Troubled Campaign

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Foreword by
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To my sons
Sahil and Ashim
and the gallant men of
"FASAITE" Gurkhas
It was, when I was commanding First Battalion of The Eighth Gorkha Rifles (1/8 GR), also called “FASAITE” that I came across an album of photographs. On its’ perusal, I realized that the album contained some splendid photographs pertaining to “Younghusband’s Expedition to Tibet”. These photographs had been taken by an officer of the Battalion and related to various stages of the expedition. The album and its’ contents were so fascinating, that it spurred me on to undertake a study of “The Tibet Mission”. In doing so, I had the opportunity to go through the “War Diaries” of the Battalion of that period, apart from studying other published material on the subject.

The Expedition to Tibet, was the first of its’ kind to be undertaken in modern times. Tibet, or “The Forbidden Land”, as it has been known for many centuries, has been shrouded in mystery. Many who ventured were either lost to history or did not reach their destination or were not allowed to proceed to Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. Those who did, have not left too much detail to consult. Very little was known of this Buddhist Kingdom and few authentic details were available. From this point of view alone, the foray into this country by a British Expedition assumes significance. This apart, the venture has set to rest many myths about this kingdom.

The expedition gave rise to many controversies. Some of these in my view were attributable to the lack of knowledge and information about this country. During the course of this expedition to Tibet there were many interpersonal and interdepartmental matters that arose and assumed significance in the progress and task assigned to this mission. Whereas many writers have penned these down such as the rift between Younghusband and General Macdonald or Lord Curzon and Lord Kitchener not seeing eye to eye on many matters, my focus has been on the physical movement and important battles that had to be fought before the mission could achieve its aims at Lhasa. I have deliberately not dwelt on these aspects because I thought they may be out of place in this narrative.

While a number of books have been written about the expedition, the official records held at “The National Archives of India”, have been a great source of clarification on many issues. The book has been so structured that reference to these where deemed important has been included.

Finally, the expedition became necessary because of the lack of response by Tibet under H H the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, to Lord Curzon’s missives which perhaps was an invitation to the British to march into Lhasa. His stance, that ancient covenants forbade him from interacting with foreigners, especially, since he was in touch with the Russians through one of his emissaries, does point a finger at the conduct of affairs of the state.

In this book I have expressed some views which may be the cause of hurt to some. I would like to iterate that this is not my intent and I respect the actions taken then. These are my views and cannot take the place of actions that were based on judgment made on the spot!
Exploratory missions to un-chartered territories were the hallmark of British diplomacy in the early 20th Century. The Younghusband expedition was one such remarkable feat which, when viewed from a military perspective, contains many lessons for students of military history. Crossing of Jelep La during peak winter was a tough call, but a prudent military decision, as it facilitated the conduct of operations, many miles away from the main logistic bases, during the summer months. Herein, there is yet another important military lesson for a discerning military mind; that the problem of ‘campaigning season’ being restricted to specific seasons can be overcome by innovative means. Brigadier General Macdonald’s forces had conclusively shattered the impregnability of the 14,500 feet high Jelep La, as they walked across the frozen pass on 12 December 1903.

Complete unison of thought amongst the components, at the decision making level, should always remain an inviolable pre-requisite of any major military campaign. Inspite of serious perceptional differences between Brigadier General Macdonald and Sir Francis Younghusband over the conduct of operations, the mission was extremely fortunate to have survived this serious flaw. Exhaustive preparations, undertaken to ensure the operational success, underlines the enormity and importance of logistics.

Major General Sood has skillfully utilized the extracts from war diaries and military despatches to portray the politico-military realities of the time. The book provides an insight into British diplomacy in the early 20th Century and some valuable lessons on operations in high altitude areas. While the reader may debate the approach of the British Empire and some of the inferences drawn and views expressed by the author, Major General Sood deserves to be complimented for presenting this rare historical event in an absorbing form. It is to his credit, that a book dealing with a serious subject of politico-military diplomacy and details of a messy war manages to retain the reader’s undivided attention. Such recapitulation of events are most invaluable to the students of military history.

Army HQ
New Delhi
15 Oct 04
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All photographs are captioned as per the captions given in the original album
"Of all the little wars that set the frontiers of a great Empire, the march to Lhasa is the strangest, the most striking; but as an ebullition of Imperialism it is singularly out of character.

Peter Fleming—"Bayonets to Lhasa"
The Potola from across flooded Meadows
Evening view from Lhasa house
Troubled Campaign
Overview

Tibet on the "Roof of the World" has been surrounded by an aura of mystery to the world at large. Also known as "The Land of The Gods" the country has been shrouded in a veil of secrecy. The primary cause has been that outsiders were gazed upon with suspicion and seldom allowed to reach Lhasa the capital and the seat of Government of this country. Those who did venture, to explore the country, rarely returned and were consequently lost to history! Why this country of Lamas with little or no development in any field except the spiritual, assumed such significance in world politics of the late 19th and early 20th century is something that needs to be understood. Once that is done, the need for "The Younghusband Expedition" into Tibet will be better received.

Warren Hastings was perhaps the first Administrator in India, more specifically of The East India Company, who realized the significance of trade links with Tibet. In 1772 when Bhutan attacked Cooch Behar a principality of East India Company under the British, a military force expelled the intruders. It was on the intercession of the Grand Lama of Western Tibet, that, Warren Hastings out of consideration for the Grand Lama forgave the Bhutanese. Taking advantage of this contact, in 1774 he despatched a mission hoping to negotiate a commercial treaty with Tibet. Unfortunately this was not to be. On the death of Lama of Tashilumpo another mission was dispatched in 1783 to congratulate the new Lama on his accession. This mission failed to reach Lhasa or secure any commercial treaty.

Whereas history has been a harsh judge of the motivations of Lord Curzon who authorized the expedition into Tibet, the problem of borders with it had existed much before Lord Curzon came on the scene. The borders of Tibet in the mid and late nineteenth century were disputed and ambiguous. The Government of India had been making constant efforts to regularize the watershed separating the Tibetan Boundary from The British feudatory states of Sikkim, Nepal and Bhutan. The situation worsened when a Tibetan Force occupied a strip of Sikkimese territory some twenty miles deep through the Chumbi Valley in 1886. In 1888 a small British expedition dislodged the intruders without any major problem. Britain concluded a Sikkim-Tibet Convention with China in 1890 and recognized China's suzerainty over Tibet. In 1893, this treaty was supplemented by a set of Trade Regulations. Britain had hoped to secure formal Chinese recognition of her paramount rights in Sikkim through these instruments. However, Chinese control over Tibet, tenuous at best, that time, made this problematic. The uncertain hold of China on Tibet was further weakened by the extremely unfavorable war with Japan in 1894-95 and coupled with the Muslim rebellion in China's North Western Provinces which resulted in the cutting of Beijing's one of main line of communication, these congealed into a hardened Tibetan approach. The Tibetans with little or no love for their rulers adopted the stance that since they were not a party to any of the instruments, they were not bound by the provisions of these. This unyielding attitude of the Tibetans gave rise to several incidents that breached the Instruments of 1890 and 1893.

By themselves, these incidents could perhaps be overlooked. However when it comes to frontiers of a nation with its' neighbours and that too when that country is seen as an Empire, it was the prestige of Her Imperial Majestys' Government of India which was at stake! Tolerance of misdemeanour of this nature would tantamount to acquiescence in the rebellion. The Government of India, having asserted its' position, any
intransigence on this account could not be tolerated. The question often posed is, was this adequate to undertake a punitive expedition or was there more to what met the eye? Considering those times and the fact that wars have been waged for even lesser reasons in the past, one would take the view that the expedition was justified. On a larger canvas, strategic or perceptibly strategic reasons, were also present which lent impetus to the launch of this campaign.

Commencement of the construction of the 3500 mile long “Trans Siberian Railway” in 1898 by the Russians; rumours of linking up of this railway with the Chinese Province of Sinkiang lying North of Tibet and the near disintegration of The Manchu Empire in 1895 as a consequence of the Sino-Japanese war, focussed on the inevitable emergence of larger Russian designs in Asia. Given the Russian threat and the assessment of some military experts, that non reversion of Lhasa would allow the Russians to enter Tibet before The British, some strategists felt that Great Britain could not be an idle bystander and had to act.

It was the coalescence of these micro and macro considerations with the appointment of Lord Curzon as The Viceroy of India in 1898, which shaped the unfolding of events as they did! Curzon had been long known for his “Forward Policy” against Russia. In 1889 he wrote, “Whatever be Russia’s designs on India, whether she be serious and inimical or imaginary and fantastic, I hold that the first duty of English Statesmen is to render any hostile intentions futile.” With his appointment to the Viceroyalty of India, destiny was affording Curzon a chance to test his conviction.

The English generally believed that Russia’s dominant position challenged British prestige and interests throughout Asia and more notably in India. On taking over as The Viceroy of India at a young age of 38, Lord Curzon proceeded with despatch to introduce some administrative reforms. One reform that would allow him a free hand in Tibetan Policy was the separation of The North Western Frontier Province from the territory of Punjab. With this, matters of frontier policy were brought under the direct control of the Viceroy. Since that was so, any matters pertaining to Tibet were now dealt with directly by The Office of The Viceroy with The Home Government in England.

In 1903 the Government of India authorized “Tibet Mission” under Col FE Younghusband to proceed to Khamba Dzong in Tibet to seek a peaceful solution through negotiations with Chinese and Tibetan Delegates designated for this purpose. Whereas the Chinese Amban who had been replaced was still on his way to Lhasa, the Tibetan Authorities did not send officers of appropriate rank or those authorised to carry out meaningful dialogue with the Mission. The British see this expedition as having been forced upon them especially since three letters written by Lord Curzon to His Holiness The Dalai Lama were returned unread. Under the circumstances, where the British Government wanted a negotiated settlement, there being no response from Tibet, complicated matters further. The Dalai Lama, in his note to Tongsa Penlop (the Governor of the Province of Tongsa, Central Bhutan,) has stated that under Tibetan Laws it was inconceivable for him to correspond with outsiders. Bearers of these messages would not deliver for fear of their life. Given this scenario, British reaction would be understandable since there were no channels of communication open to them. It was under these circumstances that the cooperation from “Tongsa Penlop”, was sought. The British provided ample opportunity for negotiations by first moving to Khamba Dzong where they stayed for nearly five months. Tibetan stubbornness and non arrival of Tibetan representatives of appropriate rank to meet with the British, merely brought on further advance to Lhasa!

On 6th November 1903, The Home Government authorised advance of the Mission to “Gyantse Dzong with strict orders that any further advance was to be undertaken only on specific orders from the Home Government. It was thus that the Mission withdrew from Khampa Dzong and crossed
“Jelep La” Pass to enter Chumbi Valley in Tibet with a military escort under Brigadier General JR Macdonald. The military expedition plan was completed in four phases during which these were conducted at an average altitude of 14000 feet with the troops having to fight, more than once, at altitudes of 17-18000 feet. Phase-1 which lasted from 15 October 1903 to 24 March 1904 included occupation of Chumbi Valley and preparations for the advance to Gyantse. Phase-2 that was from 25 March 1904 to 9 July 1904 included advance to Gyantse and preparation for advance to Lhasa if required. Phase-3 included advance to Lhasa. Phase-4 of the operations included occupation of Lhasa and withdrawal of the Mission and troops on conclusion of the Treaty. For Phase -3, additional reinforcements of a battalion and half of infantry and eight guns with gun detachments were provided. This brought the total strength of the force to, 125 mounted infantry, 1950 infantry personnel, 2150 followers, 4000 animals and included the supply train.

During this advance severe fighting between Tibetans and the Missions’ escort took place. This resulted in heavy casualties to the Tibetans. An allegation has been levelled that the British force massacred Tibetans; once a military force engages in battle, casualties become secondary. After all it can be conversely argued that had the Tibetan Army been well led and trained, the situation may well have been reversed especially since they had the complete advantage of fighting in their own country. On the other hand, Peter Fleming on page 151 of his book “Bayonets to Lhasa”, quotes a Norfolk Regiment soldier in his letter to his mother that, “I got so sick of the slaughter that I ceased fire, though the Generals’ order was to make as big a bag as possible”. Here it would be prudent to say that these orders were perhaps given to impose, first and foremost, the British will on the Tibetan soldiers and make them desist from offering resistance in future and, secondly, to ensure that the fire power of the force would act as a deterrent. One must remember however that the two adversaries were at war!

Many writers have contended that the British Commissioner Colonel Younghusband and the commander of his military escort Brigadier Macdonald were not on the most cordial terms. Private correspondence of Colonel Younghusband with his father would seem to indicate that this was true. Some have even suggested that Brigadier Macdonald, was very cautious in his decision making and did tend to play safe. Both these seem to have some basis, and have been detailed in the appropriate chapters. This apart, there appears to have been some dissonance between the Military and the Political Departments, at the level of the Government of India. Whereas many have attributed this to the clash of personalities of the Viceroy and Lord Kitchener, The Commander-in-Chief in India, one cannot say that this did not have its’ impact on the players in the field.

It has been said that Colonel Younghusband exceeded his mandate when he sought to include in the treaty that the British Trade Agent at Gyantse be permitted to visit Lhasa to discuss matters arising out of the implementation of the Convention. He had also imposed an Indemnity of Rupees 75 Lacs to be paid at the rate of Rupees one lac every year. Until this payment was completed or Trade Marts established, whichever was earlier, Chumbi Valley was to be occupied by the British. In retrospect and seeing the Chinese policies applied in Tibet subsequently, this was a very well thought out move. Had this been accepted, history may have been different on this border in the later part of the 20th Century. At the insistence of Whitehall and agreement of the Government of India, the indemnity was reduced to Rupees 25 Lacs to be realised over three years and provision for visits to Lhasa was deleted. There was NO mention of the occupation of Chumbi! Colonel Younghusband was reprimanded instead of being appreciated for closing the wedge between Sikkim and Bhutan by occupation of Chumbi.

The cooperation of “Tongsa Penlop” in this affair earned him a KCIE in 1905 and in 1907 he was installed as the ruler of Bhutan. The campaign in Tibet also provided the opportunity to survey parts of that country. Not only this, it also allowed building of many roads and tracks there. These activities
there. These activities till then, especially of surveying the countryside, had to be undertaken clandestinely with pilgrims using ingenious methods of measuring distances. For example, they constructed a prayer wheel - commonly carried by Tibetans they therefore drew no attention - whose revolutions assisted in measuring distances. Finally, since Everest could not be approached from Nepal at that time for various reasons, Khamba Dzong was chosen as a base for climbing Mount Everest. This perhaps was influenced by Colonel Younghusband's familiarity with the area who was also then the "President of the National Geographic Society", and the first expedition from Khamba Dzong was organised by them.

Militarily, a very significant lesson to be learnt is that the belief that passes at these altitudes are impassable during winter is a myth. Given the technological advantages available now, negotiating these passes in winter is certainly possible. If Younghusband's primitively armed force could do it, any modern force can do it better.
KEY PLAYERS
Many important players were involved in the planning and execution of the "Tibet Mission" but standing alone as the strategic protagonists in this episode is a core group of men.

The expedition into Tibet could only be authorised by the Home government in Britain. Lord Curzon who had assumed the Viceroyalty of India in 1898 and who was a great believer in the Russian intention of dominance in the Region was convinced that the Dalai Lama was in the process of negotiating some understanding with the Russians which would bring the Russians into Tibet. To lend credibility to this belief, he relied on various reports and newspaper articles on Lama Dorjieff acting as a special representative of the Dalai Lama in Russia. It will be pertinent to note that during the period, intelligence available on Tibet was minimal or non-existent. Thus, the spread of many rumours was a natural phenomenon. Factoring these also into ones' assessments was therefore natural.

Lord Curzon, wrote three letters to the Dalai Lama to which he not only had no reply, but which were returned unopened. This and other incidents, therefore, became principal inputs for formulating his recommendations to the Home Government to mount this expedition. In Britain, given Lord Curzons' views on Russia, there had been some unease felt in some quarters of the decision making machinery. It was this reason that generated so much debate in the authorisation of the 'Tibet Mission'. It was a combination of Curzons' persuasive powers and reasoning coupled with scanty information and conditions that were brought about, that convinced His Majestys' Government to sanction or authorise the Mission.
Lord Curzon

Lord Curzon's ability to befriend people in high places lead to an appointment drafting speeches and doing research for Lord Salisbury, Conservative leader in the House of Lords. As a result Salisbury recommended Curzon to the Tories of Southport, Lancashire, who agreed to adopt him as their candidate at the next election and in 1886 Curzon became a member of Parliament for the first time. With Salisbury's approval he embarked on a world tour and came back infatuated with Asia. From this and subsequent journeys emerged three books: Russia in Central Asia (1889); Persia and the Persian Question (1892), by far the most successful of his works; and Problems of the Far East (1894).

The British Statesman George Nathaniel Curzon Marquess, Viscount Scarsdale, Baron Ravensdale, also called Baron Curzon of Kedleston, or Earl Curzon of Kedleston was born on January 11, 1859, Kedleston Hall, Derbyshire, England. And would go on to become viceroy of India (1898-1905), and foreign secretary (1919-24), who during his term in office played a major role in British policy making."

Curzon was the eldest son of the 4th Baron Scarsdale, rector of Kedleston, Derbyshire. Educated at Eton, he entered Oxford in 1878 and was elected president of the Oxford Union in 1880 where he made a fellow of "All Souls College" in 1883.

On Nov. 10, 1891, Curzon became under secretary of state for India in the Tory Government and on April 22, 1895, he married Mary Victoria Leiter, daughter of Adolphus (Levi) Leiter, a Chicago millionaire in Washington DC. The union involved marriage settlements of several million dollars that helped him to cope with the extravagance of his political office. On his return from their honeymoon Curzon was offered the job of under secretary of state, Salisbury having just been appointed foreign secretary. Curzon accepted on the condition that he was also to be made a privy councilor, and on June 29, 1895, he was duly sworn in by Queen Victoria at Windsor Castle.

In 1898, at the young age of 38, he succeeded Lord Elgin as the Viceroy of India, and in September of that year he was created Baron of Kedleston. On assumption of the Viceroyalty, he initiated commissions of inquiry into education, police, and civil services; he reduced taxes; he ordered immediate punishment of any Briton (including members of the army) who ill treated Indian nationals. In external affairs he toured the Persian Gulf and on his return from what he called a "triumphal" tour of the Indian provinces, he ordered the restoration of the Taj Mahal which was decaying, and thereafter took a personal interest in India's artistic and cultural heritage.

What concerns us here is the special attention he paid to India's frontiers and the successful mission he sent to Tibet to frustrate Russian ambitions there.

At the end of his first five years in India, while his successes were recognized by the government at home by renewal of his term; his request to have Lord Kitchener the hero of Khartoum appointed as C-in-C and military member of the viceroy's Cabinet despite repeated warnings from his friends in England against such a move, became the cause of his undoing. It was a clash of personalities, and finally, owing to disagreement with the C-in-C, Curzon
cabled to England, that either his views must be accepted or he would go. On Aug. 16, 1905, he was informed telegraphically by King Edward VII that his resignation had been accepted. By the time he returned to London, the Tories were out of office, and his Indian achievements had been forgotten. He was not even given the earldom usually awarded to retiring viceroy.

During this intervening period he held the office of Chancellor of the University of Oxford and many other important offices. During this time his wife passed away. Her death affected him deeply. From the money that now came to him, he bought Tattershall, a castle in Lincolnshire, and later bought Bodiam Castle, Sussex. Both of these, he eventually presented to the nation.

In 1911, after the coronation of King George V, Curzon received an earldom, along with the viscountcy of Scarsdale, and the barony of Ravensdale. He joined the coalition cabinet of HH Asquith in the summer of 1915, and, when Lloyd George took over that December, he became leader of the House of Lords with the office of Lord President. From then on Curzon was one of the members of the inner cabinet concerned with the policies and pursuits of World War I.

On Jan. 2, 1917, Curzon married Mrs. Alfred (Grace) Duggan, widow of a rich Argentenian rancher and daughter of J. Monroe Hinds, an American diplomat. After three daughters from his first wife, Curzon hoped for a son from his second to inherit his title especially after he had been created a marquess in 1921, but was again disappointed. In the postwar government led by Lloyd George, he was appointed foreign secretary, and served with distinction until 1923. When the Tory prime minister Bonar Law, a dying man, prepared to relinquish office, it resulted in the appointment Stanley Baldwin, from the House of Commons, as prime minister. He carried on as foreign secretary until 1924, when Baldwin replaced him with Austen Chamberlain.

On March 9, 1925, he was operated on for an internal condition, and he died of complications less than two weeks later. With him died his marquessate and his earldom. The viscountcy subsequently passed to his nephew and the barony of Ravensdale to his eldest daughter, Lady Irene Curzon.

Colonel Sir FE Younghusband

After repeated attempts to gain trading rights with Tibet, Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, authorized Colonel Sir Francis Edward Younghusband, accompanied by a military escort, to cross the Tibetan border in July 1903 to negotiate trade and frontier issues. When efforts to negotiate were not successful, the British troops under the command of Major General James Macdonald, invaded the country and slaughtered some 600 Tibetans at Guru. Younghusband then moved on to Chiang-tzu (Gyantse), where a second attempt at trade negotiations also failed. He and his troops then marched on to Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, and forced the conclusion of the historic Tibetan Treaty with the Dalai Lama, the ruler of Tibet, on September 6, 1904 that gained Britain long sought trade concessions. This action earned Younghusband a knighthood in 1904.

Born on 31 May, 1863, at Murree, India, Younghusband became an officer of the British army in 1882 and an explorer whose travels, mainly in Northern India and Tibet, took him in 1886-87 across Central Asia from Peking to Yarkand, now in Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, China. Continuing on to India by way of the long unused Mustagh Pass of the Karakoram Range, he proved the range to be the water divide between India and Turkestan. On two later expeditions to Central Asia he explored the Pamir Mountains.

Younghusband had also led the relief of the garrison in Chitral in the North Western Frontier Province of India in 1893. At the time of his appointment to the "Tibet Mission", he was serving as the Resident in the Indian Kingdom of Indore and had been acquainted with Lord Curzon during his expeditions in Central Asia. These factors combined with his knowledge of the region made him an ideal candidate for the task at hand.

Tongsa Penlop

Thirteenth Dalai Lama
The division of Bhutan into administrative units is attributed to Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal, who also founded more important monasteries and fortresses in Bhutan. Each of these administrative units was under a local Governor owing allegiance to a Central Authority. While exercise of supreme religious authority vested with the Namgyal and his successive reincarnations, the secular administration was entrusted to their nominee, known as the Deb Raja, (the 'King who dispenses bounty), who was appointed on the recommendation of a Council of State. The administrative units were placed under officers of various ranks, depending on their size and importance. The most important of these units were the Provinces of Tongsa and Dagana in Central Bhutan and Paro in West Bhutan, each under the rule of a Penlop (Governor). All major decisions were taken by the Shabdrung also called "Dharam Raja" on the recommendation of the Council of State consisting of the Deb Raja, Penlops and other high ranking religious and secular officers.

Sir Ugyen Wangchuk who was Tongsa Penlop (the Governor of the Province of Tongsa in Central Bhutan), had helped the British in their efforts to enter into negotiations with the Tibetan Government at Lhasa and had also tendered his whole hearted cooperation to Colonel Younghusband during the course of his expedition. A shrewd diplomat and fearless warrior, he had, step by step, emerged as most powerful of the various functionaries in Bhutan. Both the Dharam Raj and Deb Raja passed away in the same year. For the British, anxious as they were, that there should be a single authority with whom they could conduct relations, this was the obvious opportunity. Through their Political Officer in Sikkim, they sedulously cultivated the Penlop, conferred upon him (in 1905) the title of K.C.I.E. at a solemn Durbar held at Bhutan’s winter capital, Punakha, and finally gave their blessings to his installation in 1907 as the country’s hereditary ruler.¹

Sir Ugyen Wangchuk passed away in 1926 and was succeeded by his son King Jigme Wangchuk, on whose death in 1952, the kingdom passed to his son King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk. The present King of Bhutan, Jigme Singhye Wangchuk, ascended the throne in 1972 after the demise of his father at Nairobi.

The Dalai Lamas of Tibet are believed to be the embodiment of Avalokitesvara (Tibetan Chenresi) or the Bodhisattva of compassion. Each Dalai Lama is a reincarnation of the previous one and on his death will be reborn and a search for this child has to be made.

On the selection of the incarnation, Sir Charles Bell has this to say, "Three or four years after the Dalai Lama has departed, the Tashi Lama, if of age, and fifteen or twenty other great Lamas, e.g. the abbots of Sera, Drepung and Ganden-the three huge monasteries near Lhasa- the State Oracle at Lhasa, known as the Nechung, and the Oracle at Sam-ye, one of the most famous monasteries in Tibet, decide as to the tract of country in which the new Dalai Lama will be found, the year of birth of his father, his mother, and himself, the kinds of trees growing near his house and so forth."

Until 1959 when The Chinese Communists took over Tibet, the Dalai Lama, as head of the Gelugpa Order, was both the spiritual and temporal ruler of the country. The title developed out of the earlier title of Grand Lama, and was conferred on the 3rd Grand Lama by the Mongol leader, Altan Khan, in the late 16th century. The title was then applied posthumously to the 2 previous Grand Lamas, the first in the line having died in 1475. (Dalai means ocean and is often translated as ocean of wisdom).

With the help of the Mongols, 'Great Fifth' Dalai Lama secured the dominance of the Gelugpa over rival orders and became the spiritual and the temporal leader of the whole country in mid-17th century. During his rule the splendid Potala palace was built in Lhasa as the winter residence of the Dalai Lamas.

The 7th Dalai Lama Kesang Gyatso continued to rule till his death in 1757. The appointment of Dalai Lama being reincarnate, involved the choosing of the new incumbent when in infancy or at a very early age. This practice meant the nomination of a Regent till the designated Dalai Lama attained majority i.e. the age of 18. After the death of 7th Dalai Lama, until the accession of the 13th Dalai Lama, the wielding of power by regents so affected them that no Dalai Lama attained majority or died early! The 8th Dalai Lama was the only one who reached majority and died at the age of 45. He was content to let the Regent rule! The 9th and 10th Dalai Lamas did not reach majority. The 11th and 12th Dalai Lama died soon after they attained majority. It was suspected that they had been done away with. It is believed that the Tibetan Public had a hand in getting rid of the Regent and installing the 13th Dalai Lama. For nearly 110 years, therefore, authority in Tibet lay with a Regent Lama.

Thubten Gyatso, the 13th Dalai Lama was born to a peasant family in 1876. He was discovered, brought to Lhasa and enthroned at the age of three. Educated as a monk, he took over full power when he was 18 and ruled until his death 37 years later.

The 13th Dalai Lama, during whose rule this expedition was conducted, assumed complete authority in the conduct of the administration of the

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state. Given the circumstances under which he assumed power and the fact that the Chinese dominance over the Tibet had suffered significant set back because of the Sino-Japanese war and other happenings, this was to be expected. In his attempt to protect Tibet and safeguard its sovereignty, his proclivity to listen to his advisors was not too pronounced. It has been known that those of his advisors who sought to make peace with the British were dealt with in somewhat of an unceremonious fashion! He was also not too inclined to accept diktats from the suzerain! His reasoning is obvious from the contents of a letter dated 18th June 1904, sent by him to the Tongsa Penlop who was interceding with The British Mission for Tibet. Excerpts of the translation would amply clarify the position taken by him. "The English very well recollect that the treaty which was then concluded was made between the Chinese and the English without in any way consulting the Tibetans. Last year the English came without permission to Khamba Jong, and afterwards crossed the Yatung barrier and advanced up the Chumbi Valley to Phari and Guru.......... The English Government have sent us many communications, but according to our ancient national covenant the bearers and recipients of such letters are subject to heavy penalties, and it is impossible for us to receive or answer them....... Now you have often sent me word that it will be well to effect a settlement; and the English have fixed a date upon which the Tibetan representatives should arrive, saying that if they do not come they will assemble a large force and that the Viceroy has ordered them to wage war with Tibet even if lasts for twenty years. So I have dispatched the Ka-ton Lama, the Grand Secretary Lo-Sang Tin-le, and representatives of the three great Lhasa monasteries to conduct negotiations. When they arrive at Gyantse please assist in making a treaty between Tibet and the English. I entrust you with this duty and beg you to help the Tibetan delegates and to see that they are not seized or killed."2

2. Enclosure 1 to Colonel Younghusbands’ Letter No518-G, dated Camp Gyantse, the 9th July 1904, Foreign Deptt Proceeding No 190, National Archives, July 1904.
Chinese Amban

The appointment of the Amban dates back to 1728/29. With the death of the "Great Fifth Dalai Lama" in 1682, a number of events that were set in motion brought about Chinese intervention in Tibet. The Sixth Dalai Lama who was enthroned in 1696 was considered unsuitable by the then ruling king of Tibet who arrested him and sent him to China. The Sixth Dalai Lama died while on his way to China. He was replaced by a nominee of the Ruler who in turn was not acceptable to the Tibetan people. They chose, instead, a child born soon after the death of the Sixth Dalai Lama. These events were the harbingers of trouble that surfaced soon and Tibet was thrown into a civil strife. In 1718, the Emperor of China dispatched a military expedition followed by another in 1720 on the defeat of the earlier one and restored normalcy in Tibet. In 1722, when Emperor Yung Ch'eng succeeded his father Emperor K'ang Hsi, on his demise, he decided to withdraw Manchu troops from Lhasa and the military governor was to be replaced by a civilian man. The withdrawal of the military force from Lhasa brought about another civil war and in 1728 the Emperor sent in another military contingent to control the situation there. Having quelled the rebellion, The Tibetan Council was reorganized and two civil officers were appointed to represent the Emperor. These representatives came to be known as "Ambans" in Tibet with an armed garrison under a military commander to ensure and safeguard the position of the Ambans.

The Ambans' primary job was to keep the Emperor apprised of the happenings in Tibet and advise the Tibetan Council on matters relating to dealings with the Imperial Court in China. It was not their task to interfere in the governance of Tibet. The Ambans assumed a bigger role once the Regents for Dalai Lamas started ruling. During this period, i.e. after the Eighth Dalai Lama and up to Twelfth Dalai Lama, the Regents were in power since none of them attained majority or where they did, died soon after. It is believed that the Regents could not have carried on without the tacit consent of the Amban.

In December 1902, a new Amban was appointed to Tibet while the preceding one was recalled to Peking. The new Amban, Yu-t'ai, who left China in December 1902, reached Lhasa only in February 1904. By this time the British Mission along with its' military escort was already camping in New Chumbi and preparations for advance to Gyantse Dzong were afoot and in full swing. Whereas the presence of the Amban in any negotiations before the Mission reached Gyantse would have been extremely helpful in avoiding a conflict situation, the Amban, according to him, was not provided with the necessary transport to reach the location of the Mission. The Tibetans had scant respect for the suzerain power and given the obtaining conditions and the difficult situation that China was beset with, this was understandable.

The role of the Chinese Amban seems to have been made more important by the British Government itself. It would appear that they were so taken in by the Imperialists in China that keeping China on the right side and in good humour became paramount. Many writers including Lord Curzon and Sir Francis Younghusband have commented on this aspect.
Chinese Amban on Horse Back
Khamba Dzong
KHAMBA DZONG
**Khamba Dzong**

In April 1903, when asked for his views on negotiations with Tibet, Lord Curzon, suggested that any mission to Lhasa should be held in abeyance for the time being. He proposed that negotiations be opened at "Khamba Dzong" the nearest inhabited place near Giaogong. The Chinese delegates had already been appointed; they should be instructed to bring with them a duly accredited Tibetan representative of the highest rank. The British representative would be accompanied by an escort of two hundred rifles; reinforcements would be held in Sikkim. If the Chinese and the Tibetans failed at the rendezvous, the British representative would move forward to Shigatse or Gyantse, to accelerate their arrival from Lhasa. His Majesty's Government approved the arrangements. However, it was stipulated, that under no circumstances, any advance from Khamba Dzong to be made without reference to them. Major Younghusband who was then a Resident at Indore was appointed to lead the Mission with the temporary rank of Colonel along with Mr. JC White, who had 14 years experience of the Tibetan Frontier; Major (later Sir) Fredrick O'Connor, who had learnt Tibetan language; and Ernest (later Sir Ernest) Wilton, borrowed from The China Consular Service.

Khamba Dzong was reached on 7th July 1903. The Tibet Frontier Commission, as it came to be designated, with an escort of two hundred rifles with Mr. White entered Tibet through Kangra La, while Colonel Younghusband stationed himself at Thangu, near Giaogong in Sikkim with three hundred men of The 32nd Pioneers along with their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Brander. Younghusband joined the Mission at Khamba Dzong on 18th July.

The Tibetan delegates refused to receive written communications, to report oral communications to Lhasa, or to hold any discussions at Kharnba Dzong. They insisted that if Younghusband wanted to negotiate, he must go back to his own side of the border. Mr. Ho, the Chinese delegate was recalled to Lhasa, because of protocol problems.

The Tibetan officials, that the Mission met with here refused to negotiate unless the British returned to their own side of the border. According to W.D. Shakabpa (the former Finance Minister to The Fourteenth Dalai Lama) the British took to shooting birds and gazelles, and passed their time carrying out impressive military exercises, taking photographs, hiking in the hills, mapping the surrounding country, botanizing, and geologizing.

Negotiations at Khamba Dzong could not take off because of a host of factors. Government of India had to await its, policies on Tibet to be cleared by Whitehall; Tibetan assertion that since they were not part of the 1890 Treaty, they were unable to abide by its contents; protocol or perceived protocol problems because of lower ranking officials being deputed both by Lhasa and the Emperor of Chinas' Court; proclamation of the British as enemies of Buddha by the Tibetan Tsongdu, (Tibet's National Assembly) and their declaration, that Tibetan troops would expel any invading soldiers; and the general belief that if negotiations were not carried out at Khamba Dzong, the British would return to their own land! In the meantime, very cordial

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Khampa Dzong from East Showing Everest in Distance
Badula and Head Monk under Tashi Lama
relations existed between the members of the Tibet Mission and the Locals at Khamba Dzong. Peter Flaming states that, “during August a senior abbot from Shgatse, a man of charm and affability, was a frequent and welcome visitor to the Mission's tents.”

According to Patrick French, “while he waited for a response from the Tibetan delegates, Younghusband could do nothing but sit tight in the cold winds of Khamba Dzong. An assortment of specialists had arrived to take advantage of the access to Tibetan territory: Mr Hayden the fossil hunter, Captain Walton the bird man and Colonel Prain the plant collector. I have an idea that Khamba Jong has become a sort of scientific playground; wrote Curzon to Younghusband, with botanists, geologists, mineralogists etc sticking their heads out behind every rock. But his correspondent was in no mood to be amused. We have in this merely to burst that bloated bubble of monkish power, he fumed, in his reply to the Viceroy, and we shall have the people with us, and be able to oust that Russian influence which has already done us so much damage. He especially resented the lack of reverence for his Mission among the inhabitants of Khamba Dzong. There is not a native of this border... who does not think the Tibetans will beat us here; and all of them think the two Lhasa delegates are infinitely bigger men than I am.” While China's suzerain power over Tibet was officially accepted, given the existing circumstances and the waning Manchu hold, it was clear that the Tibetans had little respect for Chinese authority.

The Mission waited at the rendezvous without negotiations taking place. When it became clear that there was little scope of furthering their objective, Government of India were able to prevail upon Whitehall to allow the Mission to advance to Gyantse. Towards this end many ploys were employed including a petition from the family of two men from Lachung who had undoubtedly been dispatched for espionage into Tibetan territory and were in captivity at Lhasa, for their release!

