we gain. We obtain no less than a lasting assurance that we shall have a year's notice of the approach of an European army to our frontier. In three days Shir-Ali can give intimation to the Commissioner of Peshawur of any threatening danger. From Peshawur a telegraphic wire runs in every direction, so that in three weeks' time half a dozen Engineer Officers, five mountain batteries, twenty officers, similar to those who defended Kars against the Russians, and, above all, a subsidy for five years in advance, can all be in Cabul. With such supports the Afghans could alone keep the Russians in check, and greatly impede their advance into the country; at the same time, by means of our railroads, we could concentrate in front of our advanced post and our own territory the formidable armed force of a military power ranking fourth in Europe, and backed by the mighty resources of an inexhaustible treasury."*

* I have not found this passage in Von Hellwald.—(Translator.)
So these are the conditions of the agreement at Umballa, and these, then, are the means by which we are to be checked by the English? Is this not, however, a false alarm?

Our latest advance in Central Asia was at first made with the single object of closing our Siberian and Syr-Darian lines.

The promotion of this object entangled us in a series of hostilities with Kokand and Bokhara, which terminated in the complete triumph of our arms, and in the acquisition of vast territories, which never entered into the former plans of our Government. Although these acquisitions have brought us into closer proximity to the frontiers of India, we are still far from entertaining the idea of persevering to the end, so that the apprehensions of the English are premature, to say the least. The extent of the possibility of an invasion of Afghanistan is best known to the English themselves, therefore the alarm which they raise with reference to a supposed Russian inroad is to be regarded by us as an indication of that unexpected result which we have achieved without intent. We find that we are already dangerous to India from our present position. This is clearly recognized, not alone by the English, but likewise by all politicians who are in the least acquainted with the geographical, ethnographical, and political conditions of our arena of operations. General Ignatief, our Ambassador at Constantinople, expressed himself on this question as follows, in a Despatch of the 28th June 1868:—

"The friendship of America and the advantageous position which we have secured through our conquests in Central Asia will necessarily influence the decision of England in the event of a crisis in Europe which may be brought about by France. So long as we do not directly menace the interests of England, she will at the present time think twice before she involves herself in a war with us."

We may in this place also quote the advice given
by Baron Brunnow (Despatch of the 26th September 1868,—“Prudence dictates that we should never rely "too much' on the irrevocableness of the resolutions "made by England; without challenging her to no "purpose, it were well to be on our guard against "her.”

In order to pacify public opinion in England, our Minister for War sent Lord Stanley a detailed statement of the number of our troops in Asia, which were very far from 100,000, and constantly far from being capable of making further advances.

We have already reflected on the importance of public opinion in England. So soon as this or that daily paper sounds the alarm, we at once recognize the social set or the party among which the stir is raised. The number of subscribers (to a paper) serves as a thermometer in indicating the degree of sympathy of the masses with the ideas propounded by the print. In this respect the Times plays the leading part, and it is therefore properly called the "sixth great estate." We cannot, for this reason, ignore the opinion of the English papers, if we wish to study the views of the Government. The Queen reigns, but she does not govern; such is the order of things in England; it is the people who rule through their representatives, who must, of course, give ear to the voice of their constituents.

We may judge of the opinion of English journalists on Central Asia affairs when they received the intelligence of our successes, from the following extract from the Saturday Review:—

"At all events, the Russians must not be allowed to "cross the Oxus; they must not be allowed to come "near to Herat. They are already within 500 miles of "that place, and within 800 of the frontier of India. "The left bank of the Oxus and the mountains bor-"dering Herat on the south constitute India's first "line of defence, therefore there should be an English "force in Herat always ready to march out to any
point on the left bank of the Oxus which may be "menaced. The presence of such a force would serve "as a material support to diplomatic representatives, "and if we are to act, we must act without delay, so "that we may not be anticipated."

Thus, in reply to our movement towards Tashkent the writer proposed the occupation of Herat.

The road through Persia and Herat is, indeed, the best that could be followed by a pedestrian proceeding to Herat. From Herat one may go to Candahar, thence to Quettah, and further through the Bolam (Bolan) pass, which is 120 versts (80 miles) in length, along a winding rivulet, and so into the English dominions. It is, indeed, difficult to gain possession of the pass, because it is occupied by robber tribes; but the side which these will take is as yet an open question. From Astrabad through the Bolam pass the entire distance is 2,000 versts (1,333 miles), and Herat stands midway. From Candahar one might turn to Khelat in Baluchistan, whence a turf road of 466 versts (310 miles) conducts to Karrachi. From Khelat one may emerge on Shikarpur, if one does not mind the robbers in the mountain defile.

Proceeding from Herat to Guznee, one may traverse the Gomah pass and come out on Dera Ismael Khan, yet here also by leave of mountain robbers.

All these roads are so convenient that the English cannot anyway admit either Persia or Russia to Herat. Persia is not admitted from fear that she is not alone too weak to prevent Russia from making use of this road, but that she will even open it to her.

But we can approach Herat without passing through Persia; from our position on the Oxus it were not so difficult for us to make a stride to Merv; from there Herat is within easy reach.

It is really this that has made the English consider what they are to do. They have decided what that is; they will occupy the Bolam pass and the town of Quettah. They will themselves then stand on the road
to Herat. The apple of discord will thus speedily ripen.

It is to be observed that the question of Herat has been mooted before. When the Persian army laid siege to the capital of this Khanat, the Russian Agent, Count Simonitch, was then with the Shah's suite. His presence led to an interchange of notes between the St. James's and St. Petersburg Cabinets. More than that, the English, in order to compel the Persians to raise the siege, claimed satisfaction for ill-usage of a messenger of the English mission, and occupied Karrak. The Shah was puzzled, for up to that time his relations with the English were of the most friendly nature.

The question of Herat was raised a second time in the year 1857, during the quarrel between Dost Mahomed and the Persians. The English again occupied the island of Karrak and Bushire, which obliged the Persians to recede from Herat. As in the year 1838, so also on this occasion the Persian advance on Herat was attributed to Russian instigation and to Russia's desire to secure a road to India through that Khanat.

The Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence, met Dost Mahomed at Peshawur, and concluded at the time, on the 26th January 1857, a treaty of 13 clauses.*

The alliance with Dost Mahommed was really not needed. The Persians evacuated Herat, not under compulsion from the Afghans, but on the strength of the English occupation of Bushire. It may be that the gift of an extra 100,000£. or so was nothing to the English, but this was not a question of so much money, but of the way in which it was laid out. It may be positively asserted that all these subsidies to the Afghans do not raise, but lower the dignity of the East India Company. How is it possible to persuade the Asiatic that England pays because she is strong, not because

* Here follow the 13 Articles of Agreement, correctly given.—
"Epitome of Correspondence regarding our Relations with Afghanistan and Herat, 1863," pp. 81 to 83.
she is weak, and not because she is not capable of meeting emergencies single-handed?

This is still less comprehensible to the Afghans in the face of the conflicts which they have had with the English. How can they explain to themselves the reason which induces their foes of yesterday to pay money to them to-morrow, but in the following way, as they have long done?—the Afghans are necessary to the English; the English alone cannot even cope with the Persians.

Such an opinion can hardly be flattering or desirable to the East India Company.

But Dost Mahomed was no long in receipt of the subsidy. On the 4th of March the Persians became tractable and signed a treaty.*

It cannot be said that the conditions were agreeable to the Persians. And we can quite understand that the Persians formed a very favourable opinion of the English, who "without fighting made themselves great bullies,"† solely by means of seizing possession of commercial ports. At the same time Herat—the point of convergence of all the main roads from Astrabad, Khiva, Bokhara, Cabul, Khelat, and India—is so important a place, and more especially to Persia, that the latter had constantly put out her strength in that direction.

There is no doubt but that, at the first hint of support, Persia will abandon her involuntary inaction, and will occupy Herat; the only thing is, that no one can promise her that support, because, in order to give it, a fleet as well as a land force is needed.

Western Europe, long hostile to Eastern Europe, i.e., to Russia, has ever readily credited and gives credence to every absurdity which has been spread concerning her by idle politicians. Since in 1870 the French

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† A Russian saying.
proved their utter ignorance of the geography of their own country, what can be expected of them with reference to Russia? Not knowing what Central Asia is, what trouble it cost us to take our first step, or how much we have yet to labour before we can properly subject the population of the countries which we have occupied, Western journalists have seriously argued that the natural consequence of the Russian conquest of Turkestan will, first of all, be the expulsion of the English from India, and then the overthrow of Western European States by wild hordes of Kirghiz, Bashkir, and Kokandians, led by Russian Generals.

The Times and Daily News turned over the question of Herat in every way, properly holding Herat to be the key of India, and not in the least comforting themselves with the reflection that from that "gate" to the mouth of the Indus there is a distance of 1,500 versts (1,000 miles). "The Russians," they said, "will not be deterred by that when the time comes." In the opinion of the India correspondent of the Times, that time will come with the struggle for Constantinople,—

"The Russian attempt on Constantinople in 1853 to 1855 did not succeed, because the Russians did not oppose the English in Central Asia. They are now rectifying that mistake; their steamers ply on the Jaxartes and on the Oxus; their outposts are within 300 miles of our frontier; they are on the best of footings with Persia, and enjoy an unlimited popularity among the inhabitants of Central Asia."

In order to tranquillize this frightened patriot, the Times enumerated all the impediments which would stand in the way of a Russian army on its road to India, proving, as clearly as that twice two are four, such an army would perish, if not on the road, then in Afghanistan, and if not there, then most assuredly in the heated atmosphere of North-Western India.

"In the first place, the distance between India and Russian Turkestan is not to be reckoned from outpost to outpost, but from the actual centres of power."
This idea is a correct one, but it seems that the English have not a very clear understanding as to the centres. When it comes to looking for centres, we may as well point out that they are not to be found either in Turkestan or in India; these are only the outposts of Russia and England, and thus we should say that the Russian position of Asia is the best of the two.

The *Times* continues to say that "the intermediate zone is distinguished during the winter season for its terribly severe climate, and for its unbearable heat in the summer. The country around the Caspian is in the highest degree unhealthy. There are no roads. . . How is it possible to carry artillery and stores for an enormous army across barren deserts? How is it possible to send out supports?" . . .

To this a reference to our late expedition to Khiva will be the best answer, and once having gained a footing at the mouth of the Oxus, we shall find it a matter of comparative ease to send supplies and supports to this advanced line of the English. But should all these terrors enumerated by the *Times* not prove sufficient to check the Russian troops, there are others to scare them, *i.e.*, the Afghans. "The brave, energetic, wily, and treacherous population of Afghanistan will receive with acclamation, betray, and destroy the hostile army. The interminable passes, yawning precipices, eternal snows, wild torrents, will effectually help the Afghans to dispose of the hated foreigners."

If all this does not prove enough to frighten the Russians, then, "fatigued by long marches, without artillery or ammunition, these children of the North will emerge on the sultry plains of India, in another world, to engage in a war with an enemy fighting on his own soil, provided with every means, and free to choose his own time for attack or retreat."

It is as plain as noonday that here is an end to it.

In order, however, to divert the attention of the Russians from India, the *Times* calls their consideration
to a question of "greater magnitude," to the occupation of the vast regions of Central Asia, from the Caspian to China, from the Altai Mountains to the Himalayas; "the pacification of the wild tribes were a more grateful occupation than a struggle with the climate and "Army of India."" On this condition—that we do not stretch our hands to India—the English are ready to tolerate us in Asia, and would even find some advantage in doing so. "We do not at all desire" says the Times, "that this enormous portion of the earth's surface should remain, for ever, a refuge for wild nomads. "Russian civilization is, at all events, higher than the "civilization of those parts."

So then, we are considered to be, at all events, better than Kirghiz and Turcomans. Well, even for this we may be thankful!

Fearing, however that the greed of the Russian bear will not be satisfied with such insignificant things as Bokhara, Khiva, and Kokand,—which, taken collectively, hardly contain more people than London alone,—the English point out to us* the value of the Amur "country, which is to be traversed by a great Siberian "railway, of which the construction should be expedited, in view of its world-wide importance."

If this should give us too little occupation, then we may annex the western provinces of China, "the annexation of those lands would bring to Russia 35 millions of new subjects, and the preservation of order among them and the spreading of education will give "Russia quite enough occupation."

Thus then we are charged with the grateful and honourable duty of pacifying and educating the nomads. "Anglo-Indian" differs from the Times, in his way of putting it,—he does not, like the Sixth Estate, endeavour to frighten us,—on the contrary, he tenderly and in insinuating tones, strikes the chord of the great variety

* The Goloss for 1873, No. 21. Letter from Anglo-Indian (Dr. Long).
of links which connect Russia with England, such as commercial, literary, social, and, even religious (this is in allusion to the unification of the Churches); he says that the two nations sympathise with each other, that the English formerly looked at the Russians through Polish spectacles, but that now they have quite an affection for Russia since the glorious reforms of the reigning sovereign, &c.

