The Sinkiang Story

by JACK CHEN

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—Jack Chen
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Ithaca, N.Y. 1977
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**SEMI-FEUDAL, SEMI-COLONIAL SOCIETY, 1840-1949**
- Republic of China         | 1911-1949|

**NEW DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALIST SOCIETY, 1949-**
- People’s Republic of China  | 1949-   |
There, under the last tree on the edge of the desert, the storyteller beat out the rhythm of his ballad on his castanets. Now fast, now slow. It was a tale from a timeless folk epic about great warriors, statesmen, ingenious stratagems, battles and kingdoms won and lost. The storyteller was the storm, the men, the neighing horses. A crowd sat, fan-shaped around him, on the ground. Uighurs with their deepset eyes and aquiline noses. Hans, bright black eyes, broad-cheeked under large cartwheel hats. Mongols in emerald-green silk robes and vermilion sashes. Kazakhs wearing the conical white felt caps nomads have worn since the Han dynasty, before the birth of Mohammed, the Prophet, or of Christ or the Buddha. They all sat riveted to his words and movements, filling in the details of the story with their imaginations—until I came.

I stood on the edge of the semicircle and took out my drawing pad. I was as enthralled as they were. Suddenly the storyteller broke off in mid-career. He straightened up and said in a rather peevish, resigned voice: "Eh-ya! There is too much competition. I'll wait until you've finished."

Only then did I realize that a crowd had gathered behind me, deeply interested in my picture of the storyteller and his audience on the edge of Sinkiang.

For twenty years I had been reading about Sinkiang. I devoured the records of ancient and modern travelers. I read the story of Chang Chien, that Han-dynasty combination of Dr. Livingstone and James Bond; of Kan Ying, who traveled from China across Sinkiang in the days before
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Christ to learn about Ta Tsin—imperial Rome. I read the reports of the monk Hsuan Tsang, who set out on the overland route to India to collect Buddhist scriptures; of Marco Polo, the remarkable Venetian merchant; and of the papal envoys John of Plano Carpini and William of Rubruck, who visited the heirs of Genghiz Khan. I studied the travelogues of Sir Aurel Stein, the British explorer who pilfered the treasures of Tunhuang, and of Sven Hedin, who worked for the Nazis. Later, when I learned Russian, I found the books of such Russian sinologues as Iakinf, the monk, and Prejevalsky, who named for science the wild horse of the Central Asian steppes. I read with enthusiasm Grousset’s Empire of the Steppes, with its broad sweep and penetrating insights, and the stately, embellished prose of Tarikh-i-Rashidi of Muhammad Haidar Mirza. These diverse accounts filled me with the desire to visit these mysterious regions and see them for myself. Finally, in the late summer of 1957, my wish was gratified.

The train deposited me at the edge of the Gobi, which means “the desert,” and there I got my first view of Sinkiang. Stretching westward as far as I could see beyond the storyteller and his audience was gray gravel desert, utterly empty, pocked with rare, dark-green clumps of yantag, that incredibly tough desert plant with its thin, brachial leaves yearning for water. The sun pulsed heat out of a cloudless blue sky. Toward midday as I bumped along in an open truck, the air above the heated earth shimmered as if seen through a curtain of quivering silver wires. Mirages formed in the hazy distance. I could have sworn that I saw low hills above lagoons of water and groves of trees. Then they all disappeared, leaving nothing but empty sky and earth. The desert continued westward, ending in the fearsome Taklamakan, where a man might walk straight on to his death and see nothing but a moonscape of sand and wind-eroded clay. Northwestward was hardly better. In the past, except for nomads out for adventure or pillage, imperial envoys, merchant caravans and conscript armies, only desperate criminals or God-driven monks used to attempt these desert crossings. Now in three days’ time our truck* would bring anyone with a ticket to the Celestial Mountains, the Tienshan, crowned with snow, where the desert is dotted with green oases. I can picture one now: trees casting their reviving shade on flocks of sheep and goats, an ice-cold brook hurrying out to its fatal meet-

* The railway reached Urumchi in 1965 and will be continued southwest to Kashgar and west to Ili.
ing with the desert, crops laid out on its banks and beside its ramifying irrigation ditches and channels, and thick-walled farmsteads as cool inside as caves cut in the mountains.

Sinkiang offers these dramatic contrasts in countless surprising variations. Going south across the Tarim River from such green havens as Kucha or Kezir you reach dead desert sands seldom crossed by man. On the northern slopes of the Tienshan, leaving an arid waste, the detritus of crumbling mountains edging the dry Dzungarian Basin, you make your way up the funnel of a rocky gully. Suddenly a freezing blast roars down upon you. A passing horseman draws his cloak tight about him. Like an invisible witch, the wind pulls and tears at it. His horse's mane streams straight back as if in fright. At the top of the gully the wind ceases abruptly, and spread before you is a gemlike blue lake with clean washed pebble shores—Sairam. Rolling green pastures stretch south and west of it. Herds of fat-tailed sheep, goats and cattle, camels and horses graze, wandering up to the line of the thick spruce groves hanging like collars around the mountain peaks. Ice-clad ranges form the northern shore. In wintertime, cold and solitude grip this place. In spring and summer it is an Elysian field for the Mongol and Kazakh nomads of the Mountains of Heaven.

Oases and deserts, some untrodden by man; grassy plains; exhilarating highlands and mountain ranges with countless unclimbed peaks; broad streams, underground irrigation channels defying a lambent sun, rivers of ice that melt and form vast lakes beneath the barren desert; ancient forgotten cities; uncounted wealth in coal and iron, oil and copper and other minerals—all these are Sinkiang. It is also a land of many peoples: Uighurs and Kazakhs, Mongols and Huis, Tadjiks and Hans, skilled herdsmen, farmers and artisans famed through the ages. They are now swiftly mastering mankind's most modern technology and science, helping to launch rockets from their desert ramps to arch over the Celestial Mountains and the rim of earth into space. Such is Sinkiang, holding the keys to deep secrets of the past and boundless prospects for the future of China.

Geographical Sketch of Sinkiang

Sinkiang, now known as the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China, is China's westernmost area and the eastern borderland of Central Asia. Covering one-sixth of the total area
of China, it is as big as Britain, France, Germany and Italy combined—over 660,000 square miles, inhabited by eleven million people, half of them Uighurs.


The northern saucer of Sinkiang (called Djungaria or northern Sinkiang), an area of 270,000 square miles, is rimmed on the east and north by the Altai and on the west by the Tarbagatai and Djungarian Alatau merging into the Tienshan Mountains. Here perpetually snow-covered peaks rise to a height of 23,000 feet, with Mount Sheng Li (Victory) towering 24,406 feet, highest of all. This juncture of the ranges is a high, well-watered plateau. Down its valleys race the Tekes and Kunges, tributaries of the Ili River flowing over the border into Balkhash lake in the USSR.

Riding over these magnificent highland pastures with spruce and pine forests climbing far up the mountainsides and rich grass and clover on the rolling hills, looking up to the soaring, snow-crowned crags and down to the poplars and willows that grace the valleys, I felt sheer joy at being alive. Kazakh herdsmen entertained me royally. As we sat drinking welcoming kumiss, they dragged up a fat sheep, woefully unwilling. “You’ll stay to lunch! You’ll stay with us several days!” they urged. They paraded their breeding stallion with enormous pride. “When he scented the mares coming down from the pastures yesterday, he kicked out the back of his stall—two-inch planks!”

In the distance glinted the golden roofs of a lama temple, center of an autumn encampment of Mongol herdsmen. I learned that it was difficult to find young men now who wished to be monks.

The southern rim of the Djungarian Basin is framed by the Tienshan, Bogdo Ula and Barkul ranges, a majestic rampart of peaks sweeping to the east, studded here and there with gemlike lakes.

Djungaria was the great road of passage for the Huns, Ouighours, Mongols, Djungars and others who rode their way through history. There are great stretches of desert there like that above the oil stratum of Karamai, but in the right seasons they can be crossed or circumvented without too much difficulty by following the foothills of the surrounding
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mountains to avoid the Kurban Tangut, the desert at the heart of the basin, once the bottom of a great inland sea.

The center of the larger, southern saucer of Sinkiang, variously referred to in history as Eastern or Chinese Turkestan or Kashgaria, is the Tarim Basin, 850 miles long and 350 miles wide. The Tienshan Mountains, whose Bogdo Ula, Barkul, and Karlyk ranges merge into the Nanshan Mountains, form its northern and eastern rims. On the west are the Pamirs. As I drove or flew along its southern rim, I skirted the magnificent backdrop of snowy peaks running east to west: the Altyn Tagh and the grand Kunlun and Karakoram mountain systems. The latter two are among the highest ranges in the world, part of the great crunch of continental plates still forming the Himalayan massif, with peaks rising 24,000 feet and more above sea level.

From these mountains flow swift streams fed by the melting snows of spring and summer. Many quickly lose themselves in the Taklamakan Desert at the bottom of the basin. The Yarkand, Kara Kash, Aksu and other rivers from south, west and north join to form the Tarim River, 1,250 miles long, China's longest inland river. This fringes the Taklamakan on the west and north, where it is 4,000 feet above sea level, joins there with the Kunche Darya, and empties into the lake and marshes of Lob Nor 1,500 feet lower down at the eastern end of the desert. South of Bogdo Ula and north of the low Kurugh Tagh is that strange phenomenon the Turfan Basin, deepest valley in the world, more than 500 feet below sea level. In the sultry heat of its leafy oasis I ate the finest grapes and melons in the world. I could well believe, as I was told, that in the surrounding desert in summer you can cook an egg by burying it in the sand.

These streams and lakes are the nuclei of the famed oases of Kashgaria. The main ones bordering the southern edge of the Tienshan (going counterclockwise) are Turfan, Yenki, Karashahr, Korla, Kucha, Aksu and Uch Turfan. Those on the northern edge of the Karakoram and Kunlun (going east) are Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, Keriya, Char-chan and Charkhlikh. Lob Nor rounds out the circle. These fertile spots grow wheat, rice and millet. They lack rainfall, but their farmers told me that they have a more dependable source of water than rain—the rivers bringing the melted snows in spring and summer.

Between these oases lie barren deserts. I crossed them by car or truck without a qualm. They are negotiable for well-equipped horse or camel caravans and small bodies of troops or even armies if well organized, but they offer formidable difficulties for nomad tribes or men on foot. Clans
and tribes which settled these oases in the first millennium B.C. took to
agriculture. Some of the larger oases supported nomad tribes. Mongol
tribes have lived for centuries in the lovely hunting and pasturelands
of the Yulduz, south of Urumchi and around Lake Bagrach Kul. South
of the Tienshan, the nomads, mostly Kirghiz and Tadjiks, live in the
valley pastures of the Pamirs, the Karakoram and the western Kunlun.
Farther south are the nomads of the Tibetan highlands.

Traveling from the east, from Central China, you enter these two
saucers via the Kansu corridor, through Lanchow, capital of the province,
Wuwei, Yumen and Anhsi. Here begins that formidable desert, the
southern end of the Black Gobi. In 1957, it took me two days by truck
to make the desert crossing from Anhsi, where the empty old town is
being slowly buried by sand, to Hami, the first large oasis on the Sinkiang
side. Now it takes a day by train, an hour by air.

Regular motor service started in 1952. The railway reached Hami in
1959. In the old days of travel by foot, horse or camel, it took many
days to cross this waterless barrier. The signposts on the way were the
bones of the uncounted thousands who began the journey but never
ended it.

From Hami, one road to Urumchi, the capital, goes northwest via
Kuchengtze in the pass between the Barkul and Bogdo Ula ranges. An-
other goes southwest via Turfan. This is the route taken by the railway.

In western Sinkiang, the Torugart Pass (12,155 feet) on the Tien-
shan or Kyzyl Art (14,045 feet) over the Pamirs lead into Soviet Central
Asia or, as it used to be called, Western Turkestan.

Sinkiang can be entered from the southwest only over a few extremely
high passes across the Karakoram and Kunlun ranges. The most easterly
is the Karakoram Pass (18,350 feet) from Leh in Ladakh; to the west is
the Mintaka Pass (15,450 feet) from Srinagar. These are used by car-
vans from Kashmir as the most easily negotiable routes, and that only
in summer. Sinkiang is thus protected on its south by an almost insur-
mountable mountain rampart—the Karakoram and the huge range of
the Kunlun Mountains running east and west for some 400 miles at
heights of over 18,000 to 24,000 feet. These ranges are backed up to
the southeast by the barren wastes of the 15,000- to 16,000-foot-high
Tibetan plateau and the mighty Himalayas.

Though these two saucers of Sinkiang lie deep below their mountain
rims, they are actually part of the high Central Asian plateau which
projects like a shelf north of the Himalaya-Tibet-Kunlun massif. Their
average elevation is 10,800 feet above sea level, hence yet another name—High Tartary—given to this whole area.

A large part of these saucers of Sinkiang is trackless, desolate desert of sand or gravel. They look like what they are—bottoms of two once-mighty lakes. Their climate in general is sharply continental. The summers are hot and dry. Gobi winters are icy cold, with temperatures going down to −25° C. Rain rarely falls in southern Sinkiang. The surrounding ramparts of the Tienshan and Pamirs, the Kunlun and Himalayas, wring out the clouds. In Kashgaria, the most favored part of this area, yearly rainfall averages only 88 mm. In the Taklamakan, China's greatest desert, only 5 to 10 mm. fall, mostly in summer. Fierce dust and sandstorms rage in the spring. In southern Sinkiang, winters are short and not severe; summers are hot and long. In Djungaria, only in the Altai, Tarbagatai and Alatau ranges of the north and on the northern slopes of the Tienshan is there anything like normal rainfall. Their green pastures and spruce forests make a striking contrast with the arid desert bowl. Northern Sinkiang has a cold, Siberian winter but a resplendent spring and summer. In the areas without adequate rainfall, human life and cultivation are dependent on snow-fed streams and underground channels. Again and again in Sinkiang one hears the words: “Water is life.”

Fertile oases bloom wherever there is water. Ancient caravan routes and modern roads thread their way from oasis to oasis, from mountain pass to mountain pass. In the years before our era, in the first millennium B.C., merchant caravans trod out the Jade Road carrying jade from Kashgar and Khotan through Lob Nor, Yumen (Jade Gate) to Lanchow and the markets of all China. In the third century B.C. this became the great Silk Road to the West. The first caravans, carrying Chinese silks and other products, went via Anhsi to Tunhuang and on to Lob Nor—site of ancient Loulan, now buried in sand. Thence they went across the deserts and through the oases south of Lob Nor to Kashgar and across the Pamir passes to Central and Western Asia, to the Mediterranean and beyond. Later, when the encroaching desert sands borne by prevailing winds made this southern route too difficult, movement shifted to the oases on the northern rim of the Taklamakan, on the southern slopes of the Tienshan. By the fourth century A.D. the caravans traveled this route from Anhsi to Hami, Turfan and Kashgar and on over the Torugart Pass. Travel along these routes in Sinkiang was a major enterprise in the days of horse and camel caravans. In 1957 it took me about two
weeks to cover the 1,250 miles from Anhsi to Kashgar by public bus traveling eight hours a day at a good speed on rough terrain. I met men who had traveled this route by caravan when that was the normal way of travel; it had taken a hundred days and more.

Along the better-watered northern slopes of the Tienshan run the road and projected railway: Urumchi, Manass, Hsiho, Ili (Ining), down the Ili River Valley to Alma Ata in Soviet Kazakhstan. From Hsiho there is a branch road north to Tacheng and thence to Ayaguz in Kazakhstan. To Kuchengtze come the trails from Kobdo and Uliasutai in Mongolia and the great saddle road across the Mongolian steppes from Peking through Kalgan and the alternative Winding Road, also from Kalgan, running in an arc to its south.

Urumchi, Bishbalikh or Tihwa (towns in Sinkiang often have three or more names given them by the Turki Uighurs, Mongols, Hans or others) lies at the northern end of the main gap in the Tienshan between northern and southern Sinkiang, the Iron Gates (the Tieh Men Kuan or Dawencheng Pass). The other two gaps are the Muzart Pass, a high pass between Ili and Aksu, and the gap farther east up the Kok-su River.

The distance from the Hsinghsinghsia customs post on Sinkiang's eastern border to the Tienshans' Torugart Pass is 1,370 miles. From Anhsi to Ili, over 900 miles. From the northern border as the crow flies to Urumchi, 370 miles; and from Urumchi south to the Kunlun, another 520 miles.

For centuries Sinkiang was the crossroads of Eurasian history between the steppes of Mongolia and the great cities and plains of East and Central China on the one hand and west Central Asia and Europe on the other. Great migrations of multiplying nomad tribes erupted out of the Central Asian steppes from the headwaters of the Kerulen and Selenga and north of the Caspian and flowed south and east and west through the passes, deserts and oases of Sinkiang to found empires to east and west, in China and Persia, in Mesopotamia, on the Indus and in India, to crush the Roman empire and build new states upon its ruins.

Such are the physical troughs into which the destiny of Sinkiang has been poured.

In earliest times, Stone Age man moved east across the surface of Sinkiang in search of food. Migrating tribes and nomad clans, conquerors and refugees followed the watercourses essential for life. Ancient peoples—Scyths and Saks, Wusuns, Yueh-chi, Huns and Hans and others—rode the vast distances of Sinkiang. Farmers and artisans among
them settled in the oases. Here they founded flourishing settlements that attracted the covetous eyes of nomad marauders or feudal tyrants, for whom pillage was a normal occupation.

Sometimes all or part of Sinkiang passed under the domination of some overlord or nomad ruler, some Modeh of the Huns or imperial power, like the Han dynasty under Wu Ti when the links between Sinkiang and the rest of China were first forged two thousand years ago. Sometimes, in savage wars, it was split up among petty feudal lords or states. Sometimes barbarian tribes gathered strength here to swarm across the borders of imperial China, or west to the Caspian and beyond to the gates of Rome. The encampments and cities of Sinkiang trembled at the names of Alexander the Great, Genghiz Khan, Tamerlane and lesser tyrants. The interface between the sown land and the nomad pastureland was a zone of conflict and coalescence.

With peace, the oases flourished. Trade poured along Sinkiang's east-west roads. Channels and ditches carried cultivation out from the water-courses, pushing back the desert. Peasants raised millet, rice, wheat and barley, cotton, and peaches, grapes and unrivaled melons. Nimble-fingered craftsmen plied their trades in the bazaars. The weapon steel and metalwork of Kashgar, the carpets of Khotan, the painted caves of Kezir were famed throughout Central Asia. The nomads tended growing flocks of cattle, horses, camels, sheep and goats. They hunted the wild horse or gazelle. In the high Karakoram or Kunlun, life moved at the pace of the slow-moving herds of yaks. Landlords and khans took their pound—and more—of flesh. The people were patient and long-suffering, but mighty in their anger when their suffering became unsupportable.

Sinkiang was a melting pot of peoples who traversed and settled its soil: the Indo-Iranian (Aryan) Saks, Scyths, and Yuezhi, the Wusun, and Huns, Turkic, Mongol and Tungusic peoples from the area of present-day Mongolia and northeastern China. Uighurs, Hans, Kazakhs, Huis, Mongols, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Manchus, Russians, Tibetans, Sibos, Tadjiks, Solons—peoples of thirteen main nationalities inhabit Sinkiang today. It was mart and avenue of trade and culture between east and west, north and south. Here China met Greece, Persia and India, Byzantium, Rome and Europe. Here China met the Arab East. It was a meeting place of religions: ancient nature worships, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Islam, Christianity and the philosophies of China: Taoism and Confucianism.

But periods of peace and the flourishing of culture were all too few. Again and again wars wiped out in a day all that had been created in
decades and centuries of toil. But with incredible tenacity, after each such cataclysm the settlers returned. Soon the oases would blossom again and the flocks and herds would be cropping the pastures. Once again the caravans with their lordly looking camels would be plodding across the deserts from town to town while the sturdy little Sinkiang donkeys and ox- or horse-drawn high-wheeled arbas made the short hauls.

Beginning with the latter half of the eighteenth century, the modern world closed in on Sinkiang, China’s New Dominion. Its riches attracted not only the local feudal tyrants and neighbors but the great world imperialist powers: Britain, czarist Russia, Germany, Japan and the United States of America, acting themselves or through puppets. During the Second World War, when the defenders of Stalingrad were fighting with their backs to the Volga but holding the Nazis at bay, the representative of the Polish Mikolajek government-in-exile was busy in Chungking trying to organize a “second front” in Sinkiang against the Soviets.

This is the Sinkiang story. Its beginning is obscure. No one has yet unraveled all the intricacies of its plot and subplots, but the big design is clear. In the 1940s came the denouement—the beginning of its real history. Despite all the efforts of its feudal rulers, ideas of democracy—of rule by the people and for the people—came in over the deserts and mountain ranges. The people realized their power. Kazakhs and Mongols saddled their horses and took to arms. Uighur farmers and Hui artisans took their rifles, pikes and cudgels and formed an army of liberation. With astounding determination and courage, they took their destinies into their own hands, overthrew their native oppressors and drove the foreign plotters out of the country. I was fortunate enough during my travels in Sinkiang to hear of these events from actual participants. In the later chapters of this book I relate that story. On the desert road near Hami they linked up with the People’s Liberation Army, which brought them the aid of the rest of the family of peoples of China. Sinkiang set up its People’s Government in December 1949 and became an Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China in 1955.

The story since then has been the building of a new socialist Sinkiang led by the Chinese Communist Party and its remarkable chairman Mao Tse-tung. The changes are dynamic. Ancient caravan trails and routes of march have become level roadways carrying machines and goods for the common people. Airlines link the oases. Socialist state and collective commune ranches raise all the herds on the pasturelands. Great mecha-
nized state farms and people's rural communes cultivate the oases with modern methods. Sinkiang is industrialized. Its socialist industry, run by the state or co-operatives, uses its natural wealth for the people. Deserts are being conquered and made to bloom or yield up their riches. Glaciers and rivers are being harnessed. People of many lands visit and enjoy overwhelming Sinkiang hospitality. Goods from many countries help stock its colorful bazaars, richer than they were in the storied past. Its famous products—its silks and jade, carpets and leather, furs and skins and wool, cattle and horses, melons and grapes, and poetry, music, dance and songs—carry its fame abroad.

After twenty-eight years of peace, jealous to safeguard their heritage, Sinkiang's people want to devote their energies to only one "war"—to harness the forces of nature to the needs of man. They have much to do: modernize the economy, build homes, schools, health services, water-conservancy and other public works, roads, railways, forest belts and sandbreaks. They have no time or wish to argue pointlessly over lands and borders already defined by history, but they will not allow themselves to be pushed around. They want to devote themselves to the tasks of peace. But will they be allowed to? At this moment, half a million alien troops are poised on the northern and western borders.
Some thirty thousand years ago, after the last Ice Age, the Sinkiang region was moister and more lush than it is today. The rivers carried down more water; the lakes were bigger; the vegetation richer. The woolly mammoth, rhinoceros and bison—animals that have now disappeared—and deer and wild horses roamed the flatlands. We know that to the northwest, by the Irtysh River, primitive man stalked herds of mammoths and bison 80,000 to 50,000 years ago and that men lived and hunted and gathered food to the east in Shensi Province. To the southwest, remains of Neanderthal man have been found in present-day Uzbekistan at Zaraut Sai in the Babatagh range. In caves in the Pamirs, as at Altamira in the Pyrenees, Stone Age men drew magic pictures on cave walls to help them in hunting. The Englishman Aurel Stein first found a sharpened Stone Age flint in the dry bed of the Keriya River, east of Khotan. Many more such artifacts, crude stone tools and weapons, knives and bludgeons, show that groups of primitive hunters and gatherers moved into Sinkiang’s more favored areas as many as 80,000 years ago. They moved from the west, from the Volga River, across the plains of Kazakhstan and
from the southwest (Iran) to the northeast along the natural routes.

By 15,000 B.C., the climate of Sinkiang had become drier. Stretches of desert had already formed in Djungaria and were spreading between the oases of Kashgaria. The Gobi, Kurban Tangut and Taklamakan deserts were already vast but Han dynastic chronicles of the second century B.C. report that even then rhinoceroses, elephants, lions, tigers and wild horses still ranged in the lush parts. Of these only horses and tigers are now found in a wild state. The ostriches of that time have also disappeared, but camels and yaks remain, along with goats, deer and other small game and fish, especially carp in the rivers and lakes.

It would appear that as the small, blood-related groups of hunters traversed Sinkiang, they left a residue of settlers all along the route, future clans and tribes of the area. Whether some of them were among the people who crossed the Bering land bridge to the Americas between 50,000 and 35,000 years ago, we do not know. But it is certain that at the eastern end of Sinkiang, as they advanced down the basin of the Yellow River, they met another group of people evolving for 400,000 to 500,000 years in that fertile region. Around 12,000 B.C. these peoples were still in the main hunters and gatherers of food, Stone Age men whose productivity was barely above subsistence level. But in the next few millennia a dramatic revolution took place in their way of life as a result of the spread of systematic farming and technological advances. The systematic growing of crops with the use of the hoe and irrigation developed earliest in the Fertile Crescent of the Middle East, 1,500 miles west of Sinkiang. Animals such as dogs were domesticated at an early stage of this revolution. Around 9,000 B.C., sheep and other animals were raised and herded, and the bow and arrow were invented. Some centuries later, grain began to be cultivated in Mesopotamia between the Tigris and Euphrates, on the Nile River around 5,000 B.C. and in the Indus Valley at Mohenjo-daro and Harappa around 3,500 B.C. Systematic farming had developed in southeast Asia as early as 12,000 B.C. It spread to the Yellow River peoples only around 4,000 B.C. Finds of Neolithic artifacts in Lob Nor, Keriya and Aksu indicate that settled communities were developing there, too, more than 5,000 years before our era. Excavations at Catalhoyuk near Ankara, in Turkey, have revealed a city with settlement layers dating back to the seventh millennium B.C.

These advances gave the Neolithic communities an assured supply of food and materials for clothing and shelter, and they multiplied, forming larger clans—groups of families with a common ancestor—and permanent settlements with diversified crafts.
It is now clear that Neolithic communities in the fifth millennium were far more mobile than was once thought. Their settlements are found in many places in Kazakhstan, Turkestan and Sinkiang. Trade was quite widespread. Pale green or cream-colored pottery with black-on-red designs is found from Shantung province at the estuary of the Yellow River west to Kansu and in settlements in eastern Sinkiang from northeast of Urumchi south to Turfan and Lob Nor. Similar colored ceramic wares, in fact, are found westward as far as Bohemia, Moravia, Thessaly and Sicily. The motifs of polychrome Neolithic pottery of the Chinese Yangshao culture (4000 B.C.) have marked features, such as the spiral design or double-headed axe design, in common with the painted pottery of Anau in Turkestan and in the Ukraine and Tripolje (south of Kiev) and even in ancient Babylonia. These wares were probably spread by Indo-European intermediaries moving over the deserts and oases of Sinkiang.

At this stage of social development, except for the constant struggle against nature, life was fairly peaceful. Without classes, without rich or poor, the early Neolithic communities practiced a primitive communism and democracy, headed by the council of elders and senior patriarch. Each clan community had its home territory with its settlement and arable fields surrounded by a considerable area of hunting and pasture-lands. A neutral zone between this and the territory of the next clan helped prevent disputes. There was movement between clan settlements, however, as shown by the distribution of pottery and decorations and the marriage customs that demanded exogamous unions (compelling men to marry outside their own clans). Clans also exchanged tools and weapons; some possessed better implements and weapons because they had quarries of obsidian or flint handy. After 4000 B.C. mankind approached the ages of bronze and iron. A bronze culture developed as early as 3600 B.C. in Ban Chiang, northeast Thailand, some centuries earlier than in the Middle East at the other end of Eurasia. Knowledge of bronze spread north to the Yellow River dwellers.

Farmers and Herders

About the third millennium B.C., improved methods of livestock raising led to nomad pastoralism. By the end of the second millennium, sheep herding had become an important activity in southern Siberia. Some Neolithic communities found that as they increased their herds, they needed larger pastures. Taking their main property—their herds of sheep
or cattle—with them, they ranged out from the foothills and oases to the open steppes of central Eurasia, from the Danube to Manchuria. They began to follow the pastures with the seasons: first in periodic moves over a limited area; then, as their herds increased and the small clans merged into tribes and associations of tribes, forming powerful tribal alliances, they moved more confidently over the great swath of sparsely populated grasslands. They staked claim to regular pastures in the cool highlands in the summer and in the lower, sheltered valleys in the winter. They sometimes covered hundreds of miles on these yearly migrations. Nomadism was born.

The two types of economy—farming and nomadism—were to some extent complementary and to some extent contradictory. Specialization speeded advance in techniques. Where the natural resources were readily available, the settled farmers, in addition to farming, developed mining and metallurgy and learned to forge better implements of bronze, an alloy of copper and tin. Mine workings have been found in western Kazakhstan dating from 1300 B.C.

The nomad, searching for better means to keep pace with his herds, developed the technique of horse riding in the second millennium B.C. in western Asia. Harness was known in eastern Europe around 2500 B.C. The first bit was of horn. The ox was harnessed to be a beast of burden. The wheel was invented, and so was the cart and collapsible mobile home, the yurt or aquoi. The pastoralist was now as mobile as the herds that supplied him with most of his needs. What he lacked was got by barter with the farmers. They exchanged not only goods but knowledge. There appeared craftsmen working entirely for the market and merchants devoting themselves wholly to the task and profit of exchanging goods. Barter and haggling were one step away from discord, contention, pillage and war. The increased wealth of nomad and settled communities made warfare profitable for the strong, not only among the nomads and settled farmers, but between them. Social organizations had to be adapted to the realities of life in times grown dangerous for the unwary. The increasing complexity of life demanded more complex organizations and centralization of authority. The clan had to be organized not only for the periodic hunting foray or raid at a time of their own choosing, but for instant and ever-ready defense. The first weapons were forged for making war. The nomad armed with bow and arrow and sword on his swift horse had a stunning advantage in battle over the settled farmer, at least at the beginning of this struggle.

The nomad prized his roving life; the farmer loved his farm. The
civilization the farmer developed in his settlements—grown into towns and cities—finally gave him the edge over the barbarian nomad.

**Wealth, Slavery and Warlords**

The change from slash and burn farming to systematic cultivation and nomad herding steadily increased the productivity and wealth of both farming and pastoral clans. This ended the old equalitarianism and democracy. Within the clan, stronger individuals or family groups began to enlarge their shares of clan property and set themselves up above others. Inequality in wealth and status between the clans began to grow. Larger clan groupings—tribes—were formed, the better to defend or enforce claims on land and other wealth. Bigger herds increased the competition between tribes for pastures. Success in arms brought not only better pastures but also plunder in the form of goods, herds and slaves. Enemy captives had formerly been exterminated. When they could produce more than their keep they could and were turned into slaves. War demanded a special kind of leader—the warlord. War impelled tribes to form alliances or leagues led by the strongest tribal group or family of great war leaders for mutual protection or aggression against rich or weak neighbors. New, more powerful tribal leagues were formed: those of the Saks or Scyths, Huns, Wusun, Yueh-chi.

Just as the war leader began to claim property as his own personal property separate from the common property of the clan, so he began to claim a woman or women as his own wife or wives in exclusive possession. This claim over a woman and mother became even more important with the emergence of inheritance of property and status from father to son through direct line of primogeniture. More and more the family under its patriarchal head emerged as a self-contained entity within the clan or tribe. Richer, stronger, “noble” houses came to the fore. The hero, fighter and commander who had hitherto been selected as leader on a temporary basis by the council of elders of a clan now became rich and powerful enough to maintain his position permanently with a chosen band of adherents and paid retainers, passing his power and wealth down to his sons or male relatives in direct line of male succession.*

* Even though they lost their earlier status in the clan, the women of the nomads still had most important work to do. They looked after the domestic animals while the men hunted, herded far afield from the camps, or made war. They did the cooking, the milking, the making of the felt for tents, the spinning and weaving; they looked after the home and the children. Their important economic position gave them a lasting degree of freedom and prestige in the nomad tribe, a position that women of
The patriarchal family with hereditary succession led to ever greater concentration of power and wealth in a few great houses. They successfully challenged the old clan customs and carried through a political, social and cultural revolution. The powers of the clan council were eroded and taken over by the elite grouped around the noble house of the autocrat, with his guard of warriors bound to him by oaths of fealty and military service. This was the germ of nomadic feudalism, the feudalism of the steppes. The oasis farming communities underwent a similar transformation. For sheer self-preservation they too were forced to organize for war under competent military rulers of their own, or they were conquered by the nomad warlords and incorporated into the tribal alliances as tribute payers, slaves or army auxiliaries.

By the middle of the third millennium B.C. both nomad and farmer communities were re-forming as class societies. The era of slavery and feudalism had arrived.

The nomad warriors fought on horseback with the bow and arrow, spear or javelin, sword, dagger or battle-ax. Their slaves and serf craftsmen made their bronze weapons and worked gold and other precious materials for their decorations. They were skillful horsemen and great eaters of flesh. Their religious beliefs reflected the state of their knowledge and understanding of the conditions of their existence. People had earlier deified the many mysterious forces of nature—the sky, the sun, the elements, the mountains—and made them objects of worship with rituals for propitiation. Mirroring the new social order, this nature worship developed into a hierarchy of powers and spirits with a supreme godhead, Tengri, the all-encompassing heaven, represented on earth by the feudal ruler.

There was a belief in a life after death in which men and women needed the weapons or tools they had used. These and food were placed in the grave. The ancestors, it was thought, continued to protect their progeny. Each clan had its imagined forebear or progenitor, most frequently an animal forerunner with esteemed qualities, and this became the totem of the clan or tribe. For the Huns it was the wolf, the ruler of the steppes which hunts in packs.

The development of nomadism as the way of life of the pasturelands agricultural communities only regained after long struggles in the modern era. In Sinkiang, the women of the nomads preserved their privileged position even when the introduction of Moslem customs from the Arab East brought varying degrees of immurement (the tradition of the harem and purdah) to the women of the farming communities in the oases.
was, like systematic farming, one of the decisive inventions of mankind, a social-economic advance with far-reaching consequences.

By air or land, I have traveled the wide swath of steppe and pasture-land that encouraged the nomad way of life. It spreads in a great arc eastward from the banks of the Danube, Dnieper, Don and Volga, from the shores of the Black Sea and Caspian, across the Kazakh steppes, through northern Sinkiang, the valleys and foothills of the Pamir, Altai, Tien Shan and Altai ranges, over the spaces of Mongolia, Kansu, Chinghai and the Ordos in the bend of the Yellow River, together with the steppes of Siberia and the larger oases in what is now Soviet Central Asia and the edge of the Persian plateau. Sinkiang lies at the center of that arc like the central fulcrum of a balance.

Farther northeast and east, there were tribes of hunters like the Turki-Mongol Yakuts of the northeastern Siberian tundra, the forest Mongols of Buriat Mongolia and the Tungus and Hsien-pi boar hunters and swine herders of Manchuria. As their burgeoning herds of cattle and other domesticated animals demanded wider pastures, they began to take to herding and nomadism. Some, like the Hsien-pi Mongols, rode thunderingly across the stage of history. It must not be thought that the differences between nomads and farmers were unbridgeable. Some nomads who lost their herds or pastures through war or other calamity were forced to settle. Some nomad tribes like the Wusun had farms in the places of their winter pastures. Some switched to new herds. Yakuts, driven north by powerful neighbors, became reindeer herders in the Siberian arctic tundra. The Uighur nomads from the Altai and Mongolia settled in the Sinkiang oases and became farmers, artisans and merchants. The semi-nomadic Manchu herders and hunters who conquered the cities of China succumbed to the blandishments of civilization and became sinified and settled.

Farming was the way of life of the Sinkiang oases. Agricultural settlements began to develop at a very early stage, possibly 10,000 B.C. or earlier in the oases south of the Tienshan, in the foothills of the Kunlun and in other favored spots. It is known that considerable agricultural communities with villages, towns, handicraft workshops and markets had developed at an early date (certainly between 3000 and 2000 B.C.) in the climatically and geographically suitable areas of Western Turkestan such as Khoresm, south of the Aral Sea, the Ferghana valley on the Syr Darya river, the middle reaches of the Amu Darya and other places west of the Pamirs, and in such fertile oases of Sinkiang (Eastern Tur-
kestan) as Kashgar and Khotan, east of the Pamirs. Remains of irrigation works, essential for farming in the almost rainless oases, have been found on the lower reaches of the Amu Darya dating back to 2500 B.C. The oasis farmers raised wheat, introduced from the Middle East, and rice from South China, introduced to them later through Kansu Province.

Nomad economies are notoriously volatile. A succession of good years with favorable weather could produce a population explosion and a tribal migration to seek new pasturelands. Burgeoning herds and a growing population gave an ambitious feudal ruler cause for wars of conquest and plunder.

The flocks and herds had so greatly increased that the plains and hills of Kashgar could no longer provide sufficient pasturage, therefore in order to satisfy the wants and demands of his people, the khan formed the bold project of subduing Mogholistan.

These words were written by Mirza Muhammed Haidar, a Moghul (Mongol) leader of the fifteenth century, but with just a change of names they could have been written about any one of countless such happenings in the history of the nomads of Sinkiang and Central Asia. In addition a tribe might be forced to migrate or wage war to seize fresh pastures if its old ones were devastated by war or natural calamity. Droughts or blizzards could wipe out the flocks of a tribe and even a tribe itself. In a great blizzard in 63 B.C., snow fell to a depth of ten feet in a single day, decimating a whole army of Huns. In the next year, three-tenths of the people and their animals perished of famine. In A.D. 46 a drought in Mongolia killed two-thirds of the livestock. Six-tenths of the population was wiped out in another famine caused by drought. Even in modern times the great sub-Sahara drought in the mid-1970s reduced millions of nomads in the Sahel to starvation. In 1974 thousands bereft of their herds were dying of starvation every day.

War had come to the world. There was war and pillage among the clans of pastoralists and farmers, but the main conflict was between pastoralists and farmers. Farmers want land to till and raise crops on. Nomads and hunters need wide areas of open land for pasturage or the chase.* These struggles and their final resolution are a central part of the Sinkiang story.

The conflicts inside Sinkiang were small-scale local clashes between petty princelings, rulers of small oases and nomad leaders, most of whose

* The parallel with the incoming settlers' struggle with the American Indian hunters immediately comes to mind.
names are forgotten. The larger arena of conflict involving the great settled civilizations of the empires of the Middle East and West Asia and of China in the east and the nomad confederations and empires of Central Asia produced the clash of world empires and battles and events of commensurate scale and ambition.

**East and West of Sinkiang—an Overview**

Sinkiang was a pivot and microcosm of Eurasia. East and west of it were vaster pasturelands and oases, larger competing communities of nomads and farmers.

Between 4000 and 1500 B.C., first in the West and then in the East, the egalitarian Neolithic farming communities were evolving into towns and cities with crafts and trade and classes, nobles and rulers with their governing bureaucracy and commoners and slaves.

**Nomads and Settlers in the Tigris and Euphrates Basin**

By 5000 B.C. Sumerian tribes had settled fertile Mesopotamia between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Pressing back the surrounding desert with irrigation channels from the rivers, they laid out farm fields and built towns. Soon half a million people were packed into the metropolitan area of their capital, Ur. A score of other cities had ten thousand or more inhabitants. Large-scale community efforts and skilled administration were needed to maintain these irrigation systems and the complex life of their cities.

Rivalry and feuds between cities and contention over water rights led to conflict, war and the emergence of military leaders and kings. But, as in China's Yellow River Valley and other key water-conservation regions, the economics of irrigated agriculture on a single-river system, trade and affinities in religion, culture and life-style all made for unity. Finally, around 2400 B.C., the ruler of Umma provided the needed leadership.

The Sumerian states prospered. City life and handicrafts based on skilled farming developed trade. Writing evolved about 4000 B.C. Trade and building fostered calculation and mathematics. The farmers' need to keep account of the seasons and the regime on the rivers encouraged the development of astronomy. The early sciences flourished, as did the arts of architecture, sculpture, literature, music and ceremony. Regulation and defense of this complex society based on control of the rivers brought into being a civil and military bureaucracy: priests, scribes, cal-
Extent of China during the Western Chou dynasty, c. 1066–770 B.C., and advances of Indo-European (Aryan) nomads and Huns
culutors, diviners, organizers, fighters, commanders and rulers. This balance was disrupted around 2350 B.C.

In the second half of the third millennium, Aryan (Indo-European) barbarian nomads had erupted out of the south Russian steppes. Pouring south between the Black and Caspian seas they fanned out south and west and overran the settlements on the periphery of the main civilized centers in Sumeria.

Sumeria, united under the ruler of Umma, was an enticing accumulation of wealth when viewed by the nomads. The mixed Semitic-speaking and Aryan Akkadians were strategically placed in northern Mesopotamia on the crossroads of caravan trails between the civilized south, with its advanced administrative skills, and the barbarian nomads, with their military ability. Under the warlike Sargon they descended on the flourishing Mesopotamian cities and conquered them (c. 2350). Akkadian rule brought together all the land from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean south of Anatolia.

From about 2000 B.C. other waves of nomads emerged out of southern Russia and Central Asia west of Sinkiang. Around 1700 B.C. they advanced on the Indus cities where civilization had developed somewhat later than in Mesopotamia (c. 2600), plundering and destroying them and then passing on into India where they conquered and amalgamated with the aboriginal inhabitants. Other waves veered westward. These were formidable warriors. Driving the horse from Central Asia—first introduced by the Kassites and far superior to the onagers of the tribes they confronted—and shooting arrows from their war chariots, they had a decisive advantage over the slow-moving pikemen or archers of city dwellers and farmers. With varying fortunes they challenged the agricultural civilizations of Mesopotamia and the Middle East, Egypt, the Mediterranean lands and south into India. But once the nomads had seized the cultivated states, they faced a new problem. Abandonment of their nomad life made them as vulnerable as their victims, now subjects, to the next determined thrust of virile, rapacious and ambitious hordes from the steppes. As conquerors they oppressed the people and mistreated their slaves, succumbed to the softness of urban living, and lost their martial vigor. This historic pattern was repeated again and again. Thus Akkadia was overthrown by a new nomad incursion—the Gutians from the Zagros Mountains—that lasted 150 years until the cities of Sumer and Akkad were reunited under the rulers of the Ur Nanshe of the south. This new Mesopotamian peace and prosperity lasted a century until it too toppled under the blows of Elamite and Semitic-Aryan
Amorite nomads of the Syrian steppes in 1950 B.C. In 1792 B.C., the Amorites under Hammurabi united the whole area. Two centuries later his capital, Babylon, was sacked and pillaged and the empire dismembered by the Elamites of the Zagros Mountains, the nomad Hittites, Kassites and others. By the first millennium the nomad warriors were riding their horses.

By 725 B.C. the whole area from Egypt through Syria to Babylon had passed under the control of the invading Assyrians from northern Mesopotamia. These slave-owning nomads fought with iron weapons that triumphed over the softer bronze of their enemies. They carried war to its ultimate in terror for those times. An Assyrian king boasted:

I carried away their booty and possessions, cattle and sheep. I reared a column of the living and a column of heads. I burned their boys and girls. I erected a pillar of skulls before their city... I dyed the mountains, like red wool, with their blood... I spanned the Orontes with their corpses.

It is one of the ironies of history that these bloody, totalitarian Assyrians gave the Middle East an administrative foundation that for centuries preserved it from barbarian chaos. Building on the experience of the preceding rulers, they created a centralized system of rule with civil servants and provincial governors, systematic tax collecting, a unified legal code and administration of justice, and a postal courier and road system that made possible the later cosmopolitan empires of Persia, of Alexander the Great, the Parthians and Arabs. Nonetheless their empire too sickened and declined. Its exactions to serve the luxury and military ambitions of its rulers resulted finally in desperate risings by the tormented people. Weakened by revolts, it fell to the Chaldaeans and Medes, nomads from the northern and eastern pasturelands. Nineveh, the capital, was laid waste in 612 B.C. In 553 B.C., the Persians from Iran led by Cyrus conquered in turn Armenia and Cappadocia, the Medes, Croesus of Lydia, the Greek colonies on the shores of Asia Minor, crushed the Chaldaeans and entered Babylon. The horsemen carried all before them. Many of the nobles, priests, usurers and merchants switched support to Cyrus in expectation of the advantages that his vast, united empire would bring them. Led by Cyrus' successor Darius I (521–486 B.C.), the Persians vainly tried to destroy or subdue the upstart and obstreperous Greek states with their subversive ideas of democracy. Foiled in that endeavor, Darius in 517 B.C. turned against the equally obstreperous freeranging nomads—the Scyths and their allies, the Massagetes. Foiled in this attempt as well, he renewed the attack in 514 B.C.
He advanced as far as the north Caucasus before he realized that he and his army were being enticed into a trap. He made good his escape. His successor Xerxes renewed the attack on the Greeks with fatal results, suffering catastrophic defeats at Marathon, Salamis and Plataea. In 331 B.C. the tables were turned completely. Alexander the Great of Macedon and his Greek hoplites conquered Persia. His victorious commanders ruled over the whole of the Near and Middle East, together with Bactria and the Indus Valley.

But Alexander and his generals had just as little success as the Persians against the nomad Scyths (Saks) and Yueh-chi, who blocked further advance into Central Asia, the nomad heartland. On the death of Alexander in 323 B.C., the eastern regions from Phrygia in Asia Minor across Mesopotamia to the Indus were ruled as Asian satrapies by his successor generals, the Seleucids. Sinkiang and the area west and east of the Caspian remained free under their nomad rulers. Then the tide turned. Bactria, on the edge of the Seleucid empire and screening Sinkiang, was the first to pass from the Seleucids as a Graeco-Bactrian state back into the hands of the nomad Saks and then of the Yueh-chi.

Sinkiang, the secure rear of the nomads, lying east of Bactria, was never reached by the Greeks and was unknown to them. When Greek rule was replaced by Roman, the Romans too found their way east blocked by the Parthian empire between them and the tribes of Central Asia and China.

**Nomads and Settlers in the Yellow River Basin**

A similar historic pattern is seen to the east of Sinkiang as well. Here in East Asia the Chinese developed their agricultural civilization first in the valley of the Yellow River—the cradle of Chinese civilization—and expanded it to contiguous areas. It became an irresistible attraction to the nomads of east central Asia and also a threat. As might be expected there are similarities in the development of the two areas west and east of Sinkiang, but there are also crucial differences.

The similarities are the general pattern of the riverine agricultural state and the constant conflict with nomad neighbors. Here, as in West Asia, the barbarian nomad alliances (here pivoted on Sinkiang and Mongolia) resisted the spread of the farmlands and raided and tried to conquer the farmlands and cities. The Hun tribal alliance in the third century B.C. was the first nomad rival strong enough to challenge the power of the Hans. But Chinese civilization and polity were tough and
The Hans enjoyed a strategic advantage in that the indigenous tribes in their eastern and southern rear were relatively weak—Koreans, Yaos in Hunan, Tien in Yunnan, and others. Thus while nomad incursions in West Asia left obliterated empires, and the story of these “lost civilizations” in Mesopotamia and on the Indus is being deciphered from their writings and remains only with great difficulty by modern archaeologists and scholars, in China the web of civilization was never broken. Chinese civilization absorbed each barbarian incursion and, enriched and strengthened by these infusions of new peoples and cultures, finally produced the amalgam that is the modern Chinese People's Republic.

Events to the east and west of Sinkiang were not only similar but related. By the time the Hun nomad alliance was at its strongest, so too was the Chinese empire under the Han dynasty. The Huns were defeated and put to flight, a flight that had crucial results in history. Fleeing across Sinkiang, they set in motion a wave of nomad migrations that culminated in the devastation of the Western Roman empire in the fifth century A.D., bringing an end to Roman domination and slavery and leading to the evolution of European feudalism and the modern kingdoms and nation-states of today.

This Hun defeat was by no means the end of the historic conflict between nomad herdsmen and farmers, or rather between nomad feudal nobles and feudal landowners. It continued with varying results and with other protagonists. The Hun’s successors, the Turki Toba Wei, the proto-Mongol Juan-Juan and many others, also failed to overwhelm China, each able to hold parts of North China only for a time. Only the Mongol heirs of Genghiz Khan (Yuan dynasty, 1271–1368) and the Tungusic Manchus (Ching dynasty, 1644–1911) maintained a long dominance over all China—and the Mongols were driven back to their steppes while the Manchus were conquered by Chinese civilization.

Strife between the nomads within Sinkiang involved the settled communities of the region. All were likewise drawn one way or another into the struggles between the great nomad alliances on the one hand and the agricultural civilizations in the west and east. Such struggles continued down to the nineteenth century. The interaction between the two ends of Eurasia over the expanse of Sinkiang has continued to be a key fact in history.

Throughout this long period in central and eastern Asia, all of the protagonists until the second half of the nineteenth century were feudal. What was finally of supreme importance was that the nomad tribes and settled peoples of the oases and river lands mixed, coalesced and grew to
know that they had a common destiny and interests apart from those of their feudal rulers and imperialist interlopers. Then they finally transformed their relations and created a system that took account of their real needs and resolved the historic conflict between the herdsmen and farmers, townsmen and countrymen.

**Early Records of Central Asia and Sinkiang**

What did the protagonists of the early epic conflicts think and know of each other? The Huns and other nomads of the time had no written historical record, so we know only what their neighbors to the east and west thought of them.

It is in the first millennium B.C. that we get the first written mention of the area that is Sinkiang and of the peoples who inhabited or traveled over it. Aristeas, a Greek of the sixth or seventh century B.C., described the nomad Issidone, whom he visited north of the Tienshan. They lived in the Ili Valley and in Tarbagatai. North and northeast of the Issidone on the western foothills of the Altai lived the Arimaspe. Their neighbors on the northeast were “rich in gold,” but their name was not mentioned. Herodotus (484–425 B.C.) gave an account of the Scythian peoples living from the area of the Caspian east to the Tienshan and the Yellow River. He called all these peoples Scyths. Strabo, another ancient Greek historian (c. 63 B.C.–A.D. 19) called the people living to the east of the Scyths in the area between the Crimea and the Caspian the Asiatic Scyths and notes that each group (clan or tribe) “has its own name.” Persian records describe Central Asia as being inhabited by nomad Sakae (Saks). Persian chroniclers call all Scyths Saka. Persian cuneiform inscriptions of the time of Darius I (sixth and fifth centuries B.C.) speak of three groups of Sak tribes: the Haumavarka (“brewers of hauma”), the Tadrava (“trans-river Saks”) and the Tigrahauda (“wearers of sharp-pointed hats”). These Saks or Western Scyths were in fact a much-mixed agglomeration of Indo-Aryan peoples, an alliance of several tribes. Scyths roamed on the Upper Yenisei in 1700 B.C. These early chroniclers did not know that their enemies the Saka-Scyths themselves had bitter enemies to their east—the Hsien-yun (Huns), a Turki-Mongol people.

We begin to hear of the Scyths or Saks in the chronicles of the West and West Asia because they began to take part in the great historical events of those times. In the ninth century B.C. the Chinese of the Western Chou dynasty counter-attacked the Hsien-yun nomads harrying their borders, and defeated them. Retreating, the Hsien-yun dis-
lodged the tribes to their west and in a chain reaction forced westward the Massagetae tribes of Scyths in the area between the Aral Sea and Lake Issyk Kul. Drought may also have contributed to this result. Between 750 and 700 B.C. the Scyths then attacked the tribes on the northeast of the Persian Iranian lands as well as the Cimmerians dwelling in the Caucasus and the plains between the Black Sea and the Caspian, and on the Volga steppes. The Cimmerians recoiled south and west. Those who went south via Thrace and the Hellespont arrived in Asia Minor (present-day Turkey) c. 720 and in Pontis to the southeast in 630 B.C. Here they were decimated by the relentless Scyths, who pursued them and then proceeded to ravage the entire area. After attacking the Assyrian empire as well as Egypt, the Scyths were in turn routed by the enraged Medes of the region, and their remnants returned to their new homeland around the Caspian Sea, where they were feared both as Scyths and as Parthians (their name some centuries later).

These Scyths were not only superb horsemen and skilled warriors, but also scalp hunters who reveled in battle. They were superstitious. They recruited craftsmen from among the settlers they subjugated, and these created the art of animal motifs characteristic of Scythian culture and belief in the magic power of the artistic image. Magnificent hoards of Scythian goldware and artifacts have been discovered. Some of this treasure from Soviet museums was exhibited in 1974 in New York and won astonished acclaim.

In the seventh century, the main body of these Indo-Aryan Scyths lived in southern Russia with a related group, the Sarmartians, higher up the Volga, but they were also spread in the valleys of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya (the Greeks' Oxus and Jaxartes) and across the Pamirs into Kashgar, Yarkand and other oases of southern Sinkiang. They spoke dialects of Persian (Eastern Persian). Thus Kashgaria was called Yatta and Khotan had the Persian name of Yutan. These first incursions of the Asian nomads to be recorded in the West were typical of many others up to the seventeenth century when the semi-nomadic Manchus attacked China and established the last nomad imperial dynasty there in A.D. 1644.

The last Scyth state was wiped out in the Crimea in the first century B.C., but the Saka-Scyth tribes continued to exist in various forms till long after. Under many other names—such as Wusuns or Parthians—the descendants of the Scyths continued to make the history of the steppes and oases of Eurasia. This reappearance of old tribes under new names is characteristic of the history of this area.
Cyrus of Persia (c. 550 B.C.), founder of the Achaemenid empire comprising Persia, Iraq, Bactria and Asia Minor, won his empire as an ally of the Saka-Scyths. When he turned on them and the Massagetaes, their kinsmen, he was defeated and he perished. Herodotus tells the story of how the Massagete queen Tamiris had a hide filled with blood into which she ordered the head of Cyrus placed, crying: "You thirsted for blood? Well, drink your fill!"

Saks fought in the armies of Darius I of Persia when he attempted to conquer the Greeks. They helped the Persians under Darius III in his disastrous campaign against the invading armies of Alexander the Great. Many perished at the crucial battle of Arbela (331 B.C.), which opened the way for Alexander’s conquest of Persia.

Darius pitted his unwieldy mass armies of conscripts in stand-up combat with the Greeks under their great commanders and was defeated. But the nomad Central Asian tribes of Scyths, Saks, Massagetaes, Yueh-chi and others used guerrilla tactics and avoided head-on combat in their furious resistance to the invading Greek armies. This was no Persian levy of conscript and mercenary troops. It was a people’s war. The Greek Ktesis wrote that the Sak women “are brave and help their husbands in war.” Graves of warrior Saka-Scyth women have been found in the Soviet Union. The Scyths prevented their Western enemy from advancing east of the Syr Darya.

Thus neither Greek nor Persian chroniclers ever came into direct contact with the so-called Eastern or Asiatic Scyths. Knowledge of these peoples and of this part of Central Asia at that time comes principally from Chinese dynastic histories of the Han dynasty and the Wei.

Chinese chronicles sometimes provide the facts behind Western legends and hearsay about the mysterious Central Asian lands which no Westerner had yet seen. The West wondered at the Amazons, a kingdom of women warriors who fought the mythical hero Hercules. Chinese sources make it clear that such a kingdom did indeed exist, a strange survival of a matriarchate. It was called in Chinese Nu-Kuo, or Women’s Land, with ten thousand households lying many miles south of Kashgar. The queen’s consort had a title but no power, and the men of the country were allowed to engage in military exercises but not to rule. They were a hunting people who also raised fine horses and sold salt to India. This tribe sent gifts to the Sui dynasty Chinese court in A.D. 586. But these same scribes give a somewhat fanciful description of an ostrich: “a big bird, like a camel with two wings but unable to fly.”

The Chinese had been recording raids by barbarian nomad tribes ever
since 1400 B.C. At first they called them the Hu or Hsiun-yu, and later in the ninth and eighth centuries, the Hsien-yun. In the third century B.C. they were called the Hsiung-nu. These, were, in fact, the Huns (Hunni or Hunna, as they were later called by the Romans and the Indians). The Hun raiders came in from the Ordos in the loop of the Yellow River and northern Hopei, north of Peking. Later, as the Chinese built great walls anchored on the seacoast to prevent their incursions, they shifted their points of attack to the west around the end of the ever-extending defenses. The Chinese on their part actively counterattacked and extended their outposts and armed settlements into nomad territory. Around 300 B.C. the Huns were expelled from the northern part of the Ordos. Those Chinese communities bordering on nomad territory set out to beat the nomads at their own game by creating cavalry detachments, in addition to using war chariots, and discarding the robe for men in favor of trousers.

The Huns were typical nomads and hunters of the time. "Their country was on the back of a horse," as the Chinese wrote. Their restless vigor eventually carried them from the banks of the Yellow River to the Rhone in France. Horses, cattle and sheep were their main riches, but they delighted in fine arms and furs and richly colored silks and brocades. They were a rude people who believed that washing was effeminate and wore their clothes until they dropped off in rags. They built no cities or towns. Their capital was a mobile camp of felt tents, carried on pack horses, bullocks or carts. They had no written language of their own but used Chinese Han scribes for communications with the Han rulers or sent ambassadors with oral messages. The women looked after their settlements and homes and made the kumiss—fermented mare’s milk—they loved to drink. The men were devoted to herding, hunting and warfare, learning these skills almost as soon as they could master their first mount, a goat. Hunting and horse racing were favorite pastimes. They were pitiless in warfare. A man was not a man until he had killed his first enemy and drunk his blood. They preferred to fight from the saddle, killing their enemy with arrow or spear. If their attack failed they would not hesitate to flee to entice their adversary into an ambush, or to regroup and attack again at a time and place of their own choosing. The "Parthian shot"—the unexpected parting shot from an enemy in retreat—became proverbial. Accustomed to the rigors of life on the steppe, they could endure weather and hardships that would kill the average plainsman farmer. Accustomed to subsisting on meat alone, they could travel swiftly, driving their “food train” of horses or other
animals along with them. They did not even stop to cook their food, but tenderized their meat by placing it under their saddles.

It was the custom for a son to take over his deceased father's wives, with the exception of his natural mother, and for younger brothers to take over the widows of elder brothers. The Hun kings or shanyu (Cheng-li Ku-tu Shanyu or Great Son of Heaven) were hereditary monarchs. Their queens, when not from some foreign royal house with which an alliance was sought, were traditionally chosen from three or four noble Hun houses.

The Huns traded with the farming communities on their southern borders when these were strong. When these were weak they were considered natural prey. Cultural exchange between neighboring peoples is exemplified by the art of the Hsiung-nu. Known as the Ordos style, because that area is the principal source of finds, it mainly takes the form of decorative metal pieces used for harness and dress ornaments. These are akin to the animal motifs typical of Scythian art to the west, but just as that art shows affinities with the Assyro-Iranian and Greek cultures from which the Scyths recruited or captured their craftsmen, so Ordos art reflects the influence of Chinese art. It was probably Chinese master craftsmen captured by the Huns who made these objects for them. Chinese art in the time of the Warring States (475–221 B.C.) reflects the influence of Ordos art. This influence and counterinfluence too is typical of the relations between the Chinese and the nomads of the north and west throughout the history of contacts between them.

Hun territory at its greatest extent in the third century B.C. ranged from the forests of Lake Baikal to the Yellow River, from Sinkiang through Outer and Inner Mongolia to the Manchurian forests. This is a vast expanse of steppe and desert steppe, fringed by forests and intersected by the great Gobi. It was inhabited by twenty-four tribes, divided into two wings—eastern and western—who could field an army of 100,000 mounted warriors.

Chinese chronicles give the position of the nomad Wusun* in the third and second centuries B.C. as the area of the river Chu, across the Ili River Valley, and up to the eastern foothills of the Tienshan, including Urumchi and Barkul and from Lake Balkhash to south of Lake Issyk Kul. This includes the central and western part of Djungaria, where the Greek Aristeas placed the Issidone.

* See Maps 1 and 2.
The Huns were a Turki-Mongol people speaking what some say was akin to the Yet dialect of the Yenisei valley in Siberia; the Wusun were a “blue-eyed, red bearded” people who spoke Turki. Some of them were farmers. Some were nomads with herds of horses and flocks of sheep. They numbered, with their vassals, over 600,000 souls. At their head was the gunmo. Formerly elected to the post of leader, by this time he had usurped that position and made it hereditary. One of his nobles might own 5,000 horses. However, as with many nomad tribes, including the Huns, the old tribal democracy had not entirely died out. The gunmo was assisted in his governing and judicial functions by a council of elders. However bitterly exploited the poor Wusun might be, he was still a free man. Captives in war were made slaves, but the slavery was of a patriarchal character and slavery never dominated the whole society as it finally did in Rome, where it led to the destruction of that society. Nomad herding and the freebooter life of the steppe are not suited to dependence on slave labor. The Wusun had shaken off Hun rule but were allied to the Huns, whom they still feared. Coming from the east near Tunhuang, they had seized their grazing areas from the Indo-Aryan Yueh-chi (see below), some of whom they had driven west or south and some of whom they had incorporated into the Wusun confederacy.

The Wusun left their only material remains in Djungaria in the form of strange stone monoliths, crudely sculpted human forms like stunted columns, found in the Ili area. Presumably burial monuments, similar figures are found as far west as the Dnieper River. We will meet the Wusun again briefly in the events of the Han dynasty. Later in the first century B.C. they were rent by civil war and fell under the domination of the Hsien-pi, the progenitors of the Mongols, raiding from the northern Khingan ranges, and they disappeared as a great nation. The last mention of them as a contemporary people is in Turki writings of the seventh and eighth centuries A.D. After that their name is preserved only in the name Uishun as one among the Kazakh nomad tribes of the Ili area.

Northwest of the Wusun in the third century B.C. were the Kangui tribes, with a slightly smaller population but with more or less the same tribal organization and customs. Northwest of the Kangui were the Alani (Sarmartians), roaming what is now western Kazakhstan. West of these was a Scyth tribe, the Davan.

Northeast of the Wusun were the Ugeh in the Irtysh River valley and the highlands of the Narim Mountains. East of the Ugeh roamed
the Czeshi. These latter two were Hun tribes nomadizing on the Djun-
garian spaces and in the Altai and Eastern Tienshan. East of them was
the main body of Huns in Mongolia. East of the Huns were the swine-
raising Hsien-pi and the Tungus tribes (Tung-hu or Eastern Hu) dwell-
ing in the forest lands of eastern Mongolia and northeastern China
(Manchuria). North of them in the forests of Siberia roamed forest
Mongols, hunters like the Buriat Mongols, with the reindeer-herding
Tungus peoples, the Olunchun and Yakuts and other peoples akin to
the Eskimos of Alaska, living in the forests and tundra beyond.

Chinese chroniclers name five Yueh-chi tribes of Indo-Aryan nomads
(the true Eastern or Asiatic Scyths or Saks) living to the east of Sinkiang
near the headwaters of the Yellow River and around Koko-nor and in
what is now Kansu Province. The Yueh-chi, 400,000 in number, were
bitter enemies of the Hun alliance, whose grazing grounds flanked them
on the north. Eastward in the Yellow River Valley were the settled lands
of the Chinese Hans. The Tufan nomads (progenitors of the Tibetans, a
people coming from the south and with affinities to southern peoples
like the Burmese) lived east and southeast of Lob Nor (south of the
Yueh-chi pastures) in Chinghai and on the Tibetan plateau.

There are two readings of the archeological records of the time (which
are still scanty), outside historical records and extrapolations from
linguistic investigations. Because of the prevalence of Altaic elements
common to the speech of the peoples of the area, some say that they
had a common Altaic ancestry and language. As they developed in
scattered parts of the vast area of Central Asia and Siberia, their dialects
diverged more and more until they became separate tongues retaining
certain common words. Others contend that the common elements in
their speech derive from assimilation by various unrelated peoples result-
ing from proximity to each other.

However, it is certain that at this period there were three or four
main strains of peoples here. On the western and southern side were the
Aryan (Indo-Iranian or Persian) nomads and settlers, among these the
Persian-speaking Scyths (Saks, Ssek in Chinese) in Kazakhstan and
south of the Caspian and Aral Seas and in southern Sinkiang, with the
Yueh-chi spread up to the east of Sinkiang in the Kansu panhandle. To
the north and east were the Turki-speaking Kangui, Wusun and Czeshi
and then the Turki-Mongol-speaking Huns. All of these peoples incorpo-
 rated in various degrees the earlier aborigines of the areas which they
 overran. East of the Huns, part of the Hsien-pi-Tungus tribes, speaking
a variety of the Turkic-Mongol-Tungus tongues, later took over the Hun
lands as these nomads moved west after their defeat by the Han Chinese in the second century B.C. It is these people who formed the core tribes of the later Mongols under Genghiz Khan—the Kerayit, Merkit, Kon-girat and others. Other Hsien-pi and Tungus tribes remained in the northeast. Among these were the Kin Manchus, who later conquered China and established the Ching dynasty.

It must be remembered, however, that at this time and for many centuries tribal alliances of Central Asia were unusually fluid. As far as manners and general way of life are concerned there were often no great differences between one tribe and another. A tribe not infrequently shifted its allegiance, and moved from one alliance to another and so changed the name it was known by. Tribes that were part of the Hun alliance in the first century B.C. and that we meet again as distinct entities of the Turki Tu-chueh Khanates in the sixth century A.D. may turn up later as part of the great Mongol campaigns under Genghiz Khan in the thirteenth century. Furthermore, one and the same tribe may appear in the historical records under different names in Chinese, Greek, Persian or other chronicles because of misunderstanding, misspelling or mistransliteration of the name. The Djungars, for instance, may be met with under the names of Kalmuk Tartars, Western Mongols, Eleuths, Eluth, Oirat, Olot or Olets. Hence the extraordinary difficulty in plotting a detailed history of the nomads.

The Saka-Scyth, Yueh-chi, Wusun and Hun alliances which all held parts of Sinkiang in the first millennium B.C. were led by kings selected or, at a later stage, confirmed in their power by the tribal councils composed of the tribal leaders. They were military democracies of their ruling groups organized for war.

With the advent of nomad feudalism, war became an important social activity. No tribe or alliance of tribes could hope to exist unless it was constantly prepared to wage war either to defend itself or to seize the wider pastures needed for its natural growth.

The war leaders or kings of these nomad alliances, whether shanyu or gunmo, gradually displaced the old tribal councils and took over their administrative and judicial functions. They became at once military commanders, judges and leaders in religious observances. They were served by the most noted shamans (witch doctors) who were reputedly intermediaries with the forces of nature. The leaders, arrogating to themselves the patronage of those forces and kinship with them, demanded and received veneration by association. In wartime they assumed
dictatorial powers (though even Genghiz Khan had to be installed as grand khan by the Kuriltai, the Mongol tribal council). It was they who arranged alliances and agreements on peace or war in the name of the tribe or Destiny, the dictates of Heaven. It was they who settled conflicts between members of a tribe or between tribal groups. They arranged the allocation of pastures to tribes moving on their seasonal migrations.

In 1957 in the foothills of the Tienshan I saw just such migrations from summer to winter pastures; the men with some of the women and children on horseback, the older people and toddlers on oxen or in carts, the acquoi folded and snugly stored on the backs of plodding bullocks with all the property of the group in boxes or bags. Everything was in its appointed place so that a family could be on the move within a few hours of the order to strike camp. And the nomad takes a great pride in making a fine impression on this march. The men ride freshly curried mounts; the women are brave with flowing scarves; the children wear bright new clothes.

From the time of the Bronze Age, as noble houses began to strive for wealth and power on the steppes, raids and wars were a constant phenomenon of Sinkiang's oases and pasturelands. The defeated were often forced to leave their ancestral pastures and seek new homes hundreds of miles away from their enemies. Driven out into the unknown, they might secure uninhabited ground, or they might be forced to fight the people who stood in their path. They in turn might be victorious, setting their defeated opponents off on another wave of migration, or they might be wiped out, or, losing their name, become part of the tribe of the victor. It was normal practice for all the warriors of a defeated community to be exterminated along with aged and babies, while the women, youngsters and useful artisans would be seized by the conquerors.

Brutal exploitation of the impoverished members of the tribe or clan went on under the guise of collective tribal or clan activities. The clan shepherd, for instance, looked after his own few cattle along with the numerous cattle of the feudal nobility under the illusion that he was looking after the undifferentiated herd of the old tribal or clan organization. Various types of specifically feudal exploitation also developed. Poor men were made gifts of cattle and in return were obligated to look after the donor's cattle or render him various other kinds of service.

There was some limit to this exploitation, however. A nomad clan or tribe could, and often did, simply ride off with all their possessions from
a too oppressive ruler. Even a township that felt itself too heavily burdened might place itself under the protection of a stronger but less exacting ruler. Or there was the remedy of war.

War was a legitimate and honored occupation. Booty, human and material, was the just reward for successful fighting. Pity did not enter into the calculations of the contenders. There should be no idealizing or romanticizing of the reality of feudal nomad life. A chronicler of the nineteenth century describes a small raid by one group of nomads against another less than a hundred years ago:

...the Kazakh settlement was attacked and a thousand acquoi were smashed and burnt. All their cattle was driven off. Many people were killed or taken into slavery. A hundred children were thrown into the river.

That description could serve for any of tens of thousands of such raids in the preceding 3,000 years. War was a way in which young men proved their mettle, acquired wives without paying a marriage portion and gained wealth and position—or mutilation or death. Death on the battlefield was considered a proud death that ensured honor and happiness in the existence after this life.

War increased the power and wealth of the kings and tribal leaders. It became the custom for them to receive the pick of the plunder. The leaders thus became differentiated from the mass of the tribe which stratified into classes with the nobles, the rich, the exploiters above the subordinate commoners, the freemen and the poor and exploited and the slaves. Princes and nobles were enfeoffed by their ruler with a number of military units or a territory from which they collected tribute for their liege lord and tribal chieftain with a share for themselves. This system differed obviously from the feudal land-tenured system of Western Europe in the Middle Ages, but I find no better name for it than the one I have used—nomad feudalism.

The settled tribes that cultivated the oases of Central Asia raised barley and other grains and herded their sheep and other flocks around their settlements. They made pottery, wove cloth on narrow looms, carved wood, and became skilled at metalwork. They too waged war and captured slaves, whom they used as craftsmen as well as menial labor. Against the nomads’ cavalry and arrows, they raised stout city walls, which in the absence of gunpowder and heavy siege weapons were invulnerable except to cunning, hunger or treachery.

With increasing diversification and specialization of the nomad and
settled economies, trade became more varied and systematic. It encompassed the nomad tribes and their oasis neighbors and also the great civilized communities on either flank: the Chinese in the east and the Persians, Greeks, Egyptians, Romans and Europeans of the west. Trade along the Silk Road between these two poles, passing through the oases of Sinkiang, linked the civilizations of East and West and became a bone of contention between them and the nomad marauders who stood astride that road.
CHAPTER 2

Farmers of the Yellow River

The route across Sinkiang linking the Eurasian continent was a thoroughfare of trade and cultural exchange and also war. The third and second centuries B.C. were a crucial time in Eurasian history. In eastern Sinkiang and Mongolia, the power of the nomad Huns was at its height, and its main aggressive thrust was nationally southeast against the rich settlements in the Yellow River Valley. That the Chinese farmers were able to repulse that aggression was decisive for ensuing history. They were able to do so because of their evolution from a loose congeries of farming tribes into a powerful unified feudal empire, under the Chin and Han dynasties, that used Hun tactics to defeat the Huns.

The Early Chinese

Discoveries of the remains of Peking Man dating back 500,000 years and of a modern type of man of 50,000 years ago at the same site near Peking, a distinctively Mongoloid skull found in Kwangsi Province,
South China, dating from the end of the Ice Age around 30,000 years ago, and other finds show that the Chinese evolved mainly out of a union of indigenous proto-Chinese peoples who developed their own characteristically Chinese civilization and culture. Other strains from various directions were infused into that main stream. Among these incoming streams was that from the west through Sinkiang in the Stone Age. The archaeological record typified by the Panpo excavations near Sian, in Shensi Province, shows these proto-Chinese in the fourth millennium B.C. living in the basin of the Yellow River in settled agricultural communities with a Neolithic culture. The very soil on which Chinese civilization grew is also part of Central Asia. The yellow loess of North China the Chinese farmers till is fine loam and dust carried off the Central Asian plateau by wind and water and compacted to form the great plains of the Yellow River Basin. An extremely fertile soil, it is easily worked even with primitive tools. Millet was grown as the main cereal until superseded by wheat and then rice in South China. Sisal was raised for cloth, and later so were silkworms. Dogs and swine, cattle, goats and sheep were domesticated. Donkeys were used as beasts of burden by the third millennium B.C.

Clan Communes and Sage Kings

These farmers lived in clan communes which gradually perfected their methods of cultivation and their crafts of weaving, pottery-making, and metalworking. They increased their wealth in arable land and herds, stores of grain, weapons and tools. A patriarchal form of clan society developed. With the growth of wealth came interclan rivalry and war. Clans coalesced into clan alliances, and clan or tribal patriarchs evolved into military commanders and kings.

This was the time—probably extending over several centuries or time periods—of the legendary leaders of the proto-Chinese tribes: Fu Hsi, Shen Neng, Huang Ti (the Yellow Emperor), Yao, Shun and Yu, ideal rulers, lauded in the Confucian classics, who were probably sage patriarchs and may indeed have been responsible for or associated with the invention or development of the crafts or tools linked with their names—the fishing net, writing and the lute; the plow, agriculture, fire and medicinal herbs; the making of boats and carts. Yu was the great builder of water-conservation works. That these men were rulers although they
were not blood relations suggests that these leaders of the early Yellow River communities were still elected in a primitive democracy.

The Yellow River Basin was the heartland of China. Its people, the Hundred Clans, and their culture pushed out from that area, intermingling and intermarrying with and absorbing, conquering and assimilating the tribes around them. The resulting amalgam was enriched in many ways as it advanced. Such tribes as the Ni Miao, Yi and Man retreated south and southwest before the Chinese, but bit by bit they also entered the orbit of the predominant culture.* They received and also gave elements of culture that finally coalesced and evolved as Chinese civilization.

Throughout this period contact was maintained with Sinkiang and with other areas through Sinkiang. Neolithic settlements based on the clan commune and using pottery and artifacts similar to those of the people of the Yellow River have been found in Sinkiang near Lob Nor. Sinkiang continued to be an important communications link between East and West. In the Bronze Age, men, ideas and goods circulated over it between the regions of the Fertile Crescent (Middle East), including Mesopotamia and the Indus Valley, and the Yellow River civilization.

The Chinese, who got millet and, later, rice from the south, received wheat in Neolithic times via Sinkiang from the Middle East. Chinese tradition has it that jade was introduced during the half-legendary days of Yu the Great (c. 2200 B.C.), founder of the Hsia kingdom. This date seems probable, and most probably this jade was from Sinkiang's Khotan and Yarkand rivers, where even today great water-rounded stones of it can be found by the diligent searcher. When I visited Khotan in 1957, I was standing outside the cottage workshop of a jade carver when I wanted to tie my shoelace. I put my foot up on a massive stone on the roadway by the door. It was about two feet in diameter. As I moved my foot, I scraped away the dust that covered the stone. It was pure dark green jade, recently found in the river.

* This process has continued down to today. Even at the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, its fifty-five different nationalities lived at various stages of social development. There were the Olunchuns of the northeast, who were Stone Age hunters. Tribes in the southwest like the Lisu, Wa, Chingpo, Tulung, Nu and Pulang in Yunnan Province still preserved strong elements of primitive communism in their farm settlements. Some still practiced slash-and-burn farming. There was feudal serfdom among the Tais in Yunnan and slavery in Tibet. Mongols, Kazakhs, Tadjiks and Kirghiz were nomads. Most of the rest of the country still had a feudal landlord economy on which capitalism had been superimposed, while part of the Liberated Areas freed from Kuomintang rule were already moving forward to socialism. In the two following decades all of these people succeeded with the help of the Hans in making the great leap from even the most backward social order into socialism.
The First Chinese State

The first centralized tribal state claiming and exerting power over all the Hundred Clans* of the early Chinese was established by the Hsia clan, which won leadership of the clans by force of arms.

In this savage time a clan defeated in war faced the prospect of a massacre of its menfolk. It was a relative advance when a defeated community was only enslaved. The Hsia chieftains or kings ruled from about 2200 to 1562 B.C. Their last king, a cruel tyrant, was overthrown by the leaders of the Shang clan of the lower Yellow River Basin, slaveowning hunters and warriors who changed the name of their ruling house to Yin when they moved their capital to Anyang in Honan Province. The Shang-Yin ruled from about 1562 to 1066 B.C.

The earliest written records of the Chinese people date from Shang times. They have been found on bronze ritual vessels or inscribed on tortoiseshell or bones used for divination and discovered at the site of the last Yin capital. The historical and archeological records show a strong tribal slaveowning kingdom.

Feudal Slaveowners

The Shang-Yin kingdom covered an area of around 40,000 square miles in the Yellow River Valley, but its vassal domains stretched from Pohai Gulf west to Shensi and south to the Yangtze Valley. A flourishing but brutal slaveowning civilization developed on the basis of the farming of this fertile region, supplemented by livestock raising, hunting, fishing and handicrafts. Crowning the social pyramid was the Shang king. Below him were his relatives and allied and noble vassals pledged in loyalty to him, and then the rest of the "common people," peasants and slaves. By this time slavery and emerging Asiatic feudal relations had almost completely overlaid the relations of the ancient patriarchal clan society and even more primitive communal society. Yet the popular belief in a "golden age" of freedom and plenty remained in the social memory of the masses and was enshrined in their folklore and many customs. This traditional belief is reflected in the words of the leader of China's first recorded peasant uprising: "It cannot be that princes and earls, generals and ministers are of a special pedigree." (Chen Sheng, c. 209 B.C.)

*Even today a popular orator in China will speak of "the Old Hundred Names" (Lao Pai Hsing) rather than "the people."
The peasants working the “nine-square” land system (ching tien)* of the ancient village commune were compelled to hand over an increasing part of their produce to their overlords as tribute or to perform work for them. Slaves, mostly captives taken in war, worked wholly for their masters. When their lord died, many were immolated and buried in his tomb to accompany and serve him in the kingdom of the dead.

All the evidence unearthed illustrates the ferocity of the Shang-Yin regime. The king was military leader and chief priest as well, the typical oriental despot with life and death power over his subjects, the intermediary between the people and Heaven. His courtiers were his aristocracy, members of his own clan and representatives of clans which supported him. These supplied the administrators and military commanders, diviners, astronomers, scribes and other officials and managers of the royal establishments: arsenals, granaries and weaving, pottery and other workshops catering to the royal needs. The magnificent ritual bronze vessels of the time are treasured today in museums around the world. The first calendars were made to regulate farming. Writing in the form of ideographic script developed. But slavery, love of luxury, insupportable exactions and cruelty so corrupted and debilitated the rulers and alienated their subjects that the weakened regime fell easily when attacked by the house of Chou.

The Chou clan inhabited the western borderlands of the kingdom, and here, bearing the brunt of attacks from the nomads, its members became steeled warriors, frequently called upon to help their Shang-Yin overlords repel nomad raids. On the one hand they were closely associated with the leading culture of the East; on the other, being on the periphery, they were less tied to old ways than those at the center. When the Shang-Yin were forced under nomad pressure to move their capital east, and slave and peasant discontent weakened the Shang-Yin, the Chou leaders resolved to seize power for themselves. In 1066 B.C., the Chou king Wen took to arms and utterly defeated the Shang-Yin in a bloody battle in Honan Province.

**Chou Feudal-Slave Society**

The new Chou ruler named seventy-one loyal relatives hereditary dukes and gave them rule over groups of the ching tien townships in

* The “well system,” so called because in layout it resembles the Chinese ideograph for “well,” looking like a tic-tac-toe framework. In early days peasants worked the eight outside squares themselves and the central square for the clan administration or leader. Later the leaders and their noble vassals claimed not only the produce of the central square but larger and larger parts of the remainder as well.
which free peasants and thousands of slaves lived. His noble vassals' duty was to provide him with tribute, manpower and soldiers when he needed them. But this was still a slave society, and the conflict between slaveowner and slave persisted and finally undermined the Chou regime as it had the Shang-Yin. By the reign of the thirteenth Chou king Ping (776–720 B.C.), the Chou clan was already unable to repulse the attacks of the Jung nomads on its western border. The king moved his capital from near Sian to greater safety at Loyang. In the later days of the Chou, the ruling house was reduced to a figurehead and scores of ducal and smaller principalities struggled for supremacy. In the succeeding period, called the Spring and Autumn Period after the title of the chronicle of events kept by the state of Lu in the years 770–475 B.C., the civil wars became even fiercer and more complex.

While the great lords warred, slaves and serfs revolted, abandoning the fields to which they were tied and taking shelter with rulers who allowed them to reclaim land and hold it in private possession in exchange for payment of rent. Squatters claimed land laid waste by war and cultivated it in free possession. Freemen plebeians took advantage of weakened rulers to take over common lands and rent them out. In the state of Chi in Shantung, a freeman named Tien Cheng-tzu won popular support and in 485 B.C. overthrew the slaveowning ruler of the state. Freeholding in land was a great incentive to increased production, and a number of ducal states found it expedient to reject slavery and follow this trend. To justify their opposition to the traditional rites of the slaveowning social order of the Chou dynasty, supported by the followers of the scholar-official Confucius, they introduced the “rule of law,” which was drawn up by the Legalist scholar-officials to govern the new, emerging social relations of landlord feudalism

**Revolution: From Slavery to Feudal Empire**

Too weak to establish a state to foster its own interests, as opposed to those of both the feudal rulers or slaveowners, the new landlord class sought the aid of the feudalists against the conservative, slaveowning aristocracy. This alliance was the basis of the unique feudal landlordism of China that lasted down to 1949.

The transition from slavery to feudal landlord society saw a great technical breakthrough in farming. High-yielding paddy (water) rice cultivation was introduced from the south, and this development necessitated even more meticulous irrigation procedures and more centralized
water control than before. Paddy rice needs varying amounts of water at each stage of growth. Up to that time farm implements were still Neolithic, made of stone, wood or bone, fragile and of low productivity. Developing the technology of iron casting which had been invented in the Chou dynasty, Chinese craftsmen could produce iron cheap enough to make both weapons and farm tools, a big advance in efficiency. Heavier blows could be struck. Heavier soils could be worked. New land could be conquered and cleared more expeditiously. Bronze weapons became obsolete. At the same time, more economical, more protein-rich crops like soya beans were cultivated. Those of the warring states which embraced these new, more efficient technologies triumphed over the more conservative.

The Spring and Autumn Period was followed by the Warring States Period (475–221 B.C.). All the ducal states were involved in the struggle for hegemony, but as the civil wars dragged on the lines became more sharply drawn between the hereditary, conservative slaveowning states and those in which the new feudal landlord forces had come to power to a greater or lesser extent. Both sides had their scholarly protagonists. The disciples of Confucius (551–479 B.C.) became the officials of the slaveowning states. The Legalists, whose most famous representative was Shang Yang (died 338 B.C.), were proponents of the new landlordism.

The Confucianists wished to retain the old ching tien system of land use and slaveowning by nobles founded on hereditary right and tradition. To support this system they lauded the Five Constant Virtues—benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and sincerity—which were the props of the Three Cardinal Guides: the sovereign guides the subjects, the father guides the son and the husband guides the wife. When the slaves were butchered after a revolt in the state of Cheng, Confucius’ comment was: “Excellent! When slaves are treated too leniently, they will rise in rebellion. Such rebellions must be severely suppressed!” Confucian benevolence was a virtue only in relations among the orthodox elite. Propriety did not deter the Confucianists from dismembering alive the Legalist Shang Yang when they got the chance. And so it was with their other admonitions.

The Legalists favored landholding with free trade in land founded on laws promulgated and administered impartially by the ruler and leading to the abolition of slavery and the hereditary nobility. The state of Chin most consistently implemented the Legalist reforms, and it emerged the victor over all its opponents.
This was the time of the innovator, and Chin, situated in present-day Kansu Province, had a frontier mentality. A pioneer state, it was on the direct route of passage of everything from the west. Chin gave Legalists leading posts. It became a haven for runaway slaves and dissidents from other states. In the easier conditions of a frontier state they were able to open up new land and settle as smallholders. Chin traded extensively with the nomads, buying cattle, leather and horses and selling metal goods, silk, salt and handicrafts. A money economy was well developed. This profitable trade was carried on by the ruling house as well as by the slaveowning nobles and private entrepreneurs. Enough trade existed to support a class of merchants, who invested their wealth in land and became landowners with tenant farmers tilling their land. Though they did not belong to the ruling autocracy, their wealth gave them political power.

Duke Hsiao, ruler of Chin in 359 B.C., made Shang Yang, the Legalist philosopher, his minister and army commander and came to terms with the new emerging order by formally abolishing the ching tien system and legalizing private ownership and sale of land. Households producing larger amounts of grain and silk were exempted from corvée. Corvée service could also be remitted on payment of a tax in kind or in money. State officials were recruited by merit, not by favor or blood relationship. This was the germ of the later famed examination system for recruiting the Mandarin bureaucracy.

Slavery is not an efficient means of production in comparison with voluntary labor. By encouraging free labor, Chin increased the productivity of the state. In 384 B.C. the immolation of slaves on the death of their master was banned in Chin. Politically and economically, Chin gained the edge over its rivals. A period of reaction followed the death of Duke Hsiao, but when the young duke Ying Chen came to power in 246 B.C., he threw his weight on the side of the new landlord class, the merchants, craftsmen and smallholders and the Legalists against the slaveowning nobles and Confucianists. Ruling a state that was politically and economically the most advanced of its time, Ying Chen carried his innovations into administration and the army. He picked officials and commanders of vision and initiative, choosing them on merit to produce results. It was no wonder they were victorious against traditionalists like the quixotic Duke of Sung, who chivalrously and stupidly refused to attack until the enemy forces had completed preparations for battle. Learning from its constant conflicts with the nomads on its borders, Chin added mobile cavalry forces to its squadrons of two-wheeled war
Chin dynasty, 221-207 B.C.
chariots. This addition gave it a great military advantage over the other ducal states. The rich area of Szechuan was conquered and within ten years Ying Chen had brought the whole of China under his rule. He took the title of Chin Shih Huang Ti or First Emperor of Chin (China). The first unified, multinational feudal empire of China was established (221–207 B.C.).

The new emperor moved swiftly to consolidate his realm and establish the new order throughout the country. While strengthening the prerogative of the emperor, he abolished the old hereditary ducal states. He legalized the rights of landowners throughout the realm. Extending the Chin system of unified government administration, he divided the country into thirty-six prefectures and subordinate counties, administered by the governors and magistrates he appointed. He standardized currency, weights and measures and the writing of the ideographs. This latter measure has been a significant unifying force. Though pronounced differently, the ideographs were understood everywhere by the powerful literate minority. Strategic roads and post stations were built, facilitating trade and communications between all key areas of the country. Roads could be built because cartwheel gauges had been standardized: the whole road was not paved, only two parallel tracks for wheeled vehicles. Local levies on trade were abolished. The system of canals and water conservation works which had been built in Chin and had boosted farming there was extended. A strategic canal, the Lingchu, was cut in Kwangsi Province to join the key economic area of the Pearl River to that of the Yangtze and to the metropolitan areas.

Slavery was largely replaced by voluntary wage labor but was not entirely eliminated. Like other revolutions this one was not completely successful. Hundreds of thousands of slaves were freed or freed themselves, but hundreds of thousands remained slaves, and soon millions more were forced into virtual servitude. The remnants of slavery were eliminated only 2,000 years later.*

This revolution of 221 B.C. was led by the feudalists and landlords. The new society was headed by the landlords and their representative, protector and leader, the emperor and his court, with their bureaucratic-scholar state apparatus and army, ruling the vast mass of the common people.

* The last stronghold of slavery in Tibet ended only with the revolt and flight of the Dalai Lama in 1959.
conquered extensive tracts in the south together with the tribes which lived there: Miao, Man and others. Even Vietnam became a vassal state. In the north, he joined up existing fortifications to form the Great Wall of China. Two million slaves and conscripts were mobilized to build this 2,000-mi. wall, with 300,000 troops to guard them and the Wall. The nomads were pushed back to the north at tremendous expense. At the same time the capital was embellished with splendid and costly new palaces.

Arnold Toynbee has written:

The political bane of traditional agricultural civilizations has been the incubus of a privileged "establishment." Civilization is made feasible by the production of a goods surplus that releases a minority of the population from agriculture and animal husbandry. But this minority has usually abused its power. The leaders have appropriated an inequitable share of the surplus, and usually misspent a large part of it building monuments and waging war.*

The communal ching tien system had been corrupted by the slave-owning nobles and turned into a means of brutally exploiting the farmers, but it still gave some protection of tenure to its members. Now it was completely overthrown. Under conditions in which a ruthless, monied and armed elite was dominant, freedom to purchase and sell land quickly resulted in a polarization of landownership.** Hundreds of thousands of peasants lost their land to rapacious new landlords, merchants and usurers. Others fell into debt slavery. The more enterprising of the dispossessed migrated to open up new land, squatted on open land, became bandits or rebels. The first recorded peasant uprising in Chinese history occurred in 209 B.C. when Chen Sheng and Wu Kuang, two peasants, led a thousand conscript farmers in a revolt against the second Chin emperor. Harsh repression only fanned peasant discontent. This marked the beginning of the end of that short-lived dynasty.

The Chin emperors' mania for building and aggrandizement emptied the treasury. Forced labor and other exactions, loss of their lands and the threat of destitution exhausted the patience of the people. The old slaveowning nobility took heart at the empire's growing weakness and plotted a restoration. In the second emperor's reign, popular risings and

** The process of polarization of land ownership can be extremely rapid. After the equal distribution of land took place in the land reform of 1950-51 in Chekiang Province under the People's Government, land began to change hands within a few months until halted by the movement for cooperation among the peasants.
civil war caused the collapse of the empire in 207 B.C. In the ensuing civil war, a former minor official, Liu Pan, gained the leadership of the peasant revolt, emerged the victor over all rivals and founded the Han dynasty. He suppressed the resurgent slaveowners, repealed the harshest laws, gave the people abandoned lands and estates and stilled popular discontent.

The Han dynasty (206 B.C.–A.D. 220) consolidated the integration begun by the Chin. It reunited the empire and began to weld together the many ethnic groups that inhabited China, and also brought the country peace. Following the depopulating massacres and disruptions of war and the deaths of countless nobles in battle and insurrection, there was ample land to reward loyal supporters and distribute among the peasants as smallholdings. The power of the merchants and usurers was momentarily curbed. They and their offspring were forbidden to occupy official posts. Titles of nobility were distributed. But with increasing prosperity, trade flourished. Chinese goods were famed all over the known world. Merchants traveled from China to the Japanese islands and to the south seas and India. Chinese goods were brought to Sinkiang and beyond to Parthia, the Middle East, Egypt and Rome.

