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ON
TIBETAN AND BUDDHIST
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY
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THE IMPORTANCE OF LOVE AND COMPASSION IN BUDDHISM

by

ACHOK RINPOCHE (Vienna)

I am really happy that a Tibetan geshe is given the opportunity to talk during this conference about how Tibetans maintain their religious and cultural tradition. I am grateful to the Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies of the University of Vienna organizing the conference and giving me this opportunity.

Tibetan culture and the Buddhist religion are so interwoven in Tibet that it is difficult to separate them. Since the 7th century Tibetan culture has directly or indirectly supported the Buddhist religion, as well as serving and benefitting the Tibetan people. There have always been many different views about Buddhism, but I am going to give you my view, which is that of a monk who had studied in the traditional way up to the level of geshe.

The doctrine of Buddhism is basically established on love and compassion for all sentient beings and is actually a way of transforming one's thoughts and actions in whatever situation of life. Since Buddhism is based on love and compassion, and as these are qualities which are especially important for everyone in this 20th century, I am going to talk about love and compassion.

The Nature of Loving Concern and Compassion

Love and Compassion are warm feelings wishing that everyone may be happy and free from any suffering, or, in other words, regarding everyone as valuable, and caring if anyone suffers. Love and compassion are the sharpest opponents of neglecting other people or using them for one's own benefit. There are many different degrees of love and compassion, starting with the simplest type which ordinary people feel for their own children and parents. A little wider is that kind of love and compassion
one has for the people of one's own country. Greater than that is feeling it for all sentient beings, including even the smallest insect. The highest form of compassion is reached when one is willing to undergo any suffering for countless aeons, even giving one's own life, if it is of the slightest benefit to any single being, even an ant. There is an example given in the second chapter of Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā, where it is said that the love and compassion of a Buddha is the same towards a man who is cutting his arm as it is for one who is anointing him with perfume.

Compassion includes the Six Perfections, because a compassionate person practices generosity by being willing to give whatever he has or whatever is needed. Out of compassion he does not harm others but, has the morality and discipline which enables him to help others, as well as the patience of never being discouraged. Due to enthusiastic perseverance he never loses interest in the welfare of others, but works with one-pointed concentration for their benefit, having the wisdom which knows the best way to help any sentient being.

The Value of Love and Compassion in the World

In recent times there has been great scientific and technological progress, and this will doubtlessly continue for some time in the future. Most countries and political leaders think that material progress is the best method for achieving happiness. In fact so much importance is given to it, that science and technology have become almost a common religion. Paradoxically, those countries which have made the greatest material progress have also inevitably and rapidly been driven into great fear, such as has never been known before. They have become economically and militarily powerful, due to advanced science and technology, but don't seem to realize that the feat under which they now live is due to their having been careless about the needs of others. In fact they even believe that it is right to put one's own progress and welfare first. Out of a need to protect themselves they design and make weapons which can destroy enemies, and enable them to win wars, but after accumulating these weapons they are afraid of what the result might be if those have to be used, or if similar weapons are used against them. This increases fear, insecurity and confusion, and leads to the aggression that sparks off a war.

The source of fear and suffering for all human beings is exaggerated self-concern, or self-cherishing, and therefore a lack of concern for
others. You can not cure this suffering with medicine or weapons. The only cure or opponent is changing one's attitude from self-concern to concern for others or, in other words, to care more about others than about oneself.

Some people may argue that, if I care about others and don't think about myself, than I will suffer, because people will think I am weak and will exploit me. In short term this may seem to be so, but the long-term benefit is far greater than any immediate loss or hardship. If one is thinking only in terms of happiness for oneself, even at the cost of others, this may result in enjoyment or having what one wants now, whereas the long-term result from cherishing others more than oneself is to be free from suffering and, therefore, to have enduring happiness and peace of mind.

As long as there is self-cherishing and lack of concern for others, there will be no end to great conflict between countries and small conflict between individuals. If you think about this, you will understand it logically and you will also see that whatever short-term benefit you gain from caring only about yourself is limited, whilst the benefit that comes in long term from helping or being kind to others is not only limitless, but always continuously increasing.

Therefore self-cherishing, or lack of concern for the well-being of others is, and always has been, a source of suffering, whereas love and compassion, which are the opposites, are always a source of happiness now and in the future. No one can say that love and compassion were only useful in the past, but are no longer of value. Anyone who feels this is completely illogical and hasn't thought deeply. Isn't it true that material progress is mostly based on self-concern? Someone may ask: if we remove selfish concern, than how can we still have material progress, which is undoubtedly useful for man. I am going to answer this way: In the beginning we were concerned only about ourselves and careless about other people, so it was mostly for our own benefit that we built schools to give education, which has lead to great advance in scientific and technological development. But why can't we have the same advance and benefit based on concern for others instead of only for ourselves? Not only is such a development of benefit for everyone, but it can also be used for the benefit of all sentient beings.

In the sūtras it is said that someone who has achieved a high state of love and compassion can take advantage even of desire in order to have a child who can be educated to help others. It is also said that,
in the same way as the manure from the city of Serkya was of benefit for
the field of sugar cane, the manure of a Bodhisattva's delusions can be
beneficial for himself and others to achieve enlightenment.

Moreover, if you have love and compassion very deeply and extensive-
ly, in order to serve others, you can belong to any system – be it demo-
cratic, social or communist – and this need not contradict religion but
can be in harmony with it. With love and compassion you can benefit
others through any system or religion, or you can use any system or re-
ligion to help others.

The Connection between Buddhism and Love and Compassion

Generally speaking all religions are based on love and compassion,
but according to what I know, Buddhism is even more specially connected.
When Buddha turned the Wheel of Dharma he taught Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna
according to the disciples' ability or comprehension. In Hīnayāna it
doesn't specially say how to develop love and compassion, and doesn't
teach how to practice the bodhisattva deeds, but out of love and compas-
sion for others, it teaches that it is wrong to do any harm, like even
raising one's arm to strike, or to steal anything though it may cost on-
ly one penny, or to say harsh words and cause dissensions between people.
In short, harmful actions or thoughts are not allowed, whereas doing
things to help others is clearly taught, like giving food and shelter to
any uninvited guest or traveller, providing food when there is famine,
caring for sick people and giving medicine, building temples, libraries
and schools, etc. The Hīnayāna Tripitaka teaches morality, concentration,
wisdom as a means of removing the cause of suffering, which is the se-
cond of the Four Noble Truths; and the removal of the root of suffering
implies love and compassion.

Unlike Hīnayāna, which chiefly teaches how to cease from harming
others, Mahāyāna goes further and states that one should use all means
to benefit others, even by sacrificing one's own life if necessary. As it
is said in chapter 3 of Śāntideva's Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra:

"May I be the doctor and the medicine
and may I be the nurse
for all sick beings in the world
until everyone is healed."
Against self-cherishing the same text teaches how to dedicate one's body for the welfare of others, for in chapter 3 Śāntideva also says:

"Having given this body up
for the pleasure of all living beings
by killing, abusing and beating it
may they always do as they please."

and:

"May all who say bad things to me
or cause me any other harm,
and those who mock and insult me
have the fortune to fully awaken."

Of course, there is no need to mention to wish to help our relatives and friends, but we should also wish our enemies - those who do us harm - to achieve enlightenment quickly. The opposite of being careless about the welfare of others is to be able to care even for your enemies. Śāntideva continues:

"May I be a protector for those without one,
a guide for all travellers on the way;
may I be a bridge, a boat and a ship
for all who wish to cross (the water)."

In his homage to compassion, in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, Chandrakīrti says:

"Mercy alone is seen as the seed
of a Conqueror's rich harvest,
as water for development, and as
ripening in a state of long enjoyment;
therefore at the start I praise compassion."

In the same way, Tantrayāna also depends on love and compassion, since good practitioners, who cannot bear the suffering of others, try to find the quickest way to be able to benefit them, which is to become enlightened. According to Buddhism there is only one quick way to achieve enlightenment, even within three years, and that is Tantrayāna, but if one engages in Tantra without this supreme motivation and does it for one's own benefit, then one will be disappointed and may say that Tantra is not true and can not help to attain enlightenment quickly.
Achok Rinpoche

How the Tibetans Preserved Buddhism

In the introduction to his spiritual autobiography, *The Well Arranged Stepping Stones - A Personal Narration of the Omniscient Lord*, Je Tsong kha pa says:

"In the beginning I searched again and again for comprehensive learning. In the middle I had all the discourses arise as a guidance. In the end I put them into practice throughout day and night and dedicated all to the dissemination of the doctrines. Keeping in mind this procedure is a well arranged stepping stone - most gracious is the venerated treasure of knowledge."

In brief, this is how the Tibetan monks studied, practised and maintained Buddhism. Now I will explain this little more detailed.

Normally we study, under the guidance of a qualified teacher, beginning with the alphabet and continuing up to all the sūtras and Tantras. There is not even one text in sūtra and Tantra that you don't have to study.

These texts were brought to Tibet from India in the 7th century. As the Tibetan people wanted to have them translated into Tibetan, King Srong btsan sgam po sent Thon mi Sambhoṭa to India to invent a script for the Tibetan language. This was done under great difficulties, and after that Indian and Tibetan scholars translated the texts, with much effort and care, under the guidance first of King Srong btsan sgam po and later of King Khri srong lde brtsan. These translations had to be exactly in accordance with the original Sanskrit, even having the same number of syllables, and nothing was added or altered. They were checked by many other scholars and translators before publication, to make sure they adhered strictly to the original texts.

Later on the Tibetan monks studied these translations, and many became learned scholars who meditated on and practised what they had learnt, and thus gained realization. Then they themselves wrote commentaries on the texts, based on their own understanding, and their disciples studied these commentaries, which is how the Nyingmapa, Sakyapa, Kagyupa and Gelugpa traditions developed. They all teach the same principles of Buddhism, but with some differences in the methods of meditation. The way of studying the texts or commentaries is similar, but since I belong to
the Gelugpa tradition I will explain how we study.

Around the 14th century Tsong kha pa established the Gelugpa tradition, which gradually became famous and is the largest tradition now. There were numerous Gelugpa monasteries in Amdo, Kham and Lhasa, where one could study, but the most famous were Gaden (established by Tsong kha pa himself), Drepung and Sera, known as the "Three Great Pillars". Sometimes Thashilhunpo in Shigatse is added as the fourth. In 1958, at the time, when His Holiness the Dalai Lama took the geshe examination, there were 5,000 monks in Gaden, about 10,000 in Drepung and some 7,000 in Sera. Although some of these monks worked in the administration or as cooks the majority were students.

Most of the students were from Amdo, Kham and Tsang. Those from Amdo and Kham, the furthest provinces from Lhasa, came on foot, carrying their provisions on their back. The journey took 3-4 months, and when they had no food left, they begged for it. Because it was very cold and an arduous journey, many died on the way. It wasn't because they were poor that they travelled on foot; some were from rather rich families, but they felt this way was the best way to come to Lhasa, as pilgrims, and therefore they did so voluntarily. Many students also came from Mongolia on camels, and as they didn't even know Tibetan, they had to learn the language first. On reaching Lhasa the new arrivals would first of all go to see the Śākyamuni-statue and pray for whatever they wanted. Some wanted to study until they were geshes, others only for a few years. Although some travelled alone, most of them came in groups and were usually aged between 17 to 21. They joined whichever of the three great monasteries was usual for people from their regions.

On joining a monastery a teacher would be allocated to each student, who would then have to offer tea for all the monks in the hostel to which he was admitted. Although they were very poor after such a difficult journey, they offered tea even if it meant borrowing money from their teachers or others. The new students also had to do manual work of various kind when required. All lived in very simple conditions, but did so willingly because they felt they were very fortunate to be able to study in these great monasteries and turn away from worldly life. They studied through many classes on the following subjects: Pramāṇa (Logic), Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom), Madhyamaka (the Middle Path), Abidharma (Metaphysics) and Vinaya (Discipline). The texts studied were the relevant sūtras and their Indian and Tibetan commentaries. These studies took about 20-30 years, after which the students were
examined for the geshe degree. Each year from the final class of each college the two best students would take the lharampa geshe examination, so some of the best students might have to wait another 10 years before getting the lharampa degree. Those with less ability got other geshe degrees called dhorampa and lingseb.

Students didn't receive any scholarships or money; all they got was whatever offerings were made by lamas or sponsors, and from this they should buy food, but sometimes they also had to offer tea for the monks in their college. They usually wore very poor robes which were patched and repatched and used for all seasons of the year. They studied and debated day and night, and when they returned to their rooms, they recited whatever they had memorized. Often they would go to bed without even undressing, so that they could rise quickly and go to the main temple where they would have tea. Some of them didn't even have any food to eat, but others would share what they had. They would then go to the choera (debating ground) and debate on what they had studied all morning, after which they would have lunch and continue debating for 2-3 hours, as well as studying and debating in the evening. While in the Prajñā and Madhyamaka classes, in Serejey college for instance, the monks debated throughout the entire night.

The reason for debating - still an important feature in traditional Tibetan education - is the fact that all the monks had individual teachers with diverging ideas, so that although the subject is the same, there might be many different points of view. Debating is a way of understanding other views and checking whether their or another's point of view is correct. So debating on a subject means to listen to some other person's opinion and, then, either to refute it by logical argument, or see that one's own view is lacking. Debating also sharpens one's mind, because one has to formulate the own opinion clearly in order to refute wrong views or to convince the other person of one's own view being more logical. This is specially important when there are many different schools of thought on one subject, śūnyatā for instance.

Before going in for the geshe examination, monks had to make offerings in their monasteries, colleges and hostels for all the monks. Rich people usually came forward and offered to pay the expenses, so that the geshe could give food, tea and money to all the monks, according to the custom. Even though a sponsor was willing to bear the costs, the geshe himself would prefer to sell whatever he had to pay for them, and only after his own resources were used, he would accept help from others. The reason for this is, that by practicing giving he creates merit that will
benefit others.

From the time of the 13th Dalai Lama onwards, the lqarmaapa geshes examined extensively in front of the Dalai Lama, his two Tutors and religious assistants, prior to which they had been examined in the temple in Lhasa by learned geshes from Gaden, Drepung and Sera. During the "Great Prayer Festival", which was founded by Tsong kha pa and is held in the first month of every Tibetan new year, the geshes were examined by the abbots of all the colleges of the three great monasteries. When people knew that famous students were being examined, the temple would be crowded with geshes and monks, as everybody wanted to hear them. During the examinations great geshes and scholars put really sharp questions and arguments, which they had prepared during the year. Each geshe was examined for one full day during Monlam, and at the end he would be awarded an official degree, so there would be much interest and excitement as to who received first place.

After attaining the geshe degree some would join one of the two Tantric Colleges to study Tantra for many years and also take an examination. Thereafter they could become Chief Disciplinarian (dge bskos), Prior (bla ma dbu mdzad) or abbot of the tantric colleges. From this position they could rise to representatives of rGyal tshab rje or mKhas grub rje, and then to Gaden tipa, representative of Tsong kha pa, which is the highest position geshes can attain. They could also become regent during the time of minority of the Dalai Lama. Students say that the position of the Gaden tipa is not reserved for anyone in particular but it is open for everyone who has the ability. All the great Gaden tipas have studied like ordinary monks for many years with great difficulties and often without proper food.

Such is the way that Buddhism was developed, studied, practised and preserved in Tibet. Though I have spoken in the past tense, this same tradition of studies is still carried on by the monks nowadays, even though the conditions in exile in India are quite limited compared to what they used to be in Tibet.

How Love and Compassion Benefit Sentient Beings

Once, before Buddha became enlightened, he was a bodhisattva called Mahâsattva, the son of a great king, Mahâratha. One day, when the prince and his two elder brothers, Mahâdeva and Mahâpranâdâ, went to the forest, they saw a female tiger with five cubs, who were all hungry, and the
mother tiger was about to eat her cubs. But the youngest prince couldn't bear it and wanted to feed them with his own body and blood, so he sent his brothers away on the pretext of looking for food and then lay down so that the tiger could eat him. But the tiger was so weak that she couldn't do so, and the prince, out of his great compassion, took a sharp branch and cut his flesh so that the blood came and then fed the tiger with his body. He did this to prevent the mother from eating her cubs and the cubs from starving, and he dedicated the merit of his generosity so that he could help the tiger and cubs not only in that life, but in all future lifetimes. Later, when Buddha had become enlightened, he first turned the Wheel of Dharma for the tiger and cubs, who were then human beings, and they became his disciples and reached arhatship in that very life. This is one of many similar incidents in the life of Buddha given in the Jātaka tales, telling of the compassionate deeds which led to Buddha's enlightenment.

In Tibet, as I've already mentioned, there were many monasteries where people could study, and every year new students made long and difficult journeys to join them. In the beginning they didn't know who were going to be their teachers, and also the the teacher didn't know who his students would be. They were not chosen personally but the names were drawn from a container and students assigned to particular teachers by such means of selections. The teacher would then be responsible for the students and had not only to educate, but also feed and clothe them. Nobody paid the teacher for doing so or thanked him, but the teacher undertook this task out of love and compassion, and he helped the students in whatever way they needed. We can easily understand that it would be natural to do this, if the students were relatives or friends of the teacher, but they were not. Yet he looked after them with great kindness, and when the students learnt well the teacher was happy and he worried when anything adverse happened to them. Whatever all the great lamas and geshes have achieved, is due to their teachers, and this is why the utmost reverence is paid to one's teachers, not only when one is a student, but throughout one's entire life.

In this century the great Indian leader, Mahātma Gandhi, went through many difficult situations for the sake of helping the people in his country. Even though there was opposition when he worked for India's independence, he never gave up his ideal and always tried to achieve it by peaceful means for the sake of his own people as well as others.

Mother Theresa is another example of a person who has devoted her life to serving the old, poor and abandoned out of love and compassion.
She began this work not in her own country, but for people of different race and nation, and she continues to help people in many different countries. Though she receives riches and awards, she never uses them for herself, but only for the welfare of others.

For the last 25 years there has been the most difficult situation ever experienced in Tibetan history. All the culture achievements of many centuries have been destroyed, and especially religion - which is the foundation of Tibetan culture - has suffered greatly. The people and religious practitioners have endured unimaginable misery, even though they were living peacefully and not harming others.

Out of great concern and compassion, His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, has given all his time and effort to helping his suffering people, even undergoing exile, abuse and misunderstanding, as well as hardship and loss, solely to benefit others. In the beginning he tried to cooperate with the Chinese when they overran his country, believing they had good intentions, and when obliged finally to leave his land to prevent further suffering of his people, he has worked ceaselessly not only for the Tibetans but for everyone. His love and compassion are for all people, including the Chinese. He has never abused them, in fact has referred to any good things they have done, and he always asks his people not to have any harmful thoughts, even towards enemies.

In short, no true Tibetan lama or geshe wishes harm to the Chinese or any other person, but, on the contrary, feels compassion for anyone who is undergoing suffering or causing suffering to others. If the Tibetans had cared more for material progress than for the benefits of religion, and had made themselves militarily powerful, they would probably have had greater suffering and also would have caused much harm to others.

Love and compassion are not only of help to others, they also benefit those who practice them. The Buddha reached enlightenment due to his compassionate deeds throughout many lifetimes. Parents and teachers also benefit by feeling happy when they can help their children and students. In fact anyone who sincerely helps others becomes an object of respect and admiration and feels happy, so he also benefits from love and compassion, even though he may not be thinking about himself at all. Therefore love and compassion are the main foundation of happiness and benefit for others as well as for oneself, so why don't reasonable people try to develop and practise love and compassion?
How to Develop Love and Compassion

There are two causes of suffering, one is self-cherishing and the other is ignorance of the way in which things actually exist. These two causes are linked, because if you don't have the wrong view, then self-cherishing won't cause much suffering. The purpose of studying Madhyamaka is to establish the correct view, in order to eliminate the wrong view, which is one of the causes of suffering. The other cause of suffering, self-cherishing, has to be eliminated by love and compassion for others.

In Buddhism the first of these two methods is called zab mo lta rgyud the "Lineage of the wisdom understanding emptiness", which came from Mañjuśrī to Nāgārjuna to Āryadeva. The second method is called rgya chen spyod rgyud, the "Extensive practice of love and compassion", which has two lineages. The first came through Maitreya Buddha to Asaṅga to gSer ling pa and gives the 7-point method of developing love and compassion through equanimity by (1) recognizing everybody as having been your mother, (2) recognizing that thus everyone has been kind to you, (3), wishing to repay their kindness, (4) immaculate love, (5) great compassion, (6) exceptional compassion, and (7) bodhicitta (wishing to reach the state of enlightenment, in order to benefit others. The second lineage came from Mañjuśrī to Śāntideva to gSer ling pa. Starting with equanimity, one exchanges oneself with others by thinking of the faults of self-cherishing, the advantages of cherishing others, and regarding all sentient beings as more precious than a wish-fulfilling gem. From gSer ling pa these two lineages passed on to Atiśa and merged into one. In this form they have continued to this time.

Conclusion

The purpose of all the long years of studying so many texts, which monks undergo, is to be able to recognize the root cause of suffering and, knowing the antidotes, to apply them and bring about a transformation in one's mind from selfishness to selflessness. Some people may think that this is just idealism and that it isn't possible to actually develop love and compassion in this way. But if you follow the methods of mind-transformation correctly, there is no doubt whatsoever that love and compassion can be developed - it is only a matter of time and effort.
Up to now hundreds of lamas have come through the lineages from Maitreya Buddha and Mañjuśrī. They all had the same experiences and difficulties that we have, but they practiced love and compassion for years, and finally developed it. You can know about these experiences from their biographies, and you also can see what they accomplished from the examples of the compassionate beings living amongst us.

Many people think the best method to be happy is to have material progress, but when they have material well-being they find it doesn't make them completely happy, in fact it is often accomplished by or leads to mental problems and dissatisfaction. Other people, however, without any material well-being at all, have great peace of mind and happiness. So why doesn't material progress give people happiness and peace of mind? Because very often this has been developed, acquired or used for selfish reasons. Therefore, if we want to be happy now and in the future, we should try to use material progress to benefit others and not achieve our own well-being through neglecting or making others suffer. In order to do that, we need to have developed love and compassion. There are the two methods in Buddhism which I have mentioned, and there may be many other methods, so we should find out what suits us best. It is very important to consider why love and compassion are beneficial to others, whether they can bring ourselves and others happiness and peace of mind, and then, how they can be developed.

In conclusion, as Thogs med bzang po taught in The Thirty-Seven Practices of all Buddha's Sons:

"All of our sufferings without an exception, derive from the wish to please only ourselves; while the thoughts and the actions that benefit others conceive and give birth to supreme Buddhahood."
BSHAD THABS: SOME TIBETAN METHODS OF EXPLAINING THE TANTRAS*

by

M. BROIDO (Oxford)

1. Introduction and summary

Since the Tibetan for "tantra" is rgyud and since the whole corpus of works on tantra explains the tantras, those works may be called rgyud kyi bshad pa. Among them, those which deal systematically with methods for explaining the tantras are said to be on rgyud kyi bshad thabs or bshad thabs for short. This paper is about bshad thabs as developed in Tibet and represented by works A-J of the bibliography.

In our Symposium this year Dr. Katz has given a useful review of Buddhist hermeneutics,¹ and it would be pointless to repeat that here. In any case, the term bshad thabs covers a wide range of notions, as we see from Table 1, and it is not clear to me whether all of them fall under the English word "hermeneutics". So I will continue to use the simple phrase "methods of explaining the tantras".

¹ N.Katz, Tibetan Hermeneutics and the Vāna controversy (see pp.107-130 of this volume).
### Table 1: Some Kinds of *bshad thabs* ²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canonical source</th>
<th>Mainly linguistic</th>
<th>Mainly non-linguistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guhyasamājatantra</td>
<td><em>gleng bslang ba'i rgyan⁴ mtha'drug gi rgyan⁶</em></td>
<td><em>rgyud gsum³</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GST literature especially</td>
<td><em>bshad tshul bzhi'i rgyan⁷ nyan pa po la bshad tshul gnyis kyi rgyan⁶</em></td>
<td><em>rgis pa bzhi'i rgyan⁵ gang zag lnga'i rgyan⁹</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPD and JVS</td>
<td><em>gsams ngag drug¹¹</em></td>
<td><em>bden gnyis nges pa'i rgyan¹⁰</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nam mkha dang</td>
<td><em>gsams ngag drug¹¹</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mnyam pa'i rgyud</td>
<td><em>gsams ngag drug¹¹</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hevajratantra</td>
<td><em>gsams ngag drug¹¹</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampuṭa</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

² Table 1 lists every distinct kind of *bshad thabs* identified as such in the texts A–J. Doubtless there will be other methods discussed in other texts. None of our texts gives an explicit definition of *bshad thabs*, so the literal translation by "methods of explanation" (of the tantras) can, if one wishes, be supplemented by the observation that the phrase is used, in these texts, of just these methods.

³ The *rgyud gsum* are: *rang bzhi*, *gzhi* and *mi 'phrogs pa 'i rgyud*, or *rgyu'i*, *thabs kyi* and *'bras bu 'i rgyud*: GST XVIII, 33–34; A 67b4; E 13a4. Very common are the phrases *gzhi'i*, *lam gyi* and *'bras bu'i rgyud*. Both in Sa skya pa and bKa brgyud pa works, what these sets of three phrases stand for is described by such phrases as *dnogs po'i gnas lugs* (or *dnogs po'i gnas tshul*), *lam* and *'bras bu skye ba'i rim pa*. See H.V. Guenther, *The Life and Teaching of Nāropa*. Oxford 1963, 114 ff., and my *The term dngos-po'i gnas lugs in Padma dKar po's gZhung-'grel*. *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson. Proceedings of the International Seminar on Tibetan Studies, Oxford 1979*, ed. Aris and Kji, 61ff., and numerous Tibetan works quoted in those references.

The *rgyud gsum* occupy a most central place in Vajrayāna thought. They are often described simply as the content (*bryod bya*) of tantra (e.g. A 62a4). It would not be too much to say that for many Tibetan authors on vajrayāna, their view of *rgyud gsum* is the key to their view of vajrayāna as a whole.

⁴ B 21a7; D 216b3; E 9a1; F 32b5; J 38a5
⁵ B 22b4; D 218a7; E 9a5; F 34a4; J 38b4
⁶ B 24a4; E 9b5; F 35b5; G 10b6; H 15b4; J 38b7. In D the *mtha' drug* materials are rather scattered; see more detailed references below, also table 3.
⁷ B 25b3; D 175a–206b; E 10b3; F 37a1; H 17a3; J 39b2; table 4.
⁸ B 27b5; D 220a6; E 11a2; F 37b5; J 39b5
⁹ B 28a6; D 222a1; E 11a7; F 38a3; J 40a1
¹⁰ B 29b4; D 223a7; E 12a5; F 38b6; J 40b3
¹¹ A 62b5–67b4; E 12a7. See table 2.
What is listed in Table 1 are not names of individual techniques of *bshad thabs*, but standard names of groups of such techniques. The non-linguistic ones are extremely important, but there will not be room to deal with them properly here; some very bare facts may be found in the footnotes. Here I shall deal properly only with the linguistic techniques.\(^{20}\)

Though distinguished Tibetans wrote on *bshad thabs*, it is not easy to find out about it. I know of no Tibetan work specifically devoted to *bshad thabs*. In the bibliography, A is a review of the tantras in general; B and F are about the Guhyasāmaja system in general; D is a commentary on the *Jñānavājrasamuccaya* (*JVS*); E and J are commentaries on the *Hevajratantra*; G is a work on Madhyamaka, and H is on phonetics and similar matters. Bu ston did start to write a work (C) on *bshad thabs*, but what has come down to us is only the introduction and colophons.

The main linguistic devices of *bshad thabs* are found in the three groups called *gdams ngag drug*, *mtha’ drug* and *bshad tshul bzhi* (almost always called *tshul bzhi* for short, in spite of the ambiguity). For ease of reference, these three groups are listed in tables 2-4.

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12 A 68a6; E 12b5 (here quoting the sGyu ‘phrul chen po) The three are *dbyibs* and *sngags* and *chos kyi bdag nyid*. The proper way of using this method seems to have been a matter of contention: see A 68a4; Padma dkar po, bSre ‘pho’i gzhung ‘grel 179a and khrid yig 20a1.

13 A 69a1; E 12b7. In this method, the four stages (*gnyas pa bzhi*) of development of a foetus (viz. *gong bu*, chu, *gzugs* and *gzugs las ‘das pa*) are made to correspond to the four *buddhakāyas* (in the order: *sambhoga*-, *dharma*-, *nirmāṇa*-, *svabhāvikākāya*).

14 A 69b3. They are: *de bzhin nying kyi dag pa*, *lha so so’i dag pa*, and *rang rig pa’i dag pa*.

15 E 13b3. They are the usual *bskyed rim* and *rdzogs rim*, here based on *Hevajratantra* I.viii, 24-25.

16 A 70a4.

17 E 13a6.

18 E 13b4

19 E 13b4 (sic).

20 The difference between linguistic and non-linguistic methods in *bshad thabs* can be only a rough-and-ready one.
TABLE 2: GDAMS NGAG DRUG

|rjod byed kyi sgra 'chad lugs kyi man ngag gsum:|
|yan lag gi don\textsuperscript{22}|
|yi ge'i don\textsuperscript{23}|
|bsdus don or man ngag gi don\textsuperscript{24}|
|brjod par bya ba'i don 'chad\textsuperscript{25} par byed pa'i man ngag gsum:|
|spyi'i don\textsuperscript{26}|
|sbas don\textsuperscript{27}|
|mthar thug gi don\textsuperscript{28}|

TABLE 3: MTHA' DRUG AND BU STON'S PRINCIPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>the distinction of:</th>
<th>is based on differences of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>drang don and nges don</td>
<td>Bu ston\textsuperscript{29}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dgongs bshad or dgongs pa can and dgongs min</td>
<td>bTsong kha pa\textsuperscript{30}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgra ji bzhin and sgra ji bzhin ma yin</td>
<td>Padma dkar po\textsuperscript{31}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>don</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>brjod don</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>brjod gzhi (=)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dgongs gzhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgra and don</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rjod byed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{21} This division into two groups is that set out at A 62b6.

\textsuperscript{22} A 64b1

\textsuperscript{23} A 64b4

\textsuperscript{24} A 65a3

\textsuperscript{25} My print of A (as also that used for the Japanese reproduction of the Sa skya bKa 'bum: the two seem to have identical pagination) has bshad par bya ba which is probably an old misprint.

\textsuperscript{26} A 63a1

\textsuperscript{27} A 63a4

\textsuperscript{28} A 63b4

\textsuperscript{29} B 24b1

\textsuperscript{30} D 207b3 and 218a2

\textsuperscript{31} G 8b5; H 15b4
These three groups of linguistic devices depend on one single distinction, roughly that between *rjod byed sgra* and *brjod bya don*; part of these phrases appear in various places in tables 2 and 3. It is often said that this distinction is the distinction between de Saussure's *signifiant* and *signifié*. This is not wrong, but it is not clear enough for my purposes. Later I will show that, in the present context, we have the distinction in the form:

- *sgra*: words, phrases, linguistic conventions, linguistic meaning
- *don*: propositional content, reference, referent; purpose of a speech-act, utterer's intention, etc.

In a slogan: convention and intention. But this is only a slogan, and it works only in this context. On the other hand, as I will show later, the translation of *sgra/don* by "word/meaning" will not do at all.

Now as regards method, I propose to argue for my interpretations. My arguments will be drawn from the philosophy of language, especially from theory of meaning and the theory of speech-acts. Since this paper is only intended as a general review, I will not press very hard upon any technical distinctions in those fields. At the same time, however, I hope that my discussion will be solid enough to serve as the basis for the treatment of more specialized and difficult topics in this area of *bshad thabs*.

Let me now summarize what I believe is meant by the six terms listed in table 2 under *gdams ngag drug*. This is a Sa skya pa method and bSod nams rtse mo says that *yan lag gi don* is explanatory method based on what is known in the world and in śāstras - in a word, on normal linguistic conventions. *Yi ge'i don* is explanation motivated not by the real point of the passage, but by the separate syllables or parts of the syllables or by the shapes of the letters. And *bsdus don* is explanation...
based on a code, such as the well-known one in the Hevajratantra, or some other method not known in the world or in śāstras. From the examples he gives it is clear that yi ge'i don and bs dus don involve non-standard linguistic conventions. Thus these three explanatory methods are all distinguished by their handling of convention, just as in my slogan.

By contrast, the other three methods of the gdams ngag drug are all concerned with the subject-matter of the text, the topic or propositional content (brjod bya) or purpose (don, brjod don) ascribed to the passage by the commentator. spyi'i don is explanation ascribing to the passage concern with the pāramitāyāna or with the utpattikrama. sbas don ascribes a concern with the sampannakrama. mtha' thug don is concerned with 'od gsal and zung 'jug. This is only rough outline: detail appears below.

The main system of bshad thabs used by the bKa brgyud pas, by Bu ston and by bTsong kha pa is called rgyan bdun. The most important canonical source for this system is the Pradīpoddōyotanā (PPD) of Candrakīrti. Naturally there are seven rgyan (s. table 1) and they contain altogether some 28 methods, all of which will be reviewed in the main portion of the paper. Perhaps the most important are the mtha' drug and tshul bzhi which are listed in table 3 (left-hand column) and table 4 (left-hand column) respectively; these account for ten out of the 28 methods. However the mtha' drug/tshul bzhi system is both more complex and less precise than the gdams ngag drug, and I recommended anybody who has all the texts and time to study them, to look first at the gdams ngag drug.

If we know what the gdams ngag drug are, then the tshul bzhi can be (at least roughly) defined just by looking across table 4.

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32 Sandhyābhāṣa, as discussed in HT II.iii. The Tibetan for this word here is either dgongs skad (4 times) or gsang skad (5 times). I am not saying that any of these words literally mean "code"; but just this might well be said of the word brda skad which is often used, in Tibetan commentaries, to explain them.

33 The rgyan bdun system has been briefly discussed by E. Steinkellner, Remarks on Tantristic Hermeneutics. Proceedings of the Csoma de Körös Memorial Symposium, held at Mátrafüred, Hungary, 24.-30. September 1976. Ed. L. Ligeti, 1976. I was unaware of this useful article until the present paper was completed. It is based mainly on Indian sources, especially on PPD (though some use is made of B and D). The work contains philological information (e.g. on the Sanskrit equivalents of the technical terms of bshad thabs), and it relates bshad thabs to hermeneutics and spells out some difference between the two. There as here, much of the detailed discussion focuses on the mtha' drug and tshul bzhi; Steinkellner concentrates his effort of interpretation mainly on the tshul bzhi. However he does not touch on the general linguistic basis of the explanatory methods of bshad thabs, which is the heart of the present paper. The two papers thus seem to complement one another in a very fortunate way.
Now for the \textit{mtha'} \textit{drug}. Because of the work of previous researchers these are the best-known terms in this area. I am afraid that they are still among the least-understood. They divide into three pairs, as listed in table 3. The principle enunciated in the second column of table 3 was noticed by Wayman\footnote{A.Wayman, Twilight language and a tantric song. The Buddhist Tantras. London 1973, 128-135.} who got it from bTsong kha pa (D). However it appears in Bu ston (B) and may be his invention. So I have called it Bu ston's principle. The principle was modified by Padma dKar po, as recorded in the right-hand column of table 3; but the terminology of Padma dKar po's works C and H is too difficult for this paper. In the form given by Bu ston, the principle is quite accurate for the \textit{drang don} / \textit{nges don} distinction, but only moderately so for the other two pairs.

As announced by Bu ston and explained by bTsong kha pa, the effect of the principle was roughly this. The \textit{drang don} / \textit{nges don} distinction is based on differences of intention; the \textit{dgongs bshad} / \textit{dgongs min} distinction is based on differences of words and linguistic convention; the \textit{sgra ji bzhin/min} distinction is based on differences of both convention and intention. Padma dKar po's version, which is more accurate, says roughly the same for \textit{drang don} / \textit{nges don}. On \textit{dgongs bshad} / \textit{dgongs min}, it says that the distinction turns on differences in the relation between the words and their associated conventions, and the general Buddha-intention. On \textit{sgra ji bzhin/min}, it says that the distinction turns on differences of convention (or its absence).

\textit{drang don} / \textit{nges don} are here different from the \textit{s\'utras}. Here in the tantras they refer to alternative explanations of one and the same passage, while in the \textit{s\'utras} a single author will explain a single passage by either \textit{drang don} or \textit{nges don} but not both. In the tantras, then, where one passage is explained twice, the explanation whose purpose is the more elementary is called \textit{drang don}, while that whose purpose is more advanced is called \textit{nges don}. From the lower, \textit{drang don} point of view, the \textit{nges don} point of view is said to be hidden (\textit{sbas te}).\footnote{This term already appears in PPD.} Here, one should not be confused by the fact that the \textit{nges don} interpretation is sometimes the simpler in a linguistic sense. For if the passage, taken in its natural sense, does indeed concern an advanced level of practice or realization, then it may be a linguistically complicated matter to find an interpretation which is more elementary as to its purpose. And this is, indeed, very often the case.
sgra ji bzhin is use of language according to normal conventions. Indeed, if sgra did literally mean "convention", then sgra ji bzhin would mean "according to convention". As bTsong kha pa noted, the use of this term overlaps with that of yi ge'i don. If the conventions are not normal, or if the connection between words and sense is ad hoc, one speaks of sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa. This remark suggests that there will be two distinct types of sgra ji bzhin ma yin. As Padma dkar po first pointed out, there are. He described the type with non-standard conventions in terms of brda (signs), and the type without conventions in terms of yi ge (letters).

dgongs bshad and dgongs min are the two most difficult of the mtha' drug. They cannot be used of the same passage. If the sense of the words is in opposition to the general purpose of the passage, one speaks of dgongs bshad (explanation by intention); otherwise, of dgongs min. In discussing the well-known dgongs bshad of "killing living beings", Buxton says that such phrases are only for intelligent persons who will know that they are not to be taken literally. Again, a general account of dgongs bshad which really fitted the well-known examples was first provided by Padma dkar po.

Turning aside for a moment from these theoretical difficulties, let us see how the mtha' drug were used; our authors are in broad agreement on this. First, if the natural sense of the words is clearly in opposition to the general doctrines of Buddhism, the passage has to be explained dgongs pas. Otherwise, the explanation is said to be dgongs min; and only in this case can the other four mtha' come into the picture at all. Then, if normal linguistic conventions hold, we have sgra ji bzhin; if not, sgra ji bzhin ma yin. And if two purposes are ascribed to the same passages, the soteriologically more advanced is called nges don, the less advanced, drang don. As common sense suggests, either one of sgra ji bzhin/min may be associated with either one of drang don/ANGES don.

The critical reader might suppose that there is no clear distinction between dgongs bshad and sgra ji bzhin ma yin. For a passage which, when the words are taken according to standard conventions, has to be ex-

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56 G 9a3; H 15b4
57 GST chap. V; cf. E 10a3, quoting HT II.iii, 29; also Kālacakratantra III,97 and Vimalaprabhā on it.
58 B 24b5
59 G 9a5; H 16a2
plained *intentionally* (\textit{dgongs pas}) might instead be explained by ascribing an unusual sense\footnote{"Sense" is used here as a conventional feature of words (so part of \textit{sgra}).} to the words, using non-standard conventions, without reference to *intention*. (This objection is only strengthened if one points out that no means has been specified by which one knows whether to use standard or non-standard conventions.) But the objection does not take into account the conventions governing the technical terms of \textit{bshad thabs}: if the passage has a natural sense\footnote{As for instance in the vajra-song at \textit{HT} II.iv, 6-8. This song has been interpreted by Wayman (see n.34). It has been the subject of much comment in Tibet. Padma dKar po has devoted a separate work to it: \textit{brTag gnyis nas gsungs pa rdo rje'i glu'i skad gnyis shan sbyar}, \textit{gSung 'bum} 21, 1-19. this work contains, in effect, two separate commentaries on the song; one as \textit{drang don} (starting 2a4), the other as \textit{nges don} (starting 6b1).} and that sense is inconsistent with the general doctrines of Buddhism, then the passage must be reconciled with those doctrines by means of \textit{dgongs bshad}. We (westerners) might be inclined to interpret in a different way; but to do so is to step outside the \textit{mtha' drug} system.

As an example, let us take the \textit{dgongs skad} or \textit{gsang skad}, the "code" or "secret language" of the \textit{Hevajratantra}. When this is used\footnote{See references connected with table 1.} there is no question of the natural sense of the words opposing Buddhist doctrine, no question of \textit{dgongs bshad}, therefore. The code itself is said by the \textit{rgyan bdun}-based authors to fall under \textit{sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa}, and its applications to fall under \textit{drang don} and \textit{nges don}. None of our authors explains this code or its uses under \textit{dgongs bshad}. In Sanskrit terms: no author used a technique perhaps called \textit{sandhyābhāṣita} to explain the passages called \textit{sandhyābhāṣa}. In spite of the similarity between these Sanskrit words, our texts offer no support to the suggestion that they have similar meanings.

To finish off this summary, let me give a brief critical review of the \textit{bshad thabs} sections of the works listed in my bibliography.

By far the best introduction to \textit{bshad thabs} is \textit{bsod nams rtse} mo's work \textit{A}. It is written in a smooth and clear style, it makes its points simply and easily, its examples are well-chosen and well-explained, and it is philosophically solid. The \textit{gdams ngag drug} system there described is also the best of its kind, making a good range of distinctions clearly with a minimum of technical terms. \textit{A} also contains the best available review of a variety of other systems of \textit{bshad thabs}.\footnote{As for instance in the vajra-song at \textit{HT} II.iv, 6-8. This song has been interpreted by Wayman (see n.34). It has been the subject of much comment in Tibet. Padma dKar po has devoted a separate work to it: \textit{brTag gnyis nas gsungs pa rdo rje'i glu'i skad gnyis shan sbyar}, \textit{gSung 'bum} 21, 1-19. this work contains, in effect, two separate commentaries on the song; one as \textit{drang don} (starting 2a4), the other as \textit{nges don} (starting 6b1).}
The Pradīpoddotana of Candrakīrti (PPD) is the most important Indian source for the rgyan bdun system, and contains almost the only bshad thabs material presently available in Sanskrit. As a source for bshad thabs it has been dealt with by Steinkellner.

Commenting on the Pradīpoddotana, Bu ston (B) writes to some extent as a philologist. He worked from a Sanskrit ms. of PPD, and has been through the earlier literature very carefully. This work is important and serious, and its main conclusion have not been upset by later authors. However it is also very diffuse, and its organization needlessly complex. In F, Padma dkar po provides us with a short, clear summary of the bshad thabs material, and he also quotes the PPD verses fully. This work F of Padma dkar po can be recommended as a preliminary to the study of B.

The Jñānavajrasamuccaya (JVS) is an ākhyā-tantra of Guhyasamāja. Because of various difficulties which I deal with later, this work has not the authority of PPD, in spite of being buddhavacana. The clearest account which I have seen of relevant parts of JVS is found in some almost incidental remarks by bSod nams rtse mo. In D bTsong kha pa comments at length on JVS. He is much more quotable than Bu ston, and his examples are clearer. However, he has to rely on PPD for definitions, since JVS is very poor in them; and he seems unable to deal with the inconsistencies between the PPD definitions and the examples in JVS, and with the peculiar difficulties of JVS generally. For this reason one cannot rely on D in any matter of real difficulty.

The next two works are both bKa brgyud pa works on the Hevajratantra. bKra shis rnam rgyal is not clear enough in S to add much in the way of general argument to Bu ston, but he does give some good examples. Kong sprul does little more than plagiarize bKra shis rnam rgyal.

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43 The only other Sanskrit materials on bshad thabs known to me are the few verses from the Guhyasamāja and Hevajratantra given in the references connected with table 1.

44 The connection between the gdams ngag drug and the mtha’ drug as given in JVS is set out at A 66b5. In that account, the words drang don and nges don seem to have been accidentally transposed. The tshul bzhi as given in JVS are compared with the gdams ngag drug at A 67a6. In making use of these passages, it is important to be clear that bSod nams rtse mo is not committing himself to account for mtha’ drug and tshul bzhi as given in PPD.

45 It is true that the plagiarization of older works was a fairly common practice in Tibet. But in Kong sprul’s bKa brgyud pa works, the practice reaches extraordinary lengths. The general scheme of J is taken from Padma dkar po’s gZhung ’grel. The bshad thabs section is copied word-for-word from bKra shis rnam rgyal. Kong sprul’s commentary on the rGyud bla ma (Uttaratantra, Ratnagotravibhāga) is largely copied from that of Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan. With regard to the zab mo nang gi don, I would like to speculate that when Rang ’byung rdo rje’s autocorrection turns up, Kong sprul’s commentary will be found to bear a similar relation to it.
My last two works, G and H are both by Padma dkar po and (as regards bshad thabs) seem to express his own views rather than being directly based on any earlier source. They deal only with mtha’ drug and tshul bzhi. These short and rather similar accounts are written in a terse and compressed style quite different from that of F, and are very difficult to follow. They also use a special vocabulary (cf. right-hand column of table 3). Philosophically, they are the most penetrating of the materials reviewed here, but because of these difficulties it seems best to deal with them in detail elsewhere.

The remainder of the paper will contain evidence for some of the main points made in this summary. Now, inasmuch I have given already very copious references (especially in connection with tables 1 and 2), the evidence as to what the texts says in Tibetan has already been made indirectly available to the reader, as it were. What still has to be carefully justified is the interpretative scheme which I have used, especially that relating to the distinction between rjod byed sgra and brjod bya don. I will now do this; and I will start off by setting out those distinctions of English terminology, in terms of which I will discuss the content of the texts. To those readers who find this procedure tedious, I apologize. It is a very important phase of the analysis, and a phase too often neglected.

46 On mtha’ drug, see G 10b5; H 15b4. On tshul bzhi, see H 17a3.
2. The utterance of a tantra as a speech-act

The conventions governing the interpretation of the buddha-word by commentators in Tibet were complex and not always obviously consistent. Here I will simply have to pick out those features which seem most important, without attempting a full analysis. According to one kind of rather common convention, the utterance of any particular tantra was taken as a single historical event occurring at a definite time and place and directed towards a definite audience with definite intentions.

To the extent that this convention held (and we shall soon see how it was modified to accommodate varying interpretations), it is natural to discuss the utterance of the tantras in English by means of notions taken from speech-act theory and related topics. Here I shall work with the basic distinction, so much emphasized by Strawson between sentence \( S \), proposition \( P \), and occasion and context of utterance \( O \): That is, a sentence \( S \) may be used to assert a proposition \( P \) on a particular occasion \( O \); and in analysing a speech-act by means of these notions, we may distinguish between those features of a speech-act which are functions of \( S \) or of \( P \) or of \( O \). This results in the following classification of some of the concepts used in talking about speech-acts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\textbf{Type S}</td>
<td>word, phrase, sentence, utterance-type; linguistic convention, linguistic meaning; grammatical rule, syntactical rule;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textbf{Type P}</td>
<td>proposition, question, warning and other illocutionary acts; truth, falsity and other logical notions; referent, thing referred to; fact, situation, state of affairs; topic, what ... is about;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{49}\) In this area it is conventional to take assertion as the standard type of illocutionary force; the analysis is similar for other types, such as question, warning, command, etc.

\(^{50}\) The same proposition may be asserted on different occasions by the employment of different sentences. (This is the basic reason why types P and O are different.) Just this possibility is envisaged, according to Bu ston's principle, in Tibetan discussions of \textit{dgongs bshad}. See table 1 and the following discussion.
Type 0 occasion, utterance, context of utterance, audience; utterer, utterer's intention, intent, purpose of uttering ...; purport, the point is that ...; speech-act, performance; act of referring; understanding what was said, what was meant, what was intended;

In India and Tibet we sometimes see a tendency to assimilate concepts of Type P to those of type 0. For instance, in pramāṇa a proposition (P) is not always sharply distinguished from the evidence used to establish it (O). Truth (P) may be assimilated to the notion of something being veridical (O); similarly falsehood (P) to something being misleading or delusive (brdzun pa, O).

Here in bshad thabs, the important word don is ambiguous between referent (P) and intention or purpose (O). Now the word "meaning" spreads across all three types S, P and O. The important sense of "linguistic meaning" certainly falls into type S. Noting these facts, we may perhaps feel wary of the translation of don by "meaning".

The state of affairs mentioned in connection with don is typical. Let us therefore label P/O any concept which falls into type P or type O or both. There are a few important pairs of terms in bshad thabs which exhibit a contrast between the two types S and P/O. These are given in table 5.

TABLE 5: A BASIC TYPE-DISTINCTION IN BSHAD THABS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type S</th>
<th>Type P/O</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgra (śabda)</td>
<td>don (artha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rjod byed (abhidāna, vācaka)</td>
<td>brjod bya (abhideya, vācya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...don gyis bshad pa</td>
<td>...don du bshad pa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The earlier, simpler analysis of the phrases rjod byed sgra and brjod bya don may be replaced by the following more precise claim; where, in bshad thabs, any of these three pairs of terms is systematically contrasted, the contrast exemplifies the type-distinction set out in table 5.

51 Similarly, Austin (see n.47) noted a tendency to assimilate illocutionary to perlocutionary acts.

52 "Meaning" is usually held to be ambiguous, but some people have held that it simply resists the distinction.
The main reason for devoting so much attention to bSod nams rtse mo is precisely that the type-distinction is more clearly set out in A than in any of our other sources.

Now for something else. The tantras themselves are buddhavacana; let us call them, somewhat arbitrarily, first intentions. Then texts explaining the tantras are second intentions, and bshad thabs texts are (at least) third intentions. The natural home of the terms rjod byed and brjod bya is the level of second intention (where they refer to the first-intention text and its content). In bshad thabs these terms continue to be used of the first intention; and the term bshad par bya ba is also used of the first intention text, with the sense that at the second-intention level the matter in hand was to explain that text. The verb or verbal adjective 'chad par byed pa is normally used in reference to the second-intention text, with the sense that this was what did the explaining. Sometimes the whole process was lifted by a level, as in table 2 where 'chad par byed pa'i man ngag refers to the third-intention (bshad thabs) text, with the sense that it explains the methods used in second-intention texts. These levels need to be kept well-distinguished.

Such points account for some of the difficulties in using the Jñāna-vajrasamuccaya. As a tantra, that text might be thought of as first-intention. But it actually explains the Cuhyasamāja, and in this sense it is second intention; and the bshad thabs material in it is third and even fourth intention. Unfortunately these levels of intention are not always easy to distinguish, nor do the commentaries always distinguish them.

The texts frequently use the phrase rdo rje'i tshig of the first-intention text, i.e. of buddhavacana, especially of single phrases.

Now I want to draw attention to an important ambiguity in much Buddhist writing, an ambiguity which manifests itself already at the level of second intention, or rgyud bshad. When one discusses the tantras, what is undoubtedly available is the text (type S). Scarcely any contextual evidence is in fact available which would enable us to determine more accurately what propositions (type P) were asserted, or to what purpose

53 This well-known use of "intention" need not introduce ambiguity, since it is always prefixed by an ordinal.

54 In translating brjod bya by "content", I have deliberately tried to suggest a P/O ambiguity.
(type O) the Buddha asserted\textsuperscript{55} them. On doctrinal grounds we may suppose that the Buddha had a certain very complex general intention, viz. to bring all sentient beings to enlightenment. But it is really quite obvious that the attribution of more specific intentions to him is a matter of convention. That there are such intentions is simply a claim made by the interpreter (\textquoteleft chad pa po\textquoteright). In other words, it is the interpreter who is asserting that the text has a certain content, that a certain rjod byed is connected with a certain brjod bya.\textsuperscript{55}

Sometimes it will be convenient to draw attention explicitly to the role of the interpreter. Sometimes it will be simpler to follow tradition and write as though the intentions mentioned were actually those of the Buddha, in spite of the ambiguities which result.\textsuperscript{56}

3. The gdams ngag drug

bsod nams rtse mo makes use of all the distinctions given in table 5. Explanations of the rjod byed group are often mentioned by such phrases as \textit{yan lag gi don gyis bshad pa}\textsuperscript{57} where the instrumental case-suffix on don suggests the means by which the speech-act (the utterance of the buddha-word) was effected. In contrast, explanations of the brjod bya group are often mentioned by such phrases as \textit{spyi'i don du bshad pa} suggesting the purpose towards which the speech-act is directed. This device is used consistently in A.\textsuperscript{56} It will be seen that don here has a full S/P/O ambiguity.

\textsuperscript{55} The problem of formulating the rules governing such claims is perhaps the central problem of hermeneutics. In some texts the content of the tantra as a whole is said to be simply rgyud gsum (see n.3). This raises the question of the secondary intention of the Buddha, viz. that the rgyud gsum should be realized. The connection of the brjod bya as content of a text with the realization of that content is sometimes discussed as a separate topic, not part of bshad thabs; this is so especially in connection with the Nevajratantra, where the new topic is called dgos 'brel (see A 62b4; E 15a2; J 15b7; Padma dkar po, dPal Kye'i rdo rje'i spyi don grub pa'i yid 'phrog, 5b3). Bu ston (B 21a3) and Sa skya pa Grags pa rgyal mtshan (bShad thabs kyi man ngag kun tu spyod pa'i bsdus don, 92a4) deal with it in other contexts.

\textsuperscript{56} This convention is less startling in the Tibetan cultural context that in ours. For in Tibet the primary case of the \textquoteleft chad pa po\textquoteright is one\textapos;s own rtsa ba'i bla ma. And in teaching (especially in the slob bshad – see below) he addresses himself primarily to an audience for whom his intention is identified with sangs rgyas kyi mdangs pa.

\textsuperscript{57} This exact form is found e.g. at A 63a1, 64b1, 65a7, 66a1 where the device is used to emphasize the distinction between the rjod byed and brjod bya groups of methods.

\textsuperscript{58} This -du is final.

\textsuperscript{59} It is less common in the rgyan bdun literature. However JVS consistently uses mdangs pas bshad pa. Though Buston\textquotesingle s principle would seem to suggest that this -pas has the same force, it is not really so.
Now let us consider in more detail bSod nams rtse mo's explanations of the six gdams ngag. Since part of my purpose is to show what sgra means here, I will not translate this word.