Patrick French writes that, “according to Peter Fleming in “Bayonets to Lhasa”, the Tibetan decision not to negotiate at Khamba Dzong' was based four square on infantile obstinacy. This ethnocentric judgment fails to appreciate the position in which Tserong and Lobsang Trinley found themselves. They had been ordered to avoid dialogue with Younghusband until the British Mission retired over the border. Yet without military backing they could do nothing to enforce this command. Both men knew that their personal prospects depended upon not being held responsible for whatever might go wrong. Their best strategy was to procrastinate and wait for winter, refusing to accept any diplomatic communication and hoping the problems would disappear.” Under the prevailing conditions, it would seem that there was no room for accommodation of Tibetan position. After all it had been agreed upon that negotiations would take place at Khamba Dzong!

Khamba Dzong, was to act as a staging post for six of the seven expeditions which attempted Mount Everest between the two Great Wars. Tibet Frontier Commission remained at Khamba Dzong for five months. But no negotiations took place.
BUILD UP FOR EXPEDITION
Because nothing very much happened at Khamba Jong, the Commissioner of the Mission Col FE Younghusband, was able to convince Lord Curzon who in turn was able to prevail upon the Home Government to accord permission and to authorize occupation of Chumbi Valley and onward advance to Gyantse Jong. It was thus that the logistic build up for this force to advance into Tibet was taken in hand and the necessary resources acquired for the expedition to take off.

The difficulties of undertaking an advance into Tibet from India were unimaginable. In the early twentieth century, the state of road or rail communication in this part of the world was quite primitive. Railway line lay in the plains of Bengal and Siliguri was the “Rail Head” for Sikkim. From here all loads had to be transmitted by road or track since not many roads existed. There was nothing at all at Silguri except the little railway – station- no cantonments, no go- downs, no nucleus of accommodation which could be expanded to meet the requirements of a military base. No infrastructure to support staff, transit-camps, animal lines, labour force of thousands of coolies, and water- supply existed. There was no other source from which supplies could reach the expedition. There was a small gauge train up to Darjeeling. To reach Tibet one had to go along the River Tista up to a given place from where existing mountain tracks had to be widened over a steep gradient to take mules and other load bearing animals. This apart, storage facilities en route were non existent. These had to be catered for to allow the Mission to sustain itself and achieve its' objectives. To add to these difficulties, very little support in terms of food supply was available in the mountains and the total requirement of food, shelter in terms of tents, ammunition and other necessities had to be transported from the plains. Considering that no roads were available, all these stores had to be transported over mules, yaks, donkeys and coolies. In such circumstances, the requirement of food and fodder supplies increases phenomenally and to cater to this increase, called for an increase in number of porters and animals and the requirement of supplies: a vicious circle is set into motion calling for innovations!

The construction and maintenance of a mule track presented enormous difficulties. A company of Sappers and Miners, later assisted by the 32nd Pioneers, had commenced repair in early 1903. While floods, consequent landslides and disease hindered work in the Tista Valley; in the mountains, steep gradients, giant size boulders that made bypassing fraught with risk, and ice (principal cause of many casualties both to the men and animals) had to be dealt with. From the very outset, it was clear that a large labour force was required to be pressed into service.

That an advance to Lhasa was a distinct possibility had been envisaged much earlier. To reach Lhasa entailed the crossing of the “Tsang-Po” River at Chaksam. If the Mission failed to capture the ferry in tact, alternative arrangements for another ferry had to be made. For this purpose rafting equipment was brought in from Roorkee, home and Training Centre for the “Bengal Sappers”. All this had to be factored in and detailed and thorough planning to support advance to Lhasa had been done by the Mobilization Branch of the Army Headquarters. A memorandum shown below was issued by Maj Gen B Duff.
THE BRITISH EXPEDITION TO LHASA 1904

Route used by British Expedition to Lhasa 1903 - 1904
Yaks working in Ekkas
No. 1220-M.

Mobilisation Branch, Army Head Quarter; Simla, 14th May 1904.

MEMORANDUM.

Has the honour to forward herewith for information and guidance, copies of a scheme showing the arrangement which will be made in the event of it being found necessary for the Sikkim-Tibet Mission to advance to Lhasa.

By order,

B. DUFF, Major-General
Adjutant General in India.

To the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab.

To the Quarter Master General in India.

To the General Officer Commanding, Lahore District.
To General Officer Commanding Presidency District.

" " " " " Bangalore " "

" Director-General of Ordnance.

" Director-General, Supply and Transport.

" Principal Medical Officer, His Majesty's Forces in India.

" Inspector-General of Artillery in India.

" Assistant Adjutant-General for Royal Engineers.

" Director-General, Indian Medical Service.

" Principal Veterinary Officer in India.

" Assistant Quarter Master General, Intelligence Branch.

" Military Secretary to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

" Director-General of Telegraphs.

" Director-General of Post Offices in India.

" Surveyor-General in India.

" Controller of Military Accounts, Punjab Command.

" " " " " Bengal " "

" " " " " Madras " "

MEMORANDUM.

Submitted for the information and approval of the Government of India in the Military Department.

B. DUFF, Major-General
Adjutant General in India.

Scheme showing the further arrangements to be made for the advance of the Sikkim-Tibet Mission to Lhasa.
In the event it being found necessary for the Sikkim-Tibet Mission to advance from Gyantse to Lhasa, the following additional arrangements will be made for its protection.

2. Troops.-(a) The troops at present composing the Escort, etc., of the Mission are as follows:-

2 guns, No.7 Mountain Battery.
Maxim gun section, 1st Battalion, Norfolk Regiment.
1st Company, Mounted Infantry.
2nd Company, Mounted Infantry.

23rd Sikh Pioneers.
32nd Sikh Pioneers.
8th Gurkha Rifles.
No.3 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.
No.12 Company, 2nd Sappers and Miners.
Section D, No.21 British Field Hospital.
Section C, No. 56 Native Field Hospital.
No. 71 Native Field Hospital.
Sections B, C and D, No. 76 Native Field Hospital.

(b) In addition to these units, the undermentioned details will be mobilized and dispatched to Sikkim, immediately on receipt of orders from Army Head-Quarters. They will be allotted to the Escort for the further advance or for strengthening posts on the Line of Communication as may be considered most desirable under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Escort:-

4 guns, No.7 Mountain Battery, Jutogh.
2 guns, No. 30 Mountain Battery, Abbottabad.

This section will take 7-pr. 200-lb. Guns which will be supplied from the most convenient arsenal.
2 7-pr. R.M.-L. 200-lb. Guns [without personnel – ride paragraph 10 (c)].
Head-quarters and 4 companies, 1st Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, Lebong.
Head-quarters and 4 companies, 40th Pathans, Jhansi.

These four companies will be composed entirely of Muhammedans.
The above additional units will proceed at field service strengths and scales of establishments and equipment in accordance with the Field Service Regulations and Equipment Tables, except that Native Cavalry 45 lb. Tents, at the rate of 10 men or 12 followers per tent, will be substituted for 160 lb. Tents.

(c) When the foregoing have been dispatched, the force on this service will then consist of the following:

No. 7 Mountain Battery.
2 guns (7-pr. 200-lb. Guns (additional).
Maxim gun section, 1st Battalion, Norfolk Regiment.
1st Company, Mounted Infantry.
2nd Company, Mounted Infantry.
4 Companies, 1st Battalion, Royal Fusiliers.
4 Companies, 40th Pathans.
23rd Sikh Pioneers.
32nd Sikh Pioneers.
8th Gurkha Rifles.
No. 3 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.
No. 12 Company, 2nd Sappers and Miners.
Section D, No. 21 British Field Hospital.
Section A, No. 22 British Field Hospital.
Section C, No. 56 Native Field Hospital.

Relief. – Four Companies, 1st Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers, will be moved from Allahabad to Lebong under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Bengal. Families will not accompany this wing.

Clothing. – (a) All troops and followers will be supplied with clothing on the winter scale, as prescribed in the Field Service Departmental Code, Supply – Transport, with the following additions –

British and Native troops, one British Warm coat and one extra blanket per man.
Crossing the Chaksam Ferry
View from Entrance to Iron Bridge
Followers, one extra blanket, 2 pairs worsted socks and 1 pair mittens per man.

(b) The following additional articles will be dispatched to Siliguri as early as possible for issue to the troops on arrival, viz.:-

1,000 poshtins, with long sleeves; these should be made very loose round the shoulders, so as to admit of their being worn over the British warm coat.

900 heavy woolen comforters.

1,300 pairs of quilted felt knee boots, known as Gilgit boots.

(c) Goggles will be issued if necessary.

(d) Each follower will be provided with one pair of boots 1½ sizes larger than ordinarily worn, in place of shoes.

(e) All boots to be hobnailed and toe and heel plated.

(f) Arrangements will be made for the following to be sent to Siliguri for issue as renewals:-

1,800 warm under pyjamas; 3,600 pairs worsted socks; 3,600 pairs warm mittens; 500 pairs British ammunition boots; 600 pairs Native ammunition boots; 5,000 pairs followers’ boots; 1,000 waterproof capes; and 2,000 waterproof sheets.

5. Maxim. - One Maxim gun each will be taken by the wing, 1st Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, and wing, 40th Pathans.

6. Ammunition. - Rifle ammunition will be on the scales laid down in the Field Service Regulations. With each 7-pr. 200-lb. Gun the following ammunition will be taken:-

80 double Shell.
90 shrapnel.
20 star.
10 case.

200 shrapnel will be sent with each gun of No.7 Mountain Battery.

7. Transport. - (a) The fit mules of the 5th, 9th, 10th, and 24th Mule Corps, now at Siliguri, will be utilized to meet the further requirements of the increased escort.

In addition to the above, 4 troops of pack mules will be held in readiness to move, if required, to Siliguri immediately on receipt of orders.

(b) Sixteen ordnance mules for the 2 additional 7-pr. 200-lb. Guns [vide paragraph 10 (c)] being dispatched to Sikkim without personnel will be drawn from No. 30 Mountain Battery and be sent with the guns and ammunition in charge of the Section.
(c) The sections of the Field Hospitals will each take 20 dandies in lieu of tongas. Army Bearer Corps establishment will accompany these dandies, the bearers being returned to India when replaced by hill carriers, but the supervising establishment, including sirdars and mates, will be retained.

(d) Four 12 feet duplex Berthon boats with superstructure for use as rafts, packed for carriage by coolies, will be dispatched from Roorkee to facilitate the passage of troops, animals, etc., across the Sangpo; and the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, will arrange for the dispatch of 20 Attok boatmen accustomed to the construction and use of bullock-hide rafts. These men will receive rations, clothing, etc., as sanctioned for followers with the Sikkim-Tibet Mission Escort; and will be entertained on the lowest rates of pay practicable.

(e) The Director General, Supply and Transport, will arrange for the early dispatch of 1,000 coolies to replace a similar number of Nepalese coolies who will be discharged.

8. Medical. – (a) A Native general hospital of 100 beds will be prepared and dispatched to Siliguri from Calcutta. This hospital will be located at the place considered most suitable by the General Officer Commanding the Escort and lines of communication.

(b) A strict medical examination of all troops and followers will be made before they leave their stations with special regard to their capability of undergoing the fatigue and hardship of exposure at high altitudes. Any increases in the reserves of medical and surgical stores, and any additional medical arrangements deemed necessary will be made under the orders of the Principal Medical Officers, His Majesty’s Forces in India.

9. Staff. – The following additional appointments will be made:

   (a) Intelligence Officer.

   (b) For Lines of Communication –
        officer Commanding (with the rank and pay of Colonel on the Staff).
        Staff Officer to Officer Commanding Line of Communication.

Treasure Chest Officer.

10. Equipment. – (a) Twenty-five sets of Mounted Infantry saddlery and line gear complete will be dispatched from the Mounted Infantry School at Fatehgarh.

(b) The Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Bombay, will arrange for the dispatch to Siliguri of a sufficient number of portable hand mills to grind a total of 30 maunds of atta daily.

(c) Two 7 pr. 200 lb. Guns, in addition to those taken by No.30 Mountain Battery, will also be dispatched. These guns will, if possible, be sent up in charge of the Section, No.30 Mountain Battery.
11. Miscellaneous. – Field service concessions and privileges will be as laid down in the scheme forwarded with this office No. 3221-M, dated 24th October 1903, which will be used as a guide for all matters not referred to above.

“Almost every conceivable form of transport and baggage animal suited for the work was impressed, and soon the whole track was filled by a toiling, moving mass of baggage, animals and coolies. From the base at Siliguri, where the shrieking locomotives dumped down their hundreds of tons of food and other stores daily from Calcutta, some camels and thousands of bullock carts with their yoke oxen, brought all the way from Bombay and Madras, carried the loads along the cart road winding up the Tista Valley for 45 miles, and when the road became too steep for the oxen, draught mules replaced the bullocks in the carts. Where the cart road ended, pack bullocks carried the stores up the goat tracks, which the sappers and pioneers had enlarged into mule paths in surprisingly quick time. When the track became steeper, pack mules and ponies were used, and when too steep for laden mules, several thousands of coolies “humped” the loads on their backs. These coolies were a great army in themselves, and were a motley lot drawn from all parts of the Himalayas, even 1000 miles distant.”

There was no other source from which supplies could reach the expedition except on the back of animal or men.

Peter Fleming writes, “This method of transport is subject to the law of diminishing returns, since the animal must carry its own fodder and the man his rations, cooking utensils, blankets and so on. If, for instance, a mule’s standard load is 160 lbs and the mule needs 10 lbs of fodder a day, it can carry 80 lbs of ammunition for four days, after which it must return to base. A coolie’s carrying power is similarly limited, and when man and beast form part of a force advancing in what amounts to single file through inhospitable country, neither can rely on supplementing their rations from local resources, because the head of the column consumes whatever poor perquisites, in the way of grazing or fuel, are to be found in its path. In Tibet this age-old problem was complicated by the fact that above the tree-line no firewood was available; since in that climate men could not survive without at least a cooking-fire, this often meant a further readjustment in the loads between the sinews of war and the necessities of life, always in favour of the latter. And the further the spearhead of the expedition advanced, the greater — and the more nearly self-defeating became the administrative effort required to nourish it.”

In order to overcome this shortcoming a large number of carts also known as ekkas, were dismantled and carried across the “Jelep-La” Pass to Chumbi where these were reassembled and pressed into service for supplies. This method enabled carriage of loads up to 500 pounds with one animal thereby reducing the need for additional rations for the carriers. Returning carts were also employed for evacuation of casualties. This method helped the Mission to streamline its logistic needs.

Given the state of communications and lack of infrastructure, extensive search and pooling of resources was undertaken. Most of the track construction or upgradation was carried out by people in uniform since they were better equipped and coordinated by their controlling headquarters. In the Report on the Supply and Transport Arrangements with the late Tibet Mission Force, a paragraph headed ‘Animals’ includes the following statistics:

The final entry on the list dealt with two legged animals:

Coolies 10,091 88 0.87'

Except for the Tibetan yaks, which were purchased or captured, this convoy had to pass through the Tista Valley where foot-and-mouth and anthrax disease were rife. Many animals died from eating poisonous plants that grew on the lower reaches of the mountains. During winter, when the force was immobile, grazing was scarce which resulted in heavy casualties among the Tibetan yaks mainly due to undernourishment. The mules, with the largest number in the category of animals suffered the least casualties and were by far the most reliable quadrupeds.

While there were continuous glitches in the mounting of the operations, by early December 1903 preparations were complete and the Tibet Frontier Commission was poised at Gnatong for an advance over the Jelap La, 14,390 feet high, into Tibet. The detachment still left at Khamba Jong rejoined Younghusband in the Chumbi Valley.

The Mission's escort mustered at this stage roughly 1150 fighting men, with four guns and two Maxims. It was made up as follows:

One section of the 7th Mountain Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery, with two ten-pounder screw-guns.

Two seven-pounder guns manned by men of the 8th Gurkhas and carried by coolies. Known as Bubble and Squeak, these two cannon had seen more than forty years' service on the frontier and possessed small military value.

8th Gurkhas (six companies)

23rd Sikh Pioneers (eight companies).

2nd Sappers and Miners (half-company)

Maxim-gun detachment of the 1st Battalion, the Norfolk Regiment.

Field hospital, engineer field parks, telegraph, postal and sundry detachments

In immediate reserve were the 32nd Pioneers, with the remaining elements of the 8th Gurkhas and the 23rd Pioneers.
ADVANCE TO GYANTSE DZONG
View of Jelep La
The Jelep-la, is one of the passes that leads into Tibet from Sikkim and is 14400 ft above sea level and lies in the High Altitude area as it is called today. To operate at these heights acclimatization of personnel is mandatory. In the late 19th and early 20th century such concepts had not been familiar. The pass led to Yatung one of the agreed upon trade marts or post in accordance with the Trade Agreement of 1890 and had an office of the Chinese Customs Service. The Mission along with its' escort crossed over the Pass on 12th December 1903 and halted for the night at Langram, in a pine forest some 2000 feet below the Jelep-la.

On 13 December the party moved on to Yatung beyond which the route over Jelepla joined the main axis of Chumbi Valley, down which flowed the "Ammo Chu". A few miles beyond Chumbi Village, the expedition halted and set about forming an advanced base which they called "New Chumbi". The Mission stayed here for a few days while the Escort reconnoitered the route ahead and established supply dumps necessary for further progress.
On 18 December 1903 Macdonald marched North and on the third day moved across an unguarded gorge to the great castellated fort of "Phari". The almost impregnable fort was occupied by two companies of Eighth Gurkhas with one of the seven pounder guns. Once the mounted infantry had reconnoitered the 15,200 foot Tang La, separating the Chumbi Valley from the main Tibetan Plateau, Macdonald retired to New Chumbi with the remaining force.

Occupation of the fort at Phari was contrary to the assurance that Younghusband had given to the Phari Jongpen, (the commander of the fort) who had visited him at New Chumbi. To Younghusband this was the breach of faith with the Tibetans which prejudiced his status as a negotiator. Tactically, it was inconceivable that the fort which dominated the surrounding plain was left ungarrisoned. Non occupation of this fort would have meant immense risk to the mission which was camped below this and was wholly dependent for water on the water supply of the fort.
The forward move from New Chumbi began on 4 January 1904, and four days later the Mission and its Escort, with the Mounted Infantry skirmishing ahead, crossed the Tang La, marching doggedly in the teeth of a bitter wind. Ahead of them the empty, snow-clad plain stretched endlessly to the foothills of Chomolhari, whose massive peak, rising to a height of 23,390 feet, began by filling them with awe and wonder but ended for many of them with something of a gaoler's status; for they were, it transpired, engaged only upon a token advance into Tibet proper, and the mountain was to dominate their lives for weeks to come.

As they entered this wilderness, rumours of an impending attack by hostile cavalry ran down the column. This was due to the sighting for the first time of the large wild asses known as kyangs, skirmishing in the middle distance in troops of ten or twenty. 'At first we mistook them for detachments of Tibetan cavalry, the wild horsemen of the Changtan, as they came galloping along in a whirlwind of dust, then executed a perfect wheel-round, then extended out line at regular intervals, and advanced again; and as if at the word of command reformed into close order and came to an instant halt.'

The column's destination was a place of no importance called Tuna, whose half-dozen mean houses were soon visible in what appeared to be the middle distance. All landmarks in Central Asia project this tantalizing, mirage-like impression of propinquity, it was in fact only after one of the most grueling marches of the whole campaign that Tuna was reached. It was found deserted.

1. Waddell : Lhasa and its Mysteries. Cf. 'They ranged in hordes of anything up to fifteen, and in their manoeuvres achieved an uncanny unanimity of movement ... no troop of cavalry was ever more symmetrically ranked, more precisely simultaneous in its evolutions' (Fleming : News from Tartary)
ACTION AT GURU
The advance to Guru was described in the Escort Commander's orders as a reconnaissance in force with two Pioneer regiments, the 8th Gurkhas, two companies of Mounted Infantry (each about a hundred strong), two ten-pounders of the 7th Mountain Battery (a British unit), the Gurkha-manned seven-pounders (Bubble and Squeak), the Norfolk's’ two Maxims and various ancillary units. Their total strength was just over a thousand personnel.

Owing to the extremely cold climate and the rarified air at this altitude, the troops who were clothed in heavy winter garb, found it tedious to march. Nevertheless they were very orderly in their approach. Led by the mounted infantry they plod along the plateau. During this march they were intercepted by emissaries from the Tibetan camp demanding that the British should retire to Yatung. They were sent back to inform their superiors that the British were bound for Gyantse and had no intention to fight. Should, however, the road not be left clear by the Tibetans, the Mission would be forced to clear the road. On approaching Guru, it was noticed that "Sangars" - crude stone fortifications - along a wall were strongly manned by Tibetans. Seeing this, the force was halted some distance before and the ten pounders along with "Bubble & Squeak", the two guns of the Gurkhas, were deployed. At the centre of the British force Younghusband and General Macdonald sat side by side under the Union Jack.

The General from Lhasa at the head of a small retinue trotted up and rugs and sheepskins were spread on the ground. The leaders dismounted and the meeting with the British Commissioner and his military escort began. The Tibetans, once again demanded that the force should retire to Yatung. Younghusband, courteous but firm, transmitted his usual reply through one of his officers.

The Tibetan Generals, stuck to their theme and the meeting was called off by Younghusband after a few minutes who gave the Tibetans a quarter of an hour in which to clear the road; if they failed to do so, they would be dislodged by force. Shouting excitedly to each other, the General and his fellow officials, mounted their horses and returned to the wall. Since there was no movement seen, the escort was ordered to advance without firing while General Macdonald ordered 23rd Pioneers and Gurkhas to outflank the Tibetan positions. These detachments hustled the Tibetans out of their positions and they started descending towards the centre of the wall. The escort advanced without firing. Waddell in his account writes, "On our nearing the wall the Drepon rode out and said that his men had orders not to fire, and that the General and the Mission could come up to the Wall." On nearing the wall, the Mission saw a large number of Tibetans gathered with their muskets or weapons behind the wall enclosing the Mission and its escort from three sides.

Seeing some of the Tibetans with their matchlock fuses lit and some fingerling their rifles restlessly, it was decided to disarm the Tibetans. It was when the process of disarming started that a commotion arose. It has been contended that most of these Tibetan soldiers were bearing arms which were their personal property. Since the British force commenced disarming them, they were loath to part with their property. Some, as would be expected under the circumstances, resisted this attempt by the Missions' force leading to scuffles and fisticuffs! On seeing the situation getting out
of hand, the Tibetan General mounted his horse and attempted to intervene. A Sikh soldier barred his way and grabbed the reins of the mount. The Tibetan General took his pistol and fired a shot at the soldier blowing away a part of his jaw. As soon as this shot was heard, mayhem broke loose and the British force opened fire mowing down the Tibetans at close range and with full ferocity. General Macdonald has phrased this differently at Paragraph 10 of his report!

At the end of the battle Tibetans had 600-700 men including the Drepon and other high ranking officials killed and about 200 wounded who were treated by the British Doctors accompanying the force. Through the casualties suffered in this engagement it was hoped that the futility of opposing a force equipped with modern weapons would be realized and the Tibetans would agree to negotiate. This was not to be and if anything, their resolve to face the British became more firm.

The high number of casualties of the Tibetans became a matter of concern and the engagement became controversial. It would appear that the method employed to undermine the Tibetan morale was perhaps part of the Imperial doctrine! Tibetans could not defy the Imperial Power was its’ underlying principle. One may conjecture at this point that inflicting unacceptable casualties on the enemy formed a part of this dictum! The same principle was reapplied by General Dyer one decade later at Amritsar when his troops gunned down unarmed civilians who were defying Imperial Power.

The “After Action Report” by Brig Gen JR Macdonald is placed opposite.
Pro. No. 199

No. 1060-A., dated Camp Thuna, the 1st April 1904.

From : BRIGADIER-GENERAL J.R.L. MACDONALD, C.B.,
Commanding Sikkim-Tibet Mission Force,

To : The Adjutant-General in India.

In continuation of my telegram No. 215-T of 31st March 1904, I have the honour to forward this dispatch on yesterday's operations against the Tibetans near Guru.

2. With a view to facilitating the shortly contemplated advance, with the Mission, on Gyantse, I had planned establishing a Supply Depot at Guru 8 miles further on, and for this purpose I moved out from Thuna on the morning of the 31st March with a column composed of the marginally noted troops intending to leave two Companies, 32nd Pioneers, and the 2nd Mounted Infantry at Guru with three days' rations as a guard to the depot.

2 guns, No.7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
2 7-pounder guns.
Machine Gun Section, Norfolks.
3 Companies, 23rd Pioneers.
4 “ 32nd
2 “ 8th Gurkhas.
1 Section, Field Hospital.

3. As the Tibetans were reported to be in some force near Guru and had repeatedly warned the Mission that trouble would occur should an advance be attempted, and had been seen busy building sangars on 30th ultimo, I took out with my column all available troops, leaving a garrison in Thuna of 1 Company, 23rd Pioneers, with some details, Colonel Younghusband and the officer of the Mission with him, also accompanied me.

4. I marched from Thuna at 8 A.M., the ground being covered with about 2" of snow which had fallen during the previous night, and on reaching the spur running out into the open plain some 2 miles on at 9 A.M., I formed up my column in two lines and advanced towards the hills in front of Guru-distant some 4 to 5 miles across a bare open plain. After proceeding some way, at 10.30 A.M., a party of Tibetan horsemen was observed coming towards us, which turned out to be three Tibetan Majors, who explained that the Lhasa Depon and head officials were following him, and asked us to stop where we were and await their arrival. This was done and the head Lhasa Depon accompanied by the Shigatse and Phari depons and the Chief Lama, representative of the Gadun Monastery, with a considerable mounted retinue shortly arrived. Colonel Younghusband interviewed them when they demanded our retirement to Yatung and threatened trouble if we advanced. Colonel Younghusband replied that we intended proceeding to Guru, and asked them if they would oppose us, to which no definite reply was given.

Amongst the retinue of the Depons two Russian rifles and some Russian made ammunition were observed besides five or six other breech loaders of various types.
5. The Tibetan officials, finding we were determined to advance, retired to their wall at the end of the promontory jutting out into the plain, about a mile distant, where a large number of Tibetan troops were observed, as also on the hills above, which were lined with sangars at intervals.

6. Colonel Younghusband asked me to refrain from firing till fired at, and strict orders to this effect were accordingly given to the troops.

7. Orders for the advance in attack formation were then given. The 1st Mounted Infantry being sent out by the plain on the right to make a wide turning movement against the wall, keeping in line with the Infantry. The right company, 23rd Pioneers, and machine guns, Norfolks, were also sent out on the plain to the right to enfilade and turn the wall. No.2 Company, 23rd Pioneers, was ordered to advance direct at the wall. No.3 Company, 23rd Pioneers, to advance on the end of the promontory. The two Companies, 8th Gurkhas, to advance up the long spurs leading to the higher hills whilst the 2nd Mounted Infantry was directed to advance by the left over the hill to a pass leading over a depression in the hills towards Guru plain.

The guns were ordered to take up a position to the right enfilading the sangars on the hill side and wall below. Four Companies, 32nd Pioneers, to follow as a reserve.

8. The advance was well carried out according to the orders, and though the Tibetans appeared greatly excited and occupied the hill sides and sangars in large numbers they did not open fire, but allowed our men, who used admirable restraint, to turn them out of the sangars and shoulder them down the hill without a shot being fired on either side. The Tibetans then massed in large numbers behind their high wall at the point of the promontory on the plain where our troops practically surrounded them on three sides, the time being about 12 noon.

9. As they refused to budge, and such a considerable armed force could not be left in our rear, they were told they would have to lay down their arms, and I moved up a company of the reserve from 32nd Pioneers with fixed bayonets as a precaution to the front of the wall. A Company, 23rd Pioneers, overlooked the Tibetans from the hill side whilst the guns and maxims with another Company, 23rd Pioneers, and a Company, 32nd Pioneers, as escort to the guns had moved forward and took up a position to the right front, thus almost completely surrounding the mass of Tibetans.

10. Some Pioneers then commenced disarming the Depon's retinue who were in front of the wall, and who resisted stubbornly, fighting our sepoys and refusing to give up their arms. At this point without any previous warning the Tibetans behind the wall opened a hot fire point blank at our men 15 or 20 yards off which they maintained for some minutes, several men also rushing out with swords.

11. The whole affair took us by surprise for a moment, as no one thought that, after the Tibetans had evacuated all their strongholds and allowed our troops to outflank and turn them out of their sangars, they meant fighting. Our troops were, however, instantly returning their fire with interest, and in many instances at not more than 30 yards' distance.

12. The effect of modern rifles soon became evident, and in a few minutes the Tibetans were returning in masses towards Guru being mown down by rifle and maxim fire at close quarters in large numbers, assisted by the guns which came into action at some 600 yards' range, and the road leading to Guru by which the Tibetans retired was soon strewn with dead and wounded.
13. At this encounter at the wall Major Wallace Dunlop, 23rd Pioneers, was severely wounded, and Mr. Candler, Press Correspondent to the Daily Mail, dangerously wounded, besides two sepoys severely wounded and four men slightly wounded.

14. In the meantime the two Companies, 8th Gurkhas, on the hill to the left and the 2nd Company, Mounted Infantry, had reached the top of the hill and after having turned out many Tibetans from the sangars on the hillside without firing, took up the pursuit as soon as the action below commenced and accounted for many Tibetans retiring towards Guru over the pass from Kambajong.

15. After the engagement at the wall was over the troops were reformed on the Guru side and the advance on Guru was recommenced and pursuit taken up by 2nd Mounted Infantry at 12.30 P.M.

16. On reaching the open plain beyond the spur, large numbers of Tibetans, estimated at a thousand were seen streaming out of Guru east village, up the nullah behind it and over the spur, and also down the Gyantse road to the east. The 10-pounders and maxims came into action at 1,500 yards on the fugitives from Guru over the hill behind it and accounted for a good many Tibetans. The 1st Mounted Infantry under Captain Ottley, 23rd Pioneers, took up the pursuit along the Gyantse road for 10 miles accounting for nearly 100 Tibetans and bringing back at night 120 yaks and 20 ponies.

17. At 1-20 P.M. the village on the left was found to be occupied by Tibetans who were holding it against the 2nd Mounted Infantry and one Company, 8th Gurkhas, who had come down over the hill side from the Kambajong pass.

This village of Guru West was the Tibetan main camp as 82 tents were pointed round it.

18. As the Tibetans maintained a hot fire on our men I sent another Company Gurkhas and one Company, 23rd Pioneers, to attack it from the east and in the meantime the 7-pounders shelled it.

The village was then rushed by the Gurkhas whereupon the Tibetans surrendered and in addition to a good many killed and wounded, about 100 prisoners were taken besides a considerable amount of Tsampa or barley meal, fuel and forage and some mules and ponies. Guru East was also found to contain a fair amount of supplies.

19. This second phase of the engagement was concluded by 2 P.M., by which time most of the Tibetans had cleared off and some 200 had surrendered.

20. A halt of an hour was then made allowing the convoy of 200 mules with kits and rations for the 2 Companies, 32nd Pioneers, and 2nd Mounted Infantry to come up.

21. The above garrison was then installed in Guru.

22. Every assistance was given at this time by the Medical Officers to the Tibetan wounded, and a large number of wounds dressed.

23. The Tibetan prisoners were sent back to the wall under escort of a company of Gurkhas to collect wounded and take them into the tents near the wall.
24. AT 3-30 P.M. the remaining troops marched back to Thuna against a bitter head wind, reaching that camp at 7 P.M. after a long and very fatiguing day.

25. From local information the Tibetan forces are said to have numbered 3,000, but it is doubtful if more than 2,000 were actually engaged, half of these being regular soldiers. They were all armed with matchlocks with a few rifles of indifferent make.

26. Their casualties are killed and wounded left on the field 628; prisoners (some of whom were slightly wounded, 222 and doubtless a number of slightly wounded escaped).

Amongst the killed were the Head Lhasa Depon, corresponding to the Tibetan Commander-in-Chief, the Shigatse Depon or General and a high Lama, the representative of the big Gadun. Monastery near Lhasa, and the Chari Depon was also dangerously wounded and captured.

27. A list of casualties on our side with expenditure of ammunition is attached and a rough plan of the operations.

28. The following officer and men are brought to notice:- Captain Ottley, 23rd Pioneers, Commanding 1st Mounted Infantry, did excellent work, pursuing the Tibetans and capturing a large number of yaks and ponies.

Havildar Jangbir Rana, 8th Gurkhas, for climbing into the main building of Guru West village when full of armed Tibetans.

Havildar Ram Singh, 23rd Pioneers, when sepoy Bhagga Singh fell wounded near the wall and had his rifle captured by Tibetans dashed in amongst them and at great personal risk recovered the rifle.

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**List of ammunition expended.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>No. of .303 rounds.</th>
<th>Shrapnel Shell.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-pr. Guns, 8th Gurkhas</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd Pioneers</td>
<td>2,362</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Pioneers</td>
<td>3,669</td>
<td>....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Gurkhas</td>
<td>3,380</td>
<td>....</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Mounted Infantry</td>
<td>2,418</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>1,524</td>
<td>....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maxim Detachment, Norfolks</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14,351</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank and name</td>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Nature of casualty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Wallace-Dunlop</td>
<td>23rd Pioneers</td>
<td>Severely wounded</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.4249 Lance-Naick Chabta Singh</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 3702 Sepoy Bhagga Singh</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 2717 &quot; Sadda Singh</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
<td>Slightly wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 3941 &quot; Buta Singh</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 2535 &quot; Arjun Singh</td>
<td>32nd Pioneers</td>
<td>Severely wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 3228 &quot; Atma Singh</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Slightly wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subedar Sunjat Singh</td>
<td>45th Sikhs (With 1st)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamadar Hazara Singh</td>
<td>16th Cavalry (Mounted)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.3529 Lance-Naick Jhandar Singh</td>
<td>23rd Pioneers (Infantry)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 4621 Sepoy Amir Khan</td>
<td>Queen’s Own Corps of Guides.</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. J. Candler</td>
<td>Press correspondent “Daily Mail.”</td>
<td>Dangerously wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Sepoy, 2nd Madras Infantry</td>
<td></td>
<td>Slightly (name not yet Ascertained)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

J.R. MACDONALD,
Brigadier-General
Guru - Action Plan
Battlefield at Guru
Red Gorge

Located near the Village of Kangma, (“The Red Foot”), which derives this name from the series of spurs of red sandstone that radiate towards the valley in the shape of giant toes. The gorge lies where the River Nyang passes through hills of red sandstone. Where the river was at its nosiest, crags arose from the water edge and amongst the boulders in a patch of red or crimson burberry bushes stood the great red idol which gives the gorge its’ name.¹

The Tibetans were holding positions approximately 1000 to 2000 feet above the road passing through the gorge and had erected some positions for their “jingals” (cannon) also. The Tibetans commenced engagement through fire as soon as the advancing elements of the Mission were sited.

The Gurkha troops were ordered to occupy the commanding heights above the positions occupied by Tibetans and bring down fire upon them from there. Once these were successfully occupied and Tibetan positions were effectively engaged and neutralized along with the artillery fire of the ten pounder guns of The Norfolks, the Sikhs and the main body moved up the gorge to attack the Tibetan positions. The Sikhs outflanked the Tibetan positions from the rear and forced them to withdraw while the mounted infantry pursued the fleeing Tibetans into the valley killing some and capturing the others. The official telegram on this operation from General Macdonald is appended.

Telegram, dated the 13th April 1904.

