Russian projects against India from the czar Peter to ...
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CHAPTER I.

EXPEDITIONS TOWARDS INDIA FROM THE REIGN OF PETER THE GREAT TO THAT OF PAUL.

It would be late in the day now to speculate as to whether, in pursuing their Central Asian policy, the Russians have designs upon India. They have at least designs against India. They desire, that is to say, to reach a point from which they may conveniently and effectively threaten our position in that country; not necessarily with the view of replacing us there, but in order to cause a feeling of insecurity which would render it impossible for us to withdraw troops from India for service in Europe, and which might even make it desirable to send troops from Europe for the strengthening of our Indian garrisons.

Since the accession of Peter the Great, Khiva has
been attacked, or at least approached by Russia through regular expeditions (not to speak of desultory attacks by Cossacks), no less than four times; and those who hold that in invading Khiva Russia had no aim in view but the extension of her possessions in Central Asia, will find their views contradicted somewhat flatly by Captain Mouravieff, in a striking passage from a work which that officer published 63 years ago.

As soon as the Settlement of Vienna in 1814 and 1815 left Russia free to divert her attention once more from European affairs and to direct it towards Central Asia, expeditions were at once equipped for service in the Steppes. Diplomatic missions, too, and commercial caravans, both under military escort, were sent to Khiva and to Bokhara. The chief emissary to Khiva was Captain Mouravieff; and on his return to Russia in 1822 he expressed, in a narrative of his journey, his deep regret that Russia had not yet succeeded in annexing the Khanate, whose capital he regarded as an invaluable stronghold from which to threaten the English power in India. "Khiva," he wrote, "is at this moment an advanced post which impedes our commerce with Bokhara and Northern India. Under our dependence
India in 1694, but died on his way thither at Schmaikha."

Whether Simon the Little did or did not reach India, it is certain that no information was derived from any report of his making; and when in 1716 the Russian Senate, at the command of Peter, ordered that an inquiry should be made as to the contents of the letter sent with the merchant Simon Malinki to the Mogul, and as to what it had led to, it appeared that the result, if any, of the merchant's journey had remained unknown.

Peter had now, in the year 1716, no idea of sending out a commercial or quasi-commercial mission alone. A Turcoman chief, Hodja Nefes by name, had come to him, saying that in the country bordering the river Amu (Oxus) gold sand was to be found, and that the stream, which formerly flowed into the Caspian, and which, through fear of the Russians, had been diverted by the Khivans into the Aral Lake, might, by destroying the dam, be made to run again in its original channel. Some years before an alliance had been proposed to Peter by the Khivan Khan, who even declared himself willing to become Peter's vassal. The Czar accepted the professed allegiance; and when Hodja Nefes inflamed
his avarice and his ambition by telling him of this river whose sands were gold, and along whose dried-up course he might reach the capital of his Khivan feudatory, he could not but entertain the project of a serious military expedition.

Peter was quite aware that Khiva and Bokhara were not commercial cities. "But," in the words of the official historian, "they were of great importance as channels of trade with other Asiatic countries, famous of old for the variety and abundance of their natural wealth." The visit of Hodja Nefes to St. Petersburg took place in 1713, just when Peter had finally defeated Charles XII. He had also brought his war against Turkey to a conclusion, and finding nothing to occupy him in the West, turned his attention, as his successors under like circumstances have systematically done, towards the East. He, perhaps, did not believe much in Hodja Nefes's tale of the gold to be found mingled with the sands of the Oxus. But he was struck by the story of the ancient bed, and entered warmly into the project of turning the Oxus into the channel along which it had at one time flowed. This would make it run into the Caspian Sea, and would bring the Caspian and Khiva into direct water communication.
Peter decided then to send an expedition against Khiva, and to do so in such a way that while the envoy should ostensibly be escorted only by a guard of honour numerous enough to give dignity to his mission, he should, in fact, be followed by an army sufficiently strong to overcome all resistance that might be opposed by the Khan.

Khivan towns had previously been attacked and occupied by Cossacks making war on their own account. But these minor expeditions had not been conducted with any system, nor had they been executed under the direction of the Russian Government. Peter's army of invasion, however, was to be regularly organised; and the object of its march was to bring Khiva into absolute subjection. "Although Khiva and Bokhara," in the words of the official historian, "were of themselves insignificant from their poverty in natural products and the undeveloped condition of their trade and industry, yet they were of extreme importance as channels of trade with other Asiatic countries famed of old for the variety and abundance of their natural wealth; so that the acquisition of Khiva as a first step must have been a point of great importance to the far-seeing Czar, more especially since he was assured
there was not a more direct road from India to the Caspian, in which case it was to return by it, mapping both routes. The chosen envoy for India was Lieutenant Kojin, of the Russian Navy. Several naval officers and merchants were placed under his command, and he received special instructions from Peter himself in these words: "He is to go, when the Brigadier, Prince Cherkaski, shall be able to dispense with him, by water as far up the Amu-Daria [Oxus river] as possible (or by others which may fall into it), to India, in the guise of a merchant, the real business being the discovery of a water-way to India. II. To inquire secretly about the river, in case progress by water be forbidden. III. To return, if possible, by the same route, unless it be ascertained that there is another and more convenient way by water; the water-way as well as the land-route to be carefully observed and described in writing, and to be mapped. IV. To notice the merchandise, particularly aromatic herbs and other articles that are exported from India. V. To examine into, and write an account of, all other matters which, though not mentioned here, may concern the interests of the empire."

While due preparations were being made for sub-
jecting first Khiva, and afterwards Bokhara, the Court of Embassies drew up credentials in the most approved form to the chiefs of the threatened Khanates and the distant Mogul.

The expedition was not to consist of soldiers alone. Besides 6,000 troops, it was to include upwards of 200 sailors, who were to take with them boats of different sizes. The flotilla was in the first place to carry over to Gurief, on the east coast of the Caspian, the infantry, a portion of the dragoons, the whole of the artillery (22 pieces), a year's provisions for the whole force, and the necessary implements for the construction of forts, with timber for huts. The Cossacks, with the other half of the squadron of dragoons, the caravan, the baggage train, and a certain number of dragoon horses were to proceed by land; advancing from Astrakhan through Gurief towards Khiva; while the larger detachment, starting from Krasnovodsk, on the east shore of the Caspian, was to follow the ancient bed of the river. The two columns were to effect a junction near the river, and make a combined attack upon Khiva. The plan of the attack was left to the discretion of the commander. But when the Khan had once been reduced to subjection and prevailed
upon, no matter by what means, to acknowledge Russian supremacy, Prince Bekovitch Cherkaski was, in the words of Peter's decree, as written by himself, "to ask him for vessels and to send a merchant in them to India by the Amu-Daria, ordering the same to ascend the river as far as vessels can go, and thence to proceed to India, recording the rivers and lakes, and describing the way by land and water, and particularly the water-way to India by lake or river, returning from India the same way; or should the merchant hear in India of a still better road to the Caspian Sea, to come back by that, and to describe it in writing."

In addition to the two columns which, advancing from different points, were to converge on the banks of the Oxus, and march together against Khiva, an expedition on a smaller scale was sent out under Lieutenant Kojin, the so-called "Envoy for India," to Astrabad on the Persian shore of the Caspian. Here he was to request from the Governor of the province permission for an officer to pass through Persia to Bokhara with letters from the Khan.

The Governor of Astrabad would not allow the officer to pass through Persian territory, by reason, as Lieutenant Kojin affirmed, of an insurrection in that
country. Prince Simonof who, Kojin having failed, was despatched to Astrabad to apply once more for permission to pass through Persia, had a very different tale to tell. He declared, in a report on the subject to Prince Bekovitch Cherkaski, that on Lieutenant Kojin's arrival in the harbour, the Governor of Astrabad had sent officers to meet him and to bring him with the chiefs of his expedition to the town. But Lieutenant Kojin, as Prince Simonof reported, neither went himself nor suffered the leading members of his mission to go to Astrabad. Prince Simonof, in a final accusation, charged Lieutenant Kojin with having made an attack on a herd of buffaloes grazing harmlessly near the sea-shore, and of having, after this exploit, put back forthwith to sea.

That Lieutenant Kojin did not do his best at Astrabad to procure permission for the Indian envoy to advance from Persia to Bokhara seems probable enough; for throughout the campaign against Khiva he showed himself ill-disposed towards Prince Bekovitch Cherkaski, the commander-in-chief. He was entrusted, nevertheless, with the leadership of the advanced guard. With the view of conciliating the threatened Khan and of throwing him off his guard, and also
for the purpose of obtaining information about Khiva and its approaches, Kojin despatched messengers, bearing presents, and announcing his intention to visit Khiva on a mission from the Czar.

While Prince Bekovitch was still engaged in organising the main body of the expedition, news reached him from various sources that his advance would be resisted. But this information had no effect in checking his ardour. When complete, his forces consisted of 3,000 fighting men, who were accompanied by merchants, with their servants, and by camp-followers and servants, to the number of 1,000. The train included 600 guards, 200 camels, and several hundred horses. The force was assembled at Astrakhan; and the advanced guard was in the first place sent across the Caspian to Gurief, which had been chosen as the head-quarters of the army on the east coast of the Caspian. Bekovitch himself at the earliest opportunity sailed from Astrakhan to Gurief. Lieutenant Kojin, who, as chief of the advanced guard, should have preceded him, could not be induced even to accompany him. Declining to move from Astrakhan, he sent to St. Petersburg a report in which he accused the commander-in-chief of an intention "treacherously to
Bekovitch's first encounter with the enemy took place while his force was still encamped at Gurief. He was attacked by Karakalpaks, who captured a portion of his cattle, and at the same time carried off 60 Cossacks under whose guard they had been placed. Bekovitch followed the Karakalpaks into the Steppe, recovered the oxen and brought back six of the assailants.

When all the necessary preparations had been made, the troops left Gurief at the beginning of June; in the worst possible season, that is to say, for campaigning in the Steppe. After eight days' marching, during which he met with several small streams, Prince Bekovitch Cherkaski reached the Emba, where, before attempting the passage, he was obliged to halt. The soldiers forded the river, while baggage was sent over on rafts; and the passage altogether occupied two days. From Gurief to the Emba the troops had marched 25 miles a day; they had thus accomplished a distance of about 200 miles. The commander had hastened his advance, partly lest the grass in the Steppe should be burnt up by the intense heat, partly with the view of reaching Khiva before the Khan would have time to collect any considerable number of
hills in two forced marches (67 miles in two days) the column emerged upon the arms or overflows of the Oxus, within 100 miles of Khiva, and encamped there on the 15th of August, 1717. The column consequently traversed in 65 days, or in about two months 900 miles of a barren and arid Steppe; and that, too, at the hottest time of the year. Throughout almost the whole length of the march the water obtained was of bad quality; at every halt wells were dug to a depth of from two to four fathoms. From this alone the sufferings of the troops (in a heat which sometimes exceeded 40° Réaumur) may well be imagined."

The Khan showed himself as great an adept as Prince Bekovitch himself at the noble game of brag. He seems in the first instance to have been well disposed towards the Russians, and to have believed in their assurances of friendship. When, however, the Kalmuk and Turcoman deserters reached Khiva, he could no longer make any mistake as to the purpose of Bekovitch's advance. He summoned troops from every side, and industriously circulated the report that he was about to take the command of 100,000 men, when, as a matter of fact, he was not able to assemble more than 24,000. Hearing that the
Khan was marching to attack him, Bekovitch resolved to fight a defensive battle, and drew up his troops with their rear to the river bank, and with their flanks and front covered by barricades of carts. Scarcely had he completed these preparations when the Khivan cavalry made its appearance, and at once swept down upon the camp. At night the Khivans retired some distance, "sitting down before the Russians, and enclosing them in the form of a crescent." Bekovitch meanwhile dug a trench and erected earthworks, which he fortified with six guns—all the artillery that he had been able to bring forward; so that when, next morning, the attack was renewed, the Russians were well prepared to meet it. The whole of that day and the day following the fight was kept up, when the Khivans, finding that their onslaught produced no effect, determined to have recourse to negotiations.

The charge of the Khivan cavalry had done but little injury to the well-protected Russians, and their fire-arms of primitive make had killed but 10 of the enemy. The Khivans however, had suffered greatly from the Russian musketry and artillery fire.

When, on the morning of the fourth day, an envoy arrived from the Khan begging Prince Bekovitch to
Bekovitch paid a visit to the Khan, attended by his principal officers, his brothers, and a detachment of Cossacks and dragoons, to the number of 700. Bekovitch exhibited his credentials, and delivered the presents he bore from the Emperor, consisting of "cloth, sugar, skins of sable, nine dishes, nine plates, and nine silver spoons." The Khan ratified the treaty, made personal protestations of friendship, and invited the Russian commander and his officers to a dinner, which, says the official historian, was "enlivened by the strains of the Russian military band."

The day after the interview and banquet the Khan, with his entire army, and accompanied by Prince Bekovitch and his principal officers as honoured guests, marched to Khiva. The cautious Major Frankenberg, who mistrusted the Khivans et dona ferentes, had been left in command of the Russian troops, with orders to follow the Khan and the Khivan army as rapidly as might be convenient. He probably believed, what afterwards proved to be the case, that at the council held after the four days' attack upon the Russian entrenched camp, the Khan had devised a plan for disposing of the Russians in detail, without meeting the army in the field.
However this may have been, Bekovitch, on arriving at Khiva, was told that it would be impossible to feed and quarter the Russians in that city; and he was accordingly invited to separate his own escort, and the Russian army generally, into a number of small parties, so that accommodation might be found for them in the towns adjoining the capital. The sagacious Major Frankenberg, when Bekovitch directed him to break up his force into a number of little detachments, protested against doing anything of the kind. He replied to the messenger who bore the order that this was an idea of the Khan's, and that it was his duty to obey the orders of Prince Bekovitch, the commander of the Russian troops. Although inspired by the Khan, the order had really proceeded from Bekovitch; but he was obliged to repeat it twice, and still could not make the determined Major act upon it. At last the Prince despatched a fourth written order, threatening Frankenberg with a court-martial if he refused any longer to do his duty. Then the acting commander-in-chief divided his force into five different detachments, which were conducted by the Khivans in various directions. This break-up of the Russian force was all that the Khan had desired. Prince Bekovitch
exposed to such fierce attacks from the Turcoman tribes, that their chiefs, in spite of the orders they had received from St. Petersburg, thought it advisable to embark with them for Astrakhan. The 13 vessels in which they sailed were dispersed in a storm and for the most part wrecked. No less than 400 of the returning troops were lost. The rest contrived to reach the shore—still the eastern shore of the Caspian; where they had great difficulty in finding means of subsistence. In the spring, however, of the following year, those who had not succumbed were picked up by vessels sent in search of them, and carried to Astrakhan.

Thus ended the ill-fated expedition of Prince Bekovitch Cherkaski, which, after rapid marching and energetic fighting, was destroyed through an act of treachery against which its commander ought certainly to have been on his guard. It was pleaded on his behalf that he had recently suffered great misfortunes, that he had been sorely tried during the brief but arduous campaign, and that his mind was to some extent unhinged. He received, in fact, when on the point of marching from Gurief, news that his wife and a portion of his family had been wrecked and drowned in the Caspian Sea. He seems,
Peter again thought of Khiva in 1731. But this time he contented himself with sending a simple negotiator in the person of Colonel Herzenberg. Herzenberg, however, was not allowed to enter the capital; and in addition to this insult he had to submit to the injury of being plundered on his homeward journey.

In the year 1741 Abdul Khair, Khan of the Lesser Horde, and a friend of the Russians, having had the throne of Khiva offered to him by Nadir Shah, who had caused the late sovereign to be put to death, Lieutenant Gladysheff, of the Russian army, the Russian surveyor Mouravin, and the Russian engineer, Nazimoff, entered Khiva in company with the new prince. But the interference of the Russians led to nothing. Mouravin visited Nadir Shah in his camp to request "that he, Nadir Shah, would give up the town of Khiva for the sake of His Imperial Highness Abdul Khair, for that the latter was a good and faithful subject of the Russian Empire." Nadir made presents to the envoy, and accepted his proposals. But he at the same time requested Abdul Khair to seek a personal interview with him; and the latter considered this invitation so alarming that
escape. He in the first place took refuge with a Turcoman tribe, and afterwards, through their aid, reached Mangishlak, on the east coast of the Caspian, whence he sailed to Astrakhan. Arrived in St. Petersburg, Blankenagel wrote a description of his visit to Khiva, and in one passage of the work laid great stress on the possibility, as it seemed to him, of uniting the Aral Lake with the Caspian Sea by turning the waters of the Oxus into its ancient bed; a project, as is generally known to all who pay the slightest attention to the affairs of Central Asia, which has occupied the Russians from the time of Peter I. until that of Alexander II., and which, on the occasion of an overflow of the Oxus, was revived with considerable energy only the other day.

Blankenagel entertained a quite unfounded opinion of the wealth of Khiva: "I have shown," he wrote, "what assurances I gathered regarding the rich and inexhaustible gold and silver mines of Khiva. These great treasures will cost us much less in respect of working and carriage than those of Peru cost Spain." In regard to the commercial as distinguished from the industrial question, he expressed himself as follows: "All these rich branches of trade depend on the possession of Khiva, and ought to be so
much more important to us, in that, to acquire this new Peru, it is not necessary to arm fleets, despatch large bodies of troops, or expend much blood and treasure. In a word, the possession of Khiva will cost us nothing, and this nothing will procure for Russia great wealth, and what is more pleasing tranquillity and peace for the natives. . . . I venture to say in all confidence that 5,000 men could without difficulty occupy the whole of the Khivan territory."

