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TIBETAN PRECIS

BY

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Note

The following pages have been set in such a way as to retain the original pagination. The page references contained in the table of contents and the index refer to those found in square brackets at the top of each page.

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For the maps accompanying the Tibetan Precis, see the Introduction, p. xii above.

The following abbreviations are used in references to authorities cited in the Appendices:

A.P.O.      Assistant Political Officer
B.T.A.      British Trade Agent
D.O.        Demi-Official
E.A.D.      External Affairs Department, Government of India
F. and P.   Foreign and Political Service, Government of India
F.D.        Foreign Department, Government of India
F.O.        Foreign Office, London
G. of I.    Government of India
H.M.A.      His Majesty’s Ambassador
H.M.M.      His Majesty’s Minister
P.O.S.      Political Officer, Sikkim
S. of S.    Secretary of State
Tibetan Precis

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MC MAHON LINE, INDO-TIBETAN FRONTIER.
AREAS OF TIBETAN INFLUENCE.
ASSAM RIFLES POSTS ARE IN RED.
TRIBAL NAMES ARE IN GREEN.
Chapter I — History Down to the Close of the XIXth Century

1. Early History

The history of relations between Tibet and India before the arrival of the East India Company is sketchy and obscure. Up to the Seventh and Eighth Centuries A.D. Tibet was a great military power, waging with varying success a constant warfare against the neighbouring Chinese, suffering at least once Chinese penetration as far as Lhasa, but able for long periods to maintain some degree of control over Gilgit, Baltistan, Kashgar, Nepal and Bhutan, and to carry terror and conquest even into the capital of China.

Northern India, although largely protected by its climate, did not escape Tibetan invasion and, after the death of Harsha, a Tibetan force harried the kingdom of Magadha. Tibetan inscriptions up to the end of the Eighth Century continue to claim some sort of domination over “India”.

From the Seventh Century A.D., a strong religious connection between the two countries came into being. In fact, Tibetan Buddhism was founded by the Indian Tantric priest Padma Sambhava and was reformed some four centuries later by another Indian pandit, Atisha. Many other distinguished Buddhist teachers went from India to Tibet; and Tibetan scholars and pilgrims visited India. Great libraries of Indian religious books, both in original and in translations, accumulated in Tibetan monasteries; and there was a constant exchange of pilgrims, which still continues although probably on a smaller scale, between Mt. Kailas in Tibet, and the holy places of Buddhism in India. But by the time British influence first struck root in India the rise of Muslim power and the decline of Buddhism had reduced the former extensive intercourse to the pilgrim traffic and the small but constant trade exchanges between the hill states of the Himalaya, and Tibet.

2. First British Contact

As British territorial possessions increased, the duty of protecting ever-growing boundaries brought about the inevitable contact with the Himalayan kingdoms. The occasion was provided by the Bhutanese, whose incursions into the plains and harrying of Cooch Behar appeared to Warren Hastings, then Governor of Bengal, as a threat to his Presidency. A force was sent to expel the raiders and drive them back to the hills. The Bhutanese seem to have appealed to the Tashi Lama who wrote to Warren Hastings, the first example on our records of the stately and picturesque Tibetan official correspondence; asking as a favour that hostilities against Bhutan should cease. Hastings, with far-sighted genius, replied offering a treaty of friendship between Bengal and Tibet and asking for a passport for an officer to negotiate with the Tibetans. About the same time (April 1774) he concluded a treaty with Bhutan, and shortly afterwards, George Bogle set out on his mission to Tibet.

Bogle’s account of his visit to Shigatse is full of interest, but it must suffice to say here that, although he established relations of intimate friendship with the Tashi Lama, his success was limited by that obstacle which, in different forms, has ever since overshadowed British intercourse with Tibet, the influence of China.

3. China and Tibet

Even before the height of Tibetan military power in the Seventh and Eighth Centuries A.D., the Tibetans had from time to time raided China. The earliest record is of an obscure period several centuries B.C.; again in the Fourth Century A.D. Tibetan tribes contributed to the downfall of the Tsin dynasty. After the Eighth Century, the destinies of China and Tibet continued to be interwoven, but it was the foreign conquerors of China, themselves greatly influenced by Buddhism, who exerted the most active influence on Tibet. By the Thirteenth Century the military spirit of the Tibetans seems to have become softened, perhaps by the influence of Buddhism, which took hold in Tibet in the Seventh Century A.D.; and the conquests of Ghengiz Khan, even if he did not actually invade Tibet, reduced Tibetan influence which had suffered from the breaking up of what had been a strong unified kingdom, into a
number of small principalities. But Khublai Khan, the grandson of Ghengiz, and the first Mongol Emperor of China, was converted to Lamaism, and some time towards the end of the Thirteenth Century he established the High Priest of Sakya as ruler of Central Tibet. Thereafter, when the Mongol Yuen dynasty had been evicted by the Chinese Ming, Mongol chieftains continued to act as king-makers in Tibet by their support of one or other of the rival hierarchies of Lamas. The most decisive intervention was that of Altan Khan, the scourge of the declining power of the Ming Emperors, who established the High Priest of Drepung monastery as Dalai Lama, and ruler of Central Tibet, in the place of the successors of the Sakya dynasty whose power had dwindled. The new line of rulers was confirmed and still further empowered in 1645 by the Mongol Gusri Khan who, offended by an appeal by the Regent of Tibet to the newly established Manchu dynasty of China for help against the Mongols, made a clean sweep of the petty Tibetan princelings, and then set up the Dalai Lama as an independent ruler; and it was not until the time of the Emperor Kang Hsi that dissension and fighting between Tibetans and Mongols about the succession to the office of Dalai Lama, and a consequent invasion of Lhasa by Dzungarian Tatars, gave the Chinese the opportunity of active intervention in Tibetan affairs. A Chinese army eventually established the Seventh Dalai Lama in 1720, and along with him introduced effective Chinese rule at Lhasa.

The events of these years may be read in the contemporary accounts of the Jesuit Father Ippolito Desideri, and the Capuchin, Orazio Della Penna.

From that time until the Chinese Revolution of 1911 the Ch'ing dynasty maintained its officers and military force in Lhasa but the gradual decline of Manchu vitality allowed the spirit of Tibetan independence to emerge again; and it appears that the last two Dalai Lamas under the Manchu regime were sufficiently powerful to refuse new seals of office from the Emperor.

The above account is intended to bring out that the purely Chinese dynasty of the Ming, although it did issue formal acknowledgement of such Tibetan rulers as the Si Tu successors of the Sakya Lama and also of the Dalai Lamas who were supported by the Mongols, never controlled the country; and that it was the foreign Manchu dynasty, taking advantage of the Mongol religious tie with Tibet which the Manchus shared in a lesser degree, that first brought Tibet within the Chinese Empire.

4. Hastings and Tibet

To return to the situation at the time of Warren Hastings’ attempt to establish friendly relations with Tibet, it may be observed from Bogle’s account of his mission that, although a Tibetan of the standing of the Tashi Lama was able to enter independently into negotiations with a foreigner, it was not possible for him to conclude any agreement without reference to Lhasa and Peking. Although Bogle noticed signs that the Tibetans disliked the Chinese, the Lhasa deputies who came to talk to him had to admit that they were subject to the Emperor of China. Bogle’s request for the right of trade between India and Tibet was never answered but the foundations of friendly intercourse had been laid, and although both Bogle and his friend the Third Tashi Lama died soon after their meeting, Hastings sent further missions to Bhutan in 1775 and 1777, and in 1782 despatched Captain Samuel Turner to congratulate the Regent of Tibet on the re-incarnation of the Tashi Lama. Turner did not reach Lhasa but he obtained from the Regent of Tashi Lhunpo a promise of “encouragement to all merchants, natives of India, that may be sent to traffic in Tibet on behalf of the Government of Bengal”. He reported subsequently (1786) that many natives of Bengal were trading at Shigatse without obstruction. Turner also noted the power of the Chinese, but he found the Tibetans unwilling to acknowledge their dependence on the Chinese Emperor. It is also interesting to read that Russia under the Czarina Catherine was said to have been making overtures at this time for trade in Tibet.

The promising seed of British friendship with Tibet sown by these missions was brought to nothing shortly after Hastings had left India by a Nepalese invasion of Tibet in 1792. Suspicion arose in Lhasa that this attack had been encouraged by the British, and the immediate result was a complete ban on traders and visitors, including even Indian pilgrims, from India to Tibet.

The period from 1792 to 1904 is perhaps the real dark age of Tibet when it won the reputation of a closed country hostile to foreigners.
5. Fresh Efforts to Establish Relations

In the period of obscurantism after 1792 travellers to Tibet included Manning, who visited Lhasa in 1811, Huc and Gabet, Moorcroft, the Stracheys, and the earliest of the courageous Pundits of the Survey of India; but no official attempt was made to improve the position until 1873 when the Bengal Government, believing that the policy of exclusion was imposed by the Chinese and that an effort should be made to secure a fair and regulated trade with Tibet, urged the Government of India to press the Chinese for an order of admittance to Tibet and a renewal of the friendly relations which existed in the days of Bogle and Turner. It was hoped to secure admission to Tibet for Indian tea, on which there was an absolute embargo.

The only result of this approach was the conclusion of an agreement with China in 1876, at Chefoo, by which the Chinese undertook, what later events showed they could not perform, namely to protect any mission that might be sent to Tibet. This was the first example of the mistake of making agreements about Tibet without consulting the Tibetans; but in view of our lack of information about the country there was some excuse.

The Bengal Government also began to improve the road to the Tibetan frontier in the hope of attracting trade.

6. Proposed Expedition of Colman Macaulay. 1885

The value of the agreement with China was tested in 1885 when, on the enthusiastic and vigorous initiative of Mr. Colman Macaulay of the Bengal Government, a proposal to send a mission to Lhasa was approved by His Majesty's Government, and the agreement of the Chinese Government was secured. All was ready when the mission was abandoned by order of the Government of India on account of "international considerations". It appears that the Chinese, after giving the necessary permission, received protests from the Tibetan authorities.

7. Tibetan Invasion of Sikkim. 1886

Tibetan objections to the mission seem to be confirmed by what followed. The abandonment of the proposal was apparently taken as a sign of weakness, and almost immediately, at the end of 1886, a Tibetan force crossed the Jelap La into Sikkim, which had been "again admitted into friendship and alliance" by the Treaty of 1861. No immediate military action was taken against the Tibetans. The matter was referred to the Chinese Government who were asked to compel the Tibetans to withdraw, and were given an ample time limit of one year for the purpose. The Chinese, whose power in Tibet seems by this time to have waned, probably neither could nor would do anything, and in the winter of 1887 an ultimatum was sent to the Tibetan commander. As neither this nor a letter to the Dalai Lama produced any effect, a British force was sent to the Sikkim frontier in March 1888. The Tibetans withdrew but later attacked, and were driven out of Sikkim. No Tibetan territory was occupied and no indemnity was sought.

It may be observed that the first act of aggression in our relations with Tibet came from the Tibetans. It may also be noted that most of the factors governing events in the succeeding few years can be seen in this incident: Chinese inability to control Tibet, and anxiety to intervene when Tibetan action provoked reprisals — it was Chinese intervention that caused the immediate withdrawal of the British force from the Chumbi Valley — the Tibetan readiness to take conciliation for weakness, and their habit of ignoring official communications.

8. Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1890 and Tibet Trade Regulations of 1893

Chinese intervention to effect a settlement led to protracted negotiations of a pattern to be repeated in later years. Eventually a treaty was signed at Calcutta in 1890 by which the boundaries of Sikkim were laid down, and provision was made for the subsequent discussion of questions of trade, pasturage, and the method of official communications. These discussions led slowly up to the signature of the Trade Regulations of December 1893. No Tibetan official signed either the Treaty or the Regulations, although Lonchen Shatra was present at the negotiation of the latter.

The Trade Regulations provided for the establishment of a trade centre and a British Trade Agent at Yatung (a small village where the roads from the Nathu and Jelap passes reach the Chumbi Valley) where trade was to be conducted without vexatious restrictions;
goods, with some specified exceptions, were to be exempt from duty for five years; Indian tea might be imported into Tibet at a rate of duty not exceeding that at which Chinese tea was imported into England, but this was not to apply during the five years when other goods were exempt; trade disputes arising in Tibet between British and Chinese or Tibetan subjects were to be settled by the Political Officer in Sikkim and the Chinese Frontier Officer.

9. Working of the Trade Regulations of 1893

Active obstruction by the Tibetans nullified the work of five years. Mr. White, then Political Officer in Sikkim, who visited Yatung in May 1894 to supervise the opening of the Trade Mart, reported that the Tibetans were determined to render the treaty abortive and the local Chinese officials were powerless to coerce them. The Chinese were suzerain in name only, while the Tibetans sheltered behind them and played them off against us. The site was unsuitable, and accommodation inadequate; and free trade was effectually hampered by the existence of a 10 per cent. duty on all goods passing through Phari.

The government of Bengal considered this duty a breach of the treaty; but the Government of India raised the question whether it was newly imposed or of old standing; and, in view of the short time since the Mart was opened, and the need for "the utmost patience in dealing with the Tibetans", declined to take up the matter with the Chinese Government at that stage.

Mr. Nolan, then commissioner of Darjeeling, who visited Yatung in 1895 reported on the failure to carry out the Regulations. He found that the valley beyond Yatung had been barricaded, and that Tibetan traders were prohibited from coming to the Mart. The 10 per cent. duty he reported to be of old standing, but held that it was inconsistent with the provision that trade with India should be exempt from taxation. In his opinion, the Chinese were anxious to see the Convention carried out but the Tibetans definitely repudiated the treaty.

Again the Government of Bengal recommended diplomatic representations to the Chinese Government. Again the Government of India declined. They drew attention to the increase in trade which had taken place in 1894-1895, and stressed that the point to which they attached the most importance was the development of trade. A conciliatory policy towards the Tibetans was recommended in regard to the negotiations for the demarcation of the Sikkim-Tibet frontier which had been proceeding desultorily in the face of Tibetan opposition and Chinese procrastination.

This patient and forbearing policy, and mild attempts to secure our interests through the local Chinese officers, had no reward; and by 1898, when the Trade Regulations were due for revision, the frontier was still undemarcated and the Trade Regulations still inoperative.

The arrival of Lord Curzon as Viceroy produced a somewhat firmer attitude towards the Chinese Amban, and the suggestion that, if trade conditions were improved and if British subjects were given access to Phari, a concession might be made over the boundary settlement; but no progress was made.

Chapter II — Lhasa Expedition and 1904 Convention

10. Attempt to Approach the Tibetans Directly. 1899

His Majesty’s Government now decided that, as China’s authority in Tibet seemed to be merely nominal and as we might hope for some progress by making a concession to the Tibetans on the frontier question, attempts should be made to open direct communications between the Government of India and the Tibetan authorities. Accordingly, in the autumn of 1899, two letters addressed by Lord Curzon to the Dalai Lama were sent through Ugyen Kazi of Bhutan and Captain Kennion, Assistant Commissioner, Leh, respectively. No reply was received to either letter and, in fact, that sent through Captain Kennion was not transmitted by the Tibetan officers in Western Tibet.

11. The Russian Scare. 1901–1902

And now there thrust itself into the picture a new element which roused grave doubts whether the ways of diplomatic conciliation, could be followed indefinitely. News was received that
the Dalai Lama — who had treated approaches from the Viceroy with discourtesy — had sent an envoy to the Czar of Russia. This was Dorjieff, a Buriat Russian who had lived for some twenty years in Tibet. Enquiries from the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Lamsdorf, produced the reply that this was in no sense a diplomatic mission and had no official character; but Russian official newspapers continued to refer to Dorjieff as “Envoy Extraordinary”. In view of the misgivings of the Government of India our Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed to inform the Russian Foreign Minister that we had received his assurances with satisfaction as His Majesty’s Government would naturally not regard with indifference any proceedings that might have a tendency to alter or disturb the existing status in Tibet (September 1901). Count Lamsdorf in reply repeated the assurance that the mission was chiefly concerned with religious matters and had no political or diplomatic object or character.

In the meantime, ineffective attempts to secure our rights under the Treaty of 1890, including the demarcation of the boundary, went on. When direct contact was established with the Tibetans on the north border of Sikkim, the Chinese Amban intervened and imported fresh delays and frustration; but a suggestion by Mr. White that, as a means of bringing pressure to bear, the Chumbi Valley should be occupied was not looked on with favour by the Government of India.

Still more serious concern was caused to the Government of India in the summer of 1902 when our Ambassador in Russia informed the Foreign Office of strong rumours of a secret agreement between Russia and China about Tibet.

12. Government of India Propose a Mission to Lhasa. 1903

Although the possibility of a Russian invasion of India may not have been taken very seriously in high places Russian activities were proceeding vigorously in Central Asia and Manchuria and the prospect of Russian influence in the capital of an unfriendly Tibet, where we ourselves had no representation, was sufficiently unpleasant. The Government of India accordingly proposed in January 1903 that a mission with an armed escort should be sent to Lhasa to settle our future relations with Tibet and to establish a British representative there. In the hope of putting an end to the stultifying procedure by which the Tibetans and Chinese were able to play off one against the other in their dealings with us, but recognising the need for regarding Chinese susceptibilities about the fiction of their suzerainty, they proposed that if a treaty should be signed it should be signed by a Tibetan representative as well as by a Chinese. It was to be made clear that there was no political or territorial object in the proposed mission but that it was exclusively for commercial purposes and for establishing friendly relations between neighbours.

His Majesty’s Government were at this time engaged on negotiations with Russia about our interest in Tibet, which led to the denial by the Russian Government of any secret agreement with China about Tibet; but the Russian Government contended that Tibet was a part of the Chinese Empire in the integrity of which they took an interest; they disclaimed any intention to interfere in Tibet but hinted that, if there were any alteration of the status there, they might have to take measures elsewhere.

During these negotiations His Majesty’s Government could come to no decision, but they made it clear to the Government of India that a stage had been reached when it was necessary to consider not only questions of trade and boundaries, but the whole problem of our future relations with Tibet. They acknowledged the urgency of putting those relations on a secure basis in view of Russian interest in that country, and of the disturbance which would result to Nepal from any alteration of the balance in Tibet. We had no desire to declare a protectorate or occupy any part of the country, which still had to be regarded as a province of China, but if we were committed to armed intervention some such measures might become inevitable. They required more justification before taking any action which might appear as an attack on the integrity of the Chinese Empire; and His Majesty’s Government therefore preferred to continue negotiations with China and Tibet.

13. Mission to Khampa Dzong. 1903

The Chinese had recently agreed that if Yatung was considered unsuitable for negotiations they were willing to negotiate at any place acceptable to us. The Government of India proposed Khampa Dzong, on the Tibetan side of the north border of Sikkim, as the meeting place, and
recommended that our representative should have an armed escort of 200 men while reserves should be kept ready in Sikkim. His Majesty’s Government agreed to these proposals, but did not accept a suggestion from the Government of India that, if the Chinese and Tibetan delegates did not appear at Khampa Dzong, the British party should go on to Shigatse or Gyantse.

With regard to the terms of the negotiations the Government of India recommended that as the Trade Regulations had been stultified, and as Yatung was unsuitable for a trade centre, a Trade Mart and a British Agent should be established at Gyantse. They held that the appointment of a British representative at Lhasa would be the best security for our interests, but as they did not believe that His Majesty’s Government would favour that idea they proposed Gyantse instead. His Majesty’s Government demurred, and asked what alternatives there were to advancing into Tibet. The Government of India replied that (a) a costly and ineffective blockade of the trade routes could be undertaken, or (b) the Chumbi Valley could be occupied.

Eventually, His Majesty’s Government decided on a procedure by which both Chinese and Tibetans would be bound by the action of their representatives but that negotiations should be confined to questions of trade relations, the frontier and grazing rights, and that no proposal should be made for the establishment of a British Trade Agent at Gyantse. (May 1903.)

After several more months of correspondence with the Chinese, it appeared reasonably certain that both Chinese and Tibetan delegates would present themselves at Khampa Dzong; and accordingly in June 1903 the British Expedition led by Colonel Younghusband as Commissioner and including Captain O’Connor and Mr. White, set out for the meeting.

A memorial from the Amban to the Chinese Emperor quoted by Younghusband in his book “India and Tibet” page 89 shows that the Amban made a real effort to bring the Tibetans to a reasonable frame of mind; but little attention was paid to his advice, and when Younghusband reached Giagong (within the Sikkim boundary, but claimed and encroached on by the Tibetans) the Tibetan delegates tried to dissuade him from proceeding. Nevertheless, he went on to Khampa Dzong which he reached in July 1903.

14. Negotiations at Khampa Dzong

Every kind of evasion and obstruction was encountered. The Tibetan officials, who proved to be of inadequate rank to negotiate, refused to discuss anything except at Giagong and, although they claimed to have full powers, they took cover when it suited them under the plea that by an agreement with China all matters relating to Tibet had to be addressed to the Amban. The Chinese delegate was also lacking in authority, and for five months the British Mission remained at Khampa Dzong hoping for the arrival of a new Chinese Amban who had been specially appointed for these negotiations.

Younghusband was approached by a deputation from the Tashi Lama which sought to persuade him to withdraw. In the meantime Tibetan troops were gathering between Phari and Shigatse; winter was coming on; the Tibetans were obstructing the movements of Chinese officials; and no progress was being made.

The only favourable developments were the decided support of the Government of Nepal, which addressed letters to the Dalai Lama and Council advising them in most reasonable terms to negotiate with the British Mission; and the good relations which the open and friendly behaviour of the British officers enabled them to establish with individual Tibetan officials from Shigatse.

15. Move to Gyantse Sanctioned

The Government of India recounted these obstructions to His Majesty’s Government and proposed an advance to Gyantse. At last, in November 1903, His Majesty’s Government sanctioned this move. The advance was to be solely for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction and was not to be allowed to lead to occupation or permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs in any form. As soon as reparation had been effected the expedition should withdraw, and no permanent mission was to be established. Questions of enforcing trade facilities should be considered in the light of these instructions.

When this decision became known, protests were received from the Chinese who were easy to answer and from the Russians who had been immediately informed and had been assured that there was no intention to annex Tibetan territory. These objections were disposed
of suitably and the Expedition set out. It developed into a military operation necessitating an advance to Lhasa itself before negotiations could be undertaken.

16. The Expedition of 1903–1904

Reasoning without effect all along the march, fighting sixteen engagements of varying importance including a siege of some two months at Gyantse, suffering 202 casualties, inflicting perhaps 5,000, gathering reinforcements, overcoming difficulties of transport and climate, the expedition reached Lhasa on August 3rd 1904, eight months after it had left India. The Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa before the arrival of the expedition, and made his way to China.

The details are mainly military history, and it is enough here to record a few points.

No formal declaration of our intention to advance and no declaration of war was made to the Tibetans or Chinese. The move was treated as the sequel to a letter from the Viceroy to the Amban on October 1st 1903, stating that as negotiations at Khampa Dzong had failed there was no alternative but to transfer them to some suitable spot where it was hoped that they might be resumed; and that, as it was understood that the Tibetan passes were guarded by Tibetan troops, the Viceroy had been compelled to take measures for the safety of the Commissioners.

Eyewitnesses speak of the old hostility of the monks, which they compare with the less uncompromising attitude of some lay officials, and the readiness of the peasants to be friendly when they saw themselves overpowered, and when they found the invading force generous in payment for supplies and humane in their treatment of the wounded.

The Chinese Amban, although taking an active part in the negotiation of the Treaty at Lhasa, and showing a genuine desire to help, was clearly not in a position to exercise authority.

The Nepalese and Bhutanese Governments gave valuable help. The Nepalese Minister sought by a letter in June 1904 to dissuade the Dalai Lama, whom he believed to have been kept in ignorance of the true facts, from fighting against the British; and the Nepalese officer at Lhasa was an intermediary in the negotiations.

The Tongsa Penlop, afterwards Maharaja of Bhutan, accompanied the Expedition from Phari onwards, and made several attempts to bring the Tibetans to negotiate; he also acted as an intermediary at Lhasa.

17. Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904

For military reasons negotiations had to be concluded by September 1904. The terms proposed by the Government of India for the approval of His Majesty’s Government while the expedition was still on its way were: —

1. The establishment of a Resident at Lhasa or, failing that, a representative at Gyantse who should have the right to proceed to Lhasa.
3. The demand of an indemnity.
4. The occupation of the Chumbi Valley as security for the indemnity.
5. The establishment of Trade Marts at Gyantse and Shigatse as well as at Yatung and Gartok.
6. The settlement of the Sikkim and Garhwal boundaries, and of customs duties and Trade Regulations.

His Majesty’s Government found these terms excessive. They turned down the proposal for a Resident at Lhasa; agreed to an indemnity, leaving it to Younghusband’s discretion to propose a sum which would be within the power of the Tibetans to pay within three years; agreed to the provision for exclusive political influence, to the establishment of Trade Marts at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok, to the right of a British agent to have access to the Gyantse Mart, to the occupation of the Chumbi Valley as security for the indemnity, and to other minor points.

It was explained that international and imperial considerations made it necessary to avoid a policy in Tibet that might throw any additional burden on the British Empire. There was also the situation vis-à-vis Russia to be considered. The Russian Government had given us satisfactory assurances regarding Tibet, and His Majesty’s Government had made it plain to
Russia that we had no territorial ambitions in Tibet. The duties of the British Agent must therefore be kept exclusively commercial and it was undesirable for him to have the right to proceed to Lhasa as that would inevitably give his functions a political character.

In the early stages of negotiation Younghusband found himself opposed by arrogance, futile stupidity, and unwillingness to face the facts. The Tibetans sought to delay a conclusion, but Younghusband, in spite of the pressure of time, succeeded by patience and firmness and with the help of the Chinese, Nepalese and Bhutanese representatives, in bringing the Regent to an agreement.

The amount of the indemnity produced most argument. This issue, as Younghusband pointed out, was the only one that cost the Tibetans anything; the other terms were potentially to their advantage. Eventually, at his own discretion, Younghusband accepted a proposal that the indemnity which he fixed at seventy-five lakhs of rupees should be paid in instalments, and that we should have the right to occupy the Chumbi Valley as security. This condition was included in the Treaty as signed on 7th September 1904, as was a separate note that the British Agent at Gyantse should have the right to proceed to Lhasa.

The inclusion of these terms which did not accord with the instructions of His Majesty's Government was due to the shortness of time which did not allow a reference to London before the last date fixed by the military authorities for their stay in Lhasa. Younghusband with courage and independence refused to let slip an opportunity of securing what seemed best for our interests, although it might appear to be more than had been authorised.

The Government of India strongly supported his action, but in order to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government they recommended a reduction of the indemnity to twenty-five lakhs, and the termination of the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley after three instalments had been paid.

His Majesty's Government accepted this modification, but were unable to agree to the inclusion of the right of the Trade Agent to visit Lhasa. The treaty as ultimately ratified therefore, consisted of:

I. Settlement of the Sikkim-Tibet frontier.
II. Opening of Trade Marts at Gyantse and Gartok in addition to Yatung under the Regulations of 1893 subject to subsequent modification. Undertaking to place no restriction on trade by existing routes, and to consider the opening of fresh trade marts if conditions required it.
III. Appointment by the Tibetan Government of representatives to amend the Trade Regulations of 1893.
IV. No dues to be levied by the Tibetan Government other than those to be provided for in a tariff to be mutually agreed.
V. Roads to the Trade Marts to be kept in repair, and a Tibetan Agent to be established at the Marts to deal with the British Agent.
VI. Indemnity of seventy-five lakhs to be paid in annual instalments.
VII. Chumbi Valley to be occupied until the indemnity had been paid, and until the marts had been effectively opened, whichever might be the latest.
VIII. Removal of fortifications.
IX. Provision for exclusive British political influence.

By a declaration attached to the ratified convention Clauses VI and VII were modified to an indemnity of twenty-five lakhs, and to the occupation of the Chumbi Valley until three instalments had been paid provided that the Trade Marts had been effectively opened for three years.

18. The Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906

Although the Amban Yu Tai had been sent specifically to take part in the negotiations, the Lhasa Treaty was signed only by the Tibetans and it was not until 1906 that Chinese admission was secured. The convention of 1906, as will be seen later, had the opposite effect from that which had been intended.

It contained the following provisions:

I. The Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904 was confirmed.
II. Great Britain engaged not to annex Tibetan territory nor to interfere in the administration of Tibet. China engaged not to permit any other foreign power to interfere in the territory or administration of Tibet.
III. Made it clear that China was not a foreign power for the purposes of Article IX — exclusive political influence — of the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty; and allowed the construction of a British telegraph line to the Trade Marts.

IV. Confirmed the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893.

19. Results of the Treaties of 1904 and 1906

By the treaty of 1904 we established direct and friendly intercourse with Tibet and terms which, if they had been carried out, would have led to the opening of trade; but the Convention with China in 1906 had the unfortunate result of nullifying the advantages we had gained at Lhasa. China was given the opportunity of reaffirming her influence which had almost reached the vanishing point.

We had broken down Tibetan exclusion and stubbornness, and had encouraged the deposition of the Dalai Lama by the Chinese, only to withdraw from Lhasa and later, without consulting the Tibetans, to sign terms which acknowledged China's right to preserve the integrity of Tibet, without seeking to limit Chinese interference in Tibetan internal affairs. We ourselves were bound not to interfere in Tibetan administration; and the Tibetan Government, without a proper head and with shaken morale, continued to refer all questions to the Dalai Lama, deposed and an exile in China.

The Chinese were quick to take advantage of the situation and embarked on active measures to restore their influence in Tibet.

Chapter III — Revival of Chinese Influence Upset by Chinese Revolution

20. Revival of Chinese Influence. 1906

Mr. Chang Yin-tang, who was appointed High Commissioner for Tibet in 1906, soon made it clear that he interpreted the 1906 Convention as the recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, and that he intended to nullify the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty by insisting that in all relations between Tibetans and British a Chinese officer should be the intermediary.

He also sought to detach Nepal and Bhutan from British influence.

British Trade Agents in Tibet suffered many pin-pricks of Chinese arrogance and obstruction; local Chinese officials interfered with their relations with Tibetan officials in every possible way, and eventually stopped all intercourse.

Other signs of Chinese intentions were the reported degradation of Amban Yu Tai, who had assisted in the negotiation of the 1904 Treaty, and the dismissal of Tibetan officials who had taken part in the negotiations. These provocations led to a telegram from His Majesty's Government to our Minister in Peking saying that, as we desired to have matters put right not by separate action in Tibet but through the Chinese Government, it was necessary to bring Mr. Chang's action to the notice of the Chinese Government and to point out that the recognition by China of the Lhasa Treaty was not consistent with the punishment of officials for being concerned with it.

Later His Majesty's Government had to ask for instructions to be sent to Mr. Chang that the right of the British Trade Agent to direct communication with the Tibetans should be respected; and again, it became necessary to ask for the withdrawal of Mr. Gow a particularly troublesome Chinese officer in Gyantse.

The part played by British Officers of the China Customs Service in supporting Chinese pretensions may be observed.

It became necessary for the Government of India to report to His Majesty's Government in July 1907 that the treaty was not being carried out. His Majesty's Government however declined to take any further action at that stage and preferred to wait for the negotiation of the Trade Regulations.

21. The Indemnity and Evacuation of Chumbi Valley. 1906–1908

In the matter of the indemnity, too, the Chinese asserted their influence and gained an important point. In 1906 they announced their intention, both to our Minister in Peking and
the Tibetan public, of paying the whole indemnity in three instalments. This was accepted, and the Chinese then set about attempting to exclude the Tibetans from any direct share in the transaction. Although the first and third instalments were paid through a Tibetan official, the Chinese succeeded in making payment at a place and in a manner other than that which we had intended.

As soon as the payment had been completed, the question of evacuating the Chumbi Valley was raised. The Government of India pointed out that the other conditions of evacuation had not been carried out, namely that the Trade Marts should have been effectively opened for three years, and the other terms of the treaty complied with; British subjects, they reported, were not able to rent accommodation at the Marts except at extortionate rents; unauthorised restrictions were imposed by Tibetans on trade across the North Sikkim border; there was obstruction to the postal arrangements with Gartok; and since Mr. Chang's visit to Tibet there had been serious interruption to our telegraph line. The Government of India hoped that it would be possible during the negotiation of the Trade Regulations to retain, at least, the possibility of warning the Chinese and Tibetans that our evacuation of the Chumbi Valley depended on a satisfactory settlement of matters connected with the Trade Marts.

His Majesty's Government, however, for reasons which can scarcely have satisfied the Government of India, declined to postpone the evacuation—which accordingly took place early in 1908—and contented themselves by pointing out to the Chinese Government that in return for the evacuation His Majesty's Government would expect that their wishes would be met in regard to the Trade Regulations then under discussion at Calcutta.

22. Trade Regulations of 1908

Thus, we were embarked on the negotiation of Trade Regulations with the treaty under which this action was taken already to a great extent stultified; with the prestige of our forbearing victory in 1904 waning; with the good relations established with the Tibetans reduced by Chinese intervention, and by Chinese misrepresentation that the 1906 Convention superseded the 1904 Treaty; with a conciliatory government in London, and a revived and insistent Chinese Government facing us at Simla in the person of the forceful and ambitious Mr. Chang.

The intention of the 1904 Treaty had been that we should negotiate the Regulations with the Tibetans; but we did not insist on that, and accepted the association of a Chinese representative with the Tibetan delegate. In fact Mr. Chang conducted the negotiations and Tsarong Shape, the Tibetan delegate, evaded or was unable to take any independent action, and merely signed the Regulations, which were concluded on April 20th 1908.

Their main terms were as follows:

The boundaries of Gyantse Trade Mart were fixed. British subjects were allowed to lease land at Trade Marts for building houses and godowns. Tibetan officers, under Chinese supervision, were to administer the Marts.

Joint hearing of trade cases between Chinese or Tibetan and British subjects. British subjects accused of criminal offences in Tibet to be tried by a British Trade Agent. Extraterritorial rights to be relinquished when the state of Tibetan Laws might warrant such a step. Rest-houses and the telegraph line built by the British to be transferred to Chinese control.

The Chinese were not to prevent British officers from personal intercourse with Tibetan officers and people.

British officers and subjects must adhere to trade routes, and not proceed beyond the marts without permission; but existing usage was to continue in regard to British Indians who had formerly traded beyond the marts; in this case they would be subject to local jurisdiction.

British subjects were to be at liberty to buy and sell from and to whom they pleased.

China was to provide effective police protection, and when this was done British guards would be withdrawn.

It may be observed that the trade mart at Yatung had been removed during our occupation of the Chumbi Valley to a better site at Shasima, now known as Yatung.

23. Effect of the Trade Regulations

These Regulations would have been advantageous, in view of the situation before their conclusion, if they had been carried out; but in fact they led to no better conditions than
before. They admitted a greater degree of Chinese authority than would have been thought possible in 1904; but they were in accord with the spirit of conciliation or complaisance which underlay the 1906 Treaty, and the Treaty concluded with Russia in 1907. By the latter we recognised the suzerain right of China in Tibet; agreed that, saving the right of the British agent to direct intercourse with the Tibetans, neither power would negotiate with Tibet excepting through China; engaged mutually not to send representatives to Lhasa; or to seek concessions for railways, mines, etc., in Tibet, or to accept the assignment of any part of the revenues of Tibet. They were also in accord with the expressed policy of His Majesty’s Government that our interest in Tibet was purely commercial. It is not surprising that our progressive withdrawal from the vantage point of 1904 was followed by a rapid Chinese advance.


Forceful diplomacy was soon followed by military activity. Early in 1908 Chao Erh-feng, acting Viceroy in Szechuan, was appointed Resident in Tibet, with large powers, and instructions to develop the resources of the country, to increase the number of Chinese officials, and to reform the administration. Chao had displayed vigour, ability and ruthlessness in Eastern Tibet since 1905 when he had been appointed to deal with that turbulent area, remote from the control of Lhasa, and peopled by violent feud-loving Tibetan clans. At that time Eastern Tibet was in insurrection against the Chinese, and in the disturbances several foreign missionaries were murdered. Chao, after fierce fighting and harsh reprisals, subdued the Tibetan kingdoms of Batang and Derge which he brought under direct Chinese administration in 1907. He also appointed Chinese officers in the place of the Tibetan rulers of Tachienlu, Litang and other small principalities. In these operations he had taken severe measures to reduce the power of the Lamas in whom he saw the greatest force for unified opposition. So, by the time of his appointment as Resident in Tibet, he was already a hated figure to Tibetans. After his appointment anti-British articles began to appear in a newspaper published at Lhasa and circulated throughout Tibet. The “shame” of 1904 was recalled, and the Tibetans were urged to unite with the Nepalese and Bhutanese to resist foreigners.

The next move by the Chinese Government was the reinstatement of the Dalai Lama by an Imperial Decree in November 1908, in which he was described in terms which left no doubt that he was to be considered as the dependent of a sovereign China.

Chao Erh-feng, having consolidated his position in Derge and Batang, made ready in the autumn of 1909 to march on Chiamdo, at that time a principality in close relations with Lhasa; and it was rumoured that he intended to proceed to Lhasa. These reports reached the Dalai Lama, who had taken nearly a year on his journey, even before he reached Lhasa; and in October 1909 he despatched messages from Nagchuka to the British Trade Agent at Gyantse asking for telegrams invoking help to be sent to the British Government and “all Ministers of Europe”. He also sent messengers to the Foreign Ambassadors in Peking with similar appeals and shortly afterwards he despatched an official to explain the situation personally to the British Trade Agent at Gyantse.

After the Dalai Lama arrived at Lhasa in December 1909 attempts were made to dissuade the Chinese from sending troops, but Chao was pushing on almost unopposed. He occupied Chiamdo early in 1910, and by February 12th his advance guards had reached Lhasa.

25. Chinese Troops at Lhasa. 1910

When news of this invasion was received, our Minister at Peking was instructed to protest, and to claim that an effective Tibetan Government must be maintained with which we could treat in the manner provided by the treaties of 1904 and 1906; our interest in Nepal and other neighbouring countries was also to be stressed; but, before this communication could be delivered, the Dalai Lama had again been forced to leave Lhasa, this time for the protection of the British, to whom he immediately appealed to intervene.

The Chinese Government replied that their troops were only intended for the effective policing of Tibet as provided in the Treaty; they did not desire any modification in the status quo or any alteration in the internal administration; it had not been their intention to deprive the Dalai Lama of his power, but it had become necessary to depose him and to make arrangements for a successor, after which they contemplated no aggressive action in Tibet. This was followed by a decree deposing the Dalai Lama.
26. British Reactions

When the views of the Government of India on these developments were sought the Viceroy reported that it appeared that all power in Tibet had been assumed by the Chinese who were not allowing direct intercourse between the Tibetans and British officials; he believed that the Tibetans would not accept the deposition of the Dalai Lama and that, although there was no reason why we should support him, his restoration would make for peace on the frontier. The Viceroy stated that Tibetan Ministers denied the suzerainty of China, but that some compromise might be possible. He drew attention to the number of Chinese troops reported to be in Tibet (some 4,900), and the disturbance caused to Nepal and Bhutan by Chinese actions. He detailed the definite breaches of treaty caused by the Chinese assumption of authority, and their annexation of part of Eastern Tibet. He suggested that assurances should be sought from the Chinese on these points.

The Secretary of State, Lord Morley, in forwarding these views to the Foreign Office, remarked that the Chinese were deliberately making their suzerainty over Tibet effective, and the result could be a strong internal administration. It seemed to him that Chinese assurances that they would fulfil treaty obligations affecting Tibet met the case for the present, and that it should be made clear that we expected this to be done. If China subsequently failed to carry out those obligations a precise protest could be made, but in the meantime it might be desirable to urge the Chinese Government to send orders to their officials in Tibet to co-operate with our officials there, and also to impress on them the inadvisability of posting troops near the frontiers of India. With regard to Nepal and Bhutan he recommended that it should be emphasised that we were prepared to preserve the integrity of those countries.

Nothing was said this time about maintaining an effective Tibetan Government.

27. The Dalai Lama in India

In India the Dalai Lama made repeated appeals for active help and even sought an alliance of mutual assistance, or at least the despatch of British officers to Lhasa. In May 1910 he was informed that the British Government could not intervene between Tibet and China, and that we could only recognise the de facto government.

The Dalai Lama and his Ministers and also the National Assembly at Lhasa continued to represent their case, but without effect. They repeated their denials of Chinese suzerainty, and detailed breaches by the Chinese of the 1904 and 1906 treaties, and protested against the implications of the latter treaty; but eventually, in reply to an appeal to His Majesty the King, it was stated that His Majesty regretted that he was “unable to interfere between the Lama and his suzerain”.

In spite of efforts by the Chinese and Tibetans to persuade the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet, and of a later attempt by the Chinese to take him to Peking, he remained in India.

It is difficult not to agree with Sir Charles Bell’s brief summing up of the results of the six years after 1904: “The status quo, and the promises of China went by the board. The Tibetans were abandoned to Chinese aggression, an aggression for which the British Military Expedition to Lhasa, and subsequent withdrawal, were primarily responsible”.

But in spite of the disappointment caused by our failure to give active assistance against the Chinese, the consideration and hospitality shown by the Government of India to the Dalai Lama, and the friendship which he established with Sir Charles Bell, had a profound effect on our relations with Tibet. We won the gratitude, respect and confidence of the man, who was for more than twenty years to dominate the affairs of his country.

28. 1910 to 1911

The Chinese, flushed with success, continued their efforts to expand their influence by detaching Bhutan, with whom we had just concluded a new treaty giving us control of her external relations (January 1910) and also Nepal, from the British orbit. In June 1910 they claimed both these states as Chinese vassals. They were told that these claims could not be recognised, and that His Majesty’s Government would be bound to resist any attempt by the Chinese Government to impose authority on, or interfere in any way with either of those two States.
In Tibet, Chinese officials made an open display of sovereignty and, in spite of Chinese assertions that they would respect our treaty rights, the position of our Trade Agents was in no way improved. Communication between British officials and Tibetans was cut off; the Chinese were established astride of the Trade Route, and there were various interferences with the working of the Trade Regulations.

Consolidation of Chinese influence in Eastern Tibet went on; signs were observed of Chinese interest in the people of the Assam tribal area south of Rima; and Chinese military posts were established as far West and South as Tsona Dzong. But all was not well. Tibet was reported to be seething with discontent at Chinese rule, and to be awaiting only the return of the Dalai Lama, to rise. It was feared that the failure of His Majesty’s Government to intervene might lead to violence against British as well as Chinese officials in Tibet. This led to the despatch of British troops to Gnatong on the Sikkim border.

An uprising by the Tibetans of Po-me, near the Brahmaputra bend, caused the withdrawal of Chinese troops from other parts of Tibet; and very soon the decadence of the Chinese Imperial system was to give all Tibet the chance to the independent again.

29. The Chinese Revolution. 1911–1912

The revolutionary outbreak which started in China in October 1911 reached Lhasa in November of that year. The Chinese troops rose against their officers and began to make preparations to return to China. Excesses committed by them against the people of Lhasa led to a general attack in which the monks of Sera and Ganden took the lead; but the monks of Drepung and some others at first supported the Chinese. There were suggestions that we should mediate, as both parties appeared to want a settlement, but our treaty obligations made it impossible for His Majesty’s Government to agree to such a course. Asylum was offered to fugitive Chinese by British officers in Tibet; and in May 1912 advice was given to the Dalai Lama that fighting should be stopped and the Chinese sent out of Tibet.

By June 1912 the Chinese power had been broken, and it was possible for the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet, although he did not enter Lhasa until January 1913. An agreement with the Chinese followed by which they were given safe conduct to India on the surrender of their arms. The Amban and the main body of the Chinese troops were evacuated from Lhasa in September; but a small body under General Chung remained at Lhasa where sporadic fighting took place until December 1913. Further attempts by both parties to secure British mediation were refused on the grounds of our obligations under the existing treaties, and eventually a second agreement between the Chinese and Tibetans was negotiated, with the help of the Nepalese, in consequence of which the remaining Chinese troops left for India. They were later shipped back to China.

The strict observance by the Tibetans of the safe conduct, and the absence of any recrimination against the British for helping the Chinese whereas they had done little for the Tibetans in 1910, may be noticed.

Chapter IV — Simla Convention and Frontier Agreements, 1914

30. Status of Tibet Under the New Chinese Republic

The collapse of Chinese authority in Tibet led to a reconsideration of our policy and the question was reopened by an enquiry from the Foreign Office whether the Viceroy considered that we were justified by our treaty rights in opposing the inclusion of Tibet in China proper, and whether such opposition would be in the best interests of Britain. The Viceroy, after consulting the Political Officer in Sikkim, replied in March 1912 that Tibet had always been regarded as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China, and the fact that, in Tibet, Chinese treaties with foreign powers were not valid supported this view; that opposition to the inclusion of Tibet in China would be in British interests which demanded the political isolation of the country; but that, as military opinion deprecated the use of local military action to enforce that opposition, their best course seemed to be that a satisfactory settlement of the question should be made a condition of the recognition of the new Chinese Government.
The Chinese Republic was showing signs that its imperialistic ambitions were at least as great as those of the defunct Chinese Empire. In April 1912, President Yuan Shih-kai issued an order that Tibet, along with Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan, was to be considered to be on the same footing as the Provinces of China and, later, news was received of a proposed military expedition against the Tibetans. Representations in China produced assurances that there was no intention of incorporating Tibet in the Chinese Empire, but also evasive comments about the right to send troops into the country.

His Majesty's Government sanctioned a degree of pressure against the Chinese by refusing passage through Sikkim to Chinese officials wanting to enter Tibet. The Chinese Government sought to win the Tibetans by reinstating the Dalai Lama in October 1912, and also attempted unsuccessfully to send a mission to Lhasa.

31. Statement of British Policy. 1912

In the meantime His Majesty's Government had come to an important decision on their policy with regard to Tibet, which is summarised as follows:

While they had formally recognised the suzerain rights of China in Tibet, they were not prepared to recognise the right of China to intervene actively in the internal administration of Tibet, which should be carried on as was contemplated in the existing treaties.

They did not deny the right of China to station a representative at Lhasa with a suitable escort and with authority to advise the Tibetans on their external relations; but were not prepared to acquiesce in an unlimited number of troops. Except for its failure to include a definite denial of Chinese sovereignty in Tibet, this statement met the wishes of the Government of India; but it will be observed that the hand of the 1906 Convention was still heavy upon us, and that we were prepared to accept for the Tibetans, without consulting them, more than they themselves would have admitted.

A Memorandum on the above lines was presented on August 17th 1912 to the Chinese Government suggesting the conclusion of a written agreement.

A verbal reply from an official of the Chinese Foreign Office claimed that Article II of the 1906 Convention gave the Chinese Government the right to intervene in the internal administration of Tibet; they were ready to renew the pledge not to incorporate Tibet in China proper; the number of troops was not unreasonable; and in view of existing treaties there was no need for a new one. Sir John Jordan, our Minister at Peking, refuted these claims verbally, but a Chinese memorandum of 3rd December was equally unsatisfactory, and the Chinese Government were informed that we were not prepared to discuss it, but were still willing to negotiate on the lines of our memorandum of August 17th.

32. Russo-Mongolian Relations. 1912–1913

While we were upholding the autonomy of Tibet, the Russians were equally interested in Mongolia, and in November 1912 they signed an agreement with that country, in which it was stated the old relations between China and Mongolia had come to an end. The treaty gave Russia a strong economic and political hold on Mongolia. This treaty was confirmed by a Russo-Chinese agreement in November 1913, by which Russia recognised the suzerainty of China over Mongolia, and China agreed to preserve the autonomy of Mongolia. The possible dangers of Russian influence in Mongolia were seen when it became known that in January 1913 a treaty had been concluded between Mongolia and Tibet. Dorjeff, who had joined the Dalai Lama on his return to Tibet, was instrumental in negotiating this agreement which raised the fear that if we could not do something to retain our influence with Tibet she might follow Mongolia in to the Russian fold. The Dalai Lama, however, showed great willingness to remain in close relations with the Government of India, and denied that there had been any regular treaty with Mongolia, or anything more than an exchange of friendly assurances.

33. Affairs in Tibet 1912 to 1914

In Central Tibet there was some tension between the Dalai Lama and the Tashi Lama, both of whom expressed the wish for British mediation. The Tashi Lama, although he does not seem to have co-operated with the Chinese, had maintained a difficult neutrality which had been disapproved of by the Dalai Lama. A meeting between the two Lamas at Ralung
in July 1912 resulted in a slight improvement of their relations, but distrust, probably fomented by their followers, was never wholly suppressed, and was eventually to cause a threat to the peace of the country.

In Eastern Tibet, news of the defeat of the Chinese at Lhasa was followed by successful uprisings which drove the Chinese back from some of the more distant points reached by Chao Erh-feng's advance. (Chao himself was killed in the Revolution.)

Po-me and Rima were recovered; but the Chinese held on to Chiamdo, and their expedition in 1912 restored the position in their favour. It was even feared that they might advance still nearer to Lhasa, for in May 1913 President Yuan Shih-kai issued an order claiming that the Chinese frontier extended to Giamda, 175 miles East of Lhasa. This claim was later withdrawn with a not very convincing explanation that the scribe had made a mistake and that Enta, 75 miles West of Chiamdo, had been meant. The Tibetan Government began to take more interest in resisting Chinese activities in Eastern Tibet and sent an army under the Kalon Lama which checked the Chinese at a line along the Salween-Mekong divide, where the front remained more or less stable until 1917.

34. Prelude to the Simla Conference of 1913–1914

In January 1913 the Chinese Government, disturbed by the elimination of their influence at Lhasa, fear of direct British negotiation with Tibet, and the success of Russia in Mongolia, offered to negotiate on the basis of the British memorandum of August 17th 1912. But they were informed that, in the changed conditions that memorandum could only serve as a basis for discussion and might require further elaboration, including an agreement about the boundaries of Tibet. Sir John Jordan, our Minister at Peking, suggested a tripartite agreement to be negotiated in India, and pointed out that if this failed we would be in a better position to negotiate directly with the Tibetans. His Majesty’s Government disapproved of this idea as involving too much responsibility for the fulfilment of any agreement that might be reached, and the Government of India concurred in this view. Sir John Jordan stressed the dangers of such a policy of aloofness; and eventually His Majesty’s Government agreed to his proposal.

The Chinese Government demurred for some time to a tripartite conference at which the Tibetans would be on an equal footing with themselves. They had earlier suggested that they should send a delegate to negotiate directly with His Majesty’s Government about Tibet. But the firmness of Sir John Jordan prevailed, and on June 5th President Yuan Shih-kai agreed to tripartite negotiations.

Mr. Ivan Chen was named as Chinese representative; an invitation to the Dalai Lama (who had previously sought mediation from us and had wanted to include the Russian Government in a settlement with China) was answered by the appointment of Lonchen Shatra; and Sir Henry McMahon was appointed on behalf of the British Government.

A succession of Chinese prevarications and evasions followed. Chen was appointed with the designation of “Pacificator in Tibet”; attempts were made to reproduce the conditions in which the Trade Regulations of 1908 had been negotiated; local Chinese officials in Eastern Tibet continued hostilities, and attempted to make a direct agreement with the Tibetan Government.

These obstacles were gradually surmounted. The difficulty of Chen’s title was cleared up, and President Yuan Shih-kai issued orders for a cessation of hostilities in Eastern Tibet, which nevertheless authorised, implicitly, the Chinese troops to remain in position as far as Enta 75 miles West of Chiamdo; but the Chinese continued to harp on the status of their delegates long after the other parties were ready, and it was not until His Majesty’s Government warned the Chinese Government that, unless their representative reached Simla by the 6th October, ready to negotiate, we would treat with the Tibetans alone, that Mr. Chen set out.

35. Aims of the Parties at the Simla Conference

The Chinese entered the conference in the hope of recovering as much as possible of their former position in Tibet. Their Minister of Foreign Affairs had made it clear that Chinese influence in Tibet might eventually have to be restored by the use of force. Chinese activities and pretensions in Eastern Tibet have been noted above. Their manoeuvres to exclude or
subordinate the Tibetan representatives and a last minute attempt to reserve the right to discuss at a later stage the status of the Chinese representative, show their great reluctance to give up their claim to sovereignty.

Our Minister at Peking had no doubts of these intentions and was convinced that the Chinese would take advantage of any weakness shown by His Majesty's Government.

The Tibetans sought the recognition of their country's independence, and the establishment of their frontiers to include all people of Tibetan race. The formal statement of their claims included refusal of a Chinese Amban or other officials, demands for a vast indemnity, and for the recognition of the Dalai Lama as head of the Buddhist monasteries in Mongolia and China, and repudiation of the 1906 Convention between China and Britain.

The previous relations between the Manchu Emperor and the Dalai Lama are described as those of disciple and teacher. The Emperor is said to have assumed the duty of protecting the Dalai Lama solely in order to earn merit. This typically Tibetan thought is relevant, at least in Tibetan eyes, to the present relations between the two countries, now that there is no Emperor, with whom there can be a personal relationship, and now that China has ceased to show much regard for the Buddhist faith.

Britain sought to secure a buffer state in political isolation by restoring peace between China and Tibet, if possible, on the old basis of suzerainty, and by establishing a stable Tibetan Government, free from outside interference. The fear of having to assume additional responsibilities, and a regard perhaps over-scrupulous, for the historic claims of China, led the Government of India to consider the Tibetan claim to independence as "of course, not to be supported", but they did not object to such claims being made as the basis for a bargain.

36. Negotiation of the Simla Convention

At the start of negotiations the Chinese replied to the Tibetan statement. They rested their claim to sovereignty on the alleged conquest of Tibet by Genghiz Khan and recounted the number of occasions on which they had protected Tibet from her enemies at great cost in money and lives. They alleged that the Tibetans had asked for Chinese Ambans in the time of the Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi. The blame for recent events was laid on the Dalai Lama. They claimed Tibet as an integral part of the Chinese Republic, and demanded that all Chinese rights there must be respected by Tibet and Britain. In return they would undertake not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. They claimed the right to appoint an Amban who would control Tibetan foreign and military affairs; and that no foreign power should have any dealings with Tibet except through China — saving the right of British Trade Agents to direct relations.

The Tibetans, finding that the British proposals included the appointment of an Amban, gave way on this point; but the provision for advice on Tibetan foreign affairs by such an official was omitted. The Tibetans had been anxious for a British representative at Lhasa to offset Chinese influence, and the Government of India had also been in favour of this suggestion as the only means of securing a position by which we could fulfil our treaty obligations. But our relations with Russia led His Majesty's Government to accept no more than the right of the British Trade Agent at Gyantse, to visit Lhasa. On other points there was give and take; but the frontier question was approached by the Chinese and Tibetans each with so large claims, and from so widely divergent points of view, that agreement appeared impossible. The Tibetans, who were much better prepared with evidence than were the Chinese, claimed a boundary running through Tachienlu and Sining — the racial boundary. The Chinese claimed all that Chao Erh-feng had conquered — which would have brought their boundary to Giamda, a few days' march from Lhasa.