From: BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. R. L. MACDONALD, C.B., Chalu,
To: The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

No. 288-T. April eleventh, camp, 2 miles outside Gyantse, On the morning of tenth I continued my advance to Gyantse intending to march to Changra as marked on the map, but which does not exist and attack the enemy if met with. My advance guard reported the Tibetans in position at the entrance of a very narrow gorge about five miles from my last camp. The Tibetans were found very shortly posted on ridges and rocks commanding the entrance to the gorge and open fire on my advance guard with several jingalls. The position necessitated a long turning movement to the left, and an ascent of over two thousand feet occupying about three hours. In the meantime, the enemy were shelled, and the jingalls immediately commanding the road silenced. When the heights on left were crowned, a general advance took place, and after some sharp fighting in the gorge of Jamdan, the enemy were routed, fleeing in various directions, the mounted infantry pursuing for ten miles. The enemy left one hundred and ninety dead, and seventy prisoners were captured, besides many wounded. Our casualties were three wounded.’ The enemy stood their ground until close quarters were reached, and were estimated at two thousand, including the Shigatse and Gyantse regular troops. I halted for night at a village called Seogang, four miles beyond end of gorge. Marched to Gyantse to-day, about fourteen miles, and have camped two miles from the Jong. A Gyantse Jongpen had visited me in camp, and desires peace. Have’ postponed further action regarding the Jong till to-morrow, as it is now late. Large numbers of Tibetan troops are reported to be in full flight towards Shigatse. Addressed Adjutant-General; repeated Quartermaster-General; Military; Military Secretary, Viceroy; Military Secretary, Chief; Foreign; Political, Bengal; and Colonel Hogge.

GYANTSE DZONG
Because nothing very much happened at Khamba Dzong, the Commissioner of the Mission Col FE Younghusband, was able to convince Lord Curzon who in turn was able to prevail upon the Home Government to accord permission and to authorize occupation of Chumbi Valley and onward advance to Gyantse Dzong.

It was thus that the logistic build up for this force to advance into Tibet was taken in hand and the necessary resources acquired for the expedition to take off. With these preparations the mission crossed Jelep-La Pass at an altitude nearly 15,000 feet above mean sea level and advanced towards Chumbi. Having arrived at Chumbi the escort Commander, Gen Macdonald felt that the base for the expedition had to be moved from Chumbi. He therefore reconnoitred another area about 3 to 4 miles from Chumbi and this position came to be known “New Chumbi.” Having stabilized here, reconnaissance was carried out towards Phari Dzong. The Dzong was occupied on 19 Dec 1903. The military Commander considered occupation of the Dzong imperative for undertaking further operations.

By 4th Jan 1904 adequate stores to support the operations towards Gyantse had been stocked at Phari and on that date the mission left Chumbi for Tuna a small village of no tactical significance which was to become the forward base for operations to Gyantse. Tuna was occupied on 8th Jan 1904. Here the mission established its winter camp and apart from improving communications and stocking supplies, they fell into the normal camp routine with limited reconnaissance being undertaken.

In March 1904 once the advance towards Gyantse was resumed, it was then that various military actions at different places, more notably at Guru, Red Gorge, Karola, Palla, Tsechin Monastery and Gyantse itself took place. It was during this period that Tibetan soldiers also forayed towards the missions posts and attacked them.

On 11 April Gyantse was sighted. This Dzong located on the road to Shigatse in the West and Lhasa on the East, was built at an altitude of 12000 feet above mean sea level. The fort controlled all access to the principal cities of Tibet. The enormous Fort, built on an outcrop rising sharply out of the plain to a height of 500 ft was adjoined by a Monastery of equally stout construction along the same spur. The town, the third most important in Tibet, was at its foot. The Fort, barring the way to Lhasa had a decisive influence on the expedition’s prospects. The force camped on the bank of the river about two miles from the Fort.

The Jongpen and a Chinese General, an envoy of the Amban led a delegation to the British camp. The Jongpen explained that he could not surrender the Fort while at the same time, he could not defend it as most of his soldiers had run away. The Fort was entered, explored and The Union Jack was hoisted on the finial which crowned it. Having explored it, Brig. MacDonald did not occupy the fort but retreated to Chang Lo about 1000 yards from the Fort. The mission was installed here while MacDonald returned to New Chumbi 150 miles away and took with him about half of his force including its only effective artillery. To guard the mission he left 4 companies of the 32nd Pioneers, 2 companies of the 8th Gorkhas, 50 Mounted
Infantry and Maxims, “Bubble and Squeak” and one section of an Indian field hospital, in all about 500 men. MacDonald chose Chang Lo because the only source of water for the garrison lay here. He felt that, should the mission occupy the Fort and the Tibetans cut off the water supply, it would be just a matter of time when the mission had to surrender.

The General in his wisdom, decided to leave behind about 500 rifles as escort for the post and with the remainder retired to Tuna. It has been argued that the General’s decision in doing so was in accordance with the assessment of the obtaining situation. Be that as it may, the basic tactical principle of occupation of dominating ground had been violated. This single error of judgement was perhaps responsible for avoidable casualties in the subsequent operations as also indeed prolonging these unduly. In hindsight had some more troops been left behind to occupy both the Dzong and Chang-Lo the mission would have been more secure and capable of better operations. This was possible, since reinforcements had been received. This apart, militarily, the General should have established an advance headquarters at Gyantse Dzong and been present himself. Not only was this practical but also necessary specially since bulk of the force under his command would then have been employed in this area.

Having occupied the post at Chang Lo, the Mission awaited the arrival of suitable officials for negotiations. Once these commenced, Tibetans continued to dilly dally but used the time for reinforcing and strengthening their position in the Dzong. Younghusband sent off another Note to the Secretary Foreign Department in India, giving his views on how the future relations with Tibet should be structured or progressed. The proposals outlined in Paragraphs 3 and 15 of this Note, are quite visionary in character. Eventually, when the Treaty was being negotiated at Lhasa, some of these were proposed to be included in greater detail. These were over ruled and modified by the Home Office in London and also became a cause of ire with the Government who did not take kindly to Younghusband on this account. The Note is attached below.

From : Colonel F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, C.I.E., British commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters,

To : The Secretary to to the Government of India in The Foreign Department, Simla. No. 319-G., dated, Gyantse, the 27th May 1904.

I have the honour to submit, for the consideration of the Government of India, a memorandum I have drawn up on our future relations with Tibet.

Memorandum on our future relations with Tibet.

1. The complete and sudden change in the situation in Tibet which occurred in the first days of May was probably not realized by His Majesty’s Government when they declared their intention to still maintain the policy enunciated in the telegram of the Secretary of State to the Viceroy, dated November 6th, 1903. On our first arrival here the Tibetans were stunned by the two severe blows they had received at Guru and Dzam-tang. They submissively handed over the fort without firing a shot. The country-people set about ploughing and sowing their fields: and the town-people about trading with us. Reports came in that Tibetan delegates – though of unknown rank – were on their way to negotiate. Even the Amban wrote that he was positively coming; that he was insisting on proper Tibetan delegates accompanying him: and that the Dalai Lama at last realized our power.

2. But evidently when the Lhasa Government saw that we had no intention of going to Lhasa, that instead we were still talking of negotiating here: and that our General, and a number of our troops, including two guns, had returned to Chumbi, they plucked up courage again and, relying on the
foreign and Lhasa-made rifles and assisted probably by foreign expert military advice, organized a general attack upon the Mission and upon the line of communications. We had good warning of the gathering storm and Colonel Brander was able by prompt measures to prevent its breaking with any serious ill-effects upon us. But from the moment the Mission was deliberately attacked; and from the time when the Tibetans began their bombardment of us from the fort and to send round to every village raising the whole country against us; the political situation was absolutely and entirely changed. The Tibetans had finally rejected our overtures to negotiate. They had definitely decided to fight.

3. When then His Majesty's Government say that they are not prepared to maintain a permanent Mission in Tibet; to occupy Tibetan territory; or permanently intervene in Tibetan affairs in any form, I think they may possibly have been unaware of the extent of the change which has recently occurred here, and as my experience of Asiatic people and Asiatic affairs and my study of this particular question on the spot lead me to believe that the interests of the India Empire would be best served by a directly opposite policy, viz., by the maintenance of a permanent British Agent in Tibet; by the occupation of the Chumbi Valley; and by a sustained intervention in Tibetan affairs, I think it my duty to lay my views before Government for their consideration before the present policy of His Majesty's Government is given practical effect to.

4. It is unnecessary to say at the start that it would be very much more convenient to us not to have to intervene in Tibetan affairs. There would be great advantages in being able to still preserve the policy we pursued all through last century of leaving the Tibetans alone. They would like to be left alone—at least the priests would, and nine hundred and ninety-nine English-men out of a thousand would prefer we should leave them alone. But when they occupy the geographical position they do upon our frontier, there are two essential conditions to the maintenance of this policy; firstly, that they should leave us alone, and, secondly, that they should have no connection with our rivals in Central Asia. Both these conditions have been broken. They invaded the territory of a British Feudatory in 1886 and while declining intercourse with us they sent repeated Missions to our rivals.

5. Intervention was therefore forced upon us. But we tried by every means to make that intervention as little uncongenial as possible to the Tibetans. For years we reasoned with them at Yatung. Mr. White and Captain LeMesurier, Political Officers in Sikkim, tried to settle with them there. Yet even then Chinese Amban and Tibetan officials told our officers that the Tibetan Government were relying upon Russian support; and no result was attained. At Khamba Jong I stated our case in what I studied to make a moderate speech before two minor Tibetan officials who came to meet me; but they declined to receive a translation of this speech for communication to their Government; they refused to report my words; they shut themselves up in the fort; they returned letters addressed to them; and put a stop to all further intercourse. In advancing into the Chumbi Valley I avoided any action which would bring about the actual outbreak of hostilities. At Tuna in January I made a special effort to effect a peaceful settlement. That the Tibetans might not think I was relying simply on our Maxims, rifles and bayonets, I rode without escort to their camp at Guru, ten miles away, and in an informal manner talked the situation over with the leading men; pointed out that for a century and-a-half, till they invaded the territory of a British Feudatory we had been on good terms with them, and never attempted to interfere in their affairs: that even after that invasion and when we had the treaty right to station a British officer at Yatung, we had never exercised that right: but that when they repudiated the treaty made by their suzerain with us and while returning letters from the Viceroy sent Missions to Russia, we were bound to look more strictly into our treaty rights. We were still ready however, I said, to negotiate with them in a conciliatory manner and I would gladly see them whenever they liked to come to my camp. Nevertheless, they remained as obdurate as ever.

They refused point blank to report my words to Lhasa and they returned a written communication which I subsequently made to them. Still intent
upon effecting a peaceful settlement I gladly availed myself of the offer of the Bhutanese Envoy to mediate between us. But this effort likewise failed, the Tibetans declaring that they would have no negotiations anywhere but at Yatung, the place where for years they had consistently refused to make a settlement. When the further advance to Gyantse began I tried up to the very last moment, till our troops at Guru were actually fired on, to avoid a conflict. On arrival here, acting on my instructions, I continued to offer to negotiate. But four dispatches to the Amban produced no effect. In one dispatch the Amban did indeed say that the Dalai Lama at last realized our power, but his flash of wisdom soon died out when he also realized that we were not intending to move on Lhasa itself, that we were halting here and that our General and the guns had returned to Chumbi instead of sending negotiators, he sent troops to attack me, and but for the bravery of our soldiers would undoubtedly have murdered the representative of the British Government.

6. We have therefore been compelled to forcibly intervene in Tibetan affairs. It was wise of us to beware of entrance to a quarrel. But can any Englishman doubt that it is now our duty to bear it that the opposed may beware of us?

7. Our first business then is to break the power of the Lamas and influence of that Siberian, Buriet Dorjieff, who has taught the Tibetans to rely as trustingly on Russian support as Dr. Leyds induced President Kruger to rely upon the Germans. All the evidence goes to show that the Tibetan people had no inherent animosity against us. At Khambo Jong we found the people there and of the villages round quite friendly. Even the soldiers grinned and laughed when our officers went amongst them. In Chumbi, as soon as the officials were prevented from interfering, the people readily came to sell their produce to us. Even after the Guru affair the people did not leave their villages as we marched to Gyantse. As soon as we settled here scores of traders came to our camp and a regular daily bazaar was established. For a fortnight after the attack on the Mission the dak carried by a few mounted men has, too, passed through the country unmolested. Till the Lamas roused the people there was no sign of that fanatical hatred against us which those who have served on the North-West Frontier are accustomed to; and prisoners and wounded Tibetans frequently said that they had no wish to fight against us but were forced from their homes by the officials. And of the lay officials I doubt if many had any bad feeling against us. From what I have seen and from what I learn from Captain O'Connor who has had more opportunity than any other Englishman of judging them most of them appear a colourless, placid, harmless lot. Some of them no doubt hated us. But the majority appeared to have little mind of their own, one way or the other, and to be entirely swayed by their superiors at Lhasa. The real power in Tibet and the fountain head of all the animosity to us must be sought in the great monasteries Lhasa. It is they and they only who have so consistently opposed us; who are responsible for the invasion of Sikkim; for the repudiation of the treaty made with the Chinese; for the obstruction to our trade; for refusing to negotiate; for attacking my Mission; and for now raising the peaceful country people, poisoning their minds, and preaching what in Mahomedan countries would be called a jehad against us. It is these Lhasa Lamas then who should now be punished with a heavy hand. It is they who forced us into the quarrel and it is they especially who should now be made to beware of us.

8. But if we simply negotiate here, as according to my present orders I am asked to do, or even if we proceed to Lhasa and then after negotiations in either place retire within our frontier again will these Lamas ever really fear us? Will they cease to obstruct us when we again come into relations with them, as we must with more and more frequency in the future? Will they not rather, as soon as our backs are turned, still further poison the minds of the people against us and infuse into them a deadly race hatred? Will they not increase their armaments and appeal even more strongly and frequently than before to the Russians for aid? And may not the Russian be expected to act as we have evidence that they intended to act when we
contemplated retiring from Chitral and occupy the place which we had voluntarily retired from? All these are not only possible but highly probably contingencies. We may convince ourselves that the Tibetans will be impressed by our advance to Lhasa and the evidence that gives of our power to strike at the seat of the priestly influence. And impressed they will be for a time. But for a time only, if we immediately afterwards retire right back to our own frontier. The impression will quickly wear off, and in its place will come the conviction that if they had only had as good weapons as we had they could have kept us out: they will proceed to equip themselves with such weapons and to seek that aid which we could hardly expect our rivals not to give them in some form or other-even if it is only in the form of permission to purchase arms in Russian territory, and permission to retired soldiers to assist them as retired Cossacks assisted the Persians in the siege of Heart sixty years ago.

9. If then the present policy of His Majesty’s Government is adhered to, if we withdraw as soon as reparation is obtained: if we occupy no part of Tibetan territory: and if we abstain from permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs we must expect that the rancour which our present fighting cannot but arouse in the feelings of even the mildest peasantry will be fanned into a flame by the crafty priest: that these latter will redouble their obstruction: treble the number of the Lhasa-made rifles which Colonel Brander found so troublesome at Karo-la: import from China or Russia hundreds of European rifles: and permanently ally themselves with Russia. So that unless we make up our minds that the presence of Russian influence and the establishment of a Native power growing in hostility and capacity for offence on our North-East frontier is of no consequence we shall have to renew the operations of the present year under much unfavourable circumstances in the future.

10. So convinced am I that this will be so that I venture to make the following alternate proposals. I would, then, give up all talk of withdrawal and from now onwards abandon all half measures. They have not proved successful in the past and they are not likely to in the future. The moderate policy adopted at the close of the Sikkim campaign when we would have been perfectly justified in occupying the Chumbi Valley or demanding an indemnity did not lead to a settlement with the Tibetans or make them diminish their obstruction by one atom. The policy of sending the present Mission first to an obscure place on the frontier and then to the nearest town in Tibet instead of straight to the capital, which is the obvious place for negotiations with such a country to be conducted, has not led the Tibetans to meet us in a conciliatory spirit. The time given them they have employed in increasing their armament and the hesitation displayed has augmented their determination to resist. By a move straight to Lhasa as originally recommended by the Government of India and which might have been completed a year ago, before the Tibetans had manufactured so many rifles or obtained so many munitions of war from outside, we should have compelled the Tibetans at once to make a settlement with us and impressed them in a way this step by step advance, so intelligible to reasonable human beings so liable to be misunderstood by ignorant, Asiatics never will. So now that they have forced us to go to Lhasa I would remain there. Thus only, in my opinion, shall we ever bring the Lamas to reason.

11. For what sort of men are these Lamas? Probably many people in England think that these high ecclesiastics must be men of learning and refinement and knowledge, who set themselves apart from the world for spiritual objects and who can be treated with as reasonable and cultured men. I find them very different. I purposely visited the Guru camp in order to compel an interview with these Lhasa monks who so persistently refused to see me; and by viewing them in their own surroundings get the better idea of their true character. There was nothing cultured, or refined, or reasonable about them. They were ignorant, bigoted, bad-mannered, ill-bred, filled up with prejudice and conceit and determined at every cost to keep us at a distance, and this not with an eye to the general good of the country but in order to preserve their own selfish monopoly of power. The Abbot and leading monks of the monastery here had not the same fanatical grit as these Lhasa monks had and were even less estimable on that account; but
they had the same ignorance, the same want of culture and refinement and were sordid and sensual-looking besides. These monks simply feed upon the country. They do nothing for its good. They have produced no intellectual treasures; nor have they even educated the people like the Buddhist monks of Burma. They have sapped the strength of the people; they have stifled learning; and practiced cruelties which terrorise the people. A regular Inquisition composed of Lamas examine political prisoners in secret by torture. The enlightened Minister who befriended Sarat Chandra Das and sought modern learning was cruelly tortured and thrown into a river; his household was confiscated and many of his servants murdered. The astute Councillor who dissuaded the Dalai Lama from attacking our camp at Khamba Jong last year was thrown into prison with all his fellow-Councillors, one of whom, in fear of a worse fate, has already committed suicide.

12. People of this description cannot be enlightened in flash nor made to change their entire attitude in a day. Besides striking them we must keep our power in evidence before their eyes. To win them to our side we must exercise personal influence over a lengthened period. After we have struck our blow we must keep a considerable number of troops for another year in Tibet. And Agents must be maintained at Lhasa and Gyantse to keep in constant personal touch with the Lamas. The very idea of opposing us must never be allowed to enter their heads again and at the same time we should work incessantly to let them realize that for all practical purposes they are just as well off with us in the country as they were before we came.

13. We can see already that the spirit of the placid peasants is even now being ignited by the Lamas into a flame of hostility. That we shall have to bat down. But we must also keep watch over the smouldering embers and allow the Lamas no chance of fanning them into flame again. When we have the Lamas down we must not hastily make off back across the frontier and leave them to spring to their feet again with double their present animosity against us. By such a course all our present action will have been rendered worse than useless. We shall only have turned a comparatively weak and harmless state into a state incensed against us and more than ever ready to seek the support of our rivals. There was political danger enough in leaving right across our North-East border a weak impassive state who were more disposed to the Russians than to ourselves. The danger will be increased ten-fold if we leave an actively hostile and well-armed power there whom the Russians might launch off upon the weakly defended plains of Bengal.

14. This result need never be feared and we may on the contrary permanently secure this frontier by building up a friendly power in the Lhasa oasis and so keeping Russian influence well on the other side of the great deserts of Northern Tibet if we give our immediately after our arrival at Lhasa that we mean to stay there; if we keep for a time a sufficient number of troops in the country to see that opposition is useless; if we encourage the people to trade with us as they had commenced to with great keenness before the Lhasa monks launched them against us; and if we show ever one that while we are prepared to hit hard when opposed we have every wish to respect their customs and religion and to live with them on friendly and neighbourly terms.

15. My recommendations are then (1) that at the earliest possible moment we should announce that we are going to keep a British Agent permanently at Lhasa and both as a guarantee for his future safety and as an indemnity for the past misdeeds of the Tibetans permanently occupy the Chumbi valley; (2) that in Chumbi and at Gyantse and Lhasa there should be kept up considerable garrison till as the country is more settled and as our
communications are improved, the troops may be with safety gradually withdrawn; (3) that an Agent be temporarily established at Gyantse who in communication with the Agent at Lhasa would support and encourage the trade between India and Tibet and would also occasionally visit Shigatse and establish friendly relations with the Tashi Lama; (4) that we should dictate a treaty regulating trade, travel and mining, defining boundaries, laying down the methods of official communication, especially stipulating for personal access to the Dalai Lama, the Chinese from Tibet, prohibiting the importation of arms and generally providing that the Tibetan Government should conform to the advice of the British Agent.

16. These measures will, it may be thought, while very costly to ourselves, and calculated to be viewed with dislike by both the Russians and Chinese Governments, only serve as a constant source of irritation to the Tibetans. But if at this cost we can safeguard nearly a thousand miles of frontier from Kashmir to Burma it surely cannot be thought considerable. The Russian Government can hardly complain when the reliance of the Tibetans on their support — unwarranted by definite assurance though it may have been — has brought upon us to great an amount of trouble. Nor can the Chinese raise objections when they were unable either to make the Tibetans observe the treaty they had made with us on their behalf; or to induce them to negotiate a new one; or even to prevent our Mission being attacked. And my experience of Asiatics makes me think that the Tibetans are far less likely to preserve feelings of hostility to us if we show them that our presence is inevitable and irrevocable and our power unmistakable than they would be if left completely alone after having only been irritated. The inevitable the irresistible the Asiatic readily adapts himself to. The smallest shadow of a doubt he at once clutches at.

17. Let us therefore never again let the shadow of a doubt cross the mind of the Tibetans that we mean to predominate in Tibet. Let them see that our presence means at any rate material prosperity to the country and that it means no interference with either their religion or customs; let them see by constant personal intercourse with our officers that we have entirely sympathetic feelings towards them; and I believe in a few years' time there will be as great a difference between the Tibet then and the Tibet of to-day as there is between the Hunza and Chitral of the present time and the Hunza and Chitral when I first visited them, when no man's life or property was secure; when no Englishman could travel there with safety; and when they were as much inclined to ally themselves with our rivals as with ourselves. Our Northern Frontier has been made reasonably secure not by leaving it alone but by making our power felt and keeping up a permanent though mild control. It is only by similar measure that our North-East Frontier will be likewise secured.

F.E. YOUNGUSBAND,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters

Gyantse: The 24th May 1904

The proposals contained in Paragraph 15 of this Note were subsequently to figure in the treaty and became a bone of contention between The Government of India and His Majestys' Governmental machinery in Great Britain.
CHANG-LO
Action - Chang - Lo
(Seen from Gyantse - Palla)
Chang-Lo-Mission
Telegram, dated the 5th May 1904.

From : The Officer Commanding, Gyantse, Kalatso (Tibet),
To : The Military Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

Clear the line. Post at this place was attacked by about 700 Tibetans from direction of Shigatse under General appointed from Lhasa, and accompanied by Lama representatives from Lhasa monastery at about 4-30 A.M. this morning. Attack continued till about 6-30 A.M. when enemy retired in direction of Shigatse pursued by about half the garrison for two miles. Our casualties two men 32nd Pioneers wounded. Enemy left about 250 dead and wounded in vicinity of post. Post here is perfectly secure.

On 3rd May, when Colonel Brander set out with his force to investigate and clear Karo La, the Tibetan officials at Gyantse Fort decided to take advantage of the situation. In the absence of Colonel Brander and his detachment, it was believed that the Mission Post at Chang Lo was so weak as to enable its, capture and annihilation. According to Waddell, “The intelligence department of the Lamas must have been excellently worked, for no sooner had the detachment started for the Kharo Pass than mounted couriers flew with the news of our weakened condition to Shigatse, 50 miles down the valley, and from that place the same evening a force of 1600 warriors hurried up to attack us, traveling all night and all next day to take swift advantage of our hopelessly defenceless position, as they considered it.”

On that day an ominous quiet descended in the village and the usually heavy rush for medicines at the hospital became extinct! The Tibetan servants in the camp also did not report for work and had apparently warned other servants of the Mission about the hostile intent of Tibetans. This was a clear indicator of the events to come and from this the Mission was forewarned of an impending attack. Colonel Younghusband, sent for the Governor of the fort and kept him hostage there.

As was expected, the Tibetans attacked the outer perimeter of the post at about 0400 hours on 5th May 1904. Despite the premonition and indications about it, the post was completely surprised and it was a little while before the sentries were in their battle positions. It would appear that despite having concluded that something untoward was likely to occur, the officers at the Mission did not take adequate precautions. Fortunately for them, the attacking Tibetans did not assault the post but gave their loud war cry from some distance. They resorted to firing with their weapons, mostly
antiquated, at the post and by the time that the attackers actually came up to the defensive positions, sufficient daylight was available for the garrison to bring down accurate fire with their more modern weapons on the enemy. The Tibetan attack was mainly directed at the outer wall of the post where the Union Jack was flying. This apparently was done in the hope that the flag would be defended and maximum soldiers would be found closer to it. The Garrison however had been sited for defense in the inner area in and around the higher structure.

Once the troops from the garrison were able to fire with greater accuracy it was just a matter of a few minutes that the attack petered out. The remaining Tibetans retreated and were chased by the Gurkhas under Major Murray of that outfit, till they came under effective fire from the fort by Lhasa made Martini rifles of which the Tibetans inside the fort had many. The Tibetans left behind 250 dead and wounded while the survivors fell back into Gyantse Fort thus reinforcing it. The wounded were attended to by the medical teams and the prisoners put under custody! The garrison lost three dead and one wounded. Of the three dead, two were those who were originally brought in as wounded.

The Jongpen who was taken as hostage earlier by Colonel Younghusband, was ordered to send a message to Colonel Brander through his servant, ‘under penalty of losing his own life if it were not promptly delivered.’ Given this threat not only was the message delivered 50 miles away, a reply too was received within 36 hours confirming the return of the detachment! The Karo La force under Colonel Brander returned to Chang Lo after a successful operation at Karo La, on 9th May.

The Gyantse Dzong, that had been taken over in early April and subsequently abandoned for Chang Lo Post, had now a garrison of some 2000 Tibetan soldiers and levies and this number was increasing daily! The Dzong was perhaps the last fortified stand made by the Tibetans and was only captured on 6th July. The inference is obvious.
In the last days of April rumours came in that a Tibetan army was being concentrated in the Karo La, a sixteen-thousand-feet pass forty-seven miles east of Gyantse on the road to Lhasa. A Mounted Infantry patrol, dispatched to investigate, found a wall built across a narrow defile. On approaching it they were greeted by a hail of bullets and a shower of boulders from the cliffs above. They estimated that strength of Tibetans, was nearly three thousand. They appeared to be better equipped and led than in previous engagements. This report reached Chang Lo on 1 May and Colonel Brander decided to march against Karo La and set off early on 3 May, taking with him about three hundred and thirty riflemen, forty-five Mounted Infantry, the two Maxims and ‘Bubble and Squeak’.

On contact with Karo La, Colonel Brander confronted an enormous wall. It was strongly built and was flanked by sangars. It effectively blocked, the defile of Karo La, nearly 17,000 feet above sea-level on the road to Lhasa. Flanking parties were sent up against the sangars; but the slopes which offered the most direct approach were so steep that these flanking parties were pinned down by fire. 32nd Pioneers and the Mounted Infantry (on foot) were then launched frontally but were driven back. There being no progress till mid day, the Gurkhas, and the Sikhs, detached a handful of men to edge their way upwards to the right and left of the enemy positions. These detachments had to resort to mountaineering techniques to negotiate these steep slopes until they overlooked the commanding positions from the rear. These two parties, with no training but ample spirit, went to work with determination that is peculiar to Indian soldiers.

At about one o’clock a cheer followed by rifle fire was heard from the heights on which these detachments were operating and soon some Tibetans were seen to be withdrawing from their positions across a steep face where they were caught in a crossfire. While some were taken prisoner by the Gurkhas, some were shot, while others fell to their death over the precipice on which their defence was sited, when they lost their foothold or grip on the ground. From the captured sangars, fire could be brought upon the Tibetans massed behind the wall, who, although their main position was not seriously weakened, lost heart, and started to retreat down the pass.

The Mounted Infantry were launched in pursuit who having made a breach in the wall, pursued the Tibetans at full gallop and succeeded in breaking up a reinforcement of five hundred men, on its way to the wall. The survivors beat a hasty retreat into the hills. The mounted infantry, captured several enemy ponies and burnt two well-stocked camps. In this action, the British lost four killed and thirteen wounded.

Brigadier Macdonald on receiving the report on Karo La was of the opinion that dispatch of a small force under Colonel Brander was too risky. His telegram to the Foreign Secretary on the subject is quite revealing. Peter Fleming in his book, “Bayonets to Lhasa”, suggests that the telegram ordering the return of Colonel Brander although received by Colonel Younghusband, was delayed in its’ transmission to Brander in order to allow him time to complete his mission at Karo La. Despite this exchange between General Macdonald and Foreign Secretary, the General does not appear to have made any adverse comments on this action while submitting his after action report to the Indian Army Headquarters especially since his hunch
proved right! If there was some other exchange of correspondence on the subject, that has not been documented. Under the circumstances, it would not be out of place to attach credibility to the opinion expressed earlier!

Pro. No. 206

From : GENERAL MACDONALD, Chumbi (Tibet),
To : The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Telegram, dated the 3rd May 1904.

No. 317-T. Lieutenant-Colonel Brander reports from Gyantse May 1st, that reconnoitering party of Mounted Infantry located Tibetans 1,500 strong 3 miles beyond the Karo La pass and 13 miles beyond Ralung on the Lhasa road. They were strongly posted behind loopholed walls and sangars at a narrow gorge and opened a heavy fire on the Mounted Infantry who retired without returning their fire and with no casualties. The Tibetans also loosed an avalanche of stones on the Mounted Infantry whilst returning from some well concealed sangars up the hill side which the men successfully dodged. Colonel Brander further wires that after consultation with Colonel Younghusband he proposed moving out with moveable column to-day to attack Tibetans. I am wiring, if possible, to stop this move as I consider this too far from Gyantse for the moveable column to go at present, but doubt if telegram will reach in time.
ACTION AT TSIE - CHEN MONASTERY

Memorandum from the Adjutant-General in India,-(No. 1919-A, dated 13th July 1904).

The following is submitted for the information of the Government of India, in the Military Department.


I have the honour to submit the following report on the action that took place on the 26th June resulting in the capture of the monastery and village of Niani (Ne-Nying shown Nam-gyi on Survey Departmental map).

2. The nature of the position hold by the enemy can be seen from the plan enclosed and consisted of a monastery surrounded by a solid masonry wall 360 by 190 paces, 40 feet high and 8 feet thick; the only entrances were one gate in the east side and a narrow mud ramp leading on to the walls from the out-side. A small double tier fort (marked A on plan) with solid masonry walls standing on a spur to the south-west and a fair sized village (B on plan) about 400 yards to the east of the monastery were also held.

3. The strength of the enemy was 800, all men from the province of Kham armed with Lhasa made rifles, jingals and matchlocks, who, had not previously come into contact with our troops.

4. On the afternoon of the 25th the 2nd Company, Mounted Infantry, who were reconnoitering from the direction of Saotang where my force encamped that night, were fired on from this position, losing one man mortally wounded. On the morning of the 26th I advanced from Saotang to march to Gyantse and when within about 2 miles from Niani, I received information that the enemy was still holding their ground and that Lieutenant-Colonel Brander, with a force of 2 guns, 7 Mountain Battery, two 7-prs, 8th Gurkhas, 1 maxim and 2 companies of Infantry had moved out from Gyantse and occupied the crest of the ridge west of Niani, while the 1st Company, Mounted Infantry, had taken up a position to the cast blocking the road to Lhasa.

Assaulting Force

2nd Company, Mounted Infantry
3 Companies, 46th Pathans
3 Companies, 26 Pioneers
2 Companies, 32 Pioneers.
Reserve
No. 7 Mountain Battery-4 guns.
No.30 Mountain Battery-4 guns
4 Companies, Fusiliers.
1 Company, 8th Gurkha Rifles, Baggage and Rear guard.
1 Company, 23rd Pioneers.
3 Companies, 8th Gurkha Rifles.

5. I detailed a force under command of Lieutenant - Colonel Hogge, 23rd Pioneers, to carry out the assault, the remainder of the column acting as a reserve and baggage guard, strengths as per margin (Given above).

6. On rounding a spur and coming in sight of Niani, I was informed that 2 sections of the 2nd Mounted Infantry had already entered the outskirts of the village, a movement which rendered it impossible for me to shell the monastery prior to the assault, and I accordingly pushed forward the infantry supporting their attack by artillery fire where possible, the various units being distributed as shown on the plan.

The action commenced at 10.30 A.M the infantry attack on the main position being assisted by an effective shrapnel fire from Colonel Brander’s guns on the ridge above. The Fort A was breached by No.7 Mountain Battery and taken by a Company of the 23rd Pioneers and half a Company, 40th Pathans.

By noon the 40th Pathans had succeeded in getting a lodgment on the walls of the monastery by means of the earthen ramp, being joined later by some of the 23rd and 32nd Pioneers, and these troops carried on a house-to-house fight in the interior, searching out, the enemy who concealed themselves, in the buildings and cellars within. To carry out this work with thoroughness would have required a larger supply of gun-cotton than was available and, consequently a good many Tibetans escaped but 142 were accounted for and a quantity of Lhasa made rifles, matchlocks and swords were taken. The village to the east of the monastery gave a good deal of trouble, but after being shelled by the guns of No.30 Mountain Battery was rushed by the infantry. The absence of explosives which had been sent with the troops assaulting the main position made it impossible to effect an entrance into the houses to properly clear them out. The Infantry was accordingly withdrawn and the village subjected to a further shelling which had the result of silencing it.

The troops continued their march to Gyantse at 3 P.M

I estimate that the enemy lost in this action slightly over 200 men killed and no doubt many wounded. Our own loss was extremely small, considering the work that had to be done and the obstinate resistance offered by the enemy and amounted to four sepoys killed, one British officer, one native officer and 11 men wounded.

A detailed return of casualties and expenditure of ammunition is attached.

The results of this action are most satisfactory, a reconnaissance showed that the survivors of the garrison had deserted it, and wounded men
remaining stated that they had abandoned all idea of fighting against us and declared their intention of returning to their homes.

In addition to that it has entirely cleared our communications between Gyantse and Kangma and has undoubtedly had a demoralising effect on garrisons of Gyantse Jong and the surrounding villages and monasteries, who have hitherto considered themselves perfectly secure in strongly fortified positions.

I also attach list of officers and men brought to notice and sketch.

**List of casualties in action at Niani on 26th June 1904**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sCorps Number</th>
<th>Regimental</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nature of wound</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23rd Pioneers</td>
<td>4068</td>
<td>Sepoy</td>
<td>Asa Singh</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Ditto</td>
<td>4119</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Mehtab Singh</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Pathans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nur Kabir</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd Pioneer</td>
<td>4044</td>
<td>Sepoy</td>
<td>Inder Singh</td>
<td>Wounded on 25th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>3520</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Bhagat Singh</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Pioneer</td>
<td>1165</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Makbmod</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Mounted Infantry (55th Coke's Rifles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Naini</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SKETCH SHOWING DISPOSITIONS FOR THE ATTACK ON THE TSE-CHEN MONASTERY
26th JUNE 1904

BUILDINGS ALONG RIDGE ALL STRONGLY HELD
JINGI'S ETC.

1 Coy. 81st Gurkhas
attacking, up ridge

LOW-LYING FIELDS INTERSECTED BY WATERCOURSES. CROPS ABOUT 6" HIGH

40th Pathans
S and M.
(afterwards by zigzag path up to Gompa)

LOOKING ROUGHLY N.

3 Coy. R.F.
1 = 23rd Pioneers
3 Coy. R.F.
1 = 23rd Pioneers

R.F. Maxim

Maxims, 25th Pioneers
and 81st Gurkhas.