Generally speaking, English writers profess either a complete self-confidence or fear—swayed by every rumour; there are very few among them who regard the progressive advances of Russia with calmness, discerning, in the first place, historical exigencies and, in the second place, a guarantee for tranquillity and order. The most conspicuous amongst these was, undoubtedly, Sir Roderick Murchison, the (late) president of the London Geographical Society. But even of those who share his conviction relative to the benefits accruing from the pacification of Central Asia by means of Russian bayonets and Russian influence, the great portion concur merely because of the impossibility of stopping our progress. They exclaim, with the determination of despair:—“We have nothing to fear from the fall of Bokhara, or even of Cabul; let the Russians establish themselves at our very gates; let them be neighbours. We ought even to rejoice that we shall have, as our neighbour, a consolidated power, respecting the obligations of treaties, in place of a dozen barbarous and treacherous tribes who ruin us in the cost of annual expeditions.” In other words “there is no evil but good comes of it.” The most candid openly declare that “Russia is labouring in the interests of England.” In other words, that Russia is drawing the chestnuts out of the fire for England.

The Times works out the question in greater detail:—“If Russia is left to her own devices, she will not lose time in obtaining possession of the whole of Central Asia. England alone can prevent her doing this, and the question resolves itself into this:—Is it worth her
"while to oppose Russia, and how? The interests of England do not require her to dispossess Russia" (the Lord be thanked!) "the Russian possessions on the Oxus and Jaxartes, and those even in Bokhara, are not of the least danger to us in India." . . . . "Before there can be any struggle for India, Russia must conquer not alone Khiva and Bokhara, but also Afghanistan, and this is not to be effected in one day. "In the meantime Russia's conquests are of advantage to England's commercial interests." . . . . It is strange to see the endeavours of the English Government to stem the tide of Russian influence, side by side with this assurance of its beneficial results.

In the year 1869, on the occasion of a question put in Parliament in reference to Central Asian affairs, it was observed that England should pay due attention to Persia. This had its effect: the Government adopted measures for strengthening English influence in Persia, and at the request of the Shah sent several officers to instruct and to reorganize the Persian army according to the European system. The same was done with regard to Afghanistan.

Everybody will agree that these measures of the English Government conform but very little with the general understanding of perfect non-interference,—of a policy of uncompromising neutrality. We only note the fact, having no means whatever to resist the course even if it occasioned us inconvenience.

Our diplomacy never took fright at any measures adopted by the English Government in respect to Asia; it never put any questions or made any representations, while it has been constantly obliged to assuage the calculating apprehensions of the commercial association called the British Empire.
CHAPTER XII.

Which of us is the strongest?—Our places d'armes.—Road from Kashgar to India.—Is Forsyth to be believed?—Mr. Shaw's testimony.—Means to be employed to arrest our advance towards India.—Neutrality of Afghanistan.—View taken by our Minister for Foreign Affairs.—Interview between Prince Gorchakov and Lord Clarendon in 1869.—Opinion of the 'Times' on the neutrality of Afghanistan; the danger of simple contiguity with us.—Lord Mayo on the deplorable condition of affairs in India.—Mercantile speculativeness of the English in the matter of taxation and of public well-being.—Advice to Shere Ali Khan; exchange of assurances of friendship and love.—Forsyth's negotiations relative to the centralization of Kashgar.—Advantage to Russia of contiguity with English dominions.—Sound of alarm on the occasion of the Khiva Expedition.—Reopening of the Neutral Zone question.—Count Shuvalof's Mission.—Opinions of the "Times" and "Morning Post" on our recognition of the neutrality of Afghanistan.—Bright's opinion on the Indo-Britannic Empire.—Will the policy of England in reference to Russia be changed through the alliance of the reigning families?

If the English do not consider themselves perfectly secure in India, we should take still greater precautions against all eventualities. The English have at their disposal in India a comparatively larger number of troops than we have in Asia, and possess better means of communication with neighbouring territories. They propose to turn Afghanistan into a place d'armes, where, at a given signal, may be assembled all the soldiers whom they may bribe into their service from among a once hostile population, as well as all the avail-
able forces of India; these, in the aggregate, would compose a force which obliges us here to halt. According to the agreement concluded at the Umballa meeting, the English are bound, on receipt of the first intimation of our advance on Afghanistan, to supply the Amir, within three weeks' time, with five mountain batteries, twenty-five Officers (including six Engineer Officers), and a five year's subsidy, i.e., four millions of roubles (500,000l.).

According to the returns for the year 1873, the Anglo-Indian Government disposes of an army of 190,264, of whom, however, only 60,632 are English soldiers, with 2,880 officers. The native soldiers number 123,470, these troops form 50 battalions of infantry, and 72 squadrons of horse, with 402 pieces of artillery. If we add the forces of the vassal princes and those of Afghanistan, we may estimate the strength of the English at 300,000 men.

As regards ourselves, the total number of troops in the Turkestan province in the year 1875 was 33,893, or,

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A simple comparison of these figures will enable every one to form a perfectly correct opinion as to which of us is best qualified for aggression.

It is evident that measures of prevention should be adopted by ourselves; that we should construct or look out for convenient ways of communication—that we also should have a place d'armes.

The connexion of the Caspian with the Aral, by means of a railway, and steam navigation on the Oxus, will place us in a position similar, if not better, than that of the English; at all events, we shall be nearer to our sources of strength than British India is to her own.
As regards our selection of a *place d'armes*, we may have to pitch upon Kashgar, but this also is a question of the future. As yet the only route by which the English can reach the Russian possession lies through Kashgar. According to Mr. Forsyth's first report, the caravan route from Ladakh to Yarkand traverses the Kara Korum range through the Chanchenmo valley. In those mountains the winter is less severe than in the Himalayas; the road is easy for camels, consequently heavy burdens can be conveyed that way. The English have entered into relations with Yakub-Bek, and have sent him guns and rifles; there is no doubt, therefore, that they will, sooner or later, take advantage of the Yarkand route if we do not anticipate them at that point. While despatching what we may begin to call annual expeditions to Kashgar, the English are endeavouring to assure us that the above-mentioned route, owing to the height of the mountain passes exceeding the elevation of Mont Blanc, is utterly useless for military purposes. This, however, does not entirely accord with the transport of such ponderous and cumbersome presents as the guns which they have sent to Yakub-Bek.

But, admitting that the present English assurances of the inaccessibility of the Kara Korum passes are more reliable than the previous evidences of their practicability, and that the mountains do indeed present a series of Mont Blancs—what then? It were no novelty to Russians.

The question of the practicable roads to India has been frequently discussed by us. Mr. Veniukof devoted a series of articles to it, and even read public lectures on the subject at the Academy of the Staff Corps. The extent to which these lectures were justified by a public demand may be ascertained from the bare fact that they were intended only for the academical audience,—as a supplementary course,—a public was never reckoned upon. The English press, which sounded an alarm on the occasion of these lectures, considering them as a
sign of the times, as an expression of public opinion and as a symptom of the designs of our Government, made a most grotesque mistake. It is vexing to English journalists that there should be a man in Russia who keenly watches them, who does not overlook a single article in English journals in which the Asiatic question is broached, and who, on the other hand, acquaints us with every fresh design, every fresh movement, and every fresh intrigue on the part of the rival power.

If they do not wish that anything of this should be known in Russia, then nothing of it should be published in papers, in journals, and in pamphlets. A word put into print becomes the property of the whole world. But with English sources, one must be careful, and the careful investigator is not to be deceived even by a deliberate falsehood, if he is not one of those of whom it may be said:—

"What in the latest book he'll find, Will be the impress on his mind."

At first Forsyth most strongly commended the Kara-Korum route to Yarkand; afterwards he wrote that it was practicable only during a certain time of the year, and was at all times attended with immense difficulties, seeing that several parallel ranges had to be crossed,—Baníhal, 10,000 feet; Zoji-Là, 11,000 feet; Khardung, 17,500 feet; Sasser, 18,000 feet; Kara Korum, 18,300 feet; Soget, 18,200 feet; Killian, 16,000 feet, with passes exceeding the height of Mont Blanc. But why climb over Mont Blancs when there is a capital road without any obstructing mountains? Forsyth pretends that he does not know of any such road, and yet the communications between India and Kashgar have somehow become more frequent. Even guns have been transported. Have they been carried over seven Mont Blancs? The road was, at first, held to be an exceedingly good one, and the attention of the East India Government was called to the danger to which the English possessions might be exposed if the Russians should occupy Kashgar, and gain possession of the
Kara Korum pass. Now that Yakub-Bek has been taken in tow by the English, now that the latter have taken every possible precaution against all contingencies, and now that Forsyth has achieved his object, and, since a valuable post has been created for him on the frontier, he strives, as it were, to divert the eyes of Russia from the breach which nature has made in the Kara Korum mountains.

This work was ready for publication when Hutton’s book on Central Asia was received at St. Petersburg. Turning over the leaves of this book, I lighted upon the following interesting item of information, which Hutton, having, it seems, also acquired by accident, added to his XVth chapter in the form of a supplementary note:—

"In his account of Central Asian discoveries,* published in the Royal Geographical Society's 'Proceedings,' Mr. Shaw remarks:—

"'In a letter to our late president, Sir Roderick Murchison, I described my astonishment in walking across an open plain from waters which run towards Central Asia to others which flow into the Indus, while the mighty mountain range, topped with glaciers and perpetual snow, which for days before I reached it had seemed to bar all access to the southern regions, was found on a nearer approach to be riddled through and through by the streams which rise in the northern plateaux. More recently a striking proof of the same fact reached me. Last year I had recommended certain shooting grounds north of the Kara Korum to some officers of the 37th Regiment in search of sport. Captain Skinner and his companions, finding themselves on the upper Karakash River, and their time being scanty, thought to return by a short cut to the Indus, leaving the Kara Korum pass to the west of them. On arriving at Leh, their first inquiry of me was, 'What has become of the Kara Korum range? Has it vanished?' In fact,

* Vide Hutton's "Central Asia: from the Aryan to the Cossack."
they had been tempted to follow a broad opening southward from the Karakash River, expecting always to pass the lofty range marked on the maps, but after traversing several high barren plains, had found themselves on the banks of a stream running into the Indus, without having crossed any range at all. Having thus abolished the Kara Korum chain, we may, I think, proceed to do the same with several others, and notably with Humboldt's Bolor or Belut Tagh. The explorations of the Russians from Kokand and Samarcand, and of Major Montgomerie's men from the upper Oxus, seem to show that the highlands of the Pamir, Alai, &c., participate in the character of the country I have just described. High snowy ranges there are, but they do not determine the main flow of the rivers; on the contrary, the crossing from one great river system to the other is generally over an almost insensible rise. The same might be gathered from a statement of a Kashmiri prisoner, whom we met with in Kashgar. He had been captured in one of the wild valleys south of the watershed (near that where the unfortunate Hayward was afterwards murdered). In accordance with the customs of that region he had been sold as a slave. Wounded, barefooted, almost naked, he had been tied to the tail of his master's horse and led, with other slaves, across into Central Asia. In such a plight he would probably have magnified fourfold any difficulties of the road; but he could not, when asked, remember having crossed any mountain pass on the journey, and only after repeated inquiry recollected a certain spot where the waters had been shed into opposite directions.

Mr. Shaw performed his excursions with the knowledge of Forsyth. From this arises the question: If Mr. Shaw knows of a certain road, can Mr. Forsyth be ignorant of it?

Nature herself, then, has thrown open to us wide portals into India. This is the direction in which our
explorers should push their efforts, and to which the attention of our Government should be turned. Private individuals are not generally endowed with a passion for exploring dangerous countries coupled with the means to defray their own expenses of travel. Consequently, either the public or the Government should come to their assistance. Neither trouble nor money should be spared in the matter of the exploration of the roads to India, in view of the incalculable benefits of the results of discoveries, in view of the immeasurable saving which an acquaintance with the method of approach to the Achilles' heel of England will enable us to make.

Forsyth's last mission was composed of 138 individuals and 250 pack animals. It was divided into three parties, and pursued three different roads. From Ladakh there are two roads to the Kara Korum; three passes occur here, and in the winter travellers proceed along these for ten days without falling in with fodder or water. The third road conducts to Chanchenmo, a dried-up lake, at a height of 16,000 feet, and from thence over three passes of 15,000 feet altitude to the fortress of Shahidullah. The subject of the roads to India from the Bolor and from Kashgar is thus rather clouded.

So long as this region becomes unexplored by trustworthy Russian travellers (not by dilettanti who have no knowledge of surveying or of the local dialects), so long shall we be denied all positive information concerning it. But admitting that the English do indeed encounter all sorts of obstructions on the road into Central Asia, that their caravans have actually to climb over piles of Mont Blancs raised, as it were, by sacksfull, that they are obliged to slip through the hands of some hundreds of thousands of robbers, and to drag across oceans of sand, &c.,—is the game worth the candle?

What is there to attract England to Kashgar, Bokhara, and Khiva? Certainly not the trade of those countries, which barely embraces ten millions of con-
sumers, while in India, Persia, Afghanistan, Beluchistan, and Cashmere England finds 250 millions of purchasers.

