SOME NOTES ON THE SITUATION IN WESTERN TURKISTAN.

BY

G. R. ABERIGH-MACKAY.

"Bien souvent durant les dernières années on s'est plu à assigner pour
mission à la Russie de civiliser les Contrées qui l'avoisinent sur le Continent
"Asiatique."—PRINCE GORTCHAKOW'S CIRCULAR OF 1864.

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Carpenter
PREFACE.

An attempt is made in the following pages to put together in a convenient form some information regarding the three great Khanates of Central Asia.

Some of the text has already been published in the Times of India.

G. R. A.-M.

Delhi, January 9th, 1875.
TO THE READER.

The circumstances under which this Aperçu of the Central Asian question was written and published precluded the possibility of its receiving that scrutinizing revision with which every writer would desire to purge his work. It was put together in brief intervals of leisure, prepared for the press under still greater pressure of time, and printed at a distance of nearly a thousand miles from the compiler. Many hypothetical errors must remain; and a still greater number of omissions and inaccuracies will call for the forbearance of the reader. There are three passages, however,—inserted in haste, and inadvertently left—which must not be considered as forming part of the book: they are,—that regarding Lord Granville, on the 60th page; and those on the 65th page, quoted from the Voyage, &c., of M. Anquetil du Perron. The following works and articles, moreover, the compiler wishes to add to his bibliography:

On the Road to Khiva: by David Ker, of the Daily Telegraph, Lond., 1874.


The Quarterly Review, March, 1873 (p. 36); July 1813 (p. 366); August 1810; October 1815; January 1821. Historical Account of Discoveries and Travels in Asia; by H. Murray. Edin., 1820.
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NOTES ON WESTERN TURKISTAN.

CHAPTER I.

NATURAL FEATURES.

* "It is rather more than 30 years ago since the advance of Russia from the Siberian wilds and of England to the confines of India removed, to a certain extent, the darkness which had previously rested for many ages on the mysterious regions of Central Asia; and since those days more and more light has gradually spread over these huge tracts."—The Times, May 27, 1874.

"This region which, in the days when Rome was Sovereign on the Orontes as well as on the Tiber, contained the highways by which commerce toiled painfully from the far East to the West, comprises part of

Introductory remarks from The Times.

* "This great portion of the surface of the earth, which forms one of its main divisions, may be said to extend from the mouths of the Ural to the ranges that separate China from Tibet, and from the mass of the lofty Altai—perhaps the Imaus of ancient tradition—to the vast and irregular lines of mountains which unite the Hindoo Kush with the Caspian. The Northern section of this prodigious space, which spreads from Russia in Europe to the verge of China, comprises the inhospitable Kirghiz Steppes, the impenetrable centre of classical Scythia, and, in all ages, has been a land viewed by the settled world with wonder and dread. Parts of this desolate region form the arid bed of the inland sea, which in prehistoric times connected the Caspian with the Arctic Ocean; parts of it stretch out in wastes of sand—worlds of solitude where the face of Nature seems smitten with a never-ceasing blight; and parts compose oases where, on broad plains unmarked by a tree or the boundary of man, wander the tribes and flocks of the barbarian nomades, who for countless centuries have held these wilds. These vast tracts in winter are concealed in frost, and in summer are parched by a relentless heat, and swept by storms which blot out the landscape; yet civilization has in places tamed what seemed to be the impassable desert; and Russian forts, rising along the rivers, which at distant intervals divide the Steppes, and Russian wells, sunk in selected spots, mark the progress of the arms and commerce of Europe from Orenburg to the Sea of Aral."—The Times.

An article on Central Asia in The Quarterly Review for October 1856 contains an excellent summary of the results of recent geographical exploration in the countries bordering on the Jaxartes and Oxus.

† The late Mr. Reinaud, President of the Société Asiatique, published, first in the Journal Asiatique, and afterwards in a separate form, an interesting treatise on the—" Relations, Politiques,
Russian Turkistan and the two Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, once the seats of a power which, at different times, menaced India to the banks of the Ganges, and Europe to the stream of the Vistula, but now virtually Russian dependencies. The most striking characteristic of this enormous tract is, that it is traversed, at wide intervals, by two water lines of ancient renown, which, in bygone ages, perhaps formed the avenues by which the tribes of Scythia found their way to the plains of Poland and Germany, and which in our days have led the sons of Japhet in turn to the habitations of the children of Shem."—The Times.

The following is from the Introduction to Vambéry's History of Bukhara:

"As regards its physical conformation, Transoxiana or the northern half of the tract of country vaguely known as 'Central Asia,' is chiefly a plain country, extending from that eastern chain of hills, which, as the extreme spurs of the Thien-Shan, reach nearly to Samarkand, and sink with a rapid declension down to the shores of the Caspian. With the exception of a few table-lands and some bits of hard clay or loam, the soil consists chiefly of black or yellow sand, and the only land really fit for cultivation is that lying on the slopes of the hills or on the banks of rivers or canals. As is the case throughout Asia, Nature, left to herself, produces scarcely anything, and ten years of warlike disturbance are sufficient to turn the most fertile neighbourhood into a desert. Even the most persevering industry often proves a failure, especially where there is a strip of sand all the deeper for being narrow. These strips of sandy soil intersect all the cultivated districts, and are to be found in the immediate neighbourhood of the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand; on the road between these two places the traveller passes through several miles of a sandy waste—the desert of Melik, lying in the heart of a cultivated district; there is a tradition that 300 years ago a salt lake existed here. In spite of this, the fertility of Bukhara and of the two other Khanates has passed into a proverb, for their products are both excellent and various. Bukhara has grain, fruit, silk, cotton, and

et commerciales de l'Empire Romain avec l'Asie Orientale." The Apollonius of Tyana, of Mr. Priaulx, (Lond. 1878) may also be consulted on this subject.

* Mawer-ul-nahr.
Natural Features.

Natural products.

Features.

The same may be said of its cattle, for besides their horses, which are celebrated throughout Asia, their camels surpass all the other sorts of this most useful domestic animal in the south and west of Asia; and their mutton, finally, is equal to any in the world.

Minerals.

The hilly country east and south of Samarkand is rich in minerals, which have, however, hitherto been neglected and unknown. Even Belkhi, however, mentions iron, ammoniac, quicksilver, tin, slate, gold, naphtha, pitch, vitriol, and coal, which has lately been re-discovered by the Russians in the same neighbourhood."

The Caspian* Sea occupies the lowest hollow in one of the greatest depressions of the earth's surface, its level being 82'8 f. below the level of the Sea of Azov. It was accurately surveyed for the first time between the years 1858 and 1862 under the direction of Post-Captain N. Ivashintsof. He determined astronomically forty leading points on the coast, and connected them longitudinally by means of chronometrical observations taken on board different steamers. The superficial area is laid down at 407.075\(\frac{1}{2}\) square versets. Arrowsmith computes it to be 1,118,000 square g. miles. With the Caspian, however, we are less concerned than with the Sea of Aral,§ into which, at the present day, at any rate, flow both the Oxus and the Jaxartes. This sea has a superficial area of 1,267 square miles, and is fifty-seven German miles long,|| and forty miles wide. Great diversity of opinion exists regarding its level; but we find it stated in Colonel

* The Kok-kuz of the Turkomans; the Kuzghan Denizi (i.e., Raven Sea) of the Turks; the Daria-i-ochyzyr (or sea of Kharazm) of the Persians. Vide Rennell's Geog. of Herodotus, Vol. i, p. 265. The Hyrcanian Sea of Strabo.


‡ 1 Russian square verst = 0'4394 English square mile.

§ The Sea of Kharazm of the Arabian, the Oxyana Palus of the ancients. || This statement of its dimensions is exceedingly uncertain; for we find it elsewhere stated to be 1,240 and 2,100 square miles. Vide Russians in Central Asia, Hellwald, p. 25. In Colonel Walker's map we find it is represented as about 180 English miles from east to west and 250 from north to south. Herodotus puts the length of the Caspian down as fifteen days' navigation for a swift-oared vessel, and the breadth eight days. The former measurement Rennell estimates at about 600 miles. Eratosthenes and Strabo give the length as 515 miles. Alexander and all the geographers from his time to that of Delisle regarded the Aral as part of the Caspian. This was also, probably, the opinion of Herodotus. The knowledge that the Caspian was disconnected
Walker’s (of the Great Trigonometrical Survey, India) map at 117 feet above the level of the Caspian and 33 feet above the Black Sea and Ocean. “In the regions of the Aral and Caspian lowlands, the following opinion has prevailed for centuries, namely, that the level of the Aral and Caspian Seas periodically rises and falls, a period varying from twenty-five to thirty years being computed for the Caspian, and from four to five years for the Sea of Aral. According to observations that have been made, the level of the Sea of Aral has, in the course of thirty-two years, sunk about 11.3 English feet; and the width of the line of coast gained by the receding of the water during a period of ten years, namely, from 1847 to 1858, may be estimated at nearly 0.3 to 0.6 geographical miles. Connected* with the present undeniable diminution of the quantity of water in the Aral arises one of the most interesting questions in Physical Geography, namely, will not the Sea of Aral entirely disappear in course of time?”

Sir H. Rawlinson draws an analogy between the Sea of Aral in Physical Geography and the variable stars in astronomy. Humboldt† (in his work on Central Asia) has not corroborated the theory of the disappearance of the sea. Colonel Yule and Sir R. Murchison believe (Journal R. G.S., Vol. XXXVII., pp. 134 and 136) that the relative condition of the Aral and Caspian Seas has never undergone a marked change.

from the Northern Ocean was lost in the time of Eratosthenes, Strabo, and Pliny; but Ptolemy restored it to its proper form as a lake, but in such a way as to show that the Aral was mistaken for a part of it. Rennell’s Geography of Herodotus, Vol. I., p. 253.—Vide Heeren’s Historical Researches, Vol. II., p. 32.

* Between 1300 and 1500, Missions were frequently despatched from European Courts to the Mongols of Central Asia, and envoys generally wrote accounts of their journeys. Colonel Yule has collected many of these in his Cathay and the Way Thither, but none of these accounts mention the Sea of Aral, although many of the routes described led across it, or by it. De Ruybroeck stated that the lower Jaxartes lost itself in a marsh; and the Polos, who are supposed in their first journey to have travelled direct from the mouths of the Volga to Bukhara, do not seem to have come across this sea; for Marco Polo makes no mention of it.

† “Numerous learned authorities have gone still further, such as Vivien de St. Martin, Malte Brun, Hugh Murray, Dailie Fraser, and Burnes, who assert that such a variation is quite impossible, since the Oxus and Jaxartes have never changed their course, and have from time immemorial
In an anonymous Persian manuscript acquired by Sir H. Rawlinson, dating from 1417, and presumably written by Shah Rukh Sultan, the famous Khan of Herat, the following passage occurs: “In all ancient books the Sea of Kharazm is represented as the great basin that received the waters of the Oxus, but now (1417) the sea no longer exists, for the Jailun (Oxus) has hollowed out a fresh course to the Caspian sea, which it enters near Karlawa.”

From 600 B.C. till from 500 to 600 A.D. the sea of Aral was entirely unknown. The descriptions of Herodotus and Strabo speak of a continuous series of marshes fed by the inundations of the Jaxartes. The explorations of Alexander the Great resulted in the opinion that both the Jaxartes and Oxus fell into the Caspian.† From the year 600 to 1300 all the Arabic writers concur in fixing the mouths of both the Oxus and the Jaxartes in the Sea‡ of Aral. In 1559 the English traveller Jenkinson spoke of the Oxus as having formerly issued into Krasnovodsk Bay in the Caspian; but having been drawn off for purposes of irrigation, it ceased to reach the sea during the heats of summer. He added that the Turkmans, wishing to retain some water in the bed at that season, constructed a dam at its mouth, but that eventually the old bed became choked up, and that in his time the river had its present destination. § Abul

as at present, discharged themselves into the Aral Sea. But, on the contrary, a host of not less important authorities, headed by Sir H. Rawlinson, maintain that these fluctuations in the Aral Sca have actually existed.”—Zimmerman has examined the fluctuations of the Caspian in his work on Khiva: (translated by Morien; published by Madden, 8, Leadenhall Street).

‡ Sir R. Murchison, without, it is generally believed, sufficient reason, cast discredit upon the authenticity of this MS.

† An opinion, says Von Hellwald, held in estimation among all the ancients, and one that entirely agrees with the commercial route used for the conveyance to Europe of the produce of Eastern Asia. This commercial route started from the Hindu Kush, utilised the Oxus as far as the Caspian; it then went up the river Kur (Cyrus), and descended the Rion (Phasis) to the Black Sea.

“In all the works of the European Geographers, as well ancient as modern, to the present century, the Aral Sea must be understood to be included in the Caspian, since they knew of but one expanse of water in that quarter, for the Cyrus, and Araxes, the Oxus and Jaxartes, were all supposed to fall into the same sea. The Arabian and Persian geographers, on the contrary, described them from the earliest times.”—Rennell, Vol. I, p. 174, note 3.

‡ “El-Istakhri and Ibn Haukal are the first writers who give certain and reliable information regarding the Aral.”—Von Hellwald, p. 33.

§ Vide article Journal de St. Petersbourg, 21st November 1869. Abul Ghazi Khan, when describing the expedition of Solaim Khan against the Turkmans on the banks of the Oxus, said
Ghazi, of Khiva, speaks of the river as still flowing into the Caspian in the sixteenth century, but being turned off about 1575 by this same Turkman dam we so often hear of. As even now during floods the river penetrates some fifty miles into the desert in the direction of the Caspian, it is possible that in the Khan’s time a small stream may have actually reached the Caspian when the river overflowed its banks. Burnes* believed what is spoken of as ‘the old bed’ to have been the remains of † a canal; but a writer in the Quarterly Review of April 1874 believes it to be too deep, wide, and irregular to allow of that supposition. The Turkmans told Mouravief in 1819 that the change was effected by an earthquake, and he believed that there were traces of volcanic action about the Ust-Urt.

Vambéry makes no doubt of the Oxus having formerly discharged its water into the Caspian, and ascribes its present course to a diversion caused by irrigation canals. In his Travels in Central Asia, he describes what he unhesitatingly pronounces to be “the ancient bed of the Oxus,” called the Doden by the nomads of the district.‡

It is the alleged practicability of again turning the Oxus into the Caspian that makes the discussion relative to its former course so extremely interesting. Upon this subject the Times recently expressed itself as follows:—

“It would certainly revivify Central Asia if water communication could be opened from the Caspian to the foot of the Hindoo Kush; but there seems to be the

that the river after having passed Urgunj flowed near the eastern side of Mount Abul Khan, thence for some distance southward, so as to take a western direction to empty itself into the Caspian towards Urgurteha. Abul Ghazi says in another part of the same work that the Oxus left its bed spontaneously in 1640.

* “After an investigation of the subject and the traditions related to me, as well as much enquiry among the people themselves, I doubt the Oxus having ever had any other than its present course. There are physical obstacles to its entering the Caspian south of Balkan, and north of that point its more natural receptacle is the lake of Aral.”—Burnes’s Travels in Bukhara, Vol. II., pp. 187, 188.

† “I conclude that the dry river beds between Astrabad and China are the remains of some of the canals of the Kingdom of Kharaizm.”—Ibid.

‡ The subject is carefully examined by Abbott in his charming “Narrative of a Journey from Herat to Khiva.” 2nd Ed., Lond. 1856, Vol. II., Appendix, pp. 304—308.
strongest reason for doubting whether the object in view could be attained without extensive excavations of the sand, which has drifted into the old bed of the Oxus, nor without closing the canals which absorb so much of the river water, but are absolutely necessary to the continuance of cultivation in Khiva.”

The Turkistan Gazette has repeatedly asserted that the diversion of the Oxus into its old channel leading to the Caspian must sooner or later be carried into execution.

* The Oxus takes its rise in Sir-i-kul, a Pamir lake, 15,600 feet above the sea. This lake is described by Wood:

> “We stood upon ‘the Roof of the World,’ while before us lay stretched a noble but ‘frozen sheet of water’ from whose western end

* The Amu of the Persians, and Jailun (“flood”) of the Arabs. The fertilising properties of the Amu as well as its great excellence for drinking have been alluded to by nearly every writer on Central Asia:— “According to calculations that have been made, the amount of its discharge in its lowest course is 3,000 cubic metres (French) per second, whereas that of the Rhine is 2,500 and that of the Rhone 2,000.”— Von Hettwald. Burnes gives the average depth at 9 feet cf. Abbott, Vol. II., p. 309.

“The translator of the Istakhri’s Geography cites Jailun as an example of the enduring vitality of oriental names. But there is, I believe, no trace of the application of Jailun to the Oxus, or of Sailun to the Xaxartes, before Mahomedan times. The name Sailun (often applied by Mahomedan writers to the Indus also) is probably Phison corrupted to a jingle by the Arabs as they made Cain and Abel into Kabil and Habil. M. Garrez supposes that the river was called Jailun by the Arabs, because “it encompassed the land of Kush,” i.e., of the Kushan of Hiathalalah confounded with the Kush of scripture.”— Jour. Asiat. Scr. VI., tom. 13, p. 181.

Our subject suggests the beautiful lines of Mr. Arnold:

> “But the majestic river floated on, Out of the mist and hum of that low land, Into the frosty starlight, and there moved, Rejoicing, through the hub’d Chorasmian waste, Under the solitary moon;—he flow’d Right for the polar atar, past Orgunj6, Brimming, and bright, and large; then sands begin To hem his watery march, and dam his streams, And split his currents; that for many a league, The shorn and parcel’d Oxus strains along Through beds of sand and matted rushy isles; Oxus, forgetting the bright speed he had In his high mountain cradle in Pamere, A foil’d circuitous wanderer till at last The long’d for dash of waves is heard, and wide His luminous home of waters opens, bright And tranquil, from whose floor the new-bathed stars Emerge and shine upon the Aral Sea.”

_Shrab and Hazarn._
issued the infant river of the Oxus. This fine lake Sir-i-kul lies in the form of a crescent about fourteen miles long from east to west by an average breadth of one mile. On three sides it is bordered by swelling hills about 500 feet high, while along its southern bank they rise into mountains 3,500 feet above the lake, or 19,000 feet above the sea, and covered with perpetual snow, from which never-failing source the lake is supplied.”—Marco Polo crossed the Pamir passing this famous lake out of which the Oxus flows.—Captain John Wood, Indian Navy. Journey to the Sources of the Oxus, 1838.

* From the Sir-i-kul lake the Oxus flows in a westerly direction, and waters with its southern affluents the northern provinces of Afghanistan; then, in a direction almost parallel with the Jaxartes, it flows through Bukhara and Khiva.

"When it reaches lat. 42° 12', long. 60° 15', between the towns of Kipchak and Khodjaili, it begins to bifurcate, after which its two streams again branch off into the several arms which form its delta. The centre of this portion of the basin forms a sort of depression, into which the waters of all the main branches, emptying themselves, spread out into a series of wide, shallow lagoons covered with reeds. These again discharge their surplus waters by different channels into the Sea of Aral." According to Admiral Boutakoff, none of these channels are fit for navigation, owing to the shallowness of the water and the fact of the main channels of the streams continually shifting.

Vambéry, in his Sketches of Central Asia, has the following:—"The Oxus has scarcely the capabilities of becoming the powerful artery for traffic and commu-

The course of the Oxus (Captain Trench’s Russo-Indian Question.)

The navigableness of the Oxus. Admiral Boutakoff’s view.

Vambéry’s view.

* The Russo-Indian question, by Capt. Trench, p. 42.
† Pages 142-3.

"The Oxus is supposed to be for the most part navigable, though as yet it is very imperfectly explored, and it for hundreds of miles of its course goes through wildennesses of barren sand, and no doubt forms an important line leading near the edges of our Indian Frontier.”—The Times.

Vambéry, pointing out the importance of considering the capabilities of the Oxus for navigation, says:—"With steamers on the Oxus, the Russians would not only have been able to keep the Khanate of Khiva in check garrisons Kungrad, Kipchaka, and Hazarash, but they would have had the power of introducing, with the greatest ease, a strong corps d’armée by Karakul into Bukhara, and thus into the heart of Central Asia, had not the extraordinary physical difficulties of this route rendered such a scheme impracticable.”
Natural Features.

nication in Central Asia which politicians, when speaking of the future of Turkistan, seem to expect."

"The reports on the navigableness of the river differ considerably; Hellwald on the Navigableness of the Oxus, some assert that it is difficult of navigation for the greater portion of its course, in Lenz's opinion for boats, and in Vambéry's in every respect; the whole of its upper course is ice-bound during winter, and even the lower course is frozen over in a severe winter. The width of the Oxus in its middle course varies from 2,100 to 2,400 p. f., and its depth from six to twenty-four feet. Just before falling into the Sea of Aral, it forms a marshy delta, which is entirely overgrown with reeds; the centre of this delta is slightly depressed, and its arms having only two or three feet of water, are undergoing a constant change, as was pointed out by Humbold in his great work on Central Asia."

* "The Jaxartes, or Sir Daria of modern times, descends from the distant highlands of Khokan, at first to water lands of comparative plenty; but, as it trends northwards, it passes through what is now for the most part a vast desert, until it loses itself in the Sea of Aral, in a wild delta of swamps and thickets. This stream forms the main line by which the legions of the Czar advanced to the conquest of Russian Turkistan, and as it is firmly occupied by Russian forts, and leads to the cities of Tashkend and Khojend, once centres of Asiatic commerce, it certainly opens to an invader a way into the recesses of Central Asia."—The Times.

"The possession of the Oxus is of as much importance to the Russians as that of the Indus is to the English; it is the artery which vivifies the territories of the great Tatar hordes through which it flows, who are otherwise unapproachable on all sides by reason of the steppes and deserts of shifting sands. Once masters of this river, it would be easy for the Russians to subjugate the tribes on its banks, from the Aral to Badakhshan. The Russian army could readily ascend the Oxus in the boats of the country, within two parasangs of Balkh, where it first ceases to be navigable."—Ferrier, p. 459.

"It is to be remembered that its (the Oxus') banks are peopled and cultivated; it must therefore be viewed as a navigable river, possessing great facilities for improving the extent of that navigation. The Oxus presents many fair prospects, since it holds the most direct courses, and connects, with the exception of a narrow desert, the nations of Europe with the remote region of Central Asia."—Burne's Travels to Bukhara, Vol. II., p. 197.

* The Saitius of the Arabs, Arzantes and Araxes of some of the classical writers. The historians of Alexander the Great call it the Tanais erroneously, the Massagetae Silia. It is now commonly called by the Persian name Sir. But I have avoided using the terms Sir and Amu, preferring the more familiar Jaxartes and Oxus.
The Jaxartes is navigable (see a very interesting letter in the Daily News of September 2nd, 1874, from a correspondent at Petro Alexandrovsk) for a considerable distance* from a point a good way above the Sea of Aral. In 1853 the Russian Governor-General of Orenburg brought over from Sweden the materials of two small gun-boats, and put them together on the Jaxartes, and the largest of these played an important part in the conquest of Western Turkestan.

Von Hellwald says of this river:— "The length of its course is computed at about 400 German miles, of which 200 are navigable. The first light thrown upon the topography of the Sir was as lately as 1863, when the Russian Rear-Admiral Butakov undertook an exploration of the river from Fort Perofsky as far as Baildyr-Tugai. Its sources, however, were in 1869 first discovered by Baron Kaulbars, whose surveys embraced the different chains of the Thian Shan mountain system, extending from the frontier of the Khanate of Khokand and the valley of the Aksai on the south-west to the Tengri Khan on the north-east. By means of these surveys the source of the Naryn was also determined, which is the most easterly and important affluent of

* Certainly as far as Ak Masjid, to which one of the gunboats penetrated in 1852. Vide Trench's Russo-Indian Question, p. 41.

† "Nowhere along the banks of the Jaxartes did Butakof find human habitations. In ancient days, however, it was navigable, and teemed with transports for the conveyance of merchandise. The Admiral found on its banks the ruins of cities, such as Otrar, where Tamerlane died, and Tungat, which that powerful ruler destroyed."

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Source of the Naryn.
the Sir; it was found to spring from a glacier in the Ak-shirak mountain. Little is yet known of its upper course beyond Khokand as far as Baildyr-Tugai, distant 807 versts from Ak-Masjid. The confluence of the Gulistan with the Naryn near Khokand unites their waters into one stream;" &c., &c.

The* Zerafshan† (or Kohik) has a course of 87‡ German miles.

The Zerafshan.

As the result of General Abramof’s combined military and scientific mission, it was discovered in 1870 that this river rose in a glacier nearly 7¼ German miles almost under the meridian of Khokand, at the line of perpetual snow on the Fan mountains. Beyond Panjkind (five villages—Persian) the river enters a wide valley that opens out into an extensive plain below Samarkand. To the west of Bukhara it turns suddenly to the south and falls into the small lake of Karakul. “Numerous canals have been constructed, which are fed by the Zerafshan.§ This river waters the city of Bukhara, and also Samarkand (the Marcanda of the Greeks). The land between these two cities is partially under excellent cultivation. From the commencement of the valley nearly to Bukhara there stretches almost an unbroken chain of settlements along the level, fertile plain, which has been forsaken by the waters of the Zerafshan, that must have formerly possessed a much more abundant supply. Here the

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* Hellwald.
‡ 1 German mile = 4.610 English statute miles.
§ “The Zerafshan region contains a denser population than any part of Russia, and hardly codes in that respect to the most crowded of fertile cities in Europe.”—Turkistan Gazette, 3rd February 1871.

For many centuries Samarcand bore the Chinese name of Shin. Its present name signifies the city of Samar,—the Arab Samar who, in 643, introduced Mahomedanism. In 1219 Jhenghiz Khan conquered it. Some 200 years afterwards it became the splendid capital of Taimur, and it still holds all that was mortal of that mighty conqueror.—Cf. Royal Geographical Society’s Journal, 1841, Vol. X, pp. 2-3.