No other expedition or mission, military, commercial, scientific, or benevolent, was despatched to Khiva until the reign of Paul; when one of the strangest marches ever conceived was not only resolved upon, but in part executed, by one of the Orloffs. The enterprising chief, at the head of a force composed entirely of Cossacks and horse artillery, proposed to advance, first to Khiva, then to Bokhara, and ultimately, with all the adventurous horsemen of the Steppes who could be induced to join, to India itself!
Danube. . . . As soon as the plan has been perfectly matured," continued Paul, "the Russian Emperor will give orders for the assembling at Astrakhan of an army of 35,000 men—25,000 regular troops of all arms, and 10,000 Cossacks. Astrabad will be the headquarters of the combined army. From the Danube to the borders of India the advance will occupy the French army four months, or, avoiding forced marches, five months. The armies to be preceded by commissaries, who will establish stations and halting-places where necessary. They will visit, moreover, the khans and great landowners through whose countries the troops will pass, in order to explain that the armies of two powerful nations have found it necessary to march by a road which is being prepared to India for the purpose of driving away the English from this beautiful country which they have subjected; a country formerly so remarkable for its industry and wealth, and which it is now proposed to open to all the world, that the inhabitants may profit by the riches and other advantages given to them by heaven. The sufferings under which the population of this country groans have inspired France and Russia with the liveliest interest; and
the two Governments have resolved to unite their forces in order to liberate India from the tyrannical and barbarous yoke of the English. Accordingly, the princes and populations of all countries through which the combined armies will pass need fear nothing. On the contrary, it behoves them to help with all their strength and means so benevolent and glorious an undertaking; the object of this campaign being in all respects as just as was unjust the campaign of Alexander the Great, who wished to conquer the whole world. The commissaries are further to set forth that the combined armies will not levy contributions, and will pay in ready money, on terms freely agreed to, for all things necessary to their sustenance: that on this point the strictest rules will be enforced. Moreover, that religion, laws, manners, and customs, property and women, will everywhere be respected and protected. With such announcements, with such honest, straightforward statements, it is not to be doubted that the khans and other small princes will allow the combined armies to pass without hindrance through their territories. In any case they are too weak and too much divided by dissensions among themselves to make any opposition. The commissaries will hold
expedition to India. The plan of campaign was drawn up, and the motives for undertaking it explained in a rescript which first appeared in the appendix to General Miliutin’s “History of Souvaroff’s Campaigns” published in 1853, and brought out a few years afterwards in a German translation.

“The English,” wrote Paul, “are preparing to attack me and my allies, the Swedes and Danes, by sea and by land. I am ready to receive them. But it is necessary also to attack them where the blow will be most felt, and where it is least expected. You will therefore proceed to India. From Orenburg three months, from your own part of Russia another month —altogether four months. I entrust this expedition entirely to you and your army. Collect your troops in the furthermost stations and await orders to march to Orenburg, where again expect orders to continue your march. This enterprise will cover you with glory, and according to your deserts, you will earn my special good-will. You will acquire riches and treasures, and will affright the enemy in his heart. I send you maps—as many as I have—and remain, your well-wisher, Paul.

P.S.—My maps only go as far as Khiva and the river Amu (Oxus). Beyond these points it is your
of the Aral Lake; but he was to proceed no further. A despatch reached him announcing the death of Paul; and he at the same time received an order commanding him, on behalf of the new Emperor, Alexander I., to give up his enterprise and return forthwith to Russia.

Since the time of Paul, who, as above shown, formed two separate projects for invading India and "driving the English from their settlements on the Indus," every Russian emperor has entertained plans, or at least had plans submitted to him, either for invading India in a direct manner with Russian troops, or for destroying our position in that country by indirect means and chiefly through the agency of the Afghans. The first of Paul's projects was taken up by Alexander I.; or rather was pressed upon the acceptance of that sovereign by the Emperor Napoleon. Alexander agreed to co-operate in a combined Franco-Russian expedition, which was to march to India through Persia and Afghanistan. Nor was the idea abandoned until the two emperors fell out; when Napoleon prepared, not for an expedition with Russia to India, but for an expedition supported by troops from all parts of continental Europe against Russia.
proceed to Khiva, where the Khan was to be persuaded to direct the trade of his dominions towards the spot fortified. The two officers reconnoitred all the southern portion of the eastern shores of the Caspian, and found two points suitable for the erection of a fort, one near the mouth of the Gurgen, the other on the Balkan Gulf. The Yomood Turcomans inhabiting the shores not only refrained from annoying the Russian agents in the execution of their duty, but even asked to be taken under Russian protection. Escorted by a few Turcomans of this tribe, Mouravieff proceeded to Khiva without let or hindrance. But there he was thrown into prison and confined for a space of forty-eight days; and, although he eventually had an interview with the Khan, he failed in persuading him to adopt the propositions of his Government, and soon afterwards hurried away.

On his return Mouravieff described his travels, and represented in the most vivid colours the wretched condition of the Khanate; depicting, moreover, in sombre hues, the painful situation of the Russian captives.

More important than anything seen by Captain Mouravieff in Khiva is what he wrote on the subject
after his return to Russia. "Khiva," he said (in a passage previously quoted, but which may be here reproduced) "is at this moment an advanced post which impedes our commerce with Bokhara and with Northern India. Under our dependence, Khiva would have been a safeguard for this commerce against the attacks of populations dispersed in the steppes of Southern Asia. This oasis, situated in the midst of an ocean of sand, would have become a point of assembly for all the commerce of Asia, and would have shaken to the centre of India the enormous superiority of the rulers of the sea."

Mouravieff's narrative is also remarkable as containing a denial of the favourite Russian belief (the "great Slavonian sea-serpent," as Kiepert, the German geographer, has called it) as to the diversion of the Oxus by the Khivans and the possibility of turning it back into its ancient bed. Whenever an expedition to Khiva has been planned—from the unfortunate one of Prince Bekovitch in the reign of Peter the Great, to the highly successful one of General Kaufmann under Alexander II.—the possibility of restoring the Oxus to its ancient bed has always been considered. When, some five-and-twenty years after Dr. Blankenagel, Captain Moura-
vieff visited Khiva, he recognised the fact—which no one now disputes—that the Oxus had at one time flowed into the Caspian. But he declined to entertain the idea that the stream had been diverted towards the Aral Lake, which now receives it, by the Khivans. "It is probable," he wrote, "that the river Syr (Jaxartes) was connected formerly with the Amu Daria (Oxus), or, at least, had a different course from that which it now follows. An earthquake, changing the entire horizon of the steppes, would seem to have given quite another direction to the Syr, which, with the Amu, forms the Aral Lake. Ancient historians say that the trade of India passed along the Oxus, which at that time threw itself into the Caspian Sea. The obscurity which surrounds the history of Central Asia, above all at the period of the destruction of the two great empires, has concealed great natural revolutions which changed the face of a portion of the steppe with which these regions are covered. The traces of these revolutions are still visible, and are above all recognisable in the new course of the Oxus and in its ancient bed.

"The very existence of that river has often been denied, and the belief in its non-existence acquired
a certain consistency when the expedition sent by Peter the Great in search of the gold sand which was said to lie on its shores had failed disastrously. Prince Bekovitch, sent with a detachment to Khiva, built fortifications on the Krasnovodsk promontory, and proceeding to the northern shore of Balkan Bay, a hundred versts to the east, found the outlet of the river. He ascended its dried-up bed, but after a march of five versts, lost all traces of it. Captain Kojin, who was attached to the Prince, accused him of treason, and maintained that Bekovitch had only proclaimed the existence of the river with the view of delivering up his detachment to the Khan of Khiva. The year following, in 1717, Bekovitch went once more in search of the dam which the Khivans were supposed to have constructed with the view of directing the course of the river to the north, so as to protect themselves against the incursions of Cossacks."

"Bekovitch," continues Mouravieff, "perished in the second attempt, and his sad end caused all further curiosity as to the course of the Oxus to cease. If the Government proposed at this time to establish commercial relations with India by means of the Oxus, after making it flow once more into
Balkan Bay, it must be presumed that it had some idea of the vastness of this river. If so, how could it suppose that the barbarous Khivans could have been capable of turning the course of such a river by constructing a dam, and of changing the inclination of the steppe in order to direct the river towards the north. The Khivans themselves, he concludes, "are astonished at such a supposition. They have preserved traditions, according to which a violent earthquake five hundred years ago convulsed the whole surface of the country, and caused the Amu Daria to flow towards the north, and in its course to form for itself a new bed."

In 1820, in order on the one hand to support Russian authority, and on the other to render the passage of caravans secure, another mode of action was adopted. It was resolved to send yearly into the steppes detachments of a strength varying according to circumstances. But matters, instead of becoming better, became worse. In 1822 many Turcoman tribes acknowledged the authority of the Khan. War and rapine raged between the Russian Kirghizes and those who were still independent. The kidnapping of Russians from the frontier increased tenfold; piracy on the Caspian more-
only on two conditions: first, that the Khan of Khiva should indemnify the Russian traders for all the losses they had sustained by the attack on their caravan in 1824; and, secondly, that all the Russian prisoners detained in Khiva should be sent back, and that all traffic in slaves should for the future be prohibited. These conditions were not agreed to by the Khan, and the envoy was sent back to Khiva.

At the beginning of 1830, things looking quiet and the Khivans, moreover, being nearly at war with Bokhara, the Russian Government thought the moment opportune for sending a new expedition to Khiva. An envoy from Bokhara had reached Orenburg with instructions to ask the Emperor of Russia to "put a limit to the insolent conduct of Khiva," and to offer the co-operation of the Emir, his master. The dissensions between the governments of Khiva and Bokhara had not yet taken the form of open hostilities; but the Bokharians at Orenburg declared positively that their Emir, even if he did not give active assistance to the Russians, would, at all events, be glad to see their common enemy restrained and punished. Khiva, too, was at this moment engaged in open war with Persia. Animosity, more-
over, existed between the Khivans and some of the Kirghiz chiefs. Thus Khiva was in a very critical position, and everything seemed to promise success to the Russian expedition which it was now determined to organize. But the French insurrection of July in this year seemed likely to disturb the peace of Europe; and it was in fact followed by a formidable insurrection in Poland, which occupied the whole energies of the Russian Government, and caused all idea of conquest in Central Asia to be abandoned.

In 1830 the position of the Russians detained in Khiva was, according to an official report on the subject, as follows: "Incited by the high prices fetched by Russians, the Kirghizes kidnapped them even on the line, and disposed of them in the neighbouring countries of Central Asia; particularly at Khiva, where according to reliable information, there were more than 2,000 Russians in bondage. In remote times men were seized from settlements in the interior, even on the Volga, and beyond that river, and subsequently on the Orenburg line. But about the year 1831 Russian fishermen alone were kidnapped by Kirghizes and Turcomans at the rate of about 200 every year. Russian prisoners were
sold at the Khivan bazaars; and the traffic was participated in, not only by the highest Khivan officials, but likewise by Khivan traders who visited Russia every year, and who, when frequenting the Kirghiz encampments for purposes of trade, incited the Kirghizes to make prisoners, buying them up beforehand and giving money in advance. Although the Orenburg Frontier Commission had at its disposal a sum of 3,000 roubles for the redemption of Russian prisoners, it was only able to procure the liberation of a very small number, as sentence of death was awarded at Khiva to anyone who consented to sell his slave in order that he might be restored to his native country."

The Khivans, meanwhile, finding that the Russians, from whom they had expected an immediate attack, made no movement in their direction, became emboldened, and carried on to a greater extent than ever their practice of kidnapping. The idea was now entertained of seizing the Khivan traders visiting Russia, and keeping them as hostages. But this, it was thought, would have a very injurious effect on Central Asian trade; and all the Russian Government deemed it advisable to do was to propose the formation at Orenburg of a philanthropic society
with the object of rescuing Russian prisoners from bondage. Subscriptions were collected from private sources, and the Government granted to the society a secret subsidy of 3,000 roubles. Apart, however, from the question of means, the process of ransoming prisoners was a difficult one to carry out; and it was feared that the tribes of Central Asia might learn from what source the projected philanthropic society derived the greater part of its funds; in which case they would have concluded that the Russian Government feared the Khivans and in its dealings with them was obliged to use money payments instead of force.

The philanthropic society, then, was abandoned; and General Perofski, military governor of Orenburg, was requested to furnish the Minister of War with a detailed plan of campaign against Khiva, which was to be made in the disguise of a scientific expedition under military escort. Delay, however, was now caused by local reasons. There were disturbances among the Kirghiz tribes in the Orenburg district and in Siberia; and this occupied the whole attention of the local administration. In 1834, in order to strengthen the influence of Russia over the wandering tribes.
at each halt to have its horses and camels driven away, and consequently to be deprived of its means of advancing. The train of an expeditionary force in the steppe, where everything must follow the troops, is necessarily a large one. A European force of 1,000 men can be limited to twenty or thirty waggons, or one waggon to every 40 or 50 men; whereas, in the Khivan expedition of 1839, each soldier had to be provided with two camels, while to every two camels one Kirghiz was attached. Although the Kirghizes were absolutely indispensable to the force on account of their knowledge of the nature and habits of the camels, and of their acquaintance with the steppe, the Russians could not place full confidence in them; and, in case of a hostile attack, it would be necessary to take measures to prevent them not only from running away, but also from communicating with the hostile Kirghizes and Khivans, and assisting them to drive away the horses and camels of the Russians. Thus a military expeditionary force in the steppes is, in the words of the Russian historiographer, "only an escort for the protection of its own baggage and provision train."

In reference to two previous Russian marches to Khiva, that of the Yaitsk Cossacks in 1610, and
which were inaccurate, obscure, and conflicting, having been obtained from uncultivated Russian prisoners from Khiva, or from Asiatics unworthy of full credit.

In addition to striking changes in the weather, the grass during winter is covered with a crust of ice; and as the horses, camels, and cattle are only fed on grass, the deep snow and ice deprive them of pasturage, and expose them to death from starvation.

It will be seen from the foregoing account that the principal difficulty in organising the expedition lay in provisioning the force, and in providing the requisite means for its transport. The length of the route, extending over 1,000 versts, about 500 of which passed through a barren steppe, rendered the conveyance of all the stores by the same camels impossible for the whole distance. It was, therefore, found necessary to form a dépôt of provisions, &c. at a point in the interior of the steppe, as near Khiva as possible, and to provide other means for transporting the stores to this point; whence the troops, being furnished with the requisite supplies of food, ammunition, &c., might push forward to Khiva on camels. That is to say, as a preliminary measure, it was necessary
the frontier to the intermediate dépôt against hostile Kirghizes and Khivans, to form a separate detachment, independent of the main body of the force.

VI. The transport of all provisions, &c., for the main body as well as for the troops themselves, from the dépôt to Khiva, to be performed by camels; for which purpose the requisite number of these animals to be obtained and collected during the summer from the Kirghiz tribes under Russian subjection.

VII. After the occupation of Khiva, or any other town of the Khanate, all further military operations to be regulated by circumstances.

The conduct of the campaign was entrusted to General Perofski, at that time military governor of Orenburg.
CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST RUSSIAN AGENT IN AFGHANISTAN.

In 1837, when General Perofski was already occupied with preparations for his expedition against Khiva, a military and political agent, Capt. Vitkievitch (called by Burnes, Kaye, and other English writers "Vickovitch"), was despatched by the Russian Government to Cabul, whence he was to proceed to Lahore; and both at Cabul and at Candahar he offered a Russian alliance, with subsidies and arms, in view of an attack upon Herat and upon Runjeet Singh's possessions in India.

According to a Russian official report dated Sept. 30 (Oct. 12), 1837, the intelligence received at Teheran of the arrival of Burnes at Cabul had induced Count Simonitch to send Vitkievitch thither; and this may be perfectly true. But before Burnes's arrival at Cabul, at the beginning of Sept., 1837,
Count Simonitch had written to Dost Mahomed expressing a wish to befriend him; and in forwarding to the Secretary of the Indian Government a copy of the Count's letter, Burnes pointed out that the Russian ambassador had "himself commenced the correspondence with the chief of Cabul, telling him that if the Shah of Persia would not assist him his court was ready to do so."

Dost Mahomed's agent at Teheran, in transmitting the ambassador's letter, had written as follows: "The Russian ambassador, who is always with the Shah, has sent you a letter which I enclose. The substance of his verbal message is that if the Shah does everything you want so much the better; and if not the Russian Government will furnish you with everything wanting. The object of the Russians is to have a road to the English (India); and for this they are very anxious."

It is to be observed that in the original mutilated and garbled version of the "Correspondence Relating to Cabul and Afghanistan," the letter from which the above passages are cited had been omitted. It was published for the first time in 1859, when no one was thinking of Afghanistan or of Russia. The edition of 1859, with the restored passages printed
he was charged to offer came from "the Imperial store."

The presents offered by Burnes had been, in accordance with his formal instructions on the subject, "of moderate value;" and he felt it necessary to apologise for their poorness, and to explain that they had no governmental character, but were his own personal gifts. General Hanlan, an American officer who commanded Dost Mahomed's regular troops, and acted as Chief of the Staff to the entire army, has told us in his volume on Afghanistan that Burnes's offerings were despised, and that they were regarded with contempt even by the ladies of the harem among whom they were distributed.

The arrival of Vitkievitch at Cabul, bearing rich presents, was to the Ameer something more than annoying; and though he could neither accept the support of England, involving as it did his abandonment of Peshawur, nor that of Russia, which was conditional on his recognising the claims of Persia over Herat, the interference of Russia in his affairs had, all the same, the effect of bringing about a war between England and Afghanistan.

The Russians were quite satisfied with the result attained; for the official historian of Perofski's ex-
pedition writes that the Russian agent "contrived to acquire the friendship of Dost Mahomed of Cabul, whom he succeeded in disposing favourably towards Russia."

Vitkievitch had received only verbal instructions, and, according to the Russian writer just cited, he was "not to disclose anywhere that he was sent by the Government." But Vitkievitch said everywhere who and what he was, and wore habitually the uniform of a Cossack officer. This strange demeanour on the part of a Russian agent caused a certain amount of mystification. Vitkievitch was described as a "Russian from Moscow," an "Anatolian," a "Cossack;" and one of the English agents, on being informed that he was a Pole, pronounced this statement not only untrue but "disgusting;" since no one, he said, could conceive a Pole entering the service of Russia.

Vitkievitch, however, was really a Pole; and he had not been consulted as to whether or not he would enter the Russian service. Convicted in 1824, when a student at Wilna, of having organized a secret society called the Black Brothers, and of having written "revolutionary letters and verses," he was transported to Orenburg, and drafted as private into
Vitkievitch was a friend of Count Soltykoff, well-known by his travels in Persia and in India; and he had repeatedly shown the Count a pistol with which he intended, he said, some day or other to shoot himself. Soon after his return to St. Petersburg from the mission to Cabul, Vitkievitch in fact, blew his brains out; leaving behind him a letter from which it appeared that he suffered from no one grievance in particular, but was discontented with the world in general. A disturbance had recently taken place at Wilna in which he feared that his brother might have been implicated. But this affords no direct clue to his suicide, since he afterwards ascertained that his brother was not concerned in the outbreak. The night before his suicide he was at the theatre with Prince Soltykoff, apparently in excellent spirits; and before retiring to bed he gave orders to be called early the next morning. He seems to have killed himself with deliberation; and before doing so, he destroyed all the papers, including copies of his correspondence with the English agents in Afghanistan, which he was to have embodied in a report for the Asiatic department of the Russian Foreign Office.