In the Warring States Period, the Confucianists of the conservative ducal states failed to reestablish slavery as practiced in the early Chou dynasty. The feudal landlords won out, but once they had achieved dominance through the autocracy of the emperor, they adapted to their ends the conservative outlook of Confucianism. Now they demanded "social harmony" and "moderation," observance of the doctrine of the "golden mean," the Five Constant Virtues and Three Cardinal Guides and of the rites, their rites, to maintain the status quo. Moderation, however, did not prevent them from squeezing out as rent over sixty percent of a tenant's output. Confucianism became the ideological prop of the feudal landlord system and unified feudal empire. Zealously propagated by the rulers, it permeated every stratum of society. Only knowledge of the Confucian classics allowed one to pass the imperial exams and enter official life. From the time of the Han emperor Wu, who established the exams, Confucianism dominated the imperial scholarly bureaucracy. During the next 2,000 years its conservatism became one of the greatest obstacles to Chinese progress while being an enormously powerful force of national cohesion and conservation, at least until the nineteenth century and the coming of Western imperialism and the growth of capitalism and new classes in China.
The City in Chinese History

What is distinctive about this growing Chinese feudal civilization and sets it off from the typical European feudal state of the eleventh to fourteenth centuries is the position of the cities. While some of the common people were independent craftsmen supplying goods for trade, the imperial court and the nobles maintained large manufacturing establishments of their own. This practice began in Shang-Yin times and developed during the Chou and later times. In feudal Europe, the city grew up as a bulwark of the burghers, the middle class between serfs and nobility. It became the stronghold of the guildmasters and craftsmen, merchants and financiers, as opposed to the feudal lords in their manorial estates. Capitalism developed out of the medieval cities. In China, the city grew up as an adjunct of the feudal rulers. Besides being their walled camp, court and administrative center, it was their economic productive center as well. The Shang capital of Ao (Chinchow) covered an area of four square miles and was surrounded by a wall thirty feet high on a sixty-foot base. Using the technology of the time, it would have taken ten thousand laborers eighteen years to build. Inside were residences, shops and marketplaces for the common people, merchants and craftsmen, but they were dominated by the court and palaces of the ruler and his nobles, administrative offices, barracks and arsenals of the army, state granaries, workshops making arms and accoutrements and satisfying the other material needs of the ruling class, weaving silk brocades, making ceremonial bronzes and art works and so on.

Early Chinese civilization, like that in Egypt and Mesopotamia, was built on the riverine flats where even today five or six of every seven Chinese live. Water conservation works were needed to ward off drought, contain floods and regulate the flow of water vital for good yields. At a very early stage the Chinese rulers had to form a civil service of sages and technicians to plan, create and oversee these works. Together with the retinue of geomancers (land surveyors), astrologers (astronomers, to work out the agricultural calendar), scribes (to read and record the auguries and keep population and economic records), ministers of the rites (to oversee the making of ritual vessels and conduct sacrifices and music), these formed the basis of the state bureaucracy in the capitals, an extensive establishment of advisers, scholars, technicians, craftsmen, administrators and managers. This aspect of Chinese, or, as
Karl Marx called it, Asiatic, feudalism was strengthened in the succeeding periods of the Chou, in the Spring and Autumn Period and in the Warring States Period, when every petty ruler tried to create a self-sufficient kingdom and attract to his court experts of all kinds, political and social philosophers like Confucius or Shang Yang, and military commanders, mathematicians, engineers and other technicians. It was expanded to imperial size in the Chin and Han dynasties.

With the growth of trade it was natural that rulers should use their productive and bureaucratic establishments to go in for trade themselves. When they had the power, some established monopolies in salt, metal and the issuing of banknotes to add to their wealth. Thus court and nobility entered into direct competition with the plebeian artisan and merchant. As an example of this trend, the historian Szuma Chien (c. 145 B.C.) in his *Historical Records* tells of a widow named Ching in Pa (the eastern part of present-day Szechuan Province) and the house of Chuo in Shu. Each had a thousand slaves and was "as rich as a ruler." Lu Pu-wei, a magnate of Chin, and leader of the faction of slaveowning aristocrats, was at the same time one of the biggest merchants of Yangchai (now Yuhsien County of Honan Province).

In the heyday of the Han dynasty, Emperor Wu Ti and his nobles were directly involved in the operation of the great armed caravans that traversed the Silk Road. In the West, the landed aristocracy looked down on "trade." In Han China, no such attitude existed. The Son of Heaven himself was in trade. These circumstances could not but restrict the growth of the middle classes in China and consequently the development of capitalism.

On this economic base, which was advanced for its time, and with the conquest and successive development of new great riverine economic areas in the basins of the Huai, lower and upper Yangtze (Szechuan) and the delta of the Pearl River in Kwangtung, South China, the Chinese empire became the greatest power in Asia. Its thought and civilization spread throughout the eastern world, to Korea, Japan, Indo-china and the South Seas.

Thus it was that at that crucial stage in history when the Hun nomads of Central Asia were at the height of their power, the Chinese, named Hans after that famous dynasty, were also at their strongest.

China no longer attempted merely to hold the nomad Hsiung-nu raiders at bay, but to subdue them.
At the height of its power in the second century B.C. under its shanyu Modeh (Maotun) the Hun confederation numbered over twenty tribes. More than thirty other tribes and states, including the Han empire, paid it tribute. Its raids against the Chinese state increased whenever that nation’s central power weakened or was fragmented by civil war. In the early years of the eighth century B.C., Western Jung (as the Huns were then known) had sacked the Chinese capital near present-day Sian and driven out the Chou dynasty. The memory of such exploits whetted the appetites of the able, ambitious and ruthless men who ruled the Huns.

A story about Modeh well illustrates the manners and morals of the day. Modeh’s father, Touman, in his declining years allowed himself to be persuaded by a favorite young wife to pass over Modeh’s right of succession in favor of her own son. To get rid of Modeh, his father sent him as a hostage to the Yueh-chi and then treacherously attacked them, expecting that they would retaliate by murdering Modeh. Modeh, however, was too quick for them and escaped. Touman, who appreciated courage and resourcefulness, promptly made him captain of ten thousand men. But Modeh did not forgive his father. He also knew that he would never get a second chance to do what he now planned. He devised a “singing arrow,” by placing a whistle in the tail of an arrow, and commanded his retainers to shoot instantly whatever it struck. First he shot his favorite horse in this way and then a favorite wife. Those who had failed to shoot at these targets were immediately executed. Thus prepared, one day when Touman was out hunting, Modeh shot a singing arrow at him. Instantly the old shanyu was shot dead, pierced by dozens of arrows. Modeh was proclaimed shanyu in his place. This redoubtable man did not hesitate to challenge the newly established Han empire.

For a time the Huns held the upper hand. Chin Shih Huang had sent an army of 300,000 men under General Meng Tien to clear them from the Ordos in 214 B.C., but fourteen years later Modeh with a force of similar size reoccupied that area. The first Han emperor, Kao Tsu (Liu Pang), then led his troops in person against the Huns but was surrounded and narrowly escaped capture. To buy peace, Modeh was paid a yearly tribute of brocades, silk wadding, grain, rice, wine and other goods. A Han princess was given in marriage to Modeh’s son.

This tribute continued for fifty years and marked the apex of Hun power in the East. Even Modeh, however, failed to conquer the Hans.
After coming within a few miles of the capital of the Han emperor, Wen (180–157 B.C.), he was stopped and forced to retreat. The struggle then continued on the borders of the empire and along the trade route between the Han empire and the Western Lands. The Huns were determined to tap or block the golden stream of trade going to the Han court.

In 174 B.C., Modeh forced the Wusun nomads on his west to pay him tribute. His hold on them, however, was weak, and soon the Wusun were practically independent again. On his southwest he continued to harass the Yueh-chi. The Huns, under his successor, the shanyu Chi-yu (Kayuk, Lao Shan or Lao Khan), between 174 and 161 B.C., attacked the five Yueh-chi tribes (Yueh-chih or Indo-Scyths) who were then living in what is now western Mongolia, Western Kansu and around Tunhuang. Chi-yu killed the Yueh-chi leader and in typical Scyth fashion made a drinking cup out of his skull, which he carried dangling from his girdle.

Following these defeats the five Yueh-chi tribes fled westward. Most passed southwest along the southern foothills of the Tienshan. Others took the southern route via Keriya and Khotan to Kashgar. While stragglers were left among the peoples of the Sinkiang oases, the main body poured back over the Pamir passes whence they had come centuries before, forced their way into Sogdiana in the valley of the Syr Darya and down the valley of the Amu Darya (Oxus), and settled in Bactria (around present-day Samarkand). Here they became known as the Indo-Scyths and shared with the Parthians the kingdom of the last of the Greek rulers of Bactria, Heliodorus. While they fought with the Parthians they forced the passes into the Indus Valley. In A.D. 15, their king Kadfiz founded the Kushan empire, extending from the Syr Darya to the Upper Indus, from the Pamirs to Persia. Another of their kings, Kanishka of the Kushan tribe, added to his empire Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan in Sinkiang, and northwestern India.

In this area, in A.D. 77–123, they were known to China as the Great Yueh-chi. In the West they were known by a variety of names, among them Indo-Scyths or Tokharians. After the fifth century A.D. they were sometimes confused with the White Huns, the Turko-Mongol Ephtha or Ephthalites from the Altai, who had in fact taken over the Yueh-chi's Kushan empire. It is surmised that the Ephtha were the forebears of the Afghans of today. Some of the Yueh-chi remained behind in Chinghai near Koko Nor, others moved to the Ili (Kuldja) area just west of the bowl of Dzungaria in the fifth-sixth century A.D. These were known to the Chinese as the Hsiao (Small) Yueh-chi.
On their way back across southern Sinkiang, the Yueh-chi assimilated some of the aborigines and Saks of this region, but displaced many of them farther south, west and north. Robert Shaw, the British intelligence agent, in his book *High Tartary, Yarkend and Kashgar* reported in 1870 that fifteen hundred people retaining the name of Saks lived up to that time in the eastern corner of the Sarikol district west of the Muztagh range. Then Yakub Beg, the Andijan adventurer who then ruled southern Sinkiang, forced them out because "they were giving him trouble." They spoke a dialect of Persian mixed with Turki. Were the once numerous Saks then reduced to this remnant? Little is heard again of them later in history. Many, perhaps tens of thousands, were exterminated by their conquerors or perished in flight. But their disappearance was due perhaps more to the fact that the name of their leading tribe or alliance, Sak, died out in the debacle of their defeat and the constituent elements of their tribal alliance dispersed into new groupings under the Yueh-chi, the Wusun or the Huns. There was really little to distinguish their way of life from that of their conquerors or these other peoples.

*The Great Silk Road*

But, in following the fortunes of the Yueh-chi, we have rushed many years past the period with which we were dealing—the second and first centuries B.C. During these years Chinese envoys are known to have traveled often through southern Siberia and were regularly accompanied by merchants trading Chinese (Han) goods for the animal products of the nomads. But even more important was the trade carried on on the caravan route from Anhsii to Tunhuang and south of Lob Nor to Keriya, Khotan and Kashgar. Cargoes of jade had long given this route the name of the Jade Road. It seems probable that Yumen—Jade Gate—got its name as the staging area of this trade. Trade continued even farther west from Kashgar over the Pamir passes to Central Asia to meet an answering stream of trade from the West, from Greek Asia and the Middle East, and south from Khotan and Kashgar over the Karakoram passes into the Indus Valley and present-day India. At the Terek Pass on the Tienshan, Chinese merchants met Parthian traders under a tower of stones, and here they haggled and bartered their wares.

There should be no surprise at the vast distances covered by these

* Published by Murray, London, 1871.
ancient traders. The Sumero-Akkadians (c. 2000 B.C.) had already pioneered far-ranging trading expeditions, moving from the Indus to the Mediterranean. The word “caravan” (Persian karvan) itself is probably derived from the Hittite hieroglyphic harvana, meaning “to send by caravan,” and this in turn from the even more ancient Sumero-Babylonian harra, meaning “journey, caravan.” In the fourth century B.C., Sogdian merchants had a trading post near present-day Irkutsk to collect furs for clients in south Central Asia.

Chinese silk was the main item of the trade across Sinkiang, but there was also jade from Khotan, jewels and pearls from India and gold from the Greek east and later the Roman empire. This was the time of flourishing civilizations and rich and powerful rulers in China, Central Asia, Persia, Egypt, Rome, India and the Middle East. The sixth Han emperor, Wu Ti (140–87 B.C.), was interested in this trade, and so were the rich families of his nobility and court, who kept much of their wealth in the form of goods, jewels and gold. Since land had passed out of the perpetual ownership of the clans and could be bought and sold outright, these members of the ruling class were able to build up huge estates and live in a prodigal way. A great lord might have tens of concubines, thousands of slaves, musicians, dancers and other entertainers, large mansions with well-stocked stables, gardens, hunting grounds and other extravagances.

After seventy years of peace in his realm, emperor Wu Ti had a full treasury. He became more and more determined to gain full security for his northern and northwestern borders, which were still frequently attacked by the Huns. He realized that his empire and the trade routes could not be secure unless the Huns could be defeated, utterly subdued or driven far away. Trade was only a partial substitute for pillage. While the Huns needed many Chinese goods, the Chinese needed only limited amounts of their products. The Chinese wore little wool; they used hemp, cotton or silk. They preferred pork to beef or mutton. They did want horses, but the horse was the nomads’ “strategic weapon.”

The Han Empire

Han civilization was like a magnet, attracting many small nationalities on its periphery. Economically and politically Han imperial power continued to expand southeast, south and northwest. A powerful centralized rule, cultural system and military force, the legacy of the Chin, sustained its domination and peace within its borders. It stretched from the East
Han dynasty, 206 B.C.-A.D. 220
China Sea to the upper reaches of the Yellow River; from the Great Wall on the north to the Indochina peninsula in the south. Trade flowed unhampered over all this vast area. No big nation offered armed resistance in the east or south. But the Huns in the north and northwest not only resisted but threatened conquest.

Wu Ti put into action long-range plans to crush the Huns by simultaneous blows from east and west. While gathering his armies, in 138 B.C. he sent a mission led by Chang Chien, one of the most famous diplomat-travelers in all history, to reconnoiter the Western Regions. In addition to general reconnaissance, Chang Chien was instructed to contact the Yueh-chi, who, driven west by the Huns, would probably be glad of a chance for revenge.

Chang Chien volunteered for an exploit from which more prominent personages had excused themselves. He proved to be one of the first of a remarkable group of men who forged ties between the peoples of Sinkiang and the rest of China. At the very start of his mission, as he crossed the Kansu Corridor—the narrow neck or “panhandle” of Kansu Province west of Lanchow—he was captured and held prisoner by the Huns for ten years. He married a Hun maiden and a son was born to him. He disarmed the suspicion of his captors and with the help of a Hun friend named Kan Fu (Tang I-fu) escaped with his wife and child. He continued his journey westward till he came to Ta Yuan (Ferghana). The ruler here, member of the Wusun tribal alliance, gave him a friendly reception and sent him on to the Kangui in present-day Kazakhstan. From there he went southwest into Ta Hsia (Bactria or Tokhara) on the upper reaches of the Amu Darya. Here at last he found the Yueh-chi, but they were now overlords of the Tokharoi tribes and, well satisfied with their new homeland, were unwilling to join in a new war against the formidable Huns.

Chang Chien then became interested in learning more about the Wusun. This tribe, united under a strong gunmo (K'un Mi or king), had parceled out the Eastern Kazakhstan steppes and Western Turkestan to the south among the tribes subject to them. They numbered, according to Han records of the time, 630,000 people. By this time they had recovered from their defeat by the Huns and toward the end of the second century B.C. had regained their independence and maintained more or less cordial relations with their erstwhile overlords. When he returned to Changan, Chang Chien was able to report to the Han emperor that the Wusun, for a consideration, might be willing to ally themselves with the Hans against the Huns.
Chang Chien traversed the area east of the Amu Darya (what the Greeks called Trans-Oxiana), including Sogdiana and Bactria, which had been occupied by the invading armies of Alexander the Great of Macedon in 329 B.C. When Chang Chien passed that way, Sogdiana was still ruled by Alexander's successors, the Greek Seleucides, but Bactria, which he also visited, had been captured by the Yueh-chi.

From the hospitality of the Yueh-chi, Chang Chien made his way back to China across the Pamirs and through Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan and Niya. On arriving in present-day Chinghai, he was captured again, this time by the Chiangs, a Tibetan tribe subject to the Huns. Fortunately for him, the Hun shanyu died the following year and in the ensuing confusion he escaped. He returned from his adventures with a single retainer, his Hun servitor Kan Fu. All the rest had perished or been lost on his thirteen-year odyssey.

He had failed in the primary object of his journey—the securing of the alliance with the Yueh-chi—but the information he brought back was strategically, politically and economically invaluable to the Chinese state. He ascertained not only the geography of the areas in which he had traveled, thus providing knowledge essential for the deployment of the Han armies, but discovered that the Hun power was not consolidated in depth—that its rear was weak, menaced by strong tribes ready at a suitable opportunity to turn on it in vengeance for past wrongs. He also ascertained that the thirty-six kingdoms in these Western Lands included a number of small states in the oases in the southern foothills of the Tienshan, in present-day Aksu, Kucha, Karashahr, Turfan, and in the northern foothills of the Kunlun at present-day Kashgar, Khotan and in ancient and now lost Niya, Miron and around Lob Nor. These had from a few thousand to several tens of thousands of inhabitants who, as we now know, were mainly of Indo-European stock (Saks) but with an admixture of Yueh-chi, Turki and Hun strains. It is interesting to note than in 200 B.C., a king of Bactria had sent a mission to seek the land of Seres (Silk), China, of which he had heard from nomads and merchants. The mission never reached its destination. Chang Chien, reaching Bactria from China, was thus the first official envoy between East and West.

**Westward Expansion**

During the years of Chang Chien's reconnaissance, emperor Wu Ti continued the preparations begun by his two predecessors to deal with
the Huns. Armed frontier settlements had been established. Herds of horses had been bred. Wu Ti organized a cavalry force under General Wei Ching, his brother-in-law, that could beat the Huns on their own terms. Wei Ching was considered for those times a model of the great lieutenant. According to the Han dynastic chronicles, he was scrupulously loyal to his royal master, brave, strict yet understanding with his subordinates, and a reliable commander who combined daring with circumspection in the right proportion. In 128 B.C., two years before Chang Chien returned, Wei Ching successfully raided the Hun encampments, killing or capturing several thousand Huns. The next year the Huns were again driven from the pastures of the Ordos within the bend of the Yellow River, a maneuver that relieved enemy pressure north of the Han capital at Changan (present-day Sian). Raids and counter-raids continued, but the Huns were pushed onto the defensive and suffered heavy losses.

In 121 B.C., a great campaign against the Huns was led by General Ho Chu-ping. The knowledge which Chang Chien was able to furnish about roads, wells and political conditions among the Huns proved invaluable. The Huns lost over thirty thousand men, and a Hun vassal with forty thousand followers surrendered with the territories of Wuwei and Chiuchuan in present-day Kansu. These areas as well as Tunhuang were fortified and settled. Striking out from these new forward bases, General Ho Chu-ping with ten thousand light armed cavalry then drove the Huns from all of eastern Kansu, the departure point of the Silk Road. The Kansu Corridor was secured, but the Huns still retained their hold west of Kansu and north of the Tienshan on the flank of the Silk Road. It was now necessary to drive the Huns north and split them from the shepherding Tufan nomads of Tibet and Chinghai.

In 119 B.C., Wei Ching, Ho Chu-ping, Li Kuang and other generals, each with fifty thousand cavalry and several thousand foot soldiers, penetrated deep into the heart of nomad territory. The Huns were dealt a crushing blow on the upper Tola River (near present-day Ulan Bator). The Hun shanyu was surrounded but managed to escape.

These victories protected the Han empire on the north. To consolidate the advance to the west and protect its northern flank, the Great Wall and supporting limes, or fortified defensive lines, were extended west of Tunhuang, staging area for the westward campaigns and caravans. As in the Ordos, forts were built and settlers moved into the frontier areas. Military colonies were established at key points both on and beyond the frontier as lookouts and supply bases.
Out of the Mists of Time

In 116 B.C., Chang Chien, ennobled for his services, headed a new mission to the Wusun and Yueh-chi. He visited Bactria and Ferghana again and even reached Parthia. In 108 B.C., the oases of Lob Nor (Loulan) and Turfan, at that time still inhabited and farmed by men of Aryan (Indo-European) stock, were brought under Chinese sovereignty. Thus the road west from Kansu to Lob Nor and northwest to the oases on the south slopes of the Tienshan was secure from Hun raids. Trade over the caravan trails increased many times over. Every year up to a dozen great caravans left for the West from the Jade Gate, over the Sinkiang deserts and plains and through its hospitable oases. They carried Chinese silks and handicrafts; they returned with all kinds of luxuries.

In 108 B.C., Wu Ti sent a new mission to the Wusun. Their answering mission requested that a daughter of the imperial house be given in marriage to the Wusun royal family. The emperor agreed, and the young Princess Hsi Kun was duly sent to wed the seventy-year-old gunmo of the Wusun in Chigu. Her story, told in ballads, pictures and plays, has long epitomized for Chinese the fate of the patriot forced to dwell in a strange land.

Chang Chien later wrote: "The Wusun are a great state. They have an army of 100,000 men. That is why Wu Ti sent a daughter of his house to marry their leader." The Wusun, however, still refused to break their alliance with the Huns. Their gunmo, in fact, had both a Han and a Hun consort. But they were undoubtedly becoming impressed by the vigor and power of the Han empire.

To counter Hun cavalry riding tough Mongolian steeds, the Han army needed better mounts, and Wu Ti decided to breed these from Ferghana horses—noted for their stamina, strength and speed. When a request for a number of these horses was refused by Ferghana and the Han envoy robbed and assassinated to boot, Wu Ti in 102 B.C. dispatched a punitive expedition both to get the horses and to reestablish Han prestige. An army of forty thousand men set out. After terrible sufferings on the march over the deserts, it was routed. Eight out of every ten men were killed, wounded or taken captive. The remnants limped home. The Han general Li Kuang then led another expedition of sixty thousand men. This triumphed over all the immense difficulties, subjugated Ferghana and brought back the three thousand horses demanded. Li Kuang carried the advance to the Caspian Sea, three thousand miles from Changan along the Great Silk Road. This feat raised the prestige of the Han court to an unprecedented level through-
out Central Asia. When Wu Ti sent an embassy to the kingdom of Parthia, the most considerable state between China and the Roman empire, it was met with all honor on Parthia’s eastern border by a general at the head of twenty thousand cavalry. This reception was accompanied by considerable pomp, but it seems to have been intended to convey to the Han emperor that Parthia too was a great power. However, friendly relations were established; Parthia had enemies aplenty on its western border without adding another one to its east. The Han chronicles report that a return embassy from Parthia to Changan presented the Chinese court with ostrich eggs and Egyptian jugglers who “could dance with a myriad balls, spit fire and play music.”

Wu Ti’s Generals

Han Wu Ti died in 87 B.C. A resourceful ruler, he was served by outstanding men. Many of these men were not nobly born. Chang Chien was only a minor official when he volunteered for the arduous journey into the then-unknown West. Wu Ti’s empress was the daughter of a slave in the imperial household; Wei Ching was her younger half-brother: Ho Chu-ping was her sister’s illegitimate son. In keeping with the needs of the time, Wu Ti recruited his heroes wherever he could find them.

The Huns were implacable foes, but they weakened under Wu Ti’s attacks. The shanyu thought of submitting, but unfortunately his envoy fell ill and died in Changan. Hun suspicions of foul play were aroused. The war went on. Finally, following a Hun raid on their former allies, the Wusun, in 75 B.C., the latter agreed to join the Chinese under the new Han emperor Hsuan Ti (73–49 B.C.) in the long-delayed combined attack on their common enemy. Attacked from east and west, the Huns met with defeat in 73 and 71 B.C. They were driven out of Djungaria, losing half their herds. Subject tribes revolted. To consolidate this victory, in 67 B.C. the Han commander Chen Tsi was appointed protector-general of the Western Frontier Regions and established his headquarters near Karashahr.

The Huns had suffered crushing defeats. The devastating blizzard of 63 B.C. and famine in 62 B.C. added to their sufferings. In a struggle for the succession, the Hun alliance split into northern and southern parts. Subjected to frightful slaughter by the northerners, the southern Huns in 55 B.C. turned for support to the Han court. The southern Hun shanyu sent his son to Changan. He was well received. When the shanyu
himself decided to follow, some in the emperor's councils proposed that he be treated as a vassal lower in rank than the vassal kings inside the Wall. The emperor, however, received him as an equal, loading him with gifts. These included fifteen fine horses, twenty pounds of gold, eight thousand bolts of cloth and six thousand pounds of silk floss used for wadding winter clothes. A lady of the court was given the shanyu in marriage, and he and his people were permitted to pasture in Inner Mongolia and were liberally supplied with grain. Impressed by this treatment, other Huns flocked to his standard. His northern rival Chih Chih was driven westward and came into conflict with the Wusun in the Ili area. Later Chih Chih appeared in Sogdiana and set up a state here threatening the Silk Route. In 36 B.C. a combined force of forty thousand Hans and southern Huns, led by Chen Tang, set off from Turfan, then under a Han protector-general, and, converging on Sogdiana, stormed the capital. The Chinese troops used heavy crossbows with a trigger mechanism (these only became known in the West much later) that completely outranged Chih Chih's archers. Chih Chih was killed. Roman legionnaires who were serving him were captured and settled in Kansu. Thus peace was made with the Huns, the recalcitrants subdued, the northern borders freed from raids and the Silk Road secured, and for many years China and Sinkiang prospered at peace.

While the northern Wusun had resumed an uneasy alliance with the Huns, the southern group of Wusun tribes, which controlled the Silk Road caravan route south of Lake Issyk Kul, leaned to the power of the Han empire. Forts were built there to reinforce protection of the Silk Road.

Then in 30 B.C. the Wusun were openly split by a war of succession. The northern part was helped by the Huns of the north, while the southern was helped by the Hans. Fighting between them went on for many years. But in the last years of the first century B.C., Sinkiang, like the rest of China, enjoyed peace and good trade. In this Pax Sinica, Sinkiang's oases and nomad pastures flourished. Despite many vicissitudes the association thus begun between Sinkiang and China proved to be lasting.

Keeping the Silk Road Open

The power of the Western Han dynasty declined in the reigns following that of Hsuan Ti. Wu Ti's ambitious and costly campaigns and official corruption and the extravagance of his less able successors led to ever more ruthless exploitation of the people. At one time two
million peasants were deprived of their land for nonpayment of taxes and other crimes and made vagrants and bandits.

Wang Mang, an ambitious noble and relative of the empress, usurped the throne (A.D. 9–23) and added to the turmoil by his maladministration and overbearing treatment of vassals and neighbors. Famine and flight sharply reduced the population of North China.

In A.D. 11, Wang Mang insultingly changed the title of the Hun shanyu to Fu Yu—Submitted Captive of the Surrendered Slaves. When both the greater and lesser gunmos of the Wusun sent envoys offering tribute, he tried to play one off against the other by giving the envoy of the lesser gunmo precedence over that of the greater. Thereupon “the various states of the Western Frontier regions considered that Wang Mang had repeatedly broken the ties of grace and faithfulness,” writes Pan Ku, the Han historian. “The state of Karashahr revolted first, murdering the protector-general of the Western Frontier.” A general revolt of the Huns and the states of the Western Regions followed.

By this time Wang Mang seems to have lost all understanding of the true state of things. Wu Ti’s expeditions were meticulously prepared, but to suppress the Hun revolt Wang Mang gave a grandiose order to mobilize a punitive force of 300,000 men. Convicts and free men had to be conscripted indiscriminately in scores of thousands to replenish the regular troops. When these sullen levies arrived on the western borders they found that no arrangements had been made to receive them. Local resources, already poor, were quickly exhausted. The famished frontier people were robbed to feed the troops. Soldiers deserted and became bandits. The great expedition that was to have chastised the rebels and the enemies of the empire never set out; it only weakened the empire still more. Savage punitive operations fanned the flames of revolt. The result of this imperial arrogance and cruelty, military incompetence and political ineptitude was that from A.D. 16 all the Western Regions were cut off from the rest of China. Hundreds of thousands perished in the resulting disorders. Flourishing Sinkiang settlements were destroyed. The Later Han Annals record that the “principalities of the Western Regions broke up and formed fifty-five territories.”

The Silk Road was closed for sixty-five years. Once again masters of the region from Kansu to the Pamirs, the nomads pillaged the many small oasis states resulting from withdrawal of the centralizing Han imperial power.

The roads being unsafe, trade languished. On the upper Tarim
Basin a state—Kashgaria—was formed by the local people. Not strong enough to maintain itself on such a violent line of march, it soon fell to Kushan invaders.

The Middle Kingdom of the Hans was itself invaded. Hun attacks ravaged its northern borders. A Chinese woman wrote a lament of the time describing such a raid in which every man of her community was massacred and the sprawling corpses piled in heaps. Severed heads were hung on the shafts of the carts in which the women were abducted.

It was from such tribulations that China was at length delivered by the assassination of Wang Mang. Usurping the leadership of a desperate peasant rising, Liu Hsiu, descendant of the Han royal house, re-established the dynasty as the Eastern Han (A.D. 24–220) with its capital in Loyang. Harassed by the Huns, the small states to the west sent appeals for help to the Eastern Han emperors. Slowly the Han empire recuperated sufficiently to help them. When the southern shanyu and his tribes were pacified, the shanyu came to the imperial court in A.D. 49, and his offer to act as a buffer against the northern shanyu was gratefully accepted.

The Exploits of Pan Chao

Emperor Ming Ti revived the expansionist policies of his ancestor Wu Ti. An expedition led by General Pan Chao of the famous family that included the historians Pan Ku and his sister Pan Tsao defeated the Northern Huns at Barkul. That same year two of his fellow generals, Tou Ku and Keng Ping, routed the Huns north of the Ordos. Having driven the Huns back north and west, a military colony was established in Hami as an advance post to ward off Hun attacks on the caravan routes. The next year the ruler of Turfan welcomed the Han envoys.

Pan Chao set off on the next stage of his embassy with only thirty-seven men as his military escort. In the kingdom of Lob Nor, then called Shou Shang, he found himself forestalled by the Hun envoy, who with the local ruler was plotting his destruction. Pan Chao, under cover of night, attacked the Hun encampment, set fire to its tents and caught its defenders in an ambush as they rushed from the flames. The Hun envoy was killed, together with 130 of his men. Lob Nor was won over.

When Pan Chao arrived in Khotan, he found that the Huns had again forestalled him. They were plotting with the court shaman, who
Farmer of the Yellow River

had the ear of the king of Khotan. To humiliate Pan Chao before having him murdered, the shaman told the king: "The Chinese envoy has a bay horse which our gods are desirous that I sacrifice to them." The king thereupon demanded Pan Chao's horse. Pan Chao agreed to hand it over, provided the shaman himself came to take it. As soon as the shaman appeared, Pan Chao cut off his head and sent it to the king. The king switched sides and handed over the other Hun agents.

Continuing his journey, Pan Chao then led a Khotan detachment to expel the ruler of Kashgar, who had been imposed on the people by the king of Kucha. With the approval of the Kashgarlihks, a native son was installed as king. This freed the southern Silk Road up to the Pamir passes.

Pan Chao was a resourceful diplomat, brave far beyond the average, and a man who possessed the qualities expected of a war leader of that time. His brutality was the brutality of the times. In the course of thirty years of activity he established close relations between the Han people and those of more than fifty states in these Western Regions. One by one the small states of southern Sinkiang and Central Asia renewed their allegiance to China. Many of the southern Hun tribes who sought Han protection from the rulers of the northern Hun alliance moved bodily into northern Shensi and Shansi, where they settled and took up farming. In A.D. 75, Ming Ti died and was succeeded by his son Chang Ti. There was a period of palace intrigues, revolts and Hun attacks. Pan Chao was ordered by a timorous court to return from southern Sinkiang. He made a show of withdrawal to Khotan and then used his prerogative as "a commander on the borders of the empire" to disobey the court order. He returned to Kashgar and beheaded all those who had been disloyal. In the meantime the northern Huns had been driven again from Turfan and Hami by Han troops dispatched from Kansu. In A.D. 88, another defeat was inflicted on the northern Huns by a combined force of Hans and southern Huns in the area that is now the Mongolian People's Republic. Yarkand was restored to the Han empire by Pan Chao. The Han dynastic chronicles describe the terrible retribution visited on Karashahr: "The town was sacked, they cut off more than 5,000 heads, took 15,000 captives and more than 300,000 head of livestock, horses, cattle and sheep." In A.D. 91 combined Han and southern Hun armies captured the northern Hun shanyu's whole family on the Orkhon River. By this time the remaining Sinkiang oases were freed from Hun overlordship.

These victories were decisive. The northern Hun alliance was now
harried on all sides. From the east they were attacked by the Wu-huan (Hsien-pi Tungus) tribes; from the north by the Gao-che (High-wheel Cart) and other former vassal tribes; from the south by the Hans. Giving up all hope of conquering the Chinese, they decided to try to break out to the western steppes. In a desperate and massive thrust they took the route across Djungaria (northern Sinkiang) and through what is now Kazakhstan. They did not dare try to move through the southern Sinkiang oases where Pan Chao was in full control.

Pan Chao had traveled as far as Antioch-Margiana (Merv, in present-day Turkmenistan). He made friendly contacts with the “lands of Tiaochih,” including Babylonia, Chaldaea, Syria and Parthia. The Parthians sent a return embassy to the Han court. By the end of the first century A.D., Pan Chao and his colleagues had firmly established Han rule throughout the length of the Silk Road north and south of the Tarim Basin up to the Caspian Sea.

Pan Chao wrote: “To capture the thirty-six Kingdoms of the West is to cut off the right arm of the Huns.” He was appointed viceroy of all Sinkiang and “Protector of the Western Regions.” Settlements and military colonies were established at all key points on the Silk Road. Fortresses were built at strategic points. Watchtowers had signal pyres ready-stacked to be lit at the first sign of danger from marauding nomads. But for a long time the nomads were in no position to attack the Chinese Empire.

It may be convenient here to deal with some of the questions by-passed in the preceding pages in order not to interrupt the continuity of the historical narrative, questions such as the tactics used by the Han commanders in their western campaigns, the trade that passed along the famous Silk Road, the nature of the inhabitants of Sinkiang, and the fate of the Huns who fled to the West after being defeated by the Han empire.

Tactics in Desert Warfare

In order to move and supply their armies over the formidable desert route from Kansu to Hami or to Turfan, Lob Nor and beyond, the Han commanders created mobile cavalry forces that, like the nomads they fought, were their own carriers and suppliers. Great attention was paid to the rearing or acquiring of suitable mounts and pack animals that combined the qualities of sturdiness, swiftness and stamina. I have
mentioned the special expedition to secure the "blood-sweating" horses of Ferghana, which had just those qualities. The blood-sweating, a spectacular phenomenon, had nothing to do with their suitability. It was merely that a certain bacteria growing on their skin made their sweat foam blood-red.

The Chinese, furthermore, had developed a type of harness that greatly increased the drawing power of their animals. It was an extraordinary fact that from 3000 B.C. to A.D. 1000 in Europe and west of China the only harness known was what Professor Needham, in his illuminating article on the subject, describes as the "throat and girth harness," where the pull of the chariot was taken by the yoke at the point where the bellyband joins the throat strap. This harness is inefficient; the animal fitted with it cannot pull much more than 500 kilograms. The reason is obvious: the main pull comes on the throat, and the horse tends to be suffocated. The modern or collar harness or the breast-strap harness, both of which were invented by the Chinese at least as early as 200 B.C., enables the animal to exert the whole of its weight in pulling because the collar or breast strap pulls on the shoulders. Han bas-reliefs show Chinese chariots three or four times larger than any used in Europe at that time. While the Greek, Parthian and Roman chariots carried one or at most two warriors, the Chinese chariot could carry half a dozen. The horse played an exceptionally important role in the life of the Han empire, and this is reflected in the magnificent representations of horses in the art of the time.

It is known that the Han garrisons at Hami and elsewhere also raised their own crops and so partly fed themselves. It is also possible that the Han armies in their advance did what the armies of the Ching dynasty did many centuries later: they sent on advance parties which sowed crops to be reaped by the following main bodies of troops arriving in the next harvest season.

Significance of the Silk Road

The great Silk Road, a highway of cultural intercourse, was one of the most famous commercial routes of the ancient world. Where Chinese protection ended beyond the Pamir passes, Parthian power took over. When Chinese rule lapsed, or the major power controlling the western end of the road weakened, nomad Hun, Tufan and other Central Asian tribes and local tyrants pillaged or levied heavy tribute on caravans and disrupted trade.
The Silk Road really refers to all the paths by which the much-prized silk commodities from China passed overland to the West. This trade began some time around the second century B.C. It went from Lanchow to Anhsi. Here it split along two routes. In earlier days, up to and after Han times, it ran south of the desert through Tunhuang to Loulan near Lob Nor, to Miron, Niya, Khotan, Yarkand and Kashgar. Later, in the eighth century or thereabouts, most of the traffic shifted north of the Taklamakan as the oases south of Lob Nor succumbed to the desert. This northern route ran from Anhsi to Hami and Turfan and thence along the southern slopes of the Tienshan via Karashahr, Korla, Kucha and Aksu to Kashgar. From Kashgar, caravans could take the northern route through Samarkand to Merv or go via the southern route through Balkh (Bactria). From Merv the route ran to Nissa, Hekatompylos (Damghan), capital of Parthia, to Ecbatana (Hamadan) and Ctesiphon on the Tigris (near modern Bagdad), then upriver to the East Mediterranean ports of Antioch and Tyre. In Pan Chao's time the trade route ran from a Tigris port, probably Hira, via the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and Red Sea to Aelana and Petra, Gaza, Damascus and so on to Alexandria and Antioch (Antu) and the rest of the Mediterranean world. Some goods went from Kashgar over the Karakoram passes and down the Indus or the Ganges into India.

The accounts of this wonderful road make fascinating reading. Chinese merchants never traveled the whole route from Changan to Ta Tsin, nor did merchants from Ta Tsin ever reach the Chinese capital. So Ta Tsin remained as much of a riddle to the Chinese as Seres, the land of the Silk People, was to the Romans and the Europeans after them down to the end of the Middle Ages, when Marco Polo made his famous journey and returned to describe the wonders of Cathay.

Ta Tsin has commonly been taken to refer to Rome, but more often in the old chronicles it really refers to Syria and its capital, Antioch, which at that early time enjoyed great prosperity and, from 38 B.C., was an important province of the Roman empire. Several Roman emperors spent part of their lives in this eastern capital of their empire. In later chronicles, after A.D. 500, these western regions came to be called Fu Lin (old pronunciation: But-lin). This seems to be the name the Nestorian missionaries gave the Chinese chroniclers as the missionaries' place of origin—really the place of origin of their religion, that is, the birthplace of Jesus Christ and Christianity: Bethlehem.

At the end of the first century A.D., Pan Chao was governor-general of China's western territories and controlled the area up to the borders
of Parthia, which then included present-day Iraq and Iran. In A.D. 97, he sent his subordinate Kan Ying to Ta Tsin, but Kan Ying got only as far as Tiao Chih (Babylonia or Chaldea) and a port on the Tigris (probably Hira near Nedjeb). Here the merchant sailors filled him with foreboding about the terrors of the sea voyage to Ta Tsin. According to the *Hou Han Shu* (chapter 118), they told him:

The sea is vast and great; with favorable winds it is possible to cross it within three months but if you meet slow winds, it may also take you two years... those who go to sea take on board a supply of three years' provisions. There is something in the sea which is apt to make a man homesick, and several have thus lost their lives.

Kan Ying was no Chang Chien. He contented himself with the information he collected on the spot and returned to report to Pan Chao. It is clear that the Parthian merchants, middlemen in the trade between Ta Tsin and China, were not keen on having a Chinese learn about their trade secrets and routes to Antioch and Rome. The Antioch merchants made a big profit by dyeing the Chinese silks purple at Tyre or Sidon for the Roman market and weaving silk thread into fine gauze. Furthermore, many of the “jewels” they sold to the Chinese were in reality glass. These glass trinkets commanded a good price in China until the secret of their manufacture was discovered during the Wei dynasty in the fifth century.

The Parthians, already feeling the pressure of Rome, feared direct contact between China and Rome. While they resisted the eastward advance of Rome under the emperor Trajan, they sent conciliatory gifts to the Chinese court to ensure that this distant trading partner was well disposed to them.

Parthian or Persian merchants held their position as middlemen for the valuable trade along the Silk Road until the Arabian caliphate conquered the western end of the road. Even then, it was they or Sogdian merchants who handled most of the trade which flowed by the northern route to Byzantium. It was only in A.D. 166 that, traveling via Indochina, a mission of Roman merchants sent by the Roman emperor Antoninus reached the Chinese court at Loyang. In the sixteenth century, the growth of sea trade between Europe and China deprived the Silk Road of much of its former importance.

Of all the goods carried on the road, silk was the most important. During the Han dynasty, rolls of silk were used as currency in official trade with foreign courts. The Romans especially prized the heavy
silks, which they made into togas. The finer webs were turned into diaphanous dresses for Roman matrons and courtesans. The West had no commodity comparable in value and demand to send to the East, and Pliny estimates that the adverse balance of trade between Rome and China, India and Arabia drained the Roman empire of millions of sesterces annually—a vast sum in the terms of trade of those days. What opium did to bankrupt China in the nineteenth century, silk seems to have done for Rome in the second and first centuries B.C. Things came to such a pass that Tiberius (A.D. 14–37) promulgated laws forbidding men to wear silk. Yet the trade regained its position, and it has been calculated that by the fourth century A.D. two-thirds of the stock of gold and silver in the Roman empire had crossed its frontiers eastward. The Roman empire died of many causes. One was a golden hemorrhage.

Porcelain and lacquerware were among other prized commodities from China. It is impossible to assess the value of the great Chinese inventions that went over the road to the West: the wheelbarrow, improved harness for draft animals, the crossbow, deep-drilling techniques, porcelain-making, cast iron, gunpowder, the compass, paper-making, printing and much else that helped to bring about the economic changes that led to the end of feudalism in Europe and the advance to capitalism.

China in her turn imported jewels, rhinoceros horn, tortoiseshell, pearls, coral, amber, damasks, rugs, asbestos cloth, storax (a fragrant ointment), spices, incense, fine steel and copper, hunting dogs, elephants, lions and curiosities like “camel-bird” (ostrich) eggs, bluebird feathers, dwarfs and dancers.

On his return from the Western Lands, Chang Chien brought such valuable plants as the grapevine from Bactria and alfalfa grass. Other envoys who followed him brought chive, clover, cucumber, fig, sesame, pomegranate and walnut, all of immense economic value to China.

In the other direction went the orange, peach and pear and many flowers: the rose, peony, azalea, camellia and chrysanthemum.

The music, dances and entertainments of these Western Lands came to enliven Chinese life and enrich the Chinese arts.

Chang Chien also learned about the routes to India through Khotan and across the Karakoram passes. He learned in Bactria that Chinese Szechuan bamboo and cloth were being brought through India (Shen Tu) to Bactria by a route south of the Kunlun Mountains. This was indeed terra incognita! To discover this route, Han Wu Ti sent him on
Out of the Mists of Time

an expedition to Szechuan and Yunnan. Chang Chien might have discovered the route to India via Burma or Assam, but the tribes that then held Yunnan barred his way and he returned, disappointed, to Changan.

Peace along the Silk Road brought trade, growth and well-being to the Sinkiang oases along its route. It enlivened their cultural and economic life. The importance of Sinkiang to China at that time is vividly expressed in the words of Pan Yung, Pan Chao's son, when he pleaded at an imperial council meeting for continuation of his father's policies:

If you abandon the Tarim region, you abandon it to the Huns. This would be to give them back their stores and their treasure, to refix their severed arm! The day would then come when the barbarians would once more treat our frontiers with contempt and the gates of our cities would have to be kept closed even in broad daylight.

His arguments carried the day. Sinkiang was kept safe from Hun attacks and the Silk Road was kept open until the second half of the second century, when the final decay of the Han empire set in and the country was dismembered in a fresh period of destructive wars. As part of that debacle, evil days once again set in for the oases of Sinkiang as for the rest of China.

Chinese civilization spreading through the towns and settlements of Sinkiang brought their peoples a culture far more developed than the old nomad and oasis cultures. The Hans brought a knowledge of more productive agricultural methods, the crafts of weaving and working metals and fresh knowledge of hygiene and medicine, of the arts and handicrafts. The stream of Chinese thought and inventions passed on westward. The oases were also collecting points and avenues for the passage of Hellenistic, Persian and Indian cultural streams into China. It was along the Silk Road that in the first century A.D. Buddhism came to China. Indian Buddhist missionaries arrived at the Chinese court in A.D. 68.

The Peoples of Sinkiang

We are now in a position to understand more clearly the origins of the people who today inhabit Sinkiang. Up to the ninth century A.D., the early inhabitants of Sinkiang spoke a Persian-Sanskrit tongue, the tongue of the Scyths and Saks, a language belonging to the centum
group of the Indo-European family of languages. It had several dialects named after the cultural centers of those days: Agnean, Kuchean, Khotanese, which later was the easternmost Middle Iranian (Persian) form of speech, and Sogdian, an eastern dialect of Middle Iranian that spread widely in Central Asia for many centuries and particularly in the second half of the first millennium A.D. These early inhabitants of southern Sinkiang were thus of Persian-Aryan stock. Herodotus describes the Saks as “Aryans.” It is reasonable to assume then that these early inhabitants of southern Sinkiang mixed with the incoming Ouighours and other Turki peoples (who once formed part of the Hun alliance of tribes from the third century B.C. to the second century A.D.) when these took over eastern central Asia and Mongolia from the Huns and established the Turki khanates of the sixth and seventh centuries (see Chapter 3).

When Chang Chien passed this way, the kingdoms he found were populated by these early Aryan-Persian people (Scyths, Saks, Yueh-chi) with an admixture of Wusuns and Huns. It was only after the coming of the major Turki tribes, and in particular of the Ouighours (later Uighurs) in the seventh century A.D. and the later introduction of the Moslem religion and Arab culture that the present Turki tongue with its great admixture of Arab and Persian words spread throughout these territories.

In the A.D. 630’s this process of Turki transformation—the creation of a distinctively Uighur nationality—was just beginning.

The Destiny of the Huns

What of the Huns and the north of Sinkiang, the bowl of Dzungaria? As we have seen, the defeats which they suffered at the hands of the Han rulers at the end of the first century A.D. deflected Hun aggression from east to west. They followed the tribes they had earlier displaced and like those tribes left stragglers in their wake across Central Asia and into Europe.

It is impossible here to follow the fortunes of the individual tribes of Huns. Those who stayed in the east were submerged in the flood of Turki tribes which took their place in Mongolia and Northern Sinkiang. By the third century A.D., those who went west had arrived on the Caspian steppes. In the fourth and fifth centuries they had forced the Alano-Goths to leave their homes between the Volga and the Don and settle in the Caucasus and part of the Danube Basin. But their restless
energy could not be contained. In 375, led by Balamir, they crossed the Don, again defeated the Alani, destroyed the Ostrogoths between the Danube and the Dniester, and pressed on the Visigoths, overrunning the valleys of the Dniester and Pruth and conquering territory from the Don to the Carpathians. They forced the Alani and other tribes to make way or join them in their further campaigns. In the beginning of the fifth century, they overran the area of present-day Germany and were pressing on the borders of the Roman empire. The Visigoths, in fear, asked and received permission to cross the Danube and settle on Roman soil. A million people, including 200,000 warriors, crossed the river. It was a fateful decision for Rome. In 410 the Visigoths became dissatisfied with their treatment at the hands of arrogant Roman officials and rebelled. Joining with runaway slaves, they attacked Constantinople after defeating and slaying the Roman emperor Valens. Under Alaric they attacked Rome itself. They were joined by 40,000 slaves, and the imperial city was sacked. Italy was devastated. In 445, the Huns were ruled by Attila, who, Gibbon writes in his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, claimed descent from the shanyu of Mongolia. Attila’s empire stretched from the Caspian to the Adriatic. They pushed as far west as the Rhone, where in 451 they suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the Goths (Gauls) in France and Roman-led mercenaries under Aetius, the last of the great Roman generals. After Attila’s death two years later, his loose-knit empire fell to pieces.

In the East, the Huns had confronted a strong Chinese state basically without slavery. In the West, they attacked a Roman state sick with slavery and corruption. Hun attacks hastened its decline and fall.

In its dying days proud Rome paid tribute to the barbarian Huns. Rome was sacked again by the Vandals under Geiseric in 455 with such ruthlessness that the word “vandal” has become synonymous with senseless destruction. Under the blows of these wild horsemen the complex economic ties of Roman urban civilization cracked and snapped, and the Dark Ages descended on Europe just as they would have descended on China if the Huns had been able to conquer the Hans.

The Huns destroyed what they could not use or pillage from conquered peoples. Villages were sacked and burned; fertile farms and cultivated land were turned into pastures. Hun destruction held back for decades the development of the productive forces and culture of Europe, but by destroying slavery, Hun barbarism opened the way for the rise of feudalism and capitalism.
As we have mentioned, some of the Huns remained in Sinkiang in the aftermath of this massive military migration across two continents. Intermarried with the peoples of the Sinkiang oases and steppes they too were among the forerunners of the present-day Uighurs. Ancient chronicles contain many mentions of the Oigordi (Ptolemy), Guri (in Eastern Europe and Central Asia), and Hui-ku or Hui Hu-erh (Chinese records), referring to people of Hun-Turki extraction in Eastern and Western Turkestan (Sinkiang and Central Asia) and in Eastern Europe.

**Formation of the Chinese State and People**

To understand the relations between the peoples who merged to form the Chinese state, it is important to bear in mind certain key facts. As the Han people multiplied and spread down the Yellow River Valley into the great wooded eastern plain and sparsely populated areas of the Huai and Yangtze river valleys, they absorbed the aboriginal inhabitants, Yueh, Liao, Tai and others, or drove them farther south or west into the mountainous provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan and Fukien. The Hans were only one among many peoples, but they enjoyed certain advantages which made them the most advanced and numerous of the peoples of this southeastern part of the Eurasian continent at that stage of civilization—the time of the breakup of the Neolithic clan communes, the formation of slave societies and then of Asiatic and nomadic feudalism. The extraordinarily fertile loess of the Yellow River Valley was at that time well-wooded and well-watered; in fact, it was marshy in parts of the lower reaches, quite unlike the parched, deforested expanse it became when the rivers had eaten their courses far below the level of the loess plateau, leaving the upper fields waterless except for rain.

By 1700 B.C. the Hans could already make bronze tools and weapons. Shang ritual vessels of c. 1500 B.C. are masterpieces of bronze casting. By 700 B.C. the Hans already knew how to forge iron. Such technologies gave them great superiority in manufacturing and war over their neighbors, who were still using primitive tools and weapons.

It was such advantages that enabled the Hans to create the centralized feudal empire of Chin Shih Huang, which was consolidated by the Han dynasty. Around this nucleus of the Middle Kingdom agglomerated hunting and farming tribes like the Yueh, Man, Miao, Tai and others living to the east, south and southwest of the Hans. So the
Middle Kingdom spread gradually to include all the land to the east coast, south to Kwangtung and Hainan and Taiwan islands and southwest to Szechuan and Yunnan and even Indochina—a vast and largely self-sufficient zone.

The concept of the state and government which from then until the nineteenth century dominated Chinese political thought idealized the emperor as the universal ruler of the terrestrial world and the intermediary between man and Heaven. It envisaged the world as being made up of the central imperial domain (tien-fu), surrounded by the domain of the vassal kings (houn-fu), the “domains of tranquility” (sui-fu), pacified by imperial benevolence, and of restraint (yao-fu), held back from wrongdoing by the imperial power, with the still uncharted wild domain (huang-fu) beyond. This left ample room for various degrees of relationship between the Middle Kingdom and its vassals, allies and enemies. Once they were “civilized”—brought into the orbit of Chinese culture—the barbarians too could be fitting members of the Middle Kingdom. This, and almost precisely in those words, was the opinion of a Manchu prince (the brother of ex-emperor Pu Yi) when I interviewed him in Peking in 1937. And by barbarian, incidentally, he meant, among others, the Europeans, “the Western barbarians.” This belief in the “perfectability” of man common to traditional and modern China is an expression of the Taoist strain in Chinese social thought.

Some vassal and allied rulers actually lived at the imperial court, part guests, part hostages. Others had a looser relationship as tribute-sending dependencies. Some vassals actually received more from the imperial government than they sent in tribute. Cultural and trade contacts, the natural intermingling of peoples, diplomacy, the forming of defensive and offensive alliances, often sealed by marriages between the ruling houses, and war all played their part in the establishment of these relationships. In some cases, the ties formed then have lasted and evolved until today. So it has been in the south with the agricultural Miaos, the Chuangs, the Tai, the Hakkas. In other cases the bonds were broken and the peoples have gone their separate ways. So it has been with the Thais and Vietnamese.

In the northeast, north, northwest and west, the Hans faced a different type of neighbor: the nomads, with a very different way of life. But while these two ways of life were, as we have noted, in some respects contradictory, in other respects they were complementary. For some of these peoples the Han agricultural economy and civilization were a
nucleus around which they grouped—economically, politically and culturally—and into which they coalesced. So it was with part of the Hun, Turki and Mongolian tribes and Manchus, the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and the Uighurs, Tufan and Bo. Others split off and went their separate ways like the Huns who migrated to Europe, the Yueh-chi who migrated to Central Asia, and part of the Turki, Mongolian and other tribes, such as parts of the Kazakh, Kirghiz and Uzbeks who today live in the Soviet Union, or are independent like the greater part of the Koreans or the Mongols of Outer Mongolia.

The nomads resisted the spread of the farmers to their pasturelands. Their last recourse was war. But war was also a sideline occupation fostered by their feudal rulers. The farmers resisted nomad raids, and their feudal state was prepared to fight to assert control over nomad territory and achieve the political aims of the feudal rulers.

But the nomads wanted the grain, metals and handicraft products of the agricultural-handicraft communities, while the latter wanted the hides, furs and animals of the nomads. Trade and peaceful intercourse could well take the place of war between them. Thus there was conflict—and cooperation. The conflicts were crucial.

By the third century B.C. both the Han tribes and the Huns were organized into great feudal states maintaining large armies of fighting men. In their struggles for hegemony, the protagonists invoked the aid and patronage of their gods. The shanyu of the nomad Huns, like the emperor of the Chinese Hans, claimed to be no less than the Son of Heaven. (Genghiz Khan unequivocally proclaimed that he and his house were carrying out the dictates of Heaven.) Under these circumstances there was no room for equality. Either the imperial power prevailed or it was false and impotent. But if the sown lands and their power spread, could the pasturelands be preserved? Into this mortal conflict, the shanyu led his herdsmen turned soldiers. And when these were not enough, he took slaves and subject tribes. The emperor mobilized his feudal retainers, vassal kings and their men-at-arms, and then the farmers from their fields and convicts, serfs and slaves. The outcome was inevitable. The nomads might destroy and depopulate a whole area, but this contradicted their aim and interests. Once wealth was seized or destroyed, that was the end of it. There was the possibility of exterminating a people and pastoralizing their land, and this was often done, but if an area with too large or too stubborn a population was merely subdued and ruled as a source of tribute, the nomads were obliged to forego their own way of life and adopt that of the conquered,
to be peacefully “conquered” in their turn. This happened repeatedly in the West, in Mesopotamia. It happened again and again in China, with certain of the Huns, the Toba (Hsien-pi) Wei dynasty (A.D. 386–534), the Kitan (Liao) dynasty (916–1125), the Kin Tartars (1115–1234), the Mongols’ Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), and the resurgent Kin, the Manchus’ Ching dynasty (1644–1911).

The process of integration whether by coalescence, conquest or alliance was protracted. In the north and northwest, the Han and succeeding dynasties reinforced trade and diplomacy and war with the establishment of agricultural garrison settlements set up in depth. They linked up the new lands and their peoples economically with the metropolitan area. They made Wuwei and Chiuchuan in the Kansu Corridor flourishing farm areas. Tunhuang, on the verge of the desert, was turned into a green paradise and trading mart, a steppingstone to the oases of the Kunlun and Tienshan. In this way the Han people merged with the nomads on the basis of the most advanced economy of the period—a symbiosis of agriculture, stockraising and handicrafts linked by trade. In Hsia, Shang-Yin, Chou and Chin times, a combination of Han farmers and assimilated nomad tribes became welded together and established the Chinese state in the Yellow River Valley and its outer marches. This process continued over the next two millennia.

The economy of the Sinkiang oases was like that of the Hans. Because of their relatively small size, the oasis states could not hope to maintain economic or political independence, located as they were on the main thoroughfare of nomads and traders over the deserts and steppes of Central Asia. They were inevitably subjected to one or the other dominant group of nomads or leaned for support and protection on the strength of the Han state and people. The king of Loulan (Lob Nor) as double insurance during the emperor Chao’s reign sent a son apiece to live at the courts of the Hans and Huns. But from the time of the emperor Wu Ti it was clear which orientation was of greater benefit. As vassals of the nomads they were merely bivouacking places and exploited supply dumps for the restless, warring tribes. As part of the Chinese state they benefited from peace in its times of strength and prosperity, from its advanced culture and from increased trade flowing over the caravan routes. They provided valuable products and facilities for this trade: jade and carpets, dressed hides and leather goods, victuals and water and caravanserai for travelers. The bulk and most valuable part of that trade, however, existed because the great empires at either end of the Silk Road had commodities that each needed or wanted and
wealth to buy them concentrated in the hands of a super-privileged elite upper class. Rich silk from China epitomized that trade. The oases profited hugely from this trade and their part in it. Correspondingly they were the first to feel the pinch when it was frustrated or ceased.

As far as the nomads of Sinkiang were concerned, alliances or unions between the very similar nomad tribes could produce little new except greater military strength. Contacts between nomads and Han civilization brought advantages in the form of mutually beneficial trade and cultural exchange. Hence the centripetal pull of Chinese civilization on the nomads and oases of Sinkiang. From the time of the Han dynasty, Sinkiang became part of China.

Such is the genesis of the Chinese state in those early days. Beneath its feudal trappings and brutalities, it was a joint product of the peoples who inhabited its vast extent from the East China Sea to the Pamirs and from the Mongolian* steppes to the South China Seas, with the more numerous and more developed Han people playing the central and leading role.

* Mongolia here and later (unless otherwise specified) refers to the general geographic area that is now divided into the Mongolian People's Republic, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region of the Chinese People's Republic and the Buriat Mongolian Autonomous Republic of the USSR. Inner Mongolia corresponds to that area occupied roughly by the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region of the Chinese People's Republic.
PART TWO

The Melting Pot of History
THE IMPERIAL POWER of the Han dynasty at its strongest could contain the restless nomads. When that power weakened, the centrifugal forces of feudalism took over inside and outside the Wall.

The Post-Han Interregnum

When the Eastern Han dynasty finally succumbed to internal corruption and decay in A.D. 220, a complex situation arose. The country split into the three kingdoms of Wei, Shu and Wu and a sixty-year struggle for hegemony began. Wei ruled northern China from Kansu to the eastern sea, and many of the nomads and oases acknowledged its sovereignty; Shu held western China (Szechuan); and Wu, central, southern and southeastern China. This period of the Three Kingdoms (220–280) ended in a Wei victory and establishment of the Western Tsin dynasty (265–316). But the new rulers were unable to pacify the contending noble houses and by their profligacy even increased the peasants' burdens. There followed a new interregnum of 265 years in which the contenders
were not only Han Chinese but also ambitious rulers of nomad tribes pressing in from north, northwest and northeast.

The power of the Huns in Asia had been broken since the middle of the first century B.C. The main body moved west to Europe. The tribes remaining on the eastern steppes were subdued by new tribes which took over the ancient Hun pasture grounds. Among these conquerors were Turki tribes moving from the Irtysh River Valley southeast into Mongolia. Among the most important of these were the Turki Toba Tartars. They in turn were forced to contend with the Juan-juan, a proto-Mongol tribe, offshoot of the Hsien-pi of the Wu-huan hills in eastern Mongolia and from the Khingan Mountains and Manchuria and possibly related to the Tungus farther north. When the Toba went on to take over North China and founded a notable dynasty there three hundred and fifty years later, the Juan-juan Mongols took over Mongolia and spread west to Lake Balkhash.

The post-Han interregnum of over three hundred years was a sad time for the Sinkiang oases. They were only tenuously linked by the caravan road. It was Chinese administration and power that had held them together and given them security. As soon as that power weakened, the local feudal nobles of the oases reasserted their independence and sought to extend their rule. A weakness of feudalism is its inherent tendency to split up into its constituent units.

North China had been seriously depopulated as a result of constant wars and peasant revolts brutally suppressed by the rulers. Nomad tribes, Hun refugees, Turki immigrants and then the Hsien-pi moved onto the vacated land and were in turn welcomed and exploited by the Han rulers. Heavy taxes and rents were levied on them. They were conscripted for the armies and, when captured, enslaved. Fresh revolts began. A Hun army seized Changan, the capital; the emperor Min surrendered and the Western Tsin dynasty came to an end. North China was fought over by rival claimants to the throne during the period of the Sixteen Kingdoms (304-439). South of the Yangtze was ruled by the Western Tsin's heir, founder of the Eastern Tsin dynasty (317-420). In the next 270 years four Southern dynasties succeeded each other there. Under the Northern and Southern Dynasties (420-581) bloody feudal wars for hegemony were waged in both north and south China. The northern Han nobles had no scruples about getting the aid of nomad freebooters, and these frequently usurped the imperial title. In the 135 years from 304 to 439 alone, Hun, Turki and Hsien-pi Mongol nomads set up fifteen of the seventeen different despotic kingdoms north of the
Emperors and Khans

Yangtze. Some of these dynasties were fleeting and left nothing behind them but memories of death and destruction. Others made contributions to world civilization. One of these was the Toba Tartars, who founded the Northern Wei dynasty (386–534) and held most of North China. Sinicized, they maintained a sophisticated court. They appreciated the institutions of the Romans and because they thought Roman clothing, chariots and banners resembled those of China, called Rome Ta Tsin (Great Tsin), after China’s first imperial dynasty. The Wei created the famed Yunkang Buddhist grottoes near Tatung, the capital, and splendid murals in the rock temples of Tunhuang. But in ruling North China, the nomad Toba Wei were forced to accept the conditions of feudal landlordism that had developed there. Landlords and nobles held huge estates. Virtual laws unto themselves with their armed retainers, they passed on to the central government only as much of their levies and rents as they were forced to. The court therefore attempted to strengthen itself. It attracted labor to its own royal estates by establishing a system of equalization of landholdings. Rent was paid to it in grain, and taxes in silk or hempen cloth. Able-bodied men were liable for conscript labor and military service when needed. At the same time the court encouraged its nomad subjects to settle on the land and adopt Han dress, language and way of life. Out of such coalescence of nomads and Hans evolved the typical stocky Northern Chinese.

These reforms, however, failed to transform the essential character of Chinese feudal landlordism. The common people among all the nationalities, Hans, Huns, Hsien-pi and Chiangs from Chinghai, all suffered under their feudal rulers. Peasant rebellions shook Northern Wei rule to its foundations. Toward the end, the dynasty split into Eastern and Western Wei. Both were seized by usurpers, and in the ensuing struggle Yang Chien, a scion of one of the noble houses, won supreme power. Establishing the Sui dynasty (581–618), he unified the whole country within the Great Wall and began preparations to recover its lost outer boundaries.

When the strong centralized powers and trading nations like the Parthian or Chinese empires lost control of the Central Asian trade routes, the flow of trade was quickly dammed by marauding nomads or independent feudal chieftains. These levied tribute on goods in transit or simply pillaged the caravans or caravanserai and trading posts which are essential on such a route. The ways of the money-grubbing merchant were not for the bold, barbarian, war-loving nomads. Their needs were
relatively simple. Where luxury goods were concerned, a single successful raid on a caravan or town would suffice them for many a day. A successful threat of terror against Chinese cities could net them thousands of rolls of tribute silk and damask, sacks of grain and even a Chinese princess or two.

On the other hand, loss of trade led to economic and cultural regression in China. Broken links of trade brought hardship and often disaster to those who depended on it for a living: heavy losses for the noble or imperial entrepreneurs and tax gatherers and bankruptcy for many urban merchants and craftsmen. Smaller post stations, supply centers and towns on the road were ruined.

Transport costs were high, the risks great and returns slow. Profitable trade demanded commodities that were valuable in small bulk: goods such as silk, furs and metalware from China; gems, precious metals and other luxury goods from the West; glassware, amianthus (a green asbestos) and spices from Arabia. This trade had helped to make the early Han dynasty one of the richest royal houses in the world. Its loss contributed to the decline of that dynasty. Thus there was a constant urge in China to reestablish that trade, to conquer, pacify and control the nomads, integrate them into the Chinese body politic and so gain control over the trade routes to the West.

In feudal China, members of the ruling aristocracy wielded great economic power as owners of land, serfs, slaves and workshops and controllers of the water works on which farming depended. Trained as warrior commanders and administrators, they had potentially great military and political power as well. Nevertheless they needed a centralized state to consolidate their dominant position in society and arbitrate their mutually destructive ambitions. The imperial feudal system, of course, created new problems for them. Upkeep of the emperor, his court and the bureaucracy was an extra burden on their finances. A strong emperor like Han Wu Ti tended to encroach on their rights. But when the system worked most efficiently, as under the emperor Kuang Wu of the Eastern Han dynasty, it maintained peace among the nobles and held the masses in subjection, partly through economic and military force and partly through custom and culture and superstitious belief in the godhead of the Son of Heaven—in a word, by means of the whole apparatus of the feudal Confucian state.

The imperial power was also able to organize the unified defense of the nation. The nomad barbarians at times became a major force able to field armies numbered in hundreds of thousands. Only a national
mobilization of the Chinese could defeat such attacks. And only an imperial power was able to coordinate such efforts and maintain such great public works as post roads and water conservation projects such as the Grand Canal, on which the prosperity of the country depended, and keep open the trade routes to the West.

Throughout feudal times there was a constant struggle between two forces, centripetal and centrifugal: the drive to centralize power and recover lost territories and the counter-forces of feudal decentralization.

Tang Renaissance

By the end of the sixth century, the Dark Ages of the interregnum were ending. Chinese civilization had assimilated the influx of barbarians that followed the breakup of the Han empire and was strengthened. Farmers, artisans and scholarly families were among the refugees driven from north to south, and these were an important element in the development of the south, which had been largely held by primitive hunting and farming communities.

Yang Chien, first emperor of the Sui dynasty, consolidated the Chinese heartland and then took steps to regain control over the western territories and the trade routes. As René Grousset notes, the Chinese people had assimilated the invading nomad hordes. "Fortified by the injection of fresh blood, they now turned upon the men of the steppes from whom they had derived their strength, adding to that strength the incalculable superiority of an age-old civilization."* This would not be the last time that barbarians would reinvigorate China. It would happen thrice again in Chinese history after the Tang, Sung and Ming dynasties. After the Ching (Manchu) invasion in 1644 it would be the infusion not of barbarian blood and vigor, but of Western ideas.

By skillful diplomacy, Yang Chien encouraged mutually destructive conflicts among the nomad powers in Sinkiang. But the second Sui emperor, Yang Kuang, was profligate and overtaxed the resources of the empire. He built lavish palaces in Loyang and had the pillars for their columns hauled from southern China. Half the porters died on the way. He mobilized over two million people to dig the Grand Canal, 900 miles long, to link the Yellow and Yangtze river basins, the two key economic areas in China. Another million people were conscripted to transport supplies for his three ill-fated expeditions against Korea. Disruption of

the economy caused by such public works and wars left large areas uncultivated. The defeats suffered by his armies led to civil unrest and peasant uprisings. He was assassinated by one of his generals in 618.

Out of the resulting confusion emerged a remarkable leader named Li Yuan, who became the emperor Tai Tsung. He defeated all opponents, suppressed the peasant rebels and reestablished the central power under the dynastic title of Tang (618–907). Just as the Han dynasty had built on the foundations of Chin, so now the Tang dynasty built on the foundation laid by Sui. Like the first Han emperor, the second Tang emperor, Tai Tsung, took care to improve the lot of the peasants, the foundation of the state. He equalized landholdings on the model of the Northern Wei, lightened taxes and levies. Each male adult received a hundred \textit{mu*} of land, twenty to be held in perpetuity and eighty to be returned to the government on his death. (There was plenty of free land for distribution because of previous depopulation.) The annual tax for such a farmer was two pounds of grain and twenty feet of silk. He was required to do twenty days of corvée a year, but this could be remitted on payment of three feet of silk for each day of exemption. An equivalent additional fifteen days of corvée resulted in remittance of the silk tax. Thirty days of extra corvée freed him from the grain tax. But no more than thirty days of corvée could be worked extra. This amelioration of the lot of the peasant resulted in a great increase in production and social order. Handicrafts flourished, and there was a renaissance in the arts and a growth of trade in silks, paper, pottery and ceramics of unrivaled quality and beauty. The Tang court and nobility operated many factories for the making of bronze and iron vessels, brocades, weapons, farm implements, boats, wine, sugar and building supplies. Many commoners took up handicrafts and trading. Great cities grew up: the capital, Changan; Loyang in the Yellow River Valley; Chengtu in Szechuan; Canton, the great port on the southern coast trading with the lands of the South Seas, with India and Africa.

Landholdings of the nobility loyal to the Tang were not touched, but to attract farm labor, they too had to improve conditions for their peasant tenants, at least in the early days of the dynasty. By this time Chinese feudalism and numerous slave and peasant uprisings had eliminated slavery in its crudest forms, but gradually a new form of debt slavery or peonage appeared as peasant smallholders lost their land to usurers because of destitution brought on by natural calamities or personal misfor-

\* One \textit{mu} equals one-sixth of an acre.
tune. In the heyday of the Tang dynasty, however, China flourished. Great prosperity and a splendid cultural renaissance followed her Dark Ages.

The emperor Tai Tsung continued the steps begun by the Sui to reopen the trade routes to the West and curb the nomad raiders. It was a considerable undertaking, because a great new nomad power had arisen in Central Asia, this time straddling most of Turkestan, Dzungaria (northern Sinkiang) and Mongolia.

Rise of the Tu-chueh Khanates

In the middle of the sixth century the Turki-speaking tribes living in the Altai and Mongolia began to draw together. This led in the 550s to formation of the Tu-chueh khanate, a loose-knit nomad feudal state which at its height claimed power from the Khingan in northeastern China through Sinkiang to the Caspian. At first the word “Tu-chueh” (Turk) had no ethnographic meaning. It simply meant a turkun (strong man) or member of the military nobility. Gradually it came to mean all the people united under a turkun or speaking the Turki language. Chinese chronicles of the time mention the successful revolt of a tribe called the Tu-kui in 545 against their overlords, the Juan-juan Tartars who then dominated Mongolia and Dzungaria. They say that this tribe, led by the A-shi-na (Assena) clan of five hundred families, got its name from its settlement near the southern slopes of the Chin Shan Mountains (Shantan in Kansu), where they were known as workers in metal, by a hill shaped like a helmet (tu-chueh). As so often happens, the name of this single well-known tribe came to be applied to the much larger community of tribes and peoples that later acknowledged its sovereignty or even just resembled it.

By 552, the Tu-chueh led by Tumen (Bumin) had smashed the power of their Juan-juan Tartar overlords, who had created the first proto-Mongol empire of the steppes and Sinkiang. Tumen took the title of Ili Khan (Ilkan), grand khan of the Turki tribes, and raised his standard of a golden wolf’s head. At his death, his son Muhan inherited Mongolia, the eastern part of the realm, while Tumen’s younger brother Shetemi (Istami) inherited the western part with Dzungaria. Some Juan-juan fled from the Tu-chueh to the protection of the Chinese empire; some were driven westward across Sinkiang. This tallies with the account of Gibbon that two and a half centuries later Charlemagne destroyed their remnants, then known as the Avars of Hungary. In 565, the vic-
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Trious Tu-chueh attacked the Ephthalites and captured Tashkent, Bokhara and Samarkand. They seized Bactria from Sassanid Persia.

The Tu-chueh khans were not the savage nomads of Hun times. They understood statecraft and diplomacy and were men of great ambition and far-ranging vision. In 567 they sent an embassy to the Eastern Roman emperor Justinian II. Hoping to open up direct commercial relations with the West, they proposed an alliance with Byzantium against the Persians to break the Persian monopoly as middlemen in the rich silk trade and channel it away from the Persian Gulf to the northern variant of the Silk Road. In 568 a Byzantine envoy visited the khan in the Tien-shan’s lovely Yulduz Valley. Tradition has it that at this time Byzantine monks, agents of Justinian, brought the first silkworms, hidden in bamboo tubes, from China to Constantinople. Byzantium thus hoped to establish an indigenous silk industry independent of both China and any middlemen, Persian or Turki. In 628, the Tu-chueh actually helped Emperor Heraclius in his campaign against Sassanid Persia.

Thus when the Sui and Tang dynasties were reuniting China after 260 years of division, they confronted two powers ruling Central Asia. The Eastern Turki khanate, with its capital on the Orkhon, spread over the old Hun lands from Manchuria to Hami. Its khan Tardu boasted that he could field a million archers. The Western Turki khanate had two capitals, one near present-day Urumchi, west of Hami, the other at Tashkent. At its greatest extent in the later sixth century, it spread from the Caspian to the Altai and down to Kabul in today’s Afghanistan. The two khanates included many of the tribes known in this area from the time of the Huns: the Wusun and Kangui; the Torgesh around Lake Issyk Kul; the Yagma in Sinkiang. The oasis states, bereft of Chinese support, had become tributaries of the khanates.

Aiming to restore the farthest bounds of the empire, the Sui emperor Yang Chien encouraged rivalry and disunity among the Tu-chueh. Tardu, leader in the west, was encouraged to declare himself khan, then he was opposed when he grew too powerful. But the Turki rulers played a similar game. Although the Eastern khan Sha Po Lio in 580 styled himself a vassal of the Sui dynasty and was ranked above all other kings and nobles, he did his best to prevent unification of the Chinese lands. When Yang Kuang, the second Sui emperor, was beset with troubles, Tu-chueh forces intervened directly in the civil war. In 601, the Western khan Tardu besieged the Chinese capital. Changan was relieved only when the Tolos Turks, one of the forebears of the Ouighours, then living
in Tarbagatai and Djungaria and the southern Altai, agreed to revolt and attack Tardu's army from the rear. Tardu was defeated and fled to Koko Nor, where he perished. When the Sui dynasty collapsed, Tu-chueh power revived and threatened the new Tang dynasty.

But the prince imperial who became Tai Tsung, the second Tang emperor, was a man of enormous vision and vigor. When the capital was attacked by a hundred thousand men under the new eastern khan Gheri (Hie-li), Tai Tsung marshaled his small army in a bold show of strength that overawed the enemy. He resumed the Sui dynasty's tactic of splitting the Tu-chueh power. He had already built firm relations with many nomad leaders when helping his father to the Dragon Throne of China, and now he trained a mobile cavalry army in which he enrolled nomads like the friendly Ouighours. Several of his most devoted generals were Turki warriors. The Seyenda, Baikals, Kirghiz and Ouighours, rebelling against the exactions of the khan Gheri, switched allegiance. With this support, emperor Tai Tsung in a rapid cavalry operation surprised and captured the khan in 630. The Eastern khanate was dismembered. Hami and Turfan were garrisoned by Tang troops. The rest of the khanate was held by tribes friendly to China. The nomads hailed Tai Tsung as grand khan of nomad peoples from Manchuria to Hami. More than eighty thousand Chinese captives were freed and returned to their homes. Captured Turki rulers were treated magnanimously and given quarters at the Tang court. When Tai Tsung went on a thanksgiving pilgrimage to Mount Tai in Shantung, he was accompanied by over twenty Turki chieftains. A hundred thousand Tu-chueh were settled in the Ordos and in Shensi Province.

The Western Tu-chueh khanate, however, still dominated the area from Turfan to Merv, but in a power struggle for the succession it too split into north and south parts. The south was based on Tashkent and Samarkand with the territory just north of the Syr Darya and stretched east to the oases of the Tarim Basin. The north held the Kazakhstan steppes. Taking advantage of this split in 638, Tai Tsung's armies advanced and inflicted a series of defeats on the Western Tu-chueh. In 640 the Gaochan realm (Turfan) was subdued. Karashahr and Kucha fell. The headquarters of the protectorate of the Western Lands was established at Anhsi. Soon all Djungaria and Kashgaria were restored to the Chinese empire in a final campaign led by Tai Tsung's Turki commander A-Shih-Na-She-erh and Kuo Hiao-Ko, his redoubtable Chinese general. Outposts of the empire were established as far as Tashkent on the border with Persia and in Afghanistan.
Sinkiang in Tang Times

The people of the Sinkiang oases welcomed the Tang. They had had to live under the rule of rapacious feudal khans and warlords whose only interest was in war and plunder. Even the Persian Sassanid empire feared the attacks of these freebooters. Cities like Samarkand and Bokhara had been constantly on the alert against their depredations. Now one by one they were subdued or won over to the Tang emperor. The khan of Khotan offered his loyalty to the Tang. He went to Tai Tsung's capital and returned laden with gifts, including five thousand rolls of silk, which far surpassed the value of his tribute. For several years there was peace in Sinkiang, an unheard-of achievement. Many Chinese artisans migrated to supply the trade. They made metalware, gold and silver ornaments and paper (invented in China in the second century B.C.). At that time the great powers at the western end of the Silk Road were the Sassanid Persian empire, Byzantium and the Arab world. Sassanid Persia had taken the place of the Parthian empire, and the struggle and competition of Parthia with Rome had been replaced by contention between Persia and Byzantium, until Persia and much of Byzantium's empire were engulfed by the rising Arab power in the seventh century.

Tai Tsung gained a valuable ally by marrying his daughter to Sron-tsam Gampo, who had unified the Tufan tribes and become king of Tibet. Wen Cheng, the bride, brought to her new home many of the arts and crafts of China. She is revered to this day by the Tibetans for introducing the waterwheel, the iron-chain suspension bridge and the arts of brewing, rice milling and ink-making. With Sron-tsam Gampo, the Tufans began to appear on the Central Asian stage as a military power to be reckoned with.

Once again the road was open from Changan to the West, to the Eastern Roman empire based on Constantinople. The territories north and south of the Tienshan were formed into two new commanderies, and for many years the oases of Sinkiang prospered along with the whole of the vast Tang empire.

The absorption of barbarian invaders in China between the Han and Sui dynasties from 220 to 581 was like the process of plowing up, fertilizing, and seeding a field. With the Tang dynasty came the harvest: a great resurgence of Chinese culture. This resurgence preceded by over a century the renaissance of European civilization under Charlemagne after the Dark Ages when the Roman power was shattered by the onslaught of the barbarian Hun tribes.
The Tang renaissance also preceded by many years the extension of the Arab caliphate and spread of Moslem Arab culture. Tai Tsung was a sagacious ruler. He did not overburden his fifty million people with taxes. Reform of the monetary system and abolition of dues on internal trade fostered handicrafts and trade. The early Tang regime was probably the most enlightened and ably administered of its time in the world, and it led the world economically and culturally as well.

The Grand Canal, linking the key economic areas of the Yellow, Huai, and Yangtze basins into a single system, had begun to demonstrate its advantages. It was a time of great shipbuilders and navigators and expansion of overseas trade. Seagoing junks could carry six hundred people. China had many much-sought-after commodities. Tingchow was famed for its silk brocades. A workshop there had five hundred looms. Superb porcelain, a Chinese invention, was made at Kingtehchen. Shards of it have been found at Samarra on the Tigris, capital of the caliphs in the eighth century, and on the east coast of Africa. Chengtu made silverware, Hsiangyang, lacquerware; Yangchow made bronze mirrors prized throughout the then-known world. In 643, a special Chinese mission was sent to India to King Harsha. Among other things it brought back the recipe for making sugar, which was later used with great success at Yangchow. Such wares and metal goods, silk and tea were eagerly bought in the Western world.

Printing was developed and later, in Sung times, movable type was introduced. The knowledge of silkworm culture, irrigation, improved by the use of waterwheels, the making of paper, gunpowder and the compass spread westward and did much to change feudal Europe in succeeding centuries. Paper and printing spread knowledge among the people. Gunpowder ended the impregnability of castles. The compass widened the horizons of the feudal world and opened the New World. Persian and Arab caravans and ships brought spices, medicinal drugs and gems in exchange for Chinese goods. Traders and visitors from the West who came peaceably to China were warmly welcomed. In Changan, where five thousand of them lived, they enjoyed the same political rights as Chinese. Their customs, habits and religious beliefs were respected. Tang China had a cosmopolitan attitude based on confidence in its own strength.

New cities grew up as centers of handicrafts, trade, administration and culture. It was a time of great intellectual curiosity and artistic creativity. There was a magnificent flowering of poetry with Li Po (701–752), Tu
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Fu (712-752) and Pai Chu-yi (772-846); of painting with Wang Wei, Yen Li-pen and Wu Tao-tso; and of music under the emperor Hsuan-tsung (713-755). In Buddhism, subtly sinified, the Tang empire found a spiritual catalyst for unity. The Buddhist monk Hsuan Tsang and other travelers brought back to China not merely scriptures but a whole treasury of Indian thought. Nestorian Christianity was introduced into China. Zoroastrians and Manichaeans too had their churches and temples in tolerant Changan. The Silk Road was a magnificent avenue of trade and cultural exchange to and from the West and India. Protected by Tang power and defended by the peoples it served, it was readily traversed by merchants, ambassadors, teachers and craftsmen.

The nearly four hundred years between the end of the Han dynasty and the return of Chinese power to the Tarim oases saw great changes in Sinkiang. Not only were these oasis kingdoms more sophisticated economically and ruled by Turkic sovereigns, but they had come under the influence of Buddhism.

The Coming of Buddhism

Buddhism came to the settlers and nomads of Central Asia and to China via Sinkiang. Until the second century B.C., all the Central Asian peoples east of the Pamirs were animists. They believed that Heaven bestowed the sovereignty and lands on the rulers on earth and through them cared for the people. The lesser spirits of the earth and waters and ancestors also had to be revered and propitiated. But with the second century B.C., Sinkiang began to learn of a new and more sophisticated religion—Buddhism.

Buddhism had developed in India around the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. In the third century B.C., King Asoka of the Maurya dynasty accepted the faith and became its zealous propagator. In the second and first centuries many monasteries were founded in India, and the faith spread wherever Indian influence extended and brought with it an extensive use of the Indian arts—painting, sculpture, music, processions and dancing—as part of its elaborate ritual and cult. Kanishka, ruler of the Yueh-chi's Kushan empire in northwestern India and Afghanistan, had been converted in the middle of the second century B.C. Thence Buddhism spread over the Himalayan and Karakoram passes. From Khotan in Sinkiang it was disseminated north and east. The emperor Ming Ti officially introduced Buddhism to China in A.D. 67 when a mission he had sent to India to get a fuller knowledge of the religion re-
turned to China. A number of great Buddhist missionaries passed along the Silk Road: Shih-kao, a Parthian (148); Chu Sho-fu, an Indian; and Che Chan, a Yueh-chi (170). A Buddhist religious community was founded in the Eastern Han capital, Loyang. Monasteries and temples were established in the oases, and Buddhist texts were translated into the local tongues. The Indo-Aryan populations of the oases quickly assimilated the new religion.

Buddhism arose on the basis of the earlier belief of the transmigration of souls: that a soul would be reborn again and again, its worldly fate depending on the merit of the previous life lived. Sakyamuni, the princely founder of Buddhism, who gained the title of Buddha—the Enlightened—taught that this circle of birth-life-death-rebirth could be broken only by extinguishing all desire, all wish for self, and so attaining nirvana—blessed nothingness. The attainment of nirvana depends on following the precepts of the Buddha, which are described in many moral stories.

There is the prince who sacrifices his life to save the life of a starving tiger and her cubs; the hare who hurls itself into the fire to feed a hungry man. Many other parables are told both of the Buddha himself in his incarnations and of his disciples. I saw all these Buddhist parables pictured with superb artistry on the walls of the sacred grottoes of Tunhuang and Kezir.

Its exhortations to selflessness, to love of one's fellow men, to gentleness and renunciation of worldly pleasures and force have commended Buddhism to many noble minds, but there have always been some (as with other religions) who have attempted to escape retribution for their crimes by a show of good works and empty observance of Buddhist rituals. Some of the most depraved of the Toba Wei monarchs and their queens were ostentatious Buddhists. From 515 to 528, Queen Hu governed the Chinese Wei empire. She forced her rivals into convents and even murdered them there. She killed her unwanted lovers, even poisoned her son, and finally, in a vain attempt to save her own life, herself entered a convent. Yet it was she who endowed the impressive Lungmen Buddhist grottoes, one of the outstanding relics of Buddhist art. Some of the finest masterpieces at Tunhuang are Wei creations.

More than a hundred noted Chinese scholars visited India between 260 and 751. The famous Chinese monk and traveler Fa Hsien journeyed through Sinkiang in 400 and found the Buddhist religion practiced throughout this area. From Tunhuang, where a start had already been made on the famous painted grottoes, he traveled for seventeen
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days across the desert, where "there are evil spirits and hot winds that kill every man who encounters them. No birds fly there and no beasts roam. As far as the eye can see, no road is visible across the desert, and only the skeletons of those who have perished there serve to mark the way." In Shanshan or Loulan, which has now disappeared completely under the desert sand, he found a Buddhist king and monastery with four thousand monks of the Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) School, a materialist sect of Buddhists. He then traveled westward for fifteen days to Agni (now also buried in the sand) where he found a similar number of Buddhist monks. After a further journey of thirty-five days he reached Khotan. This country he found "rich and happy, with a prosperous people. All its inhabitants are Buddhists, who delight in their religion. The number of monks amounts to several tens of thousands, most of whom study Mahayana Buddhism." The king lodged him in the Gomati Monastery, where there were three thousand monks. The kingdom had fourteen large monasteries, not to speak of smaller ones. He witnessed a splendid Buddhist procession in which a richly adorned car thirty feet high and hung with silk pennants and canopies and with Buddha's image in it was drawn to the city. When the image had approached to within about a hundred paces of the gate where the king was waiting in state, the monarch took off his crown and changed into fresh clothes. Carrying flowers and incense and followed by his attendants, he went out of the city barefoot to receive the image, humbly pay homage and scatter flowers and burn incense before it. As the image entered the city, the queen and her maidens on the gate-tower cast down all kinds of blossoms.

Fa Hsien also describes a monastery that took eighty years and three reigns to build. It stood two hundred feet high and was ornamented with carvings and inlaid work and studded with gold, silver and all kinds of jewels. The kings of six countries east of the Pamirs had presented jewels to decorate it. Its shrine-hall beams, pillars, door and windows were plated with gold.

Khotan today is a delightful small town with a textile mill and other industries. Its carpetmakers weave gorgeous rugs in the Persian style. A cooperative department store and a People's Palace front its central crossroads. Archeologists are clearing the rubble from some ancient ruins, but what has been excavated suggests that perhaps the good monk was exaggerating somewhat.

In A.D. 629, at the start of the Tang dynasty, the monk Hsuan Tsang, the famed Tripitaka immortalized in the novel Journey to the West, followed in Fa Hsien's footsteps. He was journeying to India to get more
of the Indian Buddhist scriptures, particularly the Sanskrit text of the Yoga Sastra, a great compendium of idealist philosophy only portions of which were known in China. At that time Sinkiang was divided between the Eastern and Western Tu-chueh khanates, but he found the oases deeply wedded to Buddhism and flourishing on the trade of the Silk Road. Lanchow in West Kansu was thronged with merchants from Central Asia and beyond. Tunhuang was a great center of Buddhist learning and famous for its sacred painted grottoes. Buddhist art here bore the influence of the art of Gandhara—the union of Hellenistic and Indian art—and joined this with the art of China in an extraordinarily rich amalgam. The grottoes are sited across the desert away from the city of Tunhuang. To visit them was a hard additional journey for the pious. They were being constantly enriched with murals and sculpture financed by pilgrims and devotees, merchants setting off on dangerous journeys across the desert or bloody tyrants hoping to appease their consciences and win merit by a show of good works. Whatever the motivations of the donors, the results are miraculous. I spent three full days from dawn to dusk simply going from grotto to grotto making little more than a short inspection of each preparatory to a later, closer study.

Turfan, west over the desert, was then a kingdom feudatory to the Tang emperor with a government administration modeled on that of the Chinese. There was a college, where the Confucian classics were taught, and a flourishing Buddhist church. The people there, as in the other oases, spoke Tokharian (akin to Persian and Sanskrit). Here too, in the Buddhist grottoes at nearby Baizerlikh, there are rich frescoes. The king of Turfan, recorded Hsuan Tsang, had friendly relations with twenty-four other sovereigns to the west, some of them his relatives. Hsuan Tsang had up till then traveled in peace, thanks to alert garrisons of the Tang and its allies, but on his way to Kucha he and his escort encountered bandits. Some were bought off, others were frightened away by a show of force. Kucha had a Buddhist community of five thousand monks, followers of the Hinayana school. Nearby, a day's journey by cart across the desert took him to the famous Buddhist grottoes of Kezir (Kyzyl) where, following his footsteps, I have seen the astonishing murals. Even more than those of Tunhuang they show the influence of Greek and Indian art. Here the pilgrim found a modified form of Hindu script in use.

Journeying west from Kucha to Tokmak, near Lake Issyk Kul, winter headquarters of the Western Tu-chueh khanate, Hsuan Tsang encountered a band of two thousand Turki bandits quarreling over a recent haul of booty. They showed no interest in the monk's small and obviously
modest party. Crossing the Bedel Pass through the Tienshan, Hsuan Tsang lost ten of his thirty companions and many animals from some natural disaster, seemingly an avalanche. But arrived safely at Tokmak he was made welcome by the khan, who was enjoying a hunting expedition. No longer the savage barbarian warrior of Hun days clad in skins, the khan wore a green silk gown and a turban of silk. His two hundred commanders were robed in rich brocades and the ladies of the court wore headdresses blazing with jewels. These Tu-chueh were Zoroastrians but listened with interest to Hsuan Tsang’s Buddhist teachings. Turning south, he found that the rulers of Samarkand were also followers of the early Persian religion. In Kunduz in Afghanistan, where Buddhism flourished, Hsuan Tsang ran into trouble. The new queen had just poisoned the king, her husband, in order to put her lover on the throne. However, Hsuan Tsang successfully completed his journey and his task. On his return to China from India fifteen years later he received a noble welcome from the emperor. He had practically stolen across the border when he left, but he had gained great fame on his travels. The elephant which king Harsha of India had given him for his return journey died soon after crossing the Karakoram into Sinkiang, but the emperor Tai Tsung gave orders to Khotan and other oases to provide him with fresh transport and escorts.

Nestorian Christianity entered Sinkiang from the West. Bishoprics were established in Herat, Merv, Samarkand and then Kashgar. Thence it was carried farther east to China along the Silk Road. Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism were also introduced and had their devotees there until Sung dynasty times in the tenth century. This last religion combined Zoroastrian, Christian and other beliefs.

Following the death of Tai Tsung in 649, the Tang empire suffered a temporary eclipse. His successor Kao Tsung (655–683) carried on his father’s policies in the early part of his reign, but he was a weakling dominated by the harem. Palace intrigues bedeviled the government. Misrule at home led to worsening relations with neighbors. Once again fighting broke out on the western borders. First the Tufans attacked from Tibet. In 679, king Kunling with 180,000 Tufans and allies advanced on the Tang heartland and was only stopped after bitterly contested battles in Chinghai. From 670 until 692, Tufan raiders dominated the Tarim Basin and its oases, including the Four Garrisons of Khotan, Kashgar, Kucha and Karashahr. Under Mercho (Mo-cho), the sixteenth khan,
the Eastern Tu-chueh khanate was reestablished, and from 691 to 716 nomad power was revived almost to the level achieved by the Hun Modeh. Mercho massacred 90,000 Hans in just two conquered cities. But by 715 the Turki people revolted, weary of Mercho’s tyranny and wars. A group of Baikals ambushed him, cut off his head and sent it to Changan.