7TH M.B.R.A. SHELLING
ENEMY WORKS
1800' RANGE

5TH N.Y.L. ROYAL LANCASHIRE
28TH PUNJABIS
1ST JULY 1904

E. Tape. Dy. No 5886
End W.R.A. July 1904
Samding Monastery
City Gateway from inside
Capture of Gyantse Dzong

Once all attacks or operations of the Tibetans had been beaten back and the Mission was fairly well settled in the new location, Younghusband received a note from Tongsa Penlop that Dalai Lama was keen on a settlement and had deputed one of his "Shapes" (Ministers) for the negotiations. Shape Ta arrived from Shigatse for this purpose. Somehow, the negotiations broke down. It was thereafter decided to give an ultimatum to the Tibetans to vacate the Dzong. Tibetans had utilized the intervening time, to reinforce their positions and strengthen their defences at Gyantse. The details of these negotiations are summarized in the Note sent by Colonel Younghusband, along with the translation of a letter sent to the Tongsa Penlop by the Dalai Lama, which is appended.

From: Colonel F.E. YOUNGHUSBAND, C.I.E., British
Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters,
9th, July, 1904.

To: L.W. DANE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

I have the honour to make the following detailed report of the communications I have recently had with the Tibetan delegates to test their willingness to undertake formal negotiations.

2. Though the Commanders in the Jong had returned the letters I had under your directions written to the Dalai Lama and the Amban, announcing that if they did not send proper negotiators to meet me by June 25th we would advance to Lhasa, yet they knew the contents of these letters from an open letter which I sent with them. They were also informed of the same by the Tongsa Penlop who had come from Bhutan to see General Macdonald and myself and who, after seeing General Macdonald and all our military preparations in Chumbi and been informed that unless the Tibetans sent negotiators by June 25th, an advance to Lhasa would be made, had written to the Dalai Lama, warning him of the danger which threatened him and advising him to send negotiators in time.

3. While returning from Chumbi I received at Kangma on June 24th an intimation by telegraph from the Tongsa Penlop to say he had heard from the Shape Ta Lama (the Lama Member of Council) that the Dalai Lama wished a settlement to be made, and he was on his way to Gyantse for the purpose. The Tongsa Penlop also asked to be allowed to come to Gyantse. I replied to the Tongsa Penlop asking him to come at once and I asked for and obtained the permission of the Government of India to defer the advance to Lhasa for five days to give the negotiators a chance of coming in.
4. In consequence of the fight at Naini on the way here I arrived here too late on the 26th to send a message to the delegates on that day, but on the following morning I caused a Lama in my employ to write letters to the Shape who was at Nagartse and the Ta Lama who was on his way up from Shigatse, intimating to them that I had heard from the Tongsa Penlop that they were coming here to negotiate, and that if they were sincere in their intentions, I would guarantee their security and treat them with respect, but that they must come in quickly as we were about to advance to Lhasa.

5. On June 28th General Macdonald captured the Tibetan position at the Tse Chen monastery, and impressed by this the commanders in the Jong on the following morning sent a flag of truce with a message by the bearer to the effect that my letter to the Shape at Nagartse had been brought into them, a council had been held to consider it and it had been decided to ask us to grant an armistice to enable the Ta Lama to reach here. I consulted with General Macdonald, and as it was a convenience to him to have an armistice, I replied that I was prepared to grant one for the purpose and I sent the terms upon which it was made in writing to the Ta Lama. A copy of these terms is appended.

6. The Ta Lama was very deliberate in his movements, and I was willing that military operations against the Jong should be resumed, as the Ta Lama had been specially informed that he could always come in under a flag of truce. But General Macdonald was willing to continue to suspend them, so the armistice was informally prolonged.

7. The Tongsa Penlop, though he had considerably further to travel, came in here at midday on July 1st and immediately came to see me. I thanked him for the efforts which he was making to effect a settlement and asked him if the Tibetans were really earnest in their intentions. We certainly wished to make a settlement I said, but as he knew we were perfectly ready to go to Lhasa if necessary. He assured me that the Dalai Lama really wished for a settlement and had written him a letter of which I have the honour to enclose a translation as assisting in making one and naming delegates whom he was sending for that purpose. The Tongsa Penlop also produced a packet of silks which he said the Dalai Lama had sent me. But as I doubted whether the packet had really been sent by the Dalai Lama, I told the Tongsa Penlop that it was not our custom to receive presents of this nature unless they were either accompanied by a letter or handed by an official of the dignitary who sent them.

8. About 3 in the afternoon the Ta Lama arrived in Gyantse and I sent a message to say I should be glad to see him that afternoon. He replied that he proposed to visit the Tongsa Penlop on the following day and would come and see me after that. I returned a message to the effect that unless he visited me by 9 on the following morning military operations would be resumed. Undisturbed by this threat he shortly after 9 on the following morning proceeded to visit the Tongsa Penlop, but as he had to pass my camp I sent Captain O'Connor to say that I insisted on his coming to pay his respects to me unless he wished me to consider he was not anxious to negotiate. He was at perfect liberty to discuss matters with the Tongsa Penlop, but he must no longer delay paying his respects to me and giving me evidence that the Tibetan Government were sincere in their wish to negotiate.

9. At 11 I received the Ta Lama and the Tongsa Penlop in Darbar. There were also present the Tung-yig Chembo (the Grand Secretary who was one of the delegates at Khamba Jong last year) and six representatives of the three Great Lhasa Monasteries. As all except the Grand Secretary were men who had not met me before and were probably ignorant of our view of the situation, I recounted at length showing how we had lived on very good terms with Tibet for nearly a century and a half and it was only after the Tibetans had wantonly invaded Sikkim territory in 1886 that
View looking East from Potola
Steps Leading upto Potola

Gateway of Potola
Group of Lams in Sera Monastery
Court Yard of Lalbu
In Sera Monastery
misunderstanding had arisen; that Mr. White had for years tried at Yatung to make them observe the treaty made on their behalf by the Chinese, and that when I came to Khamba Jong, a place of meeting which the Viceroy had been informed was approved of both by the Emperor of China and the Dalai Lama, they still repudiated the old treaty, refused to negotiate a new one, or have any intercourse at all with us, while after my arrival here when I told them I was ready to negotiate, instead of sending me negotiators they sent soldiers and treacherously attacked me at night. I concluded by saying that the viceroy on hearing this had directed me to write letters to the Dalai Lama and the Amban, announcing that if proper negotiators did not arrive here by June 25th we would advance to Lhasa to compel negotiations there, but these letters had been returned by the commander in the Jong, no negotiators had arrived here by the 25th and it was only because on the 24th the Tongsa Penlop had informed me that negotiators really were on their way that the King Emperor in his anxiety for a peaceful settlement had been graciously pleased to grant them a few days' grace. We were ready to go on to Lhasa the next day: we had the soldiers: we had the guns: we even had boats on which to cross the Brahmaputra: and while the army here would move on Lhasa a second army was collecting in Chumbi Valley to take the place of this one when it moved on, and a third army was ready in India to march on to Chumbi. If they were really in earnest and had power to make a settlement, I was ready to negotiate with them. If they were not prepared to make a settlement we would proceed to Lhasa forthwith. Had they proper credentials?

10. The Grand Secretary replied on behalf of the Ta Lama that we had come by force into the country and occupied Chumbi and Phari, and though the Tibetan soldiers at Guru had strict orders not to fire on us, we had fired on them and killed all the high officials. He said that they did not know I was here when this camp was attacked on May 5th. But they now had orders to negotiate with me. They had no special credentials, but the Dalai Lama in his letter to the Tongsa Penlop had mentioned that they were coming to negotiate and the fact of a man in the Ta Lama's high position being here was evidence of their intentions.

11. I replied that I did not wish to discuss the past except to make clear one point. They were not at the Guru fight, but I was and I saw the first shot fired by the Tibetans after General Macdonald had purposely restrained his men from firing. But what concerned me was the future. If they made a settlement with me now, would it be observed or would it be repudiated like the last one? They at first replied that this would depend upon what was in the settlement; but subsequently explained that though they might have to refer to Lhasa for orders, yet once the Dalai Lama had placed his seal on a treaty, it would be scrupulously observed. They said they wished to talk matters over with the Tongsa Penlop who would act as mediator and arrange matters with me. I informed them that I would be very glad if they would discuss the situation with him, and I was quite willing that he should accompany them when they came to see me but they themselves must come to me if they desired that negotiations should take place. They said they would have a talk with him the next day and would come and see me the day after. I told them, however, that they must have their talk before noon the following day and come and see me again at that hour, as I was not yet satisfied of the earnestness of their intentions.

12. The same afternoon they had a prolonged interview with the Tongsa Penlop who asked them what they had gained by their silly attitude of obstruction and advised them to give up fighting and make terms with us. The Tongsa Penlop informed me he thought the delegates or certainly the Dalai Lama were really anxious to make a settlement and suggested my giving them a written paper showing them exactly what our demands would be. He added that the Tibetans were anxious to make a settlement with us irrespective of the Chinese with whom they were not at present on good terms.
Reconnaissance Sketch
from the
PALLA VILLAGE

Red lines show positions occupied by enemy.
Lettering corresponds to that on plan.
X is point where breach was made and entry effected.

L.B. Tunn Dy. No. 5192
End of A.D., July, 1904

L. H. C. Pick, Lt.-Col.
20th R.

Caption: Position of a Palla Post.

[Diagram of Palla Village with red lines indicating positions occupied by enemy, lettering corresponding to map, and a point marked X where breach was made and entry effected.]
On July 3rd the Tongsa Penlop arrived half an hour before the time fixed for the reception of the delegates. At noon I took my seat in the Darbar which was attended by General Macdonald and many military officers while a strong guard of honour lined the approach. I waited for half an hour, but as at the end of that time the Tibetan delegates had not arrived, I rose and dismissed the Darbar. At 1-30, the Tibetan delegates appeared. They were shown to a spare tent and shortly before 4, I received them in Darbar, but to mark my displeasure I did not rise from my seat and informed them that the inference I drew from the disrespect they had shown me in arriving a hour and a half late was that they were not in earnest in desiring a settlement. The Ta Lama assured me that they were really in earnest, but the Grand Secretary was ill.

I then informed them that as I had been attacked here without any warning and after I had written repeatedly to the Amban, saying I was waiting here to negotiate and as I had been fired on from the Jong continually for 2 months since the attack, I must ask them to evacuate the Jong. General Macdonald was prepared to give them till the noon of the 5th - that is nearly two days - in which to effect the evacuation, but if after that time the Jong was occupied, he would commence military operations against it. Irrespective of these operations I would, however, be ready to receive them if they wished to make a settlement and prevent the necessity of our proceeding to Lhasa.

The Grand Secretary in reply said that when the attack was made on the post they were quite unaware that I was in it. We now have accurate information from Lhasa dated nine days before the attack was made, stating that a night attack on the British camp was contemplated. It was of course perfectly well known to all about that I was here. So I told the Grand Secretary whom we know to be at the bottom of a great deal of the present trouble that I should be obliged to write to the Dalai Lama declining to negotiate with a man who told falsehood as he did.

He then said that if the Tibetan troops withdraw from the Jong, they would expect that we also would withdraw our troops, otherwise the Tibetans would be suspicious. I replied that the Tibetans would have to remain suspicious, that they did not at all seem to realize that they would have to pay a penalty for the insult they had offered the British representative, and that I could not discuss this matter further: they must either leave the Jong peaceably before noon on the 5th, or expect to be then turned out by force. On leaving the Ta Lama very politely and respectfully expressed his regrets for having kept me waiting and begged that I would not be angry. But the Grand Secretary, though looking thoroughly shamefaced, went away without a word of apology.

The following morning the delegates had a long interview with the Tongsa Penlop and asked whether time could not be given them to refer to Lhasa for orders. I sent back a message, that it was already nearly a week since I had let the Ta Lama know that the evacuation of the Jong would be demanded, that they ought to be grateful for the opportunity that had been given them of withdrawing unmolested, and that no further grace could be allowed.

The Tongsa Penlop also informed me that they were very suspicious, that we would go on to Lhasa all the same after we had got them to evacuate the fort and wanted an assurance that we really wished a settlement. I told him he might inform them that the best evidence that we desire a settlement was the fact that the control on affairs was in my hands. If we had intended war, the control would have been in the hands of a General. We wanted a settlement, but were ready to make war if a settlement was refused.
19. The delegates and the commanders in the Jong were still undecided. No one would take the responsibility of evacuating the Jong. On the morning of the 5th the Tongsa Penlop with some Lhasa Lamas came to see me and I sent one of latter over to the delegate, saying that at twelve a signal gun would be fired to warn them that half an hour afterwards firing would commence. I told them that if they come over either before or after with a flag of truce they would be given asylum in the Tongsa Penlops' camp. I begged that the woman and children should be taken out of the town. And I sent a special warning to General Ma.

20. No notice was taken of any of those warnings. At 12, I had a signal gun fired and at 12-30 I heliographed to General Macdonald that he was free to commence firing. At 1-45 he began his military operations which planned with great skill and carried out with the utmost gallantry resulted in the capture of the Jong on the afternoon of the 6th and the dispersal of the Tibetan forces.

21. Immediately after the capture of the Jong the Tongsa Penlop sent a message of congratulations, and I asked him to try and find the Tibetan delegates and tell them and the Shape at Nagartse that I was still ready to negotiate as previously announced, but that they must come in at once if they wished a settlement, otherwise we would proceed to Lhasa. It was found, however, that the delegates had fled. It is now three days since the Jong was captured and nothing further has been heard of them.

Translation of a letter from the Dalai Lama addressed to the Tong-sa Pen-lop of Bhutan.

By the blessing of God the religions of Tibet and of Bhutan are the same. I have understood the contents of the letter as well as the verbal message recently brought to me by the Serkhang Tul-ku and the Nye-ma Gyal-po Jongpon. I also understood the contents of the letter, which you previously sent to me by the Serkhang Tulku, saying that it would be well to conclude a treaty. I am pleased also to hear by word of mouth from the Serkhang Tulku that it is your intention to proceed to the Chumbi Valley with a view to saving the lives of all living creatures. A long time has now passed since the negotiations, which took place at the conclusion of the Sikkim war of 1888-89.

The English very well recollect that the treaty, which was then concluded, was made between the Chinese and the English without in any way consulting the Tibetans. Last year the English came without permission to Khamba. Jong, and afterwards crossed the Yatung barrier and advanced up the Chumbi Valley to Phari and Guru. We had only a few men to safeguard our frontier and with them a quarrel arose. Our men did not strike the first blow, and it, will be known later after careful enquiry who began the quarrel. Both you and we are obliged to observe the frontier in accordance with the orders of the Emperor Chen-lung, as you are well aware from numerous communications, which we have sent you. The English Government have sent us many communications, but according to our ancient national covenant the bearers and recipients of such letters are subject to heavy penalties, and it is impossible for us to receive or to answer them. Now we are all resolved, monks and laymen alike, that according as the English behave to us so we will behave to them if they want war we will fight, if they want peace we will be peaceful. But I fearing that to both sides great misfortunes may arise, am much grieved in mind. Now you have often sent me word that it will be well to effect a settlement; and the English have fixed a date upon which the Tibetan representatives should arrive, saying that if they do not come they will assemble a large force and that the Victory has ordered them to wage war with Tibet even if it lasts for twenty years. So I have dispatched the Ka-ton Lama the Grand Secretary Lo-Sang Tin-le, and representatives of the three great Lhasa monasteries to conduct negotiations. When they arrive at Gyantse please assist in making a treaty between Tibet and the English. I entrust you with this duty, and beg you to help the Tibetan delegates and to see that they are not seized or killed. Please send me quickly any private news you have. I will send the Serkhang Tul-ku after you with full instructions. I send you eight pieces (squares) of fine silk. Dated the 5th day
of the 5th month of the Wood Dragon year (18th June 1904.)

As mentioned in the note to The Secretary of State, while the planning for the capture of Gyantse Dzong had been done, the actual attack or assault on the Dzong, commenced on 5th July 1904 and the Dzong was captured by the Force by the afternoon of 6th July 1904. The details are contained in the report rendered by General Macdonald to The Adjutant General of the Army Headquarters in India. This along with a dispatch from Newman to Reuters Simla, are appended.

No. 2047-A, “Special and Miscellaneous,” dated Simla, the 22nd July 1904

Memo. From : BRIGADIER- GENERAL A. A. PEARSON, C. B., Offg. Adjutant General in India,
To : The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.
Submitted for the information of the Government of India.

No. 1383-A, ”Despatch,” dated Camp Gyantse, the 9th July 1904.

From : BRIGADIER J. R. L. MACDONALD, C.B., R.E., Commanding Tibet Mission Escort,
To : The Adjutant General in India.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, a report on the operations, which have resulted in the capture of Gyantse City and Fort, and expulsion of Tibetan Forces from the Gyantse valley.

2. The negotiations with the Tibetan representatives which commenced on the 29th June 1904 after the capture of the Tse-chen monastery, having proved abortive, I was requested by the British Commissioner to resume military operations at noon on the 5th July.

A reconnaissance of the position having convinced me that the best point for assaulting the Jong was the eastern corner, I made my plans to carry out the attack at the dawn on the 6th July and, with the object of drawing the enemy from that point as much as possible, I ordered a demonstration to be made on the previous afternoon against the north-west corner of the city and the strong fortified Palchor Choide Monastery.

The troops detailed for this occupied the outlying hamlets and did not withdraw from them till dark, to give the impression that the attack would be continued from that point.

3. As I did not anticipate that the capture of both city and jong could be carried out in one day, and I made my arrangements with a view to effecting a lodgment in the eastern portion of the city on the first day, intending to relieve the troops, who did this at dusk and with the fresh troops to assault the jong on following morning, all preparations were made for the possible three days’ action.

4. At midnight on the 5th and 1 A.M on 6th July, respectively, the reserve and assaulting columns consisting of the marginally noted troops moved
out by separate routes to take up their allotted positions near Palla village. I directed the assault to be made by three columns, each consisting of a company of Pioneers, a reserve force of two companies being detailed for each column.

ASSAULTING COLUMN

Details, 3rd and 19th Company, Sappers and Miners.

1 Company, Royal Fusiliers.
2 Companies, 23rd Pioneers.
1 Company, 32nd Pioneers.
1 Company, 40th Pathans
1 Company, 8th Gurkhas.
1 7 pr. gun Gurkhas.
1 Company, Royal Fusiliers.
1 Company, 23rd Pioneers.
1 Company, 32nd Pioneers.
1 Company, 40th Pathans.
2 Companies, 8th Gurkhas.

The assaulting line was under command of Lieutenant Colonel Hogge, 23rd Pioneers. The right column was to attack the walled garden marked A on the plan; the center column the house marked B, a very strongly fortified building commonly known, hereafter referred to, as the “Chinese House”; the left column was directed against a walled enclosure C, containing some houses and a number of trees.

5. The Tibetans, whose numbers subsequent information has caused me to estimate as not less than 6,000, occupied the whole town, the jong and the monastery. They had fortified their position on every side, existing walls were all loopholed and supplemented with the sangars, the elevated position D to E was occupied by a continuous wall, and strong sangars were erected on the hills F, G and H.

The roofs of the houses in the jong and town were provided with head cover made of bags of wool, and the walls and towers of the monastery were prepared for defence. The height of the hills on which the jong and monastery stand gave them complete command of all approaches, so that the only chance of getting near them without very loss was to attack before dawn.

6. At 3.30 am the assaulting columns moved out from the vicinity of Palla village to perform their allotted tasks.

Unfortunately the enemy was on the alert and the operation could not be carried out as a surprise. The attack was discovered when about 300
yards from their objective and a furious fire opened on them from the front of the town as well as from the jong. Consequently, and in accordance, with previous arrangement, the centre column, which had the most difficult point to attack, deflected to the right and one made for the garden A, in the wall of which a breach was blown and it was occupied.

The left column similarly breached the wall of the enclosure C. and established themselves in it.

The Chinese house still remained to be taken, and this was first shelled, by the small 7-pounder with the Centre Column, its door was then blown open and its capture effected. When daylight came our troops were able to push on through the intricate maze of houses, and before 8 am the whole of the town from B to its south-west corner was in our possession.

7. As soon as it was light enough our guns, which were posted on Gun Hill to the east of Palla, on the west of Palla behind the covered way, and in the Gurkha post, commenced to play on the jong, and the extremely heavy musketry fire which the enemy maintained from the house tops and sangars on the hills was replied to by the Infantry, while the Pioneers and Sappers put the buildings gained by us into a state of defence. Our efforts to thus break down the enemy's resistance occupied the whole forenoon and about 2 P.M., their fire perceptibly slackened down.

8. I thereupon issued orders for an assault to be made on the jong itself.

A weak spot in the wall at the extreme cast corner seemed to offer a chance of effecting a breach and against this the 10 pounders of No. 7 Mountain Battery were directed while two fresh companies of the 8th Gurkhas and one of the Royal Fusiliers were sent forward from the Reserve at Palla to carry out the assault. By 3.30 P.M. the breach in the wall was considered practicable and very shortly after. The assaulting column issued from the town and commenced to climb the hill.

The attack was headed by a company of 8th Gurkhas, supported by a company of Royal Fusiliers, and behind them again came a second company, of Gurkhas.

A very heavy rifle and shell fire was opened on the jong and under cover of this and in the face of a heavy fire from the enemy, also showers of stones, the Gurkhas, gallantly led by Lieutenant Grant, worked their way up, the steep ascent.

The Tibetans made a desperate resistance holding on to the curtain on either side of the breach almost to the last moment; one man was in fact actually, shot at the breach by Havildar Karbir Pun of the 8th Gurkhas, who was the first man up, followed immediately by Lieutenant Grant.

The nature of the ascent only permitted men to get through the breach one at a time, and in this manner the Gurkhas gradually worked their way through, seizing the tower on the right as soon as enough men had arrived to enable them to do so.

9. The entry into the jong was the climax of the day and the Tibetans offered no further organised resistance, but began at once to retire through the gate in the north side towards, the monastery and western part of the town.
This brilliant feat by the 8th Gurkhas was not accomplished without considerable loss, the company that headed the assault had two British and one native officer wounded, one sepoy killed and thirteen wounded.

10. By 6 P.M. we were complete masters of the jong and were able from there to clear the sangars, on the hills to the north, or the enemy who, however, still maintained a fire from the fortified walls of the monastery. I established myself with eight companies of infantry in the position gained, intending to carry on operations against the rest of the town next day but on the morning of the 7th I received news that the Tibetans had evacuated the place. A reconnaissance in force, which I took out, proved this to be the case, and the Mounted Infantry, whom I sent out as far as Dongtse reported that the enemy had retired through that place, the garrison thereof also vacating it.

11. I am therefore glad to be able to report that the whole country within a radius of about 30 miles of Gyantse has been entirely cleared of the enemy and the Mission and our troops firmly established here.

12. I regret to say that our loss in killed and wounded, though much lighter than I had anticipated they would be in carrying such a formidable position are still, heavy, amounting to:- one British officer killed, seven wounded, and among the rank and file 3 killed and 26 wounded. Lieutenant G. P. Gurdon of the 32nd Pioneers, who was killed, was a most promising officer who had done excellent work on several occasions during the campaign. His death is a loss both to his regiment and the service.

13. I attach returns of casualties and ammunition expended, and a plan of the scene of operations, together with a hand sketch showing the features of the jong and town as seen from Palla village.

14. I desire to bring to notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the names of officers and men mentioned in enclosure A (Not included).

The Eighth Gurkhas were decorated with the awards mentioned below for their conduct in the capture of Gyantse Dzong:

(a) VICTORIA CROSS. This was awarded to Lieutenant John Duncan Grant and was notified in the London Gazette, 21st January, 1905.

(b) INDIAN ORDER OF MERIT-SECOND CLASS. Six of these were awarded to - Subedar Major Kabiraj Khaki, Subedar Nawal Singh Rana, Havildar Jangbir Rana, Havildar Karbir Pun, Rifleman Ramu Gurung and Rifleman Kargbir Gurung. These were notified through Government of India Gazette Notification No. 957 of 08 October 1904.
CAPTURE OF GYANTSE

(TELEGRAMS: NEWMAN TO REUTERS SIMLA)

TELEGRAMS OF 6TH JULY 1904.
5 PM.

We have captured Jong, storming party of Gurkhas Fusiliers being led by officer, 8th Gurkhas, who displayed extreme gallantry. Our casualties not numerous.

Telegram dated 6th July 1904.
From – NEWMAN, Gyantse, (TIBET)
To – Reuter, Simla.

No more stirring story in annals of Indian Frontier warfare than that of capture of Gyantse Fort, held by seven thousand Tibetans, by a handful of British and Indian soldiers. Excitement of long day culminated in scaling of breach in walls of Jong by Lieutenant Grant, 8th Gurkhas, followed by mixed company, Gurkhas Fusiliers. We watched with bated breath these heroic men climb cliff in rock in face of hail of fire, torrents of stone hurled on their heads by frantic Tibetans. Stone struck Grant, swept him off his feet, one thought to certain death below, but he recovered himself wonderfully; was first man over breach. As I write at dusk battle not quite over, one still hears fitful bursts of musketry but Jong is ours. It dominates town below, monastery beyond; action really commenced yesterday afternoon when Macdonald made demonstration on left towards monastery, walls of which were immediately manned by enemy whose fire seriously wounded one sepoy, than at midnight troops began to move out into position. Plan of attack included three columns which were to rush villages fringing base of rock; left centre column were able enter villages before sunrise, but so heavy fire was directed on right and centre column that they were unable to make headway for some hours; however, by seven, whole fringe villages in our possession. Lieutenant Gordon, most able gallant officer, who during siege always led storming party, when we attacked outlying villages was leading party of Sikhs when killed; beyond small village on right lies greater part of Gyantse. More follows.

Part 2. Town built on ridge, houses rising in confused mass one above another. Housetops were full of enemy who pelted right column seeking cover in fringe of town with bullets for hours; there was also continuous bombardment all round from Jong. Macdonald and staff who took up position in Parla outpost coming in for considerable share of attention of jingals; it was not till three that preparations could be made for assault on beetling Jong itself. Our ten pounders hitherto employed generally in firing at Jong and town turned their attention to making breach in wall between two towers on face of cliff beneath which was a small ravine or cleft which seemed practicable to nimble men; breaching was excellently done with common shell, was falling down in great masses. Shortly after breach was made, explosion occurred in powder magazine of enemy by which many must have been killed. Disaster in no way dismayed Tibetans. When reserve companies Fusiliers Gurkhas advanced to deliver assault, furious fire was
directed on them whilst crossing open plain, but only one man was hit owing to extending formation adopted; thereafter took place brilliant scaling feat above referred to; by dusk Fusiliers Gurkhas helmets, caps top of highest building in Jong shouting, but numbers of enemy still remain in town monastery, some Jong buildings.

With the fall of the Gyantse Dzong, preparations commenced for the advance to Lhasa. During this time, the Escort Commander and his force were busy with logistic and operational preparedness.
Road along Kyi Chu.
View of Iron Bridge at Chaksam on South Bank
Chaksam Bridge looking South
LHASA
The Mission finally reached Lhasa on 3rd August 1904. On sighting Lhasa Mr Landon described the scene in his Telegram to the Foreign Secretary at Shimla which is appended below:

Telegram, dated the 7th August 1904.

From: P. Landon, Esq, Gyantse,
To: The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Lhasa, 3rd. We are at end our long journey. Our camp pitched temporarily short distance from great Potala Palace. Lhasa lies before us, without firing shot since Karo La. Macdonald deserves warmest congratulations this successful and unchecked advance to unknown objective at end 400 miles’ communications. All daylong distant view golden roofs Potala Palace encouraged long column on last stage long march, and drizzle at six only laid dust for seven miles’ journey, which lay between us and Lhasa. First low rugged strips detached cloud lay half – way down, enclosing mountain ranges which throw down their rugged, bare spurs into milky plain, vast oval, in which Lhasa stands. Round spurs, northern side, road runs cut in places high over through solid rock, (to) escape floods which often, and now almost, rendered plain vast green morass, 4 – 5 feet deep, in rushes, reeds, mallows. But level broken again (and) again groves high timber trees, chiefly poplars, willows. Latter also often twisting along ground; trunks four feet diameter. As spurs successively passed, great monasteries Debung and Sera revealed tiering with close, white levels of houses and temples; the amphitheatre between spurs. Post Debang, few hundred yards gilt Chinese roof of Nachung Chonkyong Chief Oracles’ House seen buried among trees at mountain foot. In open opposite Debung Cheri village, where alone butchery permitted no life being taken Lhasa, as noted fourteenth century. Here road, which from Tolung rocky often difficult from worn stones underfoot – divides four miles from Lhasa smaller road following mountain base line to Sera, due north Lhasa. Other, our track, striking straight to Lhasa across marshes from which raised by low causeway. Over end this road stretches sea trees, in which Lhasa buried, from which two hills – Potala, Chagpori – rise. Latter sharp cone connected knife edge saddle with peak guarding one side main gateway. Other side gateway rises huge mass rock, upon which Potala sits, showing only dark crimson mass central building. Dalai Lama’s own residence and temple. So much visible from road winding across drainage culverts hemmed in either side earth embankments, containing treacherous waste rushy morass. Redshanks and teal fly up beside track now emptied usual long procession pilgrims, traders and those going to and fro on cover duties. As advance continued cut between two guardian hills widened, and Pargo Kaling temple roof seen over thick trees surrounding Kunduling Monstery, one of four Gompas, from which Regent formerly chosen. To south-east low crimson and white wall, Norbuling Dalai Lama’s summer palace; pleasure ground stretches 500 yards away to right our company ground. At gate city Bhagpori spur affords at last after easy two hundred feet climb, panorama, for which so many vain efforts made during last 150 years. To left, the totally disproportionate bulk of Potala rises almost from ground in gigantic stretches white masonry, pierced with interminable rows of windows and scaled by great red-edged, zig-zag.
Outside Jo Khang
stairways, twenty feet wide; above these white mass ascends either end, in shape heavily terraced, palace enclosing maroon mass; main building, in which window less seen and greatly concealed thick brown matting, hanging completely concealing central recess. Above this again golden roofs, Chinese pattern, give satisfying finish whole huge structure, which 430 height, between 800 – 900 length, completely dominating dwarfing city. Lhasa, which separate from place by wide stretches turf, beautiful plantation, full forest trees, through which streams meander. On further side greenery, Lhasa roofs lie out a small but tangled own, in which narrow streets, as irregular as London city. General colouring dull, adoba dun, relieved by brown parapets, but blaze golden roofs little to south of town, centre reveals Jokang great cathedral, centre Lamaic reverence, which in ground plan curiously resembles Santa Maria Maggiori. Further off rising above mean houses between Morm Gompa marks with scantily gilded pinnacles vicinity old Capuchin missionary chapel and on extreme north bright, golden roof Romoche, second most venerable temple Lhasa, glistens among trees. Certainly, this first bird’s eye view Forbidden City most magnificent surprise; nothing in all approach up to last moment, suggesting exquisite green foliage and towering architecture seen, when at last Lhasa from end to end breaks upon view. Potala would dominate London. Lhasa is almost eclipsed by it. Travelers must indeed been blind who saw Lhasa this fleeting month perfect summer, but left no record except of buildings and religious importance this mysterious long hidden city buried deepest most inaccessible recesses of the east. There has been no lack population in streets. Although Tibetan soldiers, reported number four – five thousand yesterday, have retreated during night. No malevolence displayed, but insatiate curiosity as to everything worn used by pilings. Yesterday abortive interview with Younghusband. Tibetans still appearing unable grasp seriousness situation; unwilling, while professing wish peace, acquiesce even smallest request such as Tibetan traders should be allowed from market outside town near camp. Lamas attempted close markets yesterday, but Nepalese representative protested, and Amban has proved friendly by securing supplies firewood for force, and sending large presents food for column. Outlook clouded; no anxiety, except dilatoriness Tibetan, whose reverses by no means reduced them to humility, but Macdonald taking every possible precaution. Younghusband this moment awaiting visit Amban.

The three Great Monasteries are deeply involved in running of the administration in Tibet and their Abbots are members of the inner council of the Dalai Lama. As has been seen earlier the Dalai Lama always sent representatives of these monasteries for various negotiations with the mission. These are Old monasteries of Lhasa whose monks are respected and venerated by the Tibetan masses. Naichung is the residence of Chief Oracle who has an important role as an adviser in the Dalai Lama’s council. A short history of these is given below :-
Drepung Monastery

Drepung Monastery, the largest and richest monastery ever in Tibet, was founded in 1416 by a disciple of Tsong Khapa under the patron of a noble family and enlarged by the Fifth Dalai Lama later. It lies 8 kilometers (5 miles) west of Lhasa under Mt. Gambo Utse. Its name means Rice Heap in Tibetan. The monastery covers a floor space of more than 200 thousand square meters. At its peak, it had a registration of more than 10,000 monks. Many high and learned lamas had learned here.

The main structures of the monastery include the Main Assembly Hall (known as Tshomchen) four Tantric colleges and Ganden Palace (Ganden Potrang). Tshomchen, covering 4,500 square meters and supported by 183 pillars, is located at the centre of the monastery. Chief of Tshomchen used to have great power. The Iron Bar Lama assistant of the Chief, would take over the administrative power of Lhasa during the Great Prayer Festival. Gilded Buddha and Sakyamuni are enshrined and worshiped in the hall. Upstairs, a collection of valuable scriptures is kept. Northwest of the hall is a small hall in which a bronze Jowo Maitreya aged 8 is enshrined and worshipped. In the front of the Buddha, a conch shell is worshipped also. It was said that it was once used by Sakyamuni and was hidden at Mt. Gambo Utse. Later Tsong Khapa discovered it and bestowed it to his disciple to the monastery's treasure.

Loseling College is the largest among the four Tantric colleges, Each of them has a chanting hall while Loseling's chanting hall can hold 5,000 monks. Ngapa is the only one specialized in tantric Buddhism while monks in other colleges have to pass sutra examination in order to learn Tantra. There are many great murals in the monastery.
Image in Drepung Monastery
The monastery lies 45 kilometers (28 miles) east of Lhasa. Lying at the mountainside, it looks magnificent and grand. Tsong Khapa, the founder of Gelugpa, established it in 1409. A story says that when Tsong Khapa and his disciples were selecting construction site a crow pecked his hat suddenly and dropped it on the mountainside. Then the monastery was constructed there in accordance with Buddha’s wish. Ganden monastery is the first Gelugpa monastery in Tibet. Its Tripa, abbot of the monastery, is actually the Throne Holder of Gelupa, which is Panchen Lama and Dalai Lamas order.

Main structures in the monastery consist of the Main Assembly Hall (Tshomchen) and Tantric Colleges. The hall has 108 pillars and occupies a floor space of 1,600 square meters, capable of holding 3,500 lamas. Maitreya and Tsong Khapa are enshrined and worshiped in the hall. Left of the huge hall is a small hall, which was the numen chapel of the monastery. The chapel was built in 1416 and the fourth Panchen added gold roof to it in 1610. Behind the chapel, there is a huge stone lying here from India according to legend.

Tri Thok Khang is one of the early structures, which is the residence of Tsong Khapa's and the successive Tripas. Their clothing has been kept in the hall. In 1720, it was expanded and its gold roof was constructed during reign of the Seventh Dalai Lama. Dalai Lamas usually would stay here during visits.

Serdhung is a three-story building which houses Tsong Khapa’s and his successors stupas. In 1419, Tsong Khapa died and his disciples built the hall to house his tomb which was made of 900 taels of silver, equaling more than 1100 troy ounces. The thirteenth Dalai Lama changed it into gold later. More than 95 silver tombs were built for deceased Ganden tripas.

Ganden monastery has two Tantric colleges which were both built by Tsong Khapa’s disciples. Both the chanting halls of the two can hold 1,500 lamas chanting. Except for the two, there are more than 20 small chanting halls, which belong to different Khangtsens, smaller organizations than colleges. Each of them can house 200 chanting monks. Dormitories and Debating Courtyards are scattered in the monastery. Debating is an essential training method for lamas, and will be held almost every morning.