Of the arguments and promises employed by
Vitkievitch in his dealings with the chiefs of Candahar and with the Ameer of Cabul, we have sufficient knowledge from the reports transmitted by Burnes to the Indian Government. The Russian agent, as Lieut. Leech sent word from Candahar to Burnes at Cabul, was offering money for a war against the Sikhs, with a view to the reconquest of Mooltan and Derajat and for regaining Scinde. The Russians would send arms, moreover, but not men; and the Sirdars of Candahar were informed that "the English had preceded the Russians in civilization for some generations, but that now the latter had arisen from their sleep and were seeking for foreign possessions and alliances; and that the English were not a military nation, but merely the merchants of Europe."

At Cabul, Vitkievitch informed the Ameer that "the Emperor of Russia was supreme in his dominions and could act of himself with promptitude and without being delayed by having to consult others while the British Government transacted its business by a Council which gave rise to procrastination. This would show him the advantage of allying himself to Russia, where no such inconvenience existed." After quitting Cabul, some weeks later than
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being under the general direction of the before-mentioned General Barofski. Count Simonitch, too, Russian Ambassador at Teheran, took an active part in the siege, and distributed large sums of money among the Persian troops, to whom arrears of pay were due.

Thanks to the energy of a young English officer, Lieut. Pottinger, of the Bombay Artillery, the defence was prolonged for a period of nine months. Meanwhile England had made diplomatic representations at Teheran, and what was probably more effective had sent an expedition to the Persian Gulf; and according to the Shah of Persia, who made a public declaration on the subject, it was owing to pressure from England that in Sept., 1838, the siege was raised.
CHAPTER IV.

PEROFSKI'S EXPEDITION.

"From the times of John the Terrible," says the official historian of Perofski's expedition, "the Russians have always sought means for opening a channel for their trade through Central Asia with India, in order to acquire some of that fabulous wealth for which India was always so famous; but it was Peter the Great who was first enabled to take energetic measures in this direction."

The successors of Peter the Great, following out his views, cherished the idea of establishing themselves in Central Asia, and thus opening a new route for Russian commerce to the East. We have seen that in furtherance of these views, Aboul-Hair-Khan, Sultan of the Lesser Horde, with the Kaisaks under his rule, was received, in 1730, under the protection of Russia, and a commencement was then made
towards the subjugation of the Kirghiz steppes, which also led to the establishment of intercourse with the neighbouring Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara.

At this period the Russian Government had, in the words of the official historian, "become acquainted with the extreme difficulty of penetrating into Central Asia and further into India." It therefore turned its attention exclusively to the organization of the south-eastern boundaries of the empire, which, for a long time, during the whole of the eighteenth century were the scenes of disturbances between the various tribes established there. Thus, first the disorders in the Kirghiz steppes, the insurrections of the Bashkirs, and the flight of the Kalmucks into Chinese territories; and, lastly, in 1773 and 1774, the Pugacheff rebellion, absorbed the attention of the Government, and diverted its views from all projects in the east.

It has been mentioned in a previous chapter that in 1793, at the request of the Khan, the Empress Catherine II. sent her oculist Blankenagel to Khiva. The Khan determined to keep him under surveillance as long as any necessity for his medical skill existed; after which he was to be sent back to Russia, but before arriving at his destination was to be mur-
dered, in order that he should not relate anything he had seen. Blankenagel hearing of this sought safety in flight, and he contrived to gain over several Turcomans, who got him safely to Mangishlak, whence he made his way by sea to Astrakhan.

In 1819 a mission was sent to Khiva, under the command of Captain Mouravief. But this Embassy was also received with distrust, and we have seen that it led to nothing.

The Russian Government, recognizing the advantages of the trade with Bokhara, and seeing that this trade was rendered very precarious by the rapacity of the Kirghizes and Khivans, and that the passage of caravans was attended every year with great danger, despatched an Embassy to Bokhara in 1819 (simultaneously with the mission of Mouravief to Khiva) in order to concert measures with the Khan of Bokhara for ensuring and strengthening commercial relations; but the Emir, or Khan, of Bokhara, though promising a friendly reception for the caravans, would not undertake to protect their passage through the Kirghiz steppes, but left that duty entirely to Russian escorts. It was consequently considered most advantageous to establish a trading company,
naturally in such a state of affairs the company could not be formed.

In addition to crippling Russian trade in the East by the constant plunder of caravans and inciting the Kirghizes to commit these depredations, the Government of Khiva had long encouraged the pirates of the Caspian, who kidnapped Russian fishermen on that sea in great numbers every year, and sold them in all the markets of the East, and particularly in Khiva. These unfortunate prisoners were doomed to pass their lives in hard toil, suffering every privation; and they usually ended their insupportable lives under the blows of their task-masters, whose Mahommedan creed freed them from all considerations of humanity with respect to "Kafirs" or unbelievers, while the civil law gave them irresponsible power over the lives of their slaves.

Already in the eighteenth century the Russian Government had tried to devise means for the liberation of Russian prisoners in the East. Thus by an ukaz of the 28th January, 1767, hostages were ordered to be seized for the purpose of compelling the Asiatics to exchange them for Russian prisoners. This measure was quite justifiable; seeing, as the official writer puts it, that "the
friendly relations with Russia, the Khan of Khiva who had always been at enmity with Russia, did not, even for the sake of appearances, attempt to disguise his dealings. His territories were equally inaccessible to all Christians.

The Government at last assigned 3,000 roubles for the redemption of Russian prisoners. This, however, likewise led to nothing. The slave-holders refused to accept any ransom, as they found it more profitable to retain their hard-working bondsmen. There was extreme difficulty, moreover, in liberating the prisoners by other means than through intermediate agents, who, if caught, were liable to be put to death or made slaves. In 1830 the position of the question of Russian prisoners in Central Asia was, according to authentic accounts as follows:—

"Incited by the high prices obtained by Russian prisoners, the Kirghizes kidnapped them even on the Line, and disposed of them in the neighbouring countries of Central Asia, principally at Khiva, where, according to reliable information received at the time, there were more than 2,000 Russians in bondage. In remote times men were seized from settlements in the interior, even on the Volga and
them in case they were retaken. To deter slaves as much as possible from attempting to escape, many were forced to marry native women, and different expedients were employed to convert them to the Mahommedan faith. In order to diminish this system of man-stealing, efforts were made to detain Kirghizes belonging to the same tribe as the kidnappers. But even this failed; and it was felt to be unjust to make a whole tribe answerable for the delinquencies of some of its members. The prisoners, meanwhile, took advantage of every opportunity to implore succour; and their helpless families assailed the local authorities with their prayers, and even accused them of intentionally allowing their relatives to remain in captivity.

Under such circumstances it was "necessary to have recourse to decided and final measures." These were to "lay an embargo on all the persons and property of the subjects of Khiva in Russian territory until the liberation of Russian prisoners, and if this should not have the desired effect to compel restitution by force of arms," the adoption of this latter alternative being repeatedly urged on the Government by the local Russian authorities. The events of 1830 to 1832, and especially the Polish insurrec-
tion diverted all the attention of the Government towards the west. But a few years later Russia determined to adopt strong measures against Khiva, and the recommendations of a Special Committee, approved by his Imperial Majesty on the 24th March, 1839, were as follows:—

1st. To commence at once the organisation of an expedition against Khiva, and to establish the necessary dépôts and stations on the route without delay.

2nd. To conceal the real object of the expedition, which was to be given out as a scientific expedition to the Aral sea.

3rd. To postpone the departure of the expedition until the settlement of English matters in Afghanistan, in order that the influence and impression of the Russian proceedings in Central Asia might have more weight, and that England, in consequence of her own conquests, might no longer have any right to trouble the Russian Government for explanations; on no account, however, to delay the expedition later than the spring of 1840.

4th. In the event of the expedition terminating successfully, to replace the Khan of Khiva by a trustworthy Kaisak Sultan, to establish order and
It is not astonishing, therefore, that the English, not being thoroughly acquainted with the existing state of affairs in Central Asia, should have been considerably alarmed at the Russian proceedings in the Kirghiz steppe; nor that they should have attributed the measures adopted by the Russian Government for securing the boundaries and trade of the empire to aggressive projects, and even to the old project of penetrating into India. Hence arose a natural desire on the part of the English to ascertain the real importance, in a political respect, of the possession of the Central Asiatic steppes by Russia, and the probability of her penetrating thence into Indian territory.

From 1824, therefore, a succession of English agents, regardless of all obstacles, penetrated into Central Asia, and some of them even returned to their native country through Russia. At first, in the year 1830, many Englishmen, "under motives entirely evangelical," says the Russian historian, settled in the town of Orenburg. "But when it was perceived that these missionaries turned their attention to other matters, they were requested to leave. Losing all hope of extending their interest in Central Asia from the side of Russia, the English com-
menced penetrating thither principally from India and through Persia. Thus from 1824 Central Asia was visited by Moorcroft, Conolly, Wolf, Burnes, and Strange, and later by Stoddart, Abbott, Shakespear, and again by Burnes near the time of the Russian Khiva expedition, or during the very period."

All the persons here enumerated, with the exception of Wolf—the brave missionary who travelled to Bokhara without escort or protection of any kind to save the Jewish inhabitants from the terrible persecution to which they had lately been subjected—were in the service of the East India Company; and of course it was not, in the words of the official historian, "curiosity alone and their own affairs that allured them into Central Asia." While these English agents were collecting every possible information on the spot, the Russians had no means of following their example, and were even unacquainted with their movements. The visits of the English agents to the various Khanates, and the details of their journeys, became only known to Russia incidentally through their published works; which, of course, did not contain all the results of their investigations. All the direct information that the Russians could procure was meagre and obscure, and was supplied
to them by Asiatics, who, either through ignorance or timidity, were not always able to furnish important and trustworthy accounts. Owing to a want of officials well acquainted with the Oriental languages, it was found necessary to confide in uneducated Asiatics, or to employ agents who, being ignorant of the Oriental languages, were obliged to have interpreters attached to them. "The principal purveyors of intelligence to the Russians were consequently almost always Mahommedans, who, being involuntarily under the influence of the rulers of Central Asia, in whom, under the régime of Mahommedanism, was also centred the highest ecclesiastical power, did not discharge their duties very willingly, nor in a reliable manner; they were not always able to disclose all they knew, and were altogether very uncertain media of communication, notwithstanding that, as Mahommedans, they had in every respect much greater facilities than Christians for gaining access to the different countries of Central Asia."

As early as 1828 Alexander Burnes had commenced his survey of the Indus river; and having become convinced in 1830 of the navigability of the Indus over its whole course of about 700 miles, he
represented to the English Government all the importance of this stream, both in political and commercial respects. At the same time some Russian goods which had by accident found their way to the banks of the Indus, led him to the conclusion that the rivalry between British and English manufacturers had already commenced at this point, and he not only succeeded in convincing his Government as to this, but also induced it to believe in the possibility of the appearance of Russian political agents on the river Indus, and even of a Russian force.

"Here, then," says the official writer, "we have an explanation of the repeated attempts made by English agents to penetrate from India through the whole of Central Asia as far as the Russian boundaries, in order to assure themselves of the justness or otherwise of their apprehensions; and these movements on the part of the English were at the same time a source of serious alarm to the Russian Government."

The Russians had reliable information that the agents of the East India Company were continually appearing either at Khiva or Bokhara; they also believed that this enterprising Company, having enormous means at its command, was endeavouring
not only to establish its influence throughout the whole of Asia, but was also desirous of extending the limits of its Asiatic possessions. The power of England, the industry and wealth of its people, the tendency of the English to act together in commercial associations, and lastly the cupidity of the Asiatic rulers—all these gave to the English great facilities for strengthening their influence in Central Asia, and for doing Russia "serious damage" by establishing regular commercial relations with Central Asia. It was only necessary to allow the possibility of the English supplying the Khivans and Turcomans, the nearest and most hostile neighbours of Russia, and likewise the Kirghizes, with arms and ammunition, in order to become convinced of the necessity of counteracting the schemes of England, "whose agents did not even try to conceal their hopes, in their published accounts, of becoming masters, not only of the whole trade between the river Indus and the Hindoo Kush, but likewise of the market of Bokhara, the most important in Central Asia."

It was accordingly decided in 1835, in order to watch the English agents and counteract their efforts, to send Russian agents into Central Asia.
during the years 1839 and 1840 were Abbott and Shakespear. In May, 1840, Captain Abbott, of the East India Company's service, reached Novo-Alexandrofsk fortress from Khiva, and proceeded thence to Orenburg. "Whether," says the Russian historiographers "Abbott had the intention to return home through Russia, or whether, like Burnes, he selected this route for the purpose of making a survey of the Caspian, and of the Russian fortresses on it, is subject to much doubt. In his communications, however, he styled himself English Chargé d'Affaires to the Russian Court. By the order of the Khan he was robbed and wounded, on his route to the Caspian, by a gang of Turcomans (who had even been instructed by their chiefs to kill him), and from Orenburg he was sent in a suitable manner to St. Petersburg, whilst the Afghans that had accompanied him were sent back to their native country." Shakespear, the other English officer, reached Orenburg via Novo-Alexandrofsk with the Russian prisoners who had been released from Khiva; he was likewise immediately sent on to St. Petersburg. Both these agents wished to take an active part in the Russian negotiations with Khiva, especially Shakespear, who desired to take credit for the
neighbouring Khanates for the reciprocal advantages of trade, and to prevent the influence of the East India Company, so dangerous to Russia, from taking root in Central Asia; and lastly (e) to take advantage of this favourable opportunity for the scientific exploration of Central Asia, by making a survey of the shores of the sea of Aral, and of the mouth of the river Amu, and settling the long-disputed question of the original course of this river to the Caspian.

The force with which General Perofski had been ordered to Khiva was to be taken from the Orenburg corps, which had never been in action, had never seen service of any kind in the field, and had never even assembled in camp. It was, in short, according to the official historian of the Perofski expedition (possibly General Perofski himself), altogether insufficient for military purposes. To improve the condition of the troops, General Perofski transferred all the battalions to new quarters and assembled them periodically in camps. "Although," says the official historian, "this could not make the infantry more martial, yet it had the effect of improving its discipline and drill."

The very composition of the Orenburg corps was likely to tell against it in a military point of view.
The seven battalions numbered, in April 1839, 8,999 men, of whom 4,403 were recruits; while of these recruits 2,527 were Polish exiles, and 1,694 either exiles or criminals.

The force ultimately despatched against Khiva consisted of 5,325 men with twenty-two guns and four rocket-stands. It carried with it mining tools, canvas pontoons, and two portable boats.

In the way of provisions, biscuits, buck-wheat, meat, salt, and corn-brandy (vodka) were carried; and in addition to this, cabbage, cucumbers, cheese, sheeps' fat, lard, onions, pepper, vinegar, and money.

Former experience in the steppe had proved that horses soon became worn out when fed on grass alone. It was therefore necessary, on the long march to Khiva, to carry a supply of forage; 15,828 poods of oats for the horses and 3,793 poods of flour, and 1,925 poods of salt for the camels were accordingly ordered to be provided; 10,000 poods of hay were obtained from the cordon posts, and hydraulically compressed for greater portability into bundles of 6 or 7 poods each, which were to be carried along with the force. Along the route to Khiva 20,000 poods of hay were stored at Bish
Tamok, 25,000 on the river Emba and at Aby- Yaksh, and 25,000 near Ak-Bulak.

Owing to the absence of any roads in the southern steppe, and because it was anticipated that the force would be obliged to march through heavy snows, it was deemed advisable to provide a larger quantity of spades, pick-axes, &c. The portable flat-bottomed boats, which were to be transported in separate parts, were to be employed for navigation on the Oxus, and for surveying the shores of the sea of Aral; each boat was armed with a swivel gun or falconet. Eighty arabas were prepared for transporting the sick, and each battalion was provided with the regulated quantity of hospital stores and drugs. In addition to these stores a large quantity of articles in Asiatic taste were bought at Nijni Novgorod for distribution as presents to the Kirghizes and Turcomans.

The principal difficulties that the expedition to Khiva was expected to encounter would be in the waterless steppes that surrounded the Khanate. It was known that there were wells along the Ust-Urt of a depth varying from fifteen to twenty and thirty fathoms. According to Kirghiz accounts, these wells were paved round with stone and protected
from the drifting sand and straying cattle, by large stone slabs pierced with a small hole through which buckets could be lowered. A stone trough for watering cattle was generally attached to each well. Small caravans could consequently traverse these steppes with facility. But large caravans had been unable, in former years, to perform the journey through the Ust-Urt without dividing themselves into sections or échelons; because, in addition to the scarcity of water, the great depth of the wells presented serious obstacles, as, out of these, only ten or fifteen buckets of water could be raised in one hour, and consequently only 200 or 300 camels or horses watered in the course of twenty-four hours. The expeditionary force could not be divided up into small parties without great danger, and the various detachments would have been obliged to wait several days at the wells for water, while it was drawn up in ordinary buckets. A special portable water-lifting apparatus was devised, by means of which the water could be rapidly drawn from the wells and distributed through india-rubber conduits, either into the boats or into leather and canvas waterproof reservoirs fixed on wooden frames.

It was proposed to transport all the stores on
camel, with the exception of the pontoon boats, arabas, and sledges, which, on account of their weight, could not be carried by these animals. The falconets, however, were to be carried on the backs of camels, and so disposed as to be capable of being mounted and brought to bear on the enemy in a quarter of an hour. In order to spare the artillery horses as much fatigue as possible, the gun caissons that could not be carried on the backs of camels were yoked to camels, which were harnessed like oxen.

In order, also, to husband the strength of the infantry soldiers (so that in case of need they might be despatched like dragoons in flying detachments), it was resolved to transport a portion of the infantry on the spare camels, two men on each camel, changing the men by turns on the march.

Then this new difficulty presented itself—that of obtaining a great number of camels, the required quantity being provisionally estimated at 10,000.

As the stores and provisions were gradually purchased and prepared, it was necessary to transport them to Orenburg, and thence into the interior of the steppe to the intermediate dépôts. For this purpose 7,750 three-horse carts, with their drivers,
RUSSIAN PROJECTS AGAINST INDIA.

were supplied by the Bashkirs, with the requisite number of officers and non-commissioned officers to superintend the operation.