Tang generals regained control of the Silk Road, but the Tufan still disputed the area, not only in the east in Chinghai but in the west where the Karakoram passes link Sinkiang with India. They advanced westward over the Tibet plateau and across Ladakh, down the Indus to Gilgit and Yasin to link up with Arab power advancing eastward for a joint campaign against China’s Four Garrisons in the Tarim Basin. But Tang power was restored to its zenith. The emperor Hsuan Tsung (713–755) had a peaceful northern border and good relations with the Ouighours, now settled around Turfan. To prevent the dangerous linkup between the Tufans and the advancing Arabs and the cutting of the caravan route to India, Hsuan Tsung’s brilliant Korean commander Kao Hsien-chih was sent from Kucha with ten thousand men. His campaign over desert, high mountain passes and desolate ranges is one of the most remarkable achievements in military history. It took him thirty-five days to reach Kashgar over the desert. Twenty more days brought him to Tashkurgan in Sarikol. He then surprised and wiped out the advance column of Tufans entrenched behind fortifications near Sarhad on the headwaters of the Amu Darya. Crossing the Hindu Kush by the Beik (Baroghil) Pass, he advanced another three days to capture Little Polu. The ruler returned with him to Changan, there to be enrolled in the Imperial Guards and accept the suzerainty of China. This exploit for the time being ended the Tufan threat to the western Tarim Basin. In 750, Kao Hsien-chih again led his troops, this time over the Karakoram into Chitral, to stop another Tufan column. Kashmir and Kabul became allies of the Tang empire. This marked the farthest extent of Tang power to the west. After that the tide began to turn.

**Tang Decline**

The rising Arab power of the Ummayid caliphate had, as early as 652, already destroyed the Sassanid Persian empire. Overrunning Persia and capturing Sogdiana in 705, Arab armies under Kutaiba crossed the Amu Darya. A desperate attempt of the last Sassanid ruler to regain his throne with Chinese help failed. In 709, Kutaiba captured Bokhara and Samar-
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kand and advanced on Tashkent and Ferghana. The kings of these two cities appealed for Chinese aid. Emperor Hsuan Tsung sent his commanders and Turki auxiliaries to their aid and they were restored to power. Moslem power was stemmed for the moment on the threshold of the Buddhist oases of Sinkiang.

But if Kao Hsien-chih’s victories marked the zenith of Tang power, his defeats marked its decline. Highhanded interference in the affairs of Tashkent and the execution of its king enraged the ruling house. They rebelled and sought the aid of Turkic neighbors and Arab power. In 751 a decisive battle was fought between the opposing forces at Atlakha on the River Talas. Kao Hsien-chih was defeated and barely escaped with his life. There was no time to repair this disaster. Four years later, An Lu-shan, Kitan favorite of the aging emperor Hsuan Tsung, began a rebellion that devastated the empire. Even after An Lu-shan’s death, ambitious generals continued his bid for the throne. Twenty million people died in this civil war. It took eleven years to restore Tang control. Seeing China in disarray, the Kitan Tartars (Tungusic-Hsien-pi tribes) raided from the north. The Tufan tribes occupied Tunhuang and held Kashgaria from 766 to 790, cutting off the Tarim Basin from the rest of China.

For a space the house of Tang made a comeback under the new emperor, Hsuan Tsung’s son, Su Tsung (756–762), aided by loyal nomads. The Shato (Desert Turks) who nomadized in the Manass area, northwest of Urumchi, had fought in the Tang armies. Caught up in the maelstrom of the war in 756, all seven thousand families were forced by the Tufan to move to Kansu and fight under their banners. When the Ouighour allies of the Tang took nearby Lanchow, the Tufan thought it dangerous to have the Shato so near a kindred Turki tribe and ordered them to move well away from the Yellow River. The Shato determined to cut their way east to join the Tang armies. In 808 the whole horde, now numbering thirty thousand families, fought their way east. By the time they reached the protection of the Great Wall, only two thousand fighters survived with their women and children. They were resettled in the Ordos by the grateful Tang emperor. Later it was the ruler of the Shato, Li Ko-yun, who drove rebels from Changan and restored it to the Tang in 883.

The Ouighours proved to be the other great Turki ally of the Tang. In 744, with the decline of the Eastern Tu-chueh, the Ouighours took over the old Hun pasturelands in Mongolia. When the emperor Su Tsung called upon them to help in the struggle against An Lu-shan, they
drove the rebels from Loyang. But they waged war in the way they knew and promptly began to sack this eastern capital of the Tang. Only when the elders of the city presented them with ten thousand bolts of silk did the pillaging cease.

Ouighour power was ascendant for nearly a century. Then, during a long stay in Loyang, their khan Mei-yu (759–780) became converted to Manichaeism and led his people to this religion. They became vegetarians and “doers of good deeds,” and their rulers fell under the influence of priestly advisers. Such attitudes gave little chance of survival in the steppes of the ninth century. Beset in addition by natural calamities, they were supplanted by the wild Kirghiz Turks from the Yenisei (who in turn were later thrust back to the Yenisei steppes by the Kitan). The Ouighours who fled to the Turfan area, Kucha and Karashahr (843), were, however, able to maintain themselves by more practical policies. Here they acquired the civilization of the oases, and later when they were incorporated into the empire of the Mongol Genghiz Khan they provided that conqueror and his descendants with an invaluable bureaucracy of officials and scribes who ameliorated the earlier savage Mongol policies.

The end of Tang came in 907. A period of fifty-three years of almost incessant war laid waste the country. The population was reduced from over fifty million to seventeen million in the period from 754 to 764 alone. The survivors lived in misery. No less than five different dynasties were established one after another. Once again Sinkiang was cut off from the rest of China. Moslem power advanced from the west, and the oases fell under the rule of the Moslem Samanid dynasty (875–999).

*The Coming of Islam*

Arab traders began to reach Sinkiang in considerable numbers in the seventh century. They were soon followed by Moslem teachers bringing Islam.

Islam arose in the beginning of the seventh century in Arabia. The hegira or flight of the prophet Mohammed from Mecca to Medina to begin his major missionary work is the first year in Moslem year reckoning and took place in A.D. 622. Based in Medina, Mohammed and his followers soon spread the new religion throughout western Arabia. Engels has described Islam as “a religion adapted to the peoples of the East, especially the Arabs, i.e. on the one hand, town dwellers engaged in
Emperors and Khans

trade and industry, and on the other hand, nomad Bedouin.* A Moslem, as the Koran, its sacred scripture, teaches, must believe in the one God, Allah, and Mohammed, His prophet, and submit himself to the will of God and those who exercise authority according to His will. The true believer must perform the prayers prescribed, give alms, pay his taxes and make the pilgrimage to Mecca. He must keep the fast of Ramadan (the ninth month of the Moslem lunar year) and bear witness to the one God, participating, when called upon, in the jihad or sacred war to defend Islam against the unbelievers. Acceptance of the faith is by a simple declaration of belief before witnesses. Islam prescribes rules for personal conduct in family matters, in business, in morality. It prohibits gambling and indulgence in intoxicating drinks. It is thus at once a religion, a society and a state.

After Mohammed's death his followers spread the faith by conversion and conquest in the seventh, eighth and ninth centuries to the whole of Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Turkey, Iran (Persia) and Khorasan to the Caucasus and east into Central Asia and Sinkiang, and west to Egypt, North Africa and Spain. Opportunely for Islam, Byzantium and Persia had exhausted themselves by long years of struggle. In 634 the emperor Heraclius was defeated, but Constantinople held and in saving itself blocked the incursion of Arab power into Eastern Europe. (Only in 1453 did Constantinople fall to the Ottoman sultan Mehmed II.) The defeat of the Moslem armies at Tours in 732 marked the limit of their advance at the other end of Europe. The Sassanid Persian king was crushed in 642. The power of the Tang empire in 710 temporarily blocked the Moslem advance in Central Asia.

The great domains conquered for the Moslem faith were divided into caliphates. Here nonbelieving citizens were required to pay a special, heavier tax—the djizya—so there was inducement—sometimes made sharper by persecution—to join Islam. By this time the far-ranging Arab conquests had created new conditions in which Islam had to function. The Koran, as recorded by Mohammed, could no longer provide all the answers in a vast Arab empire much more complex than the towns and nomad desert settlements of the Prophet's day. As a supplement to the Koran, more and more recourse was had to the Sunna, the body of sacred writings containing many of the hadith or stories and sayings of Mohammed. On this basis there developed the Shariat, the codex of Islamic law that regulates the life of all Moslems as individuals, mem-

bers of families and tribes, citizens of the caliphate and upholders of the Moslem faith.

But neither Buddhist nor Islamic rulers changed Sinkiang into a heaven on earth any more than Christianity brought the millennium to "Christian" Europe. The ruling classes continued to dominate and exploit the masses. Sometimes the domination was by tyrants masquerading as religious leaders. Rulers used religion as their sanction for exploitation, to make the people believe they were fated to be oppressed and exploited, that this was ordained by Allah. Buddhist rulers claimed suffering in this world was ordained by an evil fate which was the just punishment for evil performed in a previous incarnation. The exploited in both cases were pacified by the thought that those who were guilty would get their just deserts in the next life or reincarnation. On the other hand the exploiters themselves, by a hypocritical show of "good deeds" and an empty observance of the outward show of religion, tried to ensure salvation in the next world, while enjoying themselves in this.

The missionaries of Islam at first made little headway among the Buddhist inhabitants of the Sinkiang oases. They enjoyed greater success among the nomad populations, who still held animist beliefs, like the early Bedouin converts of the Prophet. Sinkiang, however, offered conditions comparable to those in Arabia—towns with handicraft industries and a lively trade surrounded by nomad populations—and steady pressure finally paid off.

Though Arab forces under Kutaiba had defeated the Tang army on the Talas, they were too much weakened to advance farther at that time, and the Tang empire was still strong. And even though four years later the An Lu-shan rebellion threw the Middle Kingdom into turmoil, the Ouighour khanate and friendly Turks formed a bulwark from north of Hami to Kansu. They also protected the oases of southern Sinkiang from the further advance of Islam at that time, and they respected the Buddhist and Manichaean religions of their peoples. For nearly seventy years this balance of power was maintained. As long as there were goods and buyers, trade flowed over the Silk Road, with the Ouighours now linking Arabs and Chinese. The only disturbing element was the Tufan, who still raided caravans when they could. In 787, the caliph Haroun Al-Raschid, of *A Thousand and One Nights* fame, actually sent an embassy to China to enlist its aid against the Tufan. Gradually Tang power waned and dissension spread in the Arab caliphate. Yet it was then that Islam made new advances in Central Asia.
The Samanid Dynasty and Islamic Sinkiang

In 819, a Zoroastrian Persian of Balkh, Saman by name, accepted Islam. The caliphs of Bagdad, rulers of the Moslem world, appointed him and his sons governors of the Transoxian (east of the Amu Darya) provinces of Herat, Samarkand, Ferghana and Tashkent. His grandson Nasr, governor of Ferghana, having consolidated the power of the house, took Bokhara as his capital and founded the Samanid dynasty (875–999) in only nominal subservience to the caliphs. His brother and heir Ismail extended their domains from Ispahan to Turfan and from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. Under Samanid rule, Sinkiang was gradually converted to Islam, not always peacefully. Bloody fighting continued for twenty years before the whole territory of Buddhist southern Sinkiang was subdued. The Samanid dynasty lasted a century and a quarter, long enough to complete the conversion of southern Sinkiang and bring it into close contact with the cultural renaissance transforming the Arab world.

Arabic became the lingua franca of the whole of the Middle East and a large part of Central Asia. It was the language of the literati and acted like a leaven in intellectual circles. This was the era of the great exponent of Arab medicine and philosophy Abu Ali ibn Sinn (Avicenna), follower of Aristotle, and of the poets Rudaki (913–942) and Firdousi (941–1020). Science, the arts and literature flourished. The Turki culture of Sinkiang received a lasting imprint from this association with the advanced culture of the Arab world and Persia. By the tenth century Islam was firmly established in Sinkiang, and though the Samanid kingdom, a loosely knit feudal state in which several Turki tribes, including the Ouighours, were feudatory, fell under the onslaught of the nomad Turki Kharakhanids in 999, the process of Islamization continued.

The Kharakhanids in Sinkiang

The Kharakhanid kingdom (932–1165) was established by the Turki Yagma tribe, which had once been a member of the Western Tu-chueh khanate. Storming Bokhara, the Kharakhanid monarchs established a realm extending from Khotan to Bokhara and beyond and from the Ili River south to the Amu Darya and the Kunlun Mountains. Having driven out the Samanids, who had been simultaneously attacked from the south and west by the Turkic Ghaznavid kingdom, founded by a former
slave in Afghanistan and Balkh, the Kharakhanids set up their capital in Kashgar, with Balasagun near Lake Issyk Kul as a second seat.

Typical of the nomad alliances of the past, Kharakhanid rule was a loose federation of nomad tribal rulers dominated by the ruling house. But it was also a Moslem state. Every peasant was obliged to pay the ikhta or state levy on the land he farmed, and this in effect bound him to that land. The nobility had the right to collect the ikhta as the sovereign's feudatories and were related to him by ties of blood, marriage or vassalage. Kashgar, Balasagun and Uzghent were the main ikhta-producing areas and were small, semi-independent kingdoms. Years of exploitation by the Samanids and dynastic wars between the Samanids and Kharakhanids had left the masses in a pitiful condition. They were ruthlessly squeezed to maintain the nobility in luxury and support a class of officials and scholars. Arab culture continued to flourish. Great Arab scholars gathered in the cities and transmitted a knowledge of China and its arts and sciences to the West. Suleiman the Merchant (c. 850) came to China and wrote an account of his visit.

The Kharakhanids wished to prey on the trade between China and the West, but their feudal ambitions resulted in constant strife that made trade impossible and hastened their downfall. The Central Asian trade route, which they made hazardous, was gradually supplanted by the sea route around India. Chinese ships had visited Aden as early as the fifth century.

The Ouighours in Sinkiang have already been mentioned, but we should make a more detailed acquaintance with them, because the ancient Ouighours are one of the main constituent ethnic groups composing the Uighur people of today. When first heard of in the time of the Northern Wei (386–534) in Chinese chronicles they were known as the Wei-ho and nomadized along the Selenga River, southwest of Lake Baikal and on the upper reaches of the Yenisei. They were a Turki people speaking a Turki-Coman dialect. One of the Gao Che (High Cart) tribes, they are spoken of under this name in the Sui dynasty. To this day the big-wheeled arba or high cart is a characteristic sight in the people's communes of southern Sinkiang. Later the Ouighours were known as the Wei-wu and also Wu-ho, Wu-hu and Yuan-ho. Up to the early fifth century they were subjects of the Turki Juan-juan khans but seem to have been partly dispersed toward the end of that century by
attacks from neighboring tribes. We find them in the sixth century as vassals of the Kara-Kitai (Kitans) in the Eastern Tu-chueh khanate. In the early seventh century, having increased in numbers and become skilled mounted archers, they established their first independent kingdom under their leader Szegin (Ziken, Shi-chien) in the area north of the Hsien-to (the Seyenda), another Gao Che tribe, and placed their capital on the Selenga River. In 629, Szegin's heir Busat (Pusa) routed the Kin army sent to subdue him and, seeking aid, sent an embassy to the Chinese court at Changan. His successor conquered the Hsien-to, spread his rule down to the banks of the Yellow River and promised fealty to the Chinese Tang emperor. The Ouighours at this time were still shamanists and a little-known barbarian nomad people. Under their leader Bira (Peilo), however, they established a close relationship with the Tang emperor Tai Tsung and took part in the victorious campaign against the Eastern Tu-chueh khanate. Their reward was control of the old Hun pasturelands from Lake Baikal south to Hami and from the Altai to the Khingan. This empire lasted from 744 to 840.

We have followed their fortunes during the Tang dynasty when they played a decisive part in Chinese affairs. On a later occasion they freed Changan, the capital, from investment by the Tufan (Tibetans). Bira's successor Moyendo (Moyencho), who helped the Tang suppress the An Lu-shan rebellion, married a Tang princess—indeed, that one princess, Hien-an, was married to no less than four khans in succession. Thanks to her in part, in 788 the Wei-ho under their khan Durmogho (Tun Mo Ho) received the permission of the Tang emperor to change their name Wei-ho (a simple phonetic rendering of Ouighour in Chinese) to the more poetic title of Hui-ho (Swooping Hawks). In its prime this Ouighour kingdom was the most powerful state north of the Tang empire and negotiated with it as an equal. This alliance was crucial for both. When the Tufan tribes overran the Urumchi area, Tang help was readily forthcoming to expel the invaders. Relations between the two powers remained close until the decline of Tang power.

In 840, Ouighour power on the northern steppes began to decline. Devastating blizzards and pestilence killed off much of their livestock. They were attacked by the wild Kirghiz of the Upper Yenisei. With their capital sacked and their khan slain, the Ouighour tribes took to flight. Though separated into two groups, they maintained their identity. Fifteen clans migrated westward to seek the protection of the Karluks and Yagma, the Turki tribes which pastured north of the Tianshan in the Ili area. Fifteen more clans fled south. Some sought refuge with the
Tufans. Some took to raiding Shansi Province, until they were driven out in 847. Others settled down peaceably in the borderlands of Kansu, near Kanchow. A large group settled around Barkul and about 850 founded a second Gaochan kingdom around Karakhoja near Turfan. The tradition of alliance with China was maintained. In 981, the envoy of the Northern Sung dynasty Wang Yen-teh went to Karakhoja and the Gaochan prince received him with honor.

The Ouighour khanate at Gaochan maintained contact with the Middle Kingdom throughout the chaotic time of the Five Dynasties, which spanned the interregnum between the fall of the Tang in 907 and establishment of the Northern Sung dynasty (960–1127). The Liang dynasty received Ouighour envoys in 911, and other missions were sent to the Turki Later Tang emperor. The next khan sent envoys to the capital in 927 and tribute-bearing missions frequently thereafter. The ties formed between the Hans and Ouighours proved to be enduring.

Now called in Chinese Wei Wu-erh, the Ouighours helped the Yagma Turks overthrow the Iranian Samanid state and establish the Kharakhanid dynasty in 932 ruling Eastern and Western Turkestan. In the middle of the tenth century, its ruler Sadik Boghra Khan (Satoo Boghra-Khan) was converted to Islam. The main body of Ouighours settled in the Urumchi-Kucha area; they were believers in Manichaeism and at times Nestorian Christianity. This Ouighour kingdom in Sinkiang continued until 1220, when it joined the conquering Mongol hosts of Genghiz Khan.

In summarizing the events of these times it must be remembered that for every tribe I have mentioned by name, I have omitted scores; for every battle I have described, I have omitted hundreds; for every death and massacre told of, there were thousands. There can be no idealizing of these feudal times and what life then meant for the common people.

In their new home in Sinkiang, the Ouighour nomads came more and more under the influence of the local oasis and Chinese cultures and economy, so that by the ninth century many had settled on the land as farmers or in the towns south of the Tienshan as traders and handicraftsmen. Here they became thoroughly integrated with the local population with its heterogeneous Aryan (Indo-European), Hun and Turki elements. The Ouighour oases became centers of Turkic culture for the whole of Central Asia. Thus it was that during Kharakhanid times and later, the Ouighours enjoyed a unique position as farmers, traders,
scholars and officials. When Genghiz Khan and his successors began the conquest of Asia and Eastern Europe, they were glad to enlist the services of Ouighour scribes and civil servants, renowned Ouighour scholars and advisers. If that help prolonged Mongol rule, it also alleviated its severity.

The Ouighours spoke a Turkish tongue but used a Sogdian (one of the East Iranian group of languages) script, a variety of the Syriac alphabet introduced among them by Nestorian missionaries. During the first period of Ouighour ascendancy in Eastern and Western Turkestan, this Ouighour script was introduced and used throughout that area. In 1204, it was taken over for the Mongol language by Genghiz Khan (and by the Manchus as they rose to power later). However, as Ouighour ties with Islam strengthened, it was replaced by the Arabic script, which, as has already been noted, became the repository in Central Asia of the most advanced knowledge of the day. When they became Moslems, the Ouighours accepted Sunni doctrine, not Shia, as the orthodox faith. It was only in the fifteenth century, however, that Islam could be said to be the religion of the people. By that time, the Ouighours, the easternmost branch of the Turki people to adopt Islam, were the means of spreading Islam to China, carrying it to the Tungans or Hui of Kansu and thence to interior China.

This link with Islam gave Ouighour culture its pronounced Persian and Arabic elements. It actually unites four cultures: the earliest Indo-Aryan culture of the Sinkiang oases, the Ouighours' own traditional Turki culture, the Persian-Arabic and the Chinese. They enjoy Persian music and dancing and literature and Arabic architecture as part of their cultural heritage.

The modern Ouighours share Sinkiang with a dozen other peoples, including Hans, Mongols, Kazakhs, Huis, Tartars, Uzbeks, Kirghiz and others. Like other nationalities they are a more or less homogeneous mixture of various peoples which, in turn, were amalgams of clans and tribes. Created in the melting pot of Central Asian history, the Ouighours began to fuse as a distinct nationality between the eighth and twelfth centuries A.D. In Kashgar, Khotan and Kashgaria as a whole, where they form a compact majority group, the Ouighours of today have long faces; high, well-formed noses; full beards in the men, and fair skins, typical of what anthropologists are wont to call Alpine stock. They are akin to and yet different from the Uzbeks of Central Asia, to whom they have close affinities in culture. Some Ouighours have clearly Mongolian
features as well. Ouighours are anthropologically not homogeneous, but the dominant type among them is the brachycephalic Pamir-Ferghana Europoid (Alpine) type with an admixture of Mongol elements.

The language of the Ouighour of today belongs to the southeastern branch of the Turki tongue, a branch of the Ural-Altaic family of languages.

Today there are around six million Ouighours in Sinkiang who speak the modern Ouighour (Turki) tongue. In the Soviet Union there are about 100,000 scattered in the Kazakh, Kirghiz and Uzbek SSR's, with a small group of them in Tadjikistan. Most of these crossed over the Pamirs or from the Ili area into Kazakhstan in the course of the nineteenth century. At a conference of emigrants from the Tarim Basin held in Tashkent in 1921 after the Russian October Revolution, it was proposed that the name "Uighur" be taken to denominate all the groups of these people who had been known hitherto by the names of the localities where they lived—Kashgarlikhs, Aksulikhs, Lobniks, etc. This name was generally adopted in 1934 by the then Sinkiang provincial government. So for the future as we follow their fortunes over the next thousand years we shall refer to them by their new modern name—Uighurs.

The Kitans

The Kharakhanid kingdom of the Turki Yagma tribe in control of Central Asia and Sinkiang was, like so many of the loosely knit feudal kingdoms of the time, a brittle entity that prospered under a strong ruler but crumbled when a weak ruler could not control his brawling nobles. It finally crashed under pressure of still another nomad eruption from the northeast led by the Kitan Tartars.

The Kitans, a Tungusic-Mongol people, are mentioned in the latter part of the fifth century as living in northeastern China by the upper reaches of the Liao River. Still a minor tribe of the Tung-hu or part of the Hsien-pi people of southern Manchuria, they were hunters and herdsmen. By the seventh century they had reached a patriarchal, feudal stage of social development and established their leadership of the tribes in Manchuria. At the beginning of the tenth century, thanks to their considerable contacts with their more advanced Han neighbors, they perfected their nomad feudal political and military organization. In that century they overran Outer and Inner Mongolia westward and southward to the Tienshan and set up the Kitan kingdom in 907. They drove
the Chinese Sung dynasty out of North China and with the dynastic title of Liao (916–1125) established their capital in Peking (934). It was the Kitan, in fact, who gave their name to China: Cathay in English and Kitai in Russian. In 944–956, they continued their war to conquer all North China, but then concluded an uneasy peace with the Northern Sung emperors.

One should not be surprised by the ease of the advance of the Kitan. China in the tenth century was only a wraith of the mighty Tang empire. It had never really recovered from the ravages of the An Lu-shan rebellion and its aftermath. Peasant wars erupted, desperate risings of the cruelly exploited people. Suppression of the peasant revolt led by Huang Chao in 876 resulted in the death of thirty-six million people. Large areas of the depopulated countryside lapsed into anarchy. “Dynasties” rose and fell. Nomad tribes, Han bandits, peasant rebels, aristocratic warlords contended for power. The name given this period—the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms—is a simplification masking myriad horrors and crimes suffered by the people. Out of this half-century of turmoil, there emerged the Kitan power based on northern and northeastern China and the new Chinese power under the Sung dynasty in 960, still holding most of North China and all south of the Yellow River. In their rivalry with the Kitan, the Sung emperor enlisted the help of a former vassal tribe of the Kitan, the Jurchen (Jurchid or Nuchen), or as they were known later, the Kin, a Tungusic tribe from the northeast (Manchuria). Defeated by the two allies, the Kitan by 1125 were in headlong flight.

One is amazed at their vigor. They fled in strength: 40,000 families totaling 200,000 people, with their allies. Passing on west of Kansu and bypassing the Tangut kingdom set up by the Chiang, a Tibetan tribe, in Chinghai and northwestern Szechuan, they reasserted their sovereignty over the Uighurs and other peoples in Sinkiang. They dethroned the Kharakhanid prince who reigned in Balasagun, captured Samarkand, Bokhara and Khoresm, and so established their rule over the huge area between the Irtysh and Amu Darya rivers and the Altai and Kunlun mountains. Now known as the Kara-Kitai, they founded their new state there in 1137. Under their chief Gorkhan (Gurkhan) their writ ran from west of the Tangut kingdom (Hsihsia) through Khotan and Kashgar to Bokhara. They brought Chinese artisans with them and Chinese culture. The official language was Mongolian. Their religion was Buddhism. But their rule was short-lived, less than eighty years, until
It declined as a result of dynastic quarrels and internal tensions. The local people resisted religious persecution, heavy taxes and the use of an alien tongue in government.

Meanwhile the Kin took advantage of the flight of the Kitan to seize North China for themselves. They drove the Sung emperors south of the Yangtze River, but contention between them continued until the advent of the new Mongol power in the north. When the armies of Ghenghiz Khan advanced in 1227, Kitan, Tangut, Kin and Sung rulers all were crushed, one by one.

The feudal states of Central Asia at that time were composed mainly of Turki and Mongol nomad tribes and farmers, with earlier settled oasis farmers who were Indo-Aryans, remnants of nomad tribes who had settled down. The usual social pattern among them was one of warrior nobles and rulers with commoners and slaves beneath them. These tribes included Buddhists, Manichaeans, Moslems, Shamanists, Nestorian Christians and Zoroastrians. They acknowledged fealty and paid their dues and tribute to whatever powerful tribe was strong enough to hold the overlordship. The nature of the tie with the ruling house depended on the extent of the power exerted. It might be simply a form of yearly tribute, the provision of fodder and supplies for passing troops. It might extend to close vassalage and obligation to fight for the ruling house. But at best the organization of these disparate elements was a fragile one that tended to break up as soon as the dominating power weakened. The constituent elements of these empires did not regard themselves as a nation, a single people with a common language, culture, beliefs and territory. Only the central tribal core was firmly knit together by long historical associations of language, custom and leadership. These were still tribal societies, though the advance to nationhood was beginning.

The Mongol empire of Genghiz Khan was better and more tightly organized than earlier nomad empires, but it differed from them mainly in scale and duration. Central Asia was in a state of feudal anarchy, its parts ripe for conquest when Genghiz appeared on the scene. Five great ruling houses had succeeded each other—Tu-chueh, Uighur, Samanid, Kharakhanid, and Kitan—in rapid succession, and some forty other smaller kingdoms or principalities had come and gone in the two hundred years between the fall of the Samanid dynasty and the coming of Genghiz Khan. Genghiz filled a power vacuum.
Mongolia at the beginning of the thirteenth century was the scene of a tense struggle for the hegemony and unification of the Mongol tribes. There was a historic precedent for this. Dardjegwe (Chinese: Tan Shih-hwei), a Hsien-pi leader of the second century A.D., had built an empire out of the nomad tribes that stretched from Ili in the west to Korea. He did not have time to consolidate it, and it fell to pieces after his death. There were signs of the birth of a national consciousness among the Mongol tribes in the seventh century. Now the struggle for nationhood and unity revived.

By 1196, the chieftain of the Kiyat clan, Temujin (as the young Genghiz Khan was known), had fought his way to the position of khan of the nomad Mongol tribes in Mongolia. Only Kuchluk, head of the Naiman tribe, remained as his last Mongol rival, so Kuchluk had to be destroyed. Defeated in battle in 1203, Kuchluk fled with his followers and took refuge in Kashgaria with the Kara-Kitai Gorkhan, who befriended him, even giving him his daughter in marriage. Kuchluk treacherously turned on his benefactor and seized Kashgaria. A brutal and oppressive ruler, nominally a Nestorian, he persecuted his Moslem subjects. When the imam Aladin of Khotan remonstrated with him, he had the unfortunate man crucified on the door of his religious school. It was not surprising therefore that when the crisis came he was unable to mobilize the people. In 1218, Genghiz Khan’s commander Djebe with twenty thousand troops was at the gates of his kingdom. The Mongol warriors had been given strict instructions to spare the people and were greeted as deliverers. Once again Kuchluk fled. Hiding in disguise in Badakhshan, he was caught by a Mongol patrol and beheaded. By 1220, all Kashgaria was in Genghiz’ hands with relatively little bloodshed. Only Khotan stubbornly resisted and was ruthlessly destroyed as an example.

The Uighurs played a special role in this period of Mongol dominance. Their ruler Bardju (Barchuq), lord of the region around Beshbaligh (Urumchi) in central Sinkiang, had been made a vassal of the Kara-Kitai. But when in 1209 he got word that Genghiz was attacking the Kin in North China and preparing to attack the Kara-Kitai in Turkestan, he slew the arrogant Kara-Kitai officers stationed in his country and offered fealty to Genghiz along with an army of ten thousand warriors. The Uighurs played a notable part in the victorious military operations of Genghiz against Muhammad, sultan of Moslem Khwarizm, the greatest power in Turkestan. They took part in the siege of Nishapur (Khorasan)
and the operations against the Tangut (Hsihsia) kingdom of the Tibetan Chiang. The Uighurs, former nomads like the Mongols, were farmers and townspeople now, scholars and merchants, skillful craftsmen. They made perfect intermediaries between the nomad Mongols and the peoples they were now encountering in Central Asia and to its east and west. Genghiz was statesman enough to understand the advantage of their proffered aid. He took into his service the Uighur Ta-ta-tung-a, who taught the ruler’s sons to write Mongolian in Uighur script. Ta-ta-tung-a became the keeper of the royal seal and rose to be the amanuensis of the illiterate world conqueror. The chief officers of government and accountants in Mavar-un-nahr, Khorasan and Iraq were all Uighurs. In China, too, they held high positions among the Mongol governors. It was in the Uighur script that judicial decisions were preserved and records of population and other governmental matters kept. After Genghiz’ death the country of the Uighurs was joined to the domain of Genghiz’ second son, Jagatai, who inherited the whole area of Transoxiana, Badakhshan and Balkh, Kashgar and the Uighur lands around Turfan, Karashahr, Kucha and Beshbalikh (Urumchi).
WHEN THE KURILTAI (Assembly) of Mongol* leaders in 1206 proclaimed Temujin Grand Khan of all the Mongols and of the Turkic tribes of Central Asia, it signalled the end of the destructive wars among the Mongols. Genghiz unified them as a nation, ended the patriarchal tribal order among them and instituted a tightly knit regime of nomad feudalism regulated by his stern codex of civil and military law, the Yasak. He then set out on an unparalleled career of conquest and plunder. Genghiz perceived himself as fulfilling a manifest destiny that included the immaculate conception of his ancestor. He and his successors constantly spoke of carrying out the will of Heaven (Tengri), and in its name they commanded their enemies to submit. Guyuk Khan,

* The origin of the name “Mongol” has not been clearly established. Tang chronicles first mention the Mongolian-speaking tribe as among the Shih-wei tribes of the lower Kerulen and the northern Khingan range. It is possible that the name of this tribe came to be used for all the related peoples. In India the Mongols are called Moghuls or Moguls. In Russia and Europe they were often called Tartars. This was also the name of one of the tribes of the Mongol horde and was thus similarly used to designate the whole horde.
Genghiz' son Ogedei's successor, told Pope Innocent IV: "Through the power of God, all empires from sunrise to sunset have been given to us." Before he began his campaign against the Kin rulers of Peking, Genghiz made pilgrimage to the mountain peak of Burkhan Khaldun. He removed his cap and threw his belt over his shoulders in token of submission, knelt low three times and poured a libation of kumiss. He prayed for the aid of Tengri. His white banner with the nine yak tails was venerated as the dwelling place of the guardian spirit of the imperial Golden Clan.

The Mongol Conquests

Thus fortified spiritually, Genghiz put into action a war machine of pitiless efficiency. He had a picked guard of ten thousand warriors, nobles, and freemen. For his campaigns he could raise an army of over a hundred thousand cavalry divided into detachments of tens, hundreds, thousands and ten thousands. Each member of the basic group of ten was responsible for the other nine. Flight or capture was punishable by death. Mongol freemen composed the core of this army together with allied tribesmen. But the ranks could be filled out with expendable slaves and captives. These could be driven to the vanguard in an assault and, to preserve the fighters' strength, forced to labor at earthworks or siegeworks. "If it were necessary to cross a swamp or dangerous piece of water they were sent to test the way," reports Johann de Plano Carpini, who visited the Mongol land in 1245. The fury of the Mongol attack, the skill of its archers and commanders, the fearlessness and toughness of men and mounts were partly the result of the training given by Genghiz, partly the result of the schooling of the steppes. Mobility was one of the secrets of Genghiz' success. A Mongol horseman could carry on for days without eating cooked food. He could in case of dire need open a vein of his mount and drink its blood. He was bound to his clan, his tribe, by ties of tradition that permitted no stealing, adultery, or killing within the tribe. But he was arrogant and ruthless in relations with those outside the Mongol tribes. Apart from his commanders' orders, no laws or moral scruples governed such relations. Lies, treachery, violence were all expedient, and there was no consciousness of lies, treachery or violence. That was the way to treat aliens. Mongols who refused to submit to the new order were ruthlessly dealt with.

Mongol society in the time of Genghiz gives a good example of
Mongol domains, c. 1300, and empire of Yuan dynasty, 1271-1368
nomadic feudalism replacing disintegrating clan society. The royal family was preeminent. All under Heaven belonged to the khan, and he parcelled out the people and pastures to his noble relatives and vassal warriors bound to him in fealty. Below them were the freemen and commoners of the Mongol tribes and their confederates. Every able-bodied arat (member of the tribes) was obliged to answer the call to arms and bring his mount and weapons. Last of all were the multitude of slaves. These were treated worse than beasts of burden. They could be beaten or killed for a fault. Under a bad master their lot was endless misery. Plano Carpini writes:

Those kept as slaves in the yurts of their masters are in the sorriest position in the world. We very frequently saw them walking about in fur trousers in the hot blazing sun, while the rest of their bodies were completely naked. In winter, on the other hand, they suffer abominably from the cold. We saw some of them, for instance, who had lost their toes and the fingers of their hands because they had been frostbitten in the fierce cold. We heard of others who had either died or at least had suffered from the icy frost to such an extent that they could hardly use their limbs any longer.

The Mongol conquests and privileges of the elite were made possible only by ruthless exploitation of the common people, primarily of the aliens and slaves.

The campaign against China begun in 1211 was of enormous importance for the success of Genghiz' further plans. Many North China cities held by the Jurchen Kin were pillaged, and expanses of fertile farmland turned into depopulated pastureland. Peking was sacked for a week in 1215. Rich booty whetted the appetite of his warriors and gave prestige to his arms. Chinese resistance prevented him from subduing all China for the time being, but he was able to recruit skilled administrators, metalworkers and other craftsmen and military engineers who knew how to build fortifications and reduce them with battering rams, catapults and fire. Leaving a small force to continue the war against the Jurchen Kin, the main Mongol armies now turned against Central Asia.

In a whirlwind campaign between 1218 and 1221 he conquered the Moslem khanate of Khwarizm, including Iran, Bokhara and Afghanistan. Genghiz destroyed according to plan. Cities which submitted quickly, like Balkh, were spared, but those which resisted, like Bokhara, Samarkand and Urgench, were sacked and destroyed. Fifty thousand people were slaughtered after the capture of Merv. When Herat was
recaptured after a rebellion, the killing went on for a week. Then the Mongols withdrew, waited till a few survivors returned and then fell on these too and massacred them. In Nishapur in Khorasan even the cats and dogs were killed. When Djend was captured, writes the Arab historian Juvaini, the inhabitants were driven out into the steppes for nine days while the town was stripped. When destruction was ordered, it was thorough. After the population was wiped out at Merv, the Murav dam was wrecked as well as many of the irrigation canals and channels on which farming in this oasis depended. The nomad Genghiz wanted no troublesome cities. He used terror as an instrument of policy. Scorched earth also served as a line of defense on his southwestern border.

Mongol armies under Djebe and Subodai, two of Genghiz' most trusted commanders, made a destructive reconnaissance in depth through northern Persia, Transcaucasia and the Don steppes. Genghiz returned to consolidate the southeastern flank of his empire, which now stretched from the Caspian Sea to Manchuria. In a swift campaign he subdued the Tangut (Hsihsia) kingdom which the Tibetan Chiang tribes had set up in Chinghai, northwestern Szechuan, Eastern Kansu and Ninghsia. Victory came in 1237, the year of his death.

At this stage Genghiz' empire was in effect a huge machine designed to replenish his armies and squeeze tribute from conquered nations and tribes. Mongol governors secured this tribute and maintained Mongol rule. The empire was regarded as the estate of the royal family and was divided up among his descendants, in the first place his four sons. The title of grand khan was given to the third son, Ogedei, along with Mongolia and North China. The second son, Jagatai, received the Central Asian territories, including Sinkiang and Transoxiana, with his center in the Ili Valley. The fourth son, Tuli, received the western part of Central Asia, including Persia and northern India. The eldest son, Juchi, had died, but his son Batu received western Siberia from the Irtysh to the Urals with the land north of the Caspian and the Aral Seas and the southern Ural foothills.

Possession of this empire very swiftly changed the nature of Mongol society. While steppe life remained as before, the nomad feudalism that was its base was progressively absorbed into the agrarian and commercial cultures of the conquered lands and transformed into the Asiatic feudal despotism typical of those regions at that time. The previous absorption of such Turki nomads as the Uighurs, Kin and Kitan by these cultures facilitated the Mongols' transformation. A considerable part of the
Uighur and Kin rulers and their administrative elite, the Moslem nobility of Khwarizm and other kingdoms, much of the ruling class and mandarin bureaucracy of China went over to the Mongol conquerors, "led them on," so to speak, and transformed them the better to preserve their privileges and power over their own peoples. Mongols assigned to the civil administration gradually became assimilated with the local ruling class. Many even adopted the dress and language of the conquered.

Nevertheless, Mongol rule was oppressive in the extreme. The initial destruction held back economic growth in some conquered lands for decades and destroyed irreplaceable cultural treasures. Great wealth was wrung from the people for the upkeep of the Mongol garrisons and the armies needed for their wars. And yet, when the Mongols retreated back to Mongolia after the loss of the Chinese empire 150 years later, their ancestral homeland was still a backward pastureland. The glory, such as it was, was no substitute for progress and the well-being of the people.

Genghiz died, but the aggressive forces he had organized and unleashed continued the offensive. In 1234 the Mongols under Ogedei attacked and drove out the Jurchen Kin and took over their realm in North China. The Mongol generals wished to massacre all ten million inhabitants and turn the land into pasture as in Central Asia, but Yeh Lu Chu Tsai, the Kitan statesman who had joined Genghiz' service, advised against this. He estimated that permitting the people to continue to farm and pay taxes would produce 500,000 ounces of silver, 80,000 bolts of silk and 400,000 sacks of grain. The Mongol rulers agreed to this policy.

The Sung dynasty in South China was then attacked, and despite desperate popular resistance, all China was overrun by 1279. Kublai Khan, the younger grandson and heir, took command, moved the Mongol capital to Peking (Cambaluc) in 1262 and established the Yuan dynasty in China (1271-1368).

The Mongol conquests continued in the West. Batu returned to Eastern Europe with larger forces. Between 1235 and 1242 he crushed resistance in the Volga and Don steppes, defeated the Bulgars and overran Russia, Hungary, Czechia (Moravia) and Poland, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidjan. Hulagu (Genghiz' grandson, son of Tuli) conquered Iran, Mesopotamia and Syria. In 1258, Bagdad fell and its riches, libraries, buildings and works of art went up in smoke. The
Mongol advance was only stopped in Palestine in 1260 by the Mamelukes, the warlike freebooters who had conquered Egypt. Batu's scorched-earth policy in Hungary was so thorough that "a man could ride for two weeks and not see a single house standing" in the words of a chronicler of that time of horror.

The results of the Mongol conquests in Europe are still being felt. The Mongols dominated Russia for over 150 years and its development was held back for decades. Russian relations with the rest of Europe were severed at a time when Europe was making rapid economic advances toward the end of the Middle Ages. Hungary and Poland were weakened and their growth as national states delayed so that they fell under the control of German rulers.

For Central Asia the effects of the Mongol yoke were castastrophic. Not to speak of the wholesale destruction of such great centers of culture as Bagdad, Samarkand, and Khotan, the wrecking of irrigation systems destroyed the very basis of the economic life of whole oases. Unification under the Mongols and restoration of the East-West trade routes might have compensated for all this in time, but soon Central Asia was rent again by contention and war among the successors of Genghiz Khan and broke up into scores of warring petty kingdoms.

The conquest of China's hundred million inhabitants had taken seventy-four years. By the time it was completed the Mongol leaders had been thoroughly assimilated into Chinese culture. Unable to invent any principally new way of administering this vast and populous state, the Mongols were forced to rely on the former administrators of China to run the complex economy of the country. Agriculture revived rapidly on land made fallow by war. Handicrafts and trade boomed and soon China was enjoying a period of hitherto unparalleled prosperity. Hangchow, the last capital of the Southern Sung dynasty, housed a million and a half inhabitants under the Yuan and was the richest and most cultured city in the world. Trade greatly expanded. While the Eurasian land routes were blocked by war, new sea routes had been opened from Europe to the Middle East, Africa and India. Now the Mongol conquests reopened the Central Asian caravan routes. The Yuan dynasty set up a remarkable chain of roads and post stations to bind the far-flung empire together. Kublai Khan was emperor of China, heir of all its dynasties, and khan of all the rest of Asia.

This was the time of the great travels of Marco Polo of Venice. After seventeen years spent in China he returned to tell his skeptical contemporaries of the wonders of Central Asian travel and the glories of
China and Kublai Khan's court. Marco, member of the upper class and an employee of the khan, failed to mention the frightful exploitation of the people on which these glories were based. It was not a case of dishonest reporting. There is ample confirmation of the glories and riches he describes, but just as the typical Colonel Blimp saw nothing wrong in the exploitation of the colonies and the British working class, and in fact hardly noticed it, so Marco, even if he saw the exploitation that went on, probably thought it so natural that there was no point in describing it. It was surely no worse than that enforced on the peasants and serfs of medieval Europe, and it supported a far richer and grander superstructure than anywhere in Europe. Nevertheless this exploitation later led to widespread peasant unrest and revolt.

The Tide Turns

Finally the tide began to turn against the Mongols. The Russian people had bled, but their desperate resistance had also bled the Mongol armies and prevented their further advance into Europe. Now the Russians led the way in overthrowing the conquerors. In 1259 there was a mass revolt against the Mongol governor and tax gatherers in Novgorod. In 1262, risings took place in Rostov, Suzdal and Yaroslavl. In the fourteenth century, Moscow, capital of the kingdom of Dmitri Donskoi, headed the Russian struggle to expel the Mongol invaders. Meanwhile in China a popular uprising began in the 1340s. In 1351, the Red Turban insurgents in Shantung and Honan, peasant rebels, began the struggle that finally smashed the Mongol power. The Mongol troops had been corrupted by easy living, and this general uprising drove the Mongol rulers back into Mongolia. The peasant leader of the uprising, Chu Yuan-chang, was proclaimed emperor under the dynastic title of Ming in 1368.

In 1380, khan Mamai of the Golden Horde led an immense army against the rebellious Russians. He was routed by the united forces of the Russian kingdoms at the battle of Kulikova, and Mongol power receded from Eastern Europe.

Mongol rule over China was one of the great props of the Mongol empire, and the repercussions were widespread when it ended. Subject peoples regained hope and redoubled their efforts to liberate themselves. Contention among the Genghizid heirs intensified, not only between the great kingdoms of the first generation of heirs—Jagatai's in Central Asia, Tuli's in Persia and India and Genghiz' grandson Batu's
heirs in Western Siberia and Eastern Europe—but among the parts of these kingdoms. At Jagatai’s death, wars of succession erupted in Kashgaria. In Jagatai’s khanate, twenty khans took the throne between 1306 and 1370. For a time in midcentury it was in the strong hands of Tighluk Timur Khan, a direct descendant of Jagatai, and enjoyed a period of relative peace and prosperity. In the middle of the century, at the urging of Said Pashedin, a descendant of Mohammed, Tighluk with many khans of the nomad Turki tribes, Buddhists and Shamanists, embraced Islam. From then on the Moslem faith predominated in that area except among the Mongol tribes, who were or became Buddhist, and the Hans, who continued to adhere to Confucianism, Taoism or Buddhism.

Tighluk moved his capital from Aksu to Kashgar. He annexed Moslem Bokhara (and in this his conversion was certainly an asset), and his expanded realm, comprising Kazakhstan and Sinkiang as well, became known as Mogholistan (or Mongolistan). He made his son ruler of Samarkand, capital of the region between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, which became known as Mavar-un-Nahr. After his death there was constant fighting between the rulers of these two kingdoms. A little later, in 1360, the kingdom of Khoresm was formed on the lower reaches of the Amu Darya with its capital in Urgench. While the Kazakhs continued to nomadize on the northern steppes (now Kazakhstan and the Ili area of Sinkiang), Turki and Mongol nomads in the southern oases gradually settled down alongside the earlier inhabitants. Out of this crossing of peoples and cultures came the Tadjiks, Uzbeks and other peoples who live in these areas today.

The social system in all these areas was a form of feudalism. The begs held their fiefs at the will of the khans and were obliged to muster their men-at-arms at his call. A fief could be quite a large area, including not only farmland, but cities and nomad pasturelands. Usually the khans themselves held huge estates and maintained armies which were the basis of their power. The common people were obliged not only to support their begs and emirs but also to pay taxes and give services directly to the khan overlords. Moslem religious foundations were also allocated part of their produce. Merchants and moneylenders frequently bought from the khan the right to gather taxes or operate various monopolies, and these men were particularly hated by the people. There were still numerous slaves both in the cities and in the villages, and slave markets were a normal part of life.

Tighluk’s death was the signal for renewed division and fighting. The
rulers of Mogholistan, Mavar-un-Nahr and Khoresm fell upon one another. In the turmoil Kashgaria was seized by one Kamar-Eddin. In 1369, Timur, a successful soldier of fortune, seized Samarkand.

*Tamerlane*

Timur (Tamerlane, 1336–1405) was a noble of the Mongol Barlas tribe, which had become quite thoroughly Turkicized, even to the extent of forgetting their Mongol tongue. He began his career as a typical Central Asian condottiere noted for his courage. Even in middle age he would come to the front of his army and call upon the opposing leader to test the issue by individual combat. He put himself and his band of swashbucklers at the service of now one, now the other khan or emir, but amassed little but experience. In one encounter he was severely wounded in the right leg and became lame. This earned him the nickname of Timur *lenk* (the Lame), which later evolved into the name he is known by most widely in history among Europeans: Tamerlane.

In 1364, when in his dreams, he assured his followers, he heard the voice of God instructing him, his fortunes soared. In concert with Emir Hussein, he seized Samarkand in Mavar-un-Nahr but the next year was again in flight. Left to itself, Samarkand proclaimed its independence from both Timur and Hussein and the Mongol khan. A resistance movement led by a student of the Medressa—the Moslem religious college—the head of the cotton workers' guild and an archer defeated the Mongol khan's attack, inflicted heavy losses on his army and forced it to withdraw. A large part of Mavar-un-Nahr joined the Samarkand insurgents. Then they unwisely allowed the forces of Tamerlane and Hussein to enter the city. These two adventurers immediately broke their pledge, slaughtered the people's leaders and took over the city. After ruling jointly for a time, Tamerlane killed Hussein. In 1370 Tamerlane was sole ruler of Mavar-un-Nahr.

He then began an astonishing series of conquests. Besides producing booty and slaves, land and glory for himself and his feudal retainers he was also trying to secure control of all the most important caravan routes through Central Asia so that he could levy toll on this great highway of commerce.

He conquered Transoxiana, east of the Amu Darya, and then Khoresm. In three campaigns in 1389, 1391, and 1395 he crushed the Mongol Golden Horde to the north, seized Georgia and Armenia and
Ming dynasty, 1368-1644
laid waste huge areas. By the turn of the century he had conquered Persia and Afghanistan, the lower Volga steppes and a large part of the Middle East with Mesopotamia and Syria. In his campaign in India, he sacked Delhi. These conquests were accompanied by the most terrible atrocities. In Isphahan he had seventy thousand civilians slaughtered and made a pyramid of their skulls. A hundred thousand captives were slaughtered in India because it was too much trouble to march them back to Central Asia. When Bagdad fell in 1401 there was a one-day killing of ninety thousand inhabitants. He liked to bury people alive to show his displeasure.

Before Tamerlane's character was thoroughly understood, the Tien-shan nomads, Kazakhs and others repeatedly raided the oases of Kashgaria and Tamerlane's own domains. But Tamerlane was not one to suffer such insults for long. After four fruitless campaigns to catch the troublemakers and chastise Kamar-Eddin, ruler of Kashgaria, whose weakness or complaisance enabled the nomads to use his territory as a staging ground for their raids, Tamerlane planned a final expedition in 1389 to wipe out the populations on the Tien Shan ranges as far as Lake Zaisan on the north and Kashgar on the south. This was accomplished in bloody battles and massacres. His victorious columns met in the valley of the Yulduz. Here Tamerlane, according to Persian historians of the time, took his place on a golden throne studded with precious stones. The ground around was spread with carpets and brocades. The armies were drawn up before him and the assembled chiefs were permitted to approach and kiss the royal carpet. Tamerlane awarded robes of honor and belts set with jewels to the princes and emirs. The most beautiful damsels presented golden cups of wine to his favorites. And Kashgar lay devastated, a man-made desert.

In 1404, with Sinkiang prostrate at his feet and with an empire stretching from the Irtysh to the Volga, from the Persian Gulf and the Hellespont to the Ganges, Tamerlane, aged seventy, gathered his armies at Otrar for the conquest of China. But on the eve of departure, he took sick and died. His empire fell to pieces.

Tamerlane's monument was destruction. He left little but the memory of greed and ambition. By the middle of the century, what had been an empire was an anarchic agglomeration of feudal kingdoms whose khans and emirs and begs were engaged in endless conflicts.

These centuries of anarchy on the main land route between Asia and Europe had fateful and far-reaching results. Fourteenth-century
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Europe stood on the eve of the Renaissance and the growth of mercantilism. Seeking a sea route to the East, for trade, Columbus discovered America in 1492. Magellan circumnavigated the globe in 1519–1522. This was the age of the Reformation, and the Scientific Revolution had begun. Technological change always precedes social change. A capitalist world economy began to form and function.

In China, the Ming dynasty had established a strong and aggressive feudal empire and had embarked on a policy of maritime expansion. But then it reconsidered and, fearful of outside contacts, closed China in on itself. By the time the succeeding Manchu dynasty of China had extended its rule to the Pamirs in 1757, the main routes of trade between Asia and Europe had passed to the sea lanes around Africa and India. History went by sea and bypassed Inner Asia and Sinkiang.

But that does not mean that nothing happened. The people of the oases and steppes were engulfed by appalling terrors and misery, alarms and events over which they had little control. Endless nomad feudal wars, palace intrigues, assassinations, love affairs that have become the stuff of epic poetry, great hunts and slaughters, base plots and betrayals, astonishing acts of loyalty and courage—all this was there, but while other parts of the world, particularly in the West, were advancing in knowledge of the world and nature's laws and people were growing to a fuller awareness of their capacities as individuals and social beings, these unhappy realms of Inner Asia were still treading and retreading the ancient ways.

_Uzbek, Kazakhs and Kirghiz_

The breakup of the Mongol empire's Golden Horde at the end of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth century led to a new grouping of tribes called the White Horde or Left Wing, which became more and more independent of the khans of the Golden Horde, or Right Wing. The White Horde's territory extended approximately from the Volga to the southern Urals and the Irtysh River. On its east it touched the Jagataite khanate (Mogholistan). The nomad Turki tribes of the White Horde were mainly Uzbek-Kazakh clans which, like all the Turki tribes, had come originally from northeastern Asia, but they had traveled first due west and then, appearing in what is now Kazakhstan from the northwest, absorbed the tribes they found there. Their ruler was Orda, eldest son of Juchi and grandson of Genghiz Khan. More or less the same clans or tribes are found among
the Uzbeks and Kazaks in the fourteenth century. Gradually, by the sixteenth century, out of the multitude of tribes there grew up new agglomerations which took on separate and distinct national characteristics as a result of their different historical paths of development. Chief of these new national entities were the Kazaks, Uzbeks, Kirghiz and Tadjiks. The first three were of Turki-Mongol stock; the last was of Persian origin.

The Kazaks nomadized where they live today: mainly in present-day Kazakhstan, the Ili area of Sinkiang and the Altai, and there developed their own dialect of Turki. They are descendants of the Wusun and Kangui, who inhabited these areas in Han times but who mixed with Kitan (Kara-Kitai), Yagma, Karluks and other Turki-speaking tribes, and Naiman, Kereit and other Mongol tribes to form the Kazakh people in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

The Uzbeks, having lost their herds in war and natural disasters, spread and settled as farmers, artisans and merchants as far south and west as the Hindu Kush and the Pamirs.

The Turki Kirghiz nomads are first heard of in Central Asia at the beginning of the sixteenth century. In the time of Genghiz Khan the tribes of which they are composed lived by the Yenisei River, whence they moved steadily southwestward to occupy present-day Kirghizia at the beginning of the sixteenth century. They were constantly at war with their neighbors over pastures. Under attack from the Djungar Oirats, they were forced from the northern slopes of the Tienshan and, after failing to carve out a place for themselves in Kashgaria and Ferghana, penetrated the high pastures in the Pamirs east and northeast of Ferghana in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The Tadjiks, who can probably trace their origins back to the earliest Indo-Aryan inhabitants of these regions, stubbornly maintained their independence in the highest valleys of the Pamirs.

The Ming Dynasty

The first Ming emperor, Hung Wu (1368–1398), as successor to the Genghizid grand khans claimed sovereignty over all the lands formerly held by Kublai Khan. However, that claim had to be backed by real power. Even Kublai's writ did not run farther than the reach of his arm, though that was a long, strong arm. In 1385, Hung Wu sent envoys into Central Asia to reconnoiter. His ambassadors Fu An and Liu Wei visited Hami, Turfan and Urumchi. The begs and the
Dughlat emirs who ruled there either pledged fealty to the resurgent eastern power or made suitable signs of submission. The embassy to Tamerlane, however, was detained and released only after long negotiations. Tamerlane did send gifts to Peking on three occasions in 1387, 1392 and 1394, and these might be interpreted as tribute. But this was his usual devious way. The third Ming emperor, Yung Lo (1403–1424), had just ascended the throne when Tamerlane as a Genghizid successor announced his intention of conquering China. Yung Lo, fortunately, did not have to meet Tamerlane's challenge, but his successors in the sixteenth century were obliged to defend themselves from a new Mongol threat.

Around 1434, the Oirat Mongols (the Djungar or Western Mongols made up of Durbat, Khashot and Torgut tribes with the Tchoros at their head) took over the leadership of the Mongols relinquished by the heirs of Genghiz. From their new home in the steppes north of Lake Balkhash they began their rise to power by attacking Mogholistan to the south. In 1439–1455, they then advanced from Lake Balkhash to Lake Baikal and down to the Great Wall. Under their khan Esen Taiji, they seized Hami from Ming China and then Jehol (in Manchuria) and even captured the emperor Ying Tsun himself (1499). However, they were unable to force the defenses of Peking and were constrained to make peace (1453). Their next campaign against the Jagataite Khan Yunus was successful, and at the height of their power in 1570 they held the area from the Upper Yenisei down through the Ili highlands and Mogholistan and east to Mongolia. Then the tide turned. By this time the Eastern Mongols, who had been the backbone of Genghiz' armies, had fatally weakened themselves by strife resulting from the custom of dividing up the family inheritance among the sons. At the same time they began to adopt Lamaist Buddhism. (The Ordos Mongols set the pattern in 1566.) Instead of taking to arms, their young men embraced the doctrines of the Yellow Hat sect of missionaries from Tibet and entered monasteries in the thousands. The Chahar Mongols were converted in 1557–1593, and their khan promulgated a new Mongol code based on the Buddhist doctrines to replace the stern yasak of Genghiz.

Failing to get support from their now quiescent Eastern Mongol brethren, the Oirat or Kalmuck Tartars or Djungars, as they now came to be called, were driven from Mongolia by the Khalkha Mongols with Chinese aid, and their main body settled in the region of the Black Irtysch, Urungu, Imil and Ili and in Tarbagatai. Under the Tchoros
khan Galdan (born 1645) their fortunes rose again. They took over the Manass area and the Yulduz south of Urumchi and established the Dzungar-Oirat khanate.

But it was too late for the Oirat to repeat the feats of their Eastern Mongol kin. China had passed from the hands of the Ming dynasty. The warlike Tungusic Manchus from Manchuria conquered China in 1644 and produced a series of able rulers: Kang Hsi (1662–1722), Yung Chen (1723–1735) and Chien Lung (1736–1796), sinicized nomads like Kublai Khan. The Dzungars could not prevail against the reborn power of the Chinese empire. There could also not be a repeat of the Hun performance in turning from defeat in the East to attacks on the West. The road westward was solidly blocked by the growing power of the Russian empire. It had advanced over the Urals into Siberia and Kazakhstan and down into Western Turkestan.

This drive had been initiated by Ivan IV, the Terrible. He captured Kazan from the Tartars in 1552 and Astrakhan two years later. This secured the Volga Basin for Russia. In 1645 a fortified town was built on the Ural River by Czar Mikhail. In May 1714, Peter the Great sent an expedition to the Altai.

A clash of empires—Russian, Chinese, British—was shaping up in Central Asia. Sinkiang was its pivot. The course of events leading up to this confrontation is complex. Let us unravel it by first tracing what happened in southern Sinkiang, Kashgaria.

Between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Kashgaria was ruled, actually or nominally, by the descendants of the Genghizid Tighluk Timur Khan. It was split several times into independent kingdoms with their capitals at Aksu, Kashgar and Khotan. Needing allies in their civil wars, the petty khans would seek the help of the Uzbek khans reigning in Bokhara, Samarkand, Kokand or Tashkent. The nomad Kirghiz north of the Tienshan seized every opportunity to profit themselves by “helping” one side or the other or independently raiding the oases of Kashgaria or over the Pamirs into Transoxiana.

Nominally this whole area was part of the Jagataite khanate. Mogholistan included the Issyk Kul area, the Ili Basin, the Kara-Tal Basin, Ebi Nor and Manass on the northern side of the Tienshan, together with Uighuristan, including Turfan, Hami and Kashgaria. Kashgaria, however, was under the direct rule of the emirs of the Mongol Dughlat clan. The Jagataite khan, their suzerain, was sometimes a real ruler and sometimes simply a figurehead.
Vais-Khan, the Jagataite khan in 1418–1428, waged a losing fight against the Djungar-Oirat, who after their repulse by the Chinese Ming dynasty were again gathering strength and pressing in on Mogholistan from the north. His sons, Yunus and Esen-Bugha, just managed to hold Aksu and Yulduz (Urumchi area) and Mogholistan, but Esen-Bugha’s dissolute son and heir was rash enough to make a plundering raid on Kashgar, antagonized the Dughlat emirs who ruled there, and died in the midst of a general uprising of the people. Yunus thus became sole khan of Mogholistan (1472–1486). He was a cultivated, Persianized ruler and seemed hardly the man to rule in those times. Yet for a time he was successful and even extended his rule to Tashkent. Under his overlordship, Yarkand and Kashgar were well ruled in turn by Saniz and Muhammad Haidar, two sons of the Dughlat emir Sayyid Ali, and there was a “Golden Age” of peace from 1458 to 1480 from Ferghana to the borders of China.

But with their successor, Saniz’ son Abu-Bakhr, war began again. Not satisfied with his inheritance, Abu Bakhr seized Kashgar and Khotan as well as Yarkand and later Kucha and Bai. After defeating Yunus’ forces, he proclaimed his independence and even invaded Ferghana. This, of course, could not be countenanced, and Yunus’ successor and grandson, Said Khan (Sultan Said), attacked and drove Abu Bakhr out of the country. Said Khan’s reign as Jagataite khan of Mogholistan and Kashgaria lasted from 1514 to 1533. In what was now becoming a tradition of the Jagataites, Yunus Khan’s grandsons Shah-Khan and Muhammad came to blows over the division of their patrimony. Muhammad seized part of the Hami oasis and then called in the aid of the Djungar-Oirats against his brother. Then he found that he had to defend himself from a third brother, Sufi Sultan (Sofei), who tried to get Chinese help against his brother and the old enemies of the Chinese Ching dynasty, the Djungar-Oirats.

By the time the inheritance of the Jagataite khans had passed to the next generation, Ili had been lost to the White Horde of Kirghiz-Kazakhs and the whole of Kashgaria was parcelled out into separate sub-khanates of Kashgar, Yarkand, Aksu and Khotan. Then the entire area of Kashgaria passed under the rule of the Khodjas.

The Khodjas

The Khodjas (Khwajas) were Moslem religious leaders claiming descent from Mohammed himself or the first four caliphs. There were
several such families in Bokhara and Samarkand, which by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had become centers of Moslem scholarship. This was a sort of brotherhood of Moslem dogmatists, but they were also “miracle-workers,” holy men and healers of the sick, and in these capacities achieved ascendancy over the people. Weak rulers found it dangerous to oppose them, and they began to seek political and military power the better to propagate the faith. The khodja Mak-tum Azyam arrived in Kashgaria at the beginning of the sixteenth century and was honorably received and given estates by the ruler of Kashgar. His two sons became noted Moslem theologians. One, Imam Kalyan, founded the sect known as the Akh-taghlık (White Mountaineers or Afaqiyya), and the other, Khodja Izaak-Vali, founded the sect of the Kara-taghlık (Black Mountaineers or Ishaqiyya).

What began as an argument over Moslem doctrine developed into a struggle for power. By 1622 Kashgar was ruled by White Mountaineers and Yarkand by Black. In 1678, Ismail, a Black Mountaineer supporter and the last of the Jagataite khans, succeeded in reestablishing his power and in the process drove the White Mountaineers from Kashgar along with their then-leader Khodja Appak (Abu Khodja or Hazrat Apak or Afaq). Appak, the Moslem, fled to Tibet to get the support of the Dalai Lama, spiritual leader of Lamaistic Buddhism. The Dalai Lama got him the help of the Djungar-Oirat khanate’s leader Galdan Bokushta, who invaded Kashgaria, defeated Ismail and took him prisoner. There were sixty thousand casualties on both sides in this battle, slightly more than the total casualties at the battle of Gettysburg.

Khodja Appak was appointed Galdan’s governor of the territory (1670–1680), and the Black Mountaineers were suppressed. But Appak could not leave well enough alone. He intrigued to get out of paying the yearly tribute demanded of him by the Djungars. He prevailed upon Mohammad-Emil, of Uch-Turfan, to proclaim himself khan and undertake an expedition against the Djungars. Emil, nothing loathe, raided Djungaria and carried off thirty thousand men, women and children, and herds of cattle and other property. Then, fearing Djungar vengeance, he fled to the mountains, where he was killed by one of his own retinue in hopes of a reward. When he saw this plan fail, Appak resumed his rule in Kashgaria, but soon succumbed to illness. His wife Khanwil-Padishah, a masterful woman, seized the throne after slaying Appak’s oldest son. Then she too died at the hands of the fanatical dervishes who surrounded her.

Appak enjoys a vicarious fame in Kashgaria to this day. People come
from afar to visit his mausoleum, which is one of the finest architectu- 
monuments left in Sinkiang. He sent his daughter Teleshat-Shanir. 
to become a bride of the Ching emperor Kang Shi under the title 
Hsiang-fei (Fragrant Consort). A picture I saw of her in Urumchi—
if it is to be believed—shows her to have been a great beauty. It was 
she who returned after his death to build his mausoleum, a stately 
structure with a magnificently proportioned dome of blue and green 
tiles. A deep grove of poplars surrounding it seems to shut it off en-
tirely from all the bustle of the world around it. The ancient custodian, 
a white-bearded hadji, welcomed me with the one word he thought we 
could all understand: Pace.

Strife in the name of religion continued to be the bane of Kashgaria 
and the scourge of the Uighur people there. The feud continued be-
tween the Black Mountaineers of Yarkand led by Khodja Daniel and 
Khodja Akhmet of Kashgar. Daniel called in the aid of the Kirghiz 
bands of Sultan Ashem. Ashem immediately took the chance to make 
himself khan of Yarkand. Daniel, learning that the Djungars were 
preparing a reprisal against Kashgar for the raid by Khan Emil, went 
over to their side. The Djungars, however, had plans of their own. 
After capturing Kashgar they installed a ruler of their own choice and 
took Daniel and Ahkmet with them back to Ili.

Daniel, however, finally came into his own when in 1720 he was 
appointed ruler of Kashgaria, Yangi-Hissar, Yarkand, Khotan, Aksu 
and Kucha. It was at this time that Kashgaria came to be known as Alti-
shahr (Six Cities). When the Andijan adventurer Yakub Beg, of 
whom more later, added to these Karashahr, it was called Djitwa-shahr 
(Seven Cities). Daniel's oldest son was held hostage in Ili for his good 
behavior. On Daniel's death his four sons each received a fief in Kash-
garia. Yanus, who received Khotan, immediately began plotting to 
seize independent power throughout the area. But now a stronger force 
entered the picture. In 1754, the Manchu Ching dynasty, having con-
solidated its position inside the Wall, was advancing westward.

The Manchu Ching Dynasty

At the time of the fall of the Mongol empire, Manchuria (north-
eastern China) was inhabited by a number of forest clans which 
hunted, fished and herded swine for a living. These were the Tungus 
people and included the survivors of the Jurchen, who in 1122 had
carved out the Kin empire in North China and ruled it until 1234 when they had been expelled by Genghiz Khan’s successor Ogedei and forced to return to their ancestral lands. In 1599, Nurhachi, a vassal of the Ming dynasty and a leader of these semi-nomadic people, re-united the seven Jurchen tribes and by 1616 had founded the Later Kin empire in Manchuria. Before he died in 1626 he had extended his rule to Korea, the Amur and Ussuri valleys and west to Inner Mongolia and proclaimed himself emperor of China. His son Abakahai received pledges of fealty from the eastern Mongols, changed the name of the Jurchen to Manchu and the dynasty’s name to Ching and attacked the Chinese Ming realm inside the Great Wall. The Ming dynasty was in disarray, battling two revolts of peasants. When the peasant insurgent leader Li Tse-cheng occupied Peking, in 1644, the Ming commander Wu San-kuei opened the Shanhaikwan Pass through the Great Wall and, joining forces with the Manchus, crushed the peasant revolt. Double-crossing Wu San-kuei, the Manchus established themselves in Peking. Still it took twenty years to suppress Chinese opposition in North China. In South China the struggle went on until 1680. China was thus thrown back into the past of feudal war for nearly half a century while the western world made rapid advances. Huge areas in China were laid waste by the punitive expeditions of the conquerors. Fearful of outside intervention, the Ching rulers closed the door on foreign relations and trade for many years.

This isolation had fatal results. This was the time of the English Civil War and Cromwell’s Protectorate (1642–1658) and the Dutch Republic. Industry and trade were rapidly developing in the West. The agricultural, industrial and scientific revolutions were enriching life and enormously increasing productive and military potentialities. But China was stagnating under a feudal regime with a backward farming and handicraft economy.

The first Ching emperors were strong rulers, able in the context of their time and retaining the warlike proclivities of their nomad forebears. Thus it was that at the beginning of the eighteenth century Chinese forces were able to throw back the first marauding probes of the Europeans, mainly Portuguese adventurer-traders in South China, and the Djungar-Oirat attacks on the northern borders. To counter Djungar attacks, the Ching armies advanced and after driving them from Mongolia, took over Hami and Turfan. They then continued the advance to restrain the brawling khans and restore the Sinkiang oases to the Chinese empire.
The Ching Advance Westward

Galdan-Bokushta, khan of the Djungar-Oirat, had seized the opportunity of the Manchu's preoccupation with the conquest and pacification of China to extend his rule over Sinkiang, Chinghai and, in 1690, Outer and Inner Mongolia. He came within 240 miles northwest of Peking. The Ching emperor Kang Hsi could not ignore this threat so close to his capital. Using artillery forged for him by Jesuit missionaries in Peking—men who had been specially picked by the order because their technical and scientific skills would be popular with the Manchu sovereigns—he threw back the Djungars. As surely as they had sounded the knell of feudal armor and castles in Europe, these cannon salvoes of 1690 sounded the passing of the mounted nomad archer in Asia. The Khalkha Mongols regained their pasturelands in Mongolia and acknowledged Ching rule. In the fighting in 1696, Galdan lost half his army and fled. The next year he killed himself. Emperor Kang Hsi then claimed sovereignty over all Djungaria. The ruler of Hami submitted, but Galdan's successor, Tsewang Rabdan (1697–1727), carried on the fight, launching a long, drawn-out struggle over a vast theater of war. To protect their rear the Djungars fought and repulsed a Russian force but in 1720 had to fix the frontier between the khanate and Russia on the Yenisei at the 50th parallel. In 1716, the Djungar leader invaded Tibet, captured Lhasa, imprisoned the Dalai Lama installed by emperor Kang Hsi and drove out or killed all those who chose alliance with the Middle Kingdom. His exactions antagonized the Tibetans, and in 1720 Kang Hsi's expeditionary force drove out the Djungars and installed a new Dalai Lama. The Djungars then attacked the Tufan nomads of Chinghai, who had placed themselves under Chinese protection, but again Chinese arms prevailed. A truce was signed in 1724. In further campaigns in 1731 and 1734 the Djungars could claim victories, but when the emperor Chien Lung renewed the struggle, he had the advantage. The Djungars were rent by internal dissension.

In 1745, the Djungar khan Galdan Shirin died. His second son succeeded him, but to safeguard the succession he put his younger brother to death. His older brother, fearing for his own life, assassinated the new khan and seized power. Finding that his sister and brother-in-law were plotting against him, he had these two put to death. Dawaji and Amursana, two Djungar nobles, rose against the khan. Amursana killed him in Ili. But it was Dawaji who was proclaimed khan. Amursana,
offended, fled with his followers to join the Manchu Ching troops gathering under General Pan Ti to start a new campaign against the Djungars (1754).*

When Amursana persuaded the rest of the Djungars to acknowledge Chinese sovereignty, Dawaji fled to Uch-Turfan, southwest of Aksu. Here he was royally entertained by the local hakim (governor), whom he had himself appointed. Wined and dined and made hopelessly drunk, he was bound and delivered to the Chinese army.

Amursana meanwhile tried to rally Kashgaria against his enemies and to himself and his Ching allies. He did this by playing the White Mountaineers off against the Black. His White Mountaineers protégé Burkhan Eddin advanced with a force of five thousand men through the Muzart Pass on Kashgaria. Aksu welcomed him and gave him reinforcements. He bribed the Kirghiz allies of his enemies, and, deserted by them, the Black Mountaineers were defeated. Kashgar was taken without opposition. Yarkand fell after a bloody battle. The townspeople fought bravely for their ruler, an enlightened man, but were betrayed by two officials among the court priesthood.

The people had no love for the dark rule of the khodjas, and when the Ching emperor promised to respect their customs and religion, the khodjas found themselves entirely without popular support. They were quickly defeated and the Ching troops entered Kucha, Kashgar and Khotan. A Chinese column pursued the fleeing khodjas to Badakhshan. Four were killed in battle. One escaped.

General Pan Ti then appointed khans for all the tribes in the Djungar lands. Amursana, bitterly disappointed at not getting the overlordship, roused and headed a Djungar rising against the general, who, besieged in Ili and faced with defeat, committed suicide. General Chao Hui, his colleague in Urumchi, however, held out till reinforcements arrived from Barkul and then advanced to reoccupy Ili. Amursana, who had just boldly proclaimed himself khan, fled on the approach of the Ching army. He got to the Kirghiz steppes in Russia but died of smallpox the next year. Hearing of the rising, Emperor Chien Lung gave orders for a punitive massacre of Djungars. Thousands perished. In a mass exodus led by Sultan Taish-seren, ten thousand families escaped to their Kalmuck kinsmen on the Russian steppes by the Volga. This was the end of the Djungar-Oirat khanate.

Dzungaria was then divided administratively into Seven Circles: Tabargatai, Ili (Kuldja), Kur-Kara Usu (present-day Ili area), Urumchi, Barkul, Kobdo and Uliasutai. Military settlements were built and colonists brought in from other parts of China. These included Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Khalkhas, Uriankai (or Soyot) people of Tuvinsk stock and Sibos, Solons and Tahurs (Daurs) from Manchuria and Dolons, a Turki tribe living around Maralbashi. Many Uighur settlers were brought in as farmers from Kashgaria. They are called Taranchi (cultivators) in Dzungaria. It was probably at this time that large numbers of Hui, or Tungans as they are sometimes called, moved from Kansu and Shensi into Dzungaria.

In 1771, Torgut nomads from the lower Volga returned to their native pastures in Ili's valleys south and east of Ili and in the Yulduz. This was one of those typical nomad treks. These Kalmucks had fled before the Dzungar-Oirats in the seventeenth century. Then they found life under the Russian czars oppressive and were constantly harassed by the Crimean Tartars. They began their long journey home under Khan Ubasha. Czarist troops pursued them. Then a Kirghiz band ambushed them near Lake Balkhash and pillaged their goods. Only a third of them got back to Dzungaria, where they were given pastures vacated by their earlier enemies, the Dzungars.

With Ching rule in Dzungaria consolidated, the town of Ili (Kuldja or Ining) was built at the Dzungar khan's old place of abode. General Chao Hui was appointed governor, and he turned his attention to pacifying Kashgaria.

By 1759 the whole of Sinkiang as well as Ferghana were restored to the Chinese empire under the Ching. The people felt that they were free from the oppression of the khodjas. Above all they wanted tranquility and justice and a chance to go about their affairs in peace.
By the time the road from Peking to Kashgar was reopened by the Ching in the latter half of the seventeenth century, Central Asia’s economic and political patterns and its role in the world had changed drastically.

Feudal Kingdoms of Central Asia

Sinkiang’s roads were no longer major arteries of world trade. While eastern Central Asia (Mongolia and Sinkiang) had been pacified and reincorporated into a unified Chinese state by the Ching dynasty, western Central Asia remained in a turmoil of feudal wars. With the decline of Mongol power in the fourteenth century, the northern part of their empire, held by the Golden Horde, and the southern part, held by the descendants of Genghiz' fourth son, Tuli, broke up into their constituent tribal groupings. This process, accelerating toward the latter part of the century, led to great movements of nomad tribes in the
area and new groupings and regroupings accompanied by destructive 
war. Tamerlane’s conquests utterly ended the cohesion of the Mongol 
empire. Vast areas were depopulated. One of Tamerlane’s chroniclers 
wrote: “Only gazelles and camels roam in the area between Khoresm and 
the Crimea,” which once supported great herds of livestock. The eco-
nomic links of Tamerlane’s empire were weak, and with his death the 
process of decentralization reached its peak. In the northwest, the 
Moscow princes had reestablished their independent state. In the 
fifteenth century the khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan were established 
on the middle and lower Volga. Tamerlane’s heirs controlled Khoresm, 
including Urgench and Khiva. A separate khanate ruled the Crimea. 
East of the Volga, on the western Siberian steppes, was the White 
Horde that relapsed into a welter of wars between its rival, semi-
independent khan. Each khanate lived a practically self-sufficient life 
on the basis of a limited natural economy. By the nineteenth century, 
Western Turkestan was dominated by three major khanates—Khiva, 
Bokhara and Kokand. Khiva lay on the lower reaches of the Amu 
Darya. Its capital had a population of around forty thousand, mostly 
Uzbek officials, religious leaders, merchants and artisans. It vied with 
its neighboring states and fought to bring the Kazakh nomads of the 
northern steppes under its control. 

Bokhara on the middle Amu Darya had a population of seventy 
thousand and became the capital of a khanate including Samarkand 
and Merv with a population of between two and three million 
people, mostly Uzbeks and Tadjiks along with Kazakhs, Kipchaks 
(Polovtsi), some Arabs and Persians and Middle Asian Jews, mostly 
artisans. 

The Kokand khanate had its main centers at Kokand and Ferghana, 
the ancient Central Asian settlement. The caravan trail from Kashgaria 
over the Pamirs passed through here. Kokand itself was a new city 
founded in the mid-eighteenth century when irrigation was extended 
there from the Syr Darya. In 1830 its population of Turki Uzbeks, 
Kirghiz (Sarts), Tadjiks and refugees from Kashgaria had 360 mosques 
and 12 religious schools. It was ruled by local landowning nobles and 
religious leaders, all of whom had close contacts with the merchants 
trading with Kashgar and neighboring areas. The Kokand Uzbeks, so 
recently nomads, had retained their warlike proclivities and so had the 
ability not only to administer and cultivate the oases but to wage success-
ful wars against their settled and nomad neighbors.
War was practically continuous between these three khanates and the minor shahs, sultans, emirs and begs who held less powerful strongholds like Badakhshan, Khorasan, Tashkent and Afghanistan and mountain fastnesses like Karategin in what is now Tadjikistan. Rivalry between Kokand and Bokhara was particularly intense over the city of Tashkent and the Djizak, Ura-Turbeh area which gave Kokand its outlet to the western plains. Feudal wars and ruthless exploitation by the feudal nobility reduced the population of Central Asia to an unparalleled state of poverty and misery. Plunder, slavery and serfdom were widespread. A single raid by the khan of Khiva against the Kazakhs in 1812 resulted in the capture of 100,000 sheep, 40,000 camels and 500 Kazakh girls. It is no wonder that these feudal states were unable to resist the advance of the czarist armies pressing in from the north: the conscript army of the khan of Bokhara simply refused to march against the Russians, and the khan himself was murdered by his courtiers in 1862.

While this ruinous feuding went on between the Central Asian khans, the Middle East, to their west, was also in a state of war. East-West trade over the Silk Road was blocked. The Ottoman empire, "born of war and organized for conquest," expanded out of Turkey to both east and west from the fourteenth century on. It reached Vienna in 1683 and dominated the eastern Mediterranean. Persia in the early sixteenth century was divided into several feudal states. Its eastern part was Khorasan, ruled by Tamerlane's heirs. Its western part was an arena of contending sultans. Its northern area still had large cities with skilled craftsmen and merchants, and this formed the basis of the newly revived Persian power under the Seffavid sultans (1502-1736). But this Persian peace was short-lived. Soon the whole area was engulfed again in feudal wars lasting through the late seventeenth century. The Turkish Ottoman empire suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the rising Russian power that had developed around the rulers of Moscow.

With the old Silk Road thus cut up and blocked, the arteries of world trade between the rising western mercantile powers—England, France, Holland and Portugal—and the East shifted to the sea routes around the Cape of Good Hope and India and to the ports of China. By the 1780s, the China Sea trade accounted for 6 percent of Britain's foreign commerce. The Silk Road was a dead end leaving Sinkiang in an economic backwater, where it would remain for 150 years of economic stagnation and increasing poverty.
Sinkiang under the Ching Emperors

In the early years of pacification under the Ching emperors, the peoples of Sinkiang were settled in more or less the pattern of today. In the south, in Kashgaria and the oasis towns on the southern slopes of the Tienshan, Uighur farmers, traders, and craftsmen formed the main population. There were quite a number of Han, Uzbek and Andijani merchants and some Kirghiz and Tadjik nomads. In the Yulduz, south of Urumchi, were Mongol and Kirghiz nomads. Kalmuk Djungars pastured their flocks in Karashahr and in the Ili and Altai areas of Djungaria. Military settlements of Solons, Sibos and Manchus dominated the Ili area. Kazakh, Kirghiz and Mongol nomads roamed the Djungarian steppes and the Tienshan, Altai and Alatau. Urumchi, then called Tihwa, capital of Sinkiang, the former Mongol Bishbalikh, was a cosmopolitan center of these peoples with Manchu officials and administrators and Han and local dignitaries assimilated into the ruling stratum. While there were Moslem Hui (Tungans) throughout the region, most of them were concentrated in Urumchi and Hami.

The first years of the Ching pacification promised well. Han traders, craftsmen and settlers from Shensi and Kansu brought in new ideas, opened up waste land and rebuilt and improved irrigation systems, particularly the karese, the underground channels that bring water from the melting snows and glaciers of the mountains to the farmlands on the plains. I inspected these karese in Hami and Turfan. A series of shafts are sunk in the direction in which one plans to lead the water from upland springs, and from the bottom of these, horizontal tunnels are dug to link up with each other. The shafts are lightly covered over with beams and thatch and can be opened later to clear or repair the tunnels. From the air the mounds above the shafts resemble nothing so much as a line of molehills. Karese minimize evaporation of water in the irrigation channels during the hot, dry summers.

Not much trade went westward from Sinkiang, but with peace a lively trade sprang up between metropolitan China and Sinkiang. Silk and cotton textiles, tea, paper, porcelains, pottery and lacquerware, metals and metalware came from the east. Sinkiang responded with jade, fruits, raisins and furs and other animal products.

This period of relative economic recovery and peace was maintained, however, at the cost of an oppressive military domination both inside the Great Wall and in the vast lands outside it. Even after
pacification of the region by the emperor Yung Cheng, the various peoples there were denied equal rights with the Manchu overlords. Serfdom survived, particularly in the south.

Emperor Chien Lung ran a tightly controlled autocratic government. The eighteen provinces and Manchuria were ruled by Manchu military governors directly responsible to the central authority in Peking. All important questions were settled by the emperor assisted by a council of the princes and advisers. Garrisons from a huge army of 800,000 men were stationed at strategic points throughout the empire. Every effort was made to prevent alliances among the oppressed. Hans were not allowed to marry Mongols or fraternize with Uighurs. Even ordinary social intercourse between Tibetans and Djungars was prohibited. The Manchus shared some of the privileges and spoils of conquest with the upper stratum of the conquered peoples and used these quislings to perpetuate their rule, but this was a tactic that could finally only promote the solidarity of the oppressed. In Sinkiang, the Ching governors commanding an army of over 20,000 men, ruled the region through 270 local chiefs (begs).

China's Fatal Isolationism

In the second half of the eighteenth century, English, French and Dutch East India companies were vying to penetrate the markets of China and extract special privileges from the Chinese government. They were not successful. In 1757 the only port open to foreign traders was Canton. The closed-door policy, which lasted until the mid-nineteenth century, temporarily saved China from exploitation at the hands of foreign imperialists but isolated it from developments in the rest of the world. On the landward side, Sinkiang was open only to more backward feudal areas. China was thus cut off from the influence of the Industrial Revolution and the commercial and cultural intercourse that was creating a worldwide capitalist economy and market. This isolation adversely affected the Chinese economy and held back the growth of modern cities, middle and working classes and modern thought. Economically, politically and intellectually, China lagged more and more behind the western world. Its feudal economic and social system stagnated, with the gravest consequences to the people.

The exactions of the emperor Chien Lung and his oppression of the people sparked one of the first great revolts in Sinkiang against the dynasty. In 1762, a rebellion broke out in Uch Turfan against corrupt
local officials. The *hakim*, a Moslem from Hami, and the dissolute Manchu commandant combined to mulct the people, who slew the hakim and wiped out the small Ching garrison. They repulsed the punitive detachment sent from Aksu and drove off the Kucha garrison troops which came to its assistance. The Ching *amban* (governor) of Kashgar had to detach ten thousand men from the Ili garrison to invest the recalcitrant town. When after three months' siege it was successfully assaulted, everyone in it was put to the sword. This bloody reprisal sufficed to maintain peace until 1825.

From then on, however, there was a crescendo of uprisings. The people fought but their efforts were exploited by local or expatriate feudal leaders—the khodjas—attempting to restore the power and privileges they had lost when Sinkiang was restored to China. This happened during the risings of the khodja Jehangir (Djangir) in 1826–1827 and others that occurred in 1830, 1847, 1855, 1856 and 1857.

**The Curse of the Khodjas**

The Ching court had arranged to pay the khan of Kokand a yearly allowance for supervising the khodjas who had escaped from Sinkiang and taken refuge in his domains. But in 1820 the khan died. Jehangir, one of the Sinkiang khodjas, seized the opportunity to escape from Kokand, make his way to the Tienshan and rally the bold Kirghiz to attack the Ching garrisons. Repulsed in his first foray, he fell back to the Naryn River area, where he surprised and routed a Ching force of five hundred men. This victory was enlarged in the telling. Recruits of all kinds flocked to his standard. In 1826 with this mixed force of Kokand freebooters, bands of Kirghiz and Kipchak herdsmen and Kashgarian exiles, Tadjiks and Uighurs restless under Manchu oppression, he marched on Kashgar.

The Ching garrison was driven from the city but retreated to and held the citadel. Jehangir proclaimed himself sultan. The new khan of Kokand, Madali, came to his aid with a force of fifteen thousand men but withdrew after suffering heavy losses in vain attempts to storm the Kashgar citadel. Jehangir, with more to gain and less to lose, persisted, and the fortress fell after a seventy-day siege. With the exception of four hundred Hui, and Hans who embraced Islam, the garrison of eight thousand men was massacred.

Jehangir's triumph was short-lived. By February 1827, Ching forces had advanced from Aksu and scattered his troops on the outskirts of
Kashgar. The adventurers who had attached themselves to him were the first to flee. After a reign of only nine months, he barely succeeded in escaping to the mountains. Here he was betrayed by a follower and sent captive to Peking, where he was executed. Suppression of this revolt cost the Ching treasury ten million ounces of silver. To punish Madali, khan of Kokand, the Ching government ordered an economic blockade against Kokand, depriving it of the profits of the direct and transit trade from Kashgar. This was so damaging that Madali retaliated. He had succeeded in bringing many of the nomad Kazakhs and Kirghiz of the Old or Great Horde under his rule. Now he proclaimed a *gazavat* or holy war to deliver the Moslems of Sinkiang from the yoke of the infidel and restore the rule of the khodjas. An army of forty thousand men was sent to attack Kashgar. The Ching garrison was again routed and Med-Yussuf, brother of Jehangir, was proclaimed sultan. He ruled only ninety days. A quarrel broke out between Madali and the Bokhara khanate. The Kokand expeditionary force was recalled from Kashgar, and Med-Yussuf, unsure of his power, went with it. As before, the returning Ching power inflicted heavy penalties on all who had helped the khodja and his Kokand allies.

The Ching government in a compromise agreed to have Kokand *aksakals* (agents) stationed in Kashgar and six other towns to collect for Kokand certain dues on goods imported by foreign merchants. On its part, Kokand promised to prevent the khodjas from reentering Sinkiang and to refuse them refuge should they stir up trouble there.

Peace lasted for fifteen years until 1843–1847 and the Rising of the Six Khodjas. In that year the khanate of Kokand was thrown into disorder by a struggle for power, and six khodjas, led by Katta-Turya, escaped Kokand’s surveillance and took to the hills with a thousand horsemen, nomad freebooters, Kirghiz, Kipchaks and Sarts. After wiping out a Ching frontier post, they advanced on Kashgar, gathering recruits on the way. The Kashgar garrison of three thousand men, according to custom, shut themselves up in the citadel, leaving the city to its fate. The townspeople, tired of disorder and pillage, this time refused to admit Katta-Turya and his men and barricaded the gates. The Kokand aksakal, however, treacherously opened a gate by night, and the khodjas’ fighters poured into the sleeping town. They slaughtered the non-Moslem Han merchants, took their women and plundered their goods. Katta-Turya was proclaimed sultan.

The khodjas promptly gave themselves over to corrupt living and plundering the people. Their example was eagerly followed by the
adventurers who formed their court. The Ching power reacted promptly. Gathering from Aksu, Ili, Urumchi and Lanchow a huge force—historians say 200,000 men, but this is surely an exaggeration—the Ching commanders advanced on Kashgar. Katta-Turya was defeated and fled. Panic-stricken and fearful of reprisals, thousands of Kashgar citizens fled in his wake. The khodjas crossed the Terek Dawan pass over the Tienshan on swift steeds. Sixteen camels followed loaded with plunder. At Soofi-Kurghan, Katta-Turya was intercepted by a detachment of Kipchaks from Kokand. His booty was seized and he was taken prisoner. Nearly a month later the first of the stream of refugees arrived at the Terek Dawan. The firstcomers got through safely (many of their descendants are living around Ferghana), but then heavy snows blocked the pass. The refugees were in a fearful plight. Exhausted, without food or shelter, many were frostbitten; many became lost; thousands perished. For three years after that tragedy, the waters of the Terek were undrinkable, polluted by the rotting corpses in its course. And for thirty years after, the refugees’ bones could be seen on the approaches to the pass.

In 1857, the khodjas once again inflicted themselves on the long-suffering people of Kashgaria. This time it was Valikhan Turya. Raiding Kashgar, he declared Boozhruk, son of Jehangir, khan of Kashgar. He slaughtered Hans and Manchus and was more oppressive to the people than the government he claimed to be replacing in the name of justice and religion. The women of Kashgaria traditionally enjoyed greater freedom from the restrictions of purdah and the harem than women in most other Moslem states at that time. Now they were forbidden to go unveiled in public or show even the ends of their plaits while tending their shops. Any breach of this prohibition and their hair was shorn off on the spot by the Moslem kazi (law-enforcement officers) who kept ward on the roads. All males over six years old were obliged to wear turbans and attend mosque five times a day. People were executed daily for breaking these commandments; their skulls formed a growing pyramid on the banks of the Kizyl-Su. Blood-drunk Valikhan often murdered victims himself. It is no wonder that four months after he arrived this monster was forced to flee when a Ching punitive expedition approached. The people were learning from bitter experience that they were being hoodwinked under the guise of religion. They would not lift a finger to help the tyrant. The Ching commander hunted down all those who had abetted Valikhan’s crimes. This ended the sixth attempt of the khodjas to restore their rule over Kashgaria. Valikhan Turya himself escaped to Kokand, where as a member of the
ruling aristocracy and an alleged descendant of the Prophet, he was 
exempt from bodily punishment or sentence of death. He was allowed 
to live in honorable exile.