"yan lag gi don gyis bshad pa" means manifesting the point of the text having sgra well-known in the world, sgra known from the śāstras, and etymologies which cause sgra to become manifest ... for instance the cause for sgra to become manifest is the fact that the sun has twelve stations in the sky, that it causes lotuses to open, that it dispels the darkness, defeats the night and so forth, and by these many properties it becomes suitable to designate (gdags su rung ba)."\(^{60}\)

The first part of this quotation is a description of ordinary lexical or literal interpretation. The second is a description of how it comes about that the use of "sun" is governed by linguistic convention.

"yi ge'i don gyis bshad pa" means explanation not motivated by the real point of the text, but by taking the syllables separately; one may introduce sgra based on the separate syllables, or sgra obtained by taking a syllable apart,\(^{61}\) or explanation in accordance with the shapes of the syllables."\(^{62}\)

bSod nams rtse mo illustrates these three methods with three clear examples;\(^{63}\) evidently yi ge'i don is concerned with conventions, but this time they are non-standard, unusual.

\(^{60}\) A 64b1: yan lag gi don ni | 'jig rten las grags pa' i sgra dang bcas | bstan bcos las grags pa' i sgra dang bcas | sgra 'jug pa' i rgyu mtshan nges pa' i tshig dang bcas pas, gzhung dngos kyi don la 'jug pa'o | .... | sgra 'jug pa' i rgyu mtshan yang nyi ma la khyim bcu gnyis yod pas dang | padmo kha 'gyed pas dang | mun pa sel ba mtshan mo 'joms pa la sog pa yon tan du ma yod pas de dang de dag tu gdags su rung bas ...

\(^{61}\) kha phral te here seems to mean "divided up", "dismembered", as we see from the hūm example. This is supported by the Skt. viśliṣṭa (see Lokesh Chandra, Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary, s.v. kha phral ba).

\(^{62}\) A64b4: yi ge'i don gyis bshad pa ni, gzhung dngos la rgyu mtshan mi rnyed kyang yi ge so sor byas nas, rgyu mtshan ngyed pa ste, de'ang sgra drangs te bshad pa dang | yi ge kha phral (cf. n.61') -te sgras drangs pas bshad pa dang | yi ge'idbyibs mthun pas bshad pa'o |

The use of yi ge here is perhaps best understood by reference to Sanskrit where in a sense each syllable is represented by one letter.

\(^{63}\) These examples are (a) modifying nagahāśva by saying that na stands for nar "man"; ga for ga vi "ox", etc. Cf. the explanation of HT I.xi, 8 at A 66a2; (b) taking hūm apart to yield "having neither subject or nor object"; (c) explaining the claim that e wāṃ māyā stands for the four cakra by saying that the Sanskrit letter e is triangular like the navel-cakra, etc.
bs dus don gyis bshad pa (or man ngag gi don gyis bshad pa) is explained merely by the phrase "symbol made by the buddhas", and several examples are given, which are drawn from the sandhyābhasa (dgongs skad) of the Hevajra tantra, which is another type of non-standard linguistic convention. The use of passwords would appear to fall neatly into this category.

Let us now consider in more detail the claim that yi ge'i don and bs dus don do really revolve around unusual linguistic conventions. I would not wish to quarrel over whether the more unusual ones are linguistic (e.g. the dismemberment of hūm) but a broad interpretation of "linguistic" should allow it. If the objection is that sgra is narrower than "linguistic convention", I would not wish to suggest that these passages provide evidence to the contrary. If the objection is that non-linguistic behaviour is not excluded, I think that rjod byed obviously does exclude concern, say, with gestures or onomatopoeia (and even these are conventional). If the objection is that sgra might be broader than "convention", what else could it include? Further evidence on this point will be seen under the related technique of sgra ji bzhin ma yin.

Now let us pass on to the other group of the gdams ngag drug, viz. (table 2) the brjod par bya ba'i don 'chad par byed pa'i man ngag. Obviously in this phrase, don is contrasted with sgra. Now, these three man ngag associate sentences of buddhavacana with their application to different phases of the processes of meditation. Further, it is possible for one sentence to receive two quite different interpretations. From these two facts it follows that here don is a term of type P/O (cf. table 5). But it is clear from the detailed explanations, especially of various examples, that this don is quite specifically concerned with intent of purpose. For instance, in the passage given in n.65, the last remark literally says:

64 A 65a3: sangs rgyas rnams kyis brda mdzad pa ste.
65 bsod nams rtse mo does not make this important point as explicit as one might hope. It emerges indirectly from the brief quotation from JVS at A 65b7; the full sentence in JVS runs thus (292a5-7): nyan thos la soggs pa 'dod chags dang bral ba'i chos spyod pa'i rnam par rtog pa'i bag chags las ma grol ba rnams rnal 'byor chen po'i rgyud dag tu btsun mo'i bha ga la bzhugs zhes bya ba la soggs pa 'dod chags kyis chos gsal bar byed pa nyo mthar can gyi rdo rje'i tshig thos nas smod par byed pa de rnams dang mi 'gal ba'i sgo nas bshad pa de ni spyi'i don du bshad pa gsums pa'o | The underlined part corresponds to the quotation in A.
What this boils down to is that a bowdlerized explanation of the nidāna phrase vajrayogabhageśu vijahāra for the benefit of people who would otherwise cast aspersions on the anuttarayogatantra, counts as spyi'i don, while a more literal explanation counts as sbas don. (As it happens the same holds in the rgyan bdun system.)
"This explanation for the purpose of (sgo nas) not contradicting those persons is said to be spyi'i don du bshad pa."  

Similar cases could be quoted for the other two don. Let us now give the varieties of these three don rather more fully than in the Introduction.

spyi'i don du bshad pa relates to the pāramitāyāna or to the uttapa-ttikrama. The first includes such matters as the 37 bodhipakṣadharmā, the 5 mārga and the 10 bhūmi, which are part of the content (brjod bya) of both pāramitāyāna and mantrayāna. The second is concerned with mahā-mudrā.

sbas don du bshad pa relates to the sampannakrama. It concerns what is revealed by the three higher abhiṣeka, and not the kalābhiṣeka. Correspondingly there are three maṇḍala. The body-maṇḍala is devided into rang byin rlab sbyin and dkyil 'khor lo'i thabs; the bhaga-maṇḍala into kun rdzob and don dam byang sems; and the bodhicitta-maṇḍala into rang 'byung and lhan skyes ye shes. The three abhiṣeka correspond fairly well to the three maṇḍala, but the text is not clear about the twofold divisions of the three maṇḍala. On the face of it we might expect six divisions to result in all, but there are some indications that the three pairs are alternative methods of division into two. Finally, sbas don also includes jñānavyu.

mthar thug don du bshad pa is directed towards what is not included when the preceding items are listed individually, viz. buddha-awareness. It consists of an outer ultimate, viz. the 11th bhūmi known from both yānas, and a hidden ultimate, viz. the 12th and the 13th bhūmi known from the guhyamantrayāna. He discusses the controversy as to whether it makes sense to speak of two ultimates (mthar thug pa) in this way.

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66 The remark here translated corresponds to what is underlined in n.65. The two texts differ in various small ways, but the form de rnams la in A seems better than de rnams dang in the Peking edition of JVS.

67 A 63a1

68 A 63a4

69 The three maṇḍala are those listed at GST XVIII, 99. The correspondence between maṇḍala and their divisions may seem odd, but there is no doubt that this is what bSod nams rtse mo says (63b1).

70 A 63a5. At 66b3 he counts only two types of sbas don; and at 66a4 he gives a long list of examples, all of which fall under rang byin rlab sbyin sbas pa or dkyil 'khor lo'i sbas pa only.

71 sangs rgyas kyi ye shes (A 63b4).

72 A 63b5-64b1
Because of the clear distinction between *rjod byed sgra* and *brjod bya don* in this system, any method in the first group can be combined with any method in the second group to yield nine combinations altogether. bSod nams rtse mo gives copious and well-chosen examples\(^{73}\) to illustrate all these nine possibilities.

His discussion of the *gdams ngag drug* concludes with the valuable remarks mentioned in my introduction, on the connection between his system with that in the *Jñānavajrasamuccaya*. See table 6.

**TABLE 6: BSOD NAMS RTSE MO'S CORRELATION BETWEEN THE GDAMS NGAG DRUG AND THE MTHA' DRUG, THE LATTER FROM THE JÑĀNAVAJRASAMUCCAYA**

Taken from A 66b4. References in brackets are to JVS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>spyi'i don</th>
<th>yig don and man ngag gi don</th>
<th>sbras don</th>
<th>sgra ji bzhin (293a4)</th>
<th>sgra ji bzhin ma yin (293a5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mthar thug don</td>
<td>dgos gi don</td>
<td>ndes don</td>
<td>djang don (293a3)</td>
<td>drang don (293a2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yig don ma yin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In table 6, the entries are exactly as given in A. However there seems to be a misprint; *djang don* and *ndes don* should be switched. For according to JVS (293a2), *djang don* is the literal use of ("code") words such as *ga bur* and *khrag chen po*, whereas *ndes don* is the use of a "code" in which *ga bur* stands for *khu ba*, *khrag chen po* stands for *zla mtshan gyi khrag*, and so forth.

I have spelt these points out in detail and printed the table in full so as to underline the difference between the Jñānavajrasamuccaya and the Pradipodyotana on mtha' drug. For it seems to me that bSod nams rtse mo's table gives an excellent account of what JVS actually says (apart from the misprint). On the other hand, the table is quite inconsistent with the use of the mtha' drug terms in the Pradipodyotana. bTsong kha pa in D does not succeed in giving so good an account of these differences.\(^{74}\)

This concludes my account of the *gdams ngag drug*. I have been at pains to spell out the evidence that, in this system, the terms listed in table 5 are indeed used in the way claimed in that table. When we now turn

\(^{73}\) A 65a7-66b4

\(^{74}\) Indeed, the exact connection between the terms in JVS and their correlates in PPD is a complex matter which I hope to treat elsewhere.
to the *rgyan bdon* system (as set out in works based on the *Pradīpodgyotanā*), the evidence for the corresponding points will be less direct. This being so, I propose to adopt the type-distinction of table 5 as a hypothesis when discussing the relevant parts of the *rgyan bdon* system. As in any other scientific enquiry, the evidence for the hypothesis will be just its explanatory power. And to reinforce the hypothesis, I will give examples to illustrate the difficulties encountered by an alternative hypothesis, viz. the translation of *sgra/don* by word/meaning.

4. The "seven ornaments" of *bsdad thabs*, the *rgyan bdon* as discussed in *Pradīpodgyotanā*-based texts

4.1. The *gleng bslang ba'i rgyan*¹

has a function not wholly unlike that of the page of contents of a western book. It consists of five items: the name and type of the tantra; the kind of person for whom it is intended; its originator; its length; its purpose.

4.2. The *sangs rgya ba'i rigs pa bzhi'i rgyan*⁵

consists of *rgyud, gleng gzhi, nges tshig* and *rgyu*. These terms are taken separately for the person who acts out of desire, and the person lacking in desire. The interpretations given by our authors seem arbitrary and irrelevant to the topic of *bsdad thabs*; no doubt I have not succeeded in grasping the point of this *rgyan*.⁷⁵

4.3. The *mtha' drug gi rgyan*

has already been reviewed in table 3 and the succeeding portion of the introduction. That review has been further clarified by the subsequent more detailed explanation of the *sgra/don* distinction. Now I want to make use of this clarification to give bTsong kha pa's account of the *mtha' drug*⁷⁶ with some of his examples, based on a more detailed version of Bu ston's principle, together with some remarks of Padma dkar po.

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¹ Even the name *sangs rgya ba rigs pa bzhi'i rgyan* is problematical. This form is used by bKra shis rnam rgyal. Though he suggests that this is the name given in JVS, the Peking edition of that work has only *rigs pa bzhi'i rgyan*. Bu ston uses brjod bya *rigs pa bzhi'i rgyan*. *Rigs pa* here may stand for Skt. *nyāya* "reasoning".

⁵ D 218a2
4.3.1. _dgongs bshad_ and _dgongs min_

The difference here, bTsong kha pa says,\(^7\) is one of words and conventions (_sgra_), with the main intention the same. If convention (_sgra_) and intention (_don_) are opposed, one speaks of _dgongs pas bshad pa_. If they are in agreement, one speaks of _dgongs pa ma yin pas bshad pa_. This remark is easily related to the _PPD_ verse\(^7\)

\[
\text{'gal ba'i tshig gi sbyor ba yis} \\
\text{gsungs pa gang de dgongs bshad do}
\]

\text{viruddhālāpayogena yat tat sandhyābhāṣitam}

Padma dkar po,\(^9\) commenting on this verse, says that _dgongs pa can_ is discourse\(^6\) which contradicts wordly ('_jig rten pa_) usage, and is intended for able people, while _dgongs min_ passages are very clear and are for people of limited intelligence. (These remarks show up the limitations of Bu ston's principle, at least in its original form.) Both accounts are well-illustrated by an example given by bTsong kha pa\(^8\) whose point is this: the intention of purifying the three poisons (_snang ba gsum_) is to show the radiant light ('_od gsal_). This remark is intended to be taken literally, it is _dgongs min_. Now the remarks\(^8\) ' _dod chags ma yin pa_ etc. are also intended to show the radiant light; yet literally they contradict\(^8\) the previous remark - they are not meant to be taken literally. This explanation is _dgongs pas bshad pa_.

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\(^7\) don de la _sgra_ de 'jug pa 'gal ba'i _dgongs pas bshad pa_ dang | don de la _sgra_.drang thad du bstan pa'i _dgongs pa ma yin pas bshad pa_ gnyis ni, don gyi gtso bo gcig yin pas _sgra mtha’_ la _brten pa’o_ | D 218a2.

\(^8\) The Tibetan is given as quoted by Padma dKar po (F 36a1). The Sanskrit is as given (and modified) by Wayman (see n.34).

\(^9\) F 36a2

\(^6\) _tshig gi sbyor ba_ = ālāpayoga, lit. "connection of speech".

\(^8\) D 209b7 (expanding _JVS_ 292b8): _snang pa gsum rnam par dag pa'i_ _don'od gsal ston pa na_ | ' _dod chags ma yin pa dang_ | ' _dod chags dang bral ba ma yin pa dang_ | _chags pa bar ma nye bar mi dmigs pa zhes bya ba _la sosgs pa snang pa gsum la _sgra_ ' _gal ba'i tshig gis bstan zhing de bkag pas_ , ' _od gsal ston pa la sosgs pa'i rdo rje'i tshig rnas ni, _dgongs pas bshad pa' o_ |

\(^8\) In this context ' _gal ba_ ( _viruddha_ etc.) always means something like "opposed, opposing, to oppose"; "contradictory, contradicting, to contradict", as it indeed does in _pramāṇa_. It never in either of these contexts means "ambiguous" as is suggested by the translation of the _PPD_ verse in ref.n.34. Here indeed bTsong kha pa is exceptionally explicit. By using the word _bkag pas_ he says that one assertion refutes the other. Needless to say, ambiguous discourse cannot refute anything; only by opposing something can one refute it.
Let us see in some detail how the translation of *sgra/don* by word/meaning fails to give us an intelligible account of this example. It is quite obvious that the meanings of *snang ba gsum* and of *'dod chags ma yin pa* etc. are not only not the same, but are completely different. What is the same in the two cases is a certain aspect of the intentions ascribed by the commentator (or by *JV*S) to the original utterer, the Buddha. What is different in the two cases is of course the words uttered, but also the conventions associated with the two utterances or, more accurately, the way that these conventions are, in each case, to be related to the utterer's intention. In one case, the communication-intention is straightforwardly related to the normal linguistic conventions governing the use of the words uttered; in the other case, they are opposed.

Even the grammatical form of the phrase *dgongs pas bshad pa* points away from the interpretation here of *sgra* by "word(s)", as *dgongs pa* does literally mean "intention"; and the instrumental -*pas* ("by means of") does point to a distinction in the mode of interpretation rather than in the material to be interpreted.

Further, let us consider what conditions would have to be satisfied by any two sentences of which it is claimed that they are examples respectively of *dgongs bshad* and *dgongs min*. These two modes of explanation attribute to the utterer two different modes of language-use, as is made very clear by bTsong kha pa's example; but they attribute the same meaning. The passages differ only in words. The difference is not, indeed, held to constitute or entail whatever it is that allows one passage to be explained *dgongs pas*, the other *dgongs pa ma yin pa*; but the hermeneutical difference is, according to this interpretation of Bu ston's principle, held to be based on the difference of words.

But this is quite patently absurd. A mere difference of words, without difference of meaning, cannot be the basis of any but the most trivial difference in modes of language-use.

This counter argument fails when *sgra* is taken to include linguistic convention. Obviously different modes of language-use can rest on differences of linguistic convention. But this account of the matter fails to explain the full literal force of the phrase *dgongs pas bshad pa*, explanation by means of intention. In my opinion, this is a failure of the Bu ston principle itself (as based on the *sgra/don* distinction). Padma dkar po indeed abandons that form of the distinction (table 3) and succeeds in giving a much better explanation. But I will have to deal with this elsewhere.
4.3.2. drang don and nges don

Here, says bTsong kha pa, where one deals with a single passage to which two different purposes are ascribed, and where a purpose is introduced which is different from the real point of the passage (dngos zin gyi don), one speaks of drang don; and when nothing else is introduced other than that complete purpose, one speaks of nges don. Padma dkar po, commenting on the relevant verse of PPD, says that persons of little ability are shown the real intention (rang bzhin gyi don) of the passage indirectly by being led towards something else. The real intention is hidden (sbas te). Nges don is for able persons who are to be shown the real way of things (bden pa de kho na nyid ji lta ba bzhin) directly; it is also called the indubitable purpose (gdon mi za ba'i don).

These two accounts are obviously not quite consistent; in fact Padma dkar po has in mind a slightly different notion of nges don from bTsong kha pa. But we can neglect this different here. Broadly speaking, both authors' version of the distinction is illustrated by an example given by bTsong kha pa. The example revolves about a passage describing the visualization of five different-coloured jewels, small as mustard-seeds, at the end of one's nose. The two different interpretations offered by bTsong kha pa are the following:

|de la phyag mtshan bsgom pa ni, drang don dang|
grlung sgom pa ni, yang dag pa'i don nges don no|

That is, the drang don interpretation is that the meditation concerns symbols, phyag mtshan, held in the hands of deities. The nges don interpretation is that the passage is concerned with meditation on (various kinds of) rlung/vāyu.

 Needless to say, it is absurd to claim that what is involved here (and said to rest on distinctions of don) is a difference of meaning.

In general, drang don and nges don are relative to one another, nges don being for the more advanced person. Here we must remember that the general purpose (don) of the buddha in uttering the tantras was to bring beings to enlightenment (byang chub). So "advanced" here is to be

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83 D 218a4: | dngos zin gyi don las gzhan du drang du yod pas, drang ba'i don dang | gang du drangs pa rdzogs pa de las gzhan du drang du med pas na, nges pa'i don gnyis kyi bshad pa ni, gzhung gcig la 'jug pas don mtha' la brten pa'o | (What I offer in connection with this is not to be thought of as a translation.)
84 p 35b5
85 Padma dkar po takes up this difference at H 16b4ff. But I will leave it until another occasion, as it concerns his views on the two satya.
86 D 207b5
taken in relation to enlightenment, or soteriologically. Thus in relation to saṃvṛti, paramārtha is nges don, as Padma dkar po stressed in H. In relation to the utpattikrama, the sampannakrama is nges don; bTsong kha pa's example well illustrates this. To say all this is not, of course, to say that the nges don interpretation is linguistically more advanced or sophisticated; for, as Bu ston's principle quite accurately reminds us, the drang don/nges don distinction is not a distinction of discourse, of rjod byed, at all. A tantra passage may refer quite naturally to a soteriologically advanced matter, and we may need some interpretative sophistry to extract an elementary use for it.

This reveals the limitations of my attempt to distinguish linguistic from non-linguistic methods of bshad thabs, of explaining the tantras. If "linguistic" is taken narrowly (i.e. in relation to sentences and conventions only), then the drang don/nges don distinction is not linguistic. But if "linguistic" is taken more broadly, as including the whole relation between sentences and what they are used for, then it does cover that distinction.

Similar problems arise in Dr.Katz' hermeneutical typology. Are we to say that the drang don/nges don distinction is one of text-based or of adept-based hermeneutics? Even in the sūtras, this question is less easy to answer than Dr.Katz supposes in his Introduction; and it is obviously more difficult still in the tantras. In my view, the text/adept distinction does not solve the problem of describing the drang don/nges don distinction at all. However, it provides us with another, a different way of talking about it; and that alone is of value.

4.3.3. sgra ji bzhin and sgra ji bzhin ma yin

bTsong kha pa explains the difference between these two as follows:

There is sgra ji bzhin pa when the intention is clearly indicated by the words, without any need to bring in any other intention. However when the sgra indicating that intention is not what is known in the world and in treatises on semantics, but is given by adventitious buddha-symbols, one speaks of explanation by sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa, and this depends upon differences of both sgra and don.

87 D 218a4: phal cher don gnyis pa la drang du med cing don gsal bar bsnyan pa'i sgra ji bzhin pa dang 'jig rten pa dang sgra'i bston bcos la sgra de don de la 'jug par ma grags shing | sangs rgyas kyis glo bur du brda mdzad pa tsam gyi sgra ji bzhin ma yin par bshad gnyis ni, sgra don gnyis ka'i mtha' la brten pa'o |
88 glo bur (D 218a6).
89 sangs rgyas kyis ... brda mdzad pa; cf.n.64.
As mentioned in the Introduction, *sgra ji bzhin* here means (both literally and according to the explanation) the use of language with normal (linguistic) conventions. bTsong kha pa's explanation of *sgra ji bzhin ma yin* amounts to saying that the connection between the sentence and its content is not governed by convention, but is *ad hoc*, *ad ventituous* (*glo bur*). Bu ston and bTsong kha pa both illustrate this by means of the well-known pseudo-words *koṭakhyā* etc. They point out that these pseudo-words appear in various different tantras, in each case with different senses. In *JVS* they are used of senses and sense-objects, whereas in the *Sarvabuddhasamayāyoga* they are used as names for the ten vāyu, while in the *Ngan snyon sbyong rgyud* they are used as different names for Vajrapāni.

The *Pradīpodyotanā*, and Padma dkar po on it do not add much to this. But in his other *bshad thabs* works Padma dkar po points out that there is another way in which a passage can fail to be *sgra ji bzhin*, viz. the linguistic conventions may be *non-standard*. This case, and the examples of it given by bKa brgyud pa writers fall exactly under what bSod nams rtse mo calls *bsdus don*. It is the case under which the bKa brgyud pas take the "code" of the *Hevajratantra*.

The difference between *sgra ji bzhin ma yin* and *dgongs bshad* is in fact clear enough even in the *Pradīpodyotanā*, but it is made explicit in a short passage from Kumāra quoted by Padma dkar po:

"What is the difference between explanation by *dgongs pa* and by means of *sgra ji bzhin ma yin*? It is the difference between opposition (*'gal ba*) and (the use of) unknown

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99 D 218a6, also 209b2. Bu ston (B 25a7) also uses the word in this context.
91 B 25a4
92 D 211a2
93 JVS 294a5
94 F 36a6
95 G 11a2; H 15b5
96 In both the passages given in ref.n.95, Padma dkar po says that *dgongs skad* (*sandhyā-bhāṣā*) falls under this case of *sgra ji bzhin ma yin*. For instance in G: *brda zhes bya ba ni, dgongs pa'i skad nyid kyis gsungs pa'i 'jig rten dang bstan bcos phal la ma grags pa'o* | bKra shis rnam rgyal (E 10b2) and Kong sprul (J 39a6) explicitly quote examples from the *Hevajratantra* (II.iii, 56 and I.viii, 1). I will deal elsewhere with these bKa brgyud pa authors' rather complex uses of the related terms *dgongs skad*, *gsang skad* and *brda skad*, and their relation with *sgra ji bzhin ma yin*.
97 See above under *gdams ngag drug*.
98 F 36b4
symbols (brda). What is the difference between explanation by dgongs pa and by means of sgra ji bzhi? In the first case there is opposition (between convention and intention); in the second case, there is no opposition.

4.4. The 'chad tshul bzhi'i rgyan

Enough has already been done to show that the tshul bzhi modes of explanation relate the texts to various different phases of Buddhist meditation and related practice. The Sanskrit and Tibetan terms for such phases themselves need much more attention than they have so far received. For the moment, it may be enough to say that most of the terminology applying to the stages of Vajrayāna practice derives from the Guhyasamāja literature. Most of our authors give some account of the relation between the tshul bzhi and this Guhyasamāja-based terminology; table 7 summarizes the views of Bu ston on this relation.

99 F 36b4: 'gal ba dang graqs pa ma yin pa'i brda'i bye brag gis so |
100 F 36b4: 'gal ba dang 'gal ba ma yin pa'i bye brag gis so |
TABLE 7: CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TSHUL BZHI AND OTHER NOTIONS ABOUT LEVELS OF PRACTICE, ACCORDING TO BU STON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General level of activity</th>
<th>Name of practice</th>
<th>Pañcakrama stage</th>
<th>Type of 'chad tshul</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;outer sciences&quot;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>yi ge'i don</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- grammar etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lakṣaṇayāna (mtshan nyid theg pa)</td>
<td>paramitā (phar phyin)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>spyi'i don</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kriyā, caryā &amp; yoga tantra</td>
<td>irrelevant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anuttarayogatantra: utpattikrama</td>
<td>kāyavivikta (lus dben)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sampannakrama</td>
<td>vagvivikta (ngag dben)</td>
<td>vajrājāpa (rdor bzlas)</td>
<td>ye shes gsum gyi sbas don</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cittavivikta (sems dben)</td>
<td>cittaviśuddhi (sems kyi rnam par dag pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>māyopāma, māyākāya (sgyu lus)</td>
<td>svādiśṭhāna (rang byin brlabs kyi sbas don)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>karmamudrā (las rgya)</td>
<td>'dod chags chos kyi sbas don</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>prabhāsvara ('od gsal)</td>
<td>abhisambodhi (mgon byang)</td>
<td>mṭhar thug gi don</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>yuganaddha (zung 'jug)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table may be compared with that given by Steinkellner which is mainly based on much older sources; there are some very important differences.

Bu ston's explanations of the point of these four methods is as follows. In yi ge'i don, the connection between the passage and its content is established by analysis based on the method of grammar, semantics, poetics, logic and so forth. The spyi don interpretation is for the benefit of those who have so far practiced only the paramitāyāna or
the three lower classes of tantra and who need to be reassured by giving them an interpretation related to what they understand already. The \( s\text{bas don} \) interpretation is of three kinds (as in all our authors, see table 7); what they have in common, Bu ston says is that they demonstrate the heart (\( \text{snying po} \)) of the teaching because they bring about a real certainty, which may be compared with that of a man who sees a pregnant woman and realizes that this is indeed the effect of acting out of one's desires.

\( m\text{tha} \text{r thug pa'i don} \) is certainly concerned with 'od gsal and zung 'jug, as laid out in table 7. But the specific point of it, as set out by Bu ston\(^{105}\) raises a problem which I have not been able to disentangle. For the Sanskrit original \( m\text{tha} \)' in this phrase is \( k\text{ola} \); and this is one of the ten pseudo-words occurring in \( J\text{VS} \).\(^{105}\) Unfortunately by telling us that this word is \( s\text{gra ji bzhin ma yin pa} \) and is a tathagāta-symbol,\(^ {106}\) Bu ston does nothing to clarify what, if anything, the word \( k\text{ola} \) here conveys. He does continue by telling us that one "reaches the limit, limited away from things"\(^ {107}\) but this remark is hardly less obscure.

Here there may be some help from Padma dpal', who in \( H^{108} \) gives us an account of the \( t\text{shul bzhi} \) which makes no references to the considerations of table 7 at all and is purely epistemic. Here, each of the four \( t\text{shul bzhi} \) is said to be explanation that the true purpose of the passage is attained by some form of \( \text{pramāṇa} \).\(^{109}\)

\( B \text{ 25b7;} \) compare the \( J\text{VS} \) passage quoted in n.65, and the related discussion.

\( B \text{ 26a3;} \) \( \text{dper na sbrum ma} \ \text{mthong na 'di ni 'dod chags kyi chos kyis kun tu spyod pa'i 'bras bu'o | zhes nges pa bzhin du.} \)

On the connection between \( b\text{shad thabs} \) and the varieties of \( \text{kun tu spyod pa} \), see Grags pa rgyal mtshan, cf.n.55.

\( B \text{ 26a7.} \)

\( J\text{VS} \text{ 293a5.} \) The interpretation of \( k\text{ola} \) given by Bu ston is not, however, apparently found in bTsong kha'pa's commentary (e.g. \( D \) 211a2 ff.). Bu ston's words are (\( B \) 26bl): \( m\text{tha}'i skad dod ko la zhes pa, sgra ji bzhin pa ma yin pa, de bzhin gshegs pa'i brda ste, mur thug pa'i tshig ste, mu ni yongs su ste, dngos po thams cad nas thug pa ste, mthar son pa'o | \).

\( \text{de bzhin gshegs pa'i brda, see n.105.} \) Cf. also n.64 and 89. If the point is simply that \( m\text{tha}'/k\text{ola} \) mean yongs su "completely", it does not help very much.

\( \text{See the last part of the remark quoted in n.105.} \)

\( H \text{ 17a4.} \)

\( \text{The general form is: X-don ni | dngos bstan gyi brjod don P-yis gtan la phab nas bshad pa ste. Here, X = spyi'i etc., while P is the relevant form of pramāṇa: roughly, semantics, reasoning, \( \text{ṣga} \text{ma} \) and \( \text{pratyākṣa} \) respectively.} \)
In the case of mthar thug gi don, this pramāga is a form of pratya-kṣa, i.e. of pure perception. Here one is reminded of the frequent description of 'od gsal as yang dag pa’i mtha by Padma dkar po and others. But even if Bu ston and Padma dkar po are here at bottom trying to say the same thing, this only reduces the problem of Bu ston’s use of mtha’, mu, kola etc. - a purely linguistic problem - to the far more difficult and largely non-linguistic problem of 'od gsal itself. I cannot here take the matter further than this.

4.5. The nyan pa po la bshad tshul gnyis kyi rgyan

There are two different styles of teaching; one for the crowd (tshogs bshad), and one for the individual pupil of a bla ma (slob bshad). Our authors differ as to the exact distinction. See table 8.

4.6. The gang zag lnga’i rgyan

The Pradīpoddyotanā gives five types of pupil, and these are correlated there with the two styles of teaching as recorded in table 8. That table also records the well-known correlation between these five types and the two called cig car ba and rim gyis pa. The latter distinction is especially important for Bu ston and Padma dkar po, but seems to have been deliberately ignored by bTsong kha pa. On the other hand, the latter has an interesting discussion on the relation between the nyan pa po’i rgyan and the gang zag lnga’i rgyan.

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**Footnotes:**

10 gnas tshul yin lugs mgon sum gyis, cf. n. 108, 109. For the force of the term gnas tshul (= gnas lugs) here, and for some remarks about yin lugs, see my paper mentioned in n. 3. On yin lugs, this phrase is a good example of the point made in n. 6.2. of that paper.

11 See table 1 and footnotes thereto. bTsong kha pa is interesting on this rgyan (D 220a6 ff.).

12 See H.V. Guenther, Life and Teaching of Nāropa, 115 n. 1.

13 See section 3 of my paper mentioned in n. 3, and many references given in that paper.

14 D 220b1 ff.
TABLE 8: THE PRADĪPODDYOTANĀ ON THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE NYAN PA PO LA BSHAD TSHUL GNYIS KYI RGYAN AND OTHER RGYAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>mtha' drug gi rgyan</th>
<th>tshogs bshad</th>
<th>slob bshad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgra ji bzhin</td>
<td></td>
<td>sgra ji bzhin ma yin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dgongs min</td>
<td></td>
<td>dgongs pa can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drang don</td>
<td></td>
<td>nges don</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'chad tshul bzhi'i rgyan</td>
<td>yi ge'i don</td>
<td>sbas don</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>spyi'i don</td>
<td>mthar thug don</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gang zag lnga'i rgyan</td>
<td>utpala</td>
<td>rin po che lta bu (=cig car ba)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>padma dkar po</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>padma dmar po</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>candan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(all these are</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rim gyis pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.7. The rdzogs rim bsgrub pa'i rgyan or bden gnyis nges pa'i rgyan

According to Bu ston

According to Bu ston\(^\text{115}\) this is nothing more than the acquisition of certainty about what was done before. Padma dkar po\(^\text{116}\) says it is merely another way of dividing the first six rgyan. JVS\(^\text{117}\) and bTsong kha pa\(^\text{118}\) are much more detailed, but it is not clear to me how much of this can be called bshad thabs.

5. Conclusion and outlook

Most of this paper has been about the linguistic devices used in Tibet to explain the tantras. I have tried to do two things. First, to locate these linguistic devices within the general field of explanatory methods for the tantras (bshad thabs). Second, to identify, define, discuss, interpret and apply that one distinction - the distinction between rjod byed sgra and brjod bya don - which, in the texts under review, seems to underpin the use of most of these linguistic devices. Many important and interesting problems remain for discussion elsewhere; I shall be more than satisfied if I have provided a firm foundation for such discussion.

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\(^{115}\) B 29b4
\(^{116}\) P 38b6
\(^{117}\) JVS 294a5
\(^{118}\) D 223a-225b
Bibliography

a) Canonical works:

**JVS**  
Jñānavrajrasamuccaya = Ye shes rdo rje kun las btus pa. Peking bKa 'gyur, rGyud, Ca 290b-294b.

**SRD**  
Śraddhākāravarman, Ye shes rdo rje kun las btus pa'i rgyud las 'byung ba'i rgyan bdun rnam par dgrol ba. Peking bsTan bsgyur, rGyud 'grel, Ha 10a-12a.

**PPD**  
Pradīpodyotana of Candrakīrti. sDe dge bsTan 'gyur, rGyud 'grel, Ha. Verses from this work are given as quoted by the writer commenting on them.

b) Tibetan works:

**A**  
Sa skya pa bSod nams rtse mo (1142-1182), rGyud sde spyi'i rnam bzhag, esp. 62b5 ff. (rgyud bshad thabs kyi man ngag)

**B**  
Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364), dPal gsang ba 'dus pa'i òikka sGron ma rab tu gsal ba. gSung 'bum Ta 20b2 ff. (rgyan bdun bshad)

**C**  
Bu ston, dPal gsang ba 'dus pa'i rgyud 'grel gyi bshad thabs kyi yan lag gsang ba'i sgo byed. gSung 'bum Ta 1aff.

**D**  
bTsong kha pa (1357-1419), Ye shes rdo rje kun las btus pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa. bKa 'bum Tsa 171b6-227a8 (Otani Vol.160, p.150)

**E**  
sGam po pa bKra shis rnam rgyal (1512-1587), Kye'i rdo rje'i 'grel pa legs bshad nyi ma'i od zer, esp. 8b5 ff. (rgyan bdun bshad thabs)

**F**  
Padma dkar po (1527-1592), gSang ba 'dus pa'i rgyan zhes bya ba Mar lugs thun mong ma yin pa'i bshad pa, esp. 32b1 ff. (gSung 'bum 16)

**G**  
Padma dkar po, dBu ma gzhung lugs gsum gsal bar byed pa Ngies don grub pa'i shing rta, esp. 7b3 ff. (gSung 'bum 9)

**H**  
Padma dkar po, brJod byed tshig gi rgyud bshad pa mkhas pa'i kha rgyan, esp. 15b2 ff. (gSung 'bum 1)

**J**  
Kong sprul Blo gros mtha' yas (1813-1899), brTag gnyis spyi don legs bshad gsang ba bla na med pa rdo rje dra ba'i rgyan, esp. 38a2 ff. (rgyud spyi'i 'chad thabs mdor smos)
THE TRANSMISSION LINEAGE OF THE **gCod** TEACHING
ACCORDING TO THE 2**ND** DALAI-LAMA

by

E.DE ROSSI-FILIBECK (Rome)

In the first volume of the gSun 'bum of the second Dalai-Lama, in a chapter dedicated to the eulogies of various bla ma\(^1\) is found an invocation (gsol 'debs)\(^2\) addressed from dGe 'dun rgya mtsho to the masters who in succession transmitted up until his days the teaching of gCod.\(^3\) This, as is noted, dates back to the teaching of Ma gcig Labs kyi sgron ma, follower of Dam pa saṅs rgyas, the famous Indian siddha.\(^4\)

Their meeting which took place during the third voyage of Dam pa in Tibet, in the historical period of the second diffusion of Buddhism, had a result destined to endure for a long time if one recalls that in some bKa' brgyud pa monasteries of eastern Tibet, such as rGyu ne and sKabs che,\(^5\) as also in the monastery of Diṅ ri in western Tibet, the doctrine and the practice connected to gCod are maintained until the most recent times.

The doctrine of gCod was received, even if with adequate adaptations, by the other schools of Buddhism, maintaining however a major individuality in respect to the Ži byed, a system with which it had common roots, so much so that often the gCod was seen as yan lag of the Ži byed.\(^6\)

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\(^1\) The gSun 'bum of dGe 'dun rgya mtsho (1475-1542) is in 3 volumes: the chapter to which I refer is entitled: rJe btsun thams chad mkhyen pa'i gsun 'bum thor bu las ma'i bstod tshogs (1a-75a) with a subchapter gCod yul brgyud pa'i gsol 'debs (49b-51a) written at Šel brag at the request of druṅ bZaṅ rgyal in 1503; see also Tohoku Catalogue 5545.

\(^2\) see Declere 113-123.

\(^3\) For a doctrinal exposition of gCod see Blondeau 375-76, Tucci 1973 126-132.

\(^4\) see n.42.

\(^5\) Tucci 1973 131.

\(^6\) Grub mtha' 107, Smith 1970 66
The gcōd teaching (man ṇags precepts and ņams len practice) was accepted by the bKa' brgyud pa, by the Karma pa, a branch of the same school, by the Jo naṅ pa, by the Śaṅs pa and by some rNiṅ ma pa traditions, not only, standing by the authority of the source, by the same dGe lugs pa. To cite an example which testifies to this, we find in the vast work of 'Jam mgon sprul sku Blo gros mtha' yas (1813-1899) gcōd texts collected from various Karma pa authors, among whom are Raṅ byuṅ rdo rje (1284-1339), dKon mchog yan lag who is also called Karma Chags med (1525-1583), rGyal dbaṅ thog mchog rdo rje (1797-1867), and in the same work gcōd texts of Tāranātha (1571-1640?), the famous Jo naṅ pa master.

The Karma pa masters received the gcōd teaching from the Gaṅs pa masters, so named from the Śam po or Śam bu'i gans hermitage, and they in their turn had received it from Thod smyon bsam grub, a gcōd master.

The Śaṅs pa masters not only undoubtedly received the gcōd doctrine, as is also noted in the Blue Annals, in the chapter dedicated to the followers of Khyūṅ rnal 'byor, but some of them such as Śaṅs rgyas ston pa, mKhas grub chos rje and Śaṅs ston pa, figure also in the list of dGe 'dun rgya mtsho as teachers of the principal doctrine of gcōd (bstan thog gcig ma).

7 see the introduction in dDams ṇag mdzod vol.9.
8 I cannot establish what place the gcōd had in the spiritual and doctrinal outlook of dGe 'dun rgya mtsho; thus I limit myself to noting that the gcōd and the ī byed enjoyed a certain devotion among the abbots of 'Bras spuns, as even dGe 'dun grub, predecessor of dGe 'dun rgya mtsho, was received in pilgrimage at Diṅ ri, Aziz 1978 25.
9 CCK gives a list of Karma pa masters who transmitted the gcōd teaching up to the time of Chos kyi seṅ ge. Many of these are noted in the list of Richardson and Smith 1968. Chronologically, the last identified is Chos kyi dbaṅ phyug (1584-1635). After Karma Chags med the list in CCK follows this order: Ni ma 'gyur med, bSam gtan bzaṅ po, gcōd rgod bla ma, dKon mchog bkra śis, Chos skyon pa, rDo luṅ pa, Śrīl bdzra. A list of the Karma pa masters who transmitted the gcōd is also in Lauf 91-92; it ends with Karma Chags med.
10 On the Gaṅs pa masters see BA 987; in CCK brief biographies of these masters included in the transmission of the secret mantras are to be found. (p.533); in BA the succession ends with Śaṅs bstan sruṅ, in CCK it proceeds with the following names: mNam ņid rdo rje 'jun pa, Gaṅs pa rin po che, Bla ma rdo rje, Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan.
11 This personage, more frequently called rje btsun 2īl gnon chen po, is part of the sras rgyud transmission, see CCK 560, KG 763, dDams ṇag mdzod vol.9, 817. He is further cited in the don gyi brgyud tradition, CCK 543, the ņams brgyud tradition, CCK 544, and then rtsa ba'i brgyud tradition, CCK 545.
12 See n.51, 52, 53.
Another point between the Šaṅs pa and gcōd schools which seems important to me is in Sukasiddhi, in whose teaching, no less than in that of Niguma, is evident the spiritual lineage of the Šaṅs pa. ¹³

The invocation of dGe 'dun rgya mtsho addressed to the gcōd masters is twofold: the first concerns the masters of the zab don brgyud and the second those of the bstan thog gcig ma brgyud. About these last masters not only their name, but also the place, hermitage or monastery, where they transmitted the teaching is given. That makes it possible to trace a geographical outline of the teaching of gcōd as was observed in the 16th century. According to this source it was centered above all in gTsāñ: we cite sNe mo, Kha rag, Ri bo dpal of Šaṅs, rTa nag bSam sdiñs, Luṅ dmar with the two extremities of Diṅ ri, La stod in the west and Zaṅs ri, seat of Ma gcig, in the east.

It was thus in these seats that the principle instructions of Ma gcig were handed down; in fact it is remembered also that from this doctrinal system flowed diverse teaching traditions, every one of which presents variants in the list of the masters. From the teaching of Dam pa the gcōd split into two branches, pho and mo, with respectively sKyo bSod nams bla ma¹⁴ and Ma gcig as leaders. From this then derived the two traditions of mo gcōd, called sras rgyud and slob rgyud;¹⁵ the first descended from rGyal ba don grub¹⁶ and the second from Khu sgom chos kyi sen ge.¹⁷ It seems to be opportune to recall also the other traditions of the gcōd teaching: in the list of their masters are cited also some of the names reported by dGe 'dun rgya mtsho which are not mentioned in the Blue Annals. I refer in particular in the teaching traditions listed in the text: ži byed dañ gcōd yul chos 'byuñ rin po che'i phreñ ba thar pa'i rgyan, published in the volume gcōd kyi chos 'khor together with

¹³ See Kapstein 143.
¹⁴ This branch continued with sMa ra ser po up until mKhas grub gön nu, a Šaṅs pa master, BA 990, Smith 1970 539.
¹⁵ KGT 763-764.
¹⁶ This personage also took part in the transmission called zab don in which we find him cited as Glañ luṅ chos rje, from the place of meditation (sgrub gnas) founded by him at the direction of a prophecy of Ma gcig, his mother. His biography is in CCK 494-507. He is also called Ra dra grub pe, BA 985, and sNiñ po grub pa or rKu bar dgra grub pa, KGT 763. A locality Glañ luṅ is mentioned in Tucci I.T. 4:1, 63, and it is a place near Shomang on the map.
¹⁷ See n.45.
two other texts. Their originals are preserved as rare books. All three texts are important works relative to the ži byed and gcod doctrine.

The author of the above-mentioned text is Chos kyi sen ge. In the colophon of his works the date never appears. We can, however, affirm that it is not earlier than the 19th century since in the last pages of the text the author cites personages such as 'Jam dbyanś mKhyen brtse', dbañ po (1820-1892) and Blo gros mtha' yas.

Chos kyi sen ge, in presenting the biographies of the gCod masters, divides the transmission into: ma rgyud šes rab kyi brgyud pa, pha rgyud thabs kyi brgyud pa, and gsan ba śnas kyi brgyud pa and he recognizes in the pha rgyud transmission the pho gcod and in the ma rgyud the mo gcod.

The traditions of teaching reported by Chos kyi sen ge are: śnas lugs kyi bka' gter zuṅ 'jug gcod dbañ brgya rtsa'i brgyud, don gyi brgyud, ēams brgyud, mdo lugs ēe brgyud and rtsa ba'i brgyud.

The zab don tradition seems to regard the teaching of Ma gcig connected with the practice of ro śños ms skor of Nāropa and other teachings such as those of Thaṅ rgyal po and of rGod tshaṅ pa; regarding the zab don transmission lineage of dGe 'dun rgya mtsho the only names I

18 A wood-engraving of the text by Chos kyi sen ge is found also in the Tibetan property of Is.M.E.O. in Rome, and in the Toyo Bunko Collection, see Yamaguchi no.47-724.
19 Chos kyi sen ge or Dharma sen ge is the author of other texts relative to gCod, see Tucci TPS 257, n.164. In the colophon it says that the text was written by 'Jigs bral Chos kyi sen ge in the Chos dun hermitage at Yar kluṅ at the request of 'Jigs med gZan phan 'od zer of Chab mdo.
20 CCK 588-589.
21 This division reflects the classification of tantras divided in father and mother tantras according to which way (thabs) or knowledge (šes rab) is insisted on in order to reach spiritual realization, Blondeau 369. In regard to the third division, that of the secret mantras, it includes, according to CCK 535-541, exclusively the tradition of the Gaṅs pa masters.
22 See CCK 477.
23 This transmission which is led by Khu sgom is the most similar to the bstan thog gcig ma of dGe 'dun rgya mtsho and to that of the BA. The biographies of its masters are in CCK 494-532.
24 CCK 543.
25 CCK 544.
26 CCK 545.
27 CCK 550; in regard to Thaṅ rgyal po and rGod tshaṅ pa see respectively Gyatso 111-119 and Tucci G.M. 2, 376-382.
could identify, apart from those already noted in the *bstan thog gcig ma brgyud*, are the following: sKal ldan seng ge, Glaṅ luṅ chos rje, dge bṣes gNal pa Saṅs rgyas ras pa, bSod nams rin chen and the ascetic Chu sgom.

For the identification of the names of the masters, first of all, it was necessary to consult the *Blue Annals*: apart from the initial link, as above mentioned, with the Ži byed pa I found that a) some names are completely new, being not contained in the *Blue Annals*; our source was, in fact, written about 25 years later, in 1503; not all of these masters can be identified, also because some of the names, such as Sa kya bla ma or Chos grags bzaṅ po, are so common that they are hardly identifiable; b) others, such as Khu sgomchos seng, Dol pa zaṅ thal, rGya nag gcer bu, follow the order given in the *Blue Annals* in the chapter of *gCod*; c) some names, as above mentioned, are Saṅs pa masters and their biographies are found in the chapter of the *Blue Annals* dedicated to the disciples of Khyūṅ po rnal 'byor.
The list of the masters of the zab don brgyud is the following:

Dus gsum rgyal ba skyed mdzad pa

Yum chen šer phyin

bCom ldan Ša kya thub pa

'Jam dpal smra sengl

rje btsun sGrol ma

Sukasiddhi

Ma pham mgon po

Thogs med sku mchel

Āryadeva

Dam pa sańs rgyas

bSod nams bla ma

Labs kyi sgron ma

sKal ldan sengl ge

Glän luṅ chos rje

dge bāes gNal pa

Grub pa 'ba re

sPad pa kha pa

Ša kya bla ma

Sańs rgyas ras pa

Rin chen gžon nu

dPal ldan grangs pa

'Jam dbyaṅs mgon po

Khyuṅ ston ras pa

bla ma Grags grub

Sańs rgyas ye šes

bSod nams rin chen

Chos grangs bzaṅ po

bya btaṅ Chu sgom

Don yod rgyal mtshan

Kun dga' rgyal mtshan

rtsa ba'i bla ma

---

28 He is mentioned in CCK 561 and in Smith 1970 540. This personage, a native of 'Phan yul, is part of the sras rgyud transmission.

29 See n.16.

30 He is a native of mChims phu and is a direct disciple of rGyal ba don grub; his short biography is in CCK 508; in BA 985 he is mentioned only by his other name Gra pa hag ston.

31 He is part of the third transmission of Ži byed, his biography is in BA 975.

32 He is a bKa' brgyud pa master, see BA 676.

33 He may be Kham bu ya legs; in CCK 481 he is also called bSod nams rin chen. On Kham bu ya legs see also KGT 764.

34 He is a master of Ži byed, BA 911.
The list of the masters of the bstan thog gcig ma brgyud is the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dus gsum rgyal ba skyed mdzad pa</td>
<td>'Og min chos kyi pho brañ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yum chen Šer phyin</td>
<td>Bya rgod phun po'i ri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bCom ldan Ša kya thub pa³⁵</td>
<td>rGya nag ri po rtse lha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Jam dpal smra señ³⁶</td>
<td>g.Yu lo bkad pa'i žiṅ khaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rje btsun sGrol ma³⁷</td>
<td>'Ja 'od khyil ba'i pho brañ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukasiddhi³⁸</td>
<td>dGa' ldan chos kyi pho brañ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byams pa mgon po³⁹</td>
<td>Ri bo bya rkaṅ dgon pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thogs med sku mched⁴⁰</td>
<td>rGya gar 'jag ma'i spyil bu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Āryadeva⁴¹</td>
<td>La stod Diṅ ri glaṅ 'khor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dam pa saṅs rgyas⁴²</td>
<td>g.Ye yi gaṅs par dgon pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bSod nams bla ma⁴³</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³⁵ On Ša kya thub pa and Bya rgod (Gṛḍhṛakūta) see Stein 81b-88b. In this same place according to a narrative of Langkor (gLan 'khor), Dam pa was conceived by his mother when a vulture perched on her shoulder, Aziz 1979 28.
³⁶ He is a form of Maṅjuśrī, mentioned in CCK 431, 542; see also Lauf 94.
³⁷ She is the dākimī who shows her emanation in Tibet in Labs kyi sgron ma; the history of this manifestation is in CCK 439-451; her residence, according to CCK 494, is found at the base of Potala.
³⁸ Her history is in CCK 425; she is also named in the sṅags lugs line of transmission.
³⁹ Maitreya; under the name Ma pham mgon po he is mentioned in the sṅags lugs transmission, CCK 542.
⁴⁰ Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, see CCK 542, BA 869, Lauf 94.
⁴¹ With regard to Āryadeva and Dam pa, see BA 869; in CCK he appears in the sṅags lugs and in the mdO lugs transmissions, 431, 542, 544.
⁴² Recent studies on the famous siddha who circulated the Ži byed system are AZIZ 1978 and Aziz 1979; on the tradition of Dam pa in Tibet see also Lauf. A brief biography is in BA 869, Grub mtha’ 107 and in CCK 421, where the Indian name Kamalaśīla is mentioned on p.134. This name is not recalled in BA and Grub mtha’ whereas it is in KGT 756. A biography of Dam pa is also in Lalou 45. On Glaṅ ’khor, Langkor on the map, see Ferrari 154.
⁴³ According to BA 982, 984, he transmitted the teaching of the pho gcod; his brief biography is in CCK 437-439: He was born at sTod gtsan po in the clan of skyo to which belonged also the dge bses Ša kya ye śes of the sṅags lugs transmission; after having spent much time as a hermit, he was received at Diṅ ri Glaṅ ’khor by Dam pa. He taught Ma gcig the practice of ro sṅoms (indifference to cadavers) and he is considered her bla ma root.
Name

Labs kyi sgron ma 44
Khu sgom chos sen 45
Dol pa zañ thal 46
rGya nag gcer bu 47
Sañs rgyas rab ston 48
Sañs rgyas dge sloñ 49
Sum pa ras pa 50
Sañs rgyas ston pa 51
mKhas grub chos rje 52

Place

Zañs ri khañ dmar dgon pa
sñe mo khu'i dgon pa
Luñ dmar Icañ gsar dgon pa
dBus stod dpal gyi Chu ri
inhabited places
inhabited places
Kha rag mon bu dgon pa
Ri bo dpal gyi dgon pa
bSam gtan sdiñs hermitage

44 Her biography is in BA 983, Lalou 49, CCK 451-460; the history of her life is well-known so I will limit myself to reporting the names of her teachers: dge bês dgon ston, mNgon šes, dge bêşes Sud ba ūva dmar can, dge bêses Yañ rtse ba, bSod nams bla ma.

45 The complete name is Khu sgom chos kyi señ ge; his biography is in BA 988 and CCK 509-512; for sñe mo, Gnimò on the map, see Ferrari 142.

46 His biography is in BA 989 and in CCK 512-514; the locality connected to his name is Luñ smad in BA and Luñ smad byan tshal in CCK. Luñ dmar is Lungma in the area of Ralung and Gobzi, Tucci I.T. 4:1, 58.

47 Disciple of Dol pa; brief biography in BA 990 and in CCK 514-516. The connection with Chu bo ri is mentioned in both texts. On Chu bo ri see Ferrari 163.

48 Disciple of rGya nag gcer bu, brief biography in BA 990 and in CCK 517.

49 Biography in BA 990 and in CCK 517; disciple of the preceding teacher.

50 Sum pa ras pa or Sum ston ras pa; see BA 990 and CCK 518-522, in where he is also called Sum ston ūz abandonment or Ras pa; on Kha rag see Ferrari 155.

51 He is a Śañs pa master; his biography is in BA 746 and in CCK 522-526; he was a contemporary of Yañ dgon pa (1213-1258). Ri bo is Ri bo dpal in Śañs, which was founded by Tsañ ma šañs ston (1234-1309), see Kapstein 143; on the region see also Wylie 141. n.239.