On the 18th (30th) June the march of the expeditionary force was commenced by Colonel Heke being sent forward with a flying column, consisting of a platoon of infantry transported in carts, and 400 mounted Bashkirs with two howitzers, to Donguz-Tan; which had been selected as a convenient spot for a store dépôt. Colonel Heke described his advance in a series of letters addressed to General Perofski. In one of these he gives a droll account of the means he took for testing the martial character of the troops under his command. Having concealed himself behind Bakgir Hill, he awaited the arrival of the train of stores, which advanced to the hill in two divisions; when, as soon as the first échelon appeared in sight, he suddenly showed himself with his Bashkirs on the hill, "in order to cause an alarm among the train of followers, and to watch the result." It appears that the men conveying the stores took the Bashkirs for Khivans, and immediately despatched a messenger to the second division of the train with intelligence that a body of Khivan troops, to the number of 8,000, had
disposed Kirghizes who, at the instigation of Khiva, purposed creating disturbances in the steppe by spreading false rumours respecting the Russian movements." A list of the quantity of camels to be supplied by each tribe was at once drawn up, and written instructions respecting their delivery were distributed to the different elders.

Some of the tribes, however, had not furnished their quota of camels by the time fixed, i.e., the first of November; in consequence of which the expeditionary force started with only 9,500 camels, though about 900 more joined it on the first stages of the march. The whole number collected was 10,400. Camel-drivers were furnished by the Kirghizes, at the rate of one man to every four or five camels.

The unfavourable condition of the atmosphere, combined with the scarcity of fodder and the great prevalence of disease, occasioned considerable loss among the men and cattle belonging to the different trains. The mortality among the Bashkirs attached to the five trains amounted to 199 men, while the number of horses lost on the journey through disease and exhaustion was 8,869, or a third of the whole number employed. At the same time, the dampness of the turf-huts, the rapid change from the sultry heat of
companies of soldier-choristers mastered the difficulties of a martial song composed purposely for the expedition.

All the preparations for the campaign were made under the pretence of a scientific expedition to the sea of Aral; but the large quantity of stores that was being collected, the unusual activity displayed, the preparation of winter clothing for the troops, and the concentration of an extraordinarily large body of soldiers and camels, roused general suspicion at Orenburg respecting the professed objects of the expedition, and gave rise to all manner of rumours and surmises. As the preparations approached maturity the curiosity of the uninitiated public became more acute. The secret, however, was soon disclosed. The troops destined for the expedition were mustered in the town square a few days before their departure, and the following address from the commander of the Orenburg corps was read:

"By order of His Majesty the Emperor, I am going to march with a portion of the troops under my command against Khiva. Khiva has for many years tried the long-suffering patience of a strong and magnanimous Power, and has at length brought..."
the constitution of the main force of the expedition; but in order to save unnecessary marches, it was despatched from the Kalmykovski fortress direct to the River Emba.

The first and second columns left Orenburg on the 14th (26th) and 15th (27th) November, by the Berdiano-Kuralinsk Line; and the third and fourth marched on the 16th and 17th November in the direction of the Iletskaya Zachita. All these columns were to unite near Caravan Lake in the right bank of the Ilek river (a left affluent of the Ural river), and about seventeen versts from Grigorievsk Post on the Line. Here, before crossing the frontier, an order of the day was read to the troops, informing them that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor had been graciously pleased to invest General Perofski with the powers and privileges of a commander of a separate corps in the field.

Before the commencement of the march the whole detachment was so organized as to meet the special exigences of a winter and steppe campaign; separate instructions were issued for the discharge of camp and other military duties during the expedition; and a system of signalling between the different columns was adopted.
for this latter purpose, it was taken out of the file, so as not to hinder the camels following behind, and afterwards placed at the end of its file. Or if left behind too great a distance, it would proceed with the rear-guard until the night halt.

Each file of camels was placed in charge of six Cossacks, who maintained order and assisted the camel-drivers. A Cossack rode in front of each file to show the way; these leading Cossacks endeavouring, as far as they could, to ride abreast.

The other troops marched with the advance and rear-guards and at the sides of the column. The rear-guard received all stragglers, and consisted of a body of Cossacks, a portion of the camp patrol, and the camels destined to carry the troops.

In order to allow the camels sufficient time for grazing, the columns always halted one or two hours before sunset. The camels were led to pasturage under a guard, consisting of a fourth of the whole number of Kirghizes and Cossacks in the column; the latter also did picket duty round the camp. Two or three sentries were stationed in front of each line of piled luggage, to prevent the Kirghizes opening the bales, which these "sons of the desert" were rather inclined to do. The
the frozen ground spread over with felt, under a felt tent, and even when rolled up in a sheepskin, is rather cold work." The men generally covered themselves from head to foot, to prevent their noses getting frost-bitten; but during the night, from the breathing and perspiration of the sleepers, the sheepskins froze to the hair of their heads and their moustaches, so that on getting up in the morning it took them considerable time to disentangle their hair from the sheepskin. During the first nights nobody could sleep because of the great frosts, but afterwards habit and nature triumphed. Frosts of 15° and 20° R. were at last regarded as comparative thaws, and, in spite of the cold, all slept soundly after a fatiguing day's march.

Fortunately, some of the men provided themselves on the halt at Iletz Zachita with iron stoves; and tents furnished with these proved of great service.

If it were possible to advance in the steppe without being exposed to chances of attack or loss of cattle from marauding Kirghizes, the most convenient and rapid mode of performing the march would be to adopt the order observed by the trade caravans. These advance in two or three lines, the detachment being divided into several small columns,
requiring strict supervision, unaccustomed to order and discipline, and ignorant of the Russian language; and that it was necessary to instruct the detachment in the order of march which would have to be observed on entering the dominion of Khiva. A campaign, therefore, at a short distance from the "Line" would have to serve as an experiment and as a model for the subsequent advance and deployment of the troops in the steppe.

In order to command the detachment with greater efficiency it would have been preferable to have allowed it to march in one body; but the advance and disposition in the steppe of a force consisting of more than 2,000 men and 9,000 camels presented the following drawbacks:

1st. Large and good pasturage for the cattle and fuel for the men could not always be found at the halting-places. 2ndly. It would be necessary to graze the camels at a great distance from the camp, and consequently it would be more difficult and occupy more time to collect them. Moreover, as, during the winter days, only two or three hours were available for grazing, the cattle could not be driven far from camp. 3rdly. There were no established roads across the steppe. When crossing ravines, gullies,
rivulets, and rivers it would not be always possible to advance with an extended front; all the columns would have to be contracted and drawn out into a long line, which would arrest the progress of each column for several hours. These delays, as it proved afterwards, would have been still greater had the force not been divided into columns; and consequently the horses and camels would have endured greater fatigue by standing for many hours with their loads on their backs. It was for these reasons, therefore, that the expeditionary force was divided into separate columns; and as it was known that the enemy was not distinguished for bravery, discipline, or knowledge of the military art, no serious danger was apprehended from such a division.

The detachment, as it was organised, resembled a large caravan or train, carrying with it a supply of material for the whole campaign, provisions for two months, and a large quantity of miscellaneous stores; which entailed the necessity of adapting its military organisation and campaigning arrangements to the order of march and of night halts observed by trains following the rear of armies.

The Russian expeditionary force being accom-
and brilliantly illuminated by the sun, could alone be distinguished. This brilliant reflection and the whiteness of the snow began to affect the sight of the men. The columns had scarcely gone seven or eight versts when, about noon, the sky became hidden in dense clouds, and a north-easterly wind sprang up, scattering clouds of snow, and soon attained the force of a "buran."

Beyond a distance of twenty yards no object could be seen through the clouds of snow which were whirled about in every direction. The fury of the storm was so great that it was impossible to draw breath when facing the wind, and the intense cold penetrated to the bones. The order of the advance could not be observed, and so as not to get lost in this fog of snow, the column was rapidly halted.

The "buran" lasted the whole night and subsided towards noon the next day. The Kirghizes said that if the snow had not been hardened previously by the frost, the tents would have been buried by the fall. There was a perceptible increase in the depth of the snow in the steppe after the storm; and it was then, when it had to cross ravines and hollows drifted over with snow, that the detachment experienced all the hardships and fatigues of a winter steppe campaign.
CHAPTER VI.

PEROFSKI'S EXPEDITION (continued).

The four columns were disposed in four separate camps around the fortification, at a distance of from a half to one verst. As all the herbage about the fort was consumed, it became necessary to drive the camels to new pasture-grounds, at a distance of twenty-five versts. It was, moreover, desirable that the detachment should remain for a few days at the Emba fortification, to recruit its strength before encountering still greater fatigue, and in order that the weak and unserviceable camels might be picked out, and the packs of the stronger animals reduced to four or five poods each. The original packs of six or seven poods formed together a load of twelve to fourteen poods per camel, which was now too heavy for the exhausted beasts. It was also necessary to await the arrival of fresh camels, on their way to the Emba,
and to prepare means of transport for the sick along the remaining distance to Khiva; a matter of no ordinary difficulty. The men disabled by sickness and disease had hitherto been transported partly in waggons and partly in sledges. Beyond the Emba, however, the great depth of the snow, the uneven character of the ground—holes and hollows occurring at almost every step—and the steep ascent to the Ust-Urt, involved the necessity of transporting the invalids on camels.

In Egypt and Algeria, where the only difficulty to contend with is the sultry heat, the arrangement of these invalid-packs is, according to the official writer, "comparatively easy." In the Egyptian campaign of Bonaparte boxes of five feet long were fixed to the packs, one end of the box opening on hinges, to allow the sick man to stretch out his legs when he wished. In Algeria, the French, during their expeditions into the desert, carry their sick on the backs of mules, in a kind of chair in which the sick man is strapped. The Russians could not adopt either of these methods, as the sick men might get frozen to death in severe weather. There remained only one method of conveying them: by means, that is to say, of a species of hammock,
it. This was the transport train that had been despatched for the removal of the sick and superfluous heavy articles from the Ak-Bulak to the River Emba, and which was at that time only one stage distant from the fortification. Being unaware of the proximity of the enemy, this detachment, under the command of Erofeyef, had halted at seventeen versts from Ak-Bulak. The camels and horses had been let loose to graze, and the men were employed in digging roots for fuel and in erecting the tents. While they were thus engaged the Khivan horsemen made a sudden appearance, but instead of immediately attacking the detachment, commenced driving away its horses and camels. This gave the Russians time to make a hasty entrenchment. Carts, sledges, and boxes were immediately formed into a temporary rampart, behind which the soldiers were placed to receive the enemy with discharges of musketry. The cavalry and infantry of the Khivans soon made successive charges on the camp, but were each time repulsed. At night the Khivans attempted to crawl up and take the Russians by surprise, but were driven off at the point of the bayonet and with musket shots. During the darkness, however, the Khivans succeeded in digging rifle-pits
and throwing up earthworks at a distance of fifty yards on the four faces of the Russian camp; and they opened fire from these in the morning. From this position, however, they were soon dislodged; and seeing the futility of continuing their open attacks, they collected the horses and camels they had seized and drove them straight before them on to the Russian encampment, in the hope of being able to approach the camp safely under shelter of the animals. But Captain Erofeyef, divining their intention, detached twenty-five riflemen with orders to take up a position which would deprive the assailants of protection behind the horses and camels. This was skilfully executed, and the well-directed fire of the riflemen created confusion among the enemy. A sally was at the same time made from the camp, and the Khivans were beaten off with loss, leaving their dead behind, and losing a portion of the camels and horses previously seized from the Russians. Seeing the great loss they had sustained in men, and the utter failure of their attacks against the camp, the Khivans had now recourse to another stratagem. Two of their horsemen galloped up within gunshot and endeavoured to induce the Tartars and Kirghizes in the Russian service to join
together to the number of about 200, and refused to proceed any further. This disorderly crowd, in spite of all entreaties, refused to disperse, and, increasing in numbers, "disturbed the camp with their wild shouts and violent behaviour." It was necessary to adopt severe measures so as to save the detachment from being left in the heart of the frozen steppe, at a distance of 500 versts from the Line, without any means of locomotion. The crowd was surrounded by troops, and after two of the ringleaders had been shot, the malcontents dispersed, and resumed their duties.

While the main detachment lay encamped at the Emba, a report was received that, the supplies of provisions despatched in vessels to Novo-Alexandrofsk having been delayed at sea by contrary winds until late in the autumn, ten of the ships had become fixed in the ice, some in sight of Fort Alexandrofsk, and some within 100 versts of Gurief, near the Prorvinsk islands. It was further stated that only two of the vessels had succeeded in returning to Astrakhan, after sustaining considerable injury and losing part of their cargoes, which the crew were compelled to throw overboard.

Owing to the exertions of the commandant of
Novo-Alexandrofsk, the vessels frozen in the ice near that fort were saved, and their cargoes brought on shore. Those transports, however, which were wedged in the ice near Prorvinsk Post were burnt by Turcomans and Kirghizes sent thither for the purpose by the Khivans.

While at Emba some of the soldiers were exercised in making night signals by the ignition of gunpowder—in which manner all communications were correctly maintained between the columns—others practised firing with shot and shell; and experiments were successfully made in exploding mines under the ice by means of a galvanic battery.

The distance between the Emba fortification and Ak-Bulak by the direct winter route did not exceed 160 versts, and it was traversed by the columns in fifteen days. Notwithstanding this, however, the loss in camels was very great, and continued to increase daily. The detachment, when it crossed the Line, had about 10,000 camels. But after passing Fort Emba, it could with difficulty muster 8,900 camels for transporting provisions and provender for two months; while at Ak-Bulak, a point not even half-way to Khiva, the number of serviceable camels had been reduced to 5,188. The number that
actually died between the Emba and Ak-Bulak was only 1,200; the rest being abandoned on the road on account of their complete exhaustion.

To render the march of the unloaded camels less fatiguing, the infantry columns advanced in front of them, in four files, forming beaten tracks in the snow; the advance of the loaded camels being assisted in the same way by the cavalry. Where the snow was very deep, the cavalry passed and repassed several times over the ground, to enable the camels to proceed without any difficulty. In some parts the snow was even shovelled away by the soldiers; but in spite of all this the camels continued to fall in great numbers, thus obstructing the advance of the columns. When a camel succumbed it was necessary to remove its load; and the men sinking to their knees, and sometimes to their waists, in snow, exhausted their strength in this labour. When a camel fell it rarely rose again, so that new paths had to be made round this obstruction for the passage of camels following in the rear.

The guns had to be drawn by horses, and occasionally to be pulled out of the snow by the men. In some places the surface of the snow was quite soft, while in others it was nearly as hard as ice, and sup-
ported the horses, camels, and even the 12-pounder guns. At times, when it gave way, the extrication of the camels, sledges, artillery, and so on, was attended with great fatigue and difficulty. The camels and horses got cut about the legs, and on some days only short stages of four versts were made in consequence of these delays. In "burans," or snow-storms, it was altogether impossible to advance. Thus the first column, which marched during a snow-storm, was only able to traverse twenty versts in four days; and it abandoned on the road a large number of sledges and carts, which the following three columns converted into fuel for cooking purposes.

After such severe frost and such fatiguing stages, the strength of the camels should have been recruited with plentiful food. But the surface of the steppe—poor at any time—was now completely covered with snow. It was, however, still possible to give each horse a measure of oats and about five pounds of hay per diem; although to feed 8,000 camels on hay was, of course, not feasible. The latter, however, were each apportioned about five pounds of hay a day; which was little enough.

It must be added that the frost, during this time,
was 15° and 20° R.; and, although the men had to a certain extent become acclimatised, the great cold benumbed their limbs, in spite of their warm clothing, and incapacitated them for all work. "At the same time," says the official writer, "hard work—producing perspiration, exhaustion, and sound sleep—exposed the men to the liability of catching cold."

For the first eighty versts the columns marched along the left banks of the Arty Takshi, and then followed the course of the Talysai rivulet, proceeding afterwards across saline marshes, which the frost rendered firm ground in winter, thus enabling the camels, horses, and artillery to cross without any difficulty. During summer, draught horses sink here up to their fetlocks in the oozy mud, and the wheels of carts laden with goods become embedded a foot deep. After a fall of rain, however, or during spring, it is altogether impossible to cross these saline-marsh tracts, which extend to Chushka-Kul, over a distance of eighty versts. They are intersected by two ranges of hills—the Bakzir and Ali—over which there are convenient ascents and descents for vehicles. But along the whole of this marshy tract a plentiful supply of good water is only to be found on the slope of the Ali hills; the pastur-
age for cattle throughout the distance being, more-
over, poor and scanty. In consequence of frost
and snow, and scarcity of fuel, it took the column
six or seven days to traverse these salines, and it was
on these stages that they encountered the difficulties
described above.

General Perofski, who had remained with a light
detachment at Fort Emba to superintend the depa-
ture of the last column, and to make proper arrange-
ments for the safety and requirements of the sick
left behind, quitted the Fort on the 17th (29th)
January, and after inspecting the column which he
overtook on the march, went forward to Ak-Bulak
to make arrangements for the further advance
of the troops. On reaching Ak-Bulak, he imme-
diately despatched Colonel Bizianof and Captain
Rechenberg, with 150 Ural Cossacks and one light
field gun, to reconnoitre the route ahead, and to find
a convenient point of ascent to the Ust-Urt. This
detachment, after going 150 versts in the direction
of Khiva, returned eight days later, reporting that
the depth of snow for 100 versts, as far as the Ust-
Urt, was still greater than that on the steppe already
traversed; that the grass and bushes were buried in
snow, and that some parts of the route were so
left only six days after the second one, it was, in some places, obliged to clear a new route for itself, the tracks and trodden paths of the columns in advance having become drifted over with snow. Only now and then could the route taken by the columns in front be ascertained through the pillars of snow erected at some distance from each other by the Ural Cossacks, through the snow-heaps which marked the night camps, and through the camels, living and dead, some frozen and partly devoured by wild beasts, that lay along the line of march.

If the passage of Macdonald's corps, 12,000 strong, in 1800, over the Simplon, be justly considered a wonderful feat on account of the extraordinary exertions of the French, and the great hardships to which they were exposed, how much higher, asks the official historian, must we place the endurance and discipline of the Russian troops, who encountered difficulties immeasurably greater on their march through the deep snows from Emba to Ak-Bulak, during frosts, storms, and hurricanes of unprecedented severity, and over a desert and frozen tract of 160 versts (107 miles), the advance lasting a period of half a month?

After marching in hard frosts a distance of 500
and having overtaken the last two columns on the route to Ak-Bulak, was personally an eye-witness of the hardships endured by the troops on the march. He saw, too, the complete exhaustion of the camels. Observing the position in which the expeditionary force was placed, the General sought the opinion of the commanders of the columns as to the possibility of their camels reaching Khiva. The commanders reported that, owing to the wearied condition of these animals, the scantiness of herbage, and the great depth of snow on the ground, any further advance towards Khiva was impossible. The same opinion was confirmed by the ruler of the western horde, the Sultan Aichuvakof, who, as a Kirghiz, was well acquainted both with the powers of endurance of the camel, and the condition of the steppe. Besides procuring the opinion of the commanders of the columns and of the Sultan Aichuvakof, General Perofski, on reaching Ak-Bulak, despatched Colonel Bizianof to the Ust-Urt, as already stated, with the Ural Cossacks, to examine the route in front. Then, having found that the depth of the snow became greater and greater, that all herbage and fuel were completely buried under it, and that the weakness of the camels, which were beginning to
fall at the rate of a hundred daily, increased from: hour to hour, he became convinced that it was impossible, under the circumstances to reach Khiva.