The British plenipotentiary proposed a compromise by which Tibet would be divided into Outer and Inner Tibet; the former to be autonomous, and the latter to be a zone in which the Chinese might establish such control as would safeguard their historical position there; or, as Lonchen Shatra said, in which the best man could win. This was almost the boundary established by the Manchu conquest in the eighteenth century. After further discussion the boundary between the two Tibets was modified in favour of China; the Tibetan representative, with much misgiving, agreed to give up the valuable districts of Nyarong and Derge — and a convention and map were drawn up and initialled by all parties.
The main points of the Convention were as follows:

I. Conventions of 1890, 1904 and 1906 to stand except so far as they might be inconsistent with the present convention.

II. Chinese suzerainty over Tibet recognised; autonomy of Outer Tibet recognised; China not to interfere in internal administration of Outer Tibet; China not to convert Tibet into a province; Britain not to annex any part of Tibet.

III. China not to send troops or station officials in Outer Tibet, except for an Amban and his escort. (By implication she could do so in Inner Tibet.) Britain similarly bound except for the British Trade Agents and their escorts.

IV. Amban with escort of 300 men could be posted at Lhasa.

V. China and Tibet not to negotiate about Tibet with any power except as provided in the 1904 and 1906 Treaties.

VI. Article III of the 1906 Treaty, which gave China a monopoly of concessions, to be cancelled and China not to be a foreign power for the purposes of concessions under Article IX of the 1904 Treaty.

VII. New Trade Regulations to be negotiated between Tibet and Britain.

VIII. Right of British Trade Agent, Gyantse, to visit Lhasa in connection with carrying out of the 1904 Treaty.

IX. Inner and Outer Tibet defined in a map. Tibetan Government to retain rights in monasteries in Inner Tibet.

X. Disputes arising from the convention, between China and Tibet, to be referred to British Government. Notes were also exchanged providing, among other points, for the recognition of Tibet as part of Chinese territory; that Outer Tibet should not be represented in any Chinese Parliament; and that the British escorts in Tibet should not exceed 75 per cent. of the Amban’s escort.

37. Chinese Refusal to Sign

In spite of the initialling of this agreement, the Chinese Government took what appears to be an unprecedented step. They repudiated the action of their plenipotentiary and refused to proceed to full signature. It was made clear that the boundary question was the sole obstacle, and efforts were made by the Chinese Government to secure further concessions on this point. Sir Henry McMahon urged that the Convention should be signed with Tibet alone, but His Majesty’s Government did not approve of this suggestion. It was hoped that, if it was made clear to the Chinese Government that the final concession had been reached, they would decide to sign; and accordingly a memorandum was presented to them to the effect that the Convention as initialled was the only possible basis of a tripartite agreement; that His Majesty’s Government proposed to modify Article X to remove any suggestion of British tutelage (this was in deference to Russian wishes which will be summarised later); that His Majesty’s Government and the Tibetan Government regarded the convention as concluded by the act of initialling, and that unless the Chinese plenipotentiary was prepared to sign, we would sign with the Tibetans a text modified to meet the requirements of a dual arrangement; if this were done China would be debarred from the privileges contemplated in the convention.

The Chinese Government reiterated that the boundary question was the only stumbling block, and hoped that His Majesty’s Government would continue to act as mediator. Sir Henry McMahon reported the Tibetan objections to these prevarications, and his own estimate of the dangers of delay. He was reminded by Lonchen Shatra that they were dealing with actual conditions and that the historical case was no longer of paramount importance. The Lonchen had agreed to the re-establishment of Chinese suzerainty, to the re-instatement of an Amban at Lhasa, and to the cession of the rich districts of Derge and Nyarong; all that was promised in return was the evacuation of Chiamdo by the Chinese. He refused categorically to make any more concessions without some corresponding advantage; and declared that Tibet would rather continue to fight. His Majesty’s Government finally directed that, if the Chinese refused to sign, the negotiations should be terminated; the initialled convention should be declared to represent the settled views of His Majesty’s Government with regard to the boundaries and status of Tibet; and that the Tibetan plenipotentiary should be assured
privately of the diplomatic support of His Majesty’s Government and of their assistance in the form of munitions in case of Chinese aggression.

38. Conclusion of Convention with Tibet

At the final meeting of the Conference on 3rd July 1914, Mr. Chen declared that he was unable to sign. Sir Henry McMahon explained the action which he had been empowered to take. Mr. Chen formally declared that the Chinese Government would not recognise any document now signed by the British and Tibetan representatives. He then withdrew, and Sir Henry, and Lonchen Shatra initialled a convention similar to that initialled in April by all parties, except for the modification of Article X; they also signed a declaration acknowledging the initialled Convention to be binding on the Governments of Britain and Tibet, and agreeing that, so long as the Government of China withheld signature, she would be debarred from the enjoyment of all privileges accruing therefrom.

Before the meeting was concluded Mr. Chen rejoined, and was informed that, if the Chinese Government should be in a position to sign, the plenipotentiaries would reassemble on July 6th. Although the Chinese delegate was informed of the general line of action taken, he was in ignorance of the exact character of the document signed, and the Chinese Government while formally declaring itself unable to recognise the convention signed by Britain and Tibet, continued to seek a settlement. But as there was no sign that they had anything new to offer His Majesty’s Government declined to reopen negotiations.

39. Indo-Tibetan Frontier Agreement. 1914

Early in the proceedings at Simla a settlement of the frontier between India and Tibet was negotiated with Lonchen Shatra by Sir Henry McMahon and Mr. Bell. The aggressions of Chao Erh-feng, and Chinese infiltration into the border regions on the North and North East of India, had made it desirable to secure a definite boundary with Tibet; and as a result of the negotiations an agreed line was defined in a map, fixing the boundary for a distance of some 850 miles from Bhutan to the Irawaddy-Salween divide. It included in British territory, in addition to large tracts of country inhabited by various Mongoloid tribes, the district of Tawang which had been administered by Tibetan officials for a long time. The cession of this Tibetan territory gave what seemed to be a short route to Lhasa from Assam, and what seemed to be a convenient frontier. In his Final Memorandum, Sir Henry McMahon recommended that, as a first step, a British officer should be sent to Tawang to examine conditions. Lonchen Shatra also suggested that the Tawang district should be taken over quickly and tactfully. With regard to the tribal area as a whole Sir Henry McMahon hoped that it might be possible to leave the tribes very largely to their own devices, and simply to exercise enough control to prevent any danger of foreign absorption.

In the event, the outbreak of war caused this question to be put aside, and it was not until over twenty years later that consideration was given to making the frontier a reality.

40. Trade Regulations of 1914

New Trade Regulations were signed on 3rd July 1914 to take the place of the Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 which were cancelled, and to give effect to Articles II, IV and V of the Convention of 1904. They were believed to be simple and provided for:

I. Area of Trade Marts. Right of British subjects to lease land for building at the marts, and also to rent buildings outside the marts for dwelling and storage.

II. Administration of the marts to be with the Tibetans, except for Trade Agency sites which were to be under the British Trade Agents.

III. Disputes between British subjects and other nationals to be enquired into jointly by Tibetan and British officials. Cases between British subjects to be decided by British authorities.

IV. Government of India may maintain a telegraph line to the marts. The Tibetan Government must protect it.

V. British Trade Agents may make arrangements for carriage of their mails.

VI. No monopolies shall be granted. Existing monopolies may run their course.
VII. British subjects may deal with whom they please without vexatious restrictions. Right of personal intercourse between British Trade Agents and British subjects with Tibetans.

Tibetans to Police the Marts and Routes

VIII. Import of military stores, liquor and drugs may be prohibited or permitted on conditions at the option of either government.

IX. Provision for revision and continuance of the Regulations.

41. Effects of the New Trade Regulations

Our gains were summarised by Sir Charles Bell as follows: —

A number of restrictions on trade and on British activities in Tibet, which had existed in the previous Regulations, were cancelled by the Trade Regulations of 1914. We gained the right to export Indian tea to Tibet free of duty instead of under a prohibitive tariff of 5 as. per lb. The area of the Trade Marts was enlarged, and the site in the Chumbi valley was confirmed at Shasima (New Yatung) instead of at Old Yatung which had proved quite unsuitable.

The procedure for leasing land by British subjects was simplified. Complete control of British Trade Agency sites was obtained. The provision for handing over Posts and Telegraphs, and rest houses, to the Chinese was cancelled. We were under no obligation to withdraw either our escorts or our right of extraterritoriality at some future date. Restrictions on British subjects from travelling in Tibet were withdrawn. Monopolies were abolished. The provision that Tibetan subjects in India should receive the same advantage as British subjects in Tibet, was withdrawn. This might have been a source of embarrassment.

There was no mention of a tariff; and it was held on a later occasion that, as the Regulations were framed to give effect (among others) to Article IV of the Convention of 1904 which provided for the fixing of a tariff, this question could only be raised when the Regulations became liable to revision i.e., after a term of in the first place ten years, and subsequently after every five years.

42. Russia and the Simla Convention

Since the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 the *status quo* in Tibet had changed to our detriment; this was partly due to Russian action in Mongolia. Provisions of the new convention which affected our treaty relations with Russia were principally the cancellation of the Chinese monopoly in the matter of concessions in Tibet, and the right of the British Trade Agent to visit Lhasa. Under Article 4 of the Anglo-Russian Convention the two governments had bound themselves not to seek concessions in Tibet, and if this clause was to stand they would, under the new treaty, be at a disadvantage with other powers. By Article 3 the two Governments bound themselves not to send representatives to Lhasa. It was also thought that the provision in Article X of the draft 1914 Convention initialled by the three parties, that disputes between China and Tibet should be referred to Britain, would be objected to by the Russian Government.

After the Convention was initialled, the Russian Government was informed of its provisions, and agreed to them on the understanding that Article X should be modified and notes, both public and secret, should be exchanged making the asking of concessions in Tibet, and the sending of a British Trade Agent to Lhasa, subject to mutual agreement. This was done in June 1914. In July the Russian Government was informed of the separate action with Tibet. The effect of the refusal of the Chinese to sign, so far as it affected our relations with Russia, was stated by the Government of India to be that, as the Russian Government was cognisant of the Convention as an initialled and accepted document, it would never be possible entirely to destroy its tripartite status, and that, even if it remained only initialled, our own position *vis-à-vis* Russia would not be prejudiced. With regard to putting into effect the provisions about concessions and visits of the British Agent to Lhasa, it was held that nothing could be done without some further understanding with Russia.

The Chinese Government refused to take cognisance of the Anglo-Russian exchange of views.
43. Advantages of the 1914 Convention

Although we had failed to secure the settled conditions that might have been expected to follow from the establishment of peace and a frontier between the Tibetans and Chinese, we obtained several advantages of great potential value.

We gained freedom of direct negotiation with the Tibetans and, by the right to send a representative to Lhasa, the means of offsetting foreign influences; the settlement of our mutual boundary, with the addition of an important district; and freedom of commercial and industrial enterprise.

Sir Henry McMahon, in his Final Memorandum, touched on the possibilities and laid stress on the opportunity of opening new trade routes in the North Eastern areas.

Looking ahead a little, it may be said that we have developed the first of these advantages, we have done little about the other two, and indeed, forgot for a long period that Tawang was ours to develop.

Tibet gained the recognition by Britain of her autonomy, and promises of diplomatic and material help.

China gained nothing, but retained, in her own opinion, the right to settle with Tibet in her own way, and in her own time.


44. Legal Effects of the 1914 Convention

Estimation of the legal effects of the new Convention is a subject for detailed examination, and a note by Sir Basil Gould, Political Officer in Sikkim, attached to his report on his Mission to Lhasa in 1936–37, may be studied.

Certain aspects must, however, be noted here.

The British attitude immediately after the Negotiations of 1911 was that China, by creating a state of war, had rendered previous treaties of no effect. This was specifically included in the powers given to Sir Henry McMahon. It was decided that previous treaties should be ignored and not denounced. The 1907 Treaty with Russia appears to have become for the most part a dead letter by the Russian acceptance of the 1914 Convention; and in 1920 His Majesty's Government decided in view of subsequent events that the Treaty with Russia was no longer valid.

It may therefore be said that the only valid treaties about Tibet now extant are the 1914 Convention in its operation between the British and Tibetan Governments; the Trade Regulations of 1914; the Indo-Tibetan boundary agreement of 1914; and the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904 so far as its provisions are not repugnant to the terms of the 1914 Convention. The Tibetans were not signatories either to the Treaty of 1890 or to the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906.

It therefore appears that, in the British view, the Chinese Government cannot now claim any of the following advantages.

The operation in her favour of the 1890, 1904, 1906 Treaties.
Recognition of suzerainty.
The right to appoint an Amban at Lhasa.
Admission that China is not a foreign power.
Any recognition of the conception of Outer and Inner Tibet.
Admission that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory.
Any concern in the appointment of a Dalai Lama.
Any limitation of the strength of British escorts in Tibet.

Sir Basil Gould notes instances of the Chinese tendency to ignore the 1914 Convention which are in agreement with their formal declaration in 1914; and on the other hand he notes an instance in 1921 when the Chinese were reminded by His Majesty's Government of their agreement to the major part of the 1914 Convention, and a subsequent reaffirmation of that position in 1919.
Chapter V — First Great War Period

45. 1914 to 1916

The outbreak of war with Germany in 1914 diverted the attention and energies of His Majesty's Government and of the Government of India from following up the advantages gained by the Simla Convention; but, fortunately, the weakness of China prevented her from profiting by our preoccupation.

Even during the truce for the negotiations of 1913–1914 there were minor skirmishes between Tibetan and Chinese troops in Eastern Tibet; and these skirmishes, with rumours of greater operations in the making, continued throughout 1915. Internal dissenion in the border provinces of China and the end of Yuan Shih-kai's regime lessened the Chinese capacity for aggression during 1916 and the early part of 1917.

Along with minor fighting there was constant pressure by the Chinese to bring the Tibetans to a separate settlement. Shortly after the signature of the 1914 agreement there was news that a Chinese delegation was trying to negotiate with the Tibetans; and rumours of discussions between Tibetan and Chinese officials in Eastern Tibet continued to be heard during 1916. The Government of India, while urging the cessation of hostilities in East Tibet, advised the Tibetan Government against taking any action inconsistent with their obligations to us. On their part, the Tibetan Government resolutely refused Chinese overtures and replied to them with the proposal that the Chinese should sign the 1914 Convention; they also continued to press the Government of India to secure Chinese agreement to the Convention, and to remind us of our promise to supply them with arms which they pleaded were essential on account of Chinese aggression in East Tibet. They suggested that, if we could not supply them, they would approach the Japanese Government.

There is no doubt that the Tibetan Government were feeling the strain of maintaining an army in East Tibet, and that a number of officials, who did not put much trust in the intentions of His Majesty's Government to assist them, were in favour of a direct settlement with the Chinese; but the influence and friendship of the Dalai Lama kept the government loyal to its engagements to us.

The help that we were able to give cannot have seemed to Tibet a very adequate fulfilment of our promises and their expectations. In 1914 His Majesty's Government sanctioned the presentation of 5,000 rifles and 500,000 rounds of ammunition; and later allowed the purchase of a further 200,000 rounds. But even in this matter a bargain was struck, and the presentation of the rifles was delayed until the Tibetan Government had abolished monopolies. Help was also given by training some Tibetan troops at Gyantse, and permission was granted for the imposition of a tax on wool and yak hair by the Tibetan Government in order to raise some revenue (to meet their growing expenses). Encouragement was given in another sphere by contributing towards the cost of sending four Tibetan boys for education in England; and later for further technical training in India. But on account of our commitments to Russia we refused to help in the construction of a telegraph line to Lhasa; and persistent requests for more arms, particularly machine guns, were refused as repeatedly as they were made. The Tibetan Government were bidden to wait until after the war and were refused facilities for the import of foreign arms through India.

Diplomatic pressure was also applied in Peking, and produced, in 1914, and again in 1915, an assurance from the Chinese Government that they contemplated neither aggression nor direct negotiation so far as Tibet was concerned. Later, the secession of Yunnan and Szechuan from the Central Government nullified the promises of the Chinese, but also produced a state of chaos which precluded the provincial governments from any active measures towards Tibet for some time. But in spite of its weakness, the Chinese Government was sufficiently interested in Tibetan affairs to continue its efforts to find a settlement of the Tibetan question and to elect a “representative of Tibet” to its new Parliament. This action evoked a protest from His Majesty's Government.

In central Tibet trade went on satisfactorily under the new Regulations; monopolies were ordered to be abolished; an Indian company produced some Tibetan tea which found a market in Tibet. Relations between the Dalai Lama and Tashi Lama, or rather between their respective governments, showed signs of strain when the Lhasa government tried to levy taxes in Shigatse province, towards the cost of Tibetan troops in Kham. There had been
noticeable friction since the return of the Dalai Lama, but Lhasa cannot have been pleased by a proposal from the Tashi Lama that he should send a delegate to the Simla Conference. In Western Tibet, not for the first time nor for the last, we came up against long standing exactions by local officials, safe from supervision by the Central Government at Lhasa.

The Dalai Lama, on the outbreak of the European war, offered to His Majesty’s Government all the prayers and all the resources of Tibet; and throughout the war prayers were said in Lhasa and in Tashilhunpo for the success of British arms.

46. Fresh Proposals for Negotiations. Hostilities Break Out in Kham. 1917

The weakness of the Chinese Government at the end of Yuan Shih-kai’s regime appeared to His Majesty’s Minister in Peking to offer the chance of a settlement of the Sino-Tibetan question. It was considered that the Chinese had only been restrained from aggression by the firmness of Sir John Jordan and Yuan Shih-kai, and that trouble might follow when they had settled their internal problems. The obstacle to agreement had been the creation of Inner Tibet, and it was suggested that the time had come for new proposals in modification of the 1914 Convention. The most important of these suggestions were the abolition of Inner Tibet by fixing as the frontier of Autonomous Tibet what had been the proposed boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet; and the posting of Chinese and British Agents at the existing Trade Marts and at Chiamdo.

The Government of India considered that political conditions in China would make the acceptance or continuance of any new agreement doubtful, and that the Tibetans would be disturbed if they were asked to make concessions. In Sir Charles Bell’s opinion, the Tibetans were likely to agree to the territorial adjustment, but we should not consider allowing Chinese officers at the Trade Marts.

In the meantime there was Chinese aggression near Riwoche; the Tibetans retaliated and captured the town. In view of the disturbed conditions, the Government of India, His Majesty’s Government and His Majesty’s Minister agreed that the moment was unpropitious for negotiations; and the Government of India decided to present 500,000 rounds of ammunition to the Tibetan Government for their self-defence. Diplomatic representations were also made at Peking and the Tibetan Government were urged to keep the peace. But this time representations were of no avail. The Szechuanese Commander in East Tibet, uttering most truculent threats that he would leave neither man nor dog alive, launched fresh attacks. The Tibetans, in alarm, redoubled their appeals for arms and ammunitions; but the Government of India did not share the fears of the Tibetans, whom they considered to be in a stronger position than the Chinese; and, anxious to avoid encouraging Tibetan aggression, they refused any further munitions. They also hinted that the Chinese Government might be willing to come to terms. His Majesty’s Minister, on the other hand, did not believe that the Chinese Government was genuinely willing for a settlement or that it could control the Szechuanese officers. It was decided that His Majesty’s Minister should sound the Chinese Government informally, and that Mr. Teichman of the China Consular Service should try to negotiate a truce on the basis of the status quo.

47. The Chiamdo Agreement and Truce of Rongbatsa. 1918

By the time Mr. Teichman reached the front, towards the end of May 1918, the Tibetans had recaptured Chiamdo (where they took a number of prisoners whom they later, to the embarrassment of the Government of India, despatched to India); had occupied nearly all the country west of the Yangtse; and were threatening Batang. It was reported that the Dalai Lama had ordered the capture of all territory up to Tachienlu, but that the Kalon Lama, who was in command of the Tibetan troops, preferred to establish the line of the upper Yangtse as a temporary frontier.

The Tibetan Government were urged by the Government of India to empower the Kalon Lama to act on their behalf, to accept the Yangtse line, and to treat their prisoners humanely. They put into practice the first and the last of these suggestions. The Chinese Government on their part had to confess their inability to control the Szechuanese officials, and did not appear eager for a settlement. In these unsatisfactory conditions, with no guarantee that what was done would be accepted by the Chinese Government, an agreement was reached
at Chiamdo on 19th August for a provisional frontier to consist roughly of the Yangtse river; the Tibetans, who had occupied Derge and part of Nyarong in the interval before the discussions, were to retain Derge, Teko and some other districts east of the river, but were to withdraw from Nyarong. The delay, and uncertainty about the intentions of the Chinese Government naturally roused the suspicions of the Kalon Lama; and, in order to separate the opposing forces, Mr. Teichman succeeded in negotiating a supplementary agreement, on 20th September, under which there was to be truce for one year, and a withdrawal of troops pending a settlement between the two governments. The Tibetans accordingly withdrew to the east border of Derge, and the Chinese to Kanze.

The Government of India considered that the Chiamdo agreement was unduly favourable to the Tibetans and would never be accepted by the Chinese Government; they hoped by the exercise of a moderating influence to bring the Chinese Government to a frame of mind in which they would be ready to submit the whole question to arbitration, possibly of America, after the war. His Majesty's Government did not approve of the suggestion about America, but agreed that it should be impressed upon the Tibetans that the Chiamdo agreement was made without the authority of the Chinese Government and in no way prejudiced a final settlement. In the meantime, the Tibetans would be wise to accept the Yangtse line in view of the danger from China, once her internal troubles were settled. It was decided that unless the Tibetans were attacked they should be given no further assistance that might encourage them to aggression.

The Tibetan success was ascribed by Mr. Teichman principally to the British rifles with which they had been supplied, and to the fact that the Szechuanese commander had to face both ways and be prepared for trouble in his rear. It was Mr. Teichman's opinion that but for our intervention the Tibetans would have captured Batang, and probably all the territory up to Tachienlu; but he was convinced that even the advance that the Tibetans had made was injudicious, and that in due course an inevitable Chinese recovery would lead to the discomfiture of the Tibetans if they went too far. It may have seemed to officials in Lhasa that they were being deprived of the full fruits of their success, and of the chance of securing solid bargaining counters for future negotiations with the Chinese; but, although they retained control of Derge and some areas East of the Yangtse, the prudence of the Dalai Lama and his regard for our advice restrained them from further advances.

Mr. Teichman's reiteration that the fighting was due to General Peng's ambitions and aggression may be noted, and also his frequent testimony to the courtesy, reasonableness, and humanity of the Kalon Lama.

48. Chinese Proposals for a Settlement and their Failure. 1919

After the truce of Rongbatsa the Tibetan Government pressed the Government of India to arrange a final settlement with the Chinese. Although the Szechuan generals, whose influence in East Tibet was decreasing and whose internal feuds were increasing, seemed anxious that peace with Tibet should be preserved, His Majesty's Minister at Peking had earlier reported that the Chinese Government were not anxious to join in serious negotiations for peace. At that time the Minister considered that the best way of creating favourable conditions for negotiations was that "that Dalai Lama who is a most unscrupulous and dangerous person, and an arch-intriguer", should be refused further assistance and warned to drop his ambitious schemes of conquest. In April the Minister again reported that the confusion and disintegration of Chinese affairs precluded the possibility of negotiations on a national basis. Nevertheless, in May 1919, the Chinese Government put forward written proposals for a settlement based on the 1914 Treaty, providing for the inclusion of parts of Inner Tibet in Szechuan, and the cession to Outer Tibet of Gonjo district and the abandonment of Chinese claim to Chiamdo, Draya and Markham for Inner Tibet. Proposals were also made for the posting of Chinese officers at the Trade Marts, and that the recognition by autonomous Tibet of Chinese suzerainty should be included in the treaty proper. The Government of India, as before, objected to the posting of more Chinese officers in Tibet, and disliked the proposal of His Majesty's Minister that there should be a permanent British representative at Lhasa as a counterbalance. His Majesty's Government considered that we should secure the right to appoint such a representative, even if we did not mean to exercise it immediately. The Tibetan Government disliked the proposals as a whole, and they were
rejected by a special meeting of the National Assembly. The course of negotiations at Peking was impeded by a malicious press campaign inspired by the Japanese, by the opposition of the Chinese militarists, and by the shadow of the Shantung question and eventually the Chinese Foreign Minister had to confess in a confused and unconvincing stream of bluster and explanation, that public opinion had turned against the negotiations, and was now opposed to British "Interference" in Tibet.

It is probable that, in addition to the other influences working against a settlement, the recent Chinese success in abolishing the autonomy of Mongolia had raised hopes that a little more patience would give them their opportunity in Tibet. Nevertheless, His Majesty's Minister observed that China felt herself deeply committed by her acceptance of the Simla Treaty in principle, and even more by the recent memorandum of 30th May 1919, which had confirmed that acceptance.

For Tibet the year had followed a too familiar pattern, and disappointment at the failure to bring the Chinese to terms was made the more bitter by our repeated refusal to provide the Tibetan Government with arms, or to allow them to import any through India. The Government of India had been anxious to sell the Tibetan Government two machine guns, and one and a quarter million rounds of rifle ammunition, but it was decided by His Majesty's Government that the new Arms Traffic Regulations made this impossible. There had been the usual rumours of Chinese aggression, this time from Kansu; and the usual overtures for a separate peace. These developed into "The Kansu Mission" which found its way to Lhasa in 1920 to sound the Dalai Lama on the possibilities of an agreement. The Chinese Government denied aggressive intention on the part of the Kansu authorities, and disavowed the peace mission. The Tibetan Government, on their part, returned the usual answer that they wanted the British Government to be a party to any agreement.

And so the Rongbatsa Truce, which the Chinese Government had never recognised, expired; but its effects continued for some time to come, and there was no immediate resumption of hostilities. Both sides in fact seemed willing to treat it as having been continued indefinitely, by a local exchange of assurances, in September 1919, that there would be no hostilities while the Peking negotiations were proceeding.

Chapter VI — Sir Charles Bell's Visit to Lhasa

49. Decision to Send Sir Charles Bell to Lhasa

The abrupt suspension of the Peking negotiations caused such displeasure to His Majesty's Government that they recalled Sir John Jordan from Peking; but the doors of argument were not yet closed. In response to a British proposal of tripartite negotiations at Lhasa, a tentative Chinese suggestion that a separate settlement between the Chinese and Tibetan Governments might be reached at Lhasa, and that His Majesty's Government might witness it, produced fresh diplomatic activity. The Kansu Mission had led the Tibetan Government to ask that a British officer should be sent to Lhasa to help in finding a settlement; but the Chinese Government disavowed the Kansu Mission, so that idea was abandoned. We also advised the Tibetan Government against sending a representative to China with the returning Mission. The new approach petered out in Peking; Chinese ideas were still in flux, and the militaristic and imperialistic outlook was gathering strength with each delay.

Fresh rumours of Chinese preparation for aggression in Kansu and Yunnan further aggravated the situation and the usual denials were of little assurance. Our international obligations still prevented us from supplying arms to the Tibetans; and there was growing evidence that our prestige in Tibet was on the wane.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Minister at Peking proposed in April 1920 that a British officer should be sent to Lhasa in order to encourage the Tibetans and to let the Chinese see that we were in earnest. Sir Charles Bell, whose views were supported by the Government of India, argued that unless we could give some hope of a settlement with Chinese, or unless we could promise material support, such a mission might be of little use. His Majesty's Minister developed a strong case for the supply of arms, and propounded a new policy for our relations with Tibet. He suggested that we might treat Tibet as standing
in the same relation to China as the self-governing Dominions stood towards Great Britain; he suggested permanent representation at Lhasa and the ending of a policy of sterilisation.

The Government of India were opposed to permanent representation at Lhasa, but considered that there would be advantage in sending a mission to Lhasa even if no definite promises could be made. New conditions had ruled out the necessity of considering Russian feelings, and it was held by His Majesty's Government that the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 was no longer valid. It was therefore decided that Sir Charles Bell should go to Lhasa as special representative of His Excellency the Viceroy; while, in China, efforts would be made to secure an assurance from the Chinese Government that they would not attack Tibet.

50. Sir Charles Bell's Mission to Lhasa, November 1920 to October 1921

This Mission marks a turning point in British policy towards Tibet, and it is therefore dealt with at some length.

A — Instructions and Early Activities

Bell's instructions were to treat requests for assistance in a sympathetic manner but to make it plain that he had no authority to promise arms or ammunition. He was to explain the efforts which had been made to settle the Tibetan question and the difficulty of making any progress at present on account of the disunity of China. He was to urge the Tibetan Government to avoid hostilities; to find out about the Kansu Mission, and the reported mission of one Liu Tsan Ting; and whether in case of the failure of China to resume tripartite negotiations there was danger of a separate settlement between Tibet and China. He was to telegraph his opinion about the length of his stay, which should be governed by considerations of public interest, and his own health.

The party included Major Kennedy, I.M.S. and Mr. Fairley of the Posts and Telegraphs Department who was to examine the possibilities of a telegraph line to Lhasa.

Shortly after his arrival, Bell was received by the Dalai Lama to whom he presented a kharita from the Viceroy, and conveyed the communication authorised by the Government of India, and a request for permission for an expedition to Mount Everest. He then prepared to leave. The Dalai Lama, the National Assembly, and all high officials pressed him to stay until April or May, and he agreed to do so. The Government of India, obsessed by the danger of being pressed to establish a permanent representative at Lhasa, and fearing that the resumption of negotiations with China might be prejudiced by a long stay, urged Bell to leave as soon as possible. When the strong contention of our Minister at Peking, that Bell's stay would have a beneficial effect, failed to remove the Government of India's fears, Bell also replied with similar views about the possibility of negotiations, and stressing the opportunity for strengthening our friendship with Tibetan officials and for obtaining information. He did not think it would be difficult to deal firmly with the question of permanent representation if it arose; and he pointed out the severity of the climatic conditions. Eventually the Government of India agreed principally on account of the climatic conditions; but in doing so they expressed their continuing apprehension of a request for permanent representation.

B — Bell Gets Down to Work

What would have been the results of premature withdrawal is a matter for speculation; the effect of staying on was a revision and enlivenment of our policy towards Tibet.

The Dalai Lama in replying to Bell's communication made requests for pressure to be put on the Chinese Government for a settlement; for arms and ammunition, and further military training; for facilities for engaging mining prospectors and for buying mining equipment.

Bell forwarded these requests to the Government of India with his recommendations, and after a further month's observation he submitted a closely reasoned, warmly worded, review of our relations with Tibet. After a brief historical survey, he declared that since 1913 we had encouraged the Tibetans to trust us; we had promised them diplomatic assistance and a reasonable supply of arms. They had been given 5,000 rifles, and had been allowed to purchase some ammunition, but for the last four years they had been barred absolutely from
obtaining munitions. During the war they were promised machine guns; but two years after
the end of the war they had received none. We were breaking the promises made in the name
of His Majesty’s Government, undermining the hard won freedom of Tibet, and jeopardising
the security of the North East Frontier of India.

We had won the friendship of the Dalai Lama but his life was uncertain, and if he were
to die, we could not say how far Tibet would remain on our side. Bell went on to recount
the advantage we had gained by the Simla Convention and the new Trade Regulations; and to
emphasise what a barrier against Bolshevism we had in Tibet. But Tibet was weary, and there
had been, and still were, in Lhasa persons interested in inducing her to make a separate peace
with China. Our refusal to let the Tibetan Government purchase arms was keenly felt, and
the pro-Chinese faction in Lhasa, which was only kept in check by the pro-British influence
of the Dalai Lama, was increasing with the delay in settling the Tibetan question. Admiration
for the Japanese was growing; and Russian and Japanese rifles were finding their way in from
Mongolia. It would surely be better for Tibet to get her needs from us.

An assurance from China would not mean anything to Tibet who would still have to main-
tain her frontier troops with the present insufficiency of arms and ammunition.

Bell went on to condemn our policy of aloofness as calculated to make the Tibetans tum
to China, which was what the Chinese were waiting for. Japan and China together would
gain power in Tibet to the jeopardy of our North East Frontier; and we would be regarded as
betrayers.

We should not wait any longer for China to negotiate, but should recognise the merits of
the Tibetan administration, their desire not to fall again under Chinese misrule, and the bur-
den of maintaining their army in East Tibet for ten years. We should also recognise India’s
vital interest in the problem, and the dangers of our present inaction.

He recommended for the Tibetans. 1. Permission to import arms from India up to speci-
fied maxima. 2. Help in training Tibetan troops. 3. Help in engaging British mechanics to teach
the manufacture of gunpowder and rifles. 4. Help in engaging good mining prospectors. 5.
Help in importing machinery for their mines and their mint.

This assistance would cost us nothing, and its results would make China come to terms.

Bell discounted the analogy of the unsuccessful Anglo-Persian Agreement, and described
our aim as to see Tibet enjoying internal autonomy under the lightest possible form of Chi-
nese suzerainty, a barrier for the Northern Frontier of India, free to develop on her own lines.
We might in time draw direct help from Tibet in the form of recruits, and perhaps in such
precious metals as might be discovered.

He concluded that we could no longer continue to profess friendship for Tibet and go on
treating her as we were doing. We must establish our influence, and take the present oppor-
tunity to do so.

The Government of India compared this serious advice with proposals put forward by
His Majesty’s Minister at Peking in June 1920 when the question of a Mission to Lhasa was
under consideration. The Minister had warned of the same dangers, and had urged the need
of a new policy of closer relations with Tibet, while continuing to offer China a settlement on
the lines of the 1914 Convention, or by international or American arbitration. He recommended
permanent representation at Lhasa, and perhaps also at Chiamdo.

We must avoid the reproach of sterilising the country, and must contemplate its eventual
opening to foreign residence and trade. But we must establish a position which would en-
able us to control the entry of foreigners into Tibet. The geographical position was in our
favour; and the opening of the Indian route to Tibet would mean the abandonment of the
China route. If we took a strong line in Tibet we should be prepared to make every possible
concession to Chinese public opinion e.g., in such matters as the representation of Tibet in
the Chinese Parliament, which would be make-believe, but what China would like.

He summed up our past policy as one of keeping ourselves, and everyone else except
the Chinese, out of Tibet. This had played into China’s hands. We had a chance in 1912–13 to
put things right, but made the mistake of trying to exclude Chinese officials. We could not
risk any longer the danger of the Chinese regaining control over Tibet again. We must there-
fore choose between continuing on our present lines, thereby running that risk, and adopting
a new and liberal policy towards Tibet, which would entail opening the country and devel-
oping its resources under our auspices.
Bell agreed with the general thesis of a new and liberal policy, but did not think the time was yet ripe for permanent representation at Lhasa, unless a Chinese Amban was posted there. He deprecated allowing others to go to Lhasa if we were not represented there, but advocated the opening of the Trade Route as far as Gyantse to British and foreign visitors.

C — The Government of India Formulate their Policy

After considering these weighty views, the Government of India submitted their proposals to His Majesty's Government.

They considered that Bell's mission had accomplished their main objects by deepening his friendship with the Dalai Lama, and putting new life into the Tibetan Government's waning belief in our goodwill. They agreed that something more than protestations of friendship, or even a written assurance from China, was wanted by Tibet, who expected either China's acceptance of the Tripartite Convention, or help to strengthen herself enough to be able to keep China at arm's length. The first seemed impossible as there was no sign of a disposition on China's part to reopen negotiations. They therefore advised the adoption of Bell's constructive policy. They questioned further refusal of arms to Tibet as being based on the assumption that Tibet was a province of China, and they recommended the supply of the arms recommended by Bell, on a strict guarantee that they would be used only in self-defence. They also recommended assistance for the self-development of Tibet but pointed out the danger of friction in sending up experts insensitive to the atmosphere of Tibet, and the lack of the most elementary technical knowledge on the part of the Tibetans.

They said that the policy of sterilisation was not theirs, but the traditional policy of Tibet, and doubted whether we should attempt to force Tibet's doors so long as she wished to keep them shut; that might jeopardise our influence. They thought that Tibet wanted a British representative at Lhasa as an insurance against Chinese aggression, but if we strengthened Tibet enough to enable her to keep China at arm's length, she would be able to do without one. The Government of India did not desire a more ambitious policy, or any new commitments.

If Bell's "admirably restrained policy" were adopted we should have to consider whether the time had come to take a firm line towards China. They recommended that the Chinese Government should be informed that we definitely recognised the autonomy of Tibet; that we were allowing her to import arms for self-defence; and that we were prepared to give her such facilities as were necessary to preserve her autonomy. and would do so at once if the Chinese attempted to cross Teichman's provisional frontier. We were ready to try to persuade Tibet to modify the 1914 agreement on the lines of China's written proposals of May 1919.

In another telegram they agreed with Bell's proposals for freer admission of visitors, with the exception of sportsmen and missionaries.

D — Memorandum of August 1921 to Chinese Government and Assurance to Tibet

The form of our communication to China and our assurance to Tibet were carefully considered. His Majesty's Minister, Peking, hesitated to recommend what amounted to an ultimatum, because Chinese prestige had suffered a blow by the reversal of the situation in Mongolia; the Chinese were also anxious about the possibility of renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; they had failed to get any satisfaction over the Shantung question. If an ultimatum were presented the Chinese Government would probably enlist the sympathy of America. The Government of India were in favour of a clear pronouncement regarding the autonomy of Tibet; but their main requirement was that Bell should be able to give the Tibetan Government a definite assurance that they would be allowed to import arms unless China reopened negotiations within a stated period.

Eventually, on 26th August 1921, a memorandum was presented to the Chinese Minister in London, inviting the Chinese Government to resume negotiations without delay either in London or Peking. "In view of commitments of His Majesty's Government to the Tibetan Government arising out of the tripartite negotiations of 1914 and in view of that fact that, with the exception of the boundary clause, the draft Convention of 1914 providing for Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty was accepted by the Chinese Government who in their offer of 1919 formally reaffirmed their attitude in this, His Majesty's Government, failing a
resumption of negotiations in the immediate future, do not feel justified in withholding any longer their recognition of the status of Tibet as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China and intend dealing with Tibet in future on this basis. The memorandum ended with an offer to try to persuade the Tibetan Government to modify the 1914 Convention in accordance with the Chinese offer of 1919, if the Chinese Government were to resume negotiation.

A verbal explanation which accompanied the memorandum expressed regret that the differences between Tibet and China had not been settled. The Minister was informed that if negotiations were not resumed within one month we should regard ourselves as having a free hand to deal with Tibet as an autonomous state, if necessary without further reference to China, to enter into closer relations, to open up intercourse between Tibetan and Indian trade marts, to send an officer to Lhasa from time to time whenever the British and Tibetan Governments consider it desirable, and to give reasonable assistance to the Tibetans for the protection and development of their country. It was also said that the Chinese proposal to appoint Consuls in India would be favourably considered after a settlement of the Tibetan question had been reached.

A similar communication was made at Peking and produced immediate excuses that the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs was too much preoccupied with preparations for the Washington Conference; and also contemptuous enquiries whether we really thought that Tibet was capable of self-government. These excuses were reinforced later by the plea of the chaotic state of China, and the precarious situation of the Government, but the offer was made to reopen negotiations as soon as possible after the conclusion of the Washington Conference. This situation was accepted by His Majesty’s Government and the assurance to the Tibetan Government was slightly modified. Accordingly, on 11th October 1921 a written communication was made by Bell to the Dalai Lama, stating that, owing to the Washington Conference, the Chinese Government were unable to reopen negotiations at once but had expressed their willingness to do so after the Conference. His Majesty’s Government were prepared to help Tibet to protect and develop herself, and would permit the import of arms in reasonable quantities provided the Tibetan Government would give a written guarantee that they would be used only for self-defence and internal police work. His Majesty’s Government relied on Tibet to maintain the status quo and refrain from provocative or aggressive action pending the fulfilment of the Chinese assurance to resume negotiations. The quantity of arms to be allowed was specified. This was acknowledged in writing by the Dalai Lama who gave an assurance that the Tibetan Government would abstain from aggression. The Chinese Government were again informed of the seriousness of His Majesty’s Government’s intentions, but their protestations about the difficulties inherent in negotiations did not promise well for the future. It may be noted that the Tibetan Government were not consulted about the reference to Chinese suzerainty in His Majesty’s Government’s memorandum to the Chinese Government nor were they informed about it in the written communication by Sir Charles Bell.

E — Summary of the Results of the Mission

Cordial relations with the Tibetan Government and people had been established; and the confidence of the Tibetan Government in us had been thoroughly restored.

We had adopted a new and liberal policy of helping Tibet to protect and develop itself. The chief forms of assistance that we contemplated were the supply of a definite number of mountain guns, machine guns, rifles and ammunitions; the training of the Tibetan forces to a limited extent; technical help in constructing a telegraph line from Lhasa to Gyantse; help, if wanted, in the manufacture of munitions, the development of mineral resources, and the opening of a school at Gyantse or Lhasa. It had also been decided that a British officer should visit Lhasa whenever the British and Tibetan Governments so desired.

The question of allowing freer travel on the Trade Routes was also under consideration. This new policy was outlined to the Dalai Lama by Bell shortly before he left for India.

In Bell’s view the probability of China negotiating a tripartite treaty had been increased and the Tibetan question had been settled for a number of years.
Immediate steps were taken to fulfil our promise of assistance to Tibet. Supply of the arms and ammunition, which they wanted so badly, was begun in 1922, and by 1933 the Tibetan Government had received and paid for the quantities recommended by Sir Charles Bell, *viz.*, ten mountain guns, twenty Lewis guns, ten thousand rifles, and adequate ammunition. Further instruction in various military activities was arranged for officers and men of the Tibetan Army. Between 1922 and 1926 four officers and some 350 non-commissioned officers and men received infantry training at Gyantse; four officers and 20 men were trained in the use of mountain guns, and 12 men as armourers, at Quetta; some of the officers received additional training in gunnery, infantry, and cavalry work, at Quetta and Shillong; and some of the men at Gyantse were taught signalling and heliography.

Technical assistance was given in the construction and working of the telegraph line between Lhasa and Gyantse; and some Tibetan youths were trained as telegraphists.

Sir Henry Hayden made a geological survey of parts of Tibet; and Sardar Bahadur Laden La of the Darjeeling Police was sent to the Tibetan Government for two years in order to organise a police force.

Help was given in securing machinery for a hydroelectric plant for Lhasa; but its establishment took some time.

An English school was opened at Gyantse in 1924; but it lasted only until 1926. The cost of all these modern activities was paid for by the Tibetan Government.

The proposed opening of part of Tibet to travellers also took effect. New conditions for the issue of passes under the existing Frontier Crossing Regulations were laid down. It was decided that for journeys on the Trade Route it was not necessary to consult the Tibetan Government beforehand unless there was reason to believe that any particular visitor might be regarded with disfavour. A number of visitors began to find their way to Yatung and Gyantse; and permission was obtained from the Tibetan Government in 1922 for General Pereira to travel to Lhasa from China, and in 1923 for a journey by Captain Kingdon Ward in the Brahmaputra Valley. Such permission was given rather grudgingly, and other travellers who did not have official backing were turned back from Tibet, *e.g.*, Mr. Sorenson, a business man, or refused permission to enter, *e.g.*, Mr. Sorenson, a missionary. But in 1923 Dr. MacGovern broke the terms of his frontier pass and made his way to Lhasa and in 1924 Madame David Neel travelled in disguise from China to Lhasa. Discrimination against missionaries caused some discontent on the China border where there was a considerable number of missionary workers of many nationalities and His Majesty's Minister in China reported that the local Tibetan officials, on their part, tried to put the blame for refusing entry into Tibet on to orders received from the British or Indian Governments.

A further manifestation of the new policy in Tibet was a visit to Lhasa in 1924 by Colonel Bailey, Political Officer in Sikkim, which will be described in a later paragraph.

52. *Tripartite Negotiations not Resumed*

In contrast with the prompt action to put our new policy into effect, was the delay in the matter of negotiations with China.

The Chinese representative at the Washington Conference had claimed that the principle of territorial integrity should be extended to all the territories of the Chinese Republic; some distinction was drawn between China proper and the outlying territories, but the Tibetan question was not discussed.

After the Washington Conference His Majesty's Government, intending to invite China to fulfil her promise, enquired whether the Government of India would agree to reopen negotiations on the basis of the Chinese offer of 1919. The Political Officer, Sikkim, considered that, in view of the uncompromising refusal by the Tibetan Government of that offer, it would be better to start on the basis of the 1914 Convention, and later to bring up the proposal to divide part of Inner Tibet between China and Tibet so that the former would get Nyarong and the latter Derge. Negotiations should be in Tibet or India, not Peking. The Government of India accepted the view that the 1914 Convention would be the most suitable basis, and that the formula of our Memorandum of 1921 could not be bettered. They deprecated any suggestion of partitioning Inner Tibet, and advised that the Tibetan Government should be
consulted before making any alteration to the Simla Treaty. They suggested London as the scene of the talks, and considered that, if China agreed to negotiate, the Tibetan Government should be invited to send a delegate, and should be warned that the only chance of terminating her present dangerous uncertainty lay in making some material concession to China. It was hoped that Sir Charles Bell’s advice might weigh with the Tibetans.

His Majesty’s Minister, Peking, reported that the political situation in China was more complex than ever, the country still disunited, the prestige of the Central Government at its lowest ebb, but a chauvinistic spirit on the increase. He deprecated any attempt to reopen tripartite negotiations, and put forward as a solution that we should profess to regard the problem as settled by China’s acceptance of the 1914 Convention, except for the boundary clause, and her reaffirmation of that attitude in 1919. We should try to get the Chinese to confirm that attitude again, and then, in the capacity of intermediary, to persuade the Tibetan Government to accept a modified boundary. He feared that, in fact, there would be a long postponement, because the Chinese Government would shrink from any action which might incur criticism from their opponents; but he considered that, having provided Tibet with the means of withstanding China, we could afford to tell the Tibetan Government openly that there was no chance of coming to an agreement with China for the time being, and to consolidate our relations with Tibet independently of China.

In face of this gloomy report further pressure was put on the Chinese Government. The Tibetan Government had written personally to Bell in 1923 to ask him to help in bringing about a settlement, but no communication was made to them until 1924 when Colonel Bailey visited Lhasa. He then told the Kashag verbally that the Chinese were too disunited for any agreement with them to be reached. The Tibetan asked whether a separate treaty with the Szechuan Government would be possible, but Bailey replied that it could be easily repudiated by the Central Government. He advised them to refrain from aggression, in spite of temptations; and to concentrate on organising their defence and popularising their government in East Tibet, as being most likely to cause the Chinese to come to terms.

Before Bailey left Lhasa, the Tibetan Government gave him a written communication expressing the difficulty of keeping a standing army on the Eastern front, and their fears that the Chinese might use the Tashi Lama as a cause for aggression. They asked if His Majesty’s Government could effect a settlement with China.

A written reply was sent, saying that the importance of obtaining a settlement had not been lost to sight, but regretting that nothing could be done at the present. It may be noted that as a result of the Washington Conference the Japanese Government made enquiries whether we were withdrawing our Post Officers from Tibet (presumably because they had had to withdraw theirs from Manchuria); they were informed that we would not withdraw our post offices; and it appears that the occasion was taken to decide that the Washington Resolutions could not apply to Tibet without her agreement. Thereafter nothing official appears to have been heard about the Sino-Tibetan question until 1928, by which time the Chinese Government had conveniently forgotten much of what had gone before.

Chapter VII — Lean Years

53. Tibetan Internal Affairs. 1921–1924

A — Flight of the Tashi Lama

There were signs of impending trouble between the Tashi Lama and the Lhasa Government in 1922 when the Lama appealed for British mediation on the grounds that he could not pay the contribution demanded by Lhasa for the upkeep of the army. Friction between the two administrations had led to the imprisonment at Lhasa of some of the Tashi Lhunpo officials. In spite of the friendly personal relations existing between the Tashi Lama and British officials it was not possible to intervene. The tension increased, and at the end of 1923 the Tashi Lama, after writing a sorrowful protest against the evil-minded people who had misled the Dalai Lama, fled secretly from Shigatse. He declared that he was leaving only for a short time, in order to find someone to mediate between himself and the Dalai Lama, and to raise contributions from faithful Buddhists in Kham and Mongolia.
The Lhasa Government despatched troops and officials to overtake him, but he succeeded in making his way to Mongolia and thence to Peking. The Tibetan Government's fears of the Tashi Lama's tendency to sinize were obvious. An official letter was sent to the Political Officer, Sikkim, asking for any news of the Tashi Lama's arrival in China or Mongolia; and the Dalai Lama published, in reply to the Tashi Lama's own letter, a stern rebuke, justifying his own actions, and asking why the Tashi Lama had not brought his grievances personally to his Father and Teacher (the Dalai Lama), instead "of wandering away into uninhabited places, to his great peril, like a moth attracted by the lamplight". The dangers of visiting China and Mongolia were expounded. The Tashi Lama was charged with thinking only of himself and being unworthy of his predecessors, and was exhorted to turn back from the wrong path. In conclusion, overriding the Tashi Lama's instructions to his own officials, the Dalai Lama appointed a Commissioner to administer the affairs of Tashi Lhunpo.

The effect on Tibet was profound. The sanctity and gentleness of the Tashi Lama had made him loved and revered all over the country; and it was a grave ill-omen that one of the two holiest beings should leave the country. Oracular pronouncements appeared, rebuking the evil counsellors of the Dalai Lama, and modern influences at Lhasa; the memory of old injustices by Lhasa towards Tashi Lhunpo was revived. The Lhasa party, on their side, depreciated the Tashi Lama, stressed his subordination to the Dalai Lama, and recalled his previous connection with the Chinese. Rumours multiplied; and in China there were dark hints of British designs on Tibet.

B — Trouble Between Tibet and Nepal

Relations between Tibet and Nepal were rarely amicable. In the early militaristic periods Tibet had been in the dominant position. Later, the Buddhist influence, much of which had come from Nepal, decreased the warlike spirit of Tibet. A Nepalese invasion of Tibet in 1732, which was only repelled with Chinese assistance, also caused the interruption of early relations between the British in India and Tibet. Again in 1855 the Nepalese invaded Tibet on the plea of ill-treatment by the Tibetan Government of Nepalese subjects at Lhasa. This expedition led to a treaty between the two countries under which Tibet had to pay Rs. 10,000 per annum, and to admit a Nepalese representative at Lhasa. Free trade and extra-territorial rights were also conceded. In return the Nepalese Government undertook to assist Tibet if she were attacked.

There were frequent causes of friction in the treatment of Nepalese half breeds, and the untactful behaviour of some of the Nepalese officers at Lhasa; and in 1923 the Prime Minister of Nepal expressed his apprehension about relations between the two countries. He alleged growing pride and insolence on the part of the Tibetan Government; and the Tibetans in reply claimed that the Nepalese officials sheltered criminals. They also resented the retention of Nepalese officials at other places than Lhasa.

The trouble in 1923 was probably due to a bad officer at Lhasa, but it brought out the dislike of Tibet for Nepal, fostered possibly by the fact that the Nepalese had given us assistance in 1904, and the jealousy of Nepal of our dealings with Tibet. The Prime Minister of Nepal made a bitter comment that we were supplying Tibet with 15,000 rifles, but had allowed Nepal only 10,000.

C — Boundary Disputes, with Kashmir and Tehri

Closer relations with Tibet naturally brought to light a number of cases in which one or other party sought to redress old grievances.

When Sir Charles Bell was at Lhasa a complaint was made by the Kashmir Durbar about the abduction of a Ladakhi by some Tibetans. The existence of a treaty between Kashmir and Tibet was discovered, and various aspects of Kashmir-Tibetan relations came under discussion. The Tibetan Government raised counter-complaints that some of their subjects were detained in Ladakh; they alleged an illegal embargo on the export of grain from Ladakh; and laid claim to an area known as Dokpo Karpo.

With regard to the return of Tibetan subjects from British territory the Tibetan Government were informed, that this could not be done where no heinous offence was alleged. A meeting was arranged between Kashmir and Tibetan representatives to discuss outstanding problems including the boundary, and the exchange of subjects. It produced plenty of delays.
and arguments, and the decision that, although the Tibetan claim seemed the better, there was, as in most grazing countries, no fixed boundary and it would be better to forget about the case.

A similar dispute arose about the boundary between Tehri and Tibet, with a similar result.

D — Western Tibet

Western Tibet produced a situation which was to recur often. The British Trade Agent, Gartok, complained against the independent and grasping behaviour of the local Tibetan officials, and claimed for British subjects, on his own interpretation of the Trade Regulations, rights of rather dubious validity. The Tibetan Government proved to be shrewd guardians of their own rights, and in reply to an argument based on the Trade Regulations of 1908, they pointed out that those Regulations had been cancelled, and we were now bound by the Regulations of 1914.

If the Government of India were in doubt about the Treaty position in 1921, it is not surprising that even in 1924 the Political Officer in Sikkim was not aware of the terms of the 1914 Trade Regulations, or whether they were deemed to be valid, such secrecy had been maintained in regard to the 1914 Convention. This appeared when the Tibetan Government made a proposal for the renewal of the Regulations; and it was eventually decided by His Majesty's Government that the Regulations of 1914 were to be considered as in force.

E — British Escorts in Tibet

It was suggested in 1922, by the military authorities, that the escorts of the British Trade Agents might be withdrawn as it was administratively inconvenient to have them away from their units. The arguments in favour of maintaining our position vis-à-vis the Chinese were, however, too strong to be disregarded.

54. Colonel Bailey’s Visit to Lhasa. 1924

In view of these developments in Tibet, and of the desirability of strengthening personal relations between the Political Officer and Tibetan officials, which had decreased in intimacy since the retirement of Sir Charles Bell, the Government of India, while still shrinking from the idea of permanent representation at Lhasa, recommended that Colonel Bailey should pay a visit there for one month. They hoped that his advice would be useful on such subjects as the exclusion from Tibet of Bolshevist and anti-British propagandists, such as Mahendra Pratap who was supposed to have designs of visiting Lhasa, that he would be able to gauge the extent of Japanese influence in Tibet, to help in improving relations between Tibet and Nepal (with whom we had just concluded a new treaty), and perhaps to use his good offices to smooth the differences between the Dalai Lama and Tashi Lama. He might also advise and encourage the Tibetan Government in their difficulties over the modernisations, particularly the hydroelectric scheme.

His Majesty’s Government approved, with the rider that, in view of our recent recognition of the Soviet Republic, nothing should be said or done to offend Russian opinion.

An invitation from the Tibetan Government was readily forthcoming, and Colonel Bailey reached Lhasa on 16th July 1924.

He found the Tibetan Government perturbed, in his view, unduly, by the flight of the Tashi Lama. They were anxious for his return, and Bailey considered that, although the Tashi Lama was unlikely to be long welcome in China and the people in Tibet were getting used to his absence, it would be desirable if it could be brought about. If too much persuasion were used the Tashi Lama would enhance his demands; but he was not likely to trust much to promises from Lhasa, unless we were to guarantee them.