52 He is a Śañs pa master; his biography is in BA 749 and in CCK 526-532; he was a contemporary of gSer gliñ bKra šis dpal (1242-1315); in CCK he is also called ṭGod phrug of mKhas grub chen po gzon nu grub. Founder of bSam sdiñs in Myna (gTsāñ); died in 1319. On bSam sdiñs see Wylie 144, n.271.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Śaṅs pa ston pa</td>
<td>'Jag chuṅ dpal hermitage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rin chen blo gros</td>
<td>the residence of the 'Jag chuṅ bla ma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshul khrims mgon po</td>
<td>sTag tshan hermitage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bSod nams bzaṅ po</td>
<td>sTag rtse chos kyi pho braṅ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rTogs ldan ṅi ma</td>
<td>inhabited places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don yod rgyal mtshan</td>
<td>rTa nag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kun dga' rgyal mtshan</td>
<td>Chos sku dag pa'i pho braṅ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rtsa ba'i bla ma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53 I believe that he may be the same Tsan ma Śaṅs ston pa, head of the Śaṅs pa tradition, called 'Jag pa, on which you can see Kapstein and Smith 1970 8; his name is connected with a place 'Jag chuṅ; regarding the locality according to a personal communication of Prof. Wang Yao, it would be in gTsaṅ close to Phun tshogs gliṅ.

54 Unidentified.

55 Unidentified; in regard to the place, see Wylie 146, n.292, Ferrari 120.

56 He may be the chief disciple of Bo don pa chen; his biography is in BA 1017 (1341-1433). The locality is Bye ri sTag rtse, Tagste on the map.

57 Unidentified.

58 I cannot identify him with certainty, but I recall that a Don yod rgyal mtshan exists, a member of the Sa skya family, who possessed Śaṅs and rTa nag for a long time, Tucci 1971 187. Regarding the monastery of rTa nag, it was founded by the second Dalai-Lama's grandfather, Kun dga' bzaṅ po, Kapstein 143.

59 He is the father of the second Dalai-Lama, Sreg ston Kun dga' rgyal mtshan, (1432-1506) who resided in Sreg žin of Śaṅs. According to Smith 1970 8 Blö gros mtha' yas received the Śaṅs pa teaching from the traditions of Sreg and 'Jag pa united to those of bSam sdiṅs. Regarding to the gCod teaching Kun dga' rgyal mtshan is also connected to the monastery of Rin chen gliṅ, gDams nag mdzod 9, 817. There is also a Kun dga' rgyal mtshan, author of a biography of the first Dalai-Lama, Vostrikov 192.
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**KGT**

mKhas pa'i dga' ston of dPa'bo gtsug lag. Ed. Lokesh Chandra, part 3, New Delhi 1961, Ba

**Grub mtha’**

Grub mtha’ thams chad kyi khu/ns dañ 'dod tshul ston pa by Thu kvan Blo bzañ chos kyi ŋi ma. Varanasi 1963

**CCK**

gCod ky/ chos 'khor, Three texts on the history and practice of the ŋi byed and gCod precepts. New Delhi 1974

**gDams nag mdzod** compiled by 'Jam mgon Blo gros mtha’ yas. Ed. by N. Lughtok and N. Gyaltsan, vol.9, New Delhi 1971
THE AUTHOR OF THE SUHRLLEKHA
by
S.DIETZ (Göttingen)

Among the ten Buddhist epistles contained in the subdivision sprin
gig of the Tanjur, the Suhrllekha (SL)\(^1\) is the best known, because it has become accessible to a larger public in the form of various translations.\(^2\)

In Tibet this letter has enjoyed a widespread popularity since the time that it was translated by Sarvajña deva and dPal brtsegs (8/9\(^{th}\) cent.). This is evidenced by numerous quotations\(^3\) from and commentaries\(^4\) on it.

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1 Texts in the Tanjur:
   - Cone (C), Vol.Ne (94), 40b3-46a7
   - Derge (D), Vol.Ne (94), 40b4-46b3
   - Derge, Jo bo'i chos chün, 60a3-65b6
   - Narthang [N], Vol.Ne (94), 279a7-286b3
   - Narthang [N\(^2\)], Vol.Gi (33), 64a5-70b6
   - Peking [[P]], Vol.Ne (94), 282b8-290a4
   - Peking [[P\(^2\)]], Vol.Gi (33), 74a6-81b4


4 Cf. Dietz, Briefliteratur, I, 14-16. For this paper I used the following commentaries: Mahāmati, Vyakta-padā Suhrllekhaṭikā. P, Vol.Ne (94), 324b8-376b2, (SL\(^7\)), Brag phug dge btes dge 'dun rin chen, btes pa'i sprin lig ces bya ba'i mchan 'grel, 1961 (mChan 'grel).
Although the _SL_ was well known in India and in China, a significant influence on later didactic works can be found only in Tibetan literature. To date, no Sanskrit quotations from the _SL_ are available. Besides the quotations in the _Cittaratnaviśodhanakramalekha_ of Jitārī only one more quotation is known, namely that in Candrakīrti's _Catuḥśatakāṭikā_.

Two important reasons might be adduced to explain the great success which the _SL_ had in Tibet:

1. The _SL_ contains a concise and comprehensive presentation of the way to liberation from samsāra for the layman.
2. The _SL_ is attributed to Nāgārjuna, the famous philosopher of Madhyamaka.

It is remarkable that the _SL_ has few stylistic and philosophical characteristics in common with those of the indisputably authentic works of the philosopher of Madhyamaka. Certainly, in the classification of Nāgārjuna's works in the three categories of _rigs tshogs_ "Category of reasoning", _gtam tshogs_ "Category of [didactic] discourses" and _bstod tshogs_ "Category of hymns", the _SL_ does not belong to _rigs tshogs_ but to _gtam tshogs_. The _Rājaparikāthā Ratnāvalī_ (RĀ) "Discourse to a king [with the title] 'A string of jewels'" belongs to the same category. However, in the RĀ we find many traits which are in accordance with those of other authentic works of Nāgārjuna. This discrepancy was the starting point of my investigation concerning the author of the _SL_ and its addressee, the metrical and stylistic peculiarities, and the use of philosophical terms. I should like to present the results of this investigation here.

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5 Three Chinese translations of the _SL_ are available in Taishō, Vol.32, 745b-754b:
   - Taishō 1672, translated by Gugavarman in 431.
   - Taishō 1673, translated by Sampghavarman in 434.
   - Taishō 1674, translated by I-tsing. This translation was edited together with an English translation by S.Beal, Suh-ki-li-lih-kiu. *The Suhrillekha or 'Friendly Letter'. Written by Lung Shu (Nāgārjuna), and Addressed to King Sadvaha*. Transl. from the Chin. ed. of I-tsing, London 1892.


7 P, Vol.Ya (98), 113b3-4. There _SL_ 43 is cited without reference to the work and its author. I should like to thank Dr. Ch.Lindtner, København, for this information.

1. The personality of the author of the SL and of its addressee

In the SL the author himself hardly appears. Neither his name nor that of the addressee are given. Yet he addresses a layman (khyim pa) as his spiritual adviser (bla ma), as is clearly seen from v.118:

\[ \begin{align*}
  \text{khyod la de skad gdam pa ga\'n lags de} \\
  \text{bas par dge slo\'n gis kya\'n bgyi bar dka'} \\
  \text{\'di las ga\'n tig spyd pa\'i \'no bo de\'i} \\
  \text{yon tan bsten pas sku tshe don yod mdzod}
\end{align*} \]

"Even for a monk it would be difficult to accomplish all the counsels given to you. [However], make [your] life meaningful by holding fast to the merit of those [counsels] whose nature is such that you can practise them."

In addressing the addressee only general, honorific, polite formulas are used, e.g. yon tan ra\'i b\'zin "[you] whose character is endowed with virtues" (v.1a), dge 'os "o one worthy of the merits" (v.1a), 'jig rten mkhyen pa "you who know the world" (v.29a), rigs pa\'i bdad \'nid "o righteous one" (v.39a) etc. Only dba\'n phyug "Lord" (v.54a) allows one to infer the high social rank of the addressee.

This is contrary to the practice in N\'ag\'arjuna's R\'a, where the vocative "king" (skr. r\'ajan, p\'arthiva, n\'ipa) is generally used.

The names of the author and of the addressee are mentioned in the colophon of the letter:

\[ \begin{align*}
  \text{b\'ses pa\'i phrin yig slob dpon 'phags pa klu sgrub kyis} \\
  \text{mdza' bo rgyal po bde spoyd la bkur ba rdzogs so}
\end{align*} \]

"The Letter of a Friend (b\'ses pa\'i phrin yig),\(^9\) written by \'Ac\'arya N\'ag\'arjuna (Klu sgrub) to [his] friend King

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\( ^9 \) The vocative "king" is used e.g. in R\'a I,2, 78; II,26, 76, 78, 91,97; III, 1, 5, 12; IV, 28, 31, 44, 45, 99; the vocative dpal ldan "o glorious one" in III, 75. For the text of R\'a see: N\'ag\'arjuna, R\'ajaparik\'atharatn\'avali. [Tib.] Rgyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che'i phre\'n ba. P Vol.\'Je (94), 129a5-152b4; G.Tucci, The Ratn\'avali of N\'ag\'arjuna. JRAS 1934, 307-325 and JRAS 1936, 237-252 and 423-435, S.Dietz, The Fifth Chapter of N\'ag\'arjuna's Ratn\'avali. Journal of the Nepal Research Centre 4, 1980, 189-220.

\( ^{10} \) Thus the Tatpur\'usa compound of the title Suh\'ilekha "Letter to a friend" was translated by the Tibetans. That the translation "letter to a friend" is correct is proven by the explanation of the commentary SLT (P Vol.\'Je (94), 325 a2), as well as by the analogy to the titles of other letters, where usually the addressee is quoted, e.g. Gurulekha, Putralekha, Si\'yalekha etc.
Śatavāhana (bDe spyod)\(^{11}\) is concluded."

The titles and colophons of the Chinese\(^{12}\) translations specify the Bodhisattva Lung shu (=Nāgārjuna) as the author of the letter. As the name of the addressee, we read in Guṇavarman's translation Shan t'o chia (745b), in I-tsing's "King of the country Ch'ēng shih"\(^{13}\) ("riding on the scholars" or "borne by the scholars"). The latter is probably the translation of skr. Sadvahana, that is Śatavāhana, while the name given by Guṇavarman, Shan t'o chia, is the transliteration for Jāntaka, might be another form of Jetaka, the original personal name of the king\(^1\) as is indicated by I-tsing and Bu ston. That the SL was addressed to a Śatavāhana king is reported by I-tsing\(^{15}\) who notes moreover:

"In India students learn this epistle in verse early in the course of instruction, but the most devout make it their special object of study throughout their lives."

In the time of I-tsing (end of 7\(^{th}\) cent.), the SL was very popular as an easily intelligible, concise and comprehensive summary of the Buddhist doctrine and practice.

The friendship of Nāgārjuna with a Śatavāhana ruler is well documented, not only in Tibetan and Chinese references, but also in Indian sources.\(^{16}\) According to the commentator Ajitamitra,\(^{17}\) the RA was written for the same Śatavāhana king. Certainly, the latter does not give a systematic explanation of the teachings of Nāgārjuna; however, it contains, besides moral admonitions and religious advice, also substantial parts devoted to expositions of the Madhyamaka philosophy. Nevertheless, in the RA author and addressee are also not quoted.


\(^{12}\) Cf. S.Beal, Suh-ki-li-lih-kiu, 10, 13 and Taishō. Vol.32, 745b, 748a, 751a, 754b.


\(^{14}\) Cf. E.Obermiller, History of Buddhism (Chos ḷbyun) by Bu ston. 2 voiz., transl. from Tib., Heidelberg 1931-1932, II, 125, J.Takakusu, Record, 159; S.Beal, Suh-ki-li-lih-kiu, 6; M.Walleser, Lebenszeit, 101; S.Dietz, Briefliteratur, I, 37, n.47.

\(^{15}\) J.Takakusu, Record, 150ff., 162.


\(^{17}\) Ratnāvaliṭākā, P Vol.ṇe (94), 152b7.
Summarizing, we should retain the following: No information on the personalities of the author and the addressee can be extracted from the SL; the Chinese and Tibetan tradition agree on Nāgārjuna as the author of the SL. This tradition has certainly its root in India, and must have been established already in the 5th cent., since the first Chinese translations date from this time. On the other hand, in evaluating these facts, one should not forget that the growth of legends around Nāgārjuna's life was in full bloom already at that time, as is shown in Kumārajiva's biography of Nāgārjuna. The friendship of Nāgārjuna with a Śātavāhana ruler is well known; and we should not forget that the RA was also addressed to the latter.

2. Metre and style of the SL

Since the SL is available only in translations, the possibilities for a philological investigation are rather limited. Nonetheless, the metre of the original Sanskrit text is known, simply because the author himself quotes it in v.1, where he says:

--- bdag gis ---

'phags pa'i dbya̱ns'di dag |
| cuñ zad cig bsdebs khyod gsan pa'i rigs |

"It is fitting you hear these Āryāgiti [verses] which I have composed concisely."

The Āryāgiti belongs to the group of Gapachandas, i.e. it is a mora (mātrā) counting metre. A stanza consists of two acatalectic hemistichs of 32 morae each, with obligatory caesura after the third foot, i.e. after the 12th mora.

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19 That 'phags pa'i dbya̱ns is the translation of a metre is corroborated by Mahāmati in SLT 325a7: 'phags pa'i dbya̱ns žes bya ba ni tshigs su bcad pa'i miñ no '’Phags pa'i dbya̱ns (Āryāgiti), that is the name of a metre." Cf. Dietz, Briefliteratur, I, 45, n.60.

For us it is important that the use of this metre is extremely rare. The earliest known example of Āryāgītī in the Sanskrit literature is the Nalodaya, a poem which is attributed, presumably incorrectly, to Kālidāsa. Without any doubt the ŚL is older than this poem, and hence it is the oldest known work in this metre. All the works of Nāgārjuna preserved in Sanskrit are composed in the metres Śloka (Anuṣṭubh) and Āryā, the most commonly used metres at that time.

The ŚL is written in a clear, pleasing and straightforward style. Canonical similes are used for illustration: e.g. the good result of "diligence" (apramāda), even after initial "negligence" (pramāda), is illustrated by the fate of Aṅgulimāla, Nanda and Ajātaśatru.

More generally speaking, we see that the style is adapted to the subjects treated in different parts of the ŚL. In the first part, i.e. vv.4-64, the doctrine of Buddha is taught; correspondingly, it is written in a sermonizing and admonitory style. We find in these verses several lists of Buddhist concepts. In almost every verse an imperative or necessitative is used to request the observance of virtues and the avoidance of vices. Comparing this section with ṚA I,8-21, where similarly the pure conduct is explicated, we note the following: the style is certainly as clear and pregnant, but in the ŚL the presentation proceeds in terms of dialectic juxtapositions, for instance the verses ṚA I,8-10 enunciate virtues, the precise counterparts of which are found in ṚA I,12-18. Again in vv.19-21 opposite terms are formulated, this time in one verse.

In the second part (vv.65-103), the ŚL contains a presentation of seven evils of the cycle of birth. Here a narratory, colourful description of these evils prevails. In particular the evils of the hells are traced out in frightful colours.

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21 Cf. C. Cappeller, Kleine Schriften, 58. The lost Mahārāṣṭrī epos Harivijaya by Sarvasena (4th cent.) was probably composed in this metre. The Mahārāṣṭrī epos Setubandha by Pravarasena (reigned 410-440) is, as far as is known, the earliest available work in this metre. Cf. A.K. Warder, Indian Kāvya Literature. 3 vols., Delhi 1972-1977, §§ 1265-1268, 1433. There may well be earlier examples of this metre in Prakrit literature. Cf. A.K. Warder, Pāli Metre, 144. The Āryā was particularly developed in the Prakrit poetry. Cf. H. Jacobi, Kleine Schriften, 150-151, 157, 198.

22 E.g. the MadhK, Śūnyatāsaptati, Yuktiṣāṭikā and ṚA are composed in Śloka.

23 The Vigrahavyāvartanī and the seven stanzas of the Pratītyasamutpādādhyāya consist of Āryā-stanzas. Of pratītyasamutpādādhyāya v.5 is quoted in Candrakirti’s Prasannapadā (MadhK 428,11; 551, 14) and v.4cd in Bṛh 355,14 and 532,5. These stanzas are in Āryā-metre whereas the last, most frequently quoted, v.7 is a Śloka. Cf. L.de La Vallée Poussin, Théorie des douze causes. Gand 1913, 122-124. The Āryā is by preference used in didactic literature. Cf. C. Cappeller, Kleine Schriften, 54f.

24 E.g. in the vv.4, 5, 6-8, 10-11, 29, 32, 33 etc.
In comparison with the preceding section, where concise and straightforward statements predominate, these evils are described in an epic and verbose manner. As the author himself mentions, he is fully aware of the frightening effect of artistical descriptions, pictures or sculptures.

In the third part (vv. 104-118), the style of the first part is taken up again in the presentation of the way to liberation from samsāra, which once more underlines the close correspondence of style and subject in the SL.

3. The philosophy of the SL

In the SL we find nowhere Nāgārjuna's dialectic, which is based on the relativity of opposite terms, e.g. on the opposition of "existence" and "non-existence" in Rā I,57f. From this there results a consistent, logical deduction as follows: with such a pair of opposites, since the one is only possible, if the other is given, the existence of one implies that of the other. From this Nāgārjuna deduces that in reality neither exists.

There is no trace of this kind of logical deduction in the SL. Mere references to Buddha's teaching are made, together with bald statements of supposed fact. As an example of this kind of exposition I quote the vv. 49/50:

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| gzugs ni bdag ma yin çes gsuñ ste bdag |
| gzugs dañ ldan min gzugs la bdag gnas min |
| bdag la gzugs mi gnas te de bzin du |
| phuñ po lhag ma bzi yañ ston rtogs bgyi | [49]
| phuñ po 'dod rgyal las min dus las min |
| rañ bzin las min ño bo ŋid las min |
| çbañ phyug las min rgyu med can min te |
| mi šes las dañ sred las byuñ rig mdzod | [50]
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[49] "Thus it has been said (sc.by Buddha): the form is not the self, the self does not possess the form, the self does not dwell in the form; and the form does not dwell in the self; in this manner understand also the four remaining 'aggregates' (phun po) as empty."

[50] "Know that the 'aggregates' did not arise by chance (yadrçchä), nor from time (kåla), nor from nature (prakåti), nor from self-nature (svabhåva), nor from a creator (tåvara), but rather did they arise from 'ignorance' (avidyå), 'deeds' (karma) and 'craving' (tåså)."

Ideationally, these two verses spring from canonical Buddhist doctrine. We find parallels to v.49 in SN III,114 and SN III,167. Likewise, we have quite a few parallels to the list of heterodox views of origin in v.50, in other works as well as in Nagärgjuna's. It is noteworthy that, in addition to both canonical causes of worldly personality, namely "ignorance" and "craving", "deeds" are mentioned.

28 Another possible translation of the Tibetan text would be: "They arise from deeds [caused] by ignorance and craving." But also the three Chinese translations mention these three causes. Cf. Taishö, Vol.32, 746b16 (Gupavarman), 749b14 (Samghavaran), 752b27 (1-tsing). In the commentaries, Mahåbati (SLT, Vol.4e, 350b1-6), Brag phug dge bses dge 'dun rin chen (mChen 'grel 43,5-6) and Blo bzang sbyin pa (50,12-14) comment also on three co-operative causes of existence.

30 Before Nagärgjuna, in general the five "aggregates" are used for the proof of the "voidness". Cf. Frauwallner, Philosophie, 149, 171.

29 Before Nagärgjuna, in general the five "aggregates" are used for the proof of the "voidness". Cf. Frauwallner, Philosophie, 149, 171.

31 In the commentaries (SLT 349a4, mChen 'grel 43,1-2) 'dod rgyal las "by chance" is explained as gnam babs so "fallen from heaven".


rañ bön las "from nature": This is directed against Såmkhya. Cf. SLT 349a4.

no bo rïd las "from self-nature": As A.L.Basham, History and Doctrines of the Ājivikas. Repr. Delhi 1981, 226 states, the svabhåvavåda was a small sub-sector of Àjivikism.

dbañ phyug las "from a creator": This is directed against Yoga. Cf. SLT 349a5 and E. Frauwallner, Geschichte, 1,425.

rgyu med can "without cause": This is the ahetu(kå)våda. Cf. Ja V,227ff., SN III,73, Abhidåk (La Vallée Poussin), III,82. This could be directed against the Àjivikas. Cf. A.L.Basham, History, 227 and Ja V,228.

32 Cf. Akutobhāyā, Vol.Tsa (95), 34a. I would like to thank Dr. Ch.Lindtner, Kobenhavn, for this information.

In verses 4-64 of the *SL*, in which general Buddhist teaching is conveyed, there are some examples that transcend the teaching of the Sūtrapitaka, but which are not specific to the fully developed Madhyamaka philosophy of Nāgārjuna.

The large number of parallels to the Sūtrapitaka in the use of simile is remarkable, including rarely cited examples. For example, in v.17, as in *AN* I,283, three groups of human beings are compared with three kinds of designs; in v.18, as in *AN* I,18, three kinds of speech with honey, flowers and filth; in v.20, as in *AN* II,107, human beings with a mango of various degrees of ripeness etc. Here v.53 should be mentioned. There is taught that the 150 *prātimokṣa* precepts are concentrated in the three "instructions" (tib. *bslab pa*, skr. *śikṣā*). A similar combination of these two is found in *AN* I,230.

Similarly the study of particular concepts leads to no definite proof for or against the authorship of Nāgārjuna. Thus in vv.6-7, "liberality" (*sbyin pa*) and "morality" (*tshul khrims*) are held up as special virtues of laymen, as in e.g. *DN* I,110, I,148. In Rā I,12 Nāgārjuna adds to these two concepts a third virtue "patience" (*bzod pa*), while in Rā IV,99 we find even a fourth one, "truthfulness" (*satya*).

In v.8 the six "perfections" (*pāramitā*) are listed. We also encounter these in Rā IV,81-2, V,75, but in Rā IV,80 and V,35-39 a seventh concept, "compassion" (*sūn brtse*), is added.

The context in which the concept of "absolute truth" (*paramārtha*) is used in v.27a, appears surprising:

| don dam gzigs par bgyi slad dños rnams la |
| tshul bzin yid la byed pa de goms mdzod |

"In order to recognize absolute truth, he must meditate upon material things in a thoroughly attentive manner."

In this verse "meditative contemplation" (*sgom pa*) is brought forward as the essential preparation for this recognition. However, neither here nor in the commentary *Vyaktapadā* of Mahāmati does the concept of "absolute truth" seem to have been thought to imply that of "conventional truth" (*saṃvṛtisatya*).

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36 I would like to thank Dr. Ch. Lindtner, Kobenhavn, for informing me about these Pāli parallels.

37 These are the 150 precepts which are common to the Vinaya of all schools. Cf. L. Finot, *Le Prātimokṣaśāstra des Sarvāstivādins*. JA 1913, 467f.

38 *SL†* 339a3-6.
In the second part of the *SL*, in vv.65-103, seven evils of the cycle of birth are listed, in order to inspire "weariness" (skyo ba) of the cycle of rebirth, and, hence, to create the precondition for liberation. Particularly detailed is the representation of suffering in the six forms of existence: thus, in v.102, the suffering of the Asuras (lha min) is described. According to Lamotte, in the canonical scriptures, as well as in the texts of certain Buddhist sects, only five forms of existence are mentioned, whereas in those of some other sects there are six forms. For us it is important that Nāgārjuna, the author of the *RA* mentions only five gati ('gro ba) (I,23), while the author of the *SL* has six.

In the third part, in vv.105-118, the way to liberation from the cycle of rebirth is expounded. To begin with, some preconditions are explained. "Morality", "meditation" (bsam gtan) and "wisdom", i.e. the three "instructions", are the means whereby one attains nirvāṇa. The latter is, in v.105b-d, defined as "a peaceful, subdued, untainted state, without age and death, inexhaustible, devoid of earth, water, fire, air, sun and moon." In MadhK, Nāgārjuna describes nirvāṇa as peaceful, without becoming and passing away, not eternal, devoid of the manifold, unimaginable and inexpressible. The phenomenal world and nirvāṇa are one and the same for him.

The *SL* continues: The seven "members of enlightenment" (byaṅ chub kyi yam lag) are the virtues, which allow one to attain nirvāṇa (v.106). By means of "wisdom" and "meditation", the ocean of existence becomes a mud hole (v.197). One should not speculate about the 14 "questions that were not answered" by Buddha (avyākṛta). The Sūtrapiṭaka mentions

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38 DN III, 234; MN I,73; SN V,474; AN IV,459.
39 Theravādin, Sarvāstivādin, School of the Śāriputrābhidharma.
40 Andhaka, Uttarapathaka, Mahāsāṃghika, Vātsiputriya and the Śadgatikārikā.
41 The references to the five gati found in the MadhK 269, 304, 323 refer all to Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā.
42 Cf. Mv III,441.4.
43 Cf. MadhK XXV; Frauwallner, Philosophie, 174f.; Rā I,40-42, 45-51, 64f.
44 Cf. Dhp. 372.
45 For this comparison see Mātrceṭa, Śatapāṇcāṣṭaka, v.35.
only ten questions\textsuperscript{44} that cannot be answered, whereas Nāgārjuna has 14\textsuperscript{45} of them, and he insists upon the pointlessness of these questions, in view of the identity of nirvāṇa and samsāra, and the voidness of all phenomena. In vv.109-111 the "origination in dependence" is explicated, while in v.112, we find a paraphrase of the old, oft-cited\textsuperscript{46} statement (also quoted by Nāgārjuna in other works): Who knows the "origination in dependence", knows Buddha's teaching and therefore Buddha himself. In order to be calmed, i.e. to attain nirvāṇa, one must practise intensively the eightfold "noble way" (v.113). By realizing the four "noble truths", finally one gains liberation (vv.114-115b). This part ends with the request to accomplish the counsels given by the author. This is the way to liberation from samsāra as it is expounded in the Sūtrapiṭaka and by the Hīnayāna doctrine.\textsuperscript{47} The concept of the Bodhisattva is nowhere mentioned in the SL, whereas in v.11 the eight "moral commandments" (sikṣāpada) of an Upāsaka are called "the morality of an Arhat" (dgra bcom tshul khrims). In the RA, however, Nāgārjuna states the preference of Mahāyāna to Hīnayāna,\textsuperscript{50} and he repeatedly\textsuperscript{51} asseverates that his instructions are in accordance with the Mahāyāna doctrine. In RA IV,94 he even explains why Buddha taught the different doctrines of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna:

\begin{quote}
yathaiva vaiyākaraṇo mātṛkāṁ api pāṭhayet
buddho 'vadat tathā dharmaṁ vineyānāṁ yathākṣamam ī
yathaiva vaiyākaraṇo mātṛkāṁ api pāṭhayet
buddho 'vadat tathā dharmaṁ vineyānāṁ yathākṣamam ī\\
"Just as a grammarian teaches the alphabet [to disciples], so Buddha taught [his] doctrine as it may be accessible to those to be trained."
\end{quote}
The above quoted SL v.118 also may be interpreted as an allusion to the different intellectual and receptive powers of human beings. Since the addressee of the SL is a layman he might be taught the way to liberation appropriate to him, i.e. the way of the Šrāvaka or Hīnayāna.

In the concluding 5 verses of the SL, the influence of the Mahāyāna doctrine is clearly manifest. In those verses the author explains the way to nirvāṇa after having accomplished the previously taught way.

In v.119 he brings forward the concept of the "rejoicing in the virtues" (punyānumodana) of all living beings and of the "dedication" (parigāmāna) of the own merit to other beings in order to attain Buddhahood. In vv.120-121 he continues:

Through the power of virtuous actions, one will be born as Lord of all Yogins; through the power of one's compassionate actions one will be like Avalokiteśvara, and hereafter, one will proceed to the Buddha-field and become the protector of the world like Amitābha. As a Jina, then, having extinguished fear, birth and death of all living beings, one will attain nirvāṇa which, once more, is defined as a "transcendental, only nominal, peaceful state, devoid of fear, age and death." Hence, we find a description of nirvāṇa at the beginning (v.105) and the end of the elucidation of the way to liberation.
4. Conclusions

The results of this investigation can be summarized as follows. According to tradition, the name of the author of the SL is Nāgārjuna, who is unanimously identified with the philosopher of Madhyamaka. The addressee is, traditionally, a Śātavāhana ruler. In the SL no clearly convincing evidence for these assertions can be found.

The metre, in which the SL was composed, is the very rarely used Āryāgīti. It could well be that therefore the author, being aware of this fact, mentions the name of this metre in v.1. Indeed, the earliest known example of this metre is the SL. Those works of Nāgārjuna, preserved in Sanskrit, are written in Śloka (Anuṣṭubh) and Āryā, the most commonly used metres in his time.

The style of the SL is straightforward, pleasing and clear, sermonizing in the parts devoted to advice and teaching, colourful in the descriptive parts.

Ideationally, the largest part of the teaching in the SL agrees with the Sūtrapiṭaka, and, hence, is yathāgamam. Only sporadically, e.g. in the discussion of the "perfections", and in the last verses, does it become clear that the author was well acquainted with Mahāyāna Buddhism. In particular, we find it rather striking that the presentation of the way to liberation from samsāra according to Hīnayāna is, after one concluding verse, immediately supplemented by the way to liberation according to the teaching of Mahāyāna. It seems to be merely attached, without being integrated. It is, furthermore, remarkable, that an almost identical definition of the nirvāṇa is given at the beginning of the Hinayāna way, in v.105b-d, as well as at the end of the Mahāyāna way, in v.123. Judging from the very few typical Mahāyāna concepts and from the rudimentary way in which the Mahāyāna doctrine is advanced, the SL gives the impression of an early Mahāyāna work. There are no traces of Nāgārjuna's dialectical method. Similarly, no hints of Madhyamaka philosophy are found in the letter. Certainly, the "origination in dependence" is referred to as the true teaching of Buddha; but it is not defined, as it is in Nāgārjuna's Madhyān.52 There it is promulgated as the true essence of the phenomenal world, devoid of all opposite terms and of the manifold, and hence as liberation. In the same way, Nāgārjuna's concept of

52 Cf. E.Frauwallner, Philosophie, 176.
"voidness" (śūnyatā), ston pa ŋid) is lacking completely.

Taking these results in consideration, we are led to the conclusion that for the SL the authorship of Nāgārjuna, the philosopher of Madhyamaka cannot be ascertained with the same degree of probability as it can be e.g. for RĀ. Because of its title "Letter to a friend" one might be tempted to assume that the SL, a favourite religious text-book from at least the 5th century onwards, was attributed to the famous Buddhist teacher Nāgārjuna only in a later period.
Today I would like to discuss some aspects of rGyal tshab rje's interpretation of Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī. In particular I like to focus on his interpretation of the notion of "going beyond existence and non-existence" (astināstivyatikrama) found in the root text.

The material for this paper is taken from rGyal tshab rje's commentary to the Ratnāvalī called d BuzzFeeding rin chen 'phreñ ba'i sñiñ po'i don gsal bar byed pa "Elucidation of the essence of the Jewel Garland of the Middle Way".1

The Ratnāvalī places a great emphasis on the fact that Buddha's teaching has passed beyond existence and non-existence. This is most clearly expressed in verses 61 and 62 of the first chapter. There the going beyond existence and non-existence is shown to be the distinguishing mark of the genuine Buddhist teaching. It sets it apart from the non-Buddhist schools like the Śāṃkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas and Jainas and even some Buddhist who assert person and aggregates.2 It is quite significant

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1 d BuzzFeed ma rin chen 'phreñ ba'i sñiñ po'i don gsal bar byed pa (short: d BuzzFeed ma rin chen Dar tik) by rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432). gStūn 'bum, text A: microfiche edition of the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, Ka, la-78a (LMPj o21, 031 8/17 - 11/17); text B: bkra šis lhun po edition kept at the Otani University and the Toyo Bunko, Ka, la-78b). (Abbreviation: RĀ Dar tik A, B).

2 RĀ Skt. verse 61:

sasāṃkhyayulūkyaniirgranthapudgalaskandhavādinam |
pṛcccha lokam yadi vadaty astināstivyatikramam ||

verse 62:

dharmayautakam ity asmān nāstyaṣṭityavatikramam |
viddhī gāmbhiram ity uktam buddhānām śāsanāntam ||

(Quoted PP 275 and MAV 184).

Translation: "Ask the worldly ones along with the Śāṃkhyas, Aulūkyas, Nirgranthas and the proponents of the p glands and the aggregates whether they teach the going beyond existence and non-existence".

that the text uses here the expression "going beyond" (vyatikrama) which indicates a level radically different from that expressed by the terms "existence" and "non-existence". The question is how this "going beyond" is to be understood. It is the assertion of a paradox, the simultaneous denial of two mutually exclusive statements, or is it a process that can be indicated by a logic that maintains the principle of non-contradiction? In order to see what rGyal tshab rje has to say in answer to these questions we should examine his interpretation of the most important statements concerning existence and non-existence in the root-text.

I would like to touch on two different applications, namely one in which the pair existence/non-existence occurs in a moral context, the other in which the application is to the phenomenal world.

A. Existence and non-existence in the context of morality

The occurrence of the passing beyond existence and non-existence in a moral context is illustrated by the verses 43-45 of the Ratnāvalī:

"The result of Karma does not exist": that is in short the view maintaining non-existence (nāsitādṛṣṭi). This is without merit and leads to a low rebirth. It is held to be the wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi).

"The result of Karma exists": that is in short the view maintaining existence (astitādṛṣṭi): this is merit and has as its natural consequence a good rebirth. It is held to be the right view (samyagdṛṣṭi).

Therefore, because in higher knowledge (jñāna) existence and non-existence cease, there is a going beyond

"For this reason you should know that the Ambrosia of the teaching of the Buddhas which has been said to be profound, the going beyond existence and non-existence, is the special dowry (or: distinguishing property) of the Dharma."

The Tibetan translation (N,P,DL) gaṅ zag phunḥ por smra ba yi 'jig rten graṅs can 'ug phrug daṅ gos med bcas la (DL: pa) ... dris ("Ask the worldly ones which propound the pudgala and the aggregates together with the Sāṃghyas etc./or: ask the worldly ones which together with the Sāṃghyas etc. propound the pudgala and aggregates ...") suggests as noted by Poussin (PP 275) "grantham po".

Ajitamitra's commentary states that "along with" includes only Sāṃghyas, Aulūkyas and Nirgranthas (RAT 170a5: 'di dag daṅ bcas pas na grāṅs can 'ug phrug daṅ gos med bcas pa'o). This indicates that this commentator whose commentary was originally written in Sanskrit may have used the textual version presupposed by the Tibetan translation. This and other observations in his commentary can be counted as an argument in favour of the originality of the Tibetan version. But that in itself is not enough evidence to decide the question.
(vyatikrama) evil and merit. It is for this reason that
the wise call this the liberation from both bad and good
rebirth. 3

The passages imply that both the wrong view as well as the right view
have to be gone beyond if one wants to attain liberation. Here we find
by implication the well-known conception of "no-view" held by the Mādhyamikas. 4 Like in verse 61 the expression "going beyond" is used. Here the
reader is told to go beyond evil and merit, beyond believing or not be-
believing in Karma. It is quite clear that here "going beyond" can not be
taken to invalidate the previously made distinction between right and
wrong view. The belief in Karma is the basis of the Buddhist morality
which is extensively dealt with in this text. Its relationship to wis-
dom has been clearly indicated by Nāgārjuna in the very beginning of his
book where he states (verses 5f.):

On account of faith one engages in Dharma, on account of
wisdom one truly knows. Of the two wisdom is the chief,
faith, however, precedes it.
The one who does not on account of desire, hatred, fear,
or ignorance transgress against Dharma should be recog-
nized as one possessing faith. He is the highest vessel
for the final happiness.

Here Nāgārjuna compares two essential prerequisites for religious
attainment. Faith is fundamental for the practice of Dharma. As can be
seen from the following verses in this context Dharma mainly means ob-
servance of moral discipline. It leads to mundane happiness consisting

3 This and the following translations of the root text are based on Rā Skt.

4 Cf. for instance MMK XIII,8:
śūnyatā sarvārṣṭānām proktā niḥsaraṇām jinaiḥ |
yeṣāṁ tu śūnyatārṣṭāṁ tāṁ asādhyāṁ babhāṣīre ||

While this passage and others could give the impression that the fault lies with
having any views at all this is not how these statements have been interpreted in
the dGe lugs pa tradition. In his Lam rim chen mo Tson kh a pa quotes this passage
and says:
rgyal ba rnams kyi stoh pa ǃhīd | lta kun ńes par 'byin par gsuñs | gañ daq stoh pa ńid
lt a ba | de drag bsgrub tu med par gsuñs | žes pa'i stoh pa ńid du blta ba bāes pa 'añ
rañ bžin gyis stoh pa'i stoh pa la bden par bzuñ ba 'am dños por lta ba la gsuñs pa
yin ... (Reprint of the bkra šis lhun po edition, ed. by Ngawang Gelek, Pa, Delhi 19..?,
384b3f. [p.207]). For a translation see Alex Wayman's Calming the Mind and Discerning
the Real. New York 1978, 249. This quote shows that for Tson kh a pa it is not wrong
to have views such as for example to think that something is void of inherent exis-
tence, but that the problem is with having views that regard something as inherently
existing. In that sense even the view concerning voidness becomes a wrong view if
it views that very voidness to exist truly or substantially.
in a rebirth in one of the higher realms of existence. It is only wisdom that leads to the final happiness consisting of liberation. Thus it constitutes a going beyond the achievements of faith and morality. It radically transcends any type of existence within the circle of rebirth. But although it is only wisdom that can bring about the liberation, this does not constitute a negation of the validity of faith and moral discipline. From the verses quoted we learn that they have to precede wisdom as a prerequisite and transform the practitioner into the proper vessel for realisation of wisdom.

In the light of these remarks it is evident that the Mādhyamika "no-views" does not mean to have no views at all. To have views, at least in a moral sense, is a condition for the attainment of wisdom.

Let us now examine how rGyal tshab rje understands the "going beyond" the view that maintains Karma and its results without falling into the wrong view that denies it. He makes the following comments concerning verse 44:

Therefore the existence of Karma and result is merely in a conventional way, but they are not inherently established (raḥ bţin gyis grub pa). The reason is that if one were to view them in that way (as inherently existing) one would maintain the extreme of eternalism (śāśvatadṛśti).

Discussing verse 45 he says:

On account of knowing the meaning of the mode of abiding (gnas lugs kyi don) the view of existence and non-existence ceases.

Firstly we see that rGyal tshab rje understands here the extreme of permanence as inherent existence. Then we see how rGyal tshab rje avoids understanding the "going beyond evil and merit" in a sense that would invalidate the moral distinction between the right and wrong dṛṣṭis. He considers it to be valid on the conventional level of existence. The right view of upholding the belief in Karma and its results would turn into the wrong view of śāśvatadṛṣṭi, the view of eternalism, if Karma and its results would be regarded to be self-existent or inherently ex-

5 Rā Dar ṭik A 14a6.
6 Rā Dar ṭik A 14b1.
established. Wisdom moreover does not, according to rGyal tshab rje, affect the view that Karma exists, but only affects the way one perceives its mode of being.

B. Existence and non-existence of the phenomenal world and its constituents

I like to divide the discussion of this section into two parts:
1. Cases where rGyal tshab rje understands the non-existence to be refuted as utter non-existence. 2. Cases where he understands the non-existence to be refuted as non-existence that is established inherently.

1. Cases where rGyal tshab rje understands the non-existence to be refuted as utter non-existence

Verse 38 of the Ratnāvalī gives a reason for going beyond existence and non-existence that in similar form is already known in the Pāli-Nikāyas:

Who has in that way seen the origination of cause and result as well as their cessation, does according to reality (tattvatas) not maintain existence nor non-existence of the world.

From the context it is made clear that origination of cause and effect refers to the succession of grasping to the ego which leads to the production of Karma that results in rebirth. Cessation refers to the reverse order. Also the reasoning seems to be quite straightforward: On one side the view of nihilism is averted by affirming origination of

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7 One should note that the expression yod par lta ba (astitādṛśīti) can have two meanings:
1. The view maintaining Karma and its results. As such it is a correct view (samyāgdṛśīti) (cf. verse 44).
2. The view maintaining (inherent) existence. As such it is a wrong view (cf. verse 41: the root text has yod pa nīd which is interpreted by rGyal tshab as yod lta can nīd "someone who has the view maintaining existence" (15b1). He also uses the expression yod med du lta ba (the view maintaining either existence or non-existence) (15b3).

8 J.P. Remôn translates the relevant passage in the Samyuttanikāya as follows: "What is termed 'non-being' in the world is proved not to be for one who by means of the perfect wisdom sees as it really is the origin of the world. What in the world is termed 'being', is proved not to be for one who by means of perfect wisdom sees as it really is the cessation of the world". (J.P. Remôn, Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism. The Hague 1980, 265. The translation of the given passage is based on Samyuttanikāya, Vol. 2, 17, Nidānasamyutta 15 (text of the Nālandā-Devanāgari-Pāli-Series).
cause and effect and on the other hand eternalism is averted by affirming their cessation. The notion of existence appears to be replaced by a view point that puts the emphasis on arising rather than the static concept of existence.

rGyal tshab rje sees in this verse mainly a statement of the principle of dependent origination (pratityasamutpāda) that is free of the extremes of "eternalism" and "annihilation". He transforms the expression tattvatas ("according to reality") of the root text into a means to qualify yod pa (existence) as an extreme: He reads the Tibetan translation of tattvatas, yañ dag ṇid du, as yañ dag par grub par ᇍid du yod pa "existence by way of real establishment". There is not much doubt that rGyal tshab rje sees in this formulation a synonym for the more current expression rañ bīn gyis yod pa ᇍid "inherent existence", used in the commentary to verse 46, a verse that exhibits a parallel reasoning to this verse here. Non-existence is qualified as cuñ ᇍad kyiñ med "not-existing at all", an equivalent for ye med or gtan med used in other places.

I suggest also to examine rGyal tshab rje's interpretation of verses 50 and 51 which exhibit a similar structure of the argument. There rGyal tshab rje's interpretation is based on a Tibetan version that differs to some extent from the preserved Sanskrit text. The Sanskrit text can be translated as follows:

Thus seeing the arising of the result from the cause he does not maintain non-existence. One concludes that according to the reality of this world it has arisen from discursive manifestation (prapañca).

Having come to the conclusion that according to reality also the cessation has arisen from discursive manifestation (prapañca) one does not maintain existence. There-

9 RĀ Dar ṭīk A 13a5. Also in the Nidānasamyutta referred to in n.8 the statement concerning the origin and cessation of the world as a refutation of "being and non-being" is followed by an appeal to the formula of paṭiccasamuppāda as the dhamma that avoids the two extremes and shows the middle way.

10 RĀ Dar ṭīk A 14b5f. There the extremes to be avoided are given as med pa ᇍid, glossed by rGyal tshab rje as 'khor ba rgyu 'bras med pa ᇍid du lta ba (view holding on to the non-existence of cause and effect of cyclic existence), and yod pa ᇍid, glossed as rañ bīn gyis yod pa ᇍid (inherent existence).

11 RĀ Dar ṭīk A 25b2 (ye med) and 25b3 (gtan med). The Tibetan of rGyal tshab rje's paraphrase of verse 38 is as follows: de ltar ('khor ba'i) rgyu 'bras skye ba dañ | (rgyu 'bras) de dag zad pa ᇍid mthon nas (dnos po'i de kho na ᇍid khoñ du chud pa rnas ni) 'jig rten la yañ dag (par grub pa) ᇍid du yod (pa dañ) | (cuñ zad kyiñ med (pa) ᇍid du mi sems so || (RĀ Dar ṭīk A 13a4-5, brackets mark rGyal tshab rje's glosses).
fore not relying on duality one is liberated.\textsuperscript{12}

Verse 50 uses like verse 38 the origination of cause and result as an argument against those who hold on to non-existence. *prapañca*, the activity of mental differentiation, serves in the same way as the grasping of the ego and aggregates as the starting point for the arising of the world.

The import of verse 51 as it stands is less certain. In analogy to verse 38 we would expect a statement to the effect that cessation comes about by the cessation of discursive manifestation. We find, however, a statement that cessation has arisen from the differentiation. There are a variety of possible solutions. Provisionally I propose the interpretation that in these verses the illusory character of both "arising" and "cessation" is emphasized by the fact of their origin in *prapañca*.\textsuperscript{13}

Now let us turn again to \textit{rgyals} tshab rje's interpretation. He reads and glosses the verses as follows:\textsuperscript{16}

We are not maintaining non-existence of cause and result, we are not holding the view of non-existence. The reason is because we maintain that cause and result exist as de-

\textsuperscript{12}Rā Skt.:
\begin{quote}
evaṁ hetuphalotpādam dṛṣṭvā nopaiti nāstikyāṁ |
abhyutpetyāsya lokasya yāthābhūtyāṁ prapañcajayāṁ |
nirodham ca * prapañcottonthām yātābhūtyādy upāgataḥ |
nopayāti astitāṁ tasmāṁ mucyate 'dvayānīśrītaṁ~
\end{quote}

* Tib. *'gog pa spros pa las ma byun ba = nirodham na prapañcottontham.*

It is also very possible that following the Tibetan translation we should read \textit{na} for \textit{ca}, especially since \textit{ca} and \textit{na} can easily be mistaken for each other. Ajitmitra's commentary does not quote that particular line and thus does not help us in establishing the correct reading (see RĀT 168a6-168b4).

Reading \textit{na} for \textit{ca}, the text would have to be translated as follows: "Having come to the conclusion that according to reality cessation has not arisen from discursive manifestation one does not assert existence ...". The intended meaning would be that cessation does not come about on the basis of the activity of the discursive manifestation (*prapañca*) but rather by its absence. This sense would correspond to \textit{MMK} XVIII.5, where it is indicated that liberation comes about by the destruction of *prapañca* in the voidness:

\begin{quote}
karmakleśākṣayān mokṣaḥ karmakleśā vikalpataḥ |
te prapañcāt prapañcas tu śūnyatāyāṁ nirudhyate
\end{quote}

Moreover a further indication in favour of this reading would be that in verse 50 we find the expression \textit{asya lokasya yātābhūtyād} which emphasises the point of view of worldly reality, the domain of *prapañca* and the arising of cause and effect. The unqualified *yātābhūtyād* in the next verse could by contrast be understood to indicate the point of view of absolute reality, the domain free from *prapañca*, the cessation of cause and effect.

\textsuperscript{13}See also n.12.

\textsuperscript{16}Rā Dar Ŧik A 15a5ff.
signated by conceptual thought (rtog pa’s btags pa) and as established by the force of convention (tha sñaṃ kyi dbah gis btsag pa). This is the case because we see according to the conventional norm of cognition the arising of the result from the cause in analogy to the origination of the fruit from the seed as arisen from the discursive manifestation of conceptual thought (rtog pa’i spros pa las byuñ ba).

The import of rGyal tshab rje’s interpretation of the first verse is that he sees the origination from prapāṇa in close analogy to the process of mental designation that is responsible for conventional existence. Thus the extreme of non-existence is averted. He does not give prapāṇa in this context the meaning of the mental process that is characterized by clinging to inherent existence, another interpretation that can be found in the dGe lugs pa tradition.15

When looking at rGyal tshab rje's comments on the following verse we should know that the Tibetan version of the text he used reads "has not arisen from discursive manifestation" instead of "the cessation has arisen from discursive manifestation".16 He states:

We are also not subscribing to the view that holds on to existence. The reason is the following: we refute that cause and result are established in the absolute sense (don dam par grub pa). We would, however, become ass'er-

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15 Similarly Ajitamitra (RATT 168a7ff.) emphazises in this context the aspect of prapāṇa as an extensive activity of conventional designation understood to operate by way of the verbal expression of conceptual imagination (spros pa ni rnam par rtog pa’i muniq par brjod pas rgyas par tha sñaṃ ’dogs pa’o). J.Hopkins goes probably too far when he renders spros pa as "convention" in his translation of verses 50/51, but his interpretation points into the same direction (The Precious Garland and the Songs of the Four Mindfulnesses, London 1975, 24).

An instance for the current interpretation in the dGe lugs pa school of prapāṇa as discursive activity that clings to true or inherent existence can be found in Tsön kha pa’s commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Commenting on Candrakirti’s explanation of MMK XVIII,5 he glosses spros pa (Skt. prapāṇa) as bden par ẓen pa’i spros ba (Dbu ma tsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa šes rab ces bya ba’i rnam bshaṅ rigs pa’i rgya mtsho žes bya ba. (Reprint of the bkra šis lhun po edition, by Ngawang Gelek, Ba, Delhi 19..?, 189b2 [p.378,2]).

This interpretation by Tsön kha pa is in turn apparently derived from Buddhapālita’s commentary on MMK XVIII,5: ’jig rtan pa’i rñed pa dan ma rñed pa la sogs pa’i chos rnam la ’di bden no sñaṃ du muniq par ẓen pa’i blo can dag de dan de la rnam par rtog par byed pas de’i phyir rnam par rtog pa dag ni spros pa las byuñ no || /Textedition Ch.Lindtner, Buddhapālita on Emptiness. Indo Iranian Journal 23, 1981, 193.

16 RÄ Dår ṭīk A 15blff., cf. n.12.
tors of existence if we were to maintain that they have not arisen from the discursive manifestation of conceptual thought \( (\text{rtog pa'i spros pa las ma byuñ ba}) \) (and) that they are in accordance with what is really established \( (\text{yah dag par ji bžin ŋid du gyur pa}) \). But this is not what we maintain.

We see that rGyal tshab rje understands the statement "not arisen from discursive manifestation" \( (\text{spros pa las ma byuñ ba}) \) as an equivalent for the extreme of existence. It assumes the same value as the expression "inherently existing" and entails a negation of the principle of the mere conventional and just imputed existence of phenomena that has been stated to be the correct point of view in the commentary on the previous verse.

While rGyal tshab rje is able to read the Tibetan text in such a way that "not arisen from discursive manifestation" becomes a circumscription of the assertion of existence which has to be denied, the Sanskrit version does not yield that sense. This is true of the Sanskrit even if we were to emend Tucci’s text in accordance with the Tibetan version to read "not arisen from discursive manifestation" \( (\text{na prapañcotthām for ca prapañcotthaṃ}) \).\(^{17}\)

2. Cases where rGyal tshab rje understands the non-existence as non-existence that is established inherently

This type of interpretation is illustrated by the way rGyal tshab rje explains verse 71:

Because it has many sides it is not "one". There is not

\(^{17}\)The Tibetan version of rGyal tshab rje's commentary is: yod par lta ba can ŋid du yañ mi 'gyur te | rgyu 'bras don dam par grub pa 'gog pa yin gyi rtog pa'i spros pa las ma byuñ ba yañ dag par grub pa ji bžin ŋid du gyur pa khas len na yod lta can ŋid du 'gyur na yañ | de ltar khas mi len pa'i phyir | (15blf.)

It presupposes a Tibetan text that reads:

'gog pa spros las ma byuñ ba |
yahn dag ji bzin nid gyur pa |
khas len yod pa nid mi 'gyur ..

The corresponding Skt. version would be:

\[ \text{niruddh \_ na prapañcotthaṃ \_ yathabhūtyād upāgataḥ} | \]
\[ \text{napayāty astitāṃ ...} \]

rGyal tshab rje must have understood the Tibetan in the following or a similar way: "There is a refutation (of inherently existing cause and effect) (but) we do not become (assertors) of existence, maintaining that (they) have not arisen from discursive manifestation (and) that they are in accordance to reality." This meaning can not be obtained from the Sanskrit version.
anything without sides. Without "one" "many" does not exist and without "existence" there is also not "non-existence". (v.71)

The verse explains the dependence of the notion of "many" on "one" and similarly the dependence of the notion of "non-existence" on the one of "existence". Thus Nāgārjuna demonstrates that it is not possible to conceive of these notions as independent entities. In accordance with this observation rGyal tshab rje qualifies the "one" and "many" to be refuted as that which is true as "one" or "many". He says:

The subject of our debate is an entity with form. It follows that it is not true as oneness (gcig pu anship du bden pa). The reason is because it is endowed with different sides. The fault that the reason is not established does not accrue because there is not anything that has form and no sides. If someone would say that it is true as "many" we would say that it is not true as "many" because there is no "one" that is truly established (bden grub kyi gcig).

rGyal tshab rje moreover points out that in the same way this proof termed the "proof free from one and many" (gcig dañ du bral gyi gtan tshigs) can be applied to reject the true existence of all phenomena. Then he introduces someone who raises the question whether that very void of true existence exists inherently. In answer to that he reads the rest of the verse in the following way:

Without the inherent existence (rañ bţin gyis yod pa) of something with form also the non-inherent existence (rañ bţin gyis med pa) of something with form is not inherently established (rañ bţin gyis grub pa med pa).

The reason is that if there is not the basis also that which depends on the basis does not exist.

Thus according to rGyal tshab rje this verse does not merely point to the interdependent character of existence and non-existence but more specifically demonstrates the impossibility of both inherent existence and inherent existence of the negation of inherent existence. That this is a possible interpretation of Nāgārjuna's thought is indicated by the

18 Rā Dar Ŧik 18b6ff.
immediately following verse which concentrates on demonstrating the non-existence of the antidote to existence. If we understand the antidote to be the voidness, its non-existence could possibly be understood as its non-inherent or non-absolute existence.

That the consequences of gtan med pa (utter non-existence) and the consequences of med pa understood as inherently existing voidness for rGyal tshab rje are two alternative mistakes that result from a misunderstanding of the conventional nature of existence can be seen in his interpretation of verse 104:

The Muni has explained that visibles, audibles etc. are neither true nor false (mīśā). If from one position (pakṣa) its opposite (pratipakṣa) arises both do not exist in truth. (v.104)

The verse appeals to what Jaques May has termed the "principe de solidarité des contraires" in order to show that in truth both "true" and "false" do not exist. May points out that in the Madhyamaka theory the position and its opposite are both the same with regard to their existence and non-existence. In that sense they are distinguished from contradictory opposites (contradictoires -viruddha, Tib. 'gal ba) which according to May are radically incompatible. rGyal tshab rje's interpretation is consistent with these observations. He reads the verse as follows: 20

There is a reason that the Muni has declared that the six objects, the visibles, audibles etc. are not truly established (bden par grub pa) and that they are not false in the sense of being utterly non-existent (rdzun pa ye med): they are both not absolutely (don du), that is truly (yañ dag par), established (grub pa).