In the fifth or sixth century there was a resident Christian (Nestorian) Bishop in Samarcand. Marco Polo quotes a letter written by Prince Sompad, high constable of Armenia in 1240 or 1247, in which that personage says he found “Many Christians scattered all over the East, and many fine Churches, lofty, ancient, and of good architecture, which have been spoiled by the Turks.” The Christians, however, were protected in a measure by Jhenghiz Khan and his immediate successors.

Claviro, the Spaniard, was in Samarcand in 1404; a Russian noble Khoklar, in 1623; and Lehmann and Klammukof in 1841.
villages belonging to these settlements are spread out, together with their orchards and mulberry groves, for the culture of silk, and here also the well-cultivated fields produce cotton, gourds, water-melons, wheat, barley, and maize. On the other side, however, there is a marked contrast in the barrenness of the adjacent desert of Milik. But farther to the east the country is luxuriantly fertile. A wide tract of land, extending along the Zerafshan as far as the district of Samarkand, is covered with fields of rice."

"The possession of the Jaxartes and Oxus not improbably secures a widespread supremacy throughout the interior of Central Asia, though it is still most uncertain whether either stream could be made the basis of future conquests; and the Oxus, along its upper course, is as yet in no sense of the word Russian. The remaining parts of these interior regions, beyond the reach of the two great streams, are, for the most part, stony and sandy tracts, exposed to alternations of fierce heat and cold, and with difficulty passable by the foot of man; but in one wide tract the waters of the Zerafshan scatter plenty over the lowlands and places, whence rise the walls of the once famous cities of Bukhara and Samarkand. In these provinces the wealth of nature is still seen in profuse abundance, but the influence of the Crescent, now waning before the advancing power of the Russian Cross, has left on the landscape a look of desolation."—Times.

CHAPTER II.

HISTORICAL SKETCH.

The belief in a very early empire in Central Asia, coeval with the institution of the Assyrian monarchy, was common among the Greeks long anterior to Alexander's expedition to the East; and it receives confirmation from the earliest memorials of the Iranian division of the Aryan race. It would, however, be too serious an undertaking here to give even an outline of events that would bring us back probably to the year 2,000 B.C., and it must suffice to state that from about 700 B.C. to 300 A.D. a succession of Scythian tribes crossed the Jaxartes and swept over the western portion of Asia; and that from the fourth century to the tenth a continuous stream of Turkish
hordes poured in from that officina gentium, the Altai, forming, first, extensive colonies, and afterwards great military settlements (cf. The Quarterly Review, October 1866, Central Asia).

Thirty-five years after the Prophet's death, the armies of Islam appeared in Western Turkistan. The main body of the population they encountered were of the Iranian stock,* possessing, no doubt, the seeds of those qualities which make their descendants, the Tajiks, the most cunning and cowardly people on the face of the globe. Here and there among the pasture lands bordering the cultivated islands of the desert were† Turanian herdsmen. ‡ The religion of the fire-worshippers was the national creed, but the Turanian immigrants had introduced Buddhism; and occasional converts were found to Nestorian Christianity. Western Turkistan, however, received the creed of Islam, in the process of time with a zeal and single-heartedness for which there is, perhaps, no parallel. Within two hundred years of the appearance of the Arab invaders an Iranian noble, recently converted to Mahomedanism, laid the foundation of a monarchy, known as that of the Samanides,§ which eventually extended from the source of the Oxus and Jaxartes to the shores of the

* The people of Central Asia are separated into two great divisions, supposed to represent distinct types of the universal family of man; and the immemorial strife between Iran and Turan marks, it is believed, the essential differences between two wholly dissimilar races. The tribes of Iran, who form a section of the great Indo-Germanic breed, which has civilized Europe and Hindustan, spread from the Afghanistan and Persian highlands into the interior, to Samarkand and Bukhara; and they abound even in Kashgar and Yarkand, having crossed the Bolor and Pamir ranges. The characteristics of this people, at least in the plains of Central Asia, are love of agriculture and the arts of peace; but they are accused of cowardice and habits of deceit, and they generally form a subject race, known by the dishonored name of Tajiks; a word literally meaning, I believe, runners, and, perhaps, applied to the Persians with reference to their superior activity.

† Turan, or Turiya, the Bactrian Satrapy Turina of Strabo (lib. XI, page 517, Casaubon's ed.)
‡ "Buddhism was not the only faith that Islam had to extinguish in Bukhara. That of Zoroaster maintained a more obstinate resistance. Long after the conquest, the nominal and enforced converts continued to cherish the worship of their fathers under the shelter of night, insomuch that every native family was compelled to receive an Arab inmate, whose duty was to watch against such backslidings. And among the few antiquities of Bukhara survives a monument of those days, recalling the subterranean church of St. Clement on the Esquiline, an underground mosque, bearing the name of the mosque of the Majiana."—Col. Yule, in Geographical Review.
§ Called after Samani, a nobleman of Balkh, one of the remaining followers of Zoroaster, afterwards converted to Islam. He traced his descent from the Sasanide Behram.—Vambéry. Vide Elphinstone's Hist. Ind., p. 318.
Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. The Samanide era was the most glorious in the history of Transoxiana. Arms, agriculture, and polite learning flourished; and Bukhara was the capital of a truly magnificent empire.

The peaceful Tajiks not forming good material for troops, the Samanide monarchs were compelled to draw their recruits from the eastern Turanian tribes, a circumstance which tended to consolidate this warlike people. Moreover, when the career of the Samanide family was drawing to a close, the scattered hordes of Turanians became united in the Uighar monarchy of Eastern Turkistan. Invading the country that lies between the Jaxartes and Oxus, they inflicted a final defeat on the Samanides, who were succeeded by the Seljukides, a dynasty from whose founder the Samanides had sought assistance. The dominion of the Seljukides was even more extensive than that of the Samanides. But in conquering the Uighars—now in possession of Khokand, Tashkand, Samarkand, and Bukhara—they removed the only barrier which separated them from the terrible hordes of Mongolia, who, led by Jhengiz Khan in 1218, soon swept all before them. The Persian distich quoted by Vambéry vividly depicts their progress:

"Amedend u kendend u sukhtend.
U kushtend u burdend, u reftend."

* The names of the first Seljukides, Musa, Junis, Michal, and Israil, have a strong resemblance to Biblical names, and there can be no doubt that Christianity had at this period made far more progress in Central Asia than Mahomedan historians are willing to allow.—Vambéry.

† More properly Shinghiz, an Uiguiric compound of tshin-m straight, stumug, sm, and ghiz-impetuous, powerful. The word therefore means 'the man of strong might'.—Vambéry.

"Probably no warrior ever so distinctly aimed at the subjugation of the World, as far as it was known to him, as did Jhengiz, and certainly no one ever so nearly attained the object."

"Vambéry gives the original name of Jhengiz, after the historian Juavini, as Temurji, not as it is usually given, Temujin. The former signifies in Eastern Turkish a blacksmith, and this gave rise to the belief common in Asia in the middle ages that Jhengiz had really been a smith."—Yule, Rubruquis, and Ibn Batuta, the Moor, repeat the story.—Vide Schmidt's Sanang Setzen, p. 376.

The Turanian stock comprehends the tribes of Mongols, Manchus, and Turks, which in all ages have filled the tracts of Central Asia from the Ural to China; and though some of these races have been reclaimed from barbarism and dwell in cities, they seem always inclined to the life of nomads, wandering from place to place with their countless flocks, and occasionally issuing forth in savage hordes to overrun the seats of industry and wealth.

† They came, destroyed, burnt, murdered, robbed, and went.—Cf. Timour's Institutes, pp. 23 and 25.
Within three years Jhengiz had so extended his sway, that the Indus on the one side and the mountains above Mesopotamia on the other became the limits of his empire. For two hundred years the Jhengizides ruled in Transoxania; and the history of that period is a history of wild anarchy, murder, plunder, and unrestrained excesses. Dismemberment of Mongol Empire.

Within, however, a century from their invasion, they were broken up into numerous khanates and nomad republics, calling themselves Turk, Turcoman, Kirghiz, Kassak (Cossack)—these being the names of the various tribes who had followed Jhengiz out of the howling wastes of Mongolia. Fifty years afterwards, Taimur* the Lame reunited many of the western portions of the empire; but on his death again, the process of disintegration recommenced. A century later a mixed tribe named Usbeg;† after the Khan, in whose time they had been converted to Islam, came from beyond the Caspian and Aral seas, and led by one Shaibani, descended from Jhengiz, completely overthrew the power of Taimur's struggling successors.‡ Within a hundred years, this dynasty was cut short by assassination, and, with the consent of all parties, the supreme power was handed over to a family lately expelled from Astarkhan§ on the Volga by the Russian Dukes, a family connected with the Shaibani and sprung from the Khan of the house of

* Taimur=iron. Of Emir Taimurc, the Turk, or Tamerlaine, as we more commonly call him, Vambéry gives an interesting account. History Bukh., pp. 162-193.
† Usbeg=Independent. "Mouravieff supposes UzbeK to be derived from Uz his, or himself, and bek, master, thus meaning master of himself, or independent. Klaproth derives it from the people called Ouz, or Gouz, by the Arab historians. These were the same as the Ouigour, a Turkish tribe which formerly inhabited the countries to the south of the Celestial Mountains, that is, little Bukharia. At the commencement of the sixteenth century, the Uzbeks passed the Silun or Jaxartes proceeding westward. They are, at present, masters of Balkh, Khaurism, Bukhara, Ferganah, and some other countries in the neighbourhood of the Belut Tagh," Klaproth's note, Mouravieff's Bukhara, p. 395. Cf. Elphinstone's Hist. of India, pp. 268-289. Original home probably on the banks of the Ural and Emba, the country now known as the territory of the Little Horde.
‡ Of these the one who has left the greatest name is Baber, who, driven out of his particular Khanate of Khokand, eventually founded the Moghal Empire in India.
§ Astracan.
Historical Sketch.

Jhengiz* "For one hundred and forty years the Astarkhanides continued in the exercise of a dominion which was gradually weakened in extent and coherence by successful revolt, and for nearly fifty years more furnished occupants for a nominal sovereignty, the real power of which was wielded by powerful and hereditary Wazirs of the Usbeg house of Manghit.† In 1784 the farce was closed, and the last prince who claimed a descent from Jhengiz was quietly set aside by his Wazir, grandfather of the Amir of Bukhara, who is now a dependant on Russian protection." The house of Manghit brings us down to the end of the Asistic rule in Western Turkistan. We have now to note how the Romanoff star gradually rose above the horizon.‡

* The Quarterly Review, No. 272, April 1874, p. 399.
† The Manghists came originally from the forests in the north-east of Mongolia. After the Kungrats, they were the most celebrated among the Turkish tribes for bravery and nobility of birth.—Vandéry.
‡ The Khansates of Bukhara, Khiva, and Khokand, dissolving as Russia comes in contact with their anarchy, their weakness, and their mouldering ruins, are all that remain of the mighty States which at different periods grew upon this land.—The Times.

Note.—The Turcomans.—"The Turcomans are a nation of Turk race, which, in the 11th and 12th centuries, overran Bukharia, northern Asia, and, on the westward of the Caspian Sea, Armenia, S. Georgia, Shirvan, and Daghestan. They lead a nomad life and compose the principal part of the population of these countries, where they are called Terekameh, Turkman, and Kizl-bashi. To explain the name of Turcomans, the Persians relate that the Turk tribes, at the time of their invasion of Khorassan, had married the women of the country, and that to their descendants was given the name Turcomans, which means 'like the Turks.' This specious etymology appears very paradoxical, since the hordes of this people who speak Turkish and have remained beyond the Jaihun also call themselves Turcomans. I think the name is rather derived from Turk and Coman, and that it was given to that part of the Coman nation which remained on the east of the Caspian Sea, under the domination of the Turks of the Altai; while another independent part came and established itself in the vast plains to the westward of that sea, and to the north of the Sea of Azof, and afterwards pushed forward into Hungary.—Note by M. Klaproth, Voyage de Mouraviev, p. 394.

"The Uzbeks (so called from one of their Khans) were a mass of tribes of Turki Moghal, and probably of Fennic origin, moulded into one people, but with a great preponderance of Turks."—Erskine's Baber, pp. LIX—LX.

The Uzbeks who now possess Transoxiana, the Turcomans, both on the Oxus and in Asia Minor, the wandering tribes of Northern Persia and the Ottomans or Turks of Constantinople are all Turks, as was the greater part of the army of Tamerlane. The ruling tribes, and the greater part of the army of Jhengiz Khan, was Moghal. The Tartar dynasty that now reigns in China and the adjoining part of Tartary is Manghan."—Elphinstone's Hist. Ind., p. 268.

"Between the Turcomans and the Uzbeks I see only a difference of tribe and nothing more; the types are similar, the face is flat, large and pointed at the chin; the beard is sandy, or light, thin, and irregular; the head often too small for a body exhibiting considerable development of
Professor Erdmann says:—

Note.—"Those Turks who were carried westward by political vicissitudes, as well as those who in the east of Asia continued to form small independent principalities, maintained the name of Turks, whilst those who remained in the east of Asia, or on the frontier of China as nomad, or subject nations, received from the Chinese the name, at first specific, afterwards generic, of Tatars, and were discriminated into White, and Black, Wild, and Water Tatars. The Black Tatars, after their victory over the White, and over those Turks who existed in independent principalities, came forward as Mongols, extended their sovereignty as far as the east of Europe, and so imposed the names of Tatars and Mongols also upon the Turks of the West, excepting always that part of the latter in Asia Minor—such as the Ottomans, who remained unaffected by the new movement, and carried the name of Turks with them into Europe."—*Temudschin der Underschutter Liche.*—The ethnological question is treated by Hellwald, pp. 96-122, and Vambéry in his travels pp. 301-325.


CHAPTER III.

RUSSIAN ADVANCES.

Prince* Gortchakow to Baron Brunnow (State Papers printed for the information of Parliament)—"The possible advantages of an extension of territory diminish in proportion to the distance, and in all annexation there is a limit imposed by nature, beyond which any advance will lead to difficulties, and indeed to danger." "Prince Gortchakow said that Baron Brunnow had correctly described the Imperial Government as desirous to restrict rather than to extend the possessions of Russia southwards in Central Asia. He admitted the possibility of Russia being drawn into a course similar to that which had caused the extension of our Indian Empire."—The Emperor of Russia to Sir A. Buchanan (conversation officially communicated to Lord Clarendon):—"For I (Sir A. B.) must know that he (the Czar) had no ambitious views, and that he had been drawn by circumstances ('que nous avons été entraînés') further than he had wished into Central Asia."—M. de Westmann (of the Russian

muscles; the face is pierced with two small holes, the form of which recalls the eyes of a Chinese. There is, however, a striking difference. The Turcomans are nomads, and the Uzbeks are villagers.—Ferrier, p. 89.


* A very interesting account of Prince Gortchakow, Generals Millutine and Ignatieff, and Count Peter Schouvaloff will be found in "Distinguished Persons in Russian Society."—Smith Elder and Company, 1873.

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Russian Advances.

Foreign Office Asiatic Department) to Sir A. Buchanan:—“He did not deny that there might be Russian officers in Central Asia on whose prudence no reliance was to be placed; but he said the difficulty of organizing the administration and of maintaining tranquillity in the countries already acquired by Russia would give sufficient occupation to the officers entrusted with that duty for many years to come.”—Prince Gorchakov to the Earl of Clarendon:—“Prince Gorchakov said he was glad I had at once alluded to the subject, because he could assure me that we had no cause for apprehension; as the Emperor considered, and he entirely shared His Majesty’s opinion, that extension of territory was extension of weakness, and that Russia had no intention of going farther south.”—The Emperor of Russia to Mr. Forsyth:—“His Majesty further remarked that there was no intention of extending the Russian dominions; but it was well known that, in the East, it is impossible always to stop when and where one wishes.”—Prince Gorchakov to Sir A. Buchanan:—“His Excellency then observed that I might feel assured he would never consent to an extension of the territory of the Empire, and that the Emperor even wished to withdraw from the advanced position already occupied in Bukhara.”—The Czar to Sir A. Buchanan:—“I have no feeling of covetousness in Central Asia.”

“In 1864, the Russian frontier from the Caspian to the River Jaxartes was conterminous with the northern frontiers of the three great Usbeg Khanates of Turkestan—Bukhara, Khokand, and Khiva. These Khanates were previously so remote and isolated as to be little known to the civilized world. On the north they had hitherto been more or less separated from Russia by the great Kirghiz Steppes; east and south a series of vast mountain systems shut them out from China, Cashmir, and Afghanistan, whilst on the west the pathless wastes of the desert of Khiva stretched far away to the shores of the Caspian. The inhabitants of Khiva and Western Bukhara are scarcely more civilized than the Kirghiz, but those of Eastern Bukhara are a settled and more civilized people.”—Summary of Affairs, Foreign Department, India.

*Russia made her first step into Asia about the time when the people of England were looking out for the approach of the Spanish Armada. The Cossacks of the Don, but recently subjugated and conciliated, were sent with success against the Tatars of the Ural mountains, whose raids on Russian subjects near Perm had come to the ears of the authorities in Moscow. These Tatars, like their Cossack conquerors, were subjugated, conciliated, and

* The Quarterly Review, April 1874, p. 490.
† This process of digestion is the secret by which Russia has not only managed to conquer but to keep the fairest provinces of Asia with a handful of regular European troops.
in process of time found themselves Russian soldiers. * They, in their
turn, were sent after other wild clans. These clans again underwent
the process of—1st, conciliation; 2nd, protection; 3rd, incorporation,
4th, military instruction, being eventually rolled forward to teach other
barbarians the lessons they had learned themselves.

"Under Ivan IV.," says Von Hellwald, "Russia subdued the Tatar
Khanates of the south, with the exception of the
Crimea. Kasan was conquered by Ivan, after a
bloody battle, in 1552; it had, however, been subject to the Czars from
time to time ever since 1487. Astrakhan, in the
north, fell in 1554, and the Bashkirs were subju-
gated in 1556, and at the same time a firm footing was gained in the
Kabarda on the Kuban. The Cossacks Yermak† and Timofeyev opened,
in the last year of Ivan's reign, through the dis-
covery of Siberia, a new continent to their father-
land, and laid the foundation of Russia's Asiatic
power. In 1587 Tobolsk was founded. In 1727
Russia obtained, through a treaty with Persia, those provinces which
were four years previously conquered by Peter the Great, viz., Daghes-
tan, Shirvan, Ghilan, and Mazenderan; that is to
say, the whole west coast of the Caspian Sea;
but in 1734 they had to be restored. The last
two of these provinces are the only territories

* In the 17th and 18th centuries Siberia was slowly overrun and colonized, and Russian
settlements are still being continually formed in the more fruitful tracts of this vast and far-
spread region, controlling the wild inhabitants of the Steppes, and reducing them more and
more to subjection. Meanwhile the conquests of Peter the Great had brought Russia into collis-
ion with Persia, and before his death he had obtained a hold on the Provinces of the Shah
around the Caspian, which, though afterwards in part lost, nevertheless gave Russia the commandi-
of that sea, and opened the Caucasus to her future efforts. The arms of Catherine were rather
directed towards the Danube and the realms of the Sultans than against the dynasties and tribes
of Asia; but possibly one of the visions of Tilsit was a project of triumphs in the far East; and
after the events of 1812-14 had relieved Russia from fears in the West, her attention was turned
again towards the lands that formed her growing Asiatic Empire. For several years the advance
of her rule was marked only by new colonization and the discoveries of scientific travellers who
explored and mapped out a variety of points between the Ural and the Chinese frontier; and in
this manner her power moved forward almost imperceptibly, but at a steady rate, from about 1820
to 1840.—The Times.—Fraser's Magazine, April 1864, "Russia and her Dependencies," should be
referred to.

† "The author appears here to be in error, for a certain Ermak Timothew, Hetman (Hetman) of the Cossacks of the Don, was the conqueror of Siberia."—Colonel Wirgman.
which this empire once possessed, lost, and has not regained. In 1813

Daghestan and Shirvan regained, 1813.

the Persians were obliged to restore Daghestan and Shirvan, the important province of Darbend having been already in the hands of the Russians since 1806. A new war with Persia at length extended the territory of this gigantic state beyond the Araxes, and as far as the Ararat; and at the Peace of Turkmanchay, in 1828, the province of Arran was acquired.”

From* 1828 until the Afghan war (1838), Russia declares that, while she was suspected by England of a systematic policy of encroachment towards India, she was in reality exclusively occupied with the consolidation of her hold upon the Kirghiz Steppe, and with measures directed to the development of her commerce in Central Asia. †Her diplomacy in Persia, where she certainly promoted the expedition of Mahomed Shah against Herat, merely aimed, she asserts, at the improvement of her position in that country; and the activity of her agents in the Uzbeg Khanates is explained by a reference to the efforts of the Indian Government in the same direction. She considered that her geographical position gave her a claim to the monopoly of the trade‡ in Central Asia, and she resented, as an invasion of

* Quarterly Review, October 1865.
‡ A useful report on the trade and resources of this region was drawn up in 1862 by Mr. Davies (now Sir H. Davies, Lieut.-Governor of the Punjab) under instructions from Sir H. Montgomer, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. In Part III, p. 80, of this state paper, the following passage occurs:—“It has frequently been debated whether British India can compete with Russia in trading with the countries of Central Asia. Time has already begun to solve this question. Although the Volga, the Caspian, the Aral, and the Oxus afford great facilities of water communication, it seems certain from Mr. Atkinson’s accounts that the trade with Bukhara is still (1862) carried on by means of caravans to Orenburg and other frontier towns. The journey occupies from 45 to 60 days, and 28 days more to Nijni Novgorod. It has been shown that from Peshawar to Bukhara only takes 45 days, and from Peshawar to Kurrachee is, taking boat at Attock, 1,107 miles; or, proceeding by land as far as Multan, 1,188 miles. Again from Kurrachee to Yarkand is only 74 marches.”

“...far as distance is concerned, Captain Montgomery’s remark would appear to be just, that a glance at the map is sufficient to show that British goods from India have a very fair chance of underselling Russian goods in Eastern and Central Afghanistan, and also in Eastern Turkistan or Little Bukhara, and in the more easterly towns of Western Turkistan, or Bukhara Proper.”—Vide also appendices of ibid., p. CXLIV. “Route from Cabul to Bukhara by the Hindu Kush.”
Russian rights, the proposed participation of England in that trade. The travels of Moorcroft and Trebeck, Arthur Conolly, Ballie Fraser, Alexander Burnes, and the missionary Wolff, excited in her the gravest suspicions.

"Now it is certain" says a writer in the Quarterly Review from whom I have already quoted "that England has always considered, and does still consider, that she is entitled to exercise a fair amount of influence in Central Asia, and to enjoy a fair access to the markets of Bukhara and the other markets of that region equally with Russia; but it is also certain that she has never taken any active measures to assert or realise her right, and that the apprehensions of Russia, therefore, on this score, which urged her on to an armed intervention, were altogether unfounded. What England really dreaded, thirty years ago, and what she had a perfect right to impede by all the means in her power, was that Russia would gradually absorb, or would, at any rate, extend her influence, either by treaties or by political pressure, over the independent countries intermediate between the Caspian and India, and would thus complicate our position in the latter country. The mainsprings of action in the English and Russian movements in Central Asia from this time forward were a feeling of political jealousy on the one side and a spirit of commercial* rivalry on the other. When Lord Auckland, for instance, persisted in marching an army across the Indus in 1838, notwithstanding that the object for which the expedition was originally organised, the relief of Herat, had been already accomplished by the retirement of the Shah's forces; under the pressure of our demonstration in the Persian Gulf, it was avowedly to prevent the spread of Russian influence towards India."

* Cf. Supplement to the Gazette of India, Russian trade with India, November 26th, 1870. Among the state papers published in 1870 for the information of Parliament, I find the following:— Prince Gortchakow to Mr. Forsyth: "There is not the least intention of interfering with British trade with the countries of Central Asia, and as regards imports into Russian Turktistan, only such duties will be imposed as are necessary to protect Russian manufactures." Cf. Von Sarauw's Brochure, translated by the Indian Foreign office.
Prince Gortchakow's Circular, November 21st, 1864. "The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized tribes which are brought into contact with half savage, nomad populations, possessing no fixed social organization. In such cases it always happens that the more civilized state is forced, in the interest of the security of its frontier and its commercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendancy over those whom their turbulent and unsettled character makes most undesirable neighbours.

Such have been the reasons which have led the Imperial Government to take up at first a position resting on one side on the Syr-Daria, on the other on the Lake Issyk-kauk, and to strengthen these two lines by advanced forts, which, little by little, have crept into the heart of these distant regions, without however succeeding in establishing on the other side of our frontiers that tranquillity which is

* "That Khanate (of Khokand) was the particular patrimony of the branch of Taimur's family, that was made illustrious by the career of Baber; but, from the date when he was expelled therefrom by the Usbegs under Shaibani, it had merged in the monarchy of which, under the Shaibanides, and the Astarkhanides after them, the capital was Bukhara. In 1775 A.D., while as yet the last of the Astarkhanides was allowed a nominal sovereignty, and before the Wazir of the House of Manghit finally set him aside, a Khokandi, thirteenth in descent from Baber, re-asserted the independence of his native country. His grandson much extended the limits of the Khanates, which up to the time had been confined to the Upper Valley of the Jaxartes, and pushing along the right bank of the river, brought Tashkand and Chamkand within the circle of the dominions, ending in 1814 with the acquisition of Hazrat Sultan on the confines of the Black Desert. This brought the Khokandis into direct dealings with the Kirghiz of the Little Horde."—Quarterly Review, No. 272.