Difficulties of finance were also weighing upon the Tibetan Government who expressed their desire to levy import and export duties in order to raise money for their increased expenditure. This had been in their minds for some time, and had been discussed in 1914 and again in 1917. The principal obstacle was that the Government of India were not willing to give up their right to most favoured nation treatment; and their consent to a customs tariff for Tibet would be contingent on a similar tariff being imposed on goods entering Tibet from
other quarters. But Tibet had agreements with China, Nepal, Ladakh, and other states which precluded them from levying such duties. Colonel Bailey held out no hopes on this score, but the question was raised later, in writing, by the Tibetan Government and has continued to be raised at intervals.

The Chinese situation was, of course, discussed, and Colonel Bailey's advice to the Tibetan Government has been described in an earlier paragraph. Other proposals of the Tibetan Government were for the entry of Tibet into the Postal Union, and for an extradition treaty.

The difficulties of the former were pointed out, and the matter was subsequently allowed to drop. With regard to the latter it appeared that the Tibetan Government were principally anxious to secure the return of their runaway subjects whether or not they had committed any offence. The Government of India declined to consider a formal treaty but would treat each case on its merits. Other subjects were also discussed.

The Government of India, on receipt of Colonel Bailey's report, considered that the main object of his visit had been achieved by the establishment of friendly relations with the Dalai Lama and his officials. They did not like the suggestion that the Government of India should guarantee the conditions of the return of the Tashi Lama, nor did they approve of any idea for developing Tibet which would look like exploitation, such as the appointment of a financial adviser.

55. Eastern Tibet. 1920–1925

The assurance of non-aggression which had been contemplated at the time of Sir Charles Bell's Mission to Lhasa was never secured from the Chinese. The internal situation in China grew progressively worse, and the border provinces were given up to the feuds of rival generals, which encouraged the increase of brigandage and disorder.

The Chinese Government were informed of Bell's arrival at Lhasa, and this visit aroused a good deal of suspicious comment. In the weak state of the Chinese Government fears of Tibetan aggression began to assume large proportions, and these fears may have been increased by Chinese views on Bell's probable intentions. Reports of Tibetan violation of the provisional frontier were received in 1921 and were supported by Mr. King, Consular Officer at Tachienlu. They were hotly denied by the Tibetan Government and by Sir Charles Bell. The verdict seems to lie with the latter; but the Chinese secured their object in that British influence was applied to prevent the Tibetans from taking advantage of China's weakness.

In 1923 a state of civil war existed in West China; and our Consular officers on the border had no doubt that if the Tibetans had chosen they could have overrun the country as far as Tachienlu. But regard for the extinct truce of Rongbatsa still continued; and the Tibetans received fresh warnings from the Government of India. Eastern Tibetan tribesmen, and local lamas, profited by the disturbances to indulge in raids in the Batang area, but the Tibetan forces, in spite of alarmist stories from Chinese officials, did not take the offensive. Tibetan influence penetrated slowly into the Chinese area, and there were reports in 1923 that they were collecting taxes in Chinese territory.

The Tibetans had had no worries since a threatened expedition against the Goloks in 1921 by the well-organised Kansu Muslims — the only border Chinese to preserve any semblance of order at this time. But as the Golok country was not within Inner Tibet no representations were made to the Chinese Government.

Reports by foreign travellers make it appear that Tibetans living in the Kokonor area were contented with the government of the Muslims, and that the latter actively sought to win over the border Tibetans by good treatment and education.

In 1924 a minor storm blew up over a tactless article by General Bruce on our new policy in Tibet. American, Russian and Chinese papers took up the cry of "British domination and exploitation of Tibet," and it was suspected that this publicity campaign was subsidised by the Chinese Government. The publication of our Memorandum of 1921, as a counterblast, was considered, but it was decided not to do so, in order to avoid raising the Tibetan question at an unpropitious moment. By the end of 1925 there was a lull in the civil war, and a state of comparative peace in the frontier areas. A new Border Commissioner, Liu-I-chiu, inaugurated a new incarnation of the province of Sikang, and proposed to deal with the Tibetan problem by peaceful penetration.
The Thirteenth Dalai Lama was an autocrat; but he was apt to be swayed by favourite advisers. His zeal for modernisation may be ascribed largely to the influence of Sir Charles Bell and to that of Tsarong Shape, a trusted officer who had accompanied the Dalai Lama on his flight to India in 1910, and who was ardently pro-British and progressive. But the power of the clerical party has long been a dominant factor in Tibet. This party is by nature conservative and obscurantist; and its influence on Lhasa opinion, through the 20,000 monks living in the great monasteries near the capital, is very great. At the time of the Chinese Revolutionary movement in 1911–1912 the monks of Sera took a leading part in the attack on the Chinese but the return of the Dalai Lama, and the weakening of Chinese pressure on Tibet, lessened the national unity which danger had fostered. It does not seem that the monasteries were pro-Chinese, for there was a story that in 1924 a "Chinese Amban" from Sining had come to Lhasa with offers of peace; he was sent away, but later despatched messengers with presents of gold and needles (the latter implying a threat) for the three great monasteries of Lhasa; the presents were refused. But the monks were ever resentful of anything that seemed to infringe on their authority, and there was a constant rivalry between them and the military.

The Dalai Lama — then 54, and ageing by Tibetan standards — was constantly surrounded by Lama officials including a domineering and ambitious Lord Chamberlain. There was also a lay official, Lungshar, of volatile and self-seeking mind who in 1921 had been involved in an attempt to divert to China the four Tibetan boys whom he was accompanying on their way to England for education; and who, while in London, had been in frequent touch with the Chinese Minister there.

Personalities play a great part in the mediaeval conditions of Tibet, and the ascendancy of these two new counsellors of the Dalai Lama had unfortunate results. Their influence appears to have been largely responsible for the breach with the Tashi Lama, and in 1925 they rapidly reduced the military party to ineffectiveness by the removal from their posts of those officers who had been trained in India, and other Tibetan military officers including Tsarong Shape, then Commander-in-Chief. A little later the newly organised police force, whose activities were disliked by the monks, was treated in a similar way. Charges of abuse of power were made against some of the officers, and there may have been foundation for such charges; but other complaints, which showed the conservative nature of the opposition, were that the officers had cut their hair short and wore foreign uniform.

It is possible that there had been a military plot against the Lord Chamberlain, or even against the Dalai Lama; but, whatever the reason, the results of the recent training and organisation were swept away, and a feeling of suspicion and unrest was created at Lhasa.

Rai Bahadur Norbhu was sent to Lhasa to find out what was happening, and to advise the Dalai Lama against undoing the good of the past few years. He reported that there was no anti-British spirit as such, but rather a strong reaction against the progressive party; the monks seemed to think that the mere possession of modern arms was enough, and that it was not necessary to know too much about their use. Nevertheless shortly after Rai Bahadur Norbhu's visit another small party of officers was sent by the Tibetan Government for military training in India, — perhaps a conciliatory gesture by the Dalai Lama.

The Government of India were naturally apprehensive that, in the mind of the ordinary Tibetan, we must be to some extent associated with the policy that was then suffering a setback; and the Political Officer was concerned at the probable ill-effects on Tibetan military efficiency, and at the loss of influence of a number of those whom we counted our friends. But, on viewing the matter two years later, he summed it up in what appears to be its true light — that the Tibetans, although no less friendly to us, were less dependent on us than formerly.

The Russian Press took delight in publishing exaggerated reports of the "crash of British influence in Tibet" and it must be admitted that much of our influence was lost. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that the change in Tibet took place not because we had been pushing things too fast — we had only given the Tibetan Government what it had asked for — but because the progressive party at Lhasa had been going too fast.
In 1926 the Lord Chamberlain died; but Lungshar, assisted by Kunphel La, a new monk favourite, continued to have the ear of the Dalai Lama. In the assertion of Tibetan independence of others, and of the traditional conservatism, military training was gradually discontinued; the drill, discipline, and general condition of the Tibetan troops was allowed to deteriorate; the recently trained officers, although gradually restored to office, were not given military appointments except in rare instances; and the police force was allowed to decay.

The English school at Gyantse was closed in 1926 after achieving remarkable results in a short time. Factors which had worked against it were the current reaction against modernisation, the dislike of Tibetan parents of sending their children away from home, and their anxiety lest their Tibetan education should suffer; and want of faith in Western education which was confirmed in Tibetan eyes by the fact that none of the boys who had been sent to school in England had been given any special promotion. These sentiments were so strong that, although the Dalai Lama had wanted to send to England boys from the noble families, he met with such objections from their parents that he had to be contented with sending boys of the middle class.

A further manifestation of the monastic ascendancy was the imposition of a ban on the import of tobacco.

The stopping of a motor mail service introduced by the British Trade Agent, between Phari and Gyantse, might not have occurred if the progressive party had remained in power, but it was not necessarily a calculated act of unfriendliness. As a result of the new service the villagers on the Trade Route and local Tibetan officials would have lost the profits of supplying fodder to our pony mail service, and would have incurred the trouble of having to maintain the road in good condition. The villagers also feared the loss of the carrying business.

There was not a total hatred of foreign things; vaccination continued to be in demand, and electric light was installed in the Dalai Lama's palace in 1927 but work on the main hydroelectric station went very slowly. This, however, was largely due to expense which may have been a considerable factor in the general reaction against modernisation.

There was, nevertheless, a gradual decline in the former cordiality; and rumours of real or imaginary grievances were sometimes heard.

The regime of the favourites, which was unsatisfactory to us and to the progressive party in Tibet, was no more pleasing to many of the high officials who remained in office but whose advice and authority were persistently ignored. Even the advice of so old a friend as Tsarong Shape was unpalatable to the Dalai Lama, and, although Tsarong established a modus vivendi with Lungshar in 1927, he was degraded in 1930 on account of his independent views. This period saw a plentiful crop of difficulties, of which a management of affairs, arbitrary in manner and uncertain of direction, if not wholly the cause was at least an aggravation.

58. A Soviet Mission to Lhasa. 1927

It was not long before interested parties began to fish in the clouding waters. In the Spring of 1927 there arrived at Lhasa a party of Mongolians whose behaviour soon revealed them as Soviet propaganda agents. Their arrival was reported to the Political Officer by the Prime Minister of Tibet who asked for advice. A verbal message was sent to him and to the Dalai Lama that it would be advisable to send the party away immediately. It appeared that although the officials and people of Lhasa were perturbed by this visit, the Tibetan Government was likely to hesitate to turn the party out of Lhasa. The Political Officer, therefore, despatched Rai Bahadur Norbhu to Lhasa to press the Dalai Lama to get rid of the emissaries. Norbhu found the Dalai Lama reluctant to take decisive action, apparently for fear that Tibetans in Mongolia might be ill-treated. The general feeling at Lhasa was strongly against the Soviet; and there were rumours that the party was seeking to play on the old relationship between Tibet and Mongolia and to arrange for the exchange of representatives. It appeared on further enquiry that they had actually asked for a learned Lama to be sent to Mongolia; but this might have been followed up later by a request for a Mongolian official to be received at Lhasa. The party had a letter of commendation from Dorjieff, but it was understood that Dorjieff had also written privately to the Dalai Lama.
advising him to have nothing to do with these people. At last, after about five months, the party were summoned to audience with the Dalai Lama, and after a further interval they left Lhasa in December 1927.

About the same time, but probably without any connection, there was an attempt to reach Lhasa by Dr. Roerich who had travelled from Kashmir to Mongolia. This party was sidetracked from Nagchuka and eventually reached Sikkim.

There was also another expedition from China led by an American, Mr. Plymire, which was suspected of being Bolshevist, and was made to travel from Nagchuka to Ladakh instead of being allowed to come through Lhasa and Sikkim.

The Dalai Lama was perturbed by all this activity. He expressed his intention of keeping Mongolians out of Tibet, and asked to be informed whenever we received news of Bolshevist parties intending to visit Tibet.

But Lhasa was not to be free of Soviet emissaries for some time. In 1928 another visitor, believed to be a high military official of the Soviet, arrived at Lhasa where he lived in considerable style for over a year. This mysterious figure, a large red-faced man, possibly a Buriat, whose name was Po-lo-te, is said to have been on intimate terms with many high officials at Lhasa, and to have been received by the Dalai Lama. In March 1930 he was reported to be travelling to India, but he disappeared, in the direction of Nagchuka.

59. Revolt in Po-me. 1927–1928

In the autumn of 1927 a demand by the Lhasa Government that the people of Po-me, a semi-independent district N. E. of the Brahmaputra bend, should pay them taxes, led to a rebellious outbreak. The people of Po-me killed a Lhasa official who was sent to collect the taxes and a minor war developed which caused a good deal of concern to the Tibetan Government. They were compelled to re-appoint one of the British trained officers who had been degraded, and he eventually restored order and brought the Po country under the administration of Lhasa.

This rebellion was represented in the Press as an agrarian uprising, but it appears to have been rather the struggle of a semi-independent prince to avoid absorption by the Central Government of Tibet. There were conflicting rumours that the people of Po intended to appeal to the British or to the Chinese for help. When the revolt was crushed it was reported that the King of Po had fled to Tachienlu, but it later appeared that he had taken refuge at Sadiya whither he was pursued by Tibetan officials asking for his surrender. In pursuance of our policy of non-intervention in Tibetan affairs neither this request nor the appeal of the King of Po for assistance to regain his country could be entertained. The King was given sanctuary and support in Assam, but was kept under surveillance. In 1931 he escaped, but died shortly afterwards while attempting to return to Po-me.

60. Sino-Tibetan Affairs. 1926–1930

The Chinese gradually began to take advantage of the new situation in Tibet. At first their own internal affairs absorbed most of their attention. In 1926 there had been another mild bout of fighting between rival generals in the border area; while in Central China the war between North and South gave no one any time to attend to Tibet. Nevertheless, a Buddhist Mission, well provided with funds and with influential support, established itself at Tachienlu awaiting a chance to visit Lhasa.

In 1928 it was rumoured that Ma Chi, the Muslim governor of Sining, was in communication again with the Dalai Lama and was proposing to send an agent to Lhasa. But by the end of the year the encroachment of General Feng Yu-hsiang’s troops, and the outbreak of a Tungan revolt in Kansu, seem to have put a stop to this plain. Szechuan, being somewhat aloof from the struggle in Central China, still had time to dabble in Tibetan affairs, and in 1928 news was received of a “Save Tibet” Society at Chungking, which was indulging in lurid anti-British propaganda.

The Rongbatsa truce continued — the Tibetans having been repeatedly warned by us against aggression — and the familiar peace overtures were received by the Tibetan general from his opposite number in the Szechuanese forces.

By the end of 1928 a comparatively stable National Government was established at Nanjing and soon encouraged a revival of official interest in Tibet. A Committee for Mongolian
and Tibetan Affairs was appointed and set about publishing a magazine aimed at winning back the Mongols and Tibetans. Recommendations were made that the Dalai Lama and Tashi Lama should be made members of the National Government; and there were reports that the Tashi Lama had been summoned to Nanking, and had been promised help in his return to Tibet.

The new Government, ignoring the 1914 Convention, and the offers of its predecessor, and referring back to the Convention of 1906, proposed a new treaty, concerning Tibet, between China and Britain. This overture went unanswered.

In the North, the Communist general Feng Yu-hsiang published a threatening manifesto about his intentions to create a new province in Kokonor. Feng later fell into difficulties and proposed to travel to India through Tibet, but nothing came of this. The Nanking Government sent, as special emissary to the Dalai Lama, the Yungon Dzasa, a Tibetan official who had been living in Peking. He reached Lhasa early in 1930 and was received with extraordinary honour. He and his associate, a Chinese woman called Liu Man-chin, appear to have applied great persuasion to the Dalai Lama and officials at Lhasa. The Dzaza is reported to have offered help on behalf of China in case of Bolshevist aggression, and he urged a return to friendship and membership of the Five Nations of the Chinese Empire. He also took an interest in the Tibet–Nepal dispute which had aroused comment in China, and he sent a telegram to China asking for the instructions of the Chinese Government. Laden La, who was in Lhasa at the time, was struck by the increase in Chinese influence and the extent to which the proposals of the Yungon Dzaza appeared to have appealed to the Dalai Lama. It is probable that our prolonged failure to bring the Chinese to a tripartite agreement and the fear that, unless he settled with China, the Chinese Government would send back the Tashi Lama by force, were weighing heavily with the Dalai Lama.

Among other manifestations of Chinese designs on Tibet were the activities of Tsa-Ser-Khang, an official of the Tashi Lama, who persuaded a number of Tibetan and half-Chinese boys to go from Darjeeling and Kalimpong to China, where they were to be educated. It was proposed that they should return to Tibet with the Tashi Lama. Arrangements were made for Tibetan boys to be educated at Nanking; there were reports that the Dalai Lama and the Tashi Lama had agreed to co-operate in the government of Tibet; and the Yungon Dzaza on his return to China was reported to have brought renewed pledges of Tibet's loyalty to the Central Government of China. Later in 1930 a dispute between the monasteries of Targye and Pehru, both on the Chinese side of the Rongbatsa line, led to a telegraphic correspondence between the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Committee and the Dalai Lama.

61. The Tashi Lama. 1926–1930

Fears of the Tashi Lama's return with Chinese backing were ever present in the Dalai Lama's mind, and no doubt Lungshar, who was instrumental in causing the breach between the two Lamas, was equally apprehensive. In many parts of Tibet there was strong sympathy for the Tashi Lama which must have added to the anxiety of the Lhasa clique.

The Tashi Lama was eager to return, and the Government of India were as eager to see him do so for the safety of Tibet; but the risk of incurring blame for any unfortunate results of a return in which we had a part discouraged the Government of India from altering their policy of non-intervention.

Means of bringing about the desired event were constantly being examined; and the Tashi Lama himself, who had been impressed by the friendly interest in his welfare displayed by Prince George (the late Duke of Kent) when he met the Lama at Peking in 1926, made repeated approaches to the Government of India and His Majesty's Minister at Peking by letter and through emissaries. Mr. Williamson, British Trade Agent, Gyantse, who visited the Tashi Lama privately at Mukden early in 1927, found him anxious to return but apparently not willing to make any great effort. The Tashi Lama's representatives took a more active interest, and in 1927 suggested a conference between representatives of the Dalai Lama, Tashi Lama, and the Government of India.

To all these overtures friendly but non-committal answers were given, but at last, in view of a definite request for mediation received through an emissary at Peking, it was decided that the Political Officer in Sikkim should write to the Dalai Lama offering his services in bringing about a reconciliation. The letter unfortunately arrived just after very harsh action
had been taken against a nephew and other followers of the Tashi Lama who tried to escape from Shigatse. The Dalai Lama in reply referred coldly to the unreasonable nature of the Tashi Lama’s flight and to the obligation of the Government of India not to interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet. The hand of Lungshar may he discerned in this lack of cordiality. The Political Officer then proposed that, to remove the potential danger caused by the Tashi Lama remaining in Chinese hands, he might be offered asylum in India; but the Government of India considered that such a step would involve too great a risk of rousing the Dalai Lama’s resentment. The Political Officer suggested that if personal correspondence between the two Lamas could be resumed some progress might be made, and also that personal discussion between the Political Officer and the Dalai Lama might clear the air. The Government of India agreed to this last suggestion and Rai Bahadur Norbhu was sent to Lhasa to arrange for the Political Officer’s visit. He found the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government disturbed by the desire of foreigners to visit Tibet, and by the activities of the Communist General Feng on the North China border. They were unwilling to issue an invitation; and although this was disappointing, it is probable that they were genuinely afraid that if the Political Officer were allowed to go to Lhasa they would be deluged with similar requests from Chinese and Soviet emissaries.

The Tashi Lama, who had spent some two years in Peking and North China, moved in 1927 to Inner Mongolia where he was supported by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, and also received a contribution from the National Government. In spite of frequent rumours of his impending return with Mongolian or Chinese assistance there were no definite developments: but the interest shown by Chinese officials must have raised the ambitions, if not of the Tashi Lama, at least of his adherents. A private hint by the Political Officer to Tsa-Ser-Khang the Tashi Lama’s representative in India, that the Lama might travel to India of his own accord, was not welcomed. On the other hand, Tsa Ser-Khang suggested that the Government of India might supply the Tashi Lama with arms by which he might effect his return. The suggestion was repeated in 1930, in the form of a verbal message from the Tashi Lama who mentioned offers of assistance he had received from the Chinese and “a few foreign nations” and explained that it was necessary for his security that he should be accompanied by an army on his return to Tibet.

62. Tibet—Nepal Crisis. 1929–1930

In the autumn of 1929 one Gyalpo Sherpa, who had been arrested and imprisoned by the Tibetan Government some 18 months earlier, escaped from prison and took refuge in the Nepalese Legation at Lhasa, claiming to be a Nepalese subject. This man seems to have been born in Tibet but to have been brought up in Nepal. He had acquired wealth by trading and was used as a confidential informant by the Nepalese Officer at Lhasa. He seems to have used his claim to Nepalese nationality and the protection of the Nepalese Officer to indulge in the sale of tobacco and in other activities to which the Tibetan authorities took objection. His arrest was due to information being given that he was, in fact, a Tibetan subject. When it was known that he was in the Nepalese Legation the Tibetan Government demanded that he should be handed over; this was apparently refused; and a party of Tibetan soldiers under the command of Lungshar broke into the Legation and seized Gyalpo by force. The Maharaja of Nepal protested strongly to the Prime Minister of Tibet and asked for an apology, and for the return of Gyalpo. The Tibetan Prime Minister in reply justified the action taken. The matter was aggravated by the death of Gyalpo who had been severely beaten after his rearrest. The incident was taken as a grave insult to Nepalese honour and the existing tension in Tibetan—Nepalese relations was increased almost to breaking point. The matter was reported by the Nepal Government to the Government of India in accordance with Article 111 of the new Treaty, by which each Government undertook to inform the other of serious friction with neighbouring states. The Government of India addressed the Tibetan Government urging them to adopt a conciliatory attitude but the Tibetan Government in reply claimed that they had been acting within their rights. In the meantime a firm telegram was addressed to the Dalai Lama by the Maharaja of Nepal, requesting the Dalai Lama to use his influence to avert a serious danger to the relations between the two states, giving a statement of the Nepal Government’s view of the case; and asking for a public apology
and the punishment of the offenders. The Dalai Lama replied that the case would be investigated; but this did not satisfy the Maharaja who telegraphed again asking for an apology. The Dalai Lama then sent a message justifying what had been done, but saying that he had directed the Kashag to send an apology. The Government of India also addressed the Dalai Lama advising him to acknowledge a mistake if one had been committed; but this produced a similar answer. The letter from the Kashag to the Maharaja, purporting to be an apology, was in fact a defence of their action, and a letter in similar terms was sent by the Dalai Lama. The Tibetan Government then appeared to consider that the matter was closed, but the Nepal Government were far from satisfied and continued to demand an apology although they were prepared to accept it in a private manner and not publicly as had originally been asked. In the meantime preparations for war were being made by both sides.

The crisis caused great anxiety to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, and strenuous efforts were made to find a solution. The case turned largely on the nationality of Gyalpo. If he were a Nepalese the action of the Tibetans would have been unjustifiable; but if he were in fact a Tibetan and if the Nepalese Officer had refused to hand him over, there would have been something to be said for the Tibetan Government although, even in those circumstances, their action was provocative. Reference was made to International Law; the British Envoy at Katmandu tentatively suggested arbitration by the League of Nations; and His Majesty's Government recalled the rescue, by their authority, of Sun Yat-sen from the Chinese legation in London in 1896. Preparations for war continued in both countries and the Government of India were in the unenviable position of being pledged to supply arms to each of the rivals. The request of the Tibetan Government for an instalment of the supply of arms, promised at the time of Sir Charles Bell's Mission to Lhasa, was held up on account of their delay in paying for the previous consignment, and in view of the tension with Nepal; but the Government of India considered that we were obliged by the new treaty with Nepal to supply that Government with its needs. His Majesty's Government replied that, in view of our leading part in world disarmament, we could not afford to incur the severe foreign criticism which would result from providing arms to Nepal at this crisis.

It was decided to send Sardar Bahadur Laden La to Lhasa with personal letters from the Foreign Secretary and the Political Officer to the Dalai Lama, advising him to take the matter into his own hands and bring it to a happy conclusion. About this time there were signs of a slightly more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Tibetan Government. This may have been due to the realisation that Nepal was in earnest, to a suspicion that we were backing Nepal unsatisfactory state of public opinion in Tibet. Nevertheless, the resulting attempt at an apology was scarcely more successful than the first and produced another stern telegram from the Maharaja.

Laden La found the Dalai Lama friendly, and appreciative of our efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement, but apparently not fully aware of the seriousness of the situation. After long discussions the Dalai Lama was persuaded to have an apology sent by the Kashag in a formula suggested by the Government of India. The apology was accepted; gratification was expressed all round; and the crisis ended to the relief of all concerned.

Before Laden La left Lhasa he was instructed to give to the Dalai Lama an assurance from the Government of India of their unaltered friendship and their fixed determination to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Tibet.

It may be noted that China took some interest in the dispute. An emissary from the Nanking Government who arrived at Lhasa early in 1930 sent a telegram to China in which it was reported that the Nepalese were marching on Tibet, and the Chinese Government was asked to wire instructions. There was also an impassioned manifesto published by some Chinese students in Peking accusing the British imperialists of backing Nepal, and urging the despatch of reinforcements to save Tibet. There seems little doubt that the influence of Lungshar, who was personally implicated, was mainly responsible for the obstinate attitude that nearly brought Tibet to war; but it must be recognised that the Tibetan Government seemed genuinely convinced of Gyalpo's Tibetan nationality, and that no one can be more stubborn than a Tibetan in sticking up for what he conceives to be his rights. Tibetan obstinacy asserted itself again in 1930 in the arrest and maltreatment of another person claimed by Nepal as their subject;
but the nerves of both parties had been sufficiently strained by the recent crisis; and, in spite of some ill-feeling, discussions were conducted in a more moderate spirit.

The Chinese, having got an opportunity of interfering in Nepalese affairs, continued to intrude. Chinese envoys were sent to Nepal where they offered the services of their government in settling any troubles with Tibet. This claim to interfere was repudiated by the Maharaja. The Chinese Consul-General in Calcutta also sent a letter from the President of the Chinese Republic to the Maharaja of Nepal on the same subject. After consideration, it was decided not to take up this action with the Chinese Government. Chinese interest in Nepal continued for some time after.

Chapter VIII — Col. Weir in Lhasa. Death of Thirteenth Dalai Lama

63. Colonel Weir is Invited to Visit Lhasa. 1930

Laden La’s visit and the Government of India’s assurance of their continued friendship, combined with the removal of the acute tension between Nepal and Tibet, appear to have gratified the Dalai Lama, who invited Colonel Weir, Political Officer in Sikkim, to visit Lhasa. It was thus possible to renew personal relations which had been weakened during the past five years, and which only the invaluable work of Sardar Bahadur Laden La and Rai Bahadur Norbhu had kept alive. This was also an opportunity to effect a change in the Tibetan attitude which, if not anti-British, was certainly not in our favour. In addition to seeking a way of reconciling the Dalai Lama and the Tashi Lama, which had been the object of the proposed visit to Lhasa in 1929, Laden La’s visit had made it clear that something had to be done to counteract the growing Chinese influence in Tibet. There were also many lesser questions which had arisen during the period of aloofness, and which it had not been possible to settle by correspondence. The Tibetan Government wanted more arms and ammunition which had been withheld on account of their slowness in paying for those already supplied, and on account of the crisis with Nepal; they wanted to import silver from India; they hoped that it would be possible to arrange for the imposition of a customs tariff; and, in their financial difficulties, they had granted what amounted to a monopoly in wool, contrary to the terms of the Trade Regulations, by ordering the sale of 2/3rds of the wool crop to their official agent; they hoped that their action, which they maintained did not amount to the creation of a monopoly, would be approved.

On our side there were a number of questions relating to Western Tibet where the independent spirit of the Lhasa Government had been reflected in exaggerated form. Relations between the Garpons and the British Trade Agent, Cartok, had been strained largely on account of an order by the latter that Ladakhi British subjects should not pay a 2 per cent. tax recently imposed by the Garpons, until it had been sanctioned by the Government of India. This tax had been an offshoot of the disputes between Tibet and Ladakh mentioned in an earlier paragraph. The Garpons also had their own views on the interpretation of the Trade Regulations with regard to the trial of joint cases. The result was that the Garpons refused to hear any cases pending in the joint court at Cartok until they had received orders from Lhasa about the 2 per cent. tax. Their attitude was haughty and uncompromising, and their reception of Mr. Wakefield, I.C.S., who visited Western Tibet in 1929 to examine trade conditions there, was little short of insolence. The Tehri boundary dispute, which it had been hoped might be forgotten, had been revived by the Tehri Darbar’s assertion of its supposed rights in the disputed area.

64. Colonel Weir at Lhasa. 1930

Colonel Weir, who was accompanied by Mrs. Weir and Captain Sinclair, I.M.S., reached Lhasa on August 4th 1930. The Dalai Lama and his favourites received him cordially, but many other officials, who might have been expected to call on the Political Officer, hesitated to do so, perhaps on account of dissatisfaction over the Tehri affair and apprehension that the latest incident over the arrest of a Nepalese subject might cause a new crisis, but more probably owing to
reflection on the treatment by the Dalai Lama of Tsarong Shape and others who had favoured modern ideas. This uneasy situation improved before the end of the visit.

The principal matters discussed by Colonel Weir during his stay of nearly two months are summarised below: —

The Tashi Lama — In two long talks on this subject the Dalai Lama reiterated his former attitude towards the Tashi Lama who, he complained, had not answered letters sent some months before. He ascribed the trouble not to the Tashi Lama himself but to his entourage, and was concerned about the ill-effects of exile on the Tashi Lama's health, and by the dissatisfaction which his absence caused in Tibet. He was anxious for the Tashi Lama's return, but appeared to hesitate to make overtures for fear of a rebuff.

Relations with China — Colonel Weir observed a feeling in Lhasa that Tibet could not long retain her independence and that a rapprochement with China would be necessary before long. This confirmed Laden La's report on the success of the Chinese emissaries; but Colonel Weir got no chance of sounding the Dalai Lama on this delicate topic. The Dalai Lama hoped for the eventual acceptance by China of the 1914 Convention but did not consider that the time was propitious for fresh negotiations.

Soviet Activities — The Dalai Lama fully appreciated the danger of Bolshevist pressure, particularly from the direction of Mongolia.

Relations with Nepal — The Dalai Lama stressed his intention of preserving peace.

Material Help for Tibet — The danger of war between Tibet and Nepal being past, the Government of India were ready to fulfil their promise of a supply of munitions, and to release another consignment. The Tibetan Government, on their part, promised to make early payment of their dues.

Help in Securing Hydro-electric Equipment was also offered.

Wool Monopoly — The Tibetan Government were informed that their action was contrary to the Trade Regulations but that, as a mark of friendship, the Government of India would allow their arrangements to continue until April 1933.

As another mark of friendship the Government of India would sell fine silver to the Tibetan Government considerably below market prices and free of duty.

Customs Tariff — After Colonel Bailey's visit the Tibetan Government had reverted to this favourite question and had stated that they were actually levying duty on some goods coming from China. They had professed not to understand the meaning of most-favoured nation treatment, and had pressed for a tariff. The difficulties of asking the Tibetan Government for a guarantee which they would probably be unable to carry out, and of arrangements with other countries enjoying free trade agreements with Tibet, were still the main obstacles; but in 1929 the Government of India decided to permit the Tibetan Government to impose a tariff on the Indo-Tibetan frontier. Conditions to be observed were: —

(a) Rates not to exceed a maximum of 5 per cent. ad valorem. (b) At least equal rates of duty to be imposed on goods coming from China overland. (c) Recognition of the right of the Government of India to impose a tariff on their side of the Indian frontier at the same rate as their sea customs. It was also to be explained that the Tariff must be mutually agreed upon as stipulated by the 1904 Treaty; that British commerce should receive not less favourable treatment than the commerce of China or the most favoured nation; and that the Government of India, in addition to the right of imposing equal duties on the land frontier, had the right to levy customs duties at ports on goods transiting India, for Tibet. After discussion with Colonel Weir, the Dalai Lama decided that a tariff would be a hardship for the Tibetan people and that they would not proceed with the matter.

Entry of Foreigners into India from Tibet — The Tibetan Government were asked, in writing, to provide foreigners travelling from Tibet to India, especially Russians, Chinese and Mongolians, with letters of identity. Tibetans, Nepalese and British subjects were excepted. This arrangement has never been worked.

Tehri Boundary Dispute — The Commissioners who had enquired into this case in 1923 found widely divergent claims, and the Tibetans stubbornly adhered to a boundary well within limits in which the Tehri Darbar appeared to have exercised authority for a long time. The British Commissioner suggested a boundary along the watershed; and the Government of India proposed a compromise along another natural line further south, which would have divided the disputed area between the two claimants.
In the discussion at Lhasa, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government treated the matter as of great importance and produced maps, published in England, which supported their claim. They were willing to make concessions in parts of the line, but would not relax their claim to most of the disputed area. No decision was reached.

Western Tibetan Affairs — The Tibetan Government promised an improvement in the attitude of the Garpons; they agreed to call for reports about other disputed matters; they did not consider that another Trade Mart at Taklakot was necessary but promised to consider the case. It is not recorded that anything was said to the Tibetan Government about the sanction of the Government of India to the imposition of a 2 per cent. tax by the Garpons; and although this was communicated by Mr. Wakefield to the Garpons it does not necessarily follow that they informed the Tibetan Government.

Income Tax on Tibetan Traders in India — The Tibetan Government were informed that, as a mark of friendship, the Government of India would not collect income tax from Tibetan traders who had no fixed place of business in India.

The Government of India and His Majesty's Government agreed that, although there were no very tangible or immediate results in questions of major importance, the visit was justified by the restoration of mutual understanding and improved cordiality.

65. Fighting in Kham. 1931–1932

Tibetan Reverses

The dispute between the monasteries of Targye and Pehru in Chinese controlled territory developed into a general outbreak of hostilities, with unfortunate results for the Tibetans. In 1931 the Tibetan Government unwisely sent some troops to support Targye — Pehru, which was said to favour the Tashi Lama, appealed for help from the Chinese. Some Chinese troops arrived (whether regular or not makes little difference), and attacked the Tibetans. In retaliation, the Tibetan troops drove the Chinese far Eastwards, capturing Kanze and Nyarong, and penetrating to within a few days’ march of Tachienlu. Negotiations for an armistice were begun, and the main body of Tibetan troops gradually withdrew to Rongbatsa. A delegate of the Nanking Government, one Tang K'o-san, was deputed from the Chinese side, but there was some delay in reaching a settlement. In September 1931 a treaty or, as the British Minister in China described it, “a modus vivendi,” was drawn up, providing for the settlement of the Targye-Pehru dispute by the Tibetan general on behalf of the Lhasa ecclesiastical authorities; for the maintenance by both sides of small garrisons in Drangu, Kanze and Nyarong; and other minor points.

During this period of Tibetan successes there were violent anti-British articles in the Chinese press, alleging that the British had instigated the Tibetans; that British officers were leading the Tibetan troops; and that the British had established themselves at Chiamdo. The peace was short-lived. It had been suspected from the first that the Chinese only wanted a breathing space, and intended to postpone their revenge until matters elsewhere were settled. The local press had attacked the settlement and suggested that it should be disavowed; local students had assaulted its maker, Tang K'o-san. But it is not necessary to make too much of this alleged deception by the Chinese, for the Tibetans too were in need of a breathing space, and were short of ammunition. In April 1932 the Chinese attacked the Tibetans and drove out their advanced troops from Kanze and Nyarong. The Tibetan main forces withdrew rapidly to the line of the Yangtse which was reached in August. In this disengagement there were not very heavy losses but in attempting unsuccessfully to hold the left bank of the Yangtse the Tibetans seem to have suffered considerably. Their position was made more dangerous by a combined move against them from Sining. It seems that another monastic quarrel in the Nangchen district of Jyekundo had tempted the Tibetans to interfere in that area, where they scored early successes against the Sining troops, but later had to retreat on account of their reverses at the hands of the Szechuan troops. There was a third, but independent, outbreaking of fighting in the Bating district where a half-Tibetan called Kesang Tsering appeared with a claim to have a mandate from the Nanking Government to establish Chinese administration from Batang to Giamda. He was not well received by the Szechuan warlord, Liu Wen-hui, and accordingly leagued himself with the Gongka Lama, a Tibetan freebooter-priest. These
two defeated the Szechuanese, but later fell out. Gongka Lama was at first overwhelmed by Kesang Tsering, but later secured the help of the Tibetan governor of Markham and drove Kesang Tsering out of the country.

Early in August 1932 the situation seemed so bad that the Dalai Lama telegraphed to the Political Officer, Sikkim, reporting the unauthorised conclusion of an armistice and the half-hearted fighting of his troops, asking for immediate pressure on the Chinese to cease hostilities, and offering a secret treaty with us. In another telegram of a few days later he asked the Political Officer to visit Lhasa in order to discuss matters concerning China and the Tashi Lama. It appears that he connected the Tashi Lama, who was believed to be in Kokonor, with the Chinese activities. The Dalai Lama was informed in reply that the Government of India were sorry to hear of the Tibetan reverses, but they could not conclude any further treaties with Tibet which would involve intervention in the frontier dispute; they had urged His Majesty's Government to make representations to the Chinese Government; and they had instructed Colonel Weir to go to Lhasa.

The British Charge d'Affaires in China was doubtful whether the Chinese Government could control the frontier forces, and was afraid that Chinese amour propre would make negotiations difficult. He mentioned that there had already been protests against our supplying the Tibetans with arms. He did not think it necessary to inform the Chinese Government of Colonel Weir's visit. His Majesty's Government decided that the Chinese Government should be informed that arms were being supplied to the Tibetan Government only for self-defence; that representations should be made for the immediate cessation of hostilities, avoiding if possible any discussion of Tibet's status; and that it should be stated that Colonel Weir was going to Lhasa to assist in the restoration of peace.

Colonel Weir arrived at Lhasa early in September 1932. Lungshar had fallen from favour in 1931, and Kunphel La, was now all-in-all. His influence was more salutary. He had combined with Tsarong Shape to pursue a progressive policy, and he had the support of the rank and file in the monasteries. Colonel Weir found that only the inner circle knew the real state of affairs in Kham; in the rest of Lhasa there was an undercurrent of panic, and it was said that not only were the Tibetan troops being defeated, but many were surrendering because they believed the Tashi Lama to be with their opponents. Reports from China did not confirm this story; there it appeared that the morale of the Tibetan troops was good, in spite of their reverses. The Tibetan Government rushed all the men it could raise, including bodies of warlike monks, to the Eastern front.

The Dalai Lama and Cabinet were bitter against the Chinese whom they accused of making a treacherous attack while negotiations were in progress. They were told by Colonel Weir that their invasion of Chinese territory, almost as far as Tachienlu, was not in accordance with the 1914 Convention or the Rongbatsa agreement of 1918; and that by using, for that purpose, arms supplied by us specifically for their self-defence they had caused complaints against us. After a meeting of the National Assembly, the Tibetan Government put forward proposals for a settlement with China on the basis of the 1914 Convention. They had to accept an Amban at Lhasa, but hoped that it might be possible to limit the size of his escort to less than the 300 stipulated in the Convention. With regard to the boundary they made claims which, in view of their difficulties, were ridiculously large, but were probably intended for bargaining. They emphasised their dependence on British mediation. Colonel Weir suggested that it might be possible to agree on a boundary which gave Nyarong and Derge to the Tibetans, on condition that these districts were demilitarised for the immediate present he proposed that the Tibetan troops should remain on the right bank of the Yangtse and the Chinese should be withdrawn to the Batang-Tachienlu line. The Tibetan Government were ready to accept that proposal but the Chinese Government were in no mood for negotiations, and Tibetan anxieties were increased by news of fresh disasters in the northern sector and the advance of the Sining troops in the direction of Chiamdo. Unnerved by their reverses, and disappointed at our inability to give them reassuring news of the cessation of hostilities, the Tibetan Government made enquiries about the possibility of securing help from the League of Nations, the U.S. or Japan.
Fortunately for Tibet the situation was eased by the outbreak of civil war in Szechuan between Liu Wen-hui and his nephew Liu Hsiang, in October 1932. Anticipation of this event had probably restrained Liu Wen-hui from crossing the Yangtse when things were going well for him. At last, the efforts of our Charge d'Affaires in China bore fruit, and an order was issued by the Chinese Government for the cessation of hostilities. But there were still rumours of an advance by the Sining troops, and the Dalai Lama telegraphed a protest to the Chinese Government through his officials in China. In reply he received a message from Chiang Kai-Shek that the Kokonor (Sining) troops were being withdrawn and that he knew that Liu Wen-hui could not spare troops for any aggressive action. He said that it was easy to see who was responsible for the trouble, and urged that differences between China and Tibet should be settled without outside interference. To call in British mediation would be like dismembering one's own body. Our Charge d'Affaires also renewed his requests to the Chinese Government and it was possible for Colonel Weir to leave Lhasa at the end of November in a more peaceful atmosphere. The parting request of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government was for early resumption of negotiations with China, in which it was essential that we should act as mediators. Letters to the same effect were also sent shortly after Colonel Weir's departure.

67. Diplomatic Activity in China. 1932

Discussions in China had been conducted by Mr. Ingram, His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires in Peking, and by Mr. Holman, his representative at Nanking. From the first Mr. Ingram had feared that the Chinese would resent our intervention, and had doubted whether it was wise to tell them of Colonel Weir's visit to Lhasa. Mr Holman's first interview with Hsu Mo, Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, was not a success. Mr. Hsu seems to have made the running with repeated protests against the supply of British arms to Tibet; he claimed that if this was stopped the Tibetans would soon give up the struggle. Mr. Holman did not venture to tell Mr. Hsu about Colonel Weir's visit to Lhasa for fear of an outburst, and Mr. Hsu considered that the whole question was too delicate for him to refer to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Our diplomatic representatives were anxious to avoid being drawn into deep waters over this affair; and the Government of India considered that, as our good offices had been refused, there was no use in pursuing that line any further nor in giving any formal intimation of Colonel Weir's presence at Lhasa, but that we should make clear to the Chinese our interest in preserving the autonomy of Outer Tibet. His Majesty's Government accordingly instructed Mr. Ingram that the larger question of mediation for a settlement was under consideration, and that he should make representations as soon as possible with a view to securing cessation of hostilities. Our interest in the integrity of Tibet and the maintenance of a stable Tibetan Government was to be emphasised, and the Chinese Government was to be given to understand that, if China should endanger these by an advance on Chiamdo or otherwise, His Majesty's Government would take a very serious view of the matter. News of fresh Chinese advances caused His Majesty's Government to follow up this message with another, instructing Mr. Ingram to point out to the Chinese Government that the recent movements threatened to violate the territory of Outer Tibet; and to press for urgent orders to the Chinese troops to advance no further, to withdraw from Outer Tibet if they had entered it, and to desist from hostilities pending negotiations for a settlement of the dispute. Mention was also to be made of the readiness of His Majesty's Government to employ their good offices towards a permanent settlement of the Tibetan question.

The firmness and personality of a Minister such as Sir John Jordan were sadly missed at this time. After an inconclusive talk with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ingram was fobbed off for some days with a Head of Department who clearly knew nothing about the business. Nevertheless, instructions to cease hostilities were issued, although the Chinese were at pains to make it clear that this was done independently and had no connection with Mr. Ingram's representations, and a separate visit was paid to inform Mr. Ingram that the Chinese Government could not avail itself of His Majesty's Government's kind offices, as the matter was a domestic issue. At his next meeting with the Foreign Minister Mr. Ingram succeeded in impressing upon him the serious view which His Majesty's Government took of the situation. The Minister, who confessed his ignorance of the subject, promised to discuss it with Chiang Kai-Shek, and to put before him Mr. Ingram's suggestion for a mutual agreement
for troops not to cross the Yangtse while negotiations were going on. After visiting Chiang Kai-Shek, the Minister for foreign Affairs was able to say that strict orders had been issued that there should be no more fighting, but he refused to discuss the question of an armistice, and tried to head off Mr. Ingram’s assertion of our interest in Tibet by indicating that the question was one of internal politics. In these circumstances it was decided that no further formal representations should be made to the Chinese Government but that it should be made clear at every suitable opportunity that His Majesty’s Government did not acquiesce in the Chinese contention that the dispute was a purely domestic issue.

These exchanges made it evident that, whatever their internal difficulties might be, the Chinese Government had worked up a nationalistic spirit about Tibet which was not easily to be shaken. Tibetan successes had stirred up anti-British propaganda; Chinese successes increased the planning activities of the Chinese Government. A special committee discussed ways and means for recovering Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, the definition of the Sino-Tibetan frontier, and other kindred matters. Tibetan representatives were asked to attend the National Assembly at Nanking, and the Tibetan Government sent four officials whom they intended to be diplomatic officers rather than representatives in a Chinese parliament. This caused delay in their recognition by the Chinese Government. Formation of the province of Sikang went on, at least on paper, but the influence of Liu Wen-hui prevented the Central Government from getting a footing there.

It is worth noticing that, at the time when this irredentist spirit was hardening, Chiang Kai-Shek was personally dealing with Tibetan problems.

68. The Tashi Lama. 1932

The Tashi Lama’s return was discussed during Colonel Weir’s visit to Lhasa. It is doubtful whether the Tashi Lama was connected with the Chinese aggression to the extent which the Tibetan Government suspected, but it is probable that his followers were ready to take advantage of any opportunity that offered. The Dalai Lama, whose anxiety for the Tashi Lama’s return was increased by the fear that he might be used by the Chinese as an excuse for further aggression, remembered the advice given by Colonel Weir on his former visit and wrote again to the Tashi Lama. The letter was in friendly terms and expressed the Dalai Lama’s wish for the return of the Tashi Lama. At the same time relations of the Tashi Lama were released from imprisonment.

A translation of the letter was telegraphed to Mr. Ingram who, at an interview in November 1932, informed the Tashi Lama of its terms. The Tashi Lama was pleased, but decided to wait for the original letter before sending any message to the Dalai Lama. Mr. Ingram expressed doubt whether we were wise to encourage the Tashi Lama to return to Tibet. He feared that the Lama might be a pro-Chinese influence, and he believed that the Chinese did not take him seriously and regarded him as a nuisance.

The Political Officer, Sikkim, on the other hand stressed the danger of internal trouble in Tibet if the Tashi Lama remained in China, and urged that we should not miss this opportunity of bringing about what both Lamas and the whole of the Tibetan people desired, when the atmosphere was more favourable than for a long time. The Dalai Lama’s letter was delivered to the Tashi Lama in January 1933, and the latter despatched a friendly reply and a party of representatives who reached Lhasa in June 1933 prepared to discuss details of the Tashi Lama’s return.

In the meantime the Chinese continued to make the most of the Tashi Lama for propaganda purposes. He was appointed Commissioner for the Pacification of the Western Border, and statements by him were published in which he was alleged to have expressed his hope that Tibet would return to the Central Government fold. The Chinese standard of veracity in such matters is not such that great importance should be attached to these statements.

There is one point of doubt in a reference in the Dalai Lama’s letter of 9th October 1932 to the fact that he had written two letters to the Tashi Lama, one in 1924 and one in 1926, but had had no answer. It appears that on October 15th 1932 he sent to the Political Officer, Sikkim, a copy of a letter from the Tashi Lama dated July 1924, acknowledging the Dalai Lama’s letter of January 1924. It can only be assumed that this letter arrived, eight years late, after the Dalai Lama had despatched his letter of October 9th 1932.
Sino-Tibetan relations overshadowed other events of these years, and were also observed with interest in Russia and Japan where anti-British articles appeared in the press. Chinese interest in Nepal continued, and reference was made in the Chinese press to "tribute" from Nepal. The Tibetan Government were supplied with ammunition, and with silver. One officer and twenty five other ranks of the Tibetan Army were trained at Gyantse.

Mr. Williamson I.C.S. visited Western Tibet and Tehri without any immediate results, but he brought back valuable information on trade conditions in West Tibet, and a fresh opinion on the merits of the Tehri frontier dispute.

70. Sino-Tibetan Affairs. 1933

The Question of Direct Negotiations

Civil war in Szechuan had led to an armistice on the Hsikang sector in November 1932 and by February 1933 the Sining general, who seems to have run short of military supplies; was also ready for a truce. This was later confirmed in a written armistice under which the Tibetans recovered all the territory which had been occupied by the Sining troops, and both sides undertook to refrain from aggression pending ratification of the agreement by their respective governments. The situation was so far improved that in February 1933 the Dalai Lama telegraphed to the Political Officer referring to the repeated requests of his government that we should mediate in a settlement with China, and to the Chinese refusal to accept our intervention. He enquired whether it would compromise His Majesty's Government if he attempted to regain, either peacefully or by armed action, the territory which had been lost in the Chinese advance, particularly Derge. He was advised not to take any aggressive action. A kharita from the Viceroy was also sent to the Dalai Lama, assuring him the Government of India would not fail to impress on His Majesty's Government the importance of doing every thing possible to assist in securing a peaceful and permanent solution of the disputes which had recently disturbed the Eastern Frontier of Tibet.

Previous requests for mediation had been referred to the Government of India who had also been informed of Chiang Kai-Shek's correspondence with the Dalai Lama and his proposal to send a delegate to Lhasa. As it appeared that hostilities had ceased, His Majesty's Government urged His Majesty's Minister at Peking, Sir Miles Lampson, to tackle the frontier settlement without delay. It was proposed that, even if it was not possible to press for our mediation in the dispute, the Chinese Government should be kept to their promise to settle the matter. When Lampson first raised the question he was advised by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that to press it would be playing into the hands of the Japanese. Nevertheless he reverted to the matter informally on a later occasion and gave a firm and definite warning that we could not tolerate anything likely to cause disturbance or lead to trouble on the Tibetan frontier. The Chinese attitude, with which Lampson appeared to be in sympathy, was that they would never agree to our mediation, and that Tibet was a naughty child who would one day return to the fold either as a result of parental chastisement or of its own accord. He did not consider that our present policy was leading us anywhere except to a loss of face with China, when she was strong enough to impose her will on Tibet; and, although he was ready to make representations if the Chinese were guilty of aggression, he would advise the Tibetans to come to terms with the Chinese.

This view did not satisfy the Government of India who reminded the Secretary of State that their objective was to secure a friendly Tibet free from external influence; that for twenty years they had been trying to reach that objective by supporting the Dalai Lama in his claim to the integrity of Outer Tibet; and that, as a result, there was in Lhasa a pro-British government whose stability and friendship largely depended on our continued support against Chinese aggression. They considered that if we were to advise the Dalai Lama to make the best terms he could with the Chinese, we should probably lose our influence, while Tibet would be forced to admit Chinese authority, or perhaps to seek help from the Soviets. They urged careful consideration before His Majesty's Government decided on a radical change in
policy. They proposed that the Dalai Lama should be advised that if the Chinese sought to negotiate, a direct settlement of the frontier question he should decide for himself what course of action to pursue, but he might be assured of the interest of the British Government in the solution of his difficulties.

The Secretary of State for India wrote to the Foreign Office and recalled that attempts to mediate between China and Tibet had been temporarily abandoned in 1921 when we had decide to treat Tibet as an autonomous state and to help the Tibetan Government to develop and protect their country. He presumed that their could be no going back on that policy. The present question was whether we should or should not encourage the Dalai Lama, to accept Chinese overtures for direct negotiations on the isolated matter of the frontiers. The Secretary of State considered that we ought not to take the responsibility of advising the Dalai Lama to refuse such an offer, and that it should be made clear that he could count on our advice and diplomatic support in that connection. A draft reply to the Dalai Lama was proposed for the consideration of the Foreign Office. It was also suggested that the Chinese Government should be asked whether any steps had been taken towards a settlement with Tibet, and that the possibility should be considered of sending a British observer to any conference that might take place between the Chinese and Tibetans. Mr. Ingram’s proposal of a mutual withdrawal might also be examined.

The Foreign Office agreed with the terms of the communication to the Dalai Lama, and decided that as it appeared that the Chinese were pressing the Tibetans to negotiate directly and as it was the Tibetans who were holding back, there was no question of enquiring from the Chinese Government about the direct negotiations. Ingram’s suggestion had been superseded by the recent armistices which were reported to be valid for three years. It was not likely that the Chinese would agree to a British observer at any conference between themselves and the Tibetans, but there was no objection to consulting Sir Miles Lampson on that point.

A telegram was accordingly sent to the Dalai Lama in March 1933 reminding him that; as a result of our representations, fighting had ceased and there appeared to be no immediate reason for anxiety. Our interest in securing a permanent settlement was reiterated, but it was explained that, owing to the political situation in China the time was not opportune for pressing the Chinese Government for a general agreement on the basis of the Simla Convention, and that the Chinese were at present willing to agree to British mediation. If the Dalai Lama should decide to accept an offer of direct negotiations the British Government would follow the discussions with interest and would give their advice in the negotiations or their diplomatic assistance in arriving at a settlement whenever required.

This message was gratefully acknowledged by the Dalai Lama who said that, although his representatives had been sent to China for negotiations, no opportunity had yet been found. The Secretary of State for India did not press for enquiries from the Chinese Government about the negotiations, or about Ingram’s proposal, but asked that the authenticity of the alleged armistices should be examined. He also asked that Sir Miles Lampson should not be allowed to misconstrue the communication to the Dalai Lama as implying that His Majesty’s Government were prepared to depart from their accepted policy of dealing with Tibet as an autonomous state, or to think that there was any question of discontinuing our official relations with the Tibetan Government. Both these requests were put into effect, the first officially, and the second semi-officially.

Towards the end of 1933 there was anxiety in China about threatened Tibetan aggression. The Kokonor armistice seems to have been holding good, although no reports of its authenticity were received; but the Szechuan troops must have been weakened by the civil war, and the Dalai Lama was clearly anxious to restore the Tibetan position in that area. The rumours proved to be groundless, and probably derived from diplomatic attempts by the Tibetan commander to come to some agreement like that by which lost territory in the north had been peacefully recovered.

71. Mr. Williamson Visits Lhasa. 1933

Progress of Negotiations for the Return of the Tashi Lama

Mr. Williamson, who succeeded Colonel Weir as Political Officer in Sikkim, was invited by the Dalai Lama to visit Lhasa. The Government of India agreed and Mr. Williamson reached
Lhasa in August and stayed until October 1933. He was given a very friendly reception and had several discussions with the Dalai Lama. The most important subject was the return of the Tashi Lama. It appeared that negotiations between the Tashi Lama’s representatives and the Tibetan Government were not making much progress. The Tashi Lama asked for the return to himself and his followers, of all the property that had been confiscated; for what amounted to complete control over Tsang Province including its troops and its revenues; and for a guarantee by some foreign power of any agreement that might be reached between himself and the Dalai Lama. There demands were thought to be pitched far too high and their acceptance would have meant the establishment of quite a new relation between Lhasa and Tashi Lhunpo. The Dalai Lama was prepared to make only a few concessions, and he was definitely opposed to the return of some of the Tashi Lama’s officials, and insisted that the Tashi Lama should return by sea and not overland. The Tashi Lama’s representatives prepared to go back to China with their report, at the end of 1933, when the whole situation was changed by the death of the Dalai Lama on December 17th 1933.