The outcries which England raises against us for hampering her trade, for our aims at conquest, for the danger to which India is exposed through our vicinity, are all owing to a desire to maintain a political supremacy, to an anxiety to preserve her precious colony. The effect of these repeated outcries has been to persuade us actually that England does indeed apprehend danger from us, and we have, therefore, given to England an explanation of our movements, reassuring her in respect to our intentions and justifying our policy. All this could not but reflect on our actions, which exhibited symptoms of indecision and an apparent fear of awakening in our neighbour groundless apprehensions. The desire to remove the mistrust of England and avoid occasion for protest on her part made us overlook numerous violations of the law of nations by Khiva, Bokhara, Kuldja, and Kashgar. England would not have overlooked one half of these violations.

But our moderation was exercised for nothing; we gained nothing in the estimation of the English; and if England does at times affect confidence and friendship, they are not sincere.

England apparently shares the following opinion expressed by Vâmbèri in his chapter on the rivalry between Russia and England in Central Asia:—*

"With the position she (Russia) holds on the Aral "and the Caspian Seas, after conquering the whole of "the Caucasus, after her enormous successes in Central "Asia, it would now be useless to try and force back "that giant power. What might, with no great "trouble, have been attained twenty years ago, it is "now far too late to attempt; but if England would "avoid the usual lot of commercial States,—the doom

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* Vâmbèri's Sketches, p. 423.
of Carthage, Venice, Geneva, Holland, and Portugal—there is but one way left to her, a policy of stern watchfulness, a swift grasp of the measures still at her command."

We dare think that even twenty years ago we should have been able to maintain our own. If England had been able to force us back, she would have done so long ago, if she were strong enough to keep us in our present positions, she would not lose a moment's time in doing so. She is incapable of anything of the kind, and limits herself, therefore, to an issue of protests and to newspaper articles, in order, at all events, to arrest our progress, and to preserve as long as possible a safe distance between us. This object she fully achieves.

As a means of arresting our progress on the road to India, the English devised the neutralization of Afghanistan and Kashgar.

The communications opened on this question between the Cabinet of Her Britannic Majesty and our Minister for Foreign Affairs led to an interchange of views and in the end to an understanding, but not to so definite an agreement as was desired by England.

On the question of Afghanistan, our Government declared that that country lies beyond the sphere of our interests and political relations. The British Cabinet expressed a determination to renounce every idea of extending the British dominions in that direction. The object of English interference in the affairs of Afghanistan was stated to be a desire to help that country in escaping from the anarchy which overwhelmed it.*

It is, however, difficult to believe the above assurance, and to attribute English aid to a particular and perfectly disinterested attachment towards an unfortunate country perishing from anarchy. It is still more difficult to make this comprehensible to the Afghans, who must be trained to the idea, so that they might not hold

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* Baron Brünnow to our Minister for Foreign Affairs, 30th June 1869.
themselves to be an English advance guard against Russia and contemplate any operations in direct opposition to the magnanimous protestations of their patron. The English themselves know full well how they are detested by the Afghans. When Sir John Lawrence, the Viceroy of India, sent an Officer to Cabul at the death of Dost Mahommed, to congratulate Shere-Ali-Khan on his accession to the throne, the agent could not show himself in the streets without an Afghan escort. The irritation of the fanatic population was so great, that without this protection the Englishman would have been torn to pieces.

According to Vâmbèri, the Afghans even pride themselves on having placed themselves on such a footing that, while they may safely go to India and trade there, no Englishman dares to show himself amongst them. Hitherto all the weight of treaty obligations has fallen on the English alone, while the Afghans have derived all the advantages. Thus, in the year 1857, what was the result of the interview at Peshawur, at the instance of Lord Canning, between the Viceroy Sir John Lawrence and the Dost, when a treaty of alliance was concluded with the latter against Persia?

The English supplied the Dost with 8,000 rifles and 300,000* roubles, and over and above paid him one lakh of rupees per month (i. e., 100,000 or 60,000 roubles) during the continuance of the war with Persia, and yet they could not procure for themselves the right of maintaining an agent at Cabul. The Dost evaded the condition on the ground that he could not guarantee the security of the Consul's life.

We conclude from this that the English make a mistake in relying as they do upon the Afghans. Vâmbèri would have it that†:—"Not only chiefs and "princes, but every Afghan warrior, nay, every shepherd "on the Hilmund, puts his trust in the idea of Russian "connexions. . . . . Whether such a friendship

* 37,500L.  † "Sketches," p. 403.
"would be wholesome, and conduce to the interests of Afghanistan, no one takes into question. The Afghans, like all Asiatics, look only to the interests of the moment—see only the harm which Afghans have suffered in Kashmere and Sindh through English ascendancy, have a lively remembrance of the last sojourn of the red jackets in Cabul and Kandahar."

Sir Henry Rawlinson takes a somewhat different and a more confident view of the matter. Thus, considering the necessity of occupying Herat and Kandahar, he observes:—*

"The only parties from whom we should experience ill would be the priesthood, and a few of the Duráni Chiefs, and they might be called upon to retire to Cabul. Most assuredly, as far as the disposition of the natives is concerned, we should not have more difficulty in governing Kandahar and Herat than the Russians encounter in governing Tashkend and Samarcand; whilst our long familiarity with Eastern administration, our special knowledge of Western Afghanistan, our consideration forMohamedan prejudices, our prestige, our high reputation for justice and good faith, ought to make the task of maintaining the position far more easy to us than to our less experienced northern neighbours."

Such is the way in which the English deceive themselves. What praises Sir Henry Rawlinson lavishes upon them! What incense he burns before them! One might almost be persuaded by him that the English are thorough professors in the art of Eastern administration, that their prestige is indestructible, that honesty and justice are synonymous with the name of Englishman.

But, when we remember how they conducted themselves in Cabul in 1839, when we bear in mind that an apathetic people, indifferent even to death, are being

repeatedly roused to rebellion, we then find that these professors have yet much to learn. The prestige of the English is certainly great, but it has been very much shaken by the victories of the Russian troops. As regards their honesty and justice, the English are positively mistaken, for the Asiatics have a very different opinion of them. They naturally do not understand the word "justice," and they are not capable of appreciating "English" honesty. This is the only explanation of that perverted opinion which the Asiatics have formed of the English, which is expressed in the words, "Ingliz very much devil."

It is no easy matter to make the Afghans believe that arms and money are given to them with the sole object of securing all the blessings of peace and tranquillity. There is not a single Afghan who, since the Umballa meeting, entertains such an idea; the majority of them simply consider themselves sold to England, that England means sooner or later to exact kun, i. e., blood money, for the English army which they annihilated in 1840.

In the Despatch from our Minister for Foreign Affairs to Baron Brünnow under date the 30th June 1869, we read as follows: "If Afghanistan considers that she is intended to be an advanced guard of the British Empire against Russia, then Russia will be necessarily obliged to adopt measures of her own for the protection of her political and commercial interests. These measures may, in their turn, arouse the mistrust and suspicions of England and lead to combinations which will shorten the distance between the two countries, or create a rivalry which they both endeavour so eagerly to avoid. Should the Afghan ruler, however, be fully assured that the support which he receives from England was given him with the single object of creating, in contiguity with the British dominions, an orderly State formed for peaceful prosperity under the ægis of neutrality, then may indeed be accomplished the sincere desire of the Imperial Cabinet,—that
Central Asia should become a field for the friendly and beneficial enterprise of both the Great Powers,—each operating within her own sphere,—without any other rivalry than fruitful competition in the development of trade and civilization. Instead of indulging, as before in mistrust and rivalry, both powers will then act in unison, in order to instruct, restrain, and, when necessary, to repress the uncurbed passions of the people and of their rulers, whose education is now to be undertaken.

On the occasion of Lord Clarendon's interview with Prince Gorchakof in 1869, the former said: "We have advised Shere-Ali to refrain from all proceedings calculated to arouse the susceptibilities of Russia, and that, if he should indulge in any such course, he was not in any case or in any way to rely on the countenance of England. This was urged upon him and will be repeated to him, so that no misunderstanding is possible. . . . We entertain" he continued, "no apprehensions on account of the views of your Government; we rather fear its subordinate officers,—the consequences of the immoderate zeal of Generals in pursuit of fame and ambitious of elevation without regarding the views of their own Government."

The Chancellor's reply to the effect that all our efforts were turned towards the direction of opening up shorter and safer trade routes into Central Asia, and that it was necessary from this point of view to consider what we have already done and what we might still effect, seemed thoroughly to tranquillize Lord Clarendon and to give him much pleasure.

The northern frontier of the neutral zone, as proposed by Lord Clarendon was,—the upper waters of the Oxus as far as the meridian of Bokhara, from which point the line of demarcation ran direct west, thus intersecting all the caravan routes to Khiva and Bokhara.

It is observed in the Memorandum of the Asiatic Department of the 16th April 1869, "the English
"Government seems to have no doubt that Russia will, in the immediate future, annex both Bokhara and Khiva. In this line of frontier, the English Government accordingly finds a line beyond which she has determined not to allow of the extension of Russian dominion in Central Asia. This is not consistent with the dignity of Russia." Lord Clarendon's proposition, as being incompatible with the dignity of Russia, was not accepted, and our Government not recognizing the neutrality of Afghanistan, confined itself to a declaration of a determination not to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan. (Communication from the Imperial Chancellor, 7th March 1869).

It was at the same time agreed upon that Shere-Ali on the one hand and Said Muzaffer on the other, should be advised not to undertake any operations one against the other.

The significance which was attached in England to the question of the neutrality of Afghanistan—the Asiatic Switzerland,—may be judged from the following passages quoted from the London papers:—

"If" observed the Times "we could secure the friendship of Afghanistan and her independence of Russia, then Great Britain would have no Central Asian question to deal with."

Having once burned her fingers in Afghanistan (1840) England now finds that it would not be advantageous to annex that Khanat to India: "Russia need be under no apprehension of any attempt on our part to annex Afghanistan. All the advantage which is to be derived from that country depends upon the-preservation of its independence. Independent Afghanistan will protect the English frontier against enemies from without, whereas in a state of vassalage she would, herself, need English protection. . . . If a Russian recognition of the neutrality of Afghanistan be obtained by diplomacy, then the British Government will have to blame itself in the event of a sudden attack upon that country."
It is difficult to conceive why the English are so anxious that Russia should recognize the neutrality of Afghanistan, when in a thousand ways they prove that they have nothing to apprehend on account of India. A single glance at the map is enough to show how difficult it would be for us even to reach the Indian frontier from our present positions. Since the Khivan campaign, all doubts, all arguments as to the impossibility or the inaccessibility of whatsoever object to Russian troops must indeed vanish, yet it must be admitted that the English are not Khivans, and that if we were to project an expedition against them we should have to do so with great care and, at all events, not soon.

Evidently it is not this that is feared by England,—she is simply not able to endure the contiguity of Russia to her Indian dominions where so many inimical elements yet secretly prevail; the neighbourhood of a strong State naturally weakens the power of England, and serves palpably to show that the British Colossus has legs of clay.

This is what Lord Mayo wrote in 1872: "A feeling of dissatisfaction and of antagonism prevails among all classes of society, both European and Native, with regard to the increase of taxation; I am convinced that this constitutes a great political danger. We never for a moment thought we could preserve order, but it is my opinion that the condition of affairs is now more serious than ever."

Soon after this candid statement, Lord Mayo was assassinated by a fanatic; the year before, the Chief Judge of Bengal was murdered. In the island of Ceylon, insurrections were frequent,—as in 1817, 1823, 1834, 1843, and in 1848. On the continent they broke out in 1820 to 1824, in 1827 to 1830, in 1852, in 1857 to 1858, in 1863, 1868, and, finally, in 1873.

The taxation of which Lord Mayo complained was frequently the occasion of agitation. Thus, in 1810, when a window tax was imposed at Benares, the inhabitants of the town ceased work and insisted on the abolition of the
tax. In 1848, the inhabitants of Ceylon agitated against the tax on dogs, arms, and shops, and on the natural liabilities relatives to the high roads. "We may judge of the inequality of the distribution of taxes, for instance, from the fact that in Bengal the price of salt on the spot where it is obtained is 6 copecks (twopence) per hundredweight (about 3 poonds 4 lbs) while the duty on it is Roubles 2. 62 copecks.*

Although the amount of imposts is not great, seeing that each individual pays on an average not more than 7s. (Roubles 2. 14 copecks.), while in England it is not less than Roubles 19 (2l. 7s. 6d.), at the same time England yields 900,000,000l. by her industry, so that a tax upon it of 72,000,000l. is not heavy. India produces an amount of 300,000,000l. sterling, and pays 50 millions, or 1/6th, in taxes, and would pay 150 millions if its produce amounted to 900 millions, which is more than double the impost in England.