The feudal, reactionary religious obscurantism preached by the 
khodjas was the bane of Sinkiang and the Moslem peoples on its bor- 
ders. In Shensi and Kansu, infuriated by Ching oppression, the Hui 
(Tungan) people on more than one occasion rose in revolt. Leadership 
in these revolts, however, was seized by the ruling groups among them 
and their Moslem religious leaders. These leaders turned populist 
revolt into religious war, so that it was diverted from the road of anti-
feudal revolution and degenerated into a pogrom in which terrible 
blows were struck not only against the Manchu and Han ruling circles, 
which oppressed poor Hans and Huis alike, but against the Han peas-
ants and working people as well and even Buddhist Tibetans and Mon-
gols. This weakened the rebels by depriving them of their natural allies. 
Isolated, they were crushed by the Ching rulers.

It was the same in Sinkiang even without the personal intervention 
of the khodjas; their bigoted fanaticism alone was sufficient to mislead 
the people. In 1862, influenced by the upheavals in China caused by 
the Taiping revolution, the Hui, Uighur and Kazakh peoples began a 
fresh rebellion against the Ching regime. This was an attempt to throw 
off oppression, but once again leadership was usurped by the local 
feudal aristocracy and clergy. Ching garrisons were destroyed or driven 
out. Several petty khanates were formed and immediately began a 
struggle for power. Yakub Beg, an Andijani adventurer, was the victor. 
For a time he managed to unite all Kashgaria under his rule (see Chap-
ter 6). But he was encircled by hostile, stronger forces, not only the 
Ching. The British imperialists and their vassal Turkey were planning 
to detach Sinkiang from China as a first step to bringing the area under 
their protectorate and domination. The czarist imperialists greedily 
studied the situation.

Sinkiang became the focus of a struggle between rival imperialisms 
and empires that was resolved only after a century when the people 
finally realized that they should fight for themselves and not for others —and learned how to take their destinies into their own hands.

Clash of Empires

Until the mid-nineteenth century, the history of Sinkiang was a 
record of struggles for power between the ruling classes of the various
tribes which inhabited it, between the settled farmers and the nomad herdsmen in and around its borders. None of these peoples (Saks, Huns, Turki, Mongols, Arabs, Manchus, Hans) had advanced beyond the social-economic stage of feudalism—nomadic or Asiatic. Only in Sung and Ming dynasty China had the embryonic forces of capitalism developed, but the actual birth of capitalism had been aborted by the barbarian invasions of the Mongols and Manchus. In contrast, when the forces of capitalism appeared in the West, they grew and flourished so that by the seventeenth century they had already altered the content of class struggles in the world.

By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European capitalism was in the stage of primary accumulation of capital. The scientific revolution in the seventeenth century transformed European thought. It was the age of Francis Bacon, Descartes, Kepler, Galileo, William Harvey, Newton. The English Civil Wars of 1642-51 were followed by the rapid growth of mercantilism. The eighteenth century encompassed the Age of Enlightenment, the American Revolution of 1775 and the French Revolution of 1789. The Industrial Revolution in England in that century signaled the rise to power of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, the still more rapid growth of capitalism in Europe and the colonial expansion that brought about intense rivalry among the emerging great powers in the nineteenth century. Britain established her Indian empire and Canadian colonies, seized Hong Kong in 1842, conquered Burma (1886) and the Malay Peninsula, building the empire on which “the sun never set.” She was engaged in a tense confrontation with the Russian empire expanding toward the East and Middle East. The Crimean War flared up in 1854.

The growth of capitalism in Russia spurred her drive to the east and her search for a warm-water port. The 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk with China had given recognition to her occupation of 93,000 square miles in eastern Siberia. In 1860 the Russians founded Vladivostok (Ruler of the East). They were clawing at China’s Manchuria, probing and thrusting down to the Dardanelles and the Middle East and east of the Caspian. In 1847 they had advanced east of Lake Balkhash and down to the Pamirs, absorbing the nomad Kazakh and other peoples or driving them back and seizing Chinese territory.

Sinkiang was the focus of this struggle in Inner Asia. Having seized the lands of the weaker peoples in between, the rival imperialists were now coming face to face there with one another and with the power of
the Ching empire. Further advances—and none was willing to admit that it had reached the limit of its advances—demanded that an opposing power would have to give way.

These years also saw the emergence of a new power not confined by territorial boundaries: the revolutionary force of the international working class opposed to all capitalists, all imperialisms. Karl Marx (1818–1883) began propagating the revolutionary ideas that were later to inspire the Russian and Chinese revolutions and thus again radically transform the balance of forces in the world. However, in the mid-eighteenth century the dominant force in the world was imperialism, and among the imperialists the British and Russians were the most aggressive in Central Asia.

In 1774 the first British expedition entered Tibet, and in 1837, British intervention in Afghanistan began. By 1858, the British conquest of India was practically complete and the first viceroy was appointed. British posts were established on the northern mountain passes leading to Afghanistan, Sinkiang and Tibet. In 1840, exerting pressure on China farther east, Britain fought the first Opium War against China and two years later in Nanking forced the Ching government to sign the first of the Unequal Treaties. Forsyth, the British agent who later visited Yakub Beg, in an article in 1879 admitted that the “chief business done by our traders with Eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang) was in opium which they smuggled across the Karakorum and sold for enormous profit in Yarkend and Khotan. Later trade was in tea and British cotton goods.” Britain’s grand strategy was to incorporate Sinkiang into the British sphere of influence or empire; failing that, Sinkiang would be used as a buffer zone (along with Afghanistan and Tibet) against Russia’s advance toward India, the “brightest jewel in the British crown.” In the latter case, Sinkiang might be a separate client state under some puppet such as Yakub Beg or might be preserved as part of a China under British control.

These plans were countered by Russian imperialism, encroaching on China from the Siberian north as British power pressed in from the south and by sea. Reports of gold deposits near Yarkand and Khotan reinforced the desire of both Britain and Russia to control Sinkiang, this key strategic area of Central Asia. (A later attraction was the report of oil and then of uranium in the twentieth century.) In 1714, Prince Gagarin, governor of Siberia and Kremlin lobbyist for Central
Asian expansion, proposed appropriating these gold mines by building a line of forts forward from the Irtysh to Yarkand. In 1717, Peter the Great sent a military expedition to Khiva, a step in his plan to open up a direct overland trade route between Russia and India. But the whole force of six thousand men was wiped out by unfriendly khans. Despite this setback, a Russian force in 1720 reached Lake Zaisan in the drive to the east. In 1731, to get help from the Russian state in their struggle against the marauding Djungars, the Small Horde of the Kazakhs of present-day Kazakhstan were encouraged to take Russian citizenship. Later that year, the Middle Horde of Kazakhs followed suit. This brought czarist power to the ill-defined borders of the Ili and Tarbagatai areas in northern Sinkiang.

In 1876, a Russian force under General Skobelev entered Kokand and brought that khanate under Russian rule. Only the Pamir range then separated the Russian empire from Kashgar. Agents of both Britain and Russia made their way into Sinkiang in the guise of explorers or merchants. Between 1868 and 1876, four Russian missions arrived in Kashgar. But neither British nor Russians were yet prepared to force dismemberment of the Ching empire. An uneasy balance of power existed. While still able to exert considerable force in Central Asia, Ching power seemed to be clearly on the wane.

China under the Ching dynasty was a unique surviving example of the Asiatic feudal state. The empire was based on peasant farming and handicrafts using a relatively backward technology. Large areas and their populations were set aside for the upkeep of the Manchu armies and nobles and members of the Han or other nationalities who supported the Manchu overlords. The Ching emperor headed this system of exploitation. He represented the interests of the feudal ruling class of Manchu and Han landowners and protected those interests with a reactionary Confucian mandarin bureaucracy and ruthless military force. Kang Hsi and his successors, as we have seen, could perpetrate the most atrocious massacres to sustain "law and order."

This system was shot through with contradictions and conflicts which finally tore it apart. China's landlord setup was the cause of her military ascendancy over the nomads nearly two thousand years before; when adapted by the nomad conquerors and pitted against the modern world, it was the cause of her military weakness. Manchu rulers and armies that gave China victory over the Djungar nomads in 1759 brought humiliation to China in the contest with the West in 1840. Leading a
parasitic life of victorious conquerors they grew corrupt and inefficient. Their state apparatus was unable even to maintain the essential water-conservation works and other basic public services on which the prosperity of the country depended. The chief debilitating conflict was between the peasants, the foundation of the economy, and feudal landlords. The landlords pressed harder on their tenants to squeeze their share out of a degenerating economy. The peasants lived in grinding poverty. More and more fell into debt, losing their land to landlord usurers, becoming debt slaves, landless laborers, beggars or tenants paying 50 percent and more of their yearly produce as rent in addition to, taxes, with the result that they could no longer make needed investments in their exhausted farms. Caught in this vicious spiral, China for all her size was disjointed and weak, a clay colossus.

The Ching regime with its feudal landlord system and mandarin bureaucracy became a brake on China's progress. While feudal China was becoming more backward, the surrounding capitalist world, pressing in on her, was becoming more industrialized and stronger. From the mid-nineteenth century on, the Manchu rulers suffered one defeat after another at the hands of the foreign imperialists: British and French, Russian and Japanese, German and American. Lesser powers took their cut.

The Peking government, forced to pay huge indemnities to the victors, had to squeeze these sums out of an already impoverished people and drove them to revolt. At the same time, capitalism, with a bourgeoisie and a working class, began to develop in China. It was partly indigenous and partly under the aegis of foreign powers.

When China was defeated by the British in the Opium War of 1840 and signed the first Unequal Treaty, she began to change from an independent feudal power into a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country. Progress for China now demanded the solution of two crucial and interrelated conflicts. The first was between the Chinese nation and oppressive foreign imperialisms, a conflict that could be resolved only by a victorious struggle for national liberation. The second was the conflict between the great bulk of the people and their feudal landlord oppressors—a mere handful, perhaps 5 percent of the population. This conflict could only be resolved by a successful struggle for democratic rule, rule by the people, leading to agrarian reform and the end of feudal landlordism and its main prop—the imperial state and mandarin bureaucracy.
China’s history from 1840 to 1949 was in fact a century-long revolutionary struggle for liberation of the people from the foreign invaders, the imperialist powers who used the feudal Ching dynasty and its warlord successors, including the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang clique, to hold down the Chinese people. It was also the history of the struggle of the Chinese people for unity against their native oppressors and exploiters. In the drive for freedom, the Han, Manchu, Uighur, Hui, Mongol, Kazakh, Miao, Tai, Chuang and other peoples forged the consciousness of a common nationhood. But how much energy was dissipated in fruitless struggles among the peoples themselves! These struggles were fostered and instigated by the ruling classes and imperialists, using the oppressors’ immemorial principle: “divide and rule.”

The struggle to achieve and maintain direction and unity confronts every revolution based on a coalition of classes. One example is the Taiping Revolution of 1851–1864. This was directed primarily against the Ching regime. Peasants, workers, craftsmen and part of the merchant class flocked to the Taiping standard and fought heroically in its ranks. But some Han landlords joined them hoping to overthrow the Ching dynasty in order to bring the Han feudal gentry back to power with a new, native Han dynasty.

The Taiping government initially confiscated some of the property of the big officials and feudal landlords and divided up some land among the peasants, but after establishing its rule over a large part of the Yangtze Valley and south China, lost its revolutionary drive and was crushed by the combined forces of the Manchu and Han rulers and foreign imperialists. The forces against it were large, but its defeat was caused primarily by the presence in its ranks of the landlord elements which prevented it from carrying out the most essential reform—land reform—and so spreading its influence among the greatest revolutionary social force in the country—the peasants. These elements also brought the old evils of corruption and privilege into the Taiping kingdom. At the same time, conditions in China were not yet ripe for the victory of a new progressive social order. China had no modern industry. The middle classes, the bourgeoisie and the working class—the protagonists of modern democracy—were present only in very limited numbers.

The Taipings, for all their heroism and relatively high level of organization, failed to destroy the feudal regime, but they made an immense contribution to fulfilling this historic task by fatally undermining it. The very failure of the Taiping revolution began to teach the people that the struggle against feudalism could not be separated from the
struggle against the foreign imperialists who came to the aid* of their erstwhile enemy—the Ching dynasty.

Sinkiang in 1850

A fairly accurate record of events in Sinkiang can be pieced together by this time in the mid-nineteenth century. Official reports and books by diplomatic envoys, travelers and spies give much detailed information on everyday life and customs.

In addition to the six cities there were about thirteen smaller towns and 16,000 villages and hamlets. The total population appears to have been around 2,500,000, with 1,625,000 in the Ili area and north of the Tienshan. These northerners included 12,000 exiles deported from other places, not only criminals but “politics” and former rebels from inside the Great Wall. The big Kashgar Circle, as it was called, had 16,000 families and the Yarkand Circle 60,000. The Ching garrisons, numbering from 200 to 10,000 men each, totaled around 40,000 troops.

The whole area was divided into two provinces: Djungaria and Kashgaria, each under a lord-lieutenant. Kashgar was composed of six circles or governorships—Yarkand, Kashgar, Yangi-Hissar, Aksu, Uch Turfan and Kucha, each centered on the principal town of the oasis with its satellite villages. Each circle was governed by a Manchu or Han amban who controlled both civil and military affairs, with a military subordinate in direct command of the troops. A hakim-beg was in charge of civil administration in each circle. A yuzbashi headed each district in the circles. Beneath these officials, as in older times sanctioned by Moslem custom, were the kazes or judicial officials who could order their whip-carrying attendants to administer summary justice on the spot wherever they happened to be; the muftis or interpreters of the Moslem Shariat or Holy Law; and a host of lower officials. Other officials collected taxes, furnished transport for traveling officials, inspected the state gardens or vineyards, supervised the irrigation systems, and so on. Kazis and muftis were supposed to be chosen by the people themselves, but in corrupt times these posts were pork-barrel jobs. They wore ordinary dress; wide trousers tucked into riding boots under an ample caftan (like a loose overcoat) with a cummerbund around the waist and head covered in Moslem fashion with a hat of fur in winter or a small dab or skullcap in summer. (I am describing the dress of the Uighurs or Uzbeks.

* British and other foreigners supplied the Ching regime with funds, arms and the “Ever-Victorious Army” led first by the American, Frederick Ward, and then by the Englishman, General “Chinese” Gordon.
Kazakhs, Mongols, Kirghiz and Tadjiks dressed in their own national styles.) Higher officials of all nationalities were obliged to dress in the manner prescribed by the imperial court. A meritorious official had the right to wear a round hat with a peacock feather and three flowers made of jewels or semi-precious stones fastened to its top button. All officials wore some type of button on the top of their black skullcaps—ruby, coral, lapis lazuli, silver, white stone or blue or green glass—and these denoted their rank.

The Ching authorities demanded utter obedience and subservience from their subjects. When a high official walked or rode on the streets, all commoners had to dismount and stand in humble respect. When an amban toured a city, the people were obliged to kneel until he had passed—the representative of the emperor, the Son of Heaven himself.

I have described the horrible massacres perpetrated on the people by rulers in time of war, but in normal times sentence of death was rarely passed. "Executions were carried out only after careful consideration," writes the Russian agent Kuropatkin, who could hardly be suspected of undue regard for Ching rule. Even an amban was empowered to pass a death sentence only for political crimes. There was a curious survival of some earlier form of punishment known as "civil death." This was imposed for certain offenses which, while grave, did not merit physical death. The offender was taken out with various ceremonies on a sunny day and placed against a tree. His shadow cast on the tree was marked out in outline. He was then confined to his house and from then on his relatives were obliged to consider him dead as of that date.

The official Geographical Record of the Western Region (Hsi Yu Tsian Lu, 1778) states that the Kashgar Circle had 16,000 taxpayers and a population of about 80,000. Taxes yielded 39,600 ounces of silver; 14,000 sacks of corn; and 10,000 lengths of mata, a local folk weave made in lengths of 6–10 feet, over a foot wide, much prized in Sinkiang and neighboring areas. Southern Sinkiang, reports Kuropatkin, writing some years later, had about 375,000 taxable souls, but was then in a poverty-stricken condition due to the recent wars. He calculates that between 1760 and 1825 there were from 100,000 to 150,000 men in the Kashgar Circle who paid an average yearly tax of around £9,000 sterling (in the sterling values of that time, worth much more today) and 6,120,600 pounds of grain and 10,000 lengths of mata. Revenue was mainly devoted to maintenance of the garrisons and local administration, but as the regime declined, corruption and the burdens on the people increased.
Salaries of lower officials (under the rank of hakim-beg) were mostly paid in kind from the proceeds of state lands given to them for their use or from their own lands cultivated free of charge by the corvée labor of the people.

Garrisons were mostly infantry armed with pikes, swords, bows and arrows, flintlock muskets and taifoors, oversize muskets shooting a large charge. Four men made up a taifoor team: one carried its ten cartridges; the second, its sponger-out, carried an iron rod with a brush of horsehair tied to its end; the third and fourth carried the taifoor. When this was fired one man held it on his back by means of a thick cloth band, and the other helped to hold it in place. The cavalrmen were picked horsemen able to wield swords, bows and arrows and guns from the saddle. Modern breechloading rifles were coming into use. These were bought from Turkey, Russia and Britain. Later, some were made locally by skilled craftsmen. But even in the 1870s, Hui cavalrymen carried eight or ten clubs suspended from their saddles. These they threw with great force and effect against their opponents. Sinkiang was strategically important in protecting the western frontiers of the older Chinese provinces from the advance of the Russian and British imperialists, but it is clear that while it could, under good leadership, inflict severe losses on an attacker, its army would be no match for a well-prepared western expeditionary force.

The Silk Road continued to be traveled, but its greatness was now nothing but a memory. Long stretches of its southern arm were buried in sand, along with such ancient cities as Loulan, Niya and Charchan. The branch on the northern rim of the Taklamakan still carried a trade in tea and other products from within the Wall, and some of these goods went on in transit to western Central Asia, India and Afghanistan. Kashgar exported mata, silk floss and mashroop (a silk and cotton web woven in brilliant traditional patterns); copper; metalware (Kashgar copper vessels are splendid objects to this day); brimstone; saltpeter; jade; gold and leather; furs and carpets. Other parts of southern Sinkiang had much the same exports. Khotan was especially famous for its carpets and jade. Other Sinkiang goods were robes of various kinds; sheepskin furs and lambskins, especially the white variety; alum; sal-ammoniac; opium; agates; and dyes. Precious metals went from Sinkiang to the eastern provinces. Three hundred men worked in the gold mines near Keriya, east of Khotan. Trade between Sinkiang and other areas was encouraged. Large caravanserai were built in the principal towns. All foreigners, even if they resided in the towns and brought their families with them, were
considered as guests and paid no taxes. No taxes were levied on goods intended as offerings or brought only in small quantities. Domestic trade from end to end of the region was tax-free. Disputes among traders were settled by a jury composed of the merchants themselves. Cattle were especially welcomed. Cattle driven in by the neighboring nomads paid a levy of only one-thirtieth of their value.

At that time Kashgar was not as important as it is today. The walls were only a little over three and a half miles in circumference. Yarkand was then the biggest city in southern Sinkiang, and its bazaar was famous. The tradition of the weekly bazaar was, as it still is today, well established. On such days people pour into the towns for a whole day of shopping, trading and enjoyment. The teashops provide not only rest and drink but all the gossip of the day. There were well-built shops owned chiefly by enterprising Han merchants.

Handicraftsmen, metalworkers, weavers, jewelers, makers of embroidered dabs displayed their goods in abundance before their shops or on the lines of stalls just as they do today. Merchants came from Bokhara, Kokand and Andijan and other towns and from India. There were Arabs, Kazakhs and Kirghiz, Afghans and Uzbeks, Tadjiks and Uighurs. There was a babble of foreign tongues among the bright stalls and exotic costumes.

Describing Sanju at such a time of relative prosperity before Yakub Beg's exactions took effect, the British agent Shaw wrote in 1878:

The people here seem very well-to-do. No rags or appearance of poverty anywhere. Every member of the crowd that gathered around our party was well dressed in several good thick robes reaching below the knee, with high leather boots and a cap turned up all round showing a handsome fur lining ... Here everyone looks respectable, brisk and intelligent.

The nomads lived much as they had for centuries past. Hunting and herding with its daily round of tasks; milking and lambing, shearing, and preparing the various animal products; endlessly moving their herds from pasture to pasture.

Because of backward technology, Sinkiang's oasis farming was not highly productive, but the Uighur farmers, hardworking and peace-loving, tilled their fields diligently. The walls of their farmhouses were made solidly of packed earth, pounded down between plank "molds" just as they are today. Shaw describes a typical well-to-do farmhouse:

The walls were all of mud, a couple of feet thick. A straight log of poplar supported the roof of the room, passing from wall to wall, while small
sticks were laid across from each side resting on this beam in the middle. A good coating of dry mud on the top of this formed the roof, through which a small opening was left near the door to give light. After entering, a step led up to the floor of the room, which was covered with felt carpeting. There were shelves for cups and dishes all round the room, and a large wooden bedstead at one side, with a great quantity of good bedding. The fireplace projected from the wall forming a kind of arch about four feet high; behind which the chimney went up through the wall. About a foot above the hearth were recesses on both sides, to hold the cooking pots. Several vessels for water were standing in the corner, being large calabashes, the larger half below and the small above, joined by a neck round which a rope is tied. There was another similar room in the house, also several store-rooms, and a large cattle shed. Outside the courtyard was a small shed for fowls.

This remains today a good description of the typical old Uighur farm-houses I saw on the cooperative farms of Sinkiang in the late 1950s. The main difference was that today large glass windows give ample light to the rooms. Such a farmstead represented the simple hope of the peasants. They wanted only this and peaceful work and their native enjoyments: feasts and lights, sweet sherbets cooled with mountain snow, gay festive clothes, the excitement of the bazaars and festivals, horse races and the game of ooghlak,* the singing of the glorious ballads, the chance of giving their children an education, of practicing their religion and making the holy pilgrimage to Mecca, freedom from sickness and disease. But all too seldom were these simple joys allowed them, between the greedy hand of the overlord, the intrigues of the great powers and the soaring and disastrous ambitions of petty tyrants and adventurers. Even so, in such moments of peace there was tolerance and friendship between peoples.

During these years of peace under the Ching rulers the corruption common to semi-feudal military regimes gradually increased and undermined the administration. Constant affronts to their human dignity naturally angered the people. Resentment smoldered as oppression increased and the exactions imposed by their rulers grew. Adventurers eager to take advantage of the situation were not lacking.

* A headless sheep thrown on the ground was snatched up by a horseman who tried to hold it and carry it as far as possible. The other players, who might number three score or more, did their best to wrest it from him and carry it off in their turn until awarded the victory by the umpire. Ooghlak was played in the early years of Liberation, but modern ideas have made it lose its old popularity. Serious injuries often resulted to players and damage was done to their mounts.
In 1861, the Tungans, the Hui people in China's northwestern provinces, rose in revolt. Fighting spread swiftly through Kansu Province and Djungaria, and by the next year Kashgaria was in turmoil.

The Hui distinguish themselves by wearing small white skullcaps instead of the flowered skullcaps (dabs or tubiteika) worn by Uighurs, Uzbeks or Tadjiks, but their origin is unknown. According to one account, when the Turki Uighur state in eastern Sinkiang joined the Tang empire in the eighth century, tens of thousands of Turki tribesmen migrated to live in the fertile but sparsely populated northwestern provinces of China. They intermarried with Hans of the area, and later many of them embraced the Moslem faith. Their religion set them off from the Hans among whom they lived and in the towns restricted the occupations in which they could engage. They became merchants, craftsmen, jewelers and butchers and sellers of mutton, which many Hans cannot abide to smell or eat. Later the Hui spread back westward into Djungaria and then into southern Sinkiang. Moslems, the Hui speak Han (the Chinese language).
Another account has it that when Genghiz Khan marched on North China in the beginning of the twelfth century, numerous Moslems from eastern Sinkiang were already in his service. When Mangu, Genghiz' son, was left as governor of the conquered Chinese territory, many of these Moslems stayed with him, and their descendants are the Tungan or Hui of today. Other researchers suggest that the Hui are a group of northern Chinese (Hans) who accepted Islam along with a great deal of cultural influence from the Turki Moslems near them, and particularly the Uighurs, with whom, of course, religion was no longer a bar to marriage. Still others see the Hui as originally Tungusic-Manchurian tribal groups connected with the Kitan Tartars who settled down in northwestern China, became urbanized and accepted Islam. Anthropologically, the Hui are clearly North China-Turki in type. But whatever their origins, the Hui rose in revolt against the intolerable oppression they suffered under Ching rule. It was tragic, however, that they were induced to see as their enemies not only the Manchu Ching rulers and their agents among the Han feudal landlords and mandarin elite, but the whole Han people and all non-Moslems. The Ching rulers had cunningly spread disunity among their potential opponents by granting Hans a higher social status than Hui. With this lure a large part of the Han upper class had indeed come to terms with the Ching and served them. The Hui now demanded equal status with Han and Manchu. In religious conflicts and race riots, thousands of Hans and Hui were slaughtered. This turned Han against Hui, to the gain of the Ching rulers.

News of the revolts in Kansu and Djungaria sparked a general rising in Kashgar. The people set upon the Ching officials and their henchmen. Kucha was first to revolt. Hui soldiers in the Ching army mutinied and the Ching garrisons there and in Aksu, Karashahr and Turfan were wiped out. Rasheddin, a khodja, usurped command of the rising and, proclaiming himself khan of these oases, spread his rule to Kashgar. Yarkand chose its own khan, Khazred Abdurrahman. Khotan elected Habibullah as its khan. By 1863 only Yangi-Hissar, Kashgar's citadel, and that of Yarkand remained in Ching hands. Greedy hands intervened. Kirghiz, led by a warlike chief named Sadeek, eager for adventure and booty, attacked and sacked Kashgar. While they were still dividing their spoil, they in turn were attacked. Boozhrakh Khan, an exiled scion of the Sinkiang khodjas, and his lieutenant Yakub Beg had secretly crossed the border from Kokand with a handful of followers. They routed the Kirghiz and captured Sadeek himself. As so often in the past, what had begun as a rising of the people to right their wrongs and
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establish an order that would give them peace and justice was perverted
and turned into a struggle for power and wealth between rival cliques of
feudal adventurers.

Yakub Beg skillfully exploited the khodjas to advance his own fortu-
tunes. Soon he had transformed his original force of eighty Andijani
freebooters into an army. Taking command of all the forces at Kashgar,
he tightened the siege of the citadel, Yangi-Hissar, and led all the remain-
ing troops north against Aksu. Here, acting in the name of Boozhrukh
Khan, the khodja, he defeated Rasheddin Khodja, who fled to Kucha.
Yakub Beg then wheeled south again against Yarkand. This large town
of seventy-five thousand inhabitants was held by a garrison of several
thousand men. However, the Hui contingents had mutinied, massacred
as many of the Manchu and Han detachments as they could lay their
hands upon, and joined the popular revolt. The remaining Manchu and
Han troops had shut themselves up in the citadel.

With Yakub Beg's arrival, the situation became a siege within a siege.
The Hui insurgents, however, beat off his first attack and he was forced
to withdraw. Seeing a chance to liberate themselves, the whole popula-
tion of Yarkand then joined the Hui rebels. A final assault was launched
on the Manchu and Han troops holed up in the citadel, and these were
slaughtered. The Hui rebels with reinforcements from Kucha then ad-
vanced on Kashgar to attack Yakub Beg's forces, which were still invest-
ing the citadel, Yangi-Hissar. But Yakub Beg did not wait to be attacked.
He ambushed the Hui rebels and routed them.

Frustration followed. Yarkand stubbornly defended itself. The siege of
Yangi-Hissar dragged on. To make matters worse, quarrels broke out in
his own ranks between the Andijanis, who were his special favorites,
and his Kipchak mercenaries.* Then he had a stroke of luck.

The Kashgar citadel was strongly defended. Its walls, of rammed earth
and sun-dried brick faced with clay, measured a thousand yards by eight
hundred and stood over thirty feet tall. In Yakub Beg's time they were
thirty to forty feet thick at the base, tapering to sixteen feet on the ramp-
parts. A thirty-six-foot-wide moat surrounded them. The besieging forces
had no means or experience to reduce such defense works. Nevertheless,

* The Kipchaks were a Turki-speaking nomad people, the western branch of the
Kimaks whose pastures were originally on the banks of the Irtysh. Known in Europe
as the Polovets in the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, they inhabited the central
and western parts of Kazakhstan and the southern Russian steppes. As the Russian
empire advanced its borders eastward in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many
Kipchaks moved ahead of them east and south.
after several months, supplies of water, food and ammunition began to run low and the besieged began to negotiate terms of surrender. As the discussions neared their close, the Ching amban took his ceremonial seat in the main hall and gathered his family around him. His daughters stood behind him silently. His sons served tea to the assembled official guests. It was a solemn occasion. The amban sat in full ceremonial regalia, a lacquered image, his robes of richly embroidered brocade supporting him with their folds. When he heard the triumphant shouts of “Allah Akbar!” as the enemy poured into the adjoining courtyard, he took his long-stemmed pipe from his mouth and shook out its glowing ashes onto a certain spot on the floor beside him. From here a train of gunpowder led to a barrel of explosives which he had previously prepared beneath the floor of the room. The building was blown up and he and all with him, loved ones and enemies alike, perished in the ruins.

Lest you be tempted to consider the amban a bit of a hero you should also know that at the start of the troubles when he heard that the Hui detachments of the Aksu and Kucha garrisons had mutinied, he invited the Huis under his command to Kashgar to a feast and had them massacred by the Manchu and Han detachments of his garrison.

Yakub Beg’s fortunes soared. Ho Ta-lai, the Ching military commander, who had arranged the surrender of the Yangi-Hissar garrison, accepted Islam with three thousand Manchu and Han soldiers with their wives and children and took service with Yakub Beg. At the victory festivities Yakub Beg received the honors of a conqueror. All the treasures of Kashgar were his. He took to wife Ho Ta-lai’s beautiful daughter, one of the first of a reputed three hundred spouses. But this was no time to enjoy the delights of the harem. Leaving Boozhrukh Khan, his nominal sovereign, to the pleasures of his new capital, Yakub Beg hastened with his army to reduce Maralbashi. Yarkand fell to him in 1865. The Hui leaders there had fatally weakened themselves by a fruitless attack on Khotan. Boozhrukh Khan was pushed more and more into the background. Fortunately for him, Yakub Beg finally sent him off with all honors on a pilgrimage to Mecca from which he never returned. Kattaturya, who had been appointed interim khan while Yakub Beg consolidated his power, was poisoned. At his state funeral, Yakub Beg, a fine actor, walked in front of the bier shedding copious tears. Valikhan Khodja was unceremoniously seized and executed. Four other compliant members of the khodja family were appointed viziers to Yakub Beg, positions which allowed them to wear gorgeous dress in the Persian style
but hold little power. This effectively silenced the opposition of the khodjas. By then the people of Sinkiang had had enough of them.

Yakub Beg next turned his attention to Khotan. Here ruled Habibullah, a pious mullah, teacher of Islamic law, who had recently returned from the pilgrimage to Mecca and had been elected ruler by acclaim of the people. Yakub Beg, encamped outside the city, invited him to a sumptuous dastarkhan, a ceremonial banquet, and entertained him most kindly after a respectful welcome. That night the innocent Habibullah was murdered in his sleep. His signet ring was taken from his finger and used to trick his principal officers into leaving the safety of Khotan's walls. On reaching Yakub Beg's camp, they were immediately surrounded and made prisoner. Despite this disaster, the townspeople put up a stout resistance. Even the women fought, but after a bloody struggle Khotan was crushed.*

By force of arms or treachery, Yakub Beg similarly conquered Aksu, Karashahr and Kucha. Rasheddin Khodja of Kucha was disposed of in almost the same way as was the hapless Habibullah. As Yakub Beg approached Kucha with his army, Rasheddin sent emissaries to him to say that he, Rasheddin, had freed his fatherland from the Ching invaders and had no wish to fight against brother Moslems. Yakub Beg replied that he too wished only peace. He had come with the sole object of prostrating himself before the tomb of Rasheddin's sainted ancestor Khan Hazret Maulan. Upon hearing this, Rasheddin left his walled city to embrace Yakub Beg. He was then lavishly dined and murdered.

The Hui leaders of Hami, Urumchi, Karashahr and Ili were not cowed by threat of war but were ready to compromise. Yakub Beg, who now liked to style himself Atalik Ghazee or Teacher of Champions, had to be satisfied with their nominal submission to his rule. They, in turn, hoped to have his support in the event of a Chinese reprisal. Yakub Beg was anxious to return to Kashgar. He had received a report that czarist Russian troops were building a fort on the River Naryn, on the headwaters of the Syr Darya, at a point only six days' march from Kashgar. Hurrying back to his capital, he subdued Uch Turfan in 1868.

Yakub Beg was now at the height of his power. He ruled Sinkiang from the Kunlun range 900 miles north to the Altai and 1,400 miles from east to west. With this realm of 630,000 square miles, as large as

* An account of events in Khotan was given to the Englishman Shaw by Yakub Beg's maram-bashi, Ala Akhund, whose father had been governor of Kashgar under Ching rule.
Britain, Italy, Germany and France combined, all conquered in the space of seven years, he took the title of Badaulet, the Fortunate One.

**The Fortunate One**

Yakub Beg’s father was a native of Khodjent, a Moslem holy man and healer, a wanderer until he married a woman of Pskent, a town some thirty miles from Tashkent. Soon after Yakub’s birth his parents were divorced and his father went wandering again. Yakub stayed with his mother, and when she married a local butcher he was raised by his stepfather. That is how he got his nickname of the “Butcher’s Son.”

His mother died while he was still a child, so to support himself, since he was a pretty boy with winning ways, he became a batcha, a boy who dressed in women’s clothes and danced for the public. While engaged in this occupation he took the fancy of a traveling sipahi, a soldier, a condottiere, who carried him off to Kokand. Here in court circles he quickly made a name for himself and passed from patron to patron until he reached the chambers of a certain officer who was chilim-chi, Bearer of the Pipe, in the suite of Madali, khan of Kokand. When this latest patron was slain in a palace coup, Yakub, as spoils of war, became batcha to the new hakim of Tashkent. But by this time he was growing too old for dancing. Luckily, his stepsister, the butcher’s daughter, caught the fancy of the hakim, and through her influence Yakub became first aide-de-camp to the hakim and then a pansat, or captain of five hundred men.

Yakub showed as much talent for swashbuckling as for dancing. He saw active service in the field as beg of Ak-mechet. He plundered the local Kirghiz nomads and stood up to the czarist troops which came less to help the Kirghiz than to take advantage of a fresh opportunity to attack and conquer Kokand. Though the skirmish with the Russians was unsuccessful, it afforded valuable experience of modern warfare.

With such a schooling in the ways of the bazaar, in court intrigue and war, Yakub Beg became a person of some note in the troubled times that now beset the Kokand khanate. At the very moment that Alim Kool, the new ruler of Kokand, was planning to have him murdered as a dangerous member of the opposition, a message arrived from Sadwik Beg, hakim of Kashgar, requesting that Boozhrukh Khan be sent back to Kashgar from his Kokand exile to take advantage of the Hui rising against the Ching. Alim Kool was only too glad of this opportunity to get rid of Yakub Beg. He attached him as lashkar-bashi, or commander of troops, to Boozhrukh
Khan, who was no fighter, and packed the two of them off to Kashgar with a handful of followers. This is how Yakub Beg found himself so opportunely before the walls of Kashgar and pondering the brilliant prospect of making himself master of Turkestan.

Sadwik Beg was by no means as selfless as he seemed in inviting Boozhrukh Khan to Kashgar. He hoped to use the prestige of the khodjas to seize power himself. But he reckoned without Yakub Beg. This astute intriguer had the ear of Boozhrukh Khan, pandered to his desires, outwitted his rival and forced Sadwik Beg to flee for his life.

The Badaulet has been described as an intelligent man with a phenomenal memory, energetic, cunning and, when he wished, charming. He spoke little and thereby gained a reputation for wisdom and learning. His formal education was superficial, but, a true courtier, he could quote the Koran and the Persian poets to good effect. As a former dancer, proud of his body, he lived simply and did not eat or drink to excess. His only personal luxury seems to have been his inordinately large harem. Six wives accompanied him wherever he went. When supervising the building of fortifications he was not above helping with manual labor. He lied, murdered and permitted, indeed ordered, the most atrocious brutalities, but he insisted on punctilious observance of the ceremonies of religion. The English agent Shaw described an incident in which a Hindu, surprised by a joke into saying: “I am a Mussulman!” was nearly killed when he retracted. Shaw adds: “If a man as much as says ‘Yahooda!’ (My God!) he is considered to be converted to Islam and has to choose between continued adherence to Islam or death.” Shaw, whose job it was to win over Yakub Beg to the British side, naturally had every interest in presenting him in as favorable a light as possible, yet he reports a Pathan officer in his service as saying that when the Atalik thought his men were getting too independent, he would “cut a few throats” and drop the bodies about here and there “as a lesson to others.” Shaw admits that Yakub Beg executed many Hans and Manchus, civilians as well as soldiers, who refused to embrace Islam.

The Badaulet was a man of his time and no more. In the traditional style of the Central Asian monarch he would sit at the gate of his capital to administer justice or receive his subjects’ petitions. He also knew how to mount occasions of state. Shaw gives the following description of an audience with him.

Entering the gateway, we passed through several large quadrangles whose sides were lined with rank upon rank of brilliantly attired guards, all sitting in solemn silence so that they seemed to form part of the architecture of the
buildings... entire rows of these men were clad in silken robes and many seemed to be of high rank judging from the richness of their equipments. The numbers, the solemn stillness and the gorgeous coloring gave a sort of unreality to this assemblage of thousands.... Yet not far from this same place, by the side of the road, a man could be seen lying with his throat cut, a mat thrown over him, with his clothes and the ground beneath him soaked red with blood, punished for some crime, stealing perhaps or offending against some religious practice, as a grim warning to others.

Man of the dance that he was, Yakub Beg, the former batcha, knew how to create a theatrical mise-en-scene to impress foreign visitors, but he was not inventive in either military affairs or statecraft. His bizarre treacheries were not original but the stock in trade of medieval tyrants. His soldiers were fancifully garbed but not equipped for modern war. Red-gowned privates were led by captains who today would be looked upon as wearing Hollywood costumes from a version of Aladdin and His Wonderful Lamp. They wore a long crimson robe or caftan, reaching well below the knees, trimmed with black at the edges and around the slits at the sides. Their wide trousers were tucked into boots. On their heads were conical caps of blue cloth with a red pompon. A curved scimitar hung from a belt crowded with pouches and flasks of food, drink and charges for those few who carried muskets. Only a few breechloaders were in use in the army in those days.

In the style of the times, the Badaulet placed officials whom he believed devoted to himself at the head of the various circles. The governors of Aksu, Kashgar, Yangi-Hissar, Yarkand, Posgam, Guma and Sanju were all fellow Andijanis, and so was the Yarkand vizier. These and other governors were obliged to furnish him with a certain quota of troops and any sums he might demand from them from time to time in emergencies. Shaw heard that the beg of Khotan had arrived in Kashgar to pay court to the Badaulet. Rumor had it that he was to be superseded in his post, so he had brought a “peace offering” to the Badaulet consisting of seventy camel loads of presents together with two pack horses carrying silver bullion and a special present of thirty-seven picked mounts and fourteen racing camels. By such means did officials prove their loyalty and keep their posts.

At first Yakub Beg's rule was relatively light as far as taxes were concerned, but as his ambitions and troubles grew and his governors and officials became more corrupt, the demands on the people steadily increased. Toward the end, while the treasure chests of the rulers were full, his troops were badly paid, badly armed and hungry. The people
were cruelly oppressed by the tax gatherers and nursed a sullen hatred. By the end of his seventeen-year rule, war, pillage, pestilence and starvation had halved the population of some oases.

The Badaulet’s reign was a troubled one. In the nature of things, as soon as his personal grip failed, all was lost. He was the focal point not only of internal stresses but of pulls and pressures exerted by rival imperialist groups that could crush him like a nut in the jaws of a nutcracker. He was threatened not only by a resurgent Chinese power from the east but by the British from the south and the Russians from the west.

Following the defeat of the Indian mutiny caused in part by maladministration of the East India Company, the British Crown had established direct rule over the Indian empire in 1858. The viceroy’s appointment consolidated the British grip on India and then began to press on its neighbors to the northwest, north and northeast in the never-ending search for more “security.” Intervention against Afghanistan began with the First Afghan War of 1839.

In the Second Afghan War in 1878, British troops occupied its capital, Kabul. In 1786–87, the Englishman Captain Younghusband surveyed the area from Manchuria through Mongolia to Sinkiang. The first British expedition to Tibet was in 1774. Tibet was then a territory of China inhabited by over a million people ruled by slaveowning feudal nobles and a Buddhist lama theocracy. Trading rights were demanded and secured. In 1865, E. H. Johnson, an officer of the Indian Survey Service, visited Khotan while exploring the Karakoram passes and Aksai Chin, the Stone Desert, across which lay the ancient caravan route between Sinkiang and Tibet. In a piece of “cartographic aggression,” Johnson “annexed” this desolate plateau to Kashmir, whose ruler he served. His maps were later used by the Nehru government after India achieved its independence as “evidence” for its claim to sovereignty over Aksai Chin.

Crossing the passes from India, the British agent Shaw appeared in Kashgar in 1868. His mission was to incite Yakub Beg against the Chinese and the Russians—no very difficult task—and promise him support. He was followed by two more British missions under Forsyth in 1870 and 1873. These brought Yakub Beg a much needed supply of modern weapons. On his part the Badaulet attempted to strengthen his position by sending embassies to the viceroy of India and to Turkey. Syed Yakub Khan, the Badaulet’s nephew, arrived in London as his envoy in 1871. From Turkey, then a British satellite, Yakub Beg received three military instructors and fresh consignments of weapons transported through India.

The British had now assigned Yakub Beg’s Kashgaria the role of buffer
state between their Indian territories and the expanding czarist Russian domains in Central Asia, but they kept open their second option of wholesale annexation to counter the threat of Russian expansion. They busily surveyed and mapped possible routes for their advance, seeking particularly an "artillery pass" over the Himalayas. Hayward, an agent who closely followed Shaw, had the task of discovering the best route from India into Kashgaria and wherever he went mapped trails, pastures and watering places. Reports of rich gold deposits near Yarkand and Khotan heightened the excitement of traveling these "unknown" lands.

Keeping a wary eye on the British, the czarist Russian army advanced steadily into Western Turkestan. In 1868, a Russian mission under Captain Reintal arrived in Kashgar, to be followed in 1872 by that of Baron Kaulbars, a captain on the general staff. A second Reintal mission arrived in 1875, and he was followed by Captain Kuropatkin in May 1876. In that year the imperial Russian army under General Skobelev completed the conquest of the khanate of Kokand and established posts on the Pamirs on the western border of Kashgaria. As a soldier in the service of Kokand, Yakub Beg had already fought against that army and he realized that if he were to repulse it he would need powerful allies. The Turks, the British? He could expect no help from China.

These missions were sometimes circumspect about their intentions, but most hardly bothered to hide the fact that they were collecting information about everything that might come in useful for future military operations. Some of these men were highly competent and have left valuable accounts of their researches. Colonel Prejevalsky, the noted Russian ornithologist and traveler, made a detailed study of the road from Kuldja across the Tienshan to Lob Nor and the Altyn Tagh to Tibet.* Kuropatkin made no secret of his military intentions. He took a high tone. The Russian army was just six days away. He wrote:

In my conference with the Badaulet I considered it possible to assume a tone somewhat different to that which the Russian embassies to Kashgaria prior to mine had adopted. In addition to the open declaration that we were exploring his country, I spoke to Yakub Beg of the necessity of "subjecting himself to the will of Monsieur, the Governor-General of Turkestan," and I requested him to surrender without any indemnification on our part several posts which, in the opinion of Yakub Beg, had a very important military significance."

* Colonel N. Prejevalsky, From Kuldja Across the Tienshan to Lob Nor (London: Sampson Low, 1879).
The Russian imperialists were blackmailing Yakub Beg exactly as they had blackmailed the Djungar leader Tsewang Rabdan fifty-six years previously.

The Englishman Shaw, for his part, besides introducing modern British rifles, poured subtle poison into the ears of the rulers of Kashgaria: “Agreeing that the Khatai (Chinese) are a bad race,” he said to the Shaghawal (Grand Vizier) that England had had three wars with them, “chiefly caused by their faithlessness...” He added: “They are poor hands at fighting. When we first fought with them they used to paint their faces and make themselves hideous, wearing two swords apiece, and yelling frantically to try and frighten us, but as soon as our guns opened, they could not stand fire, but ran away.”

German imperialism was also by then on the scene but with considerably less success. Adolphus Schlagintweit arrived in Kashgar in 1857 in the midst of the invasion led by Valikhan Turya. They met in front of the besieged Chinese citadel of Yangi-Hissar. Schlagintweit asked how long the siege had lasted. Valikhan replied: “Three months.”

“Oh,” exclaimed Schlagintweit with contempt. “My countrymen would take that place in three days. There is no difficulty at all!”

“Indeed!” rejoined the bloodthirsty khodja, and turning around gave orders there and then to take the German away and cut his throat. Schlagintweit was then killed on the banks of the Kashgar River, where Valikhan was building his pyramid of skulls.

In his brief moment of glory Yakub Beg fought desperately to maintain himself at this pivot of power. But could such an isolated feudal state as Kashgaria be established and maintained at this time of history? Room for maneuver was getting steadily smaller as the world was parceled out among the great imperialist powers. Yakub Beg’s ill-paid conscripts were no match for their rifles. As Schlagintweit had boasted, modern cannon could indeed make short work of the earthen battlements around Kashgar or Khotan. The Badaulet was saved for the moment only because there was an uneasy truce between the powers. Czarist Russia was consolidating its hold on Kokand and preparing the way for a further advance into Kashgaria. Meanwhile it was extending its control over the Kirghiz and Kipchak nomads on the Pamir ranges bordering Ferghana. The nomads evaded the Russian yoke by retreating farther and farther into the fastnesses of the Pamirs and then into the Tienshan in Djungaria. Czarist strategists turned their attention to Djungaria. They warned that
any British move into Kashgaria would be countered by annexation of the Ili (Kuldja) tract.

Britain, on its part, made it clear that while it would tolerate a weak buffer state under Yakub Beg in Kashgaria (on the analogy of Afghanistan, to the southwest) or even a restoration of Chinese rule there—which would be difficult to contest in international law—any overt move by the czarist army into Kashgaria or Dzungaria would be met by immediate countermeasures.

While Yakub Beg endeavored to play off these two powers one against the other, he had more immediate difficulties on his hands. The Hui leaders who controlled Ili, Urumchi and Hami were by no means satisfied with the promise of subservience and loyalty they had given Yakub Beg. Suspecting his weakness, as soon as his troops had withdrawn, they raided Karashahr and plundered Korla. After defeating the detachment sent against them by Yakub Beg, they attacked and pillaged Kucha. Yakub Beg now advanced against them with troops under his own command and routed them. The Hui leaders fled. In their retreat they sacked Korla for the second time, taking cattle and abducting women.

Yakub Beg's luck still held. The nomad population of the Korla Circle included several thousand Kalmucks of the Torgut (Eleuth) and Khashot tribes. In alliance with the Hui they had pillaged the settled Uighur population of Karashahr and seized the fertile area of the Haidwin Kul valley and the pastures around Lake Bagratch Kul. Then, fearing Yakub Beg's vengeance following the rout of the Hui, they switched sides. Led by their ruler, a woman of the Torgut tribe, they came to him with a thousand camels, a thousand horses, five hundred sheep and a store of silver as tribute and offered their allegiance. Yakub Beg accepted their submission and the aid of their army of several thousand men armed with bows and arrows and some rifles. He promised to respect their religion. They were Buddhists. Not long afterward, however, the Kalmucks quarreled with the local hakim appointed by Yakub Beg and again they rose in revolt, plundering unhappy Korla once again before fleeing to the Ili Valley beyond the reach of the Badaulut.

Yakub Beg mobilized an army of fifteen thousand men and advanced to restore the situation. The nomads retreated, but it can be imagined what havoc such large and largely undisciplined forces caused in the already stricken oases through which they passed. Within a few years, in 1862, a fresh expedition had to be sent to subdue Urumchi. This time Yakub Beg sent his son Beg Kuli Beg. He executed his task with great brutality, slaughtering hundreds of people, innocent and guilty alike.
There were a few years of peace. Attempting to consolidate his rule, the Badaulet received embassies from the Russians and the British and sent missions of his own in a feverish round of intrigues. Then the armies of the Ching appeared on his eastern horizon.

The Han Marquis Tso Tsung-tang had won imperial commendation by crushing the Taiping revolution in 1864. In recognition of his services, he was appointed governor of Shensi and Kansu provinces, and by 1873 he had succeeded in quelling the Hui insurgencies in the northwest. Now, at the age of sixty-five, he submitted a memorial to the Ching court with a plan for the pacification of Chinese Turkestan. It was accepted, and he immediately sent out advance parties to sow crops and lay in fodder for his army. In early 1876, he marched to subdue Hami, Kuchengtze, Manass and Urumchi in a swift advance. In March, he captured Karashahr, and in April, Turfan. Yakub Beg's power began to crumble. The people hated him. His troops were in poor condition. One soldier interviewed by Kuropatkin had served for five years, and in all that time had received only two cloth coats and a portion of his promised pay. He had never got full rations. In Turfan where he was stationed, he said, soldiers had sometimes to beg for alms. Shaw tells of a trooper who was executed for selling his ramrod. Such men, unwilling conscripts, had no reason to fight for their ruler and deserted in thousands. The Badaulet's own close adherents began to desert him. The first to flee were those Andijani soldiers of fortune in whom he had placed his main trust. At the first sign of the impending debacle they made off with the loot they had stolen. His treasurer decamped with all the ready cash he held. Sabotage destroyed a key arsenal and food dumps near the front. Yakub Beg's taifoor cannons—the only weapons that gave him technical superiority over his enemy—were serviced by the Hans and Manchus he had forcibly converted to Islam. They naturally proved to be unreliable when commanded to fight against their compatriots in the Ching army.

The Chinese field commanders led by Liu Chin-tang played their cards well. They received with dignity those who surrendered and gave them posts in the towns taken from Yakub Beg. They treated prisoners with the same leniency, explaining that the real enemies of the people were the foreign adventurers from Andijan, Ferghana and Tashkent, the henchmen of Yakub Beg who had led people astray. When these prisoners were released and sent to their homes they were stupidly arrested on Yakub Beg's orders and many of them were executed. When this news
spread it fanned the flames of hatred that now burned all around him. The end came swiftly. In a fit of anger and despair in May 1877 he killed his secretary in an altercation and set upon his new treasurer. In the struggle that ensued he received a blow on the head and died the next morning.

A struggle for power immediately began between his sons and underlings. Beg Kuli Beg murdered his younger brother. As the opposing factions weakened each other in fratricidal strife, the Chinese armies advanced relentlessly over the desert roads. Kashgar fell in January 1878. In that year Chinese rule was restored over the whole of the area of Kashgaria and Djungaria. Beg Kuli Beg fled over the Pamirs into Russian territory. Under the 1851 Treaty of Ili, the Russians had got the right to establish consulates and duty-free trade at Ili and Tacheng. In 1871, the Ili Tract was occupied by the Russian czarist forces as a countermove to British support for Yakub Beg. Under the Treaty of St. Petersburg, they withdrew from most of it in 1881 after receiving an indemnity of nine million rubles. To place a buffer between themselves, Russia and England in 1895 agreed to leave Afghanistan alone and even stretch out its territory to the east to include the Wakhan and bring its eastern border in a thin wedge right up to China's westernmost border.

In 1884, the Ching government reorganized Chinese Turkestan into the province of Hsin Kiang (Sinkiang or the New Dominion) and the three areas of Ili, Altai and Tacheng, and centralized their administration under Liu Chin-tang as governor with his capital in Urumchi. Peace again reigned. But soon new troubles began. The Ching government ordered Sinkiang to pay part of the huge indemnity demanded by the eight interventionist powers which had been instrumental in suppressing the Yi Ho Tuan (Boxers') Uprising in 1901.
PART THREE

Modern Times
The decline, fall and supersession of the Manchu Ching dynasty did not follow the traditional pattern of dynastic change. New social forces were active inside and outside China, and these broke the recurrent cycle of dynastic rise-growth-decay-new dynastic rise that had characterized 2,000 years of Chinese history. The revolutionaries who ended the Ching dynasty in 1911 proclaimed a republic and thwarted the attempt to establish a new dynasty.

In the world outside the Middle Kingdom, capitalism had evolved rapidly into a worldwide system of imperialisms, and by the end of the nineteenth century, most of the world was divided between the great imperialist powers. Great Britain had seized India, Burma, Ceylon and large areas of Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Caribbean islands and Central and Latin America. It controlled the great dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. It held strategic bases around the world: Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Singapore, Hongkong, Wei-hai-wei and in the Pacific. From India it was probing into Tibet and Central Asia. From its concessions in China at Shanghai, Kiukiang,
Hankow and Wanhsien on the Yangtze River, and from Canton and Tientsin and other treaty ports, it was probing and staking claim to a new empire in China. It regarded the rich Yangtze Valley with its hundred million people as its “sphere of influence.” But forces were already at work that would shatter that and other imperial dreams by the middle of the next century.

The same economic imperatives spurred the Japanese imperialists. In 1879 they seized the Liu-chiu Islands. In 1895, having sunk the new Chinese fleet, they demanded and received a huge indemnity of nearly £40 million sterling; they occupied Taiwan and, in 1910, Korea, a Chinese tributary state, in preparation for the projected conquest of Manchuria and then all China. France seized Indo-China, a tributary state of China, and was probing into southwestern China’s Yunnan Province. It too had concessions in China’s great ports and at Kwangchowan. Germany, though a latecomer among the imperialists, had established itself in Tsingtao with a plan to annex Shantung Province. Czarist Russia was pressing in on China’s northeast and northwest. By 1860 it had ripped off over 300,000 square miles of territory on the northern bank of the Amur River, east of the Ussuri River and east of Lake Balkhash. Relations with Sinkiang were defined in 1881 by the Treaty of St. Petersburg, but Russia clearly regarded the forced withdrawal from the Ili area as only a temporary measure to be reversed as soon as opportunity arose. It was poised on the ramparts of the Pamirs, ready to descend into southern Sinkiang. Only Chinese and British power restrained it. Its unbridled attempt to seize all Manchuria in 1900 led directly to the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 and its ignominious defeat by Japan. This in turn, together with the hardships caused the people in general by over-ambitious imperialistic adventures, contributed to the 1905 and 1917 revolutions which overthrew czarism.

The United States of America, with its own specific interests, advocated the Open Door Policy for China. By virtue of this and the “most favored nation” clause which it inserted into its treaties with China, it automatically received its share of the privileges other nations wrung out of China.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, China was a prime object of imperialist expansion. Strategists around the world openly discussed its final dismemberment. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the question seemed to be not if but when it would be carved up. All that saved it from this dismemberment was rivalry among the imperialist powers themselves and, even more, that backlash to national oppression
the growing nationalist and anti-imperialist movement among the peoples of China. The imperialist powers still sought to use the Ching government as a temporary means of holding the Chinese people in subjection until the country would be divided up. Only Japan dreamed of seizing it all.

In the nineteenth century the Turkish Ottoman empire was the “Sick Man of Asia.” France seized Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881. Under the Berlin Agreement of 1878, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Romania broke away from it. Britain took Cyprus. Russia took Kars-Ardahan. In the twentieth century, China was dubbed the “Sick Man of Asia.”

1911—China's Modern Revolution

The traditional ingredients of dynastic revolution were, of course, also inherent in the situation. As the central power waned, the centripetal forces of the feudal empire grew stronger. Powerful provincial governors and military leaders representing regional interests jockeyed to seize power and fix a new dynastic yoke on the people. In 1911, chief among these military leaders was Yuan Shih-kai, viceroy of Hopei Province, surrounding the capital, and the man entrusted by the Ching to build its modern new army.

But profound economic and social changes had taken place in China since the 1840s. A capitalist middle class of merchants and industrial entrepreneurs had sprung up. This development had been twice aborted in Chinese history in Sung and Ming times. But now the treaty ports became centers of capitalist development fostered by Western merchants and businessmen, and a Chinese bourgeoisie found shelter here to grow. As they increased in numbers and influence, they became more and more irked by the restrictions put on their activities by the Manchu government and more and more eager for a government representing their interests and able to aid and support them in competition with the foreigners who controlled much of China’s economy. They began to agitate for needed reforms to modernize China, and particularly agrarian reform to lighten the burden imposed by the feudal landlords on the peasants, give a boost to farm production and so create a great domestic market for native capitalist enterprise. Since Manchus had no need to go in for business, this new Chinese bourgeoisie was mainly Han and nationalist, anti-Manchu and anti-imperialist.

At the same time, a working class was created in the new factories, mines and transport and communication enterprises built by these mod-
ern middle-class entrepreneurs. During the many years it took for this working class to become conscious of its own interests, the revolutionary cause was led by the new middle class. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a Kwangtung physician who had received his education in Hawaii and Hongkong, became the leader of the middle-class revolutionaries and formed the Tung Men Hui (Chinese Revolutionary League), a revolutionary nationalist and democratic republican organization.

Its power weakened by the Taiping and Yi Ho Tuan uprisings, its prestige shattered and its treasury bankrupted by defeats and indemnities imposed on it by the imperialists, the Ching dynasty was finally overthrown in 1911 by Sun Yat-sen's followers. A republic was proclaimed.

The Tung Men Hui was a coalition of revolutionary forces representing the rising national bourgeoisie, the reformists among the mandarin officials and literati, the more enlightened landlord families and petty bourgeoisie and modern intellectuals. Tragically, however, leadership of the new republic almost immediately passed into the hands of the conservatives. Threatening civil war, Yuan Shih-kai forced the revolutionaries led by Dr. Sun to turn power over to him as "the lesser danger." Yuan established a military dictatorship. Parliament was suborned (part of it withdrew to the south, where eventually a new opposition republican government was established) and Yuan actually proclaimed himself emperor but died soon after in 1916 as a general uprising flared up against him. His clique of successor warlords and militarists took over. The so-called Northern Warlords who controlled Peking and the central government were puppets of either Britain or Japan. Wu Pei-fu was the British choice; Tuan Chi-jui, the Japanese. Other warlords, clients of the foreign powers, seized various parts of the country, turning them into small personal kingdoms. Chang Tso-lin took the northeast; Yen Hsi-shan, Shansi; Chang Chung-chan, Shantung; Sun Chuang-fan, Shanghai; Yang Tsen-tsin, Sinkiang. The bourgeois revolution of 1911 ended in betrayal, defeat and chaos.

Sun Yat-sen and his followers, however, continued the revolutionary struggle. They formed the Kuomintang Party as a successor to the Tung Men Hui to create an independent Chinese republic with a parliamentary democracy.

Revolutionary China in the years 1917 to 1927 was a political hot-house. Political forces which in other countries took decades to evolve matured here in years. Chinese industry developed rapidly while the great powers were preoccupied with World War I. The working class grew fast in numbers and organization. In 1917 China got news of the
Russian socialist October revolution. Marxist ideas spread rapidly among the young intellectuals. The young Mao Tse-tung was then working and studying at Peking University. In 1919 there was a great outburst of national feeling, demonstrations and strikes against Japanese encroachments. The Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921 by a dozen delegates including older Marxists like Li Ta-chao and young men like Mao Tse-tung and Chen Tan-chiu. Within months it numbered thousands. Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang also evolved rapidly from a bourgeois party of an orthodox type into an anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolutionary party with a well-defined socialist economic, political and social program—Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles of nationalism, democracy and socialism. While looking forward to creation of a communist society in the distant future, the Communist Party at that stage also supported the Three Principles, so the two parties formed a united-front government in Canton.

Shortly after Dr. Sun's death in 1925, the Canton government placed its revolutionary army under the command of a young follower of Dr. Sun, Chiang Kai-shek, and launched the Northern Expedition to rid the country of the warlords and their imperialist backers. Rousing the peasants as it advanced, the Kuomintang swiftly reached the Yangtze River at Wuhan, where the new temporary capital was set up, and then moved against Shanghai. At this juncture tragedy overtook it.

The Kuomintang also had its right wing. This represented the compradors, the conservative part of the capitalist middle class connected with foreign imperialist firms and conservative elements closely linked by birth or economic interest with the feudal landlords. Such men were quickly alarmed when revolutionary ideas began to filter down to the masses, the working class and peasants, who impatiently demanded swift and radical measures to end their intolerable sufferings and, in their anger, tended to "go too far." As the revolution spread to new regions and brought more and more of the masses into action, the essentially anti-populist reactionaries searched desperately for a leader to bridle the revolution. They thought they had found him in the person of Chiang Kai-shek.

The foreign imperialists were also anxious to curb the revolution, which in 1927 had already regained the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang. They too wooed Chiang Kai-shek as the revolutionary armies approached Shanghai, China's greatest industrial and commercial center and the biggest concentration of foreign capital in the Orient. The deal between the Kuomintang right wing, the foreign powers and Chiang
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was consummated in the spring of 1927. Chiang repudiated the Wuhan government and established a separatist government in Nanking, a dictatorship backed by the foreign imperialists. In April, he began a massacre of revolutionaries in Shanghai and other cities. The Kuomintang democrats were dispersed and the Communist Party forced underground. With indomitable courage, however, the Communist leaders Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, Chen Yi and others set to work building revolutionary bases in the countryside, calling on the peasants to carry out the agrarian revolution, rallying the people to their side.

Yang Tsen-tsin, Despot of Sinkiang

While these events were taking place inside the Wall, the course of history in Sinkiang was somewhat different. The 1911 revolution had immediate repercussions there. In December of that year, an uprising against the Ching started in Urumchi, the capital, led by junior officers and soldiers, members of the Han secret society Keh Lao Hui (Elder Brothers' Society), which had long struggled against the Manchu invaders. This was speedily suppressed by the Ching governor, but it was followed within a month by a new uprising in Ili led by the Chin Chih Hui, another revolutionary organization which, working in close collaboration with the Keh Lao Hui, succeeded in uniting people of the various nationalities in the area—Hans, Uighurs and Kazakhs, Mongols and Tartars—for joint action against the Ching regime, their common oppressor. The Ili authorities were overthrown and a provisional revolutionary government established.

Such a revolt could succeed only if the masses of the people, the peasants and herdsmen, rallied to it in the various oases and so dispersed the forces of the oppressors. But the leaders of the revolt, mostly representatives of the merchant class, were by no means anxious to rouse the masses. They were mainly ambitious to get a share of political power by forcing a deal with the Ching rulers. The governor fled. In this crisis, the conservatives found a savior in a high Ching official named Yang Tsen-tsin, Urumchi's commissioner of judicial affairs and former amban (circuit commissioner) of Aksu. He was in touch with Yuan Shih-kai, who had come to power in Peking, and in 1912 a Peking decree appointed Yang governor of Sinkiang.

He was an able tyrant and suppressed the revolutionaries with an iron hand. Risings in Karashahr, Kucha, Aksu, Kashgar, Hami and Turfan were not well coordinated, and Yang Tsen-tsin crushed them
The Warlords

one after another. Inside the Wall, Yang Tsen-tsin's patron Yuan Shih-kai had also triumphed.

Governor Yang was a typical product of Yuan Shih-kai's militarist rule. From 1912 to 1928, while the rest of China was undergoing tumultuous changes, he preserved the old order in Sinkiang almost unchanged. At the base of the social pyramid were the peasants and herdsmen, constituting more than 90 percent of the population. Above them were their oppressors, the feudal landlords, owners of large herds and government officials.

Yang Tsen-tsin tried to hold back the hand of time in Sinkiang by keeping the people in subjection and completely isolating the territory from the influence of revolutionary movements inside the Wall and outside the borders of China.

After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the May Fourth Movement of 1919 in China (when students and workers joined forces to protest betrayal of the country by the Peking warlords) and the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, he was more than ever determined to exclude the outside world from his domain. Not only foreign books and periodicals but even the press of the rest of China was banned in Sinkiang. The deserts to the east were an effective barrier. The strictest control was exercised over people attempting to cross from Anhsi to Hami along the old Silk Road.

The October Revolution and establishment of the Soviet Union in 1917 ended czarist Russian imperialism. In its July 25, 1919, declaration to the Chinese people and September 27, 1920, statement, the Soviet government under Lenin announced the basic principles of its foreign policy in relation to China: a policy of friendship and equality and repudiation of all privileges extorted from China by the czarist regime. On this basis even Governor Yang was induced to sign a trade agreement with the USSR in 1920. This arranged for the setting up of two Chinese commercial and consular agencies in the USSR and of Soviet agencies in Sinkiang on a reciprocal basis, and the import of Soviet light industrial goods in exchange for Sinkiang products, mainly hides and furs. The then Peking government (headed by the northern warlord clique) approved this agreement and itself recognized the USSR in May 1924. But even this limited intercourse across the border—though it clearly benefited the people—was soon considered too dangerous by Governor Yang. So fearful was he of revolutionary ideas that he preferred to go without needed imports. He repudiated the trade
agreement in 1922. No Soviet Russians were allowed to enter Sinkiang, but in 1920–21 several thousand White Russian émigrés were allowed to cross the border and settle in Sinkiang, mainly in its northern areas, in Ili and Urumchi, then called Tihwa. A new trade agreement restoring trade was negotiated only in 1924. By that time it had become urgently necessary to replenish stocks of basic industrial goods. Only rare caravans had brought goods to Sinkiang from within the Wall, where civil war was constant.

For a time under Governor Yang, Sinkiang became an extraordinary backwater, cut off from the modern world. Sir Francis Younghusband, the man who brought British influence into Tibet, wrote in 1887 that the czarist consul-general was the dominant foreign representative in Sinkiang and that there was not a single English resident there. In 1922 it was the British consul-general who was the most influential European in Kashgaria.

Even in 1922 there were no trucks or cars in the region. Transport was medieval—by donkey, horse or camel. It took five months to reach Kashgar from Peking. There were still no bookshops in 1926, no newspapers, no cinemas, no telephones, not a mile of railway or even paved roadway, no schools other than those attached to the mosques, which taught only reading, writing and the Koran, and those maintained privately by rich citizens or officials. Opium was “forbidden,” but it was the curse of the land, slowly poisoning its people. Immured behind its mountains and deserts, lying the farthest of any country from the open sea, Sinkiang was living in the Middle Ages, and Yang did all he could to preserve this anachronism.

And yet, in contrast to the bloody days of Yakub Beg, the peasants and herdsmen did at least enjoy a measure of peace, though oppression was hard. Brigandage on the roads had declined. While rents remained a heavy burden, government taxes were more or less fixed. Taxes on internal trade were farmed out to Uighur taxgatherers, who usually dared not go too far in their exactions for fear of popular vengeance. The opening up of new land was actually encouraged, and this gave a safety valve. A settler on newly opened land paid no taxes for three years and for the next three paid half rates. Once again cultivation expanded in the oases and the population increased. Sinkiang's soil responds readily to irrigation and care by a good farmer. Slowly the land recovered from the devastation of Yakub Beg's last years. Once again the markets were colorful with fruit and produce. Manufactured goods came over the borders from the Soviet Union and India.
Travelers like the Englishman Aurel Stein have painted a somewhat idyllic picture of Sinkiang under Governor Yang. It is a one-sided picture, because such travelers received extraordinary privileges from Governor Yang while they mapped out the country for their employers. The "law and order" they describe was the law and order of a backward feudal regime. Law for Yang was his personal judgment as a mandarin Confucianist. He presided himself over his court to hear important cases. His face immobile and impassive, he would listen to the evidence collected and presented by his yamen runners* and agents. He fanned himself. At the end of the hearing he would deliver the verdict and sentence. If he snapped the fan shut suddenly without a word, that was a sentence of death, and the unhappy wretch before the court would be rushed out and publicly beheaded.

One ornament of Governor Yang's regime was General Ma, commander of troops in the southwest in Khotan and Kashgar. Ma robbed, blackmailed and mutilated people to enrich himself. He claimed all local mineral wealth and used his power to acquire and run coal and copper mines, jade workshops and carpet factories. In his jade workshop the craftsmen were conscripted and forced to live like slaves on the premises. He had some shale-oil workings that produced kerosene, which everybody needed, but also paraffin wax, which only the cobblers needed. Ma got around this lack of demand by forcing each shopkeeper in Kashgar to buy a monthly quota whether he wanted it or not. Cobblers were forced to take a double quota. When their spokesman humbly petitioned that the system of forced sales of wax should end because they were overstocked, he was beaten to death. His widow was fined so heavily that she had to sell her house to pay the fine.

Such iniquities finally resulted in an order of dismissal from Urumchi, but General Ma refused to surrender his seals of office. He mobilized his troops to resist the governor and at the same time tried to ingratiate himself with the people by pretending that he had not known what was happening but was misled by evil men. He cut off the fingers and toes of hated taxgatherers and exposed their mutilated bodies to the public. When Governor Yang's troops came down from the north to enforce the dismissal order, Ma's half-starved, tin-pot army was defeated without difficulty, and he himself was shot where he had had so many others put to death or tortured. People were released from his jails; some did not even know why they had been put there. The Khotan jade carvers who

* Lower officials of the Yamen or government office.
had been kept as virtual serfs in his Kashgar jade factory were allowed to return home.

**Little Chin Takes Over**

After seventeen years' rule, fate finally overtook Governor Yang. He was assassinated by revolutionaries on July 7, 1928, only a month after he had raised the Kuomintang flag over Urumchi. (See p. 248.) In the resulting confusion, however, Chin Shu-jen, chief of his political (intelligence) department, who, it seems, knew of the assassination plot, seized power and bloodily suppressed the revolutionary movement. In trying to continue his late boss' autocratic rule, however, Chin lacked the talents even of that great scoundrel. As the central power weakened, official corruption and oppression of the people increased. For the next six years Sinkiang was in constant turmoil. Within five years Chin was fleeing over the backwall of his yamen.

Unlike Governor Yang, Little Chin, as he was nicknamed, was a man of humble origins, an immigrant from Kansu Province, where he had once worked for Yang. He was greedy for money. He appointed his two worthless brothers to high military and civilian posts and gave his batman command of a brigade. Taxes were raised to the maximum and his taxgatherers harried all classes. His troops robbed and preyed on the people. He added a new finesse to extortion by printing more and more banknotes without backing. They soon lost their value, but in the meantime he reaped a quick return by using them to buy up all manner of goods, which he sold later for gold or silver.

Gold and silver disappeared from the markets. Then Chin made trade in furs and wool, Sinkiang's main exports, a state monopoly under his personal control. Such brazen official thievery led naturally to increasing contempt for "law and order." Official lawbreaking and corruption eroded all levels of government. There was indeed no way to exist without breaking the law. Ideas of insurrection spread swiftly among the people. To counteract them, Chin's spies and provocateurs were everywhere. To prevent word of his misrule from getting out, he sealed Sinkiang's borders off from the rest of China. Even inside Sinkiang travelers needed a passport signed by him personally, an additional source of revenue.

To strengthen his rule and open up fresh fields for plunder, Chin abolished the centuries-old Hami khanate and in 1931 incorporated it into the ordinary provincial system of officials appointed by himself.
The Hami feudal nobility, led by Khodja Niaz, were affronted by this attack on their privileges, and falling for the bait of help from German and Japanese sources, they plotted revenge. At this moment an event took place that further exacerbated feeling among the Hami populace. Crowds of peasants fleeing from famine in Kansu had arrived in the Hami oasis after making the hazardous desert crossing from Anhsi. Chin Shu-jen ordered Uighur farmers to vacate their land in favor of his fellow provincials and open up new land and irrigation channels on the uncultivated fringes of the oasis. The Uighur farmers were outraged. There was no organized revolutionary party there able to lead the people's just resentment into constructive revolutionary channels, and it burst out into spontaneous racist attacks on the unfortunate Han refugees. A Han taxgatherer, one of Chin Shu-jen's creatures, stirred up further passions by assaulting a Moslem Turki woman. A throng of Uighurs fell upon him and killed him and then went on to vent their anger again on the Kansu refugees.

Instead of being directed against the real evil, the oppressors of the people, the rising exploded indiscriminately against all Hans, who at that time formed about 10 percent of Sinkiang's population. Kirghiz nomads from the Tienshan rode in to join the rising. Chin was thus able to mobilize the Hans onto his side. Han troops were dispatched from Urumchi, a three-day motor drive away, to suppress the rebels. The punitive expedition acted with great brutality, killing many of the Uighur and Kirghiz insurgents and driving the rest into the mountains. Chin added to his difficulties by executing the civil and spiritual leader of the Torgut Mongols at Karashahr for refusing to come to his aid. The Mongols joined the revolt. Khodja Niaz and Yulbars Khan, chancellor and grandson, respectively, of the deposed khan of Hami, then sent word to a rising young Moslem military leader in Kansu to bring his troops to their aid. They drew for him a tempting picture of prospects in Sinkiang for a man of courage.

**Flying Horse**

Ma* Chung-yin was the last of the would-be conquerors of Sinkiang. He saw little more than its roads and left it ignominiously clinging to a speeding truck amid a cloud of dust. In the few months of his adventure he caused death and destruction on an impressive scale.

Ma Chung-ying, "Flying Horse" as Sven Hedin calls him, was born

* Ma means horse in Chinese.
in southern Kansu of Hui parents and early found his vocation as a soldier of fortune in the army of Ma Ku-chung, a relative and Hui warlord of Chinghai, one of the Five Mas who for a time dominated politics in China’s northwestern provinces. At seventeen, Ma Chung-yin was already a colonel. A dapper, lithe warrior, he quickly showed his talents in politics. When the “Christian General” Feng Yu-hsiang, who in 1927 held parts of Shensi and Ninghsia, took his troops on a campaign in Kansu, Ma Chung-yin raised the banner of revolt—against what and for what is not precisely clear—and marched his troops to attack Hochow, a city which Feng held in southern Kansu. The siege lasted several months. Feng sent a relief force and Ma Chung-yin was compelled to withdraw.

Unable to return to Chinghai for fear of what Ma Ku-chung might do to him, the aspiring young warlord wandered around with his troops, plundering and murdering on various pretexts. Thousands of people are said to have perished at the hands of his troops. The winter of 1929–30 found him “operating” in the Ninghsia area, where there is a considerable community of Hui Moslems, Ma Chung-yin’s compatriots. Meantime the governor of Kansu, Liu Yu-feng, had Ma Chung-yin’s father put to death in retaliation for the son’s crimes in the province. This deeply embittered him and made him still more anxious to win more power and avenge himself on all Hans.

In the spring of 1930 he went to Nanking and enrolled himself in Chiang Kai-shek’s military academy. Three months later he was in Chungwei on the upper reaches of the Yellow River, where he reassembled his old troops. When he had a division of men under his command he appointed himself general and marched east into Kansu. In a move to appease him and give his restless energies something to do, the new governor appointed him commander of the Kanchow garrison. In ancient days this was an important strategic center, and Ma Chung-yin, learning from history, swiftly made himself ruler of western Kansu. At that time in China, three years after Chiang Kai-shek had established his national government in Nanking, a dozen warlords were battling for supremacy in China. Among them were Chen Chi-tong in Kwangtung, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi in Kwangsi, Lung Yung in Yunnan, Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi, Chang Hsueh-liang in the northeast (Manchuria), Feng Yu-hsiang and the Five Mas in the northwest, and several lesser fry like Ma Chung-yin in the same waters. At the same time the great imperial powers, with the Japanese the most insistent and ambitious, were preparing to carve up China. Each had its pet. Chiang
Kai-shek was the Anglo-American favorite. The Japanese were ready to deal with anyone.

Ma Chung-yin, with overweening ambition and a woeful ignorance of the real facts of life, thought that he too could be a man of destiny. He had ten thousand men under his command and his own foreign military adviser, Kemal Kaya Effendi, a Turk from Istanbul. But he was not yet ready for play in the big league. When he got too insufferably arrogant even for his own kind, the local Kuomintang “pacification commissioner” Ku Chu-tung was sent to chastise him. Once again he was defeated and driven out of Kanchow.

He was therefore in a mood to listen when Japanese agents contacted him and suggested the establishment of a companion version of “Manchukuo” (their puppet state in China’s northeastern provinces), this time in Sinkiang. This was part of the Japanese plan for the conquest of China and Siberia.

On September 18, 1931, the Japanese imperial army began the invasion and conquest of all Manchuria. In the following years it continued to penetrate China south of the Great Wall and several times probed the defenses of the Mongolian People’s Republic until it was badly mauled by the Mongolians and Russians at Khalkin Gol in 1939. Ma Chung-yin probably thought he could use Japanese aid for his own personal ambitions. They on their part, at small cost to themselves, used him to carry out a diversionary operation deep in Central Asia that just might pay off. It is also interesting to note that in one engagement in Sinkiang considerable quantities of Krupp munitions were captured by the Urumchi government from Ma Chung-yin’s allies. Just previously German arms agents had been busily trying to contact people who “knew Sinkiang and Mongolia.” Evidently they had made their contacts.

When Yulbars Khan’s request for aid reached Ma Chung-yin, he was ready for a new adventure. Taking five hundred men, he marched the 225 miles from Anhsi to Hami in the middle of the summer of 1931—no small feat of daring and endurance in the hottest part of the year over the desert. In Barkul he was welcomed as a liberator of the Moslems and presented by the local rebel commander with two thousand rifles and plenty of ammunition. Using these to arm and train reinforcements conscripted from among the local Huis and Uighurs, he besieged Chin Shu-jen’s forces in Hami for six months. The local populace supported his troops during the siege.

The arrival of a relief force from Urumchi forced him to raise the
But time was on his side. Leaving his troops in Sinkiang under his adjutant, Ma Shih-ming, he returned to Anhsi. Here he was fortunate to find the supply dump of the French Citroen survey expedition. He commandeered its stores of gasoline and spare parts, communications equipment and food. In February 1932, he entered Suchow, the second main strategic center of the area. But instead of arresting him for insubordination, the Kuomintang government appointed him commander of its 36th Division and in this capacity he immediately began enlisting fresh troops to bring his division up to full strength. He stayed in Suchow training his recruits for a full year before making his next move. Chiang supported him in the hope of using him to win eventual control over Sinkiang after Ma had taken it from its local rulers.

Meanwhile events in Sinkiang had developed dramatically. Revolts had flared up in several places against Chin Shu-jen, and he had been forced to send several columns of troops from Urumchi to suppress them. The ensuing civil war was destructive. Thousands of village homes were set on fire and gutted to deprive the insurgents of shelter. The castle of the khans of Hami was destroyed and its treasures plundered. There was particularly hard fighting between the troops under Sheng Shih-tsai, the new field commander of the Urumchi forces, and those of Ma Shih-ming, Ma Chung-yin's second in command. In the winter of 1932-33, Ma Shih-ming, based now on Turfan, southwest of Hami, gained the advantage and advanced directly on Urumchi itself. He surprised a body of troops sent against him by Chin Shu-jen and wiped them out at the Dawencheng Pass, south of Urumchi. But then in turn he was checked outside the capital.

In January, the rebel forces combined to storm Urumchi. But under the influence of Ma Chung-yin's men they made indiscriminate attacks on Hans and spread their animosity to the considerable numbers of Russians who had settled in Sinkiang before and particularly after 1917. Chin Shu-jen was thus able to gather within the city walls a band of terrified people determined to defend their lives to the last. A civilian militia was organized, in which the Russians played a notable part, and this was mainly responsible for repulsing the first rebel attacks. The situation remained tense. Time was clearly on the side of the attackers. On February 21, the combined forces of the Uighur nobles and Ma Chung-yin's lieutenant again stormed the western suburbs of the city. The fighting was bitter. To prevent a breakthrough, artillery fire was turned on the area by the defenders. A fire started and whole
blocks of houses, mostly of timber, began to burn. Many fighters on both sides perished in the flames, but the attackers were forced to withdraw beyond the conflagration.

The rebels then decided to organize a regular siege and invested the capital. Even in this hour of peril, Chin Shu-jen's brother was still thinking of how to profit. He confiscated wheat stocks from the regular merchants and began selling them to the hungry inhabitants at siege prices. Hatred of Chin Shu-jen boiled in the threatened city. But the Russian settlers had to face the fact that the Uighur nobles, encouraged by Ma Chung-yin's agents, were bent on destroying them (Japan at that stage made no distinction between red, white or pink Russians), and the Han troops and civilians were similarly threatened. Surrender would lead to a bloody massacre. Chin Shu-jen on his part feared that the Russian settlers would turn against him, so while using them as cannon fodder, he held them back from exploiting and consolidating their military successes for fear of what they might do to him later. He refused to give them horses to form a cavalry unit to pursue the beaten enemy, and then, when he was finally forced to agree to give them horses, he held up the issue of saddles.

When the rebels made it known that they would end the fighting if Chin Shu-jen would leave Sinkiang, the leading Han commanders and Russian settlers got together and decided to depose him. They gave him an ultimatum. He asked for three days to think it over. On the deadline, April 11, 1933, a joint deputation of Hans and Russians waited all day in his courtyard. Chin sent out various excuses to delay receiving them. When they returned next day his guards refused even to admit them to the yamen. Firing started. The delegates called up reinforcements and began to storm the yamen. Fighting went on all day. That night Chin fled over the yamen's back wall. His brother, the speculator, was not so fortunate. He was captured and shot. Chin finally turned up in Nanking after escaping through the Soviet Union via Tacheng. In Nanking he was arrested—for signing an unauthorized trade agreement with the Soviet Union, probably the only act of his that brought any benefit to the people of Sinkiang.

Sheng Shih-tsai

All officials in Urumchi met and agreed to appoint Lin Wen-lung, a former commissioner of education of Sinkiang, provisional governor with General Sheng Shih-tsai, Chin's former chief of staff, as pro-
visional military governor. A civilian committee representing the various nationalities of Sinkiang would assist them. Sheng Shih-tsai assumed his post immediately on April 14, 1933, but Khodja Niaz and Yulbars Khan were opposed to these arrangements. Two weeks later they sent a second call for help to Ma Chung-yin, who was in Kansu. Now he was well prepared. He turned over his part of Kansu to his relative General Ma Pu-fang, got his new army on the march to Sinkiang and followed posthaste. Once at Hami, he took command of all forces there and seized Kuchengtze, a caravan stop and watering place on the desolate road to Urumchi.

Sheng Shih-tsai, the new military governor and real head of the new administration in the capital, offered to compromise. He knew better than anyone how weak he really was. He therefore played for time and offered Hami and “Eastern Sinkiang” (presumably the desert east of Hami) to Ma Chung-yin. Ma rightly interpreted this conciliatory gesture as a sign of weakness and treachery. He prepared to attack Urumchi.

By this time the people of Sinkiang knew him better. In common peril, Uighurs, Mongols, Hans and Russian settlers in Urumchi closed ranks. The Russians, horsed and saddled, went forth to do battle with him west of Kuchengtze. Though they were repulsed, their attack forced Ma Chung-yin to pause for regrouping before beginning the assault on Urumchi. This gave Sheng Shih-tsai time to get some wholly unexpected and welcome reinforcement.

When the Japanese, Ma Chung-yin’s patrons, seized China’s three northeastern provinces (Manchuria) in 1931, part of the northeastern army had continued to resist despite Chiang Kai-shek’s orders.* Betrayed by Chiang’s Nanking government and left without supplies, they were driven back across the Soviet Union’s Siberian border. Here they were disarmed and sent to internment camps in Kazakhstan just over the border from Sinkiang. Some elected to settle down there on farms, but most wanted to get back to their homes in China. The Soviet government faced a ticklish question in settling their fate. Now, in view of Japan’s hostility, it decided to repatriate them to Chinese territory in

* Chiang Kai-shek was carrying out a policy of appeasement of the Japanese invaders. His slogan was: “First pacification and then resistance.” This meant first completing his campaign to wipe out the Chinese Communist Party, its Red Army and the Soviet areas it led and then turning to resist the Japanese. The Communist Party on its part successfully defended itself and countered with a proposal for a united front against the Japanese. Chiang’s policy of appeasement gave the Japanese time between 1931 and 1937 to consolidate their hold on the northeast and penetrate North China south of the Wall.
Crossing the southern Gobi Desert by bus from Kansu to Sinkiang.

A high-wheeled arba on an avenue in Iining.

A Kazakh encampment near Kintsai Pass.
A survey team exploring the Taklamakan Desert.

Reclaiming the desert in a Tarim oasis.

A pasture on the northern slopes of Tienshan in Dzungaria.
Government office and theater and cinema designed and built by the Construction Corps of the People's Liberation Army.
The restored Abu Hodja Mausoleum in Kashgar.

People’s Palace in Khotan.

Elementary school in Urumchi.
Nationalities Institute in Lanchow.

The author and the bus that carried him to Kashgar.

The famous Russian "tank" used by the People’s Army in the Ili Revolution.
General Chang Chih-chung and his favorite daughter, Su-su, in Peking, 1958.

The Uighur chairman of the Five Star Commune in Turfan.
A *tabur* of horses in a state ranch in Horgos, in the north Tienshan.

A muezzin calls the faithful to prayer in a village near Khotan.
Sinkiang, where they would be relatively free from Chiang Kai-shek’s reprisals for disobeying his orders. In January 1934, seven thousand of them crossed the border at Tacheng. They were very willing to take service with Sheng Shih-tsai, a fellow northeasterner. This also gave them a chance to strike a blow against at least a puppet of their old enemy, the Japanese invaders.

With this accession of strength in trained and eager fighters, Sheng was able to inflict a severe defeat on Ma Chung-yin’s already battered force of some four thousand men. Ma lost a thousand men, killed or wounded, in the battle for Urumchi. If Sheng Shih-tsai had followed up his victory promptly with a cavalry pursuit of the routed army he might have delivered the coup de grâce then and there, but a policy of caution prevailed. Ma got away with the rest of his troops, cut across the Tianshan via the Dawencheng Pass, captured Turfan and advanced on Karashahr. It was a skillful move. It practically isolated Urumchi from southern Sinkiang at a time when new dangers threatened Sheng Shih-tsai. In the north, in the Altai, the Moslem Kirghiz nomads and Hui had risen again in a fresh revolt. They imagined that Ma Chung-yin, their co-religionist, had come as their savior. In the west, the commissioner in Ili, General Chang Pei-yuan, was nursing a grievance. He had expected to be made governor after the death of Governor Yang Tseng-tsien, but Chin Shu-jen had outwitted him and seized power. Now with Chin Shu-jen disposed of, he had been outwitted again and Sheng Shih-tsai had been given power. Twice frustrated in his ambitions, Chang Pei-yuan threw in his lot with Ma Chung-yin.

Ma Chung-yin now reckoned that if he could hold the Dawencheng Pass and Karashahr while his allies, Chang Pei-yuan in northern Sinkiang and Yulbars Khan in Hami, held Urumchi under threat, he could seize the poorly defended oasis towns of southern Sinkiang one by one, reinforce his army and then turn and conquer Urumchi. In a rapid advance he took Karashahr, his first objective. This was the peak of his career. From then on the road was down.

Not by accident at this point in June 1933, Huang Mu-sung, a Nanking government envoy, arrived to attempt to settle the dispute in the province. As Sinkiang’s newly appointed pacification commissioner he proclaimed a ceasefire, but no one paid any attention. The fighting went on. Indeed, Sheng Shih-tsai put him under arrest for “plotting” and released him only when he agreed to telegraph Nanking a request for confirmation of Sheng’s new post.
The Nanking envoy arrived and left by the air service of the Eurasia Aviation Company, a joint Nanking-German enterprise that was trying to start a Berlin-Shanghai airline. It already held the franchise from Shanghai to the Soviet border with Sinkiang, and it was negotiating to get flying rights across the Soviet Union to Germany and so open the shortest air route from Europe to the Pacific. This was in 1933, the year that President Hindenburg gave power to Hitler. I mention this as an indication of the consistency of the ambitions of the Germans. They were the first to establish contact with the embryo capitalists in Sinkiang as far back as 1910. They helped build the first modern factory in Sinkiang, a tanning works in Ili for the merchant Mus-sabayev, whose products shod most of Sinkiang's people who could afford leather boots. Sven Hedin, the Swedish explorer, and the Eurasian pilots helped keep them in touch with events in Sinkiang, and now they were supplying Ma Chung-yin, the Japanese puppet, with arms. These were the days of the formation of the Berlin-Tokyo axis.

In September, Lo Wen-kan, the Nanking foreign minister, arrived for a new attempt at settling the civil war in Sinkiang, bridling Sheng and annulling the trade pact with the USSR. He failed on all counts and was obliged to confirm Sheng Shih-tsai as military governor. He also took Sheng's terms to Ma Chung-yin: withdraw to the Hami area and obey orders. Ma would have none of this. He was in a much better position, straddling both Hami and Turfan. That way he could prevent Sheng Shih-tsai from getting supplies from inside the Wall or from southern Sinkiang. He hoped that his ally Chang Pei-yuan would complete the blockade from the west as well.

Finding himself with only enough supplies for eight weeks, Sheng Shih-tsai was forced to attack. He moved a considerable body of troops up the road to Ili, both to attack Chang Pei-yuan, the weakest link in the blockade, and also to reopen the road to the Soviet Union and the nearest source of supplies. Despite the severe winter weather his men attacked and captured Hsiho on December 31 and then advanced and captured Tacheng. Chang Pei-yuan mustered his remaining forces to drive south across the Tienshan and join Ma Chung-yin at Aksu on the south side of the Tienshan. He was making for the Muzart Pass on the glacier of that name, the only practical way across the Tienshan at that point, when he was ambushed and overwhelmed by Sheng's forces. Many of his men perished in the battle or in the wild country over which they tried to flee. Many deserted. They were Hans who
were afraid to join up with Ma Chung-yin's Hui fighters. Ma's anti-Han feelings were now well known. Chang Pei-yuan in fury and despair committed suicide.

Sheng Shih-tsai succeeded in pacifying the Altai rebels by promising them and all the people of Sinkiang a new deal based on eight points: national freedom; religious freedom; immediate aid for the rural areas; financial reform; administrative reform; extension of education; encouragement of regional (local) self-government; and judicial reform. The people of Sinkiang had never heard any government promise them that much. His popular support grew. It was not a moment too soon. Ma Chung-yin launched a sudden attack on Urumchi on January 11, 1933. Encamping his forces six miles away, he laid siege to it. For a month he was held at bay. This gave time to recall the Urumchi detachments from Hsiho and Tacheng. On February 11, they attacked the besiegers from the rear while the Urumchi garrison made a victorious sortie. Ma Chung-yin's forces were thrown into disorder and fled south again through the Dawencheng Pass. Here they made a short stand, but Sheng Shih-tsai's position was now much strengthened.

With a program calling for an end to national strife, for religious tolerance and democratic reform, he had succeeded in forming a government which rallied around it all the progressive forces in Sinkiang. With this popular backing, his administration was able to buy planes, armored cars and trucks, machine guns and ammunition from the Soviet Union. His troops fought with fervor because they were also his genuine supporters and not mercenaries. Sinkiang was sick of war. Uighurs, Hans, Russians fought shoulder to shoulder. Ma Chung-yin had done his best to stir up national hatreds and range the other peoples of Sinkiang against the Hans. The Russian settlers in Sinkiang no less than the Hans were fighting for survival, and they fought desperately.