"Khokand, or Ferganah, the country of the celebrated Sultan Baber, the founder of the Moghul Empire in India, lies north-east of Bukhara, from which it appears to be separated by the Ak-tagh or Asperah Mountains. It occupies the upper affluents of the Jaxartes, and is a much smaller territory than Bukhara. The country is celebrated for its silk, and its other produce is much the same as Bukhara. Its capital is Khokand, an open town on the Jaxartes, about half the size of Bukhara; the ancient capital is Marghilan, still a large and fine city some miles to the south-east of Khokand. Andijan is likewise a town of considerable note. Tashkand, an ancient and flourishing city, 80 miles N. N. W. of Khokand, is described by the Siberian merchants who visit it as a large town of 80,000 inhabitants. Unaccustomed as they are to extremes of climate, these travellers complain bitterly of the oppressive heat of Tashkand. Its whole wealth consists in the produce of the soil; yet that soil would soon be annexed to the desert were it not for the industry of the inhabitants. Every vegetable substance grown in Tashkand, the mulberry trees to feed the silk worms, the fruit trees, even the trees reared for fuel, are, with the humbler vegetables, all planted in gardens watered by canals, which flow from the little river Cherchik at 12 miles distance.

"The staple article of produce is cotton, in the manufacture of which more than half the population is employed; but owing to the rudeness of their processes, the Russians, notwithstanding the long land carriage, can supply them with manufactured goods at a cheaper rate than
indispensable for their security. The explanation of this unsettled state of things is to be found, first, in the fact that, between the extreme points of this double line, there is an immense unoccupied space, where all attempts at colonization or caravan trade are paralyzed by the inroads of the robber tribes; and, in the second place, in the perpetual fluctuations of the political condition of those countries, where Turkistan and Khokand, sometimes united, sometimes at variance, always at war, either with one another or with Bukhara, presented no chance of settled relations, or of any regular transactions whatever.

The Russian frontier* of 1730, passing from the Caspian to Orenburg, thence by Orsk, Petro-Paulousk, Omsk and Semipolatinsk to Bukhtarminsk, was advanced in 1848 to a line of forts that formed an intermediate stage between the old Orenburg Line and the long-coveted frontier of the Jaxartes. The most important of these forts were the Karabutalskoi, the Uralskoi on the river Irghiz, and the Orenburgskoi on the Turgai. In 1847 the foundations were laid of Fort† Aralsk, near the mouth of the Jaxartes. Simultaneously with the erection of this fort, the Russians prepared to launch a small‡ flotilla on the Sea of Aral to facilitate the further ascent of the

They can make them. Turkistan is a town of 1,000 mud houses, defended by a fort and ditch 16 feet deep. Uch, at the foot of the Takht-i Suliman Mountain, is a town frequented by numerous pilgrims, who came to pay their devotions at a small square building at the top of the mountain. Tradition asserts that Solomon sacrificed a camel on this spot, where the blood is still shown on a stone that is quite red. Khojand, on the banks of the Jaxartes, is a fortress surrounded with fields and gardens like Bukhara.” Malte Brun and Balbi.—New Ed. Lond., 1859, p. 780.

“The country of Ferghana is situated in the fifth climate, on the extreme boundary of the habitable world. Ferghana is a country of small extent, but abounding in fruits and grain; and it is surrounded with hills on all sides, except on the west, and on that side alone can it be entered by foreign enemies. The river Saihun, which is generally known by the name of the river of Khojend, comes from the north-east, and after passing through this country flows to the west. It then runs on the north of Khojend and south of Finakat, which is now better known as Shahrak-hia; and thence, inclining to the north, flows down towards Turkistan, and meeting with no other river in its course is wholly swallowed up in the sandy desert, considerably below Turkistan, and disappears.”—Baber, by Erakine and Leyden, p. 1; vide also Introductory Memoir by Waddington, p. xiii.

* Consult sketch map of Russian encroachments in Quarterly Review, October 1865, p. 552.
† I find it stated in Vambéry’s Hist., Bukhara, p. 396, that this Fort was built in 1847; but Von Sarauw and Von Hellwald both say 1845.
‡ This Flotilla seems to have disappointed the expectations that were formed of it; for in 1870, the Russian Government were trying to dispose of it to a private Company. The tortuosity of the Jaxartes, the un-navigability of the mouths of the Oxus, and the shallowness of the sea itself were the reasons assigned for this measure.—St. Petersburgh News, 7th March 1870.
Jaxartes. Three small vessels, built at Orenburg and transported overland to the Jaxartes, were the first to carry the Russian flag upon this sea. Afterwards two iron steamers, built in Sweden and brought in pieces via St. Petersburg to Samara on the Volga, and afterwards to Aralsk, were added to the above in 1852.*

It was now the avowed object of Russia to establish a line of forts along the Jaxartes to the point where the Kara-tau range sinks into the desert, and from thence, either by the old frontier of the Chu or by the more southern line of the Talas, to establish other links which should connect the Jaxartes Forts with the eastern settlements in the neighbourhood of the Issik-kul† Lake. In making this advance Russia recognised no territorial encroachment, as her own Kirghiz‡ already camped on the right bank of the Jaxartes, and the Chu had been adopted long ago as the southern frontier of the Steppe; but, nevertheless, the Usbegs of Khokand, already in possession of the

* The total cost of these two vessels, including their conveyance to the Jaxartes and the salaries of the artisans employed in constructing them, amounted to no more than £7,400!

Note.—The above events are thus recorded by Vambery.

† General Peroffsky, Governor-General of Orenburg, had caused the fort Aralsk to be built by Captain Schultz at the mouths of the Jaxartes in 1847. As this fort, afterwards called fort 1, proved a good point of departure, it was easy to predict that forts 2, 3, and so on, would shortly follow, and that the advancing Russian columns would soon come into collision with Khokand as the power which, nominally at least, ruled over these territories. At first the garrison of the Khokand fortress of Ak Masjid took upon itself the ungrateful task of obstructing the outposts of the northern Colossus by attacking now the Russians themselves, now the Kirghizes placed under their protection; but, as usual, they were repulsed with heavy losses. Their skirmishes lasted for years; the Khokanders mostly had to deal with small detachments of the Russian army, so that they never were sufficiently impressed with the immense superiority of the enemy, whilst the Russians, on the other hand, becoming accustomed to the various stratagems and general local habits of conducting war in these parts, went through a most valuable preparation for their conquest of Turkistan. Meantime, the steamers intended for the navigation of the river had arrived on the dark green waters of the old Kharezmian Lake, having been transported by land from Sweden to the Aral. For want of coal the wood of the gnarled shrubs, called saksaul, had to be used for fuel.—Vambery’s History of Bukhara, p. 396.

‡ Issik-kul (the “warm lake”). In the famous Catalan map of 1374, giving the caravan route pursued by the Polos from the Caspian to China, an Armenian Xonastery is noticed to the north of the lake in the position of Vernoe, said to contain the body of St. Matthew!—Mr. J. Mitchell has translated a series of valuable papers on this region by Semenoff, Goleshof, Abramof, and Veniuikof. These are now published in the 31st and 32nd vol. of the R. G. S’s Journal.

According to a calculation made by Humboldt (Asie Centrale, tom., II, p. 129, note 2) the entire Kirghiz population amounted to 2,400,000 in 1843. Cf. Michell’s Russians in Central Asia, pp. 99, and 103; also introduction by Esquieu to his edition of Baber’s autobiography.
river, considered the Russian approach as a direct invasion. Their apprehensions were not without foundation; for in 1852, the Russians, having completed their preparations at the new base, determined to proceed with their design and advance farther up the river.

The principal fort of the Khokandis on the Jaxartes is Ak-Masjid, built in the year 1817, at a distance of some three hundred miles from the mouth of the Jaxartes. It is regarded by the Usbegs as a place of great strength. The operations of the Russians against this fort are thus described by Vambéry in his *History of Bukhara*, p. 396.

"In the year 1852, Colonel Blaramberg set out with a corps on a reconnaissance towards the fortress of Ak-Masjid,* and penetrated with a handful of men under the very walls of the fortress; this daring act, for

* It consisted of 2,168 men, including officers, with 2,442 horses, 3,038 camels, and 2,280 oxen, used for transport.

"In 1847 the Russians established themselves on the Sea of Aral by the construction of fort Aralsk at the mouth of the Syr-Daria. The principal fort was situated about three hundred miles from the mouth of the river, and belonged to the Khokandis. It was named Ak-Masjid, or the white mosque. It had been constructed in 1817, and had ever since dominated the river, and was regarded by the Usbegs as a place of considerable strength.

"The capture of Ak-Masjid is a mark in the history of Russian advance in Central Asia. For eight years this place was apparently the extreme point reached by Russia; and during that period she seems to have been content to hold her own without provoking further hostilities. It is a curious fact, as illustrative of the political hostility between Khokand and Bukhara at this period, that the Amir of Bukhara congratulated the Russians on the conquest of Ak-Masjid—a circumstance which the Russians brought forward in after years when occasion served.—*Summary of affairs in the Foreign Department.*—J. Talboys Wheeler.

"From the Governor-General of Orenburg to the Commander of the fortress of Ak-Mechet.

"By order of my master the Emperor of all the Russias, I have come here to take possession of the fortress of Ak-Mechet which the Khokandians have erected on Russian territory for the oppression of the Kirghizes, subjects of His Imperial Majesty.

"Ak-Mechet is already taken, although you are inside it, and you cannot fail to perceive that without losing any of my men, I am in a position to destroy every one of you.

"The Russians have come hither not for a day, nor yet for a year, but for ever. They will not retire.

"If you wish to live, ask for mercy; should you prefer to die in Ak-Mechet, you can do so. I am not pressed for time, and do not intend to hurry you. I here repeat that I do not come here to offer you combat, but to thrash you until you open your gates.

"All this I would have told you on the first day of my arrival, when I approached the walls of your fortress unarmed, had you not traitorously opened fire on me, which is not customary among honorable soldiers."—*Russians in Central Asia*, p. 348.—*Michell.*
which he had ventured 250 leagues away from the Russian frontier, led to no immediate result; but the grand attack of the following year was all the more successful. This expedition was planned on a much larger scale. The Russians in an unusually warm spring pushed across the most barren part of the great Steppe of Orenburg as far as fort 1, intending thence to reach Ak-Masjid on the right bank of the Jaxartes.

The Steamer Peroipsky followed up the river. Neither the intense heat nor the swarms of grass-hoppers and locusts sufficed to intimidate the hardy northerners. Ak-Masjid was invested, and the struggle for this, the first fortress on Turkistan ground, commenced."

The Khokanders, being summoned to surrender, replied that so long as they had a grain of powder in their flasks, or a clod of earth to fling at their enemies, they would not surrender. They held out, accordingly, with surprising obstinacy, and it was not until their commander and the greater part of the superior officers were killed that the Russians were able to effect an entrance. Ak-Masjid is the greatest fortress in Central Asia, and while the Russians were well occupied in the Crimea, the Khokanders made repeated and desperate attempts to re-occupy it. They were, however, invariably unsuccessful; and notwithstanding a deal of good advice and urgent remonstrance on the part of the Porte, the different Mahomedan States* that had fallen under the shadow of the Russian eagles, made no effort during the Crimean war to drive back the advancing Power. Russia, therefore, as soon as her troubles in Europe had come to an end, resumed in Asia her schemes of conquest. In 1859 Cholek was taken, and two years later, Yenghi Kurghan.†

The town of Hazreti Turkistan ‡ was captured in the month of June 1864;§ and Tashkend (the ancient Shash) about

Ak-Masjid falls.

Cholek, 1859.

* Khiva, instead of assuming the offensive, sent Envoys to Ak-Masjid with professions of friendship. At Bukhara Nasrullah took advantage of her weakened condition to invade Khokand.

† Or Yani Kurghan—the new fort—the seat of a band of Khokandi robbers, situated among the Kipchak Kirghiz.

‡ Here the tomb of Khoja Ahmed Yesevi fell into the hands of the infidels, and sent a thrill of pious horror through the people of Mawar-ul-Nahr.

§ In the same month Auleita, to the north of the Karatagh range, was taken, the Russian loss being three men slightly wounded, while no less than 370 of the garrison were killed and 390 wounded.

|| See Erskine's Introduction to Memoirs of Baber, p. XL.
a year afterwards. Meanwhile, on the eastern side of the Ural mountains, the Russians had been gradually advancing into the possessions of the "Great Horde." In 1852 a fort had been erected at Kopal, and in 1854 at Vernoe, which is now a great emporium of trade. In order to connect these places* with the Jaxartes, the Khokandi forts of Tokmek and Pishpek were seized, and a fort was built on the eastern slopes of the Karataghi range, at Julek.

In November 1864, Prince Gortchakov issued a circular, describing the embarrassment of a civilized Government when it finds itself face to face with barbarous nations, whose depredations, necessitating severe and frequent chastisement, are at length the cause of a weakness and

Princé Gortchakov's circular, 1864.

Taskhend (Vide D'Herbelot Art. Aksiket.) An article in the Quarterly Review of April 1874 gives the following account of the siege of Taskhend:—"In the middle of May 1865, after two days' investment, Cherniayeff captured the fort that guards the water supply of the city, and, by cutting the channels, reduced the inhabitants to such distress that they promised to fall on the garrison as soon as the Russian force attacked the walls. But the accomplishment of this plan was prevented by the arrival in the city of Alim Kul himself, with a large force, which he straightway led out against the Russians. His troops were however driven back with loss, and he himself was mortally wounded. In him died the last Khokandi who had spirit or ability enough to offer resistance to the Russian arms; but his death only added strength to the Bukhara faction, which he had always bitterly opposed; and, as the Amir was known to be approaching, the party in favour of opening the gates to the Russians was intimidated. Cherniayeff then sent a detachment to the other side of the city to capture the fort of Chinaz, which guarded the nearest passage of the Jaxartes from the side of Bukhara. The possession of this little place enabled him to cut the Taskhendis off from their supply of food, and, after six weeks' investment, he escaladed the walls one night. This was an especially daring attempt, seeing that he had with him only 1,950 men, while the city was supposed (erroneously, however) to contain a population of over 150,000 souls, and the defenders were believed to number 30,000. And in fact, after the walls had been mastered, it was not till after two days of street fighting that resistance was finally overcome."


"Taskhend, with a population of 300,000, is the centre of commerce, and Islamism covers an area of nearly twelve versets, and lies literally in a forest of fruit trees. The town is irregularly built. The inhabitants are peaceably inclined, and fond of commercial speculations. Living is extremely cheap. The town, even at that time a place of considerable traffic, might some future day become the chief emporium of Central Asia; for here assemble merchants from the whole of Asia, not excepting the most distant parts of India."—Von Hellwald. See also Lumley's Report on the Russian Trade with Central Asia, p. 283.

* By an Ukase of the 30th July 1864, the Russian frontier was then declared to be the line of forts established along the north of the Karataghi range from Vernoe to Yani Kurgan. When, however, the news of this decree had reached the army, the line of frontier had advanced 100 miles further into Khokand territory.
demoralisation which induce them to seek protection against the violence of totally unsubdued and hence more formidable tribes beyond. His Highness goes on to deplore the consequent necessity of a civilized nation, in that plight, being obliged from year to year to advance its frontier; and ends with the announcement, that henceforth the boundary of the Czar’s Empire shall be the line of the lower Jaxartes, diverging to Chamkand, and passing along the north of the Karatgah range to Lake Issik-kul. Before, however, this decree reached the newly-fixed frontier, Tashkand was taken, and the circular of the Chancellor was stultified.

The principal places of Khokand had now all fallen into the hands of the Russians, and the puppet ruler slipped away from under the shadow of Bukhara to the protection of Russia. "He had to surrender the valleys of the Jaxartes from Mehrem onwards down the whole course of the river; to open his cities to Russian subjects, and give security for their property; and over and above all this to pay over to the Russian territory a war indemnity, which will most undoubtedly cripple him for years to come. His power is reduced to a perfect shadow; and at his death the whole of this, the easternmost Khanate, will, as a matter of course, be incorporated with the dominions of the Russian Empire!"

Mr. Talboys Wheeler, in his summary of affairs in the Foreign Department, 1864-69, gives us the following table indicating the modern history of Khokand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mahomed Ali Khan opened communication with Russia</td>
<td>1835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposed and executed by the Bukhara Amir</td>
<td>1821-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim, Lieutenant, from Bukhara, who was driven out by a general insurrection</td>
<td>1841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shere Ali Khan murdered</td>
<td>1841-1844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murad Beg I. assassinated after 17 days</td>
<td>1844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khodayar Khan, 1st reign</td>
<td>1844-1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance of Russia to the Syr-Daria</td>
<td>1844-1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khodayar Khan compelled to fly to Bukhara, 1844-1859</td>
<td>1844-1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malle Khan — treaty with Bukhara, 1860</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance of Russia towards Tashkand, 1859-1861</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdayar Khan, 2nd reign, a vassal of the Bukhara Amir, 1861-1862</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syed Mahomed Khan, a mere boy, who reigned with the assistance of the Minister Alam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kul, 1862-1865. Khudayar Khan, 3rd reign, deserts Bukhara and becomes the vassal of Russia, 1865-1868.

Notes.—The following somewhat romantic incident is worth being put upon record:—

“In August 1867, the wife of the Russian General at Tashkand paid a visit to Khudayar Khan, the ruler of Khokand, attended by eighteen Cossack horsemen and six Russian females. A party of Khokand officials, together with a hundred horse and foot, were sent by Khudayar Khan to escort the lady into the capital. In this manner the lady entered the city of Khokand by the Bukhara gate, and on arriving at the royal fort and palace was welcomed with a salute of fifteen guns, on which she presented the gunners with a hundred ratiskas, about eight rupees and a half. Khudayar Khan received her at the gate of the fort, and welcomed her in Oriental fashion with joined hands. The lady returned his salute, shook hands with him, and enquired after his health in the Russian style, and was conducted to a seat in the public hall. Her hair was interwined with gold thread, and decked with bunches of pearls; her cap was of the famous Bukhara lamb-skin with gold border; the buttons of her coat were of gold; her gown was of China silk, and she wore a purple neckchief. While visiting the Khan’s harem, she presented four strings of pearls with an attar dhan to his principal wife, which she placed round her neck with her own hands. She also gave to the Khan’s mother a gold chain studded with precious stones, with a picture of the Empress attached. She also gave presents of Russian cloths to the other ladies of the harem. The lady conveyed to the Khan salutation from the General, and stated that the General considered the Khan to be his right-hand man. She added that she had seen the Khan’s picture at Orenburg, and was happy now to behold him in person,” &c., &c.

“Khokand is about 300 miles from Bukhara. The ‘Khan Hazrat,’ as the chief who boasts a descent from the Emperor Baber styles himself, receives (1862) by permission of the Chinese Government the customs duties realized on the dealings of Mahomedans at Yarkand and Kashghar, and is thus interested in the preservation of commerce. The rulers of this state have shown themselves less bigoted and exclusive than those of Bukhara. They have occasionally sent envoys to Constantinople, Pekin, and India, colonies of Jews have found refuge under them, and have introduced the art of dyeing. The exiles of Badakshan also formerly sought the same asylum from the tyranny of Murad Beg of Kunduz. The capital is well populated and adorned with spacious bazaars and colleges. Wheeled carts or arabahs are common. The people of the districts consist of Kirghiz, Kazaks, and Kipchaks. The revenue of the state is estimated at about 27 lakhs of rupees.”—Trade Report by Mr. R. H. Davies.
CHAPTER V.

BUKHARA.

The Czar to Mr. Forsyth:—"It is not Russia's fault that she has been drawn on to Bukhara."

The Amir* declined† to afford that protection to Russian merchants which the Czar demanded, nor would he release the Russians known to be in captivity in Bukhara. And, at length, when all apprehensions of an English invasion had been removed by our disasters in Affghanistan—a few weeks after the execution of Stoddart (see Ferrier, p. 129) and Conolly,—the Russian representative was dismissed with circumstances of marked discourtesy. Five years later the Russians built the fort Aralsk, already spoken of, in order that they might thus be able to stretch out a protecting arm to their trading caravans. In the meanwhile Russia came into collision with Khokand, and hostilities, interrupted indeed by the Crimean war, lasted until 1865, when Bukhara, foolishly interfering in the affairs of her hitherto more unfortunate neighbour, came once more face to face with the armies of the Czar. In the autumn of this year General Cherniayeff commanding the advanced Russian forces, ten days after having captured Tashkand, feeling convinced—as he had every reason to feel—of the inimical designs of the Amir of Bukhara, who was near at hand with a considerable and lately victorious army, arrested all the subjects of His Highness in Russian Turkestan, and prevented an ambassador proceeding to St. Petersburg.‡ A little later, however, the General having deputed four civil and military officers to arrange matters with the

* "M. De Negri was sent with presents and a letter from the Emperor Alexander to the Amir. The incidents of the mission, with much valuable information regarding Bukhara, were recorded by his companion Baron Von Myendorf in an interesting work that has lately been translated by Capt. Chapman, R.A."—Quarterly Review, April 1874, p. 401.—See Reisen in Bukhara: Khanikoff, 1863.

† "A curious commentary on this is the following from Perofski's Narrative of the Russian Military Expedition to Khiva. "Bukhara had ever been eager, even since the mission of Denovene, sent there by Peter the Great in 1733, to sustain a commercial intercourse with Russia."

‡ The eminent astronomer Colonel Von Struve was Chief of this mission, and published an account of it. The portion relating to Geography was translated into French in the Bulletin de la Société de Géographie, September 1866, pp. 265-296.
Amir, was placed in the awkward predicament of having his envoys
imprisoned until he should accept the alternative of permitting the
Amir’s Ambassador to go on his way.* Cherniayeff, highly enraged, led a force of 1,700 men across the
desert lying between the Jaxartes and the nearest
cultivation on the side of Bukhara; but finding, too late, that this little
army was insufficient to procure, even * vi et * armis, forage and provisions,
he was obliged to return, and for the failure of the expedition† was punish-
ed by the loss of his command. He was succeeded
by Romanovski, ‡ who found the whole force in
Turkistan under his command less than 13,000, the
administration greatly disorganised, and the Amir§ of Bukhara close at
hand with a great army. On the 19th of May, however, within a
few weeks of his arrival, the new Russian General, having massed
all his available troops, attacked the Amir’s en-
trenched camp at Irjar, and utterly routed an
Army of 40,000 well equipped Bukhariot soldiers.
Guns, treasure, and camp equipage fell into his hands, and 1,000|| of
the enemy lay dead on the field. Following up his success, he at once

* Vide “La Russie et L’Angleterre dans L’Asie centrale,” Revue des Deux Mondes, 1867,
pp. 603-606.

† The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan:—“Prince Gortchakow replied that he could
take no exception to anything I had said, and particularly with regard to the military commanders
(Lord Clarendon had said that England well knew “how difficult it was from a great distance
to control the ambition of military commanders”) who had all exceeded their instructions, and who
constantly, one after the other, had been recalled; and he made special allusion to General
Cherniayeff, whose talents and bravery were remarkable.”

‡ Author of “Notes on the Central-Asiatic Question” (in Russian), St. Petersburg, 1888.

§ Throughout the war with Bukhara, the Russian losses were absurdly small. The Bukharians
got the credit of being cowards among the Asiatics. In 1872 a mêlée took place in the Amir’s palace,
and half a dozen Afghans in Shere Ali’s suite are said to have put the whole bodyguard to flight.

|| The Russians had 12 men wounded only, according to some accounts.

“A decisive battle was fought at Irjar on the left bank of the Jaxartes, some miles north-west of
Khojend; the Russian artillery opened up a way through the wooded ranks of the Ozbeg cavalry,
and when the handful of Russians charged, their mere appearance was enough to throw the enemy
into confusion and cause a precipitate flight southward. The whole camp, including the Amir’s
magnificent tent, and the entire park of artillery, was abandoned, and Mozuffar-Uddin himself
escaped with difficulty to Jizzak. The loss of the Bukharians amounted to about 1,000 men, the
Manghuts of Karshi, the elite of the army, suffered most severely of all; but the Russian killed
and wounded were only about 50. This battle of Irjar proved the Cannoise of Turkistan, for it cost
her her independence as a country, which she had successfully asserted during a thousand years,
and the whole cause of Islamism in Central Asia may be said to have received a deadly blow.”—
Vambéry.
took the fort of Nau; and a week later the great commercial emporium of Khojand, on the Jaxartes. The Amir now sent back the Russian envoys, released the Russian traders, and wanted to know on what conditions Romanovski would make peace. That he should acknowledge the sovereignty of Russia over the region recently conquered, reduce the rates on Russian merchandise to those levied in Russia on that from Bukhara, and finally pay some £50,000 as an indemnity for the cost of the late campaign, were the conditions offered in reply. To the last of these the Amir’s envoy objected, whereupon the Governor-General† of Orenburg, who had lately arrived on the scene of action, gave him ten days to pay the indemnity, and added,‡ among fresh terms, that he must give his consent to the establishment of a Russian Consul in Bukhara, the erection of rest-houses expressly for the use of Russian traders, and the equalisation of the imposts upon traders. These conditions not being complied with at the expiration of the fixed period, the Russian columns marched from the Jaxartes, bombarded and took the strong forts of Ura-tippa and Jizakh—the latter commanding the narrow pass that leads into the rich valley of Samarkand—and seized the little stronghold of Yani Kurghan at the southern mouth of the defile. Having gone so far, the Russian commander issued a proclamation to the people of Bukhara,§ repudiating the notion that Russia

* "No agent has been found more apt for the progress of civilization than commercial relations. Their development requires everywhere order and stability; but in Asia it demands a complete transformation of the habits of the people. The first thing to be taught to the populations of Asia is, that they will gain more in favoring and protecting the caravan trade than in robbing them (sic). These elementary ideas can only be accepted by the public where one exists; that is to say, where there is some organised form of society and a Government to direct and represent it. We are accomplishing the first part of our task in carrying our frontier to the limit where the indispensable conditions are to be found."—Prince Gortchakow’s Circular, Nov. 21, 1864.

† Kryjanovski.

‡ The enhanced terms were justifiable, as it was known that the Amir was attempting to profit by delay, and making warlike preparations.

§ Judging from official proclamations and declarations, it would appear that nothing was further from the intentions of Russia than territorial aggrandisement. When General Romanovski took command in Turkistan, his instructions included the following:—"While striving undeviatingly to avoid the extension of absolute dominion in Central Asia, it is not advisable that we should refrain from such operations and arrangements as might be indispensably necessary; and, generally, the true interests of Russia should be kept in view."
entertained any designs on the independence of the Khanate, and adding that another period would be acceded to the Amir for the fulfilment of the conditions of peace.