72. The Death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. 1933

Events which followed the death of the Dalai Lama showed up the mediaeval texture of Tibetan life. There were tales of a miraculous revival of the Dalai Lama for one day; of mistaken remedies prescribed by the State Oracle; and of the suicide of the Lord Chamberlain by eating broken glass. A struggle for power began, of which Kunphel La was the first victim. It was reported that his party, which proved to consist of a few lay officials and a large body of ordinary monks, had petitioned the Kashag for Kunphel La to be made joint Prime Minister, and that Kunphel La had himself proposed this shortly before the death of the Dalai Lama. Neither of the two main parties that emerged liked Kunphel La, who was promptly arrested on the charge of having been privy to the death of the Dalai Lama. This was almost certainly untrue although it seems that he had concealed the fact of the Dalai Lama’s illness for several days. His chief enemy, Lungshar, sought to inflict death or mutilation on him, but the sympathy of the mass of ordinary monks saved him from this, and he was soon released from imprisonment and exiled to a monastery in Kongbo (whence he escaped to India in 1937). His principal supporters were imprisoned for short periods. In theory the government lay with the young, newly appointed, Regent, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet; but it was Lungshar who dominated the scene. He allied himself with the leading figures in the National Assembly, the Abbots of the great Monasteries, and sought to use the Assembly to strengthen the influence of the monastic party with whose support he aspired to supreme power. His aim was generally reported to be the establishment of a republic, and his policy was strongly anti-Chinese. Talk of a republic was probably a cloak for oligarchic rule by the Assembly under his domination; but his anti-Chinese views were confirmed by a letter which he sent to the Political Officer informing him that the Chinese had been pressing strongly for the reception of a Chinese representative at Lhasa to conduct negotiations. He said that this would almost certainly be accepted; and he advised the British Government to pay attention to the matter. More evidence of anti-Chinese feeling was seen in a telegram sent to Chiang Kai-Shek and the Chinese Government shortly after the Dalai Lama’s death. In this it was stated that the Prime Minister and Kashag were conducting State business, and that all matters in China might be referred to the Tibetan representatives there. The Chinese Government were advised that, if anything were done through the influence of persons who wanted to create trouble between the two countries, such action would never be tolerated even if Tibet were reduced to the last man.

In view of Lungshar’s past history, this attitude may appear surprising, but Political Officers on their visits to Lhasa had found him very friendly, and it is probable that, to him, Chinese influence meant the return of the Tashi Lama, whom he had reason to fear.

The Kashag’s party had no leader so forceful as Lungshar. Their principal figure was Trimon Shape, an elderly Conservative, much hated by Lungshar. Tsarong Shape remained away from Lhasa, determined to take no part in politics. For some months Lungshar and the National Assembly continued their efforts to strengthen their position at the expense of the Kashag; but, although Lungshar’s ambitions were increasing, doubts began to appear whether
he was in fact dominating the Assembly or was being used by the leaders of the Monastic party as a stalking horse.

On the 10th May events moved to a crisis. The National Assembly met and framed a number of demands designed to increase their power. Trimon who had warning of impending trouble fled from Lhasa and took shelter in Drepung monastery, but, on finding that the monks in the Assembly refused to take any action on Lungshar’s complaints against him, he returned the same day and prepared a counterblow. The Kashag summoned Lungshar to the Potala in the afternoon of the same day. He came with some armed servants, and was immediately seized and charged with attempts to subvert the government and introduce a Bolshevist regime. In his struggles to reach for a revolver from his servants his arm was broken by one of the giant monk attendants of the Kashag. His official dress was torn off him as a sign of degradation. When his boots were removed some pieces of paper fell out. One of these Lungshar seized and swallowed but the other was secured, and was found to contain the name of Trimen Shape. This was black magic to harm one’s enemy by treading on his name; and it was suspected that the other paper contained the names of the Regent and Prime Minister.

The arrest was followed by secret meetings of Lungshar’s lay supporters who also called on the monasteries for help. A deputation of senior monks visited the Regent and Prime Minister to ask for Lungshar’s release, but, on hearing of his criminal designs against his enemies, they agreed that such a man was not worthy of support. With this reassurance, the Kashag proceeded to break up Lungshar’s party. Arrests were made and confessions extorted. It was disclosed that Lungshar was to have been made colleague of the Regent, and perhaps King of Tibet, that several senior lay officials were to have been murdered, and that debts to government, which were owed by many of Lungshar’s supporters, were to be cancelled. A few days later Lungshar’s eyes were put out and he was confined in a dungeon. His pride, and the toughness of his fibre, kept him alive in these horrible conditions, and he was eventually released in 1938. The Kashag, perhaps fearing to try too far the remaining dissident elements in Lhasa, used their success with moderation, and only a few sentences of banishment and fine were inflicted on Lungshar’s followers.

From this brief and exciting period of confusion emerged an unimpressive, stable, cautious, government which has continued, although not wholly united, without any substantial change until the present day, not flaunting its claim to independence, but hoping quietly to preserve it by remaining on good terms both with Britain and with China.

Chapter IX — Huang Mu-Sung in Lhasa and Williamson

73. Chinese Mission to Lhasa. 1934

Huang Mu-Sung

The first test of the new Tibetan Government was its handling of a determined attempt by the Chinese to re-establish their position in Tibet. The death of the Dalai Lama provided an excuse for sending a mission of condolence; but neither the Chinese nor the Tibetans can have imagined that its only purpose was to mourn. The Chinese hoped that the removal from the scene of their resolute opponent, the Dalai Lama, would make things easier for their diplomacy. The Tibetans had concluded from our message to the Dalai Lama on the subject of direct negotiations that they might see what they could do for themselves as we appeared unable to help.

The Tibetan Government agreed to accept a mission; and the Chinese Government appointed General Huang Mu-Sung, then a member of the National Military Council, as Special Commissioner for Ceremonial Offerings to the late Dalai Lama. They also conferred posthumous titles on the late Dalai Lama by special Mandate.

A small advance party travelled to Lhasa by India to make arrangements for the main body, consisting of Huang with a large number of minor officials and a bodyguard, which was to travel overland. From our side, Rai Bahadur Norbhu was sent to Lhasa to watch proceedings and it is due to his skill and devotion that we have a detailed knowledge of events during Hang’s mission and also of the happenings after the death of the Dalai Lama.
Norbhu, who before the arrival of Huang had been actively reminding friendly Tibetan officials about their independence, had some apprehensions about the result of negotiations between the Chinese and Tibetans. He found that, although the Tibetan Government professed to object to the establishment of a wireless set which the Chinese had sent in advance, in fact they allowed it to be installed without protest. They also allowed themselves to be persuaded into receiving Huang with far greater honours than had ever been accorded to a British representative at Lhasa.

The Chinese were clearly out to make a good impression. Huang himself worked indefatigably, visiting the great monasteries with lavish presents, making a great show of reverence in the holy places, and chanting prayers in a doleful voice. Presents were given to everyone of consequence, and entertainments were on a grand scale. But his republican retinue was not so well trained. They offended Tibetan susceptibilities in many ways; by ill-manners; protests against the playing of British music by Tibetan military hands; riding furiously through the streets; drunkenness and quarrelling; and not least by their lack of respect for their own leader. The monks showed obvious signs of dislike for the Chinese and had to be restrained by special order from jostling and harassing Huang’s bodyguard, who on their part did all they could to avoid the monks.

In matters of business Huang did not force the pace. Shortly before his arrival he had issued a proclamation that he was coming to perform religious ceremonies for the late Dalai Lama. The only bit of propaganda in it was a reference to the unity of the Five Races. The next move was the offering of a seal and memorial tablet for the late Dalai Lama. This was at first refused on the grounds that the Dalai Lama was dead and so a seal was no use; but, on finding that there were no compromising inscriptions on the objects, the Tibetan Government yielded to pressure, and accepted. In this and in all matters connected with the Mission the National Assembly was consulted. Huang then proposed that all Tibetan officials should go to him to receive the seal and escort it to the Potala. This was cut down to a ceremony at the Potala attended by all high officials.

Huang very tactfully left it to the Tibetans to open diplomatic conversations; and where this was seen to be the case a meeting of the National Assembly was held. It was decided that the frontier question should be broached, but that it should be made clear that, although Tibet and China should be considered as “like the two eyes”, Tibet must remain independent.

The Kashag then raised the question with Huang. He replied that he had come only on religious business and had no power to decide anything. The Kashag pointed out that Huang had been given out to be second only to Chiang Kai-Shek and must surely have some power. He then asked for their suggestions, whereupon they decided to consult the National Assembly again. The Kashag also mentioned the return of the Tashi Lama and their objections to his return with an armed escort. Huang replied that he had met the Tashi Lama and could assure them that he had no intention of resorting to force.

Gradually Huang put his cards on the table. He asked the Tibetan Government to declare themselves one of the Five Races of China, and a republic. Chinese support against all comers was to be the reward for this. The National Assembly, after a meeting lasting two days, replied that Tibet had been ruled by thirteen Dalai Lamas, and would never declare a republic. They would fight any invader to the last man. When the Kashag reported this decision Huang tried threats; he said that the Tashi Lama had joined the Republic and would probably come back to Tibet by force of arms. The Chinese Government would not try to stop him. The Kashag did not think this was likely and reminded Huang of what he had previously said about the Tashi Lama’s intentions. The matter was again put to the National Assembly which reaffirmed its previous decision and signed a paper to that effect.

Huang, greatly disappointed, telegraphed to Nanking for instructions and was advised to return without deciding anything. Nevertheless he did not give up his efforts and at another meeting with the Kashag, he diplomatically watered down the implication of membership of the Five Races, and said that it would not be necessary for Tibet to adopt a republican form of government. The important point was that Tibet should rely on China. He also said that in a treaty between Japan and Great Britain, Tibet was acknowledged to be subordinate to China. The Kashag replied that as Tibet was not a party to such a treaty it could
not affect her status. Huang pressed for an admission of subordination and provided help in return. The Kashag asked him what sort of help China had been able to give to Mongolia and Manchuria.

Again the matter was referred to the National Assembly who returned a flat refusal of Huang’s proposals. In doing so they stressed their friendship with the British Government whose treatment of them, even in 1904, they praised as fair. The only enemy they had to fear was China.

74. Final Proposals by the Chinese Mission

After these repeated rebuffs Huang passed the ball to Wu Min Yuan, an elderly member of his Mission, who had been born at Lhasa. He visited the Kashag with a proposed agreement in fourteen articles. He professed that Huang was too severely disappointed to do any more and that these proposals were his own idea. Norbhu reported that the Kashag, and especially Trimon, were said to have been bribed on a large scale, and that people in Lhasa expected them soon to give way to the Chinese demands, but that there would be strong opposition from the National Assembly.

The proposals, which were in writing, were debated for several days by the Kashag and Assembly and a detailed examination of them and of the Tibetan replies is given below:

1. “The relations between the Central Government and the Tibetan Government should be those of benefactor and lama.” The Kashag accepted, provided “Chinese Government” was substituted for “Central Government” which was a new term. The Assembly agreed.


3. “Tibet has religion, men, and complete administrative arrangements. Therefore China should consider Tibet to be independent (?) autonomous and should not interfere in its internal administration.” Agreed.

4. “No Chinese troops should be kept on any of the frontiers of Tibet.” Agreed.

5. “Five thousand troops should be selected from the Tibetan army and called Frontier Guards. They should be posted on the various frontiers. China should pay, arm, equip, and train the troops.” The Kashag said that troops might be posted on the frontiers but there was no need to call them by any special name. They did not want pay or arms from the Chinese. The Assembly added that it was not necessary to post troops on the frontiers until an emergency arose.

6. “A Chinese Officer should be posted at Lhasa to advise the Tibetan Government. He should be given an escort out of the Frontier Guards and should control the movements of the whole force.” The Kashag said they would prefer no Chinese officer to be posted at Lhasa. If one were appointed he should have nothing to do with the Tibetan army, but he might have a small Chinese escort. The Simla Treaty had said 300.

The Assembly said that 25 servants would do as an escort, and that the Chinese officer should strictly observe the provision for non-interference in Tibetan internal affairs.

7. “The Tibetan Government should consult the Chinese Government before corresponding with other nations about external affairs.” The Kashag said that Tibet is independent and would deal with external affairs without insulting the Chinese. The Assembly agreed and added that the Tibet Government would correspond with all nations, “headed by the British Government”, whenever they wished.

8. “The Chinese Government should be consulted about the appointment of officers of the rank of Shape and above.” The Kashag refused, but offered to inform the Chinese Government after the appointments had been made. The Assembly agreed.

9. “China should recognise the boundary existing at the time of the Emperor Kuang Hsu”. (This appears to mean the boundary under the Manchu Empire, before Chao Erh-feng’s aggression.) This was considered favourable; but demands were made for additional territory including Nyarong, Batang, Litang, and the Golok country.
10. “China should fight with or mediate with any nations who try to invade Tibet.”

The Kashag and Assembly both said that as Tibet is a religious country no one is likely to attack her. If they do she will deal with them herself without Chinese help. The question of mutual help could be considered if it arose.

11. “China should be informed when the incarnation of the Dalai Lama is discovered so that she can offer him a seal and title.”

The Kashag agreed. The National Assembly said that China should be informed only after the installation had taken place to avoid trouble such as was created in the case of sixth and seventh Dalai Lamas.

(That trouble led to the imposition of Manchu rule at Lhasa.)

12. “The Tibetan Government should invite the Tashi Lama to return at once, should restore to him his former powers, estates and property, and should guarantee that no harm should befall him or his followers. If this were done the Chinese Government would take away his munitions.”

The Kashag and Assembly replied that the Tashi Lama being a religious person required no arms and ammunition; they would welcome him back and guarantee his personal safety if the Chinese took away his arms. They added that he should be asked to return via India in accordance with the wishes of the late Dalai Lama.

13. “All Tibetan officers in China should receive salaries from the Chinese Government.”

The Kashag agreed. The Assembly said that it was a matter of indifference to them but that only officials appointed by the Tibetan Government should attend meetings.

14. “All half-Chinese in Tibet should be under the sole jurisdiction of the Chinese officer at Lhasa.”

The Kashag and Assembly replied that when the Chinese were turned out of Tibet in 1912 the Tibetan Government asked all Chinese to return to China. Those born in Tibet asked for permission to remain, and signed an agreement to pay taxes and submit to Tibetan jurisdiction. This article was therefore unacceptable.

On receiving these replies Huang wrote to the Kashag asking that all of Wu Min-yuan’s proposals should be accepted and laying particular stress on three demands. That Tibet should admit subordination to China; that all direct correspondence with outside nations should cease, or failing that, China should be consulted before the Tibetan Government replied to any communication with outside nations; that China should be consulted before appointments were made to the post of Shape or higher officers.

After long deliberation the National Assembly decided:

1. That Tibet might be considered subordinate to China to the extent laid down in the Simla Treaty. (i.e. recognition of Chinese suzerainty). 2. That Tibet would correspond with all nations direct “headed by the British”, and would not consult China on the subject. 3. In view of religious ties, Tibet would inform China after the appointment of officers above the rank of Shape.

The National Assembly desired that the British Government should be a party to any agreement reached between Tibet and China. But Huang refused to consider this proposal at all.

The result of the negotiations was reported by Huang to Nanking, and he was ordered to return to China for further discussions.

These direct negotiations have been described at length because our record of them is unique, and because they shed a clear light on the Tibetan approach to diplomacy and the characteristic attitudes of the Kashag and the National Assembly of the day.

More important still, they show in its full context the Tibetan offer to admit Chinese suzerainty. This was not an isolated, unqualified admission but was clearly conditional on the acceptance by the Chinese of the other Tibetan terms of settlement. Huang made it known before he left that he was going to put the Tibetan Government’s answers before the Chinese Government and that if they agreed, a formal settlement would be drawn up. His farewell letter to the Kashag is eloquent of failure and makes no mention of any Tibetan admission. Moreover, it was made quite plain in the following year by Trimon Shape, who was considered to lean towards the Chinese side, that the Tibetan Government had offered to admit Chinese suzerainty provided the Chinese would surrender to them certain territory and would
leave them to manage their own internal affairs. The Tibetan Government did not acknowledge even the nominal suzerainty of China because their demands for an agreement about the frontier had not been accepted.

75. Results of Huang's Mission

The Chinese Mission succeeded in establishing a wireless set at Lhasa and in leaving behind them two officials, who were later described as a branch of the Executive Yuan. The senior of these men died shortly after Huang left Lhasa, and the junior remained, with the wireless staff. An officer from Sining who came to Lhasa independently of Huang's mission also stayed for a time. Statements by members of the mission sought to conceal that there had been no great success by explaining that the mission had no political objectives, and even going so far as to say that China wanted the Tibetans to rule themselves. The intimate relations between China and Tibet, and Tibetan loyalty to Nanking, were, of course, mentioned; but even the make-believe was not carried too far.

In a telegram from Lhasa, Huang reported that Tibet was pledged to whole-hearted support of the Chinese Government; but on his return to China he made very mild statements indicating that everything in Tibet was all right, and denying that Britain had any special influence there, and adding that British activities were "strictly in accordance with agreements". The hopes in which the mission set out may be reflected in a newspaper article forecasting the restoration of an Amban at Lhasa, the demarcation of the Tibetan boundary provided that Tibet recognised Chinese suzerainty, and the discussion with the British Government of the Indo-Tibetan frontier. After the return of the mission a semi-official Chinese magazine was stung by British press comment on Huang's activities into extravagant words about Chinese sovereignty in Tibet.

On the whole, it may be said that the great effort and expenditure by the Chinese did not secure a proportionate result; but direct contact at Lhasa had been re-established, and the seeds of future advance sown.

On our part there was at first a tendency to misinterpret and overrate the Tibetan written offer to admit Chinese suzerainty. Even if it were an isolated document it would have represented quite a good bargain for Tibet, as freedom in internal administration was claimed in return for the recognition of suzerainty. When the offer is seen in its proper place in the negotiations described above it has a very different appearance. The real danger of the whole affair was that the Chinese had succeeded in making gaps in the 1914 Convention. Under Article 5 Tibet was bound not to negotiate with China and, under the terms of our agreement with Tibet, China was not to enjoy any advantages under the 1914 Convention until she signed it. Now direct negotiations had been undertaken, and China looked like securing a recognition of her suzerainty, and a permanent resident at Lhasa, and she had secured the right to establish a wireless station, all of which were advantages from which she should have been barred until she signed the tripartite convention. It was thus realised that in not discouraging the Dalai Lama from direct negotiation on the question of the frontier, and by giving the impression that we could not do much to help, we had made possible the evasion of the 1914 Convention both by China and Tibet.

At this time there was some uncertainty about our treaty relations with Tibet, for both the Government of India and His Majesty's Government showed a tendency to talk about our acceptance of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet as an established fact, forgetting that it was one of the advantages to be gained by China when she signed the 1914 Treaty, and that our declaration of 1921 had been made to China without consulting or informing the Tibetan Government.

The Tibetan Government had displayed unexpected unity and resolution in face of strong pressure and probably a good deal of bribery. They had managed to stave off any immediate threat; but they did not in fact make any strong protest about the retention of Chinese officers at Lhasa although they professed to treat them as connected only with the wireless station which they found useful for their business transactions with East Tibet.

It is probable that Norbhu's presence at Lhasa and his tireless reasoning with Tibetan officials contributed not a little to Huang's failure.
The Tibetan Government attitude to the return of the Tashi Lama in their discussions with Huang had been described above. Their objection to an armed escort was evident. Reports from China and from the Tashi Lama’s representatives in India made it equally clear that the Tashi Lama was not satisfied with the Tibetan Government’s reply to his proposals, and that he was not sufficiently reassured about his reception in Tibet to come without an escort, or possibly a guarantee from the British Government. Although efforts were made by our Legation in China to persuade the Lama to return via India, we were not prepared to consider giving any guarantee for his security.

After the death of the Dalai Lama, the Chinese took more interest in the Tashi Lama. They issued a commendatory decree about his work as Cultural Commissioner for the Western Borders. His intention to return to Tibet was publicised and there were press reports of statements by him on the need for unity between China and Tibet. Evidence of his dependence on the Chinese was seen in his own remark to the British Minister, that he was waiting for “instructions” from the Chinese Government, and the statement of a Chinese official that the Central Government would determine the Tashi Lama’s movements, and that the purpose of his return was purely for the sake of cementing relations between China and Tibet. Nevertheless the Tashi Lama continued to cultivate the friendship of the British Minister in Peking, and to write to the Political Officer in Sikkim.

Perhaps he hoped that after the removal of Lungshar, the Tibetan Government would be more accommodating; but it was not easy to ascertain his real thoughts which were usually interpreted to us by his followers. Signs were seen of the existence of two parties in his entourage, one of which was in favour of returning by land with an escort, and the other declaring that the Tashi Lama did not want temporal power and would prefer to return to India by sea, if the Chinese would let him.

In spite of rumours of trouble, peace was preserved in Eastern Tibet and a new armistice with Szechuan was concluded. Four Tibetan boys were sent down to India for training in electrical engineering.

The Tibetan Government were helped to obtain gold at a concession price, for the adornment of the Dalai Lama’s tomb. Interference with the wool trade at Phari, which had been troublesome for about a year, was removed after the matter had been represented to the Tibetan Government by Norbhu on his visit to Lhasa.

The Chinese continued their interest in Nepal. Their special agent in Calcutta visited Kathmandu in May 1934, and Huang Mu-sung also went there after his visit to Lhasa.

The imposition of a Land Customs Regime on the frontiers of India had been under consideration since 1932. Its objects were to safeguard revenue, and to enable the Government of India to answer embarrassing questions, when a commercial treaty was under consideration, about the absence of a customs tariff of the main land frontiers. The political objections so far as Tibet was concerned were recounted by the Political Officer, and similar considerations in other parts on the frontier led the Government of India to propose a limited customs regime applicable to certain articles only. In 1934 this was agreed upon; but the land customs line was to be only theoretical so far as Tibet and Bhutan were concerned because the list of dutiable articles did not contain any which were produced in those countries.

Towards the end of 1935 it was considered advisable for the Political Officer to go again to Lhasa to examine the results of Huang’s mission, to counteract the growth of Chinese influence, and to do what might be possible to secure the return of the Tashi Lama.

The occasion was taken for a review of our policy towards Tibet. The Government of India realised that we could not look for any strong diplomatic action at Peking, but that it was particularly important to maintain British influence in a friendly Tibet, at a time when new political forces were at work in Eastern and Central Asia.

The danger of Chinese influence spreading to Nepal and Bhutan was recalled, and also the interest of Japan from whose government there had lately been an offer to supply arms to Tibet.
The Government of India were satisfied that Tibet was genuinely friendly, and that whatever had been yielded to the Chinese had been yielded through fear, and through doubt of our willingness to give effective support. The death of the Dalai Lama had given the Chinese an opportunity, and their mission had had some success.

In drawing up instructions for Mr. Williamson the first consideration was the return of the Tashi Lama. There were signs that the Chinese might be preparing to restore him by force of arms and the Tashi Lama himself was reported to be issuing threats of war. Mr. Williamson was to make efforts to secure a peaceful return.

It was desirable to examine on the spot the necessity of posting at Lhasa an officer equivalent in rank to any officer whom the Chinese might manage to establish permanently.

The Government of India assumed that there was no question of maintaining Tibetan integrity by force of arms, and it was decided that, if this question was raised, Williamson should make it clear to the Tibetan Government that in the event of trouble with China, Tibet would have only our diplomatic support so far as was justified by the merits of the case, and that in the meantime His Majesty’s Government would use all their diplomatic influence to prevent the development by China of an aggressive policy. The question of assistance against any other aggression i.e. from the Chinese communists who were then a possible danger in Eastern Tibet — should be considered as and when it arose.

The Tibetan Government were to be given three specific assurances.

1. That His Majesty’s Government, while prepared to admit the theoretical suzerainty of China, would adhere to their present policy of treating Tibet as an autonomous country in practice.

2. That His Majesty’s Government were anxious to maintain their traditional friendship with the Tibetans and to continue to deal with them direct as in the past.

3. That His Majesty’s Government were prepared, in so far as the merits of the case justified, to give Tibet their fullest diplomatic support at Nanking should she become involved in any trouble with China. The misconception about our attitude towards direct negotiations between China and Tibet was to be cleared up, and it was to be explained that His Majesty’s Government would like to be represented at any general negotiations between those two countries.

If the Tibetans were doubtful of our intentions, they were to be assured that we would not enter into negotiations with China about Tibet without their participation or knowledge. If they were in any doubt as to the implications of the 1935 Government of India Act, it was to be explained that the basis of relations between Great Britain and Tibet would remain unchanged.

Mr. Williamson arrived at Lhasa on 26th August 1935; shortly afterwards he fell ill, and he died at Lhasa on 17th November. He had nevertheless concluded most of the business with which he had been entrusted, and the results of his mission are summarised below.

The Tashi Lama — The outstanding points of difference between the Tibetan Government and the Tashi Lama were the control of the army in Tsang, the control of three of the principal districts in that province, and the Tashi Lama’s wish to bring a Chinese escort. When Mr. Williamson arrived at Lhasa he found that neither side showed any willingness to make concessions. The question of the escort was the principal anxiety of the Tibetan Government. Whether the Tashi Lama himself wanted such an escort, and whether the alleged threats of war were his doing or that of his followers, is uncertain; but it was clear that the Chinese Government intended to send an escort with the Tashi Lama, and Mr. Williamson was informed that in July 1935 the Tibetan Government had telegraphed to the Chinese Government to protest.

Mr. Williamson exchanged friendly but infructuous telegrams with the Tashi Lama who denied that he wanted to bring Chinese officials or troops to Tibet. At the same time representations were made to the Chinese Government who were to be informed that the despatch of Chinese troops and officials with the Tashi Lama was contrary to the wishes of the Tibetan Government. This was done, and the Chinese in reply made what appears to be a false statement that when Huang Mu-sung had mentioned to the Tibetan Government that the Tashi Lama would be accompanied by a bodyguard they raised no objection. They also denied that the bodyguard would be “troops”. Our Minister rather incautiously referred to the Simla Convention and received the obvious retort that the Chinese did not recognise it.
Mr. Williamson at first believed that the Tibetan Government were so much in fear of the Chinese that they would withdraw their opposition to the escort if they had any doubt of receiving effective support from His Majesty's Government. Nevertheless, even when they had asked for military assistance and had been told that they could expect nothing beyond diplomatic support, they stood firm, and the National Assembly decided to oppose by force the entry of Chinese troops into Tibet. In spite of the unsatisfactory reception of the representations made by the British Minister, His Majesty's Government insisted that the Chinese Government should be left in no doubt about the Tibetan attitude towards the despatch of an escort and Chinese officials with the Tashi Lama, and a firmly worded aide memoire was handed to the Chinese Government.

Representation — The Tibetan Government professed not to consider the officials left behind by Huang's mission to be permanent representatives, and they did not want a permanent British representative at Lhasa unless they had to accept an Amban. The behaviour of the two Chinese officers at Lhasa was overbearing and unpopular, and the Tibetan Government, when consulted, asked us to prevent the British Legation in China from issuing passports to two more officials whom the Chinese Government wanted to send to reinforce or replace the existing officers.

79. Assurances. Tibetan Views on Suzerainty

The assurances and explanations which had been authorised by His Majesty's Government were conveyed to the Tibetan Government who took the opportunity of clarifying their own attitude towards the Chinese claim to suzerainty. The Kashag stated definitely that they did not recognise even the nominal suzerainty of China. They had been prepared to do so, to the extent which had been provided in the Simla Convention, in exchange for territorial concessions from the Chinese. There had in fact been no concessions, and accordingly the Tibetan Government had not formally recognised Chinese suzerainty.

Chapter X

80. Events Leading up to Sir Basil Gould's Visit to Lhasa. 1936

Mr. Williamson's death interrupted the development of our efforts to bring about the peaceful return of the Tashi Lama.

The Tibetan Government continued to be anxious, and to repeat their request for diplomatic representations in China. The Chinese Government had professed to be disappointedly our insistence on this matter at a time when they were facing difficulties in other quarters: but their subsequent blank denial that they had received any protest from the Tibetan Government appeared to indicate that they intended to do what they liked about the Tashi Lama's escort. His Majesty's Government took an increasingly serious view of the Chinese attitude and urgent representations were again made by our Ambassador in China, who was able to confute Chinese denials by exact reference to the dates on which Tibetan protests had been sent.

The Tibetan Government reaffirmed their intention to oppose the escort by force, but were clearly apprehensive of what might follow. The movements of the Chinese Communists on the Tibetan border were the cause of more anxiety. These troops had been evicted from Hunan in 1935 by the Nanking Government forces and, breaking up into several bodies, had been harried through Kweichow, Yunnan, Szechuan, and Kansu to the borders of Tibet, bringing terror and destruction wherever they went. Driven from place to place, but winning some remarkable successes against the Nanking and provincial troops, they had swept back from the North West in May 1936 and occupied most of Kham as far as the Yangtse to the alarm of the Tibetan Government. It was reported that the Chinese had suggested joint action against the Communists, and it seems that the Tibetan Government, although not willing to go so far as giving military help, did assist the Kansu authorities to get supplies. By July 1936 the Communists had been driven north again, and Tibetan fears decreased. This interlude had various results. On the one hand the disturbance delayed the Tashi Lama's move towards Tibet and distracted Chinese attention from his return; on the other hand the pursuit of the
Communists enabled the Nanking Government to acquire more influence in Szechuan and Sikang, and to insinuate their own troops there. Another result was the diversion of much of the Chinese trade with Tibet from the overland route to the sea route and India. Sikang itself was reduced to a state of poverty and disorder.

81. Instructions

In May 1936 it appeared to the Government of India that the situation justified another effort to help in the solution of the differences between the Tashi Lama and the Tibetan Government and an examination of possible ways of strengthening the general position of Tibet in furtherance of our policy of keeping that country autonomous and friendly. With the approval of His Majesty’s Government it was decided that Norbhu should go again to Lhasa to inform the Tibetan Government of our diplomatic efforts in China, and to obtain from them a written repetition of their objection to the Tashi Lama’s Chinese escort, with which to refute Chinese denials that such objections existed. He was also to ascertain whether the Tibetan Government agreed to the issue of a letter from Sir Basil Gould, who had succeeded Mr. Williamson as Political Officer, to the Tashi Lama offering to mediate between him and the Tibetan Government and to export him to Tashilhunpo if he would forego his Chinese escort. This would involve more active intervention than His Majesty’s Government had been willing to contemplate before, and also some responsibility for seeing that any agreement which the two parties might reach would be carried out. It was suggested that the offer of help by way of customs concessions and military training, or perhaps a hint that existing facilities might be withdrawn, might make the Tibetan Government willing to be conciliatory. The British Embassy in China were also in favour of more active intervention in the dispute. Norbhu found on his arrival at Lhasa that the Kashag were not anxious for our mediation at the moment, but the National Assembly were in favour of the proposal. A few days later it was finally decided by the Tibetan Government to invite Sir Basil Gould to visit Lhasa, and to send a protest to the Chinese Government, through the Government of India, against the despatch of an escort with the Tashi Lama. The Tibetan Government were grateful for the offer of mediation but stated that they had almost reached a settlement with the Tashi Lama and therefore did not need our help at the moment. They referred to our policy of non-intervention in Tibetan internal affairs. Possibly the removal of danger from the Communists had something to do with their decision, or possibly it was affected by the discovery of bombs in the advance baggage of the Tashi Lama; but it is just as probable that the reason they gave was genuine and that they hoped that concessions which they had made to the Tashi Lama would bring about a solution without any outside intervention.

In spite of the somewhat altered circumstances it was decided that Gould should go to Lhasa. His instructions were revised to meet the new conditions. He was to explore the situation generally, to advise the Tibetan Government against over-optimism, and to impress on them the need for strengthening their own position by making peace with the Tashi Lama and reorganising their army and finances. To these ends we were prepared to help them with instructions for their fighting forces, if they wanted it, and with customs concessions. There was now no immediate question of sending a message to the Tashi Lama.

82. Sir Basil Gould’s Mission to Lhasa. 1936

Sir Basil Gould reached Lhasa in August 1936. He was accompanied by a larger party of British officers than had visited Lhasa since the 1904 Expedition. They included Brigadier Neame of Eastern Command who was prepared to advise the Tibetan Government on military affairs, and two officers of the Royal Signals who were in charge of a wireless transmitter which was being taken on such a mission for the first time.

This mission has proved to be comparable in importance in our relations with Tibet only to that of Sir Charles Bell. Its immediate effect was to restore the confidence of the Tibetan Government to whom the presence of a Political Officer has always appeared to act as a tonic. But its wider effect was to put our relations with the Tibetan Government on a new footing by establishing close and unbroken contact, such as had not existed before, but without committing the Government of India to permanent representation. Although Sir Basil Gould left Lhasa in February 1937 the mission has remained there, in charge of a succession of junior officers, until the present.
The question of our representation at Lhasa was examined when the Mission had lasted for about five months, and it became necessary to consider how much longer it should stay. The Government of India and His Majesty's Government appreciated the value of keeping in close touch with Lhasa, particularly at a time when in the midst of rapidly changing events, the presence of a British Mission would tend to consolidate the ground we had gained, and to confirm the more resolute spirit which its arrival had engendered in the Tibetan Government. There was still a Chinese officer at Lhasa, and that was another reason for maintaining a representative of the Government of India there. But it was not yet certain that the Chinese was considered to be a permanent official, and the Tibetan Government did not appear to have given up hope of getting him withdrawn. The time did not, therefore, seem ripe for the formal discussion of permanent British representation at Lhasa. It was decided that Sir Basil Gould, who had important duties and responsibilities in Sikkim and Bhutan, should leave with the main body of the Mission, and that Mr. Richardson, British Trade Agent, Gyantse, should remain at Lhasa, to be relieved later by Rai Bahadur Norbhu, without any suggestion that the temporary status of the mission was being changed. That is the basis on which, after many changes of personnel, and after a further visit by Sir Basil Gould for the Installation of the Dalai Lama in 1940, the Mission still exists. The staff has always included a wireless officer and a sub-assistant surgeon. Financial problems in connection with the Mission were set at rest by the sanctioning in 1940 of a contract budget grant for which the funds were originally found from savings effected by changing the mail service between Gangtok and Phari from runners to mules.

Lhasa is the only place in Tibet where it is possible to get reasonably prompt and accurate information, and it is the only place where the slow tempo of Tibetan business can be accelerated a little. When information was needed, or action had to be taken, about any event of importance in Tibet it had formerly been necessary to send Norbhu or Laden La to Lhasa; and, if it was desired that the Political Officer should go there, slow preliminaries had to be gone through. In the intervals between visits, we had to rely on such news and rumour as filtered through to Gyantse or Gangtok, and we might miss information about important developments. Now, with an officer always at Lhasa, we are in constant touch with Tibetan affairs; the Political Officer in Sikkim can arrange to visit Lhasa without any delay; and, although the conduct of business may at times appear to drag, it is certainly quicker and more effective than anything that could be done by correspondence.

By the time Sir Basil Gould left Lhasa in February 1937 the Tibetan Government had been reassured and encouraged by news of our diplomatic support, by the provision of arms and ammunition, by help offered in other directions, and by the general air of friendliness and calm with which the Mission had conducted its work. Cordial and friendly relations had been established between the members of the Mission and a very wide circle of Tibetan officials. The length of the stay, the size of the party, and the absence of the restraining influence of a Dalai Lama, had enabled an unusually large number of contacts to be made and a wide insight into Tibetan life and ideas to be gained.

With the passage of time, the Mission has become in Tibetan eyes a familiar, accepted, and almost necessary institution. At no time has there been any suggestion that its continued presence is unwelcome even to the conservative monks.

The following sections deal with questions arising both during Gould's stay, and after.

83. The Tashi Lama. Last Stages. 1936–1937

In September 1936 the Kashag made it clear that although they did not want our mediation at the moment, they hoped that we should still be prepared to give it if their attempts to reach a direct settlement with the Tashi Lama were to fail. They repeated this statement in October. It was learnt that in July 1936 letters had been sent to the Tashi Lama protesting against the discovery of war-like stores in his baggage, and refusing to admit "even one Chinese official or soldier" into Tibet. The Tibetan Government had offered to send a Tibetan escort to meet the Tashi Lama at the frontier, and the great monasteries had offered to guarantee his safety and that of his followers. They continued to communicate with the Tashi Lama, but received no replies, and although they reiterated to Gould their intention to oppose the escort by force, they were clearly apprehensive that such action might bring them into conflict with much larger bodies of the Chinese army. It was considered whether we should advise them not to
oppose the escort by force, but the decision was against such advice, it would certainly have become known and would have played into the hands of the Chinese.

The Tashi Lama’s representative in China continued his discussions with the British Embassy and his representative in Lhasa, Ngagchen Rimpochhe, was in touch with Sir Basil Gould and was well aware of our efforts on behalf of the Tashi Lama. It was apparent that the two parties in the Tashi Lama’s suite were not on good terms. Ngagchen Rimpochhe considered that the Tashi Lama was little less than a prisoner in Chinese hands, and that his other officials were all in Chinese pay. When Ngagchen left Lhasa early in 1937, to report on developments at Lhasa, he was dismissed by the Tashi Lama for having done so without orders.

Our Ambassador in China sought to deliver the Tibetan Government’s letter of protest to the Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs but the latter refused to accept it, saying it should go through the Committee for Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs. He continued to deny knowledge of any protest from the Tibetan Government or of any indication that the Tashi Lama himself did not want a Chinese escort. The letter was eventually handed to an official of the Committee for Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs, in November 1936.

This was followed in December by a note from His Majesty’s Ambassador expressing His Majesty’s Government’s concern lest Chinese policy in the matter might endanger the quiet of the Indo-Tibetan border. The Chinese reply emphasised their intention to avoid any danger to the peace, but maintained that the despatch of an escort was a ‘suitable administrative step’, for the dignity and the protection of the Tashi Lama.

The Tashi Lama arrived at Jyekundo in the autumn of 1936 and remained there while preparations for his return went on. The Tibetan Government’s attitude to the question of the escort under-went a number of changes in 1937. At first they reiterated their intention to resist and asked for further representations to the Chinese Government. At the request of the Government of India they sent another letter to that effect, which was to be used as the basis for further action by His Majesty’s Ambassador in China, and was forwarded to the Chinese Government in May 1937 with an accompanying note from the Ambassador. A further protest was made in July 1937 when it was known that the Chinese were making preparations for the escort to enter Tibet. In the meantime meetings were going on in Kham between the Tibetan Commissioner there and representatives of the Tashi Lama, at which the latter proposed that the Tashi Lama and his escort should proceed direct to Shigatse from where the escort should return via India. The Tibetan Government replied that they would only accept such a proposal if the agreement were witnessed by the British Government. This attitude was repeated in July at a meeting of the National Assembly but no approach on the subject of a guarantee was made to us until August when the Kashag asked that the situation should be reported to the Government of India for their consideration. They did not make any specific suggestion or request, and it was decided that, in view of the improbability of the Tashi Lama being allowed by his Chinese advisers to accept British witnesses of his guarantee, the Tibetan Government should be informed that His Majesty’s Government could not do more than continue their diplomatic efforts. In September, Tibetan fears were roused by reports that the Tashi Lama had left Jyekundo for Tibet. The National Assembly decided to mobilise troops to oppose the escort; and shortly afterwards the Kashag asked the Government of India to approach the Tashi Lama with the request that he should not bring Chinese soldiers with him. About the same time rumours began to reach Lhasa that the Chinese Government had advised the Tashi Lama not to return to Tibet for the present; and, before a decision could be reached on the request that we should approach the Tashi Lama, the Tibetan Government offered to allow him to bring his escort on the guarantee, which would be witnessed by the great monasteries; that it should be sent back from Shigatse within five months of its arrival. It will be remembered that war between China and Japan had broken out in June 1937, and, although this does not appear at first to have affected the Chinese Government’s intentions with regard to Tibet, the signs of weakening which reached Lhasa in September may have seemed to the Tibetan Government an opportunity for securing the return of the Tashi Lama even with a Chinese escort which they hoped to be able to deal with, if it refused to leave, at a time when China was too much pre-occupied for a major adventure in Tibet. But the Tashi Lama was not a free agent. In answer to the Tibetan Government’s offer he telegraphed that he was not returning to Tibet that year; and shortly afterwards the Chinese Government
informed our Ambassador in reply to his representations (which had been renewed in September along with a statement that we regarded Tibet as autonomous although under the suzerainty of China) that the escort would not enter Tibet that year and decisions about it would be taken later.

On receiving the Tashi Lama’s reply the National Assembly held a meeting which lasted four days. Two parties held opposing views. The monasteries, who had been asked to witness the Tashi Lama’s guarantee, argued that he should be encouraged to return even with the escort; the other party remained resolutely opposed to a Chinese escort on any terms. The Assembly was unable to come to a decision, although the matter seems already to have been decided for them by the Chinese Government, and they referred the question to the Kashag, who sent a telegram to their representative with the Tashi Lama, enquiring why the Lama was returning to Chinese territory. All these tangled and complicated questions were finally resolved by the death of the Tashi Lama at Jyekundo on 1st December 1937.

It seems fair to say that the encouragement provided by the presence of a British Mission at Lhasa, and our constant diplomatic pressure at Nanking aided by the internal difficulties of China, which included Japanese encroachments and the Sian revolt against Chiang Kai-Shek, succeeded in staving off the considerable increase of Chinese influence in Tibet that would have followed the return of the Tashi Lama. The disunity in the Tibetan Government on the subject of his return did not seem to indicate any serious growth in the pro-Chinese faction, but it is very probable that the Chinese would have been able to turn the re-establishment of the Tashi Lama in Tibet to their own advantage.

84. The Question of Direct Negotiations

Sir Basil Gould discovered during his visit that the Tibetan Government were almost completely ignorant of their treaty obligations to us. In particular they do not appear to have understood Mr. Williamson’s communication about His Majesty’s Government’s desire to be represented at any discussion of a general settlement between China and Tibet. As the possibility of direct negotiations was still in the thoughts of the Tibetan Government and there was talk of sending a delegate to China for that purpose, the attitude to be adopted by His Majesty’s Government in such an eventuality had to be considered. It was decided that Article V of the 1914 Convention barred the Tibetan Government from direct negotiations with China but that, although it would be unwise to encourage them to enter direct negotiations, we should not enforce our strict rights if they decided to do so spontaneously. If we did waive our right in this matter it would be on the conditions that the Tibetan Government should instruct any representative they might send to Nanking to keep in touch with the British Embassy there; and that they should keep the Political Officer in Sikkim informed of the progress of negotiations. In fact no move in that direction was made by either the Tibetan or Chinese Government.

It may be noted that the Regent of Tibet sent a personal representative to China early in 1936. The Regent was inexperienced and self-seeking, and was believed to have pro-Chinese leanings, of which there was some evidence in his acceptance of a seal of office from the Chinese Government without the knowledge of the Kashag; but this emissary does not appear to have had any instructions to open the question of negotiations.

85. Chinese Influence at Lhasa. 1936

Mr. Tsiang, who had been left at Lhasa, by Huang Nu-sung, was found to have more influence than had estimated at the time of Mr. Williamson’s mission. He was, in fact, acting as a representative of the Chinese Government and had access to the Kashag. His control of a wireless set, both for receiving and disseminating news and for sending messages for the Tibetan Government gave him an advantageous position. When he found that Gould was bringing a wireless set he visited the Kashag and made an angry and tearful protest, which met the obvious answer that if he had a set why should not the British have one too. Later he put forward a proposal that he and a Shape should go to Eastern Tibet in order to assist in the settlement with the Tashi Lama. It seems to have been intended that he would be relieved by an officer who was accompanying the Tashi Lama but, as this fell through Tsiang left Lhasa at the end of 1937 without awaiting the arrival of a relief. The Chinese wireless operator carried on in his place.
86. Wireless. 1936

The introduction of a British wireless set into Lhasa broke the Chinese monopoly. Although the Tibetan Government found the Chinese wireless useful, they realised the influence which its possession gave to the Chinese at Lhasa. It was understood that they had made several attempts to have the set withdrawn and there was a suggestion that they would make another attempt by asking us to remove our set or to present it to them, in order to have a lever by which to move the Chinese to take similar action. We offered to present our set, but the difficulties of its operation by the Tibetans were too great, and the Chinese showed no signs of willingness to remove theirs, so the situation remained unchanged.

87. Military Questions. 1936

Brigadier Neame’s advice was readily sought by the Tibetan Government and he was given every opportunity of studying the Tibetan military system. His estimate of the efficiency of their army was not encouraging, and he criticised previous efforts to help in training and equipment as having been not wholly suited to the material which Tibet had to offer or the conditions in which it would be used. He made detailed recommendations for training and re-organisation and also examined the Tibetan Government’s request for a further supply of arms and ammunition.

To carry out Neame’s recommendations would have involved a radical change in the Tibetan attitude to military affairs, and also an increase in the willingness of the Government of India to intervene in Tibetan domestic issues. Even the powerful Dalai Lama had been unable to effect much improvement in Tibetan ideas on military re-organisation, and it was not to be expected that the existing government would embark on such an adventure. Nor were the Government of India prepared to undertake more than the training of a small number of Tibetan officers and non-commissioned officers in India, and a further supply of arms and ammunition. The Tibetan Government were very grateful for the latter but, while appreciating the offer of training, regretted that their preoccupations in East Tibet made it necessary to postpone its acceptance.

88. Visitors to Tibet. 1935–1939

Sir Charles Bell’s policy of opening the trade route to visitors had led to an increasing flow of holiday-makers travelling as far as Gyantse. Sir Basil Gould’s visit to Lhasa with a large British staff, and the routine changes and visits which followed, did much to habituate the Tibetans still further to foreign visitors. In spite of the irritation caused by the unauthorised entry into East Tibet of Mr. Kingdom Ward and Messrs. Kaulback and Hanbury Tracy in 1935 and 1936, permission was secured for another Everest Expedition in 1938 and for a visit to Eastern Tibet by Messrs. Ludlow and Sherriff whose discretion and suitability was known to the Tibetans. Visits to Lhasa by Mr. and Mrs. Cutting, Mr. Bernard (Americans), and Captains Jack and Shepherd (British) and to Tashi Lhunpo by Professor Tucci (Italian) were also allowed in 1937–38. A German expedition under Dr. Schafer received permission to travel extensively in Tibet and to visit Lhasa and Shigatse in 1938 and 1939. The behaviour of this party was not very well adapted to the circumstances of Tibet, but it did at least give the Tibetans an insight into the differences in the various races of Europe, and pointed the contrast between their conduct and that of British visitors to the great advantage of our prestige. Nevertheless, in granting permission for such visits the Tibetan Government always sought to make it clear that they were rather reluctantly granting a favour; and in 1939 they asked that the Government of India should do all that it could to prevent such applications from reaching Tibet.

89. Medical Work. 1936–1942

The political value of medical work in Tibet has always been apparent during the visits of British Missions to Lhasa. Treatment is much in demand and provides great opportunities for social contact. Formerly such work could be carried on only in a fleeting and intermittent manner, but the continuance of Gould’s mission has established British medical activities at
Lhasa on a more permanent footing. Ever since 1936 there has been a Sub-Assistant Surgeon with the Mission, and the Civil Surgeon, Gyantse, has paid frequent visits. The Tibetan Government have come to appreciate this work more and more, with the result that in 1940 they voluntarily constructed a new hospital at the British Mission, and in 1942 added further ward accommodation, thus removing the difficulties which our doctors had previously endured on account of inadequate and unsuitable hospital buildings.

90. Other Forms of Assistance

Progress was made in drawing the China–Tibet trade from the over-land route to the sea route and India by granting free transit to goods for the Tibetan Government and high officials. This concession was made for a trial consignment of brick tea from China, and for silks and other goods for Tibetan officials. Arrangements were also made for the import to Tibet by officials, of silver at concession rates. The effect on Tibetan Government finances was not very great, although the profits of some consignments were used for official expenses, such as those of the New Year Ceremonies, and the expenses incurred for the return of the Dalai Lama; but the gains in friendship and feelings of obligation on the part of the recipients were considerable.

Chapter XI — The North-East Tribal Frontier

91. Tawang, 1935–1944

It came to light, by chance, in 1935 that one of the advantages which we secured in 1914 had been overlooked. The inclusion of Tawang within the Indian frontier had been obtained by the boundary agreement with Tibet; but the outbreak of war prevented any action being taken on Sir Henry McMahon's advice for the administration of that area, and Lonchen Shatra's recommendation that it should be taken over without delay; and it does not appear that any instructions on the subject were sent to the Assam Government. At all events, it was discovered in 1936 that the latter were not aware of the position of the Indo-Tibetan boundary, and that the administration of the Tawang area was actually being carried on by Tibetan officials who extended their activities as far as Kalaktang, nearly fifty miles to the south of Tawang. It was decided that Sir Basil Gould should try to secure from the Tibetan Government a reaffirmation of the McMahon Line. An opportunity was provided when the Kashag raised the question of the Tehri boundary, (which was eventually shelved), but Sir Basil found them far from willing to acknowledge that Tawang was in British territory. Our position was verbally reaffirmed, and it was decided to take active measures to make our control of the Tawang area a reality. Financial considerations prevented a large-scale effort being made, but in 1938 an exploratory visit was paid to Tawang by the Political Officer, Balipara, and even that cost over Rs. 33,000. The Tibetan Government were not informed beforehand as it was desirable that the visit should not appear to need any justification. When they came to know of the visit they asked why it had been made without informing them. Norbhu, who was at Lhasa, explained the position to the Kashag but found them suspicious. They seemed to think that our claim to Tawang was something new; and they continued to discuss the matter among themselves without coming to a decision.

Information about the Tibetan administration of the Tawang area, which was gathered at the time of the exploratory visit, appeared to the Governor of Assam to reveal serious and inhuman oppression and to make it more pressing still that British responsibilities in that area should be fulfilled. This estimate of the situation does not agree entirely with the finding of other travellers in that area. In spite of the recommendation of the Governor of Assam, financial stringency came in the way of further action, and the outbreak of war in 1939 added to the difficulties. But evidence of Tibetan administrative activity in other parts of the Assam Tribal area, far south of the McMahon Line, kept the problem from being forgotten and showed that it extended not only to Tawang but to a great stretch of country of some 30,000 square miles. When the McMahon Line was fixed in 1914 lack of exact geographical knowledge led to the choice of a frontier running for the most part along the crest of the main Himalayan range and designed to provide a mountain barrier between
Tibet and British territory; but the range is pierced by the great rivers, Subansiri, Brahmaputra and Lohit; and the McMahon Line is crossed in other places by the head waters of lesser rivers and by a number of mountain passes. The northern parts of our territory south of the McMahon Line in fact appear to be more accessible from Tibet than from Assam, for example Tawang is cut off from the south for several months in the year by the snows of the Se La, whereas the road from Tibet is always open. The area is populated by a great variety of tribes and peoples many of them of Tibetan stock — Abors, Miris, Mishmis, Akas, Dafals, Bhutias, Nonbas, Lopas, Popas and true Tibetans. It exhibits wide differences in culture and organisation of which the highest probably exists in the Tawang district where Tibetan officials have carried on their administration for centuries, and in which, when negotiations for its cession were carried out in 1914, we agreed to respect existing rights of property owners and of monasteries.

Exploration in this vast territory by officers of the Assam tribal administration has been slight and intermittent, and has been conducted rather on the lines of a military expedition than of political penetration. Only a fraction of the area has been visited. Detailed knowledge is still so scanty that it is not yet possible to realise the full extent of what we took under our protection in 1914 and forgot until 1936, or how far we are capable of exerting real authority in that area.

The underlying consideration was not so much the need to check Tibetan activities as the knowledge that behind Tibet, and ready to absorb it at the first opportunity, lay the covetous power of China which in the expansionist days before the Revolution had established posts at several places within what is now our North East frontier, including the neighbourhood of Tawang in the West and Menilkrai in the East. The problem was examined, among others, in a note by Mr. Caroe, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, which dealt with the whole of the “Mongolian Fringe” on the northern border of India. It was also discussed by the Political Officer in Sikkim in a note on Factors in Tibetan Policy, and in conference with the Governor of Assam.

By 1943 it was possible to look ahead to post-war developments, and the need for action to forestall possible Chinese designs on the borderlands of the North East Frontier again assume importance. Moreover the Tibetan Government had shown signs of an increased interest in Tawang and had sent a high official with some troops who set about collecting taxes from villages far south of Tawang. It was decided to take immediate steps to prevent a deterioration of the position, and a note was addressed to the Tibetan Government reminding them of the boundary agreed on in 1914 and informing them that there was no excuse for exercise of their authority south of that line. They were also told that they should avoid direct reference to the Government of Bhutan whose external affairs were under the control of the Government of India. This was necessary because in 1938 they had pressed the Bhutan Government for a direct settlement of the Tawang-Bhutan boundary and were now demanding the return of Tibetan subjects who had migrated from Tawang to Bhutan. In reply they acknowledged the Red Line of the McMahon map to be the frontier, and said that if certain places mentioned in our note were in British territory they would instruct their officers to refrain from interference there. They deliberately avoided mentioning Tawang which had been specifically mentioned in our note.

His Majesty’s Government agreed with the Government of India that action should be taken to confirm our authority in the North East Frontier area, but considered that the lapse of time in taking up our claim might mean that we should have to make some concessions to the Tibetan Government and not necessarily seek to assert our rights in full.

A preliminary air reconnaissance and a detailed examination of the problem as it affected the whole North East Frontier and the special area of Tawang was conducted by the Political Officer in Sikkim who also took part in discussions with the Government of Assam.

He recommended the appointment of a Resident for the McMahon Line area, with an adequate staff to enable our scanty knowledge of that country to be increased. With regard to Tawang, there would be no great danger in leaving it to the Tibetans were it not for the possibility of Chinese infiltration.

If we were to exert our authority there we would have a more effective barrier against Chinese forward movements, and would be able to fulfil our obligations to the Monbas; but
if we meant to take action there it must be thorough and effective. He suggested that the influence of the Maharaja of Bhutan might be used to our benefit in that area, and that possible road alignments should be studied. In any case the question of Tawang should wait until the main problem had been tackled.

After full consideration with the Assam Government and the General Staff, the Government of India recommended that the Tawang question should be postponed, but nothing should be said or done to compromise our claim. The frontier as a whole should be stabilised by the progressive occupation of forward posts beginning from the East — nearest to China — and moving the West. The organisation should be in the hands of the Governor of Assam aided by an Adviser, because that government had experience of the tribal peoples of the frontier. Action was to be taken quietly and without saying anything more to the Tibetan Government.

These decisions are now being put into effect and special officers are touring in the little visited Subansiri and Lohit valleys and in other parts of the Assam tribal area.

Chapter XII — The Fourteenth Dalai Lama

92. Affairs in Eastern Tibet. 1936

In the Autumn of 1936, after the Communist influx had receded, Tibetan troops crossed the Yangtse and occupied parts of Derge and other districts. This led to a protest from Chiang Kai-Shek to the Kashag, who denied that they had authorised the advance; and the Tibetan troops were withdrawn to the West of the Yangtse without any fighting. Their excursion may have been intended to strengthen their position against a possible return of the Communists but were probably an attempt to outflank the Tashi Lama’s escort and to be ready for trouble in the event of hostilities. Apart from this incident, relations between the Tibetans and Chinese were unusually placid. They were even reported as being amicable; and no attempt was made by the Tibetans to take advantage of the Chinese difficulties when the Communists captured Lanchow, or when Chiang Kai-Shek was imprisoned by Chang Hsueh-liang.