The Orenburg infantry soldiers, not being accustomed to the fatigues of a campaign, suffered severely from disease. On the completion of half the journey only 1,856 effective men could be mustered out of a force of 2,750 which had left Orenburg. Of the number on the sick list, 236 had already died, 528 remained under treatment, and 130 were invalided and left behind at Fort Emba. On reaching Khiva the number of sick would in all probability be still greater.

"If," says the official writer, "the mortality and exhaustion among the camels were to go on increasing at the same rate, which in all probability it would do, the detachment would be obliged to return to Fort Emba before reaching Khiva, after abandoning its provisions and stores on the route, and encountering still greater difficulties than those already experienced. And, furthermore, if the enemy were at this juncture to commence marching to meet the Russians, might not the return of the latter be interpreted as a flight from
our supplies are plentiful. In one thing only have we been unfortunate; we have lost a large proportion of our camels, and those remaining are exhausted by hunger and fatigue. We are thus deprived of the means of transporting our stores of provisions for the remaining distance along the route. However painful it may be to forego the victory that awaited us, we must on this occasion retrace our steps towards the frontier. There we shall await the further orders of the Emperor. Our next expedition will be more fortunate. It is a source of consolation for me to be able to thank you for the unflagging devotion and energy which you have displayed under all the difficulties encountered on the march. Our gracious Sovereign and Father shall know it all."

According to calculations made afterwards, it appeared that from the day of the departure of the detachment to the 20th February, the number of sick cases, both in the marching columns and fort garrisons, amounted to 3,124, out of which 608 were fatal.

The following was the ratio of sickness and deaths among the different branches of the expeditionary force:—

L.
PEROFSKI'S EXPEDITION.

Perofski in 1839, the mortality among the whole force employed reached about one-third. These two experiments would seem to testify in favour of summer expeditions in the steppe. Seeing that the country traversed by General Perofski yielded an abundant supply of water, the commencement of the campaign in winter was decidedly unadvisable. The whole force might have been collected on the Ust-Urt before winter set in.

There were many officers who condemned the plan of a winter campaign when it was in contemplation; but the opinions of those who supported their arguments to the contrary by quoting Lord Wellington's saying, that "Sandy wastes can only be traversed by troops in winter," preponderated.

As soon as it became known that the first expeditionary force would not be able to reach Khiva, orders were issued for strengthening the Orenburg Corps with six battalions. Admiral Rimski Korsakov was sent to ascertain the number of vessels on the Volga and Caspian capable of transporting these troops to the eastern coast of the Caspian, in order that Khiva might be reached by the route taken by Prince Bekovitch. When it was found that there were not sufficient vessels available, it was decided
CHAPTER VII.

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844.

When, in 1844, the Emperor Nicholas started for England in order to visit Queen Victoria he was convinced that the only stumbling-block between England and Russia was the apprehension caused to the former by the ambitious views attributed to the latter in the East. He resolved then to see the English Sovereign and the English Ministers on this subject; ready to give, in regard not only to Turkey, but also Central Asia, all needful explanations and all possible guarantees. Perofski's expedition to Khiva in 1839, following immediately after the siege of Herat, which had been conducted by Russian engineers under the direction of a Russian general, had, in spite of its disastrous result, caused much speculation, some apprehension, and, among a small party, downright alarm. Every Russian sovereign,
The memorandum is given at length in the "Diplomatic Study on the Crimean War," issued by the Russian Foreign Office; and it is probably to this document that Mr. Thornton refers in his "Lives of English Foreign Secretaries," as one which, without having been placed in the archives of our Foreign Office, was handed from minister to minister at each change of Government. However that may be, the memorandum must be accepted as reproducing in substance the agreement come to between the Emperor Nicholas and the Government of England in the year 1844; and it throws a new light, to the advantage of the Emperor Nicholas, on the celebrated conversation which he held nine years afterwards with Sir Hamilton Seymour on the subject of the "Sick Man." The objects with which, in case of "anything happening" to the Sick Man, Russia and England would have to come to an understanding, were set forth as follows:

"1. Maintenance of the Ottoman Empire for so long a time as this political combination may be possible.

"2. If we see beforehand that it is breaking up, a preliminary understanding to be arrived at as to the establishment of a new order of things destined to
replace that which now exists; and precautions to be taken in common, so that no change occurring in the internal situation of that empire may threaten the security of our own states, or the maintenance of the European equilibrium.

"In view of the objects thus formulated, the policy of Russia and that of Austria are clearly bound together by the principle of complete solidarity. If England, as the chief naval power, acts in concert with them, there is reason to believe that France will find herself obliged to follow the course decided upon between St. Petersburg, London, and Vienna. All possibility of conflict between the Great Powers being thus averted, it may be hoped that the peace of Europe will be maintained, even in the midst of such grave circumstances.

"It is with the view of assuring this result in the interests of all, that Russia and England should first come to a preliminary understanding between themselves, as agreed upon by the Emperor with the Ministers of her Britannic Majesty during his stay in England."

Viewed in connection with this memorandum, addressed in 1844 by the Russian Government to the Government of England, and accepted by the latter,
the conversation of the Emperor Nicholas with Sir Hamilton Seymour in 1853 acquires a new character. The "Sick Man," whose introduction to the world through the published despatches of Sir Hamilton Seymour caused so much scandal at the time of the Crimean war, was but a revival. He is at least foreshadowed, with the mortal character of his malady already indicated, in those clauses of the Nesselrode Memorandum which consider the probability of "something happening" to Turkey, and which stipulate that on the occurrence of the unhappy event, England and Russia shall come to an understanding, with a view to action in common.

But England in 1844 mistrusted Russia, in connection not only with Turkey but also with Central Asia. Apart from Perofski's expedition to Khiva, of which the immediate effect, even in case of success, could only have told indirectly and remotely upon India, Russia had helped the Persians during the siege of Herat with money, arms and men, and she had been intriguing against us in Afghanistan; a fact better known to the English Government, who had received particulars on the subject from its agents at Cabul, than to the English public, to whom the despatches from these agents
ment on the subject, just as he had broken the one relating to Turkey”—for the Russian Foreign Office persists in its belief that Lord Palmerston was the true author of the Crimean war. Immediately after the Treaty of 1856 he “profited by circumstances to wage war against Persia, in order to make that country feel the power of Great Britain, and to take from it definitively Herat, which was then annexed to Afghanistan.” “Thence,” it is added, “resulted the progress since accomplished in Central Asia by Russia restored to her full liberty of action, and free from all illusions as to the utility of subordinating her interests to the idea of an impossible solidarity.”

Whatever, then, English writers and English politicians may say on the subject, the Russians themselves have always regarded their movement towards Afghanistan as injurious to the interests of England. It is not astonishing that they should do so now, considering that the Emperor Nicholas took the same view in 1844, when not one successful step in that direction had as yet been made.
CHAPTER VIII.

IGNATIEFF'S MISSION TO KHIVA AND BOKHARA.

Count Nicholas Pavlovitch Ignatieff, who first owed his European fame to his restless activity as Ambassador of Russia at Constantinople, during and immediately before the recent Russo-Turkish war, is the son of the General Ignatieff who was for many years Governor-General of St. Petersburg, and who was afterwards President of the Committee of Ministers. Nicholas Pavlovitch Ignatieff was educated at the Institute of Pages, and, according to custom, quitted that select establishment to enter the Guards. The so-called "Crimean War" found the young Ignatieff, at the age of 22, serving with his regiment at Revel, in the Baltic provinces, under Count Berg, to whose staff he was attached. In spite of the exertions she was compelled to make in the Crimea, Russia, throughout the war of 1854
Affairs; a department in which, for no visible reason, Slavonic questions are treated. Here he drew up a plan for uniting the Orenburg and Siberian lines; afterwards executed by Colonel Verëvkin, marching from Orenburg, and Colonel (now General) Tchernaieff marching from Semipalatinsk. He had previously urged upon the Government the necessity of occupying Tashkend, when he received the same answer which was afterwards given to Tchernaieff—that the Russian Government did not wish to extend its possessions in Central Asia, and that Tashkend was not to be taken.

It was thought that General Ignatieff would be made Governor-General of the Russian possessions in Central Asia. But in 1865 he was appointed minister at Constantinople, where his legation was subsequently raised to the rank of an embassy.

From London his report on the government of India seems to have taken him to Central Asia; his successes in Central Asia took him to China; his success in China to the direction of the Asiatic department where Slavonic affairs are treated. From the Asiatic department he was moved to Constantinople—the one point at which a true Russian of the orthodox faith is always stationed;
of the Bokharian Court; there were councillors and secretaries of embassy; adjutants, provosts, a guard of honour, grooms, a piper, a drummer, a doorkeeper, and four valets, the whole constituting a complete retinue. This company was likewise conveyed to Orenburg. Houses were hired, and another allowance of money was provided: two roubles to the envoy, one rouble twenty-five copecks to the commandant, and as much to the councillor; fifty copecks per man to eight "distinguished men," and twenty-five copecks to each of the rest. For every one of their horses they were furnished daily with two garnetz of oats and sixteen pounds of hay.

Having rested from the fatigues of their long journeys, the envoys, according to custom, asked to be allowed to proceed to the Imperial Court, in order to deliver the letters from the rulers of Khiva and Bokhara, and from their different ministers; declaring that the object of their missions was to offer congratulations to the Emperor on his happy accession to the throne of his forefathers.

In the letter from the Khan of Khiva there was, indeed, no mention of anything besides this; but in the letters from the Khivan ministers a unanimous desire was expressed to make the Jaxartes the
boundary line between the territories of Khiva and the empire of Russia.

The contents of the letter from the ruler of Bokhara were of a different kind. Commencing with condolence on the death of the Emperor Nicholas, and congratulating his successor on his accession to the throne, the Ameer held it to be indispensably necessary at the same time to announce his victories in Shahr-i-Suby, and with the solemnity of a great monarch to make known his occupation of the little towns in that province, which lie within an area of from ten to twelve square versts. In conclusion, the Ameer expressed a desire to see a Russian envoy at Bokhara. "The intelligence," he wrote, "concerning the removal of the great sovereign from this perishable world to an eternal life, and the succession of the great monarch to the imperial throne reached our ears at the time when our most sacred person was engaged in the conquest of the Shahr-Kish dominions. Thanks to the Almighty and to His mercy, and owing to the efficacy of the prayers of the holy of the famous kingdom, the zephyr of victory and glory blew, and by the inexhaustible grace and lavish munificence of the Creator, the dominion of Shahr-Kish, Kital, Utra-kirgan, and Shamatan, with all
their surrounding districts, have been overcome and subjected to the authority of the all-conquering kingdom.

"Owing to these causes, it has been made a matter of obligation to send an embassy to pray for the soul of the renowned Sovereign, to congratulate the monarch whose merits are equal to those of Dyemohidi, on his accession to the throne, and to make joyful communication of the conquest of the above-mentioned dominions. It is also despatched for the purpose of strengthening those bonds which have existed since the times of our ancestors, and of consolidating the mutual relations between two great sovereigns. We have, therefore, commanded the departure, as ambassador, of our respected and esteemed Mirakhur Mulladjan, a well-wisher to your Majesty, who is reputed among our nobles for his straightforwardness and justice. When vouchsafed a gracious reception we hope he will receive various imperial favours, and that his assurances will be kindly listened to; after which we trust he will be granted permission to depart. May the precious and bright intelligence of the Sovereign be then directed towards the sending of an embassy from himself.
Sheb, or night-policeman in the city of Bokhara, and in no way enjoyed the confidence of the Ameer Nasr Ullah. The councillor and the secretary of embassy are likewise persons who do not perform the duties which in Europe belong to those offices. The envoy treats them more like servants than like officials of a certain standing. A few days ago, finding them asleep when he awoke, he became furious, and with his own hand thrashed them with a nagaika (the Cossack horse-whip), and also laid it over the back of his son, the Commandant of the Bokharian Court."

Explaining further that the envoy was inquisitive, and that he readily entered into conversation about his own country, Mr. Gregorieff adds:—"He is very miserly, and consequently must be covetous, like all Asiatics. In proof of this, he refuses to provide his suite, at his own cost, with the warm clothing they require for their journey to St. Petersburg at this late season of the year; in consequence of which, by command of the Governor-General, the councillor and the secretary of the embassy have been supplied with pelisses, and the servants with tulups (sheep-skin coats), at the expense of our Government."
Such were the personages who, at that time, appeared in Russia as the representatives of Khiva and Bokhara.

On news being received at St. Petersburg of the arrival of the envoys, the imperial sanction was given for their admission to Court. On the 9th of September the Khivan envoy started for St. Petersburg, followed on the 23rd of October by the Bokharian envoy, accompanied by a limited suite.

Their stay in St. Petersburg was not long. Having been favoured with audiences, they received answers to the letters from their Khans and ministers; and after seeing ballets and other sights, and having, in particular, accumulated a good supply of presents, they returned to Orenburg in the month of January, 1858. From there they started for their respective countries; the Khivan envoy on the 28th of February, and the Bokharian envoy on the 24th of May.

The response to these missions was the equipment of a special mission, in the spring of 1858, to the Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara, under Colonel Ignatieff.

The Supreme-Governor, and the Governor-General of Orenburg, had become convinced of the necessity
of sending an agent to Turan before the arrival of the Asiatic envoys at St. Petersburg. Since the year 1842 the Russians had had no relations, hostile or friendly, with the Central Asian Khanates. "The information," says Mr. Zalesoff, as translated by Mr. Robert Michell, in one of his valuable contributions to the history of the relations of Russia with the Khanates of Central Asia, "which had been acquired through previous missions, was out of date, and in respect to the topography of the country, it bore only on localities in proximity with Bokhara and Khiva, without any reference whatever to the main artery of Central Asia—the Oxus—which, as regards commercial as well as political relations, is of such immense importance. Moreover, while in 1853 we had brought our line of forts down to the Jaxartes, and so placed ourselves in immediate relations with the Khanate of Khiva, we not only wanted correct information concerning the condition of the Central Asian states, their mutual relations, the territories of Bokhara, and other territories along the Oxus; we had, moreover, unfortunately only a very vague idea of the localities on this (the Russian) side of the Jaxartes. These circumstances were sufficient of themselves to call our attention to the study of the
Lieutenant Skriabin, of the Corps of Topographers, under orders to execute a reconnaissance during the summer along the western limits of the Ust-Urt, was directed to send across the Ust-Urt a flying party of 150 Cossacks to afford assistance, if it should be necessary, to the mission in its progress along the west coast of the Aral.
IGNATIEFF'S MISSION TO KHIVA AND BOKHARA

(continued).

No expense was spared in the equipment of the embassy. The staff of the mission consisted of the agent, Colonel Ignatieff, the secretary, two interpreters, two officers of the general staff, two officers of the Corps of Topographers, two doctors, one naval officer who was an astronomer, a photographer, a civil official of the Governor-General's staff, and three topographic clerks. There were also an official from the Academy of Sciences, sent for the purpose of studying the Eastern dialects, a priest proceeding to join the Aral flotilla, and a student of the University of St. Petersburg, attached at his own request, and desirous of going as far as Khiva, in order to study the nature of the steppes. The convoy was composed of picked men, consisting of twenty-three
mounted Fusiliers, seventeen Orenburg Cossacks, seventeen Ural Cossacks, and nine Cossacks unattached, with an excellent rifled piece of ordnance, and seven officers.

Besides a variety of articles for use, the mission was supplied with astronomical, photographic, and geodesical instruments, and with sketching materials, as well as with the results of steppe surveys, and of surveys made in the Khanates on previous occasions.

For the carriage of two months' supply of provisions and forage, 220 camels were hired at six roubles per month each, and for the transport of the baggage belonging to the members of the mission, 110 camels were engaged, at the rate of fifteen roubles each from Orenburg to Khiva. These were attended by a regular number of servants under a caravan bashi; the full strength further comprising four Kirghiz messengers and two guides.

The mission started to traverse the Barsuk sands and the barren and arid Ust-Urt desert, with twenty-three carriages, ambulance waggons, and carts, and nearly 200 horses, exclusive of the supplementary convoy of seventy-five men from General Katenin's detachment.

The vessels of the Aral flotilla were being pre-
Asiatic Department, General Kavalewski, from the bivouac at Bish-Tawak, on the 24th May:—

"While wending my way across the steppe I have been thinking over the business which is before me in Khiva and Bokhara, and have determined to tell you some of the ideas which have occurred to me in trying to reconcile the information on Central Asia obtainable at Orenburg with the instructions which have been given to me. I beg your Excellency will treat these lines as candid gossip, to which you repeatedly challenged me before I left St. Petersburg, and not as the expression of any misgivings.

"Making a sacrifice of myself for the benefit of the service, I am not afraid of my candour.

"When the time comes for negotiating with the Khans, I shall be entirely guided by what, to the best of my judgment, will be most advantageous to us and most compatible with the general views of the Ministry, in the event of any doubts, or of any disaccordance of local circumstances with my instructions; and I have considered it my duty to acquaint you beforehand with my view of the commission entrusted to me by order of His Imperial Majesty, seeing that there is even yet time to send
me positive ministerial orders in case it should be found that I am in error.

"It is said in my instructions, that in case the Government of Bokhara consents to all our demands, I am to promise compliance with the requests preferred by the envoy, Mir-Akhur Mulladjan. The first of these requests was that Bokharian merchants should be allowed to visit all towns and fairs, without any exception, within the Russian Empire; and the second, that separate shops should be assigned to Bokharian traders at the Nijni Fair, at a permanent charge, whether they be occupied or not. The Orenburg authorities have endeavoured to convince me that for many years past Bokharians have been in the habit of visiting all the towns and fairs in the Russian Empire, and that, by authority long ago granted, nineteen shops at Nijni Fair were assigned to them on payment in advance of a fixed charge; and, moreover, that the Bokharians, having ceased to pay for these shops in advance, the Court of Management let them to other tradesmen. In November last (1857) they paid into the hands of the Frontier Commission the sum of 810 roubles for nine shops, for the present year, 1858. The Commission
forwarded the money to the Military Governor of Nijni Novgorod, and the shops will be at the disposal of the Bokharians. As far as I can make out, from conversations with the Bokharian envoy, the Bokharians desire a certain number of shops to be definitively assigned to them, as in the case of the Chinese. In regard to the privilege which is sought, of trading throughout Russia without hindrance, it seems to me that the Bokharians mean thereby, that they wish to be freed from the obligation of taking out trade certificates, and to replace them by a permanent charge, as has hitherto been done in their case only at Nijni, Irbit, Tiumen, and Korennoi fairs. I do not know whether this interpretation of the Bokharian demand falls in with the views of the Ministry. In order not to promise too much, I shall, in drawing up the 'Obligatory Act' which I have to submit to the Ameer, endeavour to employ the same words as those in which the promises to be made are expressed in my instructions; but I fear that the Bokharians will not appreciate these privileges, and that the Ameer will not consider himself sufficiently compensated for his signature to the Act.