The Monastery has extremely delicate and fine murals and sculptures. It also keeps an armor decorated with gems, which was worn by Emperor Qianlong and was bestowed to the monastery as an offer to Tson Khapad. Its thangkas are special and similar with embroidery of south China. The most important and valuable arts left are the paintings of Buddha and Jataka Stories drawn by the First Panchen Lama.
Sera Monastery

Sera, one of the three largest monasteries of Gelugpa, sits at the foot of Hill Tatipu. It is as prestigious as Drepung and Ganden, which had a longer history. Sera in Tibetan means Wild Rose Garden since opulent wild rose woods once grew around it. A legend said Tsong Khapa and his two disciples travelled in the area, spreading their religion. One day, they heard a horse whinnying underground when they were taking a walk in the rose woods. A statue of Hynagriva (a horse-headed demon-god) was dug out then. Tsong Khapa started to build the monastery to enshrine Hynagriva. However, the trust is that in 1414, Jamchen Choje (or Sakya Yeshe), one of Tsong Khapa’s disciples, on behalf of Tsong Khapa, visited Emperor Chengzu, who granted him a title of Dharma King of Great Mercy as well as sutras and a set of sandalwood Arhats. In order to preserve them, Tsong Khapa suggested Jamchen Choje to build a monastery to house these treasures. Then Sera monastery was set up in 1419.

The center of Sera is the Main Assembly Hall, or Tsokchen in Tibetan, which is the grandest hall of Sera, occupying a floor space of 1,000 square meters. The four-storied hall has four chapels in which Arhats, Manjushri, Tsong Khapa and Chenrezi are enshrined respectively. A huge Maitreya had been enshrined in the hall during the reign of the Seventh Dalai Lama. The Buddhist sutra Jamchen Choje bought back from Beijing is kept on the sutra pigeonhole against the hall, which is now of great value.

Sera has three colleges. Sera Me college is the one built first, in 1419. Later it was destroyed by lightening strike and restored in 1761. Its Chanting hall is remarkable. Sera Me is prestigious for its fine, undamaged murals.

Sera Je college was first found in 1435 and expanded by a Mongol King in seventeenth century. The building has five stories, covering a piece of a thousand square meters. In its main hall 11 stupas of Ganden tripas and Ratreng tripas were contained. The Hynagriva said above is enshrined in its Hynagriva Chapel.

Ngagpa College was set up in 1559. The smallest college of the three though, it houses its founder, Jamchen Choje’s statue in its chanting hall. The set of sandalwood Arhats granted to the monastery has been housed in this college. For the sake of perfect preservation, they had been placed in the bellies of a set of clay Arhats which are definitely the same with the original ones.
Located about half a mile to the south of Drepung Monastery, is the seat of the “State Oracle”, in whose body the spirit of a given deity enters on specific occasions. In this state the Oracle answers questions put to him on matters pertaining to State, religious and personal matters. In this state the Oracle also makes predictions on important matters and subjects. The Naichung Monastery is affiliated to Drepung Monastery and the resident Oracle is selected from amongst the approximately one hundred Lamas residing there. The Dalai Lama has a big say in the selection and appointment of the Oracle. The individual is selected on the basis of his understanding of religion and his purity of self. There are other oracles also in Tibet including a lady oracle of “Tenma” a female deity located just above the Drepung Monastery. The Naichung Oracle is the most important one and is the State Oracle.

The description of the Monastery itself has been covered in detail at pages 446-454 in the book, “Oracles and Demons of Tibet” by Rene De Nebesky-Wojkowitz, published by Mouton & Co, ’S Gravenhage in 1956. It is said therein that three gates lead into the courtyard of the Monastery. The southern gate remains closed, though visitors may enter through the eastern and western gates. The cloistered courtyard is covered with stone slabs; the walls surrounding covered with frescoes, the pillars of the cloister decorated with weapons and armour. In the center stands a seven-foot tall column. Towards the northern end, steps lead to an arcade, which stretches in front of the façade of the three-storied temple. The main entrance to the Temple is heavily carved. The crossbeams of the inner roofing of the arcade consist of bundles of weapons and firearms, which it is believed enhance considerably the magic forces that pervade the Temple. The main door leads to the chief assembly-hall, divided by pillars into three aisles. The monks gather here daily to say their prayers. The walls of the Temple are covered with frescoes. Close to the walls stand rows of drums with long handles. A gate in the left sidewall leads into a chapel. Next to this door (in the main hall) stands a small altar bearing several statues. In the far left corner of the assembly-hall a low gate leads into perhaps the most important rooms of the Monastery. The room is open up to the gilt roof of the Temple. This room contains the famous tree (in the center) in which Pe bar is believed to have vanished in the form of a white dove. The tree is covered with ceremonial scarfs. Next to the tree stands an altar with a statue of Pe bar. The walls are covered with frescoes. On the right side of the door to this room (from the main hall) an altar bears the statues of the three mkhan slob chos gum. Next to this altar, in the center of the wall, leads a broad door into the most important chapel of the Monastery. In the middle stands a massive carved silver-plated throne, on which the chief oracle-priest of Tibet takes his place whenever the reigning deity of Naichung Gompa or one of its minor emanations is due to enter his body. A set of ceremonial garments is kept ready on the throne. Behind the throne, on a small altar, lies a statue of Padmasambhava, believed to have been blessed by the sage himself. To the right side of the entrance of the chapel, stands another altar, also bearing three unknown images. Through a small door, which lies to the right of this altar, one enters the mgon khang. Inside the mgon khong, on the rightside, close to the entrance, stands a statue of the Pe bar and all his emanations united into one single form, known as the Kun ‘dus rgyal po. At times when the seat of the state oracle is vacant and Pe bar did not manifest himself in another medium the image is carried from time to time in procession around the Monastery. At the wall to the left of the entrance stands an altar bearing an image of dMag zor rgyal mo, and on a second altar to the opposite rests a statue of the goddess Nyi ma gzhon nu.
The *mgon khang* also contains various other images. When entering the main hall and proceeding clockwise, one reaches a door opening into another chapel. From this room a staircase leads to the upper floor of the Temple. Behind the shrine lies the house of the oracle priest.

Very little is known of the seers who occupied the Monastery. It is however easy to see that the position of the seer is precarious both due to his political influence as also that he is responsible for his political utterances. The position of the Oracle is said to have been established at the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama when an oracle saved Lhasa inhabitants when he predicted the conspiracy of Nepalese intent on killing them by poisoning the public wells there. Given this position the Oracle assumes responsibility for wrong predictions also and it is not unknown for him to be penalized when this happens.
Lhasa is a city which is identified with the Potola Palace of Dalai Lama. The Palace is the central landmark around which the city of Lhasa is built. The Potola Palace in its magnificence dominates every aspect of life in Lhasa. Having seen what Mr Landon had to say of this palace, the Potala as it is today with its history as gleaned from the Net is given below. We must however be aware that there has been an innocuous attempt to show that Potala has been in existence since the 7th century.

In 641, after marrying Princess Wencheng, Songtsen Gampo decided to build a grand palace to accommodate her and let his descendant remember the event. However, the original palace was destroyed due to a lightning strike and succeeding warfare during Landama’s reign. In seventeenth century under the reign of the Fifth Dalai Lama, Potala was rebuilt. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama expanded it to today’s scale. The monastery-like palace, reclining against and capping Red Hill, was the religious and political centre of old Tibet and the winter palace of Dalai Lamas. The palace is more than 117 meters (384 feet) in height and 360 (1180 feet) in width, occupying a building space of 90 thousand square meters. Potala is composed of White Palace and Red palace. The former is for secular use while the later is for religious.

The white Palace consists of offices, dormitories, a Buddhist official seminary and a printing house. From the east entrance of the palace, painted with images of Four Heavenly Kings, a broad corridor upwards leads to Deyang Shar courtyard, which used to be where Dalai Lamas watched operas. Around the large and open courtyard, there used to be a seminary and dormitories. West of the courtyard is the White Palace. There are three ladder stairs reaching inside of it, however, the central one was reserved for only Dalai Lamas and central government magistrates dispatched to Tibet. In the first hallway, there are huge murals describing the construction of Potala Palace and Jokhang Temple and the procession of Princess Wencheng reaching Tibet. On the south wall, visitors will see an edict signed with Great Fifth’s handprint. The White Palace mainly serves as the political headquarter and Dalai Lamas’ living quarters. The west Chamber of Sunshine and the East Chamber of Sunshine lie as the roof of the White Palace. They belonged to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Fourteenth Dalai Lama respectively. Beneath the East Chamber of Sunshine is the largest hall in the White Palace, where Dalai Lamas ascended throne and ruled Tibet.

The Red Palace was constructed after the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama. The center of the complicated Red Palace is the Great West Hall, which records the Great Fifth Dalai Lama’s life by its fine murals. The scene of his visit to Emperor Shunzhi in Beijing in 1652 is extraordinarily vivid. It also has finely carved columns and brackets. The hall has four additional chapels. The West Chapel houses three gold stupas of the Fifth, Tenth and Twelfth Dalai Lamas’. Their mummified and perfumed bodies are well kept in those stupas. Among the three, the Fifth Dalai Lama’s stupa is the biggest, which is made of sandalwood, wrapped in gold foil and decorated with thousand of diamonds, pearls, agates and others gems. The stupa, with a height of 14.86 meters (49 feet), spends more than 3,700 kilograms of gold. The North chapel contains statues of Sakyamuni, Dalai Lamas and Medicine Buddha, and stupas of the Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Dalai Lamas. Against the wall is Tanjur (Beijing edition), a most important Tibetan Buddhist sutra sent to the Seventh Dalai Lama by Emperor Yongzheng. In the East Chapel a two meter (6.5 feet) high statue
of Tsong Khapa, the founder of Gelugpa which is Dalai Lama’s lineage, is enshrined and worshipped. In addition, about 70 famous adepts in Tibetan Buddhism surround him. The South Chapel is where a silver statue of Padmasambhava and 8 bronze statues of his reincarnations are enshrined. On the floor above, there is a gallery which has a collection of 698 murals, portraying Buddha’s, Bodhisattvas, Dalai Lamas and great adepts and narrating jataka stories and significant Tibetan historic events. West of the Great West Hall locates the Thirteenth Dalai Lama’s Stupa hall. Since he was regarded as great as the Great Fifth, people started to build his stupa after his death in the fall of 1933. Taking three years, the stupa is comparable with the Great Fifth’s stupa. It is 14 meters (46 feet) in height, coated with a ton (2200 pound) of gold foils. In front of it is a mandala made of more than 200,000 pearls and other gems. Murals in the hall tell important events in his life, including his visit with emperor Guangxu. The highest hall of Potala was built in 1690. It used to be the holy shrine of Chinese Emperors. Dalai Lamas would come here with his official and high lama to show their respects to the central government annually before.

Dharma Cave and the Saint’s Chapel are the only structures left which were built in seventh century. They both lie central of the Red Palace. Dharma Cave is said to be the place where King Songtsen Gampo preceded his religious cultivation. Inside the cave, statues of Songtsen Gampo, Princess Wencheng, Princess Tritsun and his chief ministers are enshrined. In the Saint’s Chapel above Dharma Cave, Chenrezi, Tson Khapa, Padmasambhava, the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Dalai Lamas are enshrined and worshipped. Visitors may find a stone with a footprint that was believed left by the infant Twelfth Dalai Lama.

On entry into Lhasa there were minor incidents of manhandling of some of the members of the mission. The Dalai Lama had fled Tibet and the “Ti Rinpoche” of the Ganden Monastery had been appointed in his place by the Dalia Lama to look after the affairs of the state. Once the force reached Lhasa, they were left with supplies to last them only for one and a half days. The monks of Lhasa had issued an edict to their people not to make food supplies available to the force. Seeing this, General Macdonald moved a part of this force to surround the monastery at Sera and deploy his guns for an attack on this monastery. Once these arrangements were completed the monks of this monastery gave in and provided the needs of the force! Stories of the prowess of the force had, it appeared, traveled to this part! In that much therefore the action at Guru had paid off!

Finally, the Amban had declared the deposition of the Dalai Lama and had posted posters to this effect in the streets of Lhasa. A Translation of this was forwarded by Col Youngusband to Mr Dane Secretary Govt of India is given below:
Front of Potola
No. 787-g., dated Lhasa, the 15th September 1904.

From: COLONEL F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, C. I. E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters,

To: I. W. DANE, ESQ., C.S.I., I.C.S., Secretary to the Government of India, copy of a Notice posted by the Chinese Amban in Lhasa denouncing the Dalai Lama.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a Notice posted by the Chinese Amban in Lhasa denouncing the Dalai Lama.

Translation of a Notice posted by the Amban in Lhasa, 10th September 1904.

This notice is posted by Yu Amban (&c., &c.), on receipt of a reply to his telegram, dated 25th of the 7th month (5th September). The rank of the Dalai Lama is temporarily confiscated and in his place is appointed the Tashi Lama. In accordance with instructions received notice to this effect has been sent to the Tashi Lama. For more than 200 years Tibet has been a feudatory of China and the Dalai Lama has received much kindness from this great kingdom, but in return for this kindness he did not remain to guard his kingdom. On account of his not regarding the interests of the faith, the gods and guardian spirits became angry, and he also allowed his subjects to act as they pleased. Moreover, he gave no orders to his subjects to settle the question of the Indian-Tibetan boundary, which had been outstanding for more than 10 years. Although orders were given to him to settle the matter quickly, he paid no attention to them, but collected soldiers from various parts and made war, and then being defeated and great trouble having arisen, he, instead of protecting his subjects and country, ran away to a distant place in an unknown country. In the war thousands and tens of thousands of Tibetans were slain and he being unable to fight, reproached those who ran away for not carrying out his orders. The teacher of the Dalai Lama (the late Regent) and Him Amban had desired a peaceful solution of the frontier difficulties, but the present Dalai Lama out of jealousy not considering properly the correct view of the case, caused the death of many people, and thus caused much grief to the people of Tibet, and listening to bad advice, he heavily punished the Regent. In the case of the Sha-pes Pal-jar Dorje the Dalai Lama wrote to the Amban requesting him to report the Sha-pes to the Emperor for bad conduct, and the Amban having reported the matter, the Shapes was deposed and punished. As to the other Shapes if they had to be punished it should have been done in accordance with the custom of nations; but the Dalai Lama, although he had sent a representation to the Amban and the Amban had himself enquired minutely into the case and was awaiting a reply from the Emperor, nevertheless became angry one day and of his own accord punished them severely. Again one day his anger being appeased he set them free. From this it appears that he paid no regard to the Emperor nor to the law and justice. These various crimes show that he is not a man who should not be punished. So being a man of evil mind and having oppressed all his subjects and robbed them, it appears that his ministers cannot hold in much regard. As he has transgressed the laws of the Buddhist Faith and thus caused disturbance amongst the great powers, he has been denounced and so reaped the fruits of his ill-doing and all men will thus receive satisfaction. In order that you may all thoroughly understand this matter I have posted this notice, and you should all, Chinese and Tibetan officials, soldiers, peasants, men and monks, take it to heart. In future Tibet being a feudatory of China the Dalai Lama will be responsible for the Yellow-cap faith and monks, and will only be concerned slightly in the official matters while the Amban will conduct all Tibetan affairs with the Tibetan official and important matters, will be referred to the Emperor. The Dalai Lama will not be permitted of his own free will to intervene in affairs. You must all understand this and act accordingly so that no punishment may befall you, and must not transgress my orders.

Dated 1st of the 8th month of the 30th year of the Emperor Kwang Shu (10th September 1904.)
The Mission was welcomed by both the Chinese Amban and the Nepalese Representative. During their stay in Lhasa the mission took time off to visit various sights in and around Lhasa and also the great Monasteries of Sera, Drepung and Ganden apart from Naichung Monastery where the Chief Oracle of the Dalai Lama was resident. During their stay friendly relations were established between the troops of the mission and the Tibetan peasantry and lot of sport and other activities were indulged in.
Gilded Roofs inside Potola
The treaty with the Tibetans was concluded on 7th September 1904. The ceremonies observed during the signing of the treaty including the speech made by Col Younghusband and the treaty have been described by him in his Memorandum to Mr LW Dane, Secretary of State Foreign Department to the Government of India and is appended below :

No.765.G., dated Lhasa, the 8th September 1904

From: Colonel F. E. YOUNGHUBAND, C. I. E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters,

To: L. W. Dane, Esp, C. S. I. Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

In continuation of my Telegram of yesterday's date, I have the honour to make the following report of the circumstances under which the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet was signed.

2. Half an hour before the time fixed for the ceremony the whole of the route leading up to the Potala and the passages as well were lined with troops, and soon after 3 P.M. General Macdonald and I, accompanied by the members of the Mission and the military staff, reached the Potala. We were received in the Durbar Hall by the Amban who had arrived there more than an hour previously to guard the sacred portrait of the Emperor Kein Lung.

3. The hall was the one in which Dalai Lama holds durbars, and was large enough to hold about two hundred of our troops (some of whom were formed up as an escort, while others had been allowed to attend as spectators), about one hundred Chinese, and a hundred Tibetans. The scene, as we entered was extremely picturesque. On the left all the British and Indian officers and men; on the right were the mass of Tibetans, the Councillors in bright silk robes, and many others in brilliant clothing, together with the Bhutanese in bright dresses and quaint head-gear: and in front the Amban and his staff in their fullest official dress advanced to meet me with the Acting Regent by him in the severely simple grab of a Lama. The pillars and cross-beams of the roof of the hall were richly painted. An immense silk curtain was hung immediately behind the chair to be occupied by the Amban and myself. And the whole scene was rendered curiously soft and hazy by the light entering, not through windows at the sides, but through the immense sunlight in the centre of the hall, which was covered over with coloured canvas. A plan of the Durbar which I had arranged before hand is appended. The Ti-Rajmopochi (the Acting Regent) sat next to the Amban on his left.

4. As soon as we were seated Tibetan servants brought in tea and handed cups to all the British and Chinese officials. Low tables of dried fruits were then set before the two rows of officials. When these were all cleared away, I said to the Amban that with his permission I would proceed to business. I first had the Convention read in Tibetan and then asked the Tibetan officials if they were prepared to sign it. They answered in the affirmative, and the immense roll of paper, on which the Convention is written in three parallel columns in English, Chinese and Tibetan,
according to their custom of having treaties in different languages inscribed on the same sheet of paper, was produced. I asked the Tibetans to affix their seals first, and the long process began. When the seals of the council, the Monasteries and the National Assembly had been affixed, I rose and with the Ti-Rimpoche advanced to the table, the Amban and the whole Durbar rising at the same time. The Ti-Rimpoche then affixed the Dalai Lama’s seal, and finally I sealed and signed the convention. Having done this, I handed the document to Ti-Rimpoche and said a peace had now been made which I hoped would never be broken again.

5. The same ceremony was followed in the case of the copies in the three languages for the Amban which, having been signed and sealed, I handed to him.

6. The three copies each in three languages for the British Government were then signed and sealed, the whole operation lasting nearly an hour and a half.

7. When the whole ceremony was concluded I addressed a speech, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy, to the Tibetans. This was translated sentence by sentence by Captain O’Connor, and the Amban’s interpreter translated it sentence by sentence to the Amban. At its conclusion the members of Council said that the treaty had been made by the whole people and would never be broken. We would see in future that they really intended to observe it.

8. I then turned to the Amban and thanked him for the help had given me in making the Convention. He said he was glad he and I had been able to work together, and hoped and thought the Tibetans would keep the treaty.

9. A copy of the Convention, as signed, is appended. The three original copies I will bring back to India with me.

10. The Tibetans throughout showed perfect good temper and the fullest respect. They often laughed over the operations of sealing, and when we left they all came crowding up to shake hands with every British officer they could make their way to.

11. The Amban was very courteous, and showed special pleasure when my words regarding the continued suzerainty being recognised were translated to him.

12. Altogether I should say the ceremonial very deeply impressed the Tibetans who, without being humiliated in a way, which may cause resentment, have now learned to accord us the respect, which is our due.

13. At the conclusion of the Durbar I had the Lamas of the Potala presented with one thousand rupees.

14. In regard to the Convention itself, it is necessary to say that in the Tibetan translation the Chumbi valley is defined as running up to the Tangla pass, for the Tibetans do not regard Phari as being in the Chumbi valley as we do. In deference to the wish of the Amban, I did not insert the words “Regent of Tibet” after Ti-Rimpoche, as he has not yet been officially recognised as such by the Chinese Emperor. He has however been so recognized both by the Dalai Lama and the National Assembly, and the seals which were affixed in support of the seal of the Dalai Lama used by the Ti-Rimpoche render the agreement absolutely binding.
Speech delivered by Colonel Younghusband on the Signing of the Convention,
Lhasa, September 7th, 1904.

The Convention has been signed. We are now at peace. The misunderstandings of the past are over, and a basis has been laid for mutual good relations in future. In the Convention the British Government have been careful to avoid interfering in the smallest degree, with your religion. They have annexed no part of your country. They have made no attempt to interfere in your internal affairs. They fully recognise the continued suzerainty of the Chinese Government. They have merely sought to ensure that you abide by the treaty made on your behalf by the Amban in 1890; that trade relations between India and Tibet, which are no less advantageous to you than to us, should be established as they have been, with every other country in the world, except Tibet; that British representative should be treated, with respect in future; and that you should not depart from your traditional policy in regard to relations with other countries.

The Treaty now made I promise on behalf of the British Government, we will rigidly observe. But I must also warn you we will as rigidly enforce it. Any infringement will surely be punished; any obstruction to trade, any disrespect or injury to British subjects will be noticed and requirement exacted. We treat you well when you come to India. We take not a single rupee in customs duty from your merchants. We allow Tibetans to travel or reside whenever they will. We preserve the ancient buildings of the Buddhist faith. But we expect when we come to Tibet that we should be treated with no less consideration and respect than we show to you in India.

You have found us bad enemies when you have not observed treaty obligations and shown disrespect to the British Representative. You will find us equally good friends if you keep the present treaty and show civility.

I trust that the peace which has this moment been established will last for ever, and that we may never again be forced to treat you as enemies.

As a first token of peace I will ask General Macdonald to release all prisoners of war, and I shall expect that you will set at liberty all those imprisoned on account of dealings with us.

Convention between Great Britain and Tibet.

Whereas doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government under these agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Tibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government and on behalf of that said Government, and Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three monasteries Se-ra, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Tibet :-
I.

The Government of Tibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and to recognise the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, as defined in Article I of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which all British and Tibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyantse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Tibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Tibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III.

The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Tibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorised delegates to negotiate with representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyantse and Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok, and, at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Tibetan Agent who shall, receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in question any letter, which the latter may desire to send to the Tibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Tibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.

VI.

As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the despatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for breaches of treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Tibetan Government engages to “pay a sum of pounds five hundred thousand, equivalent to rupees seventy-five lakhs, to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate whether in Tibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual instalments of rupees one lakh each on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January 1906.
Sha-pes Negotiating Treaty
Ti Rimpoche
Nepalese Representative
VII.

As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi valley until the indemnity has been paid and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII.

The Tibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhasa,

IX.

The Government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government-

(a) no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise given for occupation, to any foreign Power;

(b) no such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs;

(c) no representatives or agents of any foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet;

(d) no concessions for railways, roads, telegraph, mining other rights, shall be granted to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power, in the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government;

(e) no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any foreign Power or the subject of any foreign Power.

X.

In witness whereof the negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa, this 7th day of September in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the 27th day of the seventh month of the Wood Dragon year.

(Sd.) F. E. YOUNGUSBAND,

Colonel,

British Commissioner.

(Seal of the Dalai Lama)
In Proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the representatives of Great Britain and Tibet declare that the English text shall be binding.

(Sd.) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
Colonel,
British Commissioner.

Once the Treaty had been signed some goodwill gestures were undertaken to demonstrate the positive thinking of the mission some of those are contained in the Note appended below:

No. 762-G. dated Lhasa, the 8th September 1904.

From: COLONEL F.E. YOUNGHUSBAND, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters,
To: L W DANE, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department

Two Shap-ses arrived at noon to-day, and I informed them that General Macdonald has agreed to my request to release all prisoners of war. These
were paraded in front of the house, and General Macdonald sent a Staff officer to order their release and to give each man five rupees for work he had done.

2. The Sha-pes then produced two men who had been imprisoned owing to assistance they had given to Sarat Chandra Das and two men who had been imprisoned for helping the Japanese traveller, Kawaguehi, one of whom was a trader from Darjeeling. The two first men had been in chains for nineteen years, and showed signs of terrible suffering. All were in abject fear of the Tibetans, bowing double before them. Their cheeks were sunken and their eyes glazed and stared. Their release is entirely due to the exertion of Captain O'Connor. I thanked the Sha-pes for their action, which I looked upon as a sign that they really wished to live on friendly terms with us. I trusted they would never again imprison men whose only offence was friendliness to British subjects.

3. I then returned to the Sha-pes the sum of Rs.5,000 which I had exacted from them and released the hostages I had demanded on the occasion of the attack by a fanatical Lama on two British officers last month. But I demanded back the sum of Rs. 1,000 on account of one and the brutal torture of another servant of the Mission caught in the town of Gyantse on the night of the attack of the Mission. I said we did not mind fair and square fighting between men whose business is to fight, but the murder and torture of harmless and defenceless servants was pure barbarity. The Sha-pes acknowledged that what I said was just, but said they were not present and knew nothing of it. Rupees 1,000 was therefore retained to be paid in compensation to the servants' families.

4. I then remarked that we had now had a general settling up of all accounts between us and could start fair. The Sha-pes said they hoped now we would always be on friendly terms, and they certainly meant to observe the treaty.
FINAL REPORT
Final Despatch

Before any worthwhile conclusions or comments on some of the aspects of this Expedition are made it is relevant to read the "Final Report" on the operations of the Missions' Escort submitted by Brigadier General J.R.L. Macdonald to the Indian Army Headquarters. The report is extracted from "Proceedings No 57 of the Foreign Department, March 1905", at "The National Archives of India". Here too there are two sets of proceedings, i.e. Proceedings No. 57 and Proceedings No.58. The contents of these are similar except at one place which puts into perspective the obtaining lack of harmony between the Military and the Political Departments in the Government of India. This will be dealt with at the appropriate place later. Since contents of Proceeding No. 57 and 58 are identical, only the last page of Proceeding No. 58 is being reproduced.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, MARCH 1905

Operations of the Tibet Mission escort.

DESPATCH FROM GENERAL MACDONALD DESCRIBING THE OPERATIONS OF THE TIBET MISSION ESCORT. (2) THANKS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE NATIVE STATES OF NEPAL AND BHUTAN FOR THE ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY THEM DURING THE TIBET MISSION (3) REPORT REGARDING THE MEDICAL RELIEF AFFORDED TO THE TIBETANS AND THE SERVICES RENDERED BY HOSPITAL ASSISTANT HIRA SINGH IN THAT CONNECTION.

No. 3888-B., dated Simla, the 8th November 1904.  

From: MAJOR B. HOLLOWAY, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,  
To: The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department. From Adjutant-General in India, No. 2917-A, dated 26th October 1904, and enclosures.  
Forwarded for information.  

No. 2917-A., dated Simla, the 26th October 1904.  

From: MAJOR-GENERAL B. DUFF, C.B., C.I.E., Adjutant-General in India,  
To: The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.  

I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying despatch from Brigadier-General J.R.L. Macdonald, C.B., R.E., describing the operations of the troops which accompanied the Mission to Tibet.

2. It will be seen from the despatch that the work which fell to the troops had to be carried out in the face of physical difficulties which subjected them
to the severest hardships and privations and these became increasingly acute as they neared their destination. Notwithstanding these difficulties, supplemented as they were by armed opposition, the undertaking was carried through in so successful a manner as to constitute it a highly creditable achievement. The Commander-in-Chief gladly takes this opportunity of placing on record publicly his approbation of the admirable arrangements, made by Brigadier-General Macdonald and of the good services of the officers-Regimental, Staff and Departmental—and of the troops through whose efforts the objects of the Mission were so successfully attained. Not the least gratifying and credible feature of the undertaking was the excellent discipline and conduct of the troops, as exemplified in their abstention from acts of spoliation, despite the many temptations with which they were confronted throughout the operations.

3. A list of the rewards which His Excellency recommends should be bestowed on those who specially distinguished themselves is forwarded under separate cover.

Sub-enclo., encl. 1, Pro. No. 57.

No. 1532-A., dated Gyantse, the 9th October 1904.

From : BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. R. L. MACDONALD, C.B., R.E., Commanding Tibet Mission Force,
To : The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honour to submit this, my final despatch on the operations of the Tibet Mission Force during 1903-1904, operations which had to be carried out in the face of exceptional national and climatic difficulties.

2. The theatre of operations was on the whole singularly barren and sterile, the only comparatively fertile districts being the Chumbi valley, the Gyantse-Shigatse valley, the Sangpo valley near Chaksam, and the Lhasa district.

The operations had to be carried out at an average altitude of 14,000 feet, while the troops had more than once to fight at altitudes of 17,000 to 18,000 feet. Four lofty ranges had to be surmounted by passes of 14,200, 15,200, 16,600 and 16,400 feet, respectively, and the first two of these had to be regularly traversed during the winter when gales, snow and 50 degrees of frost were not unusual. The force had to traverse two stretches of country each nearly 100 miles, when not only food for the men, but grain, fodder and even fuel had to be transported in whole and part.

To these difficulties must be added the passage of the Sangpo, a rapid and dangerous river. In addition to the formidable natural obstacles we had to overcome, the obstinate resistance of the Tibetans, whose inferior armament and want of tactical skill were largely counterbalanced by their great superiority of numbers, by the solidity of their fortifications and the immense natural strength of their positions.

3. The first phase of the operations included the occupation of the Chumbi valley and the period of preparation for the advance on Gyantse; or from 15th October 1903 to 24th March 1904. In December 1903 the enemy had collected a considerable body of troops to watch the Mission at Khamba Jong, and every effort was made to encourage them in the idea that, our main advance was to be made from there. Thus when the Mission withdrew into Sikkim on the 13th December simultaneously with the main advance into the Chumbi valley, it appears that
a number of the enemy's levies, seeing the former movement and not having time to hear of the latter, disbanded, and could not be again collected in time to resist our advance up the Chumbi valley. Chumbi was occupied on the 15th December 1903 and a flying column pushed on and secured Phari Jong on 20th December, thus completing our hold on the valley. For urgent political reasons the Mission was installed at Tuna on the 8th January 1904, with sufficient escort to protect them against the 2,000 to 3,000 Tibetans who had by now assembled at Guru. Between the Chumbi Valley and Gyantse stretched a barren tract of about 100 miles where not even fuel or fodder could be depended on, and before an advance in force could be made some 15,000 maunds of supplies had to be collected at Phari. The forwarding of this mass of stores in mid winter, over the lofty passes which separate Sikkim from Chumbi, was one of immense difficulty. The Nepalese Yaks had succumbed to various diseases and I relied on 700 ekkas to take their place on the barren uplands of Tibet; these ekkas also had to be carried in pieces over the mountains before they could be utilized at Phari. The roads, also, were execrable and their improvement when the soil was frost bound, a work of extreme labour. This period of preparation was one of grim strain and I cannot speak too highly of the fortitude and endurance of all ranks, by whose efforts the necessary arrangements were completed by the 24th March 1904.

4. The second phase included the advance to Gyantse and the period of preparation for the advance on Lhassa if necessary. For though the actual decision to advance to Lhassa was not arrived at till July, the military preparations for such an eventuality had to be made in advance. This period extended from 25th March to 12th June.

On the 29th March the Gyantse column was concentrated at Tuna, and next day all available transport returned to Phari to bring up supplies. The Tibetans had now about 7,000 men in the field distributed as follows:—3,000 at Guru guarding the Gyantse road, 2,000 at Hram east of the Bamtsø lake guarding the Lhassa road and, 2,000 in reserve between Kala Tso and Gyantse. The first mentioned body commenced active hostilities on the 31st March as we marched to Guru, and were completely defeated.
led to the hasty retirement of the Hram force on Kala Tso. A company was left at Tuna and the advance to Gyantse was resumed on the 4th April, the enemy falling back before us, and skirmishing at Samoda and Kangma.

On the 10th April, having received reinforcements from Gyantse, they stood at the Zamdang gorge and were again decisively beaten. Our Force pushed on and on the 11th April were before Gyantse, the Fort at which place was surrendered to us next day. The Mission were then located in the village of Chunglu which was fortified and provisioned, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. Brander, 32nd Pioneers, was placed in command of their escort consisting of 500 Rifles, 50 Mounted Infantry, two 7-pounders and two Maxims with details, and with sufficient transport for a moveable column of 400 men and two guns. The remainder of the Force, consisting of 300 rifles 100 Mounted Infantry, and two guns, with all remaining transport, began its return march to Chumbi on the 19th April, and dropped en route one company at Kangma and another at Kala Tso where a company had been already left on the way up. Chumbi was reached on 27th April. The weather had been very inclement, with frequent snowstorms.

Meanwhile the Tibetans were again assembling and Lieutenant-Colonel Brander went out with his Moveable Column on the 2nd May, and on the 6th completely defeated a gathering of 3,000 men at the Karo la. Another force of 1,600 men, who had assembled at Dongtse, took the opportunity to attack the Mission Post on the early morning of the 5th May, but were beaten off with heavy loss. They, however, occupied and strengthened Gyantse Jong. Reinforcements of 200 men including half a company of Sappers and two 10-pounder guns were sent to Gyantse, and Lieutenant Colonel Brander was directed not to assault the Jong but to be sufficiently active to keep the enemy's attention concentrated on Gyantse and off our communications. He carried out his role admirably and by the capture and occupation of a house, afterwards called the Gurkha Post, on the 19th May, the capture and destruction of Tagu on the 20th May, the capture and occupation of Palla on 26th May and various minor operations kept the enemy so busy that they only attacked Kangma on the 7th June when they were repulsed, and made one other threat on our communications which by that time had been strengthened. Meanwhile another period of intense strain fell on the Supply and Transport Services, as not only had the advanced troops to be supplied, but larger accumulations had to be laid in at Phari, Tuna, Kala Tso and Kangma to facilitate an advance in force to Lhassa if necessary. The weather on the upper plateau had improved, but early rains in the Teesta Valley and an outbreak of cholera (fortunately localised) handicapped the lower section of our line.

The Supply and Transport Services, however, responded nobly to the call made on them for a special effort, and by the middle of June the necessary reserves of 18,000 maunds of supplies had been collected and distributed.

5. The third phase of the operations was the advance in force to Gyantse and thence to Lhassa, during the period from 13th June till 3rd August. As soon as the additional reinforcements asked for (1&1/2 battalions Infantry, and 8 guns and details) arrived in Chumbi, the advance on Gyantse began, the force moving in two columns. The first column comprised 125 Mounted Infantry, 8 guns, 1,450 Infantry, 950 followers, and 2,200 animals; the
2nd consisted of 500 fighting men, 1,200 followers, and 1,800 animals, and included the supply train.

The leading column reached Kangma on the 22nd of June and was there joined by the second column next day.

The enemy had by this time collected against us a force of 16,000 men. They had several small cannon, some 30 Jingals and wall pieces, and 800 breech-loaders, while the balance were armed with matchlocks. They were distributed as follows:—At Gyantse 8,000, at Niani holding the Kangma-Gyantse road 800, at Niru 15 miles east of Kangma and guarding the Kangma-Balling road 800, at Gubshi 18 miles east of Gyantse and guarding the Lhassa road 1,200, at Tsechen guarding the Gyantse-Shigatse road 1,200, with a support of 2,500 men at Dongtse: All these bodies held strongly fortified positions, and a further force of 1,500 was at or en route to the Kharola which was also fortified. Thus, though the enemy had a great numerical superiority, they were so distributed, as to facilitate their being dealt with in detail.