The Chinese were reported to be adopting a more conciliatory attitude in Sikang, influenced perhaps by the desire to restore the flow of trade.

The Chinese Government took such opportunities as arose of repeating its claim to sovereignty over Tibet. In applying to His Majesty’s Government through His Majesty’s Ambassador at Peking for free transit for goods of Chinese origin passing between China and Tibet via India, the Chinese Government referred to “Tibet and the other provinces of China.” His Majesty’s Ambassador was instructed to remind them of our memorandum of 1921, and to say that if an agreement on the subject of free transit was necessary it should be made directly with the Tibetan Government.

Again in 1936 our attitude towards Tibet was clarified to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs in reply to enquiries whether we were supplying arms to the Tibetans and installing a wireless set at Lhasa. Our intention to deal with Tibet as an autonomous country, under suzerainty, was restated in writing.

93. Tibetan Agitation against Marwari Traders in Tibet. 1937

In 1937 there was an agitation at Lhasa for the removal from Tibet of all Marwari traders. This had its origins in the activities of the Kalimpong firm of Sriram which had for some years kept an agent at Phari, and had recently begun to send men to buy wool at Shigatse and other places off the Trade Route.

It is probable that high Tibetan of officials who were themselves interested in the wool trade resented these incursions by Marwari firms penetrating further and further into Tibet in an effort to secure the wool before their rivals.

The Tibetan Government issued an order prohibiting Tibetan subjects to work for Sriram, and the latter was unable to obtain transport at Phari for the wool he had bought. In this action the Tibetan Government contravened Articles II and VII of the 1914 Trade Regulations. The order was eventually withdrawn after a strong protest by Norbhu who was at Lhasa. But the Tibetan Government, with considerable heat, continued to press for the removal of
Marwaris from Tibet. They were told that, as Marwaris were entitled to the advantages of the Trade Regulations to the same extent as other British subjects, no such order could be given, but that their specific allegations against Sriram would be investigated. The case was submitted to the Government of India who held that while Article I of the Trade Regulations allowed a British subject to rent a house at Phari for his accommodation and for the storage of goods it did not allow trading there. Sriram was to be severely warned not to trade beyond the Trade Marts.

The Tibetan Government and local Tibetans at Phari and Yatung kept up an agitation against Sriram and Marwaris in general, and it was eventually arranged in 1939 that Sriram should withdraw his agent from Phari without the necessity of a formal order from the Political Officer. Tibetan feelings about Marwaris seem now to have cooled down.

94. Reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. 1937–1939

The Chinese had been robbed by the death of the Tashi Lama of a valuable instrument in their policy towards Tibet. They continued to make desultory suggestions that his body might be sent back to Tibet with an escort. The Tibetan Government objected and the Chinese did not press the matter. Apart from this the Tibetan Government took little interest in the Tashi Lama’s remains, and even appear to have neglected the usual ceremonies in his memory.

Chinese interest in a dead Tashi Lama soon gave way to the more promising prospect of a live Dalai Lama. The search for the reincarnation of the latter had been going on for some time, and by the beginning of 1938 there were strong rumours that a most likely candidate had been discovered in the Amdo district of Sining (the Chinese province of Chinghai). There were some doubts about the part the Chinese might have played in this matter and some suspicion that the Regent might have been influenced to assist in the discovery of the reincarnation in Chinese territory. The Tibetan Government maintained strict secrecy and made efforts to bring the child quietly to Lhasa. But this move was frustrated by the Governor of Chinghai who detained the party and sought to extract a large sum of money, ostensibly for the expenses of an escort, before he would let the child go to Tibet. In February 1939 the Tibetan Government approached the Chinese Government through the Tibetan representative in Chung-king, and asked for their help in sending the child to Lhasa. In reply the Chinese Government advised that a Tibetan representative should he sent to settle the matter direct with the Governor of Chinghai whom they instructed not to delay the child’s journey to Tibet. It seems that the Chinese Government had little say in the disposal of the child, and that the Governor of China was playing for his own hand. The Chinese Government were also greatly preoccupied by the war with Japan; but they were clearly being informed of what was going on, and in April 1939 the Chinese Embassy in London asked His Majesty’s Government for facilities for Mr. Wu Chung Hsin, President of the Committee for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to travel to Lhasa through India for the ceremony of electing the new Dalai Lama. The Tibetan Government, who were consulted, did not think Mr. Wu’s presence was necessary and facilities were refused. (It will be remembered that one of Muang Mu-sung’s demands in 1934 was that the Chinese Government should be informed of the discovery of the Dalai Lama and that the National Assembly would only agree to informing them after the installation had taken place, in order to avoid Chinese interference in Tibetan internal affairs.)

The Tibetan Government also made another direct approach to the Chinese Government asking for the journey of the candidate from Amdo to be expedited, and saying that they would consider on his arrival at Lhasa whether the presence of a Chinese representative was necessary. Thereupon the Chinese Government demanded that the Tibetan Government should decide at once which of the existing candidates was the true Dalai Lama; and if the choice fell on the Amdo candidate they would cause the question of payment for his release to be dropped, and would send him with an escort.

The Tibetan Government refused this demand and sent a party of high officials to Sining for further negotiations. This party eventually paid the Governor of Chinghai 400,000 Chinese dollars for the release of the child. The money was well spent, for it seems that they avoided having to accept more than a small escort of Chinese soldiers, and that the Chung-king Government had little or no hand in the matter.
The party left for Tibet in July 1939 with only 20 Chinese soldiers for a bodyguard, and a few minor Chinese officials. Towards the end of August the facts became known to the Tibetan Government and, when the child was safely inside Tibetan territory, a meeting was held at the Potala and he was declared the true incarnation. A Shape went to meet him at Nagchuda and after acknowledging him as Dalai Lama, escorted him to Lhasa, which was reached on the 8th October 1939.

It was learnt much later that the high officials of the Tibetan Government had decided long before, that the child was the true incarnation, but had concealed this and had ostensibly treated him as only one of several candidates, in order to avoid having a Chinese escort sent with him. In fact they were helped by the preoccupation of the Chinese Government and the independent action of the Chinghai Governor who was more interested in money than in long-term politics, and there is no doubt that the Tibetan Government got the best of the bargain. The Chinese, making the best of a bad job, announced in the press, as soon as the child left Sining, that he had been declared Dalai Lama with the approval of the Chinese and Tibetan authorities.

The Government of India had a small share in helping to bring about the return of the Dalai Lama by allowing the Tibetan Government to sell on advantageous terms some silver which had been sent from Tibet to India where it had been confiscated on the suspicion that it had originally been imported into Tibet without payment of duty.

95(A). The Installation of the 14th Dalai Lama. 1940

Having had their way over the declaration of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government allowed the Chinese Government to send Mr. Wu Chung-hsin to Lhasa for the Installation Ceremony. Sir Basil Gould also visited Lhasa on this occasion with ceremonial presents from the Government of India. The Chinese press made tendentious claims about the part played by Mr. Wu. It was alleged that he had escorted the Dalai Lama to his throne and had announced his installation; that the Dalai Lama had returned thanks and had prostrated himself in the direction of the Imperial Abode. This report which had been prepared and issued before the event may have represented what the Chinese intended to take place, but in fact Mr. Wu was allowed only a passive part in the ceremony and did no more than present a scarf. There was also a Chinese Press report that the Dalai Lama had been "permitted to succeed", by a Chinese Government Mandate of 5th February 1940. It was also claimed that the Regent had accepted a letter of appointment from the Chinese Government. These announcements are evidence of the Chinese addiction to make-believe, and their tendency to treat events that have happened despite of them as having happened through their agency. The effectiveness of such an attitude in Tibetan affairs is that the Chinese have the ear of the world, through the press, and their falsehoods go undenied. They can later refer to press records of past events and convince themselves, and perhaps others, of a wholly fallacious view of history.

(B) Results of Mr. Wu's Visit

Mr. Wu's behaviour reflected the traditional Chinese attitude towards Tibet. He looked upon the Tibetans as an inferior race, and Tibet as an integral part of China. He harped on the expense which China had incurred on Tibet in the past. He offended Tibetan susceptibilities by lack of respect for the Dalai Lama which he showed among other ways by demanding an immediate interview on his arrival at Lhasa.

In comparison with Huang Mu-sung, Wu was clumsy and tactless but his retinue was far better behaved than that of Huang. Wu does not appear to have made any serious efforts to enter into any sort of negotiations with the Tibetan Government and he confined himself to general expressions of benevolence, and of the readiness of the Chinese Government to help in the development of Tibet, and an offer to repay the sum of 400,000 dollars which the Tibetan Government had had to pay to the Governor of Chinghai. It appears that the Tibetan Government politely refused his overtures but had no objection to accepting the money as a "pious offering" from the Chinese Government.

From the Chinese point of view conditions were not favourable for any great progress at Lhasa; and the presence of the Political Officer at Lhasa acted, as always as an encouragement to the Tibetan Government. But they too proceeded, with caution, and the Regent made
it clear that uncertainty about the extent of our support in an emergency made it necessary for them to be conciliatory to the Chinese. The single point of importance gained by Wu’s mission was the establishment at Lhasa of a Chinese official of higher standing than the stop-gap who had been representing Chinese interests at Lhasa since the departure of Mr. Tsiang. This was Dr. Kung, who was one of Wu’s party, and remained at Lhasa when Wu left.

During his four years stay at Lhasa, Kung, who is now (1944) about to be relieved, has not been able to overcome his feeling of superiority to the Tibetans, and his behaviour has at times brought him into conflict with the Tibetan Government. But he has strengthened the position of the Chinese officer at Lhasa as, de facto, a permanent representative of his Government. The Tibetans, nevertheless continue to treat the Chinese officer as a special Delegate to discuss a settlement.

Chapter XIII — The Second Great War Period

96. A New Declaration to the Tibetan Government. 1940

While Mr. Wu was at Lhasa the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty’s Ambassador in China at an interview on March 6th 1940 that the object of Wu’s visit was to dispel the impression that China had designs on Tibet. They wished to undo the bad tradition which had been established by Chinese Amban under the Empire. Mr. Wu’s task was to persuade the Tibetans that, although China would at all times be ready to help Tibet if desired to do so, she promised not to interfere in the development of Tibet along her own lines.

The Government of India considered this statement an advance on anything the Chinese had said before, and that it should be accepted as a solemn declaration by a responsible Chinese Minister. His Majesty’s Government agreed that the statement should be communicated to the Tibetan Government with the assurance that, if there were any tendency on the part of the Chinese to go back on it, His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India would certainly give the Tibetan Government the support which had always been forthcoming since the time of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in maintaining their practical autonomy.

The communication was made verbally by Sir Basil Gould to the Kashag who received it with gratitude.

Latterly there has been a tendency in the British Embassy Chungking to consider that too much weight has been attached to what was actually an obiter dictum; but it may be remarked that before the communication was made to the Tibetan Government His Majesty’s Ambassador was consulted, and raised no such objection. Nevertheless it must also be noted that as a practical weapon against the Chinese the statement which was never reduced to writing is unlikely to be of any great effect.

97. General Situation in Tibet. 1939–1942

The European war in its early years affected Tibet but little. Prices of all commodities rose considerably, but the all-important wool trade went on satisfactorily on account of an increased demand by America for Tibetan wool to take the place of Australian supplies which had been cut off by British block purchase.

In contrast to the definite and generous support offered by the Dalai Lama in 1914, the present Government maintained its cautious avoidance of commitments and, although promising its prayers, confined itself at first to strictly neutral aspirations for the restoration of peace. But in 1942 they sent a less restrained message of congratulation on the British victory in North Africa.

There had been a growth of Tibetan sympathy for China since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war; and, as hostilities kept the Chinese occupied, and as evidence of Japanese methods made it clear to the Tibetans that there were potential dangers of greater menace than the Chinese, they could afford to offer prayers for China. But they did not make any conditions, and refrained from opening their doors to visitors from China. In 1938 they had evaded allowing a successor to Mr. Tsiang, the Chinese officer at Lhasa, to enter
Tibet although this result was due to independent action by their Commissioner in Kham who was not aware that the Tibetan Government had given permission for the officer to come to Tibet. They had refused Mr. Wu Chung-hsin's first application for permission to visit Lhasa for the election of the Dalai Lama. At Lhasa Dr. Kung proved himself a more vigorous officer than his predecessors. But he was unable to bring himself to treat the Tibetans with the equality and sincerity which might have brought him success, and he became involved in a number of minor disputes with the Tibetan Government in which he usually came off worst. By this time the activities of the Chinese school at Lhasa, which had been started after Huang Hsung's visit, were on quite a considerable scale.

In Eastern Tibet consolidation of Chinese influence in the new province of Sikang went on comparatively fast. It had begun with tendentious talk of the extent of Chinese influence in those parts, and with rumours of intentions to deport the Tibetan inhabitants, and paper schemes of industrialisation. The withdrawal of the Chinese Government to Chung-king had brought a closer and more effective interest on the part of the Central Government, and although the actual control of Sikang, as of Chunghai and Yunan, remained in the hands of the provincial governors who wanted only to run their provinces in their own way and for their own profit, some development of agriculture, education and lesser local industries took place.

There was also considerable activity in the building of roads, designed eventually to open up both the central and northern routes to Tibet, and in the construction of air fields near the Tibetan frontier. But nothing happened to disturb the peace of the border.

Signs of the old-ambitions of China were seen in a suggestion from the Chinese Government that some Tibetan and Bhutanese boys might be sent to China to be educated at the expense of the Central Government.

In Lhasa the Regent — Reting Rimpochhe — retired. He had become generally unpopular on account of his grasping and high-handed behaviour, and was believed to incline towards the Chinese who appear to have spent a good deal of money on him. His successor was an old and pious Lama who at once set himself to reform the corrupt and unreliable administration of his predecessor.

The Tibetan Government had some trouble with the father and mother of the Dalai Lama who were forever demanding new easements and estates and even indulged in rustic abuse of the Kashag. The lady went so far as to invade the Kashag Chamber and abuse the Kashag in its own sanctum where no woman had ever before been admitted.

98. A New Foreign Office at Lhasa. 1942

In 1942 a new "Office of Foreign Affairs" was opened at Lhasa for the discussion of all matters arising between foreign representatives and the Tibetan Government. The officer in charge of the British Mission was thus precluded from discussions with the Kashag except in matters of unusual importance. This is a step towards improving the status of the Tibetan Government for it is not usual that foreign representatives in any country should have access to the Cabinet or Executive Council.

Nor is the change likely to affect the work of the British Mission. Meetings with the Kashag used to be infrequent, cautious, solemn affairs, and were usually the occasion for a formal statement of matters that had been examined earlier at more open and unofficial informal meetings with individual Shapes. Inside information could rarely be expected at the formal meetings. It has to be collected in the course of those many social contacts that take up so much time of an officer at Lhasa. A communication from the new Foreign Office is just as much a communication from the Tibetan Government as if it came direct from the Kashag, and it has gone through the same degree of preparation. Moreover it is possible to have much more frequent access to the Foreign Office than used to be possible with the Kashag; but it is desirable that when the Political Officer visits Lhasa he should retain his right of dealing direct with the Kashag.

The Chinese officer at Lhasa refused, on orders from his Government, to have any dealings with the new office, and has found himself in a difficult and isolated position. It is not clear how he maintains contact with the Tibetan Government at present. It is probable that
he sends messages through his official guide occasionally, but that most of the Chinese correspondence with the Tibetan Government is carried on by telegrams between the Chinese Government to the Kashag, thus by-passing the Chinese officer at Lhasa.

The Nepalese officer also continues to deal with the Tibetan Government through special officer, known as Gorships and not through the Foreign Office. Thus, it is only the British Mission at Lhasa that has regular dealings with the Tibetan Foreign Office.

99. Tehri Boundary Dispute

The Tehri boundary case, which had been delayed in 1935 by a subsidiary dispute between Tehri and Bahshar, made no progress although Tibetan officials continued their incursions into the debated area. The war, and the examination of the whole Indo-Tibetan boundary situation, made the time unpropitious for reopening the matter, and all that was done was to remind the Kashag in 1940 of our interest in an eventual settlement, and to urge them to avoid action likely to cause a disturbance during the war.

100. The Kazak Migration. 1936–1942

In 1941 there came to light an unhappy, anachronistic, successor to those waves of migration that had formerly swept over central Asia. The Kirei Kazaks from north of Hami, in the north east corner of Sinkiang, found themselves unable to endure the political and religious persecution of the Sinkiang officials who had come under Soviet influence and were trying to break up the old nomadic way of life of these Muslim herdsman tribes. In 1936 a party of about 18,000 of these Kazaks left their old haunts and, pushing past all attempts to stop them, came to the borders of Kansu province. Here the majority of them settled down; but after some two years about a third of them, who claim to have been harassed by the Tungans of Kansu, decided to move on, and travelled south to the Kokonor region. The difficulty of finding a living led them to robbery and violence and they seem to have come into conflict with the Chinese soldiery, so that after about a year they could stay no longer in Kokonor. When in Kansu they had heard of India and Calcutta and, with some strange hope, they decided to make for those places by way of Lhasa.

In 1941 they reached Nagchuka with their dromedaries, horses and sheep, and soon reports of their arrival and their robberies reached Lhasa. A Tibetan force, which was sent to drive them off, seems to have advised them to go to Ladakh. They pushed on to the west and, before long, alarming stories of pillage and violence poured into Lhasa, Kashmir and Bashahr. The Tibetan Government sent troops against them, and the Government of India took measures to prevent an irruption into India.

There was a skirmish between the Tibetan troops and the Kazaks who made off towards Kashmir. On the Kashmir border near Demchok they came in contact with the State forces who fired on them, killing several men. The Kazaks laid down their arms and appear to have been allowed to proceed to Kashmir, on their way to British India. They struggled over the Zoji La into Kashmir in the winter of 1941, and one party had to endure conditions of great hardship from snow and blizzard in which they lost many men and animals. On their arrival they were rounded up along with their flocks and herds and were interned in ill-run and insanitary camps where disease carried off many more, and the exactions of the Kashmiris reduced their remaining property in cash and in kind.

It seems that they had already lost much of their loot, some to the Tibetans and much more to the Kashmir authorities in Ladakh.

The Government of India when presented with the problem of looking after these unfortunate and destitute people were justifiably annoyed. They expressed their great disappointment that the Tibetan Government had not been able to prevent the Kazaks from entering India. And the Kashmir Durbar; who were even more to blame, also came in for rebuke. But the Government of India had to take the responsibility, and eventually arranged for the transfer of the Kazaks to the North-West Frontier Province whence it is believed that most of them have since been moved to other parts of India, including Hyderabad.

The affair attracted attention in the Indian press, particularly the Muslim press, and hard things were said about the Kashmir Durbar. Claims were made by the Tibetan Government and by Tibetan and British subjects for the return of looted property taken by the
Kazaks into Kashmir. But most of this had disappeared, and most of the claims were rejected on the grounds that there was no evidence that the property had been taken out of Tibet. The Tibetan Government recovered 15 stolen rifles, and a Johari trader, Sher Singh, who saw his property being sold in the presence of Kashmir officials, appears to have been awarded compensation.

It seems that there are other parties of Kazaks at large in North Tibet. In 1942 a small party found their way down to India via Lhasa and Sikkim; and in 1944 reports were received of the arrival in west Tibet of another batch of unidentified Chinese Muslims who will probably turn out to be Kazaks. There is also the main body of the migration presumably still in Kansu where it is to be hoped they will remain.

101. Land Customs Regime

The imposition of a Land Customs Line between India and Tibet hung fire. The decision of the Government of India in 1938 to take this step had been followed by a number of cases of seizure by the Customs Officers in Calcutta of consignments of silver from Tibet on which no duty had been paid. It was, however, decided in the Courts that no action could be taken against the importers until the Land Customs regime had been made effective on the frontiers. An examination of the position with a view to establishing Customs Posts on the Tibet or Sikkim frontier was undertaken by Mr. Greenfield, Director of Inspection, Customs and Excises. He made detailed recommendations for a Line and for Prescribed Routes, but it was decided by the Government of India in 1941 that the time was not opportune for such action, and that the scheme should be held in abeyance.

At the same time Mr. Greenfield had proposed a system of transit trade to Tibet under exemption from British India Customs duty. With regard to this scheme the Government of India decided that, as war conditions had practically extinguished the traffic to which it was intended to apply, the introduction of the procedure should be postponed.

It may be noted that in 1941 the Government of India exempted from duty Chinese brick tea when imported at Calcutta from Burma. Although the effect of this was later nullified by the loss of Burma, it represented a further stage in the policy of drawing the China-Tibet trade away from the overland route.

The Tibetan Government reverted in 1941 to their proposal to levy duty on all goods imported into Tibet from India, but they met with no encouragement in view of the known difficulties, and the matter was dropped.

102. Roads to China. 1940–1942

The cutting of China's supply routes by Japanese action made it inevitable that attention should be drawn to the possibilities of new routes from India to supplement the Burma Road; and tentative discussions about road alignments through Tibet were conducted by His Majesty's Ambassador Chungking with the Chinese Government. In February 1941 His Majesty's Ambassador was informed that Chiang Kai-Shek had given orders for the construction of a new highway from South-West Szechuan through Rima (in Tibetan territory) to the Assam border. It appeared that the Chinese intention was to treat the political obstacles as nonexistent, and to deal with any opposition from the local populations in their own way. His Majesty's Ambassador recommended that in this matter we should not allow outmoded political conceptions to stand in the way of progress. The Government of India had doubts of the nature of the progress aimed at by the Chinese, and were unwilling to agree to any proposal for making roads through Tibetan territory without the consent of the Tibetan Government.

His Majesty's Government supported this view but wished to return as friendly as possible an answer to the Chinese Government. At the same time they considered that the opening up of the Sadiya–Rima route would be of considerable benefit to Indo-Tibetan trade. It was decided to sound the Tibetan Government and inform the Chinese Government that Tibetan assent was necessary before we could co-operate in their plan. It was suggested that a preliminary air survey was necessary, and that an alternative route via the Chaukan Pass and Fort Hertz in Burma should also be considered. This route would avoid Tibetan territory. When our communication was made to the Tibetan Government it was to be emphasised that we
were not going back on our undertakings to them. The Tibetan reaction to our approach was to agree to an aerial survey over the proposed route, but to request that no roads should be made through their territory.

Suspicions about Chinese intentions were increased by the intervention of the Chinese officer at Lhasa, who informed the Tibetan Government that the British and Chinese Governments had decided to make a road from China to Assam through Tibetan territory, and that a survey party had left China sometime ago for that purpose. The Chinese Government also showed that they were determined to go their own way; and it was accordingly necessary to inform both the Chinese and Tibetan Governments that we would take no responsibility for co-operating in a ground survey without the agreement of the Tibetan Government. A meeting of the Tibetan National Assembly decided that the Chinese should not be allowed to build any roads in Tibetan territory, and the survey party was turned back from the Tibetan border. A Chinese Muhammadan official from Sining who visited Lhasa about this time, also made efforts to persuade the Tibetan Government to fall in with the wishes of the Chinese, but without success. In spite of Tibetan objections Chiang Kai-Shek stuck to his determination to make the road through Rima. His Majesty's Government thought it probable that his officials had not ventured to explain the position to Chiang; and the Government of India continued to urge the possibility of the southern route. There was further evidence of Chinese persistence in their claims to control Tibet when, in connection with the establishment of an air route from China to India, they refused to discuss what was or was not Tibetan territory. Nevertheless they did in fact make arrangements to avoid flying over it.

At a time when the diametrically opposed claims of the Chinese and Tibetans appeared to be leading to trouble, the outbreak of war with Japan created a new relationship between ourselves and China, and the rush of Japanese successes created a new urgency, not without a hint of panic in it, to conciliate Chinese opinion which had been shocked and alarmed by our collapse in the Far East.

103. Trans-Tibet Transport. 1942

Our new allies considered that the Government of India were luke-warm in aiding their ambitious schemes, and the new military situation made it necessary to conciliate them, if only for reasons of maintaining morale and good-will. The first step was taken during the visit of Chiang Kai-Shek to India in February 1942 when there was a meeting attended by the Foreign Secretary, Commander-in-Chief and the outgoing and incoming Ambassador to China. As a result the Government of India were impressed by the importance of opening as many roads from India to China as possible in the earliest possible time. Chiang Kai-Shek gave up for the time being his proposal for a road through Rima but the Government of India felt that an initiative by them to open up a route through Tibet would be very well received by the Chinese. They proposed to examine at once the possibilities of pack transport through Tibet which had been suggested by Sir Basil Gould. At the same time survey work on the Chaukan pass route was to go on. The best method of approach to the Tibetan Government was examined and detailed consideration was given to the connected problems of road improvement, transport for the route, and the Tibetan wool trade on which the supply of pack animals was mainly dependent. In March 1942 Norbhu, who was at Lhasa, was instructed to approach the Kashag and seek to obtain the consent in principle to the despatch of supplies from India to China through Tibet. He did not find the atmosphere very promising and had reason to fear opposition from the monastic party. In spite of strong hints of the possible consequences of refusal Norbhu's fears were justified and the Kashag, after consulting the National Assembly, replied that they could not accede to the request, for fear that other powers might take advantage of the situation to the detriment of the peace of Tibet.

The Government of India were greatly disappointed by this decision, and the question of what steps could be taken to secure our objectives was further considered. It appeared that the Chinese, who knew about our approach to the Tibetan Government, might wish to take a hand in the matter and that it would be desirable to induce the Tibetan Government to agree before such a development took place. A fresh approach was then made to the Kashag by Mr. Ludlow who had joined Norbhu at Lhasa; but again without success.
The Government of India declined to accept this result. His Majesty's Ambassador Chung-king reported a growing impatience on the part of the Chinese who showed signs of wanting to join us in the approach to the Tibetan Government, and warned of the danger of independent action on their part unless early progress was made. The Government of India, while pointing out that they had never sought to exclude the Chinese from co-operation in this matter, agreed that it was necessary to dispel Chinese and American suspicions by joint pressure at Lhasa, even at the expense of the collapse of our valuable Tibetan policy. They made it clear that while the practical importance of the route was small (the Chinese estimate was 3,000 tons a year and its actual maximum capacity was probably about half that) — the psychological factor made action necessary. It was assumed that there was no question of a military adventure in order to gain the desired result; and either possible "sanctions" of a political and economic nature were examined. In the former category it was suggested that His Majesty's Government's guarantee of Tibetan autonomy might he withdrawn; and in the latter, in which Chinese co-operation would be necessary, it was suggested that the export of Chinese brick tea might be prevented, and a blockade imposed on Tibetan wool. It was proposed that Sir Basil Gould should go to Lhasa to concert action with the Chinese representative there. It did not appear to the Political Officer that the political approach offered much advantage, and it was decided that Ludlow should keep up pressure on the Tibetan Government, using appeals to their friendship and threats of economic sanctions. His Majesty's Government, realising that Tibetan obstinacy was dictated by fear not only that they might be involved in war but also by fear of Chinese encroachment on their independence which we were committed to support, considered that, while we were prepared in the last resort to apply pressure to the Tibetan Government, we were entitled to ask the Chinese first to do everything possible to win Tibetan co-operation by clarifying their attitude to that country. They suggested the possibility of a public declaration of the intention of the Chinese Government on the lines of the Chinese Foreign Minister's oral declaration of 1940, that they would respect Tibet's autonomy and, refrain from interference in its internal administration. Chinese willingness to give such an assurance would be a text of the importance they attached to the opening of the proposed route. Overtures on these lines produced no immediate reply; and in the meantime Ludlow had secured the agreement of the Kashag to the passage through Tibet of non-military supplies for China.

The limitation to non-military supplies was due to a misunderstanding. It had been suggested that if the Chinese Government agreed to such a suggestion it might be easier to win Tibetan consent to the proposal. Chinese agreement had not, in fact, been asked, and it had not been the intention that a definite proposal for such limitation should yet be made at Lhasa. It seems that even to secure consent to the passage of non-military supplies independent action by the Regent of Tibet was necessary. He knew that the National Assembly would again refuse the request, but took the matter in his own hands and gave consent without consulting the Assembly.

In the event, the limitation proved to be for the best. It is improbable that the Regent would have ventured on an independent decision about military stores, and it is almost certain that the National Assembly would have refused permission. We would then have had to jeopardise our good relations with Tibet by putting sanctions into effect. In fact, it would have been possible to give a wide interpretation to the meaning of non-military stores; but events have proved that Chinese Government interest in the route slackened as soon as the possibility of using it for political penetration had vanished.

Once Tibetan agreement to the passage of stores had been obtained the Chinese Government naturally evaded any public declaration about Tibetan autonomy. It was said that it would be "rather difficult" for Chiang Kai-Shek to take any such steps and it is doubtful whether the proposal was ever submitted to him. But verbal assurances were given by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Chinese Government had decided to drop the question of new roads through Tibet, and that they had no intention of becoming involved in hostilities with the Tibetans. This latter assurance was in reply to enquiries about rumours then prevalent that there were threatening Chinese troop movements in Chinghai. It is interesting to note in connection with events in 1943 that an incursion of Chinghai troops into Tibet did actually occur in 1942; but its connection with the Tibetan decision to allow the passage of supplies, and the responsibility of the Chinese Government for the movement, are, in the
present state of information, problematical. The United States Government and the United States Ambassador at Chungking were kept in touch with developments, and the latter was informed by the Chinese Government that they were unwilling to give a declaration of their intention not to intervene in the internal affairs of Tibet. At the same time they explained that, while they considered Tibet as part of China, they had no intention of altering the present state of affairs by which Tibet enjoyed autonomy in its internal administration.

It remained to put the plan into execution. There is no doubt that our intervention was solely responsible for the advance that had been made. The Chinese promptly sought to profit by it, and informed His Majesty’s Ambassador Chungking that they had decided to station officials at various points along the route to organise the service in co-operation with the Tibetan authorities. As a sop to Tibetan opinion — and ours — these officials would be strictly instructed to confine themselves to their transport duties.

In order to make it clear to the Tibetan Government that we did not necessarily support this demand, their opinion was sought on the Chinese proposals. They refused to allow the posting of Chinese officials on the route.

Discussion followed about details of working and financing the route and the possibility of using part of the proposed British loan to China for this purpose was examined. But the longer discussion went on the clearer it became that the Chinese Government sought only to use the advantage which we had secured for them in order to come to an agreement with the Tibetans to the exclusion of the Government of India. They also sought to use the Tibetan Government’s concession as the thin end of the wedge, and insistently revived the proposal to open not only the northern route through Tibet, but also the central route, and the road through Rima.

Efforts were made to eliminate political implications and to deal with the transport question on a commercial basis, but it was assumed throughout that the Tibetan Government would expect us to participate in any arrangements for working the route, and that we could not afford to disinterest ourselves entirely in the matter. In November 1942 a situation was reached when the Government of India, whose help in any event would be essential to the despatch of supplies from India, was prepared to withdraw almost entirely into the background. Their attitude was described as follows:

“The Government of India’s purpose has throughout been to arrange for the establishment of a supply route for the benefit of their ally the Government of Free China in their resistance against Japan. Apart from this they had no direct object. They undertook certain discussions with the Tibetan Government in the course of which the latter laid down terms and conditions on which they would agree to supplies being passed through Tibet to China. The Government of India accepted the conditions on which Tibetan ascent was given and note that it has been proposed that direct negotiations should be undertaken between representatives of the Stage Transport Administration of the Chinese Ministry of Communications and the Tibetan carrying firms. The Government of India have it in mind to confine themselves to using their good offices with a view to facilitating such an agreement within the terms laid down by the Tibetan Government.”

The Tibetan Government in reply to this communication made it plain that the presence of the Government of India as guarantor of any agreements with the Chinese was absolutely essential; and they reiterated their refusal to allow Chinese experts into Tibet. Tibetan traders when approached by an official of the Chinese Ministry of Communications refused to deal with him unless authorised to do so by the Tibetan Government. A direct approach to the Tibetan Government by the Chinese Government produced a similar reply to that given to the Government of India.

In this way nearly nine months passed since the Tibetan Government gave its assent to the passage of goods for China, without any progress being made.

104. The Chinese Lose Patience. Fears of Direct Action. 1943

While discussions were going on, some private consignments of goods were finding their way to China across Tibet through the agency of Tibetan contractors, but in March 1943 the Tibetan Government issued orders that all goods for the Chinese Government should be held up until a settlement of the transport question had been reached between the three governments. The order in fact operated against all goods for China. This action seemed
unwise to the Government of India and caused resentment on the part of the Chinese Government.

In April 1943 the Tibetan Government became alarmed by reports of Chinese troop movements from Chinghai towards the Tibetan border. A meeting of the National Assembly decided to fight if Tibet were invaded, and Tibetan troops were sent to Nagchuka. On our advice a less provocative attitude was adopted with regard to goods for China, but tension increased and the Tibetan Government appealed to us for help. In China at the same time there were rumours of Tibetan preparations for aggression; these were possibly intended to provide an excuse or Chinese troop movements.

It appears from information from several sources that at one time the Chinese Government, irritated by Tibetan obstruction, had contemplated the use of force against Tibet, and that early in 1943 Chiang Kai-Shek directed the Governors of Chinghai and Sikang, possibly also the Governor of Yuan, to move troops to the Tibetan border. It is presumed that these orders were primarily intended to overawe the obstinate Tibetans but there may also have been the underlying hope that, if the border Governors obeyed the order and became embroiled with the Tibetans, there might be an opportunity for the Central Government to follow up any success won by the provincial governors, or to send troops into the border provinces ostensibly as reinforcements.

Liu Wen-hui, Governor of Sikang, whose troops were not in a good state of equipment or efficiency and whose personal interests lay in preserving peace and trade with the Tibetans, refused to comply with Chiang Kai-Shek's order. Lung Yun, Governor of Yunan, who had good troops which he did not want to waste on such an adventure, seems to have done the same. Ma Pu-feng, Governor of Chinghai, answered that he was willing to take action if he were provided with arms and ammunition. He moved troops to Jyekundo and beyond, and sent men to Chungking to fetch the promised supplies, of which he seems to have secured fourteen truck-loads. But it is doubtful whether Ma ever intended to take serious action against Tibet, for he too was interested in maintaining his independence, and he may have seized the opportunity of obtaining, in return for a gesture of obedience, military supplies which could be put to more useful purposes than war against Tibet. It was decided that His Majesty's Ambassador Chungking should ask the Chinese Government for an assurance that rumours of troop movements against Tibet were without foundation; that Sheriff, who had succeeded Ludlow at Lhasa, should obtain from the Tibetan Government a denial of aggressive intentions on their part; and that the United States Government should be informed of the situation which contained the possibility that weapons supplied by the United States of America through India for China's war effort might be used against Tibet; and that their support in deterring the Chinese from aggressive action should be sought. His Majesty's Ambassador's approach to the Chinese Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs produced the reply that there was no information about troop movements, and a doctrinaire statement on the thesis that Tibet is part of China. Later informal talks with a confidential go-between made it clear that no lesser official dared to mention the matter to Chiang Kai-Shek who was notoriously sensitive on the subject of China irredenta. We had to content ourselves at Chungking with private assurances that although the Chinese Government did not intend to resort to force they were not prepared to give any formal assurance to that effect, on account of their determination to regard Tibetan politics as Chinese internal affairs. It may not be out of place to note that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears to be maintained principally as a buffer to prevent unwelcome enquiries and unwelcome facts from reaching the notice of the Generalissimo. It is little respected, has little influence, and statements by its officials rarely have a note of authority.

The Tibetan Government gave a denial of aggressive intentions on their part. The State Department of the United States of America enquired from their Charge d'Affaires at Chungking about the facts. It appears that the latter, on it is not known what information or intuition, discounted the stories of Chinese troop concentrations as exaggerated; and that the State Department decided to keep clear of complications by replying that they had no reason to look on Tibet as other than part of the Chinese Republic. But it is possible that a word of warning was given, for when Mr. Churchill met Dr. T. V. Soong the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs (who spends most of his time in the United States of America)
at Washington in May 1943, Dr. Soong said that there neither was, nor would be, any con-
centration of Chinese troops against Tibet although he claimed that Tibet was part of China. 
By the end of 1943 tension had decreased, and although no progress had been made in the 
sphere of ideology, and although the detente may have been mainly due to unwillingness of 
the border governors to co-operate in Chiang Kai-Shek's imperialistic schemes, we had again 
made it clear to the Chinese — and the United States of America — that we had an interest in 
preserving the integrity of Tibet.

105. Some Results of Trans-Tibet Transport

Although Tibet had been threatened and persuaded into concessions, the obstinate adherence 
of the National Assembly to its idea of neutrality and independence had never been over-
come. It had to be side tracked by the Regent and Kashag.

The attention of the United States of America had been drawn to Tibetan affairs, although 
cursorily and without very satisfactory results. But at least it may be hoped that the State De-
partment has taken notice of Chinese irredentism, Tibetan aspirations for the recognition of 
the independence which they are actually enjoying, and the nature of British interest in Tibet. 
In this connection it may be noted that two American officers, Captain Tolstoy and Lieut. 
Dolan, visited Lhasa as bearers of a letter from President Roosevelt to the Dalai Lama. Per-
mission for their journey, which had been refused when application was made through the 
Chinese Government, was obtained through the Government of India. When at Lhasa, these 
officers made the suggestion to the Tibetan Government that Tibet should be represented at 
the Peace Conference. The Tibetan Government welcomed the idea and it is understood that 
Captain Tolstoy reported his discussions to the United States Government. In reply to Presi-
dent Roosevelt's letter the Tibetan Government took the opportunity of referring, in well 
chosen words, to American advocacy of the rights of small nations, and their own desire to 
remain independent. From Lhasa, Tolstoy and Dolan went to China, and on their journey they 
received some confirmation of Chinese troop movements in the Jyekundo area, which they 
are believed to have reported to their Government. In spite of the letter from President 
Roosevelt their visit seems to have been of rather a free-lance character and too much impor-
tance can not be attached to their doings and sayings. Their principal object appears to have 
been to examine the possibility of constructing a motor road from India to China, but this 
was not disclosed to the Tibetan Government.

Looking back on the question of Trans-Tibet Transport it is hard to resist the conclusion 
that its political implications were the chief attraction for the Chinese Government. If they 
had been solely interested in securing all possible supplies, the most promising approach 
would have been to ask the Government of India to arrange the carriage of goods through 
Tibet on their behalf. But this would have been an admission of British influence in Tibet, 
and the nearest they came to a direct request for help was a vague approach by the General-
issimo's Private Secretary. Their activities were in fact aimed at using us to break the ice and 
then excluding us from the business. The inevitable result was Tibetan obstruction which 
produced unfortunate results. The state of calm which had existed on the border since the 
Communist irruption was brought to an end; and we had once more to resort to protests 
against Chinese aggressive intentions at a time when our relationship as allies made it diffi-
cult and unpleasant to do so. The timely concession by the Regent of Tibet averted the necessity 
of proceeding to stern measures which might have had a damaging effect on our friendly 
relations with Tibet.

The traffic across Tibet is now of little practical value to the Chinese Government but is 
being used by Chinese business firms, under cover of Tibetan contractors, for the export to 
China of whatever goods they can secure on the Indian market. These goods, if they escape 
the rapacity of the frontier officials in China, are sold at fantastic profits; and it is not impos-
sible that, along with Chinese political interest in Trans-Tibet Transport, went the interest of 
commercial firms which hoped to find in it scope for the selfish profiteering of which they 
had been deprived by the loss of the Burma Road.

In connection with arrangements for traffic across Tibet the Chinese authorities obtained 
permission to open at Kalimpong a branch of the Bank of China, which had previously es-
tablished itself at Calcutta. There was also talk of opening branches at Lhasa and at Kanze in 
Sikang.
Work on the road from Sikang to Chinghai continues, and there seems little doubt that it is intended for political purposes. The Chinese Government have also succeeded in pushing through, by the Rima route, a rather dubious survey party, in spite of previous objections by the Tibetans.

On the Indian side considerable improvements were made on the pack road from Gangtok to the Tibet frontier at the Nathu La.

106. Re-examination of our Attitude Towards Chinese Suzerainty over Tibet.

Another result of the Chinese attitude towards Tibet and towards ourselves in Tibetan affairs was the reconsideration of our views on China's suzerainty over Tibet.

This subject will be treated more fully in an appendix.

Put as briefly as possible the position is that, at least from the middle of the 19th century until 1912, Tibet was for all practical purposes independent in spite of the presence of a Chinese Amban at Lhasa. The treaty between Tibet and Nepal in 1856 was concluded without Chinese participation; and at our invasion of Tibet in 1904 we concluded a treaty directly with the Tibetan Government. We recognised a special relationship between China and Tibet by confirming that treaty in a subsequent agreement with China in 1906.

During this period the Tibetans refused to recognise the treaties of 1890 and 1906 to which they were not parties, and denied both Chinese sovereignty and suzerainty.

The Revolution of 1911-1912 put an end to the brief attempt by the Chinese to establish complete control in Tibet in which they had taken advantage of the confusion following our invasion of Tibet and subsequent withdrawal. Chinese authority vanished from Tibet, and since then Tibet has continued to conduct external relations with the Government of India and with Nepal without any reference to China.

On our side we have since 1912 acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over Tibet on several occasions, but have made it clear that we do not recognise the right of China to interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet. Since 1921 we have openly recognised Tibet as autonomous in all respects and have dealt with her without reference to China.

The Tibetan Government were neither informed nor consulted about any of our statements on the subject of China's suzerainty, and has continued to claim full independence and to deny Chinese suzerainty. The existence of a special relationship was admitted — that of Lama and disciple — and Tibet was willing to convert this into a formal recognition of suzerainty in exchange for a formal recognition of her autonomy, and a fixed boundary.

Between 1912 and 1919 the Chinese were willing to acknowledge Tibetan autonomy in exchange for the recognition of Chinese suzerainty, but disagreement on the frontier question prevented any settlement being reached. Since 1919 the growth of nationalist ideas under Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-Shek has led to a hardening of opinion; and now the official Chinese view is that Tibet is a part of China which has temporarily broken away from control. Any attempts by us to discuss Tibetan affairs are resented on the ground that they are a Chinese domestic concern; and, although the Chinese Government have expressed the intention not to alter the existing state of affairs by which Tibet deals with its own internal affairs, they are not prepared to give any formal assurance to that effect.

Thus, the relation which we have professed to recognise between China and Tibet is not recognised by either of these countries.

Although Mr. Churchill had told Dr. Soong at the Pacific Conference at Washington in 1943 that "no one contested Chinese suzerainty over Tibet", the Chinese attitude to Tibet which had become apparent in the discussion of Trans-Tibet Transport caused His Majesty's Government to review the situation and to take up a new position. It was decided to withdraw our acceptance of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and to make it clear that we were only prepared to accord that recognition on the understanding that Tibet was regarded as autonomous. A memorandum to that effect, which was given by Mr. Eden to Dr. Soong in August 1943, also contained an offer of help in arriving at a settlement between China and Tibet on those lines.

Nothing was said to the Tibetan Government about these exchanges.
Greater attention was paid to affairs in Western Tibet, which was visited in 1942 by Capt. Saker, British Trade Agent, Gyantse and in 1943 by Rai Sahib Sonam Tobden, who was specially appointed British Trade Agent, Gartok.

Western Tibet is a long way from Lhasa and Tibetan officials there are very independent. Our interest has formerly been in the hands of British Trade Agents who have toured the country only in the summer months, and who have not been of a status to command very great attention either in Tibet or in India. In their interpretation of the complex Trade Regulations they have on the whole been apt to claim for British subjects greater rights than a close reading of the Regulations might warrant, and have been unable to put their claims into force. And so, from West Tibet has come a long series of complaints about despotic behaviour and illegal exactions on the part of the local Tibetan officials.

These have from time to time been taken up with the Tibetan Government who have regularly answered that they will instruct their officials not to introduce any new system.

There is a number of interesting reports by British Officers who have visited West Tibet. These reports, which will be summarised in a special appendix, show the persistence of conditions which probably go back to a time long before there was any British contact with Lhasa. Every year some 12,000 British subjects, including 2,400 traders, from various hill communities of the border visit West Tibet by a number of different routes. Different sections trade by long established usage at different markets in Tibet, and jealously exclude other persons from their own preserve. These markets are not Trade Marts. Only Gartok is a Trade Mart within the meaning of the Trade Regulations, and hardly any trade is carried on there.

Interpretation of the Trade Regulations in their application to the conditions of West Tibet is a complicated problem.

British subjects have a right of access only to the Trade Mart at Gartok. When disputes arise or offences are committed at the Trade Marts or on the routes to the Trade Marts they can claim the protection of the Trade Regulations in the matter of the trial of such cases.

There is specific protection of trade by routes existing before 1904; and there is no specific bar against trading at other places such as was contained in the Trade Regulations of 1908. But it is not clear what distinction is implied between trade “by routes” and trade at markets. Nor is it clear whether traders who have never gone to Gartok, and never intend to go to Gartok, can claim to be on the route to a Trade Mart, on the assumption that “all roads lead to Gartok”.

The provision in the Trade Regulations that trade shall be carried on without vexatious restrictions seems to be of general application both to places where trade is carried on of right, and where it is carried on by permission. But it is doubtful to what extent long standing taxes and miscellaneous dues levied by local officials at markets in West Tibet can be regarded as vexatious or illegal exactions.

These and other problems have been submitted to the Government of India by Sir Basil Gould, for interpretation.

Whatever may be the answer it is improbable that any rapid change in the existing system is likely to be effected by representations at Lhasa; and, if we were to attempt to force upon the Tibetan Government an interpretation of the Regulations that differed greatly from theirs, the consequences might be more damaging to trade and to good relations than the continuance of the existing practice which has not deterred British subjects from carrying on their trade in West Tibet or from excluding other British subjects from their lawful share in it.

If it is decided that the Trade Regulations confer extra-territorial rights upon all the British subjects who now visit the many markets of West Tibet it will be necessary to consider whether without a great increase of staff and administrative arrangements we would be able effectively to supersede the present system by which a large number of disputes between British and Tibetan traders are decided in the first instance by local Tibetan officials. It would also be necessary to consider to what extent it might be advisable to insist on the full assumption of a right which inevitably bears in it the seeds of resentment by the people of the country where it is exercised, and which in other parts of the world is coming to be regarded as an outmoded relic of Imperialism.
Our Position in West Tibet is Potentially Very Strong

West Tibet depends for its wheat supplies almost entirely on the India traders who on their part buy, or take in exchange, wool, salt and borax. The trade therefore seems to be more important for Tibet than for India, and it is possible that questions of extra-territoriality could be minimised, and business regularised and developed, perhaps in different hands from those that now conduct it, by an attempt to draw the centre of gravity from Tibet to India, and to make the Tibetans bring their goods to an Indian market. In this connection Gould has suggested the improvement of the road to Garbyang which lies in British territory less than 30 miles from Taklakot, the most important market in West Tibet, from which it is separated by a pass described by Cassels in 1906 as "ridiculously easy".

108. Tibetan Wool

Central and Eastern Tibet

Raw wool constitutes some 90 per cent. of the export trade from Central and Eastern Tibet to India. It is a somewhat harsh wool, with a very low percentage of grease. The wool is cleaned by hand, sorted, and baled at Kalimpong. There are no records of the amount actually brought down year by year but there are exact records of the amounts put on rail at Kalimpong. These have varied between 25,000 maunds in 1930–31 and 155,000 maunds in 1939–40. Prices fluctuate greatly and rapidly, minima and maxima in recent years having per pound, C. & F. U.S.A., 5 to 5½, pence per pound in 1934–35 and as much as 15 pence per pound on six occasions since 1926–27.

Mules which have brought wool to the market carry back necessities and trade goods to Tibet. When prices are low most of the wool is stored in Tibet until conditions improve, but if transport is cheap, considerable quantities are brought down for storage at Kalimpong.

During the war of 1914–1918 the Government of India at first imposed an embargo on the export of wool. Later they established Government buyers at Kalimpong with the sole right to buy all the wool coming out of Tibet, at a fixed price. The Government of India thought this might be held to be a breach of the Trade Regulations but it caused no protest because the control price was higher than the prices which had prevailed for the past few years. The system worked well.

Again in 1939, on the outbreak of war, an embargo was imposed, and it was proposed to allow exports only on license. It was pointed out by the Political Officer in Sikkim that most of the wool normally went to the U.S.A.; that, if a quota were to be granted to shippers irrespective of place of origin, other wool might take the place of Tibetan wool in actual shipments; that, if the quota permissible for shipment were less than the amount offering, producers and merchants in Tibet would be at the mercy of quota holders; and that if, as was suggested, only a percentage of the probable value were to be paid at the time of despatch and the balance after estimation of value at port of destination, the balance would not reach the pockets of the producers and merchants in Tibet. Wool prices at Kalimpong rose very sharply at the end of 1939 owing to heavy purchases by a Dutch buyer, apparently for the U.S.A. It was considered whether all restrictions on the export of Tibet wool should be removed, or whether His Majesty's Government should purchase the whole clip. Arguments against the latter course were the prevailing high prices which would have made the fixing of a control price difficult and the fact that Indian mills had not been using Tibetan wool for about ten years, and had hopes of getting an adequate supply of Australian wool. The Government of India also remembered their treaty obligations to Tibet. It was decided to allow unrestricted export of Tibetan wool, to neutral countries. This was later qualified by requiring that all exports of Tibet wool should go from Calcutta in order to prevent Indian wool from being exported in the guise of Tibetan wool.

From 1939 until the end of 1941 large quantities of wool were exported to the U.S.A. and high prices were obtained. The maximum quantity exported was 155,000 maunds, and the highest price was Rs. 60 per maund for raw wool on arrival at Kalimpong. The entry of Japan into the war stopped exports to the U.S.A. and imports of Australian wool into India. The stocks of Indian mills ran low and the Government of India's interest in Tibetan wool was renewed. They decided to buy up to 40,000 maunds of wool at once at a price which would include a political element for the purpose of retaining Tibetan good-will. It appeared
at that time that the whole of the Tibetan wool clip would be needed for the duration of the war.

This decision coincided with difficulties over Chinese anxiety to open roads through Tibet, and the Political Officer in Sikkim recommended that precipitate buying should be avoided so that we might retain a valuable economic weapon for removing Tibetan objections. But the need was apparently so great that about 30,000 maunds were purchased by May 1942. More was required but the purchase was delayed until the autumn; and when buying was undertaken the Indian merchants proved obstructive; and, although 80,000 maunds were needed, it was only possible to contract for half that amount, by direct purchase from the Tibetans.

These were not Government purchases, as in the last war, but were purchases by private buyers. The Government was interested in controlling the price and in providing rail transport.

By the end of 1942 it began to appear that the Indian demand for Tibetan wool might not be so great as had been anticipated. The military authorities who took most of the output of the mills did not approve of the quality of cloth in which there was a mixture of Tibetan wool, and agreed to this admixture only as a temporary expedient. It seemed probable that supplies of Australian wool would be renewed.

There were difficulties about the export of wool to the U.S.A. on account of a shipping shortage, and the prospect of a steady demand and a steady price for Tibetan wool did not look good. The Political Officer in Sikkim proposed that for political reasons the Government of India should appoint agents to buy the whole Tibetan clip for the rest of the war and so ensure stable conditions in the Tibetan market. The wool could be used as a strategic reserve.

In 1943 the anticipated slackening in the Indian demand for Tibetan wool became a fact. There was less need for items of military clothing in which this wool was used, and in addition there were complaints from the mills that the wool was hard on needles. Indian mills were not anxious to lay up a reserve of Tibetan wool which they would not want to use after the war, and which they might not be able to sell at the prices they had paid. Nor were the Government of India disposed to buy the whole clip, for fear of introducing inflationary tendencies.

A suggestion that the U.S.S.R. might need Tibetan wool was examined but came to nothing.

The Tibetan sellers delivered 45,000 maunds of wool against their 1942 contracts. It is understood that, apart from the fact that the wool was inevitably inferior to Australian cross-bred, the mills found the wool to be fully up to specification and that not a single objection was raised by them on account of uneven quality. But it appeared that rising costs of transport might make it necessary to pay higher prices for any future purchases, except for wool already stored at Kalimpong.

Towards the end of the year, news that wool was being exported to the U.S.A. from Bombay and Karachi made it appear possible that an outlet might again be found from Calcutta for Tibet wool. The Political Officer in Sikkim asked that shipping facilities should be made available; and recent requests from Tibetan sellers for hoop iron for baling make it probable that export is being resumed.

Small-scale experiments in the introduction of near-Merino blood have resulted in the production of a small quantity of wool which has been classed by the Cawnpore Woollen Mills as Super Cross-bred. In view of the fact that good wool is more readily saleable than coarse wool; and of the high cost of animal transport in Tibet, it will be worthwhile to experiment further on these lines.

Western Tibetan Wool

From Western Tibet also wool is the principal article of export. It is difficult to estimate the amount which is exported owing to the facts that it is exported by many routes, that a considerable portion of it is consumed in areas adjacent to the Tibetan Frontier, and that, being of somewhat better quality than the wool of Central Tibet, it is often bought by various woolen mills in India. Part of it is possibly exported from India as East Indian wool.
109. Exports to Tibet. 1930–1944

Wartime legislation forbids the export to Tibet without license of goods of which the export from India has been controlled. But, for a variety of reasons, including the absence of adequate machinery, the Export Regulations have not been enforced for goods destined for Tibet, and no license is in fact required for such goods.

In order to prevent the pretext of Tibetan trade from being used for the passage of unlicensed goods to China, consignments are liable to examination at Kalimpong, where the customs staff have discretion to detain anything that appears to them to be in excess of Tibet's normal requirements.

Difficulties of purchasing what Tibet normally needs for internal consumption, such as iron, steel, copper, metalware, broadcloth, sugar, etc., have reduced the possibilities of export; but in order to keep up the flow of trade, whatever can be purchased in India is being exported. High prices offered by the Chinese, both in Lhasa and in China, make it probable that even such goods as might be considered to be Tibet's normal requirements will be drawn to China.

It is arguable that such things as khaki drill in large quantities are not normal requirements of Tibet; and it is on such arguments and on information provided by "intercepts" that the Customs staff at Kalimpong is proceeding. Such messages often show that consignments for China are being booked as for Tibet. In a few such cases consignments have been detained; but the Customs have inadequate staff and machinery for any detailed preventive work, and are unable to prevent goods leaving Kalimpong at night, or in small consignments.

There is no evidence that the Tibet route to China is being used on any large scale for the export of valuable goods of foreign origin which it is particularly desirable to retain in India such as medicine, dyes, watches, etc. The bulk of the demand seems to be for cotton yarn and piecegoods.

In May 1944 the Government of India agreed, as an experimental measure, to remove customs restrictions at Kalimpong and to permit free export to Tibet of about 3,500 tons of goods a year.