Thus India pays 3s. 4d. on every pound sterling, while England only returns 1s. 8d. Considering also that 1/6ths, or nearly the whole amount of the taxes in England, is applied to the benefit of the population of that country, while the millions raised in India are, for the most part, exported to the British metropolis, it became at once evident that the Indian imposts are not only relatively but absolutely oppressive. The Government neither gives its attention to measures for guaranteeing the country against inundations, or for securing a supply of water against periods of drought, nor does it trouble itself with accumulating stores of grain against periods of failure of the crops. It takes all from the people and gives back nothing! The consequences have been inundations in 1832, 1835, 1849, 1852, 1857, 1858, 1863, 1867, and droughts in 1834, 1837, 1840, 1841, 1866. These visitations are generally accompanied by awful famines. Almost a third of the population, or about 10,000,000 of people died from starvation in Bengal in

* About 7s.
In Orissa, in the year 1866, nearly half of the population perished, i.e., more than one million out of 2,600,000 inhabitants.

The English have endeavoured to crush manufacturing industry in India, in order to make the Indians producers of only raw material, i.e., agents for and consumers of their own manufactures. The means employed for the eradication of industry were most simple; all machinery, all instruments for manufacture, were heavily taxed. A tax was imposed upon everything, from the churn to the spinning-wheel, from the boat even to the adze. At the same time the importation of machinery was prohibited. Who is not aware of the fact that India was famed for her manufactures until it fell under the grasping paw of the British lion?

The native factories have all been closed one after the other, and the Indian agriculturist gives up his cotton to the Englishman at 1½ copek (¼d.) per pound, to receive it back in cotton texture for 50 copecks.

Without reference to the outrageous illegalities of such men as Hastings—to the faithless, perjurious, and dishonest policy of many Governors of India, and without reference to the ferocity with which the English quell all popular ferments, the cheerless financial condition of the country is of itself sufficient cause for murmur and discontent.

The development of the people nevertheless progresses, although it is not promoted by the English, and perhaps for that very reason. In the year 1851 there were 40 native printing presses in Calcutta. The Indian Sun is published in Persian, in Hindustani, in English, in Ordos (Urdus), and in Bengali. A cultivated people are naturally governed with greater facility, but only on the conditions of justice and humanity; the English cannot be accused of either the one or the other.

The reader will now clearly understand why the English press, followed by English diplomacy, cries and groans when this or that Governor of Turkestan grows tired of sitting with folded hands.
Let us now return to Shere-Ali-Khan.

When Lord Mayo acquainted the Ameer of Afghanistan with the complete understanding between England and Russia relative to the mode of proceeding in Central Asia, and Afghanistan was in consequence to refrain from acts of hostility against Russia, the Ameer of Cabul replied that not only had he no intention of acting in opposition to Russian interests, but that he would also refuse to afford shelter in his dominions to persons inimical to Russia.

Sir Andrew Buchanan acquainted the Emperor at Baden with the contents of Lord Mayo's letter to Shere-Ali-Khan, and expressed a hope that the influence of Russia would assure to the Ameer of Cabul similar conduct on the part of his neighbours. His Imperial Majesty was pleased to declare that, in as much as it should depend upon him, this hope should be realized.

The appearance of Abdu Rahman Khan, the nephew and political opponent of the Ameer within our limits, gave the Governor General an occasion for entering into direct relations with the Ameer of Cabul, and for explaining to him our view of the significance and political situation of his State.

This letter Shere-Ali referred to the Viceroy of India, and, on the strength of an agreement with the latter, instructed his Sirdars on the frontier not to interfere in the affairs of his neighbours. A copy of the same letter was forwarded by our Foreign Office to the British Cabinet, who instructed their minister of St. Petersburg to thank the Imperial Government for its expression of a thoroughly friendly feeling towards England.

The question of Afghanistan was thus closed.

As regards Kashgar, the arguments employed by Mr. Douglas Forsyth, who was commissioned to negotiate with our Minister for Foreign Affairs, led to no result. We not only refused to acknowledge the neutrality of that country, but declined even to recognize its independence; our friendly relations with China necessitating such conduct on our part. Moreover, the
instability of Yakub-Bek's government, in a country periodically given to convulsions, added to the possibility of its reconquest by the Chinese, obliged us to be careful in a matter of such great importance.*

The only result of Mr. Forsyth's negotiation with our Government was the assurance that, in the event at any future time of the occupation by Russia against her own desire of the whole or of a portion of Bokhara, she should not undertake any conquests in the direction of Afghanistan, and that England should not allow the Ruler of Afghanistan to disturb his northern neighbours.

The opening of the direct relations with Afghanistan by the Governor General of Turkestan, which so correctly indicated the line of policy in Asia, led to the vesting of the Governor General with authority to communicate directly with the Viceroy of India on matters of a purely local character.

Having suffered a defeat in the matter of the recognition of the neutrality of Afghanistan and Kashgar, the English occupied themselves with the strengthening of their relations with Kashgar, and with its subjection to their influence. Yakub-Bek very nearly succumbed to them at once, through a consideration of the material advantages promised to him, but it appeared that in 1872, after an interchange of missions with us, he showed a preference of Russian protection to English money. It also appeared to us that the time was not so far distant when Kashgar would adhere to us among the other vassal States.

The neutral zone proposed by the English Government was meant as a preventive measure against our immediate contact, as if contact and collision are one

* I pointed out in a Memorandum drawn up in 1870 that, previous to Mr. Forsyth's first mission to Kashgar, namely, in 1868, Shadi-Mirza went on a message from Yakub-Bek to Russia, and was allowed to proceed to St. Petersburgh, while a Russian Agent (Colonel Reinthal) proceeded secretly to Kashgar. Yet Sir A. Buchanan was asked in 1869 to transmit a message to Yakub-Bek from the Russian Government on the ground that the latter "had no relations with him." — [Parliamentary Papers [C. 704], 1873, p. 12. ]—R.M.
and the same thing. It is strange indeed that measures should be adopted against the drawing together of different people. It is therefore quite comprehensible that the endeavours of the English to create around them a girdle of neutral States, are solely dictated by an anxiety to preserve their colony from a Russian invasion. In this case our interests are diametrically opposed to those of England.

There are in Europe so many questions still undecided and requiring revision, that our Government is most probably bent on gaining the confidence of England, and to secure her voice at European congresses.

Experience has shown us that we can arrive at this only by means of a contiguity with her dominions, the farther off we are from these the more difficult will it be to come to any agreement. It is enough, in support of this, to refer to the change in the English policy on the Polish question, when information was received in Russia of the arrival in New York of the Russian squadron, which so dexterously slipped through Scaggersack, the Cattegat, and across the German Ocean round the northern extremity of the island of Great Britain.

The advantageous positions which we have occupied since then in Central Asia (Auliéta, Turkestan, Chemkend, Tashkend, Hodjend, Ura-Tiubé, Jizakh, Samarcand, Katy-Kurgan, and Kuldja), together with the changes in the system of the European States brought about by the Franco-Prussian War, had this effect, that when our Government raised the question of the Treaty of Paris it encountered no opposition from England on the subject of the abrogation of some of the clauses which were of the greatest importance to England (concerning the Black Sea fleet).

English diplomacy, as well as the English press, has at last become convinced that we are not running after conquest in Central Asia [proofs: the capture of Karshi and Shahr-i-Subz, and their surrender to the Ameer of Bokhara], but that in case of need we shall proceed
onward in spite of everybody and everything, after doing everything to ensure military and diplomatic success. This conviction led to the alteration of the tone both of English diplomacy and of the English press, and to the opinion that it were better not to exhibit too great an anxiety on account of our successes.

We seemed to think from this that our peaceful relations with England would not be disturbed even if we occupied all the Khanats on the Oxus, but in this we were bitterly mistaken.

So soon as our preparations for the Khivan campaign ceased to be a secret, the English press sounded the alarm. The most violent and unbecoming articles appeared in the English papers. "We must stop "Russia. We must show her her proper place," it was said in one journal; in another it was said, "Our "moderation and forbearance are badly understood in "Russia, and we shall dictate the limits beyond which "she must not trespass;" in a third it was written, "Asia should belong only to England, as the repre- "sentative of right, civilization, trade, and peace. She "must put a limit to the extension of a power which "carries with it only the principles of desolation and "robbery, and which is only in the pursuit of conquest." Never did England show so much anxiety and fear. One might have imagined that it was a question of a descent on the British shores.

The Khan of Khiva, seeing that he was not allowed to communicate with the Russian Government except through the Governor General of Turkestan, and being averse to concession,—not only from obstinacy, but because he had already gone too far,—sent embassies at last to Constantinople and to Calcutta. The English took advantage of this to interfere in the business, and renewed their attempts to obtain the recognition of the neutrality of Afghanistan by our Government, this time throwing in Badakhshan and Wakhan, situated on the banks of the Oxus.*

* Lord Granville's Dispatch of the 5th October 1872.
The object is plain: the Afghans will come down to the river, consequently the English will be able to establish their factories on it and float their steamers,—the Afghan flag will quite lawfully cover English enterprise.

To many people in Russia it appears that the question of some Wakhan or other is the greatest possible rubbish, and not worth very much discussion. The geographical knowledge of most people who give their opinion on the Central Asian question does not go much beyond the fact that Turkestan and Daghestan are not one and the same.

Our Government treated this question very seriously, and did not easily cede to the English representations.

Prince Gorchakof answered (7th December) that the province of Badakhshan with its dependencies was not formally annexed to the dominions of Shere-Ali, and did not, therefore, lawfully belong to Afghanistan, consequently neutralization could not extend to that province.

Lord Granville replied (12th January 1873) that Badakhshan had been conquered by Shere-Ali, that the Chiefs of the various clans had formally given in their submission to him, and that if he had given them a ruler and had not taken the government into his own hands, that was, in the first place, his own business, and, in the second place, he had done so by way of experiment for one year. As regards the apprehensions relative to the possibility of the Ameer being ever urged to entertain aggressive intentions against neighbouring States by the recognition of the dependence of Badakhshan, "Her Majesty's Government would not fail to bring to the observation of the Ameer, in the strongest possible terms, those advantages which accrue to him from a recognition by Great Britain and Russia of the frontier which he lays claim to, and the obligation which consequently rests upon him to refrain from any aggressions."

Besides the exchange of diplomatic notes, direct per-
sonal negotiations were conducted in London between the Cabinet of St. James and Count Shuvalof, Special Envoy from St. Petersburg.

Count Shuvalof's well known position gave great weight to his words among the English. Under these circumstances the negotiations could not be protracted, and, indeed, all the desires of England in respect to Afghanistan were recognized as legitimate. Writing to Count Brünnow on the 19th January 1873,* Prince Gorchakov said that although, according to our views, Badakhshan and Wakhan enjoy a certain independence, yet considering the greater facilities which the English possess for collecting precise data, and not wishing to give to this question of detail greater importance than is due to it, "we do not refuse to accept the line of boundary laid down by England." In the language of English newspapers this signified "giving way to the "demands of England which dictated lines of boundary "to Russia." In reference to the published diplomatic correspondence, the "Times" observed that England should rejoice over her success, that the Russian concessions gained greater importance from the tone in which they were made, &c. At the same time, the "Times" raised the question whether it was to be supposed that the entire country to the north of Afghanistan was to be sacrificed to the conquering tendencies of Russia. As regards the guarantee for the good behaviour of Shere-Ali, the "sixth estate" was not pleased with it at all.

In the opinion of the "Morning Post," the Government sought, by means of its negotiations, to avoid a parliamentary or public pressure. The whole series of facts adduced by that paper proved that the Gladstone-Granville Government had always acted up to a policy of "disagreeable surprises for the nation." The success over which the "Times" found occasion to rejoice threw

the "Morning Post" into a state of despondency. "In the present position of affairs," it said, "the frontiers of Afghanistan became the frontiers of England, who thus comes in contiguity with Russia. . . . "The latter is allowed to advance, and in virtue of "treaty right, to occupy a position at which she has "long aimed. . . . All this gives birth to complications in the future, which will be entirely owing to the extreme docility of the Cabinet."

And what did we gain as the price of the recognition of the neutrality of Afghanistan? Nothing more than that the papers ceased to cry out against the expedition to Khiva. But even this was, in a great measure, consequent on the categorical assurances given by Count Shuvalof, that Khiva should not be annexed to Russia. . . . It is well known that this promise was faithfully kept; . . . the city of Khiva was not occupied.

The tone of the English papers was considerably altered, and the "Times" itself came forward with the following declaration:—*

"We have watched the expedition to Khiva with an interest more nearly akin to friendship" (So, indeed!) "than to rivalry. We have awarded, in no chary terms, our meed of praise to the able Generals and the Russian troops for their brilliant exploits."

But, further on, the "Times" says:—"There never was so fitting a time for England to draw more closely the cords which bind her to Afghanistan. We cannot deny that, when Lord Mayo's famous Durbar was held at Umballah, the leading idea was the adoption of a decided policy against Russia. Lord Northbrook has been enabled to take up the threads of that policy, but in quite a different spirit. The rise of a Moham
dan power on the highland of Kashgaria, and the

* Vide "Times," 10th September 1873.
“Russian expedition to Khiva, have given our relations to Afghanistan a new direction. We lost our footing in Afghanistan while Russia advanced in Central Asia.”

What more is wanted? It would appear there is nothing more to be done than to proceed with the occupation of Afghanistan.