On the 23rd June I detailed 500 infantry with two guns and 50 Mounted troops to attack Niru. The enemy, however, hastily withdrew and retired for the most part over the Sela instead of to Ralung. The same day I occupied the outlet of the Zamdang Gorge with 250 men who entrenched themselves.

On the 24th the first named detachment rejoined and on the 25th June the march on Gyantse was resumed, and the enemy located in a strong position at Niani where they had been reinforced from Gyantse. On the 26th June the enemy were driven from Niani after a sharp action in which a portion of Lieutenant-Colonel Brander's force participated, and Gyantse was reached on the same day. I now determined to drive the enemy from their Tsechen position and so open the fertile Shigatse valley to our foraging parties, an operation which was successfully carried out on the 28th June, with surprisingly little loss, thanks to the thorough co-operation between the Artillery and Infantry.

Their defeat at Tsechen led the enemy's force at Dongtse to hastily retire on Shigatse, while some 2,000 of the enemy also deserted from Gyantse Jong. I had moved my camp to the south bank of the Nyang Chu on the 28th, and commenced a bridge west of the town near an advanced post Lieutenant-Colonel Brander had established the same day, with a view to inducing the enemy to believe our main attack on the Jong would come from the north-west. Meanwhile the enemy sent in flags of truce, and futile negotiations followed with the Mission until noon the 5th July, when active operations were resumed. That afternoon we directed a strong demonstration against the north-west face of the enemy's defences, to confirm them in the idea that this was the direction of our main attack. Our troops pushed in and occupied some houses within 300 yards of the enemy's line, held their positions until after dark, and then having lighted picquet fires, silently withdrew to camp. At midnight the troops intended for the real attack on the south-east side of the Jong moved silently off and were in their allotted positions at 3-30 A.M. on the 6th July. The enemy had been misled by our demonstration the previous day, and when our three assaulting columns advanced against the town at 4 A.M., they effected an entrance with comparative ease, and had so strongly established themselves by the time the enemy could draw men from their north-west defenses that the enemy's persistent efforts to dislodge them were completely frustrated.

Late in the afternoon the south-west curtain of the Jong was breached and the Jong carried by assault by Gurkhas and Fusiliers supported by a concentrated fire of every gun and maxim. Though the Monastery and greater part of the town were still in their hands, the enemy fled during the night mostly towards Shigatse, and their force at Gobshi retired hastily on the Kharola.
A flying column despatched down the Shigatse valley for supplies, found both Dongtse and Penam Jong evacuated, and returned to Gyantse with large stores of grain and meal. An advance on Lhassa was now imperative, and on the 14th July the Lhassa column consisting of 200 Mounted Infantry, 1,900 Infantry and Sappers, 8 guns and 6 maxims with 2,000 followers and 3,900 animals carrying 23 days' rations marched out. A garrison of 8 companies Infantry, 50 Mounted Infantry, and four guns was left to hold Gyantse. On the 16th after marching in daily rain, the Lhassa column reached Relung and ascertained the Karola (10,600 feet) was strongly fortified and held.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, MARCH 1905.

On the 18th July the Karola was forced after comparatively slight resistance, the bulk of the enemy having fled during the night. The engagement was chiefly remarkable for the great altitude at which our troops had to fight (18,500 feet) and the retreat of the enemy over a glacier and snowy field.

On the 19th July Nangartse Jong was occupied without resistance, and some loss inflicted on the retiring enemy.

The weather still continued inclement so I gave the column a day's halt and then continued the advance. Pete Jong was occupied on the 21st without resistance, and from all sources we learned the enemy were fleeing before us and devastating the already barren country. On the 24th July we crossed the Kambala pass (16,400 feet) and reached the Sangpo (Brahmaputra), our Mounted troops having that morning seized both ferries. On the 25th July we reached Chaksam ferry and the same day passed over the river a company of Mounted Infantry and 7 companies of Infantry. As our guns could effectively command the north bank of the river, our position was quite secure. To the intense regret of the force and the great loss of the service my Chief Supply and Transport Officer, Major G H. Bretherton, D.S.O., who had so ably superintended the onerous work of the Supply and Transport Department, was drowned while crossing the river. The passage was completed on the morning of the 31st July and the same day the advance on Lhasa was resumed. The enemy had fortified several positions between Chaksam and Lhassa, but abandoned all of them as we approached, and the force encamped before Lhassa on the 3rd August, having encountered no resistance since the skirmish at Nangartse on the 19th July.

Posts had been established at Ralung, Nagartse, Pete Jong, Chaksam ferry and Toilung bridge, and the garrisons of those, together with convoy escorts, absorbed 70 Mounted men and 400 Infantry. As about, 50 sick had also been left at posts between Gyantse and Lhassa, the effective strength at Lhassa was reduced to 130 Mounted Infantry, 8 guns, 1,450 Infantry and Sappers and six maxims.

6. The fourth and last phase of the operations included the occupation of Lhassa and the withdrawal of the troops after the conclusion of the Treaty, and extended from the 4th August till the close of the operations.

The Lhassa valley is extensively cultivated, but does not produce sufficient for the requirements of Lhassa and its monasteries, and the crops were not yet ripe so that the food question soon became critical. The Amban and the Tibetan authorities promised supplies, but all the efforts of the Mission to persuade them to act up to their promises proved of no avail, and on the 5th August the troops had only 1 and ½ days' rations in hand. We
could not expect a convoy from Gyantse before the 29th at earliest, so I decided on strong measures and on the 8th August moved out with 900 rifles and 6 guns against the Debung monastery, which was said to contain 9,000 monks and have ample granaries. I selected this monastery mainly because it was the largest of the three great Lhassa monasteries which were reported to form the obstructive element in the Lhassa Councils. The monks were very obstinate and it was not until the guns were in position and Infantry had been ordered to advance that they agreed to our demands. Next day a requisition for a smaller amount was made on the Sera monastery, and I may say that both these monasteries satisfied our requisitions in full and were paid for the supplies furnished at market rates. The demonstration against Debung also stimulated the Lhassa authorities, and induced them to bring in satisfactory supplies daily. On the 12th August we shifted our camp to the driest site we could find in the marshy environs of Lhassa and the same day the Mission moved into the Lhalu palace with a guard of two companies of Infantry and were spared the discomforts of camp life in almost nightly rain. Though the Tibetan authorities had withdrawn their troops from Lhassa itself they retained them in small bodies in the neighbourhood, so constant reconnaissance had to be made. From various sources of information I reckoned that if a proportion of the monks could be induced to take the field, the Tibetans could within 24 hours assemble a force of 8,000 to 10,000 men. On the 13th August one of our reconnoitering parties surprised a camp of Tibetans and made 64 prisoners; again on the 18th August a reconnaissance up the Kyichu valley effected the dislodgement of 600 soldiers from the arsenal. The activity of these reconnoitering parties induced the Tibetan troops to withdraw 20 to 80 miles from the capital and reduced the tension. At the beginning of August I had procured and issued for sick some Tibetan woollen cloth and towards the end of the month, my supply department bought a large quantity to be made into poncho blankets in case our departure should be delayed, as low temperatures and snow were reported on the uplands between Lhassa and Gyantse.

By the 1st September the situation had so far improved that I allowed the troops to pay daily visits to Lhassa City and Bazar, and on the 7th September the Treaty was signed in the Pota La; small bodies of men selected from units composing the Lhassa Column were present at the interesting ceremony as a Guard of Honour.

In consultation with Colonel Younghusband it was decided that the force should withdraw on the 23rd September. By this time the posts between Lhassa and Gyantse had been stocked with two or three days' supplies for the column and on the 9th September I sent the Sappers, with one company of Infantry, the Brigade coolies and five days' supplies for the force to Chaksam, to arrange for the passage of the Sangpo. The upper crossing, Parti, was found the more suitable, and three ferries were extemporised.

On the 23rd the Force marched from Lhassa in one column.

On the 25th Colonel Younghusband with the bulk of his staff and a small Mounted escort left us and pushed ahead by double marches for India. On the 27th Parti ferry was reached and so excellent were the arrangements of the Engineers that the whole force was passed over by 2 p. m. on the
29th. The Force marched from Parti to Gyangtse in two columns leaving the former place on the 29th and 30th September and arriving at Gyangtse on the 5th and 6th October, respectively. The supply arrangements at the posts were excellent and the only discomfort was the low temperature at night which registered 10 to 21 degrees of frost. A survey party with an escort marched independently, and did some useful work between the Sangpo and Gyangtse. From Gyangtse the Force returns to India in smaller columns and picks up the garrisons of posts en route.

7. In all the Force had 16 engagements and skirmishes in which we suffered loss and the total war casualties amounted to 202, including 23 British officers, of whom five were killed. A separate abstract of War casualties is attached.

8. The Artillery co-operated with the Infantry in a manner which did credit to their training and I attribute the comparatively small losses we sustained in several of the more important actions to the thorough artillery support afforded to the assaulting Infantry.

9. The engineering work of the force comprised road making (170 miles) bridging, hutting, defense of posts, siege works, demolitions, and heading storming columns with explosive parties, and was carried out in a very creditable manner, often under extremely trying conditions. The gallantry of the explosive parties was marked, and the work of the engineers, Sappers and Attack boatmen at the crossing of the Sangpo river was excellent.

10. The most important work of the Supply and Transport Department was carried out in a way that justly merited the admiration of the whole Force.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, MARCH 1905.

Operations of the Tibet Mission escort.

The extraordinary difficulties this Department had to face and overcome must have been seen to be fully realised. In the unhealthy Teesta valley one form of disease after another seized the transport animals in spite of every precaution. During the winter the transport service had to be maintained over the passes in spite of intense cold and constant gales and snowstorms. On the barren uplands of Tibet there was one long sustained struggle to provide grain, fodder, and fuel. But thanks to excellent organization and a loyal devotion to duty, the work was throughout performed in a thoroughly efficient manner.

11. The peculiar climatic and physical conditions threw an additional strain on the Medical Department. But all requirements were met and the Force maintained in good health throughout the operations. The total number of deaths and men invalided, excluding war casualties was 411 and 671, respectively, and of these numbers 202 and 405 were more or less due to the special climatic conditions. In addition to the above 160 wounded from among our forces had to be cared for, exclusive of a large number of Tibetan wounded who also received medical attendance. That everything worked so well reflects great credit on this department.

12. The Survey Department succeeded in mapping a large extent of practically unknown country, and the geographical results are likely to be most valuable. In all some 17,000 square miles were surveyed on the 1/4 inch to the mile scale, and a total of 3,000 square miles on double this scale in the neighbourhood of Chumbi, Gyangtse and Lhassa, as well as about 300 miles of route sketches, on the scale of one inch to a mile.
13. The Veterinary Department carried out its duties to my complete satisfaction, and it is largely due to the skill and resources displayed, that the casualties amongst our transport animals were so low.

14. The line of communications was a long and difficult one, from Siliguri to Gyantse being 226 miles, and from Siliguri to Lhassa 370 miles. In all some 30 posts had to be maintained, five of which were in the unhealthy Teesta valley, and of the remainder, seven were approximately 15,000 feet above the sea. Up to the end of the second phase, no special officer was sanctioned to command communications, but during the third and fourth phases Colonel H. Read, 4th Rajputs, was appointed to this duty, and the Force strengthened by another battalion of Infantry, with two guns and 100 Mounted Infantry. Colonel Read had charge of the line from Siliguri to Ralung, a length of nearly 260 miles, and carried out his work with ability and judgment, and to my complete satisfaction.

15. I was fortunate in my staff and am happy to say that the conduct and discipline of the troops was throughout all that could be desired, while their patience and fortitude under privation, and their gallantry in face of the enemy are worthy of the highest praise. The Staff and Departments carried out their work smoothly, and with the greatest efficiency. I trust that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India will see fit to recommend that His Majesty the King Emperor may be pleased to bestow on the Force some special mark of His Majesty’s approval.

16. The Field postal service had many difficulties to contend with, but carried out its work satisfactorily. From Siliguri to Tuna the mails were carried by departmental agency, and thence on to Lhassa by military agency. Up to Gyantse a daily service was maintained latterly, and between Gyantse and Lhassa mails were carried by Mounted Infantry every three days.

17. The construction and working of the Telegraph was admirably carried out. In the first phase of the operations the line accompanied the force and was extended from Sikkim to Phari, the construction parties being exposed to the full rigour of the climate. During the second phase the line was extended to Kala Tso, and during the third phase it accompanied the force to Gyantse. Throughout the whole operations the work of this department was thoroughly satisfactory in every way.

18. The operations threw a very great deal of extra work on the Public Works Department, both in the Teesta valley and in Sikkim. I always found the officers of the department ready to furnish all the assistance in their power, and would wish the name of Mr. U. H. Green, Executive Engineer, Sikkim, brought forward for special consideration for his zealous and excellent work. Mr. R. Dover, State Engineer, Sikkim, also rendered great assistance.

19. I am much indebted to the Government of Bengal for their ready assistance and trust that the special valuable services rendered by Mr. J. H. E. Garrette, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, may be recognised by the Government of India.

20. His Highness the Maharaja of Nepal and the Nepal Durbar offered substantial help in the matter of transport, while His Highness’s Agent in Lhassa, Captain Jit Bahadur Khattri Chittori Vakil, at all times placed his valuable services at my disposal in the matter of collecting information and supplies, I would wish to express my acknowledgment of the cordial assistance afforded by the Tongsa Pen lop of Bhutan.
His Highness the Raja of Sikkim placed the resources of his State both in men and animals at our disposal, and a locally raised Cooly Corps, organised by Mr. J. C. White, Political Officer, Sikkim, worked over the Nathula pass from January till the end of the operations in a very efficient manner.

In this connection I would wish that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will bring to the special notice of the Government of India the names of Mr. J. C. White, and the Kumar of Sikkim, both of whom personally interested themselves in the working of the Sikkim Cooly Corps in the most inclement weather.


22. I attach list of the names of the officers and men whom I wish to bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.
### Abstract of War Casualties

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Casualties</th>
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**Total**: 5 1 28 3 19 4 116 13 202

**J. R. L. MACDONALD, Brigadier-General, Commanding Tibetan Mission Force.**

*Gyangtsé: The 9th October 1904.*
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<td>H. Reed, Indian Army, Commanding Line of Communications</td>
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<td>W. G. L. Beynon, D.S.O., Deputy Assistant Quarter-master-General</td>
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<td>J. M. Stewart, 2nd Gurkhas, Special Service Officer, Line of Communications</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>F. A. Easton, 7th Mountain Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery</td>
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<td>Captain</td>
<td>T. M. Luke, 7th Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Royal Engineers</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>C. H. H. Heycock, 2nd Company, Sappers and Miners</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>C. H. D. Ryder, Surrey Officer</td>
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<td>Captain</td>
<td>S. H. Sheppard, District Staff Officer, 1st Sappers and Miners</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>C. E. Elbirtt, Field Engineer</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Queen's Royal West Surrey</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>J. A. McHenry, Assistant Field Engineer</td>
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<td>C. A. H. Patenet</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>A. L. Hayden, Commanding Machine Gun Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Royal Highlanders</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>J. B. H. M. Pollock-Morris, Transport Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>14th Murray's Jat Lancers</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>H. M. W. Souter, Transport Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>19th Punjabis</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>I. N. Herbert</td>
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<tr>
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<td>W. J. Otley, Commanding Mounted Infantry Company</td>
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<tr>
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<td>46th Punjabis</td>
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## Operations of the Tibet Mission escort.

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<tr>
<th>Regiment</th>
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<tr>
<td>2-2nd Prince of Wales's Own</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>F. G. C. Ross, Transport</td>
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<td>Guzha Rifles</td>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel</td>
<td>M. A. Kerr, Transport Officer.</td>
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<td>C. Blye.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>D. W. H. Humphreys.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>J. D. Grant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply and Transport Corps</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>A. Mulloy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>H. H. Roddy</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>C. H. G. Moore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Army Medical Corps</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>W. B. Dunlop</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indian Medical Service</td>
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<td>A. R. Aldridge</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>L. A. Waddell, C.I.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>C. N. C. Wymberly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Veterinary Department</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>T. B. Kelly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph Department</td>
<td>Mr.</td>
<td>B. C. Moore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal Department</td>
<td>Mr.</td>
<td>L. Truminger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Station Master, Eastern Bengal</td>
<td>Mr.</td>
<td>H. Talbot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Railway</td>
<td>Mr.</td>
<td>A. J. Roakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Nursing Sister</td>
<td></td>
<td>A. Taylor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers and men.

| Royal Artillery               | No. 65135 Battery Quartermaster Sergeant J. H. Carter, No. 7 Mountain Battery. |
| "                             | No. 64838 Sergeant Instructor J. Caution. |
| "                             | No. 70031 Sergeant W. E. Joye, No. 7 Mountain Battery. |
| 1st Battalion, Royal Fusiliers| No. 250 Sergeant-Major E. Clarke. |
| "                             | No. 2475 Colour-Sergeant Gillingham. |
| "                             | No. 5760 Sergeant G. Haywood. |
| "                             | No. 4478 Lance-Corporal H. Blake. |
| "                             | No. 4545 A. Miles. |
| 2nd Battalion, West Riding Regiment | No. 5465 Sergeant J. E. Packman. |
| Supply and Transport Corps    | Sergeant W. E. Joye, No. 7 Mountain Battery. |
| "                             | Sergeant W. E. Joye, No. 7 Mountain Battery. |
| "                             | Sergeant W. E. Joye, No. 7 Mountain Battery. |
| Telegraph Department          | Sergeant W. E. Joye, No. 7 Mountain Battery. |
| Indian Subordinate Medical Department | Sergeant W. E. Joye, No. 7 Mountain Battery. |
| Miscellaneous List, India.    | Sergeant W. E. Joye, No. 7 Mountain Battery. |

### Native Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men.

| 6262 Naik                      | Badri Pande |
| 239 Subedar                    | Triloke-Chaube |
| Subedar                       | Saugat Singh, 45th Sikh, and 1st Mounted Infantry. |
| 806 Sepoy                     | Nama Din, 55th Cane's Rifles and 2nd Mounted Infantry. |
| 2150 Naik                     | Jhanda Singh |
| Subedar                       | Jwala Singh |
| Subedar Major                 | Zaman Ali, Sardar Bahadur |
| Subedar                       | Shah Mohammed |
| 2239 Lance-Naik               | Dilawar |
| 3295 Sepoy                    | Sar-Gul |

### Additional Notes:

- 31st Sappers
- 22nd Pioneers
- 40th Pathans
### Native Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men.

| Jemadar | Mewa Thapa | Maniram Pun |
| 2473 Rifleman | | Kana Rana |
| 2811 | Shannaj Gurung | Lachma Gana |
| 2638 | Jitbahadur Gurung | Seth Gurung, 2-2nd Gurkhas. |
| 1146 Havildar | Azhar Hussein | Medico Services |
| 2941 Rifleman | Muhamed Amir | Tika Ram |
| Lance Naick | | Kotbuddin, 10th Lancers |
| 719 1st class Hospital Assistant | Hakim Singh, 6th Mule Corps. | Basant Rai, Supply and Transport Department. |
| 560 2nd class Hospital Assistant | Nawab Khan, 7th | Siva Dass Chatterji |
| 917 2nd class Hospital Assistant | Ali Sher, 9th | Troops, Indian Telegraph Department. |
| 1798 Sower Ward Orderly | Basaki Ram, 10th | Fanindra Nath Malick, Postal Department, Advance Section. |
| 1st grade clerk | Sham Singh, 7th | |
| | Mohamed Suliman, 12th Mule Corps | |
| Kote Duffadar | Sambir Ghale, 2-3rd Gurkhas and Supply and Transport. |
| ditto | | |
| ditto | | |
| 2193 Naick | | |
| Veterinary Duffadar, 2nd class | | |
| ditto | | |
| ditto | | |
| Havildar | | |
| 4th grade clerk | | |
| Sub Inspector, 2nd class | | |
| Clerk | | |
| 308 Sapper | | |
| 4609 Sapper | | |
| Subadur | | |
| 2960 Havildar | | |
| Jemadar | | |

### Subadur

| 3464 Naick | | |
| 335 Sepoy | | |
| 4406 | | |
| Jemadar | | |
| 2845 Naick | | |
| 2148 Sepoy | | |
| 2552 Rifleman | | |
| 372 Driver Havildar Major | | |
| 43 Driver Havildar | | |
| 2076 Havildar | | |
| Store keeper, 2nd class | | |
| Surveyor | | |

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Naga Thapa, 23rd Pioneers.

Jewa Singh, 23rd Pioneers.

Natha Singh, 23rd Pioneers.
Pro. No. 58 No. 3979-B., dated Fort William, the 21st November 1904

From: The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,

To: The Adjutant-General in India.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 2917-A., dated the 26th October 1904, submitting a despatch from Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.E., R.E., describing the operations of the troops which, accompanied the Mission to Tibet. I am to state that the Government of India concur with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in his appreciation of the skilful manner in which Brigadier-General Macdonald has carried out the duty entrusted to him and of the good services of the Officers, Regimental, Staff, and Departmental, and of the troops under his command.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, MARCH 1905.

Operations of the Tibet Mission escort.

2. The despatch was published in the Gazette of India of the 11th November 1904.

Copy of the above, with copy of Gazette notification referred to, forwarded to:

The Foreign Department.
The Public Works Department.
The Home Department.
The Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.
Enclo.,

Fort William, the 11th November 1904.

No. 1065. The Right Hon'ble the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council is pleased to direct the publication of the following letter from the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 26th October 1904, forwarding a despatch from Brigadier-General J. R.L. Macdonald, C.E, R.E., Commanding Tibet Mission Escort, describing the operations of the troops which accompanied the Mission to Tibet.

2. The Governor-General in Council entirely concurs with the Commander-in-Chief in India in his appreciation of the skilful manner in which Brigadier-General Macdonald has carried out the duty entrusted to him. His Excellency in Council is also fully sensible of the excellent conduct of the officers and men engaged in the operations, which were of the most trying nature, and he has noticed with satisfaction the good service of those who have been specially brought to notice. His Excellency in Council is glad to have the opportunity of expressing his appreciation of
the excellent services rendered by all ranks of the Supply and Transport Corps. The services of the late Major G. H. Bretherton, to whose untiring energy and power of organisation the successful advance of the Mission to Lhassa under exceptionally difficult conditions was largely due, calls for special notice.

The services of the Civil Officers to which allusion is made in General Macdonald's despatch will form the subject of a separate notification hereafter.

No. 2917-A., dated Simla, the 26th October 1904.

From: Major-General B. Duff, C.B., C.I.E., Adjutant-General in India, To—the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying despatch from Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., R.E., describing the operations of the troops which accompanied the Mission to Tibet.

2. It will be seen from the despatch that the work which fell to the troops had to be carried out in the face of physical difficulties which subjected them to the severest hardships and privations and these became increasingly acute as they neared their destination. Notwithstanding these difficulties, supplemented as they were by armed opposition, the undertaking was carried through in so successful a manner as to constitute it a highly creditable achievement. The Commander-in-Chief gladly takes this opportunity of placing on record publicly his approbation of the admirable arrangements made by Brigadier-General Macdonald and of the good services of the officers—

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, MARCH 1905.


(Last Page only)

15. I was fortunate in my staff and am happy to say that the conduct and discipline of the troops was throughout all that could be desired, while their patience and fortitude under privation, and their gallantry in face of the enemy are worthy of the highest praise. The Staff and Departments carried out their work smoothly, and with the greatest efficiency. I trust that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India will see fit to recommend that His Majesty the King-Emperor may be pleased to bestow on the Force some special mark of His Majesty's approval.

16. The Field postal service had many difficulties to contend with, but carried out its work satisfactorily. From Siliguri to Tuna the mails were carried by departmental agency, and thence on to Lhassa by military agency. Up to Gyantse a daily service was maintained latterly, and between Gyantse and Lhasa-a mails were carried by Mounted Infantry every three days.

17. The construction and working of the Telegraph was admirably carried out. In the first phase of the operations the line accompanied the force and was extended from Sikkim to Phari, the construction parties being exposed to the full rigour of the climate. During the second phase the line was
extended to Kala Tso, and during the third phase it accompanied the force to Gyantse. Throughout the whole operations the work of this department was thoroughly satisfactory in every way.

18. The operations threw a very great deal of extra work on the Public Works Department, both in the Teesta valley and in Sikkim. I always found the officers of the department ready to furnish all the assistance in their power, and would wish the name of Mr. II. II. Green, Executive Engineer, Sikkim, brought forward for special consideration for his zealous and excellent work, Mr. R. Dover, State Engineer, Sikkim, also rendered great assistance.

19. I am much indebted to the Government of Bengal for their ready assistance and trust that the special valuable services renuered by Mr. J. H. E. Garrette, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, may be recognised by the Government of India.

20. His Highness the Maharajah of Nepal and the Nepal Durbar offered substantial help in the matter of transport, while His Highness’s Agent in Lhasa, Captain Jit Bahadur Khati Chitti Wakil, at all times placed his valuable services at my disposal in the matter of collecting information and supplies.

I would wish to express my acknowledgment of the cordial assistance afforded by the Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan.

His Highness the Raja of Sikkim placed the resources of his State both in men and animals at our disposal, and a locally raised Cooly Corps, organised by Mr. J. C. White, Political Officer, Sikkim, worked over the Nathula pass from January till the end of the operations in a very efficient manner.

In this connection I would wish that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will bring to the special notice of the Government of India the names of Mr. J. C. “White and the Kumar of Sikkim, both of whom personally interested themselves in the working of the Sikkim Cooly Corps in the most inclement weather.

21. I attach list of the names of the officers and men whom I wish to bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.
Concluding Issues

At the conclusion of the campaign a number of issues that scripted the actions of the Mission came into focus. These ranged from the military to the political and inter governmental as also intra governmental. This also brought some issues of governance in Tibet apart from logistic problems into the limelight. Be that as it may, signing of the treaty in Lhasa brought to an end a glorious chapter in discipline, logistics and battle worthiness of the force that took part in this campaign. The more important of these issues have been dealt with in the succeeding paragraphs.

Whereas in the original Report forwarded by Army Headquarters for notifying in the Gazette Publication, paragraph on General Macdonalds' gratitude to The Commander of the Tibet Mission and his officers is included, the same is missing from Proceeding No. 58. This leads the reader to wonder whether it was an oversight or was this deliberate. Considering that by this time HE The Viceroy and The C-in-C Lord Kitchener were not on the very best of terms, could this have been one reason for this omission. The other plea could be that this was a report on military operations and therefore the omission. In that case one will have to remember that the military escort was in support to the Tibet Mission without whom they had no role to play! Perhaps the omission though glaring, was a simple case of oversight.

Proposals forwarded by Younghusband on future relations with Tibet were indeed revolutionary. It would appear that the Mandarins in the administration were either unable to grasp the import of these in totality or were merely expressing annoyance at their being told how to do their job! Another school of thought attributes it to their being in awe of the Chinese Imperial Court and the thought of annoyance that this may cause to the Russians. Whatever be the thinking process, it is clear that had some of these proposals been put into place the subsequent Chinese moves may have been checked. Be that as it may, India would have been better placed for negotiations with the Chinese. There will be other reasons also put forth by the practitioners of foreign policy like China does not recognize India as the successor state and so on. The case would have been different if we were already in Chumbi. Of course the argument that cannot be defeated, is, that at the time of this treaty, independent India was not only inconceivable, it was nowhere on the horizon. Imperial Britain was negotiating with her best interests at heart and not thinking about India and its’ future! It is obvious that even after the treaty was signed doubts persisted in the minds of the British Policy makers. A Note written by Younghusband to the Secretary of State, Foreign Department, appended below, sheds some light on some aspects of the situation then obtaining.

"I do not think there is any need on this particular account to hurry on the ratification of the Convention, for, as far as the Tibetans are concerned, it is already complete, as I made it with the then head of the Tibet State, viz., the Ti Rimpochi, who had been appointed Regent by the Dalai Lama and recognised as such by the National Assembly, whose seal is also affixed to the Convention. There is no exchange of ratifications necessary with the Tibetans, and no ratification by us makes it any more binding on the Tibetans than it is now. Our Government can repudiate what I did; but even the Dalai Lama cannot repudiate what the Tibetans did, for his seal, supported by the seal of the National Assembly, was attached. But I certainly think that, if the Chinese do declare Tibet to be a Chinese province, we should notify them as Mr. Dane suggests. This will be useful for paper correspondence purposes. In actual practice, no amount of gazette notification by the Chinese will improve their precarious position in Tibet. The
Amban, before we arrived, was most perilously situated, and had actually suggested to his Government that he should retire from Lhasa. On the very day of my arrival, he sent privately to borrow some money from us, as the Tibetans had refused to furnish transport for the money for him coming from China. After the way his predecessor had insulted me, I would have been perfectly justified in ignoring him, and the Tibetans were ready to deal directly with me and ignore him too; so that, if I had given the slightest hint that we had no special wish to deal with the Chinese, the Tibetans would have thrown over the Chinese completely. They threw out more than one hint to me that they wished to, and it was only my steady recognition of the Amban that saved him.

As usual the Chinese, having sat silent while we did all the fighting and endured all the risks and hardships, are trying to rob us of the fruits of our efforts and snatch them for themselves. I told the Amban quite distinctly that I considered our interests and theirs also lay in mutual co-operation in Tibet; but that, if the Chinese chose to thwart us instead of acting with us, our interests clearly lay in dealing more directly with the Tibetans.

The Amban, I believe, did thoroughly recognise this point, but he is terrified at reporting the true state of affairs to Peking. It is the Peking Government whom, therefore, we have now to impress, and my own opinion is that we can best do that by showing them how little importance we attach to their adhesion to the Convention. A full Convention with them we have found in practice to have been of not the slightest practical use. Their adhesion to the Convention we have made directly with the Tibetans is not likely to be of very much more. We have our Convention with the Tibetans, and we may intimate to both them and the Chinese that we intend to see it observed, and from the way in which the Tibetans are actually at the present moment of observing it, I should gather that they would prefer not risking trouble with us by breaking their treaty with us, simply because the Chinese Government at Peking chose to notify in the gazette that Tibet was a province of China. A much more likely result of such a notification would be that the Tibetans would definitely appeal to be taken under British protection.”

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, 4-11-1904.

The Note, both for its' content and tenor, is most informative and revealing. It can be seen from this that Younghusband was possessed of deep insight into the Chinese methods of implementing policy! That Younghusband included what he did at Articles-5 to 7 of the Treaty and the Governments response to this as mentioned earlier, may have, in fact, in my opinion, did act, as the cause for this note. It would have been more appropriate therefore, to go into all aspects of the insertion before acting on it. Had that been done, the situation today, though not necessarily, may have been different.

Some significant fallouts of this campaign need mention. First, the cooperation of "Tongsa Penlop" in this affair earned him a KCIE in 1905, and in 1907, he was installed as the ruler of Bhutan. The ruler of Bhutan, like Dalai Lama in Tibet, was reincarnate and was known as “Dharma Raja”. To manage the affairs of the state, “Deb Raja” was appointed. During this year both the appointees had passed away thus paving the way for installation of a dynasty and the Governor of the largest province of Bhutan on the throne. With the installation of Sir Ugyen Wangchuk as the first non reincarnate king of Bhutan, this Kingdom changed from the system of reincarnate kings to that of a dynasty ruling Bhutan. Sir Ugyen Wangchuk, was elected King by the chieftains, rajas and other dignitaries of Bhutan. Today the Great Grandson of Sir Ugyen Wangchuk rules Bhutan. The second was formal survey by the Suveyor Generals Office of many parts of Tibet which till then had to be undertaken clandestinely. Another was the construction of some roads or tracks into Tibet from India. Finally, the use of Khamba Dzong as a base for expeditions to climb "Mount Everest".
A very significant event of Military importance occurred which has been lost to history! This was the crossing of "Jelep-La", in mid winter by a force of poorly armed, equipped and clothed soldiers, coolies, animals and others. It has been generally believed that at this time of the year, passes at these altitudes close due to excessive snowfall and inclement weather. In fact Indian Army continues to believe in this myth. Yet, not only the combat elements, even the logistics required for sustenance in such terrain and weather, were able to build up from mid December 1903 onwards to conclude a successful campaign. It needs to be noted that the benefits of modern roads, infrastructure and air effort was non existent in 1904. If anything, this force was primitive compared to the facilities now available.

A little analysis or appreciation of the coming events by General Macdonald and occupation of the Gyantse Fort on its first sighting and surrender may have helped in curtailing the duration of this expedition apart from the unnecessary casualties that the force suffered. That he did not do so and instead fell back to New Chumbi with the bulk of his force, does indicate that he violated "Selection and maintenance of aim", "Concentration of Effort" and "Economy of effort", three principles of war. Having been tasked to advance to Gyantse, and that being the initial objective, it had to be held. Concentration and economy of effort would have followed if the force had occupied Gyantse in strength. Having gained the initiative it should be the endeavour of every commander to retain it. This is one rare example where it was deliberately given up and for no commensurate benefits! What is more surprising is that there were no adverse comments on this from Lord Kitchener or his staff once the final report was filed!

A question often asked is, how was it possible for a numerically much larger force operating in its own country and well acclimatized for operations at these heights to suffer so humiliatingly. While, lack of training, modern weapons and tactics have often been advanced for the defeat of the Tibetans, the answer is really provided by General Macdonald in his final report where he says, "Thus, though the enemy had a great numerical superiority, they were so distributed, as to facilitate their being dealt with in detail." The Tibetans were so located that they could only support the operations in one particular or given area. In military parlance they lacked "Mutual Support."

Many have questioned the use of excessive military force and the wholesale killing of Tibetans by the Missions' military escort during engagement with the Tibetans. The letter of the soldier from Norfolk Regiment where he states that the General had wanted them to make as big a bag as possible would tend to support the propagators of this argument. To be fair to the General, it must be noted that he was operating with limited forces in alien land. Not only that, he was there to impose the King Emperors' will. Tibetans could not defy imperial authority. If they did, they had to be punished. This appears to be the doctrine in vogue, especially for senior officers of the British Army. In 1915, similar trait was displayed by General Dyer at Amritsar. He too could not tolerate disobedience of Imperial authority by Indian subjects of the Empire.

The role of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in this whole episode needs separate evaluation. His methods of using his authority to rule Tibet need study. In all fairness to him, he had assumed power in Tibet after more than one century of rule by Regent Lamas. Under the circumstances, his anxiety to impose his will and rule unhindered is understandable. This apart, China too was facing difficulties during the said period. Therefore it may have been a godsend for the Dalai Lama to assert his independence. All these may have coalesced to guide him into acting in the manner that he did. Here it will suffice to say that had he gone by the advice of some of his "Sha-pes" the campaign may not have been necessary. Having imposed his authority in the given manner through out the period, it was ironic that he left Lhasa before the Mission landed there. The treaty was negotiated and signed on his behalf.
by “Ti Rimpoche” of Ganden Monastery, who had been appointed as Regent by the Dalai Lama. A telegram reproduced below, from The Viceroy to His Britannic Majesty’s Minister at Peking, dated 9th April, 1904, is illustrative of the treatment meted out to officials in Tibet by the 13th Dalai Lama

**PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, JULY 1904.**

Military news of the Tibet Mission.

Telegram No. 1075-E.B., dated the 9th April 1904.

From: His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,
To: His Britannic Majesty’s Minister, Peking,

Younghusband reports Amban delegate, Ma, says property, of Generals and Lamas killed at Guru has been confiscated by Lhasa Government because of their failure to stop us, and that 1,000 Tibetans are collected thirteen miles beyond Chalu and reinforcements are hastening up, but he is unaware if their intention to fight is serious.