Sven Hedin, who was traveling through Sinkiang with his survey expedition, was caught up in the movements of the armies. He was told by Ma Chung-yin's chief of staff that "General Ma's principle is to have all Russians who fall into his hands shot at once."* Ma's ruthlessness and his troops' indiscipline turned his former supporters against him. Uighurs, Kazakhs and others who had experienced his rule in Hami and Turfan quickly lost enthusiasm for his cause. As his star waned, even the upper classes, who had called him into Sinkiang, began to desert him. The forces led by Sheng Shih-tsai, rearmed with

even a small number of modern weapons, were more than a match for the ill-equipped conscripts whom Ma had press-ganged in the oases to replenish the diminishing ranks of his veterans.

Sheng Shih-tsai's new planes bombed Ma Chung-yin's defenses at the Dawancheng Pass and the road behind from Turfan. For ground forces holding the pass against infantry, this is a very strong position. Called the Iron Gates, the pass narrows to a long, narrow defile between towering cliffs where the road is hacked out of the eastern cliff-side. Properly sited enfilading machine-gun fire makes the approaches impassable. But bombing from unopposed planes can and did turn the pass defenses into a death trap for the defenders. Faced with the bombing and the attack of a column advancing up the pass, the Tungan defenders broke and fled, and Turfan fell to Sheng Shih-tsai. Ma Chung-yin faced the choice of retreating to Hami and Kansu or going forward in the hope of consolidating his hold on southern Sinkiang. He chose the latter course. But when a column of Han and Russian fighters took a short cut through the Tienshan and attacked Karashahr, threatening to split his forces into two, his advance or retreat, whichever he considered it, turned into a rout.

Ma Chung-yin himself was able to commandeer a truck belonging to the Sven Hedin expedition. Abandoning Yulbars Khan to his fate, the Kansu adventurer speeded on to Kashgar. His army struggled on after him on horseback, carts or afoot. Deserters, shedding their uniforms, melted back into the people.

For months southern Sinkiang had been without effective government. Bandits seized control except where the people in desperation had risen and armed themselves in self-defense. Khodja Niaz, Sabit Damulla, self-styled “king of Khotan,” and others among the Uighur feudal nobility gathered in Kashgar. They usurped leadership of the peasant rising and with British help in 1933 formed a puppet “Republic of Eastern Turkestan” which Sabit Damulla planned to extend into a Pan-Turk Islamic state. He sent a special envoy to Delhi to ask for additional aid.

This did not suit Ma Chung-yin, who planned to create a base for himself in the Kashgar-Khotan area. Some of his troops reached Kashgar by March 1933 and began to talk terms with Sabit Damulla and his Uighur beggs and landlords. Representing completely opposite foreign interests, British and Japanese, they were soon rent with quarrels. Kirghiz of the Kunlun ranges joined the Uighurs, and the Tungan troops, outnumbered, were driven to defend themselves in the fortress
of Yangi Hissar. They held out there for six months. In the meantime, public support for Sabit Damulla’s bigoted puppet and racist regime eroded. Women were executed for omitting to wear the veil, whether this was a light covering of silk over the face alone or a dark gown and hood that completely concealed a woman from head to toe. When Ma Chung-yin’s main force of some two thousand men arrived to relieve the Yangi Hissar garrison in April 1934, the East Turkestan Republic and its army crumbled immediately. Khodja Niaz fled, and Sabit Damulla was killed in the fighting.

Led by Ma Hu-shan, Ma Chung-yin’s brother-in-law and second in command, the Tungans then advanced on Khotan. Here Ma Hu-shan set up a little feudal warlord principality which at one time included Posgam, Kagarlikh, Guma, Keriya, Charchan and Charklikh. But this was little more than a resting place for the fugitives. By the end of 1934, troops of the Urumchi government under Sheng Shih-tsai had advanced in force to Kashgar and routed or captured the Tungan garrison. Ma Chung-yin was last seen in the summer of 1934 fleeing in a truck over the Pamir passes to the Soviet Union. After living there for some years in internment, he died an unlamented death, neither the first nor the last puppet of the great powers to be deemed expendable. His brother-in-law held out in Khotan until 1936, when he in turn was attacked by the Urumchi troops and, defeated, fled over the Karakoram Pass to India.

Khodja Niaz and several of his colleagues benefited from the general policy of pacification and conciliation inaugurated by Sheng Shih-tsai’s government. He became civilian deputy governor of Sinkiang, and his colleagues became mayors of various towns. Once again Sinkiang was united under the leadership of the government in Urumchi. The region enjoyed a short spell of peace and increasing well-being.
Sheng Shih-tsai was the last of the Sinkiang despots. He fell, execrated by the people, and after him came the cleansing deluge. Yet he came to power under auspicious signs on April 12, 1933. The people at the start praised him for his enlightened rule. Having made a realistic assessment of the situation, he seemed to respond to the popular progressive demands of the time. His initial program gave Sinkiang a real chance to achieve political and national unity, build up the economy and bring the people well-being and happiness.

The Good Years

A native of Liaoning in northeastern China, from a landlord gentry family, Sheng received his army training as a protégé of various war-lords, including Chiang Kai-shek. He completed his studies with a course in a Japanese military academy. It was a friend, one of Chin Shu-jen’s subordinates, who got him invited to Sinkiang. In 1931 he was appointed to train Chin’s troops, but Chin, who did not like him
or trust him, allowed him little initiative. It was only when Chin was at his wit’s end over the revolts that were flaring up all over Sinkiang in 1931 that he finally appointed Sheng Shih-tsai his chief of staff and later commander in chief of all forces in the field. Endlessly suspicious, however, he kept Sheng on a tight rein and withheld real control over the troops. The result was near disaster.

Sheng Shih-tsai came to prominence only after Chin’s death, when he was appointed military governor of Sinkiang by popular demand of the Urumchi citizenry. He rose to the occasion. His victory over Ma Chung-yin brought him prestige and popularity. These were reinforced when he issued his Eight-Point Declaration in 1933. In 1934, he gave his government a broader base by including representatives of all the main elements of the Sinkiang population. Real and promised reforms assured him the support of all the popular progressive forces in the region. When he received the unexpected reinforcement of the northeastern troops repatriated from the Soviet Union together with planes and new weapons as gifts or on credit, he had an absolute preponderance of military power. He could well afford to be lenient to his former opponents.

In 1934 his government supplemented the Eight-Point Declaration with a six-point program of policy: opposition to imperialism; friendship with the Soviet Union; democratic and equal rights for all the peoples of Sinkiang; clean government; peace; and a systematic program of economic and cultural construction. Energetic implementation of this program made him the man of the hour. Peace was restored; taxes were reduced and the taxgatherers were put under democratic control. With this alleviation, Sinkiang’s diligent farmers, herdsmen and craftsmen soon put the region’s basic economy on its feet. Trade and cultural contacts were established with the Soviet Union. A substantial Soviet loan on favorable terms was negotiated in 1935, and various kinds of Soviet aid were asked for and received. Soviet doctors came to establish a public health system and anti-epidemic measures. A number of students were accepted into Soviet technical schools. Soviet industrial consumer goods were made available. Once again machine-made cloth appeared on the market, with small “luxuries” like toothpaste and soap and essentials like iron tools and matches at reasonable prices. Roads were repaired and trucks imported to get a transport system working again. Equipment was brought to start a communications system. The Soviet Union was a good customer for Sinkiang’s exports of wool, hides and other animal products. Sinkiang’s “back door”
to the Soviet Union was of some importance at that time. There was
civil war inside the Great Wall,* and the mounting pressure of the
Japanese imperialists against North China made it wellnigh impossible
to get normal supplies in from other parts of China.

Between 1935 and 1939, under Sheng Shih-tsai's enlightened rule,
Sinkiang was at peace and prospered. The good news filtered through
the Kuomintang censorship, and a number of progressive intellectuals,
persecuted by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang secret police, were en-
couraged to emigrate to Sinkiang. Responding to Sheng's request, the
Chinese Communist Party sent several of its members in 1937 to help
the people of the province. Among them were Chen Tan-chiu, one of
the founders of the party and member of the Central Committee; Mao
Tse-min, a brother of Mao Tse-tung, who became Sheng's finance
minister; Chu Tan-hua, his wife, a teacher; and Lin Chi-lu, Chao Ku-
chung, Huang Ho-ching, Chung Tien-hsu, Wu Mao-lin and others.
They found there a number of officers of the Fourth Front Red Army
(formerly led by Chang Kuo-tao) who had been cut off in the west
during the Long March. Among them, Huang Huo-ching, after the
Liberation of 1949, became mayor of Tientsin.

Local progressives who had been engaged in dangerous conspiratorial
activities against Chin Shu-jen were able to emerge from the under-
ground or exile and devote their energies to constructive work for the
people. The jails were emptied of political prisoners. I heard of one
woman, Li Liu-yeh, who had spent seven years in jail because of her
public-spirited stand against the Chin regime. Five ministerial posts
were filled by members of the Communist Party. Chang Chung-shih,
a returned student from the USSR and a translator of Russian economic
and political literature, was appointed deputy director of the committee
for the promotion of culture. Schools were built and, something un-
heard-of in Sinkiang, the people were encouraged to open schools for
themselves. Tu Chun-p~uan, another Communist and noted educator,
was appointed head of the newly established school for animal hus-
bandry and farming, which became the nucleus of the Sinkiang college
and university in Urumchi. Tu was also editor of the Sinkiang Daily.

* Chiang Kai-shek continued his fatal policy of "first pacification, and then resis-
tance," but the Chinese Communist Party defied him, and the local regimes led by the
warlords Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi, Lung Yun in Yunnan, Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-
jen in Kwangsi and others refused to subordinate their authority to Chiang's corrupt
rule. The result was continued civil war while the Japanese prepared and, step by
step, implemented their plans for the wholesale conquest of China.
The first daily newspaper ever to be published in Sinkiang, it had four editions, in Uighur, Han, Mongolian and Kazakh.

Several other outstanding scholars and leaders of Chinese culture came to Sinkiang at this time. Mao Tun (Shen Yen-ping), one of China's leading novelists, was leading a hunted existence in Shanghai when I knew him there in 1936. After the fall of Shanghai to the Japanese in 1937 he came to Sinkiang, together with Chao Tan and his wife, well known in theatrical and film circles. Sa Kung-liao, a first-rate journalist, also arrived to help establish Sinkiang's first radio station and radio monitoring service. This provided Urumchi with its first wire service. Up to 1938, even Sheng Shih-tsai was able to get world news only through the Tass news bulletin handed to him by the Soviet consul. Because of lack of translators the news was always four to five days late. He received no news even from the Kuomintang Central News Agency. Now he was able to get up-to-the-minute news from all over the world. Cooperating closely with the eager Sinkiang intellectuals of all ethnic groups, these and other revolutionary intellectuals played a leading role in introducing modern literature, drama and culture and Marxist ideas to Sinkiang.

When news of these developments seeped through to the outside world in garbled form, Western intelligence services analyzed it as a takeover of Sinkiang by the "Reds"—the Soviet Union. In fact at that time the Soviet Union was, for various reasons, very circumspect about involvement in Sinkiang's international affairs. For obvious reasons, it did not want a Japanese puppet like Ma Chung-yin installed in strategically placed Sinkiang, so it was willing to assist Sheng Shih-tsai as the most viable contender for power, particularly in view of his popular support and his Eight-Point Declaration. A peaceful, prosperous, friendly Sinkiang was to be welcomed. Hitler had come to power in Germany in 1933, and Moscow wanted to be sure that its Central Asian rear was secure. While it was prepared to repulse Japanese probes, it had no wish to exacerbate relations with Chiang Kai-shek by provocative encroachments in China's northwest. Still less did it wish to alarm Sheng Shih-tsai. Students sent to study technical courses in the Soviet Union were not given any political courses.

Far from having "gone Red," Sinkiang under Sheng Shih-tsai had hardly got its feet firmly on the first rung of the ladder to democratic rule. Sheng Shih-tsai kept a sharp and careful eye on everything. He was an opportunist who needed Soviet help to consolidate his own posi-
tion. But he proved to be an inept opportunist, a poor reader of the international situation, as he learned to his cost—a tragically heavy cost to others, too.

Once again clouds were gathering over Sinkiang.

By the end of 1931, the Japanese militarists had virtually completed their occupation of Manchuria, China’s three northeastern provinces, and during the next few years they were busy consolidating their hold there by establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo headed by Pu Yi, the last and former emperor of China. When their probes into the Mongolian People’s Republic and Sinkiang failed, they withdrew from those areas and tried instead to extend their grip south of the Great Wall in Hopei Province. Despite his ambitions, Chiang Kai-shek was in no position to intervene effectively in Sinkiang at that time.

After Chiang’s treacherous betrayal of the United Front with the Communist Party in 1927 and subsequent massacres of Communists and democrats, the Communist Party, led by Mao Tse-tung, had set up Red peasant guerrilla bases in south China and established a Soviet government. Four attempts by Chiang to eliminate these Red bases failed. In 1934 he launched his fifth “annihilation campaign” against them, using new tactics devised by his German Nazi advisers led by General Falkenhausen. Mobilizing a million men, he built a ring of blockhouses around the area, and then another smaller ring within, and so on, gradually tightening the noose around the Soviet areas. Under Mao Tse-tung’s leadership the Communist Party had successfully repulsed the four previous “annihilation campaigns,” but unfortunately at the time of the fifth campaign he had been forced aside, and the new leaders, instead of opposing the methodical German-style strategy by flexible tactics, met them in the very way Chiang hoped for—head on. Stonewalling tactics deprived them of their advantages of mobility and fatally exposed them to the superior firepower of the well-equipped Kuomintang troops. After suffering heavy losses, the Red Army learned the lesson. It decided that the only way left was to break out of the Kuomintang encirclement and abandon the Red base area.

Thus in October 1934 began the Long March of the Red Army from South China to Shensi Province in the northwest. Three hundred thousand men set out on the long trek. Some units marched six thousand miles. In October 1935, a year later, the vanguard of the thirty thousand survivors arrived in Shensi Province. Here a new Red base was established around Yenan, and the party called for a new united front of all patriot forces to expel the Japanese invaders.
Having failed to annihilate the Red Army either in South China or on the Long March, Chiang Kai-shek’s troops and plans were in disarray. He made haste to concentrate a new force at Sian, capital of Shensi, for another try. The bulk of these troops were northeasterners under Chang Hsueh-liang who had been driven from their homes by the Japanese. They wanted to fight the Japanese invaders and get back to their old homes. When ordered by Chiang to fight the Communist-led armies in a civil war, rather than unite with their compatriots against the foreign invader, they and their commanders rebelled. Chiang, overconfident, went among them to compel obedience to his orders and was arrested by them in December 1936. In the following negotiations with the rebels and the Communist Party, Chiang agreed to end the civil war and form a united front to repel the invaders. It was not a moment too soon. Now the Japanese were in a hurry. In July of that year they launched an all-out attack on China. They invaded North China, seized Shanghai after a hard fight and captured and sacked Nanking, massacring fifty thousand of its inhabitants.

The two parts of the united front fought in very different ways. The Communist Party based on Yenan infiltrated behind the Japanese lines in North and Central China (the Red Army there took the designation Eighth Route Army as part of the national army) and established guerrilla bases on what had been occupied territory. The Communist-led New Fourth Army pinned down large numbers of Japanese troops in South China in the Nanking-Shanghai area and later to the north of the Yangtze River. By the end of the war these Communist-led Liberated Areas had a hundred million people, a fifth of China’s population. The peasants there set up democratic united-front governments, reduced rents and poured into the armed forces to defend their gains. By the end of the war, the Liberated Areas had a million battle-tested fighters and several million partisans.

Chiang Kai-shek fought a passive, defensive war, husbanding his troops and the military supplies he received from the Western allies. He calculated that when his allies defeated the Japanese he would be in a favorable position to renew the civil war, invade the democratic Liberated Areas led by the Communist Party, smash their army and partisans, and reestablish his dictatorship over the whole country. In view of this it is not surprising that relations between the two parties deteriorated steadily.

In these conditions Sheng Shih-tsai could hope for little help from the Kuomintang, so he leaned to the Soviet Union and the Chinese Com-
munist Party members who had come to help him. Chiang himself was getting considerable aid from the Soviet Union. It must be remembered that right up until the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Western democracies continued to appease Japan and sold it scrap iron and oil for its war machine. The Soviet Union, on the contrary, had given a stunning rebuff to the Japanese and helped Sheng Shih-tsai defeat the Japanese puppet Ma Chung-yin. Soviet pilots in 1938 helped defend Wuhan, Chiang's wartime capital, from Japanese bombers.

When Canton, the last of China's ports, was captured by the Japanese in 1938 and the Burma Road was closed by Britain soon after, it became necessary to open a new route of supply through Sinkiang and northwestern China. Chiang sent General Hu Tsung-nan, a close associate, to negotiate with Sheng Shih-tsai. Hu had known Sheng as a schoolmate, but they were not friends. It was hard to woo Sheng. No one knew better than he what grasping hands the Kuomintang militarists, bureaucrats and bureaucrat-capitalists had. Furthermore, Sheng feared Chiang's collaborators, the Five Mas, the Moslem warlords who controlled Chinghai, Sikang and part of Kansu and had once been the patrons of Ma Chung-yin. Nevertheless he had to consider the value of his good relations with the Soviets, on whom he depended for trade and goods to keep Sinkiang economically healthy and its people contented. He therefore reluctantly agreed to open the border at Ili to Kuomintang convoys and arrange for service stations along the road from there to Urumchi and Hami and across the desert to Kansu. Air bases with refueling dumps and repair services were built at Ili, Urumchi and Hami for Soviet supply planes. Soviet pilots brought the planes to Hami. There they were taken over by Chinese pilots. Sheng's relations with Chiang became closer, but it is a remarkable commentary on the situation that every truck on the Sinkiang route had to have an armed escort to prevent its contents from falling into the hands of Sheng or one of the Mas. Sheng in 1940 signed an agreement for a joint Soviet-Sinkiang company to mine tin for export to the Soviet Union.

Gathering Clouds

Once again Sinkiang became a pivot of competing forces, and the inevitable storm clouds began to gather. The Kuomintang reactionaries felt that the success of Sheng's democratic Eight Points and Six Policies were a threat to their own rule.

In August 1939, after Chamberlain and Daladier had vainly tried to
turn Hitler to the east to attack the USSR, Stalin signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Hitler overran Poland, the Western Powers’ ally, in three weeks and then turned against the West. Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and France fell in quick succession. Britain, now under Churchill’s leadership, stood firm. Germany, Italy and Japan signed the Axis Pact in September 1940, and this made it inevitable that the war would become worldwide. In April 1941, to protect the Soviet rear, Stalin signed a neutrality agreement with Japan. In June, Hitler launched his ill-conceived invasion of the USSR, and in December of that year the Japanese attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. From that time on the Soviet Union had to strain all its energies against the Nazi invasion. In 1942, after being frustrated in his attempt to capture Moscow and Leningrad, Hitler found himself before the gates of Stalingrad nearly a thousand miles inside the USSR. Hard pressed itself, the Soviet Union was unable to maintain supplies to Sinkiang or to the Kuomintang. With America in the war, Chiang came to rely more and more on aid from the United States and less on the Soviet Union. At this point Sheng Shih-tsai made a fateful decision. Like a number of other reactionaries, he was convinced that the Soviet Union was done for, and he completely changed his former policies.

Some British conservatives were still fighting the Crimean War. They wanted to keep Russian influence out of Sinkiang “to guard the Indian empire.” They were not averse, even though the Russian people were bearing the brunt of the war against Hitler, to prolonging the Russian agony. Hitler’s dreams of Asian conquest were well known. The last German advisers to leave Chungking were saying that one day they would return—via Sinkiang! Still farther out on the lunatic fringe was the envoy of the reactionary Polish government-in-exile in London. In Chungking he was telling people confidentially over cocktails that he was organizing a “second front” against the Soviet Union. The first front was in Europe. These various anti-Soviet intrigues focused in Sinkiang. One aim was to stop all supplies of livestock, leather, furs, tin or whatever going into the Soviet Union from Sinkiang.

Sheng felt that he was firmly in control. Because of the war he was getting little aid from the Soviet Union, but he was not much worried about Chiang Kai-shek, beleaguered in Chungking. Having seen how easily his predecessors had lost power, he thought he would strike a preventive blow at possible opposition inside Sinkiang.

He began a secret campaign to rid himself of “dangerous elements.” In this attempt to assert and consolidate his own authority he drew
nearer to the Kuomintang's anti-popular, anti-Soviet ideas. He thought that he could use the Kuomintang in his struggle against the democrats and progressives, and that they would be a reserve of strength if his campaign against the Communists and other elements of the united front in Sinkiang should lead to a break with the Soviet Union. Just the year before, in January 1941, Chiang Kai-shek had launched his bloody and treacherous attack against the Communist-led New Fourth Army and forced it to evacuate the areas south of the Yangtze, which it had been defending from the Japanese. Sheng felt that he was riding the wave of the future.

He had given only a hint of what was to come when in 1937 he arrested a thousand progressives on charges of plotting an uprising. In 1940, following a demonstration by some of his restive troops, he arrested several hundred more people on similar charges. In 1941 he set up an organization called the Six Stars in which young people, he said, would study Marxism-Leninism. He had let it be known that he had joined the Russian Communist Party. But this was a trap. Soon this organization was outlawed, and many of its members were arrested on charges of conspiracy. In the summer of 1942, in a sudden act of terror, he arrested Chen Tan-chiu, Mao Tse-min and other known Communists. Again the charges were conspiracy. Six hundred party members or alleged members were jailed. Surrounded by spies and informers, he seemed seized by paranoia. He began to arrest all who took his Six-Point Program seriously. Young men whom he himself had sent to study in the Soviet Union were clapped into jail as soon as they returned to Sinkiang. He closed schools which on his orders the people themselves had started with their own funds. Soon he became so suspicious that he trusted no one except his toadies—those least to be trusted.
In 1944, an American official declared that Sheng Shih-tsai had “made the province into a New Sinkiang, a remarkable new New Dominion.” I asked a young man in Sinkiang what indeed had been happening at that time. Here are notes from that interview.

Mutini was an extremely tall young man with an engagingly frank expression. He was dressed in the loose-fitting brown serge suit with wide-legged trousers and shirt and tie which in 1957 were in fashion among Uighur cadres. But he was obviously not much concerned about clothes or, by the looks of it, office status. His room at the Sinkiang People’s Publishing House, where he worked, was of the simplest: wooden desk, odd chairs, a sofa that had seen better days long, long ago, a threadbare Khotan carpet. This was not untidiness. He would have refused—as indeed I learned he had done—any better furnishings while the country was still pulling itself up out of the past.

He spoke in a detached way about conditions under Sheng Shih-tsai. I had to prod him to reveal the truth about conditions in the jails.
"Sheng Shih-tsai," he said, "had seven jails in Urumchi alone. When I was arrested in 1940 I was put in Number Four. I lived in a cell in which more than half the floor was raised about a foot high to form the brick kang. This was covered with kaoliang matting and was our bed and chairs and table. With fifteen people in the cell that gave each man a space about thirty centimeters wide to sleep on. We had to learn to sleep on our sides. You couldn't turn over without disturbing your neighbors.

"Mornings we got a bowl of hot water to drink, a piece of nan [un-leavened flat-cake bread] or maybe a bit of wheat pancake and onions fried in a bit of fat. At ten o'clock we got cabbage soup, no meat or fat in it—just cabbage boiled in water—and in the evening, hot water and pancakes again.

"We were not allowed pencils, paper or books, so we amused ourselves talking, or playing chess with a "board" marked out on the kang, and other games. These conditions didn't seem too bad until they started to interrogate us. The first time, I was questioned for two days running. Since I didn't know what I was accused of and hadn't done anything wrong, I had nothing to admit and insisted I was innocent. So the third day they started to beat me. I was beaten steadily on my palms till they swelled up and felt like pulp. Then I was strung up against a wall as if crucified. I was all by myself. My feet just touched the floor, or rather a pile of fine coal dust. When I got thirsty and yelled out, a jailer came in and gave me half a cup of water. I gulped this down and only then realized that it was sugared especially to increase my thirst. He refused to give me anymore to drink. . . .

"But I was lucky. Later I heard that other people had been put into gasoline drums filled with water and then heated slowly until they "confessed their guilt." Others had had their feet thrust into boiling oil. Others were burned on the skin with stubs of glowing wood.

"When I was taken down from the wall after a week, I was aching all over. My feet were bloated and excruciatingly painful from the coal dust that had worked into the pores. Back in the prison, older prisoners told me that so long as it did not incriminate anyone else I might just as well sign whatever it was they wanted me to sign even if it wasn't true. I did not believe them, so I was tortured again intermittently in various ways for another month.

"I found it hard to realize what was happening to me. I'd been born and brought up in Turfan and had got a bit of training as a tailor. In the early Sheng Shih-tsai days when he was still pretending to be a democrat
I'd gone to one of the schools which the people had themselves opened with his encouragement. Then I had been chosen along with a number of other Turfan lads to go to the Soviet Union to study Russian and get some technical training. This was all arranged by that Sheng himself. We studied in the Soviet Union for two years, from 1936 to 1937. When we returned to Urumchi several of us were admitted to the new Urumchi College. Here I studied the Uighur language and trained to become a teacher myself. Sheng Shih-tsai himself used to come to the college to teach us politics. In the Soviet Union we were taught only the Russian language and the natural sciences, but no politics, because we came from China. Then suddenly a whole lot of us students were arrested.

"Gradually, through the interrogations I understood that I was accused of plotting against the government. Though I was innocent, I finally decided to sign the paper they put before me. This got me into a second jail. Here at least you could look through windows, even though they were barred, and see the world outside. The food was much the same, but with a bit of kaoliang added to the pancake diet. Sometimes we had fruit, when there was a glut of any on the market, instead of cabbage. The only exercise we had outside was a ten-minute daily walk around the prison yard. Then one of the new prisoners told us what he had heard some German political prisoners do, and we organized a hunger strike. That forced them to give us some milk. Then we tried it again and got some books. But still we had nothing to write with. I was still being interrogated once a month, so I seized a chance and stole a nib. I made ink out of lampblack and water. To get paper I soaked cigarette boxes in water and with the pulp made paper—twelve small sheets from each box. These were real treasures. I used them to learn to write Chinese characters. When I'd finished using them I hid them behind the lavatory hole. We made this so filthy on purpose that none of the warders wanted to go near it.

"Many people died in the jails. Young people like myself tried to keep fit by doing exercises and rubbing ourselves down with cold water. We didn't have too much to worry about except ourselves, but older men mourned and worried about their families. Some simply lay down on the kang and died away. I had finally been sentenced to twelve years in prison, so at least I knew where I stood. Some people had been thrown into jail and hadn't any idea why or how long it would be for.

"In 1942 I got dysentery from eating rotten kaoliang. I grew haggard and weak. I think I would have died then, but luckily one of the Soviet hospitals was still functioning and a doctor from there managed to
visit the jail. He gave me some medicine to cure me and later cod-liver oil to build me up again. That just about saved my life. Nothing much happened after that until I was freed in 1944.

"Once Sheng Shih-tsai himself interrogated me. I was taken to an office where there were a desk and two chairs. The one behind the desk was an ordinary chair. The other, in front of it, had arm rests with an iron bar on a hinge across them. I was made to sit in this; the bar was clamped across in front of me and locked with a padlock over the other arm so that I couldn't get up. Then Sheng Shih-tsai came in. He was quite affable. He asked if it was true that I was trying to organize a Soviet republic in Sinkiang. Of course I said no. Then he asked if I had been ill-treated in jail or beaten. I replied yes, but the interpreter said no. I didn't dare expose him, but I knew that anyway Sheng Shih-tsai understood very well what I had said. He asked me this question twice, with the same result. Pretending not to know anything, he also asked how things were in the prison. He told me to be patient, to read and study, and that I would soon be released.

"I sat in jail for another four years after that interview. Later I learned that he himself used to plan the tortures.

"It was only when I was released that I got a full picture of what had happened. Sheng Shih-tsai had arrested me and others in 1940. That was just after Paris fell in midyear to the Nazis, and it seemed that Hitler was on his way to winning the war. We were the first victims of his betrayal, but it was clear that he had been plotting and planning this for some time. After us, he began to arrest more and more people. Practically every family who had relatives doing any sort of public work had some member in jail or under suspicion. During those years I lost my brother and my half-brother. Both were killed by Sheng Shih-tsai's agents. He didn't kill us all because he was still waiting on events. But he miscalculated."

Sensing danger, Chen Tan-chiu asked that the Communist cadres be allowed to leave and return to Shensi. Sheng refused this request and soon arrested as many as he could lay his hands on.

Sa Kung-liao and other progressives who had their ears to the ground fled Sinkiang in 1940. Mao Tun and Chang Chung-shih had narrow escapes. Chao Tan and many others were arrested. Some spent eight years in jail. They were lucky. Tu Chung-yuan was murdered. Families were ruthlessly broken up, prisoners were held without charge and died
of illness and ill-treatment. Many died under torture or in desperation took their own lives. Soon the whole of Sinkiang was gripped by terror. Officials turned pale when they heard an automobile stop outside their offices. There were few automobiles in Urumchi in those days. People walked, rode horseback or went by carriage or in a Russian-style katanka. The security service was privileged. One of its favorite strategies was to drive up to its victim's house or office, enter unceremoniously and club him over the head. They would then stuff his body into a sack and remove it in their car. Many so kidnapped disappeared forever. This method was originally used so as not to attract attention, but it later became so notorious that any sack in a car was assumed to be an arrest.

It is said that 200,000 people were killed, arrested or disappeared during Sheng Shih-tsai's rule. Records of the deaths of half this number were found by the People's Government when Sheng's archives were opened. His security officers were forever discovering plots and conspiracies, and those implicated were invariably known or suspected Communists, democrats, leading intellectuals, students, activists among the working people or peasants, simple patriots. At the start such people were accused of being "imperialist agents" and "spies." Later, when Sheng Shih-tsai shifted his public stand, exactly similar people were accused of being "underground Communists," "front men for the Communists" or "agents of the Soviet Union." The progressive elimination of these people—the idealistic youth of the region, the intellectuals and artists, the public-spirited—turned his regime into an outright military dictatorship and police state. In this night of terror, feudal inefficiency and corruption took over. Hoping to insure himself for the future, Sheng pledged himself to the hilt in support of the anti-Soviet and anti-democratic intrigues being hatched at that time.

With the Nazis battering at the gates of Stalingrad, reactionaries all over the world were predicting a catastrophic defeat for the Soviets. The Churchill government in Britain held up vital shipments of goods in convoy to the Soviet's arctic ports, and over serious Soviet protests postponed the opening of the second front in Europe, which was to relieve the pressure on the Russian army. Sheng Shih-tsai took such doubtful cues and stepped up his anti-Soviet measures. Chiang Kai-shek's ambitious wife Soong Mei-ling arrived in Sinkiang in late August 1942 with a large Kuomintang delegation to encourage and celebrate Sheng's "conversion." She was sure that she was adding a Central Asian kingdom to her family's domains. Sheng, charmed to be of service, in Oc-
tober demanded that all Soviet personnel be withdrawn from Sinkiang within three months. He abrogated the commercial agreement he had signed with the USSR, and trade ceased abruptly. In January the next year he joined the Kuomintang and became the nominal head of its Sinkiang branch. But in the Chinese phrase, Sheng was simply “lifting a rock to crush his own feet.”

The effect of the Sinkiang embargo on the Soviet Union was merely irritating. It gave Sheng Shih-tsai only a worthless prestige in anti-Soviet circles. But the loss of Soviet imports was crippling to Sinkiang’s economy. Soon it was impossible to buy such goods as textiles, sugar, metals, matches. Prices soared. Smugglers and speculators did a roaring trade. There was a glut of Sinkiang’s traditional exports—wool, hides, furs—and their prices dropped. Those who had lavished bad advice on Sheng had nothing much else to give him. Only a trickle of goods came over the long caravan trail from Kuomintang territory, and prices were high. While the masses suffered, a handful of bureaucrat-capitalists amassed new wealth through the Local Products Company, a government trade monopoly set up in November 1942.

To replace dwindling taxes on trade, Sheng Shih-tsai increased direct taxes. Public anger increased. The Kuomintang drew the net tighter around him. Having jettisoned his popular program and antagonized the people by his economic policies, and arrested, exiled or killed his former supporters among the people, Sheng had become just another warlord pitting his guile against others far more skilled and just as ruthless as he. Chiang Kai-shek’s agents came in increasing numbers to “help” Sheng in his struggle against the “Reds.” They bought over his commanders and even his closest “friends” and relatives whom he had placed in key positions as bastions of his rule. Then in September 1943 as a “sacrifice” he had Chen Tan-chiu, Mao Tse-min and the other leading Communists murdered. But in vain. He had cut the ground from under his own feet. Without popular support, he was nothing but a pawn in the Kuomintang’s game of power politics.

Then the battle of Stalingrad ended—not with the expected Soviet defeat but with the rout and annihilation of the German invaders. Sheng Shih-tsai now realized that his gamble on a Soviet defeat had failed. In 1944 he tried to ingratiate himself again with the Soviet government, but it was too late. His overtures were ignored. Now desperate, in April he began to arrest Kuomintang agents—the small, expendable ones, that is.
The Kuomintang Takes Over

The payoff came dramatically. Liang Han-chao, formerly head of Chiang's propaganda department and new deputy secretary general of the Supreme National Defense Council, flew in to Urumchi with Shuen Tsun, head of the Special Agency (counterintelligence and covert action). Sheng had to be circumspect in dealing with the Kuomintang bigwigs. His administration was infiltrated, bribed and corrupted. One day Shuen Tsun called and after exchanging the usual civilities told Sheng bluntly that he was requested to go to Chungking "for a new appointment." Sheng was flabbergasted and tried to bluster. Shuen Tsun told him, "Go, or you're finished!" Sheng swore that he would have him arrested. Shuen Tsun sat back in his chair, smiled and said, "Try. I dare you!" He was obviously enjoying himself.

Sheng Shih-tsai snatched up the phone and rang up his police chief, who answered immediately. It was clear that he had been expecting the call. He listened in silence to Sheng's order and after a moment's pause answered, "I'm sorry. That is an order I cannot carry out!"

A few days later, on September 11, 1944, Sinkiang's would-be dictator was flying to Chungking just as he had been ordered. The next month, after paying a huge bribe out of the wealth he had stolen from Sinkiang, he was appointed minister of agriculture and forestry and later, concurrently director of the reclamation administration. The work went on precisely as before—corruptly and ineptly. At the same time General Wu Chung-hsin, a Chiang Kai-shek confidant, arrived in Urumchi as the new governor of the province. He was the first of a swarm of Kuomintang officials who descended on Sinkiang "to strengthen the administration"—and milk the flagging economy dry.

The situation was made worse by the fierce struggle of rival Kuomintang cliques for power and spoils. The main contenders were the Chen brothers' CC Clique and the Political Science Group of old-time bureaucrats.

This Kuomintang move to take over Sinkiang was part of the Chiang Kai-shek clique's plan to win control over all of China in the postwar period, to recruit or cow dissident warlords, and to crush the Communist Party and the Liberated Areas it led. A huge army of 200,000 men commanded by General Hu Tsung-nan was blockading the main Liberated Areas around Yenan (an area spread over the borders of Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia provinces), on its west and south. The Japanese
were attempting to do the same on the east. Now with Sinkiang under its control, Chiang's government thought that it really had the Liberated Areas encircled and isolated from the Soviet Union. Sinkiang, strategically placed next to the Soviet Central Asian areas, could be used as a staging ground for the second front in what Chiang hoped would be part of a third-world-war coalition led by Britain and the United States against the Soviet Union. Chiang's seizure of Sinkiang was a move in the anti-Soviet cold war long before that term was invented.

All of these plans were shattered by the Chinese people as they rose in their War of Liberation against the Kuomintang.
The new Kuomintang rulers of Sinkiang had the same aim as Sheng Shih-tsai—to plunder as much as they could, just as they were doing inside the Great Wall. But they were in such a hurry for the golden eggs that they nearly killed the goose. Every petty Kuomintang bureaucrat and officer tried to line his pockets as fast as he could in this New Dominion. The people's condition went from bad to worse.

Sinkiang's was more or less a marginal natural economy. It still had no modern industry. Due to war and misrule the economy of Kuomintang China inside the Wall was in dire straits, so when trade with the Soviet Union was banned the only manufactured goods Sinkiang could get were cigarettes from the Kuomintang-held areas. By the end of 1942 practically no industrial goods could be bought in the shops and bazaars. Iron became a precious metal in Kashgaria. A single pound of it could buy several ten-yard bolts of homespun mata, the popular multicolored folkweave of the Uighurs.

Kazakh and Mongol herdsmen make up half the population of the Ili area in Djungaria. With the Sinkiang-Soviet border closed to their wool,
hides and other products, they were forced to sell to speculators at low prices. Agents of the Kuomintang Four Big Families of monopoly bureaucrat-capitalists* reaped a golden harvest. The big local firm of Mussabayev, a Uighur capitalist, the first in Sinkiang, was hard pressed to hold on. As I have said, most of Sinkiang's population walked on Mussabayev's leather. He had got his machinery from Germany in prewar days, and when I saw it in the late 1950s it was still going well.

Tea became a luxury beyond the reach of the common people. Salt and sugar disappeared. Stocks of cheap manufactured cotton were soon exhausted. Islamic custom prescribes that a corpse be wound in a shroud, which required up to twenty feet of cloth. Now there was nothing in which to bury the dead. This was the final affront, the final indignity.

While Kuomintang carpetbaggers prospered on speculation and the growing black market, the provincial government in Urumchi was headed for bankruptcy. In 1936, trade with the Soviet Union provided 50 percent of its revenue. By 1943, this had dropped to 3.5 percent. Direct taxation was increased to make up for this loss. In 1936, direct taxation amounted to 317 Sinkiang dollars per capita. By 1944, twenty-two different direct taxes had increased this seven times. The land tax alone swallowed over 15 percent of a farmer's crop. Each year a herdsman handed the taxgatherers from 10 to 15 percent of his newborn animals. Yet lower Kuomintang officials, soldiers and police were often left unpaid for months at a time. It became usual for these Kuomintang underlings to make up their wages or lack of them with bribes, illegal levies, "requisitions," extortion and plain theft. More powerful bureaucrats got innocent people of any substance arrested on trumped-up charges and mulcted them of their property. Though health services were by then nonexistent in the province, the head of the provincial health department in 1945 remitted 20 million Sinkiang dollars to his wife in Lanchow. They were inflated wartime dollars, but that was a considerable sum even at that time. The Manass County headship, a modest post, was worth 25 million Sinkiang dollars. A jailer in a police affairs department grew so rich after a year's "work" that he was handling 100-million-dollar deals. Government posts were sold to the highest bidder. In Turfan, a county headship cost 650 ounces of silver, a pao head-

* Capitalists and bureaucrats who used their official positions to foster their business interests. The Four Big Families were those of Chiang Kai-shek himself, the Soongs and Kungs (T. V. Soong was a brother of Madame Chiang; H. H. Kung was married to her elder sister), and the Chen brothers, Li-fu and Kuo-fu, leaders of the CC Clique, who were political allies of Chiang and leaders of the Kuomintang Party and government.
The Storm Breaks

ship, 150 to 200 ounces. It was no good offering to pay in paper money. Government bigwigs had no confidence in their own paper currency. But purchase of such a post was a good investment. A pao head in Kucha named Pu Mu-erh built his estate up from 5 to 250 acres in ten years' service under Sheng Shih-tsai and the Kuomintang.

Khodjas and Landlords

The basic social system in Sinkiang had not changed for centuries. It endured right down to the Liberation of 1949 and in some places lasted a few more years. In the herding areas of the Altai and Tien Shan, among the Kazakhs, Mongols and Kirghiz nomads, a few powerful families owned hundreds of acres of pastures and great herds of cattle, horses, camels, sheep and other livestock. Serving them as herdsmen, even though belonging to the same clan, were poor men owning only a few sheep or other animals. In the farming oases, more than half the population were poor, landless or land-poor tenant farmers or laborers. In most counties a small minority of landlords and rich peasants owned up to 70 percent of the arable land. A 1950 survey of a southern Sinkiang county showed that laborers, poor and middle-income peasants made up 89 percent of the population and owned 24 percent of the land. Rich farmers (4 percent of the population) held 4 percent of the land. Landlords made up only 7 percent of the population but owned 72 percent of the land.

But it was not only economic inequality. Great landowners invested their privileged position with a religious aura by taking the Moslem title of khodja, although few of them had any relation to the Prophet. They surrounded themselves with a halo of superstition the better to defend their feudal privileges. “Whoever pisses where a khodja has pissed will get a sore organ” was one of the myths they popularized. Some clerical feudal landowners maintained a vicious system of serfdom, which grossly contradicted their professed spiritual values. The origins of their landownership were extremely murky. In one case there was a legend that the local khodja was authorized by the khan to own as much land as could be “bounded by an oxhide.” The khodja cut an oxhide into thin thongs which he joined together to surround a huge area. Everyone, however, knew how khodjas increased their holdings by usury, usurpation and blackmail. One khodja allowed peasants to use his land if they agreed to work it and in addition open up wasteland for him. In 1951, one of his former serfs reported that he alone had reclaimed 33 acres
for this khodja. Another khodja inherited 66 acres, but by 1951 his holding was ten times larger. Still another began life with 3 acres but amassed another 70 in thirty years. Some landlords not only owned land which they rented out, but also rights over water sources or karese channels. They used these to exploit the peasants, who desperately needed water for their farms and were sometimes forced to pay half their harvest for the privilege of using it.

Serfs were compelled to work on their masters' land and perform other services as well. They did household work, toiled in their masters' workshops and could be punished or beaten with impunity. Artistically talented serfs had to make music, sing or dance on command. Sometimes serfs' wives and children were liable for service. A post-Liberation survey found families that had been serfs for seven generations. Even in the early days of the twentieth century, some serf owners enjoyed the right of the first night when a serf's daughter married. Some khodjas lived in utter idleness. Serf labor not only grew and raised and cooked their food and made their clothes and entertainments, but bathed them, dressed them and cleaned them when they defecated.

Relations between khodjas and peasants varied greatly even in one county. Serfdom for some peasants differed little from slavery. There was also a semi-serfdom in which the relationship was a part-time one and the services demanded were more or less irksome. While some landowners received as much as half the serf's crop and thirty to a hundred days' work as "labor rent," in other cases the master-serf relationship was similar to that between landlord and tenant. The serf paid his master a quit rent, a sum in money or kind, and that freed him of all other duties. But whatever the relationship, the khodja-landowner or serf owner always came off best. No matter what the regime—the rule of the emperors, of a Turki nomad sultan or khan, a Yakub Beg or other local tyrant or the Kuomintang—the privileges of the feudal landlords and herdowners remained. As they said: "The river flows on, but the rocks remain."

The Kuomintang imposed its own exactions of taxes, contributions and forced labor levies on top of this exploitation by the landlords and herdowners. Only those who could bribe themselves free were exempt. With the arrogance of power, the Kuomintang was sowing the whirlwind. More and more people fled in desperation to the mountains and wilderness to become outlaws from a lawless government and society. Cities and towns stagnated and decayed.

Oppression, injustice, humiliation and insult to ethical and religious
beliefs and human dignity generated the seeds of revolt. This had happened before in the past. It was not the first time the people of Sinkiang had risen in revolt. But this time was different.

The Storm Breaks

By 1944, Sinkiang seethed with modern progressive and revolutionary ideas. Concepts of national liberation, of democracy and of socialism had been brought into the region by Kuomintang veterans still loyal to the teachings and principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Kuomintang betrayed by Chiang Kai-shek. These ideas and those of communism, Marxism-Leninism, had been brought in by members of the Communist Party of China. Misrule had prepared fertile soil for such ideas to take root among the people. Sheng Shih-tsai, alarmed, had tried by physical extermination to uproot these ideas, but he failed, and so did the Kuomintang. Despite the white terror, centers of revolutionary organization were preserved and carried on their activities even under the most difficult conspiratorial conditions. “Vanguard,” the underground revolutionary organization of the Han people in Urumchi, surfaced and became known to the general public only in 1949 when Sinkiang was peacefully liberated and the People’s Liberation Army entered the city. By 1944 there was an underground network of anti-Kuomintang revolutionary organizations. These were by no means homogeneous. Some of their members were middle-class nationalists; some were Marxists; some simply hated the Kuomintang tyrants. Since the Kuomintang was almost exclusively Han, some rebels were bitterly anti-Han. Some were against infidel domination; against all infidels whether Han or not.

The dispossessed masses of Sinkiang rose against the Kuomintang just as they had risen many times in the past against other tyrannies, but a narrow nationalism or religious fanaticism alone or in combination would have led, as in the past, to fratricidal strife among the ethnic groups and religious communities of Sinkiang—and to a common defeat. Fortunately, progressive ideas of democratic freedom, national equality and socialism also inspired the revolutionaries. The leaders who came to the fore had learned that their prime enemies were the Kuomintang and the foreign powers which backed the Kuomintang, the party of the Great Han chauvinists,* warlords, landlord reactionaries and bureaucrat-capitalists.

* Great Han chauvinism, chauvinism among the Han majority people, was reflected in the local chauvinism among some strata of the ethnic minorities. Both were divisive forces in Sinkiang.
The various factions of insurgents each pressed their claims, demands and ideologies, but the revolutionary leaders succeeded in channeling these spontaneous demands into purposeful, unified, organized action, resolving conflicting interests through discussion and debate, negotiating a consensus, defining what was truly in the interests of the vast majority and exposing and combating what opposed the common interest. Xenophobia, religious intolerance and localism were transcended by progressive democratic and socialist ideas. This was the difference between this revolt and all those that preceded it.

**Revolutionary War**

I pieced together the following account of the ensuing revolutionary war from interviews with participants, with those I have named Argun and Rakhmet, with the widow of Akhmedjan Kassimeh and with scores of others. With some of them I retraced the marching route of the revolutionary armies and visited the battlefields of those days. This is the first full account of those stirring days leading to the liberation of Sinkiang.

The revolutionaries and progressives who had been proscribed and driven into the mountains maintained contact with centers in the villages and through them with the key centers in Urumchi, Ili, Tacheng, Kashgar and elsewhere. In the summer of 1944 the call went out through this network to prepare for a general armed uprising.

A particularly resolute band of revolutionary outlaws had collected in the Nilka area, formerly Kungka County, some eighty kilometers east-southeast of Ili on the headwaters of the Kunges, a tributary of the Ili River. They included Fatikh, a former government employee from Ili, a Tartar; Ghani, a Uighur worker; Hamet, a young Tartar intellectual; Paichuren, another Tartar, a worker; and Akhbar, a Kazakh cattle farmhand. Among them too were Russian settlers who had come to Sinkiang previously or who had been born there and had fought in the ranks of the people against Chin Shu-jen. By August, preparations for the rising were well advanced. The Nilka revolutionaries were in contact with other outlaws in the Tienshan and Altai ranges: political prisoners who had escaped from jail or threat of jail; all sorts of “criminals” framed by Kuomintang officials; families of political prisoners who had been sent to special camps set up by the Kuomintang in these isolated but beautiful highlands; people put under surveillance who had tired of a life of con-
stant petty persecution and had escaped to the free wilderness; men who had been forced to flee their homes or been driven into bankruptcy by official misgovernment, corruption or blackmail. This was a brotherhood of desperate men who faced a lifetime of want and hardship unless their rulers and oppressors were overthrown. They were supported in their daring venture by the angry herdsmen and farmers of the region, who, traditionally hunters, were well used to firearms.

The Kazakhs and Mongols of the Nilka area are herdsmen and horsemen, proud of their marksmanship and horsemanship. They prize their freedom to roam the steppes and ranges. They have a tradition of rebellion against oppressors and in some places were in a chronic state of rebellion against the Kuomintang. Now their anger overflowed. A new Kuomintang order demanded ten thousand horses or seven hundred Sinkiang dollars in lieu of each horse for the troops which were the backbone of Kuomintang oppression. This was at a time when the people were starving and a horse could be bought for 350 Sinkiang dollars on the open market. The main burden of this exaction would fall on Ili and Tacheng as the principal horsebreeding areas. The revolutionary rank and file demanded an immediate rising against the Kuomintang. Their leaders knew they had insufficient modern weapons—the Kuomintang had been carrying on systematic searches to take these from the people—but they felt that weapons good enough to kill wolves were good enough to kill tyrants. Superb horsemen, they knew every fold of these highlands. Preparations for the rising were stepped up from August to October 1944. Small patrols of Kuomintang soldiers were waylaid and their weapons seized. By October, the revolutionaries had four hundred men armed and ready. But the Kuomintang had over 10,000 troops in the Ili area.

The attacks on their patrols stung the Ili authorities into action. Thinking to scare the people, they foolishly announced in public that a punitive expedition would be dispatched to wipe out the "bandits disturbing order in Nilka." They underestimated the threat to their power. The expedition numbered only ninety men and officers.

Paichuren, Akhbar, Hamet with Fatikh and Ali, another Uighur, and Sait, a Kazakh, heading a detachment of picked fighters, laid an ambush at the pass of Ulastai. The Kuomintang troops advanced in their usual way, pillaging the people, requisitioning mutton and kumiss. Every move they made was reported to the guerrillas, and they fell headlong into the ambush. Only a handful of them escaped. All their weapons were captured. When the survivors reached Ili with their story, made
doubly horrendous to save face, the Kuomintang finally realized that the Nilka “bandit menace” was a serious matter.

With ninety new modern weapons, the prestige of a victory and the initiative in their hands, the partisans decided to attack Nilka itself. Whether they knew it or not they were following the well-tried principle of revolutionary action: to advance and again advance, and to hit where the enemy is weakest. The rulers at the start of a revolutionary uprising can usually muster superior forces, but they must not be given the chance to concentrate those forces for a decisive blow.

All available revolutionary forces were gathered for the attack on Nilka.

Rakhmet, the Herdsman

Rakhmet was twenty years old. Son of a Kazakh herdsman, he lived with his family near Ulastai. Their clothes were rags. Their food was mutton and only the coarsest grain. The yurt that was their home was of tattered felt barely held together with thongs. Inside it was almost as bare as the steppe outside. A single battered wooden chest held all the family's cherished possessions.

To the Kazakh, kumiss is the drink of life, but tea is the drink that brings flavor to life, tea with a dash of salt and a helping of cream and butter. The precious caddy of tea was kept locked in this chest, and the key to the chest was tied to the apron that grandmother wore. Only she had the right to open the chest, to take out a pinch of tea for the honored guest or ravage the contents of the caddy for the great family events—the return of a wandering member, a marriage, a birth. And now the caddy was empty. They were drinking “tea” made of dried carrots or burned apple skins.

Life as they lived it seemed to be a hopeless struggle. If you had four cows, the Kuomintang taxgatherer took your first calf as tax. But there was no knowing what else they would take. Their neighbor had only one horse, but this was requisitioned and he never got it back.

Rakhmet and his family shunned the towns. They went there with a feeling of misgiving. If it was to sell a sheep or a fur, they knew instinctively that no matter what cunning they showed, they would be outwitted and never get the true price of their goods. And as like as not they would have to put up with insults. “Kazakh!” someone would shout and spit upon the ground.
When Rakhmet’s father heard of the rising, a family council was called. In the circle formed by the yurt walls, they discussed what was happening. The call had gone out: “Out with the Kuomintang!” That was good! Rakhmet’s father sent his son to the wars. He gave him his blessing, calling on Allah to preserve him. He was mounted on the family horse. His only weapon was the weapon of the people in their extremity—a club of stout pine wood. Rakhmet fought at Ulastai, the first of eight battles. His pine-wood club knocked sense into more than one hard Kuomintang head. And now Rakhmet, elated at his first victory, was marching on Nilka.

The partisans threw all they had into the attack on Nilka and captured the town. But Hamet, their commander, was mortally wounded by an enemy grenade as he led his men to storm the center of Kuomintang resistance, the public security bureau.

Somehow the Kuomintang security chief evaded the cordon thrown around the town to catch Kuomintang runaways. He made his way up into the neighboring mountains until, foot-weary and exhausted, he reached a Kazakh encampment. Only the women were at home. Every man had gone to the attack on Nilka. Hastily taking council, they gave their “guest” a lavish welcome, promising him a horse as soon as they could round one up, or at least a donkey or a cow. Meanwhile they plied him with meat and more and more kumiss. When they had finally got him drowsy and befuddled, they tied him up and delivered him trussed to the revolutionary command.

Success breeds success. The raising of the revolutionary banner at Nilka on October 9 attracted crowds of new recruits. More than five hundred men were added to the original force. This more than replaced losses. Men were clamoring to enlist. Suddenly word came from the underground revolutionary organization in Ili that the Kuomintang was preparing to send a large part of the Ili garrison on a punitive expedition to Nilka.

The partisans did not make the mistake of waiting to be attacked. Leaving Akhbar with a small holding force at Nilka, they swiftly mobilized over a thousand men to attack Ili itself. Half of this force was armed with rifles, pikes or some other recognized weapon. The rest carried clubs, knives or anything else that would serve. On November 7, Sait, the Kazakh, rode off at their head carrying the new banner of national liberation—a white star within a crescent on a field of green. Rakhmet gazed at it with reverence. This was his flag. His club was
discarded now. Cradled in his arms was a rifle of ancient Russian vintage nicknamed the Berdyanka. It had first come into general use in the Russian army back in the 1860s.

The Kuomintang had airplanes, but despite daily reconnaissance flights from Ili, they were unaware of the revolutionaries' plans. The partisans split up into small bands and, moving mainly at night, converged on Ili. The Kuomintang continued to underestimate the strength and resolution of the people. Even as the threat to Ili, the key to the area, grew, they continued their march on the village of Nilka. The small force of partisans there had orders to hold out and pin down the Kuomintang troops as long as possible.

The revolutionaries in Ili did not wait to be liberated. As soon as they heard that the partisans were approaching, they prepared an armed uprising. The signal for zero hour was Sait's offensive. Sait was mustering his forces in the hamlet of Altaisival, ironically named after the ill-fated Six Policies of Sheng Shih-tsai.

The Kuomintang had three battalions in Ili. One was a force of regulars raised and trained inside the Wall. They were mainly Han veterans and were the best-equipped troops in the Ili area. They had modern automatic rifles, mortars, light and heavy machine guns and plenty of ammunition. They were quartered in barracks on present-day Stalin Street, a poplar-shaded avenue in central Ili not far from Kuomintang army headquarters. The second battalion was a training unit camped in the West Park. Made up of conscripts from the various national minorities in Ili, this was a scratch force distrusted by the Kuomintang, and it was therefore poorly armed. It had only two or three rifles to a company. The third battalion, also of well-armed Han regulars, was stationed in the Airambek district and guarded the nearby airfield.

Only on the very eve of the rising did the Kuomintang sniff trouble. Then, panicky and desperate, it unleashed a wave of terror. Martial law was proclaimed. Security guards rounded up hundreds of suspects. Patrols indiscriminately gunned down anyone moving on the streets. Suspects were butchered. Without even a pretense of investigation or trial thirty-three men and women were shot inside the first district police station. Another thirty-five were shot at the central police station. Two hundred and thirty-three newly arrested people were herded together, shot in batches and buried in a single mass grave. Another thousand caught in groups was shot and tumbled into wells and ravines. There was one survivor of this massacre. He wriggled free of his captors, escaped, jumped down a well himself to hide and was buried alive
there with the dead thrown down after him. He was rescued when the victorious revolutionaries searched the wells a day later.

The Kuomintang terror was wild and indiscriminate. The revolutionary organization in Ili suffered losses, but its leading cadre was intact and swiftly reacted to the attack. A detachment of armed men was sent with Abbasov, Zolun Tahir and Abdulla Zakhir to link up with and guide the partisans from Altaisal. Another group was sent to contact the training battalion in the West Park. It won over the Uighur and Mongol conscripts, but the Hans were confused and wavered. They knew that the revolt was against the Kuomintang, but the Kuomintang was almost entirely Han, and so it seemed that the wrath of the people would be directed against all Hans, just another episode in the long history of racial and religious strife in Sinkiang. So the Han conscripts hung back. But even their neutrality was a plus.

The third and best armed detachment was deployed to attack the Ili security bureau, the center of reaction. An abortive attempt was made to capture alive Lu Pen-ti, the hated Kuomintang security chief. Lu, a former confidant of Sheng Shih-tsai, was in Ili especially to apprehend young revolutionaries. A commando of four picked men went to ambush him in his house some six hundred yards from the bureau. But he was on the alert and opened fire on his attackers. In the return fire he was killed outright. The skirmish drew a posse of guards from the bureau, and the battle was on.

Attacking from the rear where trees gave them cover, the insurgents, dodging fire, gained the wall around the compound, scaled this barrier at many points and in hand-to-hand fighting captured the two-story building. It was immediately turned into their own headquarters. By the end of that day, November 10, most of Ili was in the hands of the people. While the attack on the bureau was being pressed home, the partisan units under Sait had attacked from the west. The match and tobacco factory and four other plants were quickly occupied and their guards disarmed. Sait was leading the advance on the town itself when he was killed by a bullet.

Communication between the various Kuomintang centers had been cut at an early stage of the fighting. Had they worked to a common strategy, their story might have been different, but each unit thought only of itself. They were invested and one by one destroyed by far less well-equipped fighters.

On November 13 a special group was detailed to capture the city jail and free the prisoners. There had been fighting for two full days and
nights now. The town was filled with expectation and rumors. But the rebels were clearly having the best of it. Their green flags dominated more and more buildings. So great was the demoralization of the Kuomintang that a hundred armed men backed up by the people were able to overcome a force of over three hundred police holed up behind the walls of the jail.

The Intellectual

The jail was packed with prisoners. Talkative jailers and prisoners with outside contacts brought in news and rumors. Something was astir, but exactly what was happening was anybody's guess. While hope of deliverance grew, every man knew too that the danger of a massacre of prisoners was also growing. Which would come first—deliverance or death? And there was nothing they could do but wait in agonizing suspense. A premature move on their part would spark a massacre.

Argun (this is not his real name; a modest man, he shunned publicity) paced his cell in frustration. He had not been in jail long. His powerful young body was irked by the narrow cell hardly big enough for four steps in each direction. From outside came sounds of fighting: the chatter of machine guns, the whine of bullets, confused shouting. Sudden rushes of footsteps and then long silences. The jailers were almost as much in the dark as the prisoners. A besieging force of rebels prevented anyone from entering or leaving. Telephone communications had been cut. No orders came. Not knowing what might befall, they thought to use the prisoners as hostages and even treated them a bit better than usual, but they were also quite prepared to cut their throats if necessary. A whole day passed in this tense purgatory. Darkness fell.

Argun had been born in Ili but had gone as a child with his family to live in Urumchi. His father, a well-to-do Tartar, had worked hard as a junior government employee and besides providing for his family had given his children a good education by teaching them himself. He had prospered in the first promising years of Sheng Shih-ts'ai's regime. Then came disaster. In 1938, at an early stage of Sheng Shih-ts'ai's betrayal of democracy, he was arrested, ostensibly on a charge of "subversion" but more probably because he was honest and intelligent and possessed some property. He languished in jail for seven years. His health was broken. His family was not only ruined but deported from Urumchi as "enemies of the people." They were sent to an isolated penal camp in the Chaosu
hills near Ili where the inmates lived in the stalls of long barracks no better than stables. Argun nourished a bitter hatred for the Kuomintang, and this hate extended to the whole Han people, in whom at that time he saw the cause of all the misfortunes and sufferings of Sinkiang and of his own family.

No longer a child and considered able to look after himself, he was released from the concentration camp and went to find work in Ili. A lively, sociable youngster, he joined the Cultural Promotion Association and frequented a Tartar club, one of the national-minority clubs that had continued to exist from Sheng Shih-tsai's early "democratic period." Here he heard about events in the Soviet Union just over the border and also about the Han revolutionaries led by the Communist Party in Kansu, Shensi and Ninghsia who were fighting for a free, democratic China in which all the peoples could live in peace, equality and brotherhood. For the first time he learned about Marxism and socialism. He heard vague rumors about a revolutionary organization in Sinkiang and in Ili itself. Finally, through a friend, he established contact with an underground group of Tartar youths in Ili. They studied political theories, enthusiastically discussed their hopes for a new Sinkiang and plotted revolutionary action. But they were inexperienced in underground activity. The Kuomintang secret police got on their trail and arrested nearly all of them. Some were sentenced to imprisonment. Some were shot. Those who survived later became some of the most active participants of the revolution in Ili. So it was that Argun found himself behind bars and helpless just when the revolution had need of every man it could muster. Argun beat his fists against the walls of his cell in angry frustration.

The long day of November 13 drew to a close at last. Darkness fell and then, just as hopes faded, there came a sudden rattle of rifle fire. Fierce shouts came from all sides—those who had no guns created as much din and terror as they could with their lungs—and after a few minutes of confusion and uncertainty, the prisoners saw their cell doors opened and they were free, dazed or hysterical with happiness and relief. Their jailers were locked in the cells.

Fighting was going on in various parts of the town. The glare of fires lit the sky. Kind hands carried away the prisoners who from torture or mistreatment were too weak to walk. The rest, Argun among them, were led to the revolutionary command post. Some wished to find their families. Argun wanted to fight. His big frame marked him out and he was given a Berdyanka. He sent word to his mother and within minutes,
fighting with the fury of a liberated lion, he was adding his wit and strength to the revolutionary forces battling with the Kuomintang for other strongpoints in the town.

**Battle for Ili**

Deployed to overawe an unarmed citizenry, the Kuomintang forces were dispersed for maximum visibility in small garrisons in factories, offices and walled strongpoints. But these had no coordinated plan of defense. The revolutionaries were thus able to repeat their earlier successful tactics of using small units to tie down isolated enemy garrisons while concentrating their main forces for all-out attacks on key targets of their own choosing. The small garrisons were wiped out or surrendered where they stood. Those that could, retreated to three remaining strongpoints: the district of Airambek, the airfield and Liang Shan (Two Hills), all lying east of the town. Here they were closely invested by the Ili people and the Nilka partisans. Other Kuomintang units which failed to cut their way to these enclaves tried to escape in other directions. One group fled south to the Chaosu highlands, the pastures across the Ili River and then across the Tienshan, south again, to Aksu. Another group of two hundred tried to detour around the town to the Airambek redoubt. It was waylaid and wiped out on the way.

The Kuomintang command, however, managed to concentrate about eight thousand men with modern weapons in its last remaining three strongpoints, and these now became the focus of operations. Unaware of the strength of the Kuomintang at Airambek, a detachment of partisans and Ili revolutionaries made an impetuous attack that was thrown back with heavy losses. A Kuomintang counterattack caught the investing forces off balance. Untrained to holding operations under concentrated fire, many raw recruits wavered. But the Kuomintang failed to press home its temporary advantage, and the danger passed. This reconnaissance in force and trial of strength showed that a persistent and systematic struggle would have to be waged to wipe out these centers of Kuomintang resistance. The revolutionary command ordered a close blockade of the besieged while a decisive blow was prepared.

The Kuomintang meanwhile strengthened its defenses and waited hopefully for help to come from outside. Urgent messages had been sent to Urumchi, and help was actually on its way from three places. Kuomintang garrisons were ordered to converge on Ili from Ashaleh, Turasu and Gurtsago (Kintsai), the three strategic passes leading
through the Tienshan and Boro Horo Ula down to the Ili Valley from the steppes of Djungaria and the road from Urumchi.

The revolutionary command drew up plans to prevent these reinforcements from reaching their destination. They were unwittingly helped by the Kuomintang commanders, who stayed passively on the defensive in their three Ili strongholds instead of launching determined and coordinated sorties to link up with these reinforcements or, at least, pin down their opponents’ forces.

The strongest Kuomintang detachment was the seven hundred men from Ashaleh. The revolutionary force sent against them numbered only 150 men, but these were fairly well armed and already battle-trained. Using the age-old tactics of nomad warriors, they made a feint attack on the Kuomintang column and then retreated as if in flight, inveigling the enemy into an ambush where five hundred of them were killed or captured. The remnant two hundred fled, but fell into another ambush of fifty partisans in prepared positions. They were wiped out or surrendered in this final encirclement.

The second Kuomintang force from Turasu was met and defeated by a partisan force under Fatikh of Ulastai fame. The third from Gurtsago was wiped out by a force under Izaakbeg, a Kirghiz who later became commander in chief of all the revolutionary forces. Having eliminated all immediate prospects of relief of the Kuomintang in Ili, the revolutionary command prepared to complete the liberation of the town.

**Aims of the Revolt**

After the first successes, the revolutionaries’ tasks rapidly multiplied. To complete the defeat of the Kuomintang, a first necessity was to coordinate the actions of all fighting detachments and then reorganize the scattered and heterogeneous bands into a regular army backed by a mass movement of the people. At the same time the revolutionary leaders had to assume all the functions of government and civil administration. The rebel headquarters in Ili worked day and night. Several factors favored it. The Kuomintang had made itself universally detested by its tyranny and corruption, and the people responded enthusiastically to the rebel appeals. Militarily, the Kuomintang forces in Ili were isolated in their three strongholds. These were closely blockaded by the trenches and defenses thrown up by the besiegers, and it would be weeks before a new Kuomintang operation could be mounted for their relief. Help could come only from Urumchi, but much of the three-day truck
journey from there to Ili is over desolate desert without water or food, and with the rebels in control of the passes, any advancing force would have to fight for the last third of the road through the sharp descent into the Ili plain. Furthermore, there was trouble or threat of trouble everywhere in Sinkiang, and the Kuomintang authorities in Urumchi were hard pressed to muster a large enough force for a decisive offensive against Ili. While they were busy mobilizing and equipping this force, the Ili rebels gained a valuable breathing space, which they used to consolidate their positions and prepare for the next round of fighting. In Ili, the Kuomintang still had more and better-armed troops than the rebels, but their policy of passive defenses left the initiative in the hands of their nimbler opponents.

As soon as the capture of Ili seemed assured, the revolutionary command on November 11, 1944, formed an administration with the name of the Provisional East Turkestan Revolutionary Government. It was made up of leaders of the armed uprising such as Isaakbeg and members of the underground organization in Ili, including Akhmedjan Kassimeh, Abassov, Saifudin and Alikhan. A revolt had become a revolution. News of the successful uprising in Ili spread swiftly through the valleys and pastures of Ili and Chaosu. Swift riders took it south across the Ili and Tekes rivers to Aksu and beyond, north to the highlands of Tacheng and Tarbagatai and the steppes and pasturelands of the Altai. Revolutionary groups all over Sinkiang now looked to Ili for leadership. Wherever they could they made trouble for the Kuomintang, forcing it to disperse its troops.

Men and women from every national group and stratum of society flocked to the green banner of revolt against the Kuomintang. Every nationality and religious belief in the Ili area was represented in the fighting ranks or among their supporters. There were Kazakhs and Tartars, Kirghiz and Uighurs, Huis and Mongols, Russians, Sibos, Solons, and Hans. There were workers, peasants and herdsmen, handi-
craftsmen, intellectuals and merchants, factory owners, tenants and landowners, serfs and feudal nobles. Those who could, bore arms. Others gave money, goods or what service they could as carriers, messengers, cooks or stretcher bearers.

The revolution meant different things to different men. To some it meant liberation and justice after uncounted and insupportable wrongs suffered in the past. Young men rode against the enemy shouting "Liberty and fraternity!" But to others it was the day of retribution, and they raised the fratricidal cry of "Death to the Hans!" There were gray-
beards who offered up their dearest possessions in the conviction that it was a jihad, a holy war for Islam. They told their sons on the eve of battle, as Rakhmet's father told him: "Who lives through this good fight will be honored for all eternity, and who dies in it will be assured a place in Heaven, accepted without question at the Gates of Paradise!" It was with such battlecries that old Moslem warriors, fanatic in their zeal for holy glory, rode against the enemy guns. Native capitalists, smarting from the ruthless competition of the Kuomintang bureaucrat-monopoly capitalists, wanted a chance for free competition and backed the revolution with their money. While some wanted a socialist system within China, some wanted to establish a separatist, a landlord-capitalist state in Sinkiang or even an exclusively Islamic theocratic state. All these elements had their representatives in the leadership. But in all this diversity of aims and passions, two facts stood out: the main fighting force of the revolution was the working people of town and countryside; and the uniting force was opposition to the common enemy. This common enemy was the Kuomintang party dictatorship, with its oppression and Han chauvinism, and the forces that stood behind it—the bureaucrat capitalists, the feudal landlords and warlords and the foreign imperialist powers. This was a revolutionary, national liberation struggle.

While the Mongols and many Hans were Buddhists and the Russian settlers included Orthodox Christians, the great mass of those fighting for the revolution—Kazakh and Kirghiz herdsmen, Tartar, Hui and Uighur peasants, workers, artisans and intellectuals—was Moslem. Furthermore, the authority and power of the upper strata of these peoples at that time was closely bound up with their role as leaders of the Moslem religious community. All this had to be taken into account by the revolutionary leadership. To maintain the united front, to achieve the main immediate aim on which all agreed—liberation from the Kuomintang—it was essential to prevent conflict between the various religious groups within the united front and get general agreement that only a secular state could guarantee religious tolerance for all.

The central core of leadership—the left—represented the revolutionary workers, peasants, herdsmen and intellectuals. Mainly Moslems, they did not, however, share the reactionary ideas of the right or the religious fanatics. They knew that the immediate task of the provisional government was to rally to itself all who could be rallied and so isolate the main enemy—the Kuomintang oppressors. They knew that there would be a parting of the ways eventually, but in the meantime it was
their responsibility to maintain the unity of the left, center and right of the united front and lead and encourage as many of these diverse elements as possible to support the immediate aims of the revolution: the overthrow of the Kuomintang and its agents and the establishment of democracy and national freedom and equality among all the nationalities of Sinkiang. These were the minimum demands of the time.

The military situation was still precarious. A split in the revolutionary ranks could be disastrous. To go ahead and carry out the further tasks of the revolution as they envisaged it, that is, the socialist transformation of society, while carrying forward in the revolutionary ranks as many members of the united front as possible, needed much preparation and systematic educational-propaganda work. The need now was for unity—the creation of a revolutionary united front of the people, including the national bourgeoisie and even the landlords and big herd-owners, against the Kuomintang. For the revolutionary left leadership, this was not a matter of political expediency but of revolutionary principle. Thanks to the mass support which it enjoyed, that leadership was at all times master of the situation, but it had to be circumspect in exercising its power. Dictatorial, dogmatic action could quickly erode its base.

To take one example, trade with the Soviet Union was reopened and a new state corporation was put in charge of it. Merchants who assisted the corporation as agents, buyers and distributors were allowed a reasonable profit. When it was discovered that some of them were profiteering, the offenders were called into the ministry of trade and asked to make amends by contributing to the revolutionary exchequer. Seeing the justice of the demand and understanding the consequences of non-compliance, they readily agreed.

It is the contention of the Ili leaders with whom I spoke that insofar as the Kuomintang was playing the despicable role of agent of the imperialist powers in exploiting and oppressing the Han people and the various national minorities in China and endeavoring to turn Sinkiang and especially Ili into a staging area for attack on the USSR, the 1944 Ili Uprising was also an anti-imperialist movement aiding the revolutionary and progressive national liberation struggle and the socialist revolutions in China and the Soviet Union.

At the moment in 1944, however, the main and limited aim of the Ili revolutionary government was to expel the Kuomintang and bring immediate relief to the people. It achieved its goal in the three areas of Ili, Tacheng and Altai. This success enabled it to play a key role first in
alleviating the condition of the people throughout Sinkiang and later in the peaceful liberation of Sinkiang by the Communist-led People's Liberation Army* in 1949. Following that, linked up directly with the powerful revolutionary movement of all China led by the Chinese Communist Party, the people and revolutionary leaders of Sinkiang were able to go on to complete the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and tackle those of the socialist revolution as an integral part of the whole Chinese revolutionary movement.

The full significance of the Ili Uprising did not, of course, become immediately evident. It took time to channel into constructive activities the revolutionary flood loosed by the first victory of the people in Nulka. In the early days, undiscriminating anti-Han tendencies made themselves felt. The Ili leadership was forewarned both of this and of the very real danger that shortsighted local nationalisms, or even tribalisms, might distort the character of the revolution. Other popular uprisings in Sinkiang had foundered on this rock.

Because nearly every Kuomintang Party member in Ili was a Han, it was very difficult at first to get all the people to accept Hans into the revolutionary ranks. In the heat of conflict, fanatical elements attacked Hans simply because they were Hans. Yet many a Moslem risked his life to protect a good Han neighbor from racist attack. The revolutionary committee at that time issued white armbands to all Han civilians who applied for them, and an order was widely publicized to protect all Hans wearing them. This order was obeyed. The Kuomintang, however, issued arms to reactionaries among the Hans and spread panic stories of an impending massacre of Hans. When some of these armed Han civilians were found firing on the revolutionary forces, the angry cry was raised: “Kill the Hans!”

There was a saying in Sinkiang: “Every three years, a small clash (between the nationalities); every five years, a big clash!” Prompt action was needed to prevent the revolutionary movement from degenerating into indiscriminate slaughter of the Hans, easily distinguishable in a land where everyone normally wore national dress, distinctive skullcaps or hats, gowns or boots. Akmedjan Kassimeh had quickly emerged as one of the outstanding political leaders of the movement. Now, speaking for the revolutionary leadership, he issued a warning against the dangers of undiluted nationalism and religious fanaticism. He pointed

* The new name for the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army, which were the wartime designations given by the Kuomintang to the former Red Army units of the Chinese Soviets.
out that the revolutionary workers, peasants and intellectuals among the
Hans and ordinary middle-class people and progressives from other
classes—that is, the overwhelming majority of the Han people—themselves suffered from the Kuomintang dictatorship, and they should be
welcome to join all the peoples of Sinkiang in a common struggle for
freedom, equality and progress.

It was not generally known that Han progressives in Sinkiang had their
own underground revolutionary organization, which supported the pro-
visional government and cooperated with it closely. As soon as it was
feasible, more and more Hans openly joined the revolutionary ranks.
As soon as they understood the true situation, individually and then in
whole detachments, Kuomintang soldiers came over to the revolutionary
forces. Most of these were poorly paid conscripts, pressganged Han
peasants and urban poor. They had fought for the Kuomintang as mer-
cenaries, rice-bowl soldiers, terrorized by their officers—that hard core
of scoundrels in the Kuomintang ranks who had committed crimes
against the people and feared retribution. As soon as they were con-
vinced that they would be justly treated by the revolutionaries, these
soldiers of Han or other nationalities only sought an opportunity to
escape from their Kuomintang officers. Step by step, the danger of a
Han massacre was eliminated and the revolutionary forces were able
to concentrate on their main task—defeating the Kuomintang.

Young Argun’s experience was typical. He saw poor Han conscripts
being treated like expendable cannon fodder by their Han officers. He
learned that a man’s valor was not a matter of nationality but was in-
spired by the cause for which he fought. He cast off his bitter hatred of
Hans in general and reserved his hatred for the oppressors of the people
—all people.

Ili Freed

Many other matters demanded urgent attention. Order was restored
in the Liberated Areas. Kuomintang officials, alarmed, were fleeing
their posts in districts threatened by the partisans. The Kuomintang
special commissioner for the Ili area fled to Suidun. But a partisan
detachment soon captured that town and Horgos on the Chinese-
Soviet border west of Ili and drove him out. This secured the rear of the
revolutionary base and reopened trade with the Soviet Union. Restora-
tion of trade brought immediate economic relief to the people. Soon
another four nearby counties passed over peacefully to the Ili government, and local governments were established by the people for the first time in their lives. Partisan detachments were sent to complete the liberation of all the eight counties that with Ili comprised the Ili area.

Preparations went ahead simultaneously to liquidate the main threat to Ili—the large concentrations of Kuomintang forces in Airambek, the airfield and Liang Shan.

Airambek was a strong position long prepared by the Kuomintang for just such an emergency. It was a military barracks on a hill surrounded by a stout earthen wall, and it dominated the eastern suburbs of the town and the road to the airfield. The smooth sides of the hill had been cleared of trees and offered an attacking force no cover against heavy enfilading machine-gun fire. The rebels had no artillery or explosives able to breach even the earthen wall of this fortress refuge for some eight thousand Kuomintang troops and officers with their families and hangers-on.

Such a position could not be taken with partisan tactics, so the revolutionary headquarters decided on a strategy of siege. A mobilization department was set up in early December. Young Argun was appointed to this and threw all his considerable energies into its work. Within a few days it enrolled over a thousand young stalwarts, including Rakhmet, the Kazakh herdsman, and their training in modern warfare began in earnest. Arms were still in short supply. The commander and deputy commander had only ancient Russian nagans (a type of heavy Mauser). The few rifles were given to the most experienced fighters. The rest were armed with pikes made by local blacksmiths. Such were the weapons with which the Ili army attacked and captured Kuomintang machine-gun nests.

The newly formed detachment got its baptism of fire in the attack on the Liang Shan area. This too was strongly defended but with fewer men. The tobacco factory there and mosque with its minaret lookout tower provided good positions for the enemy’s twelve heavy machine guns. The attackers made several attempts to engage the enemy hand to hand and so make most effective use of their primitive weapons, but each time they suffered heavy losses and were driven back. Only thirty yards separated the two lines. It was easy for even a badly demoralized Kuomintang soldier to hit a man with a rifle bullet at that distance. Crossfire from the machine guns made an impenetrable curtain of death.
But though the position could not be taken, the Kuomintang troops there were held immobile. Not daring to venture out of their defenses, they waited in vain for help. They could get nothing from the people. Water and food began to run out. Their situation became desperate. With the usual Kuomintang ineptitude, the larger groups of Kuomintang troops holed up at Airambek and the airfield gave them no help by way of sorties.

Learning from their heavy losses in daylight actions, the rebel detachment began to attack at night, eating into the Kuomintang defenses post by post and arming themselves first with rifles and then with machine guns. A sixty-year-old Uighur volunteer was the first to get himself a machine gun. He crawled unseen and unheard to surprise a Kuomintang post, kill its defenders singlehanded and return with their machine gun. In January, a considerable part of the Liang Shan positions were captured. By that time, the three Kuomintang strongholds were completely isolated from one another.

Five months previously at Nilka, only a few score men were involved in the fighting. Now thousands were in the front lines. Without the aid of the people it would have been impossible to keep up such fighting. The revolutionary forces at first had no organized medical service, but good people came from the cellars at the height of the fighting, dragged wounded men out of danger and tended their wounds. Doctors and medical workers were organized to make regular rounds of improvised hospitals and homes that had “adopted” wounded men. Townsfolk and cottagers provided billets for the hundreds of volunteers flocking to Ili from the surrounding areas. They gave clothes and food and shelter to those who had lost their homes in the fighting. Families near the front line blockading the Kuomintang strongpoints baked bread and took it piping hot to the fighters. The peasants of the suburbs regularly brought in supplies of food. Shopkeepers and artisans helped to keep economic life going amid the whine of bullets and crackle of machine-gun fire.

Fortunately, time, for the moment, was on the side of the rebels. But it was becoming increasingly urgent to wipe out the three Kuomintang strongpoints in Ili. News came that the Kuomintang was preparing a major offensive against Ili and that the forward elements of this drive were already marching up the road from Urumchi. Unless the Kuomintang forces still in Ili were wiped out before that attack came, the people’s forces might be caught between two fires. If the danger inside Ili could be eliminated, the rebel forces could be deployed to spread the
revolution or concentrated to deal with the threat from Urumchi, the main center of Kuomintang forces in Sinkiang.

The airfield is on a flat plain. A wide area around it gave the defenders a clear field of fire. The revolutionary forces had neither guns, mortars nor explosives to shell the Kuomintang camp or to shatter the barbed-wire entanglements protecting the enemy positions. Every attack melted under murderous machine-gun fire. It was then that the Ili command brought its famous "tank"* into action. This was a heavy "Stalinetz" tractor that had got stranded in Ili from the Sheng Shih-tsai days. The rebels rigged it up with metal sheets to form a moving fort. The inside was upholstered with thick felt as additional protection. As I saw it later in Ili, with a driver and two light machine gunners as crew, it seemed to be a formidable weapon with which to crash a way for supporting infantry through the enemy barbed wire.

Though only a few hundred yards of open ground had to be crossed to reach the Kuomintang lines, the advance, which began at seven A.M., went so slowly that when the winter darkness fell, the attack was still going on. The Kuomintang troops, who had panicked at first, seemed to rally. Then suddenly a group of men who were clearly not Hans appeared before the Kuomintang lines, waving their weapons and shouting. With a victorious yell many of the volunteers got up from their hiding places and rushed forward. But it was a cunning ruse. The Kuomintang had forced some of the national-minority people who had been carried into their positions to take empty rifles and stage this tragic farce. Now they poured machine-gun fire into the attackers running in the open and mowed them down by the score. At this crucial moment, the "tank" ran out of fuel and stopped dead, though its crew continued to do all they could with their machine gun to protect the infantrymen around it.

A girl nurse, hearing the cries of the tank crew, dashed out of the revolutionary lines before anyone could stop her, and was seen lugging a can of gasoline straight through the field of enemy fire. Somehow, despite being wounded, she got through. Once again the tank went into action, this time covering the withdrawal of the attackers.

A second attack was launched in December. But it too failed. December 24 saw the climax of the fiercest fighting. In early January the

* The Kuomintang dispatches blew this incident up into a report about "Soviet tanks in action."
Kuomintang launched a counteroffensive. It brought all its weapons into play, but in its turn, it could make no headway against the stubborn defenses of the besiegers. With this effort, the Kuomintang had shot its bolt. Its men were in a sorry plight. As at Liang Shan, lack of food, water and rest began to take toll of their spirits. Attempts to drop them fresh supplies by plane failed. Concentrated rifle and machine-gun fire from the ground forced the planes to fly high and miss their aim. The supplies dropped into the arms of the revolutionaries. Eighty days after the siege started, the Kuomintang troops at the airfield, at Liang Shan and in Airambek were faced with the alternatives of surrendering or attempting a breakthrough. Many had already perished from disease or lack of food, or been wounded or killed in action. In March, the remnants, desperate and unable to wait longer for help from outside, made a determined attempt to escape. In the retreat to Turasu on the road to Urumchi they were wiped out piecemeal.

The whole of the Ili area was now freed from the enemy. Following the actions at Nilka, Ili and Airambek, a new stage of the liberation struggle started: the battle to extend the revolutionary base to the Tacheng and Altai areas to the north and defend the gains of the revolution from Kuomintang counterattack.

Rakhmet, the young Kazakh herdsman who had fought at Nilka with a club and in Ili with a Berdyanka, now set out for new battles armed with a brand-new American submachine gun captured from the Kuomintang—“supply train” of the revolutionaries.
CHAPTER 11

The Three Areas Freed

The revolutionary army was preparing for new operations even while the battle for the three Kuomintang strongholds in Ili still raged. The fighting and the many urgent problems of civil administration were a rigorous test for the rebels' new government. That searching examination graduated a group of leaders with vigor and initiative. They were Akhmedjan Kassimeh, Saifuddin, Izaakbeg, Dalilkhun, Abdul Karim Abbas (Abassov) and Partikhan. By January 1945 all the counties in the Ili area were liberated, but the threat of a Kuomintang counteroffensive was growing. Kuomintang troops were gathering in strength at Chingho, 240 miles west of Urumchi and 100 miles as the crow flies from Ili. Reinforced with a motorized and armored column, this army was just about to advance when news came of the fall of the three Kuomintang strongholds in Ili. This loss forced postponement of the offensive. More reinforcements had to be brought up. The Ili revolutionary command on its part made good use of the time gained to strengthen its forces and initiate some action of its own.

The most urgent military task was to create a regular army out of the
various revolutionary forces and partisan detachments. All who had taken part in military operations were eligible to join, but older men were urged to return home, and it was still deemed inexpedient to allow Hans to bear arms or join the army. Izaakbeg, son of a Kirghiz herdsman, was appointed commander in chief of the National People's Army.

Then forty-two years old, Izaakbeg was one of the outstanding leaders of the Ili uprising. By all accounts he combined rare warmth with great energy, daring and resolution. All who knew him speak of him with unreserved affection and admiration. He was born in 1903 in Szemohala township, Wutze County. He tended sheep and did the other chores of a Kirghiz lad till he was fifteen. Like many Kirghiz nomads at that time and many years later (till the late 1950s, in fact), he drifted over the ill-defined borders into Soviet territory and lived there until 1922. When he returned to Sinkiang he saw his country ravaged and exploited by the warlords. Leading a partisan detachment in Wutze and Tashkurgan counties, west of Aksu, he distinguished himself in a rising against the "little dictator" Chin Shu-jen. Thus he joined the Ili uprising with some military experience and added to this in the Ili battles. On April 8, 1945, with the rank of lieutenant-general, he was given command of all the revolutionary forces and led them until his untimely death in 1949. Under his command the People's Army was turned into a modern force, armed with several thousand rifles and other modern equipment captured from the enemy. Designations and flags were given to the various units. There were ten regiments: the First, Second and Third were infantry, the rest were cavalry units. The First Cavalry Brigade was commanded by Izaakbeg himself. In addition to a Mongol cavalry squadron, a Hui and a Kazakh regiment were the only ones composed entirely of men of a single nationality. The others were all of mixed ethnic composition. In addition there were machine-gun and mortar companies, an artillery battery, rear service establishments and a political department for education of the troops. Captured Kuomintang trucks became the core of an independent motorized battalion.

Experienced fighters, veterans of many battles, like Rakhmet, the Kazakh, were distributed through these units and gave the new recruits a few weeks' intensive training. To ease supply problems, the troops were quartered in various parts of the Ili area. Some were in Suidun; others guarded the passes at Turasu and Kintsai. Argun, now a senior commander, was attached to the First Suidun Regiment, which played an outstanding role in the later operations at Chingho and Hsiho (Wusu).
He himself attended a three-month course for commanders. In May, June and July intensive training went ahead in the regiments from dawn to dusk and after. In June, the Suidun Regiment held a general review. It made a good showing in marching and field maneuvers. Arms inspection, however, showed that courage would have to make up for a lack of matériel. It had only three light machine guns, one a Choissey, one a Lewis and the third a Maxim, antiques of World War I vintage. All were of different caliber and there were only a hundred rounds of ammunition apiece. Its rifles came from various countries: Japan, Britain, Germany and America. Ammunition even for them was far from plentiful. It was, however, a regiment made up largely of youth, representative of every nationality in the area. Only a few veterans of fifty and over were enlisted because of their special experience. All were volunteers and eager for action.

Regular political education was introduced from the start. Argun, appointed deputy political commissar for political work, led the men in discussions of the aims of the national liberation struggle and the policies of the provisional government. All instruction and other activities were designed to bind commanders and men together in brotherly unity, to teach them to observe revolutionary discipline conscientiously and to love and care for the people as if they were all of one family. They took the oath of the army "to serve the people to the death and never retreat in the struggle to overthrow the Kuomintang oppressors."

As soon as the first units of the People’s Army were ready for action, Izaakbeg gave the order to free the Tacheng and Altai areas. The cavalry column sent on this mission in July 1945 was commanded by Polinov, one of the first partisan leaders and, like many of the twenty thousand people of Russian descent who lived in the Ili area at that time, a Russian born and bred in Sinkiang. He had been harshly treated by Sheng Shih-tsai and the Kuomintang and had fled with other outlaws to the mountainous frontier district west of Ili. On the first news of the uprising, he had led men of many nationalities to join the revolt. A valued military aide was old Lesgin, also a Sinkiang Ilikh (man of Ili) born and bred, of Russian descent. He was a skilled motor-transport worker. From partisan detachment leader, he had been promoted to regimental commander. Balding, blue-eyed, he spoke Kazakh and Uighur as well as Russian like a native and was popular with all. Participation of these Sinkiang Russians in the revolution should cause no surprise. Many Chinese settlers in Siberia took part in the fighting for the Russian...
revolution in 1917 and after. A monument to them stands in Novosibirsk, and at least one Soviet film tells of their exploits with a symbolic scene where the young Chinese partisan hero meets Lenin.

Polinov's deputy commander was Zolun Tahair, a Uighur. Lesgin, his regimental commander, was entrusted with actual field operations in Tacheng. While Lesgin led his men through the Mongol-inhabited Burota River area and north into Tacheng (Chuguchak or Tarbagatai), Polinov's column freed Russo. Zolun Tahair consolidated the victory, gathered reinforcements among the local people and replenished supplies. Polinov, who had pressed on so as not to give the Kuomintang a breathing space, linked up with local partisans under Hojakmet and together freed Dobujin (Ermin) on July 29. Uighur conscripts switched sides as soon as the situation was explained to them, but most of the Han soldiers fled over the border.

With these new recruits, Polinov's forces wheeled east, picked up the new units formed by Zolun Tahair and attacked the strong force of enemy troops in Chipaitze (Chipulai). This first assault was beaten back with heavy losses. Two hundred men were killed or wounded. A second assault on September 4 succeeded. The Kuomintang lost two regiments in these operations. The Independent Tartar Cavalry Squadron in Tarbagatai came over to the revolutionaries with all its equipment. It fought well in later engagements.

Strengthened by these successes, a flying column under Lesgin was sent to the vast Altai area, where a partisan detachment under Dalilkhan-Surgurbdayev was already harassing the Kuomintang. Contact was established and a combined operation routed the two Kuomintang regiments in the area.

This summer and autumn offensive of 1945 secured the rear of the passes of Turasu, Ashaleh (Borbozon) and Kintsai, commanding the approaches to Ili along the road from Urumchi, and completed liberation of the Three Areas of Ili, Tacheng and Altai.

**Battle for Chingho**

Great successes had been won, but the struggle was by no means over. The Kuomintang was almost ready to deliver its main counterblow. Chingho, on the road from Urumchi to Ili, was the key to the situation. Fifteen thousand well-armed Kuomintang troops were concentrated there to recover the Three Areas. The revolutionary army had about as many men, but they were not as well armed. Nevertheless, the Kuomintang
concentration at Chingho had to be smashed to maintain the momentum of the revolutionary advance and protect the Three Areas.

This would be a decisive trial of strength. Even while the Tacheng and Altai operations still continued, Izaakbeg and his deputy commander in chief Hassanov mustered their main forces against Chingho. Small detachments of partisans and propagandists were sent out in various directions to the rear of Chingho and Urumchi to rouse the people, harass the Kuomintang garrisons in Kashgaria and prevent them from being withdrawn to reinforce the Chingho striking force.

While the main revolutionary force advanced down the Ili-Urumchi road for a direct attack on Chingho, fifteen hundred men of two infantry battalions of the Suidun Regiment and one cavalry squadron was given a special assignment: to make a big detour in an arc north and then south, threaten Chingho from the rear and cut off the Kuomintang’s retreat to Urumchi. This meant a march of two hundred and eighty miles on foot over pitiless desert terrain with the rendezvous sixty days away. They would go into battle straight from the march.

The Suidun people had seen their regiment grow from a rather ragged troop of volunteers into a smart-marching regiment of regulars. Now they poured out of the town to see them off. Parents solemnly gave their farewell behests to their children. Speaking in the rhetorical cadences of the Kazakh ballads—the Kambar or Koblandi sung in the encampments to the music of the dombra—one old man told his son, a beardless youngster in an ill-fitting cotton uniform: “Son! Whatever you do, don’t be a coward! Never tarnish the honor of our family! If die you must, let the bullet pierce your breast. I’ll sorrow for your death, but rejoice in your bravery. But should you be killed by a bullet in your back, I’ll never forgive you!” and he clasped the lad to his breast.