The English should, however, bear in mind the words of John Bright:

“I have arrived at the conclusion that the edifice which has been raised in India is too immense. It were injudicious, and perhaps dangerous, to annex territories which should be left as independencies, and to wage wars which are as unnecessary as they are unjustifiable. The great Empire which we have acquired by conquest is too vast to be properly governed; its foundations are unstable, and it sometimes appears that it is ready to tumble to pieces.”

Bright is not Vombéri, and his words may be believed.

Our present relations with England appear to many Russians to be thoroughly established through the family alliance of the reigning dynasties. It is not, however, to be forgotten that in England “The King reigns, but does not govern,” so that to us the sense of the majority of the Parliament is of greater importance than the opinion of the Queen.

The English take another view of this alliance, and do not cede on any point. An example of this is supplied in the despatch of an English military agent, Mr. Napier, to Persia. Apparently he has only reviewed the Persian frontier from Meshed to the caravan road to Herat, along the course of the Herirud, has collected circumstantial information concerning the country at the head waters of the Attrek, has drawn up a detailed map, and has entered into relations with the Téké Turcomans,—but whence came the 6,000 English rifles which the Turcomans have now got?
This is all very intelligible—the Russians have reached the Attrek and the Oxus, . . . the road to Herat lies before them, . . . it is possible to put impediments in their way only by the hands of the Turcomans, . . . hence the Turcomans receive rifles. The Cabinet of St. James denies the fact, but the evidence still holds good. In addition to this the English intend to occupy Quettah in advance of the Bolan pass. We are convinced by all this that the English policy is the same that it was. Let us then abandon futile hopes, and look before us with both our eyes open.
CHAPTER XIII.

Questions and Answers.—Why have we lodged ourselves in Asia?—Protection of Confines; Trade "etapes;" the Way to India.—How viewed by the English?—Adoption of measures in India.—Importance of Railways.—Who shall prevail?—Stability of natural Frontiers in Asia.—What are we struggling for?—A curb on England.—The curious history of England's ultimatum of 1863 on the Polish question.—We are disliked only from a distance.—Sir Henry Rawlinson's opinion on the importance of the positions we occupy.—Herat, the Key of India.—Measures for the strengthening of English influence in Persia.

Having explained the general character of our advance into Central Asia, and the bent of our policy in that part of the world, we shall proceed to reflect on the problems which we may possibly have to solve in the future, and on the opinions which have been expressed upon this subject by the press of Europe. Following upon this, we shall refer to our method of conducting diplomatic relations with the khanats.

We very frequently meet with people in Russian society, who, on learning that we have been to Central Asia, overwhelm us with questions like the following: What made you rush into that country? What advantage can we gain from your conquests, from your glories? The whole of Asia is not worth a farthing, and yet you spend upon it our precious millions. Do you benefit the Asiatics? &c., &c. These, however, are mere exclamations requiring neither interlocution nor reply, rather than challenges to an interchange of ideas.
At the same time, the utterance of these exclamations, indicative of an entire lack of comprehension of our Central Asian affairs, is a very legitimate phenomenon. Nowhere has there been so little written about these affairs as in Russia. In Western Europe the Central Asian question has been laid threadbare; all possible combinations, whether political, military, or financial, have been minutely examined. Yet in our midst there is, as it were, an exhibition of fear to look into the dreadful face of the future, and an endeavour by all means to evade the burning question.

It would appear as though all the persons who are more or less concerned in the management of the affairs have decided to abide by the well-known maxim of Talleyrand, that "language is given to us in order that we may with the greater art disguise our thoughts." A distrust in official communications, in statements of fact, &c. is a natural emanation from this course. But there is another aphorism: "If you wish to deceive your enemy, tell him the truth." Herein it is calculated that the man trained in diplomatic sinuosities, in falsehood and dissembling, will never believe what is told to him, and will therefore take the truth for a lie. We have grown accustomed to the expressions "diplomatic veracity," "diplomatic candour," that is to signify a universally accepted opinion of diplomats; they have perverted the truth, and there is no more faith in them.

Eschewing all prevarications, let us boldly look into the question—Why have we lodged ourselves in Asia?

We deduce the reply to this from the exposition of facts which we have already given. Our advances towards the East have not been the results of far-seeing plans; we have only pursued immediate objects; unrestrained nomads attacking our frontier lines, kidnapped our people and sold them by thousands in the markets of Central Asia. Our detachments entered into reprisals, complicating accounts and intensifying the mutual hatred. The system next resorted to, of steppe
forts, answered the purpose better; but it was necessary to connect the forts. Hence arose lines. The process of connecting the Orenburg and Siberian lines led to the occupation of positions on the Jaxartes and Chu rivers, and this evoked the enmity of Kokand, Bokhara, and Khiva. A series of wars with those khanats brought us to the points which we now hold.

It may be boldly asserted that during all that time there was not even a thought of India. All incomprehensible as it was, the whole process reduced itself to this short formula,—“Ours are being set upon—consequently we must go to the rescue.”

It is asked, “What are the advantages from our conquests?” I reply with the query, Why is the same question not put in Orenburg or in the Ural?

It may be answered, because decorations are distributed there for Asia.

Nothing of the kind. Simply because you may now feel secure in Asia for every hour of your existence.

Thus the first advantage which we have derived has been the security of the confines of the country of the Ural.

The second advantage has been the security of our trade. This is proved by the following figures: previous to the year 1850 the value of the imports from Asia was Roubles 800,000 per annum, and that of the exports from Russia in Asia Roubles 600,000. In 1867 the former figure increased to 13 millions, and the latter to 16½ millions, and this, too, notwithstanding the series of hostilities with Bokhara and Kokand, and in defiance of the prohibition against trade with Bokhara, imposed at the instance of Cherniayef.

The third advantage which we have gained is this, that from our present positions we can menace British India, not only in projects but in reality. In this respect the Central Asiatic territories are serviceable to us as “étapes” for further operations,—stations where we may take rest and collect our forces.
If an overland expedition to India was considered practicable in the time of Paul I., it is surely still more so now that we have advanced so far on the way.

We shall, of course, not fall out with England on account of Asia; if we quarrel, it will most likely be over some European question. But we shall undoubtedly be obliged to profit by the advantages of our position in Asia and by our proximity to India. It were extremely unwise of us not to do so.

The English themselves perfectly understand the possibility of a Russian march into India, and they have seriously pondered over the question.

They have sensibly concluded that railways are the best counterforce, and since our occupation of Tashkend they have assiduously taken to extending their lines.

On the 1st of April 1872, 5,145 miles of rail were open to traffic, 1,600 miles were in course of construction, and the laying down of 1,165 miles more was sanctioned. Thus the entire network of railway included an extent of 7,910 miles.

The relation of the State to the railway system may be judged from the fact that the railway companies, during the period from 1849 to 1871, received, in the shape of guaranteed interest alone, the sum of Roubles 204,560,779.* The average profit of working the lines is now 392. per mile.

If we add to this 1,990 miles of canal, 200,000 troops, 400 guns, and, finally, the consideration, a deficitless English Budget, we may form a tolerably accurate idea of how far British India is prepared for hostilities.

Who shall prevail is another question, which we do not intend to discuss. It is, however, an undoubted fact that the English expect us, and are making preparations for a triumphant encounter, although they none the less sincerely desire to postpone the occasion

* At Rs. 8 to the £ = £25,570,099.
of our visit as long as possible. We are expected, too, by enthralled Hindoos.

The East India Company* is nothing more than an unhealthy excrescence on the beauteous form of India—a parasite fattening on all the best juices of the richest and most luxuriant country in the world. This excrescence or tumour is removable only by a surgical operation. The Hindoos attempted the performance of this singlehanded in 1857, but they showed a deficiency in skill. They now look to the north for a surgeon, seek to hasten his advent by prayer, and preach about him in their holy places.

I shall not enlarge on the causes of this detestation of the English by the Hindoos. But I confess to a wish that this trait may flourish and bring its fruits to maturity.

The English are well aware of the instability of their position; they have endeavoured to strengthen it with gold and iron; they have not stinted in money; they have not hesitated to incur enormous expenditure, and they have bound the ponderous disintegrating body with coils of iron; lengthways and crossways they have bandaged it with lines of rail.

At any given moment, and in any given place, they can concentrate a sufficient body of troops for resisting an external foe and for suppressing local insurrections.

The Hindoos will not soon regain spirit enough to repeat their attempt of 1857, so that the English for a long time to come will have to deal with small outbursts alone, but no one can be assured that the flame of rebellion will not spread over all India so soon as the impetus to the movement is given from the outside. The complexion of affairs will then be different. The

* The author is somewhat behind the times in his knowledge of history. The Company ceased to exist in the year 1858, when Her Majesty's Government assumed absolute control of India and of Indian affairs.—(Translator.)
200,000 troops will then have to be reduced by nearly
124,000 Natives, and the residue will have to be dis-
persed, to guard the most accessible and the most
vulnerable parts in the country.

It is to be observed that the Indian Government has
reduced the pensions of Officers serving in Native regi-
ments; the result of this has been that many of these
Officers (especially Colonels) have exchanged into other
regiments or retired, in order to draw pensions on the
old scale; this must, of course, affect the degree of
efficiency of the Native troops.

As regards the possibility of another revolt of the
Native regiments, the English have had recourse to an
artful measure; they have armed them with Snider
rifles (similar to our Krynkas), which have metallic
cartridges. It has been said in the *Russian Invalid*
that, “notwithstanding the unreliability of the Sikhs,
the English have yet armed them with breech-loading
rifles.” Looking a little deeper into this circum-
stance, it will be found that the English have com-
mitted no blunder in this matter, for a very small
supply of cartridges is issued; consequently, in the
event of a revolt, and when all the cartridges are ex-
pended, the rifles will be serviceable only by the butt
end; therefore, instead of saying, “notwithstanding the
unreliability,” we would express it, “in consequence of
the unreliability.” The old weapons are sent by the
India Government to the Turcomans, Kashgarians, and
to all those who wish to show resistance to Russia.

And so, after all, the Sikhs are not to be trusted.
As regards the railways, they are, of course, not insured
against injury. The deduction to be drawn from this
is that, when menaced by a *serious* danger, the English
may not, after all, “at a given time or place, be stronger
than their opponent.”

If we had India alone in view, we should naturally
progress more rapidly, without wasting time over the
profitless game of diplomacy with dull-headed Khans.
And our movements do actually depend on those Khaus; one or the other of them commits a foolish blunder—and lo! we have advanced a step.

Whereas bayonets do not glisten, there our frontiers are not firm. There is no natural line of limitation which will restrain the dashing Asiatic horseman,—this justice must be done him. He swims the river on his horse, or, properly speaking, by his horse's side, holding on by its mane. He climbs the mountain even with his camel, though he may have to chop steps to ascend and descend.*

It has become evident that the very best and most natural frontier is a chain of riflemen.

Agesilaus, King of Lacedæmon, observed "the frontiers of Sparta are on the points of the Spartan spears." And, indeed, in the absence of effectual natural barriers, the enemy fails to penetrate just there where he pricks himself against a breastwork of spear points or of bayonets.

The Jaxartes would appear to afford a very good natural line, yet how often have numerous parties swam across the stream!

Pistolkors's Cossacks and Skobelef's sotnia have performed this feat at China a countless number of times.

On the other hand, our Bokhara frontier is protected neither by mountains nor rivers, and yet the Bokharians never violate it. And why is this? Because Russian bayonets glitter along the road.

So long as our neighbours possess an indefinite notion of the science of international law,—in which, however, they are making progress, under instruction from our line and rifle battalions,—so long shall we continue to be uncertain of remaining to-morrow on the ground which we stand upon to-day. It is therefore very possible that we shall approach nearer still to India.

* This refers to the Muzart, which is a glacial pass.—(Translator.)
There is nothing in this to terrify us. This must be the desire of every Russian who has any reasoning faculties left to him.

What is it, then, that we are struggling for?

In Europe, as well as in Asia, we employ our energies to the end that our neighbours may enable us to live in peace and tranquillity, may allow us to arrange our internal affairs, to develop our natural resources, our industries, and our trade; without this it becomes impossible to achieve a moral and material well-being,—the single aim of our country.

And so we are struggling for peace, but peace is not secured with folded arms; it is secured by conquest.

International law, which springs from the right of might, from the right of war, and from the right of conquest, is supported exclusively by a dread of punishment,—a dread of condemnation by a powerful majority. If there be no such dread, the provisions of the law are unceremoniously disregarded. History supplies us with a thousand instances of such a disregard for sacred treaties. Napoleon alone offered a host, and England need scarce be mentioned. The only way in which she has attained prosperity has been by violating treaties without compunction, and by treating the weak with a scant ceremony.

We will guard ourselves here by observing that England shows a greater respect for international law than, for instance, Khiva, Bokhara, or Kokand, and we repeat the assurance that it would be more advantageous to ourselves to have England as a neighbour instead of Khiva. We are convinced that we should then ourselves be obliged to adopt the English system of holding only those treaties sacred which are disadvantageous to our opponent, and to hold at nought those that injuriously affect ourselves.