Macdonald wires 2nd mounted infantry reconnoitering, 7th April, thirteen miles beyond Chalu met Tibetans at place called Samunda where they had a wall and two block-houses occupied by two to three hundred men armed with Lhasa-made Martinis. They opened fire on mounted infantry at two to three hundred yards which was returned, mounted infantry retiring slowly. We had no casualties.

The prevailing mood in the Tibetan government was that of insecurity. Despite the convention having been signed there were fears in many quarters that the Dalai Lama on his return may not be too happy with the people who signed the convention. At the same time the Tibetan public had respect for the Dalai Lama. This manifested itself in the reaction of the Tibetans to the Amban’s notice deposing the Dalai Lama. Both these are borne out by the memorandum below.

No 565 (F.C.R. No 2) dated Chumbi, the 10th December 1904 (Confidential)

From : C. A. Bell, Esq., Assistant Political Officer, Chumbi
To: J. C. White, Esq., Political Agent, Sikkim

I have the honour to report that two Chumbi Valley mule drivers and two Lhasa Traders have arrived here from Lhasa. They report that everything is peaceful in Lhasa and elsewhere; that the crops have been excellent; and trade is going on as before the advent of the Mission. Other arrivals from Shigatse and the Tsang Province confirm this.

2. The arrivals from Lhasa agree in stating that a lay official (Trung-kor) and a monk official (Tse-Trung) and some representatives of the monasteries started last October from Lhasa to fetch the Dalai Lama back from the Kar-Ka country in Mongolia, where he is said to be staying at present with the Lama known as Jetsun Tam-pa, an avatar of very high rank. Some more officials, both lay and monks are to start next February, and meet the
Dalai Lama on the way with provisions for the journey. It is thought that the Dalai Lama will start back from the Kar-ka country about April or May next, when the weather will be warmer, and reach Lhasa, traveling by easy stages about September or October. It is thought in Lhasa that there will not be any disturbance of the existing order of things when he returns, since if he blames the persons who signed the Convention, they will blame him for running away.

3. The copies of the proclamation by the Amban deposing the Dalai Lama were torn down by the Tibetans, who were angry with the Amban for putting them up, denying that the Amban posted them by the orders of the Emperor of China, and denying that the Emperor of China had power to pass any such order.

Memo No 566, dated Chumbi, the 10th December 1904.

Copy submitted to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Calcutta, for information.

C.A. Bell,
Assistant Political Officer

Finally many have argued for and against the so called suzerain power of the Chinese. I am in no position to accept or deny it. This notwithstanding, there is ample evidence in support of the fact that the Chinese Imperial Court held some sway over the events in Tibet. There is sufficient evidence to subscribe to the view that military intervention by the Chinese on several occasions did help in establishing discernible order in Tibet. Some Treaties made by Tibet since the Ninth Century, will help in understanding the situation. Most of these have been extracted from “Short History of Tibet”, by HE Richardson. Perusal of these, may provide a different perspective on this. Be that as it may, current realities need to be taken into account before coming to any conclusion.
TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS
TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

1. Treaty between Tibet and China A.D. 821-822 (translation from the Tibetan text)

The Great King of Tibet, the Miraculous Divine Lord, and the Great King of China, the Chinese Ruler Hwang-ti, being in the relationship of nephew and uncle, have conferred together for the alliance of their kingdoms. They have made and ratified a great agreement. Gods and men all know it and bear witness so that it may never be changed; and an account of the agreement has been engraved on this stone pillar to inform future ages and generations.

The Miraculous Divine Lord Thri-tsun De-tsen and the Chinese King Wên Wu Hsiao-te Wang-ti, nephew and uncle, seeking in their far-reaching wisdom to prevent all causes of harm to the welfare of their countries now or in the future, have extended their benevolence impartially over all. With the single desire of acting for the peace and benefit of all their subjects they have agreed on the high purpose of ensuring lasting good; and they have made this great treaty in order to fulfil their decision to restore the former ancient friendship and mutual regard and the old relationship of friendly neighbourhood.

Tibet and China shall abide by the frontiers of which they are now in occupation. All to the east is the country of Great China; and all to the west is, without question, the country of Great Tibet. Henceforth on neither side shall there be waging of war nor seizing of territory. If any person incurs suspicion he shall be arrested; his business shall be inquired into and he shall be escorted back.

Now that the two kingdoms have been allied by this great treaty it is necessary that messengers should once again be sent by the old route to maintain communications and carry the exchange of friendly messages regarding the harmonious relations between the Nephew and Uncle. According to the old custom, horses shall be changed at the foot of the Chiang Chün pass, the frontier between Tibet and China. At the Suiyung barrier the Chinese shall meet Tibetan envoys and provide them with all facilities from there onwards. At Ch'ing-shui the Tibetans shall meet Chinese envoys and provide all facilities. On both sides they shall be treated with customary honour and respect in conformity with the friendly relations between Nephew and Uncle.

Between the two countries no smoke nor dust shall be seen. There shall be no sudden alarms and the very word 'enemy' shall not be spoken. Even the frontier guards shall have no anxiety nor fear and shall enjoy land and bed at their ease. All shall live in peace and share the blessing of happiness for ten thousand years. The fame of this shall extend to all places reached by the sun and the moon.

This solemn agreement has established a great epoch when Tibetans shall be happy in the land of Tibet, and Chinese in the land of China. So that it may never be changed, the Three Precious Jewels of Religion, the Assembly of Saints, the Sun and Moon, Planets and Stars have been invoked as witnesses. An oath has been taken with solemn words and with the sacrifice of animals; and the agreement has been ratified.

If the parties do not act in accordance with this agreement or if they violate it, whichever it be, Tibet or China, nothing that the other party may do by way of retaliation shall be considered a breach of the treaty on their part.

The Kings and Ministers of Tibet and China have taken the prescribed oath to this effect and the agreement has been written in detail. The two Kings have affixed their seals. The Ministers specially empowered to execute the agreement have inscribed their signatures and copies have been deposited in the royal records of each party.

The treaty is carved in Tibetan and Chinese on one side of a stone pillar near the Jo-khang—the Cathedral of Lhasa. On another side is a historical introduction in Tibetan only; and on the other two sides are bilingual lists of the names of the ministers who witnessed it. The texts have been edited in Ancient Historical Edicts at Lhasa (H. E. Richardson. Vol. XIX of the Prize Publication Fund of the Royal Asiatic Society). The translation of the Tibetan text of the treaty proper is a revision of the somewhat clumsy, literal rendering given in the above-mentioned publication.

The king of Tibet named in the treaty is better known as Ralpachen (815-841); and the Chinese Emperor is Mu Tsung or the T'ang dynasty (821-825). The frontier appears to have been not far to the west of the Kansu-Shensi border.

Two translations of the Chinese text of the treaty can be seen in G. Timkowsky's Travels of the Russian Mission through China, etc. London 1827 and one by S. W. Bushell in JRAS 1880.

2. Treaty between Tibet and Bashahr, 1681

Professor L. Petech gives the best available information about this in his valuable article on 'The Tibetan-Ladakhi-Moghul War of 1681-1683' in the Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. XXIII,
September 1947. At the time of that war there was an alliance and a brief general agreement about friendly relations and the exchange of envoys between Raja Kehari Singh of Bashahr and the Government of the Vth Dalai Lama.

3. Treaty between Tibet and Ladakh, 1683

This treaty terminated the war mentioned above. Its conditions are summarized by Professor Petech (op. cit.) and included the cession to Tibet of the Province of Ngari, commercial stipulations mainly connected with the important trade in wool, and the dispatch to Lhasa every second year of a sort of tribute mission. This liability was taken over by Kashmir when that State annexed Ladakh in 1842, and continued to be discharged down to 1950. The mission was known as the Lopchak. The frontier between Ladakh and Tibet was fixed at 1st Lhari stream at Demchok.

4. Treaty between Tibet and Ladakh, 1842 (translation)

As on this auspicious day, the 2nd of Assu, Sambhit 1899 [16th, or 17th September A.D. 1842], we the officers of the Lhasa Government Kalon of Sokan and Bakshi Shajpuh, Commander of the Forces, and two officers on behalf of the most resplendent Sri Khalsaji Sahib, the asylum of the world, King Sher Singhji and Sri Maharaj Sahib Raja-i Rajagan Raja Sahib Bahadur Raja Gulab Singhji i.e., the Mukhtar-ud-Daula Diwan Hari Chand and the asylum of vizirs, Vizir Ratnum, in a meeting called together for the promotion of peace and unity, and by professions and vows of friendship, unity and sincerity of heart and by taking oaths like those of Kunjak Sahib, have arranged and agreed that relations of peace, friendship and unity between Sri Khalsaji and Sri Maharaj Sahib Bahadur Raja Gulab Singhji and the Emperor of China and the Lama Guru of Lhasa will henceforward remain firmly established forever; and we declare in the presence of the Kunjak Sahib that on no account whatsoever will there be any deviation, difference or departure [from this agreement]. We shall neither at present nor in future have anything to do or interfere at all with the boundaries of Ladakh and its surroundings as fixed from ancient times and will allow the annual export of wool, shawls and tea by way of Ladakh according to old established custom.

Should any of the opponents of Sri Khalsaji and Sri Raja Sahib Bahadur at any time enter our territories, we shall not pay any heed to his words or allow him to remain in our country.

We shall offer no hindrance to traders of Ladakh who visit our territories. We shall not, even to the extent of a hair's breadth, act in contravention of the terms that we have agreed to above regarding firm friendship, unity and fixed boundaries of Ladakh and the keeping open of the route for wool, shawls and tea. We call Kunjak Sahib, Kairi, Lassi, Zhoh Mahan, and Khushal Choh as witnesses to this treaty.

The agreement is quoted in Aitchison’s Treaties, Vol. XIV, p. 15. The Tibetan signatories had been taken prisoner and it does not appear that any reference was made to Lhasa before the conclusion of the agreement. Not only the Dogra Raja of Jammoo, who had occupied Ladakh, but also his nominal overlord the Sikh ruler are cited as parties to the treaty. In fact, since the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839 the Maharaja of Jammoo had been virtually independent and proof of his position was seen in his refusal to support the Sikhs in their war against the British. Similarly, on the other side, the Chinese Emperor is mentioned as a party as well as the Dalai Lama.

Neither Sikhs nor Chinese took any part in the campaign in Ladakh and Tibet.

‘The boundaries of Ladakh as fixed in ancient times’ refer back to the treaty between Ladakh and Tibet in 1683. See No. 3 above.

5. Treaty between Tibet and Nepal, 1856 (translation)

Treaty of Peace, consisting of ten Articles, between the States of Gurkha and Tibet (Bhote), settled and concluded by us, the Chief Sardars, Bharadars, and Lamas of both Governments, whose signatures and seals are attached below. May God bear witness to it. We further agree that both States pay respect as always before to the Emperor of China and that the two States are to treat each other like brothers, for so long as their actions correspond with the spirit of this Treaty. May God not allow that State to prosper which may make war upon the other, unless the other’s acts are contrary to this Treaty, in which case the State that declares war upon the other shall be exempt from all blame.

1. The Tibetan Government agrees to pay the sum of ten thousand Rupees annually in cash to the Gurkha Government.

2. The States of Gurkha and of Tibet have both respected the Emperor of China up to the present time. The country of Tibet is merely the shrine or place of worship of the Lama, for which reason the Gurkha Government will in future give all the assistance that may be in its power to the Government of Tibet, if the troops of any other ‘Raja’ invade that country.

3. The Government of Tibet agrees to discontinue the collection of all
duties that have hitherto been levied upon subjects of the Gurkha State, merchants and others trading with its country.

4. The Government of Tibet agrees to give up to the Gurkha Government all the Sikh prisoners now in captivity within its territories, and all the Gurkha Sipahis, and officers, and women who were captured in the war, also all the guns that were taken; and the Gurkha Government agrees to give up to the Government of Tibet all the Sipahis, also the ryots of Kerong, Junga, Tagla Khar and Chewur Gumba, and all the arms and Yaks [chowrie cows] belonging to that country now in its possession, and on the final completion of this Treaty it will restore Tagla Khar, Chewur Gumba, Kerong, Junga, Kuti and Dhakling and will withdraw all the troops that may be on this side of the Bhairab Langar range.

5. A Bharadar on the part of the Gurkha Government (not merely a Naikia) will for the future reside at Lhasa.

6. The Gurkha Government, with the free consent of the Government of Tibet, will establish a trading factory at Lhasa, for the sale of all kinds of merchandise, from jewellery etc. etc. to articles of clothing and of food.

7. The Gurkha Bharadar residing at Lhasa will not interfere in the disputes of the subjects, merchants, traders, etc. etc. of the Government of Tibet, neither will the Tibetan Government interfere in any disputes between subjects of the Gurkha Government, Kashmiris of Nepal etc., who may be residing within the jurisdiction of Lhasa, but whenever quarrels may occur between Gurkha and Tibetan subjects, the authorities of the two States will sit together and jointly adjudicate them; and all Amdanis [fines etc.] will, if paid by subjects of Tibet, be taken by that Government, and if paid by Gurkha subjects, Kashmiris of Nepal etc., will be appropriated by the Gurkha Government.

8. Should any Gurkha subject commit a murder within the jurisdiction of that Government and take refuge in Tibet, he shall be surrendered by that country, and if any Tibetan subject who may have committed a murder there take refuge in the Gurkha country, he shall in like manner be given up to the Government of Tibet.

9. If the property of any Gurkha subjects and merchants be plundered by any subject of the Tibetan Government, the party who has stolen it shall be compelled by the Tibetan Government to restore it; should he not be able to do so at once, he shall be obliged by the Tibetan Bharadar to make some arrangement, and will be allowed a reasonable time to make it good. In like manner, if the property of any Tibetan subjects or merchants be plundered by any subject of the Gurkha Government, the party who has stolen it shall be compelled by the Gurkha authorities to restore it; should he not be able to do so at once, he shall be obliged by the Gurkha Government to make some arrangement and will be allowed a reasonable time to make it good.

10. All subjects of Tibet who may have joined the Gurkha cause during the war, and all subjects of the Gurkha Government who may have taken part with the Tibetan Government, shall, after the completion of this Treaty be respected both in person and property, and shall not be injured by either Government.

Dated Sambhat 1912 Chaitra Badi 3rd (and day) Sombar; corresponding with 24th March 1856.

The treaty, apparently translated from the Nepalese text, is given in Aitchison's Treaties, Vol. XIV, pp. 49-50. A translation from the Tibetan is given in the Appendix to Tibet: Past and Present by Sir Charles Bell.

6. The Convention of Chefoo (between the British Government and the Government of China), 1876

Extract:

Her Majesty's Government having it in contemplation to send a mission of exploration next year, by way of Peking, through Kansuh and Kokonor, or by way of Szechuen to Thibet, and thence to India, the Tsungli Yamen, having due regard to the circumstances, will, when the time arrives, issue the necessary passports, and will address letters to the High Provincial Authorities and the Residents in Thibet. If the Mission should not be sent by these routes but should be proceeding across the Indian frontier to Thibet, the Tsungli Yamen, on receipt of a communication to that effect from the British Minister, will write to the Chinese Resident in Thibet, and the Resident, with due regard to the circumstances, will send officers to take care of the Mission, and passports for the Mission will be issued by the Tsungli Yamen, that its passage be not obstructed.

The above is a separate article. The main body of the Convention did not concern Tibet.

7. Convention relating to Burmah and Thibet, July 24th 1886 (between the British Government and the Government of China)

Extract:

Inasmuch as inquiry into the circumstances, by the Chinese Government, has shown the existence of many obstacles to the Mission to Thibet provided for in the separate article of the Chefoo Agreement, England consents to countermand the Mission forthwith. With regard to the desire of the British Government to consider arrangements for frontier trade between India and Thibet, it will be the duty of the Chinese Government, after careful inquiry into the circumstances, to adopt measures to exhort and encourage the people.
with a view to the promotion and development of trade. Should it be practicable, the Chinese Government shall then proceed carefully to consider trade regulations; but if insuperable obstacles should be found to exist, the British Government will not press the matter unduly.

The remainder of the Convention was concerned with the recognition of British supremacy in Burma and the above clause about Tibet appears to be in the nature of a concession to facilitate the principal object of the Convention.

8. Convention of March 17th 1890 between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet (Ratifications exchanged at London, August 27th, 1890)

[English Text]

WHEREAS Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exist between their respective Empires; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the said relations, and it is desirable to clearly define and permanently settle certain matters connected with the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject, and have, for this purpose, named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, his Excellency the Most Honourable Henry Charles Keith Petty Fitzmaurice, G.M.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.M.I.E., Marquess of Lansdowne, Viceroy and Governor-General of India;

And His Majesty the Emperor of China, his Excellency Sheng Tai, Imperial Associate Resident in Tibet, Military Deputy Lieutenant-Governor;

Who, having met and communicated to each other their full powers, and finding these to be in proper form, have agreed upon the following Convention in eight Articles:

I. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain-range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nipal territory.

II. It is admitted that the British Government, whose Protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recognized, has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State, and except through

and with the permission of the British Government neither the Ruler of the State nor any of its officers shall have official relations of any kind, formal or informal, with any other country.

III. The Government of Great Britain and Ireland and the Government of China engage reciprocally to respect the boundary as defined in Article I, and to prevent acts of aggression from their respective sides of the frontier.

IV. The question of providing increased facilities for trade across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier will hereafter be discussed with a view to a mutually satisfactory arrangement by the High Contracting Powers.

V. The question of pasturage on the Sikkim side of the frontier is reserved for further examination and future adjustment.

VI. The High Contracting Powers reserve for discussion and arrangement the method in which official communications between the British authorities in India and the authorities in Tibet shall be conducted.

VII. Two joint Commissioners shall, within six months from the ratification of this Convention, be appointed, one by the British Government in India, the other by the Chinese Resident in Tibet. The said Commissioners shall meet and discuss the questions which, by the last three preceding Articles, have been reserved.

VIII. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible after the date of the signature thereof.

In witness whereof the respective negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quadruplicate at Calcutta, this 17th day of March, in the year of our Lord 1890, corresponding with the Chinese date, the 27th day of the second month of the 17th year of Kuang Hsi.

LANDSDOWNE,
Signature of the Chinese Plenipotentiary.

The Convention was signed at Calcutta. No Tibetan representative was present or took part in the negotiations.

9. Regulations regarding Trade, Communication, and Pasturage, to be appended to the Convention between Great Britain and China of March 17, 1890, relative to Sikkim and Tibet. Signed at Darjeeling, December 5, 1893

1. A TRADE mart shall be established at Yatung on the Tibetan side of the frontier, and shall be open to all British subjects for purposes of trade from the 1st day of May, 1894. The Government of India shall be free to send officers to reside at Yatung to watch the conditions of British trade at that mart.

2. British subjects trading at Yatung shall be at liberty to travel freely to and fro between the frontier and Yatung, to reside at Yatung, and to rent

1 British and Foreign State Papers, 1892-1893, Vol. LXXXV, pp. 1335-1337.
houses and godowns for their own accommodation, and the storage of their goods. The Chinese Government undertake that suitable buildings for the above purposes shall be provided for British subjects, and also that a special and fitting residence shall be provided for the officer or officers appointed by the Government of India under Regulation 1 to reside at Yatung. British subjects shall be at liberty to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities in kind or in money, to hire transport of any kind, and in general to conduct their business transactions in conformity with local usage, and without any vexatious restrictions. Such British subjects shall receive efficient protection for their persons and property. At Lang-jo and Ta-chun, between the frontier and Yatung, where rest-houses have been built by the Tibetan authorities, British subjects can break their journey in consideration of a daily rent.

3. Import and export trade in the following articles:—arms, ammunition, military stores, salt, liquors, and intoxicating or narcotic drugs, may, at the option of either Government, be entirely prohibited, or permitted only on such conditions as either Government, on their own side, may think fit to impose.

4. Goods, other than goods of the descriptions enumerated in Regulation 3, entering Tibet from British India, across the Sikkim—Tibet frontier, or vice versa, whatever their origin, shall be exempt from duty for a period of five years, commencing from the date of the opening of Yatung to trade; but after the expiration of this term, if found desirable, a tariff may be mutually agreed upon and enforced. Indian tea may be imported into Tibet at a rate of duty not exceeding that at which Chinese tea is imported into England, but trade in Indian tea shall not be engaged in during the five years for which other commodities are exempt.

5. All goods on arrival at Yatung, whether from British India or from Tibet, must be reported at the Custom Station there for examination, and the report must give full particulars of the description, quantity, and value of the goods.

6. In the event of trade disputes arising between British and Chinese or Tibetan subjects in Tibet, they shall be inquired into and settled in personal conference by the Political Officer for Sikkim and the Chinese Frontier Officer. The object of personal conference being to ascertain facts and do justice, where there is a divergence of views, the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide.

7. Despatches from the Government of India to the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet shall be handed over by the Political Officer for Sikkim to the Chinese Frontier Officer, who will forward them by special courier.

8. Despatches from the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet to the Government of India will be handed over by the Chinese Frontier Officer to the Political Officer for Sikkim, who will forward them as quickly as possible.

9. After the expiration of one year from the date of the opening of Yatung, such Tibetans as continue to graze their cattle in Sikkim will be subject to such Regulations as the British Government may from time to time enact for the general conduct of grazing in Sikkim. Due notice will be given of such Regulations.

General Articles

1. In the event of disagreement between the Political Officer for Sikkim and the Chinese Frontier Officer, each official shall report the matter to his immediate superior, who in turn, if a settlement is not arrived at between them, shall refer such matter to their respective Governments for disposal.

2. After the lapse of five years from the date on which these Regulations shall come into force, and on six months' notice given by either party, these Regulations shall be subject to revision by Commissioners appointed on both sides for this purpose, who shall be empowered to decide on and adopt such amendments and extensions as experience shall prove to be desirable.

3. It having been stipulated that Joint Commissioners should be appointed by the British and Chinese Governments under Article VII of the Sikkim-Tibet Convention to meet and discuss, with a view to the final settlement of the questions reserved under Articles IV, V, and VI of the said Convention; and the Commissioners thus appointed having met and discussed the questions referred to, namely, trade, communication, and pasturage, have been further appointed to sign the Agreement in nine Regulations and three General Articles now arrived at, and to declare that the said nine Regulations and the three General Articles form part of the Convention itself.

In witness whereof the respective Commissioners have hereeto subscribed their names.

Done in quadruplicate at Darjeeling, this 5th day of December, in the year 1893, corresponding with the Chinese date, the 28th day of the 10th moon of the 19th year of Kuang Hsu.

A. W. Paul, British Commissioner.
Ho Chang-jung.
James H. Hart, Chinese Commissioners.

A Tibetan Minister was present at the negotiations in Darjeeling but took no active part and did not sign the Regulations.

X. Convention between Great Britain and Tibet. Signed at Lhasa, September 7th 1904.

WHEREAS doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1891.

and as to the liabilities of the Thibetan Government under these Agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Thibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following Articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty’s Government, and on behalf of that said Government, and Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoché, and the representatives of the Council, of the three monasteries Se-ra, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Thibet:—

I. The Government of Thibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Thibet, as defined in Article I of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II. The Thibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which all British and Thibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyangtse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Thibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Thibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III. The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Thibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorized delegates to negotiate with representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV. The Thibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V. The Thibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyangtse and Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyangtse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Thibetan Agent who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Thibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Thibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.

VI. As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the dispatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for breaches of Treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Thibetan Government engages to pay a sum of 500,000 l. —equivalent to 75 lakhs of rupees—to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate, whether in Thibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual instalments of one lakh of rupees each on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 1906.

VII. As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid, and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII. The Thibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyangtse and Lhasa.

IX. The Government of Thibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government—

(a) No portion of Thibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power;

(b) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Thibetan affairs;

(c) No Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Thibet;

(d) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power.

In the event of consent to such Concessions being granted, similar or equivalent Concessions shall be granted to the British Government;

(e) No Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power.

X. In witness whereof the negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa, this 7th day of September, in the year of our Lord, 1904, corresponding with the Thibetan date, the 27th of the seventh month of the Wood Dragon year.

(Thibet Frontier Commission.) (Seal of the Dalai Lama affixed by
F. E. Younghusband, Colonel, the Ga-den
(Signature of British Commissioner.) Ti-Rimpoché.)

(Seal of British Commissioner.) (Seal of
(Signature of Lama.) National
(Seal of Council.) (Seal of Assembly.)
Dre-pung Sera Ga-den National
Monastery.) Monastery.) Monastery.)
In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the representatives of Great Britain and Thibet declare that the English text shall be binding.

(Thibet Frontier Commission.)

F. E. Younghusband, Colonel, British Commissioner.

(Seal of the Dala Lama affixed by the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche.)

(Seal of Council.) (Seal of Dre-pung Sera Ga-den National Monastery.) (Seal of Churkhang Monastery.) (Seal of Ga-dan Monastery.) (Seal of Assembly.)

AMPHILL,

Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

The Convention was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Simla on the eleventh day of November, nineteen hundred and one, subject to reduction of the indemnity to Rs. 25,000,000 and a declaration that British occupation of the Chumbi valley would cease after payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity, provided that the Tibetans had complied with the terms of the Convention in all other respects.

This was the first direct treaty between Great Britain and Thibet. The Chinese Amban at Lhasa was present at the negotiations and signing, but did not sign.

11. Convention between Great Britain and China respecting Tibet. Signed at Peking, April 27, 1906 (Ratifications exchanged at London July 23, 1906) 1

[Signed also in Chinese]

WHEREAS His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exist between their respective Empires;

And whereas the refusal of Tibet to recognise the validity of or to carry into full effect the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of March 17, 1890, and Regulations of December 5, 1893, placed the British Government under the necessity of taking steps to secure their rights and interests under the said Convention and Regulations;

And whereas a Convention of ten articles was signed at Lhasa on September 7, 1904, on behalf of Great Britain and Tibet, and was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India on behalf of Great Britain on November 11, 1904, a declaration on behalf of Great Britain modifying its terms under certain conditions being appended thereto;

His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have for this purpose named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:—

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland:

Sir Ernest Mason Satow, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, His said Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of China; and

His Excellency Tong Shoa-yi, His said Majesty's High Commissioner Plenipotentiary and a Vice-President of the Board of Foreign Affairs, who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them to be in good and true form have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in six articles:—

I. The Convention concluded on September 7, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are attached to the present Convention as an annex, is hereby confirmed, subject to the modification stated in the declaration appended thereto, and both of the High Contracting Parties engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified therein.

II. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.

III. The Concessions which are mentioned in Article IX (d) of the Convention concluded on September 7th, 1904 by Great Britain and Tibet are denied to any state or to the subject of any state other than China, but it has been arranged with China that at the trade marts specified in Article II of the aforesaid Convention Great Britain shall be entitled to lay down telegraph lines connecting with India.

IV. The provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and Regulations of 1893 shall, subject to the terms of this present Convention and annex thereto, remain in full force.

V. The English and Chinese texts of the present Convention have been carefully compared and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

VI. This Convention shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both countries and ratifications shall be exchanged at London within three months after the date of signature by the Plenipotentiaries of both Powers.

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, four copies in English and four in Chinese.

Done at Peking this twenty-seventh day of April, one thousand nine hundred

and six, being the fourth day of the fourth month of the thirty-second year of the reign of Kuang-hsu.

_ERNEST SATOW._
(Signature and Seal of the Chinese Plenipotentiary.)

Notes were also exchanged by which the Chinese undertook not to employ any foreigners in Tibet.

The Tibetans took no part in this Convention and its terms were never formally communicated to them.

12. **Convention between Great Britain and Russia relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. Signed at St. Petersburg, August 31st 1907**

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russians, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the Right Honourable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russians;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russians, the Master of his Court Alexander Iswolsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:

Arrangement concerning Thibet

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognising the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the external relations of Thibet, have made the following arrangement:

**ARTICLE I**

The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in the internal administration.

**ARTICLE II**

In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Thibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Thibetan authorities provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet of the 7th September 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April 1906; nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Buddhism in Thibet; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, as far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present arrangement.

**ARTICLE III**

The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send Representatives to Lhasa.

**ARTICLE IV**

The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any Concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Thibet.

**ARTICLE V**

The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Thibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

Annexe to the arrangement between Great Britain and Russia concerning Thibet.

Great Britain reaffirms the declaration, signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratification of the Convention of the 7th September 1904, to the effect that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by British forces shall cease after the payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity of 25,00,000 rupees, provided that the trade marts mentioned in Article II of that Convention have been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Thibetan authorities have faithfully complied in all respects with the terms of the said Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood that if the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces has, for any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russian Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratification exchanged at St. Petersburg as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at St. Petersburg, the 18th (31st) August 1907.
(a) The line begins at the Chumig Dangsang (Chhu-Mig-Dangs-Sangs) north-east of the Gyantse Fort, and thence it runs in a curved line, passing behind the Pekor Chode (Dpal-Hkhor-Choos-Sde), down to Chag-Dong-Gang (Phyag-Gdong-Sgang); thence passing straight over the Nyan Chu, it reaches the Zamsa (Zam-Srag).

(b) From the Zamsa the line continues to run, in a south-eastern direction, round to Lachi-To (Gla-Dkyi-Stod), embracing all the farms on its way, viz., the Lahong, the Hogtsa (Hog-Mtsho), the Tong-Chung-Shi (Grong-Chhung-Gshis), and the Rabgang (Rab-Sgang), &c.

(c) From Lachi-To the line runs to the Yutog (Gyu-Thog), and thence runs straight, passing through the whole area of Gankar-Shi (Ragal-Mkhar-Gshis), to Chumig Dangsang.

As difficulty is experienced in obtaining suitable houses and godowns at some of the marts, it is agreed that British subjects may also lease lands for the building of houses and godowns at the marts, the locality for such building sites to be marked out specially at each mart by the Chinese and Tibetan authorities in consultation with the British Trade Agent. The British Trade Agents and British subjects shall not build houses and godowns except in such localities, and this arrangement shall not be held to prejudice in any way the administration of the Chinese and Tibetan local authorities over such localities, or the right of British subjects to rent houses and godowns outside such localities for their own accommodation and the storage of their goods.

British subjects desiring to lease building sites shall apply through the British Trade Agent to the Municipal Office at the mart for a permit to lease. The amount of rent, or the period or conditions of the lease, shall then be settled in a friendly way by the lessee and the owner themselves. In the event of a disagreement between the owner and lessee as to the amount of rent or the period or condition of the lease, the case will be settled by the Chinese and Tibetan Authorities, in consultation with the British Trade Agent. After the lease is settled, the sites shall be verified by the Chinese and Tibetan Officers of the Municipal Office conjointly with the British Trade Agent. No building is to be commenced by the lessee on a site before the municipal office has issued him a permit to build, but it is agreed that there shall be no vexatious delays in the issue of such permit.

3. The administration of the trade marts shall remain with the Tibetan Officers, under the Chinese Officers' supervision and directions.

The Trade Agents at the marts and Frontier Officers shall be of suitable rank, and shall hold personal intercourse and correspondence one with another on terms of mutual respect and friendly treatment.

Questions which cannot be decided by agreement between the Trade Agents and the Local Authorities shall be referred to the Government of India and the Tibetan High Authorities at Lhasa. The purport of a reference by the Government of India will be communicated to the Chinese Imperial

The Tibetans were never informed about the provisions of this treaty.

13. Agreement between Great Britain, China and Tibet amending Trade Regulations in Tibet, of December 5, 1893. Signed at CALCUTTA, April 20, 1908 (Ratifications exchanged at Peking, October 14, 1908)

TIBET TRADE REGULATIONS

Preamble

WHEREAS by Article I of the Convention between Great Britain and China on the 27th April, 1900, that is the 4th day of the 4th moon of the 32nd year of Kwang Hsü, it was provided that both the High Contracting Parties should engage to take at all times such steps as might be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified in the Lhasa Convention of the 7th September, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, the text of which in English and Chinese was attached as an Annex to the above-named Convention;

And whereas it was stipulated in Article III of the said Lhasa Convention that the question of the amendment of the Tibet Trade Regulations which were signed by the British and Chinese Commissioners on the 5th day of December, 1893 should be reserved for separate consideration, and whereas the amendment of these Regulations is now necessary;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of the Chinese Empire have for this purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India: Mr. E. C. Wilton, C.M.G.;

His Majesty the Emperor of the Chinese Empire: His Majesty's Special Commissioner Chang Yin Tang;

And the High Authorities of Tibet have named as their fully authorized representative to act under the directions of Chang Tachen and take part in the negotiations, the Tsarong Shape, Wang Chuk Gyalpo.

And whereas Mr. E. C. Wilton and Chang Tachen have communicated to each other since their respective full powers and have found them to be in good and true form and have found the authorization of the Tibetan Delegate to be also in good and true form, the following amended Regulations have been agreed upon:

1. The Trade Regulations of 1893 shall remain in force in so far as they are not inconsistent with these Regulations.

2. The following places shall form, and be included within, the boundaries of the Gyantse mart:

1 British and Foreign State Papers, 1907-1908, Vol. CI, pp. 170-175.
Resident at Lhasa. Questions which cannot be decided by agreement between the Government of India and the Tibetan High Authorities at Lhasa shall, in accordance with the terms of Article I of the Peking Convention of 1906, be referred for settlement to the Governments of Great Britain and China.

4. In the event of disputes arising at the marts between British subjects and persons of Chinese and Tibetan nationalities, they shall be inquired into and settled in personal conferences between the British Trade Agent at the nearest mart and the Chinese and Tibetan Authorities of the Judicial Court at the mart, the object of personal conference being to ascertain facts and to do justice. Where there is a divergence of view the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide. In any of such mixed cases, the Officer or Officers of the defendant’s nationality shall preside at the trial, the Officer or Officers of the plaintiff’s country merely attending to watch the course of the trial.

All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between British subjects, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the British Authorities.

British subjects who may commit any crime at the marts or on the routes to the marts shall be handed over by the local authorities to the British Trade Agent at the nearest mart, the object of personal conference being to ascertain facts and to do justice. Where there is a divergence of view the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide. In any of such mixed cases, the Officer or Officers of the defendant’s nationality shall preside at the trial, the Officer or Officers of the plaintiff’s country merely attending to watch the course of the trial.

Chinese and Tibetan subjects, who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects at the marts or on the routes thereto, shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese and Tibetan Authorities according to law.

Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides.

Should it happen that Chinese or Tibetan subjects bring a criminal complaint against a British subject before the British Trade Agent, the Chinese or Tibetan Authorities shall have the right to send a representative, or representatives, to watch the course of trial in the British Trade Agent’s Court. Similarly, in cases in which a British subject has reason to complain of a Chinese or Tibetan subject in the Judicial Court at the mart, the British Trade Agent shall have the right to send a representative to the Judicial Court to watch the course of trial.

5. The Tibetan Authorities, in obedience to the instructions of the Peking Government, having a strong desire to reform the judicial system of Tibet, and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to relinquish her rights of extra-territoriality in Tibet, whenever such rights are relinquished in China, and when she is satisfied that the state of the Tibetan laws and the arrangements for their administration and other considerations warrant her in so doing.

6. After the withdrawal of the British troops, all the rest-houses, eleven in number, built by Great Britain upon the routes leading from the Indian frontier to Gyantse, shall be taken over at original cost by China and rented to the Government of India at a fair rate. One-half of each rest-house will be reserved for the use of the British officials employed on the inspection and maintenance of the telegraph lines from the marts to the Indian frontier and for the storage of their materials, but the rest-houses shall otherwise be available for occupation by British, Chinese, and Tibetan officers of respectability who may proceed to and from the marts.

Great Britain is prepared to consider the transfer to China of the telegraph lines from the Indian frontier to Gyantse when the telegraph lines from China reach that mart, and in the meantime Chinese and Tibetan messages will be duly received and transmitted by the line constructed by the Government of India.