In the autumn of 1866, the Amir of Bukhara sent to Calcutta a distinguished member of the priestly order to beg for aid against Russia. In the years 1864 and 1865 similar missions had been despatched from Khokand. *Sir John Lawrence returned in each case the same answer, that our Government would not interfere, and that his advice was that they should accede to the reasonable demands of Russia. From Calcutta, the Bukhara envoy went to Constantinople; it being the opinion of the Amir that a word from the Sultan† could arrest the advance of Russia. But from Turkey no more encouragement was received than from India. Despairing of help, the Amir made one other desperate effort to shake off his unwelcome neighbours, and sent a considerable army against the Russian outpost at Yani Kurghan. This force dissolved without showing a fight, at the first shots fired. While this army was marching forth with all the bravery of kettledrums and religious war-cries, a Bukharian envoy was toiling alone the road to Orenburg, sent to discover what demands the Russian Governor-General still persisted in. Nothing came of this mission,‡ but a Bukharian fort having fired on a Russian force, whose approach it supposed to be hostile, the Russian Government determined to add, in the shape of a fine, another item to its demands. The Bukhara populace were frantic with rage. Kaufmann began to advance towards Samarkand, and at the river he found the army of Bukhara drawn up on the oppo-

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* With reference to Lord Lawrence's answers, Mr. J. W. S. Wyllie's articles in the Quarterly and Fortnightly Reviews should be consulted.—See Quarterly Review, January 1867, "Foreign Policy of Sir J. Lawrence."—The Fortnightly Review, March 1st, 1870, "Mischievous Activity."—The Fortnightly Review, December 1st, 1869, "Masterly Activity."

† The Sultan being the head of Islam.

‡ “The Russian detachments, and the Kirghiz under their protection, were continually harrassed along the whole line of the Jaxartes by bands of plunderers, who had started into being on the break-up of the Khokandian and Bukharian regular armies; accordingly, in 1868, a small body of Russians was sent to seize one of the principal seats of these robber bands at Ukhum, on the northern slope of the Nura-Lagh hills. After succeeding in this object, they went on to the small Bukharian fort of Nura-Tagh, the commander of which fired on them and drove them off.”—Quarterly Review.
site bank. In the face of an ill-directed fire he forded the stream, captured 21 guns, and utterly routed the Asiatic host with an inconsiderable loss* on the part of his own forces. The citizens of Samarkand ceded to the Czar.

Samarkand ceded to the Czar.

and on the next day opened them to the victorious Russians. Samarkand was ceded to the Czar, an indemnity of £40,000 was promised, the duties on Russian merchandize were reduced, and free trade between Bukhara and Russia was finally established. The Czar,† however, directed the speedy evacuation of Samarkand, and issued orders that the people of Bukhara should be assured of his pacific intentions, and of his determination to push Russian territory no further. Kaufmann was unwilling, however, to give up a place.§ that

* The Russians had 3 killed and 30 wounded.
† Vide Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, 1869, No. 26, and 1872, No. 325.
‡ In the meanwhile the Amir was involved in fresh troubles with his son and the Governors of Hissar, Deh-i-nan, and Kulab, who went into revolt. Eventually, however, they were all subdued.
§ Agriculture in Bukhara entirely depends on Samarkand, because the upper course of the Zerafshan, which supplies the fields and gardens of Bukhara with water, flows through Russian territory.

Samarkand.—"On May 14th, 1868, the Russian Christians took possession of Samarkand, the once-splendid capital of Timour, the birth-place and the grave of so many men distinguished in the annals of Islam, and the brilliant centre of old Mahomedan learning. With Samarkand the best part of Transoxania was transferred from the hands of the Ozbeg dynasty of Manghit to the house of Romanoff. The first conqueror of the country, so far as we know, was Alexander (the Macedonian), and another Alexander (II. of Russia) has been the last. Two thousand years ago Samarkand paid tribute to a small country in the south of Europe, now it is governed from a northern capital of the same continent, and if we take into consideration all it has gone through in the interval during the struggles of so many different dynasties at the hands of Greeks, Arabs, Turks, Mongolians, and Ozbegs, it would be difficult to find another spot in Asia with so chequered a history of sunny and stormy days to compare with it."

Prince Gortchakow to the Earl of Clarendon, September 3, 1869 (officially recorded conversation):-"Prince Gortchakow then proceeded to say that I was right in thinking that Bukhara might at any moment be taken, because it depended for its supply of water upon Samarkand, which was in the possession of Russia, but that it was the intention of the Emperor not to retain Samarkand, and he could give no better proof of His Majesty's determination not to proceed farther southwards; certain arrangements had to be made and were not yet completed with the Amir of Bukhara. It was the intention, however, of the Russian Government to demand 1,000,000 roubles for the expenses of war, and to allow ample time for payment, about which no difficulty was anticipated, as the revenue of Samarkand was 300,000 roubles per annum." Prince Gortchakow to Sir A. Buchanan, December 1st, 1869:—"I (Sir A. B.) expressed a hope that the Emperor's intention of retiring from Samarkand would be carried out, as such a measure would have a powerful influence in promoting tranquillity in Central Asia; but when I pressed him for an answer on this point, he spoke of the necessity of first obtaining guarantees against aggression in future from Bukhara, adding that he hoped, as the Bukharian envoy now there had convinced himself of the power of Russia and of her desire to live on friendly terms with the Amir, that a satisfactory arrangement might be made on his return."
commanded the water-supply of Bukhara, and as the indemnity was not paid, Samarkand remained, and still remains, in the hands of Russia. In 1871 Kaufmann handed over to Bukhara the troublesome but fertile little Begship of Shahr-i-Sabz.* Almost simultaneously three districts on the upper waters of the Zerafshan were annexed by Kaufmann, thus bringing Russian territory up to the borders of the hill State of Karategin. One cannot doubt but that this little principality will (if this has not occurred already) share the fate of its neighbours, and be eventually “assimilated.” When this happens, Russia† and Afghanistan will be conterminous.‡

Notes on Bukhara.


“Bukhara itself, the capital, the seat of Government, and of all learning, and the centre of considerable trade and manufactures, is one of the dirtiest and most unhealthy places in all Asia, numbering at the outside 30,000 inhabitants” (cf. Burnes II., p.

* Shahr-i-Sabz had for two or three years previously maintained a precarious existence, and had even ventured to afford shelter to the enemies of Russia.

† Having now completed their embrace of Khokand territory.

‡ Russia being then in almost immediate contiguity with the Afghan outposts in Shignan, at the head of the Oxus.

Note.—The arms of the power of the north were next turned against the neighbouring Prince of Bukhara, and after a brief and successful struggle the sacred city of Samarkand was taken, the Russians attained the banks of the Oxus, and the vanquished Khan is now a mere vassal of the mighty potentate who rules on the Neva. The characteristic feature of all this contest was that the discipline and skill of the West overpowered without difficulty the vain resistance of the once formidable Tatar races; and though the hardships of the conquerors were great, and they displayed their well-known endurance and courage, they found no foesmen worthy of their steel, and a few hundred Russians could always scatter thousands of their ill-trained and ill-armed antagonists.—The Times.

“And for the rest, the Russians are doing their utmost to settle down as quickly as possible, and trying to make themselves comfortable in Central Asia. Even at present they feel quite at home in Turkistan. Tashkand now boasts of its casinos, balls, and soirees musicales just like any European town. Coal mines of a very promising character have been opened. Energetic measures have been taken to lay down a Railway from Samara to Orenburg and from thence to Tashkand and Khokand.”—Hellwald.

Churches and Clubs have been opened at Tashkand, Khodjend, and Samarkand: in the first named city there is even a newspaper (Turkistan News), and the melancholy monotony of the muezzin’s chant is broken by the cheerful sounds of the bells of the Greek Churches. A Russian hospital and store-house is established in the once-splendid palace of Timour, whither in olden times embassies from all the
184. Myendorff's estimate is 2,478,000), "of which the larger proportion still belong to the Iranian race, which has maintained so far the commercial and industrial reputation of the city. The only traces of former splendour are to be found in the foundations of a few mosques and remains of the palace, dating from the pre-Islamite period.

Karshi. *Vide* Moorcroft, Karshi is the second city of the Khanate, both for trade and manufactures, and also for the number of its inhabitants. Next to Karshi, Samarkand, which is rich in ruins, used to be pointed out especially as the resting place of many hundred saints. It is celebrated for fruit, for leather and cotton manufactories, for cream, and for skilfully-enamelled wooden saddles. According to Feljenko's estimate, it contains 30,000 inhabitants and eighty-six mosques, 23 colleges, 1,846 shops, and 27 caravanserais. But Samarkand and Kette Karghan, where the best boots in the Khanate are manufactured, have both fallen under foreign dominion, so that Kerminah must now be reckoned the third in rank of the cities of Bukhara.

Kerminah.

Hissar.

Kette Karghan.

Chiharjui.

Karakol.

*Vambro's History of Bukhara.*

"The Khanate of Bukhara contains some 5,600 square miles, lying between the 37th and 43rd degrees of N. Lat., and the 80th and 88th degrees E. Long. Only five or six hundred square miles are inhabited by a stationary population; the remainder consists of steppe or desert, on which the wandering Uzbegs pitch their felt Kibitki, and tend their flocks of horses or sheep. The total population is estimated at two millions. It is composed of Uzbegs of various clans, some of whom live in villages and others are nomad; of black-skinned Arabs, who are chiefly engaged in breeding sheep; of the aboriginal Tajiks, chiefly inhabiting the city of Bukhara; and of the descendants of the Persians formerly transported from Merv. The Uzbegs greatly preponderate, and the ruling family is of this tribe. The capital (Lat. 39° 40', N.; Long, 64° 45'E.) in past ages successively destroyed by Jhengiz Khan, restored by Taimur Lang, and spared by Nadir Shah, is about 15 days' journey from Khiva. It has a religious celebrity among the Mahomedans, contains numerous double-storied colleges, with open quadrangles, in which the study of the Law, and of the *hikmah* (worldly wisdom) is pursued under the superintendence of lecturers. About half the land revenue is alienated in behalf of these institutions."—*Trade Report of Mr. R. H. Davies.* Khamiokff estimates the population at between 60,000 and 70,000 souls; Burnes puts it down at 150,000; McCulloch at from 100,000 to 150,000.

princes of Asia came to do homage and bring offerings, whither the proud King of Castilo himself sent his ambassadors humbly to sue for friendship."
"Bukhara, which is the richest, most populous, and most powerful (of the three Khanates), is an isolated kingdom of small extent in the midst of a desert. It is an open champaign country of unequal fertility. In the vicinity of its few rivers the soil is rich, but beyond them it is barren and unproductive. On the banks of the Oxus, the Kobik and the river of Karshi, lies the whole cultivable soil of the kingdom."—Malte-Brun, p. 778.


CHAPTER VI.

KHIVA.*

Despatch to Lord Clarendon from Sir A. Buchanan, December 1st, 1869:—"I (Sir A. B.) spoke to Prince Gortchakow yesterday of the alleged intention of the Russian Government to despatch a military expedition to Khiva, and he denied positively the existence of any such intention, repeating what he had formerly stated as to the proposed establishment of a factory protected by a small garrison at Krasnovodsk, for the purpose of at once opening a shorter commercial route to Central Asia, and of acting as a warning to the Khan of Khiva that he is within reach of punishment if he renews his intrigues among the Kirghiz; but unless such provocation is given, there is no idea, His Excellency said, of going to war with him, and much less of occupying his country, the possession of which would be only an embarrassment to the Government. In support of this statement, he read a despatch to the same effect, which he had written to Baron Brunnow. Prince Gortchakow's language was so apparently sincere, that, notwithstanding the strong grounds which exist for believing that an expedition is preparing against Khiva, I shall endeavour to hope," &c., &c.

In 1700 and 1703 Khivan chiefs offered homage to the Czar. Eleven years later, Peter the Great, desirous of opening a channel for Russian trade through Central Asia with India, ordered Prince Bekovitch

*Khiva, in the twelfth century of our era under the Khwariziman princes who revolted successfully against the Seljukides, played a very important part in the history of Asia. The dominion of these rulers extended over Bukhara, Khorassan, and part of Persia. The Moghal invasion, however, obliterated nearly every vestige of their greatness. Early in the sixteenth century, the Khanate passed into the hands of four brothers, whose descendants, the Maks, held patriarchal sway over the four tribes (descendants of the adherents of these brothers) among which the Khivans are divided. They, however, acknowledged the supremacy of Bukhara. Abulghazi, in the seventeenth century, repudiated this supremacy, and though repeatedly forced to re-acknowledge it, his successors never ceased to re-assert their independence. The last of this
Cherkaski to lead to Khiva an army of 6,000 men,* in order to estab-
lish that supremacy which had been already admitted by the rulers of Khiva, Khan Shaniaz and Khan Aran-Naamet. Accordingly, in 1717, after preparations which lasted for three years, a Russian force started from the north-east shore of the Caspian, and found itself, after a few months of difficult marching, on the confines of the Khanate. Here, however, "notwithstanding† this indisputable claim of Russia to Khiva, and that the Russian Government only sought to obtain one thing, that is, protection for the Russian trade in Central Asia," the Khivans behaved in the most unfriendly manner, attacked the Russian columns with considerable ferocity, afterwards deluded Bekovitch into accepting peaceful overtures, and, finally, having distributed his half-starved troops among a number of villages, where food was promised, murdered them almost to a man.

dynasty was killed in 1741 by Nadir Shah, and the four rival tribes passed under the sway of the neighbouring Kirghiz chieftain leader of that portion of the "Little Horde" who call themselves the "Kazzaks of the Uurst-Urt." A Kirghiz representative was now stationed at Khiva. After many struggles, however, the Khivans, towards the end of the eighteenth century, shook off the authority of the nomads, and even ventured on an expedition against Bukhara, which had attempted to re-impose its supremacy. They were led by an able commander, who had usurped the kingly office, a man of courage and great force of character. Although defeated in this enterprise, this usurper succeeded in establishing that dynasty, which through unparalleled scenes of bloodshed and cruelty preserved the independence of Khiva until the arrival of the Russians.

* In addition to this object, Bekovitch received instructions to explore the Oxus.
† Perofski's Narrative, p. 30.

Note a.—"Khiva is poorly cultivated, and inhabited chiefly by Uzbeg and Turcoman hordes, who, clothed in coarse linen or woollen, subsisting on a little corn, millet, and milk, and mounted on the high-bred horses of the Turcoman steppes, are notorious for the length and rapidity of their plundering expeditions. Abbott reckons the area of the State at 450,000 square miles, and the population at 2,450,000 souls. The journey from Khiva to Orenburg occupies from 25 to 30 days. The manufactures of Khiva consist of inferior felts, swords, and daggers.—Trade Report, Mr. R. H. Davies."

Note b.—"Thus from the very commencement of the 13th century, the Khivans had chosen five Khans who were Russian subjects. In 1700 Khan Shah Niaaz paid voluntary homage to Russia, in 1703 Khan Aran Na-amet did the same. Abul Khair Khan and his son Nur Ali both Russian subjects ruled over Khiva till 1750, and Khan Kaif, another Russian subject, held the same position from 1770 to 1780. Hence arises the prescriptive right of Russia to the Khanate of Khiva." Narrative of Russ. Exped. to Khiva, translated by J. Michell.

Note c.—"The Khanate of Khiva, more generally called Orgunjo by its inhabitants, lies about 200 miles W. N. W. of Bukhara. It is a small but fertile territory occupying the delta of the Oxus and surrounded by deserts. It claims the dominion of the deserts which border the Caspian, and has of late years established its supremacy over the Turcoman hordes south of the Oxus. It is the ancient Kharian, and is mentioned by Arrian under the name of the "country of the Chorasmii." It contains only two places of note, New Orgunjo and Khiva; the former of which is
A quarter of a century afterwards, Khiva came to be closely associated with certain Kirghiz tribes; and one indeed, a feudatory of Russia, exercised a paramount influence in Khivan affairs.† "The gradual installation of order and tranquillity in the Orenburg region was favorable to the maintenance of commercial relations with the neighbouring khanates of Khiva and Bukhara, but disturbances in the steppes occasionally broke out, which secondary causes were principally created by the unfriendly attitude of the Khivans towards Russia. Assuming power over the tribes wandering near Khiva, over the Kirghizes under Russian subjection, over the Karakalpaks‡ and Turcomans, the Khivans exacted tribute from those tribes by violence and oppression, while Khivan emissaries, penetrating into the Kirghiz steppes with trade caravans and under the guise of Mullahs, excited religious fanaticism and hatred between the tribes, and not only incited them to plunder caravans, but to attack the line and the Russian fish-traders for the purpose of making prisoners and selling them as slaves in the Khivan market." In 1819, a mission was accordingly sent to Khiva under Captain Mouravief to remonstrate with the Khan; but nothing came of it. The Khivans were as troublesome as ever. They compelled all Russian caravans destined for Central Asia to pass through Khiva, where excessive duties were imposed, and to enforce this demand, they plundered all recalcitrant merchants.

The commercial capital, the latter the residence of the Khan. Khiva supplies Bukhara and all Turkistan with slaves, and is said to contain about 2,000 Russian slaves. They, however, grant protection to caravans on payment of fixed duty. The Russian cabinet has long attempted, but without success, to form a connexion with Khiva, not only for commercial purposes, but for the suppression of the practice of enslaving its subjects."—Malte-Brun, New ed., London, 1859, p. 180.—Cf. McCulloch’s Geog. Dict., Vol. III., p. 89.

* Peroński’s Narrative, p. 41, and Quarterly Review, No. 272, p. 421.
† Peroński.
‡ "The Karakalpaks swore allegiance to Russia in 1732, and the Turcomans in 1791."
§ "Captain Mouravief published, in 1822, an account of his travels to Turkmania and Khiva."

This work is abundantly illustrated with sketches, tables, and charts. Captain Mouravief advocates the occupation of Khiva on the grounds that:—"In Russian hands it would become the emporium of Asiatic trade, and would shake to the centre the commercial superiority of the Masters of the Seas."—Mouravief stated the number of Russian slaves in the Khanate to be 30,000; Abbott gives the total number at 700,000.
Russia therefore sent a detachment under General Herzberg* to punish those who would not yield her submission, and to repel the marauding Kirghiz. This however proved a failure, being organised on too small a scale. During 1820 and 1830, on the recommendation of General Essen,† recourse was had as before to the plan of sending out occasional expeditionary forces to preserve order in the steppe, and placing the caravans under armed escorts. In 1820, a Russian embassy went to Bukhara (simultaneously with Mouraviev’s mission to Khiva) “with the object of concerting measures with the Khan of Bukhara for ensuring and strengthening commercial relations.” The Khan, however, did not feel disposed to undertake the protection of caravans passing through the Kirghiz steppes, although willing to welcome them on arrival at his capital.

A caravan was accordingly sent to Bukhara in 1824 under the protection of 500 Russian soldiers; it was met, however, by Khivans, who plundered part of it, and forced the remainder to return. A report got wind in 1825-26, owing to the appearance of a surveying party between the Caspian and Aral, that the Czar was preparing to send a punitive expedition against Khiva; and the Khanate sent an envoy to the Sarai-chikovski Fort with an elephant, as a peace offering for the Czar. But the envoy was not allowed to proceed to St. Petersburg, as he would not accept certain conditions laid down by the Russian authorities at the Fort. So he returned to Khiva, giving out that he could not come to terms with the Russian Government as to the route by which he should travel to St. Peters burg.

Caravan plundered by Khivans, 1824.

Khivan Envoy sent to the Czar, and not allowed to proceed.

* Colonel Strukof, attached to the expedition, kept a diary, which has, I believe, since been published.

† "By a decision of the Asiatic Committee, in 1823, Colonel Berg was despatched to examine the condition of affairs on the spot. In the month of December of the same year, the Council, on the strength of the reports of General Essen and Colonel Berg, decided—1st, to divide the little Kirghiz Horde, which was under Russian subjection, into two parts, the eastern and western, and to place over them two Sultan rulers; 2nd, to protect the Orenburg line by fortifying it, and increasing its military force; and, 3rd, to establish a company which would carry on the caravan trade under the protection of military escorts.”—Perofski’s Narrative.

‡ 1st. That the Khan of Khiva should indemnify the Russian traders for all the losses they had sustained by the attack on their caravan in 1824; 2nd, the return of all Russian prisoners in Khiva, and strict prohibition of the traffic in slaves for the future.
Khiva.

Plundering caravans, and inciting the Kirghiz to commit similar depredations were, however, among the lesser crimes laid at the door of the Khanate. The traffic in kidnapped* Russian fishermen carried on by the Khivan Government with the pirates of the Caspian was a more serious matter.† "Incited by the high prices fetched by Russians, the Kirghizes kidnapped them even on the line, and disposed of them in the neighbouring cities of Central Asia, principally at Khiva, where, according to information received at the time, there were more than 2,000 Russians in bondage. In remote times men were seized from settlements in the interior, even on the Volga, and beyond that river; but about the year 1830 Russian fishermen on the Caspian were exclusively kidnapped by Kirghizes and Turkmens at the rate of 200 every year. Russian prisoners were sold at Khiva in the bazaars, and this traffic was participated in, not only by the highest Khivan officials, but by Khivan traders, who visited Russia every year, and who, when frequenting the Kirghiz encampments for the purposes of trade, incited the Kirghizes to take prisoners, buying them up beforehand and giving money in anticipation." Various means were taken by the Russian Government to stop this slave trade, and release the unhappy men who had already been taken. Ransoms were offered, hostages from the kidnapping Kirghiz tribes were seized, and a military expedition was threatened; but all in vain. The Kirghiz, instigated by Khiva, became more and more troublesome. Flying columns were sent out at different times to chastise offending clans. These succeeded in their immediate object; but could effect no permanent improvement. In 1839 the Czar, unable to stand it any longer, determined to strike a blow at Khiva, the centre of the evil. In the winter of 1839-40, General Perovski started for Khiva with a force of 5,217 men; but owing to the terrible severity of the weather (the temperature sank at times to 35° Fahr. below zero), and

* Bukhara participated in this slave trade.
† Extracts from notes in the Archives of the Orenburg Corps.
‡ It was originally intended that the expedition should start in the spring of 1840, but news of the English movement into Afghanistan precipitated, unfortunately, the plans of the Imperial Government. The expenses of this expedition, as estimated by the Russian Government, amounted to £70,000. The Afghan war cost us £16,000,000.
the consequent mortality among the baggage animals, he was forced to return without effecting his object. Good was done notwithstanding. The Khan felt that he had only been saved by the elements, and hearing that a second expedition was being prepared,* he released 416 Russian captives, and forbade the slavery of Russian subjects. In 1842 a treaty of peace and commerce was concluded between the Czar and the Khan, and a period of peace ensued. But after some years had elapsed, the kidnapping of Russian subjects and the disturbances† among the Kirghiz re-commenced. The latter disquietude was owing, it is said, to a premature attempt to conquer the nomadic habits of the horde by means of an unelastic system of internal administration. In 1869, restlessness and discontent broke out into open rebellion on the enhancement of the tax levied from each tent. Caravans were plundered, one small military detachment was cut to pieces, and another was surrounded,

* "An Indian officer, Captain (Sir Richmond) Shakespear, who visited Khiva about this time, had the pleasure of contributing, by his counsel, to this happy result, and of escorting the liberated slaves back to Russia. A previous visitor, Captain Abbott, had endeavoured, but in vain, to procure their release."—The Quarterly Review, No. 272.

† These disturbances among the Kirghiz, fomented, as they were, by Khiva, led to the conclusion "that what was needed to secure the permanent repose of the tract was a military post (south of any that already existed on the east coast of the Caspian), the occupation of which would enable Russian troops to operate on the line of communication between Khiva and the Kirghiz tribes. And the project being once started, further arguments in its favour were found in the unsuitability of the line of the Jaxartes as a highway for the enormously increased commerce between Russia and Central Asia; in the tediousness and expense of traffic by the other round-about route; in the belief that the Oxus had once flowed into the Caspian, and could be turned back into its old course with ease; and, lastly, in the apprehension that the opening of the Suez Canal would give a great impetus to England's trade in the East, so that, unless some new and better trade route were made available, Russian commerce with these regions was doomed."—Ivarnin has the following:—From Krasnovodsk to Khiva (Captain Mouravief's route in 1819). This route, although the shortest, being only 600 versts in length from the Balkhan Bay, is not abundant in pasturage and water: besides, the Turkomans who wander here are dependent on Khiva, and any Russian force, were it to follow this route, could not rely on procuring horses, camels, sheep, and guides from the wandering native tribes, who are more likely to display hostility or treacherously feign co-operation."—Pereski's Narrative, p. 81.
suffered considerable loss, and made a very narrow escape. In the Ming-Kishlah peninsula a party of Cossacks, under Colonel Roukine, the Collector of the tent tax, were cut off, and he, with a number of others, was sent captive to Khiva. Fort Alexandrovsk was attacked, and only saved through the opportune arrival of troops by forced marches.

The army in the steppe was now, however, strongly reinforced. Flying columns created a feeling of wholesome alarm, and in the autumn of 1871 peace was restored. Two years later the grievances of the Kirghiz were redressed.