But England is fitted with a curb,—an apprehension of losing a precious colony. The greater her apprehension on this account the more reasonable will she be in all matters which do not directly concern her.
Europe has yet to decide several questions of the first magnitude which she has hitherto allowed to stand over. England, more than any other power, has impeded the solution of these questions, being unwilling to risk all her profits on the uncertainties of the future.

Putting aside these matters, which history may bring to the fore,—and we could but speculate on them,—it is enough for us to bear in mind the vital “Eastern” question, which has cost us so many sacrifices,—so many sacrifices rendered fruitless by England alone.

England was the soul of the coalition of 1854-56. France alone would never have ventured the descent on our shores by means of her own fleet. England wished to destroy the famous docks of Sevastopol, to strike a blow at our supremacy on the Black Sea, hence France was taken in tow.

Since then, however, circumstances have changed very much; we have advanced 2,000 versts (1,300 miles) towards India, and the subjects and tone of discussions are now different.

Russia announces a determination to be bound no longer by the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1856) referring to the Black Sea, and the repudiation is hastily accepted by England, who was the most urgent in pressing those terms.

An apprehension on account of her colonies is a chord upon which we can strike an endless variety of notes.

In the year 1863 England instigated France and injudicious Austria to send a collective note to Russia in reference to the Polish question. Having assured herself that France and Austria will recede, she suddenly assumed an arrogant tone and threatened to recognize Poland as a belligerent, i.e., an independent power. The text of a Despatch to this effect was published in the English papers, and the Despatch itself was for-
warded to the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg. A rupture seemed inevitable.

The English were already calculating the time necessary to the Russian Chancellor for the drafting of replies, and the time which would elapse in the observance of various formalities, whence they concluded that war could not commence before the autumn, and that active operations could not be begun before the spring with the opening of the navigation.

Suddenly the clouds are dispersed; the Despatch is eagerly withdrawn ere it is presented to the Russian Government. The tone is lowered, and long before the lapse of the calculated period of time a pill administered by Prince Gortchakof is meekly swallowed.

Whence this change?

The explanation is easily forthcoming. On the receipt of the collective note it became evident that matters would not rest there. It was, therefore, determined by our Government to take a bold step; six of the fastest-going vessels of our fleet, under Admiral Lessofski, were despatched quietly under orders to proceed round the north of England (in the Channel they might have been noticed), and to call at New York, where they were to be in readiness to sail to Australia at a given notice.

It will be remembered that at this same time, England had done an injury to the American States by recognizing the belligerency of the South, consequently, it will not be wondered at that our squadron was received at New York with great demonstrations of delight.

So soon as the intelligence of the arrival of the Russian squadron at New York was received in England, the English Government came to their senses; an exchange of Australia for Poland did not appear desirable, and the coalition satisfied itself with a reprimand from Prince Gortchakof.

Considering the peculiar sensitiveness of the English in respect to their colonies, we ought most assuredly to occupy positions the most contiguous to the latter. The
English dislike us at a distance, but when in proximity they feel a certain respect for us; it follows, then that it were more to our advantage to be a little closer to them.

We should then not only guarantee the fate of our relations with England against all unforeseen and undesirable eventualities; not alone should we not be foes, but, in all probability, we should show the world an example of inviolable concord in the greatest intricacies of European politics.

On the light in which our aims in Asia are regarded by the English, we have already spoken. In conclusion, we shall here make some quotations from a work by Sir Henry Rawlinson, entitled "England and Russia in the East."

Sir Henry Rawlinson's opinions have all the more weight in England from the fact that that General Officer occupied, at one time, the post of Ambassador at the Persian Court, and was thereby enabled to familiarize himself on the spot with the circumstances which enter into the composition of the questions treated by him. On the death of Sir Roderick Impey Murchison, Sir Henry Rawlinson succeeded to the presidency of the Royal Geographical Society. In negotiations with Russia, English diplomatists occasionally refer to Sir Henry Rawlinson's works for confirmation of their arguments. On all these grounds, then, we cannot but attach importance to the opinions of such an authority on Asia.

Referring to the Russian conquests in Asia, Sir Henry Rawlinson observes:—

"We have no intention of impugning the good faith of the Russian Government in its recent proceedings, . . . . but experience has proved, as indeed might have been perceived pretty clearly before, that Russia cannot stop midway in the career on which she has now entered [in the original Russian "in the pursuit of a fixed object."] . . . . Kokand itself will be ["is" in the Russian translation] a
"standing menace against Tashkend, precisely as Tashkend was against Chemkend, and, still earlier, Chemkend was against Turkestan. Indeed, the further she advances the more imperative will it ["does it"] become for her to take complete possession of the country." . . .*

Considering, however, that Kokand is a dangerous enemy to Russia, Sir Henry Rawlinson is of opinion that the Russians will long remain stationary,—

"What England, then," he proceeds† to say "has to apprehend from the progress of affairs in Asia, is not the immediate or even proximate invasion of our Indian empire, which is a notion peculiar to the panic-mongers of London and Calcutta, and which, we should have thought, hardly required the refutation that was given to it [in the Russian thus—"which found expression"] in the anniversary address, admirable in all other respects, delivered by Sir R. Murchison, &c. . . ."

‡What we really have to apprehend is, that an Asiatic Russia will arise to the north of Hindú-Kúsh, take root [sic in translation] through its inherent vitality, and become, in due course of time, a formidable rival to our Indian Empire. What we may not unreasonably expect is, that, under the condition of Russian colonization, the developement of the country will be assured as in the happy days of Turkestan under [sic in Colonel Terentief's translation] Jenghiz-Khan and Timour, who nursed their nascent fortunes in the valley of the Jaxartes before pushing on to foreign conquest and dominion. But the growth of such a satrapy, acquiring the strength and consistence of an empire, will be a work of time, a work, perhaps, of ages, and the chapter of accidents

* Page 191 of Sir Henry Rawlinson's "England and Russia in Central Asia." 1875.
† Ibid, page 194
‡ Ibid, page 195.
"may, at any moment, intervene to deliver us from the "dreadful incubus."

Whilst the chapter of accidents does not intervene, the incubus continues to scare the minds of the martial sons of Albion, who tremble for the fate of their precious colony.

"As far as can be judged"* continues Sir Henry Rawlinson, "from the tone and comments of the Indian press, there would seem to be coming on—even while "Russia is still at so great a distance—that same disturbed and dangerous state of native feeling which "was observable at the time of the first Persian siege "of Herat, and which has been so well described by "Kaye in his history of the Afghan War. We have no "wish to discuss dangers which may not, after all, be "realized, but it must be obvious that, the nearer the "Russians approach to India, the greater will be their "disturbing influence, and the more difficult it will be "to maintain order in the frontier districts. If, indeed, "an army of 70,000 Europeans is required for the "garrison of India, under present circumstances, an "augmentation of 50,000 would not be an extravagant "estimate for our enhanced necessities when confronted "with Russia on the Indus, and, considering the strain "on our home resources to meet the present demand, "where, let it be asked, is such an additional force to "come from?"

With reference to the Russian advance eastwards, Sir Henry says the following:—*

"Any one who traces the movements of Russia "towards India on the map of Asia cannot fail to be "struck with the resemblance which these movements "bear to the operations of an army opening parallels "against a beleaguered fortress. The first parallel "would thus be the Russian frontier of twenty years

* Page 201 of Sir Henry Rawlinson's "England and Russia in Central Asia." 1875.
back, stretching from the upper end of the Caspian, by the Orenburg and Siberian lines northward of the steppe, to the Irtish. This may be considered strategically as a mere line of observation. The second parallel, which would constitute her line of demonstration, would be the frontier which she is now preparing to take up, and which, according to Romanofski's plan, would be drawn from Krasnovodsk bay, about the centre of the Caspian, south of Khiva, to the Oxus, and along the course of that river to the Pamir plateau, thus including the whole of the Uzbeg territory, and placing at her command the entire waterway of the Oxus and Jaxartes. This parallel is about 1,000 miles in advance of the first line, but it does not directly menace India, inasmuch as the intervening Afghan mountains constitute a strong military defence. The third parallel would be the natural result of the preceding preliminary operations, and which, if Russia survive revolution in Europe and catastrophe in Asia [italicised in the Russian], she will assuredly some day attempt, would be drawn from Asterabad at the south-east corner of the Caspian along the Persian frontier to Herat, and from thence through the Hazareh uplands to the Oxus, or possibly by Candahar to Cabul. Established along such a line, the position would indeed be formidable. Troops, stores, and materials might be concentrated to any extent at Asterabad. The country between that fort and Herat is open and admirably supplied. A line of military posts would connect the two positions and effectually control the Turcomans, thereby conferring an essential benefit on Persia and securing her goodwill and co-operation. Herat has often been called ‘the Key of India,’ and fully deserves its reputation as the most important military position in Central Asia. The earthworks which surround the town are of the most colossal character, and might be indefinitely strengthened. Water and supplies abound, and routes from all the great cities
"to the north, which would furnish the Russian sup-
ports, meet in this favoured spot. In fact, it is no
exaggeration to say that if Russia were once estab-
lished in full strength at Herat, and her communi-
cations were secured in one direction with Asterabad
through Meshed, in another with Khiva through
Merv, and in a third with Tashkend and Bokhara
through Mymeneh and the passage of the Oxus, all
the native forces of Asia would be inadequate to
expel her from the position. Supposing, too, that she
were bent on mischief,—and it is only hostility to
England that would be likely to lead her into so
advanced and menacing a position,—she would have
the means of seriously injuring us, since, in addition
to her own forces, the unchallenged occupation of
Herat would place the whole military resources of
Persia and Afghanistan at her disposal. . . . .
Russia has only to point to India as the traditional
plunder ground of Central Asia, as the prize which has
ever rewarded the victorious hordes rushing down
from the northern mountains, and she at once enlists
their sympathies in her behalf."

Passing, then, to a consideration of the measures
by which Russia is to be counteracted, the author in-
quires,—*

"8. Are we justified, then, in disregarding this
danger merely because it is remote? Ought we not
rather, while there is yet time, to provide against the
possibility of being thus taken at a disadvantage?
Russia could never establish herself at Herat and
keep up her communications with Asterabad without
the co-operation of Persia, and against the risk of
that co-operation our efforts should be accordingly
directed.

"(a). The doctrine which prevails at present in our

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* Page 288 of Sir Henry Rawlinson's "England and Russia in
Central Asia." 1875.
"Eastern diplomacy is simply this, that Persia is too
weak and faithless to justify any extraordinary ex-
pense in keeping up cordial relations with the Shah.
We are content for awhile to occupy a subordinate
position to Russia at Teheran, trusting that, when the
time comes for action, we may regain our lost ground
by increased expenditure and redoubled activity; but
this is, after all, a very short-sighted policy. The
good-will of a nation,—that which we once possessed,
but have now lost in Persia,—is not to be purchased
in a day. It is the growth of time, of steady and
unremitting attention. If we desire, then, to check
the advance of Russia towards India,—if we desire,
avove all, to render impossible, or, at any rate, in-
definitely to postpone, her occupation of Herat, it is
indispensable that we should bestir ourselves in Persia
at once. The vast expenditure that we incurred in
the days of Harford Jones, and Malcolm, in expelling
the French from Teheran, is no longer required.
What is required is an indication of renewed interest
in the country, and a disposition to protect it against
Russian pressure. Our officers should be again placed
in positions of confidence and power with the Persian
troops, as in the days of Christie, of Lindsay, and of
Hart. Presents of improved arms, and perhaps artil-
lery, would testify to our awakened interest. The
Persian nobles should be encouraged to send their
sons for education to London rather than to Paris.
Investments of English capital in banks, in railways,
in mining operations, and other commercial enter-
prises, are freely proffered, and, if supported by our
authorities, would create a further bond of union
between the countries. Among a people, again, who
are so fond of display, and attach so much value
to outward forms, it is of the first importance that
our mission should be kept up on a very liberal scale,
and that presents should be freely distributed,—that
the diplomatic establishment, in fact, at Teheran,
should be Oriental rather than European."
We find a justification of Sir Henry Rawlinson’s fault-finding in Vambéri’s chapter headed “Rivalry between England and Russia in Central Asia;” these are the words [see “Sketches in Central Asia,” p. 404],—

“At the time of Sir Henry Rawlinson’s embassy, “English influence was near being in the ascendant, “but since then it has been continually sinking; for “however lavish of gold and greetings the English “policy might be in Malcolm’s days, it showed itself “just as cold and indifferent from the time of MacNeil “downwards.”

Reverting again to the supposed designs of Russia, Sir Henry Rawlinson observes:—*

“At the present moment, indeed, it may be assumed “that the attention of Russia is steadily turned in the “direction of Merv and Herat, and that she will be “mainly guided in her general Asiatic policy by consid-“erations affecting this special question. Whether, “for instance, the Khan of Khiva be continued in the “nominal chiefship, or whether he be superseded by a “Russian Governor, will depend upon which arrange-“ment promises best for the control of the Turcoman “tribes; and even the great engineering works, the “ship canal and railway between the Caspian and the “Aral, which are about to be commenced, are probably “regarded by Russia as of more value in strengthening “her position on the Oxus, with a view to the occup-“cation and restoration of Merv, than as improving “the communications with Turkestan.”