After this he introduces an objector who says:

The negation of true existence (bden par yod pa = bden par grub pa) should result in utter non-existence (gtan med) or inherently existing non-existence (med pa rañ bțin gyis grub pa) because true existence and non-existence (bden par yod med) are directly contradictory (dños 'gal).

20 Rā Dar ḍik 25b2-4.
We see that rGyal tshab rje anticipates here not only the possible conclusion that the negation of inherent existence should be complete non-existence but he introduces again the false view of an inherently existing non-existence of voidness. The opponent holds that bden par yod pa (true existence) and med pa (non-existence) are directly contradictory. At the same time he understands by med pa gtan med pa or med pa rañ bzin gyis grub pa. If that would be correct one would be forced either to accept true existence (bden par yod pa) or else utter non-existence or inherently established non-existence. A refutation of true existence would therefore necessitate the acceptance of either utter non-existence or inherently established non-existence. This is clearly not acceptable for a Mādhyamika and therefore from rGyal tshab rje's point of view bden par yod pa and med pa can not be directly contradictory but are non-contradictory opposites or contrary opposites rather than contradictory opposites. As non-contradictory opposites they either both exist or both not exist. Thus refuting bden par yod pa also med pa (gtan med pa/med pa rañ bzin gyis grub pa) is refuted.

On the other hand bden par yod pa (true existence) and bden par med pa (not true existence) are by the Madhyamaka point of view as represented by rGyal tshab rje understood to be directly contradictory (dños 'gal). The negation of bden par yod pa establishes not true existence of voidness of true existence.\textsuperscript{21}

These considerations should be enough preparation to understand rGyal tshab rje's interpretation of the last part of the verse and refutation contained in it:

If it is assumed to be necessary that from the position of an inherently existing entity (dños po rañ bzin gyis grub pa) the contrary position ('gal zla mi mthun phyogs) of an inherently existing non-entity (dños med rañ bzin gyis grub pa) should arise, it follows that both true

\textsuperscript{21} The observation that bden par yod pa and med pa are wrongly conceived to be dños 'gal by the opponent and that bden par yod pa and bden par med pa are dños 'gal goes back to an oral explanation by Kyab je Zong Rinpoche from Ganden monastery, now rebuilt in the South of India. If we follow this explanation the expression bden par med pa should not be understood in analogy to bden par yod pa (true existence) as "true non-existence" (=inherently established non-existence) but as not true existence. The expression bden par yod med is ambivalent: It can either be read as "true existence and non-existence", according to the Madhyamaka point of view as represented by rGyal tshab rje a statement of two non-contradictory opposites, or as "true existence and (its) non-existence", to be understood as a statement of two mutually exclusive positions.
existence and non-existence (bden par yod med) are not inherently established. The reason is that entities are not inherently established.

rGyal tshab rje keeps to the "principe de solidarité de contraires" already indicated in the root text when he makes the hypothetical statement that "from the position of an inherently existing entity the contrary position of an inherently existing non-entity should arise". From the "solidarity" of the opposites in existence or non-existence the non-existence of an inherently existing non-entity (or non-existence) follows from the non-existence of an inherently existing entity (or existence). The reason is similar to the one rGyal tshab rje has employed earlier: if the basis, here an inherently existing entity, does not exist, also what depends on it, here the inherently existing non-entity or the inherently established negation of true existence, does not exist. rGyal tshab rje does not state a separate reason for the impossibility of utter non-existence. But we can assume that in the same way as the inherently existing non-existence it has to be understood to be a contrary opposite of inherent existence. Thus its hypothetical acceptance necessitates the acceptance of inherent existence. The refutation of inherent existence in turn implies the refutation of utter non-existence. rGyal tshab rje presupposes here of course the refutation of inherent existence and its equivalents that has been demonstrated in other places of the text by arguments such as the proof "free from one and many".

The paper demonstrates in brief the following traits of rGyal tshab rje's interpretation of Nāgārjuna's "going beyond existence and non-ex-

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2 The expressions dchos po rAn bzin gis grub pa and dchos med rAn bzin gis grub pa are apparently used as equivalents to the expressions bden par yod pa and med pa rAn bzin gis grub pa, the pair suggested by the opponent. rGyal tshab rje states in the title to this section that the topic is the non-inherent establishment of real existence and non-existence (dchos por yod med rañ bzin gis ma grub pa) (RĀ Dar Tik 25a4). dchos por yod med is an equivalent to the expression bden par yod med used here, and thus dchos por yod pa is a further equivalent of bden par yod pa and dchos po rañ bzin gus grub pa. In one respect rGyal tshab rje's use of this terminology seems to be somewhat misleading: namely there when he says that both true existence and non-existence do not inherently exist (bden par yod med de ni gni ga don du rañ bzin gis grub pa min te ... , cf. dchos por yod med rañ bzin gis ma grub pa in the title). It is not very likely that he does intend to say that true existence and non-existence are not inherently established because to say that true existence, an equivalent of inherent existence, is not inherently established, makes no sense. The context shows that the sense should be that existence and not true existence are both not inherently established. Thus we would have expected yod pa dañ bden par med pa and must conclude that in all probability bden par yod med is here used as a synonym of this longer expression.
a) rGyal tshab rje qualifies the existence and non-existence that have to be transcended. Thus not existence and non-existence have to be gone beyond, but a certain way existence and non-existence wrongly appear to be.

In the passages discussed we found the following qualifications of the type of existence (yod pa) that is not to be asserted:

raṅ bžin gyis yod pa ("inherent existence", commentary ad verse 71, the Tibetan root text has just yod pa), raṅ bžin gyis yod pa ŋid ("inherent existence", ad verse 46, root text: yod pa ŋid), bden par yod pa ("true existence", commentary ad verse 104), dños por yod pa ("actual existence", subtitle ad commentary verse 104, see note 22), yaṅ dag par grub pa ŋid du yod pa ("existence by way of real establishment", ad verse 38, root-text: yaṅ dag ŋid du / tattvatas).

Instead of compositions with yod pa rGyal tshab rje has used also compositions with grub pa (established) that have the same meaning:

raṅ bžin gyis grub pa ("inherently established", ad verse 44, bden par grub pa ("truly established", ad verse 104, root-text: bden), don dam par grub pa ("established in the absolute sense", ad verse 51), don du grub pa ("absolutely established", ad verse 104, root text "don du"), yaṅ dag par grub pa ("really established" ad verse 104).

Besides that there have been usages that grew out of elements occurring in the root text which have been interpreted by rGyal tshab rje to convey the same sense of inherent existence as the expressions mentioned before:

rtog pa'i spros pa las ma byuṅ ba ("not arisen from the discursive manifestation of conceptual thought", ad verse 51, root text spros pa las ma byuṅ ba) and yaṅ dag par grub pa ji bžin ŋid du gyur pa ("to be in accordance with what is really established", ad verse 51, root text: yaṅ dag ji bžin ŋid gyur pa / yāthābhūtyād). We should also mention that rGyal tshab rje has used dños po raṅ bžin gyis grub pa ("an inherently established entity" as an equivalent to bden par yod pa (comm. ad verse 104).

The non-existence not to be asserted has been characterized as follows:

cuṅ zad kyaṅ med pa ŋid ("not existing at all", ad verse 46, root text: med pa ŋid), rdzun pa ye med ("false in the sense of complete non-existence", ad verse 104, root text: rdzun pa), gtan med ("utter non-existence", ad verse 104), med pa raṅ bžin gyis grub pa ("inherently established non-existence", ad verse 71, root text: med pa; ad verse 104), bden par med pa raṅ bžin gyis grub pa ("inherently established non-existence of
true [existence]", ad verse 104), ḏnos med raṅ bṭin gyis grub pa ("an inherently existing non-entity", ad verse 104).

The type of existence that can still be affirmed after the negation of the extremes of existence and non-existence is indicated in the following way:

rtogs pa'i spros pa las byuṅ ba ("that what has arisen from discursive manifestation of conceptual thought", ad verse 50, root text: spros pa las byuṅ ba), rtogs pas btags pa ("what is designated by thought"), tha sṇad kyi dpañ gis bṭag pa, ("established by the force of convention", ad verse 104), yod pa ni tha sṇad tsam du yin ("existence is merely in a conventional way", ad verse 44).

b) rGyal tshab rje's use of qualifications serves in maintaining the conventional validity of the basis of morality.

c) By the use of qualifications he asserts the logical character of the going beyond existence and non-existence. There is no simultaneous denial of two directly contradictory or mutually exclusive statements. There is only a denial of an extreme quality wrongly attributed to both of them.

d) The refutation of inherent existence implies also the refutation of the extreme of non-existence.
Abbreviations

MĀV Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Traduction Tibétaine. Publiée par L.de La Vallée Poussin, St.-Pétersbourg 1907-1912


RĀT Ratnāvalīṭīkā by Ajitamitra. P 5659 (vol.129)

RĀ Dar ṭīk rGyal tshab Dharma Rinchen's ṭīka to the Ratnāvalī. See n.1
UN TÉMOIGNAGE SUR LE BON FACE AU BOUDDHISME À L'ÉPOQUE DES ROIS TIBÉTAINS* 
par 
S.G. KARMAY (Paris)

La religion Bon a été étudiée ces dernières années par plusieurs tibétologues éminents. Tous s'accordent pour dire que l'influence du Bon sur les croyances religieuses tibétaines en général a été considérable, comme l'a été celle de la littérature bonpo, par exemple les cycles hagiographiques du maître gsen rab Mi bo et des qter ma dont certains sont des documents quasi-historiques connus comme bsgrags pa.

Les traditions historiques bouddhiques et bonpo s'accordent pour dire que le Bouddhisme au moment de son introduction au Tibet au septième siècle ap. J.C. y rencontra une croyance indigène = le Bon. Les opinions des savants occidentaux varient néanmoins sur la valeur de ces traditions. La discussion reste ouverte sur la question de l'existence même du Bon, et sur son interprétation comme religion populaire à l'époque royale, c'est-à-dire du septième au neuvième siècle ap. J.C. Cependant, je n'ai pas l'intention d'entrer dans les controverses des tibétologues ni de défendre la tradition historique tibétaine. Qu'il me soit permis toutefois de noter à propos de cette tradition qu'elle ne me paraît pas dénuée de tout fondement.

Les avis des tibétologues sur le problème peuvent être groupés sous trois rubriques:

I. Ceux qui considèrent le Bon comme la religion ancienne du Tibet en acceptant la tradition historique tibétaine.1

* Mme A-M. Blondeau et M.A. Macdonald ont bien voulu relire cet article. Je leur exprime ma profonde reconnaissance pour leur corrections et leur suggestions.

II. Ceux qui maintiennent que certains types de rituels qui ne se trouvent que dans la littérature bonpo sont, certes, d'origine très ancienne, mais qu'à l'époque des rois le mot bon désignait des prêtres; selon eux ce serait seulement dans la période tardive que le mot bon est devenu le nom d'une religion.  

III. Ceux enfin qui sont d'avis que la religion appelée Bon n'existait pas en tant que telle avant le XIe siècle. Selon eux, la religion ancienne du Tibet s'appelle gTsug ou gTsug lag. Cette thèse est cependant totalement étrangère à la tradition historique tibétaine.

Le scepticisme à l'égard de l'existence de cette croyance pendant la période en question est sans doute dû à l'absence de référence claire et péremptoire dans les inscriptions gravées sur les stèles, dans certains textes des manuscrits de Touen-houang et dans des sources non-tibétaines relatives à la même période au Bon comme religion organisée ayant son propre système philosophique. Les conclusions auxquelles sont arrivés les tibétologues occidentaux sont cependant loin d'être en harmonie, comme nous l'avons déjà constaté. Pourtant les arguments invoqués sont habituellement basés sur des recherches si longues et des connaissances si profondes que l'on ne peut que tomber sous le charme de leur érudition.

J'ai donc commencé par accepter pratiquement l'opinion selon laquelle l'existence de la religion Bon à la période royale n'était pas en fin de compte attestée historiquement, mais j'ai eu tort en imaginant naïvement que ceux qui avaient abordé ce sujet avaient parcouru en détail tous les manuscrits de Touen-houang qui sont disponibles. Aussi, ce fut pour moi une grande surprise de lire le manuscrit de Touen-houang que je vous présente dans cette communication, et qui n'a pas été utilisé dans les travaux cités ci-dessus.

Il s'agit du Pelliot tibétain No.972, conservé à la Bibliothèque nationale à Paris comportant trois folios (1a-3b). Ce manuscrit est écrit en vers et il contient 116 vers au total. Le texte ne porte pas de titre au début; mais, à la fin, on lit: "(Le dit) de l'arbre, qui a été pronon-

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cé (par le Buddha)" (ṭal nas gsuṅs pa'i ljon šiṅ)." Bien que le manuscrit soit décrit comme un "fragment", il est en réalité complet. Il est écrit en caractères Ḟbu can; chaque folio comporte cinq lignes à l'exception du dernier qui n'en a que quatre. Il n'y a pas de colophon qui pourrait indiquer l'auteur, celui-ci reste donc inconnu. À l'origine, le manuscrit a été conservé plié en deux parties égales dans le sens de la largeur, ce qui a laissé une marque sur chaque folio endommageant légèrement le manuscrit, surtout au milieu des lignes 1 et 2 du folio 1a où un petit morceau est déchiré; en conséquence un mot manque au recto et deux au verso du même folio dans les lignes 4 et 5; mais au verso les mots manquants ont été réécrits à côté de la déchirure.

Quant à la question de l'ancienneté de notre texte, tous les manuscrits de Touen-houang sont considérés comme ayant été cachés vers l'an 1035 ap. J.C.; mais les dates les plus tardives qui ont été constatées dans les manuscrits chinois de Touen-houang sont des environs de l'an 924 ou de l'an 984.6 Cela ne nous apprend pas grand-chose quant à la date de notre manuscrit. Toutefois la langue et le style du texte suggèrent qu'il a été rédigé à une période où le Bouddhisme était bien établi. Il est possible que le "texte" soit plus ancien que la rédaction qui nous est parvenue. En effet, il est certain qu'après la reconquête de Touen-houang par la Chine en 848 ap. J.C. on a continué à recopier des textes bouddhiques en langue tibétaine; mais il n'est pas sûr que

4 Dans le manuscrit Pelliot tibétain 842 la même phrase žal nas gsuṅs pa précède le titre d'un sutra: žal nas gsuṅs pa'i mdo - "Le sutra prononcé de la bouche (du Bouddha lui-même)". L'auteur de notre texte s'est peut-être inspiré d'un tel exemple pour donner un titre à son ouvrage. D'ailleurs, dans les textes bouddhiques tardifs la "parole du Bouddha" (bka') est divisée en trois catégories dont la première est žal nas gsuṅs pa'i bka'. Voix, par exemple, mkhas grub rje dGe legs dpal bzaṅ (1385-1438), rǒd sde spyi rnam (éd. Lhasa), l3a.


l'on ait également continué à rédiger de nouveaux textes en tibétain à Touen-houang. Aussi est-il difficile d'affirmer si notre texte y a été rédigé ou non. Par ailleurs, ce texte, à ma connaissance, n'est cité dans aucune source tibétaine ancienne ou tardive.

Notre texte traite de théories bouddhiques telles que les lois de l'impermanence des phénomènes et du karma. L'objet principal de cet ouvrage, me semble-t-il, a été de promouvoir la conversion au Bouddhisme des non-bouddhistes. La nature transitoire de la vie humaine est fortement soulignée ainsi que l'importance de prendre en considération l'au-delà plutôt que l'existence actuelle. Le lecteur est donc pressé d'adopter la pratique bouddhique par un langage assez alarmant, exprimé en images poétiques qui visent à engendrer une profonde tristesse. De plus, avec une conviction ardue, l'auteur essaie d'effrayer le lecteur en déclarant que la vie arrivera inévitablement à son terme et qu'à ce moment là ni les parents ni les amis ne seront d'aucune utilité. Selon lui seuls "la religion des dieux" (lha chos, c'est-à-dire le Bouddhisme), le Boudda et le Samgha peuvent protéger les êtres qui se trouvent dans le saṃsāra. L'auteur constate que les gens ordinaires ont foi dans le Bon, la croyance "fausse" et le lecteur est averti du danger que l'on court en suivant cette croyance. Ici le partisan du Bon est assimilé à un insecte pris dans une toile d'araignée. Plus il se débat plus la toile s'en serre. Ensuite le texte conseille de ne pas accorder confiance aux Mo bon. Cette expression, à mon avis, désigne ici le prêtre qui pratique le Bon, lequel est présenté comme opposé au Samgha. Nous aurons l'occasion d'en reparler plus loin. Le texte prévient ensuite contre la vénération de certaines catégories d'êtres telles que les

7 Dans le manuscrit Pelliot tibétain 1284 (Choix, II, Pl. 550, II) l'expression lha chos est employée avec une nuance particulière. D'abord, elle est distinguée de bka', c'est-à-dire de "la parole du Bouddha" (lha'ichos daň bka' na re). Quelques vers plus loin elle est reprise en extension lha la yid ches chos byan (bya) na/ mais ce que recouvre ces deux termes: lha et chos, n'est pas précisé. Toutefois, il paraît évident que cette expression avant que les Bouddhistes ne l'aient empruntée pour leur compte désignait une croyance comme le Bon. Ce manuscrit 1284 est identique au Pelliot tibétain 126.1 résumé par A.Macdonald, Essai, 370-73. Sur l'expression lha chos, voir aussi G.Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls. Vol.II, Roma 1949, 720; R.A.Stein, La civilisation tibétaine. Seconde édition, Paris 1981, 144, 168, 204, n.204.

8 mu stegs est une contraction de mu stegs can qui traduit le mot Sanscrit tīrthika (Mahāvyutpatti 3320) et désigne tout d'abord les écoles philosophiques et religieuses non-bouddhiques de l'Inde, mais comme dans notre texte il désigne aussi les croyances non-bouddhiques en général. A mon avis la traduction habituelle de cette expression par "hérésie" ne rend donc pas son sens propre. Pour une définition précise de mu stegs can, voir sgra sbyor gam po gnis pa. P 5833 (The Tibetan Tripitaka, Pe-king Edition. Vol.144, Tokyo 1965, 84-3-2).
Dre, les Srin, les bDud, et les bGegs. Le fait que ces êtres sont mentionnés tout de suite après les mo bon nous amène à penser que ces derniers leur rendent un culte. Enfin, le texte s'achève sur une nouvelle admonestation d'adopter aussitôt que possible la foi bouddhique, car la vie humaine est tout à fait transitoire et ne nous laisse pas le temps de nous adonner à une pratique fausse.

La présentation du Bon dans ce document implique que cette croyance se bornait à s'occuper du bien-être terrestre. Une telle attitude est inacceptable pour le Bouddhisme, car elle est totalement incompatible avec ses doctrines concernant l'impermanence, la renaissance et le karma.

L'emploi d'images me semble jouer un rôle important sur le plan des expressions littéraires aussi bien que sur le plan idéologique. Tandis que la croyance bonpo est comparée à du poison, le Bouddhisme lui, est comparé à un nectar.

Nous avons donc un document de Touen-houang de l'époque royale qui atteste l'existence de la croyance Bon qualifiée de "fausse" et adversaire du Bouddhisme qui est la "vraie religion". Il faut signaler qu'un autre texte, le manuscrit Pelliot tibétain 1284 s'attaque dans le même style aux croyances anciennes. De plus, notre manuscrit n'est pas le seul qui atteste le Bon comme un système de croyances. Le manuscrit Pelliot tibétain 239/II, qui est bien connu des tibétologues et qui a été publié, est également un ouvrage bouddhique traitant des rites funéraires. Il me paraît intéressant de citer ici un passage de ce manuscrit rédigé dans le même esprit combattif, et de souligner le contraste marqué avec lequel les deux systèmes de foi sont dépeints.

D'abord le Bon:

myi nag po'i gžuṅ |
śid nag po'i lugs |
bon yas 'dod smraṅ |

9 En effet, ces trois derniers êtres font partie du group des huit êtres connus comme lha s rin sde brgyad et auxquels les Bonpo rendent encore un culte de nos jours, voir mKha' kloṅ gsaṅ mdos. Delhi 1973, texte No.7., 236-53.

"La tradition des hommes noirs,
Les coutumes des rites funéraires noirs,
Le Bon, c'est le récit archétypique des rites qui nécessitent beaucoup d'objets d'offrandes rituelles".  

Ensuite le Bouddhisme:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{lha} & \text{ cho} \text{ s} \text{ dkar po'i} \text{ gsku} | \\
\text{myi} & \text{ dkar po'i} \text{ lugs} | \\
\text{sh} & \text{id} \text{ dkar po'i} \text{ ches} \text{ (chos)} \text{ } |^{12}
\end{align*}
\]

"La tradition de la religion des dieux blancs,
Les coutumes des rites funéraires blancs,
La religion des rites funéraires blancs."

Quant à la question de l'expression \textit{Mo bon} dans notre manuscrit, elle est employée dans le sens de ceux qui pratiquent le rituel bonpo, donc "prêtre". De plus, les \textit{Mo bon} sont présentés comme adversaires du Samgha. Cependant, dans les textes tardifs, l'expression est très souvent employée dans le sens de "Bon". En revanche, dans certains textes très anciens, il se trouve à l'envers, \textit{bon mo}, dans le sens d'une sorte de "prêtre"se (\textit{bon po dañ bon mo}). 

Ce manuscrit ainsi que le Pelliot tibétain 239, II et d'autres,\(^{14}\) me semble-t-il, attestent l'existence du Bon comme un système de croyances répandu et déjà enraciné au temps des rois. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant l'inexistence d'autres croyances indigènes à la même époque.


\(^{13}\) Le Pelliot tibétain 990 (\textit{Choix} 1, \textit{P1.279},15). dGe sdig rnam par dbye ba'i mdo. P 1022 (Vol.40, 344-3-4); 'Phags pa legs ŋes kyi rgyu dañ 'bras bu bstan pa. P 1023 (Vol.40, 340-3-3). Ces deux textes sont presque identiques, mais c'est le second qui, dans le colophon, précise que c'est 'Gos Chos grub qui l'a traduit. A propos du traducteur, voir P.Demiéville, \textit{Récents travaux sur Touen-houang}. T'oung Pao 56, 1970, 47.

\(^{14}\) Par exemple, le Pelliot tibétain 1040 (\textit{Choix}, 2, \textit{P1.314}) fait état du Bon qui est "secret" (\textit{bon 'di gsan ba'i bon} ....) et le Pelliot tibétain 1248 (\textit{Choix}, 2, \textit{P1. 506}) dit à propos d'un récit sur "l'origine du Bon du fils de (?)..." qu'il a été copié à partir d'un autre manuscrit trouvé dans un "bureau" (..pa'i bu tsa bon rabs | phyagibal na mchis pa la dpe'a bians pa'o). Le Pelliot tibétain 443 aussi donne le Bon comme une croyance ancienne parmi d'autres (M.Lalou, Documents de Touen-houang: "Deux prières de caravaniers tibétains". \textit{Mélanges chinois et Bouddhistes} 8, 1945-1947, 220-21).
Cependant, il est vrai que cette croyance ancienne se définit encore mal et que nous ne connaissons presque rien quant à l'organisation de sa pensée philosophique ou dogmatique. C'est pourquoi, lorsqu'on parle du "Bon organisé" à partir du XIe siècle ap.J.C., il s'agit en fait de ce que les bouddhistes tibétains appelent le "Bon transformé" (bsgyur bon). Celui-ci serait le "Bon éternel" (g.yu′ dru′ bon), mais les Bon po appliquent ce dernier nom rétrospectivement au Bon du temps des rois. Comme cette question est très complexe je me bornerai à dire ici que le "Bon organisé" ne peut pas être entièrement dissocié du Bon du temps des rois, dont nous venons de parler, car on ne peut pas ignorer les nombreuses relations entre le "Bon organisé" et la tradition ancienne. ¹⁵

Traduction du texte tibétain

[Fol.1a] Comme la gelée, la sécheresse, et l'orage, détruisent instantanément les branches, les feuilles, les fleurs et les baies des bons arbres de l'été.

5 De même cette vie est-elle transitoire: il faut vite la quitter. Cela, il n'y a pas moyen de l'éviter car elle (la vie) est illusoire par nature.

Bien que la grande armée du Seigneur de la mort soit sur leurs talons les hommes, jeunes et vieux, sans s'en rendre compte espèrent encore continuer à vivre.

Comme, depuis un temps infini, ils ont manqué d'énergie errant dans les ravins intolérables du saṃsāra, ils y sont partout tués par les souffrances, les maladies, et quand ils doivent revenir dans ces vagues, à nouveau ils ne s'en rendent pas compte: ils sont stupides par nature.

Puisque même frappés à coups de bâton, ils n'ont pas l'idée de faire un effort,

10 ne sont différents en rien de la progéniture des bêtes de somme. Si l'on se couche et dort sans réflexion, les mérites (que l'on a gagnés) dans ce monde-ci [fol.1b] disparaîtront par la porte, et les mérites accumulés auparavant seront proches de l'épuisement.

Si l'on ne se souvient pas de soi-même, qui s'en souviendra?

Les actes vertueux accomplis, pour la plupart, sont comme des graines semées dans un bon champ: bien qu'invisibles au printemps, (leurs) fruits sont récoltés en automne.

Les actes pécheurs accomplis, pour la plupart,

25 ne tranchent pas immédiatement comme une arme le corps, mais accompagnent chacun où qu'il aille. Alors que vous avez le loisir de pratiquer le Dharma maintenant, que vos actions soient celles du nectar du but suprême. Prenez garde d'agir rigoureusement avec vertu.

Puisque naître dans les mondes supérieurs des dieux et des hommes, ou dans ceux des preta, des bêtes et des enfers,
ceci dépend de soi,
pourquoi se faire du mal à soi-même?
Quel est le nectar et quel est le poison,

si on regarde ne le voit-on pas clairement?
   Si l'imbécile pense [fol.2a] que cela est facile,
   il sera attrapé dans le lacet des bDud,
et emmené dans les trois mondes des mauvaises naissances.
   Se repentir ensuite ne servira à rien.

Même si on a une grande puissance et une nombreuse parenté,
d'à l'instant de la mort, il n'y a plus ni grand ni petit;
à ce moment là il n'y a plus ni courageux ni lâche.
Bien que l'individu quis sur sa couche,
soit entouré de nombreux parents et amis,
les souffrances intolérables de la mort,
l'individu tout seul les éprouve.
C'est pourquoi parents et amis, en quoi sont-ils utiles?
Si le sage ne pratique pas la sainte religion,
il n'est qu'un singe rusé, insensé.

Si l'érudit n'observe pas la discipline,
il n'est qu'un chercheur d'or aux mains vides.
Si le riche ne fait pas d'aumône,
il n'est que le gardien du trésor d'autrui.
Ne vous vous attachez pas à accumuler beaucoup.

(Quand) vous vous attachez à accumuler beaucoup,
ce qui a été accumulé deviendra la richesse d'autrui.
Bien que les abeilles travaillent dur [fol.2b] pour accumuler du
nectar,
il arrive que le miel soit utilisé par d'autres.
Où qu'il naisse, puisque chacun sait qu'il doit manger,
il ne refuse pas d'agir (pour se procurer de la nourriture).
Sans effort, à partir des graines,
on n'obtiendra pas de l'huile de sésame.
Par exemple, d'une graine de petit pois
comment le fruit deviendrait-il l'orge?

Si l'on agit bien la gloire sera grande.
Si l'on agit mal le mal arrivera.
Les gens ordinaires,
accordent leur foi au Bon, la croyance fausse.
Dans leur activités religieuses ils se délectent dans les "apparen-
ces"(?).
Ils sont, par exemple, comme des insectes errants, qui se suivent vers la toile d'araignée.\textsuperscript{16} Plus ils agitent leurs six pattes, plus la toile se resserre. N'accordez pas confiance au Mo bon. Ne rendez pas de culte ni aux 'Dre ni aux Srin.

Ne cherchez pas de protection auprès des bDud ni des bGegs. C'est la "religion des dieux" qui est bonne pour protéger de la souffrance. C'est le Bouddha qui est puissant pour protéger de la naissance et de la mort.\textsuperscript{17} C'est le noble Samgha qui est un guide utile.

Ecoutez! ô vous, fils de bonne famille.

Puisque l'on vous offre un remède qui est le nectar parfaitement pur, ne buvez pas le poison des vues perverses.
Dans la vie corporelle de celui qui est né comme un être humain, ses bonnes et mauvaises actions le précèdent.
Les richesses grandes ou petites qu'il a accumulées restent en arrière.

(Même) si les enfants pensent (rester) toujours jeunes, comment les enfants resteraient-ils toujours jeunes?
Comme un prisonnier emmené sur le terrain d'exécution, chaque pas que l'on fait rapproche de la mort.
Quoi sait même si on ne mourra pas le lendemain?

Il ne convient pas de rester tranquille, mais il faut se prosterner dès aujourd'hui.
Qui sait si l'on ne mourra pas demain ou après demain?
Quand on est attrapé pas le lacet des bDud, (à ce moment), dix mille appels, mille appels (des parents et amis), les oreilles ne les entendent pas.\textsuperscript{18}

Pourquoi les bDud seraient-ils tendres?
Les bGegs placent des obstacles n'importe où.
Les gDon jouent des tours à n'importe qui.

\textsuperscript{16} Le mot usuel pour la toile d'araignée est bāl thag ou sdom thag.
\textsuperscript{18} Le même vers se trouve dans le Pelliot tibétain 1284, II (Choix, 2, P1.551,33)
Les richesses et nourritures amassées pendant toute une vie, les fils, femmes, serviteurs et domaines,

il faut les abandonner, [fol.3b] et soi-même partir,
s'il y a une fin dans la compréhension de la religion(?).
Quelles que soient les richesses accumulées pour vivre aucune n'en paraît au matin de la mort.
Quelles que soient les victuailles accumulées pour vivre,
on part affamé au matin de la mort.
Quels que soient les vêtements accumulés pour vivre on part tout nu au matin de la mort.
Bien que l'on soit entouré par beaucoup de parents et d'amis, pas un ne paraît au matin de la mort.

A celui qui possède une maison, devant lui on la prend.
Que vous soyez intelligent, courageux ou sage, aussi difficile que ce soit ne renonces pas aux dix actions vertueuses.
Ce sont les graines pour renaître comme homme ou dieu.
Les dix mauvaises actions certes sont aisées (à commettre),
mais les trois naissances inférieures sont intolérables.
C'est pourquoi, pratique avec assiduité les dix actions vertueuses.

(Le dit) de l'arbre, qui a été prononcé (par le Bouddha).

La fin.
Transcription du texte

[Fol.1a] ci ltar dbyar gi¹ ljon šiṅ bzaṅ po la |
yal ga lo 'bras me tog 'bras...kyaṅ |
graṅ lhags than drags dus kyi rluṅ byuṅ bas |
de dag skad cig tsam gyis² myed pa ltar |
tshe 'di myi rtag myur du 'gro dgos na' |
cis kyaṅ myi zlog sgyu ma'i raṅ bzin can |
'chi bdag sde chen rtiṅ³ la thug bzin du |
sems can byis pa rgan rgon⁴ da duṅ ma tshor duṅ du re |
thog ma myed pa'i 'bad thag chad pa na |
¹０ 'khor ba'i gcoṅ roṅ myi bzd kha 'grim⁵ bzin |
de kun dag na sduṅ bsṅal naḍ rnams kyaṅ |
bsad nas rba⁶ kloṅ der ni 'gro dgos na |
da duṅ ma tshor glen pa'i⁷ raṅ bzin... |
dbyug pas brgyab kyaṅ 'bad pa'i sems myed na' |
¹５ byol soṅ phyugs⁸ kyi bu daṅ ci ma 'dra |
bsam pa med pa'i ŋal te gṇid log na |
'jig rten 'di yi bsod nams sgo ru [fol.1b] nub |
sṅun gyi⁹ bsod nams ci bsags zad du ņe |
bdag la bdag gis gžen¹⁰ bskul ma btab na |
²₀ bdag la gžen bskul 'debs pa su žig 'oṅ |
dge ba'i las rnams phal cher spyad pa ni |
ţīṅ rab ŋiṅ la sa bon btab pa bzin |
dpyid na snaṅ ba myed kyaṅ lo 'bras ston na btsa',¹¹ |
sdīg pa'i las rnams phal cher spyad pa ni |
²₅ 'phral du lus la mtshon ltar myi good kyaṅ |
ɡaṅ ltar 'gro ba'i sa phyogs de na sdoḍ |
da ltar chos spyod khom pa'i¹² tshe |
don mchog bdud rtsi las su byos |
dge spyod myel tshe dam du gyis |
³₀ mtho ris skyes pa'i lha daṅ myi |
yi dvags¹³ byol soṅ dmyal ba gsum |
ɡaṅ ...bdag la dbaṅ yod na |
ci phyiṛd bdag la gnod pa byed |

¹ gi ² gis ³ rdīṅ ⁴ dgon ⁵ 'drim ⁶ lva ⁷ ba ⁸ pyugs ⁹ gi ¹⁰ bžen ¹¹ rtsa ¹₂ ba ¹₃ dags
Le Bon face au Bouddhisme

35
btaṣ na gsal bar myi mñon nam
blud po sems [fol.2a] la sla sñam na
bdud kyi žags pas zin nas su
ñaṅ soṅ gsum du khrid 'og tu
lä nas 'gyod pas phan pa myed
40
či ltar dбаṅ che gñen maṅ yaṅ
ši ba'i dus na che chuṅ myed
de yи dus na dpa' sḏar myed
bdag ŋid mal na ŋal bžin du
gñen bšes maṅ pos mtha' bskor yaṅ
45
srog gcod myi bzod sdug bṣñal dag
bdag ŋid gcig pus myoṅ bar 'gyur
de bas gñen daṅ bšes ci phan
'dzaṅs pa dam chos myi sphyod na
de ni spre'u gcam don myed yin
50
mkhas pa tshul khrims myi sruṅ na
de ni gser pa lag ston yin
phyug la sbyin pa myi gtoṅ na
de ni gšan gyi gter sruṅs yin
ha caṅ bsoṅs la ma ņen cig
55
ha caṅ bsoṅs la ņen pa ni
bṣags pa gšan gyi nor du 'gyur
šbraṅ mas 'bad de [fol.2b] rtsi bṣags kyaṅ
šbraṅ rtsi gšan dag sphyod par snaṅ
gar skyes su ni za ņes na
60
raṅ gi rtsol ba dor myi bya
'bad pa myed par tig dag la
til mar thob par 'gyur ma yin
dper na bra sran sa bon las
'bras bu nas su ga la skye
65
legs par sphyad na dpa'l du che
ňes par sphyad na byur du 'oṅ
so so byis pa skye bo rnam
mu stegs bon la yid ches ste
las kyi don du mtshan ma sphyod

20 du 15 khrigs 26 gi 17 chaṅ 18 chaṅ 19 gi 20 la
70  dper na 'sbur bu 'gro byed pa'
    bal sdu²¹ nañ du šul drañs nas
    sug drug bskyod ciñ phyir phyir dam
    mo bon dag la srid ma ltos
    'dre srin dag la yar ma mchod
75  bdud dañ bgegs²² la skyabs ma tshol
    sduñ bšnal skyabs su lhachos bzañ
    skye ši mgon du sañs rgyas che
    'phags pa'i dge' 'dun phan ston yin

[fol.3a] kye rigs kyi bu rnams dgoñs su gsol
80  yañ dag bdud rtsi sman blud²³ na
    log par lta ba'i dug ma 'thuñ
    myi cig skyes pa'i tše lus la
    bzañ byas ŋan byas mdun du thal
    che bsags chuñ bsags phyi na lus
85  bus pa göñ nu rtag sñañ na'
    bus pa göñ nu ga la rtag
    gsad sar khrid pa'i btson²⁴ bšin du
    gom re bor ŋin ši dañ ŋe
    sañ tsam 'chi yañ su²⁵ šes kyis
90  bde bar 'dug par myi rigs ste
    di riñ kho na 'dud²⁶ de bya
    sañ ši gnañs ši sus šes kyis
    khri 'bod ston 'bod rnas myi thos
    bdud kyi žags pas zin pa ni
95  bdud ni ci la bsam pa chuñ
    bgegs²⁷ ni ci yì bar tu 'jug
    gdon ni ci la rkyal ka byed
    tshe cig bsags pa'i nor zas dañ
    bu dañ chuñ ma 'khor yul rnams
100  bor te bdag [fol.3b] ni 'gro dgos na'
    rtogs pa'i chos la srid yod na'
    ci tsam 'tsho ba'i nor bsags kyan
    'chi ba'i nañ par gcig myi sñañ
    ci tsam 'tsho ba'i zas bsags kyan

²¹ rdud   ²² bgags   ²³ blun   ²⁴ brtson   ²⁵ su   ²⁶ bdud   ²⁷ bgrags
105 'chi ba'ĩ nāṅ par ltoṅs par 'gro |
ci tsam 'tsho ba'ĩ gos bsags kyaṅ |
'chi ba'ĩ nāṅ par gc'er bur 'gro |
gñen bkes maṅ pos mtha' bskor yaṅ |
ší ba'ĩ nāṅ par gcīg myi snaṅ |
110 ldan pa'ĩ khab khaṅ sñun na khyer ḍ |
blo ldan dpa' 'dzaṅs gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ |
dge bcu dka'28 yaṅ ma gtaṅ ḍig |
lha daṅ myiRs skye sa bon yin |
myi dge bcu po sla mod kyi |
115 ṇan soṅ gsum po bzod glags myed |
de bas brtson te dge bcu spyod |

ţal nas gsums pa'ĩ ljon śiṅ || rdzogs so ||
TI
BETAN
HERMENEUTICS AND THE YĀNA CONTROVERSY
by
N.KATZ (Williamstown)

This essay is a companion to a piece I'm currently working on, tentatively entitled Deconstruction and Prasāṅga: The Hermeneutics of Derrida and Candrakīrti. In the present essay, I freely employ some Derri-dian terminologies in explicating Tsong kha pa's exegeses, although the foundations for such cross-cultural translation must wait for the next essay to appear. My appreciations to David Langston of the English department and Mark C. Taylor of the Religion department at Williams for suggestive discussions of Jaques Derrida.

I. Introductory

Lecturing at Harvard University this past summer, the Dalai Lama commented on the difficulties involved in such Buddhist hermeneutical principals as whether a given text is definitive (nItīrtha) or in need of interpretation (neyārtha). "Were I to explain the position of the Buddhist schools (siddhānta) on this topic," he said, "not only would you become confused, but I would become confused as well."\(^1\) Indeed, these issues are intricate. Whether a given text is definite or interpretable depends, of course, on the views expressed in that text from the perspectives of each of the schools. We also find texts stratified according to tantric classification systems, which themselves vary. Texts are spoken of as belonging to this or that "vehicle" (yāna), and this system is compounded by a yāna discourse that refers not simply to the texts as such, but to

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\(^1\) From a lecture by the Ven. Tenzin Gyatso, H.H. the XIV\(^{th}\) Dalai Lama, at Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., August 3, 1981.
attitudes through which the texts are practiced. Moreover, one and the same sūtra seems to propound and negate the entire yāna discourse. As one might expect, there is also a highly elaborated system for classifying the attitudes of the practitioner, systems found in the earliest Buddhist texts and modified throughout the long history of Buddhist thought. So it seems that the Dalai Lama's comment reflects more than his characteristic humility: the issues confronting one who wishes to gain an overview of Buddhist hermeneutical principles are vast, complex and relatively uncharted.

Therefore, rather than attempting to gloss even the main controversies in Buddhist hermeneutics, which would be more the task of a book than a brief essay, I intend to present a rather elementary typology. Identifying one particular hermeneutical problem, which is felt to be representative of the sort of issues over which Buddhist hermeneutics have pondered, namely the yāna controversies, I will proceed to discuss Buddhist hermeneutics through a twofold typology.

The first type is that which led the Dalai Lama to his comment, which I call text based hermeneutics. From this perspective, a given text may be called definitive (nītārtha) or in need of interpretation (neyārtha). Or, a given text may be seen in a particular context of other texts: thus it may be said to belonging to this or that class of tantras, or it may be said to belong to one or another yāna. Different schools have different reasons for their classifications, and I shall follow some of the debates between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools as representative of these discussions.

The second type of hermeneutical strategy is what I call adept based hermeneutics. Unlike those rooted in the texts themselves, these systems seek to analyze the person who practices a given text. Of course these two types overlap somewhat, but we find quite distinct systems of discourse. In Pāli texts, for example, one finds the language of the four holy persons (ariyā puggalā), one finds the Buddha speaking about his teaching as relying upon the dispositions of his audiences, and these dispositions are thoroughly investigated. As Buddhist thought flowered in India and Tibet, one finds further elaborations such as gotra and kula, the "families" or psychological types of practitioners, with differing texts and practices prescribed for different psychological types, much as a skilled physician prescribes different medicines for his patient, as the traditional metaphor goes. Further elaborations are developed with the rise of tantric Buddhism, as in the Guhyasamāja Tantra's discussions of types of adepts and the Hevajra Tantra's analysis of ar-
Guiding both these typologies is the principle of the "four securities" (catuhpratisarapa) wherein exegetical values are placed on the teaching (dharma) and not the person who teaches (pudgala), on the spirit (artha) rather than the letter (vyañjana), on definitive (nītārtha) rather than interpretable (neyārtha) texts, and on intuition (prajñā) over dualistic consciousness (vijñāna). This topic has been extensively studied by Professors Lamotte and Thurman, so I shall not devote a great deal of this discussion to it, but apply it to these typologies as appropriate.

Finally, I will return to our original yāna controversy through the eyes of Tsong kha pa. In his sNga gs rim chen mo, Tsong kha pa deconstructs yāna discourse as referential, yet maintains its use on an everyday level, writing sous rature if you will. It is this double movement of deconstruction of referential or logocentric language and a return to everyday language that I find most characteristic of Buddhist hermeneutical methods derived from the Madhyamaka, and nowhere is it more eloquently found than in the sNga gs rim chen mo. By sorting out one hermeneutical problem it is hoped that a more general sense of the richness of Buddhist hermeneutics might at least be indicated.

Western scholarly treatments of Buddhist hermeneutics are very few. In fact, the sum total of western scholarship directly on this question is essentially three journal articles: a pioneering study by Professor Lamotte; a very penetrating study by Professor Thurman who sees the hermeneutical enterprise as the essence of the Buddhist path; and a challenging analyse of tantric hermeneutics revolving around the alampkāra doctrine by Professor Steinkellner. It is hoped that this present essay might continue along the lines of my respected colleagues, adding to the discussion of this very vital theme within the rich tradition of Buddhist thought.


II. A Hermeneutical Problem: The yāna Controversy

By "hermeneutics" I mean the systematic interpretation of texts sacred to a given tradition. As an intellectual discipline, hermeneutics begins with an awareness of the difficulties in reading sacred texts; that is, hermeneutics presupposes hermeneutical problems. In our present context, a problem is a case where differing or even contradictory claims are canonically given about a key Buddhist doctrinal element, namely of a yāna. A problem entails an estrangement of letter (vyāñjana) and sense (artha); a confusion resulting, according to such Hindu grammarians as Kaupḍabhṛta, when a signifer (vācaka) has lost its signified (vācyā); a problem likened by Śāntarakṣita to a conversation about the colour and shape of the moon conducted between two people with ophtalmic disease. Hermeneutical shock is symbolized by fainting: when the Mahāyāna teachings of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka were first announced, the śrāvakas in the audience passed out; similarly, when the tantric teachings of the Guhyaśamāja were promulgated, the bodhisattvas fell senseless to the ground, and the same situation ensued when the Hevajra teachings were promulgated. Hermeneutics, then, begins when the familiar conventions known as language take on shades of the uncanny; when the signified seems randomly selected, rather than orderly evoked, as the signifier is spoken.

As we shall see, how textual claims are reconciled and adjudicated depends on what our hermeneuticians have in mind, and it is certainly the case that hermeneutics itself raises further problems, provokes new controversies of a more theoretical nature. However, by focusing on one particular canonical problem, the yāna controversy, I hope to elucidate some of the fundamentals of Buddhist hermeneutics, which is to say to point toward some of its fundamental hermeneutical problematics.

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4 Sphoṭavāda, quoted by K.K. Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning. 2nd ed. 1969, 137.
5 Tattvasamgraha, 1211, quoted by Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, 93–94.
It could be and has been argued that, in Buddhism, the problems of hermeneutics, or interpretation generally, are the problems of life itself. Surely it is the case that any aspect of experience which could be interpreted is done so only through the meditation of intellective construction (savikalpa-pratyakṣa), and that the actually given is indeterminate and immediate (nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa). Therefore, any act of interpretation is a reification (vikalpa), and it is precisely this tendency towards reifying which stands in need of analysis and therapy. This is to say that all interpretation is a form of subjectivism bordering on solipsism (asmimāṇa or ahaṃkāra), and that the therapy which Buddhism offers is one which removes such subjectivizing tendencies. Such a view has much to offer; but to accept it would lead to holding all of Buddhism as precisely the hermeneutics of awareness of subjectivist domination of experience, thereby turning hermeneutics into everything, reducing discrete fields of enquiry such as psychology or epistemology into hermeneutics. In keeping with the field parameters given by the Buddhist tradition itself, I prefer to use the term "hermeneutics" specifically in the context of textual interpretation and reflection upon the nature of this interpretation.

If hermeneutics begins with the awareness of a hermeneutical problem, my problem is how to interpret the term yāna, of which has been said remarkably contradictory things. Generally, yāna is a very common teaching device used for systematizing various Buddhist practices and doctrines in terms of two or three, and later as many as nine, discrete yāna. The western academic tradition has been very quick, and I would say overly-hasty, in adapting yāna discourse and inappropriately referring them to forms of Buddhism found in geographic areas. Thus, the technical term hīnayāna has been atrociously misused to refer to southern Buddhism, Mahāyāna to northern Buddhism, and Vajrayāna for certain trends within Indo-Tibetan Buddhism involving magic and sexual symbolism. One might suspect that such a handy designation, readily applied to living religious traditions, is applied inappropriately, and it has been. What I propose is a brief history of the term.

Etymologically, the term derives from the Sanskrit root yā-, "to go", and gives the sense of going or proceeding, as well as the means of carriage or vehicle, and is very close in many connotations to mārga, the path. The only pre-Buddhist reference to the term which I could locate

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9 Thurman, Buddhist Hermeneutics.
is found in the Chandogya Upaniṣad\textsuperscript{10} which gives the sense of a way or path: \textit{pathordeva yānasya pitṛ yānasya ca vyāvartana}. Dutt\textsuperscript{11} distinguishes its usages in the sūtras as a "way" or "career" from that found in the later Śāstras as "vehicle". This latter sense is conveyed in Kong sprul's definition of the term:\textsuperscript{12} "Like a vehicle or conveyance by riding on which one goes beyond suffering, thus it is known as yāna."

Thus the term, derived from "to go", carries a range of meanings from a spiritual career, to a path or way, to a conveyance or vehicle. Oddly, scholarly convention has been to translate it by this last alternative only.

Differing senses on a technical term do not in themselves pose hermeneutical problems; contradictory claims and uncertain signification do, and we find, on the one hand, a discourse emphasizing radical distinctions among yānas, and on the other hand a discourse claiming, in the extreme, that there are no yānas at all, or the more modest claim that there really is only one yāna.

Of the first discourse, we find in the Ākāśagarbha Sūtra\textsuperscript{13} the claim that the śrāvakāyāna is so dangerous to one practicing the bodhisattva-yāna that it must, at all costs, be strenuously avoided. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra\textsuperscript{14} says that radically different doctrines are taught in the different yānas, and\textsuperscript{15} that the nirvāṇa of the śrāvakas is really only a certain stage (rang gis rig pa) in the training of the bodhisattva. The Aṣṭasāhasrika\textsuperscript{16} says that the true meaning of a bodhisattva's detachment is his or her detachment from the śrāvakāyāna, and the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrika\textsuperscript{17} says that egoism (ahaṃkāra) may cause a bodhisattva to fall

\textsuperscript{10} Chandogya Upaniṣad, 3,2, S.Radhakrishnan, ed. and trans., \textit{The Principal Upaniṣads}. London 1953, 426
\textsuperscript{12} Kong sprul, \textit{Theg pa'i sgo kun las btus pa gsung rab rin po che'i mdzod bslab pa gsum legs pa ston pa'i bstan bcos, Shes bya kun khyab}. Lokesh Chandra, ed., Kong-trul's Encyclopaedia of Indo-Tibetan Culture. New Delhi (Ṣata-Piṭaka Series 80) 1970 vol.2, 495: gang la nyon pa ste de la brten nas mya ngan las 'das par 'gro bas theg pa'am bnyon pa dang 'dra ba'i cha nas theg pa zhes khyang bya'o.
\textsuperscript{13} Quoted by Śāntideva. Bendall, ed., \textit{Śikṣā Samuccaya}. St.Petersbourg 1897, 61.
\textsuperscript{14} B.Nanjo, ed., \textit{Laṅkāvatārasūtra}. Kyoto 1923, 333.
\textsuperscript{15} Nanjo, ed., \textit{Laṅkāvatārasūtra}, 212.
\textsuperscript{17} E.Conze, trans., \textit{The Large Sūtra on the Perfection of Wisdom (Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra)}. Berkeley 1975, 365.
to the level of a śrāvaka. The Saddharma-puṇḍarīka\textsuperscript{18} affirms that the Buddha's teaching is divided into three yānas, but that this division is simply a pedagogic expedient (upāyakausalya). Examples of this yāna discourse could extend almost indefinitely, as virtually all Mahāyāna sūtras have something to say on the subject.

The yānas which are affirmed in these sūtras are generally three, but occasionally two. The division into two, hīnayāna and mahāyāna, arose out of the Pātaliputra schism. The three yāna teaching (triyāna or yāna-traya) often speaks of:

(1) The śrāvakayāna, literally the "hearer's way", by which it is said that the disciples of the Buddha were able, upon hearing his teachings, to resolve the multi-lemma of saṃsāra utterly. Whether this resolution was final or not, complete or not, or a mistaken assumption, was a question on the Māhayāna hermeneutical table. In the Pāli texts, it is abundantly clear that the nibbāna of the sāvakas was final, complete in terms of wisdom and teaching skill, and accurate.\textsuperscript{19} Some Māhayāna texts seem to hold that the nirvāṇa of the śrāvakas was a self-pacification only, and did not address the goals of others.\textsuperscript{20} Other texts posit the śrāvaka's enlightenment as a temporary resting place, an intermediate stage before the bodhisattva practices were begun,\textsuperscript{21} while others seem to hold it as an egoistic delusion.\textsuperscript{22}

(2) The pratyekabuddhayāna, or the way of the solitary buddhas, originally seemed to mean that there were some who could actualize the resolution of saṃsāra without having heard the Buddha's teaching, a way of dealing with saints of "other religions".\textsuperscript{23} In any case, the pratyekabuddha, while attaining to full enlightenment, was unable or unwilling to teach others, and not a great deal of interest was invested in this yāna.

(3) The bodhisattvayāna, the way of those dedicated to bodhi, is another name for the pāramitāyāna, the way of practicing the "perfections"

\textsuperscript{18} Vaidya, ed., Saddharma-puṇḍarīkasūtra, 23.
\textsuperscript{19} N. Katz, Buddhist Images of Human Perfection: The Arahant of the Sutta Piṭaka Compared with the Bodhisattva and the Mahāsiddha. Delhi 1982, chaps. 3 and 5.
\textsuperscript{20} Thurman, Buddhist Hermeneutics, 37, n.1.
\textsuperscript{21} Vaidya, ed., Saddharma-puṇḍarīkasūtra, 94.
\textsuperscript{22} Nanjo, ed., Laṅkāvatārasūtra, 11.
(paramītas) in emulation of the āṭṭaka tradition of the former lives of
the Buddha; the hetuyāna, or causal way in the sense that it is the ne-
cessary precedent for Buddhahood;\textsuperscript{24} or the Mahāyāna as a whole.

Yāna discourse continued to proliferate. The Guhyasamāja Tantra\textsuperscript{25}
offers a fourfold classification of tantras as: kriyā (action), cārya
(practice), yoga (method for union) and anuttara (unsurpassed). The He-
vajra Tantra\textsuperscript{26} links this fourfold classification with the four moments
of a romantic courtship: glance, smile, embrace and sexual union. When
the Guhyasamāja's fourfold tantric classification was correlated with
the three yāna doctrine, a seven yāna system ensued, but it was short-
lived. The anuttara class itself was permuted into three (father, mother
and non-dual), and finally the well-known nine yāna system emerged.

In contrast with this theme of continuing refinement and distinctions
among yāna was the negation (or perhaps Derrida's term, soliciting) of
yāna language, often in the very same texts which asserted it. This
negation of yāna discourse could take two forms: the simple negation
which claims that there are no yāna or that yāna talk is predicated up-
on some basic misunderstandings; or a negation of yāna discourse which
asserts the notion of "one yāna", ekayāna, as a principle overarching
all discrepancies among yāna. Of the first type, we find in the Saddharma-
puṇḍarīka\textsuperscript{27} the Buddha telling Kāśyapa that there are no yāna but simply
people who practice differently, and in the same text it is also said\textsuperscript{28}
that since all yāna talk is due to unreal, reified thought (vīkālpa),
then such notions are the products of dull minds. In the Laṅkāvatāra the
Buddha says\textsuperscript{29} that there are yānas only so long as the mind (citta) re-
mains moving (pravartate) in saṃsāra, but when it comes to know itself
all thought of a yāna ceases. Similarly, Śāntideva\textsuperscript{30} cites the Sarva-
dharmavaipulyasamgraha Sūtra which says that the Buddha never taught
differences among yānas, and that such distinctions are mere confusions.

The second type of negation of yāna language, that which does so

\textsuperscript{24} Kong sprul, Shes bya kun khyab. Vol.3, 493.
\textsuperscript{25} Bhattacharyya, ed., Guhyasamāja Tantra, 162-163.
\textsuperscript{27} Vaidya, ed., Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra, 90.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 65.
\textsuperscript{29} Nanjo, ed., Laṅkāvatārasūtra, 135-136.
\textsuperscript{30} Bendall, ed., Śikṣā Samuccaya, 95.
with recourse to the ekayāna idea, is found, for example, in the Laṅkāvatāra\textsuperscript{31} which says that when the grasping by subjects (grāhaka) for objects (grāhya) ceases, then the one yāna is known as it is (yathābhūta). The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka in several places asserts the ekayāna teaching. In one place\textsuperscript{32} it claims that since the Buddha had only one aim, there could be only one yāna; and elsewhere\textsuperscript{33} this ekayāna is called the buddhayāna.