Towards the end of the year 1869 a few troops of the army of the Caucasus landed at Krasnovodsk* Bay on the eastern shore of the Caspian repelled with ease the attacks of the Turkomans who resented the intrusion, and made several expeditions into the interior with a view of discovering whether the Oxus could be turned back into what was supposed by some to be its old bed.† “Prince Gorchakov said that the proposed establishment on the Bay of Krasnovodsk would be merely a factory, which would, however, of course require to be protected by a small armed force, but it was incorrect to speak of it as a fort. He said its object would be entirely commercial, as it would open a shorter caravan route to Central Asia, and also give increased security to trade by restraining the predatory practices of the Turkomans, and by warning the Khan of Khiva that hostility on his part would not be tolerated hereafter.” In the same year General Kauffmann wrote a letter of remonstrance to the Khan of Khiva, urging him to release the Russian captives, to protect caravans, and cease instigating the Kirghiz to com-

*Krasnovodsk Bay is an inlet in the Bay of Balkan, into which the Oxus flowed in former times. It has a tolerable depth, and affords a good anchorage for large vessels. The coast is high, in some parts it is rocky. Inland there is a sufficient number of fresh water wells, and fuel is obtained from a naptha island outside the bay. The bay is never covered with ice. Independent tribes of Yamut Turkomans live in tents along the shores and in the vicinity of Krasnovodsk Bay. These nomads are said to occupy themselves with navigation and trade; they used to make piratical descents on the Persian coast of the Caspian, and to attack Russian trading ships.”—Moscow Gazette, December 8th, 1869.

† Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon, November 1st, 1869.
mit depredations. No reply was received to this; and we find, from a despatch to the Earl of Clarendon, dated March 8th, 1870, that "the attitude of the Khan" was causing uneasiness at St. Petersburg. In 1871 Kauffmann began to prepare for an expedition to punish the refractory Khivans; but the disturbances then taking place in Bukhara —through which the expedition would have to pass—induced the Imperial Government to refrain from attempting chastisement at this time. In 1872 Khivan missions arrived at Tiflis and St. Petersburg. The Khan had become alarmed at the near approach of the Russian reconnoitring parties; but yet, with that love of intrigue and tortuous dealing, characteristic of the Asiatic, preferred appealing to these far distant centres of authority to yielding to the not unreasonable demands of General Kauffmann, the Governor-General near at hand. The consequence was that these missions were returned—as were the envoys he despatched charged to obtain moral countenance and material support from the Indian Viceroy and the Amir of Cabul. These latter Potentates advised the Khan to remove the causes which inspired a feeling of hostility against him. But the Khan hardened his heart, and, like Pharaoh of old, would not let his captives go. About this time a Russian reconnoitring party, which had advanced with fewer precautions than usual, was attacked, defeated, and plundered. Overrating their success, the Kirghiz subjects of Khiva were induced into making a great raid on the Orenburg steppe. Russian forts were invested (unsuccessfully however), and property to a great amount was carried off. This was the culminating point of the Khan’s misconduct.

It was not, however, their misconduct alone that rendered the Khivans troublesome to Russia. Its geographical position rendered their

* Sir A. Buchanan wrote (Dec. 1st, 1869) to Lord Clarendon:—"Persons here declare that a large force will cross the Caspian from the Caucasus in February next under the command of General Heymann, a distinguished officer, with great experience in warfare with Asiatics. The object of the expedition is, I am told, to be the conquest of the Khanate of Khiva and the creation of a new Russian province on the left bank of the Oxus, which will extend to and absorb Bukhara. According to the communications which have been made to me, the expedition will be accompanied by a flotilla on the Oxus, and surveys will be made on the march from Krasnovodsk Bay for ascertaining the feasibility of connecting the river by a railway with the Caspian."

† The seat of the Government of the Caucasus under the Grand Duke Michael.
State a stumbling-block in the road of Muscovite conquest and a source of constant annoyance. Khiva is an oasis surrounded on all sides by desert. But those portions of the desert which lie west and north of the Khanate are within the nominal limits of Russia. The Khanate thus intruded herself and intercepted communication between sundry outlying sections of the Czar’s Asiatic provinces. And, from its central position, it threatened simultaneously several surrounding points. The chief posts of Russia on the western shore of the Caspian, Alexandrovsk to the north, Krasnovodsk to the south, were within an easy rush from the Uzbek horsemen from Khiva, and could be effectually prevented from assisting each other. To the north-east, Khiva menaced the Russian lines on the Jaxartes and on the Irgiz; to the north-west, those on the Emba; and two or three hundred miles north of the Emba lay Orenburg, the head-quarters of Russian civil and military organization in that part of the empire, for the safety of which, it was reported, fears were entertained. Of course the same circumstances of position which rendered Khiva formidable as an assailant, so long as the Russian forces were few and detached, tended to diminish or rather destroy her security as soon as Russia had time to collect her huge strength and surround her adversary. Russia had now, according to common information, about 30,000 men in Central Asia. Meanwhile, the steppes of the “Lesser Kirghiz Horde,” which lay across the road to Orenburg, had already been “raided,” as the phrase runs, by the Khivan squadrons, and a Russian detachment under Colonel Markosof repulsed, with considerable loss of camels and baggage.*

“Accordingly six columns were directed against the offending State from the northern, from the central, and from the southern shores of the Caspian sea; from Orenburg, by the head waters of the Emba, and the western shore of the Aral sea; from the forts along the lower course of the Jaxartes; and from Jizakh, along the Nura-Tagh and Arslan-Tagh hills. The hardships cheerfully undergone by all these columns from fatigue, scorching heat, scarce and bad water, were such as to raise to the highest pitch the world’s admiration for the

Khiva.

The Khivans an impediment to Russia.

The Russian Soldier.

Expedition of 1873.

* The Quarterly Review.
hardihood of the Russian soldier. The column from the south of the Caspian was obliged, when half way, to retire, owing to the nearly entire failure of the water supply. No connected account of the movements of the others has as yet been given to the world; but it is believed that General Verefkin, commanding the Orenburg force, was first to reach the neighbourhood of Khivan territory; and being joined by the other two Caspian columns, composed of troops from the Caucasus, advanced to the gates of the capital, where he was obliged to suspend operations by orders from General Kauffmann, who, with the united forces from the Jaxartes and from Jizakh, had at last, after repulsing the repeated attacks of the Khivan horse, arrived on the bank of the Oxus."* The sufferings of these gallant columns when crossing the desert have been vividly described by Mr. Mac-

Khiva falls, 29th May 1873. Gahan of the New York Herald in his graphic work entitled Campaigning on the Oxus. Since the time when Alexander's army marched for sixty days through the desert of Gedrosia nothing to compare with this feat has occurred, and it has been well observed that the accounts given by the Nubian Geographer, Edrisi, by Arrian and by Strabo, of the march of the great Emathian Conqueror, will apply with no little accuracy to this Russian anabasis. The Khan fled; but, being assured that his life would be spared, came in, and attached his signature to the terms imposed by the conquerors. He agreed to pay an indemnity of £300,000 (spread over twenty years), to permit the occupation of two fortified towns by Russian troops till this sum was paid, and to yield the administration of the Khanate to a Council of four Russian and three Khivan officials, with himself (the Khan) as president. It was stipulated, moreover, that the territory on the right bank of the Oxus, together with its Delta, should be placed at the disposal of Russia; that the Khan should renounce all right to maintain direct relations with any power but Russia; that Russian merchandise should be entirely free from any kind of customs or transit duty; that Russian caravans should be protected, all other European traders excluded from the Oxus, and slavery abolished in the Khanate.

The conditions of peace between Russia and Khiva were published at St. Petersburg on the 12th July 1873, and the publication was accom-

panied by a document explaining the causes which led to the campaign. A summary of this document says:—The chief reasons are stated to be the uninterrupted marauding incursions of nomadic Turcoman tribes into Russian territory, the carrying away of Russian subjects into slavery, which has been going on for several years, and the powerlessness of the Khan of Khiva to prevent these evils. These facts compelled Russia, in opposition to her policy in Central Asia, to undertake the expedition against Khiva, in order forcibly to bring about a situation of safety, remove the impediments to commerce, abolish slavery, and suppress predatory expeditions. The difficulty of the task lay in the extremely unsteady and uncertain foundations upon which the States in Central Asia are established. After the capture of Khiva it was evident that despite the Khan's own desire to keep up good relations with Russia, he was not in a position to give effect to his wish, because his influence over the Turcoman tribes in Khivan territory was partly only slight, and partly altogether null. Hence it became clearly necessary to establish fortified places with strong garrisons to insure both the Russians and the Khivans against the attacks of the marauders from the steppes. The south shore of the sea of Aral would have been the most suitable spot to erect fortifications, but the swampy condition of the ground rendered this plan impracticable. It became necessary then to erect the proposed fortifications on the right bank of the Amoo Daria. In order to make communication between this post and Russian territory safe, and in consequence of the difficulty of navigation on the Amoo Daria, which in winter entirely ceases, it was manifest that it would be requisite to annex the necessary territory, though this territory is a barren desert. This course was all the more imperative, as the Khan announced that he should otherwise be unable to fulfil his obligations to Russia, and, indeed, even demanded that a Russian garrison be left in Khiva. Russia would have preferred any other guarantee of safety.

The *Turkistan Gazette* says that the Khivans have now resumed their ordinary occupations, and that they seem to be getting on very well with their Russian conquerors. The bazar in the capital has been opened, but prices have risen considerably, owing to the large purchases made for the troops.
The Khan, who had resided temporarily in a tent with his younger brother and suite, has now again taken up his quarters in the palace, which has been splendidly fitted up for his reception. Although he retains his title of Khan, his power will be considerably restricted during the period of the Russian occupation by a divan or council, consisting of four Russian and three Khivan members. The Russian members are selected by General Kaufmann, and the appointment of native members to the council can only be made subject to the General's approval. All questions relating to the government of the country are settled by a majority in this council, the Khan (who is its president) having the casting vote.

It was confidently expected that Russia would hand over the surrendered territory to the Amir of Bukhara, as a recognition of the neutrality he had observed while his co-religionist was being punished. Nor was this belief entertained without sufficient warrants.

*For from early in 1869 to the summer of 1873 our Foreign Minister had been repeatedly assured, in the most decisive, unmistakeable terms,

*Vide correspondence respecting Central Asia (No. 2), 1873.

Vide Pall Mall Budget, January 17th, 1873. "Russia and Khiva."

NOTE (a).—The Turcistrictan Gazett adds that the Khan has told General Kaufmann that he did not wish to escape from the Russians, but that he was compelled by circumstances to leave his capital. Being unwilling to prolong the defence unnecessarily, he informed his troops that he had sent a plenipotentiary to the commander-in-chief to open negotiations, and that an answer was to be returned before sunset. The Turcomans, however, continued to fire, and refused to obey him. Upon this he rode forward to stop the firing, but his horse was shot under him, and he was obliged to return to the town. On arriving at the gate he was informed that the people refused to listen to him any longer, and had elected his brother, Abadschan, to be Khan in his place. He believed that this had been done by the order of the Russian commanders, and he then decided to leave the town. It was at first feared that Abadschan's supporters might again make a revolution on the departure of the Russian troops, but Abadschan himself has volunteered to prevent this danger by making a pilgrimage to Mecca. He at the same time asked General Kaufmann for permission to travel through Russia, which was readily granted.—Pall Mall Budget.

NOTE (b).—The Times makes the following comments on the above cited document:—The steppe which is to supply a line of communication to the garrison of the new fortress when the Amu is frozen up is impassable in winter. Its inhabitants, moreover, are nomadizing savages. Whether annexed or not, they will always allow a strong Russian column to pass unmolested; but there is nothing in the mere announcement of their incorporation with the Empire to restrain their predatory instincts or to diminish the local difficulties encountered in punishing them. Were any fresh proof needed to demonstrate this, we should find it in the reason alleged for the cession of a portion of the annexed territory to Bukhara, that the Khan of Bukhara's help is required to secure the safety of the steppe. The Russian Garrison will be unable to depend upon
that on the Khan being sufficiently chastised the Russian troops would be withdrawn from Khivan territory, that the Government of the Czar repudiated any desire for extension of territory, and that the advances which had already been made were due to circumstances that could not recur. Earl Granville and his predecessor received these assurances with emphatic expressions of satisfaction; and even while the Russian troops were on the march to Khiva, the most cordial interchange of despatches between St. Petersburg and London exhibited our Secretary of State and Prince Gortchakow deprecating with uplifted hands the bare notion of Russian aggression in Central Asia. England and Russia were at one upon this point. The Chancellor of the Empire, in the most conclusive arguments, showed Sir Andrew Buchanan and Lord Augustus Loftus how “any accession of territory was to Russia an accession of weakness.”

In the autumn of 1873, however, “for reasons that have not as yet been made public,” these assurances were laid on the shelf; and, with the exception of a strip of land 70 miles in length transferred to Bukhara, the whole territory surrendered by Khiva was permanently annexed; and Bukhara simultaneously was compelled to sign a treaty permitting their communications, unless, indeed, they are kept up by a force strong enough to command respect, whether acting in annexed or unannexed territory; but of course the Khan of Bukhara will be quite as powerless to introduce a civil code in the steppe as was Khiva and as is Russia. It is rather important to clear up this part of the business, considering that the annexation of the steppe is the only reason which can be alleged for the appropriation of the whole adjacent territory on the right bank of the Oxus, including the colonized and mountainous districts of Sheik Jeli. Obviously, the mere construction of a Russian fortress in Khiva would not have necessitated the appropriation of a tract of land about 300 miles in length. As regards the navigation of the Oxus, there was hardly much danger of piracy on the part of the Turcomans, the Russians having succeeded in removing the dams which during the campaign prevented the Aral squadron ascending the river beyond Kungrad. The fact is proved by the new fortress of Petropaulovsk, near Shurakhan, having been victualled by ships belonging to the Aral flotilla. There is nothing now to hinder the Russian gunboats from penetrating up the river as far as the Afghan frontier, an eventuality likely to be accelerated by the trip of the exploring squadron ordered for April next.

Norm (c).—In Captain Kostenko’s work on Central Asia published in 1870, the following passage occurs.—“Of Khiva the experience of a century and a half has proved that the Khanate can be reduced to order only by the complete abolition of its independence. The acquisition of this country will be attended by the following advantages to us. 1st.—It will no longer be an asylum for rebel Kirghizes on our borders. 2nd.—It will give us the embouchure of the Oxus, the gates to all the basin of that river. There can be no difficulty in the seizure of this Khanate; it is more barbarous and rude than the others.”
Russia to station troops in any part of Bukharanian territory, 'even on the south bank of the Oxus, contiguous to Afghanistan.'

"In this manner the hosts of Russia have reached the interior of Central Asia, and within an exceedingly short period their conquests have been portentously rapid. The Northern Power had been three centuries in its march from the Ural to the south of the Caspian; but the last thirty years have seen it advance from the Aral Sea to the walls of Samarkand."—The Times.

Some miscellaneous notes relating to the conquest and annexation of Khiva.

NOTES.—Captain Lusilin’s Map of the Trans-Caspian littoral shows the lower course of the old bed of the Oxus and the various routes taken by the Russian columns converging upon Khiva, scale 1: 4,200,000. St. Petersburg, 1872, with a plan of the city of Khiva on a separate sheet.

Colonel Hyin, director of the largest geographical establishment in Russia, has published a Map of the Khanate of Khiva and of the Turkistan steppe.

A new edition also has been issued of Captain Lusilin’s two-sheet map of “The Government-General of Turkistan.” In this chart the post-roads leading to the country east of the Issi-kul have been inserted, but the Geographical Review points out that Fedchenko’s explorations in southern Khokand and the reconnaissances made in the steppes of Bukhara have been omitted. Kiepert’s “Map of the Road leading to Khiva” extends from the shore of the Caspian to Khiva, including the Aral Sea. Wyld’s “Map of Khiva and surrounding countries” embraces a wider area. The scale is 1: 3,150,000.

A revised edition of the four-sheet map of Central Asia, published by the Russian General Staff in 1863, was brought out last year. This map, however, has been denounced by Professor Vambéry in the strongest terms. Ocean Highways says of it, nevertheless, that all the results of the scientific expeditions undertaken within the last ten years have been embodied in it. "Due account has been taken of Fedchenko’s journey to the Alai Steppe, of Abramoi’s inquiries concerning Karategin, of Kaulbar’s and Scharnhort’s late journey to Kashghar, of the exploration of Eastern Turkistan by English travellers, of Matusovski’s travels in Zungoria, of Markozof’s and Stebnitzki’s reconnaissances from Krasnovodsk, &c., and the new post-roads established by the Russian Government.

Colonel Walker, of the Great Indian Trigonometrical Survey, has brought out a new edition of his magnificent Map, in four sheets, of Central Asia.
See Vambéry's Travels in Central Asia, pp. 410-413, Khivan routes.

See Von Hellwald's Russians in Central Asia, pp. 197-213. The operations against Khiva.

See Daily Telegraph, January 13th, 1873. Russian motives and pretext for invasion of Khiva.

The Turkistan Gazette states that Khiva has an area of 2,100 square miles, a population of 300,000 (i.e., 133 to the square mile).

A Russian officer of the État Major, M. Glukhovski, wrote a series of letters in 1869 on Russian trade with Central Asia, which were translated by Mr. Michell, our consul at St. Petersburg. This writer states that the Khivans are very enterprising, and have all the qualities that go to make good navigators. In 1865 he saw two Khivans at Fort No. 1, who had come from Khiva by boat through the Aral and up the Jaxartes, bringing timber and corn for sale. When the projected line of railway from the Caspian to Khiva is carried out, a very great stimulus will, M. Glukhovski thinks, be given to all trade in Central Asia.

The Journal de St. Petersbourg, December 19th, 1872, gives a clear and well-arranged historical summary of Russian relations with Khiva.

The Turkistan Gazette of August 13th, 1870, had an article on the Khivan question, in which the following occurs:—"Central Asiatic Khanates cannot be brought to a sense of the advantages of friendly, commercial, and state relations, and they cannot be brought from out of their isolation but by means of severe lessons learned through a sacrifice of blood. Khokand and Bukhara have at last realized the impossibility of a hostile bearing towards Russia, their nearest and strongest neighbour. Khiva alone continues from time to time to assert herself through an injurious influence over the neighbouring Kirghiz and Turcomans. Khiva, the only remaining slave market in Asia, holds the lower course of the Oxus, which are peculiarly essential to Russia, if the Krasnovodsk route is to be recognized as a convenient and profitable highway for commerce and military purposes. But it again observed, the necessity for exploring the channel of the Oxus does not at all point to the necessity of making any conquests in the basin of that river; what was formerly achieved through an unavoidable shedding of blood can now be attained by means of Russian influence, which is steadily gaining strength in Central Asia. The aim of all the acts of the Russian administration in the Turkistan province, with reference to the neighbouring provinces, is to enable Russian men of science and traders to travel without hindrance and in perfect safety over all Central Asia. If it has hitherto been necessary to employ shot and bayonets for the achievement of this object, it may be hoped that that mode of operation will now be less and less frequently resorted to."
“Since the campaigns of Alexander of Macedon across the Turcoman deserts and
the deserts of Kerman, one might seek in vain for so
difficult a military expedition as that which on the 29th of
May ended so brilliantly, by the taking of the town of Khiva. . . . The enemy
endeavoured to resist; it was incalculably more numerous than our troops, was better
acquainted with the localities, was more used to them—was, in short, at home, and had
all the time and means to organize an obstinate resistance—and, in spite of all that,
could not hold its own. The brilliancy of the glorious expedition of 1873 forces the
checks of 1717 and 1839 into oblivion, and justifies the belief of the inhabitants of
Central Asia that ‘The arm of the white Tsar is long, and can reach as far as he
pleases.’ The campaigns of the French in Egypt and Syria, the English expedition
to Abyssinia, so remarkable nevertheless, seem something secondary in comparison to
this difficult enterprise of the Russians, who have, besides, accomplished it as though
it were a common occurrence, and one that could not but be done as a very simple
episode of their military history.”—The Voice, July 1873.

Khiva is known among Oriental geographers as Khwarizm, and the Khivans
are the Chorasmii of the ancients. In Ouseley’s Oriental
Geography of Ibn Haukal, p. 278, we find Khawai used
in connection with Khwarizm. Colonel Yule believes it to be the ‘Choja’ of the
Catalan map of 1375. Jenkinson does not “appear to have touched at any place
bearing that name on his way to Bukhara, vid the Caspian, A.D. 1558. It seems,
however, to be identical with the Khayuk of Abu-l-Ghazi Khan, a century later.

Khiva German press at St. Petersburg, the ‘Tartars of Khiva’ was a term used by the
Russians under Alexander Bekowitz to designate the ‘Uzbeks of Karazm,’ when the
former invaded Turkistan, and mention is made of the
1718.

The name Khiva.

A tradition exists among the Mahomedans that Khiva was shown, in vision, to
the Prophet by the Angel Gabriel, on his night journey to
paradise. The Angel promised it as a glorious acquisition,
adding, with reference to its conquest from the infidels, that all believers, who should
thereafter die in their beds on the banks of the Oxus, should, at the resurrection,
receive the reward of martyrs.

“The most complete account of the history and geography of Khiva that has
yet appeared has just been published in a brochure from the
Herr Lerch’s work on German press at St. Petersburg, by Herr Lerch.” (This is,
I suppose, what was originally published in the Russische Revue, Vol. II., pp. 445-484.)

“who himself has formerly made a close personal acquaintance with the country.
From a brief review of it by Arminius Vambery, we learn that the Oriental historians
of Middle Asia—Arabian, of course, chiefly—have never before been ransacked to such
good effect as concerns this khanate. Herr Lerch undertakes, among other parts of his task, to disprove the theory of Rawlinson as to the former drying up of the Aral; but his reviewer judges that he here fails. The latter part of the history is greatly abbreviated, but this is a direct consequence of the absence of any proper records during a period of constant petty commotions and revolutions. The present abject poverty of the khanate and its patent causes—the unruliness of the Uzbegs and the raids of the Turcomans—are clearly though shortly explained by Herr Lerch.”—Pall Mall.

The natural capabilities of the oasis of Khiva are said to be considerable; but a long interval must elapse before the profits of Khivan commerce or industry would pay the expense of conquest. The Russians have hitherto sought in Central Asia, not terminal stations, but rights of way to more distant regions, and Khiva lies between the territory of the Empire and the newly acquired dependency of Bokhara.—Saturday Review, Jan. 18th, 1873.

“General Kauffmann’s report on the Khiva expedition, which has now been published by the Russian papers, contains an interesting account of the occupation of the Khivan capital by the Russian troops. At daybreak on the 29th of May, the General’s detachment left its bivouac at Yangi-Arik, and by eight o’clock in the morning it reached the gardens which lie close to the walls of Khiva. Here the General was received by the principal public functionaries of the country, who came out of the town to greet him. Among them was Sayed Amir Ul-Umar, uncle of the Khan, Ata-Jan, brother of the Khan, and Inak-Irta-Sali, one of his more distant relatives, who had visited General Kauffmann the day before. These personages made some presents to the General, at the same time informing him that as the Khan had left his capital and had not returned, the inhabitants had liberated his brother Ata-Jan, whom he had kept in confinement for seven months, and had proclaimed him Khan under the regency of his uncle Sayed Amir Ul-Umar. The latter, an old man of seventy, is the representative of the peace party in Khiva, and had always urged the necessity of maintaining friendly relations with Russia, which caused him to fall into disgrace with the Khan. General Kauffmann then ordered the other detachments to cease firing; and at two in the afternoon the troops marched into the town with bands playing and colours flying. The four gates and the citadel were first garrisoned, and the remainder of the troops halted in the fortress on the square in front of the palace. Here General Kauffmann congratulated the troops, in the name of the Emperor, on the successful results of the expedition, and thanked them for their services, after which he withdrew to the palace, where he received various deputations of citizens, merchants, &c. The alarm and confusion which were at first caused by the presence of the Russian troops speedily abated; the people in the town and in the adjoining villages returned to their houses, the bazaar and shops were again opened, and trade became as brisk as ever. All pillage was strictly forbidden by order of General Kauffmann, and everything that the troops required was regularly bought and paid
for. On the 1st of June the General addressed a letter to the Khan. The latter was then among the Yomads, with whom it was said he was preparing to attack the Russians; but the General, not giving much credit to this report, simply requested the Khan to meet him at Khiva. The Khan came on the following day, and the General then informed him that he would be permitted to continue to rule the country. General Kauffmann adds that the troops under his command are in excellent health and spirits, and show no traces of their laborious march through 1,000 versts of steppe. A number of military parties are to be sent in various directions during the stay of the troops at Khiva to assist in astronomical and topographical research. One of these parties had already left, at the date of the General's report, to explore the district between Khiva, Sheik-Aryk, Shurakan, Khanki, and New Urganj, and measures had been taken to collect geographical, statistical, and ethnographical data about the country."—Pall-Mall.

At length, "England seems to have seriously appreciated the dangers of the situation. The possession of Khiva would not only round off the territories of Russia on the right bank of the Oxus, but put her in possession of the mouth of that river, which is one of the principal channels of communication in Central Asia, and the nucleus of the roads which lead to the south. For the territory known as Khiva comprises not only the small country of that name on the Lower Oxus, but also the whole of the steppe which extends to the north of Persia; and it has for centuries had a legal claim to Merv and to the territory which exists in the immediate vicinity of Herat, that northern gate to India. Tashkand, Khodjand, Samarcand, Bukhara, and Khiva are inseparable links in the long chain of Russian conquest, which will certainly be continued to Herat and Kandahar; and there would be no rashness in predicting that the Russians will be close to India in five years at the latest." M. Vambéry thinks that in such a case India would not be so safe against a Russian invasion as some suppose. "It is true," he says, "that the Indian railways would enable an army to be sent to the northern frontier in a very short time; but it must not be forgotten that India is separated from England by a vast stretch of sea, while Russia would be connected with the Indian frontier by an uninterrupted chain of her own possessions."—The Lloyd of Pesth: Mr. Vambéry.

The Torgovoy Zbornik published an article in the early part of 1873, ridiculing the idea of Khiva being a rich country, and offering on that account a tempting bait to the cupidity of Russia. The Khivans, says this journal, are wretchedly poor, hardly able to wring from the soil the barest necessities of life.