And so the latest events in Asia lead the English to the idea that an unavoidable danger menaces them.

From among the measures recommended by Sir Henry Rawlinson, there is only one missing,—the occupation of Herat by English troops. But even this finds place

* Page 345, “England and Russia in Central Asia.”
at the end of the book. The English have more than once discussed the question of Herat, and it has only been the remoteness of the place and the difficulties of communication across the mountains infested by plundering tribes that have hitherto restrained the English spirit of enterprise. Considering it necessary to occupy Candahar and Herat in the event of any further Russian advances, Sir Henry Rawlinson expresses a desire that the measure should be explained in a proper light.

"It should," he says,* "be understood that we had " no views of aggrandisement or territorial conquest, " but, on the contrary, that the occupation of Candahar " and Herat was purely a measure of military defence " forced upon us by the aggressive attitude of Russia. " If the Amir went along with us in this policy, and " placed the resources of Western Afghanistan at our " disposal for the purpose of the expedition, as was the " case in our former occupation of the country, there " would be no occasion to supersede the ordinary civil " administration, or, in fact, to behave otherwise than " as temporary visitors in a friendly country."

Arguments like these are, of course, calculated only to spur on the Anglo-Indian administration and to keep it to its determination to adopt extreme measures. Distance, difficulties of communication, and robbers have already ceased to frighten the Viceroy.

Since we have taken up a position on the Oxus, the English have made up their minds to take an important step; they wish to march out to our encounter along the road to Herat. To this end it is proposed to traverse the Bolan Pass and to occupy Quettah. To do this the English consider they have every right under a treaty with Khelat.

Thus the English are erecting a lightning conductor against a coming storm. As it is universally known,

* Page 360, "England and Russia in Central Asia."
however, that a lightning conductor, instead of warding off a passing thunder-bolt only attracts it, so it is very possible that, in case the English occupy Quettah our encounter with them will occur much sooner than would be desirable to themselves.
Opinions on the European Press on causes of our Advances in Central Asia and on the objects we have in view.—Impartiality of a German Writer.—A Frenchman treats us with a ton of honey to a handful of pitch.—Russia’s destiny 100 years hence.—Peculiarities in the Works of the Magyar Vámbéri.—Endeavours to fall in with the tone of public opinion.—A little praise to a great deal of abuse.—Degree of reliability of Vámbéri’s authority.—What our American “brothers” say of us.—Misunderstandings in reference to M. Schuyler’s Despatch.

As a very conspicuous phenomenon, our advance into Central Asia created quite a literature among the journalists of Western Europe. Passing over the English papers and magazines, which have been filled with the most nonsensical articles showing the greatest prejudice, we have found that even the Germans, French, Austro-Hungarians, and Americans are equally aroused by the question.

The following extracts from some of the pamphlet and magazine articles published abroad will show how our actions are judged by the European press:

Mr. Von Hellwald in his “Rassen in Central Asian,” observes, as follows:

“... Russian policy may aim at three different objects in Asia, none of which, however, excludes the others. The first—the conquest of India, which is, of all, the most improbable; the second, indirectly to bring the Eastern question to a solution,
' in Asia, which is possible and probable;* and, the third, the striving after the monopoly of commerce in Asia . . . . . which is positive. Those who, like ourselves, have no political aim, and who look upon the Central Asian question only from a scientific point of view, must never forget that scientific research follows the Russian standards into Asia, and makes us acquainted with countries hitherto buried in darkness. They will never forget that, even now, civilization inevitably follows the victorious flight of the Russian Eagle.'

"Russia fulfils her true mission, introducing European civilization into Asia. We, who are disinterested, must admit that Russia is extending the sphere of human knowledge, that she is introducing fresh races into the family of civilised nations, and that that is the greatest gain which mankind has always derived from such warlike expeditions beginning either from the time of Sesostris or of Alexander the Great."†

These quotations demand no comment. Every disinterested and sensible person will naturally agree with the opinion expressed by the German writer.

We now have the French opinion of us:—

Mr. Lejean, who recently visited Central Asia, has published two articles in the Revue des deux Mondes, entitled "Les Russes en Boukharie" and "Les Anglais sur l'Indus," in which he describes the position of affairs in that region with an impartiality which is really remarkable in a Frenchman; but in his general deductions he concurs with the ideas propounded by the Anglo-Indian and the British press.

"I shall endeavour" he says in the introduction "to prove three things: (1) That the invasion and subjugation of Turkestan by the Russians was a lawful

* The Italics indicate words either omitted or added in the Russian.
* It is to be observed that the Russian author does not quote correctly.—Vide Von Hellwald: "The Russians in Central Asia," preface, pp. X. and XI.
"measure of defence; (2) that it is not a menace to "any European interests, and is as little threatening to "India as to us Frenchmen; and, (3) that not alone is "it not a measure of misfortune to the conquered races, "but that it is the sole means of salvation to them, "seeing that they have never been able to govern "themselves."

Although M. Lejeau has not satisfactorily argued his points, yet these three problems raise his work above the average of the flimsy French emanations which stock the market of Western Europe.

It is so common a habit for writers on Russia to aim at kicking her, each in accordance with his strength, that one is astonished to fall in with a correct notion picked up by a Frenchman or a German.

As we shall have occasion to see further on, M. Lejeau has also continued to suit the tastes of a certain portion of society, but we freely pardon him every outburst on account of the sensible character of the bulk of his work.

M. Lejeau evidently does not desire that Russia, after the example of the English in India, should girdle herself around in Central Asia with a series of states dependent upon her politically, but preserving self-government. On the contrary, he wishes the unconditional absorption by Russia of Bokhara, Kokand, Khiva, and the country of the independent Turcomans.

In allusion to Bokhara, for example, this is how he expresses himself:—

"Remaining in a state of vassalage, but preserving "her autonomy, Bokhara will continue her control and "traffic in slaves to the same great extent to which it is "still prosecuted in our vicinity in Constantinople. "Treaties will be violated with as little ceremony as "they are violated on the shores of the Bosphorus. A "strict supervision can be exercised only by Imperial "Commissioners, riding through the streets of Bokhara "as freely as they do, at present, through the villages "beyond the Caucasus."
To do M. Lejeau justice, his words have proved to be prophetic; for not alone after the victory of Samarcand, but also after the conquest of Khiva in 1873, which revived the treaty of 1868, the traffic in slaves continued to flourish in the bazaars of Bokhara, under the very beak of the Russian eagle.

Treating of the Russian conquests from the point of view of the material benefits arising from them, M. Lejeau says: "If England has derived such a wonderful "benefit from a continent so poorly endowed by nature "as Australia is, what then must be the results of the "powerful and creative rule of Russia in such coun-
tries like Kashgar, Yarkand, and Bokhara?"

In all other places, we find these reflections in respect to the West, these remote Central Asian conquests "add nothing to the aggressive power of the Tsar. If "Russia should conquer the whole of Turkestan, she "will acquire a territory with a scanty population equal "almost to that of Moldo-Wallachia, and in respect of "natural wealth equal to Moldavia alone. If, instead "of the Uzbeg lands, it were a question of Roumainia, "then Europe might have cause for apprehension in an "annexation which would give the conqueror an excel-
 lent strategical position, the course and the estuary of "a large river (Danube), and the cradle of capital "soldiers;—Is there anything similar to this on the "banks of the Oxus?—provinces which have long been "exhausted by incapable rulers,—so far removed from "the centre of Russia that their administration is ren-
dered ominously expensive; territories which in thirty "or forty years, will not repay the cost of their con-
quest; finally, populations, which are peaceful, "neutral, unwarlike, from which Russia, for obvious "reasons, will for a long time exact nothing, ex-
cepting perhaps a militia like that of Mingrelia which "was mobilized in the year 1855 on account of the "invasion of Omar Pasha. It is true that the Tartars "of Kazan and Astrakhan are liable to conscription, and "supplied Russia during the Crimean War with
"soldiers who were as firm under fire as any native Muscovite, but Kazan and Astrakhan were conquered three centuries ago, and there has been time enough to subject them to proper discipline. Without doubt, Bokhara will, after the same period, likewise be in a condition to provide the Empire with soldiers, if only the Russian Empire endures three centuries longer, which, even at St. Petersburg, is not firmly believed in."

As the reader will observe, M. Lejeau failed to sustain the dignity of impartiality. All the shallowness of the Frenchman broke out in him at last.

If he wishes to know what is really thought in St. Petersburg by Russians, not by French hairdressers, he may read the following: Russia numbers, at present, a population of 90 millions; in a hundred years' time she will have 270 millions; with such a number we may probably be spared to drag over the problematic 300 years.

As showing the period of time in which a population may be doubled, we extract the following table from Vappius:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Annual Increment</th>
<th>Period in which the Population has doubled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The annual increment in Russia is 1.01 per cent., which ranks Russia after Norway. The annual increase of the population in Russia is 10,000 to every million; it
will therefore double in 66 years. Consequently, in the year 1940, Russia will have a population of 180 millions and 33 years later, 270 millions.

England has now 32 millions; Prussia 25; France 36. In 100 years time, England will have about 42 millions; Prussia about 44; France also about 44. And these will be too cramped for space, while we shall have ample room and means of sustenance.

If the world now is sensible of the presence of Russia with her 90 millions, what will it be when she possesses 270 millions of inhabitants?

Mr. Lejeau and all hairdressers have no need to have any anxiety for Russia.

We shall now contrast the Magyar Vâmbéri with Von Hellwald and Lejeau specially marking the peculiarities in his words. Firstly, Vâmbéri considers that the object of our advances in Asia is the conquest of India. This is very categorically stated in his chapter on the Rivalry between Russia and England in Central Asia. These are his words:

"Russia wants India, first of all, in order to set so rich a pearl in the splendid diadem of her Asiatic possessions; . . . . next, in order to lend the greatest possible force to her influence over the whole world of Islam, . . . . because the masters of India have reached, in Mahomedan eyes, the non plus ultra of might and greatness; and lastly, by taming the British lion on the other side of the Hindû-Kush, to work out, with greater ease her designs on the Bosporus, in the Mediterranean, indeed all over Europe; since no one can now doubt that the Eastern question may be solved more easily beyond the Hindu-Kush than on the Bosporus. . . . ."

For the accomplishment of these great objects, Russia will, of course have to work hard, to spend much blood and money, but, in Vâmbéri's opinion, she has already prepared the soil and spread her roots, having entangled

the population in a net of expectations of rapacity and revenge.*

The hands which have spread this net are not to be guessed at?

Vâmbéri asserts that the St. Petersburg Cabinet has encircled Persia, India, and nearly the whole of Central Asia with an electric chain, through which it passes the electric stream of its powerful influence. The links in this chain are the Armenians.

"How many zealous subjects of British rule in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras are not enrolled at St. Petersburg as yet more zealous promoters of Russian interests? Every member of the Armenian Church in Asia is to be regarded as a secret agent of Russian policy."†

We know the Armenians as a commercial people, clever, calculating, and capable of appreciating the advantages of this or that state of affairs. If Vâmbéri has fallen in with clever Armenians with a knowledge of arithmetic, he should not be astonished if he found that they had correctly valued their individual preference of Russia over England. It may be even that Russian rule might prove less burthensome and more advantageous to Persians and Hindoos. Vâmbéri had himself previously given utterance to words which he did not know how to retract.

Describing his journey to Khiva and Bokhara, he concluded as follows:—

"We ought to wish every success to the Russian arms in Central Asia, in the name of European civilization and humanity." Here it might be asked "Was wilst du noch mehr?"

But Vâmbéri is above all a charlatan, and attaches no value to a conviction. Whenever the papers find occasion to declare a hatred of Russia, Vâmbéri is the first to repudiate his former words, and to sing a

† "Sketches," p. 414.
different song. He adapts himself to the tone of the press for the sake of a piece of bread.*

In his chapter on the Rivalry between Russia and England in Central Asia, we find for instance passages like the following:—

"Studying the history of Russian conquests on the " Asiatic continent, we always find one same procedure " of intrigues and wiles,—a scattering of the seeds of " discord, bribery, and corruption, through the vilest " means,—all serving as forerunners of invasion."† By " bribery," Vâmbèri means presents, and by "vile means," "a liberal treatment with brandy." "Entering into commercial relations with the natives, the " Russians readily employ the slightest differences as " casus belli;"‡ failing these, the ground will be under- " mined by emissaries, the Chiefs bribed by presents or " bemuddled with lavish draughts of vodka, drawn on " into the dangerous magic circle." This is actually laughable!

The reader may picture us to himself undermining the Amir of Bokhara and the Khan of Kokand, drinking off their legs first Yakub-Bek and at last the Great Bogdokhan!