Knowing this unity of teaching was considered no easy matter. Kong sprul\textsuperscript{34} says that such knowledge is possible only upon the attainment of the seventh stage (bhūmi) of spiritual growth. The Laṅkāvatāra\textsuperscript{35} speaks of an essence of the teachings of all the Buddhas (sarvabuddha-pravacanaḥdaya), and the Seventh Dalai Lama\textsuperscript{36} sees this unity as one of intention behind all texts: "All the extensive teachings spoken by the Jina—for example, the three yānas, the four classes of tantras, and so forth—in short, all the sūtras and tantras, are spoken only as a means solely for training our mental continuums (saṅtāna or sems rgyud)."

This problem of continuity and diversity within the Buddha’s teachings causes even the greatest of all Buddhist philosophers, Nāgārjuna, to pause. In his Ratnāvalī\textsuperscript{37} he says: "It is certainly not easy to know what was intended by the Tathāgata, so therefore guard yourself with equanimity about the one yāna and the three yānas." In his Rājakathā-ratnamālā,\textsuperscript{38} he succinctly states the problem which I have been discussing: "How could what is taught in the two vehicles be of unequal value for the wise?"

It is precisely this hermeneutical problem which Tsong kha pa addresses in his sniras rim chen mo. Before viewing his findings, however, in order to appreciate the hermeneutical moves he makes it will be necessary

\textsuperscript{11} Nanjo, ed., Laṅkāvatārasūtra, 133-134.
\textsuperscript{12} Vaidya, ed., Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra, 31.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{14} Kong sprul, Shes bya kun khyab. Vol.3, 534.
\textsuperscript{15} Nanjo, ed., Laṅkāvatārasūtra, 259.
\textsuperscript{16} dGe slong bLo bzang bskal bzang rgya mtsho (Dalai Lama VII), gsang chen rdo rje theg pa'i smin byed kyi dbang rjes gnang sogs kyi dgon 'gro'i chos kyi gtam de bya ba gZhan phan ra ster bzhugs. Tibetan wood block ms., Library of Tibetan Works & Archives accession no.1081, 8a-8b.
\textsuperscript{17} Nāgārjuna, Ratnāvalī. G.Tucci, ed. and trans., The Ratnāvalī of Nāgārjuna. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1936, 251. (My translation).
to survey, by means of typology, various hermeneutical systems within Buddhism, a task to which I now turn.

III. Text Based Hermeneutics

How to read a text (or an idea, doctrine, etc.), which is to say, text based hermeneutics, is the very point of departure of Buddhism itself. When the Pāli texts were canonized, the redactors placed the Brahmajāla Sutta39 at the very beginning, and the import of this sutta is how to interpret the claims made by other Indian religions. Thus, an ability to interpret texts, to set the Buddha's teachings off against those of his correligionists, was considered to be paramount.

The Brahmajāla itself is one of the most intriguing texts of the entire Pāli canon. In it, the Buddha employs a psychologizing hermeneutic to unearth the structures of thought of other teachings. In it, claims as to the eternity or temporality of the world and the self are examined; assertions about the destinies of the soul after death are scrutinized; cosmogonies are found to be rooted in various psychological malaises; and so forth. While space does not permit an extended discussion of how these psychologizing hermeneutics of the Brahmajāla are employed, my purpose is served by pointing to the hermeneutical enterprise of Buddhism from its very inception. A recent translation of the Brahmajāla by Bhikku Bodhi is prefaced with philosophic skill, and the reader is recommended there.40

While it might seem that hermeneutics did not play a major role in early Buddhism, since there were no Buddhist texts prior to the Buddha, this really is not the case. We find that the Buddha of the Sutta Pitaka was well aware of the need for promulgating interpretative principles to be applied to his own teachings. As Professor Thurman points out,41 this raises a very unique case within the history of religions, wherein the founder of a religion is himself aware of exegetical and hermeneutical difficulties regarding his own doctrines. For example, in the Samyutta Nikāya42 we find the Buddha discussing his anattā (no-self) doctrine with

41 Thurman, Buddhist Hermeneutics, 22.
one Vacchagotta. Seeing Vacchagotta's confusion, the Buddha tells him that there is indeed a self - a claim manifestly contrary to what he taught in virtually all other instances. His disciple Ānanda, overhearing this discussion, becomes understandably perplexed, and the Buddha tells Ānanda about the necessity of clarity regarding the levels at which one is speaking. Thus we get a portrait of the teacher, the Buddha, as one aware of hermeneutical problems about what he teaches, aware that there is no uniformity of letter in what he teaches, but affirming a uniformity of purpose. His teaching is neither agreement (saṃvadati) nor disagreement (vivadati), but is skillful employment of everyday language without becoming so infatuated with language that its conventions become the speaker's convictions: yañ ca loke vuttam tena voharati aparāmasanti.²³

Either agreement or disagreement is understood as mere opinion (diṭṭhi), and opinionatedness is precisely that which prevents one from true seeing (darsana). By the time of the great Pāli commentaries, escape from opinions was itself made into hermeneutical principle. The Atthasālinī²⁴ claims that the entire system of abhidhamma was developed in order to prevent the mind of the adept from running to metaphysical extremes: abhidhamme duppaṭipanno dhammacittam atidhāvanto acinteyāni pi cinteti, tato cittavikkhepaṃ pāpuṇāti.

The classification of Buddhist texts as either definitive (nītārtha) or indeterminate (neyārtha) was accepted by all Buddhist schools except for the Mahāsāṃghikas, who held all texts as nītārtha.²⁵ As might be expected, heated controversies arose as to which texts were nītārtha, although all writers held nītārtha texts as the most reliable and authoritative. As mentioned above, the Catubpratisarāṇa Sūtra²⁶ cautions that one should rely on nītārtha sūtras over neyārtha ones; similarly, the Bodhisattvabhūmi²⁷ says that the bodhisattva relies on nītārtha sūtras so as not to disgress from Buddhist teaching and discipline.

According to the Aksayamatinirdeśa Sūtra,²⁸ those texts which deal

²⁵ Lamotte, La critique d'interprétation, 348-349.
²⁶ Ibid., 342.
²⁷ Asaṅga, Bodhisattvabhūmi. Ed. Wogihara, 257, as discussed by Lamotte, ibid., 355.
²⁸ Quoted by Candrakīrti, dBu ma tshig gsal (Prasannapadā). Dharamsala 1968, 30.
with the path (mārgāvatārāya nirdiṣṭa) are neyārtha while those which deal with the goal (phalāvatārāya nirdiṣṭa) are nītārtha, and this came to be accepted in principle by all schools. How to apply this principle, however, was a matter on which no consensus was ever reached. According to Candrakīrti, it was just to clear this matter up that Nāgārjuna wrote his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.49

From the Madhyamaka perspective, nītārtha sūtras are those which speak directly about śūnyatā. Śūnyatā, of course, implies that all factors of experience (dharma) have no independent existence (svabhāva), so while some sūtras might speak about skandha, dharma and the like, these texts are considered as neyārtha. Nītārtha sūtras, such as those of the Prajñāpāramitā genre, deconstruct these doctrines as a means of establishing the ultimate (paramārtha or don dam).50 So for the Madhyamaka school, those texts are nītārtha which adopt the deconstructionist hermeneutical stance of negation on the ultimate level along with the double movement of reaffirmation on the relative, pragmatic level.

Germinal Yoḡācāra texts such as the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, on the other hand, held that this negative dialectic (prasaṅga) of the Madhyamaka, like the naively positivistic statements of the earlier texts, were neyārtha, and that only texts which, like itself, spoke about the ultimate in positive terms could be held as nītārtha. Other teachings were understood by it as based on egoism (asmimāna or nga rgyal).51

Thus, both the Madhyamaka and the Yoḡācāra hold in principle, along with the Akaśayamatirdeṣa, that nītārtha texts deal with the ultimate or the goal (artha or don), while neyārtha sūtras deal with the relative (samvṛti or kun rdzob) or the path (mārga or lam); just what is considered as ultimate is a matter of contention.

From the perspective of the Saṃdhinirmocana, the imputed ultimate of the Madhyamaka is merely another polarity in the vacillation between affirmation and negation. Thus it propounds the well-known "three wheels theory", which holds that the first turning of the wheel was the Buddha's hīnayāna teachings which consisted of naively positivistic statements, his second turning was the Madhyamaka which negated the first turning on an ultimate level, both of which it considered neyārtha because they were extremes, that is, their positions were defined by each other. The

49 Candrakīrti, dbu ma tshig gsal, 28.
50 Quoted by Candrakīrti, dbu ma tshig gsal, 30.
third turning, that which proclaims what was really intended in each of
the first two, is the only set of doctrines to be considered as nītārtha
and is best exemplified by the Saṁdhinirmocana and related texts. This
real intention, or saṁdhā bhāṣā, speaks of the ultimate as non-dual, of
one taste, and of having been affirmed by the Buddha. 52

As syncretic movements between the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra-
emerger, resolutions of this nītārtha/neyārtha controversy continue to pro-
liferate. Dkon mchöd 'jigs med dbang po summarizes the position of the Yogā-
cāra-Svātantra-Madhyamaka school as holding: (1) that neyārtha suṭras
are concerned with the basic or the relative (samvṛti), while nītārtha
suṭras are concerned with the ultimate; and (2) that of the three wheels
as propounded by the Saṁdhinirmocana, the first is neyārtha and the last
two contain both nītārtha and neyārtha. Of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka
school, he says they are in agreement with point (1) above, but see the
three wheels theory differently. According to them, the first and the
third wheel are neyārtha while only the second is nītārtha because its
teachings are corroborated in the Prajñāpāramitādhāya Sūtra. 53

Questions about implicit intentions in the Buddha's teachings, a no-
tion used to promulgate the three wheel theory as well as to locate a
text in terms of nītārtha/neyārtha distinctions, bring us to the ques-
tion of what is meant by saṁdhā bhāṣā or "intentional language". It seems
that this technical term has been misspelled in several texts as saṁdhya
bhāṣā, which would give us "twilight language", a reading which some
scholars still hold. Understanding how the term saṁdhā bhāṣā is used
does not depend on its translation as "intentional" or "twilight" lan-
guage, however. While the "intentional" reading seems etymologically
closer to the original, nevertheless "twilight" is suggestive when it is
understood as opposed to literal sense.

In the poetic text, the Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana, a clear dis-
tinction is drawn between literal (vācyā) and metaphorical (pratīyamāna)
usages, the latter being "something like charm in girls which is dis-
tinct from the beauty of the various parts of the body." 54 That this

52 Ibid., 52: don dam de ni tha dad ma yin te/kun tu ro gcig mtshan nyi đ sangs rgya
gsung ||

53 Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bshag pa rin po che'i 'phreng ba, 527 and 533, as disuc-
ised by Iida, Reason and Emptiness: A Study in Logic and Mysticism. Tokyo 1980, 36,
48.

54 Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, 283-284.
distinction is quite familiar within Buddhist texts is clear from the *Laṅkāvatāra*, 55 where it is said that any attempt at conveying the sense (*artha*) of a text by means of literal exegesis is like feeding uncooked rice to children. The tantric author Nāropa, in his *Sekkodeśaṭīkā*, distinguishes between outer (*bāhyya*) and inner (*adhyātma-mīka*) readings, and affirms that his system is based on the latter. 56 Tsong kha pa, in his commentary on the *Jñānavajrasamuccaya*, 57 tells us that there are two alternatives in reading scriptures (*śabda*), namely the intentional and non-intentional modes (*saṃdhī bhāṣā and nasamaṃdhī bhāṣā*). Thus, the distinction between literal, outer and non-intentional readings on the one hand, and metaphorical, inner and intentional on the other, is clearly drawn. What is not so clear in western scholarship is how to fit the nītārtha/ neyārtha distinction into the scheme. Both Lamotte 58 and V. Bhattacharya 59 take *saṃdhī bhāṣā* as neyārtha; however, Tsong kha pa tells us that one who is proficient in the most advanced tantras (*anuttara*) employs discourse that is nītārtha and *saṃdhī bhāṣā*. 60 This leads me to suspect that Lamotte and Bhattacharya were a bit too hasty. In the *Hevajra Tantra*, 61 Vajragarbha asks the Buddha: "What could be said about intentional language as used by the yoginis, unknown by the śrāvakas? Please make this clear, Bhagavan." The Buddha replies with a very formalized list of correspondences between intentional and literal discourses. Here it seems that no great mystery is involved, as the intentional language is treated as a rather clear cipher. Thus, following Tsong kha pa, those texts written in *saṃdhī bhāṣā* are nītārtha texts.

Steinkellner 62 discusses the Guhyasamāja’s discerning of four types of meanings in texts: the literal meaning (*aṃśārthaḥ* or *tshig gi don*), the common meaning (*samastāṅgam* or *spyi’i don*), the hidden or pregnant meaning (*garbhi* or *sbas pa*), and the ultimate meaning (*kolikam* or *mtshar thug pa*). Another fourfold meaning classification, and one quite possibly related to this from the Guhyasamāja, originated with sGam po pa and

60 Elder, Problems of Language in Buddhist Tantra, 236–237.
61 Snellgrove, ed., *Hevajra Tantra*, vol. 2, 61. (My translation.)
62 Steinkellner, Remarks on Tantristic Hermeneutics, 453.
was developed by Klong chen pa. This method involves organizing Buddhist doctrines around four points (chos bzhi). By the fifteenth century when Klong chen pa wrote his Chos bzhi'i rin po che'i 'phreng ba, these four points came to be equated with four discernible levels of spiritual practices. These four points of practice are: (1) a basic life orientation of cultivating a sense of disgust for samsāra and a yearning for nirvāṇa; (2) the cultivation of the virtues understood as essential for spiritual progress; (3) the cultivation of specific virtues as antedotes for specific mental defilements; and (4) the transmutation of defilements into wisdom, a characteristic tantric metaphor for returning the mind to its original spontaneity, the basis of the rdzogs chen system. In each of these four points, or levels of spiritual practice, differing textual claims are employed, thus reducing truth claim controversies or hermeneutical problems to issue of levels of practice, a hermeneutical principle very close to that found in the Saṃyutta passages cited above. Once hermeneutical problems become problems of levels of spiritual practice, as Klong chen pa suggests, then the road is paved - conceptually if not historically - for a hermeneutic based not on textuality but on the mind of the adept. It is to this theme that I now call your attention.

IV. Adept Based Hermeneutics

Probably what is best known about the Buddha's pedagogic method is its emphasis on the one who is taught over and above what is taught. Following from the Brahmajāla's principle of psychoanalyzing metaphysical statements, from the Buddhist perspective metaphysical claims are cognitive and emotional obscurations of a fundamental lack of ease (duḥkha). To combat this malaise of reifications (kalpaṇā), the Buddha offers a therapy which is not based on naive counter-claiming (that is, combating falsehood with "truth") but on silencing the passion for claiming itself (drṣṭi-tṛṣṭā). A doctrine is not that which could be independently or objectively established, but is that which is useful in quelling this psychosis of metaphysics. Understanding a claim or a text, then, entails

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understanding the one who claims or the one to whom claims are addressed. To do hermeneutics means to shake a text to its foundations, to solicit it to reveal its psychological matrix. To facilitate the Buddhist hermeneutical enterprise, various theories and systems about the nature and types of practitioners, and corresponding useful doctrines and practices, were employed, and a survey of some of these systems will be the topic for this section.

It was well known in Indian linguistic thought that a signifier might evoke various signifieds depending on the mind and intentionally of the one who hears or reads it. Mādhvācārya, discussing Buddhism in his Sarvadarśanasamgraha,\(^{64}\) says:

"It is a common experience that the same word conveys different meanings to different persons. For example ... the sentence 'the sun is set' may imply to a thief that it is time for committing a theft; to a brāhmin, that it is time for saying his evening prayers; and to an amorous man, that it is time for meeting his sweetheart. But what was meant by the speaker himself? ... The problem is the same in the teachings of the Buddha."

While for Mādhvācārya this free play of the signifier represented a weakness and a lack of consistency in Buddhism, according to Buddhist texts any consistency could be found in principle but not in the letter of the text. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka\(^{65}\) has the Buddha saying that he teaches according to the abilities and talents of his auditors, and that he adapts his teachings by the principle of the freed signifier, or "permutable meanings" (anyamanēhi arthehi). A similar point is made in the Laṅkāvatāra\(^{66}\) to the effect that while a good physician employs the same therapeutic principle in all cases, due to differences in diseases specific cures might vary. Thus, from a Buddhist point of view it is not the weakness of inconsistency involved, but the skillful employment of a nondogmatic therapy.

The same point is made in the Samyutta Nikāya.\(^{67}\) When the Buddha was asked how it was that he taught different portions of the Dhamma to different disciples, he explained that one makes the greatest effort where

\(^{65}\) Vaidya, ed., Saddharmapuṇḍarikasūtra, 86.
\(^{66}\) Nanjo, ed., Laṅkāvatārasūtra, 204.
\(^{67}\) Freer, ed., Samyutta Nikāya, vol.4, 314.
one expects the fullest result, just as a farmer tends his best fields and only then turns his attention to the poorer ones. Thus, a skilled farmer needs to know which fields have the greatest potential; similarly, a Buddhist hermeneutician needs to know the psyche of the adept in order to make sense of what is prescribed in his case. "Let us never forget," cautions Lamotte, "that the omniscient Buddha is less a master of philosophy than a physician for universal suffering; he imparted to each the teaching that he needed."

In the Sutta Piṭaka several typologies of adepts are offered. Probably the most basic typology is found in the Aṅguttara Nikāya where two groups are mentioned, the dhammayogā and the jhānīyā. In general terms, the first group of adepts was the more intellectual and the second was more inclined towards transic meditations. Apparently, even during the Buddha's lifetime there were some tensions between these two types (and probably continue to this day), so the Buddha admonishes each to see the rarity and value of the other. These two types are called in the Kīṭāgiri Sutta the paññāvimutto, those freed by insight, and the ubhatobhāgavimutto, those freed from both portions who were also known as the cetovimutto, those freed through the affective mind. The Kīṭāgiri goes on to mention five other types of disciples. The kāyasakkhi, dīṭṭhipatto, saddhāvimutto, dhammānusārī and saddhānusārī, all of whom were still in the course of their training (sekhā). I have discussed this typology in some detail elsewhere, so here I will focus on the most elementary typology which corresponds to our western distinction of intellectual and intuitive persons. While it has been a fashion to see the latter as superior to the former, the Buddha found the matter much less categorial, saying that such judgments are no easy matter, that full enlightenment is accessible for both types, and that the distinction refers to the sort of meditative teachings one gives to each.

68 Lamotte, La critique d'interprétation, 357.
71 Katz, Buddhist Images of Human Perfection, 78-95.
72 For example, Bhikshu Sangharakshita, A Survey of Buddhism. 3rd ed. Bangalore 1966, 161.
73 Morris and Hardy, eds., Aṅguttara Nikāya, vol.1, 120.
75 Katz, Buddhist Images of Human Perfection, 78-82.
Here we have a clear sense that different personality types require different therapeutic methods without stratification of superior and inferior. This distinction again becomes important in Tsong kha pa’s hermeneutics, as we shall see.

Discussions about three types of adepts are found from the early texts right through late tantric works. In the Aṅguttara Nikāya, the Buddha speaks of three sorts of disciples: the ārukūpamacitta, one with the mind like an open sore which festers at the slightest stimulation; the vijjūpamacitta, one with a mind like lightning who is capable of seeing things as they are in a flash; and the vajirūpamacitta, one with a mind like a diamond who has destroyed the āsavā, who has attained full enlightenment. Indrabhūti, in his Jñānasiddhi, also speaks of three types of disciples - the inferior (mṛdu), middling (madhya) and superior (adhimātra) - for whom differing teachings are required. Of these types, Atiśa in his Bodhipathapradipta, says that the first merely pursues worldly pleasures, that the second strives after his own welfare (rang zhi), and that the last pursues the goal of others. According to Professor Wayman, various meditational manuals (blo sbyong) were prepared for each of these types, so the hermeneutics of the adept rather than the text is understood as the basis for the entire lam rim genre of Tibetan literature.

Another important principle for adept based hermeneutics is the doctrine of the five buddha families (rigs ni rnam pa lnga) and its correlation with the five kula or gotra. The gotra idea is introduced in the Lankāvatāra where it is equated with five yānas. The five buddha families doctrine is found in germinal tantras such as the Guhyasamāja and the Hevajra, where they are said to share characteristics with the five elements and the five skandha. It was for Indrabhūti, however, to make an explicit psychological typology out of the Guhyasamāja’s five buddha families, and he discusses the characteristics of each of the

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78 A.Wayman, trans., Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real: From the Lam rim chen mo of Tsong kha pa. New York 1978, 7-9.
82 Indrabhūti, Jñānasiddhi, 41.
psychological types. He also reinterprets the notion of wisdom, jñāna, in terms of the five aspects of wisdom as correlated with the families as the major theme of his Jñānasiddhi. Just as the Buddha did not assert a superiority of one type of practitioner over the other, Indrabhūti does not prefer one of the five psychological types over another; rather, he follows the Hevajra's dictum that the yogi has no special liking for one or another type, and that this fivefold division exists on a relative level only. So important was this psychological typology that Dombi Heruka says that this kula doctrine is one of the most important aspects of Buddhist tantra.

Since claims have no sui generis authority but need a reduction to their psychological matrices for analysis, then the interpretation of claims, and especially of hermeneutical problems, presupposes a jump in levels to the mind of the practitioner for successful Buddhist exegesis and interpretation. It is this dominant theme which I call adept based hermeneutics, a stance affirmed within Buddhist hermeneutical literature from its inception right through the present. These issues have been discussed at length by tantric authors like Klong chen pa, Indrabhūti and Tsong kha pa, and future work in Buddhist hermeneutics needs to take them into very careful consideration.

V. Tsong kha pa and the yāna Controversy

Having sketched text and adept based hermeneutics, we may now return to our yāna controversy and Tsong kha pa's resolution of it as formulated in his sNgags rim chen mo. I find that he employs several hermeneutical strategies in this work, namely:

(1) a solicitation of yāna language as referential, affirming a uniform but empty "inner horizon" of śūnyatā;
(2) following the traditional medical model for Buddhist teachings, a return to an everyday use of yāna language rooted in adept based hermeneutical principles;
and (3) a provisional separation of wisdom and method, the former being śūnyatā and the latter involving the Mahāyāna trikāya doctrine as under-

83 Ibid., 33-40.
stood through the definitive tantric practice of deity yoga (*lha'i rnal 'byor*), both as a method and as the actualization of Buddha intentionality.

Distinctions among *yāna* cannot be asserted, Tsong kha pa writes, for superficial reasons:

"Individual vehicles (*yāna*) are posited (1) if there is a great difference of superiority or inferiority between them in the sense that a vehicle is a fruit or goal toward which one is progressing; or (2) if there are different stages of paths that give a different body to a vehicle in the sense that a vehicle is a cause by which one progresses. However, if the bodies of the paths have no great differences in type, then a series of vehicles cannot be assigned merely because the paths have many internal devices or the persons who progress along them differ in superiority or inferiority."

Following up on his first point, Tsong kha pa then deconstructs claims as to differentiation of *yāna*. Accepting the position of many *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras* that there is indeed a uniform "inner horizon" of enlightenment, which he calls the cognizing of *śūnyatā*, he dismisses the construction of *yāna* discourse on the basis of wisdom. "Without cognizing the mode of subsistence of phenomena," he writes, "one cannot extinguish all afflictions and cross to the other side of the ocean of cyclic existence. Therefore, the wisdom cognizing the profound (emptiness) is even common to the two lower types of superiors (*śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*)."

To reaffirm *yāna* discourse after such a thorough deconstruction, even on a relative level, is his next task, and a rather difficult one. He poses an enigma: "There is no contradiction in the fact that for a Mahāyānist, Hīnayāna is an obstacle to full enlightenment, but for one in the Hīnayāna lineage, it is a method for full enlightenment." As a

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87 For examples see Vaidya, ed., *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, 21, 137, 140, etc.; Conze, trans., *Pañcav...iṣāṣaḥsārikā*, 237, 388, etc.

88 J.Hop..., *Tantra in Tibet*, 115.
method for a certain personality type, the so-called hinayana teachings lead to full enlightenment; but for another personality type, these teachings are an obstacle. Citing Aryadeva's Caryamelapakapradipa, Tsong kha pa relies on adept based theories to say that, "the vehicles are divided through arranging practices into three types (i.e., the three yana) from the viewpoint of the three types of trainee's interests," and these three types are the same as found in Indrabhūti's Jñanasiddhi.91

Thus, Tsong kha pa has established his provisional distinction for discussing the Buddhist path: (1) an "inner horizon" of wisdom, and (2) an "outer horizon" of method which is based on typologies of adepts. Wisdom in tantric Buddhism is often symbolized by the mother and method by the father, so Tsong kha pa employs these symbols in an extended metaphor:92

"Hinayana and Mahayana are not differentiated through their view (of emptiness) (the "inner horizon"): the Superior Nāgārjuna and his sons assert that the two vehicles are discriminated by way of acts of skillful method ... For instance, a mother is a common cause of her children, but the fathers are the cause of discriminating their children's lineage (Tibetan, Mongolian, Indian and so forth). In the same way, the mother – the perfection of wisdom – is the common cause of all four sons (śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas and samyaksambuddhas), but the cause of their being divided into the individual lineages of Māhāyana and Hinayana are methods, such as the generation of an aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings."

Very similarly, the Laṅkāvatāra93 makes a distinction between the "realization itself" and the teaching about it, the former a uniform "inner horizon" of sūnyatā and the latter simply a methodical distinction. Taking this methodical distinction as something real, according to the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka,94 is simply prapanca or the "outer horizon" of the

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91 Indrabhūti, Jñanasiddhi, 95-96.
92 J.Hopkins, Tantra in Tibet, 99.
93 Nanjo, ed., Laṅkāvatārasūtra, 149.
psycho-historical context in which a doctrine is taught. It should be emphasized that this "inner horizon" of śūnyatā is a deconstruction of referentiality and its bases, that is, the egoistic tendencies (vāsanā) towards reification (vikalpa).

As I have indicated, Tsong kha pa's deconstruction of yāna language is not based on a nihilism: hence, the double hermeneutical movement which negates only to reestablish on an everyday level. Since yāna cannot be established on the basis of wisdom or goal, their distinction is a pragmatic, pedagogic one. It is as though Tsong kha pa, having negated yāna, continues to use the term "under erasure". So pervasive is the Madhyamaka dialectic throughout his writings that each time the negated term reappears, it is as though crossed over: yāna becomes yāna as a methodical instrument.

Distinctions of Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna are similarly deconstructed and reconstructed sous rature. Clearly, as he says, "the division of the Mahāyāna into two is not made on account of wisdom cognizing the profound emptiness but on account of method" and, citing the ātmasādhanā-vatāra of Jñānapāda, "that the vast deity yoga constitutes the difference in method between the (pāramitāyāna, or the perfection path of the bodhisattva, and the mantrayāna, or the path for tantric adepts)."

As mentioned above, the deity yoga practices are a uniquely tantric application of the Mahāyāna notion of a kāya. Incidentally, this discussion bears heavily on the early Buddhist distinction of the cetovimutto and the paññāvimutto, the former being one who, having practiced the jhāna meditations, attains the supernormal powers (iddhi) which are essential for discovering and unobstructedly teaching the Dhamma, and the latter being the one who by bare insight attains enlightenment. Although both share the same wisdom (aṇā), only the latter can truly emulate the Buddha in pedagogic skill.

The trikāya doctrine, as used in tantric Buddhism, is itself often a hermeneutical tool. Professor Guenther quotes from the dGongs pa zad thal: "The dharmakāya promulgates that which is ineffable; the sambhoga-gakāya, the six self-existing letters (om maṇi padme hūm); and the nirmā-
\( \text{pakāya}, \) the enumerable sūtras and tantras." This is to say that from the highest perspective, there is \( \text{būnyatā} \) as teaching; from the middle level is the realm of symbolic strategies; and on the ordinary level are the letters (\( \text{vyāñjana} \)). The letters become associated with their sense (\( \text{artha} \)) only when deconstructed, when they are understood as empty. This might be why Kong sprul\textsuperscript{99} tells us that only a seventh level bodhisattva can appreciate this uniform, empty inner horizon. Thus, the three \( \text{kāyas}, \) according to tantric exegesis, cohere only when understood in their utter interpenetration, when they are not reified by notions such as independent existence (\( \text{svabhāva} \)); thus, the tantric doctrine of a "fourth" \( \text{kāya}, \) \( \text{svabhāvikakāya}, \) indicating not a fourth but the interpenetration of the three.

According to \( \text{pāramitāyāna} \) texts such as the \( \text{Bodhisattvabhūmi} \), the last several stages of a bodhisattva's career are spent in attaining the various teaching powers of a Buddha, symbolized through such \( \text{kāya} \) (or intentionality) discourse.\textsuperscript{100} In Vajrayāna Buddhism, these powers are actualized through the deity yoga practices, which are considered as the very essence of tantra.\textsuperscript{101} Thus, the Vajrayāna is understood as simply a short way (\( \text{myur lam} \))\textsuperscript{102} for doing what takes aeons according to the \( \text{pāramitāyāna} \) traditions.

The deity yoga practices involve the selection of a tutelary (\( \text{yi dam} \)), a selection which is based on the abilities (\( \text{dbang} \)), psyche (\( \text{bsam} \)) and sensitivities (\( \text{khams} \)) of the adept, according to the Seventh Dalai Lama.\textsuperscript{103} Understood as embodying the three \( \text{kāyas}, \) the \( \text{yi dam} \) is a symbol of Buddhahood which collapses the ultimate and relative levels into each other, a practice thereby existentially demonstrating the highest wisdom according to Buddhism, since the distinction of relative and ultimate, like all distinctions, is a reification for one who adheres to it but a skillful method for one who employs it without entanglements. As Tsong kha pa says,\textsuperscript{104} "One should know that joining such method and wisdom nondualistically is the chief meaning of the method and wisdom set forth in the Mantra Vehicle."

\( \text{99} \) Kong sprul, \( \text{Shes bya kun khyab}, \) vol.3, 534.

\( \text{100} \) Asaṅga, \( \text{rNal 'byor spyod pa'i sa las byang chub sms dpa'i sa (Bodhisattvabhūmi)}. \)

Peking Tripitaka 5538; Otani 5538, 165a-165b.

\( \text{101} \) J.Hopkins, \( \text{Tantra in Tibet}, \) 119.

\( \text{102} \) bLo bzang bskal bzang rgya mtsho, \( \text{gZhan phan ra ster}, \) 8b-9a.

\( \text{103} \) Ibid., 8b.

\( \text{104} \) J.Hopkins, \( \text{Tantra in Tibet}, \) 127-128.
Thus, by analyzing such text-based distinctions as nītārtha and ne-yārtha, ultimate and relative, by employing adept-based considerations such as types of adepts, and by filtering Mahāyāna doctrines such as trikāya through tantric practices, Tsong kha pa exemplifies a hermeneutic rather characteristic of later Buddhism. Basing his system on the Madhyamaka thoroughly, he is able to deconstruct all referential tendencies underlying the use of language, allowing for the free play of the signifier in a skillful, pedagogic proliferation of methods.
THE AKŞAYAMATINIRDEŚASŪTRA AND MI PHAM'S MKHAS 'JUG

by

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I

A most prolific and comprehensive scholar, Mi pham 'jam dbyaṅs rnam rgyal rgya mtsho (1846-1912 [hereafter: Mi pham]) wrote many works concerning not only his own indigenous Tibetan Buddhist tradition but also the Mahāyāna tradition of India. Among his many commentaries on the Indian Buddhist Śāstra tradition, he has one called mkhas pa'i tshul la 'jug pa'i sgo 'tes bya ba'i bstan bcos (paṇḍitasya nayam avatāramukhanāma śāstram [hereafter: mkhas 'jug]). This work consisting of 164 Tibetan folia systematizes the major philosophical, psychological, and religious systems that constitute the basic ideas underlying Mahāyāna developments in India. Therefore, this text is indispensable for those who wish to sift out, from the vast array of Buddhist literature, those topics that relate to each other in the classification of the Mahāyāna doctrine.

1 Mi pham was born in Golok (East Tibet), where, at the age of twelve, he joined the Me hor gsāṅ sngags chos gling Monastery of Že chen. Many of his teachers were shining beacons in the nineteenth-century cultural renaissance which became known as the Eclectic movement (ris med) in Eastern Tibet, and include dpal sprul Rinpoche (b. 1807), 'Jamgsbyaṅ mkhyen brtse'i dbaṅ po (1820-92), Koṅ sprul blo gros mtha' yas (1813-99), rdzogs chen mkhan po padma rdo rje, and others. Mi pham wrote over thirty-two volumes, including works on music, painting, poetics, sculpture, engineering, chemistry, alchemy, logic, philosophy, tantra, and astrology as well as two volumes on the Kālacakra Tantra. He was also a creative physician and his medical works are highly regarded to this day. For more information, see L.S.Kawamura transl., Golden Zephyr. Emeryville 1975, xi-xx.

2 Mi pham, mkhas pa'i tshul la 'jug pa'i sgo 'tes bya ba'i bstan bcos (Woodblock print, Poṭī style, N.D.). See also his mkhas 'jug gi sdom byaṅ, Ka sbug (Kalimpong) 1965, and his mkhas 'jug gi sa bcad mdor bsduṅ pa pad dkar phriṅ ba, 1965. For a commentary on the mkhas 'jug see mkhan po Nus ldan, mkhas pa'i tshul la 'jug pa'i sgo'i mchan 'grel legs bṣad snaḥ ba'i 'od zer, Delhi 1974.
In composing his mkhas ’jug, Mi pham begins with the usual verses of veneration and intention and then divides his text into three major discussions:

1. mkhas par bya ba’i gnas bcu (daśavidhaṃ kauśalyaṃ: the ten kinds of expertise: 2a3-123b6),
2. chos kyi sdom bți (dharmoddāna-catuṣṭaya: the four synoptic statements concerning the doctrine: 123b6-140b5), and
3. so so yan dag par rig pa bți (catvāri pratisamvidāḥ: four detailed and accurate knowledges: 140b5-161b4).

He concludes the treatise with a short discussion on the import of the text.

In this paper, I wish to focus my attention on the eighty inexhaustible topics (mi zad pa bryad cu) that substantiate Mi pham’s discussion on what constitutes a Mahāyāna path. However, before becoming involved with that topic, I believe that the eighty inexhaustible topics should be put into their proper context, and therefore, I shall deal first with the ten kinds of expertise (mkhas par bya ba’i gnas bcu, daśavidhaṃ kauśalyaṃ).

II

The ten kinds of expertise are discussed by Maitreya in his Madhyāntavidhāgakārikā (hereafter: MVK) and explained further by Vasubandhu in his Madhyāntavidhāgabhasya (hereafter: MVB) and by Sthiramati in his Madhyāntavidhāgaṭikā (hereafter: MVT). Mi pham has also written a commentary4 on the MVK and therefore his systematization of the major philosophical, psychological and religious systems of Buddhism in India in his mkhas-’jug according to the ten kinds of expertise has been modelled

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3 In previous presentations I have discussed the reason for Mi pham’s ordering of his text into the three major discussions. See Dawn Horse, A Journal of the North American Tibetological Society, 1, 1981.

I have given an outline of the “Expertise Concerning the Vehicles”, Theg pa la mkhas pa, at the 31st Conference of the Japanese Association for Indian and Buddhist Studies. See their Indogakkō Bukkyōgaku Ronshū 29:1, 956-61.

I have also submitted to Bulletin of Buddhist Cultural Institute Ryūkoku University (Kyoto, Japan) my article, An Analysis of Yāna-kauśala in Mi-pham’s mKhas-’jug. See No.20. Vicennial Commemoration Volume. 1982, 1-19.

4 Mi pham, dBus dañ mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa’i bstan bcos kyi ’grel pa ’od zer phreñ ba (Woodblock print, Poți style, N.D.).
after the discussion of them found in Maitreya's MVK.

According to this earlier Yogācāra text, the tenth tattva, which is known as kauśalyatattva (reality of expertise), consists of ten kinds of expertise, each one of which is to be cultivated to overcome a specific kind of opinionated view concerning the "self" (bdag tu lta ba, ātmadṛṣṭi). Hence, Vasubandhu states:

\[
\text{kauśalyatatvaṃ darśanapratipakṣenety uktam}
\]

"The reality of expertise has been explained as an antidote against opinionated views."

and Maitreya states (MVK III, 2c,d):

\[
\text{kauśalyatatvaṃ daśadhā ātmadṛṣṭi vipakṣataḥ}
\]

"The reality of expertise is of ten kinds in view of being antidotes against opinionated views about the 'self'."

Vasubandhu goes on to comment further as follows:

\[
\text{eṣa daśavidha ātmāsagṛhahaḥ skandhādiṣu pravarttate} |
\]

\[
\text{yasya pratipakṣeṣa daśavidham kauśalyaṃ ....}
\]

"These ten kinds of attachment to the unreality of 'self' originate [as attachments to] the psycho-physical constituents etc. There are, therefore, ten kinds of expertise to overcome them."

Thus, the ten kinds of expertise counteract ten kinds of attachments to opinionated views about the "self". Both Vasubandhu (MBV) and Sthiramati (MVT) clarify further that the ten kinds of expertise and the ten kinds of opinionated views about the "self" are related to each other in a specific way. That is, each one of the ten expertise counteracts one of the ten kinds of attachments that result from the basic belief that what is known as a "self" must exist as a permanent entity. In accord with the specificity of the ten kinds of expertise as ten specific attachments of the "self", Mi pham's discussion on the ninth one - i.e., expertise concerning the vehicles (theg pa la mkhas pa, yānakausalya)

5 On the ten tattva, see G.M. Nagao, ed., Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya. Tokyo 1964, (MBV), 37-49. See also P.O'Brien, A Chapter on Reality from the Madhyāntavibhāga-cāstra. Monumenta Nipponica 9, 1953, 277-303 and 10, 1954, 227-269. See also Mi pham's text mentioned in n.4 above; Roṅston Šes bya Kun rig, dBus daṅ mtha' rnam par 'byed pa'i rnam bṣad legs par 'doms pa lha'i rḥa ba che, Delhi 1979; and S.Yamaguchi's Chū-hen-fun-betsu-ron Shaku-so, Tokyo, Reprint, 1956; and Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, Nagoya 1934.

6 MBV 44,1.

7 ibid. 37,5.

8 ibid. 44,6.
can be understood to be specifically for the purpose of counteracting the opinionated view that a performer of a meditative exercise must be a "self" having a permanent essence (ātman) because a meditative experience refers to a special combination of the ātman with the manas (mind). This is, of course, the belief held by the Vaiśeṣikas. However, the Yogācāra do not uphold this view and instead argue that a meditative experience is a dynamic process of spiritual development that carries one from one level of awareness to higher levels; thus, what is called a "self" is this transforming process.10

III

In one sense, all Buddhist literature can be said to explain a method of attaining this higher level of awareness. The method by which the higher level of awareness is attained is spoken about in Buddhism as a path (lam, mārga) or a vehicle (theg pa, yāna), because sentient beings are transported from a degenerating or negative condition to a higher or more positive condition by means of it. Further, because a path or vehicle in this sense is not merely the support or merely a carrier, but is also what results from being the support or carrier, the path or vehicle must be understood as both the cause and the effect. Not only is that the case, but the path or vehicle must not be misunderstood to be a single method for spiritual growth, for Buddhist texts speak of many possible paths. Among those many possible paths is the Mahāyāna path which is said to be the "Great Vehicle" or the "Superior Vehicle" in comparison to others such as the śrāvakayāna or the pratyekabuddhayāna owing to seven kinds of superiorities (chen po bdun, saptāvīdhāma-

9 Yamaguchi, Chū-hen-fun-betsu-ron-Shaku-so, 233, n.5.
10 See for example, Sthiramati, Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya. S.Lévi, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Paris 1925, 15,10-12: athā vā dhārmapudgalaḥbhavaniṣṭāḥ cittamātram yathābhūtaṁ na jānanti ato dharmapudgalanairāryatmyapradarṣanena saphale vijñaptimātre "nupūrveṇa praveśārtham prakaraṇārmbhah. This seems to indicate that rather than an "Idealism" in the Western philosophical sense, Yogācāra is better understood as a system for overcoming attachments, and hence, could be understood as a "mentalism", in the sense that what counts is the mental imagery or attitudes (vijñaptimātra). This is not to say that the world and "self" are merely ideas. When one realizes that what is real is not ever what constitutes an "idea", then there occurs a transformation in one's epistemology. When one's way of looking at the world and at oneself changes, then one's whole state of being or existence changes (āsrayaparāvṛtti). This is what I mean to say when I use the words "transforming process" (parināma).
three kinds of excellences (bla ma med pa gsun, trividham ānuttaryam), and three kinds of distinctivenesses (khyad par gsun). Furthermore, because the Mahāyāna claims that only it can transport its adherents to the highest and most perfect enlightenment (bla na med pa yañ dag par rdzogs pa’i byañ chub, anuttarasamyaksamābodhi), it is not surprising to find the following statement in Asaṅga’s bodhisattvabhūmi: "The first occurrence of an enlightenment mind begins from an initial aspiration to become enlightened. The bodhisattva’s mastery of positive qualities (kuśalaparīgraha) for the sake of enlightenment is superior to the mastery of those qualities by others in two respects: viz., superior in its cause (hetuvaiśeṣya) and superior in its effect (phalavaiśeṣya). Furthermore, the bodhisattva’s mastery of positive qualities is the cause for the highest and most perfect enlightenment, and that [highest and most perfect enlightenment] is its effect. When even the mastery of positive qualities by others [such as] the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha is not [a cause for the highest and most perfect enlightenment], what is there to say for [the mastery of] other sentient beings? Therefore, the mastery of positive qualities of those bodhisattvas is superior in cause and in effect in comparison to the mastery of positive qualities by others." Thus, the highest and most perfect enlightenment begins from the first instance of awakening the mind and directing it towards enlightenment.

12 See MVB 60-70
From this first occurrence of an enlightenment mind (dañ po sems bskyed, prathamāsprathamaṃ cittotpādam) the deep (zab mo, gambhīra) and vast (rgya che ba, udāra) Mahāyāna doctrine, whose expanse, like open space and the ocean, is difficult to measure, begins to unfold. However, this deep and vast doctrine cannot be mastered nor can the highest and most perfect enlightenment be experienced without cultivating a path that leads to such spiritual growth. Thus, Mi pham introduces his discussion on what constitutes a Mahāyāna path with the following summary statement:

"The Mahāyāna path, the nature of which is deep and vast, is difficult to fathom, like open space and the ocean. However, in summarizing what is to be taken to heart concerning it, here [in this treatise], only the eighty inexhaustible topics will be discussed, because [the Mahāyāna path] is accounted for in their mode of being."15

IV

The source from which Mi pham derives the eighty inexhaustible topics is, without a doubt, the Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra ('phags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa žes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo [hereafter: ANS]).16 This sūtra begins with a very lengthy prologue (122b5-139b2), discusses the eighty inexhaustible topics in a most exhaustive manner (139b2-263b2), and concludes with a lengthy epilogue (263b2-270b1). The colophon of the text indicates that the Venerable Translator of žus chen, Dharmatāśīla17 translated the text into the Tibetan language. The original Sanskrit text

15 mKhas 'jug 77b: ....theg pa ni | bdag med gñis ka yoöis su rdzogs par rtogs pa'i zab pa dañ | sa dañ lam dañ phar phyin sogs tshad med pa'i spyod yul la 'jug pa'i rgya che ba ste .... | srid ti la skyon yon du mi rtog par mñañ pa ŋid du Žes pa'i sgo nas 'bras bu mi gnas pa'i mya ñan las 'das par ... 'gyur pa .... |

16 Āryākṣayamatinirdeśanāmamahāyānasūtra (P[eking Tripiṭaka] 842). I have not looked at the Āryākṣayamatinirdeśaṭīkā (P 5495) written by dByig gñen (Vasubandhu). The copy of the sūtra that was readily available to me was the one found in microfiche edition of the Lhasa Kanjur, New York 1979. In that edition the Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra can be found in vol.60, Lmpj 022,060 8/24, 122b5-270a7. The folio number of the chart in this paper is in accordance with the microfiche edition. For a discussion concerning the meditations in this sūtra, see A.Wayman, The sa-mādhī Lists of the Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra. Acta Orientalia 34, Budapest 1980, 305-318.


17 Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra 270b1.
is lost, but there exists a Chinese translation of it in the Taishō edition of the Tripitaka.\textsuperscript{16}

The eighty inexhaustible topics, which will be listed shortly, are discussed in the ANS in order to explain why Akṣayamati has the name that he does. The question is put forth by Śāradvatiputra, and the events that lead up to the question are as follows.

When the Bhagavan completed his discourse on the final meaning (\textit{nes pa'i don, nītārtha}) of the teaching (\textit{chos kyi rnam grañs, dharmaṇaparyāya}), a splendor of light, so bright that nothing can compare with it, arises from the Eastern Direction. Awed by the brilliance of this light, Ānanda requests that the Bhagavan explain the reason for its appearance. The Bhagavan explains that this light anticipates the visit of Akṣayamati and his 60 billion attendants to the Sahā world. When Akṣayamati arrives as predicted, he pays homage to the Bhagavan and takes his seat on a Lotus Throne. Then the Elder Śāradvatiputra asks the Bhagavan to explain from whence Akṣayamati comes, what Buddha resides over his country, of what kind is his country, and how far away his country is. The Bhagavan suggests that the Elder Śāradvatiputra put these questions directly to Akṣayamati. Śāradvatiputra does so and Akṣayamati responds in a manner reminiscent of the \textit{prasaṅga} or \textit{reductio ad absurdum} method of argument found in the Mādhyamika system. Śāradvatiputra responds by telling Akṣayamati that such questions were put to him not for the sake of hearing a discourse on the concepts of "coming" (\textit{'oh ba}) and "going" (\textit{'gro ba}) but for the sake of hearing the teaching of the superior one. Akṣayamati tells Śāradvatiputra that in that case the questions should be directed to the Tathāgata. Śāradvatiputra then directs the question to the Tathāgata who then explains that Akṣayamati comes from a place in the Eastern Direction called Mi 'dzum (Animśa?)\textsuperscript{19} which is as infinitely far away as the infinite numbers of sand of the Ganges River and in which the Tathāgata Samantabhadra resides. When Śāradvatiputra requests to be shown such a place, Akṣayamati enters the meditation called "displaying all Buddha Lands" (\textit{saḥs rgyas kyi ذي thams cad kun tu ston pa  zes bya ba'i tīn  nye 'dzin}) and manifests that land. The assembly in the Sahā

\textsuperscript{16} See J.Takakusu and K.Watanabe, ed., The Taishō Shinshu Daizōkyō. Tokyo 1927, Reprint 1960, vol.13, No.403, 583a-612b. This text corresponds to Nanjio No.74, where all eighty topics can be accounted for; but see MSA 17, n.2, where Ṭārīvī seems to imply otherwise.

\textsuperscript{19} See B.Nanjio, ed., The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Kyoto 1923, Reprint 1956, 105, 10, where \textit{animiśa} appears as the Sanskrit term translated into the Tibetan \textit{mi 'dum}. 
world pays homage to Samantabhadra by adorning Mi 'dzum with multitudes of flowers. The bodhisattvas in Mi 'dzum ask Samantabhadra to explain the reason for the adornments of flowers. Samantabhadra explains that Akṣayamati is visiting the Sahā world and when he manifested the world of Mi 'dzum, the bodhisattvas of the Sahā world paid respect to the Tathāgata therein. Samantabhadra's attendants then request to be shown the Sahā world. When Samantabhadra displays the Sahā world by emitting a ray of light from his body, his attendance pay homage to Tathāgata Śākyamuni and asks him why so many bodhisattvas have gathered from the Buddha Lands of the ten quarters to listen to the dharma. At this point, the Elder Śāradvatiputra gets up from his seat and asks Akṣayamati to explain why he is so-called. Akṣayamati responds that he is so-called, because he intends to render the topics of the teaching "inexhaustible".

Then Akṣayamati begins to discourse on the eighty inexhaustible topics, one by one, in the following sequence:

1. The first occurrence of an enlightenment mind (dañ po sems bskyed, prathama śīlo; 139b2-142a3),
2. Earnest intention (bsam pa, āśaya; 142a3-143b4),
3. The linking-up phase (sbyor, prayoga; 143b4-146b2), and
4. Aspiration (lhag pa'i bsam, adhyāśaya; 146b2-148b2).

At this point, the Elder Śāradvatiputra asks Akṣayamati whether there are other kinds of inexhaustible topics. Akṣayamati continues with his list:

5. Perfection of giving (sbyin pa, dāna; 148b4-153a3),
6. Perfection of ethical behaviour (tshul khrims, śīla; 153a4-157b2),
7. Perfection of endurance (bzod pa, kṣānti; 157b2-163b2),
8. Perfection of endeavour (brtson 'grus, vīrya; 163b2-172a2),
9. Perfection of meditation (bsam gtan, dhyāna; 172b2-179a3),
10. Perfection of discriminating awareness (śes rab, prajñā; 179a3-201a4),
11. Friendliness (byams pa, maitrī; 201a4-204a2),
12. Loving-kindness (sniṅ rje, karuṇā; 204a2-206a2),
13. Sympathetic-joy (dga' ba, muditā; 206a2-208a4),
14. Equanimity (btañ sñom, upekṣā; 208a4-210a5),
15-19. Five supersensible cognitions (mñon šes lha, pañca abhijñāḥ; 210a5-221a4),

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20 The designations, for example 139b2, refer to folio number 139, reverse side, line 2, according to the Lhasa Kanjur. See n.16 above.
20-23. Four factors of attracting [people] (bsdu dnos bti, catvārī samgrahavastūṇī; 221a4-223a3),
24-27. Four detailed and accurate knowledges (so so yaṅ dag par rig pa bti, catvārī pratisamvidāḥ; 223a3-228b2),
28-31. Four supports of confidence (rton pa bti, catvārī pratisarakāṇāṇī; 228b2-233a4),
32-33. The two accumulations of merit and knowledge (bsod nams dañ ye sses kyi tshogs, puṇyasaṃbhāro jñānasambhāraś ca; 233a4-239b5),
34-37. Four sustained attentivenesses (dran pa ēne bar gzig pa bti, catvārī śrīty-upasthānāṇī; 239b5-248a3),
38-41. Four correct exertions (yaṅ dag pa spoṅ bā bti, catvārī prahāṇāṇī; 248a3-250b1),
42-45. Four footholds for higher cognition (rdzu 'phrul kyi rkaṅ pa bti, catvārī gāḍhīpāḍāḥ; 250b2-251a5),
46-50. Five powers (dbaṅ po lña, paṃcendriyāṇī; 251a5-252b2),
51-55. Five strenghts (stobs lña, paṃcabalāṇī; 252b1-253b6),
56-62. Seven adjuncts to enlightenment (byaṅ chub kyi yan lag bdun, saptabodhyaigini; 253b6-255b1),
63-70. The noble eightfold path ('phags pa'i lam yan lag bryad, aṣṭāṅgamārga; 255b1-257b1),
71-72. Calm and extraordinary seeing (ti gnas dañ lhag mthoṅ, šama-thavipāśyanāḥ; 257b1-259a5),
73-74. Unfailing memory and eloquent speech (gzuṅ dañ spobs pa, dhāraṇipratibhāna; 259a5-260b2),
75-78. Four axioms of the teaching (chos kyi mdo bti [?] chos kyi sdom bti, dharmoddāṇa; 260b2-261a6),
79. The only path to walk (gcig pus brgod pa'i lam, ekāyana; 261a6-262a4), and
80. Expertise concerning appropriate action (thabs la mkhas pa, upāyakauśalya; 262a4-263b2).

In Mi pham's mkhas 'jug, these eighty topics make up the contents of the Mahāyāna path and they appear there in the same sequence. However, whereas Mi pham groups numbers 11 through 14 as the four immeasurables (tshad med bti, catvāry apramāṇāṇi) and numbers 34 through 70 as the thirty-seven facets of enlightenment (byaṅ chub yan lag so bdun, sapta-
also, Mi pham uses the more familiar form chos kyi sdom bti to refer to numbers 75 through 78 rather than chos kyi mdo bti, a form which appears in Maitreya/Asanga's Mahā-
yānasūtrālāṃkāra (hereafter: MSA) XVIII,101 as a title of a sūtra. Far more significant than these minor differences is the fact that the ANS's treatment of these eighty topics is an "inexhaustive" treatment of them. One needs only to compare Mi pham's treatment of them to the very detailed and lengthy discussion on them found in the ANS, to appreciate Mi pham's summary and systematization of these eighty inexhaustible topics.

The break which occurs after the first four inexhaustible topics have been discussed and at which point the Elder Śāradvatiputra asks Akṣayamati whether there are any other inexhaustible topics is not without reason. Mi pham introduces the eighty inexhaustible topics by drawing our attention to the fact that the Mahāyāna path begins to unfold with the first occurrence of an enlightenment mind (prathamaṃ cittotpādam). This act of generating a mind directed towards enlightenment begins with a desire to attain the awakened state (sāṇs rgyas) for the sake of benefitting all sentient beings. The act of generating a mind directed towards enlightenment comes to its completion and culminates as the awakened mind when it reaches a state of being freed from the afflictions of degenerating emotions (ñon moṅs pa'i sgrīb pa, kleśāvarāṇa) and muddled thinking (śes bya'i sgrīb pa, jñeyāvarāṇa). The gradual process of nurturing the mind towards enlightenment is a process of spiritual growth that consists of four specific levels of cittotpāda that correspond to four specific kinds of defining characteristics which are, in turn, contextually related to the first four inexhaustible topics. Therefore, the break that occurs after these four inexhaustible topics have been discussed is a device to draw our attention to the importance of the first four in generating a mind directed towards enlightenment.