Only those who know Sinkiang or similar deserts will be able to imagine the appalling hardships faced on such a march. July and August are the hottest months in the Ili area. Desert gravel and sand interspersed with scrub can sometimes stretch from horizon to horizon for a whole day’s march. Mirages are frequent. At midday the heat pours down from a blazing sun. The hot earth bakes the soles of your feet; its exhalations shroud you with stifling heat. Thirst and shelter from the sun become obsessions, and your mind grows numb from the monotonous sameness of the world around you.

The Suidun fighters’ objective was Hsiho, a hundred miles east of Chingho on the road to Urumchi where it skirts the northern flanks of the Tienshan. To get to it and preserve secrecy they would march in a
wide arc, carrying them well north of Lake Ebi Nor, through Borotala.

It was pleasant enough on the first stage of the march, up through the green Ili plain and into the lovely mountains around Lake Sairam. People came out of villages to say farewell and offer them fruit and drink, bread and meat. Many volunteered to join them. North of Lake Ebi Nor, they turned east and then south for the most difficult part of the march across the desert of Dzungaria.

Hsiho was then held by the Kuomintang’s First Independent Cavalry Regiment. This was well armed and had a reputation for bravery and resource in action. They were expecting the attackers because their planes had spotted the Suidun Regiment on the march and had bombed and strafed its columns. The Suidun fighters had not suffered many losses, however. They had formed anti-aircraft units and kept the planes flying high. The Suidun Regiment’s arrival at Hsiho was timely. The Ili Kazakh Regiment was already in action but was having a hard time of it.

The Kuomintang forces had dug themselves in at Hsiho with professional thoroughness. They had cleared the approaches to their forward lines, cutting down the scrub and leveling houses to deprive an attacker of cover. Part of their defenses was a deep, broad ditch filled with water and covered by machine-gun crossfire from pillboxes. These defenses covered the main positions inside Hsiho township itself.

The Suidun men reached the battlefield at night. Part of Hsiho was burning. Both battalions were immediately ordered into action to support the Kazakh Regiment, which had suffered heavy losses. Dawn was already breaking as they reached the enemy’s forward posts and went in to the attack. Unexpectedly heavy fire cut into their ranks. The first company of the first battalion took the brunt of the blow and only one man remained alive. But training and revolutionary spirit told. The battalions dug in and held on to the positions they had taken. Casualties mounted. The first battalion commander was wounded. Argun, out of luck this time, also received his first wound in the campaign, but was able to go on fighting.

The Kuomintang forces, for a reason the regiment did not know until later, did not press their advantage but remained on the defensive the whole day. This gave the Suidun battalions the opportunity to regroup in the night. In the early dawn they renewed the attack to support the advance on other sectors of the front. This time the Kuomintang troops broke and fled back into Hsiho township itself. The Suidun fighters had time only to bury their dead and snatch a hasty meal when they got the
order to pursue the enemy and storm Hsiho. Advancing cautiously, they found Old Hsiho abandoned. They mustered in its ruins to attack New Hsiho, where the Kuomintang had prepared its main defenses. Old Hsiho had been only a forward position.

The attack on Hsiho had to be pressed home resolutely. Success here was a key part of the campaign not only to capture Chingho to its west, but to wipe out the strong Kuomintang forces there, end the immediate threat to the Three Areas and prepare the way for further spread of the revolution.

The Kuomintang had a whole division of troops in Chingho. The People's Army was attacking there with only two regiments, one of infantry and the other of cavalry, and so far had met with little success. The Sibo cavalry spearheading the attack was the bravest of the brave, but though in hand-to-hand fighting it was more than a match for the enemy, now it was suffering from superior Kuomintang firepower defending fixed positions. There was a danger that the Kuomintang forces might manage to slip out of Chingho to escape and regroup in Urumchi.

The Suidun regiment and other forces at Hsiho had to prevent such an eventuality. Hsiho has oil wells and a refinery, but is strategically important for another reason. It lies where the road from Urumchi splits into two: one branch going west to Ili, the other north to Tacheng and the Altai. The Kuomintang was committed to defend Hsiho, its way of retreat, and also, with Chingho, its jumping-off ground for attacks on the Three Areas.

Hsiho was defended by some eight thousand Kuomintang troops armed with submachine guns in considerable numbers, light and heavy machine guns, some artillery and—this was not known when the attack started—a couple of light tanks.

The attack was mounted by the Suidun Infantry Regiment, the Sixth Independent Kazakh Cavalry Regiment, the Mongolian Cavalry Squadron and the motorized battalion. Though this force numbered three thousand men, none of these units was fully armed. According to the principles of orthodox warfare the proportions between attackers and defenders should have been reversed. But this revolutionary war of the people of Sinkiang against their oppressors shattered all such accepted principles.

That first day, the Suidun fighters advanced with spirit and according to all the lessons they had learned in their months of training. Their attack was well delivered and forced the Kuomintang back from their forward defense lines. The next day the elated fighters prepared to repeat
their performance. They advanced straight down the road and its flanks in good order, when suddenly the Kuomintang unmasked its tanks. This took the Suidun men completely by surprise. They had been taught how to deal with "tanks" simulated by carts covered with paper, but the real thing spitting fire caught them off balance. The Kuomintang counter-attack threw some of the raw recruits into confusion, and a disorderly retreat commenced. The tanks and enemy riflemen took full advantage of this near rout and mowed down men who had given up cover and were running in bewilderment. Hard-fought-for ground was lost in a matter of minutes. The Suidun veterans, however, kept their heads and brought up armor-piercing bullets and an anti-tank rifle. With his first shot their Uighur gunner Saud killed the driver of the first tank and put it out of action. The second tank, attempting to take evasive action, overturned in a ditch. It was captured intact. The situation was saved.

On the third day of the attack the Suidun fighters again suffered heavy losses. For many it was their baptism of fire, and they were up against troops who were desperate as well as skilled. Every inch of the way had to be fought for. There was no artillery preparation for an attack, as the only field piece available was a mountain gun captured at Kintsai. In the heat of battle raw recruits forgot combat rules, closed ranks and offered easy targets to the enemy. Young commanders lost touch with their men or made heroic but foolhardy sacrifices. Kuomintang sharpshooters took advantage of every false move. But losses only seemed to stir the revolutionaries to greater efforts. Dariev Turgan, a Uighur, coolly caught a Kuomintang grenade thrown at him and tossed it back into the pillbox from which it had come. He followed its explosion with a dash into the Kuomintang strongpoint, mowed down ten men with his submachine gun and held the post until support came up. Shaukat, a squad leader, led his men to the Kuomintang point he was ordered to capture. Half of them fell on the way, but the rest dug in. Then a masked enemy machine gun opened up on them and pierced Shaukat with eight bullets before he fell, still shooting.

Such losses were inevitable as the people's fighters came to grips with the enemy. Then the order came: "Press the assault! Hsiho must be taken! The decisive attack on Chingho has started!"

During the night, the revolutionary command took the risk of throwing all its reserves into an attack all along the front. Crawling in the night to within thirty or forty yards of the enemy positions, they rushed the last desperate distance just at dawn. The gamble paid off. They broke and scattered inside the town, where hand-to-hand fighting took place.
This suited the weapons and spirit of the revolutionaries. By ten A.M. on September 6, Hsiho township was cleared of the enemy. Some fought to the last, but most surrendered. Toward the end the demoralization among them was such that youngsters armed with pikes were capturing riflemen by the score. There was no way of gathering in the rifles of such crowds of prisoners, so the People's Army men simply took the locks out and tied them together in bunches, which they carried slung over their shoulders, and so herded their prisoners to the pens.

These operations were hardly complete when word came that the Kuomintang troops in Chingho had been routed and the remnants were fleeing over the desert. Sending men to occupy the oil wells and refinery south of the main road, the Hsiho victors took up positions and prepared to give a warm reception to the now encircled Kuomintang troops from Chingho.

The last organized operations of the enemy were crushed in a short sharp engagement. The remnants of the Kuomintang forces either surrendered or fled to the nearby Tienshan Mountains. Hoping to escape, the Kuomintang commander disguised himself as a private but was exposed by his own men and captured. For a month after that Kuomintang stragglers were taken captive in the hills or driven from their hiding places by Kazakh herdsmen. That autumn was particularly cold. Many perished miserably, unaccustomed to survival in wild open country. Over two thousand Kuomintang troops were killed in these battles; 3,800 were captured and the rest of the Kuomintang forces were either wounded or unaccounted for. The revolutionary army captured fifteen guns, large and small, a hundred machine guns, twelve mortars, over a million rounds of much-needed rifle ammunition, and several thousand rifles, together with radio sets, motor vehicles and other equipment.

On that same day the Altai was freed by Dalilkhan's partisans, aided by Lesgin.

If at first the Kuomintang had underestimated the strength of the revolutionary forces, they overestimated them at Chingho and Hsiho. This was the reason for the passive tactics that were their undoing. One reason for this new respect for the People's Army—in addition to the beating the Kuomintang had suffered in Ili—was the trick played upon them by the Ili commanders in the fighting at Tahaiyentze, west of Chingho. They had driven up thirty trucks at night and had them passing up and down the hills in circles, turning their headlights on and off so that, as the Chingho townspeople later related, the Kuomintang had estimated that the revolutionaries had at least seven hundred machines
and, it goes without saying, large amounts of other supplies and weapons "given them by Moscow."

The Chingho and Altai victories were decisive. Encountering little resistance, the revolutionary forces pressed on to the Kuomintang's next line of defense—for it was now on the defensive—the Manass River, seventy-five miles to the east. The next stop would be Urumchi, where revolutionaries inside the city were preparing a rising.

The Kuomintang's position was eroding rapidly. Partisan detachments infiltrating over the Tienshan freed Aksu and Toksun near Turfan. These successes encouraged the peasants of Kashgar and the Tadjiks of Tashkurgan. Local partisans seized Kargarlikh and cut the road between Yarkand and Khotan. Another detachment invested Tashkurgan. Kuomintang officials in Urumchi were already talking about withdrawal to Hami, three hundred miles to the east across the desert.

**Pause to Parley**

By this time the People's Army numbered some thirty thousand men reorganized into the First and Second Infantry Brigades, the Third and Fourth Cavalry Brigades and an artillery squadron. The advance on Manass was being prepared by the Seventh and Thirteenth Independent Cavalry Regiments and the Tenth Hui Cavalry Regiment. But here, in September 1945, just a few weeks after V-J Day, the campaign ended.

The Kuomintang decided to open negotiations for an armistice. It had taken a terrible beating in Sinkiang. It had lost up to thirty thousand troops with most of their arms. The Three Areas of Ili, Tacheng and Altai were in the hands of the revolutionaries. The underground revolutionary network had proved its efficiency. Urumchi was on the eve of rebellion. Kashgaria was aflame. Though it still had some seventy thousand men at its disposal, these were scattered throughout Sinkiang at widely dispersed garrison points. An attempt to concentrate them at Urumchi would have been accompanied by further losses. To bring in reinforcements from Lanchow and Kansu would be a major and costly operation that would in addition have undermined Chiang Kai-shek's strategic plans against the Communist Party and its army inside the Great Wall. Any further defeat threatened total collapse of Kuomintang rule in Sinkiang. So there was no doubt why Chiang wished to negotiate. There was also no doubt about the purely tactical nature of his apparent change of attitude.

The provisional government accepted the Kuomintang offer to parley.
Its aim was to gain national freedom and democracy for the people of Sinkiang. Taking the whole situation into account, in spite of the advantages it held, it agreed to try to reach a compromise peace with the Kuomintang. Further fighting would cause great bloodshed. Peace would give the Three Areas, now free of Kuomintang oppression, a chance to enter a period of peaceful construction. There was also a chance that negotiations would lead to immediate alleviation of economic and political conditions in the other ten areas of Sinkiang. There were also larger considerations.

On the larger stage of China, at that moment neither the Kuomintang nor the Communist Party wished to precipitate a new civil war. The Communists did not want one, and Chiang was not yet ready for it. Furthermore, immediately after V-J Day, the United States and the Soviet Union, the two powers able to exert most influence in Chungking and Ili, were moving along with their allies to the conference table to end World War II.

Chiang Kai-shek was informed by the Soviet embassy in Chungking that since the situation on the borders of the Soviet Union was naturally of concern to the Soviet people, the Soviet government would do its best to bring the two sides in Sinkiang together for peace talks if this was acceptable. In September 1945, Chiang broadcast an appeal to the revolutionary leaders in Sinkiang to negotiate. They responded affirmatively and negotiations began that month. To show their good faith the revolutionary forces withdrew from Aksu.

A true assessment of the Ili uprising must stress that while the revolutionary people of the Three Areas were the vanguard, their success depended on the efforts of all the Sinkiang people as part of the revolutionary efforts of all the people of China. Because of the existence of the Communist-led Liberated Areas inside the Great Wall, the Kuomintang did not dare concentrate its full strength to crush the Three Areas. The Ili victory was also closely linked with the international situation. The Soviet and allied armies had defeated fascism, driven the Nazis back into Germany and crushed them. Italian fascism had early succumbed to the test of war, and the Japanese military-fascist regime lay in ruins.

Soviet mediation played an important role at this stage in bringing the two sides to the conference table and helping facilitate a peaceful solution to the conflict in Sinkiang in the general interests of the people. As an example of socialist internationalism, the Soviet attitude in relation to this situation in Sinkiang certainly deserves full marks for far-sighted
tact and diplomatic correctness. Among progressives in China it enhanced Stalin's prestige as a communist leader. It stood in glaring contrast to Khrushchev's and his successors' later high-handed attitude and policy toward China.

All previous revolts of the Sinkiang people against their oppressors had failed because they lacked the organized leadership of a progressive class. Leadership of past peasant uprisings—for the peasants and herdsmen of necessity formed the main strength of such risings—always fell into the hands of feudal leaders with various types of separatist tendencies. These leaders' pious talk of common interests with the people was simply camouflage for their real aims. As a result, in the past, Sinkiang peasant wars were often only the means of establishing a new feudal rule, or, in modern times, a warlord or bourgeois nationalist regime as a puppet of one or other of the foreign powers. The regimes of Yang Tsen-ts'en, Chin Shu-jen, Ma Chung-yin, Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Chiang Kai-shek were typical of such warlord or warlord-landlord-capitalist governments.

The 1931–34 rising in southern Sinkiang led by Muhammed Imin, Sabit Damulla and others was another type of popular rising in which control was seized by local puppets of the imperialists. Such attempts to set up a separate or "independent" Sinkiang as part of a Pan-Turk or Pan-Islamic federation could not solve either the national or the peasant problems. These risings were reactionary and regressive insofar as they isolated the struggle of one part of the Sinkiang masses from another part, pitting Moslems (Kazakhs, Uighurs, Kirghiz, Huis) against unbelievers (Buddhist Tibetans and Mongols and Taoist or Buddhist Hans), or even setting Moslem Uighurs against nonbelieving Uighurs, and dividing the struggle of the Sinkiang people from the struggle of the rest of the Chinese peoples, thus weakening all in the face of their enemies. To be successful in the context of the modern world, the liberation struggle of the Chinese people had to be more than a national liberation struggle. It had to become a struggle not only against imperialism but against feudalism and Chinese bureaucrat-capitalism as well. Only thus could it mobilize the full support of the majority of the people—the peasants.

The national movement of 1944–49 was fundamentally different from all past peasant wars in Sinkiang. It had the leadership of an organized group of men inspired by the ideas of the working-class socialist revolution. Step by step, with their guidance, ideals of national equality, democracy and socialism replaced the ideals of an exclusivist, militant, traditionalist Islamic chauvinism. Step by step the people overcame the
The Three Areas Freed

idea of the crusade to unite all those of one faith in hostility to unbelievers—an idea that in Sinkiang could only lead to intranational strife. Step by step such men as Rakhmet, the Kazakh, and Argun, the Tartar, came to perceive who their enemies were—the feudalists and serf owners and the Kuomintang regime, intent only on exploiting Sinkiang for their own ends, and the foreign imperialist powers intent only on using Sinkiang for their own strategic and economic purposes. Because the Sinkiang revolution was thus transformed into a modern socialist revolution it linked up naturally with the revolutionary struggle being waged by the rest of the Chinese people within the Wall for the San Min Chu I of Sun Yat-sen—nationalism, democracy and socialism—led first by Sun Yat-sen himself and then by the Chinese Communist Party, and became an integral part of that struggle.

But many further trials faced the peoples of Sinkiang before their full union was achieved five years later. First they had to surmount trials and tests within their own revolutionary ranks and cope with the test of negotiations with the Kuomintang and their aftermath.

Struggles in the Three Areas

The people's democratic revolution had a relatively secure base in the Three Areas. But even here considerable difficulties were faced in carrying forward that revolution and implementing the Eleven-Point Peace Agreement that was finally signed. The most important task was to defend the Three Areas from overt and covert Kuomintang attacks. Chiang's perfidy was notorious. His underlings and their imperialist backers did not hesitate to use the most reactionary elements, venal politicians and downright bandits, for such attacks. In addition, within the Three Areas and among their leaders, there were diverse forces ranging from revolutionary to conservative, left, right and ultra-left. These vied for leadership of the revolution and of the people. The direction the Three Areas would take hinged on the outcome of that leadership struggle.

In 1944, the main conflict in Sinkiang was that between the people and reactionary rulers represented by the Kuomintang and its imperialist backers. That contradiction could be resolved only by a successful national liberation struggle. At that time this struggle absorbed all the energies of the Three Areas, and it cemented national unity. It overlaid the secondary, subsidiary conflict between the feudal landowners and herdsmen on the one hand and the masses of peasants and herdsmen
(tenants, slaves and serfs) on the other. When the Kuomintang opened peace negotiations, however, the urgency of the main contradiction became less acute and popular attention focused on the hitherto subordinate contradiction. That contradiction could only be resolved by the extension of democracy, by a democratic revolution which would manifest itself in the will of the people to end feudalism by agrarian revolution. This was a hazardous new stage in the revolution.

By the autumn of 1945, therefore, the advance of the revolution demanded a systematic struggle against the conservatives who had participated enthusiastically in the first, nationalist stage of the revolution but were naturally reluctant to go forward to that fuller emancipation of the people demanded by the democratic revolution. There was also the danger from the ultra-leftists, who were impatient for a showdown with the conservatives even to the extent of advocating a separatist solution, which would lead to a regressive and ultimately tragic fragmentation of Sinkiang. But since the main conflict had only died down, not died away, the revolutionary leadership had to be circumspect and not let internal conflict open the way to outside intervention. Successful leadership in such complex conditions would have been impossible without a clear understanding of how classes react according to their class interests and of the reality of class struggle in Sinkiang.

When the revolutionary provisional government was established in Ili on November 14, 1944, Alikhan Tureh* was chosen to lead it. Alikhan was a thin-faced, ascetic-looking man whose graying, wispy beard and mustache accentuated the solemnity of his face. He had been a member of the underground revolutionary movement, and his prestige in religious circles had greatly contributed to the cause. On his urging, the gospel of freedom had been proclaimed in the mosques by the akhuns, and the muezzin's call had been heard by the people as a call to revolution. It was in deference to his views and those of his colleagues that the provisional government had adopted two flags: one green with a white star and crescent, the state flag; and the other white with a green star and crescent, the banner of religion. With victory, it was natural that Alikhan and his colleagues should seek to steer the Three Areas into the path of a religious revival with state and church linked.

Under his administration many members of the upper classes, big landowners and herdowners, merchants and capitalists—"solid citizens"—were appointed to leading positions in the government. These included

* Tureh is a religious title superior to that of akhun.
Akembek Khodja, khan of Ili, who had been confirmed as khan even by the imperial Ching government. He was one of the biggest landowners in the Three Areas. Thousands of peasant families cultivated his estates, which comprised several townships east of Ili. They paid him heavy rents and in accordance with his feudal rights gave him in addition various kinds of free services. Alikhan, in agreement with the other members of the government, it is true, appointed him special commissioner for the Ili area. Aissadulla, a leading merchant of Ili, was put in charge of state trading until he was exposed as corruptly using his position to enrich himself.

Alikhan tried to integrate state and religion. A special department for religious affairs was set up with Abdul Mutta Ali Khalifa in charge. Tivzat Khalifa was appointed his chief secretary, and both were ardent advocates of a religious state. Saud Damulla, an akhun, was vice-minister of education. These three arranged for the Moslem religion to be taught in all state schools, even though the Three Areas comprise people of a dozen nationalities and Moslems, Buddhists, Orthodox Christians, Taoists and freethinkers. Under their direction the modern sciences were neglected in the schools.

The department for religious affairs also exercised judicial power through the religious courts. Here decisions in matters affecting religion (including marriage and divorce) had equal force with those of the civil courts. Because of the department’s conservatism, religious courts tended to dogmatic interpretations of religious texts and failed to adapt to the complexities of modern conditions. They particularly infringed on the rights of women, whose emancipation was one of the aims of the revolution. Great injustices were done to women when age-old religious laws and customs were blindly upheld.

The leaders of the democratic progressive forces, like Akhmedjan Kasimeh, Abassov, Saifuddin, Dalilkhan (special commissioner for the Altai), Partikhan, Izaakbeg (commander in chief of the People’s Army) and others, stood resolutely for the ideas of national unity and equality, democracy and national freedom. They had the loyalty of the People’s Army and to a great extent held the initiative, but there could be no question of high-handed action to enforce their views. This would have precipitated internal conflict and a split in the revolutionary ranks that would only have benefited the Kuomintang reaction. The only prudent course was patient education and explanation of their policies and mobilization of mass support.
CHIANG KAI-SHEK put the best face he could on it, but he was furious with his incompetent commanders in Sinkiang. They had been sent to wrest the province from Sheng Shih-tsai, and now they had all but lost it to the people. In the autumn of 1945, the People’s Army was poised on the banks of the Manass River, seventy miles northwest of Urumchi. It was clear that the Kuomintang troops, hastily mustered there, were no match for them. If Urumchi were lost, all southern Sinkiang with its scattered garrisons would be lost and Kuomintang power would be forced back across the desert to Hami. The Kuomintang command had started the struggle with a hundred thousand men but, after losing nearly a third of that force, their one chance of holding Urumchi would be to denude southern Sinkiang of troops—in effect, surrendering it to the revolutionaries.

Even if Urumchi were held, reestablishment of Kuomintang control over Sinkiang would necessitate drawing thirty thousand troops at least from the northwestern China garrisons under General Hu Tsung-nan’s command. Chiang feared withdrawing these troops. He was still faced
with the problem of dealing with the defeated Japanese occupation armies, interning them and taking over the administration of occupied territory. He refused to allow the Communist-led Eighth Route Army to do this job although it had been doing the bulk of the fighting, but he was hard pressed to do it himself, his Kuomintang troops having been held deep in the rear, away from the enemy. He particularly did not want to weaken Hu Tsung-nan's divisions—not because they had been fighting the Japanese or would take over occupied territory, but because they were being used to blockade from the west and south the Shen-Kan-Ning Liberated Area* where the Communist Party had its headquarters in Yanan and which was the main base of the Eighth Route Army. Hu's troops were part of the 450,000 Kuomintang troops already deployed to renew civil war against the Communist Party and Liberated Areas as soon as the Japanese invasion ended.**

If the Kuomintang's military situation in Sinkiang was calamitous, its economic situation was disastrous. Grain was in short supply as were industrial consumer goods, and there was no immediate source from which to import them. Sending a pound of grain from inner China to Sinkiang cost the equivalent of four pounds more. The hardships caused by such scarcities fed the flames of anger and revolt in Kuomintang-occupied Sinkiang.

These were the considerations behind Chiang's broadcast appeal to the Sinkiang people and the Ili leaders to negotiate a settlement. He hoped to retain some sort of hold on Sinkiang without further fighting. He hoped to gain time to include Sinkiang later in his anti-Communist plans.

The Ili revolutionary leadership had no illusions about Chiang Kai-shek, but they accepted his proposal to negotiate. They were anxious to achieve the aims of the revolution without further bloodshed if possible. They supported the call of the Chinese Communist Party to maintain the wartime united front and solve all outstanding internal problems by negotiation. Peace talks would be a public test of the Kuomintang's sincerity and an education to all the people.

Negotiations began in October 1945. General Chang Chih-chung was chief Kuomintang delegate. He came of Anhwei peasant stock and was largely a self-made man who even in the maelstrom of Kuomintang politics maintained certain progressive standards. After graduating from the

* The Liberated Area which included parts of the three provinces of Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia.
Paoting Military Academy he joined and worked under Dr. Sun Yat-sen. During the Great Revolution of 1924–27, he was head of the training corps at the famous Whampao Military Academy in Canton which had produced so many leaders both of the revolution and the counterrevolution. When the Northern Expedition of the Canton revolutionary armies started off against the northern warlords, he was director of the adjutant's office of the armies at the headquarters of its commander in chief, Chiang Kai-shek. He was close to Chiang but had friendly personal contacts with many members of the Kuomintang left wing, such as Tang Yen-tat, and of the Communist Party, such as Chou En-lai. Chiang Kai-shek disapproved of such contacts, and relations between him and Chiang were thus not completely cordial. Nevertheless, Chiang respected his probity and often had urgent need of his services, which Chang Chih-chung gave, as he said to me, when he “felt it to be in the national interest.” In the period 1928–37 and until the end of the Japanese war, he held several important military posts. In 1932, during the Japanese attack on Shanghai, he commanded the Fifth Army and fought the Japanese at Kiangnan. In 1937, at the start of the anti-Japanese war, he was commander in chief of China's defense forces. In 1940 he was secretary-general of the Kuomintang's San Min Chu Yi (Three People's Principles) Youth Corps.

Chang Chih-chung was chosen to head the Kuomintang peace talks delegation in Sinkiang because most of Chiang's other associates were already too compromised in the eyes of the democratic revolutionary forces in China, while other potential negotiators were afraid to undertake such a difficult assignment, which was possibly thankless and certainly dangerous. Chiang gave him full authority to handle the situation, but typically also personally instructed Wu Hsi-shih, Chang Chih-chung's controller of finances, to keep an eye on his superior and report on him.

Reliable sources say that Chiang had no particular detailed policy at that time for dealing with Sinkiang's problems. For the moment all he insisted on was a peaceful settlement of the issues there with the proviso that Sinkiang remain Kuomintang-controlled as much as possible.

General Chang Chih-chung set up his office in Lanchow in 1946 as commander of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters for the northwest, supervising not only Sinkiang, but Chinghai, Ninghsia and Kansu as well. He then went on to Urumchi. His initial statements were well received. He said he stood for peace and democracy, unity among and between the peoples of China, and the unity of Sinkiang with the
rest of China. He reaffirmed that the 2,000-year-old association of Sinkiang with the rest of China "can't be changed"; that the sufferings of the Sinkiang people were heavy and prolonged, and so their revolt merited sympathy; that the Han people had run the government for many years and so they must take the blame for mismanagement. His mission, he said, was "to help make good the damage done in the past and pay the debt of blood." It was a statesmanlike stand.*

He backed his words with deeds. He affected the release of 130 Communist Party members held in Sinkiang jails. They were allowed to go to Yenan (then headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party). He fully recognized the need for normal relations between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union and reopened the borders for trade. This immediately improved the economic situation. Many Russian settlers were also enabled to return to Russia. Much friction had been caused by intermarriages between Han men and Uighur (Moslem) women. Moslem bigots fanatically opposed such marriages even when willingly entered into by both parties. They even went so far as to kidnap girls so married, incarcerating them in the mosques and beating them to force them to separate from their husbands. General Chang issued an order temporarily banning such marriages. Otherwise he refrained from interfering in religious affairs, because religious freedom in Sinkiang was so clearly a crying need.

At the same time a start was made on ending evils such as gambling and corruption, conscription and forced labor and the compulsory planting of the opium poppy. Taxes were reduced. These acts all helped to clear the air so that serious negotiations could begin.

The Ili delegation was led by Rakhimjan Subir Khodjayev. Akhmedjan Kassimeh and Abulkhair Tureh Rabat were its two other members. Talks went on for over eight months. Basic agreement was actually reached after three months, but another five were consumed with settling such problems as the stationing of troops and the composition of the government. Finally, on January 6, 1946, an eleven-point peace agreement was initialed.

This agreement was a considerable achievement for the Ili revolu-

* General Chang Chih-chung was one of the Kuomintang delegates at the 1948 peace talks held in Peking to end civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. When Chiang Kai-shek repudiated the agreement reached by his own delegation at these talks, General Chang Chih-chung chose to remain in Peking rather than join the war party in Nanking. He later became vice-chairman of the military commission of the Chinese People's Government, in which post he died in 1969.
tionaries. It laid down that the Sinkiang provincial government should be reorganized and that the central government in Nanking should ratify the appointment of fifteen Uighurs and ten members of other Sinkiang nationalities to posts in the provincial government. The languages of the various national minorities would henceforth enjoy equal status with the Han language in the work of government; the peoples of the various nationalities would enjoy the rights of adult suffrage, freedom of speech, publication, assembly and organization; they would have the right to develop internal and foreign trade; and the local garrisons would be made up of the various peoples in Sinkiang. The Ili revolutionaries proposed that General Chang Chih-chung be appointed governor of Sinkiang, and the Kuomintang government acceded to this request.

A bright future would have started for Sinkiang immediately if this program had been carried out, but the ink was hardly dry on the paper before the Kuomintang began to contest the agreements, violate them and finally repudiate them. The Kuomintang government at first deliberately delayed agreement by putting forward various supplementary demands and articles. Even after the agreement was signed in January 1946, there was further dilly-dallying, so that it was July 1, 1946, before Chiang Kai-shek, as president of the national government, finally ratified it and it went into force.

In an interview that he gave me in the 1950s, Chang Chih-chung paid tribute to the good offices of the Soviet government and particularly its consul in Urumchi during the negotiations.

*Chang Chih-chung's Awkward Team*

A coalition provincial government was formed in Urumchi and included representatives of all the nationalities* of the province. In 1947 Chang Chih-chung was appointed governor of Sinkiang and chairman of the provincial government with two vice-chairmen: Akhmedjan Kassimeh and Burhan Shahidi (Poerhan). Saifuddin headed the department of education.

Akhmedjan Kassimeh, a Uighur, was born in 1912 in Ili. His father died when Akhmedjan was five years old, but he was well looked after by his mother and an uncle and received a good education. When he was seventeen, his uncle took him to the Soviet Union. He returned home in 1938 and worked as a carpenter and glazier. He fell under

* Thirteen is the usual figure, but detailed censuses and my own experience lists people of twenty-three different nationalities or ethnic groups.
suspicion as a progressive and two years later was thrown into jail. Released only in 1944, he resumed his work and studies and got married. Two weeks after the wedding the Ili Uprising began. Akhmedjan was not a member of the underground organization but immediately volunteered for and threw himself into any work the revolutionary leadership gave him to do. His qualities of intelligence, energy, resourcefulness and loyalty were quickly recognized, and soon he was being assigned some of the most responsible tasks. Following his work during the peace negotiations he became the Ili revolutionary headquarters' nominee for deputy provincial chairman.

People have described him as a Communist-minded progressive. A photo of him shows a fine, handsome face; small black mustache; humorous mouth, a well-chiseled head; trim, clean-cut features. He was a stickler for honesty. To test whether boots for the army were good or not, he himself wore a pair for a time and discovered that the capitalist supplier was using shoddy leather.

Burhan, son of poor Uighur peasants, was an Aksu man who lived most of his adult life in Urumchi. Here he learned the Han language (Chinese) and worked for twelve years as a salesman and cashier for a merchant. Eager for knowledge, he taught himself Russian, since there were few modern books in Uighur and no newspapers. Thus he learned about revolution. His first contact with revolutionary methods was when he and other employees banded together and demanded a half-day's rest every Friday, and got it. Up till then they had worked from dawn to dusk every day without rest.

Studying became more difficult after that because students were now suspect and in those days a man found guilty of reading revolutionary literature could have his head cut off. Nevertheless Burhan and a group of like-minded young progressives used to meet in the evenings under various pretexts—to play cards, dance or have a music party—but really to read and discuss current events. When the merchant found out about this he put a stop to it, threatening that he would denounce it as "the beginnings of Bolshevism." Next they founded a clandestine library by pooling all their books. In 1922, this too was discovered and stopped. By one means or another, however, they maintained contact with each other and later got in touch with other clandestine groups to form a Committee for Liberation. This established links with a similar group set up in 1923 in the Altai led by Sharif Khan.

At that time the commissioner for foreign affairs and taotai (mayor, magistrate) of Urumchi under Governor Yang Tsen-tsin was Fan Yao-
nan, a left-wing Kuomintang member, an honest patriot and democrat who stood for Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles* and recognized the paramount need for equality among Sinkiang’s nationalities. He was in contact with the Kuomintang revolutionary movement among his fellow provincials in Yunnan. The Committee for Liberation supported him with Burhan as contact man. Groups were mobilized for action in Kashgar, Bai, the Altai and Turfan. Fan’s plot for a coup d’état went into operation on July 7, 1928. He and his fellow conspirators in Urumchi surprised and assassinated Governor Yang at a banquet (where the assassins were disguised as waiters) and took over the governor’s yamen. Fan then summoned Chin Shu-jen, Yang’s director of the political department (including public security), but Little Chin, warned by Chang Pei-yuan, head of the Military Department, refused to go to the yamen. Chang Pei-yuan sent a detachment of troops instead. Fan had taken no steps to rouse popular support outside the yamen. He was besieged in the yamen until his ammunition ran out and he had to surrender. He and ten accomplices were tortured and shot by Chin Shu-jen, who had now taken command of the situation.

Though the uprising failed, it had important results, as I have described in an earlier chapter. Within a few years all Sinkiang was aflame. Members of the Committee for Liberation played leading roles in the later events in the province. In 1933, the progressive Turfan leader Makhsud Mukhetov led a rising against Chin Shu-jen. It failed and he perished. Sharif Khan headed a revolt in the Altai that same year. Burhan luckily was working in a truck transport company at the time, and when he had to flee he had the means. He went to Berlin via the USSR to “buy trucks.” Unable to return to Sinkiang while it was ruled by Chin Shu-jen, he stayed in Berlin to study economics. He dared return home only when, following the overthrow of Little Chin, Sheng Shih-tsai came to power. In 1933, Sheng Shih-tsai sent him with his friend Sharif Khan to the Altai as pacification commissioner. Returning to Urumchi in 1934, he was appointed director of the state trading organization and deputy head of the People’s Anti-Imperialist League. In 1937 he was appointed consul in Zaisan, in the Kazakh SSR. Recalled in 1938 during one of Sheng Shih-tsai’s fits of paranoia, he was arrested while still on the road and imprisoned for the next seven years. He was condemned to death but, for some reason, was not executed.

Like many people in that moment of confusion in 1944 when Sheng Shih-tsai was overthrown by the Kuomintang, Burhan was unexpectedly

* National freedom, democracy, and care for the people’s livelihood.
freed. In one of those sudden reversals of fortune he now found himself appointed by the Kuomintang provincial government headed by Wu Chung-hsin to the post of deputy head of the commissariat for internal affairs, and, seizing the chance, he organized a course to train personnel for local government. Then suddenly, again without warning, he was dismissed from his post. It was only much later that he learned that a certain Akhbar, a Uighur traitor, had informed against him, accusing him of plotting to organize young men to help the Ili revolutionaries. Akhbar was rewarded for his "work" with a twenty-thousand-yuan reward and promotion to the rank of colonel in the Kuomintang army. So it was that at the time of the peace negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Sinkiang revolutionaries in 1945–46, Burhan was widely known as a progressive and patriot trusted by the Uighur people. As such, Chang Chih-chung appointed him to the new coalition provincial government along with other representative men of various nationalities from the three liberated areas and the seven other areas. Forming that government entailed hard bargaining. Places were also given to Mahsud Sabri and other right-wing nationalists who were actually agents of the Kuomintang. Several notorious members of the Kuomintang CC Clique* held key posts: secretary-general; civil affairs; reconstruction and education.

Nevertheless, a progressive government program was announced. It promised political freedom for the people and the right to hold elections with direct and secret balloting for local government organs. It promised that the new provincial government would strengthen friendship with the USSR, aid the herdsman and peasants, prevent powerful individuals from further monopolizing the land, encourage industry and transport and expand public health services and education. It was even possible to implement some reforms. Several hundred more progressives, including a number of Communists, were released from jail by the new government. A start was made on improving conditions for garrison troops and lightening the burden on the people by establishing military farms to make the troops partly self-supporting and keep them engaged in productive work. Local elections were scheduled to select county magistrates. In the past all such posts were held by Hans appointed by the Urumchi authorities. Really free elections would for the first time give an opportunity to elect capable local men to these posts.

* The group of reactionaries, police informers, careerists and virulent anti-Communists gathered around the brothers Chen Li-fu and Chen Kuo-fu, who were close colleagues and mentors of Chiang Kai-shek and who controlled the Kuomintang Party apparatus.
These elections therefore crystallized the struggle for power in Sinkiang.

From the very first the elections ran up against the stubborn and organized resistance of the reactionaries. While Akhmedjan Kassimeh, Saifuddin, Abassov and other Ili revolutionary leaders and Burhan tried their best to carry out the agreed reforms which they were certain would create a grass-roots democracy in Sinkiang, Mahsud Sabri, Aissa, Mukhamed Imin Bugra and other reactionaries with Pan-Turk or Pan-Islamic leanings covertly opposed the whole scheme and tried to subvert its purpose. They were allied to the landlord interests and the big herd-owners, who currently ruled in concert with the Kuomintang. They also did not hesitate to turn to the imperialist powers for aid.

While Chang Chih-chung agreed broadly with the reform program, his headquarters were far away in Lanchow. He himself faced a complex struggle. While the northwestern-region military commander Hu Tsung-nan was a dyed-in-the-wool reactionary directly linked with the most reactionary elements in Chungking, many of the junior officers were personally attached to Chang Chih-chung. Both in Lanchow and in Sinkiang two separate and in some ways antagonistic groups of secret Kuomintang agents were active. One belonged to the right-wing CC Clique of the two Chen brothers, Li-fu and Kuo-fu, and the other was the creation of Tai Li (who died in 1946), Chiang Kai-shek's notorious intelligence chief and hatchetman. At the same time that Chang Chih-chung was trying to make the coalition government work, his commander in chief of the Kuomintang army in Sinkiang, General Sung Hsi-lien (whom Chang Chih-chung himself had appointed), was conspiring with the Kuomintang commanders and the old Kuomintang regional officials to create a second government power in Sinkiang to take over the Seven Areas and attack the Three Areas. General Sung told his followers: "Our first enemy is the Ili party!"

Mahsud Sabri emerged as titular leader of local reaction in Sinkiang. A member of the old ruling class of Kashgaria, son of a rich Uighur family of landowners and merchants, he had been educated in Istanbul, where he imbibed the ideas of Pan-Turk chauvinism. He tried to realize these ideas when he succeeded his father as emir of Khotan, and for these activities he was jailed and forced into exile by Governor Yang Tsentsin. He went to India in 1934 and then to Afghanistan and Japan, where he published articles in The Japanese Correspondent, which he

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edited in Tokyo. In his ten years of exile his dream of a great Pan-Turk domain stretching from the Dardanelles to Kansu became an idée fixe. He publicized this program indefatigably and incorporated it in a history of Sinkiang written in Uighur and published in India. In 1945 he returned to China and lived for a time in Chungking. Here he linked up with the CC Clique and with their help distributed anti-Soviet and Pan-Turk propaganda in his magazine Voice of Turkestan. Following Sheng Shih-tsa'i’s ouster, Mahsud returned to Sinkiang wearing the halo of the prophet and martyr. While in public he appeared to be the creature of the Kuomintang, in private he reviled the Kuomintang and Chang Chih-chung. In his newspaper and pamphlets he denounced the Ili revolutionaries and the Chinese Communist Party. His propaganda had some attraction for certain of the upper classes and the most backward elements in Sinkiang, but his gloomy and fanatical character was not likely to make him a popular leader. The Kuomintang, however, was eager to get any support it could in Sinkiang, particularly among the wealthier classes and “better” elements, and was willing to make a deal even with Mahsud Sabri or Mukhamed Imin Bugra and Aissa, the former beg of Kashgar. Aissa too had Pan-Turk and Pan-Islamic and chauvinist ideas and, like Mahsud Sabri, was a publisher of anti-Soviet propaganda. It was part of Kuomintang policy to play off the rivalries and animosities among such men, putting them between its rule and the people, to “divide and rule” Sinkiang.

Mahsud Sabri was made a member of the central executive committee of the Kuomintang. Mukhamed Imin Bugra, with a bigger popular following, because of his long-continued activities in the region, was appointed director of construction in the new government, while Aissa was made head of the government secretariat.

Mukhamed Imin was an accomplished demagogue and publicist. In the 1920s he worked in the Chinese consulate in Tashkent. Later he edited the paper Tienshan in Nanking under Kuomintang sponsorship, and when the Chiang government and he moved to Chungking, the magazine Altai. While Sheng Shih-tsa'i ruled in Sinkiang he was unable to return there, so he shifted his operations to Lanchow, where he was able to maintain closer contact with like-minded reactionaries in Sinkiang operating under the Pan-Islamic label. He had formed a dislike of Mahsud Sabri, although they shared many of the same ideas and both opposed the Ili revolutionaries. He felt closer to Aissa.

It was only natural that these men balked at the democratic elements in the Eleven-Point Agreement and worked to subvert it. If the Kuo-
mintang hoped to use them, they on their part hoped to come to power through the agency of the Kuomintang and then to use foreign, hopefully American, backing against the Kuomintang and to maintain their own reactionary rule. It was a complicated and unsavory political game.

The Eleven-Point Agreement became a focus of struggle. As time went by it became clearer that the Kuomintang and its hangers-on were determined to scrap it. Elections were indeed held, but in the Seven Areas it was in an atmosphere of terror that turned them into a farce. Most of the old officials retained their posts. Following establishment of a supreme judicial committee made up of one representative of each of the main nationalities in the region, the judiciary should have been reformed. But the committee was hamstrung by endless Kuomintang amendments. The courts and other judicial organs remained virtually unchanged. The secret police, which was to have been abolished, grew more and more high-handed and ruthless. The Kuomintang, instead of reducing its troop strength, brought in more and more reinforcements. With the help of the Kansu warlord Ma Chin-shan, a Hui, a Kuomintang Moslem army was formed. Within a few months the Kuomintang had about a hundred thousand men under its operational command, a reinforcement of some thirty thousand men.

At the time of the signing of the Eleven-Point Agreement, no decision had been made on the size of the armed forces to be maintained by the Three Areas, but the Kuomintang arbitrarily set this at twelve thousand men and then announced that since this figure had been exceeded, all military undertakings stipulated in the agreement were null and void.

*Kuomintang Intrigue Backfires*

By December 1945, following the Japanese surrender, the wartime united front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party had practically ended. Under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues, a democratic people’s regime had been established in the Liberated Areas as a necessary basis for the guerrilla warfare they waged against the Japanese invaders. Chiang Kai-shek naturally could not countenance this threat to his Kuomintang dictatorship, and he was determined to crush it and extend his one-party dictatorship throughout the country. He and some like-minded leaders among the great imperialist powers regarded destruction of the Chinese Communist Party and its army as a necessary step in preparing for what they regarded as the inevitable “next war” to contain and eliminate socialism in the Soviet
Union and crush its friends, allies and supporters. Chiang’s role was to prepare the Chinese staging area for the eastern front of this war, to eliminate the revolutionary movement in China and carry Kuomintang arms to the western borders of China—preparatory to striking into the heart of Soviet Central Asia.

This operation needed time to prepare. Chiang’s troops had been husbanded and holed up in western China during the Japanese invasion. To gain time to redeploy them, he started negotiations for a “peaceful settlement” with the Communist Party. In December 1945, four months after V-J Day, the United States government sent over General George C. Marshall as President Truman’s special representative. Marshall undertook to “mediate” between the two parties, but the only result of his mediation was to gain time for Washington’s client, Chiang Kai-shek. A truce agreement was signed in January 1946. A ceasefire order was issued and interminable and intermittent negotiations went on in the mediation teams’ executive headquarters in Peking’s Union Medical College, which became known as the “Temple of the Ten Thousand Sleeping Colonels.”

In June 1946, Chiang Kai-shek had succeeded in massing 80 percent of his two-million-man regular army at the fronts in readiness for his offensive against the Liberated Areas. No less than 540,000 of these troops had been moved in U.S. warships, trucks and planes. Claire Lee Chennault, one-time adviser to the Kuomintang air force, organized personnel from the U.S. 14th Air Force into an air-transport corps, which, besides transporting men and material, also reconnoitered and bombed the Liberated Areas. In July, Chiang-controlled areas contained 400 million people. The Communist-led Liberated Areas contained 100 million. Sure of his superiority, Chiang launched a countrywide offensive to establish his supremacy. In October, his troops occupied the important North China city of Changchiakou (Kalgan) and a number of other cities evacuated by the People’s Liberation Army in accordance with its strategy of not holding cities but concentrating on wiping out enemy troops. These “victories” went to Chiang’s head, and he went on recklessly pouring his forces into the offensive, spreading them so thin that soon half of his men were tied up in garrison duties to hold down dissident populations. It was in these circumstances that Sung Hsi-lien, the Kuomintang commander in Sinkiang, stepped up the campaign against the democratic movement in the province and annulled the Eleven-Point Agreement.

Sung was the incompetent commander of the 11th Group Army who
had nearly fouled up the May 1944 Salween campaign to regain the Burma Road from the Japanese. For that he was temporarily taken off field command. But he had proved his zeal in Chiang Kai-shek’s “annihilation campaigns” against the southern Red bases in 1933 and in suppressing the Fukien Uprising of the Kuomintang left wing. In March 1946 he was transferred to Chang Chih-chung’s staff in Lanchow and then appointed commander in chief of the Sinkiang garrison. Chang Chih-chung had been his teacher at Whampao Military Academy, but he gravitated to the Kuomintang rightists and the most obscurantist elements in Sinkiang. The CC Clique, Sung Hsi-lien, Mahsud Sabri, Mukhamed Imin and Aissa were among the main instigators of the efforts to suppress or split the progressive movement. They did not shrink from bloody provocations and murder. To prepare their planned attack on the Three Areas, they plotted to eliminate rank-and-file progressives and then tried to murder Akhmedjan Kassimeh and Burhan. A Committee for the Defense of Islam was formed to rally bigoted religious elements in a struggle against “godless” progressives throughout the province. In February 1947 by one means or another a crowd of tens of thousands was assembled in Urumchi and converged on the government offices in the center of the city, where a meeting was in progress. All the riff-raff of the bazaar was there as well as an organized core of professional agents mingling with those paid to stir up trouble at the meeting. Inflammatory rumors were spread and excited the crowd. The air of unease increased as the city gates were closed, locking the huge crowd in. Orators appeared among the mob, stridently denouncing the heretics who would lead Sinkiang astray to “godless communism.” Suddenly the cry was raised, “Death to Akhmedjan!” Cans of kerosene appeared as if on command and shock groups prepared to throw them into the building. But Akhmedjan had in fact not yet arrived. Burhan went out on the front center balcony to parlay with the crowd while others tried to get a warning through to Akhmedjan. But the telephone wires were cut. Akhmedjan at that moment arrived, entered the building from the back, and taking his life in his hands went out to address the crowd. By this time more and more partisans of the Eleven-Point Agreement had arrived and made their voices heard. Provocateurs, intimidated, ceased their cries. Their supporters had not been paid to fight, only to riot. After some scattered fighting the riot was quelled. But it had not been without its victims. Five people were killed and many injured. Among the dead was a man who had been in jail with Burhan, became his chauffeur and personal bodyguard, and was shot while standing next to Burhan.
In another incident, a hired assassin was caught entering Burhan's house. Denying any political motive, he declared that he had only sought revenge because Burhan had had him arrested on false charges some years previously. No record of the case could be found. The threads of many of these incidents led back to Pao Ti-san, a security officer under the orders of General Sung Hsi-lien. As part of the effort to create an inflammatory atmosphere, a house-to-house "search for arms" was carried out on March 5, 1947, which set Urumchi buzzing with fresh rumors of a revolutionary plot against the governing authorities. At this time Uzman was carrying out provocations on the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic. Mongolian countermeasures were supposed to show that the Ili revolutionaries had "foreign contacts." While they tried to sow discord between Akhmedjan and Burhan, the Kuomintang reactionaries also tried to split the unity of the peoples of Sinkiang. Sometimes, of course, one group of secret agents did not know what another group was doing and they acted at cross purposes. To fan the flames of national strife, they even instigated the Mongolian princess Chaoyapo to lead her nomad people to attack the Uighur cultivators of Karashahr. These were typical tactics of "divide and rule."

Chang Chih-chung was naturally blamed for the crimes of his subordinates. He had appointed Sung Hsi-lien, and all major appointments were officially at his discretion. But it is now known that Sung was in constant contact with Chiang and the Kuomintang right-wing elements in Nanking who wanted to bring Sinkiang under direct Kuomintang domination. He, like some of the subordinate officials on Chang Chih-chung's own staff, were agents of the Kuomintang intelligence and secret-service agencies and were carrying out a policy opposed to that of General Chang Chih-chung. Chang Chih-chung claims that on more than one occasion he attempted to restrain Mahsud Sabri, since as senior officer in the northwestern province, he was his superior. But it was to no avail. Mahsud thought that his CC Clique backers were sufficiently powerful to defy Chang Chih-chung. Chang has vehemently denied any but indirect responsibility for what his subordinates did.

Like most "men in the middle," as he pictures himself, Chang was regarded as a leftist by the right and a rightist by the left. When I discussed his activities many years later with a young Uighur activist of the time, the description I got of him was succinct: "An old fox." The truth was, I believe, that he was no revolutionary but a well-meaning conservative. Caught up in extremely complex intrigues, he was simply not able to cope with the forces that were supposedly under his
control. Chiang Kai-shek used Chang Chih-chung's prestige and reputation for his own ends, and Chang's natural conservatism played into Chiang's hands. Thus in the summer while on an inspection tour with Akhmedjan and Mahsud in Kashgar, his residence had been besieged by a mass demonstration for a whole day and night demanding action against Mahsud Sabri and the rightists. He was greatly disturbed by this and, resentful, blamed Akhmedjan for it. Piqued by what he regarded as an Ili-inspired attempt to pressure him, and without consulting the Ili representative, he issued a decree that he afterwards bitterly regretted.

On May 31, 1947, he appointed Mahsud Sabri to head the provincial government. The reactionaries were overjoyed. When the left vigorously protested, he promised Akhmedjan and Burhan that if after six months Mahsud had not been able to win the confidence of the people, he would be dismissed. With Mahsud in power, Akhmedjan left for Ili. Burhan was forced into the background. It was widely believed that a Kuomintang attack on the Three Areas was imminent. Finding it impossible any longer to keep the provincial government on a progressive, democratic course, the last of the Ili representatives left Urumchi and returned to Ili in August 1947. Burhan, fearing for his life, hid out in the mountains. He maintained contact with the Ili revolutionaries.

The Kuomintang thought that they had gained a notable victory. They became still more brazen in their attacks on progressives and their exploitation of the people. All the old evils of corruption and arbitrary rule returned to the Seven Areas of Sinkiang.
When the eleven-point agreement was ratified, the Provisional East Turkestan Revolutionary Government in the Three Areas voluntarily ended its existence, as had been agreed. Alikhan vacated the post of chairman. Local elections were held in accordance with the agreement, and new local authorities were established for the Three Areas as part of the new Sinkiang provincial administration. When Akhmedjan Kasimeh returned to Ili from Urumchi in May 1947, he returned as deputy chairman of the provincial government.

Because of the lawless state of affairs created by the Kuomintang in the Seven Areas, it was only in the Three Areas, protected by the people’s forces, that it was possible to carry out the basic reforms of the agreement. Even here it was necessary to exercise the utmost caution in implementing these reforms. To make sudden changes, even those beneficial to the people, without proper preparation and the informed support of public opinion would have provoked misunderstanding and civil strife that could only play into the hands of the Kuomintang. Sometimes it is best to make haste slowly. Constant vigilance was needed to protect the
Three Areas from Kuomintang attacks from without and within. At the same time reactionary or selfish elements had to be restrained from exploiting and oppressing the people.

It was not easy to deal with the conservatives. Ibrahim Issar was secretary to Akembek Khodja, the Ili khan who was concurrently special commissioner of Ili. One day, thinking the moment opportune, Issar came to his chief with a memorandum on reforms. But he had misjudged the time. Akembek, in the classical gesture of the oriental despot, seized his slippers beside the divan and with them drove Issar from the house. Issar never dared approach him again. Some overeager left-wingers, frustrated and impatient at the slow results of the “mass line”—mobilization of the masses behind constructive reform—wanted to start an immediate, all-out confrontation with the feudal forces. Akhmedjan, however, persuaded them to adopt more sober and realistic strategies. In 1947, he, Saifuddin and their colleagues formed the League for the Preservation of Peace and Democracy in Sinkiang. This was a broad-based organization that included people from every walk of life and all nationalities. It rallied together all the most vital elements in the Three Areas and beyond. Its Progress Daily, a newspaper in the Uighur language, was one means by which it rallied public opinion in favor of reform and gradually forced the more conservative elements to give way. The schools were reorganized to give more time to modern science. Religious instruction remained but was made voluntary. A college was established (after his tragic death it was named Akhmedjan College) with courses in agriculture, animal husbandry and other subjects suited to the needs of the areas. More schools were opened. An agricultural bank was organized to give loans to peasant farmers and herdsmen. In the autumn of 1947 a school for Han children was opened in Ili, together with a Han association for the promotion of Han culture. Every nationality now had its association, and they all had their own publications in their own languages.

These and other measures backed by the league substantially improved the people's lives. Between 1944 and 1948, taxes in the Three Areas were reduced 50 percent. Compared with 1941, farm production increased 50 percent. Daily necessities in Ili cost four to twelve times less than in Urumchi. Despite the costs of defense and active operations against attacks by the Kuomintang and those in its pay, the Three Areas spent a third of its 1948–49 budget on construction and education.

The people appreciated these basic improvements in their lives, the first fruits of the revolution. With this mass support all attempts to sub-
vert the revolution from within failed. When the elections were due, Kuomintang agents tried to infiltrate and bribe voters to vote for their candidates. These men got short shrift. They were exposed. Despite calls for calm and "due process," one of these men was killed in a riot in Tacheng. That made the others cautious. Defeated in the elections, the Kuomintang tried to use Pan-Islamists and Pan-Turk chauvinists and leaders like Uzman and Yulbars Khan of Hami.

There were complicated plots within plots. Islamic chauvinists like Mahsud Sabri, Mukhamed Imin and Aissa plotted to separate Sinkiang from China and establish a theocratic-capitalist state with the help of the Americans and British. Pan-Turks plotted to set up their Pan-Turkish state stretching from the Dardanelles to Soviet Yakutia. American cold-war strategists, forestalling even Churchill, financed and armed both of these groups of plotters in hopes of carving out a sphere of influence in Central Asia that could be used in a future anti-Soviet war. They had got Kuomintang permission to develop a strategic airbase in Urumchi and calculated that if the Kuomintang failed to maintain its rule in Sinkiang, these local reactionaries masquerading as nationalists might be used to hold Sinkiang. The Kuomintang plotted to use these local quislings to split the unity of the Sinkiang peoples and utilize their anti-Communist, anti-Soviet fanaticism to destroy the revolutionary forces in Sinkiang. All these fantastic plots finally failed.

When Mahsud Sabri was appointed chairman of the provincial government, the Kuomintang and American cold-warriors had high hopes that he would be able to rally nationalist sentiment away from the Three Areas and its revolutionary ideals. But the attacks he launched against all progressive elements with attendant arrests and killings roused the people against him and his backers. His ally Ma Chin-shan became a particularly hated figure. It was becoming clearer that his Moslem army was to be used not for liberation but to crush the revolutionaries. His father, Ma Pu-fan, warlord of Chinghai, was ambitious to establish a Moslem state based on Chinghai.

In 1948 there took place in Turfan one of those sudden, desperate risings of the people against Kuomintang exactions and oppression. Five thousand people armed with only a few rifles and machine guns attacked a Kuomintang battalion garrisoning the Hsingin fortress. Just when they thought the tide was turning in their favor they saw a force approaching and carrying the green banners of Moslems. Thinking these were reinforcements, they rushed forward to greet their brothers. But it was part of Ma Chin-shan's army. As soon as it got within range it mowed down
the insurrectionists with machine-gun fire. Three thousand men died.

It was such atrocities that threatened once again to throw Sinkiang into the maelstrom of civil war.

Uzman and the Un-Americans

The adventurer Uzman (Osman Batur) was the key figure in one of these disruptive attempts to sabotage the Three Areas. He was originally a poor, downtrodden herdsman of the Kherei Kazakhs of the Koktogai area (Fuyun in the Altai). Owning only a few cattle and sheep, too few to live a nomad life, he took to farming. Proud and rebellious after taking part in several unsuccessful anti-Sheng Shih-tsai conspiracies and uprisings, he was finally forced to flee in 1941 with a few followers into the Altai mountain fastnesses. Here he lived the life of an outlaw, fighting a guerrilla war against his oppressors. By 1943 he had about a hundred followers, and more and more joined him as Kuomintang oppression intensified. He roamed from the Altai to the Gobi, then to Bogdo Ula and back to the Altai. The Kuomintang used the foolish tactics of exacting collective punishment on any settlement that willingly or unwillingly gave aid to Uzman, so soon, rather than be subjected to double exactions, first by Uzman and then by the Kuomintang, whole nomad groups would go off with Uzman when he appeared among them. He was then a tall, tough, striking figure of a man. He had an aquiline nose and deep-set eyes under beetling eyebrows. A huge black beard completed this head of a typical old-style nomad leader of the steppes. He spoke little. As he said, he “spoke with the gun.” Though illiterate, he grew accustomed to commanding and was supremely self-confident and arrogant. Fanatical in his beliefs, he had among his followers a number of religious zealots from Turkey. There seemed to be no doubting his hatred of the Kuomintang. They had forced him to live a hard life and endure bitter privations. Sometimes, harried on all sides, he had been forced out into the wilderness and had had to eat “soup” made from old bones and leather. But it was difficult to know whether this Altai Robin Hood was more patriot or bandit.

When Dalilkhan raised the banner of national liberation in the Altai, Uzman joined him. For a time he mended his bandit ways and became known as a popular leader. He and his men helped to free the Altai and liberate Tacheng. Later, when the provisional government was formed in the Three Areas, he was appointed governor of the Altai with Dalilkhan as military commander of the area.
Uzman had now become a popular hero, a minor legend of the steppes. He received a regular allowance from the state and kept whatever he had before. He was prosperous now, and with his essentially feudal mentality saw himself as a mini-Tamerlane. Encouraged by the fawning entourage that grows up naturally around such characters, he began to lead a dissolute life and talked ambitiously about setting up a separate Moslem state. When Dalilkhun and the Ili authorities tried to warn and curb him, this would-be ruler of the steppes angrily rejected all advice and again took to the mountains. In 1946 he was an open ally of the Kuomintang. At first he spread slanders and denunciations of the Ili government. Then he began raiding and pillaging the Altai settlements in an attempt to smash the people’s power there. Defeated by a detachment of cavalry sent by Izaakbeg, he fled to Peitaishan on the border with the Mongolian People’s Republic.

Reinforced and resupplied by the Kuomintang on the orders of Sung Hsi-lien, the Kuomintang military commander in Sinkiang, he renewed the attacks on the Altai settlements. With swift-hitting cavalry units he pillaged towns and farms and press-ganged conscripts. Once again he was driven out. This time the Kuomintang appointed him “mobile governor” and created a “mobile government” for him. While he himself sat at a safe distance under Kuomintang protection he sent raiding parties into the Altai.

It was Uzman who, under Kuomintang orders, staged provocations against border areas of the Mongolian People’s Republic in the Baitik Bogdo area in 1947 and raised claims to territory which were vehemently resisted by the MPR. These events were sensationaly reported in the Western press, and it was impossible to understand then what was behind them. They were, in fact, part of the Kuomintang’s ongoing anti-Soviet campaign, which was spread to include its allies. These Uzman adventures were all aimed at keeping the Altai in turmoil, preventing the people from getting on with constructive tasks.

In Sinkiang, almost unknown to the American people, as in the rest of China, certain U.S. agents were doing all they could to preserve the already moribund Chiang Kai-shek regime. Failing that, they sought some substitute, some third force, that might prevent or delay the victory of the people. Failing even that, if the “worst” befell and the people came to power, they wanted to leave things in such a mess that the people would long be condemned to clearing it up. Had they known the facts, the American people would have been appalled at what was being done in their name, but there was no way of informing them. Very few
people were engaged in these activities, and these men, left largely to their own devices, were not talking.

These Americans were not the first of the agents of the imperialist powers to be attracted to Sinkiang. After conquering Siberia and the Central Asian khanates, czarist Russia had sent a stream of agents into Sinkiang and had nursed plans for its annexation in whole or in part. The British had not been behindhand in plotting annexations not only in Sinkiang but in Tibet. During World War I, Germany had used Turkey to build up its influence in Sinkiang. Germany had set up an espionage organization and planned to establish a separate Islamic state there which would be dependent on them and could menace the British raj in India. These plans had been taken up again by Hitler, but again they had failed, lacking both a local base and muscle. We have seen how the Japanese militarists had made their try at using Ma Chung-yin, the Tungan adventurer, to cut a two-thousand-mile corridor from their new empire in Korea and northeastern China into Sinkiang as a jumping-off place to attack Soviet industrial centers in the Urals. This dream too had been shattered. The British were played out after World War II, but they passed on as much of their ambitions as they could to British-trained officials and officers among the Indians. This legacy bore its bitter fruit in India’s disastrous China War of 1962 when it tried to seize Aksai Chin and other areas.

Now a misguided group of Americans picked up this sorry tradition. They persuaded themselves that this was the best way to assure themselves access to Sinkiang’s rich deposits of oil and ferrous and non-ferrous ores, coal, salts and rumored deposits of uranium. They too wanted a strategic base for war on the Soviet Union and control over China’s “back door.” They sent in their first motorized survey team as early as 1926–27. The Sinkiang branch of the China Oil Company, which had American capital behind it, operated here. A steady stream of U.S. “experts” arrived to make Sinkiang studies. The consulate set up in Urumchi in 1943 became a listening and watching post focused on the Soviet Union. It also became a rallying center for all the reactionary forces in the province: the Kuomintang, Mahsud Sabri, Mukhamed Imin, Uzman, those very same Pan-Turk and Pan-Islamic chauvinist elements which were always the tools of imperialism in Sinkiang. Whether or not Chang Chih-chung knew it, the proposal to make Mahsud Sabri governor actually originated with a U.S. adviser in Chung-king. Mahsud Sabri returned to Sinkiang in 1946 together with a group of U.S. army officers and at first shared their headquarters in the Ming
Garden in Urumchi. Along with ascetic Mahsud came the usual PX supply of cigarettes, lighters, beer and cosmetics and heady talk of a great Islamic Turki state under the aegis of the Kuomintang and the United States. There seemed to be ample funds. These groups published the *Sinkiang Daily*, the biggest paper in the province, and *Freedom, The Flame, The Native* and the monthly *Altai*. Supplies of arms were readily available. The rationale was probably the same as that imputed to the cold-blooded anti-hero in the British novelist Graham Greene’s *The Quiet American*. They were “defending the free world” and the “values of Western civilization.” Paxton, the U.S. consul general in Urumchi, was, I was told in Sinkiang, the center of these intrigues until he fled from Sinkiang via the Karakoram pass in 1949. He and Douglas Mackiernan, a former Marine sergeant, had persuaded the Kuomintang, which was heavily indebted to them, to allow them to establish a “weather station” at Sachow at the western end of the Great Wall and build a U.S. airbase at Urumchi. To establish this in 1948, they had brought in a comprehensive U.S. survey team. But as Kuomintang prospects waned in Sinkiang, Paxton began to cultivate the reactionary Sinkiang “notables” as a third force that might be able to form a viable separatist regime. Among them was the former beg of Kashgar and the secretary of the provincial administration, Aissa, warmly recommended to Paxton by Turkish government contacts. Paxton already had close relations with Mahsud Sabri, both directly and through Mahsud’s son, who had been educated in East China, spoke English and always associated with the Americans. Paxton also had contacts with Uzman and Ma Chin-shan. It was a delicate matter to harness this team together. Uzman had the blood of hundreds of Uighurs on his hands. Ma Chin-shan, the Hui, was notorious as the butcher of Turfan Uighur rebels. Aissa did not dare associate with them openly. It was Paxton who brought them all together at his consulate dinners and assigned them roles in a common plan. Mackiernan was Uzman’s most enthusiastic patron, supplying him with money and arms and encouraging his ambitions.

With so many cooks busily stirring the broth, it was only a matter of time before it spoiled. The Seven Areas were again ripe for revolt.

*Kuomintang Defeats within the Wall*

At the same time, matters were going badly for the Kuomintang within the Wall. In the early stages of the civil war against the Com-
Communist Party and the Liberated Areas in 1946, Chiang's troops, well armed and aided by the American airlift and the Japanese occupation forces, achieved a number of seemingly spectacular victories. In a campaign they thought would last six months, they captured town after town. But the Communist commanders were not worried. They were losing cities but winning the war, as Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh told me when I interviewed them in 1948 in Yenan.

Chiang captured Changchiakou (Kalgan) and even Yenan, the headquarters of the Communist Party, but at the cost of heavy losses. Then the campaign bogged down. Thousands of troops were dispersed and pinned down with garrison duties. It was impossible to concentrate forces for any more general offensives. Soon these too ceased. Having thus dissipated its forces, the Kuomintang was reduced to passivity and loss of the initiative. One by one its dispersed garrisons were wiped out.

It was under these circumstances that Chang Chih-chung in Sinkiang began to backtrack in an attempt to conciliate the left. He contacted Burhan in his mountain hideout. Burhan had lived through an anxious time. After he had resigned from the post of deputy chairman of the province in 1947 he had been invited to go to Nanking by Chiang's government. This looked suspiciously like a trap, so he ignored the invitation and simply disappeared into the hills near Urumchi. After three months a message from Chang Chih-chung was delivered to him by a trusted friend, and he went to Urumchi to meet the general. By this time Chang Chih-chung could see that Mahsud's government would end in disaster, so he asked Burhan during a two-day conference if he would accept the governorship of the province. He stressed the difficulties. However, and suggested that since Chiang Kai-shek did not know Burhan personally, it would be useful for him to go to Nanking and get acquainted. He personally guaranteed Burhan's safety.

Following this interview, Burhan consulted Akhmedjan. There was naturally some hesitation about accepting this new invitation, but it was finally agreed that if everyone on the progressive side retired to Ili this might worsen the situation.

Burhan therefore went to Nanking, where he remained several months. The "inspection" over, he told his hosts that he wished to see Chang Chih-chung in Lanchow and then visit his mother in Urumchi. In Urumchi he accepted a position as director of the National Institute, the forerunner of the present-day University of Urumchi. Thus it was that he was on hand when Chang Chih-chung publicly called on him to accept the post of governor of the province to replace Mahsud.
By this time Mahsud and his allies had thrown Sinkiang into a state of political and economic chaos. At the same time Chiang Kai-shek's ineptness had brought the Kuomintang to the verge of catastrophe. In the five months between September 1948 and the end of January 1949, Chiang had lost the bulk of his elite forces, a total of 1,545,000 men, in the three major campaigns of Liaohsi-Liaoning (northeastern China), of Peking-Tientsin, and of Huai-Hai between the Yangtze and Yellow rivers, and enormous quantities of U.S. equipment. His commanders and secret agents inside the Wall had shown the same ineptness as those outside the Wall in Sinkiang. Chang Chih-chung therefore thought it was time to make the move he had planned for nearly a year. On January 10, 1949 (the very day the climactic battle of Huai-Hai saw the final liquidation of 555,000 Kuomintang troops), he formally installed Burhan as governor of Sinkiang at a government council meeting in Urumchi. Mahsud Sabri was dismissed, along with Sung Hsi-lien. General Tao Chih-yueh, personally loyal to Chang Chih-chung, was appointed commander of the Sinkiang garrison forces.

Politics in Urumchi were like quicksand—hidden dangers were everywhere. Burhan was known as a man of the left center, so, in an endeavor to hold a balance, Chang Chih-chung had appointed Mukhamed Imin, a man of the right, as deputy governor. Imin refused to attend the first meeting of the new government council. Instead he sent an ultimatum: he would not serve unless he had the right to approve or veto all appointments. Burhan knew that Imin's wife was in close contact with the Kuomintang secret service, but he also knew that unless he acted swiftly and decisively all would be lost. He arranged a meeting. Imin sent word: "Come alone in two hours." Burhan, suspicious, went alone to Imin's house. A door at the back of the room in which they sat was open. Behind was a darkened room. He caught a glimpse of a Kuomintang agent, whom he knew, busily taking notes. He had nothing to hide, however; he spoke frankly with Imin and persuaded him to join the government with the usual powers.

Then came weeks of tense expectation and watchfulness. No one wanted to precipitate the final conflict, but no one wanted to be caught napping. It was "high noon" in Sinkiang.

Within the Wall, with his troops in disarray, Chiang Kai-shek tried to gain time by talking peace. He put forward peace terms on January 1, 1949, and at the same time asked the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union to intervene and save him. They publicly refused
because his position was already hopeless. That did not mean that covert U.S. and British intervention had ceased, however.

On January 14, Mao Tse-tung on behalf of the People’s Liberation Army and the Liberated Areas put forward peace terms for discussion with the Nanking government or any other government or military group of the Kuomintang. The eight-point document called for punishment of the war criminals headed by Chiang himself; abolition of the Chiang government; reorganization of all Kuomintang troops on democratic principles; confiscation of all bureaucrat-capital belonging to Chiang and the other three big families; land reform; abrogation of all treasonable treaties; convening of a political consultative conference, excluding reactionary elements; and formation of a democratic coalition government by this conference to take over all the powers of the Nanking government and of all its subordinate governments at all levels.

Those counseling moderation and realism forced Chiang to negotiate, and on April 1, 1949, a peace delegation was sent to Peking headed by Shao Li-tze, a veteran Kuomintang member, and Chang Chih-chung. A peace agreement was negotiated by April 15 but was rejected by Chiang Kai-shek five days later. The next day Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, as, respectively, chairman of the Chinese People’s Revolutionary Military Commission and commander in chief of the PLA, gave the order for a general offensive to liberate the rest of China. That same day, the PLA crossed the Yangtze River to attack Chiang’s capital, Nanking.

While the rest of the PLA continued the advance east, south and west, the First Field Army, led by Peng Teh-huai, Ho Lung and other commanders, advanced and liberated Sian on May 20. Cooperating with two other PLA armies from the North China front, they pressed forward into the northwest. Lanchow was freed on August 26. The Kuomintang troops under the Chinghai and Kansu warlords Ma Pu-fang and Ma Hung-kuei were routed, captured and reorganized into the ranks of the PLA. The First Field Army readied itself for the desert march to Hami and Urumchi. The forces of the Three Areas were mobilized to advance on Urumchi from the west, or wherever else they might be called upon to go in Sinkiang. The situation of the Kuomintang generals and troops in Sinkiang was clearly hopeless. For the revolutionaries the central problem, however, was to get them to understand this, to give them a way to surrender, a way out, and prevent a final senseless holocaust.
Sinkiang Freed

General Chang Chih-chung had helped negotiate a viable peace agreement in Peking only to see Chiang Kai-shek tear it up. Disgusted, he now elected to remain in Peking and assist the new regime. General Tao Chih-yueh and other commanders loyal to him were eager to respond positively to the telegram he sent them calling on them to surrender Sinkiang peacefully and avoid further bloodshed and destruction. Burhan, the governor, now balding, thick-set and still imperturbable behind his thick, dark tortoiseshell glasses, coordinated plans with Akhmedjan and the other Ili leaders. As commander of the pacification forces, he too had some military units to throw into the balance for peace, and he knew he could count on Chang Feng, an old schoolmate; Yu Shueh-cheh, who had just taken over from a Kuomintang diehard in Kashgar; Colonel Wang Yu-chang, in Yarkand; Colonel Chang Tsen-chung, in Karashahr; and Lui Ching-shan, in Hutubi. All were alerted. But premature action against the considerable Kuomintang rightist forces could precipitate a bloody and destructive conflict.

The Kuomintang rightists in Sinkiang could muster some eighty thousand troops if they all obeyed orders. Ma Chin-shan, the Tungan commanding the Fifth Cavalry Corps, was all for fighting to the bitter end. Every day there were rumors that Ma’s cavalry were on the march. The Kuomintang police chief Lu Han-tung, the divisional commander Lu Shu-jen, and the corps commander Yeh Cheng were in daily contact with one another. They planned to take over Urumchi, wipe out all the revolutionaries they could lay their hands on, sack and set fire to the city and then retreat with their loot south into India. On September 19, they were holding their final meeting when Yeh Cheng’s wife burst into the room. In an impassioned harangue she told them what they probably knew already: there was hardly a chance of escaping after perpetrating such an atrocious crime. Yeh Cheng was afraid of his wife. After a moment’s hesitation he cried: “Do as you like, but I’m pulling out!” There were angry recriminations, but then they cooled down enough to work out a new plan to get out while the going was good.

Next morning Burhan received a message from them: Would the provincial government buy their surplus possessions for gold? Weighed against the destruction and loss of life they could cause, there was no doubt the deal was worth considering. They got their price of eight hundred lan* of gold, packed their bags, took a small bodyguard and

* One lan equals one and one-third ounces.
made off for the Indian border. Imin and Aissa had already fled. Aissa had left, declaring that he was taking goodwill presents to Ma Pu-fang’s army. He nearly got caught by the PLA’s swift capture of Lanchow, but finally made his getaway with Imin, doubling back through Kashgaria and over the Karakoram pass.

On the night of September 25, Burhan, the governor, and Tao Chih-yueh, the commander of the garrison, dispatched a telegram to the new People’s Government in Peking accepting its terms for the peaceful liberation of Sinkiang.

On October 20 the first units of the PLA, led by an armored motorized column, entered a festive Urumchi. The column was welcomed there by units of the 25,000-strong People’s Army of the Three Areas. The capital slept that night in untroubled peace for the first time in many years. South of the Tienshan, units of the People’s Army of the Three Areas were also there to welcome the PLA into Aksu. Soon the united people’s force was in control throughout Sinkiang.

A delegation of the Sinkiang liberation movement headed by Saifuddin had flown to Peking in response to an invitation received in July and there made plans for the peaceful liberation of the province and for the subsequent work of reconstruction. Later, in Lanchow, in an exceptional procedure because of the unusual circumstances, those members of the Sinkiang revolutionary organization who applied were immediately admitted to membership in the Chinese Communist Party. Many of them, of course, were Moslems. On November 7, General Wang Chen arrived as chief military representative of the PLA in Sinkiang. In December, General Peng Teh-huai, commander of the PLA northwest-front forces, arrived. A new provincial government was formed. It was a broad coalition of party, nonparty and other progressives under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. It had Burhan as chairman and Saifuddin and Wang Chen as vice-chairmen. It included other progressive popular leaders in Sinkiang, left Kuomintang members, representatives of all the various nationalities’ mass organizations, trade unions, cultural associations, women’s and youth federations, and representatives of the workers, craftsmen, peasants and herdsmen, patriotic national bourgeoisie, religious circles and enlightened gentry among the landowners and herd-owners.

The Three Areas were able to provide important help to the PLA and provincial government in stabilizing and improving the economic situation and getting the wheels of the economy turning again. Daily necessities, food and other essentials were rushed to the most needy
areas. Units of the Three Areas armed forces and propaganda teams aided the PLA on its way through southern Sinkiang. As the people's armies advanced, they helped the people establish their own local governments and public order. From this time on the liberation movement and progress of Sinkiang went ahead ideologically as well as organizationally as a fully integrated part of the revolutionary movement of all China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Government established on October 1, 1949, in Peking.

It took many more months for all fighting to end in Sinkiang. While the greater part of the province was able to press on with the many tasks of reconstruction, the PLA was for a time occupied with mopping up Kuomintang bandits roaming the mountain fastnesses of the Altai.

When Paxton, the U.S. consul in Urumchi, got news of the peaceful surrender of the Kuomintang forces in Sinkiang he packed his bags and, traveling south, left the country via Kashgar and India. His vice-consul, Mackiernan, however, elected or was ordered to stay on. In September, said my informants in Urumchi, he had got Yulbars Khan, who was then special commissioner in Hami appointed by the Urumchi authorities, to revolt and pool his forces with those of Uzman, remnants of Ma Chin-shan's Tungan cavalry and some diehard White Russian émigrés. Ferguson, the British consul in Urumchi, abetted these schemes. Uzman and Yulbars Khan were told to “prepare for World War Three” and promised “long-term aid.” Yulbars himself joined Uzman in the Barkul area in February 1950. They proclaimed the establishment of a “Committee for the Defense of Religion” to conduct operations against the People's Government. Part of the Western press described these men as patriots. First in the Hami area and then in the Tienshan and on the Chinghai-Tibet border, they raided transport and establishments of the People's Government, engaged in sabotage and tried to stir up the most backward elements of the population against the new government. The people, however, quickly turned against them. A people's delegation was sent to reason with them, but they refused to discuss peace. Squads of propagandists and mass organizers were then sent among their supporters and active military operations circumscribed their area of activities. More and more of their supporters began to desert as they learned the truth about the new People's Government. Finally the Tungan cavalry deserted in a body.

In September 1950, Uzman's chief lieutenant, Janum Khan, was captured by the PLA. Yulbars Khan, seeing the way things were going,
planned a getaway. He and Ma Chin-shan got passports and visas from Ferguson. Taking his personal bodyguard and a herd of cattle, sheep and horses, he completed a fantastic journey of eighteen hundred kilometers across and along the Altyn Tagh, the Kunlun and the Karakoram. In parts of the desolate mountain areas he traversed not a single thing grows, not even sparse grass. Eating up his herds, his transport animals and finally his mounts as he went, he finally escaped over the Karakoram Pass into India and ended up in Taiwan. Others of Uzman's supporters made their way to India and Turkey.

Ferguson was arrested in Urumchi. Arms and explosives were found in his house and evidence of his contacts with Uzman. He was expelled from the country. Mackiernan had left earlier. Probably hoping to make use of them later, he had gotten Uzman to give him two of his sons to take with him to America. Two boys were handed over to him, but he did not know, and perhaps never did know, that they were in fact not Uzman's sons at all. It finally made no difference. Mackiernan died in Tibet while trying to escape to India, killed by Tibetans who said they did not know who he was. It is not known what became of the two boys.

Uzman stubbornly refused to leave or surrender until all hope was gone. Then he too tried to escape along Yulbars' route via the Tsaidam and Chinghai. Overtaken by the PLA forces in April 1951, he was sixty years old when he was shot and killed during the resulting skirmish. His son was captured, and after being reeducated became a responsible official in the people's administration. His two daughters, crack machine-gunners in the bad old days, have turned over a new leaf too. It took time to bring the whole Uzman gang to account. The last of them surrendered or were caught only in 1953.

If it surprises you that foreign and specifically American aid was given to such characters as Uzman, it might be remembered that similar aid was given by the United States and Indian governments (in association with the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Taiwan) to the Khamba rebels in Tibet when these revolted against the People's Government in the late 1950s. The Khambas, slaveowning tribesmen, supported the Dalai Lama and his slaveowning Tibetan nobles. When the pressure of the People's Liberation Army and the liberated Tibetan slaves grew too much for them, they fled over the southern borders of Tibet into India and Nepal. In Nepal, these men were disarmed by military operations of the Nepalese army in a campaign begun in the autumn of 1974. In mid-1975 they were still a problem. A thousand of them were settled in
Hemja, but soon local protests began to pour into Kathmandu. Here and in Kaski, another resettlement area, the Khambas continued to go on looting sprees and molest Nepalese women. Two thousand more were settled in the Langtang Valley, but when this was scheduled to become a national park to attract tourists it was felt that the Khambas “spoiled the view” and should be relocated.*

Ma Chin-shan, with as many men as he could persuade to go with him, retreated into eastern Tibet, where he linked up with the Khambas. A self-styled “missionary-journalist” named Patterson reports that he acted as interpreter for an American official who offered clandestine help to these men from Sinkiang and their Kamba allies. In proof of what he knew, in 1965 he showed a film of a 1964 raid on a PLA convoy. He says that the Khambas were “supported by air-drops arranged by radio links between the Kuomintang forces in Tibet and Taiwan.”**

Michel Peissel in his book Cavaliers of Kham: The Secret War in Tibet† described himself as doing “anthropological work” in northwestern Nepal and reports that here on the isolated plateau of Mustung in western Tibet several thousand Khambas with Central Intelligence Agency and Indian backing set up a base far from their original habitat in eastern Tibet. Peissel, a self-avowed supporter of the Khambas, calls them a “band of brigands as ruthless as they are handsome, and at times as cruel as they were carefree.” Punishment for stealing a sheep was to have one’s eyes gouged out or a hand cut off. In 1956, he says, the U.S. reconsidered its Tibetan policy and set up an airlift to these rebels. After the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959, the Indian government allowed supplies to be shipped direct to the Khambas through Nepal, and, according to Patterson, was training Khambas in northeastern India. By 1966 the Soviet government was joining in with supplies to their agents in Sinkiang and to the Khambas.

In his book The Secret Team‡ Fletcher Prouty, a colonel (retired) in the USAF, describes how he worked in the Department of Defense as contact man with the CIA on military support for special operations. He reports, “The CIA equipped a major force of tens of thousands of Tibetans high beyond the Himalayas.” He states that President Eisenhower terminated the training of Tibetans in the United States for deep paratroop missions into far northwestern China. He estimates that four-

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† Published by Little, Brown, Boston, 1972.
‡ Published by Random House, New Jersey, 1973.
teen thousand Tibetans had been armed by the CIA, and yet David Wise, former Washington bureau chief of the New York Herald Tribune, writes in his The Politics of Lying that the CIA set up a secret base at Camp Hale near Leadville in the Colorado Rockies where Tibetans were trained in modern mountain warfare in the late 1960s. He says that this operation continued into the early months of the Kennedy administration and ended only in December 1961. The operation was revealed when a bus carrying Tibetans to be flown to Tibet skidded on a road and as a result it was broad daylight when they arrived at the Colorado Springs Rekerson airfield and were seen by talkative civilians.

The Nature of the Three Areas' Revolution

From 1944 to 1949, the Three Areas' Revolution was a national liberation movement deeply influenced by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Like all revolutions it developed circuitously. In its early stages a major role in shaping events was played by the local aristocracy of herdowners and landowners and the local bourgeoisie allied to them. This was not surprising. The vast mass of the people, the farmers and herdsmen, had been brutally suppressed and deprived of education. Education and experience in administration were practically monopolies of the upper classes: the feudal landowners and herdowners, the religious leaders who mainly came from these classes, the merchants and few capitalist entrepreneurs. This gave a markedly religious and bourgeois nationalist character to the first stage of the revolution.

The Three Areas were economically backward, and the politically developed section of the laboring people was a very small minority. However, the early Sun Yat-sen Kuomintang revolutionaries had had some influence in spreading the democratic ideas of the Three People's Principles. This influence was strengthened when representatives of the Chinese Communist Party and progressive intellectuals arrived and began to work in Sinkiang from 1938 to 1944. The Sinkiang Daily, edited by them, became the most influential newspaper in the province. In the short, progressive period of Sheng Shih-tsai's rule, Marxist ideas spread in print and by word of mouth. News of the Soviet Union filtered in, and more and more the people came to know something of the tremendous social changes that were taking place there and particularly in the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan. It was from these sources that young Sinkiang intellect-
uals like Akhmedjan Kassimeh drew their ideas and ideals. Even when Sheng Shih-ts'ai's White Terror practically ended direct contact between the progressives of Sinkiang and the outside world and it was impossible for the relatively mature Chinese Communist Party to give systematic day-by-day guidance, these young revolutionaries were able to give the leadership needed to develop the revolution, overcome the influence of separatist Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turkish tendencies, of national separatism and of bourgeois nationalist chauvinism. Thus the masses were gradually won over to an increasingly clear-cut program of democracy, national liberation and unity for the common interests of the people of the various nationalities of China.

Akhmedjan Kassimeh stated these aims most clearly:

"Where there is national oppression, we are nationalist. Where there is no oppression, we are internationalist." In 1944, in a speech to young intellectuals, he said:

Our present movement is not only a national liberation movement. It is also a democratic movement.... It is not directed against one particular nationality but against the oppressors and supporters of reactionary dictatorship among the various nationalities.... Either you take your place in the camp of democracy to struggle for your own national liberation or you collude with imperialism to preserve imperialism and your shackles of slavery.... Experience shows that only when each of the nationalities in Sinkiang unites with all the others can each gain its own freedom.

Answering the question "Who are our enemies? Who are our friends?" he said further:

Our national liberation movement directs its attack against the remnant feudal forces and warlords of China and their allies and protectors, the imperialists. The democrats of China are engaged in a struggle against the military and political strength of the remnant feudal forces, the reactionary forces of the Kuomintang and their imperialist allies. If you understand that, then you will know that the democrats of China are our allies and that the counterrevolutionary clique of the Kuomintang and world imperialism are our enemies.

He called on all the Sinkiang peoples to oppose those who spread hatred of the Han people. He showed that failure to maintain such a policy of democracy and national unity, especially in the early days of the revolution, had enabled various reactionary elements to assert themselves so that, particularly in the outlying districts, they were able to hold up necessary reforms and implement anti-Han policies. As a result, real friends were attacked while Kuomintang and other reactionary elements
were protected merely because they were not Hans. Akhmedjan believed in the common destiny of all the nationalities of China. When news of the liberation of Peking came, he was so elated that he posted the news bulletin on the wall of his office and said to his wife: "With Peking liberated, Sinkiang too will soon be liberated! You must study Han well so that you can work well with the Han comrades."

The League for the Protection of Peace and Democracy spread these progressive ideas, and they took hold to become the dominant trend. It published newspapers in several languages: Uighur, Kazakh, Mongolian, Sibo, Russian and also Han. At the time of the peaceful liberation of Sinkiang, it had eighty thousand members uniting people of all nationalities and strata of society excepting only the big feudal landowners. Throughout Sinkiang it helped the people resist the pressure of the Kuomintang and establish friendly relations between the Han people and those of the other nationalities. It pressed for and got reforms in the Three Areas. But it had not yet reached the stage where it could lead the masses in an all-out struggle against feudal landlordism and for socialism. This was possible only after the liberation of Sinkiang in 1949.

The Three Areas Revolution played a key part in transforming the Sinkiang people's national liberation struggle into part of the struggle of the whole Chinese nation for a people's democracy and the later advance to socialism. It undermined Kuomintang power. In the crucial days when the People's Liberation Army stood at the eastern gates of Sinkiang, the Kuomintang leaders, huddled in Urumchi, were well aware of the military forces of the Three Areas massed in their rear. This greatly influenced them to surrender and avoid further bloodshed.

The policies implemented by the Three Areas' revolutionaries demonstrated concretely what was meant by national unity and democracy. The league laid a good foundation for the subsequent work of the Chinese Communist Party and the people's government in leading the people rapidly to socialism with a series of well-thought-out economic, political and social measures conceived in a spirit of democracy, fraternity and equality.

The People's Liberation Army was welcomed by the people of Sinkiang nowhere more enthusiastically than in the Three Areas. There were, of course, some who were at first still doubtful whether the declared policies of the Communist Party were indeed its true policies, whether the "new Hans" were indeed different from the "old Hans." But these misgivings ended as the principles of the party's nationalities policy became known in practice.
The building of the Communist Party organization in Sinkiang began in 1950. The Ili area party committee was set up in 1951 and soon after that the provincial committee of the party was set up in the capital now again called Urumchi, the Beautiful Pastures, its old Uighur name. The name Tihwa, meaning Enlightenment, Inculcation and Assimilation, was abolished in accordance with the policy of doing away with all names suggesting racial slur. When the Sinkiang people’s provincial government was established, the Three Areas became a fully integrated part of the People’s Republic of China and, with necessary amendments, began to carry out the same socialist policies.

It was one of the great tragedies of Sinkiang and of all China that several of the finest leaders of the revolution perished in an air crash on the eve of the great victory of 1949. They were on their way to meet their comrades of the People’s Liberation Army and the Chinese Communist Party for the first time. In Ili amid a grove of trees stands their mausoleum, with this eulogy by Chairman Mao engraved upon it:

May the spirit of Comrades Akhmedjan Kassimeh, Izaakbeg, Abbasov, Dalil-khan and Lo Tze live forever! They perished in the service of national liberation and of the people’s democracy!

—MAO TSE-TUNG
October 22, 1949

Lo Tze was the Han comrade who accompanied them on the fatal flight.

These brave and great-hearted men built wisely and well. The work they started and carried through was taken up by worthy hands, by men inspired by their sacrifice. In 1953 preparations for regional autonomy in Sinkiang began. In 1954, the first all-Sinkiang elections were held. On October 1, 1955, the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region was formally established. There could be no more fitting memorial to them. In succeeding years, Kazakh, Mongol and other national areas and counties were formed.

The effect of the liberation struggle in Sinkiang was like a great tributary joining the mother river in the final journey to the open sea. As Mao Tse-tung said when he greeted the representatives of the Three Areas Revolution in Peking in 1949: “The Ili Revolution is a part of the people’s revolution of China.”
The destruction wrought by time, war and other catastrophes has been so thorough and the transformations made in the last quarter of a century of peace so great, that traveling through Sinkiang today one can only guess at the terror and glory of the history I have recounted. I visited towns whose names alone evoke the past. The glory of Gaochan is a desolation of ruins of palaces, temples, tombs and fortress ramparts carefully preserved by archeologists. The only remains that need no imagination to reconstruct are the fabulous artistic riches of the painted grotto temples of Kezir and Baizerlikh. But fortunately the heritage of the past is preserved not only in physical things but in the songs and thought of the people, their dances and music, their architectural tastes, artistic skills and customs passed down from father and mother to son and daughter. These everywhere attest to the delights of Sinkiang's culture, and they beautifully reflect the rebirth of Sinkiang. It is the new in Sinkiang that dominates one's memories of it, that and the glories of its scenery.

Sinkiang is a “developing country.” Its four and a half million peo-
Sinkiang Today

people began their industrial advance from scratch in 1949. Agriculturally, they had only the age-old skills of the past, the worn fields and deteriorated channels of ancient irrigation systems and depleted herds. For farm tools they had little beyond the round-bladed ketman hoe of their forefathers. What they have achieved today is a saga of creativity and hard work. They have solved the problems of self-sufficiency in food, clothing and housing and created a relatively well-rounded industrial economy giving meaningful employment to all, basic education and a steadily rising standard of living. This record can stand comparison well with that of any developing country.

How were these successes achieved in so short a time?

New China's Overall Successes

Sinkiang shares the overall success of China in the past quarter century. Politically, China has established a unique socialist democracy. Economically, it is among the leading developing nations and will soon join the ranks of the developed nations. It is industrialized to the extent of being able to produce its own aircraft, ocean-going vessels of 25,000 tons, 26 million tons of steel a year, 500,000 kw. generators and it stands third in the world in coal production. Its growth rate is currently 10 percent a year. These political and economic achievements are reflected in the improving standard of living of its 800 million people.