"How can diplomats and journalists talk about opening commercial relations with Khiva, and thereby developing Russian commerce in Central Asia? Our people do not even know how to open up countries which are really rich in natural resources; in Turkestan, for instance, millions are thrown away on the administration and the garrisons. We may be quite sure that if Russia annexes Khiva there can be but one result—that she will have 200,000 beggars to provide for."—Torgovoy Zbornik.
The Russian papers continue to discuss the question what is to be done with Khiva. The Bourse Gazette, replying to an article in the Daily News, says that Russia wants no English authorization for annexing Khiva. After having shed Russian blood to conquer Khiva, Russia wishes to profit by her efforts, without regard to British commercial interests. The article concludes by remarking that England ought to remember that Russia is not Persia. The Berlin correspondent of the Daily News telegraphs on Tuesday:—The evening journals, without exception, look on the latest news from Khiva as confirming the intention of Russia not to release her hold on that State, but ultimately to annex it. It is not believed (the telegram proceeds) that the betrothal of the Duke of Edinburgh will affect the relations of the two countries. The National Zeitung observes that the marriage will not help England to endure the conquests which Russia is daily making in Central Asia, and, above all, the annexation of Khiva, which now seems certain. On the other hand, a telegram from St. Petersburg says that, according to further advices from trustworthy sources at Tashkand, the approaching return of General Kaufmann’s army is to be regarded as indicating the intention of Russia to evacuate Khiva.”—The Pall Mall.

CHAPTER VII.

ENGLAND AND RUSSIA.

The Emperor of Russia to Mr. (Sir D.) Forsyth.  
"I hope we shall always be good neighbours."  
—The Czar to Mr. Forsyth.

"The Czar said there was no intention of extending the Russian dominions, but it was well known that in the East it is impossible always to stop when and where one wishes."—The Czar to Mr. Forsyth.

"He had no ambitious views, and he had been drawn by circumstances farther than he wished into Central Asia."—The Czar to Sir A. Buchanan.

The Emperor to the British Ambassador, St. Petersburg, February 26th, 1869:—“Her Majesty’s Government will believe, I trust, that I have no feeling of covetousness in Central Asia; but they must know from their own experience in India that our position there is one of extreme difficulty, in which our actions may not depend so much upon our own wishes, as upon the course pursued towards us by the Native States around us. I earnestly hope, however, that no new difficulties
may arise on our eastern frontier, and that arrangements may be made for the maintenance of tranquillity, but should new conflicts arise with our restless neighbours, they will not be of our seeking."

"The Imperial Cabinet takes as its guide the interests of Russia. But it believes that, at the same time, it is promoting the interests of humanity and civilization. It has a right to expect that the line of conduct it pursues and the principle which guides it will meet with a just and candid appreciation."—Prince Gortchakow, November 1864.

"But he (Prince Gortchakow) admitted that unless we now come to some friendly understanding, there is quite enough of combustible matter in the intriguing character of the Asiatic nations intervening between our respective countries in the east, which might act upon the suspicions of Russians and English, so as to lead us into considerable discord."—Prince Gortchakow to Mr. Forsyth.

Lord Clarendon, in writing to Sir Andrew Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, stated that he had repeatedly broached the subject of Russia's advances in conversation with Baron Brunnow, and that the latter "had always replied that the policy of his Government was to restrict rather than to extend its possessions southward in Asia."

The following is a translation by the Berlin Correspondent of the Moscow Gazette, Times of an article in the Moscow Gazette.

We confess that in our opinion England derives very questionable advantage from her protectorate over Afghanistan. Still, were she to think it expedient to subject the Amir of Cabul to her dictates even more completely than is the case now, would she listen to any remonstrance on our part? And what reply would Russia have received had she ventured to protest against the annexation of the Punjab and the reduction of Cashmere? In all probability the English would have laughed us to scorn had we taken any such step without the fixed resolve to go to war in case our demand were negatived; or they would have armed against us had they known us to be bent upon bringing matters to a crisis. And could Russia act differently were she placed in the like dilemma? Could Russia enter into any obligations binding her to remain stationary at
any given point on her Asiatic frontiers? Standing upon our rights we confess we are comparatively indifferent to what the English may say or think of our doings. The extension of our influence in Turkistan is, after all, the most natural thing in the world. If our efforts have been lately crowned with success, we have worked long and patiently to bring about this result. We are now reaping the fruit of previous toil; and to renounce this reward of our labour merely to please foreign politicians would be conceding a little too much to extraneous influences. We will reap where we have sown, and to compass this we shall be guided by what has been the ruling principle of English politics in India—the determination to get back two roubles in return for every one invested.

The Moscow Gazette, of the 20th February 1869, said that the idea of a Russian army marching to India could not be realized without frightful sacrifices which Russia could only undergo if the supreme law of self-preservation obliged her to do so. "The appearance of a small military force amidst populations, retaining the traditions of former redoubtable invasions, would be a real danger to English power in India."

On the 26th of February, another article in the same journal expressed the following sentiments:

"To demand of Russia that she should by some kind of treaty respect the independence of Afghanistan, or that she should declare the neutrality of Afghanistan, Eastern Turkistan, or any other Central Asian territory, would be such an incongruity that it is not worthwhile serious consideration. Every diplomatic allusion to the affairs of Russia, which are not subject to international European right, would only be an insult to her dignity. Besides, what force and whose influence could compel Russia or England to respect any guarantee in Central Asia, if the necessity of defence, in the event of war, would require their violation?"

Again, on the 21st of February, we read in the same paper:—"The position of Russia in Central Asia strengthens her along the whole line of her national interests, and it is strange to suppose that she should herself abandon the political and strategic advantages of her position."

The Moscow Gazette of April 17th has the following:—"Central Asia is for Russia a strong strategical point against England, in the
event of an eastern war, though Russia of her own accord has no motives for threatening the interests of England in India."

In the same journal of the 16th December of the same year (1869), we find the following:

"In England's eastern possessions there are a great many elements of discontent; almost every year military expeditions are made against the mountain tribes; therefore such a neighbour as Russia would necessarily lower the prestige of England."

The Vest of May 5th, 1869, speaks of the advance of Russia in Asia inspiring England with grave apprehensions, "not because she fears the invasion of India, but because the proximity of Russian dominion will have a strong influence on the minds of the Indians, who already see with joy the approach of an European power to which they can apply for assistance in case of necessity."

The St. Petersburg Exchange Gazette makes the following declaration:—"It is only in the event of European misunderstandings, through which we might be forced into a war with England, that we would take advantage of our position in Central Asia to damage England's influence in the East."

"So long ago as the year 1840, England, being utterly ignorant of the state of affairs in Central Asia, and fearing that the proximity of Russia might lead to the loss of the British possessions in India, determined on crossing the Indus in order to stop us at the Hindu-Kush, where we never intended to go. It was in pursuance of the same policy that England concluded a treaty in 1857 with the Amir of Cabul, by virtue of which she bound herself to pay him £120,000 a year, and he engaged in return to have an army of 18,000 men ready to march against Russia. But even this did not seem enough to make England feel safe; for she began in 1859 to address Russia, who had never threatened her, about the necessity of establishing a neutral zone, and strove as much as possible to obtain Russia's consent to such an arrangement. This zone, according to the view of the English Cabinet, was to include, not only Afghanistan, but also Bactriana, that is, all the territories watered by the affluents of the Oxus. But if England will not allow her Indian
subjects to be aroused by the approach of Russia, Russia has just as much right to demand that the influence of England shall be entirely absent among the populations of Turkistan. Russia will, therefore, never accept the theory of an 'Upper Oxus State' as it has hitherto been enunciated by England."—The Golos.

The foregoing extracts will enable the reader to form some notion of the attitude assumed by Russia towards England with respect to their mutual interests in Asia. What follows will exhibit the tone of our own statesmen and journals on the same subject:

The Earl of Clarendon to Prince Gorchakov:—"I pointed out the various acquisitions of Russia, and the dates at which they were made, adding that Russia, being now in possession of Samarkand, Bokhara was completely in her power, to which His Excellency assented; and that the next step onward would probably be Balkh, which could be of no use to Russia except for purposes of aggression; and that on the Hindu Kush the British possessions might be viewed as a traveller on the summit of the Simplon might survey the plains of Italy, and that measures for our protection might then become necessary. As regarded apprehension of invasion, however, we had none, as it was impossible for a Russian Army of 50,000 men to cross that mountainous country at a vast distance from its basis of operation in order to meet, not the semi-barbarian hordes that had been easily conquered in Central Asia, but a regular army as numerous and as well organised as the Russian with all its resources at hand—the only apprehension we had was, I continued, that the nearer approach of the Russians and intrigues with native chiefs might keep the Indian mind in a ferment, and entail upon us much trouble and expense."

Lord Lawrence believes that a Russian invasion of India is improbable and impracticable. He believes that the further Russia advances in Asia the more vulnerable is her position. The policy he pursued himself and would

* Lord Lawrence.

* The articles in the Fortnightly Review of December 1st, 1869, and March 1st, 1870, by Mr. J. W. S. Wyllie, should be consulted; and "The Foreign Policy of Sir John Lawrence" in the Edinburgh Review of January 1867. These articles are now being re-published, and edited by Mr. W. W. Hunter, C. S., LL. D.
recommend to his successors is the confirmation of our authority in India by winning the affection and good-will of the people.

The policy of Lord Mayo was dictated by a somewhat different view of the situation. It was his opinion that Her Majesty's Foreign Minister should endeavor to effect some distinct understanding with Russia, and should obtain from that country some guarantee that her armies should not advance beyond a certain point. His Excellency, moreover, considered it our wisdom to build up on our northern frontiers a barrier of friendly and powerful States.

This statesman's opinion would seem to be that the advances of Russia should be regarded by England with the gravest apprehensions; and that the conquering armies of the Czar should be arrested by epigrammatic remonstrances addressed to the susceptible chancellor, appeals to the better feelings of Russia, and references to school maps.

Sir H. Rawlinson is disposed to view the rapid advances of Russia in Central Asia with some alarm. He regards, in common with many others, Herat as the key to India, and believes that it may one day, through the assistance of Persia, pass into Russian hands. It is known, too, that this eminent authority considers the route of Herat, Candahar, and the Bolan as practicable for an invading army; but that he does not apprehend danger, in the first instance, from that quarter. The policy which he has always recommended is the strengthening of British influence in Persia† and Cabul.

Sir Donald Macleod believed that while Russia was dreaded and distrusted in Central Asia, England, on account of her non-aggressive policy, was regarded with friendly feelings, and that the difficulties of Russia would increase with every advance.

Lord Sandhurst is understood to have advocated the assuming of a distinct line of policy and establishment of a more clear understanding with the cabinet of St. Petersburg. He, moreover, is known to have strongly opposed

* Consult "Mischievous Activity."—Fortnightly Review, March 1st, 1870: Mr. J. W. S. Wylie.
† Such is the opinion, I believe, of Mr. Eastwick, and was also that of Lord Strangford.
the proposal to take up an advanced position at Quetta, as recommended by Sir H. Green and others.

Captain Trench, at the close of his excellent little work, has the following:—"England may contemplate with calm confidence the future of this important question, knowing full well that if ever the time does come, as come it may some day, when the contest for supremacy has to be fought out, she may trust without misgiving to that moral ascendancy which in spite of all her shortcomings she has a right to think she has earned in Asia; to a strong strategical position, to her husbanded resources, and, above all, to her fine army in India, and to the soldiers that have never yet failed her in hour of need."

"It is assuredly a great boon to humanity that some of the most fertile countries in the world should be restored to life and touched by the breath of material progress. It is matter of thankfulness that bad and cruel tyrannies, held disgraceful among Asiatic nations themselves, should crumble to dust at the first blow from the northern giant. To us it seems a matter of absolute certainty that Russia must advance, as it were, by a law of growth, until she has firmly planted her standard on the northern foot of the Hindu Kush. Her advance, imperceptible from day to day, is, and has been, slow and resistless as the advance of an Atlantic tide. The nearer England and Russia agree upon certain limits to be maintained immutably by their own moderation, mutual good understanding, and by what may become ultimately their essential identity of policy in Asia, the less will be the chances of hostile collision and better for the world."—Quarterly Review, April 1865, p. 515.

"If Russia should take possession of the Oxus, as she has already taken possession of the Jaxartes, then, as her outposts will be in contact with the Afghan outposts along the whole line of the mountains from Mymenah to Badakshan, it will became a question for serious consideration, whether, leaving Cabul and Ghazni, the scene of our old disasters, to struggle on in isolated anarchy, it may not be incumbent on us to secure a strong, flanking position by the re-occupation of the open country of Shaul (Quetta), of Candahar, and even of Herat. There is a strong impression abroad, amongst those best acquainted with the subject, that ultimately, not perhaps in this generation, but whenever Russian
Turkistan shall include the basin of the Oxus, and a Russian Governor-General shall be enthroned at Bukhara, it will be necessary, for the due protection of the Panjab and the North-West Provinces of India, that we should erect and hold first class fortresses in advance of our present territorial border and on the most accessible line of attack, and it is thus satisfactory to find that the positions of Herat and Candahar, which precisely meet the military requirements of such an occasion, have already been pointed out by one of our most cautious diplomats" (Mr. Justice Sheil) "as the true political frontiers of India."—Quarterly Review, October 1865. cf., also Quarterly Review, June 1827, p. 135.—Jany. 1829, p. 35.—* Quarterly Review, October 1873. The Quarterly Review, June 1839.

"Many a long year must yet elapse before the Russian empire by a gradual accretion of territory can become conterminous with British India; and in the mean time it should be our earnest endeavor so to set our house in order as to meet the crisis, when it does come, without flinching or misgiving. We must expect before long to see a Russian embassy permanently established in Bukhara. We must expect to hear of Russian agents at Cabul, at Candahar, and at Herat. We must expect to find among our northern feudatories an augmented restlessness and impatience of control. We must expect to find our commerce with Central Asia impeded by the restrictions and protective duties of our Russian competitors; but we certainly need not apprehend any actual or immediate danger from the military or political pressure of our rival. Let Russia pursue her policy of aggrandisement. Let us have neither part nor parcel in her proceedings."—The Quarterly Review, October 1866.

"Though for upwards of a century a conquering power, her (Russia's) conquests have been slow and gradual; even against such powers as Persia and Turkey, they have been as much the result of her diplomacy as of her arms, and all employed in rounding and extending her frontier. She has, after every effort, halted in the midst of her career, anxious to consolidate and amalgamate her new acquisitions before she moved on. Even in Persia, where the natives never could stand against the Russians in the field, they have advanced, but not with the pomp

* By the late Mr. H. LePocr Wynne.—Sir H. Rawlinson's article of 1868 should also be consulted.
and display of conquerors. They have crept on, seemingly prouder of artifice than of warlike daring. The Russians have indeed added cities and provinces to their empire, but except in the last Turkish campaign, they have never aimed a blow at the vitals of their enemy. What they have gained they seem to have filched rather than conquered. It is difficult to set limits to what a warrior and politician like Buonaparte could have achieved. Perhaps the attempt on India might only have changed the scene of his final disaster. But Russia has never shown his active daring, and the enterprise is beyond its power."—The Edinburgh Review, July 1834.

But we have long been convinced that Russia means not to rest in Central Asia, nor to halt long upon her present path therein, till she has made herself a dangerous neighbour for England. This we believe, because we see in it an enormous advantage for Russia in furthering her ambitions in every possible direction; and out of England no sentimental considerations disturb the natural tendency of all great fighting Powers to make themselves as formidable to their neighbours as possible. We are barbarous enough to hold that that is a right tendency, and one to be cherished rather than checked as long as we live under the present dispensation. Why should not Russia do all that in her lies to provide means of damaging us at will out of England, since she is so little able to strike at us within the boundary of the three kingdoms? And if she can combine business with the pursuit of such a policy, how much less is she to be blamed for following it! It appears to us that what we hope she will not succeed in doing is for her a right and provident thing to do; and whatever may be the tenor of her "explanations" now, we have no doubt that she is bent upon establishing a position in Central Asia from which she may do us a slow mischief always and a sudden mischief upon due occasion.—Pall Mall Budget, January 12th, 1873.

In January 1869, there appeared in The Times three articles upon the Central Asian question, which may be taken as representative of the views of that journal. These articles excited great attention on the continent, and elicited replies from the inspired press of Russia. The first of these rejected as chimerical the idea of a Russian invasion of India. The second and third urged the establishment of an understanding between Russia
and England with reference to affairs in Central Asia, and suggested that negotiations should be initiated with a view of establishing an agreement that should coincide with the aims of both nations.

The *Saturday Review* of February 20th, 1869, expressed itself as follows:—"It is impossible to say whether Russia meditates the acquisition in the future of the whole or a portion of India, but it is sufficient to know that hostile action can be called forth in the Indian frontier by European embroilings."

The real or pretended disobedience of ambitious generals, the provocations which are offered by barbarous neighbours, and the consequent vengeance which, as if by accident, assumes the form of conquest, all contribute in their turn to the extension of the limits of the Russian Empire. As long as Russian ambition confines itself to the remote regions of Central Asia, England has neither the right nor the power to oppose it; and projects for interference with the English rule in India, though they may have been occasionally entertained, have rarely assumed a definite form. During the Crimean War, Russia would have been fully justified in attempting a diversion in India; but the plan of invasion which was at that time proposed was hopelessly chimerical.—The *Saturday Review*, April 26th, 1873.

The opinions of continental writers are perhaps as interesting and instructive as those of our countrymen; a few of the most typical will, therefore, be given here.

Von Hellwald concludes his work on the Russians in Central Asia—a work breathing throughout a hostile spirit to England—as follows:—"Russian policy may aim at three different objects in Asia, none of which, however, excludes the others. The first, the conquest of India, is of all the most improbable; the second, the attempt to bring the Eastern question to a solution from the East, is possible; and the third, the striving after the monopoly of commerce in Asia, and the consequent admission into the trade of the whole world, is positive."

The sympathies of Herr Vambéry, the eminent scholar and intrepid traveller, are English. This writer views the progress of Russia in Asia with anxiety and alarm, and warns England to be on her guard.
"I should like to see," says Vambéry, at the close of his charming volume of travels, "the politician who would venture to affirm that Russia, once in possession of Turkistan, would be able to withstand the temptation of advancing, either personally or by her representatives, into Afghanistan and Northern India, where political intrigues are said to find always a fruitful soil."

M. Anquetil du Perron believed that India might be conquered in two ways—

"Une seconde expedition, sans vues d' établissement en Egypte, réussira comme la première, et 12 à 15,000 hommes transportés à Suez, de-là dans l'Inde par la mer Rouge, suffisent pour occasionner dans cette vaste contrée une révolution qui rende aux naturels, des pays qui leur appartiennent; aux Européens, la possession sûre et tranquille de leurs comptoirs et de leur commerce; et qui, en resserrant dans des vastes bornes l'Inde Britannique, sans commotion, sans cet appareil immense d'attaque et de défense qui consomme le vainqueur et le vaincu, garantisse aux Anglais un revenu, un gain que l'humanité, que la probité puisse avouer."—Voyage aux Indes Orientales, p. 55, Paris, 1808.

"On compte 450 lieues environ de Balk, capital du Corasan, ou les Russes ont un poste, ou ils font passer des soldats, au Bengale. Qui empêchera vingt-cinq mille Français joints à vingt-cinq mille Russes, de descendre de Balk, par le haut du Penjab, dans l'Indoustan. L'empire Russe a des points de contact avec le nord de l'Europe et de l'Asie, de Petersbourg à la Chine, et la route ne serait ni si longue ni si difficile pour les troupes, de Petersbourg à Calcutta, que de la première ville aux frontières Chinoises, que ses armées ont visitées plus d'une fois; d'une autre côté, les Anglais doivent tout craindre d'un peuple révolutionné de trente-deux millions d'âmes, pour qui les routes les plus longues, les plus difficiles, les hazards de toute espèce sont un jeu, qui va au feu comme au bal, qui le repos n'a pas encore amollit quoiqu'il en ait besoin comme le reste de l'Europe; et dont la seule reponse eux dia-tribes politiques des deux chambres du Parlement Britannique est une marine, et nous l'aurons."—Voyage aux Indes Orientales, p. 70.

In a recent number of the Allgemeine Zeitung, Vambéry treats exhaustively our relations with Afghanistan in a spirit of marked friendliness to England and hostility to Russia. Yet he is anxious that we should abandon our present
policy of non-interference, and presses upon our notice the following
points as essential to our safety:—

(1.) The free intercourse with and access to Cabul, now refused,
must be insisted on, as the necessary accompaniment of our long-stand-
ing, and now openly avowed, protection of the ruler of Affghanistan, whose
restrictions are altogether out of date. (2.) The boundaries of Affghan-
istan to the north and north-west must be definitely laid down, and
no alteration permitted under any pretext. (3.) Russia's boundaries
in this direction should also be strictly defined, and her earth-hunger
turned into the work of civilizing what she has. But in the interests
of humanity this should include Khiva, which must at some time be hers.
It would be wise rather to encourage her to finish her process of acquisi-
tion at once, and settle into her full dominions, thus diminishing the
chances of future complications. (4.) Persia must be strengthened at
all costs, and her northern frontier, especially, well laid out and protected.
This should extend as far as the Atrek; and it is necessary, in order to
carry out this purpose, to thoroughly break the power of the robber
Turcoman hordes which infest this district, and put a stop to their
slave-making and slave-dealing propensities. Russia, once lodged in
Khiva and Buhkara, will aid largely in this, for the Asian slave-trade
exists only by its markets, and will be broken up at once when these
are in civilized keeping and the purchases forbidden. These four
demands of Herr Vambéry's make a large programme, but they would,
he declares, if complied with, make a peaceful and lasting settlement of
the whole Central Asian question.—(See Pall Mall Budget, February
28th, 1873.

M. Ferrier, writing some thirty years ago, held that "the difficul-
ties attending an invasion of British India by a

M. Ferrier.
Russo-Persian army, or Russian only, are, with-
out doubt, serious; but they may be said to exist far more in the
character of the people of Affghanistan and the Tatar states than in
the scantiness of the resources of the countries through which the
expedition would be obliged to pass—their poverty and the difficulties
of the ground have been greatly exaggerated. Let me add, however,
that the English have a chance of victoriously repulsing the attack,
although, to obtain this success, incessant vigilance is imperatively
necessary, and an European war might imperil the whole question.”—Pages 457-458.

Captain* Von Sarauw, of the Danish Army, has published an interesting brochure on Russia's Commercial Mission in Central Asia, from which I extract the following passage:—"If the Russians are deprived of the help of other great nations in carrying out the colossal work that we have indicated in the above pages, the entire undertaking will devolve upon them, just as the impulse was originally, without doubt, given by them. It is impossible to measure the benefit to trade, and consequently to civilization, which will ensue. Even already Russia deserves the thanks of Europe for what she has done in the present day towards facilitating trade with the neighbouring regions of the globe. To cause European culture and European influences to dawn on those countries, and especially on Central Asia, is Russia's mission. That she will, in the end, accomplish it, is vouched for by what she has already achieved."

In February 1873 a number of the Journal des Débats gave expression to the following opinions upon the Central Asian question, with reference to the now abandoned proposal for a neutral zone to keep asunder England and Russia in Asia:—

"We are bound to consider what will be the practical consequences of setting up this neutral territory, occupied as it will be by semi-barbarous tribes, between the possessions of the two empires. Russia undertakes not to outstep the boundary assigned to her. Good! But if she is attacked by Khiva, Bukhara, Badakshan or Wakhan, in the persons of her commercial representatives—and these tribes will be more than ever tempted to do so because they will feel assured of impunity,—what must infallibly take place? Russia will not put up with such aggressions, and, if she is forbidden to repress them herself, she will assuredly make England responsible for the damage done. England, in fact, will have to maintain order in the intermediate zone, from which she has insisted upon excluding the northern Power. This will be a task by no means easy of accomplishment, and one cannot help

* This brochure gives a valuable account of the projected lines of Railway, by means of which Russia hopes to strengthen her hold on her new possessions.
feeling that she has assumed a very heavy responsibility and a very onerous duty. It is very possible that, instead of having simplified the nature of the relations between England and Russia, Lord Granville has rendered them much more complicated, and increased those very occasions of conflict between the two empires which recent negotiations professed to provide against. In any event, the Central Asian question is not terminated, as the English newspapers are themselves obliged to admit; it has merely entered upon a new phase, which, there is every reason to fear, may prove as critical as the previous one.

At the beginning of 1873 an article appeared in *Neue Freie Presse* by Herr Karl Blind, from which the following passage is extracted:—

"The dominion of the English over 200,000,000 Asians reposess in a great measure on prestige, on a belief in England's power. If this belief is once shaken by the approach of Russia, elements of hostility, which were hitherto restrained in India, will suddenly become active, and then it will require unceasing exertions to keep them down."

In January 1873 the *Augsburg Gazette* recommended to England the annexation of Cashmere.

The *Nord*, a journal extremely well informed on Central Asian topics, expressed itself as follows in December 1873:—

"Russia is fulfilling the difficult task of pioneering civilization in Asia. She has the right to hope that this task will not be rendered more painful for her by unjust suspicions. She has always declared herself ready to share it with England, and nothing could better assure its success than the loyal agreement of the two empires to combine the efforts which they are called to put forth, each in its own natural sphere of action."

The following is a summary by the *Morning Post* of an article in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, on a memorial drawn up in 1854-1855 by General Duhamel, then Russian Ambassador in Persia, for the conquest of India:—

The General's plan is not to annex India or a part thereof—which he admits would be impracticable—but to humble England. Persia is to be gained without difficulty. Russia can easily intimidate her into submission, guarantee her
possessions, promise her Bagdad and other Turkish provinces, and, moreover, there is not the slightest difficulty in seizing her nominal dependencies practically disputed with the Turks. The Russian line of progress plainly lies along the Attrek Valley, and there no serious resistance is to be anticipated. An ally more to be sought than Persia is Afghanistan, which is, however, less amenable to Russian overtures than Persia, the more since by tradition from time immemorial friendship with the one means enmity with the other. But let a Russian division—more is not needed—advance as far as Achkale, its best basis for an expedition, easily accessible from Astrabad, which itself is easily reached by boats, and here is a place handy, rich in natural resources, able to feed a large army, the site of the "happy villages" of Diodorus, where oats yield fifty-fold and sesame five hundred-fold. Once in Achkale, Russia can easily command Afghanistan, which must then perceive that Russian power is near. Here a fortress must be built—an easy task,—and Achkale will in truth be "Strakhvragham," that is, "a terror to our foes." From Astrabad, Russian troops could march to the river Satlej in 115 days. When in Achkale, let the Afghans understand that they can plunder to their hearts' content in the rich districts of Lahore and Delhi, and they will not require one word more of encouragement. In India, Russia must instigate the natives to revolt, and give herself out as their liberator, and they will not be slow to rise. At the worst, if Russia fail, she spends at most one-tenth on the war of what England does, and strikes a severe blow at the latter's prosperity and credit, and that in itself is a good work.