The relationship between the four specific levels of cittotpāda and the four specific kinds of defining characteristics of a mind directed towards enlightenment has been clearly described by Maitreya/Asanga in MSA IV,2:

21 MSA 158, 20: dharmoddāneṣu hi bhagavatā sarve dharmā anātmāna iti deśitaṃ.
22 Mi pham, mKhas 'jug 95b5: ...'bras bu bla na med pa'i byaṅ chub mchog chos kyi sku thob pa daṅ | de thob nas nam mkha' ji srid du gzugs kyi skus phyogs bcu'i 'jig rten kun tu byaṅ chub chen po'i tshul mdzad pa bcu gnīs soṅs ston pa'i phrin las sems can gyi khams la rgyun mi 'chad par 'jug pa yin no ||
Interpreting this kārikā according to Sthiramati's Sūtrālāṁkāra-vṛtti-bhāṣya,24 the first specific level of a mind directed towards enlightenment is characterized by determination (mos pa, adhimokṣika), because this mind is generated from a trust (dad pa, śraddhā) in the deep and vast teachings of the Mahāyāna. It comes into operation at the stage of zealous application (mos pa'i spyod pa'i sa, adhimukticaryabhūmi). The second specific level of a mind directed towards enlightenment is characterized by a purity of intention (lhaq pa'i bsam pa dag pa, śuddhādhyāśayika), because at this stage, actions that benefit both oneself and others are done owing to the fact that a state of equanimity regarding oneself and others is attained. It is "pure", because this intention is freed from the subject/object dichotomy. It comes into operation from the first bodhisattva stage and lasts until the seventh (saptasu bhūmi-śu). The third specific level of a mind directed towards enlightenment is characterized by its capacity to bring sentient beings to maturation (rnam par smin pa, vaipākika), because at this stage, non-discriminating awareness (mi rtog pa'i ye šes, avikalpajñāna) occurs spontaneously and perfections, such as dānapāramitā, are cultivated with spontaneity and with ease. It is operative from the eight to the tenth bodhisattva stages (aṣṭamādyādiśu). The fourth specific level of a mind directed towards enlightenment is characterized by its total lack of being bound up with obscurations (sgrib pa spangs pa, anāvaraṇika), because it is no longer obscured by degenerating emotions and muddled thinking. Thus, Sthiramati's commentary clearly indicates that the relationship between the four specific levels of cittotpāda and the four characteristics that emphasize the quality of each level reflects a gradual spiritual progress that begins with the generation of a mind directed towards enlightenment and that culminates in the attainment of an awakened state of enlightenment.

23 MSA 14.
In MSA IV, 15-20, Maitreya/Asaṅga discuss the exemplary-traits (aupa-myamāhātmya) of cittotpāda.²⁵ It is in this connection that the MSA discusses the eighty inexhaustible topics. That is, when a mind directed towards enlightenment is accompanied by one or more of the eighty inexhaustible topics, then that cittotpāda is said to exemplify certain traits that are discussed in view of twenty-two examples. Therefore, the cittotpāda that is accompanied by the first occurrence of an enlightenment mind is said to be like the earth (sa, pṛthivi), because just as the roots, trees, medicine, and worms are supported by the great earth, so too in the same manner, it is on the basis of the first occurrence of an enlightenment mind that earnest intention (bsam pa), the linking-up phase (sbyor ba), the perfections (pha rol tu phyin pa) and all of the other adjuncts of enlightenment come forth.

Now, in Mi pham's discussion on the eighty inexhaustible topics, the four specific levels of cittotpāda are utilized to systematize the eighty into a coherent path of spiritual progress. This application of the four specific levels of cittotpāda to these eighty topics is lacking in ANS. Thus, in discussing the eighty inexhaustible topics as the contents of the Mahāyāna path, Mi pham cleverly puts them in the context of the four specific levels of cittotpāda and then discusses them in the light of the ten bodhisattva stages (sa bcu, daśabhūmi). What results on account of that systematization is as follows.

On the first specific level of cittotpāda - i.e., at the stage of zealous application (adhimukticaryābhumi) - the first four inexhaustible topics are accomplished, and as each of the six perfections are accomplished, the adherent passes from the first to the sixth bodhisattva stage.

On the second specific level of cittotpāda - i.e., when the adherent has reached purity of intention (śuddhādhyāśaya) - five component-groups that make up expertise in appropriateness of action (thabs la mkhas pa, upāyakaūśalya) which characterizes the seventh bodhisattva stage come into operation. The five component-groups refer to:
1) the four immeasurables (numbers 11-14), the function of which is to encompass and not forsake all sentient beings;
2) the five supersensible cognitions (numbers 15-19) that have domain over the great desired outcome;

²⁵ MSA 16-17.
3) the four factors of attracting [people] (numbers 20-23), whose function is to bring sentient beings to maturity; 
4) the four detailed and accurate knowledges (numbers 24-27), that function to set one free; and 
5) the four supports of confidence (numbers 28-31), that do not let one down.

On the third specific level of cittotpāda - i.e., when the adherent has matured so as to help other sentient beings reach the highest and most perfect enlightenment (vaipāka) - the adherent traverses the last three bodhisattva stages (aṣṭamāyādiṣu). During the eighth bodhisattva stage when the perfection of the vow (smon lam, prajñāna) is cultivated, three component-groups come into play. The three component-groups refer to:
1) the two accumulations of merit and knowledge (number 32-33) whose function is to support the perfection of power (stobs, bala);
2) the thirty-seven facets of enlightenment (numbers 34-70) that are conducive to liberation (nairṛyānīka); and
3) the two of calm and extraordinary seeing (numbers 71-72) that function as supports to the previous two.

During the ninth bodhisattva stage when the perfection of power is cultivated, two component-groups come into play. The two component-groups are:
1) the two of unfailing memory and eloquent speech (numbers 73-74) that function as supports for expounding the teaching, and
2) the four axioms of the teaching (numbers 75-78) that constitute the contents of the teaching.

In his discussion of the eighth and ninth stages, Mi pham seems to have reversed the order26 of the perfections, saying that the perfection of power is cultivated in the eighth stage and the perfection of the vow in the ninth stage. In the tenth stage, when the perfection of primordial awareness (je śes, jñāna) is cultivated, expertise concerning appropriateness of action (number 80) is attained. Its capacity to manifest the twelve events of the Buddha's life (mdzad pa bcu ghis) comes as a result of the six supersensible cognitions. These last three bodhisattva stages are said to be the "three pure stages", because therein there is no distinction of "another" or of an "other" owing to the fact that there is no attachment to the notion that a "self" exists as a permanent, independent, entity. Therefore, in order to reach this state of equanimity, pure and simple, the "three pure stages" are the only path to walk

26 Mi pham, mKhas 'jug, 93b: sa brgyad par stobs kyi phar phyin la ñe bar rton pa ...
and sa dgu par smon lam chen po la dbar bas ......
The three specific levels of cittotpāda discussed so far account for the contents of a Mahāyāna path, but do not account for the fruit reaped by following the path. In other words, the eighty inexhaustible topics do not account for the fourth specific level of cittotpāda - i.e., a state freed from obscurations (anāvaraṇa) - which is the special quality of buddhabhūmi. Mi pham does not omit this aspect of cittotpāda in his mkhas 'jug, for he follows up the discussion on the eighty inexhaustible topics with a discussion on the four kinds of kāya (states of being) and the five kinds of jñāna (pristine awarenesses).

The eighty inexhaustible topics have been categorized according to the five paths (lam lña, pañcamārga) in the mkhas 'jug. According to this scheme, the preparatory stage (tshogs lam, sanbhāramārga) consists of the first three inexhaustible topics; the linking-up phase (sbyor lam, prayogamārga) is contextually related to "purity of intention", the fourth inexhaustible topic; the insight stage (mthoṅ lam, darśanamārga) is contextually related to the perfection of gift-giving (number 5) which is cultivated on the first bodhisattva stage of great joy (rab tu dga' ba, pramuditā); the path of practice (bsgom lam, bhāvanāmārga) is contextually related to all of the inexhaustible topics from the perfection of ethical behaviour to the only path to walk (numbers 6-79) which are cultivated during the eight bodhisattva stages beginning with the second stage of purity (dri ma med pa, vimāla) and ending with the ninth stage of good discrimination (legs pa'i blo gros, sādhumati); and, finally, the fulfillment stage (mthar phyin pa'i lam, niṣṭhamārga), wherein the perfection of expertise concerning appropriateness of action (thabs lam mkhas pa, upāyakauśalya) is cultivated, is the tenth and last bodhisattva stage called dharmamegha (chos kyi sprin), because the bodhisattva in this stage showers sentient beings with the dharma, just as clouds shower rain down upon the crops.

By way of conclusion, then, we have found that in his discussion on the eighty inexhaustible topics, Mi pham has incorporated the contents of the ANS in summarizing the Mahāyāna path according to the four specific levels of cittotpāda and in systematizing it according to the ten bodhisattva stages and the five paths. By this method, Mi pham has attempted to show that the Mahāyāna path as the cause for the highest and

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27 Mi pham, mkhas 'jug, 93b: dag pa sa gsum na ḏar 'dzin med pa'i phyir brgod gcig lam mñam pa ńid la žugs pas gcig pus brgrod pa  žes kyaṅ ruṅ ṇo ||
most perfect enlightenment is contextually related to the first three specific levels of cittotpāda, the first nine bodhisattva stages, and the first four paths. As an effect, the Mahāyāna is the highest and most perfect enlightenment itself and this means that it is contextually related to the fourth specific level of cittotpāda, the tenth bodhisattva stage, and the fifth path.

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Before we are in a position where we can attempt to form an opinion about the philosophy of Nāgārjuna in what I would consider its three main aspects, namely (1) the ontological, (2) the ethical (or religious) and (3) the logical (or epistemological), we should, needless to say, try to reach a decision about the problem: which of the numerous works—actually more than one hundred—ascribed to him are really authentic.

For this purpose we must propose certain internal and external criteria of authenticity. In this way we find ourselves enabled to assign the various texts ascribed to him to three groups: the authentic, the spurious and, finally, the uncertain ones. This is what I have endeavoured to do in a forthcoming book on the works and the philosophy of Nāgārjuna, and the following remarks to some extent draw on the results reached in that essay.

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1 For this tripartition of the problems of philosophical inquiry I am following the ancient Greek scheme probably hailing from Xenocrates (cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adv. mathematicos, VII,16; Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, I,18 etc.). Some modern philosophers additionally prefer to treat problems concerned with the nature and function of consciousness as an independant fourth "psychological problem", cf. e.g. H.Höffding, The problems of philosophy, New York 1905, and his Erkenntnistheorie und Lebensauffassung, Leipzig 1926.

2 As no critical or complete list of the attributions is available in one place one still has to resort to the indices to the Tibetan and Chinese collections and, for the texts edited in Sanskrit, to bibliographies such as H.Nakamura, Indian Buddhism. A survey with bibliographical notes. Osaka-fu 1980, 235-245 (incomplete).

First the internal criteria: Here we may most conveniently start by axiomatically accepting the unanimous Indian, Chinese and Tibetan tradition that Nāgārjuna is the author of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. No objection can seriously be raised against this assumption. We should then try to form ourselves a clear idea of the style, the purpose, the background and the contents of this work, which is, from the yukti point of view, his magnum opus. 

If we then peruse the other works transmitted under his name we shall find that a rather large group of these are in close agreement with the tenets of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā in one way or other. However, before we are ready to accept the traditional ascription, our internal criteria must be supported by the available external criteria. Here the main evidence is afforded by the testimony of "reliable witnesses", i.e. authors and commentators belonging to Nāgārjuna's school. For various reasons we may consider it highly probable (but, admittedly, not absolutely certain) that subsequent Mādhyamikas such as *Pingala (i.e. the author of Zhōng lùn), Buddhapālita, Bhavya (or Bhāvaviveka), Candrakīrti, Śāntadeva (rather than Śāntideva), Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita provide

From these four points of view Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is closely related to Śūnyatā-saptatikārikā (and the vṛtti) and Vigrahavyāvartanīkārikā (also with the vṛtti). Their style only differs in so far as ŚSK and VVK are much briefer that MMK and that they were composed in the ārya-metre.

The cultural background of these three works comprises Abhidharma vāda-tradition. They are addressed to learned monks with the purpose of eradicating their vikalpas, drṣṭis etc., so as to attain prapañca-paśama. This is done by establishing śūnyatā, as preached in the āgama of Mahāyāna, by means of sādhana and, in particular, dūṣaṇa. - In the ultimate analysis this is fully consistent with the tenets of Nāgārjuna's other works. One should not allow the fact that the style of e.g. Suḥṣilekha, Sūtrasamuccaya, Ratnāvalī or Catuḥṣtava is usually quite simple and unphilosophical to mislead one to the supposition, that they are, for that reason, spurious. That the deśanā varies according to the mental level of the vaineya is, of course, a locus communis in Mahāyāna as well as in the works of Nāgārjuna. The form and contents of the dharmadeśanā depend on the intention of the teacher. The decisive point is whether the teaching is useful or not, not whether it is ultimately "true" or not, cf. e.g. Ratnāvalī II,35, IV,94; Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XVIII,6, 8; Bodhicittavivaraṇa 98-99, etc.

I see no reason to take Bhavya and Bhāvaviveka (or Bhāvin etc.) as two different authors, as done e.g. by S.Yamaguchi and Y.Ejima. Cf. my Adversaria Buddhica, WZKS 26 (1982).

For the reading Śāntadeva - rather than Śāntideva (which may be explained as a later lectio facilior) - v. JIP 9 212, n.5.
us with reliable testimony when they assign a certain text to Nāgārjuna, the founder of their school.\(^7\)

When the results from applying the said internal criteria are thus supported by the external ones, I do not think that we should hesitate in endorsing the authenticity of the works in question. In this way I have come to the conclusion that the following twelve works are to be considered authentic: *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Śūnyatāsaptati, Vigrahavyāvartani (both including the vṛtti), Yuṣṭiṣaṣṭikā, Pratītyasamutpādayakārikā, Bodhicittavivaraṇa, Vaidalya, Catuḥstava, Sūtrasamuccaya, Bodhisam-bhāra(ka), Suhṛlekhā and Ratnāvalī.\(^8\) The remaining works, then, are in most cases of unascertained authorship,\(^9\) or, in a few cases, certainly spurious, for instance if they quote a later author such as Āryadeva or Maitreyanātha.\(^{10}\)

II

Occasionally Indian śāstras belonging to the Madhyamaka school provide us with quotations from works which are not transmitted either in Sanskrit, Chinese or Tibetan, but which they, nevertheless, ascribe to Nāgārjuna, sometimes even mentioning the title of the work now lost to

\(^7\) To be sure, we are not to-day in a position to prove that the testimony of these authors is always worthy of unreserved credit. The notion of "reliable witness" is based on a general impression from my study of all the extant works of these authors. It is only very seldom that one can go "beyond" them (as in the case of checking their quotations). Nevertheless it cannot be denied that they are - and certainly try their best to be - utmost faithful to the spirit and the letter of the tradition they represent. As they all are, at the same time, deeply conversant with their tradition and very conservative towards it, we may regard them as "good witnesses".

\(^8\) In my *Nagarjuniana* I have edited the Sanskrit texts and/or the Tibetan versions of: *Śūnyatāsaptatikārikā, Vigrahavyāvartanikārikā, Yuṣṭiṣaṣṭikārikā, Vyavahārasiddhi (fragment), Bodhicittavivaraṇa, Catuḥstava (I and III only).

\(^9\) The most important of the uncertain works is no doubt the *Daśabhūmikavibhāga* (Taishō 1521). It has several quotations from Nāgārjuna's *Bodhisambhāra(ka) (Taishō 1660).*

\(^10\) Quotations from Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* occur in *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (Taishō 1509), Akutobhayā and Abudhabodhaka* (Peking ed. 5238. Cf. 3145 ascribed to Advayavajra. It is ultimately the same text). Maitreyanātha is quoted in the *Guhyasamā-jatantraṭīkā.*
us in its entirety.  

One of these is the Vyavahārasiddhi. As known, a work bearing this title is mentioned by the Tibetan historian Bu ston. Referring to this text of Nāgarjuna he says that it was composed in order "to demonstrate that though there is no svabhāva in the absolute sense (paramārthataḥ), still laukikavyavahāra is justified in a relative sense (saṃvṛtītaḥ)...." On the other hand, the very existence of this work is denied by later Tibetan authorities on the ground that there "is not a single instance of such a quotation (i.e. from a work of the name)".

However, a new piece of evidence showing that Bu ston was quite right is to be found in Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti. Here we come
across a quotation of six verses discussing pratityasamutpāda.\textsuperscript{16} According to Kamalaśīla, his pupil and commentator, who, to be sure, we may regard as a reliable witness, these verses are extracted from Nāgārjuna’s Vyavahārasiddhi.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} The six verses occur TP 5285, Sa 69b 1-5 and TD 3885, Sa 71b 3-6:

\textsuperscript{17} TP 5286, Sa,123a5-124b7 and TD 3886, Sa, 117a1-118a7:
The argument in these stanzas may be paraphrased as follows:

Phenomena such as mantras and auṣadha are quite efficient and useful in daily life. They depend on their respective "parts" or "ingredients", but are really neither quite identical with them nor quite different (i.e. independent) from them. In the same way one may certainly speak of the existence of a human individual or person based on the five skandha which, again, depend on karmaklešākṣepa, the projective power of karma due to passions. But, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a human being or person, either identical with the skandha or absolutely

**sgyu ma'i gliṅ po de yaṅ snañ žes bya ba la sogs pa smos so ||'di ltar sgyu ma'i gliṅ po che de ni 'jim pa'i dum bu la sogs pa las tha dad pa'am tha dad pa ma yin pa 'ţig tu 'gyur graṅ na | re žig tha dad par ni ma yin te | 'di ltar sgyu ma mkhan daṅ sgyu ma'i rgyu de dag las gud na mi snañ ba'i phyir ro (P snañ no) žes khoi nas 'byuṅ no || yaṅ na de dag las žes bya ba ni snañ daṅ sman dag las te | gaṅ 'gis ni de dag las tha dad pa 'gyur ba 'jim pa'i dum bu la sogs pa dag las logs 'ţig tu ni sgyu ma'i gliṅ po che yaṅ dag par mi dmigs so || tha dad pa ma yin pa (P ma yin pa om.) yaṅ ma yin no śnam la || gzan min min (P gzan min) žes bya ba smos te || rigs pa žes bya ba lhag ma yin no || gzan ni tha dad pa žes bya'o || gzan ma yin pa ni tha dad pa ma yin pa žes bya ba'ī tha tshig ste | de lta bu kho nar mig ma 'khrul pa can rnam kyis ma mthon ba'i phyir tha dad pa ma yin pa'an ma yin no žes bya ba'ī tha tshig go || 'o na ni de med pa kho na yin no śnam pa la | rten ciṅ 'brel par 'gyur ba de žes bya ba la sogs pa smos so || de žes bya ba ni sgyu ma'i gliṅ po che ste | rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba yin pa'i phyir med do žes brjod par yaṅ mi nus la | de 'nid daṅ g燊 la brjod par ba sa ms pa ma yin pa'i phyir yod do žes brjod par yaṅ mi nus pas de'i phyir dpe grub pa yin no || phyogs kyi choś bsdu ba'i phyir (P phyir ||) de la dmigs par byed pa yi žes bya ba la sogs pa smos te | gaṅ la gzugs kyi skye mchod de la dmigs pa'i naṅ tshul yod pa de la skad ces bya'o || mig gi žes bya ba ni 'jug lhā pa (D mjug lhā ba, P ljug lhā) | mig nas 'byuṅ no žes bya ba'ī tha tshig go || yaṅ na 'di ni 'jug (D mjug) drug pa can yin te | mig daṅ 'brel pa can gyi (P gyi om.) mig gi rnam par žes pa žes (P žes om.) ba'ī tha tshig ste | srid pa las 'byuṅ no žes 'og nas 'byuṅ ba daṅ sbyar bar bya'o || las kyi bag chaqs 'bras bu 'byin pa la mñon du phyogs par gyur pa ni srid pa'o ||

das daṅ non moṅs dbāṅ 'phanś pa žes bya ba ni chod pa'ī laṅ kyi dbāṅ gis 'jug pa'i phyir ro || len bcas pa ni zag pa daṅ bcas pa ste | srid pa las de lta bu'ī no. bo byuṅ ba žes bya ba bar sbyar ro || de bāṁ du žes bya ba ni las daṅ nom moṅs pa'i dbāṅ gis 'phanś pa ne bar len pa daṅ bcas pa bāṁ du'o || srid pa'ī yan lag kun žes bya ba ni ma rig pa la sogs pa rṇams so || de la sbyor ba ni 'di ltar bya ste | gaṅ daṅ gaṅ dag rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba de dag ni don dam par yod pa daṅ med pa niid kyī tha snañ kyī lam las 'das pa'i yul (P lus) yin te | dper na snañ la sogs pa lta bu'o || rnam par žes pa la sogs pa 'di dag kyaṅ de daṅ 'dra bas na raṅ bāṁ gyi gtan tshigs so || gal te de lta na ji ltar bcom ldan 'das kyis'du byed rṇams ni rtag pa me ces bya ba la sogs pa dnos po rṇams skye ba la sogs pa bstan śnam pa la | 'di ltar 'gog pa la sogs pa'i žes bya ba la sogs pa smos te | gaṅ gi phyir dyogis nas bstan pa de'i phyir 'gal ba med do žes bya ba lhag ma yin no || dyogs pa ni skye ba la sogs pa bstan la kho na bāṁ yod pa'i phyir de las dyogs nas | dbag med pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir skye ba la sogs pa bstan to śnam pa yin no ||

ji ltar sman yaṅ sman min pa (D pa ||) žes bya ba la sogs pas ni ji skad bṣad pa'i don gyi (P gyis) mjug bsdud (D sdu) do || gnis ka (P gni ga) žes bya ba ni rgyu daṅ 'bras bu'o || ...
different from the skandha. Similarly, all external and internal dharma are, in fact, pratītyasamutpanna, born in mutual relationship, i.e. neither sat nor asat. Still, of course, one may speak of these specific Buddhist concepts in conventional terms for sheer practical purposes. They are not absolutely real, but they certainly "work" in our everyday lives. In Kamalaśīla's introduction the purport of all this is conveniently summarized in a three-membered syllogistic formula:

pratijñā: in the ultimate sense all dharma (concepts/things) transcend being and non-being;

hetu: because they are pratītyasamutpanna;

dṛṣṭānta: like a mantra, ausadha or māyā.¹⁹

Let us see whether Kamalaśīla's attribution is supported by the internal evidence to be culled from some of the twelve authentic works mentioned above.

We may start by considering the very title of the text from which these verses are allegedly extracted, i.e. Vyavahāra-siddhi, "establishment", or "proof" of vyavahāra.

The meaning Nāgārjuna assigns to the term vyavahāra, or saṃvyavahāra (m.c.) may be ascertained by consulting Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXIV, 6-10, 36; Śūnyatāsaptati 1 and 69; Vigrahavyāvartanī 28 and 70 (vṛtti) and Ratnāvalī II, 14, q.v. Basically it means "usage", or "practice", either the conventional linguistic usage, or the various forms of commonly accepted practice, in particular Buddhist usage.²⁰

Now, it may seem rather ironical that Nāgārjuna, so notorious for his destructive criticism of all conventional common-sense notions, should attempt positively to establish or prove vyavahāra.²¹

The paradox, however, is only apparent. As well known, Nāgārjuna advocates the reality of two truths, or, if you prefer, the truth of two realities: a relative (saṃvṛti) and an absolute (paramārtha).²² Now, vyavahāra.

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¹⁸ I have offered an annotated translation of the six verses in my Nagarjuniana.

¹⁹ Striktly speaking this is a bit anachronistic. Nāgārjuna himself regularly applies the current five-fold syllogistic formula (v. Vigrahavyāvartanīvṛtti, passim), though he sometimes simplifies it by omitting upanaya and nīgamana.

²⁰ Nāgārjuna's use of the term vyavahāra hardly differs from the traditional meaning of the word, v. The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary, s.v. vohāra.

²¹ Actually, according to Nāgārjuna, one is in conflict with saṃvyavahāra when one does not take śūnyatā in the sense of pratītyasamutpāda. See Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXIV, 36; cf. Vigrahavyāvartanī 70.

vahāra belongs to the relative reality. According to Nāgārjuna one must understand and resort to the vyavahāra of saṃvṛti in order to realize and achieve paramārtha, which, again, is a necessary condition for attaining the sumnum bonum (naiḥśreyasa) of Buddhism: nirvāṇa. 23

23 On the relationship between saṃvṛtisatya and laukikavyavahāra see the sūtra quoted in Candrakīrti's Śūnyatāsaptatīvṛtti, TP 5268, Ya, 307b5: kun rdzob kyi bden pa gaṅ že na | ji srid du 'jig rten gyi tha snaṅ yi ge daṅ skad kyis ston pa'o || (TD 3867, Ya, 268b4.): katamat saṃvṛtisatyar yāval lokavyavahāraḥ ...

Here, I cannot resist quoting Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXIV,7-11 and 18 with illustrative extracts from Bhavya's Prajñāpradīpa (TP 5253, Tsha, 286a1-286b5, 287a4-287b4, 289a5-289b7 and TD 3853, Tsha, 227b6-228b1, 228b5-229a5, 230b1-231a1). - Summarizing this passage, with a glance to related passages elsewhere in Nāgārjuna's works, we may say that ontologically (cf. n.1) śūnyatā is the law of pratiṣamutpāda established "beyond" being and not-being; ethically it presupposes śraddhā in the law of karma etc.; epistemologically it is a mystic intuition (advaya-jñāna) the result of a śruta-, cintā- and bhāvanāmayi prajñā; psychologically it is strictly personal (aparāpratayah), freedom from kleśa.

atra brūmah śūnyatāyām na tvāṃ vetsi prayojanam |  
śūnyatām śūnyatārtham ca tata evam vihānyase || 7 ||

'dir stoṃ pa ŋid kyì dgos pa ni spros pa thams cad ŋe bar ži ba'i mtshan ŋid do || stoṃ pa ŋid pa 'dzin pa thams cad daṅ bral ba'i mtshan ŋid stoṃ pa ŋid la dmigs pa'i ye žes so || stoṃ pa ŋid kyì don ni de bāṁ ŋid kyì mtshan ŋid do || khyod kyis de dag ma rtogs (P rtog) pa de'i phyir 'di lta ste |

yadi śūnyam idam sarvam udayo nāstī na vyāyaḥ |

ces bya ba la soṅs pa smra žin | dper na nam mkha' la khu tshur gzas te | rnam pa du mas 'tshogs par byed pa de ltar gnod par byed do || theyg pa chen po 'di la ni |

dve satye samūpāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadesanā |

de dag kyāṅ gaṅ daṅ gaṅ že na |

lokasaṃvṛtisatyar ca satyaṃ ca paramārthathā || 8 ||

de la 'jig rten pa'i kun rdzob ni 'jig rten gyi tha snaṅ de | 'di lta ste | gzugs la soṅs pa dもらえる po rnam (P rnam kyis) skye'o || gnas so || 'gag go ces bya ba daṅ | lhas (P lha) byin 'gro'o || kyab 'jug bās gnen za'o || lla bas byin bsgom mo | tshāṅs pa byin grol lo žes bya ba dag 'jig rten gyi tha snaṅ kyis phyir phyin ci ma log pa | de ni 'jig rten pa'i kun rdzob kyis bden pa yin no || don dam par ni de don kyāṅ yin la | dam pa ḍan yin pas || don dam pa ḍan rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye žes dam pa'i don yin pas | don dam pa ste | de kho na gzan las žes pa ma yin pa la soṅs pa'i mtshan ŋid do || don dam pa ņid bden pa yin pas | don dam pa'i bden pa ste | de dus thams cad daṅ rnam pa thams cad de bāṁ byin dnas pa'i phyir ro || rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye žes de'i yul can yāṅ yul med pa'i tshul gyis don dam pa ste | de la don dam pa yod pa'i phyir ro || de 'gog pa daṅ rjes su mthun (P 'thun) pa skye ba med pa la soṅs pa bstan pa daṅ | thos pa daṅ | bsam pa daṅ | bsgom (D bsgoms) pa las byuṅ ba'i žes rab kyāṅ don dam par ste | don dam pa rtogs pa'i thabs kyis phyir phyin ci ma log pa || phyir ro |

ye 'nayor na vijānānti vibhāgāṃ satyayor dvayoḥ |

te tattvavā na vijānānti gambhīraṃ buddhaśāsane || 9 ||

gaṅ dag tshul bzin ma yin pa yid la byed pa'i līṅ tog chen pos | blo gрос kyis mig gyogs pa thea snaṅ daṅ don dam pa'i bden pa de gnis kyis rnam par dbye ba | yul gyi sbur pa'i mtshan ŋid ma 'dres pa | rnam par mi žes pa de dag gis ni saṁs rgyas cyi bstan pa zab mo'i de ŋid rnam par mi žes so ||
gal te don dam pa'i bden pa bstan pa 'nid kyis thar pa 'grub pa'i phyir | bden pa gnis bstan pa ci (P ci'n) dgos 'se na | 'di ltar

vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na desyate |

de ni 'nā gī lam thams cad las yān dag par 'das pa'i phyir ro || gzan gys yoṅs su brtags pa'i rnam par rtog pa ma lus par | bsal ba med pa 'yan don dam par rnam par rtog pa dañ | legs par bral ba gstan las 'ses pa ma 'yin par rtogs par mi 'gyur bas | 'di phyir don dam par 'yan bstan te |

paramārtham anāgaṃya nirvāṇam nādhigamyaite || 10 ||

las dañ non moṅs pa dañ | skye ba 'ne bar ši ba'i mtshan 'nid do | mkhas par rlong pa gaṅ phuṅ po rnam stōn pa 'nid las dḥos po med par lta ba dañ | phuṅ po rnam mi stōn 'nid las dḥos por lta ba dañ | bdag gis mthoṅ gyur to | mthoṅ nō | mthoṅ bar 'gyur ro || phuṅ po rnam stōn pa 'nid do || phuṅ po rnam las stōn pa 'nid gzan no || stōn pa 'nid la phuṅ po rnam yod do || stōn pa 'nid phuṅ po rnam dañ ldan no sṅam du sems pa de ltar tshul bstreet ma 'yin par lta ba 'gien pa'i na rgyal can de nī |

vināśayati durvrṣṭā 'sūyātā mandamethasam |

rnam par mi rtog pa'i 'ses rab kyi srog gi bar chad byed pa'i phyir phuṅ bar byed do || lta 'nes 'ses bya ba nī log par mthoṅ ba ste | dḥos po dañ | dḥos po med pa la sogs pa'i tshul du mthoṅ ba'o || ji ltar phuṅ bar byed ce nā |

sarpa yathā durgṛhiṭo vidyā vā dvuṇspaṣṭhitā || 11 ||

sprul rgyud de khro gtum che ba dag drag po bzuṅ (P gzuṅ) 'nes ni (D na) | 'dzin par byed po 'nid phuṅ bar byed pa dañ | nam mkha' an da 'rtul šāṇo ba la 'phags te | rāṇ gi rgyan gī nor bu'i 'od zer dag gis bar snaḥ bṛgyan par bya'o sṇam du yid la bsam pa byaṣ pa | rīg shags 'nes pa bṣegrubs na | sgrub pa po 'nid cho ga 'nams pa phuṅ bar byed pa ltar ro || ......

yāḥ pratītyasamutpādāḥ 'sūyātāḥ tām pracaṅkṣāhe |

dḥos po rkyen rnam las raṅ gī dḥos po yod pa dañ | med pa dañ | yod med dañ | gzan dañ | gzan ma 'yin pa dañ | gnis kar yod po ma 'yin pa ni | don dam par rkyen rnam las rten ci'n 'brel par no bo 'nid kyis 'byur ba med do || mig la sogs pa'i skye ba ni tha sfiad kyi bden pa lta 'brten pa 'yin no || de stōn pa 'nid du bṣad pa ni | no bo 'nid dañ bral ba'i phyir te | ji skad du |

yāḥ pratāyayā jāyati sa hy ajāṇo na tasya utpādu svabhāvato 'sti |

yāḥ pratāyāyādhiṇa sa 'sūya ukto yāḥ 'sūyātāḥ jāṇati so 'pramattāḥ ||

'żes gsun's pa dañ | de bzin du |

svabhāvānuttappiṃ samdhāya mahāmata sarvaḥdharmāḥ 'sūya desitā iti |

gsun's pa lta bu'o ||

sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā || 18 ||

rten ci'n 'brel par 'byur pa 'bya sa 'bes bya ba | stōn pa 'nid gaṅ 'yin pa de ni brten nas gdaṅs pa ste | 'jig 'rten pa dañ 'jig rten las 'das pa'i tha sfiad 'dod pas še bar len pa dag la brten nas gdaṅs pa 'yin no || de 'nid dбу ma'i lam yin te | dбу ma ni skye ba dañ | skye ba med pa dañ | yod pa dañ | med pa 'mtha' gnis span's pa'i phyir | 'di lta ste | skyes pa ma 'yin ma | ma skyes pa yaṅ ma 'yin | ma skyes pa yaṅ ma 'yin | yod pa yaṅ ma 'yin | med pa yaṅ ma 'yin | rtag pa yaṅ ma 'yin | mi rtag pa yaṅ ma 'yin | mi stōn pa yaṅ ma 'yin pas ... 'phags dkon mchod brtsegs pa'i rdo 'las astīti kāṭāya pa yam eko 'nta nāṣṭitya ayam dvitiyā 'ntañ yad etayor dvavor antayor madhyamā tad arūpyam anidarśanaṃ apratiṣṭhāṃ (?) anābhasam avidyānaktama aniketaṃ |

'żes gsun's pa de dag grub po || lam ni thob pa'i thads 'bes bya ba'i tha tshig go ||...
All this could not be expressed more concisely than in the celebrated lines of Mūlamadhyamakārikā XXIV, 10 - but let us for a change quote Bodhicittavivaraṇa 67cd and 68:

| kun rdzob las ni tha dad par |
| de ŉid dmigs pa ma yin te |
| kun rdzob ston pa ŉid du bṣad |
| ston pa kho na kun rdzob yin |
| med na mi 'byuṅ ŉes pa'i phyir |
| byas dañ mi rtag ji bzin no |

So, obviously, in a relative sense vyavahāra (sāṃvṛti) is indispensable for Nāgārjuna, though, in an absolute sense, it vanishes into the inconceivable void of śūnyatā.

Hence it is a matter of deep concern to Nāgārjuna to defend himself against charges of being in conflict with common Buddhist vyavahāra. To him this is a sheer slander - adhilaya.

We have already seen above how Nāgārjuna proceeds to establish vyavahāra, namely by means of syllogistic proof. Thus, to summarize, vyavahāra is real in a relative sense, because it "works", just as does a mantra.

From these observations we must admit that Bu ston seems to have hit the mark exactly when he stated that though there is no svabhāva paramārtha, still the common empirical vyavahāra is quite justified sāṃvṛtitaḥ. When we consider the fragment itself somewhat closer we see how Nāgārjuna attempted to prove vyavahāra in a relative sense. He does so by advancing syllogistic proof by means of the standard Naiyāyika inferential procedure, namely the five-membered syllogism: pratijñā (proposition), hetu (logical reason), udāharaṇa (exemplification), upapāya (application), and finally nigaṇama (conclusion). We may observe that he also avails himself of this procedure in his Vigrahavyāvartani when arguing sāṃvṛtitaḥ. On the other hand, in Vaidalyasūtra

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24 śūnyatā (=śūnyam iti) can be said of anything (including itself as a concept), but nothing can be said of śūnyatā as such (=tathatā, paramārtha etc.).

25 Cf. Mūlamadhyamakārikā XXIV, 13; Vigrahavyāvartanī 63.

26 It seems that Bu ston knew more about Vyavahārasiddhi than the mere fragment would permit him to deduce. But from which source?

27 Naturally, if he wished to persuade his opponents he would have to succumb to the rules of debate endorsed by them. Hence the discussion is conducted on the sāṃvṛti-(vyavahāra-) level in Vigrahavyāvartanī 1-27. (Note that the athavā in 28a marks the shift of level! Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva very often use atha(vā) with a very strong adversative sense.)
32-48, he refutes the five members of the syllogism, but this is, not surprisingly, paramārthataḥ. 28 Summing up, then, I find that the available external and internal evidence is mutually corroborative in favour of our regarding this, if we may say so, as a siddhi of Vyavahārasiddhi.

III

Before concluding this paper I would like to add a final remark on the relationship between "logic" and "ontology" according to Nāgārjuna. He himself sees this problem, as most other problems, in the perspective of the two truths (satyadvaya). 29

Thus on the saṃvṛti-level we find him engaged either in demonstrating his own standpoint (i.e. sādhana), or in refuting that of his opponents (i.e. dūṣaṇa). While on this level he willingly complies with the conventional, more or less common-sense, rules of debate current in his days. But sometimes we see him shifting to a hypothetical mode of argument which is quite his own. Now the svātāntrika, so to speak, becomes a prāsaṅgika. 30

First he hypothetically assumes - argumenti causa - that there is such a thing as svabhāva (nature/attribute) 31 in order, then, to point out the absurd implications (prasaṅga) inherent in this assumption when faced with the stern demands of logic and experience. 32 Here on the saṃvṛti-level he has only one thesis to defend, namely that all dharmas are empty of svabhāva. 33

28 The number of the sūtras follow the one given in the edition of Y.Kajiyama in Miscellanea Indologica Kiotensia 6-7, 1965.
29 Cf. ref. n.22 and 23.
30 These terms, to be sure, are not of early Indian origin. Though usually employed (but, I may add, in my opinion, not quite pertinently) to distinguish Bhavya's and Candrakirti's attitudes towards the role to be assigned to logic in Madhyamaka, they are quite convenient for describing the two possible modes of argumentation in Madhyamaka in general. Any Madhyamika is, in fact, as well a svātāntrika as a prāsaṅgika, but admittedly some are more prāsaṅgika than others. It is simply a question of whether one mainly employs dūṣaṇa or sādhana to "establish" Śūnyatā. It is not a philosophical but a personal distinction.
31 Basically, in Madhyamaka, the term svabhāva indicates either the natural existence or the specific essence of any bhāva, but, of course, only saṃvṛtībhāva.
32 The terms employed by Nāgārjuna to indicate an absurd implication (prasaṅga) inherent in the pūrṇavākṣa confronted with logic and experience are: (na) vidyate, yujyate, upapadyate, gamyate, bhaviṣyati (bhavet), upalābhya, sidhyate and (a-)sambhava. Though Nāgārjuna apparently does not presuppose any formal theory of pākṣābhāsa his prasaṅgas nevertheless serve to point out some of these.
33 This is made most explicit in Vigrahavāvatātāhī, passim.
On the paramārtha-level, however, he is beyond the ifs and the musts of logic. In his own words, he no longer defends the thesis he took so great pains to defend on the saṁvṛti-level: that things lack svabhāva. (To be sure, it is saṁvṛtitaḥ that paramārtha is niḥsvabhāva. This is, as we shall see, a prajñāpti.)

We may now be tempted to ask whether there is a consistency behind the paradox that Nāgārjuna at the same time defends a thesis and also does not defend a thesis.

Let us consider this a bit closer. In both cases he is concerned with one and the same thing, namely lack of svabhāva. But a difference remains, it is one of the outlook, one might say. On the saṁvṛti-level he speaks and argues about lack of svabhāva as a truth (an ultimate truth). On the paramārtha-level he is still concerned with the same thing (or rather nothing) but here one cannot speak about it. Here it has become reality, as it were.

The distinction (bheda) between truth and reality is solely a question of whether the medium of language is present or not. One can speak the truth, but one cannot possibly speak the reality. At the best one can, as Nāgārjuna points out, "suggest", or "allude" to reality by means of prajñāpti, or indications.

The final problem, then, is to get "beyond" language - beyond prapañca as Nāgārjuna would say.

There is no theoretical solution to this problem. Theoretical solutions can, at the best, offer us truth, not reality.

According to Nāgārjuna's faith the unexpressible gap between the truth of saṁvṛti and the reality of paramārtha can only be bridged in an utterly practical way, namely by devoting oneself with śraddhā to

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34 For the Buddhist usage of prajñāpti in general v. A.K.Warder in JIP I, 181-196 and P.M.Williams, JIP VIII, 1-45. In Nāgārjuna this key term occurs regrettably seldom. Judging from the context, however, it may be defined as a name devoid of content or reference, be it sat or asat. Thus, rather than a designation, it is a suggestion or an allusion to something which cannot, by definition, be designated, viz. paramārtha, or śūnyatā. As such a prajñāpti (= vyavahāra) is a psychologically necessary means of paramārthādhyāyana.

35 The difference is mainly epistemological and psychological, in no case ontological. Cf. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXIV,9: Yuktiśaṭṭikā 5-6; Ratnāvali I,42 etc.

36 It is, in other words, "language" (prapañca) which expands and propounds "truth" from "reality". (Again, Nāgārjuna's use of this important term does not seem to differ significantly from its canonical employment. Cf. recently, R.E.A.Johansson, The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism. Oxford 1979, 190-196.)

37 prapañca is only quenched by stopping its modus operandi, namely vikalpa. This happens in śūnyatā. Cf. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XVIII, 5 and 7.
this Buddhist way of life, or in a word, to \textit{vyabah\'arasiddhi}.\textsuperscript{38}

If we still insist in a theoretical definition of the relationship between \textit{param\'arthas} ("ontology") and \textit{sa\'mv\'rti} (its "empirical image")\textsuperscript{39} we may avail ourselves of Candrakirti's words and say that it is one of ends and means - \textit{up\'ayabh\'uta\'m vyabah\'arasatyam, upeyabh\'uta\'m param\'arthasat\-\textit{gyam} \ldots} \textsuperscript{40}

This is not a very informative definition, merely an indication of their function. But \textit{N\'ag\'arjuna} was quite aware that this cannot well be otherwise:

Of \textit{param\'artha} one cannot speak; it is a matter of belief and personal experience (aparapratyaya). Much less can one speak of its relationship to anything, viz. \textit{sa\'mv\'rti}. One must learn to remain satisfied with mere indications - \textit{praj\'\textit{n}\'apti}.

\textsuperscript{38} On \textit{\text\'sraddh\'a}, v. \textit{Ratn\'aval\'i} I,5; \textit{\text\'S\'unyaat\'asa\naptati} 72. For the canonical passages v. \textit{\text\'S\'utra-\text\'samuccaya}, TP 5330, A, 175b seqq.

\textsuperscript{39} We do not know how \textit{N\'ag\'arjuna} understood the word \textit{sa\'mv\'rti} etymologically. If we are to judge from his use of \textit{sa\'mv\'rti} in contrast to \textit{param\'artha}, \textit{sa\'mv\'rti} is the \textit{sat\'ya} which in a superficial way "covers" \textit{param\'arthasaty\'a}, to which it somehow corresponds (i.e. when it is, to use a term not found in \textit{N\'ag\'arjuna}, \textit{tathyasamv\'rti}). Thus it is in a sense the "symbolic truth" (cf. the use of \textit{praj\'\textit{n}\'apti}, sometimes given as a synonym of \textit{sa\'mv\'rti}, e.g. \textit{\text\'S\'ik\'\text\'asamuccaya} 137.). To be sure, this hypothesis is not supported by the usual definitions given of \textit{sa\'mv\'rti}, cf. La Vall\'ee Poussin in \textit{MCB} 5, 159-160 and J.\textit{I\'manishi}, \textit{Fragmente des Abhidharmaprakarana\'\text\'abha\'\text\'asyam} in Text und \text\'ubersetzung. G\'ottingen 1975, 8-11.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Madhyamak\'\text\'avat\'ara} VI,80. (\text\'bh\'uta should be rendered "serves as").
On the paramārtha-level, however, he is beyond the ifs and the musts of logic. In his own words, he no longer defends the thesis he took so great pains to defend on the sāṃvṛti-level: that things lack svabhāva. (To be sure, it is sāṃvṛtitāh that paramārtha is niḥsvabhāva. This is, as we shall see, a prajñāpti.)

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According to Nāgārjuna's faith the unexpressible gap between the truth of sāṃvṛti and the reality of paramārtha can only be bridged in an utterly practical way, namely by devoting oneself with śraddhā to

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34 For the Buddhist usage of prajñāpti in general v. A.K.Warder in JIP I, 181-196 and P.M.Williams, JIP VIII, 1-45. In Nāgārjuna this key term occurs regrettably seldom. Judging from the context, however, it may be defined as a name devoid of content or reference, be it sat or asat. Thus, rather than a designation, it is a suggestion or an allusion to something which cannot, by definition, be designated, viz. paramārtha, or śūnyatā. As such a prajñāpti (= vyavahāra) is a psychologically necessary means of paramārthādhyāyana.

35 The difference is mainly epistemological and psychological, in no case ontological. Cf. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXIV,9: Yuktīsaṃśītikā 5-6; Ratnāvalī 1,42 etc.

36 It is, in other words, "language" (prapañca) which expands and propounds "truth" from "reality". (Again, Nāgārjuna's use of this important term does not seem to differ significantly from its canonical employment. Cf. recently, R.E.A.Johansson, The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism. Oxford 1979, 190-196.)

37 prapañca is only quenched by stopping its modus operandi, namely vikalpa. This happens in śūnyatā. Cf. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XVIII, 5 and 7.
If we still insist in a theoretical definition of the relationship between paramārtha ("ontology") and saṃvṛti (its "empirical image") we may avail ourselves of Candrakīrti's words and say that it is one of ends and means - upāyabhūtaṃ vyavahārasatyaṃ, upayabhūtaṃ paramārthasatyaṃ...

This is not a very informative definition, merely an indication of their function. But Nāgārjuna was quite aware that this cannot well be otherwise:

Of paramārtha one cannot speak; it is a matter of belief and personal experience (aparapratyaya). Much less can one speak of its relationship to anything, viz. saṃvṛti. One must learn to remain satisfied with mere indications - prajñāpti.


39 We do not know how Nāgārjuna understood the word saṃvṛti etymologically. If we are to judge from his use of saṃvṛti in contrast to paramārtha, saṃvṛti is the satya which in a superficial way "covers" paramārthasatya, to which it somehow corresponds (i.e. when it is, to use a term not found in Nāgārjuna, tathyasaṃvṛti). Thus it is in a sense the "symbolic truth" (cf. the use of prajñāpti, sometimes given as a synonym of saṃvṛti, e.g. Śikṣāsamuccaya 137.). To be sure, this hypothesis is not supported by the usual definitions given of saṃvṛti, cf. La Vallée Poussin in MCB 5, 159-160 and J.Imanishi, Fragmente des Abhidharmaprakaraṇabhāṣyaṃ in Text und Übersetzung. Göttingen 1975, 8-11.

40 Madhyamakāvatāra VI,80. (-bhūta should be rendered "serves as").
THE BLO GSAL GRUB MTHA', AND THE MĀDHYA MIKA CLASSIFICATION IN TIBETAN GRUB MTHA' LITERATURE

by

K. MIMAKI (Kyoto)

In the course of my present work on a 14th century Tibetan grub mtha' text, the Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bshad pa'i mdzod of dBus pa blo gsal, I noticed a significant detail concerning the classification of the Mādhyamika school. In this grub mtha' text, we find a kind of Mādhyamika classification which is not seen in the later dGe lugs pa texts and which gives us a hint for understanding a development in the classification of this school in Tibetan grub mtha' literature.

It is well known that dBus pa blo gsal is a 14th century bKa' gdams pa author and one of the principal compilers of the "Old Tibetan Canon of sNar than". As do the majority of grub mtha' authors, dBus pa blo gsal accords the highest position to the Mādhyamika school; but he emphasizes the philosophy of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, whereas Tibetan authors after Tson kha pa (1357-1419) rather stress Candrakīrtis philosophy.

dBus pa blo gsal's classification of the Mādhyamika school can be presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sautrāntika-mādhyamika</th>
<th>Bhāvaviveka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yogācāra-mādhyamika</td>
<td>Śāntarakṣita, Haribhadra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa ...</td>
<td>Jñānagarbha, Candrakīrti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svātantrika</td>
<td>Bhāvaviveka (Jñānagarbha, Kamalaśīla)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prāsaṅgika</td>
<td>Buddhapālita (Candrakīrti)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table No.1. dBus pa blo gsal (14th c.): Blo gsal grub mtha']
In this classification, the following three points are to be noted:

1. There are two types of classification, that of the Sautrāntika-mādhyamika, Yogācāra-mādhyamika and 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbyad ma pa on the one hand, and that of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika on the other. These two types of classification are strictly distinguished in this grub mtha', and are not combined as in the case of later dGe lugs pa grub mtha' texts.

2. The school named 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbyad ma pa ('Mādhyamika who practice in accordance with what is known in the world') comprises Jñānagarbha and Candrakīrti. The sources supporting this opinion are: for Jñānagarbha, the Satyadvayavibhaṅgaṅkaṅkārika 21 and for Candrakīrti, the Madhyamakāvatāra VI,35. This school is often identified with the Prāsaṅgika school, as for example in the Chos 'byun of Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364). But the third point, now presented below, proves that, in the grub mtha' of dBus pa blo gsal, this school is not identical with the Prāsaṅgika.

3. Jñānagarbha is considered as being a follower of the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbyad ma pa, as well as of the Svātantrika. This clearly shows that, in this context, the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbyad ma pa school is thought to be distinct from the Prāsaṅgika school.

The later dGe lugs pa authors such as Se ra rJe btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1546), the second Dalai Lama dGe 'dun rgya mtsho (1475-1542), 'Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pa (1648-1722), lCaṅ skya the second Rol pa'i rdo rje (1717-1786), dKon mchog 'jigs med dbaṅ po (1728-1791) and Thu'u bkwan the third Blo bzaṅ chos kyi ṇi ma (1737-1802) combine the sub-schools of Mādhyaṃka, and consider the Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and the Yogācāra-mādhyamika as branches of the Svātantrika. As for the Mādhyamika classification by later dGe lugs pa authors, that of 'Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pa can serve as an example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Svātantrika</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sautrāntika-mādhyamika</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogācāra-mādhyamika</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rNam bden daṅ mthun pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rNam rdzun daṅ mthun pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dri bcas daṅ mthun pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dri med daṅ mthun pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prāsaṅgika</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāvaviveka, Jñānagarbha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>śāntaraksīta, Kamalaśīla, Āryavimuktisena</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haribhadra, Jitāri, Kambala</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jitāri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kambala</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, Śāntideva</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table No.2. 'Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pa (1648-1722): grub mtha' chen mo]
Earlier authors such as Grags pa rgyal mtshan (1147-1216), Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251), Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364), 'Ba' ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzaṅ (1310-1391) and Bo don Paṇ chen Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1376-1451) present various classifications of the Mādhyamika school. However, none of them considers the Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and the Yogācāra-mādhyamika as sub-schools of the Svātantrika.

We know today that the terms indicating the sub-schools of the Mādhyamika, such as the Sautrāntika-mādhyamika, Yogācāra-mādhyamika, Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, have been invented by Tibetan authors, and do not appear in Indian texts.

It was Ye dge sde, the great official translator (tu chen gyi lo tsa ba) at the beginning of the 9th century, who used the terms mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma (i.e. Sautrāntika-mādhyamika) and rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma (i.e. Yogācāra-mādhyamika) for the first time. In his 1Ta ba'i khyad par, this author indeed lists Bhāvaviveka as belonging to the Sautrāntika-mādhyamika school, and Śāntarakṣita to the Yogācāra-mādhyamika school.

Several versions of this 1Ta ba'i khyad par of Ye dge sde are extant. Besides the text contained in the Tibetan Canon, various versions have been discovered among Tun-huang manuscripts: in particular PT 814, 815, ST 692, 694. In the course of my inquiries, I have found another two fragments of the same text in the Tun-huang manuscripts: PT 820 and 2101.

In addition to the 1Ta ba'i khyad par of Ye dge sde, the following texts from the same period mention one or both of the combination names "Sautrāntika-mādhyamika" and "Yogācāra-mādhyamika"; the 1Ta ba'i rim pa of dPal brtsegs, the 1Ta ba'i rim pa of Ňi ma 'od, as well as quite a number of other anonymous Tun-huang manuscripts (ST 693, PT 116, 121, 817, 837, 842).

However, it should be pointed out that these terms appear also in an Indian text, the Pañcakramaṭīkā Kramārthaprakāśikā of Lakṣmī. But the Kaśmīrian nun Lakṣmī lived at the beginning of the 11th century, that is two centuries after Ye dge sde and the other Tibetan authors. Her text, therefore, does not diminish Ye dge sde's importance as the inventor of these terms.

If Ye dge sde was the first to use the terms Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and Yogācāra-mādhyamika, it still remains to be seen who created the terms Svātantrika (Raṅ rgyud pa) and Prāsaṅgika (Thal 'gyur ba). They do not figure at all in the texts of the first diffusion of Buddhism (śa dar). It seems that they were used for the first time by Pa tshab Ňi ma grags (1055-?) in the phyi dar period, when he made extensive translations of the texts of Candrakīrti. Thus, the terms Svātantrika and
Prāsaṅgika were also created by Tibetans. It is to be noted that the Tibetans themselves did know that these terms were created by Tibetans: for example, Tsoṅ kha pa and Śākya mchog ladan state this clearly.

Now we may ask who combined these two types of Mādhyamika sub-schools. In other words, who put the Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and Yogācāra-mādhyamika under the Svātāntrika rubric? A tendency to do this seems to appear first in Tsoṅ kha pa's writings.

In his Lam rim chen mo, composed in 1402 when he was 46 years old, Tsoṅ kha pa presented the divisions of schools as they had been mentioned by several previous authors. Naturally he used the terms such as Sautrāntika-mādhyamika, Yogācāra-mādhyamika, Svātāntrika and Prāsaṅgika. But he did not yet clearly combine the two types of classification. Rather he kept a more or less critical attitude toward the division of Mādhyamika schools.