In the meantime China shall be responsible for the due protection of the telegraph lines from the marts to the Indian frontier, and it is agreed that all persons damaging the lines or interfering in any way with them or with the officials engaged in the inspection or maintenance thereof shall at once be severely punished by the local authorities.

7. In law suits involving cases of debt on account of loans, commercial failure, and bankruptcy, the authorities concerned shall grant a hearing and take steps necessary to enforce payment; but, if the debtor plead poverty and be without means, the authorities concerned shall not be held responsible for the said debts, nor shall any public or official property be distrained upon in order to satisfy these debts.

8. The British Trade Agents at the various trade marts now or hereafter to be established in Tibet may make arrangements for the carriage and transmission of their posts to and from the frontier of India. The couriers employed in conveying these posts shall receive all possible assistance from the local authorities whose districts they traverse and shall be accorded the same protection as the persons employed in carrying the despatches of the Tibetan Authorities. When efficient arrangements have been made by China in Tibet for a postal service, the question of the abolition of the Trade Agents’ couriers will be taken into consideration by Great Britain and China. No restrictions whatever shall be placed on the employment by British officers and traders of Chinese and Tibetan subjects in any lawful capacity. The persons so employed shall not be exposed to any kind of molestation or suffer any loss of civil rights to which they may be entitled as Tibetan subjects, but they shall not be exempted from all lawful taxation. If they be guilty of any criminal act, they shall be dealt with by the local authorities according to law without any attempt on the part of their employer to screen or conceal them.

9. British officers and subjects, as well as goods, proceeding to the trade marts, must adhere to the trade routes from the frontier of India. They shall not, without permission, proceed beyond the marts, or to Gartok from Yatung and Gyantse, or from Gartok to Yatung and Gyantse, by any route through the interior of Tibet, but natives of the Indian frontier, who have already by usage traded and resided in Tibet, elsewhere than at the marts shall be at liberty to
continue their trade, in accordance with the existing practice, but when so trading or residing they shall remain, as heretofore, amenable to the local jurisdiction.

10. In cases where officials or traders, en route to and from India or Tibet, are robbed of treasure or merchandise, public or private, they shall forthwith report to the Police officers, who shall take immediate measures to arrest the robbers and hand them to the Local Authorities. The Local Authorities shall bring them to instant trial, and shall also recover and restore the stolen property. But if the robbers flee to places out of the jurisdiction and influence of Tibet, and cannot be arrested, the Police and the Local Authorities shall not be held responsible for such losses.

11. For public safety, tanks or stores of kerosene oil or any other combustible or dangerous articles in bulk must be placed far away from inhabited places at the marts.

British or Indian merchants wishing to build such tanks or stores may not do so until, as provided in Regulation 2, they have made application for a suitable site.

12. British subjects shall be at liberty to deal in kind or in money, to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities from whomsoever they please, to hire transport of any kind, and to conduct in general their business transactions in conformity with local usage and without any vexatious restrictions or oppressive exactions whatever.

It being the duty of the Police and Local Authorities to afford efficient protection at all times to the persons and property of the British subjects at the marts, and along the routes to the marts, China engages to arrange effective police measures at the marts and along the routes to the marts. On due fulfilment of these arrangements, Great Britain undertakes to withdraw the Trade Agents' guards at the marts and to station no troops in Tibet, so as to remove all cause for suspicion and disturbance among the inhabitants. The Chinese Authorities will not prevent the British Trade Agents holding personal intercourse and correspondence with the Tibetan officers and people.

Tibetan subjects trading, travelling, or residing in India shall receive equal advantages to those accorded by this Regulation to British subjects in Tibet.

13. The present Regulations shall be in force for a period of ten years reckoned from the date of signature by the two Plenipotentiaries as well as by the Tibetan Delegate; but if no demand for revision be made by either side within six months after the end of the first ten years, then the Regulations shall remain in force for another ten years from the end of the first ten years; and so it shall be at the end of each successive ten years.

14. The English, Chinese, and Tibetan texts of the present Regulations have been carefully compared, and, in the event of any question arising as to the interpretation of these Regulations, the sense as expressed in the English text shall be held to be the correct sense.
ARTICLE 2

The Sovereign of the Mongolian people Je-tsun Dampa Lama approves and acknowledges the formation of an independent State and the proclamation of the Dalai Lama as Sovereign of Tibet.

ARTICLE 3

Both States shall take measures, after mutual consideration, for the prosperity of the Buddhist faith.

ARTICLE 4

Both States, the Mongolian and the Tibetan, shall henceforth, for all time, afford each other aid against dangers from without and from within.

ARTICLE 5

Both States, each on its own territory, shall afford mutual aid to their subjects, travelling officially and privately on religious or on State business.

ARTICLE 6

Both States, the Mongolian and the Tibetan, shall, as formerly, carry on mutual trade in the produce of their lands—in goods, cattle &c., and likewise open industrial institutions.

ARTICLE 7

Henceforth transactions on credit shall be allowed only with the knowledge and permission of official institutions; without such permission no claims shall be examined by Government Institutions.

Should such agreements have been entered into before the conclusion of the present treaty, and should the parties thereto be unable to settle matters amicably, while the loss suffered is great, the payment of such debts may be enforced by the said institutions, but in no case shall the debts concern the Shabinars and Hoshuns.

ARTICLE 8

Should it be necessary to supplement the articles of this treaty, the Mongolian and Tibetan Governments shall appoint special Plenipotentiaries, who shall come to an Agreement according to the circumstances then existing.

ARTICLE 9

The present treaty shall come into force on the date of the signature thereof. Plenipotentiaries of the Mongolian Government: Acting Ministers of Foreign Affairs Biliktu Da Lama Rabdan and Assistant Minister-General and Manlai Caaty Bei Tzu Damdinsurun.

Plenipotentiaries of the Dalai Lama, Sovereign of Tibet: Gugir Tsanshib Khanen Lobsang Agwan, Donir Agwan Choinzin Tschichamtsao, manager of the Bank of Tibet, and Gendun-Galap, secretary.

According to the Mongolian chronology, on the 4th day of the 12th month of the second year of 'Him who is exalted by all'.

According to the chronology of Tibet, in the year of the Water-Mouse, on the same month and day.

The validity of the above agreement was never clearly established. See Bell, *Tibet: Past and Present*, pp. 150, 151.

15. India–Tibet Frontier 1914. Exchange of notes between the British and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries

To

Lönchen Shatra, Tibetan Plenipotentiary.

In February last you accepted the India–Tibet frontier from the Isu Razi Pass to the Bhutan frontier, as given in the map (two sheets), of which two copies are herewith attached, subject to the confirmation of your government and the following conditions:

(a) The Tibetan ownership in private estates on the British side of the frontier will not be disturbed.

(b) If the sacred places of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa fall within a days march of the British side of the frontier, they will be included in Tibetan territory and the frontier modified accordingly.

I understand that your Government have now agreed to this frontier subject to the above two conditions. I shall be glad to learn definitely from you that this is the case.

You wished to know whether certain dues now collected by the Tibetan Government at Tsöna Jong and in Kongbu and Kham from the Monpas and Lopas for articles sold may still be collected. Mr. Bell has informed you that such details will be settled in a friendly spirit, when you have furnished him the further information, which you have promised.

The final settlement of this India–Tibet frontier will help to prevent causes of future dispute and thus cannot fail to be of great advantage to both Governments.

A. H. McMahon, British Plenipotentiary.

Delhi 24th March 1914.

The map referred to in this and the succeeding note has been published for the first time in *An Atlas of the Northern Frontier*.
of India, issued on 15 January 1960 by the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India.

[Translation]

To

Sir Henry McMahon,

British Plenipotentiary to the China–Tibet Conference.

As it was feared that there might be friction in future unless the boundary between India and Tibet is clearly defined, I submitted the map, which you sent to me in February last, to the Tibetan Government at Lhasa for orders. I have now received orders from Lhasa, and I accordingly agree to the boundary as marked in red in the two copies of the maps signed by you subject to the condition mentioned in your letter, dated 24th March, sent to me through Mr. Bell. I have signed and sealed the two copies of the maps. I have kept one copy here and return herewith the other.

Sent on the 29th day of the 1st month of the Wood-Tiger year (23rd March 1914) by Lönchen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary.

Seal of Lönchen Shatra.

16. Convention between Great Britain, China, and Tibet. Simla 1914

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, being sincerely desirous to settle by mutual agreement various questions concerning the interests of their several States on the Continent of Asia, and further to regulate the relations of their several Governments, have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Knight Commander of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, Companion of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department;

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Monsieur Ivan Chen, Officer of the Order of the Chia Ho;

His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Lönchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Dorje; who having communicated to each other their respective full powers

and finding them to be in good and due form have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in eleven Articles:

ARTICLE 1

The Conventions specified in the Schedule to the present Convention shall, except in so far as they may have been modified by, or may be inconsistent with or repugnant to, any of the provisions of the present Convention, continue to be binding upon the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 2

The Governments of Great Britain and China recognising that Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and recognising also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa.

The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.

ARTICLE 3

Recognising the special interest of Great Britain, in virtue of the geographical position of Tibet, in the existence of an effective Tibetan Government, and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoining States, the Government of China engages, except as provided in Article 4 of this Convention, not to send troops into Outer Tibet, nor to station civil or military officers, nor to establish Chinese colonies in the country. Should any such troops or officials remain in Outer Tibet at the date of the signature of this Convention, they shall be withdrawn within a period not exceeding three months.

The Government of Great Britain engages not to station military or civil officers in Tibet (except as provided in the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet) nor troops (except the Agents' escorts), nor to establish colonies in that country.

ARTICLE 4

The foregoing Article shall not be held to preclude the continuance of the arrangement by which, in the past, a Chinese high official with suitable escort has been maintained at Lhasa, but it is hereby provided that the said escort shall in no circumstances exceed 300 men.

ARTICLE 5

The Governments of China and Tibet engage that they will not enter into any negotiations or agreements regarding Tibet with one another, or with any
other Power, excepting such negotiations and agreements between Great Britain and Tibet as are provided for by the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet and the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China.

**ARTICLE 6**

Article III of the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China is hereby cancelled, and it is understood that in Article IX(d) of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet the term ‘Foreign Power’ does not include China.

Not less favourable treatment shall be accorded to British commerce than to the commerce of China or the most favoured nation.

**ARTICLE 7**

(a) The Tibet Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 are hereby cancelled.

(b) The Tibetan Government engages to negotiate with the British Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Articles II, IV and V of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet without delay; provided always that such Regulations shall in no way modify the present Convention except with the consent of the Chinese Government.

**ARTICLE 8**

The British Agent who resides at Gyantse may visit Lhasa with his escort whenever it is necessary to consult with the Tibetan Government regarding matters arising out of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, which it has been found impossible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or otherwise.

**ARTICLE 9**

For the purpose of the present Convention the borders of Tibet, and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet, shall be as shown on the map attached hereto.¹

Nothing in the present Convention shall be held to prejudice the existing rights of the Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet, which include the power to select and appoint the high priests of monasteries and to retain full control in all matters affecting religious institutions.

**ARTICLE 10**

The English, Chinese and Tibetan texts of the present Convention have been carefully examined and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

¹ Published for the first time, by the Government of India in An Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India, 15 January 1960.

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**ARTICLE XI**

The present Convention will take effect from the date of signature.

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, three copies in English, three in Chinese and three in Tibetan.

Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D. one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the Chinese date, the third day of the seventh month of the third year of the Republic, and the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger year.

Initial of the Lönchen Shatra. (Initialled) A.H.M.

Seal of the Lönchen Shatra. Seal of the British Plenipotentiary.

Schedule

1. Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet, signed at Calcutta the 17th March 1880.

2. Convention between Great Britain and Tibet, signed at Lhasa the 7th September 1904.

3. Convention between Great Britain and China respecting Tibet, signed at Peking the 27th April 1906.

The notes exchanged are to the following effect:—

1. It is understood by the High Contracting Parties that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory.

2. After the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama by the Tibetan Government, the latter will notify the installation to the Chinese Government whose representative at Lhasa will then formally communicate to His Holiness the titles consistent with his dignity, which have been conferred by the Chinese Government.

3. It is also understood that the selection and appointment of all officers in Outer Tibet will rest with the Tibetan Government.

4. Outer Tibet shall not be represented in the Chinese Parliament or in any other similar body.

5. It is understood that the escorts attached to the British Trade Agencies in Tibet shall not exceed seventy-five per centum of the escort of the Chinese Representative at Lhasa.

6. The Government of China is hereby released from its engagements under Article III of the Convention of March 17, 1890, between Great Britain and China to prevent acts of aggression from the Tibetan side of the Tibet-Sikkim frontier.

7. The Chinese high official referred to in Article 4 will be free to enter Tibet as soon as the terms of Article 3 have been fulfilled to the satisfaction of

¹ Owing to the impossibility of writing initials in Tibetan, the mark of the Lönchen at this place is his signature.
On the withdrawal of the Chinese, a Declaration was signed by the plenipotentiaries of Britain and Tibet declaring that the Convention was to be binding on the Governments of Britain and Tibet and agreeing that so long as the Chinese Government withheld its signature it would be debarred from the enjoyment of privileges accruing thereunder.

17. Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations—3rd of July 1914

Whereas by Article 7 of the Convention concluded between the Governments of Great Britain, China and Tibet on the third day of July, A.D. 1914, the Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 were cancelled and the Tibetan Government engaged to negotiate with the British Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Articles II, IV and V of the Convention of 1904;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet have for this purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, Sir A. H. McMahon, G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.S.I.:

His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Lönchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Dorje;

And whereas Sir A. H. McMahon and Lönchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Dorje have communicated to each other since their respective full powers and have found them to be in good and true form, the following Regulations have been agreed upon:

I. The area falling within a radius of three miles from the British Trade Agency site will be considered as the area of such Trade Mart.

It is agreed that British subjects may lease lands for the building of houses and godowns at the Marts. This arrangement shall not be held to prejudice the right of British subjects to rent houses and godowns outside the Marts for their own accommodation and the storage of their goods. British subjects desiring to lease building sites shall apply through the British Trade Agent to the Tibetan Trade Agent. In consultation with the British Trade Agent the Tibetan Trade Agent will assign such or other suitable building sites without unnecessary delay. They shall fix the terms of the leases in conformity with the existing laws and rates.

II. The administration of the Trade Marts shall remain with the Tibetan Authorities, with the exception of the British Trade Agency sites and compounds of the rest-houses, which will be under the exclusive control of the British Trade Agents.

The Trade Agents at the Marts and Frontier Officers shall be of suitable rank, and shall hold personal intercourse and correspondence with one another on terms of mutual respect and friendly treatment.

III. In the event of disputes arising at the Marts or on the routes to the Marts between British subjects and subjects of other nationalities, they shall be enquired into and settled in personal conference between the British and Tibetan Trade Agents at the nearest Mart. Where there is a divergence of view the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide.

All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between British subjects, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the British Authorities.

British subjects, who may commit any crime at the Marts or on the routes to the Marts, shall be handed over by the Local Authorities to the British Trade Agent at the Mart nearest to the scene of the offence, to be tried and punished according to the laws of India, but such British subjects shall not be subjected by the Local Authorities to any ill-usage in excess of necessary restraint.

Tibetan subjects, who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects, shall be arrested and punished by the Tibetan Authorities according to law.

Should it happen that a Tibetan subject or subjects bring a criminal complaint against a British subject or subjects before the British Trade Agent, the Tibetan Authorities shall have the right to send a representative or representatives of suitable rank to attend the trial in the British Trade Agent's Court. Similarly in cases in which a British subject or subjects have reason to complain against a Tibetan subject or subjects, the British Trade Agent shall have the right to send a representative or representatives to the Tibetan Trade Agent's Court to attend the trial.

IV. The Government of India shall retain the right to maintain the telegraph lines from the Indian frontier to the Marts. Tibetan messages will be duly received and transmitted by these lines. The Tibetan Authorities shall be responsible for the due protection of the telegraph lines from the Marts to the Indian frontier, and it is agreed that all persons damaging the lines or interfering with them in any way or with the officials engaged in the inspection or maintenance thereof shall at once be severely punished.

V. The British Trade Agents at the various Trade Marts now or hereafter to be established in Tibet may make arrangements for the carriage and transport of their posts to and from the frontier of India. The couriers employed in
conveying these posts shall receive all possible assistance from the Local Authorities whose districts they traverse, and shall be accorded the same protection and facilities as the persons employed in carrying the despatches of the Tibetan Government.

No restrictions whatever shall be placed on the employment by British officers and traders of Tibetan subjects in any lawful capacity. The persons so employed shall not be exposed to any kind of molestation or suffer any loss of civil rights, to which they may be entitled as Tibetan subjects, but they shall not be exempted from lawful taxation. If they be guilty of any criminal act, they shall be dealt with by the Local Authorities according to law without any attempt on the part of their employer to screen them.

VI. No rights of monopoly as regards commerce or industry shall be granted to any official or private company, institution, or individual in Tibet. It is of course understood that companies and individuals, who have already received such monopolies from the Tibetan Government previous to the expiry of the period fixed.

VII. British subjects shall be at liberty to deal in kind or in money, to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to hire transport of any kind, and to conduct in general their business transactions in conformity with local usage and without any vexations, restrictions or oppressive exactions whatever. The Tibetan Authorities will not hinder the British Trade Agents or other British subjects from holding personal intercourse or correspondence with the inhabitants of the country.

It being the duty of the Police and the Local Authorities to afford efficient protection at all times to the persons and property of the British subjects at the Marts and along the routes to the Marts, Tibet engages to arrange effective Police measures at the Marts and along the routes to the Marts.

VIII. Import and export in the following Articles:

arms, ammunition, military stores, liquors and intoxicating or narcotic drugs.

may at the option of either Government be entirely prohibited, or permitted only on such conditions as either Government on their own side may think fit to impose.

IX. The present Regulations shall be in force for a period of ten years reckoned from the date of signature by the two Plenipotentiaries; but, if no demand for revision be made on either side within six months after the end of the first ten years the Regulations shall remain in force for another ten years from the end of the first ten years; and so it shall be at the end of each successive ten years.

X. The English and Tibetan texts of the present Regulations have been carefully compared, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

XI. The present Regulations shall come into force from the date of signature.

Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D. one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger year.

Seal of the Dalai Lama.

Signature of the Lönchen Shatra.

Seal of the Lönchen Shatra.


A. Henry McMahon, British Plenipotentiary.

Seal of the British Plenipotentiary.

Negotiated and signed only by the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries.

18. Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (17-point Agreement of May 23, 1951)

The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of China and, like many other nationalities, it has done its glorious duty in the course of the creation and development of the great Motherland. But, over the last 100 years or more, imperialist forces penetrated into China and in consequence also penetrated into the Tibetan region and carried out all kinds of deceptions and provocations. Like previous reactionary Governments, the Kuomintang reactionary Government continued to carry out a policy of oppression and sowing dissension among the nationalities, causing division and disunity among the Tibetan people. The local government of Tibet did not oppose the imperialist deception and provocation and adopted an unpatriotic attitude towards the great Motherland. Under such conditions the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the depths of enslavement and sufferings. In 1949 basic victory was achieved on a nation-wide scale in the Chinese people’s war of liberation; the common domestic enemy of all nationalities—the Kuomintang reactionary Government—was overthrown and the common foreign enemy of all nationalities—the aggressive imperialist forces—was driven out. On this basis the founding of the People’s Republic of China (CPR) and of the Chinese People’s Government (CPG) was announced.

In accordance with the Common Programme passed by the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the CPG declared that all nationalities within the boundaries of the CPR are equal and that they shall establish unity and mutual aid and oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the CPR will become a big family of fraternity and co-operation.
composed of all its nationalities. Within the big family of all nationalities of the CPR, national regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated and all national minorities shall have freedom to develop their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits and religious beliefs, and the CPG shall assist all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural and educational construction work. Since then, all nationalities within the country—with the exception of those in the areas of Tibet and Taiwan—have gained liberation. Under the unified leadership of the CPG and the direct leadership of higher levels of people’s governments, all national minorities have fully enjoyed the right of national equality and have exercised, or are exercising, national regional autonomy.

In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet might be successfully eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the CPR accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan nationality and people might be freed and return to the big family of the CPR to enjoy the same rights of national equality as all other nationalities in the country and develop their political, economic, cultural and educational work, the CPG, when it ordered the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to march into Tibet, notified the local government of Tibet to send delegates to the central authorities to conduct talks for the conclusion of an agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. In the latter part of April 1951 the delegates with full powers of the local government of Tibet arrived in Peking. The CPG appointed representatives with full powers to conduct talks on a friendly basis with the delegates with full powers of the local government of Tibet. As a result of the talks both parties agreed to establish this agreement and ensure that it be carried into effect.

(1) The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland—the People’s Republic of China.

(2) The local government of Tibet shall actively assist the PLA to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defences.

(3) In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Programme of the CPPCC, the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the CPG.

(4) The central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The central authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.

(5) The established status, functions and powers of the Panchen Ngoerhtehn shall be maintained.

(6) By the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen Ngoerhtehn when they were in friendly and amicable relations with each other.

(7) The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Programme of the CPPCC shall be carried out. The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected and lama monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will not effect a change in the income of the monasteries.

(8) Tibetan troops shall be reorganised step by step into the PLA and become a part of the national defence forces of the CPR.

(9) The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

(10) Tibetan agriculture, livestock-raising, industry and commerce shall be developed step by step and the people’s livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

(11) In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities. The local government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and, when the people raise demands for reform, they shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.

(12) In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-Kuomintang officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the Kuomintang and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past.

(13) The PLA entering Tibet shall abide by all the above-mentioned policies and shall also be fair in all buying and selling and shall not arbitrarily take a needle or thread from the people.

(14) The CPG shall have centralised handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighbouring countries and establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.

(15) In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the CPG shall set up a Military and Administrative Committee and a Military Area HQ in Tibet and—apart from the personnel sent there by the CPG—shall absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the Military and Administrative Committee may include patriotic elements from the local government of Tibet, various districts and various principal monasteries; the name-list shall be set forth after consultation between the representatives designated by the CPG and various quarters concerned and shall be submitted to the CPG for appointment.

(16) Funds needed by the Military and Administrative Committee, the Military Area HQ and the PLA entering Tibet shall be provided by the CPG.
The local government of Tibet should assist the PLA in the purchase and transport of food, fodder and other daily necessities.

(17) This agreement shall come into force immediately after signature and seals are affixed to it.

Signed and sealed by delegates of the CPG with full powers: Chief Delegate—Li Wei-Han (Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs); Delegates—Chang Ching-wu, Chang Kuo-hua, Sun Chih-yuan. Delegates with full powers of the local government of Tibet: Chief Delegate—Kaloong Ngabou Ngawang Jigme (Ngabo Shape); Delegates—Dazasak Khemey Sonam Wangdi, Khentrung Thupten Tenthar, Khenchung Thupten Lekmuun, Rimshi Sampozey Tenzin Thundup. Peking, 23rd May, 1951.

19. Sino-Indian Agreement, 29th April 1954

AGREEMENT

Between

THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TRADE AND INTERCOURSE

Between

TIBET REGION OF CHINA AND INDIA


Being desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India.

Have resolved to enter into the present Agreement based on the following principles:

(1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
(2) mutual non-aggression,
(3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
(4) equality and mutual benefit, and
(5) peaceful coexistence.

And for this purpose have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the Republic of India, H. E. Nedyam Raghavan, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India accredited to the People's Republic of China; the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, H. E. Chang Han-fu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government, who, having examined each other's cre-dentials and finding them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to establish Trade Agencies:

(1) The Government of India agrees that the Government of China may establish Trade Agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpung.

(2) The Government of China agrees that the Government of India may establish Trade Agencies at Yatung, Gyantsé and Gartok.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall be accorded the same status and same treatment. The Trade Agents of both Parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while exercising their functions, and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood freedom from search.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall enjoy the privileges and immunities for couriers, mail-bag and communications in code.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties agree that traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India may trade at the following places:

(1) The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Yatung, (2) Gyantsé and (3) Phari as markets for trade. The Government of India agrees that trade may be carried on in India, including places like (1) Kalimpong, (2) Siliguri and (3) Calcutta, according to customary practice.

(2) The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Gartok, (2) Pulunchung (Taklakot), (3) Gyanima-Kharka, (4) Gyanima-Chakra, (5) Ramura, (6) Dongbra, (7) Puling-Sumdo, (8) Nabra, (9) Shangtse and (10) Tashigong as markets for trade; the Government of India agrees that in future, when in accordance with the development and need of trade between the ARI District of Tibet Region of China and India, it has become necessary to specify markets for trade in the corresponding district in India adjacent to the ARI District of Tibet Region of China, it will be prepared to consider on the basis of equality and reciprocity to do so.

ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties agree that pilgrimage by religious believers of the two countries shall be carried on in accordance with the following provisions:

(1) Pilgrims from India of Lamaist, Hindu and Buddhist faiths may visit Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and Manam Tsuo (Manasarovar) in Tibet Region of China in accordance with custom.
(a) Pilgrims from Tibet Region of China of Lamaist and Buddhist faiths may visit Banaras, Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi in India in accordance with custom.

(3) Pilgrims customarily visiting Lhasa may continue to do so in accordance with custom.

ARTICLE IV

Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route:

(1) Shipki La pass, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass, and (6) Lipu Lekh pass.

Also, the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Shangatsangpu (Indus) River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.

ARTICLE V

For travelling across the border, the High Contracting Parties agree that diplomatic personnel, officials and nationals of the two countries shall hold passports issued by their own respective countries and visaed by the other Party except as provided in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this Article.

(1) Traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood and their attendants will be allowed entry for purposes of trade into India or Tibet Region of China, as the case may be, in accordance with custom on the production of certificates duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and examined by the border check-posts of the other Party.

(2) Inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries who cross the border to carry on petty trade or to visit friends and relatives may proceed to the border districts of the other Party as they have customarily done heretofore and need not be restricted to the passes and route specified in Article IV above and shall not be required to hold passports, visas or permits.

(3) Porters and mule-team drivers of the two countries who cross the border to perform necessary transportation services need not hold passports issued by their own country, but shall only hold certificates good for a definite period of time (three months, half a year or one year) duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and produce them for registration at the border checkposts of the other Party.

(4) Pilgrims of both countries need not carry documents of certification but shall register at the border checkposts of the other Party and receive a permit for pilgrimage.

(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs of this Article, either Government may refuse entry to any particular person.

(6) Persons who enter the territory of the other Party in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs of this Article may stay within its territory only after complying with the procedures specified by the other Party.

ARTICLE VI

The present Agreement shall come into effect upon ratification by both Governments and shall remain in force for eight (8) years. Extension of the present Agreement may be negotiated by the two Parties if either Party requests for it six (6) months prior to the expiry of the Agreement and the request is agreed to by the other Party.

Done in duplicate in Peking on the twenty-ninth day of April, 1954, in the Hindi, Chinese and English languages, all texts being equally valid.

(Sd.) NEDYAM RAGHAVAN, 
Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Republic of India.

(Sd.) CHANG HAN-FU, 

Notes Exchanged

NOTE

Peking, April 29, 1954

YOUR EXCELLENCY MR. VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER,

In the course of our discussions regarding the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India, which has been happily concluded today, the Delegation of the Government of the Republic of India and the Delegation of the Government of the People’s Republic of China agreed that certain matters be regulated by an exchange of Notes. In pursuance of this understanding, it is hereby agreed between the two Governments as follows:

(1) The Government of India will be pleased to withdraw completely within six (6) months from date of exchange of the present notes the military escorts now stationed at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet Region of China. The Government of China will render facilities and assistance in such withdrawal.

(2) The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the postal, telegraph and public telephone services together with their equipment operated by the Government of India in Tibet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will be decided upon through further negotiations between the Indian Embassy in China and the Foreign Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the exchange of the present notes.

(3) The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the twelve (12) rest houses of the
Government of India in Tibet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will be decided upon through further negotiations between the Indian Embassy in China and the Foreign Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the exchange of the present notes. The Government of China agrees that they shall continue as rest houses.

(4) The Government of China agrees that all buildings within the compound walls of the Trade Agencies of the Government of India at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet Region of China may be retained by the Government of India. The Government of India may continue to lease the land within its Agency compound walls from the Chinese side. And the Government of India agrees that the Trade Agencies of the Government of China at Kalimpong and Calcutta may lease lands from the Indian side for the use of the Agencies and construct buildings thereon. The Government of China will render every possible assistance for housing the Indian Trade Agency at Gartok. The Government of India will also render every possible assistance for housing the Chinese Trade Agency at New Delhi.

(5) The Government of India will be pleased to return to the Government of China all lands used or occupied by the Government of India other than the lands within its Trade Agency compound walls at Yatung.

If there are godowns and buildings of the Government of India on the above-mentioned lands used or occupied and to be returned by the Government of India and if Indian traders have stores, godowns or buildings on the above-mentioned lands so that there is a need to continue leasing lands, the Government of China agrees to sign contracts with the Government of India or Indian traders, as the case may be, for leasing to them those parts of the land occupied by the said godowns, buildings or stores and pertaining thereto.

(6) The Trade Agents of both Parties may, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the local governments, have access to their nationals involved in civil or criminal cases.

(7) The Trade Agents and traders of both countries may hire employees in the locality.

(8) The hospitals of the India Trade Agencies at Gyantse and Yatung will continue to serve personnel of the Indian Trade Agencies.

(9) Each Government shall protect the person and property of the traders and pilgrims of the other country.

(10) The Government of China agrees, so far as possible, to construct rest houses for the use of pilgrims along the route from Pulan-chung (Taklakot) to Kaug Rimpoch (Kailas) and Mavam Tso (Manasarovar); and the Government of India agrees to place all possible facilities in India at the disposal of pilgrims.

(11) Traders and pilgrims of both countries shall have the facility of hiring means of transportation at normal and reasonable rates.

(12) The three Trade Agencies of each Party may function throughout the year.

(13) Traders of each country may rent buildings and godowns in accordance with local regulations in places under the jurisdiction of the other Party.

(14) Traders of both countries may carry on normal trade in accordance with local regulations at places as provided in Article II of the Agreement.

(15) Disputes between traders of both countries over debts and claims shall be handled in accordance with local laws and regulations.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of India I hereby agree that the present Note along with Your Excellency's reply shall become an agreement between our two Governments which shall come into force upon the exchange of the present Notes.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency Mr. Vice-Foreign Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Sd.) N. RAGHAVAN, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of India.

His Excellency Mr. Chang Han-fu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Central People's Government, People's Republic of China.


The Government of the Republic of India and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, animated by the common desire to develop trade between the two countries and to strengthen further the friendship that already exists between the Governments and the peoples of India and China have, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, reached agreements as follows:

ARTICLE I

The two contracting parties being desirous of adopting all appropriate measures for the expansion of trade between the two countries agree to give the fullest consideration to all suggestions for the promotion of such trade.

ARTICLE II

The two contracting parties agree that all commercial transactions between the two countries shall be carried out in accordance with the Import, Export and Foreign Exchange Regulations in force from time to time in their respective countries.

ARTICLE III

The two contracting parties agree to accord, subject to the laws and regulations of the two countries for the time being in force, facilities for the import and export of the commodities mentioned in the attached Schedules 'A' and 'B'.

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ARTICLE IV

The present Agreement will not preclude the two contracting parties from facilitating trade in commodities not mentioned in the attached Schedules 'A' and 'B'.

ARTICLE V

The Trade between the Republic of India and the Tibet Region of the People's Republic of China will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet Region of China signed in Peking on the 29th April 1954.

ARTICLE VI

The Government of the Republic of India agree that on request by the Government of the People's Republic of China, they will subject to the regulations in force, accord reasonable facilities for the entry into the Port of Calcutta and subsequent movement to the Tibet Region of the People's Republic of China, of such commercial goods as cannot be obtained in India. These facilities will be accorded only to goods of Chinese origin.

ARTICLE VII

All commercial and non-commercial payments between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China may be effected in Indian rupees or in pounds sterling as may be mutually convenient. For the purpose of facilitating such payments, the People's Bank of India will open one or more account(s) with one or more commercial bank(s) in India authorised to deal in Foreign Exchange to be called account(s) 'A'. In addition, the People's Bank of China will, if necessary, open another account with the Reserve Bank of India to be called account 'B'. All payments between the two countries will be made through account(s) 'A'. Account 'B' will be used only for replenishing the balance(s) in account(s) 'A' whenever necessary. Payments to be made by residents of India to residents of the People's Republic of China will be effected by crediting the amounts of such payments to the above-mentioned account(s) 'A'. Payments to be made to residents of India by residents of the People's Republic of China will be effected by debiting the said account(s) 'A'. The account(s) 'A' will be replenished as and when necessary by one of the following methods, namely:

(i) by transfer of funds from another account 'A' of the People's Bank of China with another commercial bank, or from account 'B' with the Reserve Bank of India;
(ii) by sale of sterling to the bank concerned. Account 'B' will be replenished by either sale of sterling to the Reserve Bank of India or by transfer of funds from account(s) 'A'.

2. Article VII of this Agreement covers the following payments:

(i) Payments for the commodities imported or exported under the present Agreement;
(ii) Payments connected with commercial transactions and covering insurance, freight (in case of shipments of goods by the ships of either country), port charges, storage and forwarding expenses and bunkering;
(iii) Payments for distribution of films, for incomes and expenses of cultural performances and other exhibitions;
(iv) Payments of expenses on account of tours of delegations of commercial, cultural, social or official nature;
(v) Payments for the maintenance of the Embassy, Consulates and Trade Agencies of the Republic of India in China and for the maintenance of the Embassy, Consulates and Trade Agencies of the People's Republic of China in India;
(vi) Other non-commercial payments on which agreement is reached between the Reserve Bank of India and the People's Bank of China.

3. Any balances on the credit side of the account(s) 'A' or account 'B' maintained by the People's Bank of China will be convertible on demand into sterling at any time at the usual Banks' selling rate for sterling as fixed from time to time by the Indian Exchange Banks' Association. The above mentioned balances will be convertible into sterling even after the expiry of this Agreement.

4. Payments for Border Trade between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China, however, will be settled according to the customary practice.

ARTICLE VIII

The two contracting parties agree to consult with each other on questions that may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement will come into force from the date of its signature and will remain valid for a period of two years.

This Agreement can be extended or renewed by negotiation between the two contracting parties to be commenced three months prior to its expiry.

Done in duplicate in New Delhi on the fourteenth Day of October 1954, in the Hindi, Chinese and English languages, all texts being equally authentic.

(Sd.) KUNG YUAN, (Sd.) H. V. R. LENCAR,
On behalf of the Government of On behalf of the Government
the People's Republic of China of the Republic of India.

Schedules of Goods for Export not reproduced.
The Question of Tibet: Draft Resolution submitted by the Federation of Malaya and Ireland.

The General Assembly,

Recalling the principles regarding fundamental human rights and freedoms set out in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly on December 10th 1948,

Considering that the fundamental human rights and freedoms to which the Tibetan people, like all others, are entitled include the right to civil and religious liberty for all without distinction,

Mindful also of the distinctive cultural and religious heritage of the people of Tibet and of the autonomy which they have traditionally enjoyed,

Gravely concerned at reports, including the official statements of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, to the effect that the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet have been forcibly denied to them,

Deploring the effect of these events in increasing international tensions and embittering relations between peoples at a time when earnest and positive efforts are being made by responsible leaders to reduce tension and improve international relations,

1. Affirms its belief that respect for the principles of the Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is essential for the evolution of a peaceful world order based on the rule of law,

2. Calls for respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life.

Voting by roll call:

In favour: Federation of Malaya, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador.


Abstaining: Finland, France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Union of South Africa, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Belgium, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia.

The draft resolution was adopted by 45 votes to 9 with 26 abstentions.

The vote of Costa Rica, whose delegate was absent, was later recorded in favour of the resolution.
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Maj Gen (Retd) Shubhi Sood