"It is doubtful whether the Khans of Bokhara and Khiva will consent to admit resident Russian
Ministry approve of my conduct, and will it support my threats in case of need? At all events I intend, as a last resource, to try my method of persuasion. " I am also instructed to give the Ameer no positive answer if he should ask our assistance in his war with Kokand, and to be circumspect in my dealings with envoys, and with others from Tashkend. According to the latest intelligence, the Kokandians continue to be secretly and openly hostile to us. It appears to me that the dignity of Russia requires that we should treat the Kokandians as people who have merited chastisement, and that we should not only avoid all dealings with them, but also speak of them in Bokhara, where their acts of hostility against us are well-known, as robbers, with whom it is not worth our while to transact any business, and upon whom we mean to inflict punishment at the first opportunity. " It would hardly be advantageous to us to refuse aid to the Ameer of Bokhara in his war with Kokand, in the event of his applying to us for it, and thereby to lose the opportunity of connecting the Syr-Daria (Jaxartes) lines by occupying Turkestan and Tashkend. " Even if the Khanate of Bokhara were to gain strength at the expense of Kokand, it could not
On 31st May the Mission safely reached the Emba, travelling 438 verts (292 miles) in seventeen days, with its enormous transport.

The marauding excursions of the robber Iset Kutebar have already been referred to. After the employment of every means for the pacification of the nomads, the Governor-General of Orenburg thought proper to proclaim an amnesty to the rebel Kirghizes, and towards that end entered indirectly into communication with Iset himself, in order to induce him to present himself with a petition for pardon. In spite of the strong persuasions of those who acted on behalf of the Governor-General, Iset—advised, it was said, by his mother—at first positively declined to have any dealings with the authorities at Orenburg, and was preparing to migrate to the Ust-Urt, when he suddenly heard of the advance of the Mission under the Emperor's Aide-de-camp, and changed his mind. He resolved, before proceeding to an interview with the Governor-General, to give himself up to the Envoy, as one who might be considered in the confidence of His Majesty the Czar. On the 4th of June, Iset, with some of his companions, stood unarmed in the tent of Colonel Ignatieff.
Excellency's letter of the 15th April, and have advised him not to make the preliminary survey of the Oxus up to Kungrad, which he holds to be necessary. It appears, according to the information received by Captain Butakoff as to the present condition of the mouths of the Oxus, that the Taldyk has become shallow, and that the main body of water flows into the old or eastern channel. The mouth of the Taldyk has been mentioned by Captain Butakoff as the point of rendezvous for the flotilla, which, composed of the steamers Perofski and Obrucheff, and of the three barges, will assemble there on the 23rd. Taking two of these vessels, laden with presents, Captain Butakoff will proceed to the mouth of the Oxus, and ascend to Kungrad, acting upon instructions contained in a letter which I this day despatched by messenger to the Commandant of Kungrad. I have requested Captain Butakoff to pay no attention to any act of hostility on the part of individual Khivans, or any attempts to stop the steamers; to communicate with me as often as possible; and, in particular, to inform me without delay of any stoppage that may occur; desiring him, moreover, to be at Kungrad by the 25th. In the event of any unforeseen hindrances
to the passage of our boats, the presents will be transferred to Khivan barges, in charge of Mojaisky (a naval officer) and Lalatzky (staff officer), with two of our soldiers.”

Having determined upon this, merely with the object of effecting a survey of the river, Colonel Ignatieff at the same time resolved to change the route of the Mission itself, which he now directed towards Kungrad instead of Kuna-Urgendj. For the double purpose of acquainting the Khivan authorities with the reason for the entry of the vessels into the Oxus and for the change of route, and of ascertaining the impression produced on the Khivan Government by these proceedings, the Agent sent on ahead a man named Panfiloff, a clerk of the merchant Zaichikoff, in charge of the latter’s mercantile venture.

This man, who had before been in Central Asia, is described by the historian of Ignatieff’s expedition as “one of those many Russians who are so clever at finding out everything, and whose sound common-sense enables them to emerge from every difficulty.”

After arranging accordingly and directing the course of the Mission to Urga, on Aibugir bay, Colonel Ignatieff considered it necessary to furnish
the commander of the flotilla with special written instructions, in addition to verbal explanations, from which the following extract may be made, in order to throw more light on the proceedings of the Mission:

"The preliminary survey of the estuary of the river, of which the necessity is recognised, could be permitted only on the condition of your employing great caution in its performance and of its not entailing any evil consequence on the Mission and on the flotilla in the furtherance of their object—the securing of a free passage up the Oxus."

Parting from the flotilla, and performing two more marches along the west coast of the Aral, the Mission came to a halt at Urga, by Aibugir lake, an arm of the sea now completely choked with reeds.

During this movement, the reconnoitring detachment under Lieutenant Skriabin traversed the Ust-Urt and entered into communication with the Mission; but Colonel Ignatieff, having no occasion for its services, directed Lieutenant Skriabin to proceed to fulfil the duties with which he was charged.

On the road to Urga the Mission was met by Kirghiz messengers, who had been sent to Khiva by
threw the Khanate into agitation; the militia were called out everywhere. Matters were aggravated by the steamer. I am being hurried to Khiva; but I am endeavouring to gain time. I was first temporising on account of the steamer; now it is with a desire to clear up matters. The steamer attempted a passage up several mouths, causing great alarm by firing guns and by its efforts to ascend the river. From the 22nd up to the 28th it failed in these efforts, so that I was obliged to agree to the persistent demands of the Khivans that the presents should be transferred to Khivan boats. I am loitering to gain time, but I am going forward. In Kungrad I take to Khivan boats."

Everything, indeed, tended to increase the terror of the mistrustful Khivans. The Khivan Government, having received information from the Jaxartes concerning the preparations for the despatch of the flotilla, determined forthwith, at all hazards, to prevent its entry into the Oxus; and the Governor of Kungrad, under the penalty of losing his head, began on the 24th of June to urge Colonel Ignatieff to order the vessels not to enter the river. Having already given instructions for the ascent, the Agent
with suspicion and ill-feeling by the authorities at Kungrad, and learning that his letters to Russia were being intercepted on their way, Colonel Ignatieff, in response to the pressing requests made by the Khivan officials in the Khan’s name that he should hasten to Khiva, resolved, without waiting longer for Butakoff at Kungrad, to embark in Khivan boats, and proceed to the capital. He considered, too, that he would thus have an opportunity of examining the greater portion of the river’s course. The horses belonging to the Russians, with a portion of the escort, were, at the request of the Khivans, conducted to Khiva by land on the right bank of the river, under the charge of Captain Borodin, of the Ural Cossacks, and accompanied by a telegraphist named Zelenin.

At the same time the Agent despatched Lieutenant Mojaiski to Captain Butakoff, "under the plausible pretext of obtaining the presents from the steamer, but really with the object of enabling that officer to examine the Taldyk arm, of entering into communication with the flotilla, of ascertaining what had happened to it, and of acquainting Captain Butakoff with the state of affairs." Mojaiski descended the Taldyk, but passing into another
the river to the other at haphazard; the Khivans giving the boats up to the mercy of the stream, and not caring where they might be stranded. We got into two dreadful whirlpools, and if we did not sink to the bottom of the Oxus, it was only because it was not God's will that we should do so. Yet the river is undoubtedly grand, being nearly at all points from 4,000 to 6,000 fathoms wide."

When the Russian vessels had forced their way to Kungrad, the Mission was being drawn up the stream, and the Agent was in utter ignorance of the proceedings of the flotilla, the Khivans in his company being all the while fully cognizant of them, as they were informed of events at each point of communication with the shores. It was only on the 15th of July, when Urgendj was being approached, that letters were received by Colonel Ignatieff, through Iset's son and a Khivan courier, from Captain Butakoff, at Kungrad, and from the officers accompanying the horses. These letters fully disclosed the evil designs of the Governor of Kungrad, Esaül-Bashi, under whose directions all letters were taken from the Russian messengers and read. It was due to the dignity of the Russian Agent that such conduct should not be overlooked, and Colonel Ignatieff
accordingly expressed his dissatisfaction to the Khivans around him, with regard to the conduct of Esaûl-Bashi, the Governor of Kungrad. Colonel Ignatieff reported home as follows:—

"Deeming it advisable to give some of the Khivans a lesson, and to show them that I was not inclined to suffer such indignities, I stopped the boats before reaching Urgendj, summoned the Divan-Baba, and explaining to him the impropriety and unpardonable nature of his countrymen's proceedings, declared that if my dissatisfaction with the Esaûl-Bashi were not immediately reported to the Khan, coupled with a request that arrangements be instantly made to facilitate the advance of the horses and half of the escort to Khiva, I should not only discontinue my ascent of the river, but should forthwith return to Kungrad. The Divan-Baba entered with excuses, begging me at any rate to proceed as far as the Urgendj wharf. He said that my return to Kungrad would bring him to the scaffold. He despatched a report to the Khivans, and guaranteed the fulfilment of all my demands."

"While yet on the Ust-Urt," Colonel Ignatieff wrote, "I discussed with Captain Butakoff the question of navigating the Oxus this year, and that
officer explained to me that the steamer Obruchef was to be left out of all consideration, because she could go to sea only in fair weather, and was wholly incapable of making way against the current of so wide and rapid a river as the Oxus. He furthur said that it was doubtful whether the steamer Perofski could ascend the river any distance, for, should the water fall, she might be shut in there for the winter. Captain Butakoff thought it undesirable to run the risk of wating with the flotilla in that river. Taking the above into consideration, and seeing no use for a steamer in the river with an insufficient supply of fuel, and not feeling authorised to take upon myself the responsibility in opposition to the opinion of the Commander of the flotilla, of incurring the danger to which the Perofski, with a barge, might be exposed at Kungrad, and in steaming up to Chardjui and to Balkh late in the autumn, I concurred in Captain Butakoff's suggestion. I was the more inclined to do so because it was not to be expected that the negotiations in Khiva would be concluded in less than a month—not, that is to say, before the end of August. It was, moreover, ascertained that the autumnal rise of
whether he brought war?" The answer given to the Khan, that the third vessel had come with letters, in consequence of the non-receipt in Russia of intelligence from the Mission; a firm protest on the part of the Agent himself against the arrest of his couriers; and the despatch of an officer (Galkin) on the 26th of July to the steamer to fetch the post, at last pacified Said Mahomed, who allowed the steamer to anchor in the Ulkun Daria, and became generally more courteous in his behaviour towards the Russians. The Khan’s request that the Envoy should be presented to him without his sword was not consented to; and not only the Agent himself, but all his suite, constantly paraded the town with their side-arms, and in their European dress; a most unusual sight in the Khanates of Central Asia. The Khan’s suspicions were not, however, entirely lulled; and he informed the Agent that he would negotiate with him personally, while requesting him, out of regard for his ambassadorial dignity, to let the Secretary and the dragoman of the Mission see the ministers.

On the 2nd of August the Agent informed the Khan Russia’s demands, and then commenced “the interminable Asiatic negotiations.” On the same day the
Agent despatched a special Kirghiz courier to the Vizier of Bokhara, to announce the arrival of the Mission. On 15th of August, the Kush Begi, in the name of the Khan, invited the members of the Mission to a drive, at the end of which a conference was held by them with five of the ministers. The Khivans were afraid of giving offence to Russia by refusing to agree to the Russian proposals, yet they also feared from Bokhara the consequences of adhering to them—more especially as regarded the navigation of the Oxus, since the Ameer of Bokhara had, through his Envoys, repeatedly urged the Khan not to allow Russian vessels, under any pretext, to ascend the river. Nevertheless, the Khivans, "moved by impotent malice towards the Ameer," strove all the while to set the Agent's mind against him, and to persuade him not to go to Bokhara.

While agreeing to all propositions with respect to abstention from brigandage, protection to caravans, &c., the Khivans refused point-blank to accept a clause relative to the navigation of the Oxus.

The Khivan traders were equally opposed to this clause, being fully assured that the transport of merchandise in vessels would throw the whole trade into Russian hands. This idea frightened them very
in the opinion of the Khivans, went so far that in Persia "money was being coined in the name of the Emperor, and the Shah was surrounded by a Russian force instead of his own."

"If," writes Mr. Zalesoff, "one reflects how valuable the Persian slaves were to the idling Khivans, the ruin which threatened the latter on the liberation of these slaves—the only labourers in the Khanate—will then become apparent. Acting upon a resolution come to in Council, the Khan demanded (but in vain) the surrender of the Persian fugitive slave, and the cessation of the taking of soundings; to which the Agent replied that he had received no report from the Commander of the steamer, and promised to despatch a letter with the sick officers who were about to take their departure.

At the same time Colonel Ignatieff received information to the effect that Mr. Galkin, whom he had previously sent to the flotilla, had found himself obliged to quarrel with the Khivan who accompanied him, on account of the above-mentioned Persian slave, and was therefore compelled to remain on board the steamer.

Ignatieff did not succeed in the main object of his mission. He could not, that is to say, gain per-
to show what travelling or campaigning in Asia involves, and what stamina, manhood, and health are necessary for service in the steppes. The further progress of the agent, as well as the march of the men behind him, were performed under still more trying circumstances on account of the great depth of snow. The storm pursued them all the way to Orenburg, where the Agent arrived on the night of the fourth of December, the convoy of the Mission marching in at the beginning of February. The journey was begun in a temperature of 30 or 35° R. of heat, and was ended in 35° R. of frost, with constant snow-drifts.

Ignatieff's mission might also be regarded as a military reconnoissance. He made the expedition under conditions which were in many respects new; and the information he brought back as to routes, distances, state of the country, disposition of the tribes, and so on, must have been of great service to General Kauffman when the time came for that Commander to organize the expedition which ended in the subjection of Khiva and its virtual annexation to the Russian dominions.
CHAPTER X.

KAUFFMANN'S EXPEDITION TO KHIVA.

When the expedition of Prince Bekovitch Tcherkaski was despatched to Khiva by Peter the Great; when Orloff, at the orders of the Emperor Paul, marched towards Khiva, with intentions to continue his course through Bokhara to India; when Mouravieff was sent on a mission to Khiva under the Emperor Alexander I. in 1822—the ultimate and avowed object was in each case either to reach or, as Mouravieff put it, to "shake" India. Even in 1839, when General Perofski undertook operations against Khiva, the object of the invasion, as afterwards set forth by its appointed historian, was to weaken the influence and counteract the designs of the East India Company. Five years afterwards, when in 1844 the Emperor Nicholas was endeavouring in London to establish a complete understanding be-
Kauffmann. The Khan, on learning this decision, replied that he could say nothing further before receiving an answer to the questions he had put in his communication to the Emperor. Consequently negotiations fell through.

The Khan now sought in various quarters protection against Russia, who alarmed him from time to time by sending reconnoitring parties towards his dominions. He despatched ambassadors to England, India, and Turkey, praying assistance in case of need. "The matter," says Lieut. Stumm, "was one in which England could hardly act in total disregard of Russia; and in the end an agreement was come to between the two great Powers by which Russia recognised the right of the Ameer of Cabul to the provinces between the Hindu-Kush and the Oxus, known as Afghan Turkestan (on which Russia's feudatory, the Khan of Bokhara, had claims), and on the other hand was allowed free action by England as far as the Afghan border."

Meanwhile the Khan gave "repeated indications of his ill-will towards the Emperor;" and early in 1872 an expedition to Khiva was, as before mentioned, firmly resolved upon. Before the necessary preparations were commenced, Colonel Markosoff,
from the Turkestan district, consisting of nine-companies of infantry, 150 Cossacks, a rocket detachment, and a detachment of mountain artillery, somewhere near Daou-Kara, or Min-Boulak, whichever may be most convenient. The entire strength of the united Turkestan columns will then amount to 20 companies, each about 140 strong, with 12 to 14 non-commissioned officers, and 11 non-combatants; or 2,800 infantry, 700 Cossacks, and 18 guns. The whole force then to proceed directly towards Khiva, crossing the Amu-Daria above Min Boulak, where it will join the columns from Orenburg and the Caucasus, who ought by that time (beginning of May) to reach the left bank of the Amu-Daria. Adjutant-General von Kauffmann will then take the supreme command.

"The Orenburg column, made up of companies of infantry (five of the 2nd Orenburg line battalion, and four of the 1st), 600 Orenburg and 300 Ural Cossacks, six guns of Cossack Horse Artillery, six rocket parties, and six mortars, to concentrate at a spot on the Emba under Lieut.-General Vereffkin. Then to march by way of Karatamak along the western coast of the Aral to Kasarm and Ourg, where it will join the column from the Caucasus.
of winter—a feat which, according to a writer on the subject, "proves that Russian soldiers may overcome the utmost difficulties, and surmount every possible impediment."

The constituent parts of the Orenburg column, too, were put to rather a severe test in their march to the appointed place of assembly on the Emba. The first Orenburg line battalion, split up into four companies, proceeded from that town by Iletzk and Ak-Toub, while two sotnias of Cossacks went along the river Xobd; and on March 8th the 2nd Orenburg line battalion, composed of five companies, with four sotnias of Cossacks, left Orsk for the rendezvous.

The daily stage was 27 miles, and at night the men slept in the Kirghiz waggons accompanying the various companies. The temperature was made tolerable by camel dung fires which were kept up throughout the night, and a snow rampart raised round each waggon served as shelter from the piercing winds. Through frosts, snows and gales progress was steadily made, and the whole force had at length arrived safely at the Emba Post, only 45 men being on the sick list.