The New Free Press of Vienna supplements General Duhamel's plan for an invasion of India by one devised by no less a strategist than the First Napoleon, at the request of the Emperor Paul I., who suggested a joint Russo-French expedition. Napoleon proposed that two armies of 35,000 men each should join at Astrakhan, be conveyed to Astrabad, and thence march in fifty days to the right bank of the Indus by Herat, Ferah, and Kandahar. General Massena was to command the expedition.

In the Augsburg Gazette Professor Vambéry expresses particular gratification at the fact that in the present Anglo-Russian dispute the great majority of European
journals have taken the side of England. That is, he says, just as it should be. Supposing Russia really to have its civilizing mission at heart, she has scope enough in the territory she has already encompassed.*

It is not for Englishmen to decide whether Russia is morally justified or not in proceeding with her career of annexation in Central Asia; and the less we hear of her glorious mission on the one hand, or her indefensible policy of trespass on the other, the sooner we may hope to arrive at a clear comprehension of the situation, as it relates to ourselves. Nor, I may add, is it probable that the sentimental aspect of the question is one which practically affects the movements of the Russian army; for not even Prince Gortchakov has ever ventured to assert that the Khanates on the banks of the Jaxartes and Oxus were absorbed into the Russian empire with a view to spreading the benefits of Christianity and civilization among an ignorant and wretched Mahomedan people. The brave and hardy soldiers of the Czar are impelled forward by various causes, over which even their imperial master is unable to exercise much control. The ambition of a military aristocracy, the misdirected enthusiasm of a half-civilised people, who mistake conquest for progress, and the defensive wants of a long line of territory exposed to the attacks of fierce and needy nomads, with whom political relations are impossible, are among the chief influences that have led to the difficult and unprofitable course pursued by Russia of late years. To these reasons some would add the rude and antiquated notions of political economy that are supposed to induce the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to strive after a monopoly of trade in Central Asia; but I am disposed to believe that the commercial motive is rather employed to conciliate the mercantile and manufacturing classes, than really felt by the supreme Bureaucracy. On the part of the Emperor himself we have every reason to believe that a sincere desire exists to arrest the further progress of the Russian arms, and to avoid every occasion of creating distrust, apprehension, and ill-feeling in England; and we have also reason to suppose that for

* The following should be consulted on this point.—Exchange Gazette; St. Petersburg, 16th April 1869, art. on Ambala Darbar. The Times, Sept. 25th, 1869, Berlin Correspondent's letter.
further extension of territory His Imperial Majesty's ministers are not solicitous. But, with regard to the latter, there can be no doubt that a deeply-rooted jealousy and hatred of that power which once inflicted upon Russian troops, on Russian soil, a humiliating defeat, and which has never ceased to embarrass their counsels, counteract their influence, and hinder their projects in Asia—there can be no doubt, I say, that an antipathy to this troublesome neighbour greatly influences their conduct. *The tone of the semi-official and inspired journals of Moscow and St.

The inspired Press of Petersburg clearly proves this, if proof were wanted. These papers have long breathed a spirit of the bitterest hostility to England, and—save when their flagrant mendacity, and their utter ignorance of English feelings and English politics have rendered them ridiculous—they have unquestionably assisted in preventing a friendly rapprochement being effected by the two Cabinets. Yet it may be truly said, in behalf of Prince Gortchakov and his sympathisers, that the interference of England with the Asiatic designs of Russia has often been unwarrantable, and generally ill-timed. Enquiries have been incessantly made and advice volunteered by our Foreign Office, in regard to Central Asian affairs, such as we ourselves would not have brooked for a moment from Russia in regard to our analogous policy in India. This vexatious diplomacy was inaugurated by that school of peace politicians who have been so successful in destroying the prestige of England in Europe, and who would, if they had their way, tie the hands

A vexatious diplomacy.

* "The moderate and unambitious language which is attributed to the Russian Government offers a singular contrast to the hostile tone which is habitually adopted by the journals of St. Petersburg and Moscow. That all newspapers in Russia are positively or negatively subject to official control or inspiration is sufficiently proved by the absolute silence which they have maintained on the subject of General Schouvaloff's mission. It is evident that a Government which exercises the power of prohibiting unseasonable comments must at least tolerate the opinions which are allowed to find utterance. Since the introduction of a limited freedom of discussion in Russia, the newspapers have been employed as irregular auxiliaries of the diplomacy of the Government; and for a long time they have been in the habit of using unfriendly and menacing language to England. Even Lord Northbrook's refusal to interfere on behalf of Khiva was described by some Russian journals as an act of undue presumption. It is easy to understand that it may suit the Imperial Government to contrast the moderation of its official demeanour with the arrogance of writers who are ostensibly unauthorised; but it is scarcely probable that the entire scheme of Russian policy in Central Asia can have been systematically misrepresented by the journals."—The Saturday Review, January 18th, 1873.
of our Indian rulers, and weaken our empire in the East. But, happily, timidity and incapacity have not penetrated far beyond our Foreign Office, and if the London despatches addressed to St. Peters-
burg are wanting in force and dignity, the firm and sound administration of our Indian Empire is every day consolidating our power in the East. *The day will come, no doubt, if it has not already arrived, when Russia will be in a position to stir up dis-
affection on our northern mountain-frontier; but I cannot see any likelihood of a period ever approaching when England will not be able to injure Russia in a similar manner to a tenfold greater extent. The physical conditions of the three
Khanates will always make the position of their conquerors an extremely precarious one. Vast waterless deserts, inhospitable mountain ranges, great shifting masses of untameable humanity, unbridged and unnavigable rivers, render this region unfit to become at any period deeply impressed by conquest; and to speak of it as likely to form a basis of operations for a great European army equipped against a formidable foe, is to take for granted a change that only nature herself can effect.

The precarious position of Russia in Turkistan.

†The inconsiderable and scattered army, moreover, with which Russia at present garrisons Turkistan is chiefly composed of Irregulars who are only fit to be employed against the howling rabble of Mahomedan Khans. These

* M. Ferrier's opinions, though widely different from those expressed above, command our respect. "The Russians never having quarrelled with the Affghans would have the best chance of being listened to; the English, on the contrary, having been their conquerors, and their enemy, would run the risk of giving their money, as they did on a previous occasion, to people who would fight against them. The English could not oppose the Russians with more than 20,000 of their country-
men, for they would be obliged to have Garrisons in those provinces where Russian gold and intrigue might excite revolt."—Ferrier, p. 467.

Sir R. Shakespear to the Khan of Khiva:—"We have a garden, which is India; the walls are the fortified towns of Tartary and Afghanistan. Let the Russians once seize them, and our garden is theirs."

"But to reckon upon the sympathies or the hatred which the people of Central Asia might entertain either for the English or Russians would be extremely hazardous: the stability of the sentiment of such a population could not be depended upon for any length of time, and I repeat that the success of an invasion of India by the Russians is above every thing a question of money; nevertheless, supposing the Affghans to have been well bribed, it would still, as I have already remarked, be absurd to place confidence in them."—Ferrier, p. 471.

† Lastly, we must notice briefly, as a recognized national element of strength, the so-called irregular army, formed chiefly of Cossack horsemen. They are reckoned, as a paper force, at 144
troops have never come in contact with any but physical obstacles. Even the conquest of Khokand—with the oft-mentioned siege of Ak-Masjid—was a trumpery affair, such as we have often had on our North-Western Frontier, and never thought worth recording. It has obtained an entirely adventitious importance, owing to the occupation of extensive territory which it led to. * The battle of Samarkand, it is true, was conducted with a considerable body of troops on either side, and although, while crossing the Zerafshan, the Russians were exposed to inconvenience from the enemy's fire, they encountered no resistance on reaching the opposite bank; the then small losses were entirely due to the open nature of the ground. The battle of Irjar, one of the most—perhaps the most—important engagement that has occurred between the Russians and the Asiatics, was only attended, it is generally believed, by a loss of twelve men on the part of the former. No conflict that would be thought worth more than a passing remark of satisfaction in India has ever occurred in Turkistan. A few hasty shots interchanged, a dash at the baggage by a mob of hungry horsemen repulsed, or a skirmish between stragglers and robbers, is about all that a truthful military history of the Russians in Central Asia would have to record. Far be it from me to detract from the reputation of brave men. The heroism of the Russian soldier in Turkistan is, indeed, beyond the reach of depreciation; but it has been displayed in conflict with nature, not with man. Surely nothing was ever more absurdly unreasonable

regiments of cavalry, all told, with an uncertain number of battalions of untrained infantry. Though largely used in the Polish struggle, the Prussian critic does not believe that they would add more than 10,000 really effective troopers to the army for a European conflict, or that they could in any way form a very important element in it. "The enemies of Russia," he says, "on the side of Europe, will reckon on having chiefly to do with her regular troops; and the fear of Europe being again overrun, as though these were the days of Tamerlane, with half-savage Asiatic hordes, is one altogether unfounded." We confess to being altogether of the same opinion, and we may add that a study of the exploits of the Russian armies in the Napoleonic wars has long since brought us to the conviction that the Cossacks played a part—except when actually in pursuit of a fugitive foe—which was much more dramatically effective than materially important to the operations.—Saturday Review.

The Armed Strength of Russia. Translated from the German (Austrian) by the Topographical Department of the War Office, 1873.


* Hellwald says, in a note on p. 179, of his Russians in Central Asia, that "some compute" the Russian loss in the battle of Samarkand at 2,000. This is a fable, and not, of course, countenanced by Hellwald.

L
than to infer that, because the Russians have succeeded in annexing
the dominions of three barbarian Mahomedan
Khans, who had neither money nor troops with
which to offer resistance, they can, therefore,
seriously threaten a vast military empire covered with a network of
railways and great military roads, bristling with magnificently equipped
and highly organised troops, and supported by the wealthiest nation
that the world has ever known. To give even a shadow of reality to
this monstrous fiction that has got abroad, it
would be necessary to suppose that the people of
India were deeply disaffected* towards their rulers,
and that the Native Princes (see Ferrier, p. 465) had means at their
disposal of acting independently of the Paramount Power. Now it is
the most decided opinion of those who have the best opportunity of
ascertaining the truth, that these conditions do not exist, and that there
is no likelihood of their coming into existence. Day by day our
grasp of India is becoming firmer, owing to
improved communications, closer relations with
the people, and the diffusion of European learning and western ideas.
We are conferring countless blessings on the natives, we are to them a
visible Providence, and they are daily becoming more conscious of the
truth of this fact. Our army and subordinate civil
service give employment to the great mass of the
middle class: the majority of the native princes have been placed on
their thrones by ourselves; many of them have invested their wealth in
our railways and funds; and many more have imbibed occidental learn-
ing and English sentiments at our schools and colleges; while the great
body of the lower classes, small shop-keepers, and cultivators, know well
that the conquest of India would imply the plundering of their little
hoards, and the burning of their corn and villages.

* It is quite true that the Continental, and particularly the German, writers on the subject
have the most hazy ideas of the condition of British India. They obviously believe that the coun-
try, which they seem to consider to be entirely under the authority of native princes, is so disaffect-
ed that the mere proximity of a Russian force would rouse it to rebellion, and they do not in the
very least understand that where there is want of sympathy with an Englishman in the native
Indian mind, there would be downright detestation of a picture-worshipping Russian. The
power not only of resistance but aggression which the English possess in India is wholly unknown
to them.—*Pall Mall Budget, February 14th, 1873.
England and Russia.

It would seem, from the tone of that portion of the Russian press which is inspired with a sentiment of hostility to us, that the scheme of invading India is associated with the belief that the Mahomedans would immediately take the part of Russia. Nothing can be more utterly unfounded and unreasonable than this belief. Everywhere, of late years, Russia has been the champion of the Cross that has come forward to make war against Islam. Shah and Sunni dread her and hate her alike. It is notorious that she cherishes the hope of dispossessing the Caliph and making Constantinople a Christian capital; the holy places of Bukhara, Khiva, and Samarkand have already been desecrated and dishonored by her; and no one can doubt but that she has looked with longing eyes on the Shiah cities of the Shah. Will these be recommendations to the warlike Musalman of Afghanistan and the burning fanatic of Sittana? Most assuredly if the Muscovite places his project upon no firmer foundation than this, he builds his house upon the sand. My arithmetic fails me when I attempt to compute the years of torment that would be payable to a Mahomedan who should render assistance to the declared foe of the Caliph against his supporter and friend. Yet admitting, for the sake of argument, that India were our vulnerable point and that Russia could put pressure upon us from Herat, could we not, may I ask, deal her a deterrent blow in the Baltic or Black Sea? Twenty years ago we inflicted upon her a series of crushing defeats at a distance of nearly two thousand miles from England, destroyed her grandest fortress, and compelled her to sue for peace.† If her army has been reconstructed since then, ours has also been placed on a better footing; and, what is more to the point, while her great accession of recently-acquired territory has exposed to her enemies a hundred new vulnerable points, our reconstructed empire in India, since the Mutiny and the opening of the Overland Route, has immensely strengthened us, not only in the East

* By the only practicable route at that time for our troops and stores.
† We had a gallant ally to help us, it is true, and the assistance of allies we can always count upon.
but throughout the world.* It has frequently been asserted (see Ferrier, p. 461), and I see no reason to doubt the truth of the assertion, that an European power, with the co-operation of Persia, Cabul, and Beluchistan, could march an army into India by Astrabad, Meshed, Herat, Candahar, and the Bolan Pass; but I believe that every impartial person personally acquainted with our present position in India will agree with me when I say that that army, on† arriving in India, weary, foot-sore,

* "The true military road to India lies by Herat and Candahar. If there be such a thing as a key to India above the Passes, it is in this latter city."—The Quarterly Review, April 1866. This opinion is expressed by Arthur Conolly also, in his journey to the north of India, &c.—Lond., 1834

† "It is unnecessary to add that, even if the Russians were to make their way to India, thirty thousand strong, exclusive of the great number which they must have left in their rear to preserve their communications, the army of one of our Presidencies alone would be sufficient to hold them in check, while our troops would be bearing on their resources, and would be receiving constant reinforcements; the Russians, already nearly 1,200 miles from the base of their operations, would be weakened as they advanced by the detachments necessary to collect supplies. Under such circumstances, it would not be necessary to suppose more than very ordinary skill on the part of our commanders to ensure, not the retreat merely, but the absolute surrender of the Russians, as soon as they came to cross fire with our troops. Even success to them would be fruitless: victories would consume the only means of gaining more. A mere check would entail all the consequences of the most ruinous defeat."—"A Few words," &c., pp. 56-58, (vide App. B.)

"It is clear that India can never be taken by a coup de main, and that it will require a succession of years before Russia could sufficiently advance into the bowels of the land to master any secure position from which to direct ultimate operations, and upon which her forces, if any disaster befell them, might retire. To organise such an invasion would require the talent of a chief, such as has perhaps never yet been known in Russia's military history; and to lead it on to success through all the numerous populations through which it would have to pass, checked by the greater difficulties of procuring food, assailed by the vicissitudes of climate, and after all with the certainty of meeting troops, just as well disciplined, better accustomed to the climate, and with gigantic resources of all sorts about and behind them, would require the head of a Cesar, a Buonaparte, or a Wellington."—Quarterly Review, vol. 62, August 1834. (Arthur Conolly's Overland Journey to India).

"Upon the whole then in the present state (1834) of European and Asiatic politics we may consider the overland invasion of India as next thing to chimerical. There is no railroad between Moscow and Delhi by which stores and troops can be conveyed at will and with speed. India cannot be taken by surprise, as an enemy ten miles off might seize an ill-defended town. All confidence that blinds is dangerous; but it may safely be affirmed that no European army can reach India by land, but by long, tedious, and toilsome marches, after long preparation and negociation, and with little prospect of success if we have an able Governor-General and an able head to our army.—Edinburgh Review, July 1834.

"Military invasion of the territories of a power holding the Khyber and the Bolan Defiles we conceive to be so utterly out of the question as not to be worth a moment's unprofessional discussion. A stampede of Irregulars, Timur and Jenghiz fashion, is to the holders of the
England and Russia.

An invading army from the tremendous march, would be utterly annihilated by the fresh and splendid force that the Punjab could hurl against it.

I must now, however, ascend from the region of impossibilities, and bring these speculations to an end in the clearer atmosphere of the probable, and certain.* The most ordinary political prudence should teach us, in the present state of uneasiness,—however unwarranted it may be—to improve our political status† in Persia, Affghanistan and Beluchistan—the countries through which lies the only practicable military road to India.

Yet when urging this I believe that England has nothing to fear, while she continues to rule India with judgment, firmness, temperance, and an intelligent sympathy with her many subject races. She, however, has a great deal to fear from her own foreign policy, the feebleness, timidity, and inconsistency of which reflect upon herself with the most baleful influence. She has to thank a succession of incompetent foreign ministers for the fact that her prestige in the world has dwindled away, until she is herself beginning to fear recently-conquered foes, and to doubt her own power of upholding the glorious traditions of her empire.

**England has nothing to fear from Russia in Asia.**

Our foreign policy a source of weakness.

passes but as a cloud of mosquitos. A regular army would have to cross six Passes, only open for a few months, to get from Turkistan to Cabul; and Cabul viewed and occupied by us as the political capital of the country, is not on the high road to India, but off it.”—Quarterly Review, April 1865.

* Recent events (the Seistan Boundary Affair, the treacherous and unpopular conduct of the Amir of Cabul towards his able son, and our strong remonstrance, which can hardly fail to be pleasing to the great body of the Afghans; and the anarchical condition of Khelat coupled with the urgent appeals made to us for aid and interference) have given us an opportunity that may never return of strengthening our position on our North-West Frontier and in Persia.


“If Russia should ever think of making an attack upon our Indian possessions, it would be through Persia, where we have allowed her influence to become paramount. This is the route by which Western India was once conquered,” &c., &c.—Quarterly Review, vol. 52, November 1834 (Art. Burnes’ Travels in Bukhara).—Cf. Progress and present position of Russia in the East.—Madras ed., 1838, p. 120. Khiva, Moscow, Petersburgh: Abbott. Lond., 1856, pp. 203—209. Selected writings of Lord Strangford, Vol. II., p. 274.
Is this the tone of Empire? here the faith
That made us rulers? this, indeed, her voice
And meaning, whom the roar of Hougoumont
Left mightiest of all peoples under heaven?
What shock has fooled her since, that she should speak
So feebly? wealthier—wealthier—hour by hour!
The voice of Britain, or a sinking land,
Some third-rate isle half-lost among her seas?
The loyal to their Crown
Are loyal to their own far sons, who love
Our ocean-empire with her boundless homes
For ever broadening England, and her throne
In our vast Orient, and one isle, one isle,
That knows not her own greatness: if she knows
And dreads it, we are fallen.—Tennyson.
APPENDIX A.

CHRONICLE OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN WESTERN TURKISTAN.

Successive Scythian immigration from ... ... B.C. 700-A.D. 300
Turkish tribes pour in from the Altai ... ... A.D. 300-900
Nestorian Bishopric of Samarkand established before ... ... A.D. 520
Armies of Islam enter Western Turkistan about ... ... 666
Mahomedanism firmly established in Bukhara, and death-blow given to the creed of the Fire-worshippers about ... ... 710
Mokanna, “Veiled prophet of Khorassan,” appears on scene ... ... 767
Samian portrait founded about ... ... 845
Samian Dynasty closes ... ... 901
Seljukid Monarchy founded ... ... 1004
Seljukid Monarchy ends ... ... 1134
Janghiz Khan emerges from Gobi with his Mongols ... ... 1218
*Giovanni Carpini travels in Central Asia ... ... 1245
Rubruquis and Bartolomeo visit Central Asia ... ... 1253
Timur the Tatar ... ... 1364-1405
Sheibani expels Baber ... ... 1499
Benedict Gőcs visits Central Asia ... ... 1594
Astarkhanide Monarchy founded ... ... 1597
Khivaan chiefs offer homage to the Czar ... ... 1700
Bekovitch’s disastrous attempt on Khiva ... ... 1717
Treaty with Persia confirms annexation of Caspian Provinces ... ... 1723
Karalakpaks offer allegiance to Russia ... ... 1723
The entire southern shore of the Caspian becomes Russian ... ... 1729
Chinese provinces of Zungaria and Eastern Turkistan conquered by China ... ... 1756
The independence of Khokand asserted ... ... 1775
Astarkhanide Dynasty closes ... ... 1784
Two futile attempts made by Russia to chastise Kirghiz subjects of Khiva ... ... 1809
Tashkand (in the year 1800, capital of a separate Khanate) conquered by Khokand ... ... 1810
Treaty with Persia, by which Russia gains an accession of Territory ... ... 1813
Ak-Masjid constructed by Khokandis ... ... 1817
M. N. Mouravief visits Khiva ... ... 1819
M. de Negri sent with presents and letter from Czar to Amir of Bukhara ... ... 1820
Sir A. Burne’s Travels in Central Asia ... ... 1832
Russian Officers despatched to Bukhara to procure release of slaves ... ... 1834-35

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>Attempt to levy tax on Russian Kirghiz creates disturbances</td>
<td>1836</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieut. J. Wood visits the source of the Oxus</td>
<td>1838</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disastrous failure of Perofski's attempt on Khiva</td>
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<td>Khiva induced by Captain Richmond Shakespeare to release 416 Russian slaves, October</td>
<td>1840</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stoddart and Arthur Conolly executed in Bukhara</td>
<td>1842</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty of peace and commerce concluded between Russia and Khiva</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia allowed to trade in Ili. Treaty concluded at Kulja between Russia and China, August 6th</td>
<td>1851</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unsuccessful attempts made by Russia on Ak-Masjid</td>
<td>1852</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ak-Masjid falls</td>
<td>1853</td>
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<td>Two small steamers launched on Jaxartes</td>
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<tr>
<td>A Bukharian envoy (No. 1) comes to Calcutta</td>
<td>1854</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ili devastated by Mongol hordes</td>
<td>1855</td>
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<td>Chulak Kurghan taken and destroyed by the Russians</td>
<td>1859</td>
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<td>Khokandi forts of Tokmek and Pishpek taken</td>
<td>1860</td>
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<td>Fort built at Julek, and Yani Kurghan shelled and destroyed</td>
<td>1861</td>
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<td>Invasion of Khokand, and Gorchakov's Apologetic Circular</td>
<td>1864</td>
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<td>Great Mahomedan rising of the Dunganis</td>
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<tr>
<td>A Bukharian envoy (No. 2) comes to Calcutta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khokand subdued by Russia</td>
<td>1865</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bukhara applies for aid and advice to Constantinople</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khokand, with Tashkand* as capital, constituted Russian provinces by Imp. Ukase</td>
<td>1866</td>
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<td>A church built in Tashkand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chernyaev's unsuccessful demonstration against Samarkand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battle of Irjar. Bukharian army defeated by Russia, May 20th</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russians capture Nau, May 26th</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khojand surrenders to Romanovski, June 6th</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russians take Uratippa by Storm, October 2nd</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russians take Jizzak by storm, October 18th</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bukharian envoy (No. 3) arrives in India</td>
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<td>Deputation from Tashkand, Uratippa, Jizzak, and some Kirghiz, come to St. Petersburg to offer allegiance to Czar, March</td>
<td>1867</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administration of Russian Turkistan reformed by Imp. Ukase, July</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yakub Beg completes his conquest of Eastern Turkistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battle of Samarkand; Russia defeats Bukhara, t 13th May</td>
<td>1868</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty concluded between Russia and Bukhara, June 18th</td>
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<tr>
<td>Envoy of Khudayer Khan of Khokand received by Czar, November</td>
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* For an interesting account of Taskhand, see *Journal de St. Petersburg*, November 21st and December 3rd, 1865. Art. by Governor-General of Orenburg.

t The precise date of this battle is still uncertain. The above is, however, that given by the invalide Russe of June 17th, 1863.
Appendix.

Russian Agent, Captain Reinthal, visits Atalik Ghazi
Amir of Bukhara sends his son with embassy to St. Petersburg
Mr. R. B. Shaw visits Eastern Turkistan
Insurrection of Cossacks, Kalmaks, and Kirghiz
Russian military station established by Colonel Stolyetov, at Krasnovodsk, November 10th
Envoy from Atalik Ghazi arrive in Cashmere and India
A Russian Newspaper, Turkistan News, started in Tashkand
Source of Zarafshan discovered, May 25th
Persia cedes territory on the Attrek to Russia (May ?)
Kitab, capital of Shahr-i-sabz, taken by Russians, August 14th

*Vernacular supplement (in Kirghiz language) to Turkistan Gazette published, by General Kanffmann
Mr. Forsyth conducts a mission (No. 1) to Yarkand
Kulja captured, and Ili made a Russian province, July 4th
A second envoy from Atalik Ghazi arrives in India
Hostilities commenced with Khiva on Caspian, November
Baron Kaulbers conducts a political mission to Kashghar, May...
Colonel Markasoff conducts a reconnaissance from Krasnovodsk into Trans-Caspian Steppes, October
Khivans stir up Kirghiz; and Khan invades Russian territory
Aminudin, envoy of Khan of Khiva, has an interview with Viceroy of India, September 5th
Mr. Forsyth conducts a mission (No. 2) to Eastern Turkestan
Krasnovodsk detachment of Khivan expedition starts, March 20th
Khiva taken by the Russians, May 29th
Khan of Khiva abolishes slavery, June 24th
Mission from Atalik Ghazi arrives in Russia, August
Evacuation of Khiva by Russian troops commences, August 21st
Right bank of Oxus (with the Delta) from Sea to extreme western arm incorporated with Russia, October...