In his Draṅ ṇes legs bṣad sniṅ po, composed in 1406 when he was 50 years old, the combination of the two types of terms does not yet appear. This text is, among Tsoṅ kha pa's works, the nearest to being a grub mtha' text. It consists of two parts: the first part is an exposition of Vijñānavādin philosophy based on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and the second part deals with Mādhyamika based on the Aṣṭayamatinirdeśa. The Mādhyamika part is subdivided into two sections: that of the Svātāntrika and that of the Prāsaṅgika. The Svātāntrika section is again subdivided into two parts: the doctrinal position of Bhāvaviveka and that of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

The outline of the Draṅ ṇes legs bṣad sniṅ po can be presented as follows:

[Table No.3. Tsoṅ kha pa (1357-1419): Draṅ ṇes legs bṣad sniṅ po]

It is there that Tsoṅ kha pa should have used the terms Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and Yogācāra-mādhyamika, had he wished to combine the two types of Mādhyamika classification. But in this treatise, the terms Sau-
Mādhyamika classification in Tibetan grub mtha’ 165

trāntika-mādhyamika and Yogācāra-mādhyamika do not appear even once: this clearly shows that the combination of the two types of Mādhyamika sub-schools was not yet systematically established. Be that as it may, the organization scheme used by Tsön kha.pa in this treatise is almost exactly that of later dGe lugs pa grub mtha’ texts, the only difference being the absence of the terms Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and Yogācāra-mādhyamika.

In the dBu ma dgoñs pa rab gsal, a commentary on the Mādhya mākāvatā-ra of Candrakīrti, which Tsön kha.pa composed in 1418 one year before his death, he used the term “rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa” (Yogācāra-mādhyamika) and “Phyin don khas len pa'i raṅ rgyud pa” (Śvātvantrika who admit the external object) in juxtaposition. We may say that in this work Tsön kha.pa tends more toward the combination of the two types of classification, even if it is not yet completely systematical.

In this context one should also check the works of Tson kha.pa’s two eminent disciples, rGyal tshab rje (1364-1432) and mKhas grub rje (1385-1438). A fertile field of inquiry might be the ston thun chen mo of mKhas grub rje. If one did find any mention of the classification in question, this would of course antedate Se ra rJe btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1546), the author whom we took to be the first to explicitly combine the two classifications.

Thus one might conclude, although not without reservations, that the tendency to consider the Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and the Yogācāra-mādhyamika as sub-schools of the Śvātvantrika began to stabilize from Tsön kha.pa on, and did not exist before his time.

However, one problem remains. A Bon po grub mtha’, the Bon sgo gsal byed (or Bon sgo dkar chag) of Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal, presents the classification of Mādhyamika as shown in the following Table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ran rgyud pa</th>
<th>mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grags ste spyod pa'i dbu ma = Thal 'gyur ba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table No.4. Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal (14th c.?): Bon sgo gsal byed]

1. The Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and the Yogācāra-mādhyamika schools are considered as sub-schools of the Śvātvantrika.

2. The Grags ste spyod pa'i dbu ma - by which we should understand the 'Jig rtan grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa as we have seen it above (ste is therefore an error for sde) - is identified with the Prāsaṅgika school.
On the basis of the fact that Treston rGyal mtshan dpal is a Bonpo author, we might say that his classification was taken from his Buddhist precursor. As far as the identification of the Grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma with the Prāsaṅgika school is concerned, there is no problem: Buston could be his precursor. But the consideration of the Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and Yogācāra-mādhyamika schools as branches of the Svātāntrika raises a considerable problem. If Treston rGyal mtshan dpal was posterior to Tson kha pa, there would be no problem. But it seems that he lived slightly before Tson kha pa. We should therefore take a closer look at Treston rGyal mtshan dpal's dates.

According to the rdzogs pa chen po żaṅ żuṅ sñan rgyud brgyud pa'i bla ma'i rnam thar and the g-yuṅ druṅ bon gyi bstan 'byun of dPal ldan tshul khランス (20th c), Treston rGyal mtshan dpal was a disciple of spa ston dPal ldan bzan po who was himself ordained in gṣen ston bSod rgyal dpal's presence.

According to the legs bsdad mdzod of Šar rdza bKra šis rgyal mtshan (1859-1935), bSod rgyal dpal was a grandson of Khro 'bum in the gṣen family. The younger brother of Khro 'bum, named Khri skyon dar po was ordained and received the name of gṣen ston Ye šes blo gros. We can arrange these lineages as shown in Table No.5. The simple line indicates a familial relation and that with an arrow the transmission from master to disciple.

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  Khro 'bum
    Khri skyon dar po (= gṣen ston Ye šes blo gros)
      gṣen ston bSod rgyal dpal
        sPa ston dPal ldan bzan po
          Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal
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[Table No.5. Transmission down to Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal]

According to the bsTan rtsis composed in 1842 by Ňi ma bstan 'dzin (born in 1813, 24th Abbot of the sMan ri monastery), gṣen ston Ye šes blo gros constructed the monastery of Dar ldin gser sgo khra mo'i gtsug lag khan at Dar ldin in gTsan in the year 1173. However, according to the žaṅ bod gaṅs ri'i ljoṅs dar g-yuṅ druṅ bon gyi dgon deb of dPal ldan tshul khランス, the monastery was constructed in 1233, in other words the water-serpent year of one rab byun later. Finally, according to another bsTan rtsis composed in 1928 by 'Jigs med nam mkha'i rdo rje (1897-1956),
the monastery in question was built in 1257. It is difficult to decide at which of these three dates the Dar ldin monastery was founded. All we can say is that it was constructed between 1173 and 1257. Therefore, gSen ston Ye šes blo gros lived either in the second half of the 12th century or in the middle of the 13th century.

If we count thirty years between father and son, and twenty years between master and disciple, the period of activity of Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal could be almost one century later than that of gSen ston Ye šes blo gros. We can therefore with some certainty date Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal either in the second half of the 13th century or in the middle of the 14th century. At any rate, it is unlikely that he lived after Tsoṅ kha pa.

The present inquiry might be fruitfully continued by investigating the influences that shaped Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal's classification of the Mādhyamika schools. But at least, at the present stage, I believe I have traced one development in the Tibetan classification of the Mādhyamika schools in grub mtha' literature, and shown, on the basis of dBus pa blo gsal's classification, that the combination of the two types of classification is a product of a later period.

(N.B. The above is a summary of the Introduction to my forthcoming publication: Blo gsal grub mtha', chapitre IX (Vaibhāṣika) et XI (Yogācāra) édités, et chapitre XII (Mādhyamika) édité et traduit, Kyoto, 1982.)
EMPTINESS – TOWARDS A SEMIOTIC DETERMINATION
OF EMPTINESS IN MĀDHYAMIKA DISCOURSE

by
O.H. PIND (Århus)

I

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatā saiva te matā |
tathāvidhaḥ ca saddharmaḥ tatsamaḥ ca tathāgataḥ ||
tat tattvam paramārtho 'pi tathatā dravyam iṣyate |
bhūtam tad avisaṃvādi tadbodhād buddha ucyate ||

Nāgārjuna, Acintyastava

alakṣaṇam anutpādam asaṃskṛtam avānmayam |
ākāśam bodhicittam ca bodhir advayalakṣaṇaḥ||

Nāgārjuna, Bodhicittavivaraṇa
1. Introductory remarks

1.1 The Madhyamika discourse on Emptiness, śūnyatāvāda, has been a controversial topic in the field of Buddhist studies.¹ It remains so, and mainly for two reasons: on the one hand, it has proved difficult to establish a definitive and uniform determination of its underlying structure, since its paradoxical and basically dialectical nature seems to resist all attempts at a logical formalization.² On the other hand, the concept of Emptiness itself is ambiguous. The various contexts in which it occurs makes it clear that it not only represents an ontological category which defines the mode of being of entities, their essential lack of self-existence, niḥsvabhāva. Emptiness in Madhyamika discourse is also a term which, among other terms, designates the category of the Absolute.³ And it is the ontological status of this metaphysical category that first of all determines the Madhyamika explication of the topic of Emptiness. For the basic theoretical object of Madhyamika philosophy is not primarily the field of reality. Reality as such does not play any decisive role in its philosophical discourse except as an object of negation. And in this respect it manifests a radical negativity which aims

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¹ For a recent survey of this topic by J. May, see Hōbōgirin 470-493, s.v. Chūgan, and Ruegg 1981 (unfortunately not accessible to me).

² There have been various attempts at formalizing Nāgārjuna’s dialectic within the framework of western logic. See, for instance Robinson 1957 and 1967 50-57: Nāgārjuna’s logic; cp. Chatalian 1972, which is an important critical study of Robinson 1967.

³ For various synonyms of the Absolute, see BCAP 200, 19-21: ... ekānekasvabhāvavivktaṁ anutpannāniruddham anucchedam aśāśvataṁ savaprapaṇcavinirmuktam ākāśaprati-samaṇḍharmakāśāhṣyaṁ paramarthatattvam ucyate | etad eva ca prajñāpāramitāśūnyatātathābhūtakoṭidharmadhūtvādiśabdena samvṛtim upādāya abhidhiyate |

Ruegg 1978 seems to deny this terminological ambiguity, see especially p.180.

For a description of the category of the Absolute in Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, see Ramanan 1966 251-275, and Ruegg 1969 297-388.

It might be argued that the position of the Absolute differs in the two traditions of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. But, as I hope to indicate in the second part of this paper, there is no difference with respect to the position and the nature of the Absolute as such. What separates the two traditions is the degree of radicality they display as regards the possibility of establishing a discourse on the Absolute. The Madhyamika attitude is almost totally uncompromising in this respect, whereas the Yogācāra tradition seems to represent a more liberal attitude. It is, in the final analysis, a question of the position of language in the philosophical discourse. The Madhyamika position is clear: language has to be abolished in order that the Absolute may be accessible. Hence this attitude prohibits the establishing of a positive dogmatic discourse.
at a total dialectical annihilation of reality by reducing it to zero.

This dialectical emptying of the field of reality and its final disappearance as an object of perception and designation is said to merge into the subjective realization of the category of the Absolute transcending difference and representation. But so far the nature of this dominant dimension in Mādhyamika philosophy has been beyond the reach of analysis. And it must be admitted that the problematic presented by the existence of this category almost seems to preclude a discursive approach. For it is difficult, if not impossible, to speak with any certainty about the nature of this annihilation. By definition Emptiness is virtually obliterated in so far it is designated as such. For by doing this it would become an object having the same ontological status as other objects. It is undoubtedly this fundamental ambiguity which is reflected in the prohibition against designating this total absence of difference, since this would involve a process of differentiation and thus stain the non-different purity of the Absolute. Hence it is not without reason that Candrakīrti equates the category of the Absolute with silence, which

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4 The classical formulation of this dialectical emptying of being and representation may be found in Naḍārjuna MMK XVIII, (ātmadharma-pariṣkā). See especially the verses 7 and 9:

```
nivṛttam abhidhātavyaṁ nivṛttas cittagocarab |
anutpannamāniruddhā hi nirvāṇam iva dharman || 7 ||
aparapratyayam śāntam prapañcair aprapañcitam |
nirvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam || 9 ||
```

This title is much more in accordance with the actual contents of the prakaraṇa than the title in Candrakīrti, atmapariṣkā. It is represented by Akutobhayā, P 5229, 84b: bdag dañ cho chos brtag pa, and may thus be considered old.

5 For an attempt to place the discourse on the Absolute within the category of mysticism, see de Jong 1950 and Schayer 1935. However, the actual problem is not solved by referring it to the phenomenology of mysticism. It is the position of the mystical object in the structure of the mystical discourse, i.e., the semiotics of the mystical discourse that needs to be analysed. And this is not totally impossible in spite of the seemingly inaccessible nature of this subjective experience.

6 See, e.g., MMK XXII,11:

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śūnyam iti na vaktavyam aśūnyam iti vā bhavet |
ubhayaṁ nobhayaṁ ceti prajñaparyartham tu kathyaṁ ||
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Cp. MMK XIII,8:

```
śunyatā sarvadṛṣṭiṣṭāṁ proktā niḥsaraṇaṁ jinaṁ |
yeṣaṁ tu śunyatadṛṣṭīs tān asādhyān babhāśire ||
```

and BCA IX,33:

```
śunyatāvāsānādhānād dhīyate bhāvavāsanā |
kīṃ cid nāstī ti cābhāyāsāt sāpi paścāt prahīyate ||
```

This stage is presupposed by the following description of the access to the Absolute in verses 34-35. Cp. the analysis of BCA IX,35 below.

7 See PP 57,7-8: paramārtho hy āryaṁ tūṣṇīmbhāvaḥ
does not mean that silence as such represents the realization of the Absolute, but only that silence is its necessary condition since speech itself involves the speaking subject in a process of differentiation.

However, the question of the nature of this subjective realization remains to be solved. For what is the position of the subject in this radical negativity where even consciousness emptied of representation seems to be reduced to zero in the undecidable presence of the Absolute?

1.2

The nature of these fundamental levels in Mādhyamika discourse is not fully disclosed by the immense literary productivity of the Mādhyamika school. The transmitted texts do not present their philosophical doctrines in a way that elucidates the concepts and essential presuppositions which determine their discourse. In this respect there is nothing that distinguishes Nāgārjuna from some of his most illustrious successors. And historically conditioned developments within the conceptual framework of the Mādhyamika school do not affect the basic problematic, even though Bhāvaviveka's attempts at implanting Dignāgean logic in the basically dialectical discourse of Nāgārjuna—a fact that provoked the severe but just criticism by Candrakīrti—in a certain sense represents a deviation on the epistemological level. The discourse of Mādhyamika writers succeeding Nāgārjuna represents basically an ongoing process of accumulation that reflects the various developments within Buddhist philosophy as a whole. There is no conspicuous break with the fundamental principles of the Mādhyamika school as such.

1.3

It is therefore necessary to institute a theoretical supplement to Mādhyamika discourse in order to determine the nature of its presuppositions. They remain generally implicit and unformulated because they ex-

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8 Bhāvaviveka's attempt to represent Nāgārjuna's dialectic (prasaṅga) within the framework of contemporary Buddhist logic is no doubt caused by the ambiguous position of dialectics in Indian logic. Dialectical arguments are here relegated to a secondary and insignificant position in contrast to the independent syllogism. Moreover, it is clear from Bhāvaviveka's commentary to MMK that he thereby wants to defend the Nāgārjunean discourse against unwanted dialectical implications. See e.g., PD 14, 13 and cp. Kajiyama 1963 and 1964.

For some notes on the position of prasaṅga in Buddhist and Nyāya logic, see Mīmākā 1976 56-57 and n.222-224.
sert their influence on Mādhyamika thinking in a way that is beyond the theoretical reach and interest of the Mādhyamika philosophers.

The interpretation of Mādhyamika discourse therefore confronts two main theoretical objects: 1) to establish a theoretical position which will make it possible to analyse the basic principles that determine Mādhyamika dialectic and lend to it its paradoxical and seemingly evident truth, 2) to establish an analysis that explains the transcendental position of the Absolute which by definition precludes discourse itself and even leads to its annihilation.

The first point will necessarily direct the theoretical interest towards the question of the semantic structure of language and especially to the field of structural semantics. The second point, and the most complicated, representing the subjective dimension in the analytical project, necessitates reference to recent developments in the field of psychoanalysis and the theory of the subject.

The following theoretical supplement represents only an attempt in this direction and does not claim to be exhaustive. The main object has been to centre upon, and delimit, the conditions for a solution to some of the problems involved in framing a satisfactory analysis of Mādhyamika discourse.

2. Neither/nor

2.1

Among the various narratives that constitute the biography of the illustrious Mādhyamika philosopher Śāntideva there is one which reflects some of the fundamental features of Mādhyamika discourse. It may therefore serve as a point of departure for opening the discussion of its semiotic structure.

The narrative relates a supernatural event which is said to have taken place while Śāntideva was reciting his new treatise, the Bodhicaryāvatāra. At the following crucial verse in the chapter on prajñāpāramitā,

\[ \text{yadā na bhāvo nābhāvo mateh saṃtiṣṭhate purāṇ} \]
\[ \text{tadānyagatyaḥbhāvena nirālambā praśāmyati} \]

(BCA IX.35)

"When neither being nor not-being presents

---

1 For an analysis of the extant biographies, see Pezzali 1968 3-45.
Itself to the mind, then, since there are
No other ways (of being), it becomes
Appeased, being devoid of substrate",
he gradually vanished before the eyes of his audience, rising higher and higher into heaven until he finally became invisible. Only his voice was heard. And from this transcendental realm he completed the recitation of his work.²

Despite the supernatural character of this tale it is interesting because it clearly reflects the semiotic structure of the verse that provoked the incident itself. For what does this narrative display on the pragmatic level of events if not a parallel and analogous occurrence to what the verse presents on the cognitive level? Santideva's disappearance as visible presence, leaving the invisible and immaterial voice as the only trace of his existence, parallels the disappearance of the fundamental cognitive categories of being and not-being: when being and not-being, the basic conditions for sustaining the world of difference and signification are obliterated, the field of reality itself disappears as an object of consciousness.³ Consequently the phenomenological subject disappears too, being no longer embedded in the world of difference. For the subject withdraws from the empiric and this fundamental semiotic process of differentiation no longer exists as a subject. This disappearance represents in a certain sense the death of the subject. But the death of the subject also represents the realization of the Absolute and the access to Nirvāṇa. It is therefore not without reason that the narrative ends with Santideva's disappearance into the transcendental realm of heaven.

² Cf. Bu ston's reproduction of the narrative in Pezzali 1968 7:

"In the chapter on prajñāpāramitā (=BCA IX) where it is said 'When neither being nor not-being ...' he went higher and higher towards heaven, and finally, being invisible, he recited it thoroughly in his glorious voice and went away (into heaven)."

According to Obermiller 1931 2, 161 and Pezzali op.cit. 7 Santideva returned after having completed the recitation. But this interpretation of gsegs is hard to defend and also against the tradition, which obviously presupposes that Santideva remained in heaven. This, e.g., is clear from the Nepalese version. See Pezzali op.cit. 31-32.

³ In Madhyamika discourse the obliteration of "being" and "not-being" is regarded as the necessary condition for neutralizing the field of perception. See, e.g., the pivotal formulation in Nāgārjuna, MMK V,8:

"astitvam ye tu paśyanti nāstitvam cālpabuddhayāḥ |
bhāvānāṃ tu na paśyanti drṣṭavyopāśmaṁ śivam ||

⁴ Cf. n.2 and the translation proposed there.
2.2

But how are we to interpret this paradoxical utterance which conjuncts the negation of being (bhāva) with the negation of not-being (abhāva) and thus discloses the dimension of the Absolute? And what logical and cognitive status does it have? Śāntideva's commentator Prajñākaramati is obscure on this point and leaves the difficulties connected with a formal logical interpretation of the proposition unexplained in spite of his attempt at establishing a formalized interpretation of this annihilation of being and not-being. But this difficulty is characteristic of Mādhyamika discourse in his specific context:

\[
\text{tadā anyagatva bhāvena vidhipratiṣedhābhhyām}
\]
\[
gatyantarābhāvāt, ubhayānubhayapakṣayor etaddvayavidhi-
\]
\[
pratiṣedhātmakavāt, abhyām avyatiriktatāyā anayoḥ
\]
\[
saṃgraha tāv api saṃgrḥītāv iti nirāśrayā, sadasator
\]
\[
ālambanayor ayogād buddhiḥ prāśāmyati upāśāmyati|
\]
\[
sarvavikalpoṣamān nirindhanavahnivad nirvṛtim upayā-\]
\[
tīty arthaḥ || (BCAP 199,4-7)
\]

"Then, because there are no other ways (of being), i.e., because there are no other ways (of being) than affirmation and negation, and because the two alternative propositions of both and neither consist in affirmation and negation of this pair, they are also contained in the totality of these two because they are not different from these two. Therefore, being devoid of substrate because it is not in conjunction with the two substrates of being and not-being, the mind becomes appeased, i.e., it becomes extinguished. And because all representations have become extinguished like a fire without fuel, it becomes extinguished in Nirvāṇa. This is the meaning."

---

5 It is tempting in this specific context to refer to Dharmakīrti, PV IV,225:

\[
\text{vidhānāṃ pratiṣedhām ca muktvā śabdāḥ sti nāparaḥ} |
\]
\[
vyavahāraḥ, ........................................
\]

However, in Dharmakīrti negation and affirmation belong exclusively to the discursive order: PV IV,228:

\[
tasmād āśritya śabdārthāṃ bhāvabhāvasamāśrayam |
\]
\[
abāhyāśrayam atreṣṭāṃ sarvāṃ vidhiniṣedhanam |
\]

But in Mādhyamika discourse it is virtually impossible to establish a definite boundary between "being" and "not-being" as perceptual facts in the field of reality and judgements of "being" and "not-being". The concepts of negation and affirmation are therefore to be interpreted as referring both to being and not-being of phenomena and to judgements of being and not-being.
Prajñākaramati is undoubtedly correct when he interprets the main pur-
port of the verse: when negation and affirmation, i.e., being (bhāva) and
not-being (abhāva), are negated the mind is totally emptied of re-
presentation (sarvakālpopaśama) and becomes extinguished in Nirvāṇa.6
The quantification sarva seems to contradict the proposition in Śānti-
deva, which only refers to the term "being" and its negation "not-being".
This quantification, however, may be explained on the grounds that propo-
sitions involving "being" and "not-being" are generally treated as the
basic propositional attitudes a subject may assume when referring to en-
tities. They may thus be considered to represent the fundamental forms
of representation that determine the existence of all other types of re-
presentation.7

But Prajñākaramati's interpretation of the proposition itself exhib-
its another characteristic feature. It shows that he interprets the logical
form of the proposition within the conceptual framework of the ca-
tuṣkoṭi,8 even though he does not expressly refer to this pivotal term in Mādhyamika theory. His analysis may be presented in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A = bhāva = vidhi</th>
<th>A + B = ubhaya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B = abhāva = pratīṣedha</td>
<td>Ā + B = anubhaya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| I  | A: vidhi           |
| II | B: pratīṣedha      |
| III | A + B: vidhi + pratīṣedha = vidhi |
| IV | Ā + Ā: vidhi + pratīṣedha = pratīṣedha |

However, we cannot fail to notice that the conjunction of na bhāva and

---

6 This is the moment that corresponds with the disappearance of the phenomenological
subject in the narrative of Śāntideva's entrance into heaven.

7 This is no doubt the reason why the obliteration of "being" and "not-being" plays a
paradigmatic role in Mādhyamika discourse. Cp. MMK XV,7:
   kātyāyanavāde cāstītī nāstītī cobhayam
   pratīṣiddham bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvīnā |,
and RA I,58-62.

The transgression of this fundamental dichotomy is represented as a moment where the
mind has become devoid of support and the dimension of the subjective realization
is disclosed. Cp. BCA IX,35 above and YS 1:
   astināṣṭivyatikrāntā buddhir yeṣāṁ nirāśrayaḥ
   gambhiras tair nirālabhaḥ pratīyārtho vibhāvyate |,
quoted in Nādapāda, Sekoddeśatikā. Ed. Carelli, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 1941;
and RA I,75-76:
   iti naiḥśreyasato dharma gambhirō nisparigrahāḥ|
   anālaya iti proktaḥ saṃbuddhais tattvadarśibhiḥ ||
   asmād anālayad dhammaḥ šrayābhiratā janāḥ |
   astināṣṭivyatikrāntā bhītā naśyanty amedhasaḥ ||

8 See Ruegg 1977 for a discussion of this central term and cp. the analysis proposed
below in 6: The semiotics of catuṣkoṭi.
nābhāva in the proposition of Śāntideva is identical with the semantic structure of the fourth koṭi. But this is implicitly denied by Prajñākaramati's analysis which only reflects the traditional Mādhyamika negation of the four alternative propositions within the scheme of the catuṣkoṭi. It also shows that the analysis is based on purely formal criteria consisting in identifying the distribution of the negation and the affirmation within the four positions of the scheme, without taking into consideration the formal contrast between the first and the second pair of propositions, since the latter represent complex propositions of a totally different logical and semantic order. Moreover, from a logical point of view the negation of I and II is redundant since I A = II B and II B = I A. And the same is the case with III and IV, where III A + B = IV A + B and IV A + B = III A + B. But the logical status of this redundancy is not questioned by Prajñākaramati, and as a rule it never is. It only shows that negation as such is a primary and dominant factor in Mādhyamika discourse. In fact, one does not clarify the problematic involved merely by trying to establish a logical interpretation of this radical negativity, since the semantic structure of the catuṣkoṭi first of all, and no doubt exclusively, reflects the illocutionary negation of any propositional attitude a human subject might assume towards the field of reality. And in this respect the fourth koṭi itself is totally neutralizing.

2.3

This crucial verse in Śāntideva may be said to exemplify the decisive feature of Mādhyamika discourse. For in so far as difference itself is a pervasive and categorical feature in things and language, Mādhyamika philosophy aims at neutralizing difference in order to establish the ineffable presence of the Absolute. But it is also obvious that this absolute negativity which marks Mādhyamika discourse has nothing to do with the kind of negativity which generally constitutes the negation on the level of propositions. It is a negativity that annihilates the total field of difference by reducing semiosis to zero. But this point leads

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9 Cp. the quotation in BCAP 174,11-12:

na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakam

catuṣkotivinirmuktaḥ tattvam Mādhyamikā viduḥ

This verse is part of Jñānasārasamuccaya. See Mimaki 1976 188; cp. ČS VII,20 and XVI,25.
necessarily to the question of the specific epistemic principle upon which Madhyamika philosophy is based and which determines its dialectical annihilation of the field of reality. And this principle can be shown to involve a characteristic exploitation of a fundamental feature of the semantic structure of language.

3. Difference and identity - \textit{pratītyasamutpāda}

3.1

The general difficulty in interpreting Madhyamika philosophy is primarily caused by the conspicuous lack of a systematic and exhaustive account of its own epistemological presuppositions. In this respect it remains on a pre-theoretical level, and Nagarjuna's writings that constitute the fundamental ideological framework of the Madhyamika school are no exception to this absence of theoretical coherence. But his writings show clearly that he considers \textit{pratītyasamutpāda}, Origination in Dependence, to be the fundamental and supreme principle of Madhyamika discourse. The major part of Nagarjuna's scholastical works centres upon the development of the modalities of this principle which is used as a dialectical devise for putting the concepts of identity and difference under erasure.\textsuperscript{1}

3.2

In one of the few cases where Nagarjuna formulates the consequences of the inherent logic of \textit{pratītyasamutpāda} he states the following "axiom":

\textsuperscript{1} All the major scholastical works, excepting Vaidalyaprakaragā where it is used implicitly, refer expressly to the concept of \textit{pratītyasamutpāda}. Cp. MMK 0,1-2 and XIV,18; VŚ 0:

\begin{verbatim}
gan gis skye dan 'jig pa dag | | tshul 'di yis ni spaṅs gyur pa | | rten ciṅ 'byun ba gsuṅs pa yi | | thub dbaṅ de la phyag 'tshal lo | (P 5225, 22b3f.),
\end{verbatim}

ŚŚ 73 where Nagarjuna refers to \textit{idampratyayatā}:

\begin{verbatim}
rkyen ŋiṅ 'di pa 'di šes nas | | lta ŋan dra ba'i rtog pa ldog | | chag rmoṅs khoṅ khrō spaṅs phyir te | | ma gos mya ŋan 'das ŋer 'gro | (P 5231, 138a6)
\end{verbatim}

and VV 73. Cognitive and soteriological perspectives merge in this category.
pratītya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat
na cānyad api tat tasmāt

(MMK XVIII,10)

"An A that exists in dependence on B is in the first place not identical with B nor is it other than B...", which means that A cannot be designated as A, nor as non-A (=B). Identity and difference thus become neutralized and unthinkable categories. And by constantly having recourse to the axiomatic status of pratītyasamutpāda Nāgārjuna is able to annihilate all categories that can be shown to involve the concept of Origination in Dependence.

The main difficulty, however, is represented by the logical consequences Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyaṃkika school deduce from the concept of pratītyasamutpāda. For it is very far from clear what has led them to the paradoxical statement that the inherent logic of the concept of dependence is incompatible with the concepts of identity and difference.

From a logical point of view it is obvious that in order to establish a rational discourse based upon the concept of Origination in Dependence we must presuppose the initial identity and difference of the dependent elements before their final dialectical dissolution into Emptiness. But Nāgārjuna and the following generations of Mādhyaṃkika scholars obviously did not reflect upon this epistemological difficulty. They only continue the dialectical exploitation of the category of pratītyasamutpāda, which disseminates its effects in a variety of contexts throughout the ramifications of Mādhyaṃkika writings.

2 Cp. Candrakīrti, PP 376,10, where the categories of cause and effect are referred to in order to exemplify the axiom: yataś caivaṃ yat karaṇam pratītya yat kāryam upadāyate, naiva tat karaṇāṃ kāryam bhavati, na ca tasmāt karaṇāṃ tat kāryam anyat.

There are other verses in MMK that have a similar "axiomatic" function, but they may all be classified in relation to this basic axiom the implications of which they develop. Cp. MMK XIV,5-7, which develop the question of difference within this perspective:

anyad anyat pratītyānyan nānyad anyad rte 'nyataḥ
yat pratītya ca yat tasmāt tad aśyāṇa nopapadāyate
yady anyad anyad anyasmād anyasmād apy rte bhavet
tad anyad anyad anyasmād rte nāsti ca nāsti atāḥ
nānyasmin vidyate 'nyavam anyasmin na vidyate
avidyamāne cāṇyaṭeva nāsty anyad vā tad eva vā

and MMK X,10-11, which state the implications of dependence and identity:

yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvas tam evapekṣya sidhyati
yadi yo 'pekṣītavyaḥ sa sidhyatāṃ kam apekṣya kaḥ
yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvaso 'siddho 'pekṣate katham
athāpy apekṣate siddhas tv apekṣasya na yujyate
3.3

It is obviously the concept of dependence as such which constitutes
the fundamental problem. For it is the paradoxical and undecidable na-
ture of this relationship upon which Nāgārjuna's philosophy is based and
which lends to it its seemingly logical consistency. It is therefore nec-
essary to discuss the problematic of the two dependent terms in this re-
relationship in order to disclose the implicit presuppositions of Mādhyā-
mika dialectic.

3.4

The discussion of this pivotal question may provisionally be opened
by trying to re-formulate the underlying assumption which determines Nā-
gārjuna's conclusive proposition, namely, that dependent elements are
empty (śūnya) since they are devoid of self-existence (svabhāva).

The canonical argument consists in demonstrating that if a thing A
only exists through B and B only through A, which means that A is depend-
ent (pratītya/apekṣya) on B and B on A, it follows necessarily that they
cannot exist as self-existent substances of things. A substance or a
thing exists in itself and not through anything else. But, according to
Nāgārjuna, this also rules out the possibility of establishing the iden-
tity or difference of the dependent elements A and B. Hence they become

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3 A clear and comprehensive exposition of the canonical argument is found in VW, which -
in fact - is composed in defense of the proposition śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ. Cp. also
MMK XV and XX: svabhāvaparikṣā and sāmaṇḍīparikṣā, and passim. In ŚŚ (P 5231, 137b;
N dū ma, Tsa 128a) it is stated that this proposition represents the ultimate
truth, paramārtha:

```
| dnos po thams cad rañ bzin gys | 
| ston pa yin pas dnos rnams kyi (NP kyi) | 
| rten 'byuñ de ni de bzin gṣegs | 
| mtshun pa med pas ņe bar bstan | (68)
| dnos po thams cad rañ bzin gys ston pa yin pas | dnos po rnams kyi rten nas 'byuñ ba 'di de bzin gṣegs pas ņe bar bstan to |

| dam pa'i don ni der zad do | 
| san 'rgas bcom idan 'das kyi ni | 
| 'jig rten tha sňad brten nas su | 
| sna tshogs thams cad yañ dag bṛtags | (69)

```

don dam pa (NP paš) ni rten cin 'brel par 'byuñ ba'i dnos po thams cad rañ bzin
gyis (NP gyi) ston ho || žes bya ba der zad do || .........................

"The incomparable Tathāgata has explained that the dependent origination of phenom-
ena is expressed in the words that all phenomena are empty of self-existence. This
only (sa eva) is the ultimate truth (paramārtha). Buddha Bhagavān has designated
all the different phenomena such as they are by taking his stand on worldly dis-
course (laukīkavyavahāra)." Cp. MMK XXIV, 8-10.
neutralized, and Nāgārjuna therefore concludes that there is an inherent insubstantiality in things: they are devoid of self-existence (*nīhsvabhāva*). Consequently perception and representation are false since there is nothing in the field of reality that corresponds to perception and representation. Thus the natural logic of language breaks down in demonstrating that it has no real object. The object is empty, and as such it has only an imaginary existence. Reality is an illusion like mirage.

3.5

But the almost paralysing effect of Mādhyamika dialectic is based on the assumption that language fundamentally reflects the structure of reality, and Nāgārjuna's philosophy actually shows that he treats linguistic difference and perceptual difference as if they were concomitant features in being and were to be analysed on the same level. In Mādhyamika theory the apparent illogicity of language is the illogicity and unreality of being. This conception of language is common to all types of sophistical discourse where the sophistical effect generally is produced on the implicit assumption that the linguistic sign so to speak "adheres" to the thing it signifies, which, of course, has a fatal ef-

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4 See, e.g. Nāgārjuna's *Acintyastava*, quoted in *BCAP* 180, 28-29:

\[ indriyair upalabdhāṃ yat tat tattvena bhaved yadi || jātās tattvavido bālās tattvajñānena kim tadā || (18) \]

This verse is one of the few instances in Nāgārjuna where the epistemological break between the order of the sensible and the order of the intelligible is stated explicitly, even though the incompatible duality of these two orders constitute the underly-

5 Cp. *RA* I,52-53:

\[ dūrād ālokitaṁ rūpam āsannair dṛśyate sphuṭam || maricir yaḍi vāri syād āsannaiḥ kim na dṛśyate || dūribhūtair yathābhūto loko "yam dṛśyate tathā || na dṛśyate tadāsannair animitto maricivat ||, \]

and *YS* 27-28:

\[ gnas med dmigs pa yod ma yin || rtsa ba med ciṅ gnas pa med || ma rig rgyu las śīn tu byun || thog ma dbus mtha’ rnam par spāṅs || ichu śīṅ bžin du śīṅ po med || 'dri za’i groṅ khyer ‘dra ba ste || rmohs pa’i groṅ khyer mi bzad pa’i || 'gro ba sgyu ma bžin du snaṅ || \]

Metaphor becomes an argument in its own right when Nāgārjuna refers to the unreali-

-ty of the world.
fect on the natural logic of language: the rationality of language breaks down.

The Mādhyamika philosophy is undeniable part of this general problematic of language and being. And it must be admitted that Nāgārjuna’s reflection on the order of language remains on a pre-theoretical level. This is made clear by his sophistical and unusually discursive treatment of the Nyāya category of discussion (vāda) in Vaidalyaprakaraṇa, where he analyses the topic of "signifier" (abhidhāna) and "signified" (abhidheya). But the analysis does not deviate from his general axiomatic usage of the concept of dependence: the word and the thing it denotes are neither different nor identical, and their relationship may thus be said to be indeterminate.6

But while Nāgārjuna’s dialectic shows the absurd consequences that follow from the category of pratītyasamutpāda, Origination in Dependence, when it is thought to be universally present in things, it shows at the same time that the question of the nature of this category as such is beyond his theoretical reach. On this point his philosophy remains at a pre-theoretical and intuitive level.

4. NS and the semiotics of negation and dependence

4.1

NS IV.1,37-40 and Vātsyāyana's important commentary contain an interesting discussion of this problematic, which obviously is influenced by Mādhyamika concepts, and it may be ascribed to this school, even though it is impossible to be definite on questions connected with the social and historical situation of Mādhyamika discourse at this early stage of Indian philosophy. This discussion displays, along with the sophistical purpose of demonstrating that all things are non-entities, the same level of analysis as in Nāgārjuna, even though the sūtras, and especially Vātsyāyana's explication, develops the discussion of the category of dependence considerably by introducing the function of negation for establishing difference and identity in things that are maintained to be reciprocally dependent.

sarvam abhāvo bhāveṣv itaretarābhāvasiddheḥ || 37 ||

"Everything is not-being since it is a fact that there is reciprocal not-being in things."

"Everything is not-being in so far it has status as being.
For what reason?
Because it is a fact that there is reciprocal not-being in things: since the cow is not-being in the nature of the horse, the cow is not-horse, and, since the horse is not-being in the nature of the cow, the horse is not-cow. Therefore, since the concept of not-being and the negation have coreferentiality with the word 'being', everything is not-being."

The underlying assumption of the Buddhist argument is that if two things are reciprocally dependent, which in this case means that the element A (go), is dependent on the element B (aśva) and B on A, it follows that A is the negation of B and B the negation of A. Hence negation and not-being become essential for defining identity and difference.

But while the text is important because it implicitly identifies not-being and negation with the category of difference and thus shows that not-being itself is considered to be a pervasive and categorial feature in things, it fails because it demonstrably identifies not-being and negation with non-existence, since the way in which Vātsyāyana reproduces the Buddhist argument indicates that it identifies the reciprocal negation of A and B, "cow" and "horse", with the negation of their actual existence. Thus it locates a semantic and linguistic problematic in the field of reality and not in the structure of language.

Moreover, Vātsyāyana's reproduction of the argument also indicates that it confuses the copulative function of the lexeme "be" and its existential signification. For it is obviously the logical function of the negative copula which is the cause of the confusion in the argument. The negative copula only states by implication that A = A (go = go) because it is not B (anaśva), and, that B = B (aśva = aśva) because it is
not A (ago). But the text is clearly ignorant of this logical relation, and this also seems to be the case in Indian philosophy in general.¹

4.2

The following argument, NS IV.1,38: na svabhāvasiddher bhāvānām, which defends the idea that things are self-existent and therefore not to be considered mere non-entities, exhibits the same problematic. Vātsyāyana points out the sophistical nature of the Buddhist argument by discussing the function of negation as productive of difference. But he is unable to deal with the reciprocal derivation of the dependent terms, which is the central point in the Buddhist sophism. Vātsyāyana's explication of the argument against the Buddhist position also shows that the defence of self-existence (svabhāva) in things, which, in fact, is only a way of explaining the question of identity, centres on the question of the nature of the referent, but not on the nature of the semantic structure of language, a fact that discloses the same problematic as the position which it is meant to refute: it locates primarily negation in the order of things and not in the order of language:

avyatirekapratīṣedhe ca bhāvānām saṁyoGa-disambandho
vyatireko 'trāvyatireko 'bhedākhya-sambandhaḥ tatpratīṣedhe sadā 'satpratyayasya saṁmāndhikaraṇyaḥ yathā na
santi kuṇḍe badarāṇīti | asan gaur aśvātmanā 'naśvo
gaur iti ca gavāśvavor avyatirekaḥ pratiṣidhyate ga-
vāśvavor ekatvam nāśti | tasmin pratiṣidhyamāne
bhāvena gavā saṁmāndhikaraṇyaḥ asatpratyayasyaśan gaur
aśvātmaneti yathā na santi kuṇḍe badarāṇīti kuṇḍe
badarasamyoge pratiṣidhyamāne sadbhir asatpratyayasya
saṁmāndhikaraṇyaḥ iti || 38 ||

¹ It is a remarkable fact that the function of copula in simple predicate structures does not seem to play any decisive role in Indian logical theory. Technical terms like tādātmya and abheda cannot reasonably be said to describe the function of copula. Cp. Randle 1976 271,n.1. This absence may be explained on the grounds that copula is not manifested, generally speaking, on the surface level of the proposition in Sanskrit. But this point needs further investigation. Cp. Benveniste 1976 151-176: La phrase nominale, and Derrida 1972 209-246: Le supplément de la copule. La philosophie devant la linguistique.
"And, when the non-difference of entities is being negated - in this connection difference consists in a relationship of non-conjunction, etc., non-difference in a relationship called non-distinction - so, when this (non-difference) is being negated it has always coreferentiality with the concept of not-being, just as, for instance, in a proposition 'there are no jujubes in the pot'. And, when it is said that the cow is not-horse since the cow is not-being in the nature of the horse, the non-difference between cow and horse is negated because there is no identity in the cow and the horse. When this (identity) is being negated in the proposition 'the cow is not-being in the nature of the horse', the concept of not-being has coreferentiality with the entity 'cow', just as, for instance, the concept of not-being has locus in common with existent things when the conjunction of the jujubes with the pot is negated in the proposition 'there are no jujubes in the pot'."

Negation and negative propositions are thus said to reflect an absence of material conjunction of two things, and thereby their difference. For, as Vātsyāyana's exemplification of his thesis makes clear, the negation only indicates that an element A (= go) does not exist in an element B (= aśva), and, by converse, that B does not exist in A. This means that the negation states that A is different from B and B from A because there is mutual not-being in the horse and the cow. The analysis may be represented thus:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{abheda} & \quad \text{vyatireka} \\
A \cap B & \quad \neg \quad \neg \\
A & \quad \neg \quad A & \quad \neg \quad B
\end{align*}
\]

And this brings the discussion back to the problematic of the sūtra that opened it.

4.3

But if the question of difference is displaced from the order of reality and perceptual difference to the order of language and linguistic difference, it becomes obvious that perceptual difference and linguistic
difference that pertain to different epistemological orders necessarily must be kept apart in order to avoid sophism. For it is this fundamental lack of discrimination that causes the ambiguity in the discussion between the Buddhist sophist and the Nyāya opponent.

However, if the negation does not primarily reflect the order of reality, but only, as a linguistic element internal in judgement, states that \( A = A \) because it is not \( B \), and, that \( B = B \) because it is not \( A \), which means that the horse is only "horse" (aśva) because it is "not-cow" (aṅgo), and, the cow only "cow" because it is "not-horse" (anāśva),\(^2\) it becomes possible to indicate the actual epistemological difficulty in Mādhyamika philosophy. For if something only exists as such on the basis of its own negation, that is, by virtue of what it is not, it follows that it cannot exist as a thing or a substance since a thing or a substance exists in itself and not by virtue of anything else: it only exists as a concept.

It is this theoretical position which Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika school are unable to formulate and which creates the ambiguity in their philosophy. The paradoxical effect of their dialectic is based on the fact that they displace the question of what constitutes linguistic difference and conceptual representation to the field of perceptual difference by unconsciously assuming that the dialectical derivation of the concept reflects the structure of reality.

It is therefore clear that the pivotal Mādhyamika concept of niḥsvabhāva, "devoid of self-existence", does not refer to a lack of self-existence in things, as Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika school maintain, but to the fact that conceptual structures are defined by reciprocal derivation. It is the concept and thus the linguistic sign that is devoid of self-existence. In fact, Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika school unknowingly formulate a basic semiotic principle while apparently thinking that they formulate the fundamental nature of things.

4.4

But if two concepts \( A \) and \( B \) are inter-dependent, which means that they are dialectically derived, it follows that they should be present

---

\(^2\) The function of the negation in the dialectical derivation of the concept is identical in structure with the basic form of the Buddhist theory of apoha. See below 8.3 for a semiotic determination.
at the same time since one would be non-existent without the other. Hence Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika school who confuse the order of language and the order of reality conclude that there is an inherent illogicity in things since it thus becomes impossible to define objects and events in the field of reality without being forced into a paradoxical position: to maintain the actual co-presence of objects or events that perception and common experience show to be discrete and existing in temporal succession. We shall return to this problematic.

4.5

This inherent confusion in the Mādhyamika conception of dependence is analysed by Vātsyāyana in his interpretation of the two sūtras that terminate the discussion opened by NS IV.1,37. It deserves to be quoted in extenso because it appears to be the first and only attempt, excepting the subcommentaries, to analyse and comment upon this central concept in Mādhyamika dialectic. Moreover, it is also remarkable for its concise determination of the inherent weakness in the Mādhyamika theoretical position. The discussion opens with a short reproduction of a well-known Mādhyamika stereotype often used for exemplifying the concept of dependence:

\[
\text{na svabhāvasiddhir āpekṣikatvāt || 39 ||}
\]
\[
apēkṣākṛtam āpekṣikam | hrasvāpekṣākṛtam dirgham
dirghāpekṣākṛtam hrasvaṁ, na svenātMANāvastitham
kim cit | kasmāt? apekṣāsāmarthyāt, tasmān na
svabhāvasiddhir bhāvānām iti || 39 ||
\]

"They are not established per se because they are dependent" || 39 ||

"'Dependent' means 'obtained in dependence'. Long

\[\text{3 Cp.PP.10,7 and RA 1,48: asmin satidām bhavati dirgha hrasvām yathā sati |}
\]
\[\text{and RA 1,49:}
\]
\[\text{hrasvē 'sati punar dirgham na bhavati svabhāvataḥ |}
\]
\[\text{pradīpasāpyaṇutmādṛt prabhāya āpy asamabhavaḥ ||}
\]

NB.: In its exploitation of the concept of dependence Mādhyamika discourse does not distinguish between substance, qualification and functions. It would not seem to be reasonable to analyse the concepts of cause and effect on the same level as the qualifications "long" and "short", but this, in fact, is done constantly and thus indicates that the problematic of dependence in Mādhyamika dialectic belongs to the structure and nature of semantic categories.
is obtained in dependence on short, and, short is
obtained in dependence on long. There is nothing
that is established in its own nature.
For what reason?
Because of the function of dependence. Therefore
entities are not established on basis of self-
existence."

Vātsyāyana introduces his explication of the concluding sūtra by
pointing out that the logical consequence which the Mādhyamika opponent
deduces from the category of reciprocal dependence, viz. that dependent
elements cannot be defined as self-existent, is incompatible with the
existence of the category of dependence as such. For elements that enter
into a relationship of dependence on Mādhyamika premises can only be de-
dined as non-entities, and non-entities, being non-existent, do not en-
ter into a relationship of dependence:

vyāhatatvād ayuktam || 40 ||
yadi hrasvāpeksākṛtam dīrgham, kim idānim apekṣya
hrasvam iti gṛhyate? atha dīrghāpeksākṛtam hrasvam,
dīrgham anāpeksikam? evam itaretarāśrayayor ekābhave
'nyatarābhāvād ubhayābhāva iti dīrghāpeksāvyavasthā
'nupapannā |

"This is illogical because it is contradictory." || 40 ||

"If long is obtained in dependence on short, now,
in dependence on what is it perceived as 'short'?!
If, on the other hand, short is obtained in depend-
ence on long, long is not-dependent. If thus one
of the two mutually dependent (things) is non-exist-
ent, both are not-dependent since either one is
non-existent. Therefore it is illogical that short
is established in dependence on long."

And Vātsyāyana continues:

svabhāvasiddhāv asatyām samayoḥ parimaṇḍalayor vā
dravyayor āpeksīke dīrghahrasvatve kasmān na bhava-
taḥ?

"If they are not established on the basis of self-
existence, why are not longness and shortness that
are dependent found in two substances that are either
similar or circular?"

If things are devoid of self-existence (= identity), the possibility of defining difference is obliterated, and long and short might then be expected to define substances that are neither short nor long. However, it is sufficient to point out the actually perceived differences in order to refute the Mādhyamika sophism.

The absence of self-existence in things has further consequences:

\[ \text{apekṣāyāṁ anapekṣāyāṁ ca dravyayor abhedaḥ} \]
\[ \text{yāvatī dravye apekṣamāṇe tāvatī evānapekṣamāṇe} \]
\[ \text{nānyataratra bhedaḥ | āpekṣikatve tu saty} \]
\[ \text{anyataratra višeṣopajanaḥ syād iti} \]

"In case of dependence and not-dependence there is no difference with respect to two substances. There are just as many substances that are dependent as there are substances that are not-dependent. There is no difference with respect to either one. But if they are dependent, there should be an addition of distinctive features with respect to either one."

What characterizes the function of dependence is therefore not the absence of self-existence in the dependent elements, but an addition of distinctive features. And the concluding remarks are meant to clarify the nature of this addition of distinctive features:

\[ \text{kim apekṣāsāmarthyam iti cet? dvayor grahaṇe} \]
\[ \text{‘tiṣayagrahaṇopapattīḥ | dve dravye paśyann} \]
\[ \text{ekatra vidyānam atiṣayam gṛṇāti tad dīrghaṁ} \]
\[ \text{vyavasyati, yac ca hīnaṁ gṛṇāti tad ghrasvam} \]
\[ \text{iti vyavasyatīti | etac cāpekṣāsāmarthyam || 40 ||} \]

"If you ask what is the function of dependence, the answer is that it is the occurrence of perception of preponderance when two things are perceived. The one who sees two substances perceives the preponderance that is found in one. This one he determines as 'long', and the one which he perceives as deficient, that one he determines as 'short'. This, indeed, is the function of dependence."
This explanation seems to indicate that Vātsyāyana locates the real function of dependence in judgement and not primarily in things, even though his analysis refers to the field of reality as the final instance on which the nature of the Mādhyamika sophism is to be measured. The distinctive features are perceptual facts that are reflected in judgement as a supplement to the dependent substances. Dependence, therefore, is not primarily a relationship between substances. It is a relationship between terms, which in this case means the terms "long" and "short". Hence dependence is not a categorial feature in things as the Mādhyamika sophism presupposes, but a categorial feature in language. Mādhyamika philosophy confuses the inter-dependence of the terms "long" and "short" and the things they denote. This appears to be the essence of Vātsyāyana's concise remarks on the concept of dependence.

4.6

But the question of the linguistic nature of the concept of dependence cannot be solved by referring to the nature of the empiric. The actual paradox of Mādhyamika dialectic is based on the dependent nature of linguistic and conceptual categories. Hence the epistemological problematic of Mādhyamika philosophy may, in the last instance, be reduced to the question of the linguistic nature of conceptual categories.

5. The semiotic square and pratītyasamutpāda

5.1

In order to transcend the traditional difficulties in framing a satisfactory analysis of Mādhyamika discourse it may be useful to analyse its basic structure from the point of view of structural semantics since it has become clear that the actual problematic of Mādhyamika dialectic is to be located in the structure of language. For Mādhyamika philosophy does not function on the basis of an established logical canon. Its paradoxical nature is rather connected with the problematic of the fundamental structure of signification. Hence the Mādhyamika exploitation of the concept of pratītyasamutpāda, Origination in Dependence, may be said to reflect a logic of signification, a semio-logic, and not a logic in the proper sense of this word.
5.2

The level of the semiological reflection which I shall attempt to implant in Mādhyamika discourse relates to the fundamental structure of signification.

It is undoubtably one of the most remarkable results of structural semantics that it has been possible to demonstrate that even highly different types of discourse are based on this structure which may be said to govern the discourse as a structural universal. And its productive dynamics can be traced in practically any discourse irrespective or its cultural and ideological context.

This structure is represented by what in the field of structural semantics has been called the *semiotic square.* And a semiotic analysis of the basic features of Mādhyamika dialectic shows that they on a fundamental level reflect the structure of the semiotic square. This structure which presents itself as the fundamental syntax of signification may be represented in the following way:

![Semiotic Square Diagram]

The two primitive terms, the semes $s_1/s_2$, are said to enter into a relationship of reciprocal presupposition. The formal logical nature of this relationship remains, however, indeterminate. This represents the semantic axis which also constitutes a semantic category. Each of the terms on this axis may enter into a new relationship of the type $s_1/s_2$ and $s_1/s_2$. This relationship is called the relationship of contradiction, and in the field of speech acts it represents the illocutionary act of negation of the primitive terms. The assertion of the contradictory terms $s_1/s_2$ presents itself as an implication, $\overline{s_1} \supset s_2$ and $\overline{s_2} \supset s_1$.

---

Moreover, the semes $s_1$ and $s_2$ are said to enter into a relationship which constitutes a complex semantic category, $s_1 + s_2$. And the semes $\overline{s_1}$ and $\overline{s_2}$ constitute a so-called neutral semantic category, $\overline{s_1} + \overline{s_2}$. They represent basically propositions or terms of the type both/and, neither/nor. Finally there are instances where the primitive terms on the semantic axis represent a contradictory semantic category. Hence the implications $\overline{s_1} \supset s_2$ and $\overline{s_2} \supset s_1$ may be considered tautological. However, the syntax of signification does not primarily reflect the order of formal logic, and this is abundantly clear in the case of Mādhyamika discourse.

5.3

If the Mādhyamika concept of *pratītyasamutpāda* is analysed on the basis of this syntax of signification, it becomes clear that the reciprocal presupposition of the two primitive terms on the semantic axis is identical in structure with the common Mādhyamika conception of dependence, which, in fact, relates to the order of syntax of signification. And if the structure of the semiotic square is applied on this category of dependence, it will clarify some of the basic problems that derive from its use in Mādhyamika discourse.

5.4

In order to exemplify this thesis I shall attempt an analysis of the introductory statements in Nāgārjuna's main work, *Madhyamakaśāstra*, since these statements in a certain sense may be said to represent a paradigmatic instance of Mādhyamika discourse.

Nāgārjuna introduces his śāstra with the following set of propositions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam} & || 1 || \\
\text{anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam} & || 1 || \\
\text{yah pratītyasamutpādam prapañcopaśamaṁ śivam} & || 2 || \\
\text{deśayāṁ āsa saṃbuddhas taṁ vande vadatāṁ varam}
\end{align*}
\]

"I salute the Perfected Buddha, the foremost among teachers, who has proclaimed the Dependent Origination, the blissful extinction of difference, which is neither origination nor destruction,
neither continuous nor discontinuous, 
neither identical nor different, 
neither going nor coming."