In China today, including Sinkiang, as I have reported elsewhere,* there is no unemployment, destitution, beggary, prostitution, venereal disease, drug addiction or alcoholism. The people have adequate clothing, basic housing, more than a sufficiency of food, and a steadily improving diet. Women have been basically emancipated: they have the vote at eighteen years of age like men; they get equal pay for equal work; they can retire at fifty-five years of age on 70 percent of their salary (60 years of age for men); they get eight weeks' maternity leave. Like men, they enjoy the eight-hour day and the six-day work week. Trade unions supervise the implementation of good laws governing working conditions.

China has established public health, sanitation and state or cooperative health services that encompass the whole population. State medical care is free for cadres (white-collar public employees of all kinds) and workers.

Peasants have their co-op medical service at extremely low cost. It has wiped out the cholera, smallpox, and plague that used to ravage the population and ended epidemic diseases caused by diet deficiencies and dirt. By voluntary methods of family planning, it has reduced the population growth rate to around 1.7 percent. It provides universal elementary education for over 145 million children with 36 million more in middle school. Illiteracy has been reduced from 90 percent to about 30 percent of the population. University-level cadres and technicians are being trained in increasing numbers in an educational system ingeniously tailored to the country's needs and possibilities. It is enjoying a renaissance of the arts, crafts and cultural activities and an unprecedented growth of mass amateur art in drama, the dance, music, literature, poetry and the visual arts.

The Chinese have reduced crime so that there is now no organized crime problem. They have established an egalitarian society without snobbery, without a chasm between rich and poor, in which with few exceptions, the wage differential in factory, mine or office is a modest one to four or five, 30 to 150 yuan* on an eight-grade wage scale. Urban rents are low, often free or less than five percent of wages. Fifteen yuan a month will buy food for one. There is no personal income tax, no inflation and prices are stable. In fact, prices for essentials, like medicine or farm tools, have been reduced. The state is run mainly on the proceeds of the public sector—the state-owned farm, industrial, financial and commercial enterprises, with the taxes on cooperative enterprises and the tax on agriculture** playing a subordinate role.

China oppresses no nation and maintains no troops beyond its borders. Within the nation, there is no exploitation of man by man because all major means of production are owned either in common by all the people or collectively by groups of producers.

They have carried out a planned, amazingly successful restructuring of society so that the heterogeneous, tension-ridden social system they took over from the Kuomintang has been transformed into one of workers, farmers, intellectuals and cadres working in state or cooperative enterprises and institutions. In an expanding economy anyone with vocational skills is guaranteed a job. The 80 percent of the people who live

* The yuan is stable, currently worth US $2.
** The agricultural tax in kind was set in the 1950s as a fixed amount of grain or livestock to be paid each year. At that time it amounted to around 15 percent of the output of an area. Since output has gone up the proportion paid as tax has steadily decreased to around 5 percent today.
in the countryside are all members of communes or employees of state farms and as such are also guaranteed suitable employment or pensioned retirement.

Social restructuring has led to restructuring of the land. In 1949, less than 10 percent of the land was considered arable. But even much of this was uncultivated or poorly cultivated because of erosion, grave-mounds, waterlogging, lack of water or other causes. By liberating its productive forces, especially and initially by putting its plentiful manpower to work as a result of land reform and cooperation, China has increased yields and brought most of the easily accessible arable area under cultivation. Vast water and soil conservation projects, well-digging, leveling and terracing, afforestation, and flood and drought control have created a sufficiency of areas that give high stable yields no matter what the weather. Now a drive for modernization is on—mechanization, chemicalization and electrification. It is increasing yields still further and bringing marginal lands into use. Thirty million acres of wasteland were brought into cultivation in the ten years from 1961 to 1971; 80 million acres were leveled; 20 million acres were brought under new or improved irrigation; 17 million were protected from water logging and 8 million terraced. By careful, self-reliant housekeeping, it has achieved and maintained a basic economic self-sufficiency. Its rural communes and state farms, now producing over 280 million tons of grain (1976), have solved the food problem. They have had 16 years of constantly better harvests, with comparable increases in other foods and industrial raw materials. China exports rice, a high-price crop, of which it has a relative surplus, and imports a certain amount of wheat. This is eaten largely by the population in the lower-yielding northern wheat-growing lands. It has laid by a reserve of around 40 million tons of grain. Industrially, it is creating a fairly well rounded economy able to produce all the basic consumer goods and engineering products. It trades for whatever else it needs. It has no domestic debt or long-term foreign debts and no inflation. The state trade monopoly insulates it to a large extent from the vagaries of the world capitalist market.

By 1980, according to plan, China will have created an independent, relatively comprehensive industrial and agricultural economy. By the end of the century it aims to achieve the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, science and technology so as to put China in the front ranks of the developed nations. For a land as poor and backward as it was in 1949, China has accomplished a Herculean
task without parallel in modern times. The significance of the Cultural Revolution was that it kept up the momentum of change. Leaders inclined to mark time or switch goals were dismissed or remolded. Even more significant, the mass of citizens, the real movers of history, emerged with an enhanced understanding of socialism in a Chinese context and a greater determination to realize its goals.

Sinkiang shares all these successes, but as an autonomous region it has its own special problems and achievements. Much has been done, but much more needs to be done to improve the quality of life. Most housing and school buildings are still substandard or of the utility or basic variety; a great deal has to be done to bring medical service and teaching to a high, all-round level. Transport needs modernization and must be greatly extended. Here alone are tasks that need decades of effort.

China—a Multinational State

One of the great motivating forces of the Chinese revolution is national liberation. That means national liberation of all the fifty-five national minorities who with the majority Hans—94 percent of the total population—make up the multinational, multilingual and multicultural state that is China.

Ten of the minorities number over a million people. The Chuang of Kwangsi, closest in physique and folkways to the Hans, number seven million. Uighurs number over five million. There are a smaller number of Hui in Ninghsia and Yi in Szechuan and Yunnan; three million Tibetans in and around Tibet; nearly three million Miao in south China; close to two million Mongols, mainly in Inner Mongolia, Chinghai and Sinkiang; and more than a million Puyi in the southwest and Koreans in Yenpien in the northeast.

The Mongols, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Tadjiks and many Tibetans are primarily herdsmen. Most of the other nationalities are farmers. Some lived an exceedingly primitive life at the time of liberation. Kirghiz still used wooden plows. The Lolos of southwestern China were hunters, and headhunters at that. They practiced a primitive slash-and-burn agriculture. The Olunchun were hunters and numbered just a few thousand, the Hoche just a few hundreds. Urumchi, Kashgar and Ili in Sinkiang, Huhehot in Inner Mongolia and Lhasa in Tibet were large towns or cities which as modern administrative, cultural and industrial centers
had growing urban communities of the ethnic minorities of the regions.

The situation is further complicated by the multiplicity of religions among the nationalities. The Uighurs, Tadjiks, Kazakhs, Hui and others are Moslems. The Mongols and Tibetans are Buddhists, and then there are Taoists, Christians of various sects and animists as well. These national minorities, furthermore, live not only as large, compact communities on the northern, western and southern borderlands of the country. They live in sizable communities as well as small family groups within the Han areas and also within the larger ethnic regions.

It is to the credit of the leaders of the ethnic minorities and the national leaders of China that, learning from the bitter lessons of history, they realized the truth that only in unity could the Han and the other peoples build up their country—China—in peace. Fratricidal racial or religious strife could engulf all in a common misery and perhaps disaster. It is on this basis of a common striving for unity and progress that the country has evolved its nationalities policy, enabling each nationality to play its role as one of the community of the whole Chinese people.

This basic principle of national freedom was inserted in the Common Program adopted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September 1949 and signed by, among others, the delegates from Sinkiang. The Common Program prescribed national freedom and the immediate establishment of a people's democratic state based on the alliance of workers and peasants with a further program of socialist construction designed to end the exploitation of man by man, class by class, which, in the opinion of Mao's party, is the root cause of national oppression and strife. The program was, in effect, the provisional constitution of China. The September 20, 1954 Constitution adopted by the first National People's Congress (NPC), the first truly democratic assembly of the Chinese people, institutionalized the democratic socialist system and its program to build socialism and then communism and spelled out in more detail the nationalities policy of the new state. It stipulated:

All nationalities of China are united in one great family of free and equal nations. It prohibits discriminatory and oppressive acts against any nationality and forbids any action that may undermine unity among them. All nationalities are free to use and foster their own spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their own customs and habits. Through its various provisions, it ensures that all national minorities living together in compact communities in a given area may exercise their right to regional autonomy. Because each nationality has its own specific historical background and their
political, economic and social developments differ, the state will give due consideration to their needs and in the matter of socialist transformation will pay full attention to their special needs.

These policies have been confirmed in the new constitution adopted after the Cultural Revolution on January 17, 1975, by the fourth National People’s Congress.

**China's Autonomous Regions**

Thus, in a seeming paradox, unity among the national groups is based on autonomy.

The Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region is one of the five big autonomous regions of China. The others are the Inner Mongolian, Ninghsia Hui, Kwangsí Chuang and Tibetan autonomous regions. In the Chinese administrative system, the 50,000 rural communes and around 4,000 towns and urban districts are the lowest levels of state administration. Next come the 2,200 counties and nearly two hundred cities and municipalities and then the twenty-nine provincial-level administrations, including the five autonomous regions and the three cities of Peking, Shanghai and Tientsin directly under the central government. Each of these levels has its elected people’s congress and its revolutionary committee (standing committee) of that congress. In some areas there is a prefecture (chou) below the level of the province or autonomous region. Depending on need, autonomous chou or counties may be established. There are now twenty-nine autonomous chou and sixty-nine autonomous counties.

The importance of China’s minority areas is indicated by the fact that though their populations make up only 6 percent of the whole population, they constitute over half the area of the country. Their forty-eight million people engage in farming, with over five million in animal husbandry and a million and a half in forestry. The nation's pasturelands, comprising two-fifths of its total area, are in the national minority areas. These lands are also rich in forest wealth, covering 28 percent of China’s area, and in mineral resources such as coal, iron, oil and nonferrous and precious metals.

Local autonomous governments exercise the usual powers of administrations at that level. They handle their finances within the limits prescribed by the constitution and law, organize local public security forces in accordance with the military system of the state and can pass needed regulations subject to approval by the higher authorities. But an autono-
modern region has somewhat wider powers in several respects. It disposes
not only of all income from local enterprises set up with its own funds,
but keeps five percent of the annual income from the enterprises set up
in the region by the central authorities. Provinces keep only three percent.

The Sinkiang Model

Sinkiang is a good example of how the problems of a very difficult
mix of over thirteen ethnic groups have been solved. With a population
of Uighurs, Kazakhs, Hans, Hui, Kirghiz, Mongols, Sibo, Tadiks,
Uzbeks, Tartars, Tahurs, Manchus and Russians, it is the largest au-
tonomous region in China, with 1,640,000 square kilometers or one-sixth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONALITY</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF PEOPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uighur</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>5,027,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>4,554,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>704,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>451,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongol</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>99,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibo</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzik</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>66,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>11,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Include Tibetans, Miao, Koreans, Chuang, Li, Iranians, Turks, Tungshan, Sana
and Pakistanis.

of China and around eleven million people. After the Mongolian, it was
the second autonomous region established. It is the third most populous
and probably has the greatest economic potential. Not only has it en-
joyed autonomy since October 1, 1955, but the various ethnic groups
within it have also enjoyed autonomous rights in smaller constituent autonomous areas, chou (prefectures) and even counties (hsien). It has two Special Administrative Zones: Southern Sinkiang with about two-thirds of the population and the Ili, Tacheng and Altai zone. It has eighty counties and three municipalities: Urumchi, Ining and Kashgar and the four special areas of Kashgar (with ten counties where Uighurs comprise 90 percent of the population), Khotan, Tacheng and Altai.


As long as they do not violate the basic principles of the constitution, such autonomous areas, like Sinkiang itself, enjoy greater freedom than ordinary administrative areas in working out supplementary regulations in the political, economic, cultural and educational fields to suit the special characteristics, interests, needs, customs and wishes of the local population.

A people proud of its heritage wants to feel at home: to see around it its familiar architecture and forms and colors; to enjoy the traditional enjoyments—music, singing, dancing, theater, ballads and poetry, books and pictures; to dress in the traditional clothes, eat the traditional foods and speak the native tongue. This is what autonomy gives Sinkiang and its autonomous chou and counties. When you are in the mountain pastures of Chaosu, you are in Kazakh territory. Down in Kashgar there is no doubt that you are in the land of the Uighurs. In the midst of the Kazakh land you find yourself in Mongolia in the Mongolian Borotala Chou west of Lake Ebi Nor. In the Yulduz, south of Urumchi, you find
yourself in the Mongolian enclave at Yenki. Dress, architecture, speech—all are Mongolian.

Voters and the law see to it that at the national level, as in the autonomous area, all resident ethnic groups are adequately represented in the people's congresses and revolutionary committees (local governments and management groups) at all levels. Thus 14 percent of the deputies in the National People's Congress, the highest organ of state power, are from the national minorities, who comprise only 6 percent of the country's population. Saifuddin, a Uighur and veteran revolutionary, is now chairman of the revolutionary committee (government) of the region, first secretary of the Sinkiang Party committee, vice-chairman of the standing committee of the fourth (current) National People's Congress and alternate member of the Party's political bureau. Ismayil Aymat, also Uighur, is a secretary of the Party regional committee and vice-chairman of the region. Representatives of all the various nationalities are among the cadres of all levels of Party and government organizations from the grass roots in the factories and people's communes to the highest organs of power in the Party and NPC. Similarly in the higher administration of the Sinkiang region I found every effort being made to ensure full democratic representation of the region's thirteen ethnic groups. This was made easier because of the very active role the people of Sinkiang played in freeing themselves from Kuomintang rule. When the People's Liberation Army arrived to free Sinkiang peacefully in 1949, it was welcomed by a large cadre of local militants of various nationalities, tested in the liberation struggle and trained in the process of freeing themselves and administering a large part of the region. When the autonomous-region administration was formed it was thus able to achieve immediately a fair balance of all the nationalities. In 1975, the minorities sent 67 percent of Sinkiang's deputies to the National People's Congress. Three of them were elected to the standing committee of the NPC.

This same pattern of ethnic balance is followed in the various autonomous chou and counties within the area where Mongols, Kazakhs, Tadjiks, Hui and other peoples live. Most of these areas have mixed populations. So, for instance, where Mongols and Kazakhs live intermingled you will find a Mongol chairman of the local government and a Kazakh vice-chairman or vice versa. On some rural communes this is often convenient, because the Mongols are Buddhists and can eat pork whereas the Kazakhs are Moslem and cannot. So the Mongols raise pigs and the Kazakhs raise the horses and they both enjoy the monetary benefits from both animals without prejudice to their religions.
This brings us to the question of religion. In such a multinational region it is, of course, essential that the regulations governing freedom of religion and separation of church and state be strictly observed. Three religions are represented: Moslems are in the majority (Uighurs, Hui, Kazakh, Tadjik); then there are Buddhists (Mongols and Hans) and Russians of the Orthodox Church; there are also Hans and others who have no religion. There is a tacit understanding that Moslems can become members of the Chinese Communist Party. Many Sinkiang Moslems make the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Thanks to these enlightened policies there has been no religious strife in Sinkiang for the past twenty-five years. In the 1966 Cultural Revolution there was some attempt made to stir up religious trouble by hotheads, but they were rebuffed. Of course there is the odd incident where embers of the old racist attitudes leap into flame, but the tinder for these incidents to grow into a conflagration is just not there any more. Any trouble is quickly dealt with by the people of every nationality alert to the danger of racial conflict and alive to the need to preserve ethnic harmony and religious tolerance. It is common knowledge that the historically more developed Han-inhabited areas have contributed enormously in wealth and personnel and know-how to the growth of the less-developed minority areas. In this atmosphere all perceive the good sense of preserving their own languages and cultures, but at the same time they understand the need to master the Han (Chinese) language and study the rich Chinese culture which they have had a hand in developing and also one another's cultures. This opens to them the opportunity to play their part in the broad arena of Chinese national life.

The need for a correct solution of these problems was underlined when in the early 1960s the Soviet leaders led by Khrushchev began a virulent campaign to disrupt Sinkiang's growing unity. Through their agents in Sinkiang they charged that the region was being turned into a "Chinese colony," that "a policy of deception and discrimination was practiced," that there would be no development of an independent Sinkiang industry and that agriculture would go bankrupt. Exploiting shortages caused by mistakes made in the newly established communes, they inveigled sixty thousand Kazakh nomads in April–May 1962 into the Soviet Union across the borderlands where their normal winter pastures lay and where they had nomadized for centuries without hindrance.

The ghost of czarist imperialism had not been laid to rest. Sinkiang had received some valuable assistance from the Soviet Union in the period 1949–58 under the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship
and Alliance of February 14, 1950, in scientific surveys, in wiping out locusts and in oil development, but the experience of Sino-Soviet joint stock companies was not happy and these were dispensed with as soon as possible. Two companies formed in 1950 were to prospect for and exploit oil and nonferrous metals in Sinkiang, but these and an air transport line were dissolved in 1955. China wanted no more foreign concessions. It was such experiences and the later abrupt withdrawal of all Soviet aid by Khrushchev in 1959, in an attempt to blackmail China, and the trade embargo organized by the Western imperialist powers that made it necessary for China to stress self-reliance in her development plans.

**Sinkiang's Development Strategy**

With the coalescing of the revolutionary movements in Sinkiang and the rest of China, all the immense experience and expertise of the Chinese Communist Party was put at the disposal of the Sinkiang revolutionaries to produce a successful blueprint of development. The first step was to complete the democratic reforms, including land reform, which ended feudalism, serfdom and slavery. Then, following basic rehabilitation of the economy, the autonomous region was set up in 1955 and the advance to socialism began.

Besides being an autonomous region politically, Sinkiang is one of the large more or less self-sufficient economic regions into which China is divided for planning and strategic purposes. It is self-reliant but is integrated into the overall economic system of the nation. In addition to big investments from its own resources used on the authorization of the national government in accordance with the overall national plan, it receives a large annual sum from Peking earmarked according to its own wishes for economic, cultural, health and welfare services. Between 1955 and 1974, these subsidies amounted to 53 percent of the region's total revenue.

It gets special consideration from the central authorities in plans for national industrial projects, in allocating manpower, technical cadres and equipment and in setting commodity prices which are the same all over the country. For example, the value of the yuan was pegged at a higher level in Sinkiang than in the rest of the country; prices paid for pelts, sheep and other livestock products have been increased while those of commodity goods like tea, cloth and metals have been reduced. Herdsmen and farmers thus get a better deal. The squeeze that in most areas
of the world favors industrial goods over crops and livestock products has ended. The rule is now fair exchange of equivalent values. Prices for farm and livestock products have risen 59 percent in the past twenty years. Farm-tool and chemical prices have been reduced 30 percent in the Ili area. The average income of the region was tripled by 1964 and has continued to increase steadily since then. Basic to China’s development strategy is the principle that production is for the people, not for profit.

Agriculture

All economic activity, indeed all activity, in Sinkiang is guided by the exhortation of the Party and government to be self-reliant, to “build the country through self-reliance, hard struggle, diligence and thrift”; to “go all out, aim high and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism.” Here, as in the rest of China, “agriculture is the foundation and industry is the leading factor.” “Grain is the key link in agriculture but all-round development must be assured.” Rents were reduced immediately after the liberation, and this enabled the peasants to rehabilitate farming swiftly. To get the economy really moving the land reform was carried out in 1952 on the principle of “land to the tiller.” This fruit of democratic decision resolved the age-old conflict between feudal landlords and peasants. All usurious debts were cancelled. Serfs and slaves were freed. Like other land-poor or landless farmers they got an equal share of land. The former landlords also got a share of land to support themselves on and so remold themselves through honest labor. It was a wise policy. Unconditional expropriation would have left them with a sense of deprivation and made them charges on the state. The question of the large herdowners was not dealt with at this stage of the land reform.

Here, as in the rest of China, polarization of the peasants into rich and poor resumed almost immediately after the land reform. To overcome this and what caused it (lack of know-how and tools, manpower or capital, etc.), the peasants were eager to try cooperation, which alone could guarantee universal prosperity. Organization of labor-exchange brigades, mutual aid teams, cooperatives (farm, credit and supply and marketing) and communes followed in sequence.*

By the 1970s, the communes, which are at once cooperatives and the basic local units of government administration, had proved themselves by achieving more than self-sufficiency in foods and light industrial raw materials such as cotton, vegetable oil crops, sugar beets and silk. Back in the 1950s Chairman Mao had pointed out that under conditions then "cooperation in the countryside must precede the use of big machinery." Following development of industry and of the communes which now include all the peasants, and former landlords, he pointed out that "the fundamental way out for agriculture lies in mechanization." This is now the urgent task for farming, livestock raising and supporting industry. Modernization means mechanization, the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides where needed, and electric power, and Sinkiang, like the rest of China, is now at the start of a second great spiral of agricultural development.

Sinkiang is cultivating nearly 7 million acres or more than two and a half times as much land as in 1949. Its grain output has quadrupled. Yields are increasing though still rather low. Model farm units are raising wheat and cotton yields up to world standards. The current cotton output is more than 11 times that of 1949. Seventy-four percent of the cropland is irrigated. Powered pumps are widely used. When well planned, irrigation based on the regularly melting snows of the mountains and glaciers is more dependable than that based on erratic rainfall. Spectacular successes have been achieved in afforestation and water conservation. Thousands of acres of forest belts and windbreaks have been planted. The deserts are being pushed back. Three and a half million acres of wasteland have been opened up. A 670-foot dam and 8 large reservoirs now control the Tarim River. New irrigation canals total over eleven thousand miles. In 1976, 58 percent of the cultivated land was tractor-plowed and nearly half tractor-sown. Harvesting is being mechanized. Transport is much improved. Relays of horsemen once raced succulent Hami melons to the imperial court. Now superb Turfan and Hami melons and seedless grapes, peaches and apricots go by plane to working-class co-op shops in Peking and Shanghai. After satisfying its own needs, Sinkiang exports large amounts of farm products including such fruits and raisins, wheat, cotton and silk. The Red Star Commune which I visited in Turfan is an advanced farm comparable to the pacesetter communes of the well-favored eastern regions. The potential for large-scale farming is immense; little more than a third of the easily available land in Sinkiang is being tilled.

Modernization is also the watchword in the herding areas. The
former Mongol, Kazakh, Kirghiz and Tadjik nomads now live in communes and state farms. Both have set up fodder and grain farms which supplement the open pastures. These and meteorological stations virtually preclude the disasters formerly caused by blizzards. Permanent settlements have been built at these farms to house commune or state farm offices, schools and clinics, veterinary stations and breeding centers. But since a considerable number of ranchers still follow the herds on their seasonal migrations, many mobile units have been organized: health-service and veterinary teams, mobile cinemas and concert groups that keep up the traditional folk culture rich in ballads, music and the dance. Commune herdsmen have small numbers of personally owned livestock which they can dispose of as they wish: milch cows, horses to ride or to give milk out of which they make their favorite drink, kumiss, sheep to slaughter for meat or shear for wool. This personal herd is like a farmer’s home farm. But in addition they have their thoroughly modernized collectively owned and managed herds.

Thanks to the commune ranches, Sinkiang has tripled its herds since 1949 and with over 36 million animals (sheep, goats, cattle, horses, mules, camels, donkeys, pigs and yaks) it is the second of China’s three largest stock-raising areas. It has a quarter of China’s sheep, producing over 60 percent of the nation’s wool. Some of its breeds are famous: the Yenki and Ili horses, for instance. Its potential is huge. Pasturelands comprise 17.6 percent of its area.

State farms in China cultivate around 5 percent of the arable land and play a subordinate but important role in agriculture. This is true too in Sinkiang. But here an unusual aspect of agricultural development has been the state farms run by the PLA’s construction corps. These contribute substantially to the upkeep of the PLA in the region and also directly aid the region’s economy. Not allowed to take over land already under cultivation, they opened up large areas of wasteland and greatly extended the region’s irrigated area by building canals and reservoirs. They also introduce the latest techniques and put their equipment at the disposal of neighboring communities.

Many PLA farms have become state farms and their servicemen demobilized. That is why the region’s 500 state farms account for 35 percent of the region’s cultivated land and a quarter of its grain output.

Annual plans for the main products are initiated at the highest level on the basis of past performance and known prospects. These plans are then sent down to each province and autonomous region, chou, county
and commune with its brigades and teams. Here, at the grass roots level where all day-to-day matters of the members' life and work are democratically discussed and decided, each unit of a few score members discusses the drafts in detail and reports back any amendments. Only when the drafts amended at each level reach the center and are considered are the plans for grain, vegetable oils and cotton finalized.

State aid to farming has increased ninefold since liberation. Emergency aid is always available in case of natural disaster.

The new rural communes incorporate the handicrafts on which the people have depended for generations. Handicraftsmen are now all employed in the small and medium-sized industrial enterprises run by the communes and state farms or by craft cooperatives.

**Industry**

Handicraft industry is now a supplement to the heavy and light industrial enterprises of an industrializing Sinkiang. In a place where only twenty-eight years ago the blacksmith was the main representative of the metal "industry," there are modern iron and steel mills and engineering works in Urumchi making trucks, tractors and farm and factory machinery. There are modern coal mines near Urumchi and Ining and a great oil industry based on the Karamai and other oil wells and the Tushantze and Lanchow refineries with chemical works and fertilizer plants, some modern and large-scale, others indigenous and small-scale. Industrial complexes like that at Kangsu in the Pamirs produce coal, iron, coke and steel, cement and refractory materials and engineering products. There are big modern nonferrous-metal mines and refineries, and gold and silver mines. Light industry and handicrafts produce textiles, paper, leather goods, processed food and consumer household goods.

These industrial advances, like those in agriculture, have been achieved through the series of four Five-Year Plans worked out between the central planning organs in Peking and the local authorities from 1953 to 1975 and on the basis of the guidelines governing all enterprises in China: "Take agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor"; "Develop agriculture, light industry and heavy industry" in that order. Agriculture produces 66 percent of the raw materials used by light industry. Light industry requires less funds than heavy industry for expansion and yields quicker results, thereby raising funds quickly for industrial expansion and developing heavy industry.
This in turn fosters the growth of agriculture. The economy thus develops in an upward spiral “with industry as the leading factor.”

“Accumulation of funds is essential both for the state (the whole people) and for the rural communes (peasants' collectives) but in neither case should it be excessive.” This principle ensures that the peasants' communes have enough funds for capital construction projects like dams, dikes, reservoirs, afforestation to improve agriculture and develop local industry and transport, cultural, educational and health services while also ensuring that the higher authorities have enough funds for big plants and overall development projects—like the Tarim River conservation plan, railways, or other public services. The state collects national funds—the agricultural tax from the farms, income from state-owned industry, transport, trade, banking, etc. (90 percent of its revenue now comes from state enterprises) and invests or disburses grants or loans according to need to national and local projects and enterprises. State enterprises are profitable. The Karamai oilfield in twenty years has returned its capital investment many times over.

Large, Medium and Small Enterprises

A key aim in China's development strategy is to avoid the over-centralized planning and funding which some countries (notably the USSR) have tried. Such tight planning undermines local initiative and bureaucracy proliferates. The central authorities (the economic ministries, the State Planning and State Capital Construction Commissions) provide overall guidance but plan and direct only major enterprises and major quotas and allocations (unless there is some specific need for intervention at a lower level). They build large enterprises—of a size that needs national funding of over 30 million yuan or so; they may build medium-sized enterprises alone or with local authorities (provincial, chou or county). Small and medium-sized enterprises are built by local authorities down to the city district and commune level and commune brigades and teams. No special authorization is needed as long as they use their own funds and observe the normal regulations (environmental requirements, safety regulations, etc.). Only 80 major industrial products and 16 key light industrial products come under the state plan.

This strategy avoids overemphasis on the creation of giant industrial complexes with the attendant evils of overurbanization, pollution, urban sprawl and other environmental ills. While the big plants make products
that smaller plants cannot make, they act also as productive nuclei, supplying smaller plants with know-how, sets of equipment and trained personnel. This leaves a great deal of initiative in the hands of smaller local authorities and plants to coordinate their activities. In this day and age it is strategically a sound concept, since it disperses industry, moves industry close to its sources of raw materials and secures regional self-sufficiency. This economizes on transport. Heavy and medium-sized tractors are made in Urumchi, but small walking tractors can be made in most counties in Sinkiang as well as the rest of the 2,200 counties in China. Thirty percent of all tractors are locally made. Every Sinkiang county has a farm-machinery plant, most make fertilizers and many make cement. Most communes have repair workshops. Each rural commune in Sinkiang can develop its own domestic resources to the full with its own funds and small-scale or intermediate technology. Existing technology therefore need not be scrapped as it becomes "obsolete" in the more developed centers but can be passed down to less developed centers until these too are modernized. Most everyday necessities are made locally. By means of this strategy China has been able to industrialize without causing an exodus from the farms to the cities. Eighty-seven percent of Chinese lived in the countryside in 1949 in an unindustrial China. The figure is eighty percent in an industrialized China in 1977. This is exceptional for a developing country.

In industry, the slogan is "Take steel as the key." Thus there are not only the big steel-making plants near the big ore lodes but several small iron and steel works supplying local needs. Coal too is mined wherever it is found and can be profitably used.

The share of modern industry in the total value of industrial production has risen from 2.9 percent in 1949 to over 78 percent in 1965 and to over 90 percent in 1975. The number of industrial products has risen from eleven to a fairly comprehensive range today of several thousands produced by over 2,000 factories, mines and wells, 500 of them in Urumchi. Industrial growth is running at an annual rate of 10 percent (1977).

Sinkiang is one of China’s major cotton and silk producers. Modern cotton mills and silk filatures and weaving mills process these raw materials on the spot. Skilled workers have volunteered to go there from Shanghai and Tientsin, and I have seen them training local cadres in new, large mills in Khotan, Kashgar and Urumchi. Modern mills produce all the cotton, silk and wool textiles needed for domestic consumption, and an increasing amount is being exported. Leather works
in Ili using raw materials from the collective and state ranches supply most of the leather needed for boots, saddles and harness. Such ancient crafts as carpet weaving, metalworking and jade carving in Khotan and folk weaving in Kashgar are thriving. Their products are completely indigenous to Sinkiang's people. At the same time such centers as Shanghai far to the east send salesmen to Sinkiang to solicit orders and learn exactly what is liked and needed in the area.

In the old days deliveries from abroad or from "inside the Wall" took months to arrive. Now imports come on the railway from the eastern metropolitan areas through Lanchow to Urumchi. Following the route of the old Silk Road, this railway will be extended north to Ili and around the Taklamakan desert to Kashgar. There are 12,000 miles of roads radiating like the spokes of a wheel from Urumchi to all major centers in Sinkiang and bus lines join all counties. It took me seven days to go by bus from Urumchi to Kashgar. I returned by air within a few hours. Several flights a week come to Urumchi from outside via Pakistan Airways or China's national airline and the Soviet Aeroflot.

Sinkiang is now an almost self-sufficient economic unit within the integrated overall, fairly comprehensive economic system of China. Sinkiang enjoys a great deal of economic autonomy. A customs post in a Gobi desert oasis between Sinkiang and the rest of China enforces stringent checks to prevent importation of plant or animal infections. In Sinkiang cotton goods are not rationed as they are in other urban centers of China, so private citizens are not allowed to take excessive amounts of cotton goods from there to other areas.*

The overall slogan of the general line for the economic development of the country, "Go all out, aim high and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism," is used by planners, executives, managers, technicians and rank and file on the factory floor and farmers and farm managers to test the correctness of all decisions.

A corollary to this is the slogan "Walk on two legs." This means to use foreign as well as indigenous technology, large, modern technology as well as small, homespun technology. This tactic gives the greatest scope for local, amateur creativity, so that every enterprise keeps an independent initiative in its own hands and does not depend on outside aid. This tactic also stresses the possibilities of modernizing old

* The peaceful liberation of Sinkiang and its relative measure of autonomy in economic, social and cultural affairs may give some hint of how China proposes to solve the question of integrating Taiwan with the mainland.
enterprises where this is cheaper and more effective than building new enterprises, which usually require bigger investment funds.

The key guideline is, "Proletarian (or socialist) politics must be put first." That means that the political line, a socialist orientation, is primary and must inspire everything that is done. The essence of those politics is summarized in the slogan "Serve the people," which you will see on the walls of every farm, factory, school, institution, office, railway station and airport in the country. Well worth study is the way the region’s leaders search out and then publicize model enterprises and individuals and collectives in every field of endeavor. Examples are the model Red Star Commune in Turfan, known not only in Sinkiang but nationally. The practice of “criticism and self-criticism” and, of course, the Cultural Revolution, have been essential elements in keeping the region politically on course to socialism. In the field of training, they have implemented the slogan “Learn swimming by swimming,” or “Learn by doing.” Every construction project, big or small, every factory, farm or institution is used to train new cadres of skilled workers, technicians and scientists. Colleges issue no diplomas or degrees. The educational system extends far beyond the schools’ walls. Mass campaigns like the land reform or the Cultural Revolution involve millions in the learning process."

**Social Restructuring**

There were few private industrial enterprises in Sinkiang at the time of liberation. Private capital was invested mostly in transport and trade. None of this was really big-scale. All were bought out by the state, transformed first into joint state and private enterprises in 1957 by the infusion of state capital and then into wholly state enterprises. By the time of the Cultural Revolution their owners had been paid off through yearly dividends of from 5 to 7 percent on their original investments. The big enterprises of the Kuomintang bureaucrat-capitalists were all expropriated at the time of liberation. All industry and transport, agriculture, banks and commercial enterprises and the media and communications in Sinkiang are today owned and operated by the socialist state or cooperatives.

The complex social structure of old Sinkiang has been greatly simplified. The old Sinkiang in 1949 had slaves and serfs, slave owners

sinkiang today

and serf owners; feudal landlords and tenants; great herdowner khans and begs and princes and dependent herdsmen; smallholders, rich, middle-income, land-poor and landless peasants; tenant farmers; laborers, capitalists and workers; free intellectuals, handicraftsmen, masters and apprentices; warlords, bandits and other feudal riff-raff; beggars. Today, the public and cooperative sectors are absolutely dominant. As a result of the land reform and the cooperative movement, all the rural population are commune members or employees of socialist state farms or ranches. Sinkiang has an urban population composed entirely of staff and employees in socialist state or collective enterprises. All workers, intellectuals and professional people are state employees or cadres (office or white-collar personnel working for the state or socialist cooperatives). A modern industrial proletariat (with over 160,000 minority workers), managerial and administrative cadres have been rapidly fostered among the national minorities. All handicraftsmen are cooperators or employees of state enterprises. As a result of socialist transformation and co-ops, all former capitalists are either living on their savings or are salaried employees. Socialist cooperation and the modernization of agriculture and rural life is resolving the differences between the industrial working class and the peasants which remain even after establishment of a people's democracy and initial advances in creating a socialist society. Sinkiang, like the rest of China, is working to eliminate the distinctions between intellectuals and manual workers, town and countryside, workers and peasants. Beyond that, as a distant goal, its communist activists and an increasing number of supporters look forward to a classless communist society in which all means of production are owned in common by all the people and the principle of “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” is realized. But that will take several generations.

educational and cultural changes

this new economic and social structure supports and is supported by an educational and cultural superstructure that is an integral part of the educational and cultural superstructure of the whole of China. A network of elementary and junior high schools provides universal elementary education. There is a growing system of several hundred high schools and technical and vocational schools and courses. The latter train electricians, mechanics, draughtsmen and so on and are something like the two-year community colleges of the united states. While the colleges have
over 11,000 students, these vocational schools have some 235,000 students. While not neglecting to train advanced specialists, Sinkiang, as a developing country, puts a wise stress on training "bread and butter" technicians. Schools teach in the languages of their areas and also teach the Han language. Many people are multilingual and it is not uncommon to meet people who speak two or three languages well. Frequently a kind of patois is spoken and I found people remarkably tolerant of the way their language was mangled by their friends. The main thing is that they are understood. This lack of snobbishness, together with a real eagerness to communicate and a felt need to understand one another and to take a lively general and scholarly interest in one another's cultures, encourages multilingualism.

Sinkiang now has a dozen higher educational institutions. There are teacher-training colleges in Ining, Kashgar and Urumchi. Religious instruction is given in mosques and temples. The big university in Urumchi gives instruction in languages, history, science and the arts with special emphasis on the courses most needed by the region, such as agricultural science, mechanical and civil engineering, livestock raising, medicine and veterinary science. It has a dance academy and music conservatory. Sinkiang has 1.5 million students of all nationalities.

Knowing the Chinese (Han) language, students needing types of advanced training not yet available in Sinkiang go on to the Nationalities Institute at Lanchow or Peking or to universities in any part of China, where a high priority is given to student applicants from the ethnic minority areas.

Old Sinkiang had only eighteen modern-trained doctors. Now the number has grown a hundredfold, not including 10,000 paramedics. There are fifty times as many hospital beds. Every county has a well-equipped hospital. Birth-control information is available, but is not forced on the minorities. That would not be fair. The stringent measures taken to limit the birth rate among the majority Hans do not apply here, so the populations of ethnic minorities have increased by 44 percent and more since liberation. The Uighur population has increased by 56 percent; the Sibo by 100 percent. The Kazakh population was once 100,000 in the Altai. It fell to 50,000 just before liberation. Now it has grown to 160,000. The number of Hans increased from 11.5 percent in 1957 to the present 41.5 percent. Many are transients, leaving when their jobs are done. Most are permanent residents.

The region is well served by publishing houses, operatic, theatrical and concert troupes and mobile cinema teams. Books, periodicals,
broadcasts and performances are in the national languages of the region. A film studio makes color films and dubs movies from other places. Latin style alphabets devised for the Uighur and Kazakh languages have proved their value, being well adapted to modern communication technologies—typewriters, telegraph, printing—and are more easily learned. Some 80 percent of the people are now literate. Between 1966 and 1974, sixty-four million copies of school texts and other books were published in Uighur, Kazakh and Mongolian. One hundred and twenty newspapers and magazines are published in various languages. The leading paper, Sinkiang Daily, is in Han, Uighur, Kazakh and Mongolian. High-speed facsimile reproduction brings the People's Daily of Peking to Urumchi on the day of issue.

The progressive political, economic, social and cultural changes in Sinkiang have leveled out the former glaring inequalities in economic and social status and thus lessened class and ethnic tensions and created a democratic, socialist community in which antagonistic economic and cultural inequalities between different nationalities have been basically eliminated and replaced by unity, mutual aid and fraternity. Sinkiang in this respect mirrors the situation now existing in the other autonomous regions.

The unity of the working people—the vast majority of the people—forms the secure foundation of common interest of this unity of nationalities. But it has still been a hard struggle to create and maintain that national unity. Up to 1957, the main thrust had to be against "great Han chauvinism." In 1958, the effort had to be shifted to oppose "local nationalism." Mao Tse-tung pointed out that "in the last analysis, national strife is a matter of class struggle." That is why with the simplification of the class structure of the region and the progressive achievement of unity between the workers, peasants and intellectual cadres, national strife has become a thing of the past. Conflicts during the Cultural Revolution, however, showed that there are no grounds for complacency. The Hans do not try to hide the past but to expose it and analyze it and make amends as much as possible for what was wrong. The example is emulated by the other nationalities.

Mao Tse-tung warned, "Without a large number of communist cadres from among the national minorities, it is impossible to solve the national question thoroughly and utterly isolate the national reactionaries." By 1965, the region had 18,000 basic party organizations with more than 220,000 members, of whom 106,000 were of the national minorities. Today 65 percent of party members are non-Han.
Sixty-five percent of the seats on the region's Party Committees are held by members of the national minorities. There are over 85,000 minority cadres, more than twice as many as in 1955. They hold the top post in a third of the 80 counties and the overwhelming majority of the top two posts in the communes. Twenty percent of the 110,000 ethnic minority cadres in government and management are women. One of them, Nishahan Turdi, president of the Kizil Su people's court, was once a slave.
The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou is a typical example of how the question of autonomy within autonomy is handled in Sinkiang. Eighty percent of the 704,000 Kazakhs of Sinkiang live in the Ili Chou. This 350,000 square kilometers, a fifth of Sinkiang’s area, comprises some of the richest land in China. Spectacular mountain scenery, grand uplands and well-watered fertile valleys made my travels here most memorable. It has abundant natural resources: rich deposits of iron ore, copper, wolfram and other minerals; well-developed animal husbandry; deer, antelopes, foxes, wolves and other wildlife; an abundance of wild flax and a wealth of fruit both cultivated and wild; apples, strawberries, blackberries—and great riches in timber—spruce, fir, poplars and pine.

Since 1949, the population of thirteen nationalities had expanded (by 1975) two and a half times to 2,125,000. Ining (Ili), the capital, has around 100,000 inhabitants. Standards of living have risen steadily in the 26 counties of the Ili Chou including the two special areas of Altai and Tacheng and the Borotala Mongolian Autonomous Chou. Grain output is over three times what it was twenty-five years ago. This
is the result of the agrarian reform and cooperative movement, the creation of communes and a small number of state farms, vastly improved methods of water and soil conservancy, mechanization and modernization. Here too the drive is on for the creation of Tachai-style* counties and large areas of land giving high, stable yields no matter what the weather. The communes have 5,000 tractors (in terms of 15-horsepower units, 1976), and 50 percent of their land is machine-plowed. The Altai used to import nearly all its grain. Now, like the whole Ili Chou, it is self-sufficient.

Forty percent of the Ili Chou population herds livestock. They have nearly tripled their herds to a total of ten million head of sheep, goats, cattle, horses, camels, donkeys and mules. Most herds are owned by the commune members; a small proportion—under 10 percent—is owned by state farms and PLA farms. We have seen how the Kazakhs and other herdsmen lived in the past in dirty, drafty yurts, in poverty and disease, mercilessly exploited and taxed, illiterate and hungry. Today the Kazakh commune member enjoys a standard of living as high as that of the average commune member anywhere in China. He runs his own commune affairs through his elected deputies on the commune congress and its revolutionary committee, who in turn elect deputies to the county congress and so on up through the chou to the autonomous region and the National People's Congress. Taxes are light. Out of a hundred sheep, he pays two as tax. There is a rising market for his products and fair prices for what he needs to buy. In the old days, a sheep was worth two feet of cloth or a quarter-pound of tea. In the 1960s, that same sheep was worth sixty feet of cloth or fifteen pounds of tea.

The Ili cadres are proud of the fact that the agrarian reform and subsequent campaign for cooperation leading to the communes—the basis of today's prosperity—were carried through without loss of life. On the farmlands, it went much as it did throughout the rest of China: rent reduction, land reform, division of the land of the landlords equally among the landless, and then the formation of labor-exchange teams, mutual-aid teams, lower- and higher-level co-ops (collective farms) and rural people's communes in 1958. With good organizational forms and leadership, the success of this movement was due to its gradual but constant advance, with the peasants trying out each new step and being sure that it worked, that it did indeed improve their lives. The only serious setback occurred in the initial stages of the communes, when

* Modeled after the pacesetter Tachai Commune Farm Brigade of North Shensi.
unfortunately the usual careful approach was abandoned and impetuous decisions led to mistakes in organization and maldistribution of the farms' output (see Inside the Cultural Revolution). Those mistakes were corrected and the communes are now run very successfully, like those in the rest of China. Here, as in other areas, the basic forms of organization and the tempo of change were well adapted to local conditions and traditions. The socialization of herds was carried out in an exceptionally able way in the mid-1950s. In leading this campaign, the Ili cadres learned from both the good and bad experience of those who preceded them. When herds were collectivized in the Soviet Union in 1927, the natural antagonism of most of the herdowners, instead of being calmed by appropriate measures, was ignored and, in fact, exacerbated to the extent that they often preferred to kill their animals rather than see them confiscated. Angry landowners cannot destroy their land when they know that it will be confiscated and given to the landless peasants, but a herd-owner can kill off a whole herd with a single dose of poison in a water trough. It has taken decades to repair the damage done in the Soviet collectivization campaign. Such mistakes were avoided in Sinkiang.

In the first stage of the agrarian reform up to the spring of 1952, only the demand for a reasonable reduction of rents was put forward. Then, when preparations were complete and the necessary cadres trained, the second stage to end all feudal landownership began in the winter of that year. The campaign at that stage did not touch the pastoral areas or even the mixed agricultural and pastoral areas. Prominent members of the landowning class who were also popular leaders of the Moslem communities had played a leading part in the revolutionary events of 1944 on the side of the people and thus enjoyed doubly great prestige. Now they threw that prestige behind the land reform and greatly helped its success. The feudal landlord estates, land, draft animals, other livestock, grain and seed stocks, houses and large farm tools were taken over and distributed equally among the needy (including the now landless landlords themselves and their families). Resolute measures were, of course, taken against landowner tyrants who had committed crimes against the people or who sabotaged the reform—like the one who chopped down a whole orchard. Thus ended the economic and political power of the 4 to 7 percent of the population who owned between 30 and 60 percent of the land in the farming areas. This shareout gave each peasant an average of around two acres (well above the average of under half an acre for China as a whole). The smallest parcels were just under half an acre per head in the rich market gardens just outside Iining. The largest were three acres.
Land reform was completed in the winter of 1953. Some two hundred thousand acres were distributed, together with two thousand head of oxen, two hundred horses, grain, houses and carts. Here, as in the rest of China, care was taken not to infringe on the legitimate rights of the middle-income peasants or merchants, master craftsmen, or others who might have owned some land and livestock but were mainly dependent on their urban business enterprises.

I was told of one exemplary landowner named Ekhum Khodja, a noted religious leader and descendant of the khodjas of old, a special commissioner in the Ili area and the biggest landowner there with over 3,000 acres of land. He set an example in the land reform by taking the initiative in giving up his inherited estates. He retained no more than three acres of farmland but by popular vote kept his orchards as a commercial property, included as such with his shops and workshops in town, and received his regular salary as a member of the People's Political Consultative Conference. His prestige as a religious leader was enhanced by his large-minded and progressive attitude.

Since then, yields and outputs in the co-op farms and communes have been increased by the familiar methods: better use of land and labor, modernization, better seed, better tools, mechanization, improved water-conservancy methods, irrigation and drainage—improved cultivation all around, according to the Agricultural Charter drawn up under Chairman Mao's guidance.

In 1949, average per capita peasant income in the Ili Chou was around $40–50 a year. In co-ops with a working day worth 2 yuan a day, a strong farmer working two hundred days a year can earn up to 400 yuan a year (current rate $800). There is, of course, much room for improvement here. Judged by world standards, yields are still not high. At the same time in calculating real income one must remember that a commune farmer is living in his own house; has milking cows and other domestic animals, fowls, eggs from his own barnyard; vegetables from his own or collectively cultivated vegetable plots; fruit in plenty free; medical service and education for his family practically free or at very small cost; and much of his entertainment such as films or theater free. The agricultural tax is about 5 percent of output.

In Ining, the capital of the Ili area, poplars line the broad avenues and clean water flows in streams beside the sidewalks. This is still and, one hopes, will remain a garden city. Almost every house, some beautifully decorated with fretwork on their balconies and eaves, has a garden, small orchard, grapevine arbor or flower beds typical of the style of life
that has been traditional here. Orchards even surround many office buildings. These are usually two-story painted stucco or stone buildings with columns and porticoes, the best of them well proportioned in the neoclassic style that has come from Greece and Rome, via Leningrad and Novosibirsk. Girls in bright flowing dresses, and men and women alike in gay skullcaps, make the roads and bazaar vivid with color. Cadres of six nationalities—Kazakh, Uighur, Hui, Han, Mongol and Sibo—sit on the revolutionary committee that governs the area. A Kazakh, Janabil, heads the Party Committee and government and is also an alternate member of the Chinese Communist Party’s central committee.

Cooperation among Herdsmen

A number of state-owned ranches were set up in the area and, well staffed, introduced modern methods of artificial insemination, raising and storing winter fodder, improved stabling and veterinary medicine. New breeds of sheep, horses, cows and pigs were imported. Local herdsmen working on these farms quickly broadcast their successes and their friends outside were naturally eager to try out these new methods. But the introduction of modern animal husbandry methods generally was beyond the means of individual herdsmen. The solution was cooperation.

The first step to cooperation was by way of the seasonal and, later, permanent mutual-aid teams. This was an easy step to take, as the herdsmen had an old tradition of mutual aid, usually between families of the same clan or uru (Kazakh tribal group). They might, for example, arrange for one member of a family to look after all the horses while another cared for the sheep. The Communist Party helped the herdsmen systematize this mutual aid. Larger, regular teams were formed with elected leaders to direct the work. An individual herdsman often found it difficult to get everything done on time, particularly in busy seasons. Mutual-aid teams could divide their forces so that all that needed to be done got attention. The seasonal mutual-aid teams usually had few members and dissolved at the end of the season or when the need for them seemed to expire, but soon herdsmen came to see the advantage of organizing larger, permanent teams which benefited them all the year round. These enabled them to improve the organization of their various side occupations such as farming, hunting, weaving or cutting timber.

In the spring of 1955 when this stage was reached, twenty-two households formed the first herdsmen’s cooperative ranch in the Ili area. This soon showed it could do better than the mutual-aid teams in improving
the care of herds and farms and the general well-being of members. More and more herdsmen quickly followed this example. State loans on easy terms were available to co-op members to buy animals as shares.

To form a co-op ranch of between 20 and 150 households, the herdsmen pooled part of their flocks and herds as shares in the co-op, and these were put under a single management. (In most co-ops I visited, two sheep rated as one share. Other animals were rated in terms of sheep.) They reserved some of their animals to satisfy immediate daily needs for milk and meat, transport and kumiss, the nourishing mare's milk which they drink in vast quantities. The co-op also took over management of pastures and cultivated land and their main side occupations.

At the end of the year part of the net money income of the co-op was set aside for the agricultural tax, investment for the current year's production, capital investment, reserve fund, welfare fund and administrative expenses. What remained was about 80 percent of net income. Of that remainder, around 40 percent was used to pay members for the number of workdays they contributed to the common labor pool; the rest went to members as dividends on their shares. In the co-ops I visited, the young animals were divided, after deductions for costs of upkeep and to replace losses, in the ratio of 60:40 to pay dividends to members on their shares and for workdays worked. Members usually pooled their young "dividend" animals as additional shares.

A well-run co-op was able to put its most experienced members in charge of livestock, farms and side occupations and introduce more advanced methods of management. The Chaokuan Co-op in Suidun, an average one, had 5,080 head of livestock to start with in 1956. Just over a year later, it had 6,980, an increase of 14 animals per member.

When co-ops were formed, most of the herdsmen could live a more settled life, dividing among themselves the work of leading the herds from pasture to pasture. Most of them have since acquired winter houses in addition to their movable yurts. Many new villages have appeared. It is hardly necessary to stress the advantages of this. Schools opened, and shops, cinemas and theaters. Health and veterinary services improved. Those ancient enemies, smallpox and venereal disease, have been eliminated. Twenty-three percent of Mongol adults once had V.D. Now, many families, long childless, are so no longer.

Sitting by the road from the summer pastures near Kintsai, I watched many Kazakh families go by with their herds to the winter pastures down the valley. All were well clad. The women with their flowing, embroidered headdresses were striking figures. Sometimes a whole family
was on horseback; sometimes the women and children were driven in large Russian-style farm carts called *khodoks*. One family flashed by in a truck!

Within a few years of the introduction of co-op herding, every herdsman had his home herd and shares in the co-ops. It is said that a herdsman can live fairly well if he has a horse or two, a cow or two and about twenty sheep. By 1957, the overwhelming majority of co-op herdsman had around twenty head of sheep, and many had a hundred or more. Before, many could hardly ever afford to eat grain. Now they eat it throughout the year.

By 1957, the autonomous chou had nearly 600 herdsmen's co-op ranches with 28,140 households or nearly 39 percent of all herdsmen's households. Attention was then turned by the Communist Party and People's Government on consolidating co-ops already formed, and training cadres to run them, particularly accountants. By the next year, 1958, every herdsman was in a co-op, and toward the end of the year the first communes were formed.

**Joint State and Private Ranches**

Herdsmen with eight hundred or more head of livestock were pretty well off economically. Some were capitalists with businesses in town and ran their herds as a sideline. Only about 2 to 3 percent of the herdsmen owned such large herds, but the Party showed them how they too could join socialism, and it paid careful attention to their special needs. They were helped to form joint state and private ranches. On joining, they retained part of their livestock for their private use and put the rest under joint management. The pooled livestock were counted as their shares, with the state also contributing shares. Pastures were also pooled but not counted as shares. Herdsmen, formerly employed by individual owners, were hired by the joint enterprise. Their conditions were greatly improved. In the old days, many of them worked only for their keep. Now they got the going wage for their job, and a welfare fund maintained by the ranch provided them with social amenities, health care, sick pay, etc.

In such ranches, net income (after taxes and costs of production had been deducted) was divided into two parts: 60 percent distributed as dividends to owners of shares, 40 percent reserved as a public fund and welfare fund (this latter absorbed 5 to 10 percent of total net income).

Three such ranches were formed in the nine Ili counties. That in
Suidun had twenty-three households with 19,700 head of livestock. That in Chaosu County, the "Tienshan," was formed by five of the biggest herdowners. With the exception of a single vice-manager, all other leading posts were held on the private side and carried regular salaries. When other large herdowners saw the success of these ranches they too joined in similar ventures. They were well aware that a socialist society would have no place for big-scale private herdowning.

With this universal creation of co-op and state ranches and joint state and private ranches the stage was set for further advances in the pasture-lands leading to higher productivity. There was better use of pastures. Every county set up an elected committee to control their use, similar to those set up to control the use of water resources. The People's Government waged a successful campaign against animal epidemics and diseases, poisonous plants, wolves and snakes. Modern scientific facilities are expanding. In addition to fourteen district veterinary stations, every county has a veterinary center. Traditional style vets were taught modern methods. Acupuncture is now used to treat a number of ailments.

Breeding and blood stock were systematically improved with the aid of advanced modern methods and imported pedigree blood stock. Before liberation there was only one sheep-breeding station and one horse-breeding ranch.

As in other farming and livestock areas in China, these developments in Sinkiang were consolidated in 1958 with the formation of people's communes. Groups of co-op ranches and farms joined together as associations to form communes, and the co-ops usually became production brigades of the communes.

With the state buying out the private sector, joint state and private ranches were transformed into wholly state-owned ranches with the former private owners continuing to work as state-employed cadres or retiring to live on their investments banked with the People's Bank to support socialist construction.

The communes are now led by elected revolutionary committees, which are in effect the standing committees of the people's congress of the commune. The commune is not only organizer of the economic and social life of the commune members but also their local government, looking after all local government affairs: transport, education, culture, health services, registration of births, marriages and deaths, etc. While putting their primary effort into production of food and agricultural raw materials for industry, the communes, both agricultural and livestock, also run numerous small-scale local industrial enterprises such as brick
and tile kilns, carpenters' shops, toolmaking and farm-machine-making workshops, mills, fertilizer plants, handicraft workshops of various kinds, food processing plants and so on. The guiding principles were and are, as elsewhere in China: "Take agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor," "Take grain as the key and ensure all-round development," and "Serve the people."

**Development of Agriculture and Light and Heavy Industry**

When liberated in 1949, Sinkiang, not to mention Ili, could not even make an engine. It had only two sizable factories: the power plant, an unreliable affair, and the famous Mussabayev leather works. This had opened in 1905, and even then its machines were secondhand. Industrially, Ili had to start practically from scratch. While rehabilitating and developing farming and herding, in the first place, and existing enterprises such as handicraft workshops making cloth, carpets, metalware and pottery, its planners began by building up a groundwork industrial infrastructure to achieve basic self-sufficiency in industrial consumer goods and heavy industrial equipment and raw materials. Using local resources and aid from the central authorities channeled through Urumchi, they opened coal mines, oil wells, iron and steel plants, engineering centers, plants for producing chemicals, textiles and paper, food-processing facilities (butter making, dried milk powder, jam and preserved fruits)—a total of 207 factories, mills and mines by 1975. The Ili Iron and Steel Works supplies all local needs in iron and steel. The modernized Mussabayev leather works fills all the area's needs and more from sandals to riding boots, belts, harness and luggage. The Ili Woolen Mill, with seventeen hundred workers and staff and five thousand spindles, is an up-to-date plant supplying all Ili's needs in felts and woolen goods, and it exports woolens as well. A number of small and medium-sized hydroelectric power plants tap the area's rich waterpower resources. Karamai, of course, is a big-scale oil and refining center. The farms now have electric lighting and are using increasing amounts of power as they mechanize work. Twenty-one times as much power is generated as in 1954. Every commune has its own radio broadcasting station. The Tacheng area had only a few handicraft workshops before liberation. Now it has a thriving local industry producing coal, cement, electric motors, lathes, farm machinery and tools. Here, as elsewhere, the small and medium enterprises of the communes play a key part.
In developing industry, the Ili area was and is guided by the instructions of the Chinese Communist Party to support agriculture and herding in the first place and supply the farmers' and herdsmen's needs. First things had to come first—farm tools and machines, leather for girths and saddles, milk separators and consumer goods using the raw materials to hand. The Sinkiang industrial department gave the Mussabayev heirs a loan to expand production in 1950. In 1952, the plant was handling fifteen thousand hides a year. By 1958, it was up to a hundred thousand after becoming a joint state and private enterprise in 1954. Since then, as a wholly state-owned works, it has more than doubled production with seventeen different kinds of leather for rough and top-quality riding boots and those soft top boots the Uighurs love to wear and dance in; modern men's and women's sandals; volleyballs and basketballs; and much else. (The Sinkiang girls' basketball team is a leader in national championships.)

Workers' conditions and wages conform to national standards laid down in the state labor codes. As in the rest of China their representatives sit on the revolutionary committees that run the plants and their trade unions supervise working conditions. Free milk and eggs are provided for those doing particularly heavy work or work injurious to health, such as in the vat rooms of the leather works.*

Moslem workers—a majority in Sinkiang—get two days off for the Qurban festival and three days off at Ramazan. Han employees get their traditional Lunar New Year holiday. All, of course, work a six-day week and get National Day (October 1) and May Day Labor Day. Office and factory canteens cater to the eating customs of the various nationalities. People in Sinkiang are now well aware of and respect religious beliefs. A Han customer who has bought work on the market will be careful not to carry it into a Moslem meat shop.

Around the time of the Cultural Revolution, the Mussabayev heirs, like other capitalists, were bought out after receiving their guaranteed 5 percent dividend for over ten years as shareholders in the joint state and private enterprise. Those who worked in the plant in various capacities also got salaries and pensions. The plant had been assessed as worth 650,000 yuan in 1954 when the state invested an-

* Ili's workers in other industries enjoy comparable conditions. In the old days, coal-miners used to live under truly frightful conditions. Some of them actually lived inside the mines as debt slaves, getting only a minimum of food and rags for clothes. All this has ended and wages and working conditions in the mines are now equal to those in other parts of China—that is, among the best in the developing world.
other 300,000 yuan in it. In 1956 alone the capitalist owners (shareholders) received 50,000 yuan in dividends. Twelve of Mussabayev's heirs worked in the plant in 1957 as directors, store managers, accountants, and in other posts. The first director was a grandson of Mussabayev. His cousin headed the production section. All live in their family homes and appear well satisfied with the way things have turned out for them. They have more than got their money back.

Self-reliance and aid from the more developed parts of the country solved the problem of cadres to begin industrialization. The first managerial and technical cadres included people from other parts of Sinkiang as well as China's leading industrial centers such as Shanghai and the Kailan mines in Tangshan. After passing on their skills to local colleagues, some went back home, some stayed, delighted to live in Ili. When the Ining Knitwear Mill was set up it received forty machines and two instructors from its brother mill, the Number One Knitwear Mill of Shanghai. Later on it sent eight workers to learn on the spot in the Shanghai plant.

Ili's growing economy supports a thriving cultural life. All Ili's national minorities have their own primary and secondary schools with classes in their own languages. Every nationality learns at least one other language besides its own. Junior and senior high-school students all study Han (the standard Peking dialect) for three hours a week. This prepares them for further higher education in the universities or institutes of the rest of China. A small fee is charged for schooling, but this is never a bar to a child's going to school. It is more in the nature of a token of parental responsibility and participation and is readily waived in case of need. University students in need receive a stipend. Since the first school for girls opened in 1953, girls and boys get equal treatment. Regular schooling and an intensive literacy campaign for adults have reduced illiteracy in the area from around 90 percent before liberation to under 20 percent today.

Despite its advances compared to the rest of Sinkiang, in 1949 Ili had only five high schools with fifteen hundred students in its twenty-six counties. Now its educational system can compare favorably with any area in China. It has compulsory universal primary education with mobile schools serving the pastoral areas, and 136 high schools with 38,300 students. Ten of these schools are secondary vocational schools. The Ili Teachers' School has a thousand students from ten nationalities. The local press includes the Ili Daily, organ of the Communist Party,
published in Kazakh, Uighur and Han. There are radio programs in all these languages.

There was no medical system in pre-liberation Ili. The whole Altai had only one hospital. To buy forty aspirin tablets cost a sheep. Cholera and typhus used to wipe out whole villages. Now they and diseases due to dirt or malnutrition have been wiped out. Others, like malaria, have been brought under control. Every county has its hospital, every commune and every production brigade has a clinic and every team a health worker or paramedic. In the rural communes comprehensive cooperative medical care is available. Membership costs a couple of yuan or less a year and supplements the national health service. The Norman Bethune Medical School (secondary level), named after the Canadian doctor who gave his life in the service of the Chinese people during the Japanese invasion, has trained over two thousand medical workers for the area.

Sinkiang has entered the modern age confident that it can handle its problems. Age-old problems have been solved—civil and religious strife, exploitation and oppression of man by man, poverty, starvation, economic insecurity, endemic diseases. Others are well on the way to being solved—cultural and educational backwardness, illiteracy, the creation of a well-rounded economic structure and, most important, the spread and consolidation of a socialist democracy. Thanks to the Cultural Revolution, the dangers of revisionism—revolutionary backsliding and loss of direction—have, for the time being, been stalled—but this, as experience has shown, is a continuing struggle throughout the period of socialist construction. What is even more important is that revolutionary momentum has not been lost and a basis has been laid to tackle successfully the new problems that emerge—the acquisition of the most advanced technology, planned population growth, dangers to the environment.

There is also a recurrence of the old dangers from external aggression. The Soviet leaders have concentrated a million troops on China's northern and northwestern borders from the eastern sea to the Pamirs—many of them deployed on the one thousand nine hundred miles of common border with Sinkiang. To guard against this danger, Sinkiang, like the rest of China, follows out Mao's warning to "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere and prepare against war." A screening force of the PLA patrols the borders, backed up by units of the people's militia from the communes. China does not minimize the danger. There are petrochemical and other important plants at Lanchow, and the Tak-
lamakan Desert has been the testing site for nineteen nuclear and thermonuclear tests up to 1977, and also for rockets up into the ICBM category.

China wants to settle her border problems with the Soviet Union and its partner India just as she has already settled it with the rest of her ten neighbors. She has made it clear that she will not negotiate under threat. Offensive Soviet concentrations must be withdrawn from the border. But she has also made it clear that while she expects the Soviet Union to acknowledge the annexations by czarism she does not expect historically established borders to be altered, but does expect that equitable delimitations will be made according to normal international practice where no markers have yet been fixed.

Apart from the paramount question of maintaining peace and the integrity of her borders, the key problem facing Sinkiang today is probably that of keeping their revolution on course. Even with a population of eleven million in such a richly endowed area, great efforts are needed to create the material prosperity required by a socialist society. As other societies have shown, there is always the danger that in striving for the material goals of socialism, the ethical and social goals needed to make the transition to communism are forgotten. Then a production-oriented leadership evolves; the proper balance is upset between technological advance and material productivity on the one hand and the socialist ethic on the other. This danger can only be overcome if the society quickly develops a working revolutionary democracy, proof against all attempts by revisionists of various kinds such as Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, or the "gang of Four"* to eradicate the revolutionary leadership hitherto given by Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh and other veterans of the Communist Party and replace it with dogmatic elitism. As Mao Tse-tung said, they must "grasp revolution and grasp production," keep the socialist revolution going as they build socialism.

Ninety-seven percent of China's fixed industrial assets are publicly owned, owned by all the people. Only 3 percent are owned by cooperatives as collective property. Ninety-two-and-a-half percent of trade is handled by the state and seven percent by cooperatives. But in agriculture 90 percent of the grain and industrial crops come from the collective sector of the communes and 90 percent of the farmland and irrigation-drainage machinery and about 80 percent of the tractors and draft animals are collectively owned. It will take several generations to

* Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching (Mao Tse-tung's wife), and Yao Wen-yuan.
transform this collective property step by step into property owned by the whole people. The communes, embracing 80 percent of the population, and with their dual nature as cooperative and organ of state, are a key element in plans for the future transition to a communist society. They will be the means by which the bulk of this collective property will be transformed into public property as the commune property in time embraces all the main means of production in the farms. The communes are also training cadres who are at the same time workers and intellectuals, creating a citizen bureaucracy to replace the professional bureaucracy. It is here at the grass roots that a new generation of people is growing up accustomed to exercising citizens' power in management and government. But it will require dedicated and long-sustained efforts to create a true people's commonwealth and self-rule in Sinkiang and all China.
Each encounter with the PLA in Sinkiang impressed me. In Anhsì, at the start of my journey, I had settled myself in the truck and was idly looking over the sideboards as the other passengers loaded themselves on, when I noticed an old, grizzled Uighur holding the hand of a pretty young girl of twelve or thirteen. She carried a small satchel over one shoulder and a basket of food in her free hand. He scanned the passengers in our truck. He looked at me and several others, but passed us over. Then his eyes lit up. He had found those he was looking for.

"Comrades!" he called to three young PLA men who were sitting at the back of the truck. When they returned his greeting, he brought the young girl forward. "She is going to visit her grandmother in Urumchi," he said. "Will you please look after her?" He looked down at the child and reassured her: "The PLA uncles will look after you."

The three young soldiers immediately sprang into action. Two of them got down and helped the girl up into the truck, while the third cleared a space for her to sit. It was a five-day drive to Urumchi. We slept seven or eight to a kang in the caravanserai. They looked after
the girl throughout the journey and delivered her safely to her aunt, in Urumchi.

On the way south to Kashgar, we crossed a long stretch of desert southwest of Bai. Windblown sand dunes, dry eroded earth. On our right, a mighty wall of red mountains, foothills of the Tienshan, looking as if made of rusted iron slag. From a height past Aksu, we looked down on the glittering Victory Canal running arrow-straight into the distance till it was lost amid a wall of poplar trees—a green fortress in the middle of the desert. This was one of the major gifts of the PLA to Sinkiang. Thirty feet wide, it flows for two hundred kilometers down through the desert and has opened up an immense area of wasteland for cultivation. Following its course, we came upon a small army of PLA men and women reclaiming a stretch of desert. We passed their camp of neat new huts and tents. Then we saw them at work. Squads of men wielding mattocks and shovels, backed by tractors, went ahead chopping down the yangtag and uprooting tough-rooted tamarisk. Behind them came mixed squads of men and women with trucks clearing the debris. A column of tractors with harrows and plows followed, getting the land ready for its first planting. Dust. Whirring and growling of machines. It was like a battlefield. Some distance away in the shade of a grove of trees, a PLA man sat reading by a pile of melons. They were cheap, part of the produce of the new farm and a “gift” from the PLA to travelers. It certainly was not competing with any civilian enterprise. The nearest farmhouse was fifty kilometers away.

It was no wonder that the peasants were impressed with the disciplined, concerted drive of the PLA, powered by mechanized techniques at that time still out of reach of the average commune. I too was impressed. I saw the PLA Production Army in action making the desert bloom here on the northern edge of the Taklamakan and far to the south in Kashgar and Khotan building streets and modern hotels, sinking mines and making steel; and north in Djungaria, in Urumchi and Manass, pioneering farms and new cities; and in Karamai, laying down desert roads, exploring new oilfields, building an oil city of seventy thousand people, and remolding men.

The PLA regards these activities as the continuation of its work of national liberation. The First Field Army liberated Sinkiang peacefully in close collaboration with the People’s Army from the Three Areas. The main force reached Hami in October 1949. Its first group reached Urumchi via Turfan and was later joined by an armored
The second group continued the advance south to Kashgar and Khotan after being reinforced and assisted by a people's column from Ili that crossed the Tienshan to meet it in Aksu. These were major operations for an army dependent mainly on horse transport and its own feet for the grueling march over the deserts of Sinkiang. There was no major fighting, but in some places there were instances of Kuomintang sabotage and disturbances, such as a riot in Khotan. These were isolated instances, however. The people eagerly welcomed their deliverers, and the PLA showed its accustomed discipline. In dealing with disturbances only those who were the main instigators were punished. Those who had been misled into wrongdoing were treated with appropriate leniency. Captured Kuomintang soldiers, after a brief explanation of the policies of the People's Government, were given the option of returning home with travel expenses provided or joining the PLA. Most preferred to join the PLA. By the end of the year all major towns were free, and by April 1950, the liberation of Sinkiang was complete.

Since its formation in the mountains of Kiangsi in 1927 the PLA has been a fighting force, a political and productive force. It has been so too in Sinkiang. Wherever it went it publicized the key policies of the Communist Party and People's Government. Here in Sinkiang its main stress was on the party's policies on the national question and its championship of democracy, equality and unity among the nationalities of China. Itself a multinational army, it practiced what it preached and showed utmost respect for local customs and religious beliefs. Part of its forces continued the pursuit of Uzman and Yulbars Khan from the Tienshan to Chinghai and the borders of Tibet. The main forces of these two bandits were eliminated in 1952, and within a few months banditry was eliminated throughout the province.

The PLA's orders in 1949 were to defend and build up the border region. There were around 200,000 soldiers in Sinkiang, half of them PLA men and the rest surrendered Kuomintang troops. This could have been an intolerable burden on a region undermined by years of civil war and corruption. Even with the Three Areas' help, PLA units had to be most frugal. Their main food was whole-wheat grain boiled and flavored with pepper and salt. Troops were allowed to buy only a limited amount of vegetables and meat from the people so as not to strain the economy. Commanders and men had little cash to spare. Even a company commander's pocket money was just enough to buy soap, toothpaste and the cheapest tobacco with a little left over. Civilian cadres existed on a similar "supply system." They lived mostly in tents.
or dugouts, not billeted in homes. When they opened up their first farms on wasteland in 1950, they used hand tools they themselves made. Using army transport as farm animals, that year alone they reclaimed 133,000 acres.

This first experience with the PLA made an indelible impression on the people of Sinkiang. They saw in practice the difference between a people's army and an army of exploiters, and they helped the PLA because they knew they were helping their own. They showed them where water could be found to irrigate their new land. They passed on local farming experience and told them where needed minerals lay buried.

The first PLA harvest at the end of 1950 added fresh vegetables to the mess and bigger rations of grain. Thousands of men moved from makeshift quarters into new houses. Livestock had been bought and bred; the army was already smelting its own iron and making and using double-shared plows. A man with a ketman hoe could open up less than an acre a day. With the new plows he could turn over nearly seven.

East China gets from two hundred to three hundred centimeters of rain a year. Southern Sinkiang averages twenty centimeters. No groundwater means no farming here. By 1950, PLA surveyors had determined that the main agricultural efforts of the army could be best invested around Hami, Manass and Turfan and near Aksu and Kashgar. These all had areas where, because of lack of water, there were no local farms but where properly irrigated farms promised good harvests. The army did some spectacular canal building. The two-hundred-kilometer Victory Canal was dug near Aksu and the seventy-kilometer Red Star Canal near Hami. This latter runs for a considerable distance over sandy desert. Eighty years earlier the Ching commander Tso Tsung-tang attempted to build a canal here. He used rice stalks and felt to line it, but the project came to nothing. The PLA lined their canal with tightly packed stones and pebbles. Very little cement was used, and this technique has become a model for many other cheap and successful canals. The PLA-built Peace Canal near Urumchi and the eighty-million-cubic-meter Hungyen Reservoir there built jointly with the local people provide water for the capital and contain the floods that used to damage property every year.

The PLA's most difficult year was 1950. The experience gained in that year supported increasingly successful and larger efforts. By 1951, the PLA farms were sufficiently established for it to branch out into
other fields like mining and industry. It built flour and textile mills, ironworks, cement plants, coal mines, two engineering plants in Urumchi and a whole multifaceted construction department with men and machines able to undertake any big-scale capital construction project from a canal or reservoir to a city with all its services. In the midst of all this peaceful activity it sent a detachment over the Kunlun range to help the peaceful liberation of Tibet in May 1951.

The PLA has a notable farming record in Sinkiang. By 1957 it had reclaimed close to 830,000 acres and was raising 900,000 head of livestock. It had built nine large water-conservancy projects and reservoirs able to irrigate 60,000 acres. It pioneered farm modernization. Fifty percent of its farmwork is now mechanized, including cotton picking. The purchasing power of its men quadrupled from 1950 to 1955. Its forty-four major farms are all set up in former barren lands, but its men lead a far from barren life. These are modern communities with modern methods of production, modern homes, nurseries, schools, clubs, shops and community services.

PLA farms put Sinkiang cotton on the map. Cotton has been grown in Sinkiang from Tang times, but yields were low. When the PLA succeeded in raising 2,640 pounds of unginned cotton per acre at Manass, the People's Government recognized Sinkiang's potential and designated the region the nation's main cotton-growing area. Since then the PLA farms have consistently set new national records for cotton as well as for corn and wheat yields. It shared its experience with neighboring farmers and thus raised yields all around. Its example encouraged the peasants to form cooperatives to take advantage of the large-scale farming made possible only by the establishment of co-ops and commune farms.

PLA relations with the peasants were good from the start, and when the new farm co-ops wanted to open up new land and use new methods, the army loaned them its tractors and other machines and lent them its best agro-technicians. Every commune in Sinkiang has profited from the help of the PLA farms. They send selected members there to learn new methods, such as close planting. The old saying in Sinkiang was, "Not too sparse, not too dense—3,600 plants per mu." The PLA, however, showed that better yields could be got by close-planting six or seven thousand plants per mu and improving field management. The PLA also improved irrigation methods. The old method of simply flooding fields was discarded. Its fields were divided up by ridges of earth running at right angles to the irrigation ditch and the water was allowed to
flow systematically into the troughs formed by the ridges. This saved water and gave more even irrigation. The PLA is also a great planter of trees and shelter belts, and the communes have enthusiastically followed its example. I have no overall figure but two examples are indicative. One farm brigade in Yarkand country has planted an average of 1,250 trees per member since it was formed in 1958. Trees planted to hold back the sands on the southwestern edge of the Kurban Tangut desert if spaced out three feet apart would circle the globe three times.

To help communes carry through these and other reforms, the PLA command and People’s Government at their own expense send many of their workers and administrators to work on commune farms for varying periods at PLA expense. Many army farmers stay on in the farms after demobilization to work for them or for local government departments. The PLA has thus become a source of trained civilian cadres.

PLA livestock farms similarly received help from and gave help to the peasants. To start things off, the men used their savings to buy livestock from the nomad communities. Introducing modern methods, they rapidly increased their herds to around 500,000 head. They then concentrated on improving breeds. Prize white Ukrainian hogs were imported, pedigree sheep and Don stallions. The improved PLA herds then served as breeding stations for the surrounding areas. Later the state bought large numbers of PLA animals to stock state ranches, but the bulk of the PLA animals go to supply the army with meat, milk, wool and draft animals. By the end of 1958 it had over a million head of livestock and had gone in for poultry raising in a big way.

At a PLA Farm

I drove out to see the PLA’s Red Star Farm near Turfan. On Turfan’s main street, we hired a two-wheeled, pneumatic-tired two-horse cart that is Turfan’s traditional taxi, and we set off across the desert. It was a delightfully cool day in the early fall and we had a luscious melon and grapes to eat on the way. I was thoroughly enjoying the ride when our offside horse decided to do some very dirty business. This necessitated taking off shoes and socks and washing them in the next canal. However, the break gave us a rest and chance to demolish the melon. Our fatherly Uighur driver was embarrassed, but when he saw that we laughed he too joined in the joke of a tenderfoot’s temerity in sitting too close to the rear end of a trotting horse. And he enjoyed it even more
when we rechristened his horse, which had evidently eaten not wisely but too well: Huang Ho (Yellow River).

An hour or so brought us across a stretch of completely arid desert to the Red Star Number Two Farm, a “daughter farm” of the Number One Farm that built the Red Star Canal near Hami. It was a neat settlement of one-story farm buildings and houses on 21,700 acres of land. Some buildings were in Western style with high-pitched roofs, but all the latest were flat-roofed in the Uighur style with tamped earth walls that were much cooler and more comfortable for this climate. The walls were whitewashed, the woodwork blue. They had the usual community buildings—a club house, clinic, nursery, co-op shop and service workshops, cobbler shop, sewing shop, hairdresser and so on as well as tractor and machine parks, repair shops, processing plants.

Three years earlier in 1955, this was a completely desolate area, arid in summer and waterlogged in winter when the peasants had no need of the water from the Tienshan and let it all drain down into this desert. An aerial survey showed that there must be water below the desert, and in fact it was found there at a depth of 180 feet. I saw an artesian well through which water bubbled up under pressure and carried small, sightless fish. To supplement this, the farm administration planned a thirty-five-kilometer canal from the foothills of the Nanshan. Since cement was expensive to bring in at that time (before the railway reached Urumchi and before cement was made in Sinkiang) it was being lined with rocks and pebbles and would cost eight and a half times less than a cement-lined one. The canal has transformed Turfan. In the old days the oasis had to import grain. Simple cooperation enabled it to end imports, but the canal doubled its arable acreage and has helped it produce not only valuable crops like cotton, melons, grapes and raisins but more wheat, corn and sugar beets. The PLA was planning to duplicate here its big operation on the Manass-Shihotze tract of 185,000 acres in fourteen farms and the smaller-scale Hami operation. They had begun work at Hami in 1952 after building a thirty-kilometer canal. In 1957 when I went there the first time they were already cultivating 4200 acres raising sixty thousand sheep and five hundred horses at a ranch in nearby Balikun County. They grew wheat, cotton, corn, sugar beets, and hung hua (red flower), which yields vegetable oil and medicine for women’s complaints.

All PLA farms are run at a profit and contribute to the local economy. Much of their canal water goes to local farms. Their flour mills and power plants and other enterprises serve local needs. Each farm has
Appendix I

additional enterprises and livestock ranches for which the farms provide fodder and pasturage on fallow fields. The main farm headquarters are really agro-cities with accommodation for thousands in the family homes and bachelor dormitories and guest houses. The Shihotze center houses over twenty thousand people. They have schools, clubs, theaters, banking, hospital and other services, shops and various plants: power houses, textile mills, flour mills, sugar refineries, tractor repair and engineering works, food processing, even heavy industry. There was not a single tree in some of these places before the PLA came. Now forest belts stretch for miles.

When the PLA marched westward in 1949, the order of the day over the signatures of Chairman Mao and General Chu Teh said: “Work hard for the people of Sinkiang!” When I saw how it had carried out those orders I was not surprised to learn that among the men working here were whole units from the First and Second Divisions, veterans of the famous Naniwan “fight and produce” campaign in the old Yenan days. Naniwan was the first large-scale PLA experiment in carrying out the “work while you fight” instructions of the party.

I have only described the PLA’s farming projects. Partly to assist these, partly to help the region develop much-needed industries and services, the army early branched out into building grain mills, cotton-ginning plants, oil presses and other food and farm processing plants and power stations serving not only PLA needs but also those of the local people. The PLA transport group not only moves PLA arms, stores and produce but contracts to carry a large proportion of Sinkiang road freights. The PLA built and started up the July First Cotton Mill north-east of Urumchi and an automobile repair works that can handle repairs for the entire road fleet of Sinkiang and is the basis for an automobile and tractor industry that makes 30 percent of the region’s tractors. The PLA also began the August First Steel Mill and, among others, the open-caste coal mine and pits near Urumchi that supply all the capital’s fuel needs. Funds to start these enterprises came partly from the People’s Government and partly from the savings of the men themselves. PLA veterans have a habit of saving that gives each of them a bank account of between one and three thousand yuan.

All these enterprises involve a great deal of building and construction work, and this has fostered one of the most profitable and useful PLA activities: the construction corps based on the PLA engineering corps. The Urumchi post office, the big hotels, the opera house, cinemas, res-
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meat restaurants and practically all the big modern buildings in Urumchi were built by the corps.

The people's council building was planned in Kuomintang days, and it was commonly said that the Kuomintang had collected enough gold to build it out of gold bricks, but it was completed only by the PLA construction corps. All large-scale construction in the region is handled by the designing offices of the economic construction bureau of the Sinkiang People's Government and the PLA construction corps. It was the latter that built from scratch the new town of Karamai in the Djungarian desert, in a place so arid that trees had to be brought in along with the soil to plant them in.

Karamai is something special, an exceptional example of the way the PLA works in Sinkiang as a builder of things and men. I found that the main body of the men who built this new city were formerly soldiers of the Kuomintang army who had opted to join the PLA when they had been captured back in 1949.

Finally a word about the People's Militia, the volunteer force of several hundred thousand armed citizens which backs up the PLA in defense of the region. No precise figures are available of its size but an official release describes it in 1976 as being 60 percent larger than it was in 1971. Seventy percent of its members are of the national minority people; 40 percent of its members are women. A large part of routine patrolling of the borders is done by the militia, and in any conflict they will be an important reinforcement for the army.
Seven of Sinkiang’s thirteen nationalities—Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Hui, Tartars, Tadjiks and Uzbeks—are Moslems. They make up more than half of the population. But Mongols and Tibetans and many Hans are Buddhists. There are not a few Orthodox Christians and Taoists. Islamic literature and art and monuments, mosques and mausoleums are part of the great cultural heritage of the region. Sitting in Kucha with the Uighur Hadji Ahmadullah in a garden house surrounded by a tangle of hollyhocks and columbine and shaded by an ancient grapevine, it was difficult to remember that Sinkiang had often been the scene of terrible wars of religion between Moslems and Confucian Hans, Buddhists and Moslems and among feuding sects of Moslems.

At the time we spoke in 1957, Ahmadullah had not long returned from his hadj to Mecca and was vice-chairman of the Kucha People’s Political Consultative Conference. He told me that before liberation the wildest stories were spread about what would happen to the Moslem religion when the communists took control. He himself had been perturbed when he heard that the mosques would be leveled to the ground,
Islam would be wiped out, and so on. But apprehension had been tempered by knowing where these stories were coming from—Kuomintang officials who themselves had the utmost contempt for the Moslem religion. They had defiled mosques and stirred up hatred between Moslem and Moslem and Moslem and non-Moslem. It seemed unlikely that "the godless Reds" could be worse. Still, there was a certain worry.

"True religious freedom came only after the Liberation," said the hadji. "It was only then that the Moslem religion could flourish in faith and fact. One of the first acts of the People's Liberation Army when it arrived in Kucha was to restore the oldest and most revered mosque. Chiang Kai-shek's troops had quartered themselves and their horses in this six-hundred-year-old shrine and utterly defiled it." The PLA, he said, cleaned it out thoroughly, dismantled the Kuomintang fortifications built in it, repaired it and turned it over to the Moslem community in better condition than anyone living had ever remembered it.

"The PLA and the people's government," said the hadji, "did more for Moslem shrines and places of worship than Moslem rulers in the past." The two great mosques in Kashgar and the famed Abu Khodja Mausoleum had fallen into such disrepair that large sums were needed to restore them. Moslem magnates had never mustered energy or funds to do this work, but it had been done by the People's Government. I drew a sketch of the hadji while he was talking, but I could hardly convey the sincerity, dignity and earnestness with which he spoke. His religion clearly meant a great deal to him and he was deeply moved by what he had witnessed. I understood his feelings better when I myself saw these edifices. They are among the most beautiful buildings in Sinkiang.

He gave other examples of how reality had belied rumors. To prevent mosques from being used for "subversion," the Kuomintang built watchtowers to overlook them. Such surveillance kept many people from attending religious services. The new People's Government promptly tore these watchtowers down.

The Sinkiang Islamic Association was established after liberation. A hundred religious leaders of the region attended the inaugural meeting in Urumchi in 1951. This was the first such gathering in the history of Sinkiang and it was a meeting of unity, not of sects or schism. No one individual has ever been regarded as the premier religious leader in Sinkiang, but now this role is played collectively by the Islamic Association. It does not pretend to anything like "infallibility," but it has the prestige needed to be a respected guide in Sinkiang's religious affairs. It
had ten vice-chairmen, one for each of the most important chou and special areas. Its seventy-two standing-committee members are leaders in the religious affairs of the various parts of Sinkiang. Its chairman, Imin Makhsun Hadji, was also a member of the All China People's Congress. When the All-China Islamic Association was founded, Sinkiang sent a delegation to the inaugural meeting and a Uighur chairman, Burhan, was elected with Nur Mohammed Ta Pu Sheng, a Hui, as one of the vice-chairmen.

"Many professed, but not so many practiced their religion in Sinkiang, before liberation," observed the hadji gravely. Regrettably, he said, there were anti-Moslem prejudices to contend with as well as evil among the rich and influential of the Moslem community. Ahmadullah did not at the time elaborate, but from what others told me the consciences of sincere Moslems had obviously been affronted by the way powerful Moslem landowners and herdowners had exploited and mistreated their tenants and laborers and used religion to cloak their crimes and misdeeds. I heard that formerly, arrogant begs and local landlord tyrants had so humiliated the poor when they went in their rags to pray in the mosques that tiny mosques had been built near the large ones in many parts of Kucha so that the humble could worship there without being embarrassed by their " betters."

Such outrages had ended with liberation. Begs and beggars are no more. Such arrogance would not be tolerated by the Moslem community today. Society respects religious customs and practices. The mosques are open and kept in good repair. Wherever a Moslem is, he is respected at his prayers. This I saw with my own eyes whether it was in Ili in the north or in Kashgar or Khotan. At sundown, on the terrace of the guest house where I stayed in Urumchi, a group of dignified Uighurs turned to the west and prostrated themselves in prayer. In deference, the other guests stood in silence.

Old Kuomintang laws discriminating against Moslems have been repealed. More believers now come to the mosques, and there are more mosques conveniently sited for them to attend, said Ahmadullah. The Kucha oasis had over five hundred mosques for its 170,000 people. Although sixty-nine small ones in which the poor had been segregated are now abolished, this is more than before liberation. In addition, there are twenty scripture halls attached to the mosques where children get religious instruction. A seminary providing a high-school education along with its religious instruction had 280 students in 1957. These institutions are fully staffed with akhuns, imams and muezzins. Includ-
ing hadji, there were 1,800 such religious persons in Kucha (1957) compared to 1,270 before Liberation.

Describing the hadj he had made to Mecca in 1956, Ahmadullah remarked that in the old days only the wealthy could dream of such an undertaking. Not to mention the hazards of the journey itself, unless you had powerful connections or a bodyguard, as like as not you would be stripped of your possessions either going or returning. Now the People's Government helped the Moslem rank and file make the holy journey. His group had visited India and Pakistan on the way and he had had a good opportunity to compare the conditions enjoyed by Moslems in other countries. Great-power intrigue had prevented the first post-liberation group of Sinkiang pilgrims from reaching Mecca in 1954, but every year since then the Islamic Association has helped pilgrims make the hadj.

There is separation of church and state in Sinkiang, but as the many examples cited by the hadji indicate, this in no way means that the state ignores religious affairs. The People's Government takes a lively interest in the welfare of the various religious communities. Endowments of mosques and religious institutions are strictly protected. Special local government committees look after religious affairs. If those who serve the mosques have financial or other difficulties, the government helps them as it does any other citizen.

Old Sinkiang had the waqf system. Donors deeded land and the Moslem community voluntarily cultivated these lands with their output going to the upkeep of the mosques and religious schools. There was a tone of great reproach in Ahmadullah's voice as he described how certain landlords and local tyrants were wont to usurp these lands. By getting themselves appointed trustees, such landlords had appropriated large holdings and actually gave little of the proceeds to the intended beneficiaries. The agrarian reform had taken these lands from the usurpers; a sufficient amount was set aside for the upkeep of the mosques and other religious institutions and those who served them, and the rest was distributed to the poor peasants. Nowadays the people's communes cultivate the endowed lands and their rent is used for the beneficiaries. Besides this, I learned, the overwhelming majority of those serving religion had joined the people's communes in some capacity or other and so were well looked after. Kucha had nearly five-hundred acres of such endowed lands, providing an ample amount for its religious institutions. Ahmadullah assured me that in Kucha, those serving
religion had no financial worries and day by day their livelihood was improving along with that of all the people.

Conditions for religion in Kucha are similar to those in other places. The government does not permit religious instruction in the public schools as the principle of separation of religion and state is observed, but the Moslem community itself maintains its own religious schools. Sinkiang has over two thousand such religious secondary schools and colleges (seminaries), with over eighty thousand students. Teachers in the colleges receive stipends from the state. Those in the secondary religious schools get their salaries from the wokpei, voluntary gifts of believers. This is one of the religious customs preserved from the past. Many Moslems give a percentage of their harvests to the akhuns or other religious personages, in addition to their salaries. A gift to an akhun for officiating at a marriage or writing an appropriate text for a funeral is quite usual. Deceased Moslem cadres are buried according to Moslem rites. If their families need help at this time, the organization they worked for, government office, party branch, trade union, Youth League group, etc., will provide the necessary financial or other assistance.

I learned too that the People's Government always makes special arrangements for the Moslem festivals of Ramazan, Qurban and Roz. For these two- and three-day holidays for all Moslems special supplies of food are brought into the towns, as is usual for the Chinese New Year or October First National Day. Since people of other religions now make a practice of going to Moslem neighbors and fellow workers to greet them on these festivals, they too are granted a two-day holiday.

The People's Government has also given wide facilities for leaders of religion in Sinkiang to see conditions not only in their region but throughout China and abroad. It is clear that what they have experienced and seen has enlisted the support of the overwhelming majority. The policies of the People's Government have enabled Islam to flourish in Sinkiang as never before. By creating just social conditions, they have made the ideals of religion and the reality of social life coincide more closely than before. The practice of the humanitarian principles preached by religion finds consistent support and encouragement in everyday civil life.

Ahmadullah told me: "We have faith in the sincerity of the religious policy of the Chinese Communist Party because without the slightest shadow of doubt all its promises, all its slogans have been put into practice."
The good hadji's earnestness enabled me to understand better an incident that I had previously heard about. In the early months of 1957, because of some difficulties in putting the new collective farms on their feet, some peasants were inclined to return to earlier, simpler forms of cooperative activities. There were many discussions in the farms pro and con. The akhuns of Kucha, who had seen the advantages of collective farming in other parts of the country, proved to be the most eloquent supporters of the collective-farm type of organization, the precursor of the communes. In Kucha if you ask, "Do the religious people, the clergy, support the People's Government and the Communist Party?" you will get a rather surprised look in answer as much as to say, "Why shouldn't they?" To most people there it seems a strange question. An individual akhun may not see eye to eye with a particular authority on every point, but he exercises his right of disagreement like any other citizen in a democracy and then compromise or understanding is sought on that basis.