Our policy is thus characterized by Vâmbèri: always adapting ourselves to those with whom we have to do, we are Chinese with the Chinese, Tartars with the Tartars; in war we act like tigers, creeping and gliding stealthily up to their prey "until the favourable moment admits of making the fatal spring;"§ our soft-spoken emissaries avert every fear, every suspicion of becoming a sacrifice; we flatter, muddle with brandy, and entangle in our nets until opposition to us becomes impossible.

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* He once confessed this to a Russian traveller who occupied a high post in the Russian Foreign Office.
† "Sketches," pp. 419, 420.
‡ Colonel Terentief here explains the meaning of this Latin expression.
While England has disdained to enter into direct correspondence with the Amir of Bokhara, reserving such relations to the Governor General of India, in Russia, on the contrary, the Emperor himself, in his relations with the Khans of Central Asia mostly called himself “Khan on the Neva.”

These Asiatic modes are the extremes of slyness, and are far more profitable than the openness and upright conduct “employed on principle by Englishmen from old.”

Here is a lie in every word. Against whom are we obliged to have recourse to such Jesuitical means? Against Bokhara and Kokand? This is ridiculous. When has our Tsar ever styled himself the “Neva Khan”? to those Khans who are styled like merchants “High Eminences”?

All Asia knows the mighty Monarch, the Ruler over many kingdoms and people, and knows too that he is called Ak-Padshah, or White Tsar.

Even China knows this appellation, but since white is the Chinese colour of mourning, and yellow the triumphant colour of the Bogdokhan, as a mark of special respect to the Emperor of Russia the Chinese call him the Yellow Tsar. No Asiatic besides Vâmbèri has ever dared even to harbour the idea of lowering the dignity of our Sovereign. Common courtesy—everyday etiquette—do not permit this, and in this respect the Asiatics have far outstripped Vâmbèri.

As regards the characteristics of English policy, it appears to us, in reading Vâmbèri’s tirade, that England and not Russia is in his mind, and that he is all the while cavilling at the former. England cannot be accused either of sincerity or justice—they are not guilty of either. How about their robberies in India? their bombardment of Copenhagen? their poisoning of the Chinese with opium? . . .

* “Sketches,” p. 419.
In another place Vâmbèri characterizes the Russians as follows:—

"On that immense frontier where Russia touches Asia we shall everywhere find the Russians standing on a markedly lower level of development, moral as well as educational, than the Asiatics. . . .

". . . The Russian as a northerner will display more energy than the Asiatic de pur sang, but his remarkably dirty appearance, his religion bordering on fetishism, his servility, his gross ignorance, his coarse unpolished manners, make him show very poorly against the keen-sighted Eastern."

"I heard a cultivated Tadjik in Bokhara speak with contempt of the uncivilized Russians."

We should, however, remind the reader that Vâmbèri's "Travels in Central Asia" have been condemned by several European travellers as a pure fabrication.

To patch up a book from various sources, and from other people's accounts of travel, is a matter of no great difficulty, and to colour it with current fables of an Oriental type, being aided therein by a knowledge of languages, is easier still, completing the whole with that impudence and audacity of which the Magyar las in one place made a boast, he treats the public to an interesting description of wanderings.

I have myself had occasion to test the veracity of Vâmbèri on these points, with a result which proves that he has not been to Samarcand. He asserts that a large blue stone represents the throne in the palace of the Amir. Now this stone is actually a magnificent monolith of purest white. Vâmbèri has fallen into his own trap, having taken kuk tash to signify blue stone. Kuk, in the language of the Uzbegs, means sky as well as blue, so that it would have been more correct to have rendered kuk tash—celestial stone, and this appellation accounts for the veneration in which they hold the monolith.

Next to this throne was a small black oval stone slab, bearing an inscription, let into the wall. Vâmbêri stated that this was a cast-iron slab, and that the inscription was cufic. I recognized at first sight that the writing was *Naskh*, but carved by a rude hand and without punctuation, so that I could decipher only a few words; this however induced me to take a copy of the writing, which was easily deciphered at St. Petersburg by M. Naufal, lecturer on Arabic, and by Baron Tischhaus, the Secretary of the Archeological Commission.

How could Vâmbêri, a professor, confound Naskh with cufic (cuneiform writing).

In addition to all this, the map attached to his book of travels shows a Kizyl-Daria river between the Syr and the Zarofshan. Anybody in Samarcand might have told Vâmbêri that there is Kizyl-Kum or red sand in the desert, but that there is not a drop of a Kizyl-Daria, or Red River. It is evident that Vâmbêri lies unconscionably. All the officers who took part in the Samarcand expedition in 1868 strove to detect Vâmbêri in some one slip or another, and every one of them succeeded. I shall not bring forward the other accusations against him, they are not mine; moreover, it does not enter into my programme to do so.

And so the imaginary Tadjik seen by the professor in a dream has a contempt for the Russians because they are uncivilized. Both these gentlemen, the Tadjik and the Magyar, have decided between them that the Tartar has nothing to learn from the Russian.

As a set off to the opinion of the Tadjik, or, what is all the same, of the Magyar Vâmbêri, who is not far removed from the former, we shall quote the authority of old Ali, the Sultan of the Dikokamenni Kirghiz.

He spoke as follows at an audience, "I govern my people as I am directed by the Padshah. Before the wood gets into the hands of the joiner it is a common block. I and my people are the wood, the Russian Commissioner is the joiner. Were it not for him, by the will of the Padshah, we would remain blocks."
The authority of this Sultan has this merit, that our Kirghiz is a real live person, and not an imaginary one like Vâmbéri's Tadjik, besides which the Kirghiz Ali never was a charlatan like the Magyar Vâmbéri.

So soon as the last hopes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire fell, under the blows of united Germany, the Austrian papers moderated their tone with reference to Russia, and Vâmbéri began to write in a fawning style. We heard, even, that he indirectly offered his services to Russia whom he had so outrageously abused. In answer to the inquiry with the reason for his abuse, seeing that he desired to enter the Russian service, he replied, "to earn my bread." . . .

This treacherous and double-faced Hunn, is ready to sell himself also to him who will pay him best; not a trustworthy servant for Russia.

To complete the picture, we must now bring forward the opinion of an American.

For various reasons, we had a right to expect from Americans a more sober and disinterested appreciation of our actions in Central Asia. But before being just one must be competent to form correct conclusions from all one sees and hears. A tourist acquainting himself with a region while merely passing through it, necessarily gives greater prominence in his narrative to what he may have heard or read than to what he may have seen; and in order to arrive at general deductions from his data, he must not alone have a grammatical knowledge of his own language but he must also have received some training, he must have the art of arranging his material, grouping his facts, &c.; without this the tourist's comments will be a mere collection of words, and the great advantage of having seen for himself reduces itself to zero.

In the year 1873 the Turkestan province was visited, amongst others, by Mr. Schuyler, the Secretary of the American Legation at St. Petersburg. The fact of his being an American, and the circumstance of his indifferent acquaintance with the Russian language were
his best recommendation to Russian circles, and he might have gathered a great variety of information. But Mr. Schuyler failed to appreciate his advantages, and considered that our hospitality was a mere tribute to his official status. So at least it would appear from the preliminaries of his famous Despatch of the 7th March 1874, addressed to Mr. Marshal Jewel.

I borrow the translation from the Russki Mir,—“Sir, “I visited Central Asia without any political object, “but owing to the official position which I occupy I “was received everywhere with a hearty welcome, and “was enabled to collect some curious information, which “may not be uninteresting to Government, with respect “to the position of the Russians in Turkestan and to “the Khanats which have yet preserved their inde- “pendence.”

As regards the information which he gathered in reference to our position in Turkestan, it may all be placed under the one heading of “Abuses of Russian Officials.” So long as Mr. Schuyler repeats what he heard, he is tolerable, for nobody will suspect him of inventing his facts, but so soon as he came to conclusions, our American argues à torts et à travers. He produces in a series of contradictions such a confusion that one is at a loss to know what his opinions really are. I invite Mr. Schuyler himself, in case he should happen to see my book, to reconcile the statements which I here extract from his report:—

“In spite of the bad administration, the people are “on the whole well contented with the Russian rule, “finding it so much better than anything which had “gone before, and their discontent is chiefly against “individuals, officials, and others, who harass and injure “them; and it is evident that a continued series of “such occurrences cannot but awaken general distrust “towards the administration.”

“When the Russians advanced into Central Asia, “they found the natives ready to welcome them, partly “because they were discontented with the Kokand “Government, the extortions which were practised, and
the frequent executions, and desired anything for the sake of peace and quiet. Immediately after the Russia occupation there was an immense feeling of relief that now every man's life was his own, and that his property was secure from arbitrary taxation and seizure. Besides this, the addition of a large non-productive population caused a great demand for labour, and for the necessaries and luxuries of life, and consequently prices began to rise, the advantages of which were felt by the landowner and the merchant. Though the poorer class was not at first much affected, now, of course, prices as a whole have risen, and it costs twice as much to support a labouring man, however little his food, as it did before the Russian occupation. . . . But these things must work in time, and it will require some skill on the part of the Government to avert a general feeling of discontent. Circumstances were exactly the same during the English occupation of Cabul, but things succeeded each other more quickly, and the English were finally obliged to retreat."

"The inhabitants of Central Asia are by no means like the Afghans, they are more pacific, and less patriotic in their nature; still they naturally prefer Mahomedan rule, other things being equal, and they are now beginning to forget the evils which they suffered from the Khan, and are thinking more of the evils which they suffer from the Russian officials. At the same time, however arbitrary their native rulers were, their actions were all confined within the sphere limited by the Shariat or Mussulman law, and it was thought that there were certain principles which not even the most tyrannical Bek could dare to contravene."*

The reader will observe that the natives rejoiced in the prospect of our approach, and when we occupied the country the population was seized with unbounded joy; after this, seeing that there was no change for the

* Schuyler’s "Report," pp. 6, 7.
better, they preferred the Mussulman rule, and entertained a common feeling of dissatisfaction. Notwithstanding all this, and the bad administration of the country, the population are in reality “well contented” with Russian rule, finding it much better than anything which had gone before.”

In another place the writer says,—“The surrender of Shahr-i-Subz and Karshi was made against the wish and in spite of the protests of the population, who had preferred to remain under Russian rule than to return again to that of the Emir.”

This again does not look like a preference on the part of the people for Mohammedan rule. We have been long in the country, so that our neighbours have had plenty of time to study our system of government; no wonder then that the people of Shahr-i-Subz and of Karshi gave us the preference.

By what means did Mr. Schuyler arrive at the conclusion that our position in Turkestan is like that of the English in Cabul in 1839? It is well known that the English were expelled and nearly all massacred in a very short time. Does Mr. Schuyler mean to predict the same for us?

It is not alone to the apathy of the people, to their want of patriotism, that we owe the firmness of our footing; it is also to the facts that we do not oppress them, that we give them guarantee of security, and a fair share of self-government. The whole of the difference between ourselves and the English is, that we came as conquerors and behave as friends, whilst the English entered Cabul as friends and treated the people as enemies.

Mr. Schuyler’s contradictions we would attribute to a desire to record and float all the opinions which he happened to hear; of course he heard a great many, but he should at all events have sifted them, instead of submitting them to his Government in a crude form.

Mr. Schuyler’s own opinion is expressed in the following lines:—

“On the whole, the Russian influence is beneficial in
"Central Asia, not only to the inhabitants, but to the world. . . . Having once taken possession of the country, it will be almost impossible for the Russians, with any fairness to the natives, to withdraw from it."*

Alluding to our policy in Asia, Mr. Schuyler says:—

"Russia has not the slightest desire or intention to make any attack upon India, but naturally the Russians would dislike to see England extend her influence nearer than it now does to Central Asia, and it is possible that at some time difficulties might arise with regard to the English policy in Kashgar. English criticism, however, and English diplomatic interference have had much effect on the Russian policy. There is a strong objection in the Foreign Office to take steps of any kind in Central Asia, lest some difficulty with England might arise from them, and the consequence is, that the Governor General does not always have the possibility of acting in the way he thinks best suits the state of affairs. Russia apparently does not feel herself strong enough to take her own course without regard to what England might say or think."†

In order as it were to reassure us in our timidity, Mr. Schuyler points to the evidences of England's inclination to sanction our further advances southwards. "It seems to me, and I think the same would be evident to any one who understands well the position of affairs in Central Asia, that the Russians must eventually occupy the whole country as far as the Oxus, and possibly as far as the Hindu-Kush. The arrangements made last year with England with

* There is nothing original in this observation, and the latter part of the phrase had occurred in several Russian articles written before Mr. Schuyler's Report.—(Translator.)

† There is much underlying all this which Mr. Schuyler did not explain. He referred to the apprehensions of the Russian Foreign Office on account of the communications with outlying countries which the Governor General might be tempted to enter into, and so raising undesirable questions; he probably refers also to the restraint felt by the Russian Governor General on their account.—(Translator.)
"regard to the boundary of Afghanistan simply meant "that if Russia came up to the Oxus nothing more "would be said." . . .

The above extracts will be sufficient to enable the reader to form his own opinion on the degree of impartiality of the American diplomatist, and on his view of the object and benefits of our advance in the heart of Central Asia. Here we shall part company with the foreigners.