Information had meanwhile come to hand that Kaphar-Karadjigetoff, a Mangishlak chief, was stay-
ing at Khiva as the guest of the Khan, who intended, with his aid, to incite the whole Mangishlak Peninsula against Russia. A short time before Kaphar had assured the Kirghizes that the Russians intended to requisition a large portion of their cattle, and had advised them, as their only means of safety, to emigrate to Khiva, where protection would be found. This counsel had been accompanied with a threat that if they did not act upon it he (the Kaphar) would himself put them to the sword. Terrified, the Kirghizes had hastily commenced to shift with their cattle; and it was now Russia's interest to prevent the exodus and keep the commotion from spreading. Apprised of events, Colonel Lamakin, who was reconnoitring from Fort Alexander, at once made for Bouzach, where the emigrants were said to have halted. At the Kara-Kech Gulf he overtook a number of nomadic tribes with some 10,000 head of cattle on their way to the Ust-Urt. Colonel Lamakin endeavoured to calm their fears and to persuade them to return; but the incredulous Kirghizes suddenly attacked the Cossacks with lance and axe. The latter, however, although greatly inferior in numbers, quickly beat them off, and Colonel Lamakin marched on to Bouzach, where he was
joined by a sotnia of cavalry from another regiment. Recent occurrences proved beyond doubt the evil influence exerted by the Khan of Khiva against Russia. In spite of all the measures taken by the local administration, the Kirghizes scarcely ever failed to be affected by the counsels which came from Khiva. The Khan's hostility would doubtless, too, find expression through the plundering hordes from the Ust-Urt, who, in their turn, might, unless great precautions were taken by Russia, stir up the Kirghizes to the Khivan monarch's entire satisfaction. It was resolved, therefore, to station columns of observation between the Caspian and the sea of Aral. A body of 150 Cossacks went from the steppe forts to take up its position with a few companies of infantry, at Sam, the most suitable point for observations and for securing communications between General Vereffkin's column and the army of the Caucasus; one sotnia took up its position at Djebisk to keep off the hordes from the Orsk-Kazalin tract; and one sotnia watched the Mogodjarsk mountains and watercourses.

The conduct of the entire expedition was, as before mentioned, placed in the hands of General Kauffmann, who intended to approach the Khanate on the
Colonel Lamakin behind to await a detachment of his column which had not yet arrived. When this had come up he was to follow after and overtake the General, so that a united attack might be made on the fortified town of Khodjeili. Every precaution was taken to prevent a surprise, for there could be no doubt that the Khivan cavalry was hovering about ready to snatch the slightest opportunity. At 5 a.m. on the 28th the march was continued towards Kara-Baili. At noon Colonel Leontscheff's troops halted by the side of the stream to breakfast; but before cooking operations were commenced firing was heard about a mile distant. Information soon arrived that an officer of the topographical department, reconnoitring with half-a-dozen Cossacks, had been borne down upon by a very numerous body of the enemy. On reaching the scene of the attack with two sotnias of men, Colonel Leontscheff found that after killing one Cossack, wounding two others, and capturing several horses, the Kirghizès, as they proved to be, had made off. Chase was at once given; but after going some five miles over boggy ground covered with reeds higher than the horsemen's heads, the pursuit was given up, none of the foe having been overtaken. The fruitless result was
shortly explained. The fugitives had taken another
direction, and next attacked the Russian rear-guard.
Colonel Leontscheff again went to give assistance,
and this time drove the enemy to bay at a dense forest
some distance off. Many of the Kirghizes were
killed, and a considerable number of those who
escaped lost their horses. A Kirghiz, who had
been made prisoner, gave information about the two
late attacks. They had been made by the same
party of between 400 and 500 men, detached from
an army 6,000 strong, sent by the Khan, under the
command of his brother to defend Khodjeili. It
was made up principally of cavalry, and lay in wait
north of the town. The Khan had no knowledge of
the columns advancing under Kauffmann and Mar-
kosoff; but he was determined in any case to hold
out to the last.

A large fortified Khivan camp was now discovered
on an arm of the Oxus. It was 875 paces long and
450 broad, surrounded by a deep ditch, with a rampart
seven feet high, and generally well-constructed.
It had been abandoned on the morning of the
same day (26th May), and consequently the enemy
could not be far off. In the evening Colonel Lamakin
came up with his column, and joined it to that of
moving some distance they stopped, as though awaiting the Russian advance. The Russian cavalry was sent forward at 11 a.m., with two rocket detachments, who fired ten rounds, with some success, on the Khivans, the latter retiring so quickly that the Cossacks could not come to close quarters. Now the column went on without the least show of opposition. But what had already taken place proved that the Khivans, instead of being content to wait until the Russians reached Khiva, and then fight behind entrenchments, had resolved to do all in their power to hinder the march. Consequently, General Vereffkin issued the following order to his officers:—

"The right column will be led by the Caucasus cavalry to the westward of the Khodjeili road, accompanied by two rocket detachments and a sotnia of Ural Cossacks. Col. Lamakin with his staff and the rest of his column will follow. The left wing will be composed of troops commanded by Col. Leontscheff. The head-quarter staff, escorted by the remainder of the Orenburg Cossacks, will march in the centre along the bank of the Amu. The Cossack horse artillery, with four guns, will remain in the immediate vicinity of the head-quarter staff, and behind the same the infantry of the Orenburg
given up whom General Kauffmann had sent on a month before with despatches, but who had been made prisoner and maltreated by the Khan.

At 5 o'clock the Russians passed through the town of Khodjeili, and took up a position three-quarters of a mile distant to the south. Representatives from several Kirghiz tribes now came into the camp, complaining of the treatment they had received at the Khan's hands, and asking that they might be looked upon as Russian subjects. Meanwhile, no information had reached General Vereffkin concerning the columns under General Kauffmann and Colonel Markosoff.

On the 30th of May the camp was shifted from Khodjeili to a wood ten miles nearer the Khanate. Early the next morning an attack was made on the outposts by a large body of Yomuds; but they retreated after a few shells had been fired, followed by two sotnias of Cossacks. The latter when they returned, after giving over the pursuit, reported that the Sausan canal, on the way to Mangit, was swollen, and impassable for the infantry. An engineer detachment was thereupon sent forward with casks and other materials for constructing a bridge across. On arriving at the canal, the de-
tachment was fired upon heavily from the under-
wood on the opposite bank; but the cavalry swam
over to the other side, drove the enemy away, and
then returned to protect the workmen while engaged
in making the bridge, which was soon completed.
The entire forces passed over at 8:30 a.m., and
encamped on the Oxus. The river here was three-
quaters of a mile wide.

According to information brought by Russian
spies, the Khivans intended to make a severe attack
during the night; but nothing at all occurred. Next
morning two shells fired from a great distance by
the Khivans fell into the river near the camp. It
was now reported that a large body of cavalry and
infantry had taken up their position on a hill near
the road to Mangit, and purposed to prevent, if
possible, any further advance. The town of Mangit,
too, was well-fortified and garrisoned.

Careful arrangements were made in view of such
an engagement; and the column marched towards
Mangit. A little before seven o'clock the enemy
was observed at a distance of about three-quarters
of a mile southward, occupying a plain, covered with
high grass, and mounds near the town. Almost
immediately the Khivan cavalry galloped towards
the Russians, as if to attack the centre; but soon they altered their course, and went round the flank, intending apparently to commence operations on the train and rear guard. In less than a quarter of an hour they had formed an arc round the column on the south, east, and north-east. A heavy fire was at once begun by four of the centre guns, while the other three were taken to the left flank for the same purpose. Nevertheless, the enemy made repeated charges, and once pressed the cavalry under Leont-scheff so hard that not until the men got off their horses and fought on foot could the Khivans be beaten off. Meanwhile the foe had reached the rear guard and attacked it with fury. But the artillery did much execution; and the assailants, seeing that their fellows in front were falling back, retired towards the Mangit heights with considerable losses. A pursuit was now commenced; but with wonderful rapidity the Khivans vanished behind the hills. A quarter of an hour later they reappeared, and began to form for another onslaught. This time they did not come far, for the Russian skirmishers had been sent forward, and these, working in co-operation with the rocket division on the right flank, soon compelled them to retreat towards the town. On their
way, however, the Khivans set fire to the village, which was with difficulty extinguished; and at the same time, by some means or other, the steppe behind the Russian forces caught fire, though fortunately, thanks to a favourable wind, the latter conflagration did not approach the Russians. The Russian losses were one captain and eight soldiers killed, ten severely and a large number slightly wounded. The losses on the Khivan side were much greater. After a short rest, Mangit was marched on and occupied by the column without opposition. It was now about three o'clock; and an hour later the column advanced to a position on the Arna canal, three-quarters of a mile southward.

On the 2nd of June, after numerous minor engagements of no importance, the column left Mangit, Lieut.-Col. Skobelev having been sent on ahead with a body of 200 men to burn Kutebara, a village whose inhabitants had taken a prominent part in recent hostilities as well as in the marauding excursions into Russian territory made some time previously. After continued skirmishing, the Attualick canal was reached towards evening; and here the column passed the night. Next morning the canal was crossed by the wooden bridge stretching over at this
pitched a few miles south of the village of Udott. The natives here came to the Russians, begging protection against their fellow-countrymen, who, they said, had robbed and maltreated them. They further declared that the Khan's forces amounted to about 7,000 men, whereas the day before the Khivan army had been represented by other informants as 20,000 strong. The Khan, it seemed from these fugitives, had given orders that efforts were above all to be made to destroy the Russian camel train, in order to prevent the invaders from reaching the capital.

A letter was now received from General Kauffmann, addressed to Colonel Markosoff, whose column the messenger bearing it had been unable to find. The General said in the letter that he was on the right bank of the Amu, and was preparing to cross the stream, now much swollen. He hoped to arrive at Khiva on the 5th or 6th of June, and instructed Colonel Markosoff to await his arrival.

During the afternoon of the 6th the Khan, who was in Khiva getting everything ready for the final conflict, sent an envoy to General Vereffkin proposing an armistice. In his letter the Khivan monarch invited the Russian Commander as guest
to his capital, declaring that, always cordially friendly disposed towards Russia, he should now take the sincerest pleasure in entertaining personages of such distinction from her dominions. He wanted three or four days' time to make preparations for a befitting reception, and asserted that the men who had recently been attacking the column were Turcoman robbers with whom he was in no way connected; he regarded them, in fact, as his bitterest enemies. General Vereffkin was, however, not to be deceived by such soft words as these. Probably he remembered the end of Prince Bekovitch, who committed the fatal error of accepting an invitation to dine with a previous Khan of Khiva, and thereby lost his head. In any case, General Vereffkin had no inclination to partake of the present monarch's hospitality. He made no reply to the letter.

Next day the Russians had to halt at a canal where the bridge had been burnt by the enemy. Here the camp was pitched, and the construction of another bridge commenced. Colonel Leontscheff was now sent on with all the cavalry to clear the way in front. They swam the river safely, and went forward, returning towards evening with several Turcomans whom, with their horses, they had found
unarmed and anxious to give themselves up to the Russians, as they were determined to fight no more for the Khan, who would not, they said, give them the promised pay. Colonel Leontscheff had meanwhile heard it confirmed that the Khan had retired to the capital for the final struggle.

Passing on the evening of June 5th through the abandoned town of Kyat Kungrad, the Russian column arrived towards the close of the next day at Kossk-Kupir. Meanwhile a letter had been received from General Kauffmann, who said that, after a successful engagement with the united Khivan forces and the destruction of a battery on the left bank, his staff and six companies with eight guns had crossed the Oxus, but that the rocket detachment, accompanied by five companies, had gone to the town of Schuraschana. General von Kauffmann knew, he said, that General Vereffkin had taken Khodjeili; but beyond that had no knowledge of his movements.

On June 7th, Vereffkin's column arrived at the gardens of the Khan's summer palace, within three miles of the northern gates of Khiva. Two days were spent here, but in no pleasant manner; for throughout the time the Khivans were incessantly
Russian troops. The same evening the Commander-in-Chief visited General Vereffkin in his camp, and inspected the wounded lying there.

Having formally occupied the town, the troops went back to camp. Two or three days afterwards the bazaars were reopened, and business went on as usual; the Russian soldiers spending a short time in sight-seeing and making purchases.

On the 29th of June General Vereffkin, with a number of officers, left Khiva, to return to Russia. Meanwhile they had learned that Colonel Markosoff with the Krasnovodsk column, of which they knew nothing, had been obliged to return by reason of the extraordinary difficulties he had met with on his way.
CHAPTER XI.

THE GOOD AND THE EVIL DONE BY RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA.

The progress of Russia towards India has by a certain class of politicians and writers in England been regarded with marked approval, while those who watched it with concern have been stigmatized by these approvers both as "alarmists" and as selfish opponents of Russia's civilizing mission. That the type of civilization introduced by Russia into her Central Asian possessions is much higher than that which it displaces can scarcely be denied. But the positive good effected in this way by Russia bears no comparison to the evil she would do could she only carry out the projects harboured by her against our Indian empire. The disorganization of India would be a calamity before which the benefits con-
The order to advance is passed along the line, and in another moment we are dashing over the desert at a gallop. Ten minutes brings us to the summit of the hill, over which we had seen the fugitives disappear; and we perceive them a mile further on crossing another low ridge. Already the body has ceased to be compact, sheep and goats scatter themselves unheeded in every direction; the ground is strewed with the effects that have been abandoned in the hurried flight, bundles thrown from the backs of camels, carts from which the horses have been cut loose, and crowds of stragglers struggling wearily along, separated from friends and rapidly closed in upon by foes.

"Down a little descent we plunge, our horses sinking to their knees in the yielding sand, and across the plain we sweep like a tornado.

"There are shouts and cries, a scattering discharge of firearms, and our lines are broken by the abandoned carts, and our progress impeded by the cattle and sheep that are running wildly about over the plain. It is a scene of the wildest commotion. I halt a moment to look about me. Here is a Turco-man lying in the sand with a bullet through his head; a little further on a Cossack stretched out on
the ground with a horrible sabre cut on his face; then two women, with three or four children, sitting down in the sand, crying and sobbing piteously and begging for their lives; to these I shout 'Aman! Aman!' (‘Peace, Peace,’) as I gallop by, to allay their fears.

“A little further on more arbas, or carts, carpets and bed coverlets scattered about with sacks full of corn, and huge bags and bundles, cooking utensils and all kinds of household goods.

“Then more women toiling wearily forward, carrying infants and weeping bitterly; and one very fat woman, scarcely able to carry herself, with a child in her arms, which I somehow take for her grandchild. Then camels, sheep, goats, cattle, donkeys, cows, calves and dogs, each, after its fashion, contributing to the wild scene of terror.

“I am at first shocked by the number of Turcomans I see lying motionless. I cannot help thinking that if all these be killed there are no such deadly marks as the Cossacks. After a while, however, the mystery is explained, for I perceive one of the apparently dead Turcomans cautiously lift up his head and a moment after resume his perfectly lifeless position. Many of them are feigning death; and
"A few yards further on there are four Cossacks around a Turcoman. He has already been beaten on his knees, and weapon he has none. To the four sabres that are hacking at him he can offer only the resistance of his arms; but he utters no word of entreaty. It is terrible. Blow after blow they shower down on his head without avail, as though their sabres were tin. Will they never have done! Is there no pith in their arms? At last, after what seems an age to me, he falls prone into the water with a terrible wound in the neck, and the Cossacks gallop on. A moment later I come upon a woman sitting by the side of the water, weeping over the dead body of her husband. Suddenly my horse gives a leap that almost unseats me, my ears are stunned with a sharp, shrieking, rushing noise, and, looking up, I behold a streak of fire darting across the sky which explodes at last among the fugitives. It is only a rocket, but it is followed by another and another; and, mingled with the shrieks of women and children, the hoarse shout of the Cossacks, the bleating of sheep and goats, and the howling of cattle running wildly over the plain, made up a very pandemonium of terror. This lasted a few minutes.

"Then the Turcomans gradually disappeared
petrated beneath his eyes. But he liked the Russians, he was well received by them, and he was not the man to commit the fault of telling tales out of school. General Skobelev, in his report of the taking of Geok Tepé, wrote plainly on the subject of a massacre, by which the capture of the place was followed, and, when Mr. Marvin reminded him at St. Petersburg of what he had said about the slaughtering of women, replied with praiseworthy candour that he had set down the exact truth.

"When the dead were counted," he said, "women were found among them. It is my nature to conceal nothing. I therefore wrote, in making the report, 'of both sexes.'" In the report the following passage occurs:

"The pursuit of the enemy flying from the fortress was continued by the infantry for 10 versts (6\(\frac{2}{3}\) miles), and by the cavalry six versts (4 miles) further, and only complete darkness and the thorough dispersion of the enemy caused the chase to be abandoned, and the troops to return to camp. In this pursuit by the dragoons and Cossacks, supported by a division of mountain horse artillery, the killed of both sexes amounted
civilization, liberty, and peace for barbarism, slavery
and strife. He was a visionary, but one of the noblest
order; and when he looked out beyond the great
barrier of the Hindu-Kush, traversed in imagina-
tion the deserts of Merv, and visited the barbarous
courts of the Khans of Khiva, Khokand, and Bok-
hara, he never doubted for a moment that the mission
which he was about to undertake was one of the
highest with which a Christian officer could be en-
trusted. ‘I feel very confident,’ he wrote to a friend,
‘about all our policy in Central Asia; for I think that
the designs of our Government here are honest, and
that they will work with a blessing from God, who
seems now to be breaking up all the barriers of the
long-closed East, for the introduction of Christian
knowledge and peace. It is deeply interesting to
watch the effects that are being produced by the
exertions of the European powers, some selfish and
contrary; others still selfish, but qualified with peace
and generosity; all made instrumental to good. See
the French in Africa; the English, Austrians, and
Russians on the Bosphorous, forcing the Turks to be
European under a shadow of Mahomedanism, and
providing for the peaceful settlement of the fairest
and most sacred countries in the world.’"
Abbott and Shakespear succeeded in at least one part of their mission; they procured the liberation of the Russians kept captive at Khiva, who were conducted to Orenburg under Captain Shakespear's care. Stoddart, however, at Bokhara, after being insulted and tortured in every possible manner, was put to death; and the enthusiastic Conolly, on reaching Bokhara, met with the same fate.

It must be added that, Butenef, a Russian who arrived at Bokhara towards the close of Stoddart's captivity, did his best to save both the Englishmen. His efforts were all in vain.
CHAPTER XII.

PROJECTS FOR THE INVASION OF INDIA.

As long as Russia was occupied with operations against the Khanates, the possibility of a Russian advance to India through Balkh and Cabul seems alone to have been thought of. Such was the case when the Earl of Clarendon, at his interview with Prince Gortschakoff, at Heidelberg in 1869, commenced the negotiations which, four years afterwards, ended in what at the time was considered a satisfactory (though incomplete) arrangement in regard to the Afghan boundary. The Russians, he observed, already in possession of Samarcand, with Bokhara in their power, and constantly advancing in the direction of Afghanistan, might soon be expected in the vicinity of the Hindu-Kush, whence “the British possessions might be viewed as a traveller on the summit of Simplon might survey the plains of Italy;” so that
"measures for our own protection might then become necessary." Thus, in the now historical conversation between the two Ministers, an English statesman saw danger where danger is no longer seen—not because it has ceased to exist, but because it has been overshadowed by a greater peril.