110. Gunnery Training and Supply of Ammunition for Tibet. 1943

In 1943 fear of trouble with China led the Tibetan Government to ask that some of their troops might be trained in the use of 2.75 Mountain Guns of which they had bought four from the Government of India in 1937. A little later they asked for the supply of some arms and ammunition.

The Government of India agreed that gunnery training might be given at Gyantse, and a detachment of eighteen men including two officers and some N.C.O.s. was sent down in the autumn of 1943. This party was reported to have worked very well and with great keenness.

In December 1943 G.H.Q. allowed an ordinance expert to visit Tibet in order to examine the mountain guns and see whether they were fit to fire. He reached Lhasa early in 1944 and found that the guns, which had never been unpacked since their receipt in 1937, were in good order owing to the dry climate of Tibet. He overhauled the guns, and a demonstration of firing took place at which many Tibetan officials and the Chinese officers at Lhasa attended. The results were better than might have been expected, and the target was well hit.

It is an old Tibetan shortcoming that, when there is no imminent danger, they let military affairs slide and seem to derive confidence from the mere possession of weapons. There is also reluctance to make proper use of officers who have military experience, with the result that any official, picked at random, may be turned into an officer. But when the authorities allow their troops to receive training it is seen that the Tibetan soldier is keen and intelligent and can be made a good marksman.

The importance of regular maintenance has not yet been appreciated, nor is there available in Tibet the technical knowledge or equipment to maintain complicated weapons.

The Tibetan Government's request for munitions included Bren guns, Lewis guns or machine guns in addition to a supply of ammunition. The Political Officer in Sikkim provided a list of supplies already made which showed that the quantity of ammunition sold to the
Tibetan Government fell short of the maximum which the Government of India had promised in 1921. The Tibetan Government had paid for all that they had received. The Political Officer in Sikkim recommended a reasonable supply of munitions.

The Government of India informed His Majesty's Government that it would be possible to supply five million rounds of Mark VII small arms munition and some obsolete gun ammunition that would be suitable for the mountain guns. They considered that, in order to avoid the charge that material was being diverted from the war effort for possible use against China, it would be preferable to wait until after the war, when a considerable supply might be made to Tibet.

In the meantime the Tibetan Government reported that their existing supplies of ammunition were almost exhausted.

His Majesty's Government decided that no new arms could be supplied but that a reasonable quantity of ammunition should be made available. They were prepared to meet any Chinese objections by referring to the established practice of supplying Tibet with its needs for self-defence and police work. On hearing of this decision the Tibetan Government, who appear not to have great hopes of getting any supplies, were unmistakably pleased and grateful. The ammunition reached Sikkim at the end of December 1943, and is now on its way up to Tibet.

111. Wireless Equipment for the Tibetan Government

At the time of Sir Basil Gould's Mission to Lhasa in 1936 the possibility was considered of supplying the Tibetan Government with wireless equipment to enable them to establish speedy communication with their outlying officials, but nothing came of it.

When tension between Tibet and China over the question of Trans-Tibet transport increased, the question assumed a new importance, especially when it was known that in 1942 Chinese troops from Sining penetrated into Tibet almost as far as Nagchuka before the Tibetan Government received any news of their movements.

When Captain Tolstoy and Lieutenant Dolan, envoys from the President of the United States of America, were at Lhasa in 1942 they discussed with the Tibetan Government the supply of wireless sets for the establishment of stations at Lhasa, Chiamdo, Gartok, Nagchuka, Tsona and Rima, and they recommended to their government that equipment should be provided as a gift from United States of America. In sending on the correspondence about these conversations to the Government of India, Sir Basil Gould suggested that we should not leave the matter entirely to the Americans. The Government of India agreed to supply on payment, two training sets with charging machines. These reached Sikkim in January 1944.

The United States Government has made a present of 3 transmitting and 5 receiving sets to the Tibetan Government and these arrived in February 1944.

In the meantime, the Government of India had agreed that arrangements to train wireless operators might be made by the British Mission at Lhasa. Some young Tibetan officials are attending daily at the Mission for instruction in wireless telegraphy and in the maintenance of wireless sets. The Tibetan Government have shown great eagerness to get the equipment as soon as possible, but it is probable that they do not fully appreciate the difficulties there will be in setting up an efficient wireless network. The officials who are undergoing training are reported to be very keen, but they are few in number and have no technical background, and the very small number of Tibetans who know any English limits the choice of suitable people to train.

112. Education

Since the closing of the English school at Gyantse in 1926 Tibetans took little interest in English education. Tsarong Shape, always progressive and an admirer of British institutions, sent his children to school at Darjeeling, and a very few officials followed his example. No attempt was made to force on the Tibetans anything that they did not want, but one effect of the continued presence of a British mission at Lhasa was a greater interest in English.

Some officials asked members of the Mission staff to teach their children English; and in 1938 the Regent asked for a few boys to be taught enough English and Hindustani for them
to be useful to him in his trading ventures in India. A small school was set up but it was attended only by boys of the trading community.

In 1942, at the time of its difficulties with China, the Tibetan Government wanted to establish its own wireless communications with East Tibet, and asked for the supply of equipment.

The need for English in this and in other matters where they came in contact with the outside world seems to have convinced the Tibetan Government that something had to be done and in January 1944 they informed Sherriff that they intended to open an English school at Lhasa, and asked for help in finding a suitable headmaster.

This is now under consideration. The military authorities have been asked to explore the possibility of finding a suitable person in their educational service; and it is possible that a scheme of education for Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan may be co-ordinated.

The prospects for an English school at Lhasa are much brighter than were those of the school at Gyantse. Tibetan officials, who are accustomed to keeping their children with them, will not need to send their sons away from home, and they will be able to see that in addition to learning English the boys do not neglect their Tibetan studies. The school will probably be only for sons of officials, and there may still be a necessity for maintaining another school for the traders; but that is a question for the future.

113. British Propaganda in Tibet

The broad aims of British policy in Tibet are to help Tibet to remain independent, and to preserve and improve the existing good relations.

Towards the former end, we supply Tibet so far as is possible with the material help for which we are asked. Very little is done to suggest to the Tibetans things that we consider might be good for them. Experience has shown that the Tibetan public is apt to be suspicious even of those innovations which their own government may introduce. We recognise and foster unostentatiously Tibet's de facto independence by dealing directly with the Tibetan Government to whom we refer all attempts by the Chinese Government to deal with us to the exclusion of the Tibetans.

It has recently been suggested that Tibet's status might be improved in the eyes of the world by the appointment of a Tibetan representative in India. His Majesty's Government did not wholly approve of the idea which might lead to trouble if China were later to absorb Tibet. But hints were dropped at Lhasa and were well received. It would be necessary to avoid according diplomatic status to a Tibetan representative in India. There has been a suggestion that Pangdatshang, the Tibetan Trade Agent, Yatung, might be selected, but he is too much concerned in his big trading business to be a suitable choice from our point of view. As yet there have been no formal proposals from the Tibetan Government, so no details have been considered. Such developments as President Roosevelt’s letter to the Dalai Lama are steps towards the recognition by other powers of the autonomy of Tibet. There was a similar act of recognition when an American Army aeroplane crashed in Tibet toward the end of 1943. The Head of the United States Mission in India sent a message of thanks to the Tibetan Government for the help which they had given in rescuing the airmen. It was also stated that American aviators had been ordered to avoid flying over Tibetan territory.

In order to carry out the second main line of policy, and maintain friendly relations, we do not need to try to make any radical change in Tibetan opinion. The good will is there. We need to retain and expand it.

Our activities in this field which, for want of a better word, may be called propaganda are confined to the provision of straightforward news about the war, our resources, successes, and certainty of victory. This is done in conversation, by circulating summaries of the B.B.C. broadcasts, by a Tibetan newspaper published at Kalimpong with a small subsidy, and by news films.

The Chinese have recently increased their broadcasts in Tibetan in which they seek to make the Tibetans feel that they belong to China. We have not yet succeeded in arranging broadcasts in Tibetan from India in answer to this, and if we were to do so our object would be not so much to controvert Chinese claims by direct argument, as to divert attention from their programmes by providing a superior counter-attraction, and to show that the Chinese have not a monopoly of the air.
The fact that there are only a few radio receiving sets in Lhasa should not be allowed to obscure the importance of this activity. News travels fast in Lhasa, and the possessors of sets are persons likely to influence opinion.

The quality of the men we send to Tibet for political, medical, military and educational work, and the quality of whatever material and equipment we may supply to Tibet will always have an important effect on Tibetan opinion.

The special value of medical work in improving our relations with the Tibetans has been shown by experience. The Tibetans are all keen traders, and anything that we can do to improve conditions of the wool trade, on which much of their prosperity depends, is likely to have a return in good-will.

114. Chinese Propaganda in Tibet

China's aim is to establish control over Tibet. In so far as she seeks to do this by propaganda, the problem is to effect a radical change in the Tibetan attitude. The method is largely to present Chinese hopes as accomplished facts, and to keep on assuring the Tibetans that they are members of the Chinese state. Other more practical activities are the education of border Tibetans and their employment as Chinese officials; teaching Chinese Buddhists Tibetan with the view to using them as missionaries in Tibet; the use of discontented and exiled Tibetans as propaganda agents; presents to Tibetan monasteries and officials, and, possibly, attempts to buy over some officials; the establishment of a school and a wireless transmitter at Lhasa.

Much of Chinese propaganda, treating hopes as facts, is directed at the foreign press. Here the Chinese have the field to themselves and they have taken advantage of Tibetan inarticulateness to present to the world a stream of tendentious wish-projections in the guise of facts.

Their publications speak of Tibetan affairs as a Chinese domestic concern, and claim a control over events in Tibet which is quite at variance with the truth. They also seek to represent Tibet as a supporter and well-wisher of China. The old slogan of the Unity of the Five Races is now being replaced by a new theory. It is claimed that there is only one Chinese race, of which Tibetans, Mongols, Manchus and Tungans are tribes. This is obviously planned to avoid any talk of self-determination for Tibet and the rest of them, to which the old theory might seem to commit Chinese politicians who have voiced their approval of the Atlantic Charter.

So-called representatives of Tibet have been appointed to this Chinese Peoples Political Council and every opportunity is taken of publicising expressions of loyalty from Tibetans living in the Chinese provinces of Chinghai and Sikang as expressions of loyalty from all Tibet. In this matter the Tibetan Government, in addition to being inarticulate, is ill served. The Tibetan representative in Chunking appears to be very much in the pocket of the Chinese, and lately he provided the Chinese with some useful material in a message, which purported to come from the Tibetan Government, congratulating Chiang Kai-Shek on his inauguration as President of the Chinese Republic.

The message which referred to Chiang as "President of Our Republic and leader of our armed forces" seems to have been composed by the Tibetan representative without detailed reference to the Tibetan Government who had only instructed him to send a congratulatory message. In matters of this sort the Tibetan Government do not appear to be aware of the importance of world opinion, or the power of the press, and they do not appear at once to have realised the possible effects of the message.

For a long time the Chinese have had their own way in presenting a tendentious picture through their maps of China. Not only do Chinese maps show Tibet as a part of China, and the boundary between Sikang and Tibet as falling far west of the de facto frontier, but they also show the boundary of China with India in Assam as running only a short distance north of the Brahmaputra. Although we cannot share the Tibetans' excuse of ignorance we have even helped in this misrepresentation by permitting British cartographers to show similar boundaries; and a distinguished offender is the map painted on the wall of the Council Chamber of His Excellency the Viceroy. This matter which had been raised once in 1938 was again discussed in 1943 and guidance was given to British cartographers with regard to the position of the Indo-Tibetan frontier; they were also advised to show the boundaries between Chinese provinces and Tibet in a different manner from that in which inter-provincial boundaries were shown. For the boundary between Sikang and Tibet; the line of the Chinese offer of 1919, appears to have been accepted by the Government of India. This differs slightly from
the de facto position in that the Tibetans are in occupation of all territory on the west bank of the upper Yangtse from a short way north of Batang to a short way south of Jyekundo, and are also in possession of Yakkalo on the Mekong. No decision appears to have been reached as to where the boundary between Chinghai and Tibet should be shown.

115. Chinese Representative at Lhasa

The unsatisfactory relations between Dr. Kung, the Chinese representative at Lhasa, and the Tibetan Government have been mentioned in paras. 95 and 98.

The Chinese Government have recently decided to send a new official in place of Dr. Kung and have chosen Mr. Shen Tsung-lien who was a member of a Chinese Educational Mission which visited India in February 1943.

It is understood that the Chinese Government have asked the Tibetan Government to make transport arrangements for Mr. Shen who proposes to travel via India, but that the Tibetan Government have replied that they would like an assurance that the new representative will not make any trouble before they agree to receive him. They probably mean that they expect the new man to deal with the Tibetan Foreign Office, which Kung refused to do.

The Government of India agree to arrange facilities for Mr. Shen's journey from Calcutta to the Indo-Tibetan border, and informed the Tibetan Government that this was done in accordance with international practice.

Mr. Shen seems to be a quiet scholarly individual, far superior in intellect to Dr. Kung and therefore potentially more dangerous. He appears likely to be rather out of his element at Lhasa, but the Chinese abroad are different from the Chinese at home. Witness, Mr. Wu Chung-Hsin, who is a very inconspicuous figure at Chungking, but who assumed much of the state of the old Ambans when he visited Lhasa for the Installation of the Dalai Lama.

116. Reincarnation of the Tashi Lama

In accordance with Tibetan practice, search parties went out some time after the death of the Tashi Lama to look for his reincarnation. By 1942, ten candidates had been found, but none of them appeared to be satisfactory, and a further search was ordered. It seemed that the Tibetan Government was determined that the child should be discovered in Tibetan territory; but nothing definite was heard until April 1943 when it was reported from Chungking that the reincarnation had been found at Litang in Sikang. This was denied by an official of Tashi Lhunpo, from whom it was learnt that there were three promising candidates, from Litang, Amdo, and Nagchuka. The first two places are in the Chinese provinces of Sikang and Chinghai respectively. No doubt, the Governors of these provinces (Liu Wen-hui and Ma Pu-feng), who understood the possibilities of acquiring influence in Tibet through a connection with the Tashi Lama and his family, were exerting themselves to effect the desired result. The Central Government, too, took an interest in the matter. It seems that in 1940 or 1941 they had asked the Tibetan Government to inform them about the choice of the Tashi Lama's reincarnation, and it was reported in 1943 that the Chinese representative at Lhasa suggested to the Tibetan Government that they should discuss the matter with him. When this was known, the Political Officer in Sikkim proposed to the Government of India that, as the choice of a Tashi Lama seemed to be analogous to the choice of a Dalai Lama, it should be considered whether we should hint to the Tibetan Government that this should be treated as a Tibetan domestic matter and Chinese interference should be excluded in accordance with Art. II of the 1914 Convention. No decision seems to have been reached on this suggestion, and in February 1944 it was announced from Chungking that the new Tashi Lama — presumably the Litang candidate — had been acknowledged and enthroned on February 8th.

Details are lacking, but it appears that the ceremony was performed by Lobsang Gyantsen, a Member of the Chinese Central Executive Committee, who was an official of the late Tashi Lama. It may therefore be assumed that the ceremony took place in Chinese territory. The Tibetan Government have not yet given us any information about this development.

It is possible that the Chinese Government or the provincial Governor has persuaded the Tibetan Government of the claims of one of their candidates, and that the Tibetan Government may have hoped to keep the matter secret and, as they did in the case of the Dalai Lama, to get the child away from Chinese hands before making any formal acknowledgement.
On the other hand it is possible that this discovery has been arranged by the Chinese Government in collusion with the discontented members of the Tashi Lama’s staff who were formerly willing to bring this late Tashi Lama back to Tibet with a Chinese bodyguard.

If that is so, the Chinese Government may be prepared to make an attempt to force their candidate on the Tibetan Government, and even to set him up as a pretender to temporal power in Tibet. The Chinese Year Book, 1943, an officially sponsored publication, contains propaganda designed to prepare the ground for such a policy by suggesting that the Tashi Lama has a right to be considered as a possible ruler of Tibet. But, whatever is the case, the thorny problem of a Chinese escort seems likely to arise again.

On the whole, the most probable theory is that the Tibetan Government are prepared to accept the Chinese candidate, and that the Chinese have outmanoeuvred them. If that proves to be true, the Tibetan Government will try to postpone the issue, because this year (1944) is reckoned unlucky and is wholly inauspicious for such an event as the installation of a high Lama.

Chapter XIV — The Problem in Retrospect and Prospect

117. Tibetans and Chinese

Chiang Kai-Shek's recent special pleading that the Tibetans, along with the Mongols, Manchus and Tungans, are tribes of a single Chinese Race compares ill with the former Chinese theory that these were Five Races, united by some spiritual bond. Racial theories nowadays have political objects, and Chiang's new theory seems to be no exception.

It is not proposed to examine here the differences in social structure, customs, or language between the Chinese and Tibetans, or the extent to which Chinese culture has influenced Tibetan life, but only to bring together some examples of differences and resemblances in Chinese and Tibetan behaviour which appear from reading the history of the years under review, and from a short acquaintance with Tibet and a shorter with China.

The Tibetans are fundamentally religious. Their country and their faith are inextricably mingled in their thoughts. They may be dominated by a mediaeval and superstitious hierarchic system, but that has kept them united. The Chinese have never fought for religion and have never been united by religion. They have accepted it in many forms with a philosophic tolerance, and now, for the most part, appear to disregard it.

But the Chinese tolerance of religious ideas has not extended to tolerance of foreigners. The xenophobia of the Chinese Empire was inherited by Sun Yat-sen and has its manifestations to-day.

The Chinese never seem quite able to get over their "5,000 years of culture" on which they harp persistently and which seems to have brought them to view the ways of foreigners as inferior without exception. Tibetan exclusion of strangers is probably due to fears for their religion. They have a comfortable feeling of superiority in that respect, but in other matters although they are, by Western standards, grossly ignorant, and although they have a consecutive love of their own ways, they are open-minded and prepared to see the good in other people's customs and ideas. In their dealings with strangers the Tibetans can be as deliberate, obstinate, secretive and irrelevant as any Chinese; but they have a great regard for the truth. They prefer to procrastinate or to keep quiet rather than to tell a lie. Chinese standards appear to be more flexible. They have no objection to a useful lie, and their flights of imagination make it difficult to define the border between wish and fact. This tendency is wholly absent from the Tibetan mind.

The Tibetan mind does not seem quite able to compare in quickness, ingenuity and versatility with the Chinese mind. But Tibetans can be sound and thorough thinkers as was proved by Lonchen Shatra's advocacy of the Tibetan case at Simla in 1913-1914. In practical matters they are quick to learn and competent in execution. The Chinese appear to treat the granting of one favour
as only a step towards asking another. The Tibetans are perhaps inclined to adopt the same attitude in personal matters; but they have a national memory of things for which they are grateful — and of things they cannot forgive. The behaviour of the British Expedition to Lhasa in 1904 is still remembered with approval, and the treatment of the Dalai Lama during his exile in India established a strong bond of sentiment and friendship between Britain and Tibet. On the other hand the memory of Chao Erh-feng's destruction of monasteries in East Tibet, and of the Chinese soldiers who made boot soles out of sacred books, has not yet died. These feelings have their source in the fountainhead of religion which fills the bulk of Tibetan thought.

The Tibetans remain mediaeval, feudal and backward. Their hesitation to bring themselves up to date, and to make any serious attempt to put their limited resources to the best use, or to organise themselves in a way which might enable them to meet modern dangers on a more equal footing, and their delays and deliberation, may all be irritating in a rapidly moving world.

The Chinese are now in the process of modernising themselves, and they make a glib use of the vocabulary of western liberal ideas; but in their dealings with the Tibetans their attitude does not appear to have changed. Under the Empire, the Tibetans were described and treated as barbarians, and even to-day that attitude of superiority persists. Mr. Wu left no doubts about his view of Tibetan inferiority, and it is known that a similar attitude prevails in Chinese schools where Tibetans are admitted. This attitude is a great obstacle to good relations between Tibetans and Chinese, and it appears that if the Chinese could bring themselves to treat the Tibetans with more equality and friendship they would be able to make some progress in winning over the Tibetans by peaceful methods. But their superiority and their imperial longings seem to go hand in hand, and they cannot give up one without giving up the other.

This brief comparison is based on a very slight acquaintance with the Chinese to whom it is probably unfair. It is intended rather to show some of the mental factors that underlie our dealings with the Tibetans, and to bring out that they are, on the whole, quite reasonable neighbours. What follows is an attempt to see the situation more from the Chinese point of view.

The Chinese more, perhaps, than any other people have a mystic reverence for the past which leads them to cling with tenacity to their historic claims over any territory that has at any time formed part of their dominions and, with the fervour of faith, to believe that any people that have once been united to them must in fact still desire that unity, whatever the appearances may be. The proved power of China to absorb its conquerors has strengthened that belief.

In the relations of China with Tibet there is plenty of food for such mysticism. Claims based on the conquests of Genghiz Khan appear ill-founded; and the link between China and Tibet began with the establishment of priest-kings in Tibet by Khublai Khan, the Mongol conqueror of China. The connection of Tibet with China during the Mongol Yuen Dynasty was close and, after the Ming Dynasty had driven out the Yuen, a formal relationship continued, although the power of the evicted Mongols prevented the Chinese Emperors from taking an active part in Tibetan affairs. Still, it was advisable for the rulers of Tibet to placate the Chinese Emperor with gifts and courtesies which might easily be interpreted as tribute.

The internal dissensions of Tibet in the Eighteenth Century laid the country open to invasion by Dzungarian Tatars; and it was in the guise of protectors of religion that a Chinese army gained a footing in Lhasa. It is a Chinese claim that the Tibetans asked for the appointment of Ambans at Lhasa, and one of the factions at Lhasa did very probably ask for this support against its rivals. To convert such a position into the establishment of a Province was an easy step for a power which was provided with a large army. Moreover there was assistance in the religious theory by which the Manchu Emperor, with all the divine trappings of the Son of Heaven, figured as protector and, in Tibetan eyes, as disciple of the God-King of Tibet.

In the early days of the Manchu Empire Chinese protection of Tibet was a reality. Chinese armies routed the upstart Gorkha conquerors of Nepal when they sought to dominate Tibet in 1792. And in 1841–1842 Chinese armies again saved Tibet by driving out the invading force sent by Maharaja Gulab Singh of Kashmir under his general, Zorawar Shah.
Manchu rule in Tibet was light, and although it was never popular with the caste which had been accustomed to govern Tibet, there were suggestions, at the time of the Revolution, that the common people of Tibet would miss the protection from oppression which the aristocracy which the Ambans had provided.

So long as appearances were preserved and the tribute came in, it mattered little to Peking what happened in so distant a province as Tibet. But when British intrusion made it public that Chinese influence at Lhasa had become a fiction, and showed that the former conditions could not be continued, it became necessary for the Chinese Emperor to take forceful steps to preserve the unity of the Empire. Chao Erh-feng's vigorous campaigns came very near to transforming Chinese authority in Tibet from a hazy immanence into an undoubted domination; but they also sowed a bitterness which is not yet purged from Tibetan relations with China.

The Revolution and its consequences in Tibet appear in Chinese eyes as a small and transitory incident. The Chinese claim over Tibet was never allowed to lapse, although internal troubles prevented it from being enforced and dictated a somewhat conciliatory attitude. The Chinese case in 1913–1914 rested largely on the recent conquests which provided an excuse for demanding to recover all that Chao had seized although most of that had been recaptured by the Tibetans. But there was also a harking back to the imperial connection of the past to which the new Republic sought to become the heir. The reality of their historic rights was enhanced in Chinese eyes by the willingness of Tibet for a settlement which acknowledged China's suzerainty, even if the Tibetan terms were high, and by His Majesty's Government's readiness to recognize that suzerainty.

In 1928 the emergence of a Nationalistic China, which had converted the old mysticism from religious to political channels, led to strong feelings about national unity and a forgetfulness about the immediate past. The suzerainty over Tibet, which the world appeared to recognize, began to be interpreted as the right to forget the weakness of a few years which had made it expedient to be willing to admit Tibetan autonomy. The heritage of Sun Yat-sen also includes the acceptance of democratic ideas or, at least, of democratic ideas as transmuted by the processes of the Chinese mind. There is a recognition, somewhat unwilling and imperfect, that the ways of the Empire, which treated Tibetans and the like as barbarians who should be grateful for good government, are neither modern nor profitable, and efforts are being made to improve relations.

The certainty that what has been China is still China has made it necessary to revise the theory of Sun Yat-sen about the unity of the Five Races which constitute China. That theory made it appear that the cohesion was due to a voluntary act; and on that basis any one of the Five Races might seek to take advantage of the Atlantic Charter and claim the right to govern itself in its own way. The mysticism of Chiang Kai-Shek now substitutes the doctrine that there is only one race which consists of the Chinese, Mongols, Manchus and Muslims, and that any temporary aberration on the part of any one of those members of the family, or any imagining that it is not Chinese, is a delusion which the superior knowledge of the Chinese Government should justly discipline.

An inseparable element in the Chinese character is unquestioning certainty of the superiority of the Chinese over all other people, and that the outer races ought to be glad to pay reverential tribute to China. A classic example is the Mandate of the Emperor Chien Lung to the Mission of Lord Macartney, who was sent to China in 1793 by George III. The Emperor spoke graciously of the respectful and humble spirit in which this tribute-bearing mission had been despatched, but was calmly uninterested in the affairs and manufactures of the West. The isolation of early foreign commercial settlements is another example of the same feeling which had nothing of deliberate arrogance in it but only a sublime satisfaction.

Another deeply seated tendency of the Chinese mind is to believe, without regarding what other people would call facts, that things are as Chinese theory decrees that they ought to be. The reiteration that the Chinese are treating the Tibetans with every consideration and benevolence, and that the Tibetans really want only to be united to China means to the great majority of Chinese that those are the facts.

Mental habits of so long a duration cannot be eradicated by only a few decades of closer contact with the West.
With such a background, it must appear to the Chinese that the relations of His Majesty's Government with Tibet are an unpardonable interference in Chinese domestic affairs and an attempt to encourage the defection of part of a mystic whole, by taking advantage of a transient moment in five thousand years of history and culture.

118. Retrospect

In the pattern of the foregoing history certain persistent lines can be traced. From the interweaving of Chinese, Tibetan and Mongolian relations there had emerged, by the time British interest lighted upon Tibet, a texture of events in which Chinese and Tibetan affairs had been closely connected by the establishment of Manchu rule at Lhasa. But, after the initial act of conquest, the Chinese Empire gradually ceased to take an active interest in its distant dependency and was content, so long as no other power intruded, to allow the influence of its Ambans to fade into a mere formality. The first tenuous thread of British interest in trans-Himalaya made contact with the Tibetans through the Bhutanese. Although the impetus came from the need to protect the plains of Bengal from hostile irruptions by the hillmen, the principal object was to establish trade. This suggestion of opening the doors of Tibet was tolerated at first by the Tibetans whom Turner found in 1782 unwilling to admit dependence on the Chinese Empire. But a reaction, perhaps fostered by Chinese warnings of the possible effects of contact with the West, led in 1792 to a policy of exclusion. After nearly a century of aloofness and obscurantism on the part of Tibet, new and timid attempts to open up relations found the Tibetans truculent, and resentful of the approach of British influence to their borders. Perhaps this was because the approach was made through the Chinese. At all events our retreat was taken for weakness and was followed by Tibetan aggression and obstruction which the Chinese were powerless to check.

Trade was still the attraction, and the British reaction to the Tibetan attitude was not fear for the safety of the Indian frontiers but a gradual determination, by a show of force, to reduce the Tibetans to a state of friendliness in which trade could be carried on. Whether by accident or design this proved to be good psychology. The 1904 Expedition won respect and, very shortly, friendship from the Tibetans. But a result we had not foreseen was Chinese resentment at foreign intrusion into territory where they exercised even the shadow of control. Our invasion of Tibet disrupted its life, and our withdrawal left it a prey to the first comer. The Chinese quickly seized the opportunity of turning the shadow into the substance, and only the collapse of the Empire prevented the consolidation of Chinese authority in, and possibly the gradual exclusion of British influence from, Tibet.

The Chinese Revolution is another turning point in Tibetan history. The Chinese were swept out of Tibet; and from 1912 onwards there has been a gradual drawing together of British and Tibetan interests and a gradual increase of Chinese determination to reassert authority in Tibet.

In 1914 we laid the foundations of a new relationship with Tibet but war intervened, and it was not until 1921 that, under the wise persuasion of Sir Charles Bell, the Government of India realised the value of their new friend, and took practical steps to make the new relationship a reality. It took more than trade interests to shake the British reluctance to incur political commitments in Tibet. Trade has in fact proved of more advantage to Tibet than to India. Wool, the principal export of Tibet, is little used in India and contributed to Indian prosperity only through the incidental benefits to middlemen and the railways. India has not been able to supply the great Tibetan demand for good broadcloth, which used to come from Italy and Germany, nor have there been any strenuous efforts to find in Tibet a market for Indian tea of which there were formerly great hopes. It was the evidence of Chinese military advance, their insinuation of military posts along the north border of India, and their covetous glances at Nepal and Bhutan that made it seem desirable to keep Tibet in our orbit as a friendly buffer state strong enough to preserve her own independence. From our former anticipations of a profitable trade for India we have now come to do all that we can to support the Tibetan economy by helping Tibetan wool to find a market and, with the political object of binding Tibet more closely to India, to draw Tibetan imports from the overland route to the sea route and India.

Our need for Tibet as a friendly buffer state has suited the Tibetans. There is no question that they value their independence, and want only to live their own life. Since 1904 they have
had no fears of British designs on their country, and they have had no doubts about Chinese intentions. Their besetting uncertainty has been, and still is, the extent to which we shall be willing and able to help them in an emergency. Their greatest hope has been for a fixed boundary with China and a recognition of their right to manage their own affairs without interferences in exchange for this they would be willing to make a gesture of allegiance to China. In this hope, which was nearly realised in 1914, they have continued to press for our help in bringing about a settlement and have themselves dabbled in direct negotiations with the Chinese. From 1914 to 1919 China was willing to bargain an acknowledgement of Tibetan autonomy for a recognition by Tibet of Chinese suzerainty, but disagreement about the frontier was insurmountable. Since that time Chinese nationalist ambitions have increased and they demand a control over Tibet greater than Tibet is willing to concede, they also resent the intrusion of any third party between themselves and Tibet. These divergent views and Tibetan mistrust of China which had led them to depend on British guarantee of any agreement that might be reached with China — a conception which China cannot now tolerate — have prevented any peaceful solution.

There have been ups and downs in this history. The Tibetans had their successes in 1912 and 1918, but since then there have mostly been downs. There were moments of danger in the Chinese aggression of 1932, which the Tibetans brought on their own heads by advancing into Chinese territory; in 1937 when the Tashi Lama seemed likely to enter Tibet with a Chinese bodyguard. In these crises and at other times of Chinese pressure the Tibetans seemed to derive confidence from the presence at Lhasa of a British officer. Only once, in 1926, during the period of reaction against progressive ideas, did the Tibetan Government refuse to invite a Political Officer to Lhasa. Now, by a new advance in our policy towards Tibet, we have maintained unbroken contact with Lhasa since Sir Basil Gould’s Mission in 1936.

In the feudal conditions of Tibet the influence of personalities is paramount. The close friendship between Sir Charles Bell and Thirteenth Dalai Lama had a vital effect on our relations with Tibet. Other Tibetan names that occur to the mind are Lonchen Shatra, Lungshar and Tsarong. On our side the Tibetan dislike of change has been recognised, and Political Officers have been left for long periods to win the friendship and confidence of Tibetan officials. In the sixty years that cover our relations with Tibet there have been only eight Political Officers, and the combined tenures of Mr. Claude White, Sir Charles Bell and Sir Basil Gould account for more than half that time. Tibet’s greatest danger was perhaps in 1942 when, by a momentary change in the pattern, the Tibetans found both the Chinese and ourselves pressing upon them a demand to open their country for the transport of goods to China. Up to the present they have preserved their delicate balance. In this they have been helped principally by disunity in China. Their own efforts, apart from maintaining a stubborn resistance to Chinese overtures, have been from our point of view rather disappointing by their failure to take advantage of their opportunities, small though they are, of organising their army and finances on better lines. They would certainly not underrate the value of our diplomatic support in China, and they have reason to be grateful to a succession of His Majesty’s representatives there who although often disliking the task and doubting of its ultimate effects have, for the most part, firmly and decisively restrained the Chinese from aggression. But there are signs of growing unity, growing ambition and growing military power in China, while Tibet remains in its mediaeval backwardness, and the Tibetans are probably wondering, as we too may wonder, for how long diplomacy and a bold front will stave off the Chinese.

119. Prospect

The question of the near future is how far China will be able to fulfil her ambitions in Tibet. She is more united than for a long time, and may be harbouring a Young Pretender in the child who has recently been acclaimed in China as the reincarnation of the Tashi Lama.

Chinese disunity has saved Tibet in the past, and it is possible that the compulsion of danger, which brought a number of rival warlords to sink their differences and submit to the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek, may be losing its force. Although Chiang’s personal popularity seems unimpaired there are signs that his regime is not entirely popular.

The border provinces have not yet succumbed to the centripetal attraction of Chungking, but the Kuomintang is gradually pushing its feelers into Yunnan and Szechuan. The settling of accounts with Wang Ching-wei and his puppet troops may cause trouble. And there are
the Communists as yet unreconciled and unliquidated. Foreign reporters speak of the honesty, unity and fighting spirit of the Communists and if, after the war Russia were to supply them with arms or to put effective restraint on the Central Government by other means, they may remain a serious problem for Chiang. China will also have to devote much attention to reconstruction in the Eastern and Northern Provinces. But whatever dissensions and preoccupations there may be, it must be remembered that even in the early chaotic days of the Republic the idea of reabsorbing Tibet was never forgotten for long. Now, the establishment of the Chinese Government near the borders of Tibet has quickened interest in that country.

Roads and airfields are being built which are possibly aimed at Tibet, and the disparity in strength and equipment between Chinese and Tibetan forces is greater than ever before. A determined Chinese attack on Tibet would be successful. It is impossible to count on the chances of internal troubles distracting Chinese attention from Tibet. So long as Chiang Kai-Shek is in power the danger of early action against Tibet will remain. China’s Tibetan policy is peculiarly his, and he has now devised a new racial theory to evade the application to Tibet of those liberal ideas of self-determination proclaimed by the United Nations, and to which China has paid lip service.

China expects much material help after the war, and looks first to the United States of America and then to Britain. The press of the United States of America appears to have swallowed a good deal of Chinese propaganda, but many Americans have seen the reality in China and it is improbable that the United States Government is deceived. American terms for help to China will presumably be economic advantages in return, but if the State Department can be interested in the application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter to Tibet they might also exert pressure to prevent Chinese aggression.

Between Britain and China there remains the sore point of Hong Kong. The Chinese confidently expect that this will be returned to them, and Chiang Kai-Shek does not think that anyone will want to make trouble about this bit of land “the size of a bullet”. If Hong Kong is to be retained, that may denote the existence of a readiness to take a firm line also about our interest in Tibetan integrity.

If the possibility of tripartite negotiations arises again it may be remembered that Mr. Wellington Koo, who is now Chinese Ambassador in London, was closely associated with the period of Chinese diplomacy in 1914 and 1915 when the Chinese were ready to acknowledge Tibetan autonomy in return for the recognition of their suzerainty.

In our relations with Tibet it has always appeared that the Tibetan Government looks rather to Britain than to India for support, and it is not easy to foresee what may be the results of a new constitution in India. Indian public opinion takes little interest in what goes on north of the Himalayas and would be unlikely to approve of the possibility, hinted at in Sir Olaf Caroe’s note on the Mongolian Fringe, that it might in certain circumstances be necessary to send troops to Lhasa. If India neglects her northern neighbours, Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan might be able to find security by alliance with Nepal, but the old antipathy between Nepal and Tibet does not make it very probable that Tibet would look for help there.

The establishment in India of Dominion Status, or of whatever constitution the future may hold, is likely to take time, and in that interval it will remain a British responsibility to preserve for India a stable northern frontier. It is also a relevant consideration that by far the greater part of India’s frontier with Tibet consists of the territories of the Indian States of Kashmir, Bashahr, Tehri Garhwal and Sikkim, and the Assam Tribal areas, while the frontier of British India with Tibet covers only a small stretch in the United Provinces. From this aspect it appears that British assistance in preserving the security of the Indian Marches may be required for a considerable time.

There have been suggestions from the British Embassy in China that Tibet is bound eventually to be absorbed by China and that we should therefore seek to slide out of our political commitments in order to avoid loss of face, and should rely only on our geographical advantages to keep Tibet in the India orbit.

But Tibet does not want to be absorbed by China, and the advantage of India lies in the independence of Tibet. The surest way to hasten Chinese action would be to let it be seen that we have given up our policy of supporting Tibet. His Majesty’s Government in their latest decision on their attitude towards Chinese claims to suzerainty over Tibet have made
it appear that they are prepared to intensify rather than relax their interest in Tibetan autonomy.

It is therefore still in our interests that Tibet should be as strong as possible and, if it eventually becomes impossible to stave off Chinese aggression any longer, Tibet is likely to get better terms if she is strong. It is to be regretted that the Tibetan Government have never been willing to make any great effort to meet the dangers that confront them. Although lately they have taken more interest in developing the means of self-defence, they have neither the resources to maintain a modern army nor has Tibetan mentality changed sufficiently to allow them to make the most of the means at their disposal.

It appears that the Government of India are prepared to supply considerable quantities of arms to the Tibetan Government after the war, and the time seems to have come for an effort to persuade the Tibetan Government to accept training for a picked body of men in commando methods and guerrilla warfare. This would be a considerable reinforcement to our diplomatic pressure on China in which, it is hoped, we may seek to associate the United States of America as the proclaimed champions of self-determination for small nations.

The work of consolidating our position in the McMahon area which has just begun will demand the construction of roads that will serve both to open up the country to British influence and to more trade between Tibet and India.

The existing trade can best be encouraged and Tibet drawn more closely into the Indian orbit by improving the main trade routes from Kalimpong and Gangtok to the Chumbi valley, and roads from the United Provinces to the border of West Tibet.

What might follow the assertion of Chinese control in Tibet would depend largely on what sort of government there might be in India. The presence of Indian subjects in Tibet would warrant the retention of consular officers in Tibet. The fate of Bhutan and Nepal, the extent to which the Chinese might invade Indian business and trade, and the effects on India's economy of such development, are open to various speculation.

Appendix I

Tibet and its Government

Most of the territory surrounding Tibet is under the control of either Britain or China. The mountainous boundary of Tibet with British territory runs for some 1,300 miles from Kashmir to the Isu Razi Pass on the north of Burma, with a section of about 650 miles in the middle where Nepal and Bhutan intervene. North of Tibet lies Chinese Turkestan, and to the east, China.

Tibetan-speaking people, variously estimated to number between one and three millions inhabit an area not far short of one million square miles. There are different strains of Tibetan people and different dialects of the language, but the Tibetan stock is homogenous and distinct from its neighbours.

Not all the area which is geographically Tibet is under Tibetan rule. Political Tibet extends very roughly from the 78th to the 99th degree of east longitude, and from the 27th to the 36th degree of north latitude. Boundaries, particularly in the northern tracts, and figures are notoriously vague. Northern and Western Tibet, nearly two-thirds of the whole, consist of high mountain and plateau country at an altitude of well over 10,000 ft., inhabited by a sparse population living a primitive nomadic way of life. The remainder falls into two natural divisions. First, the tracts containing the upper valleys of the Indus, Sutlej and Brahmaputra. This area slopes gradually from west to east, and the lower parts are more populous and more cultivated. The country is dry and produces barley and wheat where irrigation is possible. The valley of the Brahmaputra and its tributaries contains the three largest towns of Tibet: Lhasa (about 50,000), Shigatse (about 20,000) and Gyantse (about 10,000). The other division is the system of mountains and rivers of East Tibet. The northern parts of this area are dry like the rest of Tibet, but in the southern parts there is a greater rainfall. There, the country is well wooded, and rice is grown. This part of Tibet is the most thickly populated.
The desert and mountain barriers which isolate Tibet from its neighbours have preserved there an unique character and way of life. Infiltrations of Chinese and Indian influence have been adapted to, and absorbed in, the tougher and more primitive nature of Tibet. For example the Mahayana Buddhism which Tibet borrowed mainly from India about the Seventh Century A.D. has assumed a form unknown outside Central Asia.

Amongst the most striking characteristics of Tibetan life are the rule of a reincarnate priest-king, the influence of religion on administration and daily life, and the preservation of an archaic feudal system.

The Dalai Lama — The Dalai Lama is the supreme civil and religions ruler of Tibet. He is regarded as the incarnation of Chenrezig (Avalokiteswara). In the matter of reincarnation the Dalai Lama, being divine, is not bound by the rules which cause ordinary beings normally to be reincarnated within forty nine days of their death: he and other Buddhisattvas can choose their time. The incarnation is sought for in accordance with indications left by the Dalai Lama before his death, or following signs and visions seen by the State Oracle or the Regent. The child is usually found in a humble family, and the risk of the establishment of a dynasty is thereby lessened. An obvious objection to an early discovery is that the Incarnation when found is taken away from the care of his family.

In the exercise of power a Dalai Lama enjoys a real divine right and unlimited prestige. It was therefore convenient for the Chinese, in their period of authority in Tibet, to see that the Dalai Lama did not attain his majority. The survival of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama was one among many signs of the decrease of Chinese power in Tibet towards the end of the Nineteenth Century.

Although, in theory, the Dalai Lama’s power is unlimited certain checks on it operate in practice. All state business comes to the Dalai Lama through a series of advisers who can conceal inconvenient facts. The National Assembly, which will be described later, represents to a large extent the opinion of the great monasteries. Its recommendations naturally weigh with a prudent ruler. The selection of the Dalai Lama from a humble family, and the exclusion of his relatives from public office acts to some extent as a check.

The Regent (Gyalshap, Po Gyalpo, Sikyong Rimpochhe) — In the absence and minority of a Dalai Lama a Regent is appointed by the National Assembly. Under the Ambans of the Chhing dynasty, the choice was traditionally restricted to the Incarnate Lamas of four small monasteries near Lhasa known as the Langs, or if none of them was suitable, to the Ganden Tri Rimpochhe who is the most learned Divine in Tibet, but is not usually an incarnation. But, in earlier and present practice, any incarnation lama or any lama of exceptional learning may be chosen. On one occasion a layman has been appointed Regent.

Regents lack the prestige of a Dalai Lama, and are likely to be influenced by the National Assembly, which appoints them and can remove them.

The Regent is often called Po Gyalpo — the King of Tibet — but the title Sikyong Rimpochhe — Precious Protector of the State — is more commonly used.

The Kashag — This is the Council or Cabinet of Tibet. It consists of four councilors, known as Shapes, of whom three are laymen and one a monk. The monk is usually treated as the senior member although in a recent Kashag a lay member was given precedence. No individual holds any special portfolio. The Kashag exercises a general control over the civil administration of Tibet in all matters — political, revenue and judicial. In foreign affairs its functions are largely advisory to the Dalai Lama, and in important issues the National Assembly is also consulted.

Shapes are appointed by the Dalai Lama and, in the absence or minority of the Dalai Lama, by the Regent. A list of suitable candidates is submitted by the Kashag, but the Dalai Lama can appoint any one he pleases, whether or not the name is on the list. There is much canvassing and bribery by officials who want to be included in the Kashag’s list.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chingye Le-khung) — A recent innovation is the institution of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs which discusses business with foreign representatives in Lhasa and then refers to the Kashag.

The National Assembly (Tsong Du) — In its widest form this is a gathering of all officials of the government both lay and monk except for the highest officers (the Shapes and the Chikyap Khenpo) who do not usually attend. In addition, the three great monasteries of
Drepung, Sera and Ganden are represented by their abbots of whom each monastery usually has three.

A full Assembly is only summoned for matters of supreme importance; for lesser business then is a Committee of the Assembly. Business is referred to the Assembly by the Kashag, to whom the report of the Assembly is made, and who then transmit it to the Dalai Lama with their own advice.

**Prime Minister (Lonchhen; Silon)** — At various times there have been one or more Lonchens or Prime Ministers acting as a step between the Kashag and the Dalai Lama. But they do not seem to be an essential part of the system, and there is none at present.

**Ecclesiastical Council (Yiktsang)** — This body of four monk officials is the ecclesiastical counterpart of the Kashag. It deals with the appointment of monk officials, and with the general administration of monasteries throughout Tibet, excluding apparently, the three great monasteries. The intermediary between the Ecclesiastical Council and the Dalai Lama is sort of Archbishop called the Chikyap Khenpo.

**Other Officials** — Lhasa is the centre of Tibetan life and the majority of Tibetan officials is to be found there. Working under the Kashag are numerous officers for every branch of the service — magistracy, judiciary, Treasury, municipal administration, etc. These are fully described in Sir Charles Bell's "Report on the Government of Tibet", written in 1906 and still the locus classicus on Tibetan administration. It is the practice for each important department to be managed by a board of officers including at least one monk.

**District Administration** — Broadly speaking, Tibet is divided administratively into five parts.

1. Central Tibet, consisting of the provinces of U, where Lhasa is situated and Tsang with its capital at Shigatse.
2. Western Tibet (Ngari Khorsum) with its headquarters at Gartok.
3. Eastern Tibet (Kham) with its headquarters at Chiamdo.
4. Northern Tibet (Chang) with its headquarters at Nagchukha.
5. Southern Tibet (Lhokha) with headquarters at Lho Dzong.

The officers in charge of these five divisions are commissioners (Chikyap). The most important is the Commissioner in Kham (Do-me Chikyap or Do-chi) to which office one of the Shapes is often appointed. This official commands the army in East Tibet, as well as being in general charge of the administration. Another important official in Kham is the Governor of Markham (Markham Theiji).

In Central Tibet the principal officers of the district administration are the Dzasa Lama of Tashilhunpo, an official appointed by the Lhasa Government to manage the affairs which had formerly been in the hands of the Tashi Lama. There are also two Governors of Shigatse, which has always been under the direct administration of Lhasa, even when there has been a Tashi Lama resident at Tashilhunpo. The Tibetan Trade Agents (Tsang chi) of Gyantse and Yatung are also senior administrative officials.

In Western Tibet the two Garpons are the senior officers.

In Northern Tibet the two Chang chis (formerly known as Hor chi) are the senior officers.

In Southern Tibet the Lho chi is Commissioner of some 24 districts.

Subordinate to these Commissioners are numerous district officers (Dzongpons). There are usually two in each district, one a monk and the other a layman, following the basic principle of Tibetan administration that every official should have a colleague to watch him.

The functions of the Dzongpons are to keep order, and to return to the Treasury a fixed amount of revenue. Whatever they can collect over that amount is their gain. The remoteness of many of these districts and the absence of speedy communications, coupled with the system of revenue farming and feudal authority, allows these officers a very free hand; and information at Lhasa about conditions in distant parts of the country is often very slight.

**The Government Service** — The provision of a certain number of members of their family for government service is a condition on which the landlords of Tibet hold their estates from the Tibetan Government. Government officials, except for Dzongpons, who are in a sense revenue contractors, receive a small fixed pay. The pay of the highest post is about Rs. 600 per
annum at present rates of exchange, and the lowest about Rs. 100 per annum. Bribees and other perquisites make up most of the income of a Tibetan government servant.

Appointments of lay and monk officials are made by the Kashag and Yiktsang respectively, subject to confirmation by the Dalai Lama, lay officials are trained in a special school and monk officials in another school. The way of advancement for an intelligent youth of humble family lies in becoming a monk and securing entrance into the official school. Monks of noble family also enter this school.

Officials of outlying districts often send deputies to do their work for them, and may never visit their charge. This is more common when an official holds more than one post, one of which may be in Lhasa and the other in some distant part of Tibet.

Landlords (Gyerpa) — The great landlords who hold their estates on a service tenure, as described above, also have to pay revenue. In their estates they have considerable administrative powers over their tenants. A landlord may be deprived of his estates if he fails to fulfil his responsibilities, or is guilty of misuse of his official powers. The incidence of taxation on tenants is described by Bell, and is reported to be higher than in India. The basis of taxation is the amount of seed required for sowing the peasant’s land.

The Tashi Lama and Tashilhunpo — The Tashi Lama, or Panchen Rimpochhe, is a religious dignitary second in importance only to the Dalai Lama. His headquarters are at Tashilhunpo (Shigatse) and by tradition he is purely a religious being and not concerned with temporal matters apart from the administration of the large estates in the Tsang province of Central Tibet which have been allotted for the support of his monasteries.

On the strength of this theoretical abstinence from worldly things it is sometimes asserted that the Tashi Lama is a purer vehicle of the religion than the Dalai Lama, and when the Tashi Lama is the elder of the two, he is looked upon as the spiritual teacher of the Dalai Lama. But apart from this fine shade of interpretation, the Tibetan view is definitely that the Dalai Lama is supreme in things spiritual as well as temporal.

The Tashilhunpo administration is similar to that of the Central Government, but on a smaller scale. Tashilhunpo officials hold no rank at Lhasa unless it is specially conferred.

The relations between Tashilhunpo and Lhasa were the cause of the breech between the late Tashi Lama and the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. It appears that certain revenue, or contributions, were paid by Tashilhunpo to the Central Government, and also that in the Tsang Province of which Tashilhunpo is the capital, certain important Dzongs (districts), including Shigatse itself, remained under the control of the Central Government.

Increased demands by the Central Government for contributions towards the upkeep of the Tibetan army in Eastern Tibet were resented by the Tashilhunpo officials, and in the tension that followed and during the exile of the Tashi Lama a separatist tendency became more pronounced. The Tashi Lama demanded what amounted to complete control over the whole of Tsang Province which appears to have been a break with former traditions.

At present the Tashilhunpo administration is conducted by a Commissioner appointed by the Central Government.

Feudal Principalities — There was formerly a number of these extending from West Tibet to the China border. The Western Tibetan kingdoms were absorbed in the seventeenth century, and the majority of the Eastern Kingdoms fell before Chao Erh-feng between 1905 and 1910.

Most of these lay on the east of the Yangtse. The only one that seems to have survived under Tibetan influence is Hlato, which is west of the Yangtse. There were also a number of semi-independent monastic states such as Chiamdo which were also overrun by Chao Erh-feng. When those on the west of the Yangtse were recovered in 1912 a form of direct administration was introduced.

The Kingdom of Po was conquered and brought under direct administration in 1927.

The Power of the Monasteries — It is generally assumed that the government of Tibet is priest-ridden, and there can be no doubt that the influence of the monasteries has a profound effect on Tibetan politics, but the existence of a large body of influential lay officials with great power in internal affairs must not be overlooked.

In foreign affairs the power of the National Assembly is an important factor, and its conservative, nationalistic tone is largely dictated by the monastic representatives, but it is
possible also for a capable lay official to make his influence felt in the Assembly, and the 
Kashag has an opportunity of expressing its own opinion to the Dalai Lama about foreign 
affairs.

In short, although lay officials naturally have to be careful to avoid upsetting the monas-
teries, they are not entirely under religious domination.

Appendix II

Treaties

Tibet-Bashahr Treaty. (39 C. 1908. p. 47-49.)

A vague expression of friendly relations.


Between representative of the Sikh Raja of Kashmir and of the Tibetan Government with 
mention of the Emperor of China. Government of India held that it was between the Sikh 
Government and the Emperor of China, and was determined with the downfall of the Sikh 
7 C. 1922. p. 16.)


1876 — Chefoo Convention, between H.M.G. and Government of China.

This guaranteed protection of a British Mission to be sent to Tibet. Never effective. 
(Aitchison, Vol. XIV, Tibet Introduction, Summary paras. 5 and 6.)

1890 — Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet. To set-
tle boundary of Sikkim and Tibet.

Convention repudiated and nullified by Tibetans; but accepted by them in 1904 (see be-
low) and again in 1914 in so far as its provisions do not confer an advantage on the Chinese. 
It is valid with regard to Tibetan acceptance of the Tibet-Sikkim frontier, and acceptance of 
British control over external relations of Sikkim. (Aitchison, Vol. XII, Summary paras. 7 to 17.)

1893 — Trade Regulations negotiated under the Treaty of 1890. Signed by British and Chi-
nese only. Repudiated by the Tibetans but accepted subject to necessary amendment in 1904. 

Continued in Trade Regulations of 1908; but cancelled in 1914.

1904 — Anglo-Tibetan Treaty.

Continued by Convention of 1914 in so far as not inconsistent with that treaty.

Most important clauses are II providing for continuance of "trade by existing routes" and 
establishment of new Trade Marts if the development of trade requires it.

IV. Governing, in conjunction with the Trade regulations of 1914, the imposition of dues.

IX. Provision for British political influence. Art. IX (c) may be noted. If our present policy 
with regard to Chinese suzerainty implies that China is a foreign power, this clause has been 
disregarded. See Appendix on Suzerainty.

Arts. II and III made clear China's special interest in Tibet.

The Treaty was not recognised by Tibet because the Tibetan Government did not sign it 
(see Appendix on Suzerainty) but the Tibetan Government were prepared to accept it in 1914 
as part of the Simla Convention. But in view of the failure of China to sign and of the Anglo-
Tibetan Declaration, China cannot claim the advantages of this Treaty. (Summary para. 44.)

1907 — Anglo-Russian Convention about Tibet. (Aitchison, Vol. XIII.)

Recognised Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Both parties agreed not to send representative 
to Lhasa.

Tibet was not consulted.

The effects of the treaty were modified by Russian acceptance of the 1914 Convention, 
and was later held by H.M.G. to be invalid. (Summary paras. 42 and 44.)

1908 — Trade Regulations framed under Treaty of 1904.

Signed by Britain, China and Tibet.


1913 — Alleged Treaty between Mongolia and Tibet.
Stated to have been negotiated by Dorjieff. Tibetan Government later denied that there had been a formal treaty. (Bell, "Tibet Past and Present", Appendix XIV, Summary para. 32.)

1914 — Simla Convention. Initialled by all parties, but denounced by Chinese Government.

Anglo-Tibetan declaration that the Convention is binding on them, and that China is excluded from benefits.

1914 Agreement about Indo-Tibetan boundary. Signed with Tibet only.

1914 Trade Regulations. Signed with Tibet only.

Present Position — Between Britain and Tibet the following treaties are valid:

1914 Convention in so far as it confers no benefits on China. This continues the Treaties of 1890, 1904 and 1906 in so far as they are not modified by or repugnant to it. That is to say: the provisions of the Treaty of 1890 about British relations with Sikkim, and the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim, are valid.

The Treaty of 1904 is valid; but Arts. II, IV, and V must be read with Art. 7 of the 1914 Convention by which new Trade Regulations were to be negotiated to put these clauses into effect. Thus, questions of opening new Trade Marts, if instituting a tariff, can strictly be raised only at one of the five yearly periods when the Trade Regulations of 1914 become liable to revision.

Art. IX of the 1904 Treaty must be read with Art. III of the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1906 and the Anglo-Tibetan Declaration of 1904, and the interpretation seems to be that, as Art. III of the 1906 Treaty would be an advantage to China, and is therefore inoperative by the terms of the Declaration of 1914, China is to be treated as a foreign country for the purposes of Art. IX of the 1904 Treaty. The 1906 Treaty appears to be invalid, as it conveys advantages on China, and was consistently repudiated by the Tibetans.