APPENDIX B.

WORKS AND ARTICLES.
The following list of works and articles, drawn up at random for my own guidance, I publish in the hope that it may prove useful to some of my readers who desire a more thorough acquaintance with Central Asia than my little book can afford. The list, as a glance will show, has no pretensions either to exhaustiveness or arrangement.

Khiva and Turkistan. Translated from Russian by Captain Spalding: Lond., 1874.

* Vide Ausland, 1870, p. 144.
Appendix.


A Narrative of the Russian Military Expedition to Khiva under General Perofski. Translated by J. Michell, 1865. (A new edition of the Russ. work was published last year).

A Journey to the Sources of the Oxus, in 1838. By Capt. J. Wood, Indian Navy.

Travels in Central Asia, in 1863. By A. Vambéry.


The Russians in Central Asia, by A. Vambéry.


History of Bukhara. By A. Vambéry.


Summary of Affairs in the Foreign Department, India (1864-1869). By J. Talboys-Wheeler.

Romanovski's Notes on the Central Asian Question, St. Petersburg, 1868. Translated by the Indian Foreign Office.

Moorecroft's Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan and the Panjáb.


Russian Trade with India. Supplement to the Gazette of India, Novr. 26th, 1870.


The three questions of the moment. Count Gerefeszoff, 1857.

Notices of certain Tribes and Countries in the central part of Asia. By Nazaroff, employed on an Expedition to Khokand in 1813 and 1814. Svo. St. Petersburg.

Progress and present position of Russia in the East. By M'Neill.

Zimmerman’s Memoir on the Countries about the Caspian and Aral. Lond., 1840.


A few words on our relations with Russia, with criticism on "Designs of Russia.”

By a Non-alarmist. Lond., 1828.


History of the Huns, Des Guignes.

Discourse on the Tâatars. Sir W. Jones' Works Vol. 1. 4to Ed.

Pinkerton's Geography (Vol. II.)


Tooke's view of the Russian Empire.


Petis de la Croix's Hist. de Timur Bec.
Appendix.

Voyage aux Indes Orientales. Par le P. Paulin de S. Barthélemy, Missionnaire; traduit de l' Italien, par M. ** ** avec les observations de MM. Anquetil du Perron, J. R. Forster, et Silvestre de Sacy; et une Dissertation de M. Anquetil sur la Propriété individuelle et Foncière dans l'Inde et en Egypte. 3vol. 8vo. à Paris, 1808.

Historical Researches. By A. H. L. Heren. Lond., 1846 (Vol. II. c. i. Sey- thians.)


Correspondence relating to Persia and Affghanistan, laid before Parliament, 1839, and ibid, 1869.

Clarke's travels in Russia, Turkey, and Tartary. Lond., 1816-1824.

Hakluyt's Voyages (Vol. I.)

Petis de la croix's Life of Gengis Can.

White's translations of the Institutes of Timour.


Keene's Moghal Empire.

Citron, Hist. du Moghal.


Russia's Commercial Mission in Central Asia. By Capt. C. Von Sarauw (Danish Army). Leipzig, 1871. Translated by Indian Foreign Office.

Trade Routes of Central Asia. Translated from the Russian Nautical Magazine, July 1862.

Memorandum on Trade with Central Asia. By D. Forsyth, 13th March 1871. Printed by Indian Foreign Office.


Burnes' Cabul; being a personal, &c., &c. Lond., 1842.


Burnes' Travels in Bukhara. Lond., 1834.

Atkinson's Travels in the Regions of the Upper and Lower Amoor.

Humboldt, Asie Centrale.


Bell's History of Russia.

Elphinstone's Embassy to Cabul.

Kaye's Affghan War. Lond., 1857.


From the Indus to the Tigris. By Dr. Bellew. Lond., Trübner and Co., 1874.

A Political Survey. By Mr. Grant Duff. (Chapter on Central Asia.)

Capt. Mouravief's Journey to Khiva, through Turcoman country, 1819-1820. Bonn. 1824.

A Retrospect of the Afghan War, with reference to passing events in Central Asia.
By Sir Vincent Eyre, 1869.
Voyage d'Orenbourg, à Boukharra fait en 1820: rédigé par Myendorf.
Rawlinson's:—and Rennel's Herodotus. Lond., 1830.
Briggs's Ferishta.
Narrative of the Tungani Insurrection in Eastern Turkistan, in 1863. By Capt.
Molloy, Officiating Settlement Commissioner, Ladakh.
The Travels of Ebliza Effendi; translated by Hammer and Purgstall, containing
Travels in Turkistan in the 17th century.
The Travels of Ibn Batata. By the Rev. S. Lee, B.D., Professor of Hebrew, University
of Cambridge.
The Mulsuzat Timuri, or autobiographical memoirs of the Moghal Emperor Timur,
in Jhagatai Turki; translated into Persian by Abu Talib Hussaini; and translated
into English by Major Charles Stewart, H.E.I.C.S., with a map of Transoxiana:
in demi-quarto.
The Tezkereh al Vakiat, or private memoirs of the Moghal Emperor Humayun;
translated from the Persian of Joucher by Major Charles Stewart.
Autobiography of the Emperor Jehangir; translated from the Persian by Major
David Price, of the Bombay Army.
History of the Affghans; translated from the Persian of Neamet Allah by Bernhard
Dorn.
Mémoire sur l'Ethnographie de la Perse par M. Khanikoff.
Histoire des Samanides, Defrémery.
Tarikh Bahahi; edited by W. H. Morley and Captain W. Nassau Lees in the
Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1862.
Babernameh; translated by Pavet de la Courtelle, Paris, 1871.
Shedjre-i-Turki (Turkish Genealogy). By Abulghazi Bahadur Khan: published by
Count Romanzoff at Kasan in 1825.
Hammer's History of the Ottoman Empire.
Creyas's History of the Ottoman Empire.
Descriptions des Hordes et des steppes des Kirghiz-Kazaks: Lewchine,—trad du Russe
Recueil de Voyages et de Mémoires; par J de Plano-Carpini.—
Mongolischen Volker, Pallas.
Appendix.

The Oriental Geography (a Translation of Súru-l Buldan, compiled from Istakhrí and Ibn Haukal) by Sir W. Ouseley.

Masson’s Travels in Afghanistan, &c.

De Rebus Indicis. Gildemeister.

La Geog. de l’Asie Centrale. Abel Rémusat.


Historia Saracenica: Elmacin.

History of the Saracens: Ockley.

Anciennes Relations des Indes, et de la Chine, &c., &c. par M. l’Abbé Renaudot.

Geographia Nubiensis (of Muzhtau ‘l Mushtak al Idrisi) id est accuratissima totius orbis in septem climata divisi descriptio continens, præsertim exactam universae Asiae et Africae, in Latinum versa; a Gabriele Sionita, et Joanne Hesronita.

Zimmerman’s Khiva, translated by Morier, published by J. Madden, 8, Leadenhall Street.

The Masalik of Shahabu-d-din (five of the twenty volumes of the original work) is in the Bibliothèque Impériale at Paris. M. Quatremère published, in Tome XIII of the Notices et Extraits des Mess., a description and specimens of the work.

Pinkerton’s Geography, Art. Tartary.

Astley’s Voyages (Vol. IV).

The Indus and the Oxus. By Major Evans Bell.

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The Quarterly Review, June 1839.—“ Russia, Persia, and England.”


* Sir H. Rawlinson, K.C.B.

† H. Le Pichon Wynne, Esq., Late Under-Secy., Ind. F. O.
Appendix.

Journal de St. Petersbourg, 1865, Decr. 3rd, July 16th, 1867, February 28th; 1869, Octr. 14th, Novr. 1st and 21st; 1871, Jany. 8th, May 16th, July 7th, Octr. 18th; 1872, Novr. 21st and Decr. 19th; 1873, Jany. 23rd, Febry. 7th.


Invalides Russes, Decr. 1869, E. Turkistan. 17th Jany. 1870.

The Ausland, March 11th, 1872, Art. by Hellwald.

The Russian World, June 1873, Art. on advantages to Russia of possession of Khiva, probably written by General Ignatieff.


The Saturday Review, 1873; January 18th; February 1st; April 5th and 26th; May 10th, 17th, and 31st; June 28th; August 2nd and 9th.

Pall Mall Budget, 1873, January 2nd, 10th-17th (3 Articles); February 14th and 21st; April 2nd and 25th; November 7th; December 5th.—1874, May 8th, 15th, and 29th; June 12th; July 10th.


Fraser’s Magazine.—“Russia and her dependencies.”—April 1864.—“On the present state of Russia,” October 1863.

The Edinburgh Review, January 1867.—Sir J. Lawrence’s policy, by J. W. S. Wyllie; and Jany. 1872.

The Edinburgh Review, June 1827; (Erskine’s Baber) July 1834; (Conolly’s Travels) January 1835; (Burnes’ Travels) (Foreign Policy of Sir J. Lawrence.) By J. W. S. Wyllie. Jany. 1868.


Blackwood’s Magazine, 1842.—Richmond Shakespear on Russian Invasion of India.


Mr. C. Markham’s “Ocean Highways” has constantly had of late most interesting articles on Central Asian Geography, by Vambéry, Yule, Badger, and other authorities; and the back numbers of 1872 and 1873 will well repay a search.
Petermann's Geogr. Mittheilungen is another geographical periodical that has, at any rate, found in Von Hellwald a careful student. The Gotha Doctor, however, used to be rather unfavourably known to our geographical world. His loose and wild views about a polar basin and extraordinary suggestions at the time of the Franklin Search (he proposed that in the middle of winter an expedition should sail across the Polar Sea from Spitzberg to Nova Zembla!) are remembered by the R. G. S. In 1841 it was he who prepared the Map in Humboldt's Asie Centrale.

Numerous articles on our subject have also appeared in Behm's "Geographisches Jahrbuch."


Vide Elliot's History of India, vol. III., p. 478.

A Translation of part of the Zafar Nama by Major Hollings was published in 1862, in the Delhi Archæological Journal.

Sheibani Nameh; published by Berezin, with a Russian translation. Histoire de la ville de Khoten. Abel Rémuat.


History of the Mongolians in Persia; by Rashifieddin; translated by Quatremerè. Portraits of Great Moslem Rulers; Hammer, Purgstall.


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At present the entire army in Turkistan is computed at less than 40,000 men. The Russian army in Turkistan is spread over a vast area, garrisoning forts on the Gulf of Jaxartes, strongholds among the fastnesses of the Thian Shan, and occupying a hundred cities and villages from the desolations around Khiva to the pleasant shores of the Zerafshan. The cost of maintaining these troops increases as they are distant from the Caspian; and for many years to come the force in Southern Turkistan must be kept at the lowest mark. What has been conquered must still be held by the sword; and the army which could be now set free for further conquests is altogether inconsiderable—not exceeding, perhaps, the garrison of a first class divisional station in India. The battle of Irjir was on a larger scale than any other engagement during the conquest of Turkistan, and on that occasion General Romanovski's force did not number 4,000 men. A Russian invasion of India would, for many years to come, be an absolute impossibility. Russian subalterns are said to afford material assistance to Yakub Beg in his anticipated collision with China. A Russian invasion of India will, for many years to come, be an absolute impossibility. Russian subalterns are said to indulge in this pleasing dream, but that it has ever been seriously entertained by the Government at St. Petersburg is highly improbable. If England, near a great basis of operations, with soldiers, arms, and all the material of war rolling to the front by rail, will ever seriously fear a flying column of Russian troops toiling across the all but insurmountable barrier interposed by Nature, the sooner she leaves India the better. Under the most favorable circumstances (for Russia) the force that could cross the prodigious mountains of the north would form the most inconsiderable European enemy against which England was ever matched. A few mountain batteries, some irregular cavalry, and a demoralised foot-sore infantry, all surcharged with munitions of war, would represent Russia at the northern terminus of the Peshawur Railway.

APPENDIX D.

THE NEUTRAL ZONE.

"The nomad tribes, which can neither be seized or punished, nor effectually kept in order, are our most inconvenient neighbours; while, on the other hand, agricultural and commercial populations attached to the soil, and possessing a more advanced social organization, offer us every chance of gaining neighbours with whom there is a possibility of entering into relations."
Consequently, our frontier line ought to swallow up the former, and stop short at the limit of the latter."—Prince Gortchakow, Nov. 21st, 1864.

"I was sure, judging from our own Indian experience, that Russia would find the same difficulty as England had experienced in controlling its own power, when exercised at so great a distance from the seat of Government as to make reference home a matter of impossibility; there was always some frontier to be improved, some broken engagement to be repaired, some faithless ally to be punished, and plausible reasons were seldom wanting for the acquisition of territory. Unless stringent precautions were adopted, we should find, before long, that some aspiring Russian General had entered into communication with some restless or malcontent Indian Prince, and that intrigues were rife, disturbing the Indian population on the frontiers. It was in order to prevent such a state of things that I earnestly recommended the recognition of some territory as neutral between the possessions of England and Russia, which should be the limit of those possessions, and be scrupulously respected by both Powers."—The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan, March 27th, 1869.

"The idea expressed by Lord Clarendon, of keeping a zone between the possessions of the two empires in Asia to preserve them from any contact, has always been shared by our august Master."—Prince Gortchakow to Baron Brunnov, Feb. 24th, 1869.

"You may then, my dear Baron, repeat to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State the positive assurance that His Imperial Majesty looks upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence."—Ibid.

"The Secretary of State for India had arrived at a decided opinion that Afghanistan would not fulfill the conditions of a neutral territory. It was, therefore, thought advisable to propose that the Upper Oxus should be the boundary line, which neither Power should permit their forces to cross."—The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Rumbold, April 17th, 1869.

"The Prince Gortchakow went on to say that, considering our relations with Grootchakow holds us responsible for the behaviour of Afghanistan.

Shere Ali, it was to be hoped that we should use our influence with that Chief to keep him within his bounds. As he was indebted to us for support of a very tangible kind, we should, in the general interests of peace in that quarter, seek to moderate his ardour."—Mr. Rumbold to the Earl of Clarendon, June 7th, 1869.

APPENDIX E.

THE PAMIR STEPPE.

The Pamir table-land (around Siri-i-kol) is 15,600 feet high (62 feet lower than the top of Mont Blanc). The surrounding mountains are assumed by Wood to rise
3,400 feet higher. The plain has a width of about three miles. The lake has been sounded, but the spot selected, being probably the top of a subaqueous ridge, only showed a depth of nine feet. The bottom was found to be oozy and tangled with grassy weeds, and the water emitted a somewhat fetid smell, and exhibited a reddish hue. An attempt was made to measure the width of the lake by sound, but the report of a musket, loaded with blank cartridge, sounded so faint owing to the rarity of the atmosphere that no satisfactory results were obtained from the experiment. The human voice was likewise affected, and conversation could not be sustained without considerable effort. Wood's pulse (that of a spare man) registered 110 on the Pamir, while that of a stout Cabuli was found to be galloping at the alarming rate of 124 throbs per minute. The height of the snow line in this parallel is above 17,000 feet. Wood was here in winter, but he learned that by the end of June the ice upon the lake was broken up, and that the lake and surrounding country became a favorite resort of the Kirghiz—"Their flocks and herds roam over an unlimited extent of swelling grassy hills of the sweetest and richest pasture, while their yaks luxuriate amid the snow at no great distance."

With regard to the fauna of the Pamir, Wood learned that great numbers of aquatic birds haunted Lake Victoria in summer, gradually retiring to warmer regions on the approach of winter. But the most interesting facts recorded about the live stock of this remote region relate to the wild sheep, called after Marco Polo, "Ovis Poli." (Blyth). This great traveller writes:—"In this plain there are wild animals in great numbers, particularly sheep of a large size, having horns three, four, and even six palms in length. Of these, the shepherds form ladles and vessels for holding their victuals, and with the same material they construct fences for enclosing their cattle, and securing them against the wolves, with which, they say, the country is infested. The horns and bones of these sheep being found in large quantities, heaps are made of them at the side of the road, for the purpose of guiding the traveller at the season when it is covered with snow." Wood sent a specimen of this animal's horns to the Asiatic Society, which measured as follows:—Length of one horn, on the curve, four feet eight inches; round the base fourteen and a quarter inches; distance of tips, apart, three feet nine inches. Burnes was told that foxes bred in them, and that the carcass of the sheep formed a load for two animals. The horns are said, moreover, to supply the Kirghiz with horse shoes. The Kutchkar, however, is an almost equally fine species of wild sheep peculiar to these parts. It is said to stand as high as a two-year-old colt, to have a venerable beard and splendid curling horns which with the head give a man enough to do to lift. Its flesh is tough and ill-flavored in winter, but is reported by the Kirghiz to be delicious in autumn—"The only other quadrupeds we (I quote Wood) observed were wolves, foxes, and hares, and of birds we saw but one. It was, however, a regal bird—a fine black eagle, which came sailing over the valley, flapping his huge wings as if they were too heavy for his body."
The Pamir is a kind of ganglionic focus, from whence the great mountain ranges of Central Asia diverge.

"See Rémusat's "Foe koue ki," p. 36. In the Brahminical Cosmogony, which is "given in the 6th canto of the Mahabharata, Mount Meru, explained by Wilson as the "highland of Tátary, takes the place of the central lake of the Buddhists, and the "Bhadrasoma, which Humboldt strangely enough identifies with the Irtish, is sub-
stituted for the Sinton or Indus.—See Humboldt's Asie Centrale, tom. I, p. 4."—The "Quarterly Review, October 1866.

The Pamir, or "Roof of the World," is a region supposed by some to answer to the Mosaic description of the Paradise of our first parents, as well as to the Puranic Aryan Eden of the Brahminical Cosmogony. The term Pamir is believed by Burnouf to be a contraction of "Upa Meru"—"the country above Mount Meru"—an etymology that confirms the theory of its being the fountain head of the Aryan race. With regard to its being the home of Adam and Eve, Colonel Yule says:—"Here is the one locality on the earth's surface to which, if some interpretations be just, the Mosaic narrative points, in unison with the traditions of Aryan nations, as the cradle of our common race. If Oxus and Jaxartes be not in truth rivers of the Adamic paradise, the names of Jaibun and Saihun show at least that they have been so regarded of old. The old pictures of Eden figure the four rivers as literally diverging from a central lake to the four quarters of the earth; and no spot so nearly realizes this idea as the high table land of Pamir in the centre of the Asiatic world, upon whose lofty plains a tussock of grass decides the course of the waters, whether with the Oxus to the frontier of Europe, or with the Yarkand river to the verge of China, whilst the feeders of Jaxartes and Indus from the borders of the same treasury of waters complete the square number, and the lakes that spot the surface lend themselves to round the resemblance." The Chinese pilgrims,© Hwen Thsang and Sung Yun, who crossed this elevated tract in A.D. 518, bear testimony to the great altitude of the plateau. These high lands of the Tsang Lang were commonly said to be, they inform us, midway between Heaven and Earth. As regards the existence of one lake, at any rate, we have equally good evidence of great antiquity. Hwen Thsang came over the Pamir about A.D. 644 on his return to China. He says of it:—"This valley is about 200 miles from east to west, by 20 from north to south, and lies between two snowy ranges in the centre of the Tsang Lang mountains. The traveller is annoyed by sudden gusts of wind, and the snow drifts never cease, spring or summer. As the soil is almost constantly frozen, you see but a few miserable plants, and no crops can live. In the middle of the valley is a great lake. This stands in the centre of Jambadwipa (the Buddhist Oikoumene) on a plateau of prodigious elevation. An endless variety of creatures people its waters. The lake discharges to the west and east." Benedict Goës crossed the Pamir in 1603, and speaks of the great cold, desolation, and difficulty of breathing. Abdul Mejid gives us the following account of it:—"Fourteen weary days were occupied in crossing the steppe: the marches were long, depending on un-

* This traveller calls the Pamir "Po-mi-lo" in his book entitled "Pien-i-tien."
certain supplies of grass and water, which sometimes wholly failed; food for man and beast had to be carried with the party, for not a trace of human habitation is to be met with. The steppe is interspersed with tamarisk jungle and wild willow, and in the summer with tracts of high grass.”

Marco Polo, who came by this interesting tract of country some six centuries ago, gives us the following:—“Upon leaving Wakhan and proceeding for three days, still in an E.N.E. course, ascending mountain after mountain, you at length arrive at a point of the road where you might suppose the surrounding summits to be the highest land in the world. Here, between two ranges, you perceive a large lake, from which flows a handsome river that pursues its course along an extensive plain covered with the richest verdure.” The good old traveller then goes on to dilate on the quality of this grass. It will make sorry cattle sleek in the course of ten days, he says. This is corroborated by Captain John Wood, who tells us that the ewes of the Kirghiz almost invariably bring forth two lambs at a birth when pastured here. Wood’s account of the Pamir is by far the best we now have. It is written in so vivid and picturesque a style that it whets our appetite for the results of Colonel Gordon’s recent visit. My readers will find it in Chapter XXI of that invaluable work—“A Journey to the Source of the Oxus.”

NOTE.—See Yule’s Marco Polo, pp. 163-168, vol. 1, for a very interesting account of the Pamir.—Cf. Peschel, Geschichte der Erdkunde, p. 159.


APPENDIX F.

Colonel Thuillier, C.S.I., F.R.S., has kindly placed this list at my disposal.

LIST OF THE MAPS OF CENTRAL ASIA AND TURKISTAN IN THE (INDIAN) SURVEYOR GENERAL’S OFFICE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE OF MAP</th>
<th>AUTHOR</th>
<th>SCALE</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tr>
<td>CENTRAL ASIA.</td>
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<td>Central Asia, comprising Bukhara, Cabool, Persia, the River Indus, and countries eastward of it, constructed from numerous authentic documents, but principally from the original surveys of Lieut. Alexr. Burnes, F.R.S.</td>
<td>J. Arrowsmith...</td>
<td>Miles 70=1</td>
<td>1834</td>
<td>Published in London by J. Arrowsmith, 16th June 1834.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Map of Central Asia (French)</td>
<td>M. J. Klaproth...</td>
<td>About 20=1</td>
<td>1836</td>
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<td>Map of Western Asia, Map No. 23 of Kiepert's New Hand Atlas (German), comprising Persia, Arabia, Turkestan, Afghanistan, &amp;c.</td>
<td>H. Kiepert</td>
<td>About Miles Inch 128 = 1</td>
<td>1855</td>
<td>Published in Berlin.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Map of part of Central Asia, shewing the Russian forts and communications.</td>
<td>......</td>
<td>Miles Inch 110 = 1</td>
<td>......</td>
<td>Lithographed in the Surveyor General's Office, Calcutta, 1867.</td>
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<td>Map of the Kirghiz Steppe (Regions of the Orenburg and Siberian Kirghizes and of Semipaltinsk and Turkestan), and of the countries conterminous with the Central Asiatic Possessions.</td>
<td>Copied from a Russian map at the Topographical War Office, London.</td>
<td>About Miles Inch 70 = 1</td>
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<td>Lithographed in the Topographical War Department, London, and Photo-lithographed in the Surveyor General's Office, Calcutta, 1867.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Map of part of Central Asia, shewing the Russian possessions and the conterminous countries, compiled from Russian sources and from Colonel Walker's Map of Turkestan, &amp;c.</td>
<td>Topogl. Dept. of the War Office, London.</td>
<td>About Miles Inch 70 = 1</td>
<td>Corrected up to 1873</td>
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<td>Map of Central Asia (Russian).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Map of the country of the Upper Oxus.</td>
<td>Wood?</td>
<td>Miles Inch 50 = 1</td>
<td>......</td>
<td>Published by John Murray, London.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eine General Karte Von Central Asien (Map of the General Map of Central Asia).</td>
<td>Constructed by the Imperial &amp; Royal Geographical Institute, Vienna.</td>
<td>......</td>
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<td>Published by Gerold, Vienna.</td>
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**TURKESTAN.**

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<td>Karta Tourkistanskago (Russian map of the General Government of Turkestan.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sketch Map of Eastern Turkestan, showing the Hydrography of the Pamir to the east, the true courses of the Yarkand and Karakosh Rivers, with all the routes from Ladak across Karakoram and adjacent ranges.</td>
<td>Geo. J. W. Hayward.</td>
<td>Miles/Inch</td>
<td>1870</td>
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*Note on the alterations and additions in the re-prints of Sheets Nos. 1 and 3 of the 2nd edition of the Map of Turkistan, which were published in the Office of the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India in November 1873.*

It has been thought desirable to incorporate into Sheets Nos. 1 and 3 of the Turkistan map (2nd edition) the information which was appended to them in a separate "Addendum" when they were published,—in April last,—and which was not received in this office until after they had been passed through the press.

(2.) The opportunity has been taken to make some alterations in the delineation of the boundaries of Persia in accordance with information received since the issue of the map. It must be understood, however, that any delineation of this and of other boundary lines, which have not been determined and surveyed, can only be considered as an approximation to serve as a *pie alter* until conclusive results are obtained from actual survey.

(3.) The hills in the basin of the Atrek River and its affluents have been taken from the latest edition of the London War Office map of Khiva; further details of the Sir-Daria District have also been added from recent maps of the Russian Topographical Department.

(4.) Major Lovett, R.E., who was employed on the Sistan Boundary Commission, has furnished a list of a few errata in the routes from Shiraz to Bam and from Nasirabad to Dirjand. In making the requisite corrections, a serious error was discovered in the positions of Birjand and Kain, and all places on the road between them; the data by which they had been laid down—on sheet No. 3—were the latitudes and longitudes which are given in Major Evan Smith's Tabular Itinerary of the march of the Sistan mission from Bunjar to Mashad; but the longitudes there given of Birjand, Kain, and all intermediate places are found to be half a degree too great or too much to the east, by comparison with the details of the distances and bearings which are given in the Itinerary, and with Major Lovett's map of the route. These errors have been corrected in the re-print.

(Sa.) J. T. Walker, Colonel, R. E., Supdt., Great Trigonometrical Survey of India.

Dehra-Doon, 5th January 1874.