After the subjection of the three Khanates of Kho-kand, Bokhara, and Khiva, Russia began to deal seriously with the Turcoman tribes, in occupation of the deserts which barred her way from the Caspian to Herat; and the Russian route of progress towards India to which attention is now chiefly directed is the one through Herat and Candahar.

But there is a third route of invasion which may one day be employed in conjunction with the two others. The late Lieutenant Hayward was convinced that India might, without much difficulty, be entered from Eastern Turkestan. "An army," he wrote, "attempting a passage across the mountains from Eastern Turkestan to India would have no great impediment to encounter until it had entered the deeper defiles of the lower Himalayas. . . . . A portion of the line intervening between the crest of the Karakorum range and the plains of Turkestan is quite practicable; and as, in all human probability,
RUSSIAN PROJECTS AGAINST INDIA.

it is here that the Russian and the Indian Empires will first come into contact, and the frontiers run conterminous, this fact is deserving of special consideration."

Meanwhile it should not be forgotten that the great historical route for invaders advancing towards India from Central Asia has been the one through Herat and Candahar. This was the actual route of Gerighis Khan, Timour, Baber, and, in the last century, Nadir Shah; the proposed route of the Emperors Paul and Alexander I. This, too, was the route recommended by General Khruleff and General Duhamel at the time of the Crimean war, and by General Skobeleff—conjectly with an advance through the Bamian pass and Cabul—when the last war waged by Russia against Turkey was on the point of breaking out.

GENERAL KRULLEFF'S PROJECT (1855).

"The important question of shaking the rule of the English to its foundations, and of inciting the subject races to an attempt to gain their freedom, may be determined," wrote General Khruleff in 1855, just before the termination of the war in the Crimea, "by the despatch of a corps of thirty thousand men to Candahar. The essential con-
seventy-six thousand, five hundred and ninety English miles, and is called upon to guard a frontier of seven hundred and seven geographical miles, being at the same time commanded by only seven thousand three hundred and forty-three European officers, which was the establishment in 1847. There have been many instances in which these troops have fled before compact masses of England's native foes, when the officers were killed. The entrance of a long-desired corps of thirty thousand men into Afghanistan will excite the national antipathy of the Afghans to the English, and will shake the power of the English in India.

"We may make compromises" (concludes General Khruleff) "with our other foes; but England's bearing towards us, which tends to the weakening of our power, does not justify us in leaving her at peace. We must free the people who are the sources of her wealth, and prove to the world the might of the Russian Czar."

GENERAL DUHAMEL'S PROJECT.

This project was drawn up and submitted to the Emperor Nicholas in 1854, at the beginning of the Crimean War, by General Duhamel, who succeeded Count Simonitch as Minister in Persia, when the
latter, after the failure of the Russo-Persian siege of Herat, had been withdrawn. It is the same, in principle, as the project by General Khruleff, which was laid before the Emperor Nicholas when the war was drawing to a conclusion.

"When, towards the close of the last century, an army corps was quartered on the Eastern frontiers by order of the Emperor Paul, with a design on India, the English nation, although not certain of the fact, was greatly startled by the intelligence. Since then English writers have never ceased to point out in different ways the danger of a Russian invasion of India, and their Parliament has often discussed the question. The present war, which is declared to the knife, imposes upon Russia the duty of showing how she can attack England in her only vulnerable point, in India, and thus force her to assemble so great a force in Asia as to weaken her action in Europe. History teaches us that nearly all the Powers which conquered India found their way to it through Central Asia and Persia, and that the roads by which Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Amerlane, Sultan Baber, and, lastly, Nadir Shah, broke into India are now also open; they pass through Khorassan and Afghanistan, whether they
lead from Persia or from the Oxus. The towns of Candahar and Cabul are the gates of the Indies.

"1. The first road leads from Orenburg over the table land of Uursturt to Khiva, and further on through Merv, Herat, Candahar to Cabul.

2. The second route goes from Orsk or Orenburg to the fortress of Aralsk, and thence to the cities of Bokhara, Balkh Kalum, and Cabul.

3. The third starts from Orsk or Troitzk, goes through Aralsk and Ak-Meshed to Tashkend, or leads direct through to Petropawlowsk, and, further, to Kokhand, Kalum, Bamian, and Cabul.

4. The fourth is from Astrakhan by water to Astrabad, and thence through Redushan, or Shahnid to Meshed, Herat, Candahar, and Cabul.

5. The fifth, and last road, leads from Dshuelfa, on the river Araxes, to Tabris, Teheran, Meshed, Herat, Candahar, and Cabul.

The three first roads lead through the desert in its fullest width; and here, even if the oasis of Khiva and that of Bokhara were made use of, it would need thousands of camels to transport provisions for the troops. The fourth and fifth roads lead through a country which is not crossed by deserts, and which is in some parts
very fertile and inhabited by energetic tribes. They do not lead over any such inaccessible points as those in the Hindu-Kush mountains; neither is one stopped on the way by an impassable river, as, for instance, the Oxus, between Bokhara and Balkh. When once the necessary transports are on the Caspian Sea and ready for use, then the road from Astrakhan to Astrabad is preferable to all others, for the distance is the shortest. Once in Astrabad, a footing in Khorassan would be easy, and the remaining distance to Cabul is only 1870 versts. The infantry, artillery, and ammunition would be shipped over the Caspian Sea, whilst the cavalry and ammunition train would travel from Circassia through Persia. For it would be a dangerous march through Turkestan, having to combat the Khans and their tribes, who, when repulsed, would again attack in the rear, and thus cut off communication. Comparatively easy, however, would be the march through half-civilized Persia, which is already so bound by treaties that it is incapable of any serious resistance, and is, moreover, threatened from all sides (especially from Circassia), and so rendered powerless. What more then remains to be desired? Any active co-operation on the part of the Persians involves active
co-operation on the part of Afghanistan on account of the deadly animosity which exists between the two; and this is just the *conditio sine quâ non* of an attack upon India. Of course, England would not be behindhand in taking steps to prevent all this; but, even had she time and means for sending an expedition to the Persian gulf, taking possession of Karak and Binder-Bushirs, or inciting the South Persian tribes to rebellion, it would be of little avail should Russia guarantee to the Shah his throne and possessions; still less, should she promise the restoration of the Turkish districts of Bagdad, Kerseldi, and a part of Kurdistan, and thereby kindle a war between Persia and Turkey. The road through Persia is, therefore, for many reasons preferable to those through Turkestan.

"There are three roads leading from Afghanistan to India.

"1. From Cabul, through Jellahabad and Pesha-wur to Attok.

"2. From Ghazna to Dera Ismael Khan.

"3. From Candahar, through Quetta and Dadur to Shikarpur.

"These three roads lead through passes which are easy to defend, but which are all more ex-
General Skobelev, in January, 1877, from Khokand, to an intimate friend; and it was afterwards found among the papers of the late Prince Cherkaski:—

"I am thoroughly convinced that we need not anticipate anything of a serious nature from the natives of Turkestan in the event of a war with Turkey. Therefore if we wage war with Turkey alone, and if the idea of the aggressive attitude which would determine the importance of Turkestan, in case of a war with England, has not yet ripened in our higher spheres, it would be insufferable to remain here in time of war.

"One of the objects of this letter is to remind you of my recent independent action in warfare. But its main purport is to express to you candidly my opinion that it is proper, as it is possible, to launch an expedition from Turkestan in the event of a breach with England, in order to promote the triumph and greatness of Russia.

"The aim I here indicate is one of world wide significance. No Russian patriot, recognizing the possibility of a successful achievement of the purpose, and placed by destiny in a position to guide the operation, can hesitate to point out the immense resources which, I will permit myself to say, our
"This happened one year ago, and about that time I was appointed Military-Governor of the Ferghana region.

"The region abounded with disturbing elements. With a view to its pacification I marched the troops to the Alai, where, being animated by pacific objects, I acted accordingly. The Alai campaign did not cost Russia a single drop of blood, the rebels being forced to abandon their inaccessible strongholds by purely strategic marches. Thus, I imagine, I fulfilled in the highest degree the desire of His Majesty who cherishes the blood of his subjects.

"You yourself have had occasion to see what was effected administratively from the general order issued by the Governor-General.

"It is not for me at such a period to dispose of my own self. The authorities are better able to say where I can be most advantageously employed. In every case I now unbosom myself to you, and make known to you my desire to join the army in the field at any moment and in any capacity. I am all the less in a position to apply for leave to quit this region, because I firmly believe in its aggressive power as an agent for the solution of the Eastern question."
"It has been frequently said that from Central Asia Russia can threaten the British rule in India, and that it is therefore absolutely necessary for England at this juncture to check the advance of the Russian troops in Turkestan.

"If we look around us, we shall find that our position in Turkestan is indeed most formidable, and that the apprehensions of the English are not groundless. We have established a strong base in Central Asia, with an army of about 40,000 men, from which we shall always be able to detach a force of not less than 10,000 or 12,000 men for operations outside the limits of the province; at the same time we may trust implicitly in the fidelity of our subjects, for even now there is not the slightest indication of any combination of the Mahomedans of Turkey with those of Central Asia.

"By reinforcing the troops in Turkestan, say with six companies from Western Siberia, with as many Siberian Cossacks as could be spared, with one battery, and with three regiments of Cossacks from Orenburg, we might organize a column of about 14,000 or 15,000 men.

"Such a column thrown across the Hindu-Kush could effect a great deal.
"The position of the English in India has been said to be precarious by every one who has studied the question. It has been stated that the English tenure of India is by the sword alone; that the number of European troops in India is not more than sufficient to keep order in the country, and that the Native army is not to be trusted.

"Every one referring to the question of a Russian invasion of India has declared that an approach to the frontier would be enough to raise a rebellion.

"It may be said that an enterprise against the English in India is a matter of great risk; that it might end disastrously for the Russian force. I do consider, and we should not close our eyes to the fact, that the enterprise would indeed be a risky one. We should, however, bear in mind that if we were successful we should entirely demolish the British Empire in India; and the effect of this in England cannot be calculated beforehand. Competent English authorities admit that an overthrow on the frontiers of India might even produce a social revolution in England, because for the last 20 years England has been tied closer than ever to her Indian possessions by reasons and phenomena (including an incapacity for war) identical with those of France. In a word,
able nature of our position in Central Asia; and, being reduced by necessity to conclude a humiliating treaty, Russia might get off at the price of Turkestan, which would have risen in value.

"There can be no comparison between the risk we run in making a demonstration against British India and the enormous advantages which we should gain in the event of the success of such a demonstration.

"The gigantic difference in the results of a successful issue to us and to our enemies is of itself enough to urge us boldly onwards.

"On the proclamation of war with England, we should begin at once in Turkestan by despatching a Mission to Cabul and form a column in Samarcand (which, for effect, I should call an army), composed of 10 battalions, 14 sotnias, and 40 guns, making a total of 10,000 to 12,000 men; this should positively be the minimum of our aggressive force.

"The object of the Mission should be to draw Shir Ali into an alliance with us, and to open relations with the disaffected natives of India; and in order to secure the success of these negotiations, the column should be pushed through Bamian to Cabul. If it be found that Shir Ali adheres to the English (which is not very probable, because he did not accept the
invitation to be present among other vassals on the occasion of the proclamation of the title of Empress of India and Delhi, and even expressed his annoyance at the receipt of the invitation), a claimant to the throne should be put forward in the person of Abdur-Rahman-Khan, who is residing in Samarcand; by which means internal dissensions might be brought about in Afghanistan, while on the other hand Persia might be conveniently urged to renew her claims to Herat. By turning Persia's attention to Afghanistan, we should divert her military forces from the Caucasus. The march of the Persian troops to Herat would call into requisition all the supplies and means of transport of the country, and this would most effectually paralyse any English plan of an advance from the Persian gulf to Tiflis.

"The invading column having left Samarcand, another should be at once formed in that place of two battalions of infantry, and 16 sotnias of Cossacks, with one battery of artillery for the purpose of occupying points along our line of communication and, for general service in the rear.

"Without entering into details, I would divide the campaign into two periods. The first period should be one of extremely rapid action, of diplomatic
Herat. Nor are the English in a position to march a body of more than 25,000 men beyond the frontier of India, and of these a large number would have to be told off along the line of communication. It is at the same time not to be forgotten that the Turkestan province would be on the flank of the enemy's line of communication, and that our resources would increase as we drew nearer to the Caspian.

"I have already said that this enterprise would be attended with risk. But it would be justified by the greatness of the object in view and by the immeasurable vastness of its possible results. From the standpoint of these results there can be for Russia no question as to risk, and, as to Turkestan, it is not worth mentioning.

"From the troops who should be so fortunate as to be selected for this campaign, we should expect something even more than self-sacrifice in the highest sense of the word as it is understood by military men.

"Upon crossing the Hindu-Kush the column should, in my opinion, be so managed that every man might feel that he had come to Afghanistan to conquer or to die; that each man might know that
the Emperor required even his death. We should not be reproached for leaving our standards in the hands of the enemy if not a single Russian warrior remained alive beyond the Hindu-Kush.

"Such a feeling and such a determination can, in my opinion, be based only on the sentiment commonly cherished by every soldier in the army, of an unswerving and boundless love for and devotion to his monarch. The difficulty of exalting the spirit of the column to a pitch corresponding with the nature of the enterprise, could best be met by attaching one of the Emperor's sons, who at the proper time might tell the troops what was expected of them by the Czar and by their country. I am perfectly assured that this column, favoured by the presence of one of His Majesty's sons, would do wonders, and would in no case disgrace the Russian name.

"During the course of their 10 years' experience in this region, the Turkestan troops have become trained to a systematic mode of military operations founded on a knowledge of local conditions, of the nature of their opponents, but principally on a consciousness of their readiness at any time to take the field. All this enables them to plan operations in
effect of this belief. I was greatly struck by an obser-
vation by Colonel Cory, in his 'Shadows of
Coming Events; or, the Eastern Menace,' to the
effect that he could not picture to his imagination a
power in Turkestan otherwise than in connection
with Russia by a direct line of rail between Chardjui,
on the Oxus, and Moscow. The Asiatics believe,
up to the present moment, that the Russians spit
fire when they make a rush with a cheer.

"A knowledge of this region, and of its re-
sources, leads inevitably to the conclusion that our
presence in Turkestan, in pursuance of Russian
interests, is justifiable solely on the ground of an
endeavour to solve the Eastern question in our own
favour from this quarter. Otherwise the hide is not
worth the tanning, and all the money sunk in
Turkestan is lost. We should beware lest we
prove to our enemies, by inaction in Asia at a
critical moment in the West, how aimless have been
our annexations; this, too, would most certainly
involve a loss of influence, and would necessitate in
the future a still larger unproductive outlay. I re-
peat that, with a force of 40,000 men as a minimum,
dexterously handled, we might not only keep in
restraint all Turkestan, Kashgar, and Bokhara com-
up. The notorious Nana Sahib was educated among Europeans and was received in the best English society, and it was only on that account that he was such a terror to the English. We have as yet no such elements in our midst, and in this circumstance lies one of our positive advantages over the English. When political events in the West are coming to a crisis this important consideration, coupled with many others, should urge us to derive all the benefit out of Turkestan which that province is capable of yielding us.

"'In Asia, when triumphs cease difficulties commence.' *

"This is undoubtedly true. In a political sense we are now living in a period of triumphs. Let us profit by it.

"You see how much I expect from our might in Central Asia. Having for some considerable time shared with the Turkestan forces in the hardships of campaigning, I do not wish to exchange active service here for any other elsewhere. I could not, however, remain inactive in this place while the greater part of our army was shedding its blood in the country's cause in the West. That is why I

* Correspondence of the Duke of Wellington with Lord Auckland, 1839.
beg you again to bear me in mind in the event of a declaration of war.

"MICHAEL SKOBELEFF.

"P.S.—I enclose some general orders to our troops in Ferghana, in illustration of our mode of life here. Peruse them, and give me your opinion upon them.

"I have just received the Golos of the 29th December 1876, and I observe from the leading article in it that 'a declaration of war by Russia against the Ottoman Porte is a desideratum of our enemies,' that 'Europe has entangled the question, and trusts to Russia's impatience,' and further, that 'the circumstances are such that a thorough and quick solution of the question is perfectly impossible.'

"To us, who are acquainted with our own military resources in Asia, the Eastern question, of which the solution should be fearful only to the foes of Russia, presents itself otherwise.

"So long ago as in the third decade of the present century, General Field Marshal Count Moltke dwelt on the impossibility of achieving rapid results in European Turkey, and considered that it would be a matter of great difficulty to conduct a war in that country without the aid of a powerful fleet and an
abrupt mastery of the Black Sea. Field Marshal Prince Varshafski gave it as his opinion in 1829 that aggressive operations in Asia would be of but little importance, seeing that there was no great and all-determining point of attack, although he considered the trade routes connecting Bagdad with Scutari the best objectives in this respect. The construction of the Suez Canal has, however, deprived even this line of all significance.

"One might for this reason positively assert that, however successfully we might conduct a campaign in European and in Asiatic Turkey, yet we should vainly seek there for a solution of the Eastern question. A sincere behaviour on the part of England, in conformity with the interests of our Government, in so far as I comprehend the question, might, indeed, lead to the satisfaction of our legitimate demands. Therefore I imagine we should not have two opinions on the matter of a war with England. Without a formal declaration of war, England might still be at war with us by sending officers to the Turkish army and by helping Turkey with supplies.

"Would it not be best to avail ourselves of our strong strategical position in Central Asia, of our better acquaintance with the communications in and
resources of Central Asia, in order to strike a deadly blow at our real enemies in the doubtful event of the evidence of our determination to operate against their most vulnerable point being alone insufficient to make them pliant?

"The condition of affairs is apparently grave; therefore, while resolving to maintain only a defensive attitude on the Danube and in Asiatic Turkey, we might satisfy ourselves with landing 30,000 men at Astrabad to march to Cabul, in conjunction with the Turkestan troops. By this means we should free the Russian army in Europe and in Asia Minor from those embarrassments against which it fights, periodically, without success, several times in the course of every century.

"It is not for me to say how we are to defend the Caucasus against a Turkish invasion, nor how long the army of the Danube might remain in a purely defensive attitude in the midst of the helpless Christian population of Turkey, but it is my positive opinion that,—

"1. If under the existing circumstances of the extent of the British authority in India the invasion of India with a corps of 18,000 men is a possibility and a desirability, although attended with risk, an
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