1914 Anglo-Tibetan declaration.

1914 Trade Regulations.

1914 Boundary Agreement.

Between Britain and China there are no valid treaties about Tibet. The powers of the British plenipotentiary, which were communicated to the other plenipotentiaries, stated that the existing state of war between China and Tibet had rendered former treaties of no effect. Chinese signature of the 1914 Convention would have restored the effect of the treaties of 1890 and 1906 with China in so far as they were not modified by or repugnant to the 1914 Convention. Her failure to sign appears to render those treaties still ineffective so far as British relations with China are concerned. After the failure of the 1914 Conference it was decided not to denounce previous treaties, but to ignore them. (Summary para. 44.) It may be noted that it was only in 1925 that a definite pronouncement was made by H.M.G. about the validity of the 1914 Convention between Britain and Tibet and of the 1914 Trade Regulations. (Summary para. 53 D.)

The Chinese attitude in 1914 was to decline to recognise any agreement between Britain and Tibet reached at Simla. In 1928 they harked back to the 1890 Treaty which they appeared to consider as valid between Britain and China. Their overtures were ignored. (Summary para. 60.)

It is difficult to assess the effect of British acknowledgments of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet which were made between 1921 and 1937. The Chinese might claim that so long as we recognised their suzerainty our agreements with Tibet were invalid. The Tibetans might claim that the recognition of Chinese suzerainty was an advantage under the 1914 Convention which should not accrue to the Chinese until they signed it. The only practical limit which we appeared to set on our recognition of Tibetan autonomy was a disinclination to regard China as a "foreign power" in Tibet.

The recent policy of H.M.G. to withhold unconditional recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet clears up the situation so far as Britain and Tibet and Britain and China are concerned, and appears to put our 1914 agreements with Tibet on a better footing. (Summary para. 106.) It also appears that we have allowed three breaches in our agreement with Tibet; (a) The establishment of a Chinese representative at Lhasa.
The establishment of wireless at Lhasa. (Art. IX (c) and (d) of 1904.) These on the assumption that until China signs the 1914 Convention she is a foreign power in Tibet and (c) Direct negotiations between China and Tibet. (Art. V of 1914) (Summary paras. 73-75 and Appendix on Suzerainty.)

Appendix III — Suzerainty

“Nominal sovereignty over a semi-independent or internally autonomous state”, Fowler.

The word suzerainty has been used for some years to describe the British view of the relationship between China and Tibet. It has never been defined and, indeed, appears to be incapable of absolute definition and to take its colour from the particular circumstances of each case. It is not surprising that this chameleon word has caused confusion. This note attempts to show two main lines (1) Official declarations on the subject of suzerainty; and (2) what have been the circumstances conditioning the interpretation of the word as various times.

By the end of the Nineteenth Century when the Government of India sought, after nearly 100 years of separation, to resume contact with Tibet, the power of China in that country, which had been waning at the time of our first contacts in the Eighteenth Century, had declined to a mere shadow. Our knowledge of conditions in Tibet was so slight that we proceeded on the assumption that China could exert authority there. The Chefoo Convention of 1856 and the Treaty and Trade Regulations of 1890 and 1893 on the subject of Tibet were concluded with China without the participation of any Tibetan representative. The Tibetans repudiated and stultified those agreements and so demonstrated that China’s control was only nominal. It was the refusal of Tibet to recognise the validity of agreements concluded with China that led the British Government to take steps to secure its rights under those agreements. This fact is recorded in the preamble of the 1906 Convention between Britain and China. The steps taken were the invasion of Tibet and the conclusion of a treaty with Tibet, which was signed and ratified without Chinese participation, although the Chinese Amban was present at the negotiations. A special relationship between China and Tibet was recognised, and it was described in official correspondence as “suzerainty” although the word does not appear in either the 1904 Treaty or that of 1906. Our action had to be brought into line with this relationship; and we had to take note of international opinion. Not only was Russia interested in Tibet, but the U.S.A. also let it be known that they assumed we had no intention to alter the status of Tibet as part of the Chinese dominions. Chinese concurrence was secured by the adhesion agreement of 1906. The terms of this convention show the interpretation then placed on Chinese suzerainty to include a degree of control over the external affairs of Tibet.

Chinese control over Tibetan affairs had in fact been non-existent during the past twenty or thirty years as was proved not only by our own experiences over the Treaty of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 but also by the fact that the Tibetan and Nepalese Governments had executed a treaty in 1856, without Chinese participation, and by the experience of Rockhill Bonvalot and other travellers who found that in order to enter Tibet they had to make their terms with the Tibetans and not the Chinese.

The Tibetans were not consulted about the terms of the 1906 Convention with China, and they subsequently repudiated it.

It was probably assumed that Chinese control over Tibet would remain as nominal as we found it to be in 1904, and no effort was made in the 1906 Treaty to limit the extent of Chinese interference in Tibetan affairs. But our intrusion into Tibet roused the Chinese Government to an effort to establish real sovereignty there; and our withdrawal after throwing the affairs of Tibet into confusion, provided the opportunity which the Chinese needed.

Between 1905 and 1911 they established in Tibet an authority which was strong enough to exclude British officials from direct communication with Tibetan officials.

The Dalai Lama and his ministers who fled to India in 1910 strenuously denied Chinese suzerainty, and claimed independence, but in reply to an appeal from the Dalai Lama to His Majesty the King it was stated that His Majesty “could not interfere between the Dalai Lama and his suzerain”. At this time the word suzerainty could rightly be interpreted, in its
application to the relations between China and Tibet, as including control over external relations, and also internal affairs.

In 1911 and 1912 the Chinese were evicted from almost all of Tibet, and for over twenty years they had no representative in territories under the control of Lhasa. From that time until the present, Tibet has enjoyed independence as complete as that now enjoyed by Eire, and without even a formal link with China comparable to that by which the Governor General connects Eire with the United Kingdom.

Nevertheless, His Majesty's Government continued to recognise the suzerainty of China over Tibet, and in 1912 a memorandum to the Chinese Government stated that while His Majesty's Government had formally recognised the suzerain right of China in Tibet they were not prepared to recognise the right of China to intervene actively in the internal administration of the country, which should be carried on in accordance with the existing treaties.

This statement contemplated Chinese control over or advice on Tibetan external affairs, and although it did not accord with the facts of 1912, it was then quite possible that the Chinese would take active steps to reassert their sway in Tibet. In fact the Chinese Government, so far from acquiescing in their defeat, issued a proclamation incorporating Tibet among the provinces of China, and made preparations to send an army into the country. In reply to the British memorandum they claimed the right to intervene in Tibetan internal affairs.

But later events made the Chinese Government willing to negotiate on the lines of the British Memorandum of 1912, and this willingness led to the Simla Conference of 1914.

The use of the word suzerainty in the unratified Convention of 1914 has coloured British views on the relations between China and Tibet for many years.

In the Convention as initialled, Tibet agreed to our recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but that clause was only part of a whole agreement in which the Chinese agreed among other things to Tibetan autonomy and to a definite frontier.

The treaty was never concluded, and instead, we signed with Tibet a declaration that the terms of the initialled convention were binding between Tibet and Britain, and excluding China from the benefits of the convention until they should sign it. Among those benefits were the recognition of suzerainty, and the acknowledgment of the Anglo-Chinese treaty of 1906 which Tibet had never recognised.

From 1914 to 1919 the Chinese were still prepared to negotiate with us and with Tibet on the lines of the 1914 Convention; but by 1921 their attitude had changed and, as no progress was being made towards completing an agreement, a memorandum was presented to the Chinese Government, to the effect that, in view of their attitude in 1914 and in 1919 (when they had been prepared to recognise Tibetan autonomy) we no longer felt justified in withholding recognition of Tibet as an autonomous state under Chinese suzerainty, and intended to deal with her as such in future.

Our interpretation of the extent of Chinese suzerainty was made clear in a verbal explanation that, if necessary, we would deal directly with Tibet without reference to China. The intention of this memorandum seems to have been to hasten negotiations. In the event, negotiations were not resumed, and we had, without consulting or informing the Tibetans, given China a formal, although qualified, acknowledgment of her suzerainty over Tibet, and had not secured in return any formal recognition of Tibetan autonomy.

The Chinese Government soon made it clear that they no longer were prepared to recognise Tibetan autonomy. In 1928 they proposed to negotiate a treaty about Tibet direct with His Majesty's Government. This should have made it evident that the conditions on which we had recognised their suzerainty over Tibet were not being fulfilled; and our attitude might well have been reconsidered. But in 1930 the Government of India were still entertaining hopes that a settlement between China and Tibet might still be accomplished, and did not want to give Tibet the idea that they would encourage her to throw off Chinese suzerainty.

In 1932, when Chinese aggression appeared as a menace to Tibet, His Majesty's Government again reminded the Chinese Government of the British Memorandum of 1921 and made it clear that their interest in Tibet was the maintenance of the autonomy and integrity of Outer Tibet. In 1934 during the negotiations with Lhasa with Huang Mu-sung the Tibetan Government reiterated their adherence to the proposals of the 1914 Convention and were willing to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty if the Chinese would recognise Tibetan autonomy and agree on a boundary. This statement, which was not fully understood at the time, was taken by the
Government of India as an unqualified recognition of Chinese suzerainty; but the Tibetan Government strongly denied this, and contended that they had not recognised Chinese suzerainty, did not recognise it and would not recognise it unless the Chinese fulfilled their part of the bargain.

Nevertheless, in 1936 on two occasions the Chinese Government was informed that we recognised Tibet as autonomous under the suzerainty of China. Throughout these years, while we were making pronouncements about our recognition of a suzerainty which the Tibetans did not acknowledge, we were dealing with Tibet as autonomous and without reference to China in such matters as the supply of arms, in arrangements for customs exemption on goods for Tibet, and in cases of Chinese visitors who wanted to enter Tibet. And in 1934 we told the Tibetan Government that we were "prepared to admit the theoretic suzerainty of China" not that we had done so. It is hard to see exactly what interpretation could be put on our use of the word suzerainty; it certainly did not follow the dictionary meaning quoted at the beginning of this note, for we were recognising Tibetan control over their own external affairs as well as their internal affairs.

In this matter each of the three parties had different views. The Chinese claimed that Tibetan affairs were a domestic concern of the Chinese Government, but expressed informally their intention not to upset the existing arrangement by which Tibet managed her own internal affairs, and had no reason to think that His Majesty's Government considered them other than independent. The Tibetans claimed independence. His Majesty's Government recognised a loose bond between China and Tibet which was far from satisfying Chinese pretensions, but the very existence of which was denied by the Tibetans.

This anomalous situation has been remedied in 1943 by a revision of our policy and by a decision to make it clear that our former recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was always conditional on Chinese willingness to treat Tibet as autonomous, and that our position is that we are prepared to recognise Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but only on the understanding that Tibet is considered as autonomous.

One advantage of withdrawing our unconditional acknowledgment of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet is that we remove an argument by which the validity of our direct agreements with Tibet might be challenged. Of these agreements, that with most practical present day importance is probably the 1914 agreement about the Indo-Tibetan frontier.

In the interval, when our acceptance of Chinese suzerainty was being treated as final, we have permitted without protest what would, under His Majesty's Government's latest stand on the subject of suzerainty, seem to be a breach of our agreements with Tibet. The Chinese have established a representative and also a wireless station at Lhasa, both of which could under the treaties of 1904 and 1914 with Tibet, be allowed only on the assumption that China is not a foreign power in Tibet.

Leading References to Suzerainty; and its Interpretation in Practice

1904 — China presses for direct arrangements about Tibet. Government of India presses for China to sign an adhesion agreement at Lhasa, and points out that their proceedings (directly with Tibet) have been necessitated by the reach of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890. The arrangement proposed was held to reconcile fully China's suzerainty. (Viceroy to Secretary of State. Telm. 3121-E.B. of 20-9-1904.)

Suggestion that adhesion agreement might be negotiated in Peking and include a clause acknowledging China's suzerainty. (S. of S. to Viceroy. Telm. of 1-10-1904.)

United States Government's assumption that we still regarded Tibet as part of China's Dominions stated to be correct. (Marquis of Lansdowne to Sir M. Durand. Despatch 126 A. of 20-6-1904.)

Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906. Preamble stated that Tibet's refusal to recognise 1890 Treaty made it necessary for British Government to take steps to secure its rights.

By Art. I China's responsibility for securing the due fulfilment of the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904 was recognised.

By Art. II China engaged not to allow any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.

1907 — Anglo-Russian Convention recognised the suzerain rights of China in Tibet.
**1908** — Relationship between the Dalai Lama and Chinese Emperor during Dalai Lama’s stay in Peking. Dalai Lama showed considerable independence but had to submit to Chinese Decrees expressing sovereignty. (Washington despatch to Foreign Office. No. 347 of 17-12-1908.)

**1910** — His Majesty’s Minister in China instructed to demand that an effective Tibetan Government should be maintained with which we could treat in the manner provided by the treaties of 1904 and 1906. (S. of S. to Viceroy. Telm. p. of 3-3-1910.)

**1910** — Dalai Lama after his flight to India claims right to direct dealings with British Government, asks to be restored to the independent position enjoyed by the Fifth Dalai Lama, and repudiates treaties of 1890 and 1906 to which Tibet was not a party. (Note of Interview between Dalai Lama and Viceroy, sent with F.D. letter of 19-3-1910.)

Chinese claim sovereign rights in Tibet, but offer scrupulously to observe treaties relating to Tibet. (Prince Ching to Mr. Max Muller. Letter of 18-4-1910. Sent to P.O.S. with Foreign Dept. Memo. 1330-E.B. of 29-6-1910.)

Viceroy’s suggestion that specific assurances should be sought from the Chinese Government considered by His Majesty’s Government as going too far towards questioning China’s admitted suzerainty over Tibet, which it appeared she was making effective. (Viceroy to S. of S. Telm. S164 of 12-3-1910. Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Muller. Telm. of 8-4-1910.)

Dalai Lama and Tibetan Ministers deny China’s suzerainty. (Viceroy’s Telm. S164 of 12-3-1910. P.O.S. to Foreign Dept. Letter 218 T.C. of 19-3-1910 and encls.)

**1911** — His Majesty the King Emperor “regrets that he is unable to interfere between the Dalai Lama and his suzerain”. (Govt. of India F.D. to P.O.S. Letter 113-E.B. of 19-11-1911.) (See also Summary paras. 16 to 28 for 1904 to 1911.)

**1912** — His Majesty’s Government examine policy.

Viceroy contends that Tibet has always been autonomous under Chinese suzerainty, and argues that Tibet is not part of China proper, as in Tibet Chinese treaties with foreign powers are not valid. (Viceroy to S. of S. Telm. p. of 23-3-1912.)

Chinese Decree incorporates Tibet in China Proper. (H.M. Minister, China to Foreign Office. Despatch 196 of 27-4-1912. F.D. Memo. 1293-E.B. of 15-6-1912.)

His Majesty’s Government’s Memorandum of 1 August 1912. Recognition of suzerain rights of China in Tibet admitted, but refusal to recognise right to interfere in Tibetan internal affairs. His Majesty’s Government refuse to accept definition of Tibet’s status as being on equal footing with Provinces of China. His Majesty’s Government do not dispute right of China to appoint an official at Lhasa to advise the Tibetans on their foreign policy. (India Office to Foreign Office. Letter P. 2607 of 11-7-1912. S of S. to Viceroy. Telm. of 17-8-1912. Chunking despatch 349 of 17-8-1912 sent with F.D. Memo. 2264-E.B. of 26-9-1912.)

Foreign Office instructs His Majesty’s Minister to make clear to the Chinese Government the difference between suzerainty and sovereignty. But on further consideration attempt to define “suzerainty” is deferred.


**1913** — Chinese Government willing to negotiate on lines of His Majesty’s Government’s Memo. of 17-8-1912. They dislike the word suzerainty.

(H.M. Minister to Foreign Office. Telm. of 31-1-1913. Summary para. 34.)

**1913—1914** — Simla Convention.

Powers of Sir H. McMahon stated that the existing state of war between Tibet and China had rendered previous treaties of no effect. (Tibet Series, October 1914, No. 6.)

The Tibetan Government claimed that the relation between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Emperor was a personal relationship of Lama and Disciple. They claimed independence, and repudiated the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1906. (Tibet Series, October 1914, No. 6, Annexure IV.

Political status of Tibet discussed, but no definition of suzerainty attempted. (Tibet Conference 1914 Series, passim.)
The Convention initialled by all parties included recognition by His Majesty’s Government and Chinese Government that Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and also the autonomy of Tibet.

Declaration between His Majesty’s Government and Tibetan Government denied to China all advantages under the Convention until she should sign. (Tibet Series, Nos. 124 and 212, Summary paras. 35-38.)


1920 — His Majesty’s Government decide that 1907 Treaty with Russia is no longer valid. (Summary para. 44.)

1921 — Memorandum presented by His Majesty’s Government to Chinese Government August 1921. His Majesty’s Government “do not feel justified in withholding any longer their recognition of the status of Tibet as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China and intend dealing with Tibet in future on this basis”. (Foreign to Bell. Telm. 2203-S. of 16-9-1921.)

Tibetan Government not informed of this memorandum; but the new policy entailed supply of arms to Tibet although there had previously been objection to this on account of international agreement of 1919 not to import arms into China. (Bell to Foreign. Telm. 80-S. of 12-10-1921.) (Summary para. 50 D.)

1924 — His Majesty’s Government decides that Washington Agreements cannot apply to Tibet without her consent. (Summary para. 52.)

1928 — Emergence of “Nationalist China”.

His Majesty’s Government ignore Chinese Government proposal to negotiate new Treaty about Tibet with reference to the Treaty of 1890. (F.D. to P.O.S. Telm. 2399-S. of 15-11-1928.) (Summary para. 60.)

1930 — “Tibet’s practical autonomy has been maintained since 1921”. (Viceroy to S. of S. Telm. 2245 S. of 11-7-1930.)

“His Majesty’s Government have consistently recognised Tibetan autonomy as subject to Chinese suzerainty”. Resumption of negotiations at some time is contemplated, until then we do not want to give Tibet the idea that we are anxious to encourage her to throw off Chinese suzerainty. (Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 2587-S. of 3-8-1930.)

1932 — Chinese advances in East Tibet.

Tibetan Government consider that Simla Convention is the surest basis for an understanding with the Chinese Government. (P.O.S. to Foreign. Telm. No. 10 of 20-9-1932.)

His Majesty’s Government instruct H.M. Charge d’Affairs, Peking, to remind Chinese Government of our Memorandum of 1921 and to make clear the extent of His Majesty’s Government’s interest in Tibet — viz., the preservation of the autonomy and integrity of Outer Tibet. (Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 2208 of 5-10-1932, para. 2. Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 2217 of 6-10-1932. India Office to F.O. Letter P.Z. 5636/32 of 21-9-1932.)

Mr. Ingram rejects Chinese claims that Tibet is a domestic matter. (Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 2283 of 12-10-1932.) (Summary para. 67.)

1933 — His Majesty’s Government reaffirm their policy of dealing with Tibet as an autonomous state (to H.M. Ambassador, Peking). (India Office to Foreign Office. Letter P.Z. 1630/33 of 3-4-1933. F. and P. Memo. F 1 X/33 of 28-4-1933. Summary para. 70.)

1934 — Huang Mu-sung’s Mission to Lhasa.

Tibetan Government prepared to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty to the extent provided in the Simla Convention, as part of a general agreement guaranteeing among other things their autonomy. (P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 7(8) P/34 of 10-11-1934, para. 4. Summary paras. 73-75.)

1935 — Government of India say that we admitted Chinese suzerainty in 1914 and that the Tibetan Government admitted it in 1934. But in same letter propose an assurance to the Tibetan Government that we are prepared to admit the theoretic suzerainty of China
but will continue to regard Tibet as autonomous. (Foreign Secy. to Secy. of State for India Letter F 1 X/35 of 28-6-1935, paras. 2 & 6.)

His Majesty’s Government doubt whether it would be consistent with our recognition of Chinese suzerainty to give a formal undertaking to Tibet to regard the Chinese official there as a foreign representative. (Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 2166 of 20-8-1935, para. 5.)

They want to be represented at any general negotiations between Tibet and China for recasting the status of Tibet as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China. (Ibid., para. 6.)

The assurance that we are prepared to admit China’s theoretical suzerainty over Tibet etc., was given by Mr. Williamson to the Tibetan Government. (P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 7(7) P/35 of 18-2-1935. Report paras. 19 & 20.)

The Kashag categorically denied having admitted Chinese suzerainty. (Ibid., and P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 7(5) P/35 of 16-12-1935. Summary para 79.)


1939 — Chinese Government apply to His Majesty’s Government for facilities for Mr. Wu to visit Lhasa. Tibetan Government are consulted and refuse. (Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 625 of 17-4-1939. P.O.S. to Foreign. Telms. 77 and 78 of 27-4-1939. Summary para. 94.)

1942 — Chinese Government refuse to allow their officer in Lhasa to deal with new Tibetan Foreign Office.


1943 — His Majesty’s Government reconsider their attitude towards China’s suzerainty over Tibet. (Interdepartmental correspondence sent to Foreign Secy. with India Office D.O. 2252-43 of 8-5-1943. Viceroy to S. of S. Teln. 4313 of 1-6-1943.)

Prime Minister says at Pacific Council Meeting in Washington that “no one contests Chinese suzerainty”. (Foreign Office to Chungking. Teln. 492 of 26-5-1943.)

U.S. Government has never raised questions regarding Chinese claims to suzerainty over Tibet, or to the inclusion of Tibet in the areas constituting the territory of the Chinese Republic. (U.S. State Dept. Aide Memoire to H.M.A., Washington. Dated 15-5-1943.)

His Majesty’s Government inform H.M.A., Chungking, of their decision not to give any unconditional admission of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. (Foreign Office to Chungking. Teln. 656 of 23-7-1943.)

Mr. Eden gives Dr. T.V. Soong an informal memorandum containing the above statement of policy. (Mr. Eden to Dr. Soong. Memo. 4468/43 of 5-8-1943. Summary para. 106.)

Tibetan Government ask for definition of suzerainty. Government of India and His Majesty’s Government do not attempt a definition, but Tibetan Government may be told if necessary that suzerainty is a term used to describe the relations, frequently ill-defined and vague, existing between one state and a second which, to a greater or less degree (to be assessed by the special circumstances of each case) is dependent on the first, or better “owes some degree of allegiance to the first”. (Gould to Crichton. D.O. 7(3) P/43 of 6-11-1943. Weightman to Gould. D.O. 11585 of 2-12-1943. Peel to Caroe. D.O. Ext. 245/44 of 20-11-1944.)

Mr. Shen, Chinese representative in Lhasa given facilities for travel across India to the Indo-Tibetan border, as a matter of international practice, and without previous reference to the Tibetan Government. (Foreign to P.O.S. Teln. 3187 of 23-3-1944.)
Appendix IV

Eastern Tibet

Historical Abstract — c. 890 A.D. — Tibetans establish boundary with China from a point North of Sining, through a point on the bend of the Yellow River east of the Amne Machin Range, to Yachow on the West Border of Szechuan. (See Tibetan statement of claims at 1914 Simla Conference.)

c. 1650 — The Fifth Dalai Lama makes the principalities and states of East Tibet hereditary. (See Tibetan statement of claims.) (Summary Para. 36.)

1727 — Manchu Conquest of Tibet. Boundary stone set up near Batang. East of that point control lay, in the theory, with China; west, with Tibet under the advice of the Amban at Lhasa. (Teichman. Travels Part I.)


1906–1911 — Chao Erh-feng’s Operations. Occupation of most of Tibet up to Lhasa. (Summary paras. 24, 28. Teichman. Travels Part III.)

1912–1914 — Chinese driven out of Tibet as far as the Mekong. (Summary paras. 33 and 46. Teichman. Travels Part IV.)

1917–1918 — Chinese aggression in East Tibet leads to their eviction from West of the Yangtse and from Derge. (Summary paras. 46 and 47. Teichman. Travels Part V.)

1931–1932 — Tibetans attack and reach Kanze. They are driven back to the West of the Yangtse. (Summary paras. 65, 66 and 70.)

1943 — Tension and troop movements on Tibet-Chinghai border. (Summary paras. 103 and 104.)

Historical Description — The boundary claimed by Tibet in 1914 (see map 2, China and Negotiations with Tibet) encloses territory in which Tibetan stock predominates. But in that area there are many tribes and divisions, with differing customs, differing dialects and differing degrees of culture. It is probable that most of those tribes which lie beyond a radius of about 300 miles to the East of Lhasa were for long periods in their history independent or were to be classed as within the zone of influence rather than under the control of Lhasa or China. Tibetan control up to the racial boundary seems to have been a thing of the distant past, and the Tibetan story that it was the Fifth Dalai Lama who made the local chieftains hereditary is probably due to a tendency to attach events to a great name.

The ties of race and religion and particularly the bonds between branch monasteries with their parent house in Lhasa must have kept alive a feeling of relationship with Tibet which probably reduced to a mere formality the Chinese theory, after the Manchu conquest of Tibet, that certain of the states of East Tibet were under the protection of China and others under the protection of Lhasa. There is little evidence of real Chinese control over the states claimed for that side of the line, but it appears from the account of the travels of Peres Huc and Gabet in 1844–46 that there were small Chinese garrisons in Batang, Litang and other places in East Tibet; but it also appears that there were Chinese troops in Chiando which in theory fell within the Lhasa sphere of influence. At all events it was possible in 1860 for a Tibetan army to enter Nyarong and intervene in the administration of that principality with the approval of the Chinese Emperor.

The ruler of Nyarong attacked the neighbouring Hor States and the large Kingdom of Derge. These appealed to both China and to Lhasa, and it was the Lhasa Government that sent an army to depose the troublesome prince of Nyarong and to restore peace. After this, Nyarong was brought under the direct control of Lhasa with the approval of the Chinese. A closer connection was also established between Derge and Lhasa. In 1894 further aggression by the people of Nyarong, this time against Chala, led to reprisals from the Chinese Viceroy of Szechuan who extended his activities also to Derge. His efforts to establish a measure of direct control over these two states were opposed by the Amban at Lhasa, and the Viceroy had to restore the former administration.

The British Expedition to Lhasa in 1904 awoke the Chinese Empire to the necessity of asserting effective control in Tibet. A forward movement in that direction followed quickly with the appointment in 1905 of a Resident in East Tibet. This officer first absorbed the Kingdom of Chala, the nearest to Szechuan, and established a Chinese officer in its capital city.
Tachienlu. He then moved further West, but his efforts to assert authority in Batang led to an uprising of the monks of Batang monastery in which the Resident was killed. There followed a general attack on the Chinese in East Tibet, in which not only many troops and officers were killed but foreign missionaries also were murdered.

The Chinese decided on stern measures, and found in Chao Erh-feng the man for their purpose. From 1906 to 1911, at first as Viceroy of Szechuan and from 1908 as Imperial Commissioner for the Border, he dominated Eastern Tibet. The rebellious monasteries of Batang and Changtreng were destroyed, the rulers of the states of Batang, Litang, Changtreng, and others were deposed and Chinese magistrates appointed in their place. Then Chao proceeded against Derge the leading kingdom of East Tibet. Taking advantage of internal dissension he deposed the King and brought the state under direct control. At the end of 1909, he absorbed with little opposition, the monastic state of Chiamdo which had long been closely connected with Lhasa, and by February 1910 he was in Lhasa itself. Having paralysed the Tibetan Government by this stroke he went on to consolidate Chinese power in the East. Nyarong was taken over from the Tibetan Commissioner, and Chinese troops marched into Zayul, the district which borders on Assam, and into Pome, a semi-independent kingdom to the North and East of the Brahmaputra bend. Chao appears to have proposed to the Emperor that the boundary between China and Tibet should be fixed at Chiamdo, and this appears to have been accepted after some protest from the Amban at Lhasa, whose sphere of influence would thus be reduced. It was not to be expected that order could be established over so wide an area within so short a time, and the fierce tribes of Chagtreng continued to give trouble, while the Pome campaign made little progress against the warlike Popas. Chao’s ambitions showed themselves in his orders sent through Zayul to the Mishmis of the Assam border that they should make a road wide enough for two horsemen as far as from Tibet to Assam. Chinese troops entered the Assam tribal area as far as Meilkrai, where they set up (boundary marks). They also penetrated the Hkamti Shan district of North Burma.

These ambitious plans were checked by the Revolution of 1911–1912. Chao was one of its earliest victims; and the outlying Chinese troops in Tibet, left to their own devices and infected with the revolutionary spirit, were either taken prisoner as at Lhasa, murdered as in Pome, or driven out with great loss as in Zayul. The main body seems to have retreated to Chiamdo and Batang.

At first the Lhasa Government did not take full advantage of its opportunity and seems to have left the task of driving out the Chinese to the local officials; but in 1912 Chinese preparations for the reconquest of East Tibet made it necessary for a Tibetan army, under the redoubtable Kalon Lama, to be sent to East Tibet. This force held up the Chinese advance at the Mekong, which remained the frontier until 1917. From 1912 onwards the Tibetan Government has had to maintain a standing army on its eastern borders and this has proved a strain on its limited finances. In the interval between 1912 and 1917 the Chinese side of the border had been troubled by a revolt of the irrepressible Changtreng Tibetans, who even raided Tachienlu, and by Civil War between Szechuan and Yunnan. The Chinese troops on the frontier had suffered neglect, while the Tibetan troops had been improved and strengthened. The only set-back to the Tibetans at this time was the extension of Chinese influence by the Muslims of Chinghai over the Kokonor and Nagchen area which had been untouched by Chao Erh-feng’s conquests, but where the control of Lhasa never seems to have been effective.

In 1917 hostilities broke out after a foolish attack by the Chinese on the Tibetan troops at Riwoche. The Tibetans drove the Chinese far beyond the Yangtse, occupied Derge and Nyarong, and threatened Batang and Tachienlu. The agreement of Chiamdo and the Truce of Rongbatsa negotiated by Mr. Teichman, stabilised the position and left the Tibetans in possession of Derge. For some ten years, between 1919 and 1928, the Chinese area was given up to disorder, civil war, and brigandage, but the Tibetan forces did not try to profit from these conditions on any large scale. Tibetan influence spread gradually on the Chinese side of the frontier, and independent risings by Tibetan tribes there caused some anxiety to the Chinese. In 1931 a dispute between two monasteries of Targye and Pehru connected with Lhasa, but both in the Chinese sphere of influence, tempted the Tibetan authorities on the border to intervene. The Tibetans sided with Targye and the Chinese with Pehru. There was fighting in which the Tibetans were successful. They rashly pressed their advantage, and
invaded Chinese territory as far as Kanze, and the neighbourhood of Tachienlu. The Chinese rallied and drove the Tibetans back across the Yangtse. The situation was made more dangerous by a concerted move by the Chinghai troops who invaded Tibetan territory in the neighbourhood of Riwoche. Civil war in Szechuan spared the Tibetans from greater dangers, and truces were negotiated with the armies of Szechuan and of Chinghai. The former boundary with Chinghai was re-established, but Derge was lost to the Szechuan troops, and the Tibetan frontier was pushed back to the West bank of the Yangtse. It appears that about this time the Tibetans occupied Yakalo (Yenching) a salt well centre on the Mekong, which had been in Chinese hands since the days of Chao Erh-feng.

Since then there had been no fighting, although the question of the Tashi Lama's intention to return to Tibet with a Chinese escort; the Communist invasion in 1935-36 and the alarms of 1942-1943 gave the Tibetan Government some anxious moments.

Ever since 1914 British influence in China and Tibet has been devoted to restraining whichever of the parties appeared the more likely to be aggressive. In 1914 and 1915 assurances of their peaceful intentions were obtained from the Chinese. In 1917 the intervention of Mr. Teichman saved the Chinese from a worse defeat at the hands of the Tibetans. Again in 1920 representations were made to the Chinese. From 1924 to 1926 the Tibetans were advised to refrain from aggression. In 1932 and from 1935 to 1937 constant pressure on behalf of Tibet was applied in China, and once again in 1934. Between 1914 and 1932 there were frequent Chinese overtures to the Tibetans for some sort of a settlement, but these appear to have been made on the initiative of local officers without any backing from the Chinese Government of the day.

The Present Position — The Governors of the three Chinese provinces bordering on Tibet still retain a considerable degree of independence of the Central Government.

Ma Pu-feng, the Governor of Chinghai is reported to be a progressive administrator with a special delight in planting trees. He is said to be building a motor road connecting Danchow with Jyekundo. There are Chinese troops at Jyekundo, and probably also at Barmendo near the Tibetan border, where troops were reported to be stationed in 1925. Accurate information about the border areas is lacking, but it appears from the reports of General Pereira and Capt. Spear who travelled in the Kokonor area in 1921 and 1924 that the Tibetans in this area got on well with their Muslim rulers, who were trying to turn the Tibetans into Chinese by the provision of Chinese schools. Relations between Lhasa and Sining in the past have been rather better than relations between Lhasa and Szechuan or Sikang. It is the Tibetans of this Chinghai and of Kansu who figure in Chinese reports of professions of "Tibetan loyalty" to Chiang Kai-shek.

Ma Pu-feng was the man who exacted ransom for the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, and who recently threatened to invade Tibet.

Sikang (a new province carved out of Szechuan and Kham and inaugurated in 1931) is governed by Liu Wen-hui, another old campaigner against Tibet. He appears to be satisfied with the status quo, and to be interested in maintaining the trade with Tibet, which is believed to be more prosperous even than that of Central Tibet with India through Kalimpong, wool, musk, gold, furs, etc., coming out of Tibet in exchange for silk and tea. Tachienlu and Sichang appear to be being developed as centres of local industry and trade. There is also activity in roadmaking. For some years there has been work on a motor road from Chengtu to Tachienlu via Yachow. Difficulties of terrain have held up progress, but it seems that motor traffic can pass to Tachienlu, with difficulty, at certain times of the year. Beyond Tachienlu the road strikes north-west towards Jyekundo where the country is open and easy. There seems no reason why a great border highway for trade and strategic purposes should not soon be opened. It does not appear that there is any immediate intention of building a motor road to Batang where the country is more difficult and where it seems there is still brigandage; but there is a branch in that direction which connects with a new airfield at Nashi. There are believed to be other airfields in Sikang.

The Sikang Government is reported to be developing local industries, and to be trying to spread Chinese education. It also appears that attempts are being made to use Chinese trained Khampas as minor officials in the province.
Yunan is governed by Lung Yun, who is interested in trade. The trickle of goods from India through Lhasa and Sadiya mostly finds its way to the Yunan markets of Likiang and Atunse. There has been no hint of any trouble between Yunan and Tibet.

**Note on the principal Tibetan tribes and States North and East of Lhasa.**

**Gye-de (Iya-de, Dza-de.)** — The high mountain plateau North and North-East of Lhasa, with its administrative centre at Nagchuka. It is inhabited by nomad herdsmen who probably recognise very little control from Lhasa, by whom it is now claimed. In 1891–1892 both Rockhill and Bower describe it as being Chinese territory, but, although they report that the inhabitants denied any connection with Lhasa and claimed to be under the Chinese Amban at Lhasa, neither saw any signs of Chinese authority. Both of them translate Gya-de as meaning the Chinese district, but that name seems to have gone out of use now, and the Nagchuka area is described as Chang Thang, with subdivisions into Nagchuka, Biru, and Khongtse. Rockhill also admits that he could find no mention of Gya-de in any Chinese official record.

It is on Rockhill’s report that the Chinese claim to this territory in 1914 was made.

(Rockhill “Journey through Mongolia and Tibet” 1891–92. Bower. “Across Tibet” 1894.)

**Takpo and Kongbo** — The districts of the Tsangpo valley from about Tsetang to the great bend. Kongbo is on the north of the river and Takpo on the South. Both also include mountainous country. The Tsangpo valley is fertile and well wooded. (Bailey. “Report on Exploration of N.E. Frontier 1913”.)

**Po** — The country around the bend of the Tsangpo. It is river-gorge country with a higher rainfall than most of Tibet, and is well wooded. Cultivation is unirrigated. Good crops of wheat, barley, buckwheat, peaches, walnuts are grown. The inhabitants have a reputation for savagery; their dialect is akin to that spoken further east in Tibet. Po used to be more or less independent of Lhasa. The Chinese invaded this country during the advance of Chao Erh-feng, and killed off most of the leading men, including the King. After the Revolution the Po-pas took their opportunity and massacred perhaps more than 2,000 Chinese soldiers.

In 1927 the Lhasa Government decided to bring the country under closer control, and sent an officer to collect taxes. He was killed, and a punitive expedition developed into a minor war which ended in the subjection of Po to the direct rule of Lhasa. (Bailey. “Report on Exploration of the N.E. Frontier 1913”. Kaulback. “Salween”. Summary para. 59.)


**Zayul** — East of Pemako and extending to the borders of Yunan. A hot, wet, country of river gorges. Heavily forested; grows rice and wheat. It is accessible from the rest of Tibet, from India and from China only with difficulty. Rima lies at the Southern border. The inhabitants have traces of Mishmi blood and incline to animism. The Chinese invaded this district in 1910, and penetrated south through Bima as far as Menilkrai in the Assam tribal territory, where they set up a boundary stone.

**Chiamdo** — East of Dzade. Chiamdo town lies on the Mekong. This was formerly a monastic state in close connection with Lhasa. It was captured by Chao Erh-feng in 1910; retaken by the Tibetans in 1917, and is now the administrative and military headquarters of the Tibetan Commissioner in East Tibet.

**Riwoche** — North of Chiamdo. A similar state; remained in Tibetan hands during Chao’s invasion. Is a garrison town.

**Draya and Markham** — South of Chiamdo. Taken by Chao Erh-feng in 1909 and recaptured in 1917. Markham is the headquarters of a Tibetan official, the Markham Theiji.

**Hlato** — A semi independent principality to the East of Chiamdo.

**Kham** — The above five districts constitute roughly what may be described as Tibetan Kham. Kham is a vague term for the country lying in the Salween, Mekong, Yangtse and Yalung river valleys. It includes, in addition to the five districts mentioned, and other smaller districts in Tibetan hands, the state of Derge, the Hor States, Chala, and Changtreng, which are now in Chinese occupation.

Kham is a country of dry river valleys separated by grassy uplands with pine forests and further north, by snow mountains. Barley and wheat are grown up to about 13,000 ft. and 9,000 ft. respectively. The lower parts of the valleys have more rainfall and are well wooded.
The districts described so far are in Tibetan control; those that follow are in the Chinese sphere of influence.

**Tsitam** — Marshy, upland plateau west of the Kokonor Lake and south of the Altyn Tagh range. Inhabited by nomad Mogol and Tibetan herdsmen. Probably never closely connected with Lhasa. It was recently reported that a Mohammedan general from Chinghai was sent there with an army to colonise the country.

**Kokonor, Golok country, Banakhasum, Amo** — The country between Kokonor Lake and Jyekundo. Now the Chinese province of Chinghai with its capital at Sining. A nomad grazing country. Here, too, Tibetan control was probably never more than slight, but the religious connection particularly with Amo was strong. There is a large Tibetan monastery at Kumbum near the Kokonor, and another at Labrang on the Kansu border as well as many lesser monasteries. Tsongapa, the 14th century reformer of Buddhism was born in Amo, as was the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. The Muslims of Kansu acquired control here in 1915.

General Pereira and Capt. Spear, who visited this country in 1921 and 1924 found the Tibetan inhabitants getting on well with the Muslim rulers. Jyekundo was reported to be the centre of wool weaving industry.

There is evidence of close and quite amicable relations between the Chinese Muslims and Lhasa in the visits to Lhasa of the Kansu Mission in 1920 (Summary para. 48), the “Sining Amban” in 1924 (Summary para. 56) the Sining delegate in 1934 at the time of Huang Musung’s mission (Summary para. 75). Further, in 1933 the Sining leaders made a favourable armistice with the Tibetans (Summary para. 70) and at the time of the Communist invasion of East Tibet in 1935–1936 the Tibetan general helped the Kansu authorities to get supplies (Summary para. 80). The bargain about the release of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama appears to have been quite amicable. (Summary para. 94).

**Nangchen** — A Tibetan principality between Chiamdo and Jyekundo. Now under Chinghai.

**Derge** — Formerly the most important Tibetan Kingdom of Kham. Probably more or less independent for most of its history except for religious ties with Lhasa. Came into closer connection with Lhasa in 1860–1863 after the Tibetan expedition to Nyarong. Captured by Chao Erh-feng in 1908; retaken by the Tibetans in 1917; lost again in 1932. There has recently been a suggestion that a faction of the people of Derge want the heir of their kings to be restored to his throne, while the Chinese support another claimant. The extent of Chinese control there is not clear, but the Sikang Governor seems to have consulted the Tibetans about the succession to the Titular kingship of Derge.

**Nyarong and the Hor States** — The country is pastoral rather than agricultural; it produces gold, musk and furs; the valleys produce wheat, barley and vegetables. Nyarong was brought under direct Tibetan control in 1860–1863 with the approval of the Chinese Emperor after a Tibetan expedition to depose a troublesome ruler of Nyarong who had attacked the neighbouring Hor States and Derge. Nyarong and the Hor States were absorbed by Chao Erh-feng in 1910.

**Gyarong** — Claimed by Tibet in 1914 as falling within the racial boundary. A collection of people of mixed Tibetan stock in the West borders of the Szechuan plain. Probably never had much connection with Lhasa. Their language is of Tibetan stock, but appears to be a different language from Tibetan. (Edgar’s report 1907.)

**Chala** — A Tibetan kingdom, with its capital at Tachienlu. It was absorbed by the Chinese in 1905. Descendants of the former ruler are kept as pensioners of the Chinese (Chungking report 123 of 26th April 1939.)

**Batang, Litang, Chantreng** — Tibetan monastic states, south of Derge. Captured by Chao Erh-feng 1908–1909. Chantreng (Hsiang cheng) appears to be still turbulent and troublesome. In 1921 when it was nominally under Chinese rule, the Dalai Lama wrote to the people of Chantreng ordering them not to cause trouble.

The country between the Salween, Mekong and Yangtse in the extreme north of Yunnan (North of Weisi and West of Atunste) appears to be inhabited by Tibetan tribes over whom there is no Chinese control, but probably no control from Lhasa either. Chinese money does not seem to be generally accepted in Kham.

For Chinghai see General Pereira’s report on his journey from Peking to Lhasa 1921–1922. Copy to P.O.S. with F. and P. Memo 664 X of 2-8-1923.
For East Tibet generally see Teichman's Travels in East Tibet.
Mr. Coale's report. 1917. (F. & P. Memo. 293 E.B. of 24-9-1917.)

E. Tibet. History. Sources.

(1) Teichman "Travels in East Tibet. Part I."
(2) Teichman. op. cit. Parts II and III.
  Summary paras. 24, 25, 28.
  Secy. to Govt. of Assam to F.D. Letter 231 of 26-5-1910.
  Secy. to Govt. of Burma to F.D. Letter 702 C 27 of 3-6-1910.
(3) Teichman. op. cit. Part IV. Summary paras. 29 and 33.
(4) Teichman. op. cit. Part V.
(5) Teichman. op. cit. Part V. Summary paras. 46 and 47.
(6) Summary paras. 48, 55 and 60.
(7) Summary paras. 65, 66, 67 and 70.
(10) Summary paras. 45, 47, 48, 50D, 52, 55, 60, 67, 70, 78, 80, 83, 104.
(11) Summary paras. 45, 48, 60, 66, 70.

Conclusion — The nomad tribes of the uplands appear to be of relatively small potential value in protecting Tibet from Chinese invasion, and their country of relatively small attraction for Chinese settlers. The easiest route for a Chinese army to reach Lhasa seems to be by the Northern route through the nomads, country, and it is the country rather than the people which constitutes a barrier to any but a well organised force. Movement of large caravans by the north route is limited by the amount of grazing available, but this would not impede a mechanised force.

Kham might prove a harder problem for the Chinese. The road through Batang and Chiamdo to Lhasa runs through more difficult country than the northern route, and the people were better organised than the nomads. The Khampas have the reputation of being wilder and more truculent than the Central Tibetans, but they appear to lack any national cohesion, and to be more given to sectional feuds than the people of Central Tibet. They have never united either with Lhasa or amongst themselves to resist the Chinese.

The Tibetans have asserted control over the states on the West of the Yangtse which were mainly monastic districts and probably easier to unify than the semi-independent Kingdoms such as lie on the Chinese side. The present de facto frontier seems as much as the Tibetans could hope to hold.

It has been variously debated whether the Khampas prefer Chinese or Tibetan rule. The answer is probably that they prefer to be left to themselves. We have little evidence of the degree of control now exercised by the Chinese in such places as Derge and Batang, or of the degree of success of Chinese attempts to make the Khampas into good Chinese. It is probable that at present the Chinese are riding them on a loose rein, and that their administration is based on a compromise; a stricter policy might throw them into the arms of the Tibetan Government.

Much of Kham appears to be suitable for Chinese settlement. It used to be said that Chinese who mixed with Tibetans were absorbed by the Tibetans, and it would be interesting to know whether Chinese are in fact acquiring land in Chinese Kham, and with what results. Our knowledge of conditions in the borderland is all too slight.
Appendix V

China and Negotiations With Tibet

1914 — Tripartite Negotiations at Simla.
All parties on an equal footing in spite of efforts by Chinese to keep Tibetan representative in a subordinate position. (Summary para. 34.)
The idea of Outer and Inner Tibet was accepted. In the latter China would exercise as much influence as she was able. China was prepared to recognise the autonomy of Outer Tibet, to refrain from intervention in its administration, and to abstain from sending troops there. Tibet was willing to agree to the recognition of Chinese suzerainty and to accept an Amban, with his escort, at Lhasa. The borders of Tibet and the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet were to be as shown by the Red and Blue lines on Map 1. This map was a compromise. The Tibetans had claimed even more than the territory within the red line; and the Chinese, on the basis of Chao Erh-feng’s conquests in 1910, had claimed a line running only a small distance to the East of Lhasa. (Map 2.)
The first proposal for a compromise had given to Outer Tibet the districts of Derge and Nyarong, and Tachienlu and Garong to Inner Tibet; but this had been modified to meet Chinese protests. (Summary para. 36.)
The Convention, including the map (Map 1) was initialled by all parties. The Chinese Government disavowed the action of their plenipotentiary, and refused to proceed to signature. They made it clear that the boundary question was the only obstacle (Summary para. 37.)

Shortly after the conclusion of negotiations the Chinese Government presented a memorandum containing further proposals for the settlement of the boundary question. These are shown in Map 3. As they did not represent any advance, His Majesty’s Government declined to reopen negotiations. (Summary para. 38.)

1915 — The Chinese made overtures to the Tibetan Government (Summary para. 45) and the Chinese Government gave another memorandum to His Majesty’s Minister in China with proposals for a settlement. (Papers not available in Sikkim. See His Majesty’s Minister’s telegram 179 of June 1915.) There were no negotiations. (Summary para. 46.)

1918 — The local agreements between Chinese and Tibetan officials brought about at Chiamdo and Rongbatsa by Mr. Teichman were never accepted by the Chinese Government. (Summary para. 47.)

1919 — The Chinese Government reaffirmed their acceptance of the 1914 Convention except for the boundary clause, and made fresh proposals for the boundary settlement. These are shown on Map 3. Most of what had been proposed in the compromise of 1914 for Inner Tibet was to be absorbed into the Chinese provinces of Szechuan and Yunan; but China was prepared to include in Inner Tibet part of the Kokonor territory to which she had formerly made strong claims. The principal gain was the Chinese agreement to the inclusion in Outer Tibet of the districts of Chiamdo, Draya, Gonjo and Markham. The proposals implied that the Tibetans would have to relax their hold on Derge, which they had occupied in their recent advance. These overtures unfortunately came to nothing. (Summary para. 48.)

1920 — British proposal of tripartite negotiation, at Lhasa, Chinese suggest possibility of separate agreement with Tibet, to be witnessed by H.M.G. (No result.) (Summary para. 49.)

1921 — A memorandum was handed to the Chinese Government regarding our intention to deal with Tibet as autonomous under the suzerainty of China. The Chinese expressed their readiness to reopen negotiations after the Washington Conference. (Summary para. 50-D.) Nothing came of this. (Summary para. 52.)

1928 — The Chinese Government proposed a treaty with His Majesty’s Government about Tibet, and referred to the Convention of 1906. This ignored both the 1914 Convention and the Tibetan Government. It went unanswered. (Summary para. 60.) Since that time the Chinese have shown resentment at British intervention in Tibetan affairs.

1932 — The Chinese Government refused the good offices of His Majesty’s Government in trying to bring about a settlement with Tibet. This was at a time when the Chinese had won military successes against the Tibetans on the border. (Summary para 67.)
1933 — The Chinese Government again refused to be drawn into negotiations. (Summary para. 70.) The Government of India informed the Tibetan Government that there was no objection to their trying to arrange a direct settlement with China of the boundary question.

1934 — Huang Mu-sung negotiated direct with the Tibetan Government at Lhasa. These events are described fully in Summary paras. 73 to 75. The Tibetan Government resisted almost all the Chinese demands, but were prepared to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty to the extent contemplated by the 1914 Convention, in return for Chinese recognition of Tibetan autonomy, and for a fixed boundary. The negotiations came to nothing. The Chinese offer on the subject of the boundary would have given Tibet a frontier roughly on the line proposed for Outer Tibet in the Chinese offer of 1919. (See Map 3.)

Appendix VI

The Assam Tribal Area South of the McMahon Line. (Map 5)

This note is designed as a sketch of the tribes living on the Indian side of the McMahon Line, with the particular intention of examining the extent to which Tibetan influence can be traced.

It is based only on such evidence as is available in Sikkim; and Assam can doubtless provide much more full and accurate information about the southern aspect, while Burma may be able to throw light on the special problem of the Burma-China border, and of the Nungs. (Summary para. 91.)

Monbas. (Bhutias). "Lowlanders". Tib — These inhabit about 2,000 square miles of country to the east of Bhutan. There are several divisions of these Monbas. Taking them from north to south they are; —

1. Monbas of Tawang — About 10,000 in number, living in the Tawang valley to the south of the Tibetan Border (McMahon Line) and north of the Se La. These people are completely under Tibetan administration and fall within the jurisdiction of the Tsona Dzong. The Tawang monastery also has rights of taxation in this area. Taxes mostly in grain and paper, of an unknown amount, are collected and forced labour is exacted. Tibetan officials try cases and inflict punishments.

The leading officials of Tawang Monastery are Tibetans appointed by the parent monastery of Drepung. The rest of the monks are mostly Monbas. The people are Buddhists.

The country is fertile and produces wheat, barley, some rice, maize, etc. Cows, yaks and sheep are kept.

Coarse paper and red woollen cloth are manufactured.

They customs appear to be more like those of Bhutan and Sikkim than of Tibet. Many Monbas of Tawang go to Tsetang on the Brahmaputra to trade.

Two routes go from Tawang to Tsona; one by the Milakatong La, which is only open for a few months in the year, the other by the Nyamjang Chu which is open all the year. Communication to the south is by the Se La which is open only from July to November.

A posa of Rs. 5,000 per annum is paid to officials of Tawang apparently in their capacity of successors of the Seven Rajas, subordinate to the “Tawang Raja”, who were awarded this sum in 1843 as compensation for giving up their claims to exact tribute from the Kuriapara Duar. This money is handed over to the Dirang Dzongpons at Udalgiri, and part of it is sent to Drepung Monastery.

2. Sherchokpa. “Easterners” — A vague designation for Monbas living south of the Se La — It is convenient to apply the name to the inhabitants of the area with Dirang Dzong as its centre.

This is a well-wooded, fertile country, but is sparsely inhabited. It falls under the de facto jurisdiction of the Tsona Dzongpon. Dirang Dzongpons who are appointed by the Tawang monastery, and have no connection with Tsona Dzong also collect taxes here. The people are Buddhists.

The language differs from that of Tawang and also from that of the district to the South. There is a road from Se La to Kalaktang.

The neighbouring Mijis and Akas are reported to oppress these people.
3. **Rongnongpas** — Inhabit the area to the south of the Sherchokpas. The principal town is Kalaktang. The Tsona Dzong has no jurisdiction here, but Tawang monastery appoints two Dzongpons who collect tributes.

The language differs from that of other Monbas.

The country is fertile, wooded, and has tracts of good grazing. It produces barley, maize, wheat, beans, peas, onions, chillies and other vegetables, and rice grown in terraced and irrigated fields. The plough is used south of the Se La, and the Tibetan hoe in the Tawang area. Cattle and poultry are kept.

The people are quiet and well behaved. They move down to the Amratolla in the cold weather whence they visit the plains for trade, principally in chillies, majita dye, and a few cattle. They take back salt, iron and cotton cloth.

4. **Sherdukpen** — Live to the north-east of the Rongnongpas and south-east of the Sherchokpas. Their principal villages are Rupa and Shergaon. They are practically independent of Tibetan authority, but pay a small sum to the Tawang monastery through its officials at Kalaktang. They are persecuted by the Akas on their east to whom they pay tribute.

They speak a different language from other Monbas, and although Buddhists and classed as Monbas, they are reported to resemble more closely their more savage neighbours to the east.

The Sherdukpen are more vigorous traders than the rest of the Monbas, and bring down cattle and poultry, skins, dyes and chillies by the Belsiri river route to Assam via Doimara.

Their country and its products are like those of the Rongnongpas. A posa of Rs. 2,526/7/- is paid to the villages of Rupa and Shergaon in compensation for tribute which their Rajas formerly claimed from the plains. Mackenzie reports that this sum was reduced in 1839, but it appears to have been restored as Assam Tribal administration reports show that Rs. 2,526 is paid annually.

They consider themselves British subjects, and are well behaved. In 1942-43 Tibetan officials entered Sherdukpen country and collected taxes; this called forth a protest from the Government of India.

5. **Tembang Monbas** — These inhabit a village to the east of the Sherchokpas. Formerly connected with the Sherdukpen, but separated from them some time in the 19th century. They receive posa of Rs. 45.

They are reported to be a quiet people and to suffer much at the hands of the Mijis.

6. **Monbas of But and Konia** — These occupy two villages on the eastern limit of Monba country. The inhabitants are reported to have migrated from Dirang about 100 years ago, but have now degenerated and have lapsed from Buddhism and are a miserable people under the thumb of the neighbouring Mijis, who threat them as serfs.

7. **Bhutanese** — There are some settlers in the south west corner of the area, who pay taxes to the Dirang Dzongpen.

The Monbas south of the Se La are reported to number only about 4,000.

There are other Monba settlements further to the east which will be described later.

**Tibetan Influence** — This is supreme in the Tawang area, strong in Mago and in the Sherchokpa country where it extends almost to the administered border of Assam, and Tibetan feelers have recently been put out into the Sherdukpen country.

The Monbas as a whole appear to be related to the Bhutanese (...east Tibetans.) Their languages, houses, and bridges are reported to be similar. They do not go in for slavery.