A most enlightening conversation with Abulkazi, then chief secretary of the Islamic Association, gave me further significant facts on the relations between the Communist Party, the People's Government and the religious leaders of Sinkiang. Forty-one persons, or over 20 percent of the members of the PPCC, are religious personages. In addition to other delegates who were Moslems, two persons, Salimullah Hadji and Abulkhair Tureh, attended the All-China PPCC specifically as representatives of the Sinkiang Moslem community. No less then twenty-seven deputies were elected to the Sinkiang People's Congress, in their capacity as religious personages, and were expected to pay particular attention to the interests of religion and those serving religion. The participation of such respected Moslem leaders in the revolutionary movement from the very first, and in the government of Sinkiang and of all China, was regarded by the people as a guarantee of respect for the Moslem religion in the highest councils of the nation.

Abulkhair told me that religious personages serving in the PPCC and people's congresses, like other members, receive adequate salaries so that they can devote full attention to their duties. Like other delegates they also have ample opportunity to get acquainted with conditions in other parts of China. Large delegations from Sinkiang travel regularly to Peking, where they have their own mission headquarters in the western suburbs, and to other centers. Contacts between various parts of Sinkiang are closer today than they have ever been in the past. There has never,
he asserted, been such a feeling of unity in the Moslem community and between it and those of other religious persuasions.

Three questions were of special interest to me because of the light they threw on the matter of religion in the new China. They were the question of purdah, the segregation and veiling of women; polygamy; and the compatibility between belief in Islam and support of or membership in the Chinese Communist Party.

In certain Moslem countries and communities women are customarily segregated in the seraglio or women's quarters. Women in Sinkiang as a whole have never been subjected to this extreme form of segregation. Even under the dictatorship of Yakub Beg in the nineteenth century, women veiled but sometimes unveiled looked after shops or stalls in the bazaars of Kashgar or Khotan, which in those days were the strictest centers of Moslem orthodoxy. Only women of the rich have at times been secluded in the most extreme way. In the north of Sinkiang and in the highlands of the south, Kazakh and Kirghiz women have customarily enjoyed great freedom in the nomad encampments. This is dictated by the conditions of their life and the tradition of the clans handed down from pre-Moslem times. Nomad women do most of the household work and look after the small livestock, milking and so on. No great extent of segregation could possibly be enforced there. Veils were worn, and still are, symbolically, and are a form of female decoration. Among Uighurs of the north and south before liberation, however, women commonly wore veils, either a light veil of gauze, draped or held over the face when strange men were present, or the paranja; this is made of fine dark gauze and covers the woman like a sack from head to toe, the face being covered with a finer veil of mesh. Even before the Liberation of 1949, this custom had gradually begun to pass away in the north, but it still remained entrenched among the richer classes in the south. I saw no such heavy veiling in the north in the late 1950s but there were still a few in the south, worn mostly by women from the households of Moslem clergy.

Serious study of the question showed that veiling and purdah was a social custom fostered by certain members of the Moslem community in the name of religion and morality and wrongly thought to be imposed by religious law. Ahmadullah put it politely to me in this way: "A careful study of the Koran, the source of Moslem religious law, has shown that rules not written down in it had been imposed on the people
by self-styled religious authorities." He referred to the prohibition of
depictions of the human form in art and especially to the custom of
veiling women.

There was no special propaganda campaign to end purdah or veiling,
but these customs were so obviously incompatible with a free, dignified
social life for women (not to speak of the needs of modern technology)
that the women themselves have ended them.

In Sinkiang, the question of ending polygamy has been less difficult
than might be thought. Polygamy was restricted very largely to the
better-off classes. Economic as well as other reasons actually made mo-
nogamy the rule among the masses of the people. Moslem religious law
does allow a maximum of four wives but there is a stipulation that each
wife must be satisfied that she enjoys the full rights of a wife. Before
the Moslem believer takes a second wife he should get the consent of the
first. Only if the first and second agree can he take a third, and if all
three agree, then he can take a fourth. In practice, however, the right
of polygamy was gravely abused, causing endless domestic tragedies. No
one denies the abuses caused by the ease of divorce in old Sinkiang.
Then, to end a marriage, a husband had only to repeat the words "Uch
talak!" (I divorce thee!) three times before witnesses. A woman had
no such right. There are countless stories of rich tyrants forcing girls
into marriage with them by putting economic or other pressure on their
parents. Under these conditions women were little more than chattels
of their husbands. But they dared not ask for divorce because as like as
not they would be beaten, disfigured or even murdered with few ques-
tions asked. It is no wonder then that there is a revulsion of popular
feeling against multiple marriages, and today women, its chief victims,
are well able to express their will in this matter.

By special dispensation of the National People's Congress (in defer-
ence to Moslem custom), the provisions of the May 1950 Marriage Law
prescribing monogamy do not apply to Moslems in Sinkiang, but the will
of the Moslem masses and especially Moslem women with new-won
democratic rights are, in effect, making it apply because it is based on
the new concept of complete female equality. Women today will not
marry a man who already has a wife. There is no moral, economic or
political pressure on her to do so, and it would be illegal for any pres-
sure to be put on her to force her to marry against her will.

Many men who already have two or more wives continue in wedlock
with them if the wives are satisfied. But it is not difficult these days for
a woman to be economically independent and live her own life. In the villages during the land reform they all received land in their own right. In the rural communes today every woman can be independent if she so wishes. In the towns, an expanding economy provides many opportunities for a woman to make an independent living. Under such conditions veiling, purdah and polygamy have become forgotten customs of the past in Sinkiang.

Islam and the Communist Party

The relations between the Communist Party and its Moslem members are no less commonsensical. The party in Sinkiang has over 200,000 members, most of them in their middle twenties and thirties, the most forward-looking part of the population, and most of them of the Moslem minority nationalities. If the party were to demand that every would-be party member on admission to the party be a mature, fully developed Marxist and adherent of historical materialism it could scarcely hope to be the mass party, the party of the Sinkiang people, which it is today. On joining the party, it is not demanded that a person should be a skilled dialectician or reject a belief in Allah. What is important is that he or she should be dedicated to the interests of the people. In fact, most of the members of the Sinkiang branch of the party are men and women who distinguished themselves in the revolutionary struggle before liberation, or who took an active part in the various mass movements for reducing rents, the land reform, collectivization, the Cultural Revolution and so on. The Communist Party makes no secret of its belief that the whole world will eventually become a communist commonwealth and that the majority of mankind will eventually recognize historical or dialectical materialism as the only scientific way of understanding the world. This, it believes, is a matter of historical determinism: the way the world is evolving. As part of this trend, it is confident that the most forward-looking part of the population which is now flocking to join the party will be the first to accept such ideas. But these are matters of the future. There are urgent practical tasks to do in Sinkiang that do not demand such a sophisticated level of philosophical understanding on the part of the doers.

Millions of Buddhists, Moslems and Christians of various sects practice their religions openly in China. If religion is in fact not attracting new adherents it is because youth finds so many other pursuits and activities that attract their thoughts and energies. The decline in the
number of Buddhists is particularly marked. The 1975 constitution lays down explicitly in Article 28 that “Citizens enjoy freedom to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in religion and to propagate atheism.” The state holds that religious belief is a matter of conscience and relates to the personal freedom of the individual; it is a private matter that does not infringe on the rights of others. Every citizen is free to believe in any religion he wishes, or for that matter, not to believe.

Marxist literature in China has, of course, extensively analyzed the question of religion and regards it as a social and historical phenomenon that will pass away naturally with the advance and spread of scientific knowledge. However, it recognizes that even in a socialist society there will still be people who believe in religion. Such belief cannot be legislated out of existence. In his report *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*, written in 1957, Chairman Mao Tse-tung said: “It is not only futile but very harmful to use crude and summary methods to deal with ideological questions among the people, with questions relating to the spiritual life of man.”

Nevertheless there are some special circumstances relating to religion in Sinkiang that pose special problems. In old Sinkiang, the feudal landlords and nobility, khodjas and khans were at the same time rulers and religious dignitaries who used religion to bolster their rule. In this they were like the feudal prelate seigneurs in Western Europe, the Teutonic knights of Prussia or some of the feudal prelates of Tibet. They used religious dogma and their religious prerogatives to force their dictates on the masses of the people in matters far beyond the legitimate scope of religious belief. They dictated terms of land tenure and of marriage, the subordinate position of women, how the people should amuse themselves, dress and so on. They took an intolerably high-handed attitude toward adherents of other religions or indeed toward dissident sects of their own religion. The history of Sinkiang was made hideous and bloody by their intolerance. Interdenominational strife resulted in untold crimes. Under such conditions freedom of religion or religious beliefs was out of the question. Ending the privileges of such religious feudal lords was a prerequisite of true freedom of religious belief. Only when feudal landholding and the whole feudal system were wiped out could the people really decide in freedom the question of their religious belief.

Applauding the way religion has been freed of the horrible taint of persecution and exploitation, Ahmadullah said: “It is written in the Koran that all should enjoy the right of believing in their chosen reli-
Islam in Sinkiang Today

Islamic faith. In this, the Koran and our constitution agree. This is the guarantee of our peaceful life with our fellow citizens of other religions. They respect our religion and customs and we respect theirs. This has ended religious strife in Sinkiang. It is in fact illegal to foment religious (or racial) strife in Sinkiang.

Islam in Sinkiang is mainly of the Sunnite persuasion. The Tadjik people, however, have certain rites and customs that differ from those of other Moslems. Their way of praying is unique to themselves. They respect the teachings of Ismail, I understand, but reject those of Imam Shafai. In the old days they were persecuted by the orthodox Sunnites for persisting in these differences. Today Moslems in Sinkiang may argue about the rights and wrongs of all this, but there is no dispute about the Tadjiks' right to believe as they do.
Because of its complex history, Sinkiang's peoples and places usually have more than one name. Even one's name is often spelled in different ways. In this book I have generally used the most commonly used names, but readers may find the following glossary and index of names useful, even though it is not comprehensive. The Chinese (Han) name is usually listed last. Names of persons or institutions are listed in the general index.

PLACES

Aelana, Akaba, Aqaba, Qalet el Aqaba, Elath. Gulf of Akaba seaport; served Silk Road trade, 58
Afghanistan, xx, 81, 82, 85, 89, 96, 108, 116, 130, 139, 145, 156, 159, 161, 250
Africa, 78, 84, 93, 111, 117, 165
Agni. Anc. town on Silk Road, 63, 87
Aksai Chin (Stone Desert). At E end of Karakoram Mts., crossed by anc. Sinkiang-Tibet caravan trail and modern road, 156, 262
Aksu, Aqsu, Kumon, Pohuan, Wen-su, Sen Suh, Aksu Yangi Shahr (New Town), Aksu Kona Shahr (Old Town), A Ko Su. Oasis, town on Aksu R on Silk Road S of Tienshan Mts., xxi, xxiv, 4, 48, 58, 113, 120, 121, 123, 126, 133, 135, 143, 149, 150, 151, 152, 155, 170, 182, 218, 228, 236, 237, 247, 268
Alexandria, Al Iskandariyah, 58
Alti-shahr (Six Cities, viz., Kashgar, Yangi-Hissar, Yarkand, Khotan, Aksu, Uch Turfan). 19th-cent. name for S Sinkiang, 123
America(s), 4, 117, 141, 165
Anau, Annau. Anc. site of 3000 B.C. culture in SE Turkmen SSR, 5
Andijan, Andizhan, in Uzbek SSR, 44, 123, 131, 136, 146, 145, 151, 160
Anhsi, Ansi. Last town in Kansu Province before desert crossing to Hami, xxii–xxiv, 44, 48, 82, 171, 175, 177, 178
Antioch, Antiochea, Antakya, Antu. Probably Ta Tsin or Li Kan of anc. Chinese texts. A W terminal of Silk Road, 58, 60; Antioch-Margiana, 56

Anyang. Anc. capital of Shang-Yin dynasty, in NE Honan province, 31

Arabia, Arabistan. Ta Shih or Ta Shi of anc. Chinese texts, Arabian Peninsula, 61, 76, 92, 93, 94

Artush. NW of Kashgar, 285

Asia, 18, 41, 74, 99, 111, 116, 117, 125, 193; Asia Minor, 14, 15, 18, 19; Central Asia, xvii, xix, xxiii–xxv, 10, 11, 13, 15–17, 19, 23, 24, 26, 29, 41, 44, 45, 51, 55, 57, 63–65, 67, 68, 75, 79, 81, 83, 85, 88, 93–96, 98–100, 102, 104, 105, 108–112, 114, 116, 118, 120, 128–130, 139, 140, 145, 154, 157, 165, 177, 189, 199, 202, 259, 272; Central Asian Plateau, xxii, 29; East Asia, 15, 16; Greek Asia, 44; Inner Asia, 117, 138; NE Asia, 117; Southeast Asia, 4, 165; Western Asia, xxiii, xxiv, 6, 10, 15–17

Bactria, Balkh, Ta Hsia, Tokharistan. Region between upper Amu Darya and Hindu Kush Mts. area of modern Afghanistan. Powerful independent Graeco-Bactrian state (245 B.C.) which fell (130 B.C.) to nomad Saks, then to Yueh–chi, 15, 19, 43, 47, 48, 50, 58, 61, 81

Badakhshan, Badascian. In NE Afghanistan between upper Amu Darya and Hindu Kush Mts., with Kunduz R as W boundary, including Wakhan strip to Chinese border, 102, 104, 126, 130

Bagdad, Baghdad. Anc. trading center on Silk Road, 58, 95, 110, 111, 116

Bai, Pai, Paicheng. Oasis, town on Silk Road S of Tienshan, 121, 248

Baizerlikh, Bezelik, Beziklik, Bezekuk. E of Turfan town. Famous for painted grottoes, 88, 276

Balasagun, Belasagun, Balgasun, Huszewardo. W of L Issyk Kul, 96, 101


Barkul, Barkol, Palikun, Balikun, Chensi, Chen Hsi. Oasis, town on SE shore of Bar Kul lake, N of Barkul Mts., 21, 54, 98, 126, 127, 177, 269

Bayin Gol, Payingholen, 285

Beshbalikh, 103, 104. See Urumchi

Bethlehem, Fu-lin, But-lin, 58


Borotala, Burlatala, Burlata, Bultala, Po Erh Ta La, 230, 232. Now Borotala Mongolian Aut. Prefecture. Capital, Polo (Bulak), W of L Ebi Nor, 285, 301

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Byzantium, xxv, 60, 81, 83, 93
Canton. Port, capital of Kwangtung province, S China, 78, 132, 165, 169, 192, 244

Chahar. Former province in NE China, 119

Chadlea, Chaldea, 56, 60


Changchi, Chanki, Changchi Hui A.P. Capital, Changchi, NNW of Urumchi, 285

Changchiakou, Kalgan, Wanchuan, “Gateway to Mongolia.” City on Great Wall, NW of Peking, guarding Nankou Pass. Start of old caravan route to Urga in Outer Mongolia and to Sinkiang, xxiv, 253, 264

Chaosu. Town, area between Ili and Tekes Rs, S of Ining, 214, 218, 309

Chapucha, Chapchal, Chapuerh, Chapucha Sibo Aut. County, SW of Ining, 285

Charchan, Charchen, Cherchen, Bazar, Chieh-mo. Oasis, town on Charchan R on Silk Road, S of Taklamakan Desert, start of road S to Tibet, xxi, 145, 185

Charklik, Charkhlikh, Charkliq, Chaklik, Re Chiang, Cho-chiang, Jo-chiang, Erh Chiang, Lop. Oasis, town on S branch of Silk Road, xxi, 185

Chigu. Residence of Wusun tribe's ruler, 50

Chin. Victorious feudal state in Warring Kingdoms period, 35

China, Cathay, 58, 101; Kitai, 101; Seres (Land of Silk), xvii, xix–xxvi, 5, 9 ff.; Chung Kuo (Middle Kingdom), 54, 65, 66, 94, 98, 125, 165; Chung Hwa Ren Min Kung Ho Kuo, People's Republic of China, Capital: Peking; NE China, xxv, 23, 79, 100, 101, 123, 166, 168, 176, 177, 180, 181, 186, 190, 191, 262; NW China, 148, 149, 160, 166, 176, 189, 190, 242, 271; Chinese empire, 16, 41, 75, 79, 82, 110, 120; Chinese People's Republic, 16, 30, 275

Chinghai, Tsinghai. W China province, xx, 9, 23, 43, 48, 49, 75, 89, 90, 101, 109, 125, 176, 192, 259, 266, 269, 270, 280

Chingho, Tsingho. Town S of L Ebi Nor on Urumchi-Ili road, 227, 228, 230, 231, 233, 235, 236

Chipaitze, Chipulai, Chimunai, Zimunai. Town in N Djungaria, SE of L Zaisan, on Chinese border with USSR, 230

Chira, Chira Bazar, Tse-lo, Tse Le. Oasis, town on Silk Road E of Khotan.

Chiuchuan, Kiuchuan (Spring of Wine). Suchow till 1862. Town SE of Yumen in Kansu Province on Silk Road, 49, 68

Chungking. Capital of Szechuan province, W China, xvi, 193, 201, 237, 250, 251, 262

Chungwei. In Kansu province, 176
Ctesiphon, Ktesiphon. Ruined anc. Silk Road city near Bagdad on Tigris R, 58

Damascus, 58
Damghan, Hekatompylos. On Silk Road, 58
Djend, 109
Djitwa-shahr (Seven Cities). Name for S Sinkiang in 19th cent.: Kashgar, Yang-i-Hissar, Yarkand, Khotan, Uch-Turfan, Aksu, Maralbashi, 123
Dobujin, Durbujin, Durbuljin, Ermin, Omin, Omileiho, Hoshang. Road junction SE of Tacheng in NW Dzungaria, 230

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Ecbatana. Achmetha of Bible, now Hamadan in Iran, S of Caspian. Was capital of Media Magna and summer court of Persian, Parthian kings, 58

Egypt, Li Kan (anc. Chinese name), 13, 14, 18, 39, 40, 45, 93, 111

Eurasia, xxiv, 5, 6, 11, 16, 18, 28, 65

Europe, xxiv, xxv, 6, 57, 60, 63, 64, 67, 74, 84, 94, 105, 111, 112, 116, 117, 125, 150, 182, 193, 199; E. Europe, 93, 99, 110, 112, 113; W. Europe, 26, 93

Faizabad, Pai Tze Pa, Kiashi, Chia Shih, Chien-shih. Town, oasis in W. Sinkiang, E. of Kashgar.

Ferghana, Fergana, Bo Ha Na, Ta Yuan area. City W of Tienshan, Ferghana Valley drained by Syr Darya, now part of Uzbek, Tadjik and Kirghiz SSRs, 9, 47, 50, 51, 91, 95, 118, 121, 127, 129, 135, 158, 160

Fertile Crescent, 4, 30

Four Garrisons (Karashahr, Kucha, Kashgar, Khotan), 89, 90

France, xx, 20, 64, 130, 141, 152, 166, 167, 193, 265

Fu Lin, 58

Fuyun. Town, county in Altai areas on headwaters of Black (Kara) Irtysh, 260

Gandhara. Anc. region on Indus, conquered by Alexander the Great in 326 B.C. Noted for Graeco-Indian style of its Buddhist frescoes.

Gaochang, Kaochang, Khoco, Karachoco, Karakhojda: (1) State in Turfan oasis ruled by Kiu, a royal family of Chinese (Han) origin, annexed by Tang dynasty in 640 as Haichow prefecture. (2) State est. by Uighur nomads in 840 in Turfan oasis, where they settled as farmers, craftsmen,
traders. Sometimes including Kucha. Capital, Karakhoja (see entry below). Gaochang city founded in first cent. B.C. SE of Turfan town, abandoned in 14th cent. A.D., 82, 98, 276

Gaza, 58

Germany, xx, xxvi, 64, 141, 152, 158, 166, 175, 182, 189, 193, 204, 229, 237, 262

Gilgit. In Kashmir, first major caravan stop S of Mintaka pass over Karakoram, 90

Great Wall. 2,000 mi. long, from Kansu to Pohai Gulf, 20, 47, 49, 52, 75, 91, 119, 123, 124, 131, 143, 145, 170–172, 177, 180, 182, 188, 190, 203, 212, 236, 237, 239, 265

Greece, xxv, 167; Greek East, 45; Graeco-Bactrian state, 15; Greek colonies, 14

Guma Bazar, Pi Shan. Town, oasis on Silk Road W of Khotan, 155, 185


Hangchow. Last capital of Sung dynasty, 111

Hankow. Industrial center, port on Yangtze, 166, 169

Harappa, 4

Hekatompylos, “Hundred-gated city.” Parthian capital at S foot of Elburz Mts. (near Damghan), 58

Herat, Harat. Anc. city, oasis in NW Afghanistan on trade route from India to Persia and Mesopotamia, 89, 95, 108

Hira, Hirah. Near Nedjeb, Iraq, 58, 60

Hochow. City in S Kansu, 176

Horgos, Khoros, Khorgos, Hocheng, Ho Erh Kuo Sze. Sometimes called Suidun or Ili. Town, county NW of Ining, 222


Hsinghsinghsia, Singsingsia. Customs and farm inspection post on Sinkiang border between Hami and Anhsi, xxiv

Huhehot. Capital of Inner Mongolian A.R., 280

Hungary, 79, 110, 111

Hutubi, NW of Urumchi between Changchi and Manass, 267

Ili, Ilik (Uigh, “Fragrant Place”) Kuldja, Kulja (Mon. “Wild Goat Place”), Kull-Kara-usu, Djindzinsk, Ningyuan, Hui Yuan Cheng, Ining. Area and capital Ining. On Ili R between Tienshan and Boro Horo Ula Mts., xviii, xxiv, 22, 43, 52, 97, 100, 103, 109, 113, 118, 119, 121, 123, 126,
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Indo-China, 41, 47, 60, 66, 166

Inner Mongolia. See Mongolia; Inner Mongolian A.R.; Huhehot (capital)

Iran. See Persia, 4, 14, 60, 93, 108, 110

Iraq, 19, 60, 104

Irkutsk, 45

Ispahan, Esfahan, Isfahan. Town in WC Iran, Aspadana, anc. Median town, 95, 116

Japan, xxvi, 39, 41, 166-168, 175, 179, 180, 192, 193, 229, 250

Jehol. Former NE China province, 119

Kabul. Capital of Afghanistan; commands strategic routes through Mt. passes from W to India. Taken by Alexander the Great, the Mongols, Baber and others, 81, 90, 156

Kalgan. See Changchiakou

Kanchow: (1) Chanyeh, town in Kansu province, 98, 176, 177; (2) commercial center in SW Kiangsi province, 176


Karakhoja, Karakhodka, San Pao, Hsichow, Hsi Chao, Khocho, Hchoao, Turfan, Astana. Karakhoja was capital of Gaochang state. Now in ruins, 98. See Gaochang

Karamai, Ko La Mai. Oil industry center in WC Donguria, xx, 292, 293, 310

Karashahr, Qara Shahr, Chalish, Ta Tun Tzu, Agni, Yasin, Yentso, Yulduz, Yanki (sometimes refers to whole area including Yenki), Yenchii, Center of Yenki Hui A.C., xxi, 48, 51, 53, 55, 58, 82, 92, 104, 123, 131, 149, 152, 159, 160, 170, 175, 181, 184, 267

Karategin, 130

Kargarlikh, Qarqhaliq, Yeh Cheng. Town, oasis on S branch of Silk Road E of Yarkand, 185, 236

Kars-Ardahan, 167

Kashgaria, Alti-shahr (Six Cities), Djitwa-shahr (Seven Cities), Yati-shahr, Yatta, Yetta, Eastern, or Chinese, Turkestan, S of Tienshan. Sometimes including Kucha, but not Karashahr and area E of it; once known as Uighuristan, xxi, xxiii, 4, 18, 54, 82, 91, 99, 103, 113, 114, 116, 118, 120-123, 126, 127, 129, 131, 133-136, 140, 143, 148, 149, 156-159, 161, 172, 203, 231, 236, 250, 268

Kashmir, Jammu and Kashmir, Cashmere, xx, 90, 156

Kaski, 271

Kathmandu, 271

Kazakhstan, steppeland from the Volga to the Altai where Kazakh tribes nomadized, 6, 9, 22, 23, 47, 56, 82, 100, 113, 117, 118, 120, 150, 180. Now divided into Kazakh SSR, xxiv, 3, 5, 100, 272; and Ili Kazakh AP of PRC, 275. See Ili

Keriya, Kheriya, Cheriya, Keria, Yu-tien, Yutan. Oasis, town on Silk Road E of Khotan, starting point of road S to Tibet, xxi, 4, 43, 44, 145, 185

Kezir, Kyzyl. Oasis, town NW of Kucha, famous for frescoed temple grottoes, xix, xxv, 86, 88, 276

Khalkin Gol, 177

Khiva, Kiva, Khanate. In W Turkestan. Formed in late 16th cent. out of Khwarizm region on lower reaches of Amu Darya, S of Aral Sea. Conquered by Russia, 1873. Now part of Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs. See Khoresm.

Khobuk Saur, Hopukesaierh, Mongol A.C. Capital, Hofeng, N of Karamai in Djungaria, 285

Khojent, 153

Khorasan, Korasan Khurasan. Reg. in 7th cent. included Merv, Nishapur, Herat and Balkh. Now province in N Iran, 93, 103, 104, 109, 130

Khoresm, Khorezm, Khwarizm, Khwarazm, Chorasmia, area S of Aral Sea, including lower Amu Darya basin, steppes W to Caspian and E to Bokhara. Principal cities, Urgench and Khiva. In 11th cent. a kingdom was founded here by former slave of Seljuk Sultan. With conquest of Trans-Oxiana, Samarkand became capital. A Moslem state mainly of Turko-Iranians E of Amu Darya and Iranians in Khorasan, Afghanistan
and Iraq, it was ruled by Shah Muhammad when conquered by Genghiz Khan in 1220. Now in NW Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs, 9, 101, 108, 110, 113, 114, 129, 130, 140.

Khotan, Kotan, Hotan, Cotan, Ilchi, Yotkan, Ho Tien. Town, oasis S of Taklamakan desert on Silk Road. Famous for jade from Kara Kash R sent to China on early Jade Road, xxi, xxiii, xxv, 3, 9, 18, 30, 43-45, 48, 54, 55, 58, 61, 63, 83, 85, 87, 89, 95, 99, 101, 103, 111, 120, 121, 123, 126, 139, 145, 149, 151, 152, 155-158, 173, 184, 185, 195, 236, 250, 294.

Kingtehcheng, Chingtehchen, Fouliang, in NE Kiangsi province. Pottery center since 5th cent. A.D., 84.

Kirghizia, Khirghizistan, Tienshan and Alai Mt. areas, with farming areas in valleys of Chu, Talas, and Naryn, Ferghana and around L Issyk Kul. Inhabited after 13th cent. by Kirghiz; annexed by Russia in 1864. Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic est. in 1936 as part of the USSR, 100, 118, 126.


Kizil Su (Keszelusu) Kirghiz A.P. Capital, Artush, NW of Kashgar, 285.

Kobdo, Khobdo, Hovd, Hobdo, Jargalant, Jirgalant, Chirgalantu, Dzhirlantu. Old Outer Mongolia trading town at foot of Altai Mts., xxiv, 137.


Koktogai, Koktogo, Ko Ko To Hai. Town in Fuyun county in Altai, 260.

Korea, 41, 77, 103, 124, 166, 262.

Korla, Kurla, Ku Erh Leh, Ku Er Lo. Town, oasis SW of L Bagrach Kul on Silk Road, xxi, 58, 159.

Kucha, Kuchi, Kueitsu, Anhsi, Ku Che. Early Aryan settlement, town, oasis on Silk Road E of Aksu, xix, xx, 48, 55, 58, 63, 82, 88, 90, 92, 98, 104, 121, 123, 126, 143, 149, 150-152, 159, 170, 205.

Kuchengtze, Kitai, Khitai, Chitai, Tsitai. Oasis, town N of Tienshan between Hami and Urumchi; junction of roads to N Djungaria and Mongolia, xxiv, xxv, 160, 180.

Kunduz, Qunduz. Town and former khanate E of Kunduz R in NE Afghanistan, 89.


Ladakh, xxii, 90.

Lanchow. Capital of Kansu province, important industrial petrochemical center, xxii, xxvii, 47, 58, 88, 91, 135, 204, 236, 244, 250, 251, 254, 264, 266, 268, 292, 295, 298, 313.
Leh. Town in Ladakh. Key station on Sinkiang-India caravan route over Karakoram, or Leh, Pass, xxii
Lhasa. Capital of Tibet Aut. Reg., 125, 280
Liao. S Manchurian area watered by Liao R. Liaoning province, NE China, 186
Liaohsi-Liaoning. Site of climactic battle for liberation of NE China, 265
Liberated Areas. Regions liberated from Kuomintang regime, 252, 253, 266
Likan. Anc. Chinese name for terminus of Silk Road which the Chinese themselves never visited: Rome or Antioch.
Liuchiu Islands (Ryukyu). Chinese tributary state in E China Sea, annexed by Japan in 1879, 166
Lob Nor, Lop Nor, Lo Pu Nu Erh, Lo Pu Po. Anc. Loulan, Shou Shang, Shan Shan. Town, area of Kroraina around salt and marshy depression at E end of Tarim basin, xxi, xxiii, 4, 5, 23, 30, 44, 48, 50, 54, 56, 58, 100, 157
Loulan. See Lob Nor, xxiii, 58, 68, 87; Shan Shan, 145
Loyang. Anc. capital of China in NW Honan province in time of E Han and other dynasties, 33, 54, 60, 77, 78, 86, 92
Lu. Early Chinese state that compiled the Spring and Autumn Annals, 33
Lungmen. Sculptured Buddhist grottoes, 86
Lydia. Anc. kingdom in Asia Minor on Aegean Sea, 14

Manass, Manas, Ma Na Ssu, Sui Lai. Oasis, town NW of Urumchi on road to Ili, xxiv, 91, 120, 160, 204
Manchukuo. Japanese puppet state in NE China, 190
Manchuria. Now three NE provinces of China: Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang. Original home of Manchus. Hans from Shantung and Hopei provinces migrated there since 300 B.C., 6, 9, 21, 23, 74, 81, 82, 100, 101, 109, 119, 120, 123, 124, 127, 132, 138, 156, 166, 177, 180, 190
Maralbashi. Town NE of Kashgar on Silk Road, 127, 151
Mavar-un-nahr, Ma-wara-n-nahr. Region between Amu Darya and Syr Darya, with Samarkand as capital. Transoxiana, 104, 113, 114
Mecca, 92, 93
Media. Anc. country of Medes of W Asia on NW Iranian plateau.
Merv, Antioch-Margiana, Mouru, Malu, Ma Li, Ma Li Wu, Mari, Mary, Bairam Ali. Anc. town of oasis on lower Murghab R. Conquered by Russians, 1884. Now in SE of Turkmen SSR, 56, 58, 82, 89, 108, 109, 129
Mesopotamia, "Between the Rivers," Paddan Aram. Fertile region between Tigris and Euphrates, xxiv, 4, 11, 13-16, 30, 40, 68, 93, 110, 116
Miron, Miran, Mi Lan. Anc. city, oasis on Silk Road W of Lob Nor, 48, 58 Mogholistan, 113, 114, 117, 119-121
Mohenjo-Daro. On lower Indus. With Harappa on Sutlej, twin sites of anc. Indus civilization c. 2600 B.C., 4

Mongolia, including Outer Mongolia (Wai Mung Gu) and Inner Mongolia (Nei Mung Gu) in EC Asia. Homeland of Mongols, xxv, 9, 10, 15, 23, 28, 43, 50, 63, 64, 74, 79, 91, 103, 106, 109, 110, 112, 119, 124, 125, 128, 156, 177. Now divided into the Mongolian People's Republic (mainly Outer Mongolia), est. 1924; the Tanu Tuva Aut. Reg. of the Uriankhai, est. 1961; the Buriat Mongolian ASSR, est. 1923; of the USSR and the Inner Mongolian Aut. Reg. of the People's Republic of China, est. 1947. Outer Mongolia, xxiv, 21, 67, 100, 125; Inner Mongolia, 21, 52, 100, 124, 125, 280, 284; Inner Mongolian A.R., 283; Mongolian People's Republic, xx, 55, 177, 190, 255, 261; Buriat Mongolian SSR, 9; Mongolian steppes, xxiv, 69

Muleiho. Center of Muleiho Kazakh A.C., W of L Barkul, 285

Naniwan. N Shensi province, 324

Nanking. In Anhwei province on Yangtze R, 170, 176, 179–182, 191, 251, 264, 266

Nepal, 270, 271

Nilka, Nilki, Kung-ha, Ni Li Ko. W of Ining, Djungaria, 208–211, 224, 226

Ningshia. Former province in NW China, now Ninghsia Hui A.R., 109, 176, 201, 215, 243, 280, 283

Nishapur, 103, 109

Nissa. Town SE of Caspian Sea, 58

Niya, Niya Bazr. Anc. town, oasis on Old Silk Road in Minfeng county, E of Khotan, 48, 58, 145

Ordos, O Erh To Ssu. Desert and steppeland inside big bend of Yellow R where Hsiung-nu once nomadized, 9, 20, 42, 49, 54, 82, 91

Otrar. Anc. city (12th–16th cent.). Now ruined site near Shaulder in Kazakh SSR, 116

Orient. See East

Panpo. Neolithic site near Sian, in Shensi province, 29

Parthia, Anhsi. Anc. country in W Asia nearly co-extensive with modern Khorasan province in NE Iran. A province of Assyrian, Persian and Alexander the Great's empire. On dissolution of Seleucid power, 250 B.C., Arsaces founded new Parthian empire till around 226 B.C. With great cities of Hecatompylos, Seleucia and Ctesiphon, Parthia at its greatest, in early first cent. B.C., ruled from Euphrates to Indus, from Amu Darya to Indian Ocean. Conquered by Roman empire in 39 B.C., 39, 50, 51, 56, 58, 60, 83

Peking. In N China's Hopei province, capital of PRC. Formerly Chi, Yu-
chow, Yenking, Changtu, Cambaluc, Khanbaluk, Khanbalik, Tatu, Pe-
kin, Peiching (northern capital), Peiping, xxiv, 20, 28, 66, 100, 106, 108,
110, 119, 124, 125, 128, 132, 134, 141, 168–170, 172, 265–268, 274, 275,
283, 290, 292, 298, 299
Persia. Iran (since 1935), Po Sze. Originally Persis (modern Fars). See
Iran, xxiv, xxv, 9, 14, 15, 18, 19, 43, 45, 81–83, 93, 95, 109, 112, 116, 130
Petra. Anc. city, now ruined, on Old Silk Road in SW of modern Jordan,
near Wadi Musa, 58
Phrygia. Anc. region of WC Asia Minor, now C Turkey, 15
Polo, Polu, Great Polo (Baitistan) and Little Polo (Gilgit). Small kingdoms
allied to China in 8th cent. W of Tibet in Kashmir, 90
Pontis. Anc. kingdom of 4th cent. B.C. in NE Asia Minor, 18
Posgam, Tse Pu. Oasis, town W of Khotan on Silk Road, 155, 185

Rome. Capital of Roman empire, Ta Tsin or Li Kan of anc. Chinese texts,
xxvii, xxv, 39, 45, 58, 60, 61, 64, 83; Roman empire, xxiv, 45, 51, 58, 61,
64, 83; Western Roman empire, 16; Eastern Roman empire, 81, 83;
Roman rule, 16
Russia, Czarist, 13, 18, 105, 110, 111, 125, 126, 140, 150, 161, 166, 167, 262;
Russian SFSR, xx
Russo, 230

Samarkand, Samarcand, Kan, Peitien, Maracand. Anc. Maracanda, capital
of Sogdia, destroyed by Alexander the Great. New city of Samarkand
prospered as center on the Silk Road in 7th cent. A.D. Conquered by
Arabs (A.D. 710). Flourished under Samanid rulers, 875–999, as center
of Arab culture. Destroyed by Genghiz Khan, 1221. Capital of Tam-
erlane. Occupied by Chinese, then by Emir of Bukhara and by Russians
in 1868. Now in Uzbek SSR, 43, 58, 81–83, 89, 90, 95, 101, 108, 111,
113, 114, 120, 122, 129
Samarra. City in C Iraq on Tigris, capital of Abbasid Caliphs, 84
Sanju, Sandju, Sang Chu. Town W of Khotan on Silk Road, N of Sanju
Pass, 16; 530 ft. through Kunlun Mts., 146, 155
Sarhad, Sarhad-i-vakhan. Town on headwaters of Amu Darya, 90
Sarikol. Region on E edge of Pamir Mts., 44, 90
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Shanghai. China’s major seaport and light industrial center, 165, 168–170,
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Shihotze. PLA farm NW of Urumchi, 324
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Siberia, 5, 9, 22, 23, 44, 109, 113, 120, 129, 138, 139, 177, 180, 229, 262; Siberian tundra, 9
Sidon, Zidon, Saida, Sayida. Anc. Phoenician port city on Mediterranean, S of modern Beirut, 60
Sikang. Former province in W China, now incorporated into other provinces, 192
Sogdiana, Suli, Kanchu, Trans-Oxiana. Anc. region between Amu Darya and Syr Darya, 43, 45, 48, 52, 60, 90
Soofi-Kurghan, Sufi-Kurghan, Sofi-Kurgan, Sofi-Korgon. Town E of Kokand in Kirghiz SSR, 135
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Srinagar. Capital and district of Kashmir; terminal of Karakoram caravan trail from Sinkiang, xxii
Stalingrad. Industrial city of USSR on Volga R, renamed Volgograd in 1961, xxvi, 193, 199, 200
Suchow, Hsuchou. Now Chiuchuan, 20 mi. W of Chiayukuan, where Great Wall ends, 178
Suidun, Suiting, Ningyuan. Town WNW of Ining (Ili). Sometimes refers to Horgos 30 mi. WNW, 222, 228, 231–234, 307, 309
Sumeria, Shinar. S part of Babylonia. Anc. kingdom of non-Semitic people in Mesopotamia in 4th millennium b.c., 11, 13; Sumer and Akkad, 13
Syria, Aram, Esham, Esh Sham, Ta Fu Lin (name in Han dynasty), 14, 56, 93, 110, 116; Syrian steppes, 14, 58
Szechuan. SW China province, 37, 41, 61, 62, 65, 66, 73, 78, 101, 109, 280
Ta Tsin. See Rome; Antioch, xviii, 58, 60, 75
Tachai. N Shansi province pace-setting farm commune, 303
Tacheng, Tahcheng, Chuguchak, Tarbagatai. Name of Special Area and
town on Sinkiang border with Kazakh SSR, S of Tarbagatai Mts., 161, 179, 181-183, 208, 209, 218, 220, 229, 230, 231, 233, 236, 259, 260, 301, 310; Tacheng S.A., xxiv

Tadjikistan, Tajikistan, Tokharistan. Mt. region in Pamirs and Alai ranges inhabited by Iranian people, mainly Tadjiks and Uzbeks. Now Takjik SSR, est. 1929. Capital, Stalinabad (Dushanbe), 100, 130, 272

Tahaiyentze. W of Chingho, 235

Taiwan. Chinese island province off E coast, still ruled by Kuomintang regime, 66, 166, 270, 271, 295

Tangshan, 312

Tangut. See West Hsia

Tarbagatai. In NW Djungaria, 17, 82, 119, 127, 140, 218, 230

Tashkent, Tashkend. City, oasis on Syr Darya. Captured by Russians, 1865. Now capital of Uzbek SSR, 81, 82, 91, 95, 100, 120, 121, 130, 153, 160, 251

Tashkurgan, Ta Shih Ku Erh Kan, 90, 228, 236; Tashkurgan Tadjik A.C. SW of Kashgar, 285; also town in Afghanistan, anc. Aornos in Bactria. Tatung. Early capital of N Wei dynasty in N China Shansi province, 75

Three Areas: Ili, Tacheng and Altai. Freed from Kuomintang rule in 1944


Tiao Chih. Anc. Chinese name for W part of Western Lands, Near and Middle East, 56, 60


Tientsin. Chief port of N China, 166, 265, 283, 294

Tingchow, 84

Tokmak, 88, 89

Toksun. SW of Turfan, 236

Trans-Caucasus. S of Caucasus Mts., 109

Trans-Oxiana. E of Oxus (Amu Darya), 48, 95, 104, 109, 114, 120

Tsaidam. In Chinghai province, 270

Tsingtao. In Shantung province, 166

Tu-chuch Khanates, 63, 79; Eastern Khanate, 81, 82, 88, 90, 91, 97; Western Tu-chuch Khanate, 81, 82, 88, 95

Tunhuang, Tunghand, Saciu, Sacho, Shachow. Oasis in W Kansu province, famous for frescoed Buddhist grottoes, xviii, xxiii, 22, 43, 44, 49, 58, 68, 75, 86, 88, 91

Turfan, Kiu Shih, Carachoso, Khocho, Tu Lu Fan. Oasis and deepest depression in world: 505 ft. below sea level. Its 31,070 sq. mi. embrace Tur-
fan and Shanshan counties and half of Toksun county. A central feature are Ho Shan (Flaming Mts.), where temperatures rise to 75°C. Low rainfall (16–30mm. a year) but 70 percent of cultivated land is irrigated by 1,000 karese. Lukchun is some miles E of main town of Turfan. Basin noted for grapes, raisins, melons and other fruit. Early Neolithic culture found here, xii–xiii, 5, 48, 50, 52, 54–56, 58, 82, 88, 90, 92, 95, 98, 104, 118, 120, 124, 131, 149, 160, 170, 178, 181–184, 196, 197, 204, 236, 248, 259, 290, 296. See Gaochang and Karakhoja

Turkestan, Turkistan. C Asia, Inner Asia, Tartary, High Tartary divided into Chinese (Eastern) Turkestan, now Sinkiang Uighur A.R. of the PRC and Russian (or Western) Turkestan, now Turkmen, Uzbek, Tadjik, Kirghiz and Kazakh SSRs of the USSR. Area inhabited by Turki-speaking peoples; in the S, from W to E: Turkmen, Uzbeks, Kirghiz and Uighurs; in the N: Kazakhs mixed with Mongols and other peoples; and Iranian-speaking Tadjiks and others, in Tadzikistan. Following Mongol conquest, W Turkestan became part of Jagatai’s domain (late 13th cent.). Conquered by Tamerlane (late 14th cent.) and ruled by his heirs through the 15th cent. till divided among Uzbek khanates of Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand. Conquered by Russia in late 19th cent., they became part of USSR as Aut. SSRs after the October Revolution of 1917, xiii, 5, 79, 103, 154; Eastern or Chinese Turkestan, xxi, 9, 64, 98, 99, 120, 129, 157

Turkey. Inhabited by W Turks, 4, 18, 93, 130, 136, 145, 156, 167, 260, 262, 263, 270


Tushantze. Oil center S of Hsiho, 292

Tyre. Younger sister city of Sidon. See Sidon, 58, 60

Uch Turfan, Ootch Turfan, Wensu, Wu Shih. Oasis, town and county (Wu Tze), W of Aksu on road to Bedel Pass through Tien Shan, xxi, 122, 126, 132, 143, 152

Uighuristan, Ioguristan (Turfan and Urumchi environs), 120

Ulan Bator, Ulan Baator. Capital of MPR. Urga until 1924. Previously Kulun and Da Khure, 49

Uliasutai, Ulasutai, Ulyaasatay, Javhlant, Dzibkhalantu, Jibhalanta. Town in WC Outer Mongolia, W of Kobdo, xxiv, 127

Umma. Anc. kingdom in Mesopotamia, 11, 13

Ur, 11


Urumchi, Urumptsi, Tihwa, Tihua (Spreading Enlightenment), Bishbalikh, Basbalikh, Beshbalikh, Bung Miao Tze (Red Temple), Peiting, Peitin (Tang dynasty name). Now Urumchi, capital of Sinkiang Uighur A.R.
USA (America), xxvi, 141, 166, 193, 202, 229, 237, 252, 259, 261–266, 269–271, 297

USSR. See Soviet Union, xx

Uzbekistan. Inhabited by Moslem people of Turki origin; subjects of Khan Uzbeg (d. 1340) of Mongol Golden Horde; conquered by Russia in 19th cent. Became Uzbek SSR of the USSR after the 1917 October Revolution. Capital, Tashkent, 3, 100, 272

Wakhan. E Afghanistan, 161

Wahnsien. On upper Yangtze R, 166

Wei-hai-wei. Shantung province port, 165

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West Hsia, West Hia, Hsihsia, Sia Hsia, Ho Hsi, Hosi. Tangut Kingdom, est. c. 1000 in NW China by Toba or Thygun clan of Tang Hsiang tribe (Tibetan people of NE Tibet, Chiang tribes). Tangut comprised Chinghai, E Kansu, NW Szechuan and Ninghsia provinces. Conquered, in 1237, by Genghiz Khan, 101, 104, 109

Wuhan. Triple city of Wuchang, Hankow and Hanyang on Yangtze R, 169, 170, 192

Wutze County. W of Aksu on S slopes of Tienshan, 228

Wuwei, Liangchow. Town, county in Kansu panhandle, NW of Lanchow. In anc. times garrison station covering the Great Wall, xxii, 49, 68

Yakutia, E Siberia, 259

Yangchao. Now Yu county, Honan province, 41

Yangchow, Yangiu. Town on Grand Canal, 84

Yangi Hissar, Yengi Hissar, Yangishahr, Yinkisha, Ying Chi Sha. Anc. citadel of Kashgar, 123, 143, 149, 150, 151, 155, 158, 185

Yangshao. Neolithic culture site in Honan province, 5

Yarkand, Yarkend, Yarcan Soche, Sochu, sogui, Sha Che. Town, oasis on Yarkand R, SE of Kashgar, xxii, 18, 43, 48, 55, 58, 121–123, 126, 139, 140, 143, 146, 149–151, 155, 157, 236, 267

Yenan, Fushih. CCP headquarters from 1937–47, in N Shensi province, 190, 191, 201, 243, 245, 264

Yenki (see Karashahr), xxii, 291. Yenki Hui A.C.
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Yenpien. Korean A.C. in NE China, 280
Yulduz. Area around upper Ulungu R and Yulduz R—Small Yulduz, 81, 116; and whole fertile area S of Urumchi down to L Bagrach Kul—Great Yulduz, xxii, 120, 121, 127, 131
Yumen. Jade Gate in NW Kansu province, former Chinese entry point for jade caravans from Western Lands, later start and terminal of Silk Road caravans. Now important oil center, xxii, xxiii, 44, 50
Yunkang. Site of famous Buddhist grottoes of N Wei dynasty near Tatung in Shansi province, 75
Yunnan. SW China province, 16, 30, 62, 65, 66, 166, 176, 188, 248, 280

Mountains

Alatau, Djungarian Alatau. 18,000-ft. peaks NW of Ebi Nor, part of Tien-shan system, xx, xxiii, 9, 13, 217
Altai, Golden Mountains. 16,000-ft. peaks with rich alpine forests and meadows on NE border of Sinkiang, xx, xxii, xxiii, 9, 17, 23, 43, 81, 82, 97, 101, 131, 152, 208, 218, 269
Altyn Tagh, Astyn Tagh, Astin Tagh, A Erh Ching. 17,000-ft. peaks between Sinkiang and Tibet, E extension of Kunlun range, xxi, 157, 270

Babatagh Range. In Uzbekistan, 3
Baitik Bogdo, Baitik Bogda, Baytag Bogdo, Peitashan, Pai Ta Shan. NW of Barkul on China-MPR border, 261
Barkul, Barkol Tagh, Chin Shan. N of Hami in E Djungaria, E end of Tienshan, xx, xxi, xxii
Bogda Ula, Po Ko To Shan. 21,360-ft. peaks, E extension of Tienshan, xx, xxi, xxii, 260
Burkhan Kaldun. Sacred Mongol mountain, 106

Carpathians, 64
Caucasus, 14, 18, 63, 93
Chinshan, Kinshan. In Kansu province, 79

Hindu Kush, Parapamisus, Caucasus Indicus. 25,000-ft. peaks W of Pamirs in Afghanistan down to Kashmir. Main passes, Baroghil and Kwawak, used by Alexander the Great, 90, 118
Karakoram, Kara Kunkun Shan. 28,000-ft. peaks, on border between Sinkiang and Kashmir, xxi, xxii, xxv, 85, 89, 90, 139, 156, 270
Karlyk Tagh, Karlik Mountains, Ka Er Li Ko Shan. NE of Hami, extension of Tienshan, xxi
Khingan, Khinghan, Great Khingan, Hsingan, Ta Hsingan Ling Shan. 5,500-ft. peaks W of Tsitsihar in NE China. Lesser Khingan range is in N Manchuria, 22, 74, 79, 97, 105

Kunlun, Kuenlun, Lun Lung Shan. 25,000-ft. peaks ranging from Pamirs to SE Chinghai on S Sinkiang border. Toward E divides into three ranges: Altyn Tagh, which becomes Chilien Mts.; Chimen Tagh and Kokoshili and S Bayan Kara range, watershed between Yellow and Yangtze Rs, xxi-xxv, 9, 48, 61, 68, 95, 101, 152, 184, 270

Kurugh Tagh, Kuruk Tagh, Ku Lu Ko Shan. S of L Bagrach Kul, NE border of Tarim Basin, xxi

Muztagh, 44

Nanshan, South Mountains, Richthofen Range. S of Yumen, xxi

Narim. W offshoot of Altai, 22

Pamirs, Ba Mi, Pa Mi Shan. 20,000-ft. peaks W of Kashgar on border with USSR. Adjoin Tienshan, Kunlun and Karakoram, xxi-xxiii, 3, 9, 10, 18, 43, 44, 48, 53, 55, 57, 69, 85, 87, 100, 117, 118, 120, 129, 138, 140, 157, 158, 161, 166, 185, 292, 313

Pyrenees, 3

Sheng Li (Victory) Peak, xx

Tai. One of five sacred mountains of China, 82

Tienshan, Tian Shan, Celestial Mountains, Mountains of Heaven, Northern Mountains. 190 mi. wide from N to S, separating Djungarian and Tarim basins. N slopes catch arctic air currents and in contrast to arid S slopes are Sinkiang's major pastoral area, xviii-xxiv, 9, 17, 21, 23, 25, 43, 48-50, 58, 68, 81, 83, 89, 97, 98, 100, 116, 118, 120, 131, 133, 135, 143, 157, 175, 181, 182, 205, 208, 217, 231, 235, 236, 268

Tarbagatai Range. In NW Djungaria, xx, xxiii

Urals. Low range N of Caspian and Aral seas dividing Asia from Europe, 109, 117, 120, 262

Wu Huan Hills. In E Mongolia, 55, 74

Zagros Mountains, 13, 14

PASSES

Adunkur Davan. On upper Kash R through Boro Horo Ula to Manass on road to Urumchi.
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Aghil, Yin Ti La Ko Li Shan Kou. 15,680 ft., through Aghil Mts. of Karakoram.

Ashaleh, Borbozon. E of Ili (Ining) through Boro Horo Ula to road to Urumchi, 216, 217, 230

Bedel. 14,016 ft., through Tienshan from Uch Turfan to Naryn in Kirghizia, 89

Beik, Baroghil. Through Hindu Kush, 90

Darkot. 15,400 ft., through E Hindu Kush from Gilgit in Kashmir to Chitral.

Darwancheng, Tieh Men Kuan (Iron Gates). Through Tienshan S of Urumchi into Kashgaria, xxiv, 178, 181, 183, 184

Gurtsago, Kintsai, Talki Davan. Through Boro Horo Ula, N of Ili (Ining) S of L Sairam on road to Urumchi, 216, 217, 228, 230, 307

Kara Art, Wu Tzu Pieh Li Shan Kou. SW of Kashgar at head of Kai-zu R, through Pamirs.

Karakoram, Ka La Kun Lun Shan Kou. 18,350 ft., chief pass between Khotan, Sinkiang, through Karakoram to Leh in Ladakh, xxii, 44, 58, 61, 90, 185, 268, 270

Khunjerab, Hung Chi La Fu Ta Pan. 16,188 ft., over middle Karakoram from Sinkiang to Kashmir.

Kilik. 15,600 ft., through W Karakoram from Kashgar to Gilgit in Kashmir. Kugart. 4,791 ft., W of Torugart Pass through Tienshan.

Kyzyl Art, Kizil Art, Kizil-jik. 14,045 ft., at head of Kizil Su R, W of Kashgar across Pamir-Alai into Kirghizia.

Mintaka, Ming Tieh Kai Ta Pan. 15,450 ft., through Karakoram from Tash-kurgan in Sinkiang to Gilgit in Kashmir, xxii

Muzart. 12,200 ft., across Tienshan watershed from Ili, up Muzart R and glacier and down S-flowing Muzart R to Aksu, xxiv, 126, 182


Shanhaikuan. Where the Great Wall reaches Pohai Gulf, 124

Terek. E of Torugart Pass, 44, 135

Torugart, Turugart, Tu Lu Ka Teh Shan Kou. 12,155 ft., W Tienshan from Kashgar, NE down Terek R valley to Naryn and Ferghana in Kirghizia, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, 113

Turasu. E of Ili (Ining) through Boro Horo Ula to road to Urumchi, 216, 217, 226, 228, 230
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Ulastai, Uliastai, Uliastay. E of Ining between Boro Horo Ula and Abural Ula to Nilka in Kash R valley, 209, 211, 217

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Aksu, xxi
Amu Darya. Anc. Oxus, Jayhun, Jaihun, Wuho, Kueishui. 1,577 mi long to Aral Sea. Its headstream, Pyenge Panj, rises in Pamirs, 9, 10, 18, 43, 47, 48, 90, 95, 101, 113, 114, 129
Amur, Heilunkiang. On NE China’s northern border with USSR, 124, 166

Chu, Sujab. 600 mi. long from Tienshan to desert in SE Kazakh SSR, 21

Danube, 6, 9, 63, 64
Dardanelles, 138
Dnieper, 9, 22
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Don, 9, 63, 64, 109, 110

Euphrates, Frat, Firat, Al Furat. 1,700 mi. long, with Tigris waters Meso-potamia from Turkey to Persian Gulf, 4, 11

Ganges, 58, 116
Grand Canal, Yung Ho, Imperial Canal. System of waterways, 1,250 mi. long, from Peking to Hangchow in Chekiang province. First section built 486 B.C.; extended to Hangchow, A.D. 605–618, 77, 84

Haidwin Kul, 159
Huai. 621 mi. long, from Honan into Yangtze. With Yi, Shu and Szu Shui Rs, its drainage basin of 161,560 sq. mi. contains 32 million acres of farmland, with 100 million population, 41, 65, 84, 265
Hellespont, 116

Ili. 800 mi. long, from N Tienshan to L Balkhash. Three main tributaries: Kash, Kunges and Tekes, xx, xxiv, 17, 21, 95, 119, 120
Imil. Waters Tarbagatai area, NW Djungaria, 119
Indus. 1,900 mi. long, from SW Tibet to Arabian Sea. Supported anc. civilizations at Mohenjo-daro and Harappa c. 2400 B.C., xxiv, 4, 13, 15, 16, 58; Indus Valley, 15, 30, 43, 44, 45, 90
Irtysb. 2,200 mi. long, from W Altai Mts., through L Zaisan to Ob R, 3, 22, 74, 101, 109, 116, 117, 119, 140, 150

Kara Kash, Qara Qash, Ka La Ka Shih Ho. From Karakoram joins Yarkand and other Rs to form Tarim R, xx1
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Kara-tal. 221 mi. long; feeds L Balkhash in Kazakh SSR, 120
Kashgar, Ka Sheh Erh Ho. Waters Kashgar oasis, 158
Keriy, Ko Li Ya Ho. 300 mi. long, from Kunlung. Waters Keriy oasis, 3
Kerulen. 650 mi. long, from Kentai Mts., NE Outer Mongolia, to L Hulun (Dalai) Nor, headstream of Heilungkiang, xxiv, 105
Khalkin Gol, Khalka, Ha La Hsin Ho. From Great Khingan Mts., NW Manchuria, to L Bor Nor, 70
Khotan. Waters Khotan oasis, 30
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Kunges, Kungsess. Tributary of Ili, from N Tienshan, xx, 208

Liao. In NE China, 100
Linchu Canal. In Kwangsi Province, 37

Manass. NW of Urumchi, 236, 242

Naryn, 133, 152
Nile, 4

Orkhon. 700 mi. long; in Outer Mongolia; feeds L. Baikal. Genghiz Khan's capital, Karakorum, was on its banks, 55, 81
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Selenga, Selenge, Solin. 897 mi. long, from Outer Mongolia joins Orkhon, xxiv, 96, 97
Syr Darya, Sir Darya, Jaxartes, Yaxartes, Sihon, Sihun, Saikun, Chen Chu Ho. Tributaries Naryn and Kara Darya; rises in W Tienshan, waters Ferghana Valley, feeds Aral Sea, 9, 18, 19, 43, 82, 113, 129, 152

Talas, Ta La Sze. Syr Darya tributary in Kirghiz and Kazakh SSRs, 91, 94
Tari. 746 mi. long; China's longest inland river formed by Yarkand, Khotan and other streams, xix, xxi, 53, 85, 290. Gives name to 250,000-sq. mi. Tarim Basin enclosed by Tienshan, Pamirs, Kunlun Mts., xxi, 56, 62, 82, 89, 90, 91, 100
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Tekes. Ili tributary from N Tienshan, xx, 218

Terek. (1) from W Tienshan, joins Naryn R, 135. (2) R in Caucasus, USSR.

Tigris, Dijla, Dicle, Hiddekil. With Euphrates forms basin of Mesopotamia, 4, 11, 58, 60

Tola, 49

Ural, 120

Urungu. From Altai flows into L Ulyungur Nor, 119

Ussuri. On NE China border, 124, 166

Volga, xxvi, 3, 9, 18, 63, 110, 116, 117, 120, 126, 127, 129

Yangtze, Yangtze Kiang, 3,600 mi. long; China’s longest R from W Chinghai Province, through Tibet, 8 provinces and Shanghai area to East China Sea. Drains 1,118,498 sq. mi., or 19 percent, of China’s area inhabited by 250 million people, 31, 37, 41, 65, 74, 75, 77, 84, 102, 142, 166, 169, 191, 194, 266

Yarkand, Yarkend. 500 mi. long, from Karakoram; joins other streams to form Tarim R, xxii, 30

Yellow River, Huang Ho, Hwang Ho. Once called China’s Sorrow because of frequent floods. 2,980 mi. long, second longest in China. Its basin was cradle of Chinese civilization. Rises in Chinghai Province, crosses 8 provinces and Inner Mongolia, watering 460,000 sq. mi. of farmland to Pohai Gulf, 4, 5, 9, 11, 15, 17, 20, 21, 23, 28, 29, 30, 31, 47, 49, 65, 68, 77, 78, 84, 91, 97, 101, 176

Yenisei, Enisei. 2,300 mi. long; in W Siberia, 17, 22, 92, 96, 97, 118, 119, 125

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Aral Sea, Aral Tengiz (Inland Sea). Anc. Oxianus Lacus, Khoresm Sea (Blue Sea), Pei Hai (North Sea); fed by Syr Darya and Amu Darya, 9, 17, 23, 109

Bagrach Kul, Bagratch Kol, Bagrash Kul, Po Ssu Teng Hu. Salt lake in C Sinkiang, xxii, 159

Baikal, Baykal. On W border of Buriat Mongolia. Largest freshwater lake in Eurasia, 21

Balkhash, Balqash. Freshwater lake in Kazakhstan, xx, 21, 74, 119, 127

Barkul, Barkol, Palikun Hu. L in E Sinkiang.

Black Sea. Anc. Euxine, 9, 13, 18

Caribbean Sea, 165

Caspian Sea, Tsinghai. Anc. Mare Hyrcanium Caspium, Darya-i-Khazar,
world's largest saltwater lake. In Middle Ages, link in Mongolian-Baltic trade route for goods from China and Asia, xxiv, xxv, 9, 13, 15, 17, 18, 23, 50, 56, 63, 64, 79, 81, 95, 109, 138

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East China Sea, 47, 69, 73
Ebi Nor, Ebi Nur, Ai Pi Hu. Salt lake in W Dzungaria, 120, 232

Indian Ocean, 58
Issyk Kul, Issiq Kol. Saltwater mountain lake in Kirghizia; favorite Tienshan camping ground of Wusuns, Yueh Chi and other nomads, 17, 21, 52, 81, 88, 96, 120

Koko Nor, Kuku Nor, Tsinghai, Chinghai (Blue Sea). Lake in Chinghai Province, 23, 43, 82

Lob Nor, Lop Nor. Salt lake and marshy depression at E end of Tarim Basin; fed by Tarim R, xxi

Mediterranean, xxiii, 13, 45, 58, 130

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Sairam, Sayram Nur, Zairam, Sa Li Mu Hu, Tien Chih. Lake N of Ining, xix, 232
South China Sea, 69
South Seas, 39, 41, 78

Zaisan Lake, 116, 140

DESERTS
Gobi, Gashun, Shamo, Han Hai (Dry Sea). Mainly in Mongolia, bounded by Altai on N, on W by Tienshan, on E by Mongolian steppes and on S by Tibetan plateau. SW Gobi is entirely sandy gravel, xviii, xxii, 4, 21; Black Gobi, xxiii, 260
Kurban Tangut, Ku Erh Pan Tun Hu Teh Shamo. Desert center of Djun-
garian Basin, once bed of great inland sea, xxi, 4

Sahara, 10

Taklamakan, Tarim Desert. 600 mi. wide, 198,840 sq. mi., a third of China's
total desert area; once a vast inland sea at center of Tarim Basin. The
alluvial plain, partly covered by sand dunes, was deposited by rivers from
the Pamirs, Tienshan and Kunlun. Forty rivers still flow into it with
an annual flow of 38,500 million cub. m. Detritus gravel slopes encircle
sand dune areas. Prevailing NE and NW winds push sand dunes SW
and SE at a rate of as much as 3 ft. a year for large dunes and 30 ft. for
small ones, changing river courses and burying anc. cities. The desert
surface can reach 70°–80° C. at noon and fall to zero at night in one
day. Such rapid changes can cause devastating sandstorms. Only the
hardest plants can survive such conditions. The Euphrates poplar can
grow to 30 ft., with roots much longer, and live 200 years. Desert
tamarisks, yantag and calligonum have adapted to desert life with thorn-
like or spiny leaves. In oases where underground streams emerge far in-
side the desert, irrigated oasis farms, protected by shelter belts, can thrive,
making it possible to raise cereals, grapes, other fruits and livestock: val-
uable herds of red deer, goats, sheep, cattle and camels. Bird life and
boars, antelopes and hares abound in the larger oases, xviii, xxi–xxiii, 4,
58, 145, 295, 313

PEOPLES AND TRIBES

Afghans. Descendants of Ephtha, 43, 146. See also Ephtha
Akkadians, Accadians, Semitic people in N Babylonia formed city states c.
4000 B.C., 13, 45
Alani, Aorsi. Iranian-speaking nomads related to Samartians, one of Gao
Cheh tribes or Oguz Turks living in W Kazakhstan in 3rd cent. B.C.
Moved from Asia W across Volga in first cent. A.D.; attacked by Huns in
4th cent.; some fled to join Vandals and Suevi in 5th cent. invasion of
W Europe and settled in Portugal. Others fled to Caucasus. In 13th
cent. Mongol invaders found Alani on E shore of Caspian. Ossetians,
Alani descendants, live in N Caucasus and E of Black Sea, 22
Alano-Goths, 63, 64
Alpine, Europoid, 100
Amazons, 19
American Indians, 10
Americans, 261–263, 270–272
Amorites. Mixed Semitic and Indo-European nomads. One of seven nations
in Canaan before Israelite invasion, 13, 14
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Arabs. Semitic and other nomads and farming tribes originally of Arabia, now spread in N Africa and Middle East, 14, 63, 83, 84, 90-94, 96, 99, 109, 129, 138, 146

Arimaspe. W Altai nomad tribe known to Greeks in 6th–7th cent. B.C., 17

Aryans. Speakers of Indo-European family of languages, including Sanskrit, Persian, Greek, Celtic, etc., inhabiting Europe (except N Russia, Hungary and Turkey) and SW Asia from Persia to India, 13, 23, 63, 98

A-shi-na, Assena. Leading Tukui clan, 79

Assyrians, Semitic conquerors of Mesopotamia c. 725 B.C., 14, 18, 21

Avars. Part of Turki-Mongul Juan-juan tribe, moved from between L Balkhash and Mongolia to dwell, in 5th–6th cent., in area between Danube and Carpathians. Their khan Baian est. empire over Slavs from Baltic to Black Sea. Defeated by Charlemagne, they amalgamated with Magyars and other C Asian nomads. Descendants inhabit Hungary and Romania, 79

Baikals, Bayirku. Mongol tribe, 82, 90

Barlas. Mongol tribe, 114

Bedouin. Arab pastoralists, 93, 94

Bo. Tibetan nomad tribe, 67

British (English), 44, 112, 138, 146, 154, 156–161, 172, 184, 193

Bulgars, 110


Burmese, 23

Chaldaeans. Semitic tribe; under Nabopolasar conquered Babylon in 626 B.C. Overthrown by Persians in 538 B.C., 14


Chingpo. People of SW China, 30

Chuang. Aboriginal people, akin to Han, now inhabiting Kwangsi Chuang Aut. Reg. in SW China, 66, 142, 280

Cimmerians, Kimmerians. Partly settled Indo-European tribe in area of Caucasus, Caspian and Volga steppes, c. 1200–750 B.C. Driven by Scyths into Crimea and Asia Minor, 18

Czeski. Nomad Hun tribe in Djungaria in 3rd cent. B.C., 23
Davan. Scyth tribe, xx, 22

Djungars, Zungars, Juungars, W Mongols, Kalmuck Tartars, Oirat (main tribe from L Baikal area), Olot, Olets, Eleuth, Eleuths (most W branch of Eleuth Mongols known as "Left Hand" in Mongolian, "Wa La" in Ming dynasty chronicles). Led by Oirat of Tchoros tribe and including Torguts, Khashots (Khoits), Durbats, etc. Ruled Djungaria and dominated Kashgaria in 17 cent., 24, 118, 119, 121-127, 131, 132, 140, 158. See also Djungar Oirat Khanate

Dolons, Dolan. Turki tribe nomadizing around Maralbashi in W Sinkiang in 16th cent., 127

Dughlat, Dulats, Duqhlats. Influential Mongol clan in Mogholistan and Kashgaria, 14th–17th cent., 119, 120, 121

Egyptians, 27, 51

Elamites. Nomads from Elam, N of Persian Gulf, joined Amorites to conquer Mesopotamia c. 1950 B.C., 13, 14

Ephthalites, Nephthalites, Hayathelites, Haithals, Viddhals, Edadilido, White Huns, Ephthalite Huns, Eda, Idan, Ye-tai, Hua-hua, Hua Hua Tun. Hun or Turki-Mongol tribes led by Ephtha, or Yeta, clan, nomadized in Djungaria in A.D. 126; moved S to Kashgaria in 5th cent., then to Sogdia and Bactria; fought Sassanid Persia and took over Kushan empire c. 480. Invaded and ruled Gupta kingdom in India for 30 years. In 565 their E Turkestan kingdom fell before Persians and Turks. They were absorbed into NW Indian population, 43, 81

Eskimo, Eskimantik, Esquirnaux, Innuit. Tungusic tribe crossed Bering Strait from Siberia to Alaska some 2,000 years ago. Now live in Alaska, Hudson Bay, islands in Arctic Ocean and Bering Strait. Some still live in Siberia, 23

Europeans, 27, 58, 66, 124

Gao Cheh, Kao Che (Big-wheel Cart People). Collective name for tribes called Oguz, Oghuz, Guzzoouzi, Uzes Turks, including Uighurs, Kirghiz, Alani, Karluks, Hsien-to, Ephthalites and others who use the arba, or big-wheeled cart, 56, 96, 97

Germans, 111, 177, 182, 193, 197, 200

Golden Horde, Kok Orda, Right-wing Horde. Turki-Mongol tribes in WC Asia, including Kipchak; ruled by Genghiz Khan's descendants till 16th cent. Batu Khan, Genghiz' grandson, in 1237 led Golden Horde army to conquer Russia, Poland, Silesia, Hungary. His heirs exacted tribute until 1359 when Horde split up and Russian princedoms regained independence. In 1378, Toktamish, Khan of E Kipchaks, est. new Golden Horde realm which was destroyed by Tamerlane in 1395. In 15th cent. the
Horde split into independent khanates, principally Uzbek and Kazakh tribal confederations, 112, 114, 117, 128

Goths, Gets, Ghetes, Yuts, Visi-goths (W Goths), Ostro-Goths (E Goths). Germanic people from S Sweden; settled in Vistula basin, then moved to N of Danube in early 3rd cent. A.D. Pressured by Huns from the E, they crossed the Danube to Roman protection in 376, but revolted, and under Alaric sacked Rome in 410. From Italy these Visi-goths moved through Gaul to Spain, where their kingdom survived until overrun by Moors in 711. Ostro-goths remaining E of Danube were subdued by Huns under Attila. In 490, under Theodoric, they invaded Italy and their kingdom there survived until destroyed in 550 by Byzantine ruler, Justinian

Great Horde, Old Horde. Main horde of Mongol Confederacy led by heirs of Ogedei, Genghis' third son; nomadized in Mongolia, 134

Greeks. Old and New Stone Age remains have been found in Greece. Bronze Age civilizations on both Crete and mainland (c. 2000-1000 B.C.) led to rise of Greek city states and trading colonies c. 750-500 B.C. They repulsed Persian invasions in 6th-5th cent. B.C., but Peloponnesian Wars for hegemony led to conquest of all Greece and most of W Asia by Alexander the Great of Macedon (346-323 B.C.), a state of cattle and horseherders. His successors, the Seleucidae, ruled his divided empire until Roman conquests of 2nd cent. B.C. Greeks lost their independence to other overlords till freedom was regained from Turkey in 1830, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 24, 27, 43, 48, 57

Gutians. People from between Zagros Mts. and upper Tigris; invaded Accadia c. 2200 B.C., 13

Hakka, Kechia. Chinese ethnic minority of highlands of S and SE China, 66


Hittites, Khatti, Khita. Nomads whose king-war leader and high priest, assisted by council of nobles, ruled Anatolia. C. 1600 B.C. conquered Mesopotamia and most of Asia Minor. Invasion by “Sea people” from the N ended their kingdom c. 1200 B.C. Speaking a language akin to the Indo-European group, they farmed, herded livestock, worked and exported iron, 14, 45

Hoche. Small minority in NE China, 280

Hoihu. Hunting, fishing tribes, progenitors of Uighurs. Some, like Dubo, in 7th cent. lived S of L Khusugula, had no calendar, lived in thatch wig-
wams and did not yet herd animals or farm. They wore skins and lived in patriarchal tribal units, 96

Hsien-pi. Tribal nomad people called “pigtail-wearers” in old Chinese chronicles. Included Kitans and Evenki. Living N and NE of Huns, they were driven back by Hun Shanyu Modeh (c. 200 B.C.) but with weakening of Huns under Chinese attacks, 100,000 Hun households joined their confederation in A.D. 93. Under Tan Shih-huei in 156–181 they could field an army of tens of thousands of horsemen and ruled the former Hun lands. Their power was fragmented by succession struggles, 9, 22–24, 68, 74, 75, 100, 103; Hsien-pi-Tungus, 2, 3, 56, 91

Hsien-to, Sien-to, Si Yen To. Nomad people living E of Semirechye (between Issyk Kul and Balkhash lakes). Once vassals of Yugui, 97

Hsien-yu, Hsien-yun, Hsiu-yn, Hsiung-nu. See Huns, 17, 20, 41


Hundred Clans, Lao Pai Hsing. Proto-Chinese, 30, 31

Huns, Hun-yu, Hun-nu, Hunni, Hu, Hsiun Yu, Hsien-yu, Hiung-nu, Hsiung-nu. Speaking Mongolian or Ket dialect of Yenisei R valley in Siberia, the Shan-jung, Huan-yun and Han-yui tribes lived a pastoral life in Mongolia until, under Hun Shanyu Modeh and his successors, they formed the first great nomad confederation in E Asia, c. 200 B.C., strong enough to challenge, though unsuccessfully, the Han empire, xx, xxiv, xxv, 7, 10, 15–17, 20–24, 28, 41–45, 47–57, 62–65, 67, 68, 74, 75, 81, 83, 89–91, 97, 98, 120, 138; Southern Huns, 52, 54, 55; Northern Huns, 52, 54, 55

Indians, 62, 156, 262, 271; Indo-Aryan (Iranian), xxv, 17, 18, 22, 23, 50, 86, 102, 118; Indian Empire, 193

Indo-European. See Aryan, 5, 48, 98, 99

Indo-Scyths, 43

Issidone. Scythian nomads living W of Tienshan in 6th or 7th century B.C., 17, 21

Japanese, 176, 177, 180, 181, 184, 186, 188–194, 201, 237, 243, 252

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Juan-Juan, Yuan-Yuan, Ju-Juan, Jou-jan, Geougen, Yugului, Yugulei. Proto-Mongol tribe related to Kin; held area from L Balkhash across Mongolia to Korea and from L Baikal S to Tunhuang in Kansu province in 4th–
7th cent. A.D. This offshoot of Hsien-pi Toba Tartars came to prominence in A.D. 391–555 under a succession of 11 khans, 16, 74, 79, 96
Jung (Western), 33, 42

Kalmuck, Kalmuks, Calmuck Tartars ("Kirghiz-Kazahks" erroneous). Mongol tribe, once part of Djungar Mongol alliance, today live in Karashahr, Ili and Altai areas, in Astrakhan area on Volga, 24, 126, 127, 159
Kangui, Kang Ku. Turki tribe; once held area of present-day Kazakhstan, Khoresm, Sogdiana and Syr Darya basin, 22, 23, 47, 81, 118
Karluks, Qarluqa. Turki tribe; once inhabited E Sinkiang and Tarbagatai area in NW Sinkiang, 97, 118
Kashgarlihs. Inhabitants of Kashgar; similarly Lopnihks, or Lobniks, etc.
Kassites. Aryans nomadizing between Babylon and Media, conquered Mesopotamia c. 1570 B.C.; ruled it 400 years until overthrown by Assyrians, 13, 14
Kerayit, Kereit, Kereyid, K'erit. Nomadizing around Karakorum in NW Outer Mongolia, 118, 241
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Khambas, Khampa. Nomad Tibetan tribe of EC Tibet, 270, 271
Khashot, Khoshot. Tribe of Kalmucks, 159
Kin, Chin, Jurchen, Ju-chen Tartars, Jurchid, Jurche, Djur-jen, Nuchen, Ching, Manchu (see Manchu). A Tungusic people originally named Juchen (Chinese Nu-Chen), later took name of Kin (Chinese Ching, "Golden"). Original habitat was on Sungari R and lower reaches of Heilungkiang (Amur) in NE China. Tributary to Kitan (Liao), then est. own state in N China, with Peking as capital (1125–1234), but were driven back to Manchuria by Genghiz Khan. The name Tartar or Tatar is wrongly applied to them (see Kitan), 24, 68, 97, 101–103, 106, 108–110, 123, 124
Kipchaks, Kincha, Polovets, Polovtsi. Sometimes called Turks, W branch of Turki Kimaks who originated on Irtysh R but later took over steppes N of Black Sea and Caucasus Mts., 133–135, 150, 158
Kirghiz, Kirgiz, Kien-ku, Kieh-ku, Kien-ki, Chienchun and Ha-ka (early names in Chinese), Ku-wu (3rd cent. A.D.), Ho Ko Ssu, Huang (Yellow) Kieh or Hsia-ssu or Hung (Red) Kia-ssu, Ki Li Ki Ssu (Yuan dynasty designation). Originating in Yenisei R area, they took over Turki language and emerged as a distinct people as an offshoot of the White Horde resulting from breakup of the Mongol Golden Horde in 14th cent. Move to present-day habitat in 15th cent. Cossack invaders sent by Russian Czarism thought Kazakhs they met were Kirghiz and called them Kara- (Black) Kirghiz. Hence much confusion, as the name Kirghiz is often used for Kazakhs, as well as for real Kirghiz, while Kara-Kirghiz is used for both Kirghiz and Kazakhs. One million Kirghiz live in USSR, mainly in Kirghiz SSR. More than 100,000 live in Sinkiang, with half in the Kizil Su Kirghiz A.P. in Tienshan from Tekes to Aksu, and in the Pamir and Karakoram valleys, xx, xxii, xxv, 30, 67, 82, 92, 97, 99, 118, 120, 121, 123, 126, 127, 129, 131, 133, 134, 144, 146, 149, 153, 158, 175, 181, 184, 205, 217–219, 228, 238, 280, 284, 291.

Kitan, Khitan, Kidan, Kitai, Kitai, Liao, Hsi (West) Liao, Kara-Kitai, Kitan, Tartars. A Tungusic tribe related to Hsien-pi and originating in Manchuria. Est. Liao dynasty in N China (907–1125), from which is derived name of Cathay, or Kitai. Driven from China by combined Kin and Sung dynasty forces, 68, 91, 92, 97, 100–102, 109, 110, 118, 149; Kara-Kitai, 101, 103.

Kiyat. Mongol clan, 103.


Koreans. Tungusic people; entered Korean Peninsula from NE Asia between 5–10,000 years ago, speaking Altaic tongue; unified into a single state in mid-7th cent. A.D., 16, 67, 280.

Kushan, Ta Yueh-chih or -chi. One of five Persian-speaking Yueh-chih tribes living near Tunhuang, NW of Yellow R in 3rd cent. B.C. Driven SW by Huns in 160 B.C. In A.D. 15 their king Kadfiz founded Kushan empire in area from Sogdiana to upper Indus, from Pamirs to Parthia. King Kani-shka (78–123) extended empire to include N India. Kushan rule ended with Ephthalite Hun invasion in 5th cent., 54; Kushan empire, 43.

Li. Small minority in Sinkiang, 284.

Liao. Aboriginal inhabitants of S China, 65.

Lisu. SW China tribe, 30.

Lolo. S China tribe, 280.

Mamelukes, 111.

Man. Aboriginal tribe in S China, 30, 38, 65.

Manchus, Jurchen, Juchen, Jurched, Kin or Chin. Tribes driven by Genghiz Khan in 1234 from the N China kingdom they had conquered back to
their Manchurian homeland. When Mongols in turn were driven from China by native Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the Jurchen began to recover their power. Three semi-nomadic tribal groups, the Hai-hsi, Yeh-jen and Chien-chou, united under Nurhachi of the Chien-chou in 17th cent. and defeated the Ming emperor. Nurhachi was proclaimed emperor in 1616 in Peking. His son took the dynastic title of Ching, and named the Jurchen, Manchu. About 1,000 Manchus live in Sinkiang, xxv, 9, 16, 18, 66–68, 99, 117, 120, 124, 125, 131–133, 135, 136, 138, 140, 142, 143, 149–151, 154, 160, 167, 170, 284. See also Ching

Massagetes. A Turki people living on E shore of Caspian Sea in 2nd cent. b.c., 14, 18, 19

Medes. Nomads of anc. Media. Allied with Persians, they conquered Mesopotamia, taking it from the Assyrians, in 7th cent. B.C. Defeated by Persians in 6th cent. B.C., 14, 18

Merkit. Mongol tribe, 24

Miao. Aboriginal tribe of S China, still living there as national minority, 38, 65, 66, 142, 280


Naiman. Mongol tribe which nomadized between Irtysh and L Balkhash and later in SE Mongolia, 103, 118

Ni Miao. S China aboriginal tribe, 30

Nu. Tribe in Yunnan province, SW China, 30

Old, or Great, Horde, 123

Olunchun, Orunchun. Aboriginal hunting tribe of a few thousand in Great Khingah Mts. of NE China. Now settled in modern communes, but still great hunters, 23, 30, 280

Ouighours, xx. See also Uighurs.
of Elam, c. 1200 B.C. Persian empire est. 546 B.C. by Cyrus the Great. Persia was conquered by Alexander the Great in 331 B.C. and ruled by successor Seleucids. The new Sassanid Persian empire was est. by Ardashir I of Fars in A.D. 226, conquered by Moslem Arabs in 7th cent. and ruled by succession of caliphs—Ommayad, Abbasis, Tahirid, Samanid, Ghaznavid, etc. Conquered by Genghiz Khan in 1221, Persia was governed by Mongol Il Khans (1221–1353), sometimes divided among separate khanates. Modern Persia took shape under Seffavid rulers (1502–1753). Persians lost territory to Turks, Afghans and Russians. Reza Shah Pahlavi expelled British in 1925. Names Iranian and Iran became official in 1935.

Polovets, 129. See also Kipchaks
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Pulang. Aboriginal tribe in Yunnan province, 30
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Saks, Saka, Sakae, Sacae, Saka Haumavarka (in area of Ferghana and Kashgar), 17; Saka Tigrahauda (in Aral area and lower Syr Darya), 17; Saka Taradrava (in S Russia), 17; Issidones, Ashkuz, Scyths, Skythai, W Skyths, Asiatic Scyths, Ssek: Nomads of Persian stock living W of Wusun confederation and W and E of Amu Darya in anc. times, xxiv, xxv, 7, 15, 17, 19, 44, 48, 62, 63, 138. See Scyths
Samartians. Akin to Scyths, took over area of Volga steppes and NE of Black Sea c. 300 B.C., 18, 22
Sana. Minority people in Sinkiang, 284
Sarts. Town-dwelling Kirghiz, usually merchants, in area from mid-Syr Darya to L Issyk Kul. Sometimes used pejoratively by nomads for all town dwellers, 129, 134
Sayenda, Seyenda, Hsien-to. A Gao Cheh trie. See Sien-to, 82, 97
Scyths, xxiv, xxv, 7, 14, 15, 17–19, 21–23; Asiatic or Eastern Scyths, 17, 19, 23, 43, 62, 63 (see Saks); Indo-Scyths (Tokharians), Saka-Scyths, 18, 19, 24; Western Scyths, 17
Semitic. Speakers of Semitic languages in Arabia, Syria, N Africa, including Hebrews, Aramaeans, Phoenicians, Arabs, etc., 13
Shato Turks, 91
Shih-wei, n. 105
Sibo. Tungusic tribe from Manchuria given land and settled in Djungaria as military colonists by Ching emperor Chien Lung's expedition to subdue the Djungars in 1776. Of 20,000 Sibo, about half live in Chapucha Sibo A.C. in Ili frontier zone. Other Sibo remain in their homeland in NE China, xxv, 127, 131, 218, 233, 284, 298, 306

Solons. Tribal people originally of Manchuria but enrolled in Ching armies which subdued the Djungars and settled as military colonists in Chapucha area SW of Ining, xxv, 127, 131, 218

Sumerians. Founded earliest civilization in Mesopotamia c. 3500–3000 B.C., 11, 45

Tadjik, Tajik, Sarikoli. Nomad tribes of Persian stock inhabiting Turkestan. Bactrians, Sogdians and nomad Saks or Scyths, they began to emerge as a separate nationality in 5th and 6th cent. A.D., speaking a dialect of SW Iranian group. Most Tadjiks (around 3 million) now live in Tadjik SSR of the USSR, but there are Tadjik communities in E Iran and W Afghanistan and some 12,000 in Sinkiang's Tashkurgan Tadjik A.C. where they are Moslems of a unique persuasion (Ismailis), xix, xxii, xxv, 30, 113, 117, 118, 129, 131, 133, 144, 146, 148, 236, 280, 281, 284, 286, 287, 291

Tahurs, Daurs, Daurians, Daghurs. Most live in ancestral homeland in Heilungkiang province, NE China, S of Great Khingan Mts. on banks of Nunkiang R in 100 villages in communes of the Moren Daba Tahur Autonomous Banner (county) est. in 1958. Some thousands were conscripted for military service by the Ching emperors and after the Djungarian campaign of 1876 were settled in W Djungaria where they still live, 127, 284

Tai. A minority people of SW China, 30, 65, 66, 142

Tangut, Thygun. NE Tibetan tribe which est. the Tangut kingdom (see West Hsia), 102

Taranchi. Uighurs transferred from Kashgaria and resettled in Djungaria by the Ching dynasty in 18th cent. to repopulate the area. Name means "cultivator," 127

Tartars, Tatars. Originally a Mongol tribal designation, this has become a general term, like Scyths, used for E nomadic people who became known to the West, i.e., Crimean Tartars (Turki). Used thus indiscriminately it has become almost meaningless except for the Turki tribe mainly settled in the Soviet Tatar or Tartar ASSR in the Volga region. Some 4–5,000 live in N Sinkiang, 99, 105, 120, 127, 170, 208, 214, 215, 218, 219, 230, 284

Thais (Siamese), 66

Tibetans. Descendants of Bo, Tufan and Chiang tribes inhabiting Tibet.
Some are settled now in Szechuan, Chinghai and Sinkiang, xxv, 23, 83, 97, 104, 109, 125, 132, 136, 238, 270-272, 280, 281

Tien. Aboriginal tribe in Yunnan province, 16

Toba, Tabgatch Tartars. A Turki tribe. Est. Wei dynasty in N China in 4th cent. A.D. See Wei, 68, 74, 75

Tokhara, Tokharians, Tocharoi, Tochari. Iranian-speaking people inhabiting basin of upper Amu Darya in 2nd cent. B.C., 43

Tolos Turks, Tolach. One of Gao Che tribes, S Altai forebears of Uighurs, 81

Torgesh, Torgeshi, Turgeshi, Turgish. Turki tribe that inhabited area S of L Balkhash and E of Ili in Alatau Mts., 81

Torgut, Targut, Torguuds, Torghuts, Eleuth. One of the tribes of Kalmuck Mongols, 1. Some now live in MPR, 127, 159, 175

Tu-Chueh. Turki founders of Tu-Chueh Khanates, 6th-7th cent., 63, 79, 81, 82, 89

Tufan, T‘u-fan. Early Tibetan tribe descended from Chiang, Kiang or Hsi Kiang, 23, 49, 57, 67, 83, 89–91, 94, 97, 98, 125

Tulung. SW China tribe, 30

Tungshan. Small minority tribe in Sinkiang, 284

Tungus, Tungusians, Tung Hu. Tribes of NE China and Siberia from Yakutia S to Mongolia in 2nd cent. B.C. They include Manchus, Olunchuns, Solons and others. The Tungus tribes of today, many of them reindeer herders, number some 40,000 people, xxv, 9, 16, 23, 24, 74, 91, 100, 101, 120, 123; Tungus-Mongol, 100; Tung-hu, Tungusic-Manchurian, 149

Turk, 157, 177. Turki-Mongol, 9, 17; Turki-Mongol Tungus, Turki Toba (Wei) Tartars, 16, 22, 43, 118

Turki, Tukui, Turkomen. Sometimes called Chan Tou (Turbanned Heads) in old Chinese texts. Collective name for all peoples speaking Turki in any dialect. After entering C Asia from N and E, the Turki today are mainly Moslems. They can be divided roughly into E Turks, including Uighurs, Kirghiz and Uzbeks speaking Chargatai dialects, the oldest form of Turki spoken in the Amu Darya basin and Kashgaria; and W Turks, comprising Osmanli or Ottoman Turks of Turkey and related tribes mainly in W Turkestan, xxv, 24, 48, 63, 64, 67, 74, 79, 81, 82, 85, 90, 91, 95–100, 102, 105, 109, 113, 114, 117, 118, 127, 129, 138, 148, 149

Ugeh, Ugrians. Anc. tribes inhabiting region from Yenisei W to Gulf of Bothnia and Hungary, including Finns, Lapps, Magyars, Samoyeds, etc., 22

Uighurs, Uigur, Uyghur, Wei-geh (Sui dynasty times), Wugeh, Oigordi, Oihoi, Ouighouri, Wei Wu, Wei-ho, Hui-hu or Hui-ho, Wu-ho, Wu Hu Hui-ku, Hoi Hu, Hoihor, Gao Cheh, Kao Che, Kao Ku, Gaogui, Gaor-
gui, Guri, Chi Li, Ti Li, Tieh-le, Ting Ling, Yuan Hu, Yuan Ho, Hui Hu Erh, Wei Wu Erh. Issued out of Tolos Turks. In A.D. 386 the 15 tribes of the nomad Turki Ouighours included Sien-to and Hun, Yuan-geh, Kibi~ui, Dubo, Huligan, Dolangeh, Pugu, Baiegu, Tunlo, Sigiyie, Husiye, Hisiye, Adiye, Baisi. The Sien-to was the strongest tribe; the others could field armies of 10,000 to 30,000 men. The Uighurs became farmers and town dwellers in Turfan and Kashgaria in the 10th cent. and today number over 5 million and around 46 percent of the population of the Sinkiang Uighur A.R. of the PRC, xvii, xix, xx, xxiv–xxvi, 9, 63, 64, 67, 81, 82, 90–92, 94–101, 103, 104, 109, 110, 123, 127, 131–133, 136, 142, 143, 146–149, 159, 170, 175, 177–180, 183, 184, 195, 203, 204, 208, 209, 218, 219, 224, 229, 230, 234, 238, 247, 250, 255, 280, 281, 284, 286, 287, 298, 299, 306, 313

Ur Nanshe. People of S Mesopotamia. Revived power of city of Ur, united Sumer and Akkad (N and S Mesopotamia) in 2111 B.C. and ruled until overthrown by Elamites and Amorites c. 1950 B.C., 13

Uriankhai, Uryankai, Urianghai, Soyot. Tungusic people of Tuva area of NW Mongolia. Later some moved to Sinkiang, 127


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Wa. SW China aboriginal tribe, 30

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Wusun, Uishun, Usun. Turki-speaking nomads E of L Balkhash, W of Huns during Han dynasty, xxiv, xxv, 7, 9, 18, 21–24, 43, 44, 47, 50–53, 63, 81, 118

Yagma, Yaghma. Turki tribe that est. Kharakhanid kingdom in Turkestan in 6th cent., 81, 95, 97, 98, 100, 118

Yakuts. Formerly a horsebreeding Turki-speaking Tungus Mongol people who migrated from C Asia to Baikal region. Driven from there by Buriat Mongols in 13th cent., they migrated to present-day Yakutia in NE Siberia and took to reindeer herding. 80,000 population, 9, 23

Yao. Aboriginal tribe in SC China, 16

Yi. S China tribe, 30, 280

Yueh. Aboriginal S China people, 65

Yueh-chi, Yueh Chih, Ta (Great) Yueh-Chi, Gets, Getae, Asiatic Scyths,
Indo-Scyths, Tokharoi, Tokharians, Kushan Tokharians, Tokhara, West Turks (at end of 5th cent. A.D.). Indo-European tribes (probably including Massagetae). Originally migrating from the Urals area, they moved S to the Amu Darya, crossed the Pamirs, spread E through Kashgaria and NE to Kansu near the Yellow R. They were driven back by the Huns and Hans across Sinkiang and over the Pamirs (see Kushan). Sometimes confused with Ephthalite Huns who conquered them, xxiv, xxv, 7, 15, 19, 22–24, 42–44, 47, 48, 50, 63, 67, 85; Small (Hsiao) Yueh-chi settled S of Nanshan among Tibetan tribes.
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THE SINKIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION

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2. BOROTALA MONGOLIAN
3. CHANGCHI HUI
4. BAYIN GOL MONGOLIAN
5. KIZIL SU KIRGHIZ

AUTONOMOUS COUNTIES
A. Khobuk Saur Mongolian
B. Chapucha Sibo C. Yanchi Hui
D. Mula Korakh
E. Barkul Khazakh
F. Tashkurgan Tadzik