The country is rich but south of the Se La it is sparsely populated, for which the actions of the Tibetans on the north and the Mijis on the east may be responsible.

It appears that the Monbas would welcome protection although the gloomy estimate of their condition formed by Lightfoot is not confirmed by Kingdon Ward, who considers them cheerful and contented, and that Tibetan rule is by no means oppressive, its principal fault being neglect. But his visit to the area was not extensive.

**NOTE** — As a result of the establishment of posts of the Assam Rifles at Dirang Dzong and Rupa, the Monbas have been encouraged to stand up for themselves and the activities of Tibetan officials south of the Se La have been considerably restricted, and in particular the Talung Dzongpons appointed by Tawang monastery who used to collect tribute in the Kalaktang area and tolls at Amratulla have been unable to make any collections.
Mackenzie

History of Relations with Hill Tribes of N E. Frontier of Bengal. 1884.
Report of Capt. Nevill's expedition to Tawang. 1914. (Sikkim File 15 C 1914.)
Military report on Bhareli River and Tawang area. 1920.
Report of Capt. Lightfoot's expedition to Tawang. 1938. (Sikkim File (3)-P/38.)

Kingdon Ward


Bailey

Annual Reports on Assam Frontier Tribes.

Mago — East of Tawang; north of the Se La; and just south of the McMahon Line lies an isolated valley containing about 200 people (in 1913). They are subjects of the Samdrup Potrang family of Lhasa, and appear to be quite distinct from the Tibetans and more like the Monbas.

Their language is a dialect of Tibetan, but their dress and customs are quite different, and they talk about "going to Tibet" when they cross the mountains. They are Buddhists.

The country is wet and wooded like the rest of Monyul. They grow no crops but keep yaks and exchange the produce for grain and dyes brought by Monbas and Daflas. They barter cheese, butter and planks with the Tibetans for salt and grain.

This little-known people, theoretically within the British sphere of influence, is administered by, or rather pays taxes to, an agent, a Tibetan noble, of Samdrup Potrang, with his headquarters at Kishung in Tibet.

Akas — These people inhabit the valley of the lower Bichom River and its tributary the Tenga. Their neighbours on the west are Monbas; on the east Daflas; on the north Mijis, and Silung Abors; and on the N.E. Miris.

Their name means, in Assamese, "Painted", and is derived from their custom of smearing their faces with black resin.

They are divided into clans of which the Kutsun (Assamese Hazarikhoa) and Kavatsun (Assamese Kapachor) are the principal. Mackenzie reports that in 1884 these two clans consisted of 260 families. They are reported to be dying as they and their Sherdukpen neighbours suffer from the ravages of pneumonia. They are held in esteem by their neighbours to whom they are superior in education and industry. They are quiet and well-behaved internally but exact tributes from the Monbas on their west, heavier than that paid by the Monbas to Tawang.

The Kutsun and Kavatsun clans are led by Rajas who are not hereditary; public affairs are conducted by panchayets.

Their language is Tibeto-Burman but the examples given in the Military Report 192 contain very few verbal similarities to Tibetan.

Religion, not clearly described; apparently animist.

Their cultivation is by jhuming and they grow millet, maize, barley, hill rice, chillies, onions, tobacco, etc. The soil is good and water plentiful. There were signs of rough terracing in some areas in 1920. They keep mithun and a few horses.

They trade with Assam, taking grain, skins, chillies, beeswax, musk and dyes down to the plains and buying salt, iron and cotton cloth and Assam silk. They also trade with Sherdukpen from whom they buy silver ware.

The country is easy, and village paths could with little labour be converted into mule tracks.

The Political Officer, Balipara, visits Jamiri, and other villages regularly; and in 1931 a party of Aka girls went to Charduar to dance for His Excellency the Governor of Assam.
Mackenzie reports that they were paid posa of Rs. 6,683 and the Military report says that the Kutsun and Kavatsun chiefs receive posa; but the Assam Tribal Administration reports do not mention this payment.

Their country would bear a much larger population, and they would probably respond to increased interest in their development.

There is no mention of Tibetan influence in this country. From 1829 to 1884 the Akas gave a good deal of trouble, most of which appears to have resulted from misunderstandings. In 1883–1884 there was an Aka expedition. In 1914 there was an Aka Promenade which found the people friendly and peaceful.

There is practically no slavery among the Akas.

Mijis — Inhabit the upper Bichom river. They resemble the Akas in dress, manner and customs, but are idle and not so clean as their neighbours.

They have a different language from the Akas.

They have no chiefs but have elected headmen who have in some cases become hereditary. Among themselves they are peaceful, but they lord it over the Monbas of But, Konia and Tembang. From 1937 to 1939 their oppressions went so far as the taking of slaves, and they tried to exact tribute from the Sherdrukpen, from which they were deterred by a military patrol.

The Mijis trade mainly with Tibet.

They do not appear to receive posa.

Miri Akas — A scattered tribe on the Pachuk river to the North east of the Aka country.

They act as middlemen between the Akas and their hereditary foes the Daflas.

They appear to be a mixed people, but to have a language of their own.

There is little on record about them except that they visit the plains for trade, and are well-behaved.

Sillung Abors — A small body of these people of whom the main tribe lies further east is settled to the north of the Akas. They are like the Mijis in appearance but have a different language. They act as middlemen between the Mijis and Daflas.

There is another section of them who are nomadic.

Authority

Annual Reports on Assam Tribal Areas.
Mackenzie. Relations with the Hill Tribes of the N.E. Frontier.

Daflas — A widely spread populous tribe made up of a number of clans which appear to lack cohesion. They extend roughly from the Bhareli river to the lower reaches of the Subansiri.

They cultivate by jhuming and their villages which for the most part are independent units are constantly shifting.

The land appears to be fertile.

The Daflas are said to be of the same stock as the Miris and Abors and their language is similar.

They are a proud truculent and violent people and their numbers seem to be increasing. They are given to raiding, slavery and murder. The Eastern Daflas (Tagen) are finer men than the Western; (Yonno) there are also Daflas settled in the plains who appear to suffer from raids by their kinsmen in the hills and who require to have Government passes before they are allowed to visit the hills.

They grow rice but barely enough for their own consumption. Many of them come down to the plains to trade.

The Daflas have given plenty of trouble in the past and Mackenzie reports that raids were made by them up to 1875. There were several punitive expeditions but relations with their chiefs remained friendly. In 1914 they opposed the Aka Promenade. They continue raiding in the tribal areas.

The Daflas receive posa of about Rs. 2,000.
Hill Miris — Their name means "middle men" and they include a number of clans lying between the Daflas and Abors who are all of common stocks. They cover a wide stretch of country north of the Daflas and up to and across the Subansiri.

They cultivate by jhuming and grow hill rice, maize and millet. Those that are known to Assam are friendly, lazy and take opium.

Little is known of the tribes up the Subansiri north of the Kamla River and although there is evidence of contact with the Tibetans the Military report states that the Miris are not under Tibetan influence.

The Hill Miris are paid posa which is recorded in one instance as Rs. 370 in another as Rs. 761 and in another as Rs. 890.

They appear to be rarely visited by the Political Officer.

Apa Tanangs or Ankhas — Inhabit a wide upland valley N.W. of the Ranga river and are estimated to number 20,000.

They appear to be something like the Daflas in language but have different customs and do not intermarry with Daflas or Abors. They have feuds with Daflas particularly those of the big villages of Likha and Licha near the junction of the Kiying and Panir rivers at whose hands they suffer loss of property and also with the Miris.

The name Ankha comes from their custom of wearing a tail of plaited cane.

They have a good system of village government and are far ahead of Daflas and Abors in agriculture. Irrigated rice is their staple crop. They use ploughs make terraces and keep cattle. They trade in grain with the Daflas and Abors and visit the plains in considerable numbers to work on tea gardens.

They were reported to have some connection with Tibet but the Military report considers that the Tibetan articles which they possess have come through the Daflas and Miris.

They keep serfs whose condition is better than that of the slaves of the Daflas and Abors. They are an isolated and self-sufficient people and in their own country they have no use for money.

NOTE — Recent information indicates that there is a considerable, and previously unknown, settlement of Tibetans in the Khru river valley centering round a large monastery where there is an official who is described as a 'Raja'.

(Fortnightly reports on Assam Tribal Areas for the first half of January 1945, paragraph 2, and for the first half of February 1945, paragraph 2.)
Tibetan authority and even to have been paid a sort of danegelt by the Tibetans. Some time before 1913 they were defeated in war by the Tibetans and since then they have paid taxes to the Chayul Dzong. The tribe seems to have been scattered and reduced by the war with Tibet.

**Tingba Lopas** — A Dafla tribe who travel up the Subansiri in November to Lung, in Tibet, where they trade with the Lung Tu Lopas.

**Morangwa Tingba** — These are possibly Miris. They cut their hair like Abors, and live in a valley called Morang, which may be “Mora” mentioned by the Miri Mission of 1911–1912.

They go to Migyitun in Tibet and exchange rice, cane, dyes and skins for woollen cloth. Their journey takes them from six to ten days. The Tibetans bribe them to allow the Tsari pilgrims to pass freely.

The geography of the Upper waters of the Subansiri and its tributaries and of Tsari, is very indefinite; but it appears from Bailey’s report that in order to perform the great Tsari pilgrimage Tibetans have to cross the McMahon Line, perhaps for six days march, and that while they are in this country they are in danger from the Lopas, whom they bribe to refrain from attacks on the pilgrims.

Although the Lungtu Lopas, who formerly had a strong footing north of the McMahon Line and claimed taxes from Tsari district, now pay taxes to Chayul Dzong, it seems that Tibetan influence does not extend south of the McMahon Line in this area on account of the warlike nature of the Morangwa Lopas.


**Southern Miris** — These appear to have two main sections each comprising a number of clans. The Abors claimed them as subordinates, and they acted as intermediaries between the Abors and the plains. They inhabit the plains and foothills along the north bank of the Brahmaputra from Lakhimpur district to the Dihang River.

**Abors** — A vague name, meaning according to the Assam Census Report 1881, “independent”; and according to the Military report 1931, “Savages”. It covers a number of related but separate akin to the Miris and Daflas, inhabiting the country between the Subansiri and Sisseri rivers, and including the Dihang River valley. The Abors border on tribes more closely akin to Tibetan in the northern part of the Dihang River.

The Abors are the most numerous group in the tribal area between Tibet and Assam. They have a single language which is similar to that of the Miris and Daflas, but which exhibits considerable differences in the eastern and western parts of their territory and in the various tribal divisions.

They are Tibetan stock; but along with the Miris and Daflas are said to avoid the use of milk as “Unclean”. This custom is found in Indo-Chinese peoples. They are fierce, uncouth, and arrogant. They keep slaves whom they capture or buy from their neighbours. In 1910 some Tibetans escaped from Abor captivity; it seems that these were some of the Eastern Tibetan immigration into Mipi, and that the Abors bought them from the Mishmis.

Their staple food is rice and they eat meat and fish; they drink a millet beer, and smoke tobacco.

Their agriculture is by jhuming, and is primitive. There are rough attempts at terracing in the north. They keep cattle (mythan) but do not use milk.

Their country is very wet.

**Western Abors** — Little is known; they are vaguely called Galong, and include tribes called Dobang, Tadun, Karko, Memong, Bori and Bokar. The Karko were helpful to the Survey party of 1912; the Memong and Boris opposed it.

**Eastern Abors** — Pasi, Minyong, Padam, Milang, Komkar, Pang, Karko, Simong, Bom-lanbo.

Since 1929 there has been intermittent war between the Pangi on one side and the Minyong and Padam on the other.

Minyong and Padam are the largest tribes of the southern section of eastern Abors, and British administration extends some way into their country to the extent that the inhabitants up to a vague line, pay poll tax, and others up to the Yembung river are “under our control”, by means of military posts at Pangi, Riga, and Karko. The Minyong village of Kebang appears to fall within this line, but other Minyongs to the North are unadministered. Within the tribes villages are self-governed.
The state of war between Abor tribes appears to be due to the fact that the central Abors do not cultivate enough crops for their own needs and are driven to raid their more developed neighbours to the south. There is also a system of trade blocks by which powerful tribes prevent traders from the south passing through their country, in order that they may enjoy the profits of middlemen. Continual raids by the Abor tribes on each other’s herds of cattle are another cause of trouble. During the evacuation of Burma in 1942, the Abors furnished a Labour Corps of some 2,000 men, which did fine work on the route leading to India through Ledo. One porter of the Padam clan was awarded the Albert Medal for an exceptionally fine piece of rescue work.

It is stated in the Assam tribal administration report for 1928–1929 that the best way to improve conditions would be to encourage the growth of wet rice among the hinterland Abors, and it seems from later reports that encouragement of this sort and by helping in the sale of Abor blankets and other produce is in progress; but it is not clear how far its effects extend.

History of Abor Expeditions may be read in the Military Reports.

**Tibetan Influence** — South of the McMahon Line there is a tribe of Monbas speaking a Tibetan language similar to that of Twang. They appear to have pushed the Abors out of the Tibetan district of Pemako, and to have occupied the valley of the Dihang below where the Tibetan language similar to that of Twang. They appear to have pushed the Abors out of the Tibetan district of Pemako, and to have occupied the valley of the Dihang below where it crosses the McMahon Line, and also the upper valley of the Siyom to the west. The latter people are known as Pachakshiribas, and they pay taxes to the Lhalu family. There are remnants of Abor tribes (Lopas) living among these Monbas.

In 1905 the warlike inhabitants of the semi-independent Tibetan kingdom of Po, who claimed overlordship of the Monbas of the Dihang, came into conflict with the Abors on account of frontier disputes. The Popas sent troops to help the Monbas. Since that time there have been Popa claims to collect taxes as far down the Dihang as Karko and Simong. The Tibetan Government appears to have taken over the claims of the Popas after the Po war in which the semi-independent king was defeated. The king of Po fled to Sadiya through Abor country and was pursued by Tibetan officials and soldiers. In 1931 the escape of the king of Po from surveillance at Sadiya, and his death in Mishri country led to an expedition by Monbas, possibly with Tibetan support, to take vengeance on the village of Komkar which appears to have been suspected of complicity in the death of the King. There were also reports of Monbas visiting Shimong and Karko and collecting taxes, or tribute. In 1933 the Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract, considered that Simong and Karko were the de facto dividing line between British and Monba influence. Later, in 1938–1939 parties of Tibetans came to these villages and levied tribute. It is possible that the earlier visitors were also Tibetan or Popa for the Monbas in other parts are apparently an inoffensive people. There may be Tibetan officials at Jido or at Nyerang, south of the McMahon Line where Bailey reported the Popas to have established some officers in 1905.

Tibetans do not use the route down the Siang valley, through Abor country, to the plains. In the northern area people from south of the McMahon Line cross over into Tibet to trade. Pachakshiri Monbas, Dihang Monbas Dihang Lopas and other Abor tribes seem to cross into the Kongbo district in the Tsangpo valley by a number of passes from the Tungu La to the Doshong La. There are a number of routes leading from the Dihang valley into Tibet.

The Abors do not appear to receive posa although Mackenzie states that they formerly did so, and that the posa was converted into payment in kind.

**Mishmis** — Inhabit from the Sisseri River to the Lohit, and its southern hills.

There are three main clans: Mithu (Chulikata “crop head”) Taroan (Digaru) and Miju. The Mithu inhabit the valleys of the Dibung and its tributaries. They are divided into eight principal sections of which the Mithun are known to the Assamese as “Bebejiya”. There are a large number of sub-divisions into exogamous sects.

The Taroan inhabit the right bank of the Lohit between the Dening river and the Delai-Dou watershed.

The Miju inhabit the Lohit valley south of Walong as far as the Dou confluence.

The last two clans number about 25,000.

They are Mongoloid, of unknown origin. Each clan has a different dialect. By nature they are uncertain, lazy, dirty, but enduring. They keep slaves, usually the descendants of captives, whom they treat quite well.
The Mithu do not smoke opium but the Taroan and Miju do so. Their principal food is rice. They cultivate by jhuming and grow, in addition to maize, millet, rice, beans, peas, chilies, tobacco and in the east some cotton and opium. They keep cattle.

Although there has been and still is a number of feuds between villages and tribes particularly among the Mithu, the Mishmis as a whole appear to be manageable and quiet.

As with the Abors, some of the Mishmis are "administered" and others "unadministered", but there seems to be some show of exercising control over the whole body of Mishmis. The Military report 1931 considers that the Taroan and Miju "have been peacefully absorbed under the regular administration of the British Empire". But the Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract reported in 1939-40 that the Miju of the Upper Lohit had been left to themselves for 26 years and were completely independent. Nevertheless, it appears to be possible to visit these people and direct them to mend their ways. And in 1910 when the Chinese were displaying interest in the Mishmi, a Miju headman in the Lohit valley S. of Rima claimed to be a British subject.

None of the Mishmis receive posa.

**Tibetan Influence** — There is a settlement of Tibetans at Mipi in the valley of the Matun river which rises in the mountains south of the Chimbro Chu and crosses the McMahon Line.

Bailey reports that two waves of Tibetan immigration from Po and from Kham entered the valleys of the Dri Yongyap and Andra rivers at the beginning of this century. The majority were enslaved, killed or driven out by the Mishmis and the remainder settled in the Matun valley where they appear to get small reinforcements from the Chimbro valley from time to time.

**Note** — Recent information indicates that the remnants of the Tibetan settlement at Mipi were expelled by the Mishmis about 1920–1925. (Fortnightly report on Assam Tribal Areas for the second half of January 1945, paragraph I.)

The character of the colony is probably predominantly Popa by now. It is not clear whether this colony pays taxes to any Tibetan official but the probability is that it does so.

This Tibetan colony seems to check Mishmi trade with the Chimbro valley and the Chulikata Mishmis find their way into the Tibetan province of Zayul on their east by the Kaya and Agua passes. They go mainly for salt for which they barter grain, skins, musk and "tita".

The Miju Mishmis of the Lohit valley visit Rima in Tibet for trade and a small number live permanently in the neighbourhood of Rima.

South of the McMahon line in the Lohit Valley there is a settlement of Tibetans in the villages of Walong Tinai Pong and Kahao. The Military report states that Walong was formerly a Tibetan penal settlement while Capt. Godfrey reports that in this area runaway Tibetans were settled by the Miju Mishmis three generations ago to look after their herds in the grazing grounds along the Lohit valley. The descendants of these Tibetans appear to be degenerate in comparison with the Tibetans on the Zayul side of the McMahon Line and are apparently little more than serfs of the Mishmis. In addition the Tibetan officials of Zayul claim tribute from them.

Mr. Mainprice’s recent reports confirm what has been said by earlier visitors that the locally recognised boundary between Tibet and Assam is at Menilkrai, where the Chinese set up boundary posts in 1911–1912. Tibetan officials at Rima were apprehensive about British claims to the four Tibetan villages south of the McMahon Line. It may be noted that Miju villages on the Tibetan side of the McMahon Line of which two are reported near Rima do not pay any taxes to the Tibetans.

A considerable number of Tibetans travel by the Lohit valley route to trade in Assam and Bengal. They make use of the mule track constructed by the Sappers and Miners in 1912 up the Lohit valley as far as Minzong and which has probably helped to do away with the obstruction which the Tibetans formerly suffered at the hands of the Mishmis in their attempts to travel to Assam.

**Authority**


Report by Mr. Godfrey, Political Officer Sadiya Frontier Tract on his tour up the Lohit Valley to Rima.

Copy sent to E. A. D. by Secretary to the Governor of Assam with his D. O. 1623 G. S of 11-4-1940.

Tour Diary of Mr. Mainprice, A.P.O., Lohit Valley from Jan. 11 to Feb. 9, 1944. Copy to E. A. D. with Letter Tr 2/43/36 Ad. of 17-3-1944 from Adviser to Governor of Assam.
East of the Mishmis information becomes even scantier.

Eastwards of the Diphuk La in the jurisdiction of Burma come the Khamti Long. The connection between these and the Khamtis of the Assam tribal area is not clear. But both appear to be of Shan origin and to be Buddhists. How far they extend up to or along the McMahon Line is vague; but the military report of 1931 records that Tibetans cross the Diphuk La to trade in wool with the Khamtis and that the road is easy. But it appears from Kingdon Ward that the inhabitants of the Seingkhu valley and Adung valley are a primitive people called Daru or Hkanung (Nung). Apart from Kingdon Ward I can find no other authority on the Adung salient. He records that not far above the junction of the Seingkhu and Adung he found a small settlement of Nungs Lisus and Chinese — this well within the McMahon area. He also met Chinese peddlers who come principally for a medicinal root. Further up the Seingkhu but still within the McMahon Line he came on a settlement of Tibetans.

In the Adung valley he found another settlement of Tibetans at Tahawndam just north of Adung Long; and he reports that many Tibetans cross the Namni La near the head of the Adung river every year to gather medicinal roots. In addition Lisus and Chinese come over and the Nungs cross into Tibet for salt and cloth.

Mr Godfrey was informed in 1940 that there were large numbers of Chinese traders settled in Khampto Long.

The Tibetan influence in these areas does not appear to be great but in 1932 and 1933 there were reports that Tibetan officials from Jite were trying to collect taxes in the Adung Wang (Adung Long) and Seingkhu Wang areas. The Tibetan settlers treat the Nungs as serfs and carry some off into Tibet.

The presence of Lisus from the Salween valley is also noteworthy; and Kingdon Ward considers that there is a southward migration of Tibetans meeting a westward migration of Lisus.

There do not however appear to be signs of any great increase of either of these peoples but the district is largely unknown.

It may also be noted that in 1930 it was decided to exclude from Burma the upper valley of the Taron river which lay outside the McMahon Line.

It may also be observed that the China–Burma frontier is under dispute and that the Chinese appear to claim a line running from not far north of Myitkina to about the Diphuk La (the S. conjunction of "inner" and "outer" Tibet) while Burma’s claims in the early years of the century extended almost to the Salween at Hpimaw (Pienma), where there was a military post in 1920.

**Authorities**

Kingdon Ward  
Article in the Geographical Journal March 1930 on Seingkhu and Delei valleys.

Do.  
Article in Geographical Journal. April 1932 on the Burma Tibet Frontier.


Foreign to P.O.S. D.O. D.3566 of 20-7-1933. Sikkim File 7(10)-P/33.


**Conclusion** — There are three considerable wedges of Tibetan influence south of the McMahon Line and at least three small pockets of Tibetan settlement. See also notes at pages 114 and 117.

Tibetan administration is in force in the Towang area and as far south as Kalaktang.

The Pachakshiri Monbas are treated as Tibetan subjects but it does not seem that there are any resident Tibetan officials in that area.

The Monba–Popa mixture on the upper Dihang is strongly under Tibetan influence but it is not certain that there are Tibetan officials in the area although this is probable.

The Matun river pocket of Tibetan settlers is unimportant. See also notes at pages 114 and 117.

The Tibetan settlement south of Rima is of a poor type of Tibetan and does not appear to be increasing. The Tibetan officials of Rima claim taxes from these people.

The Adung Long pocket appears to be attracting more Tibetan official interest than before.
From Gori Chen to the Siyom information is scanty and there may be some Tibetan influence in the Western section although the absence of any known passers from Gori Chen to the Lha La makes this improbable.

From the Lha La to the Siyom Tibetan penetration seems to be effectively checked by the warlike Miris of the upper Subansiri. Across the northern border of the tribal area trade flows freely wherever the nature of the country admits.

Tibetan traders travel to Udalgiri in Assam in the Western area (from Tawang to Gori Chen) and in the Eastern area to Sadiya by the Lohit valley and by the Diphuk La. In the Subansiri they appear to travel only as far as to Simong.

From Gori Chen to the Tungu La and from the Yongyap La to the Lohit it appears that the tribal people cross the McMahon Line into Tibet for trade but that the Tibetans do not cross freely into the tribal country.

Along the southern boundary of the tribal area there is also a free flow of trade except in the central section where the Abor trade-blocks interfere to some extent.

The Abors and Miris thus appear to constitute a zone of obstruction both on the north and the south between their more tractable neighbours on either side.

In its internal aspect the area exhibits a great variety of people none of whom appear to have any tribal cohesion and all of whom even the Abors where they have come under British influence appear to respond to interest taken in them and to efforts to keep the peace. Hostility does not appear to be directed at the administration but against one another.

There is plenty of room for an increased population if improved methods of agriculture are introduced.

The obstacle to the spread of administration or influence is lack of communication.

Appendix VII

Relations between Tibet and Nepal

Legend credits the Seventh Century Tibetan King, Srong-tsen Gampo, with having married a Nepalese princess and a Chinese princess. From that time, although there is little evidence, it appears that the religious tie preserved good relations between Tibet and Nepal.

Ralph Fitch, an English traveller in 1573, reported a peaceful and prosperous trade between Tibet and India through Nepal. Orazio Della Penna records in 1730 that after the Manchu conquest of Tibet, Nepal was subjected to Tibet — presumably to the Chinese Amban at Lhasa.1

The conquest of Nepal by the martial Gurkhas in 1769 diminished the religious connection with Tibet and introduced an era of Nepalese aggression and Tibetan anxiety. In 1788 the Nepalese invaded Sikkim, then a dependency of Tibet, and were only induced to withdraw by the cession of the Tibetan border district of Kuti. In 1792 the Nepalese attacked Tibet on the pretext that the Tibetans were circulating base coin, but it seems that their real motive was greed for the wealth of Tashi Lhunpo. They reached and plundered this place with great rapidity to the alarm of the Tibetans. The Chinese Government despatched an army alleged to number 70,000 men, which overwhelmed the Gurkhas and pursued them to Katmandu, where a humiliating peace was imposed on them. They had to restore their loot and pay tribute to the Chinese Emperor. It was this Gurkha invasion that caused the closing of Tibet to traffic from India, because it was suspected at Lhasa that the recent treaty between the Government of India and Nepal implied that the British had instigated the attack by the Gorkhas. When the Gorkhas were suffering defeat from the Chinese they appealed to the Government of India for help; Major Kirkpatrick was sent to Katmandu to mediate but arrived too late.2

In 1854 war again broke out between Tibet and Nepal. This time the pretext for the attack was alleged Tibetan interference with the Nepalese tribute Mission to China. The charge may have been true as Tibet was beginning to pay less attention to the presence of Chinese Ambans. At all events China gave no help on this occasion, and after two years fighting the Tibetans were defeated and had to conclude a treaty with Nepal. This treaty of 1856, which still governs the relations of Tibet and Nepal, was signed without any reference to China other than a vague acknowledgment of the respect both parties felt for the Emperor. Tibet agreed to pay Rs. 10,000 per annum to Nepal; to cease collecting any dues from Nepalese subjects; to allow a Nepalese trading factory at Lhasa, and to allow extra territorial jurisdiction to be exercised by the Nepalese representative at Lhasa, whose rank was to be raised. Mutual agree-
ments were made for the return of prisoners, for extradition of offenders, and for the restitution of stolen goods of the other nationals. Nepal undertook to help Tibet if she were attacked; and also to restore Tibetan territory, arms, and property, seized during the war. The posting of an official of high rank at Lhasa was also a concession by Nepal; but there was no provision for a Tibetan representative at Katmandu.3

The Tibetans resented their humiliation, and after this treaty relations at Lhasa were strained. Outrages on Nepalese subjects there led to the breaking off of diplomatic relations in 1873. The Tibetans had to apologize, but feelings did not improve, and in 1880 there were fears of a Tibetan attack on Nepal. In 1883 a Tibetan mob looted property worth 9 lakhs of rupees belonging to Nepalese subjects at Lhasa, and it seems that no compensation was paid. It is not surprising therefore that in 1904 the Nepalese offered us their support in the British expedition to Lhasa.

The Nepalese officer at Lhasa acted as mediator in the negotiations between Colonel Younghusband and the Tibetan authorities.4

The revival of Chinese power at Lhasa produced feelings of greater sympathy between Nepal and Tibet, but an appeal by the Tibetan Government for help from Nepal in the terms of their treaty did not produce any result.5 The Nepalese representative found that the Chinese tried to whittle down Nepalese extraterritorial rights,6 and there were efforts by the Chinese Government to claim Nepal as a vassal state. The disturbances at the Revolution in 1912 caused losses of life and property to Nepalese subjects at Lhasa, and gave anxiety to the Nepalese Government who wished for settled conditions at Lhasa for the sake of their trading interests. The Maharaja of Nepal believed that the Chinese were bound to send a large force and overwhelm Tibet, and he advised the Tibetans to make terms with the Chinese Government. It seems also that he was considering the annexation of a small strip of Tibetan territory near Kirong if conditions in Tibet remained disturbed.7

When the Tibetans got the upper hand over the Chinese troops in Lhasa, the Nepalese representative negotiated the settlement between the two.8

When the Chinese had been driven out of Lhasa the growing spirit of Tibetan independence led to renewed resentment at the privileged position enjoyed by Nepalese subjects in Tibet, and their disregard of Tibetan religious scruples. The Tibetans also resented having to compensate the Nepalese subjects who had suffered losses during the disturbance that followed the ejection of the Chinese from Lhasa, particularly as most of the damage was done by Chinese soldiers. Moreover the closer connection between Tibet and the Government of India reduced the importance and prestige which the Nepalese representative at Lhasa had formerly enjoyed in the capacity of intermediary between Tibet and the outside world,9 and the improvement of the road between Kalimpong and Tibet caused a diminution of Tibetan trade with Nepal.

The usual source of friction was the question of Nepalese jurisdiction over half-Nepalese who appear to have been less well-behaved than the true Nepalese and to have used their claim to Nepalese protection to the annoyance of the Tibetan authorities. The Tibetans also alleged that Tibetan subjects who wanted to avoid the penalty for their misdeeds, would claim Nepalese nationality.

The Tibetans also resented the stationing of Nepalese officers at Shigatse and Gyantse, and Kuti although the treaty with Nepal only specified that there should be a Nepalese representative at Lhasa. The other officers seem to have been appointed between 1902 and 1904. The behaviour of individual Nepalese officers was an important factor in relations with Tibet. Major Jit Bahadur who was at Lhasa from 1904 to 1914 was popular and respected, but his immediate successors seem to have adopted an arrogant and overbearing attitude.10 The extensive nature of Nepalese claims can be seen in a demand made in 1916 that Nepalese jurisdiction in Tibet extended to "all non-Tibetans of Mongoloid appearance" including British subjects of Nepalese extraction.11 Nepalese jealousy of their special position in Tibet must have been sharpened by the growth of British influence, and this may have tended to hasten the decline in good relations between Tibet and Nepal. A particular point of resentment after 1921 was the action of the Government of India in supplying more arms to Tibet than had been supplied to Nepal.12

By 1923 there were signs of tension and the Prime Minister of Nepal expressed his fears about the growing truculence to the Tibetan authorities. The Tibetan Government on their side began to address both the Government of India, and the Government of Nepal on the
subject of jurisdiction over half-Nepalese in Tibet. From the letters of the Tibetan Government it appears that they had accepted the practice that the Nepalese officer at Lhasa had jurisdiction over the male issue of Nepalese-Tibetan marriages. In 1925 Tsarong Shape went to Katmandu to discuss the matter with the Maharaja. It appears that he intended to propose the registration of half-castes, and the imposition of some limit of the number of generations to which the descendants of half-castes could claim Nepalese nationality. He was also going to discuss the right of Nepal to post officers at places other than Lhasa.

Unfortunately, when Tsarong reached Katmandu he received orders from his government not to discuss those matters, as the Tibetan Government believed (mistakenly) that the question was being taken up with Nepal by the Government of India. In 1926 the Tibetan Government were advised to address a letter to the Government of Nepal on the lines of Tsarong Shape’s proposed agenda, but we have no record that this was done.

The reactionary movement against foreign innovations and the irresponsible regime of the favourite, Lungshar, caused a loss of touch between the Government of India and Lhasa, and in this period when British advice was rarely sought, relations between Tibet and Nepal deteriorated rapidly. In 1929 a serious situation developed over the case of Gyalpo Sherpa. This man was arrested by the Tibetans but claimed Nepalese nationality. He escaped from prison and took refuge in the Nepalese representative’s house whence he was removed by force by Tibetan police and soldiers. The crisis which nearly led to war, is described in para. 62 of the Summary. The tension of that time caused a renewal of close relations between the Dalai Lama and the Political Officer in Sikkim; and the renewal of that connection, which did much to bring the Tibet–Nepal crisis to a peaceful end, probably also worked towards preventing other subsequent incidents from developing into further crises.

The Chinese took their opportunity of fishing in the troubled waters and renewed their interest in Nepal with which they established contact through their Consul at Calcutta. The tension gradually subsided, and relations now appear to be amicable, for which much credit must go to the present Nepalese representatives in Tibet. Major Hiranya Bista, the representative at Lhasa is sociable and courteous in his dealings with Tibetan officials, and Capt. Pande who has been at Gyantse for many years is easy going and popular.

Nepal

   D.O. Parsons to Bailey. D.O. 1668 X of 30-6-1925 and enclosure.
Ditto Letter 193 of 25-12-1909.
Ditto Letter of 3-1-1909.
Ditto Letter 148 of 1-4-1910.
Ditto Letter 96 of 4-7-1910.
Ditto Letter 128 of 29-11-1911.
   Summary para. 20 and 28.
Ditto Letter 88 of 7-7-1912.
F. and P. to P.O.S. D.O. 459 (2)X/ of 23-1-1924 and enclosure para. 8.
   Summary paras. 20 and 28.
Ditto Letter 88 of 7-7-1912.
E.A.D. to P.O.S. D.O. of 17-9-1913 and encls.
Ditto Letter 111 of 26-8-1912.
Summary para. 29.

Bell to G. of I. Letter 10 of 22-4-1921.
Bell. Tibet part 1 Present. p. 233.

10. P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 122 P. of 14-3-1924.
Ditto Letter 84 P. of 14-3-1925.
Resident in Nepal to Sir D. Bray D.O. of 5-6-1923.

F. and P. to P.O.S. Letter 47 E.B. of 8-3-1917.

Ditto Letter 22 C. of 10-7-1922.

Resident in Nepal to F. and P. Letter 16 C of 26-6-1922.
P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 122 P. of 14-3-1924 and encls.

Bailey to Parsons. 357 P of 7-6-1926.

Ditto D.O. 82/P of 13-3-1925.

15. P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 84/P of 14-3-1925.
Weir to Parsons D.O. P/734/ of 9-9-1926.

17. Summary paras. 56 and 57.
16. Summary paras. 56 and 57.
17. Summary paras. 62 and 64.

Foreign to P.O.S. Telm 623/S of 25-2-1930.
P.O. to Foreign. Telm 1(3)P/30 of 8-3-1930.
Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 76 S of 10-3-1930.
P.O. to Foreign. Telm 1(5)P/30 of 8-8-1930.
Britenvoy to Foreign and P.O.S. Telm 1 T of 13-8-1930.
Caroe to Williamson D.O. F 1(2)X/34 of 27-11-1934 and encls.
F. and P. to P.O.S. Letter 279 X of 17-9-1930 and connected correspondence.
F. and P. to P.O.S. Memo. F 279(2)X/30 of 17-1-1931 and connected correspondence.
Wylie to Weir D.O. 351 X/31 of 3-2-1932 and connected correspondence.
Reid to Williamson D.O. of 5-6-1934.

Appendix VIII

Relations between Kashmir and Tibet

The early history of Ladakh and Western Tibet may be read in Francke’s History of Western Tibet. For many centuries Ladakh and Western Tibet formed an independent Tibetan Kingdom which underwent a number of changes in dynasty, extent and strength. From the middle of the Seventeenth Century the boundary between the Tibetan kingdom of Ladakh and the territories of the Lhasa Government were roughly what are now the boundaries of Ladakh and Tibet. The Kingdom of Ladakh was conquered by the Raja of Kashmir in 1834-1840, since when there has been some sort of understanding about trade and general relations between the two countries.
In 1918 the Tibetan Governor of Rudok carried off a Kashmiri subject, named Lhagyal, and his flocks, from a grazing ground known as Dokpo Karpo. The Kashmir Durbar protested and from this incident has followed a long series of discussions, mostly inconclusive. The Tibetan Government, after pressure, released Lhagyal but asked that some of their subjects, who appear to have left Tibet to avoid taxation should be returned to them. They also claimed that Dokpo Karpo was in Tibet, and they alleged that the Kashmir officials had imposed an embargo on the export of barley from Kashmir, contrary to a treaty between Kashmir and Tibet, and that there were disagreements about the mutual provision of transport.1

It may be observed in passing that Tibetan memories are long, and that as recently as 1937 Shape Lanchungnga referred to the return of Lhagyal as a reason for the return of Tibetan subjects from Kashmir. He ignored, as the Tibetan Government have consistently ignored, the difference between the release of a man held in Tibet against his will, and the return of Tibetan subjects who do not want to leave Kashmir. It was proposed that matters in dispute should be settled at a joint conference which should be attended by a British Commissioner in view of the necessity for ratification by the Government of India of any decision reached by the Kashmir authorities. They also gave their opinion on the treaty of 1842 between Tibet and Kashmir, which they regarded as of doubtful validity, since it was made between the defunct Sikh state and the Emperor of China, and was in any case in vague terms.2

The joint meeting took place at Dokpo Karpo (see map 6) in 1924, and its heritage has been so far been unfulfilled, although the Tibetan Government did touch on the question in 1937.

A detailed analysis of the evidence, conducted in 1929 by the Surveyor General, led to the conclusion that Tibet’s claim was by far the better.3

2. Trade Relations between Kashmir and Tibet — The embargo on the export of barley from Ladakh was explained as a temporary measure due to a local shortage.

In the place of a system of exemption from taxation of certain traders it was proposed that matters in dispute should introduce a 2 per cent. duty on imports. This duty is a complicated question and a full note on it will be found in Sikkim File 7(7)P/41.

The tax obviously needed the approval of the Government of India and the Government of Tibet, but it seems that the Kashmir authorities began to levy it at once without getting ratification from the Government of India. The Tibetan Government, when the proceedings were reported to them, did not approve of the tax but preferred that existing usage should be followed. The Garpons protested against the levy by the Kashmir officials, who told them that they might do the same. The B.T.A. Gartok tried to prevent the Garpons from imposing the tax until the Government of India and the Tibetan Government approved, and his action in ordering British subjects not to pay the tax caused very bad feeling.

In 1930 the Government of India, apparently overlooking the Tibetan Government’s objection to the 2 per cent. duty, informed the Garpons through Mr. Wakefield that they might levy the tax. It appears that Colonel Weir was to have informed the Tibetan Government about this on his visit to Lhasa, but there is no record that he did so, and letters from the Tibetan Government in 1924, 1927, 1931 and 1932 treat the whole of the Dokpo Karpo proceedings as still under discussion. In 1932 Mr. Williamson on his visit to West Tibet found that the Rudok Dzongpon was levying a 2 per cent. duty, but no tax was levied by the Garpons. Again in 1937 when there was another joint conference attended by representatives of Kashmir and Tibet and by the B. T. A. Gartok, it appeared that the Garpons considered this question of a mutual 2 per cent. duty as still under discussion.

The position is unsatisfactory and the 2 per cent. duty seems to have been taken out of its proper place as part of the proceedings at Dokpo Karpo which do not yet appear to have
been ratified by the Government of India or the Tibetan Government. In spite of this the Kashmir Government has been levying the duty, and the Government of India have informed the Garpons, but not the Tibetan Government, that the 2 per cent. duty may be levied. The Rudok Dzongpon appears to be levying the duty, but there is no sign that the Tibetan Government are aware of this.  

3. Return of Tibetan Subjects from Kashmir — No decision was reached. The Tibetan officials pressed for the unconditional return of their subjects although they were told that this could only be considered where some offence was alleged. The reasons for their insistence on this matter seems to be that in the sparsely populated country of West Tibet the services of all Tibetan subjects in providing forced labour, transport and taxes, are of considerable importance.

This matter dragged on, and as the Tibetan Government received no reply to their reminders, it seems that the local officials decided to take matters into their own hands. They made armed raids into Rupshu and sought to threaten their subjects into returning. The matter was taken up with the Tibetan Government who were asked to order their officials to desist from such unfriendly acts.

4. The Return of Ganpo, a Kashmiri Subject Detained in Tibet — The Garpons refused to consider this unless their subjects were returned. The Tibetan Government, when the matter was referred to them, said that the man should be returned, but nothing seems to have been done, for in 1929 the Kashmir Government wrote of it as being apparently still unsettled.

5. Concessions for the Lopchak and Choba Missions — The continuance of these missions on amicable terms was agreed upon.

It was agreed that there was no need to appoint a British Aksakal in the Changthang.

In 1937 another joint conference was held at which in addition to adding to the confusion about the 2 per cent. tax, other subjects were discussed without much progress. No agreement could be reached on procedure for the trial case in which a Kashmir subject is alleged to have been murdered by Tibetans. The case has been dropped.

It will be seen that there are several possible sources of further disputes between Kashmir and Tibet.

6. Ladakhas at Lhasa — Ladakhi traders have been in Lhasa for a long time. Bogle found them there in 1775 and at that time they appeared to be well established.

The pure bred Ladakhis, who have homes and families in Ladakh and who return there at intervals, consider themselves British subjects and look to the Government of India for protection. The offspring of mixed marriages treat themselves as Tibetan subjects. There is some rivalry between these two parties and the Tibetan officials naturally support those who claim to be Tibetan subjects. In the past, the leader of the pure bred Ladakhi community, which numbers about 250, has usually received a title from the Government of India. The principal grievance of these merchants is that they have never had any compensation from the Tibetan Government for the damage they suffered at the Revolution in 1912. From time to time they become involved in disputes with Tibetan officials about taxation and such matters, and if there is a British officer in Lhasa they promptly appeal to him. We have not any claim to extraterritorial jurisdiction in Lhasa, but it is presumed that we have a sort of consular right to protect British subjects from violence or injustice. The Ladakhis have consistently been told that they should conform to the laws of the country in which they have chosen to live.

   P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 519/K of 6-8-1920.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Memo. 162 E.B. of 3-2-1921.
   P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 244 L.M. of 23-2-1921.
3. F. and P. to P.O.S. Memo. 25 C. of 3-6-1921.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Letter 1055 E.B. of 8-8-1921.
   P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 29 P. of 19-1-1922.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Memo. 53 X of 17-6-1926.
5. Dokpo Karpo report as at No. 5.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Letter 53 X of 10-2-1928 and enclosures.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. D.O. 515 X of 17-9-1930 and enclosures 3.
   Surveyor General's report sent with above D.O.
   Summary para. 53 C.
(Noe of Dokpo Karpo. Sikkim File 7(7)P/41. p. 9.)
6. Dokpo Karpo Report as at No. 5 above.
   P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 527 P. of 6-7-1927.
   B.T.A. Gartok to Supt. Hill States. Letter 35 A of 27-10-1926, sent to Govt. of India with
   Chief Secy. to Govt. of Punjab’s letter 886 Pol/Gen. of 22-3-1927.
   Govt. of India F. and P. to P.O.S. Letter F. 89 X/27 of 18-1-1930 and enclosures.
   Acheson to Weir. D.O. F 89 X/27 and enclosure (Acheson to Beazely D.O. of 1-6-1929).
   Summary Paras. 63 and 64.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Memo. 89 X of 1-8-1930.
   Wakefield’s report. Govt. of Punjab to F. and P.
   Letter 2474 S Pol/Gen. of 3-7-1930.
   Letter of Tibetan Govt. to P.O.S. of 4-9-1931.
   Sikkim File 12(2) P3, p. 97.
   Note on Sikkim file 7(7) P/41, para. 22.
   Mr. William’s report sent to Govt. of India with P.O.S. Letter 6(35) G/32 of 14-12-1932.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Memo. F 27 X/37 of 1-7-1938 and encls.
7. Dokpo Karpo report. 527 P. of 6-7-1927 and encls.
   P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Letter 644/53 Ext. of 16-6-1922.
   P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 536/P of 24-10-1922.
   Richardson to Menon. D.O. 7(7) P/36 of 11-6-37.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Letter F 58/X29 of 9-5-1929.
8. Dokpo Karpo report as at No. 5.
   P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 527 P of 6-7-1927 and encls.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Memo. D 3731 X/30 of 17-9-1930 and enclosure from Resident, Kash-
9. Dokpo Karpo report as at item 5 above.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Memo. F 27 X/37 of 10-6-1938 and enclosures.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Letter F 369 X/39 of 17-4-1940.
   Report on Lhasa Mission 1938-1939 sent to F. and P. with P.O.S. Letter 4(4)P/39 of 24-
   10-1939, para. 11. P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 117 E.C. of I.G. 1916 and previous
   correspondence.
   (Sikkim Files 11(9) P/36 D and 26 C 1913.)

Appendix IX

Tehri–Tibet Boundary Dispute

Map 7, based on that prepared at the time of the Boundary Commission in 1926, shows: —
Red Line The boundary claimed by Tehri.
Yellow Line The boundary claimed by Tibet.
Description of the Disputed Area — The disputed area is a wedge of mountainous territory of which the apex points north, and the sides form the watershed between the Sutlej and the Jadhganga rivers. The eastern side is the Zaskar Range. Most of the country is above the tree level and is typical Tibetan grazing country. There is a brief transition zone of stunted juniper trees. In the S.W. there is pine and deodar forest.

The area contains only two villages, Nilang and Jadang at an elevation of over 12,000 ft. The inhabitants are Jadhs, a transition people between Tibetans and Indians in type and culture. They speak, with equal ease, Hindi and Tibetan, and also a dialect of their own. By religion they are Hindu; but they retain some of the uses of Buddhism and call in Lamas for certain ceremonies.

They pass the winter in their permanent houses at Gangotri and Dhunda, south of the disputed area, and move up to the grazing in the summer. No Tibetans bring down animals to graze in the disputed area from north of the watershed.

There is trade with Tibet principally by a route leading to Tolimg across the Tsang Chok La (Jelukhaga Pass). The people of Nilang and Jadhang pay Rs. 74 to the Tibetans and Rs. 24 to Tehri.

It appears that up to the end of the 19th century Bashahr also exercised some jurisdiction over the Jadhs, and collected dues from them at intervals since then.

Authorities
Mr. Ludlow's Report, 1932.
Mr. Eustace's Report, 1935.
Mr. R. H. Williamson's Report.

Outline of the Case

1914 — Tibetan official proposes to Tehri Durbar that their boundary should be fixed at Gum Gum Nala. No action taken.¹

1918 — Tehri erects or repairs three pillars on the Tsang Chok La.²

1920 — Settlement operations carried out by Tehri in Nilang and Jadharg.³

1922 — A Tibetan official asks Tehri officials to discuss the boundary question. Tehri replies that this should be raised through the proper channel.

Tehri Durbar complain to Govt. of India that Tibetan officials are collecting taxes in Nilang and Jadharg.⁴

1928 — Boundary Commission under Mr. Acton examines the locality. Mr. Acton recommends the Sutlej-Jadhganga watershed as the obvious natural boundary, but suggests a compromise giving Nilang to Tehri and Jadharg to Tibet, in case the watershed boundary could not be accepted.⁵

1927-1928 — Govt. of India accept the compromise suggestion — roughly the line of Kinney's survey. The Tehri Durbar are willing to accept the award, but the Tibetan Govt. refuse and cling to their claim to the Gum Gum Nala.

The Govt. of India ask both parties to refrain from administering the disputed area pending a settlement.⁶

1930 — Tehri authorities cut timber in the disputed area. Tibetan Govt. protest.

Col. Weir discusses matter with the Tibetan Govt. at Lhasa. The Tibetan Govt. adhere to their claim to the Gum Gum bridge, and propose that from there the boundary should run eastwards along the line of Herbert's survey.⁷

1931 — The Govt. of India reject this suggestion and adhere to their first decision.⁸

1932 — Tibetan Govt. continue their demand for boundary at Gum Gum bridge. Govt. of India reaffirm their position.
Mr. Williamson visits the disputed area and recommends adherence to the compromise line.\textsuperscript{9}

1933 — Tibetan Govt. repeat their demand. Govt of India stand by their decision, and add that if the compromise is accepted it should be made a condition that the inhabitants of Nilang and Jadhang should not be victimised, and that the Tibetan Govt. should not treat this case as a precedent for reopening other boundary disputes.

Political Officer, Sikkim, objects to making conditions, and suggests that the question may be allowed to lie dormant.

Govt. of India point out that the case has been complicated by a claim to Nilang put in by Bashahr, and direct that Tibetan Govt. should be pressed to accept the compromise line, without prejudice to their claim to Nilang. Tibetan Govt. again decline.\textsuperscript{10}

1934 — Tibetan officials graze sheep in the disputed area, and visit Gum Gum Nala. Political Agent, Tehri, suggests that Tibetans and Bashahr are in collusion in the matter of Bashahr’s claim to Nilang, for the sake of the trade through the Tsang Chok La. He proposes that Tibet should be pressed to give up its claims in return for trading concessions. Proposal not accepted.\textsuperscript{11}

1935 — Tibetan Govt. ask for a decision, but dispute between Tehri and Bashahr is still unsettled.\textsuperscript{12}

1936 — Tehri–Bashahr dispute settled. Tehri gets the Nilang basin except for the Ghor Gad, in so far as Tibet does not make good its claim to any part of the area.

This implies that the Tibetan claim to the Chor Gad will have to be settled with Bashahr.\textsuperscript{13}

1938–1939 — Tibetan officials active in disputed area, destroy notice boards near Gum Gum; try to impose new taxes in Nilang; and in Chor Gad. Half of the grazing tax from Chor Gad deposited with the Nilang headman as the Durbar’s share.\textsuperscript{14}

Govt. of India decide that Tibetan Govt. should be told that Govt. of India do not want to reopen the question first on account of possible complications about the return of the Tashi Lama, and then on account of the question of the boundary between India and Tibet in the Tawang area.\textsuperscript{15}

1940 — Govt. of India decide that the Tibetan Govt. should be told that the war makes it inconvenient to reopen the question, and that they should be asked to restrain their officials from action likely to lead to disturbance during the war. This was intended to let the Tibetan Govt. know that Govt. of India had not lost interest in the case, and to prevent any belief that they acquiesced in the Tibetan claim.\textsuperscript{16}

2. Ditto.
3. Ditto.
4. Summary para. 53 C.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Memo. 1287/663 Ext. of 13-12-1922.
5. Acton’s Report. op. cit.
   P.O.S. to Foreign Secy. Letter 159 P. of 7-3-1927.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Letter 368 X of 8-2-1928.
   P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 848 P. of 30-8-1928.
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Letter 368 X of 8-2-1928 and enclosure.
7. P.O.S. to Foreign. Telm. 7(17) of 21-7-1930. Summary para. 64.
8. F. and P. to P.O.S. Letter F 261 X/31 of 23-12-1931
   F. and P. to P.O.S. Letter F 261 X/30 of 26-8-1932.
   Summary para. 69.
    P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 7(3)P/33 of 21-4-1933.
    Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 2062 of 21-8-1933.
The claims of the Parties — The Tehri case rests on a claim to have exercised administration in the area from 1784.

The Tibetan case rests on a historical claim to have had their boundary on the Gum Gum Nala from ancient times.

In evidence Tehri produced a number of documents relating to the grant of land and timber and to the trial of cases in the disputed area. The Tibetans produced an inconclusive record of taxes in kind having been realised in the seventeenth century; and they cited the payment of Rs. 74 by the people of Nilang.

Some of the Tehri documents related to Gangotri where the Nilang people have houses, and where there is no dispute; others related to the collection of taxes which the Tibetans do not question. Tehri collects Rs. 24 per annum and Tibet collects Rs. 74. In this connection many of the Tehri witnesses before Mr. Acton said that the payment to Tibetan officials was a trade tax not a land tax, but there is reason to believe that the witnesses had been tutored and the Rs. 74 prima facie appears to be on the same footing as the Rs. 24 paid to Tehri.

Evidence of Tehri’s occupation was the building of roads and bungalows in the area. In reaching their decision the Government of India attached most importance to the 19th century surveys and reports.

In 1817 Hodgson and Herbert drew a map showing the boundaries of the territory restored to the Raja of Garhwal after the Gurkha War of 1814. Their line, the blue line on the map, excludes the disputed area.

In 1878 Mr. Kinney surveyed the Jadhganga Valley and the boundary he found is shown by the broken red line on the map. He also reported that the Tehri Durbar had a customs post at Nilang, and mentions a tradition that Tehri claimed the whole of the Nilang Valley, but that in 1815 Mr. Fraser had found it certainly under the Tibetan Government.

It appears that in 1912 the Emerson-Barker Commission described the trijunction between Tibet, Bashahr and Tehri as falling at a point just opposite Nilang. Tibet was not represented at this commission. In 1902 maps of this area were printed by the Survey of India for the Private Secretary to the Maharaja of Tehri, apparently at his request. These showed the Tehri-Tibet boundary as being on Kinney’s line.

There is little doubt that the boundary, as so often in grazing and primitive countries, had never been defined; but the dispute now called for a decision, and the Govt. of India considered that the line of Mr. Kinney’s survey giving Nilang to Tehri and Jadhganga to Tibet. This decision needs slight modification because since Mr. Kinney’s time the village of Nilang has been moved to the East Tibetan) side of what he described as the boundary (or
possibly it always was on the East side). Mr. Williamson reports that the Tehri officials consider that whoever gets Jadhang should get Nilang also, and the Bashahr Tehri Commission of 1935 agree with this view.

Notes — (1) The attached map differs slightly from that prepared at the time of the Boundary Commission. The alleged claim by Tibet to a line south of the Gum Gum bridge was based on a conjecture by Mr. Acton. The Tibetan Govt., in fact, claim that the boundary runs eastwards from the Gum Gum bridge along the line of Herbert’s Survey.

(2) The right of Tehri to impose customs duties, as they appear to have done, needs examination. It does not seem to accord with the spirit of our Trade Regulations with Tibet.

(3) It does not appear that the Tibetan Govt. know that part of the area which they claim, the Chor Gad, has been awarded to Bashahr as against Tehri.

(4) In 1932 the Tehri Durbar mentioned the possibility of giving them compensation if they gave up their claim to the watershed boundary, and the district of Badrinath was tentatively suggested.

Possible Solutions — 1. The Compromise Line — In view of the stubbornness of the Tibetan Govt. they are unlikely to accept this without pressure, especially as it would involve them giving up part of their claim to a third party which has come into the dispute at a late stage and possibly without their knowledge.

2. Acceptance of the Tibetan Government’s Claim — This would involve compensating Tehri and perhaps also Bashahr.

3. Pressure on the Tibetan Govt. to Give Up its Claim, and Accept the Watershed Boundary, in Return for Trading Privileges — This does not appear promising in view of the Tibetan attitude, although it would be a good solution on racial and geographical grounds. One of the items of compensation proposed in 1933 was free trade to which the Tibetans may claim to be entitled under the Trade Regulations.

The compromise boundary appears the best solution, and it would eliminate consideration of Bashahr’s claims. Possibly there may be some chance of bargaining in a general settlement of the Indo-Tibetan boundary in which the question of Tawang will play a large part.

Authorities

Acton’s Report, 1926.
Williamson’s Report, 1932.
F. and P. Letter F 261 X/31 of 23-12-1931.
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