If these eight qualifications of the *pratītyasamutpāda* are invested 
in the *semiotic square*, it becomes clear that they represent four 
negated semantic categories. In their positive form they represent four 
semantic categories which on a fundamental level reflect the punctua-
tion of the field of reality in time and space. Their negation may there-
fore be said to efface the semantics of time and space:

1) \[ nirodha \rightarrow utpāda \]
   \[ anutpāda \rightarrow anirodha \]

2) \[ uccheda \rightarrow śāśvata \]
   \[ aśāśvata \rightarrow anuccheda \]

3) \[ ekārtha \rightarrow nānārtha \]
   \[ anānārtha \rightarrow anekārtha \]

4) \[ āgama \rightarrow nirgama \]
   \[ anirgama \rightarrow anāgama \]

Categories: 1) existence, 2) duration, 3) difference, 4) movement

But how are we to interpret the conjunction of the negated terms 
which constitute the so-called neutral semantic category in the *semio-
tic square*? Do they represent any meaningful statement? The point 
is that there cannot be established any meaning at all since the neutral-
ization of the implication which is produced by the conjunction of the 
negated terms obliterates the syntactic possibility of maintaining the 
semantic category as such and consequently the possibility of establish-
ing semantic difference. This neutralization of difference, "the bliss-
ful extinction of difference", which thus introduces the subjective di-
ension into the philosophical project by delimiting it from the field 
of reality and perceptual difference, is what Mādhyamika theory quali-
fies by the term *śūnyatā*, Emptiness. This concept may therefore be 
said to signify the neutralization of difference as an effect of *pratī-
tyasamutpāda*, a fact which is corroborated by statements in Nāgārjuna 
where the concepts of *pratītyasamutpāda* and *śūnyatā* occur on the same 
level of reference.
5.5

Mādhyamika discourse may thus be said to represent a dialectical exploitation of the elementary structure of the semiotic square in order to neutralize semantic difference and thereby the field of reality. This is done by abolishing the very syntax that structures linguistic difference. However, from the moment the category of the neutral and non-different is considered to be signification, the discourse necessarily enters upon a transgression of reference to the field of reality. And this seems to be characteristic of the fundamental ambiguity of Mādhyamika discourse: while the aim of the philosophical discourse itself is to transcend the field of difference by annihilating signification, it is at the same time forced to identify the semiotic category of the non-different with signification, which, in fact, only relates to the erasure of the syntax of signification.

Mādhyamika philosophy is forced to produce signification, even though this is done on a highly limited scale, otherwise the discourse would have no decidable object. The Mādhyamika tradition was well aware of this ambiguity, so it seems, and a reflex of this problematic can be seen in the distinction between the two truths, which is not an epistemological distinction, but a pragmatic one: in order to present the truth one has to speak or write, which necessarily involves signification and difference.

In any case, negation and neutralization of difference leaves the field of reality as it is, but not necessarily the human subject who identifies its own project with the cognitive discourse of śūnyavāda.

6. The semiotics of prapañca, dvaya and vikalpa

6.1

Other important technical terms in Mādhyamika theory such as prapañca, dvaya and vikalpa also have their definite place in the structure of the semiotic square.

2 Cp. VV 71: yathā śūnyatām pratītyasamutpādaṁ madhyamāṁ pratīpadaṁ ca
   ekārthāṁ niṣaṅgāda praṇamāmi tatt apratimabuddham

and MMK XIV,18:
   yathā pratītyasamutpādāḥ śūnyatāṁ tāṁ pracakṣmahe
   sā praṇāṃpatīr upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā
Prapañca, difference,¹ is the fundamental process which unfolds, explicates, the binary opposition of the two primitive terms in the semiotic square. This opposition involves what in Mādhyamika theory is called duality, dvaya, and this semantic duality determines the existence of conceptual alternatives, vikalpa.² A general representation may be given in the following way:

![Diagram](image)

¹ For the concept of prapañca, see May 1959 175-176, n.562, and Schmithausen 1969 137-142, n.101.

² For the concept of vikalpa see May 1959 64-65, n.64. For dvaya/advaya see RĀ I,51 and IV,95-96.
7. The semiotics of *caṭuṣkoṭi*

7.1

The semiotic square may also be proved to represent the underlying structure of the much-discussed term *caṭuṣkoṭi*, which was found to be involved in Prajñākaramati's commentary on *BCA* IX,35. It may be described as an exhaustion of the possible propositional positions within the semiotic square. The problematic of the concept of *caṭuṣkoṭi* thus relates to the syntax of signification. $s_1$ represents the first *koṭi*, $s_2$ the second, the complex term $s_1 + s_2$ the third, and the neutral term $\overline{s_1} + \overline{s_2}$ the fourth:

![Semiotic Square Diagram](image)

It should be noted, however, that the primitive terms in the *caṭuṣkoṭi* always represent a contradictory semantic axis and not one of opposition. This, for instance, is made clear by the Mādhyamika exhaustion of the contradictory axis of *sat* vs. *asat*, being vs. not being. And it must be admitted that most, if not all, examples which the literature presents as instances of the *caṭuṣkoṭi* centre upon the syntactico-semantic exhaustion of the lexeme "be" (*sat*),¹ or upon simple predicate structures involving copula. An instance of the latter is *Mṇk* XVIII,8:

1. *koṭi*: na *sat* = $\overline{s_1}$ ⊓ $asat$
2. *koṭi*: na *asat* = $\overline{asat}$ ⊓ *sat*
3. *koṭi*: na *sadasat* = $\overline{sadasat}$ = $asat + sat$
4. *koṭi*: na *sadasat* = $\overline{sadasat}$ = *sat + asat*

This indicates that *caṭuṣkoṭinirvimuktam* as a discursive fact does not pertain to the order of logic. It represents the illocutionary act of negation of any propositional position that might be adopted by a speaking subject. Hence it is a question of obliteration of language and the process of differentiation. Cp. the analysis of *BCA* IX,35 proposed above.

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¹ Cp. n.3.9 above. If the verse from *Jñānasārasamuccaya* is invested in the square we get the following structure:

- 1. *koṭi*: na *sat* = $\overline{s_1}$ ⊓ $asat$
- 2. *koṭi*: na *asat* = $\overline{asat}$ ⊓ *sat*
- 3. *koṭi*: na *sadasat* = $\overline{sadasat}$ = $asat + sat$
- 4. *koṭi*: na *sadasat* = $\overline{sadasat}$ = *sat + asat*
It is also a fact that the texts manifest a tendency towards delimiting the fourth koṭī as the one which is most significant of the Buddhist attitude towards discourse, even though Mādhyamika discourse claims to transcend the four positions of the catuṣkoṭi, which, in fact, is only a circumscription of silence, since the extreme negativity that affects the terms sat and asat is only productive of tautologies and thus devoid of cognitive value. The illocutionary force of negation is here to be interpreted as a prohibition against thinking and discourse itself. The peculiar position of the fourth koṭī is emphasized by Akutobhayā on NMK XVIII,8d where the bipolar opposition "neither/nor" representing the neutral term in the semiotic square is interpreted as a proposition which corresponds with the principle of the Absolute. But this would only be natural since the obliteration of signification and difference already is inscribed in the structure of the fourth koṭī as such:

\[
yāḥ dag min min yāḥ dag min ūses bya ba ni |
\]
\[
don dam pa’i tshul gyis chos thams cad skye
\]
\[
ba med pa’i phyir ūses pa rnam par rtog pa dañ
\]
\[
bcas pa dañ rnam par rtog pa med pa’i spyod yul ūnid du ’gyur ba[‘i] dnos po’i tshul gyis
\]
\[
yāḥ dag pa ma yin pa ūnid du rnam par brtags pa dañ yāḥ dag pa ūnid du rnam par brtags pa gañ yin pa de lta bu med pa yin no ||
\]

(P 5229, 83b1ff.)

"'Neither true nor not true': Since all things (dharma) are without origination according to the principle of the absolute (paramārtha), such a thing that is represented as not-true (atathya)
and true (tathya) according to the principle of being, which has status as the field (gocara) of cognition (jñana) with and without conceptual discrimination (savikalpanirvikalpa), does not exist.

There may thus be seen a kind of propositional hierarchy within the structure of the catușkoti, and this corresponds very well with the fact that the proposition in Śāntideva analysed above has been proved to represent the fourth koti.

8. The semiotics of negation, difference and dependence

8.1

The discussion in NS indicated that it is difficult to formulate a consistent solution to the problem involved in determining the precise limits of identity and difference among things. For dependence itself which is essential in organizing the relationship between things has proved to raise some fundamental problems: either the dependent categories are dissolved into irreality and pure nothingness because it is impossible to delimit one term from the other, or rather, to indicate the precise limits of the mutually dependent terms; or the category of negation is introduced as the element that delimits the boundaries among the mutually presupposed terms. But here the analysis in NS disclosed a characteristic lack of discrimination between "be" in its two functions as copula and existential verb. "Not-being" was here interpreted as an utterance about non-entity since the Buddhist sophism was based on the implicit consideration that the one who talks about not-being seems to be talking about non-entity. However, the not-being asserted here does not state the opposite of what is, but only something different from what is.

8.2

If the example used by Vātsyāyana for illustrating the Buddhist conception of mutual not-being, itaretarābhāva, is invested in the semiotic square, their relationship become obvious: the negated terms ago/anasva are to be construed syntactically with the primitive terms on the semantic axis. The function of the negation as productive of difference and as an element internal to judgement may thus be given a consistent explanation. The place of the negated terms which in this syntax
are affected by the act of assertion and thereby imply the positive terms, \( \text{ago} \supset a\text{śva} \) and \( \text{anaśva} \supset \text{go} \), may be represented in the square as follows:

![Diagram](image)

8.3.

It is evident that the light which the semiotic square sheds on the syntactical position of the negation also elucidates the Indian conception of the two types of negation, \( \text{paruyudāsa} \) and \( \text{prasajyapratīṣedha} \). \( \text{paruyudāsa} \), "limitative negation", is the type of negation which implies the assertion of one of the primitive but not manifested terms on the semantic axis. The other type of negation, \( \text{prasajyapratīṣedha} \), "absolute negation", does not involve implication and therefore not the assertion of the primitive terms either. But this fact is obviously not inscribed in the nature of negation as such, and it therefore needs to be interpreted, which means that other elements in the proposition become decisive for its correct interpretation, like, for instance, modality. It is also easy to recognize the problematic of the Buddhist theory of \( \text{apoha} \) in the structure and function of negation within the framework of the semiotic square. The mutual relationship between the terms may be represented in the following manner:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{(go)} & S_1 & S_2 \\
\text{paruyudāsa} & \text{APoha} & \text{paruyudāsa} \\
\text{(anaśva)} & S_2 & S_1 \\
\text{prasajyapratīṣedha} & \text{(ago)} & \\
\end{array}
\]

\[1\] This, for instance, is the case with Bhāvaviveka's description of \( \text{prasajyapratīṣedha} \) in Tarkajvāla, P 5256, 63a8-b1: med par dgag pa ni dḥos po'i nö bo nīd tsam 'gil 'gog par zad kyi de dañ 'dra ba de ma yin pa gzan gyi dḥos po sgrub par mi byed
9. Conclusive note

The Madhyamika dialectic has shown that it is difficult to define the limits among the inter-dependent elements, and that this difficulty may be exploited in the interest of reducing semiosis and thus also being to zero.

The effectiveness of their dialectic is based on the fact that, since the terms on the semantic axis are inter-dependent, in the sense that one is meaningless without the concomitant presence of the other, the event which represents a change from one state to another becomes indeterminable and illogical because the determination of an event involves the presence of both terms, and because the two terms are incompatible when transposed to the field of reality. It is sufficient here to recall

"As regards prasajyapratigedha, it only negates the nature of phenomena as such, but does not establish another phenomenon which is different from this one. For instance, the proposition 'a brāhmaṇa should not drink (na pibet) liquor (sūra)' only negates this as such, but does not specify whether or not he should drink a beverage that is different from this one."

The concept of negation in Indian philosophy and grammar is a complex phenomenon and covers a multitude of heterogenous elements. Cp. Renou 1957 230 for prasajyapratigedha, and ibid. 202 for paryūḍa. See also Kajiyama 1973 with references.

It is obvious that Bhāvaviveka primarily refers to the concept of prasajyapratigedha in order to defend Nāgārjuna's propositions against unwanted implications. This, for instance, becomes abundantly clear when reading his commentary on MMK I, 1. Cp. PD 10. There it is used as a hermeneutical devise without considering its logical implications. For if the negation in this case has to be construed with vidyante, all the qualifications svataḥ, parataḥ, dvābhyaṁ, ahetutaḥ become redundant because the propositions only state that things do not exist: and this, of course, precludes the possibility of implication. But, if the qualifications are not redundant, it becomes possible to deduce the dialectical implications which Bhāvaviveka attempts to avoid. The fact is that a dialectical argument like this cannot be reduced to independent propositions, but should be syntactically connected since it represents a dialectical exhaustion of the possibilities of causation.

N.B.: The four propositions in MMK I,1 cannot be invested in the semiotic square and cannot, therefore, be considered an instance of catuṣkoṭi as generally claimed:

![Diagram](attachment://diagram.png)

It is impossible to invest the term ahetutaḥ in this syntax, and dvābhyaṁ is not manifested. It can at best be described as an irregular instance of the catuṣkoṭi.
Nāgārjuna's treatment of the concept of the three modes of time and the category of process in the theory of causation in order to prove this point.¹

There is therefore no reason for ascribing the notion of contradiction to Mādhyamika dialectic since this only confuses the true nature of the Mādhyamika concept of virodha, which is one of incompatibility. The notion of contradiction requires that contradiction as such is located in judgement, but this is not the case in Nāgārjuna, who locates contradiction in reality.²

Since Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika school do not treat this problem as a question referring to the cognitive status of language in relation to being, but rather as a proof of the illogicity of being itself, the effectiveness of their thinking rests exclusively on the implicit identification of the semantic structure of language with the order of reality.

The negative dialectic empties, obliterates, being and difference in order to establish the existence of an imaginary Absolute that transcends being and difference. A second part of this paper will be devoted to the analysis of this imaginary category.

¹ Cp. MMK XIX, (kālaparīkṣā) for a Nāgārjunean analysis of the concept of time. For an analysis of the concept of process (kriyā) and causation see MMK I (pratyaya-parīkṣā) and MMK XX (sāmagrīparīkṣā). As a characteristic example of the impossibility of determining the event we may mention MMK XXI (saṃbhavavibhavaparīkṣā).

² Robinson 1967 50 maintains that Nāgārjuna knew the principle of contradiction and consciously applied it. But it is impossible to substantiate this thesis on the basis of the few examples from MMK that seems to support it. MMK VIII,7 evidently locates contradiction in being. What Nāgārjuna says is that an entity - in this case karman - cannot be both existent and non-existent since existent and non-existent are mutually incompatible and therefore cannot occur as one: pariṣparaviruddham hi sac cāsač caikataḥ kutaḥ || And the same is the case with MMK VII,30: ekatve na hi bhāvaḥ ca bhāvaḥ copapadyate || Cp. also MMK XX,20: ekatve phalahetvoh syād aikyaṁ janakajanyayoḥ. None of these examples indicate that Nāgārjuna locates contradiction in the proposition. Contradiction is located in the field of reality and is best described as opposition and incompatibility.
Abbreviations

JIBS  Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies. Tokyo
OLZ  Orientalistische Literaturzeitung. Leipzig 1898 ff.

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BCA  Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the Commentary Pañjikā of Prajñākaramati. Ed. by P.L.Vaidya, Darbhanga 1960
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ON THE THESIS AND ASSERTION IN THE MADHYAMAKA / DBU MA

by

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I

When the philosophy of the middle (Tibetan dBu ma = Sanskrit Madhyamaka) was adopted in Tibet as the predominant school of thought, its Tibetan followers were confronted with a number of difficult, and highly interesting, philosophical and religious problems several of which had not been fully clarified in their Indian sources.

This adoption of the Madhyamaka in Tibet is reported to have taken place by royal command immediately following the so-called "Council of bSam yas" or "Council of Tibet" in the 790s. And by the beginning of the ninth century indigenous Tibetan scholarship had begun to grapple with some of these questions, as can be seen from the treatises composed at that time by dPal brtsegs and Ye Šes sde, two of the greatest scholars and translator-editors of the Old Tibetan Kingdom. However, the deeper and more systematic penetration of the problems posed by the philosophical traditions of the Madhyamaka appears to have begun only at the start of the Later Propagation (phyi dar) of the Dharma in Tibet. Initiated by scholars and translators such as Rin chen bzaṅ po (958-1055) and Ati-śa (Dīpaṃkaraśrīrijñāna, 982-1054), this philosophical penetration was actively pursued later in the eleventh century by rNog Blo ldan Šes rab (1059-1109) and (s)Pa tshab Ši ma grags (born in 1055). Together with their immediate disciples these last two masters are regarded as the leading early Tibetan representatives of the Madhyamaka in its two branches known in Tibet as the Raṅ rgyud pa (*Svātantrika) and Thal 'gyur ba (*Prāsaṅgika), a pair of designations which appears to have become current only during the Later Propagation of the Dharma in Tibet.

One of the thorniest and most interesting problems to be encountered in the history of the Madhyamaka is the question whether the follower of this school - the Madhyamika (Tib. dBu ma pa) - may legitimately, within
the frame of his school's doctrine, maintain a philosophical proposition or thesis (pratijñā = dam bca') and a philosophical position (pakṣa = phyogs) of his own, and indeed whether there is any legitimate place in the Madhyamaka for a doctrinal system of one's own (svamata = raṅ lugs). This question — which appears not to be unconnected with some of the topics under discussion between India, Chinese and Tibetan thinkers towards the end of the eighth century at the time of the "Council of Tibet"¹ — has been frequently raised in Tibetan philosophical literature. For the Tibetan dBu ma pas the problem arises because Nāgārjuna, the source of Madhyamaka thought in all its branches, has himself stated that he has no pratijñā, and because this idea has been repeated by Āryadeva, the second common source of all branches of the Madhyamaka, as well as by Candrakīrti, the principal master of the Prāsaṅgika branch of the Madhyamaka.² Yet Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, and the other Mādhyamikas who have thus disowned a pratijñā were nevertheless thinkers engaged in expounding a philosophical theory (darśana = lta ba, or vāda = smra ba) — as distinct from a speculative view or dogma (dṛṣṭi = lta ba) — and in explaining a teaching that they held to be true — viz. the teaching of the Buddha. Confronted thus with the question of how the statement that the Madhyamika has no pratijñā or pakṣa relates to the actual procedure of the great masters of the Madhyamaka as philosophers and exegetes, the Tibetan dBu ma pas have found it necessary to investigate in detail the rejection of a thesis and its philosophical status and motivation. The need to do so was especially keenly felt since this problem had not been thoroughly elucidated in the Indian sources.³

¹ See below, p.224.
² That the statement "All dharmas are unborn (anutpannāḥ sarvadharmaḥ) should not be made a pratijñā is explained also in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (ed. B.Nanjo, Kyōto 1923), III,166-167. Cf. also II,41,8; II,122,12 (in a discussion of the catuṣkoṭikā); V, 219,8 (verse 3, in connexion with the avoidance of disputes, vivāda, on which see below). This sūtra in addition rejects the pakṣa that postulates existence/non-existence (sad-asat) in II,23,6 (verse 7). Cf also II,72-73, etc.

That the rejection of a pratijñā must not be equated with position 4 of the catuṣkoṭi(kā) can be seen from Laṅkāvatārasūtra II,122. And the Samādhīrājasūtra states (IX,27) that the wise person will not take his stand even in a position between the two extreme positions of existence and non-existence (i.e. positions 1 and 2 of the catuṣkoṭi) — a point that has sometimes been overlooked in recent discussions of the Madhyamaka. See also Śāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra IX,35 together with Prajñākaramati, Bodhicaryāvatāra-paṇjikā on IX,33 ff. Cf. D.Seyfort Ruegg, The uses of the four positions of the catuṣkoṭi, JIP 5. 1977,1-71.

³ Interpretations of certain aspects of this complex of problems by Jayānanda (in his Madhyamakāvatāratikā) and by his Tibetan Lotsāba disciples have been criticized by Tson khapa Blo bzang grags pa'i dpal, Lam rim chen mo, 433b1 f., 436b4 f. See below.
In his *Vigrahavāyuvartani* Nāgārjuna states (29-30):

\[
\begin{align*}
yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved doṣaḥ |  
nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmin naivāsti me doṣaḥ ||  
yadi kīmciṣd upalabheyaḥ pravartayeyaḥ nivartayeyaḥ vā |  
pratyakṣādibhir arthais tadabhāvān me 'nupālambhaḥ ||  
\end{align*}
\]

"If I had some pratijñā [this] defect would as a consequence attach to me, but I have no pratijñā so that there is no defect for me. If I apprehended something by means of direct perception and the other factors [that are valid means of right knowledge] I would engage in affirmation or denial, [but] because of their non-existence no criticism [is possible] against me."

This passage contains Nāgārjuna's reply to the objection of an opponent according to whom it is precisely the Mādhyamika's pratijñā - i.e. his statement "All entities are empty" - that is defective. Indeed, as the opponent had argued earlier (vv 1),

\[
\begin{align*}
sarveṣāṁ bhāvaṁ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaḥ cet |  
tvadvacanam asvabhāvaṁ na nivartayitum svabhāvaṁ alam ||  
\end{align*}
\]

"If [as you maintain] no self-nature exists for all entities, then your [own] statement, [which is therefore also] without self-nature, cannot controvert self-nature."

However, according to the commentary on vv 29 ascribed to Nāgārjuna himself, given that all entities are empty of self-nature, entirely quiet and "isolated" in nature, the Mādhyamika can have no pratijñā; no character of a pratijñā will then apply to his statement (contrary to what the opponent has argued in vv 4); and the alleged defect resulting from having acquired the character of a pratijñā cannot therefore arise.\(^5\)

\(^4\) VV 4:

\[
\begin{align*}
pratishedhapratishedho 'py evam iti mataṁ bhavet tad asad eva |  
evam tava pratijñā lakṣaṇato duṣyate na mama ||
\end{align*}
\]

The opponent is here represented as assuming that the Mādhyamika argues that the opponent's negation of the Mādhyamika's negation of self-nature (svabhāva) of entities is improper, and the opponent now maintains that this argument is itself improper. For, he reasons, it is the Mādhyamika's negation - and not the opponent's denial of the Mādhyamika's negation - that takes on the character of a pratijñā or thesis and it is therefore this pratijñā of the Mādhyamika that is defective.

\(^5\) VVV on 29: yadi ca kācīn mama pratijñā syāt tato mama pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptatvāt pūr-vavo daṇḍo yathā tvayoktas tathā mama syāt | na mama kācīd asti pratijñā | tasmāt sarvabhāveśaśūnyeṣv atyantopāśaṃteṣu prakṛtivivikteṣu kutaḥ pratijñā | kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇapraptikṛto doṣaḥ | tatra yad bhavatoktam tava pratijñālakṣaṇapraptatvāt tavaiva doṣa iti tan na |
With regard to the nature of his negative statement, and in reply to the opponent's objection that a negation can apply only to something real that is absent in a particular place (vv 11), \(^6\) Nāgārjuna states (vv 63):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{pratīṣedhayāmi nāhaṃ kīṃcit pratīṣedhyam asti na ca kīṃcit} & \\
\text{tasmāt pratīṣedhayasyātī adhilaya eṣa tvayā kriyate} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

"I negate nothing [really existing] and there exists nothing to be negated: therefore by saying that I negate [some thing] you make a [false] imputation."

\(^7\) Nāgārjuna has specified the nature of his negation in vv 23:

\[
\begin{align*}
nirmitako nirmitakam māyāpuruṣaḥ svamāyayā sṛṣṭam & \\
\text{pratīṣedhayeta yadvat pratīṣedho 'yaṃ tathaiva syāt} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

"Let the negation [employed by us] be like [the case] where one projection might put an end to [another] projection [or where, in a magical show put on by a clever illusionist, one] man-of-māyā [might put an end to another] created by his own illusory power (māyā)." \(^8\)

---

\(^6\) E.g. nāsti ghaṭo gehe "there is no pot in [this] house".

\(^7\) In the Tibetan translation of the Kārikās only of the VV by Jñānagarbha and Ka ba dpal brtsegs which was revised by Jayānanda and Khu mDo sde dpal (sic?), adhilaya is translated by yaṃ dag min (te khyod kyis smras). And in the translation of the Kārikās together with the Vṛtti by Jñānagarbha and dpal brtsegs (?), the word is translated by bkur pa (Peking ed.) ~ skur pa (sDe dge ed.) "denial, rejection". The Vṛtti speaks here of an irrelevant (aprastūta) adhilaya (skur pa thog tu ma bab pa). Compare below, n.11.

\(^8\) See also VV 27. - According to one theory of negation, there can properly speaking be negation (pratīṣedha) only of something that exists, e.g. a pot. This principle is stated by Nāgārjuna's opponent in VV 11. In VV 30 Nāgārjuna argues that there would be affirmation/negation if some thing were really apprehended as existent by a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa), i.e. by direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāṇa), analogy (upamāṇa), and valid testimony (āgama). But since he considers all entities (sarvabhoota) to be empty of self-nature, there exists no thing for the Madhyamika to negate; and the opponent's criticism of Nāgārjuna for negating everything is therefore irrelevant (aprastūta). - The question whether negation can be applied to a real thing is discussed by Dharmakīrti (Pramāṇavārttika, Parārthānumānapariccheda 225-226 = Pramāṇaviniścaya II,16-17), Dharmottara (Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi, ed. E.Frauwaller, WZKM 42, 1935, 227; cf. 246), Śāntarakṣita (Madhyamakā-laṃkāra 72), and Haribhadra (Abhisamayālāṃkāralokā V.8-9 ed. W.Wogihara, Tōkyō 1932, 838). The further question as to whether empty subject terms are negatable cannot be gone into here.

When the Madhyamika makes use of negation, then, it is as if, in a magical show, one illusory projection puts an end to another (VV 23, 27). Neither is real, both being products of the magician-illusionist's cleverness and dexterity. Use of negation does not therefore imply, for the Madhyamika, the existence of a real negandum (pratīṣedhya, pratīṣeddhavya = dgag bya). (See also Yṣ 8 cd and 46, quoted by mKhais
The idea that no criticism (upālambha) can be levelled against one who understands that all entities are empty of self-nature (svabhāva-śūnya), and who therefore entertains no thesis affirming or denying a self-nature, is further alluded to in other passages of the vv. Āryadeva also makes this point in his catuḥśatakā (XVI,25):

sad asat sadasac ceti yasya pakṣo na vidyate |
upālambhaś cireṇāpi tasya vaktum na śakyate ||

"It is not at all possible to level a criticism against the person who has no position positing [some thing] existent, non-existent, and both existent and non-existent."¹⁰

Nāgārjuna moreover observes in his NMK (XXIV,13):

śūnyatāyām adhilayaṁ yaṃ punah kurute bhavān |
doṣaprasaṅgo nāsmākaṁ sa śūye nopapadyate ||

"The charge¹¹ you moreover make concerning Emptiness does not apply to the empty as the occurrence of a fault for us."

That is, according to Candrakīrti, it does not apply in the case of the doctrine of Emptiness (śūnyatāvāda), which has the sense not of negativism or nihilism (abhāva) but of origination in dependence (pratītyasa-mutpāda).

¹⁰ See also ČS XVI,10:

dīotos po mthoṅ nas dīotos po ni | | med pa žes bya bzloṅ 'gyur na ||
de ltar phyogs ni bži char la | | ņes pa spāns pa gaṅ žig mthoṅ ||

"The non-existence of an entity being excluded when an entity is seen, in the case of the four pakṣas [corresponding to the four positions of a catuṣkoti] what is seen to be without a defect?"  — For the four extreme positions of the catuṣkoti, only three of which have been mentioned in ČS XVI,25, see e.g. ČS VIII,20 (below, p.213) and XIV,21. Cf. JTP 5. 1977, 1-71.

¹¹ In Candrakīrti's PP, adhilaya is glossed as adhikṣepa ("abuse, dismissal"), and as nirākaraṇa and pratiṅkṣepa ("refutation, rejection"). The Tibetan translation has spön ba(r byed pa); but in PP VII,15 (159,15) adhilaya = smod pa(r byed pa) "blame". Cf. above, n.7.
A related point is made by Nāgārjuna in MMK IV,8-9:

\[ \text{vigrahe yaḥ parīhāraṁ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet |} \\
\text{sarvāṁ tasyāpariḥṛtam samaṁ sādhyena jāyate ||} \\
\text{vyākhyāne ya upālambhaṁ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet |} \\
\text{sarvāṁ tasyānapaladbhaṁ samaṁ sādhyena jāyate ||} \\

"If someone makes a rebuttal when a debate is being conducted in terms of Emptiness, nothing serves him as a rebuttal: there [merely] arises an equivalent with what is to be established. If someone makes a criticism when an explanation is given in terms of Emptiness, nothing serves him as a criticism: there [merely] arises an equivalent with what is to be established."

In other words, whatever may be adduced in a debate or discussion as a reply or objection against śūnyatā will itself fall within the scope of śūnyatā and cannot therefore ground an argument against it. Thus, as Candrakīrti explains, the existence of sensation and the following three Groups (skandha) cannot be adduced as an argument against the non-substantiality and Emptiness of rūpa, the first skandha, since the existence as substantial entities of the last four skandhas is equivalent (sama) to - and hence just as dubious as - the sādhya in question, i.e. the substantial existence of visible form (rūpasadbhāva).

In the Yuktīśaṭṭikā the context is not only logical and ontological, as in the passages quoted above, but ethical and soteriological as well.

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12 Candrakīrti glosses vigraha, "conflict", by parapakṣadūṣaṇa, "refutation of an opponent's (or: an opposed) thesis".

13 See also CS VIII,16 (quoted in PP IV,9):

\[ \text{bhāvasaikasya yo draṣṭā draṣṭā sarvasya sa smṛtaḥ |} \\
\text{ekasya śūnyatā yai va saiva sarvasya śūnyatā ||} \\

"The seer of one thing is considered a seer of [any thing at] all: Emptiness of one thing is [tantamount to] Emptiness of [any thing at] all."

14 This is the principle (vidhi, PP 127.15) of circularity in proof. For the expression sādhyasama see also VV 26 and VV 69. - J.May translated sādhyā-sama as "pétition de principe"; see Candrakīrti: Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtā. Paris 1959, 93 f., 532. This translation has been criticized by K.Bhattacharya, JIP 2. 1974, 225-30; see also B.K.Matilal, JIP 2. 1974, 221 f., who seeks to show that Nāgārjuna's sādhyasama does not correspond with a standard interpretation of petitio principii and prefers to render the expression by "same predicament".
In this treatise Nāgarjuna indeed states not only (51):

\[ \text{che ba'i bdag ŋid can de dag | | rnam s la phyogs med rtsod pa med ||} \\
\[ \text{gaṅ rnam s la ni phyogs med pa | | de la gzan phyogs ga la yod ||} \\

"For these great beings there is no position (pakṣa), no dispute (vivāda). How could there be another's [counter-] position for those who have no position?",

but also (47):

\[ \text{rāgadvesodbhavas tiIrakašṭa[?]dṛṣṭiparigrahaḥ |} \\
\[ \text{vivādās tatsamutthāś ca bhāvābhupagame sati ||} \\

"When one makes an affirmation concerning an entity one espouses terrible and wrong [speculative] views in which attraction and hostility arise, and that leads to disputes resulting from the latter."

The eirenic character of a philosophy that makes no postulations concerning entities is here closely linked with dispassion and strifelessness on the ethical level.\(^{17}\)

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\(^{15}\) This translation (which is somewhat uncertain) attempts to follow the Tibetan version by Mūditaśri and Pa tshab Ni ma grags reproduced here, which is cited by mKhas grub rje in his skal bzān mig ’byed (146a2). But the (earlier) translation by Jñānimitra, Dānaśīla, Śilendrabodhi and Ye shes sde, included in their translation of Candrakīrti's Yuktisāṅkāvṛtti, reads:

\[ \text{rtsod med che ba'i bdag ŋid can | | de dag la ni phyogs med do ||} \\
\[ \text{gaṅ rnam s la ni phyogs med pa | | de la gzan phyogs ga la yod ||} \\

Following this version, pādas a and b could perhaps be translated: "Those whose nature is greater (?) non-disputatiousness have no position." The Tibetan version of Candrakīrti's Vṛtti has: rān gi phyogs khas len pa yod na ni de'i tse de gzugs pa'i phyir gzan rnas daṅ rtsod par gyur na de dag la ni de lta bu yān na de bas na rtsod med che ba'i bdag ŋid can no | | gal te de dag la rān gi phyogs med du zin kyaṅ gzan gi phyogs gzig pa med mi srid de | | de bas na gzan gi phyogs yod daṅ | | bdag gi phyogs kyaṅ med du mi ruṅ no || See also Candrakīrti, MA VI,118 f.

\(^{16}\) The Sanskrit text of this verse of the YŚ is quoted by Haribhadra, Abhisamayālaṁ-kārāloka II,8 (161). The reading of the Sanskrit text is uncertain.

\(^{17}\) In addition to Lāṅkāvatārasūtra V,3 (219), which links a pratijñā with vivāda, see also Samādhirājasūtra IX,28, which connects the twin opposed views of existence and non-existence with vivāda and Pain (duḥkha). See also CS VIII,10:

\[ \text{svapākṣe vidyate rāgāḥ parapākṣas tu te 'priyāḥ |} \\
\[ \text{na gamasya nirvāṇaṁ na śivāṁ dvandvacārīnaḥ ||} \\

"Being attached to [your] own position and disliking another's position, you will not attain Nirvāṇa: there is no tranquillity for him who lives in opposition"; and compare CS XII,15 and Candrakīrti, Madhyamakāvatāra VI,118.

These ideas can be traced back to the old canon, for example the Dīghanikāya (II, 58-59), the Saṃyuttanikāya (I,4) and, especially, the Suttanipāta (e.g. the Paramattha-kasutta, Tissametteyyasutta, Pasūrasutta, Māgandiyasutta, Purāñhadasutta, Kalahavādhasutta, Cūḷaviyūhasutta, and Mahāviyūhasutta of the Āṭṭhakavagga; the verse Suttanipāta 842 is found in Saṃyuttanikāya I,12). Still, notwithstanding e.g. Suttanipāta 837, the perfected Bhikkhu and Arāhan may say that he makes a statement (or teaches a doctrine?) (Saṃyuttanikāya I,14); but he does so only according to consensual usage
Concerning a *pakṣa* and its correlative counter-position, in the *Ratnāvalī* also ascribed to Nāgārjuna we read (II,4):

\[
\text{dṛṣṭabreroṭādyam muninā na satyaṃ na mṛṣoditam |} \\
\text{pakṣād dhi pratipakṣaḥ syād ubhayam tac ca nārthataḥ ||}
\]

"What is seen, heard and so forth is said by the Sage to be neither true nor false: from a position a counter-position (*mīmṭhun phyoṅs*) may proceed, but neither [holds] in fact."\(^{10}\)

This verse follows one stating that neither *ātman* nor *anātman* is apprehended in reality, and that they constitute two speculative views (*dṛṣṭi*) that the great Sage has excluded.

*Ratnāvalī* II,3–4 are quoted by Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapada* on *MMK* XVIII,6 where Nāgārjuna states that, while the designation *ātman* has been used and *anātman* has been taught, the Buddhas have also taught neither *ātman* nor its opposite (*anātman*).\(^{19}\) And in *MMK* XVIII,8 Nāgārjuna

(vohāramattena, I,15).

The above-mentioned passage would suggest a close connexion between absence of strife and contentiousness, achieved through refraining from adhering to one's own theses and rejecting others' theses, and the Buddhist ideal of *araṇa*/araṇā (Tib. ņon moṅs med pa) "absence of affliction, passion" as a quality of Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Buddhhas. In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* I,8, the *rapas* are defined as *kleṣas* "afflictions, passions" that inflict harm on oneself and others. And according to *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* VII,35–36, *araṇā* "passionlessness, strifelessness" is a condition where the Arhat avoids becoming the objective support (*ālambana*) for the arising of *kleṣas* in others. Cf. *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* VIII,7 and *Mahāyānasūtraḷāṅkāra* XX, 45 for the same in connexion with a Buddha. This *araṇa* is sometimes associated with *maitrī* "friendliness"; see *Abhidharmakośa* IV,56; *Vibhāṣaprabhāvṛtti* (ed. P.Jaini, Patna 1959), 144, and L.de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa* VII (Paris-Louvain 1925), 86-87 (cf. also Gāndavyūha, Maitreya Chapter, verse 39 [ed. Suzuki and Idu- mi, Tōkyō n.d., 402] and F.Edgerton, *BHSD* s.v. ?). The concept of *araṇa* (vihārin) has been discussed by M.Walleser, *Die Streitlosigkeit des Subhūti*. (Sitzungsber. der Heidelberger Ak. der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Kl., Jahrg.1917, 13.Abh.), Heidelberg 1917.

In the case of the Mādhyamika, his philosophical endeavour is not directed as such towards refuting another's thesis inasmuch as the latter simply dissolves and disappears in the clear light of the Madhyamaka analysis, just as darkness disappears before light, or as a mirage vanishes (VV 65-66), or as an illusion disappears (VV 23, 27). (See also Candrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI,118.) What the Mādhyamika achieves, then, by means of his prasaṅga-type reasoning is the dissolving or deconstruction of all propositional theses postulating substantial entities (bhāva), rather than their refutation (involving the setting up of a counter-thesis and the holding of a counter-position within the framework of binary alternatives).

\(^{18}\) Cf. *Ratnāvalī* I,72:

\[
\text{vināśat pratipakṣad vā syād astitvasya nāśitā |} \\
\text{vināśab pratipakṣo vā katham syād astyasambhavat ||}
\]

"Because of destruction, or because of a counter-position (*griṅ po*), for existence there would be non-existence. [But] because of the non-existence (or: impossibility) of existence how would there be destruction, or a counter-position?" - On the meanings of *pakṣa* cf. below, n.25.

\(^{19}\) On the interpretation of *MMK* XVIII,6, see D.Seyfort Ruegg, *JIP* 5. 1977, 7-9.
specifies that teachings that all is "so" (tathya, i.e. true), "not so" (atathya, i.e. mṛgā "false"), "both so and not so", and "neither so nor not so" represent a progressive instruction (anuśāsana). According to Candrakīrti, since the Buddhas, employing great compassion, introduce their various disciples to the quintessential elixir of immortality of reality (cattvāṁśatvātāra), their teaching is a progressive one (anupūr-vyā śāsanam), or one that conforms to their disciples (vineyajanānurū-pyeṇa śāsanam). Here Candrakīrti quotes Āryadeva's Catuḥśatāka (VIII, 20)

sad asat sadasac ceti nobhayām ceti kathyate
nanu vyādhivaśāt sarvam auṣadham nāma jāyate

"Mention is made [in the Buddha's teachings] of the existent, the non-existent, the existent-and-non-existent, and what is neither. [Indeed,] does not everything become what is called medicine because of [the various] diseases [to be treated]?"

Reality is then defined as without discursive development (prapañ-cair aprapañcitam) and as free of conceptual dichotomization (nirvikal-pa). Hence, for the Madhyamika, it cannot be hypostatized in terms of the positions of the catuṣkoṭi.

Exactly how, then, are the Sanskrit term pratijñā and its Tibetan equivalent dam bca' - together with corresponding verbal forms such as Skt. pratijñānte and Tib. dam 'cha' ba - to be understood?

In a number of our sources the term pratijñā very clearly refers to a propositional thesis postulating an entity (bhāva). And it is just such a thesis that Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva have disowned in the vv and the CS. This meaning is also clearly attested in the Sanskrit text of Candrakīrti's PP 16, 7-12 (svatantrā pratijñā), 23, 3 (svapratijñā), 19, 4 (svapratijñātārtha) and 18, 6 and 34, 5 (parapratijñā), in particular in the context of his critical discussion of Bhāvaviveka's employment of an independent inference (svatantrānumāna) and an independent "syllogism" (svatantraprayogavākya) to establish the understanding of the Madhyamaka (see PP 16, 18-19, 25, 34).

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21 PP on MMK XVIII.8 (372). Cf. JIP 5. 1977, 7. - Instead of sarvam (thams cad) part of the tradition however reads pathyam ('phrod pa).
22 Cf. JIP 5. 1977, 10f. On a use of the "neither ... nor" formula in the Madhyamaka which does not correspond to position 4 of the catuṣkoṭi, see, however, loc.cit. 16-18.
In other passages of the PP, however, the meaning "sentence" or statement" is no less well attested for the word pratijñā. For example, the four (negative) statements enunciated by Nāgārjuna in MMK I,1 - "Nowhere are any entities whatever ever produced from self, an other, both, and from no cause [i.e. from neither self nor an other]" - are termed pratiññās by Candrakīrti (PP on I,1 [13,3]; cf. Madhyamākavātarabhāṣya on VI,8 [81,17-18]). Moreover, Nāgārjuna's two statements in MMK VIII,1 - "A real agent does not effect a real action, nor does an unreal agent bring about an unreal action" - are referred to by Candrakīrti as pratijñās or theses (PP 181,1-2; cf. PP on VIII,7 [185,3]); but such a thesis clearly does not assert the existence of any kind of bhāva. Similarly, in commenting on MMK XXI,2 - "How indeed without coming into existence (sambhava) will there be destruction (vibhava), [for then] without birth precisely [there would be] death; there is [then] no destruction without birth" - Candrakīrti identifies a pratijñā ("How indeed without coming into existence will there be destruction"), the ad- duction of an argument ad absurdum pointing out a consequence undesired by the opponent (prasaṅgāpādāna: "[for then] without birth precisely [there would be] death"), and the conclusion (nigamana: "there is no destruction without birth").
In addition, in connexion with the Vinaya, Candrakīrti uses pratijñā in the meaning of "vow" (PP on XVII,32 [334,2]).

This second series of examples taken from Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā demonstrates that the Mādhyamika does use the word pratijñā in a positive or neutral context, without automatically rejecting it as a thesis postulating some kind of entity or relegating it to an opponent's pūrvapakṣa. And we accordingly have to distinguish between pratijñā/dam bca' as a philosophical statement or thesis enunciated by Nāgārjuna or another Mādhyamika, and pratijñā/dam bca' as a propositional thesis postulating the substantial existence of some kind of bhāva, which the Mādhyamika firmly rejects. Though of course related, the meanings "statement", "vow" and "propositional thesis (postulating an entity)" have therefore to be carefully distinguished in the usage of the Mādhyamikas.

The word pakṣa/phyoogs has been used by the Mādhyamikas in much the same way as pratijñā/dam bca', as has been seen above where it denotes

23 See also PP IV,2 (123,11) for pratijñā; and v.5 (131,17) for nigamana.- For the pratijñā in an opponent's pūrvapakṣa (where it is of course rejected), see PP on XII,2 (227,12), XX,20 (403,15), and 9,1, where we find the expression pratijñā- māṭra(ka).
24 For some relevant Sūtra passages see above, n.2.
The kind of philosophical position disowned by the Madhyamika. It has, however, also been used by Candrakirti in a positive context (see the avatarāṇīkā in PP on XXIV,15 [501,10]: ... āśmākīne pakṣe supariṇuddha-
tare sarvavyavasthāsv aviruddhe vyavasthite...). And, under the influence apparently of logicians like Dharmakirti and some of his successors who developed a synthesis of the Madhyamaka with logic, the Tibetan Madhyamikas have not hesitated to formulate prasaṅga-type arguments in which a pakṣa and a pratijñā are found. Indeed, as already seen above, Candrakirti has himself sanctioned this use of pratijñā.

Given these two distinct uses of pratijñā (and pakṣa), there is no paradox in a philosopher's saying "I have no propositional thesis (pratijñā)", for this sentence is not automatically synonymous with "I have no philosophical thesis (pratijñā = darśana, vāda, etc.)". And no logical inconsistency need therefore exist between Nāgārjuna's statement in vv 29 and the actual procedure of this philosopher and other Madhyamikas. There does, however, appear to exist a certain philosophical tension between these two approaches of the Madhyamika; and this is a question that has been addressed in particular by the Tibetan exegetical tradition.

III

The complex of problems connected with the status of a philosophical thesis in Madhyamaka thought has received special attention in the stōṅ thun sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed, an extensive treatise by mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ po (1385-1438) on the philosophy of the Madhyamaka. The author, often referred to as mKhas grub rje or mKhas grub thams cad mkhyen pa, was at first, like Tsoṅ kha pa (1357-1419), a disciple of Red mda'

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25 The functions of pakṣa, as a term equivalent to anumeya, in an inference have been studied by J.F.Staal, JIP 2. 1973, 156-166. Here, however, we are concerned only with pakṣa ("position") as either the equivalent or the content of a pratijñā.

26 An example is Jitāri.

27 PP on XXI,2, referred to above.

28 Zab mo stōṅ pa 'nīd kyi de kho na 'nīd rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos, sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed ces bya ha, in vol.Ka of the gSuṅ 'bum of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ po (201 edition). This work is included in the list of mKhas grub rje's writings in the rNam thar written by one Svasti (bDe legs or dGe legs?), 11b2 (vol. ka of the gSuṅ 'bum). - An account of mKhas grub rje's life is also to be found in Sum pa mkhan po Ye śes dpal 'byor, dPag bsam ljon bzaṅ, ed. S.Ch.Das, Calcutta 1908, 271 f. For further biographical material see A.Vostrikov, Tibetskaja istoričeskaja literaturaja, Moscow 1962, n.362 and 562. There is also an important gSan yig in vol. ka of the gSuṅ 'bum.
ba g yön nu blo gros (1349-1412) - a renowned master of the Prāsaṅgīka branch of the Madhyamaka - from whom he received his monastic ordination, and with whom he studied the philosophical curriculum including dBu ma (Madhyamaka). Then, in his twenty-third year, mKhas grub rje joined Tson kha pa, who was to be his principal teacher and with whom he studied dBu ma and the Lam rim among many other subjects. mKhas grub rje succeeded his senior codisciple rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432) - himself the direct successor of Tson kha pa - on the abbatial seat of dGa' ldan monastery.

The skal bzaṅ mig 'byed was written down by Žaṅ zuṅ pa Chos dbaṅ grags pa (1404-1469), a disciple of mKhas grub rje who, according to the colophon of this text, faithfully recorded his master's teaching without making either unwarranted additions or subtractions.

The following is a summary of salient points in the treatment of our problem which appears in the skal bzaṅ mig 'byed in the context of mKhas grub rje's discussion of various opinions on the difference between the Svātāntrika and Prāsaṅgīka branches of the Madhyamaka (145b-156b).

The discussion opens with a quotation of the opinion of many persons who lay claim to being modern Prāsaṅgīka-Mādhyamikas. According to them, even in transactional usage (tha sñad = vyavahāra) the Prāsaṅgīka has no doctrinal system of his own (raṅ lugs = svamata), no propositional thesis (dam bca' = pratiññā), and no tenet or affirmation (khas len = abhyu-pagama) whatsoever. Otherwise, they argue, the Prāsaṅgīka would not differ from the Svātāntrika [i.e. from a Mādhyamika who adopts independent

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29 The above-mentioned rNam thar by Svasti places (3b2) his ordination in the year šiṅ mo lug (=1415), when he would have been in his 30th or 31st year. This date must be wrong if Red ma' ba died in 1412. Was the year of mKhas grub rje's ordination then 1405 (šiṅ bya), when he would have been the age usual in Tibet for ordination? This is the year that Sum pa mkhan po Ye šes dpal 'byor actually indicates in his Re'u mig for the ordination. However, the gSan yig (3a1) gives for this event the khyi lo (1406). In his rNam thar of mKhas grub rje, dKon mchog 'jigs med dbaṅ po gives the year šiṅ mo lug (=1415), in his subject's 31st year (Sa, in vol. Ca of the gSuh 'bum).

30 phyis kyi dbu ma thal 'gyur bar khas che ba. mKhas grub rje does not specify who these persons were. The qualification phyis ("later") excludes such masters as the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna of the "Council of Tibet". (Could the reference perhaps be to Roṅ ston Šākya rgyal mtshan [1367-1449], who is known as an opponent of mKhas grub rje [see e.g. the rNam thar by Svasti, 6b6 f.] as well as of Tson kha pa?) The same view is mentioned by Tson kha pa, who writes da lta ("now"), in the place of mKhas grub rje's phyis, in his Lam rim chen mo, 435b3. The persons in question are not identified in the annotated edition of the Lam rim chen mo (ed. Chos 'phel legs ldan, after the Tshe mchog gliṅ blocks, 2 vols., New Delhi 1972: see the reference below, n.65).
inferences (*svatantrānumāna*) and "syllogisms" (*svatantraprayogavākya*) to establish the understanding of the middle ({\textit{dbu ma = madhyamaka}}). To support his view the opponent quotes Nagārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29-30 and 63ab and *Yuktisāttikā* 51; Āryadeva's *Catuḥsataka* XVI,25; and Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* on I,1 (16.2 and 23.3) and *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI,171 ff. and VI,81. (145b5-146b2)

mKhas grub rje replies by formulating a *prasaṅga*-type argument reducing the opponent's proposition to absurdity in the following words: [According to you,] the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika - the subject (*chos can = dharmin*) [of the thesis] - proves (*thal = prasajyate*) not to advocate a doctrinal position (*grub mtha' = siddhānta*) because he does not affirm (*khas len pa*) any doctrinal position whatever. [Now,] if this is what you hold, [the Mādhyamika's supposed] status as the best of all advocates of doctrinal position [which you also allege] is destroyed. [That is,] the person advocating such [a view] - the subject [of the thesis] - proves (*thal = prasajyate*) to have a pratijñā, because he is one who proposes a propositional thesis (*dam 'cha' ba po*) owing to his conceptual attachment to some thing veridical [in the proposition] "I have no pratijñā whatever". (146b4-6)

The opponent, believing he has discovered a flaw in mKhas grub rje's reply, then points out that to affirm that the denial of an affirmation is itself an affirmation is like requesting from somebody who has just told one that he has no wealth at all (nor ci yaṅ med do) that wealth

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32 In Tibetan literature the verb *thal ba* (prasajyate) can be used not only to designate an undesired "occurrence" or consequence (in an opponent's doctrine), but also to formulate an argument that does not involve the philosopher in the ontological difficulties pointed out for example by Candrakīrti in his critique of Bhāvaviveka's *svatantrānumāna* and *svatantraprayogavākya*. The latter use is then adopted by the Thāl 'gyur ba to give expression to his own arguments in a non-assertive (and non-refering) language, i.e. one that does not presuppose the ultimate reality, as objects of right knowledge (*gžal bya = prameya*), of the entities being talked about, including the valid means of knowledge (*tshad ma = pramāṇa*).

33 Cf. below, 149b3-4.

34 *khas len ci yaṅ med do žes bden žen gyis dam 'cha' ba po yin pa'i phyir*. - For the term *bden žen* compare below, 150b2, *dīnos por mion par žen pa = bhāvābhineṣa*, i.e. conceptual commitment or attachment to an entity (bhāva) conceived of as having self-nature (*svabhāva, "aseity") or as being *bden* (par) *grub* (pa) ("established in truth" or in a veridical cognition).

This *prasaṅga*-type argument used by the Thāl 'gyur ba includes a pratijñā, a *prasaṅgāpādāna* and a *nigamana*, which have been mentioned by Candrakīrti, *PP* on XXI,2 (see above, p.214).

35 *khas len med pa de ŋid khas len yin no žes zer ba*. 
called "nothing at all".\textsuperscript{36} - mKhas grub rje however answers that this reply is totally inappropriate. For what we have said, mKhas grub rje observes, is that your opiniated averring that there is no affirmation is itself an affirmation; but we have certainly not said that [as such] non-affirmation (khas len med pa) is affirmation.\textsuperscript{37} (146b6-147a2)

mKhas grub rje subsequently quotes passages from works by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti where an accepted doctrine is in fact explicitly mentioned.\textsuperscript{38} Accordingly, these masters of the Madhyamaka can both clearly be

\textsuperscript{36} ci yañ med pa žes bya ba'i nor de byin cig ces zer ba dāri mtshuñs so. - On MMK XIII, 8, where Nāgārjuna has characterized śūnyatā as release from (or: the expeller, niḥsarāṇa, of) all speculative views (dṛṣṭi) and has also described those who hold the view of Emptiness (śūnyatādṛṣṭi) as incurable, Candrakīrti gives as an example somebody who, when told by another that he will give him no merchandise whatever (na kimpid api paṇyam), replies: "Give me that no-merchandise whatever". - The negation in this example is interpreted as prasajyapratiśedha, i.e. as non-presuppositional absolute negation by which nothing else is implicitly affirmed, in contradistinction to paryudāsapratiśedha or presuppositional relative negation by which something else is indirectly affirmed. See also Buddhāpañita and Bhāvaviveka on MMK XIII, 8.

In its application to the problem of a philosophical affirmation (khas len = abhyupagama), the question is whether the statement "I have no abhyupagama", which is of all speculative views (dṛṣṭi) as incurable, and has also described those who hold the view of Emptiness (śūnyatādṛṣṭi) as incurable, Candrakīrti gives as an example somebody who, when told by another that he will give him no merchandise whatever (na kimpid api paṇyam), replies: "Give me that no-merchandise whatever". - The negation in this example is interpreted as prasajyapratiśedha, i.e. as non-presuppositional absolute negation by which nothing else is implicitly affirmed, in contradistinction to paryudāsapratiśedha or presuppositional relative negation by which something else is indirectly affirmed. See also Buddhāpañita and Bhāvaviveka on MMK XIII, 8.

\textsuperscript{37} kho bo cañ gis khas len med pa ze bas smras pa de ņid khas len yin no žes smras kyi | khas len med pa khas len yin no žes ma smras pa'i phyir ro. - Here mKhas grub rje calls attention to the non-affirmative character of negation in the statement khas len med pa "There exists no abhyupagama", which is of the prasajya-type; but he considers that the opponent's 'ze bas smras pa or vehement averring does not correspond to such non-presuppositional absolute negation. - Tsonẖ kha pa has phrased this point slightly differently in his Lam rim chen mo (440a): 'di ltar kho bo cañ khas len med pa de ņid khas len no žes mi smra'o | | 'o na ci žig smras sņam na | khas len med do žes ze bas smra ba dos khas len med par khas blaṅs dgos so | žes ston pa yin pas rañ tshig gi bsal ba spong bar mi nus so | "Accordingly, we do not maintain that absence of affirmation itself is an affirmation. - [Opponent:] What then do you maintain? - [Reply:] It being shown that this vigorous affirmation [by you] of the absence of affirmation itself is to be affirmed as absence of affirmation, [your] rejection of [your] own statement cannot be avoided". (In the expression že bas smra ba, že bas is glossed by thabs kyis and rim gyis "methodically, systematically" in the annotated edition of the Lam rim chen mo, vol.2, 247b4.)

\textsuperscript{38} Particular reference is made to VV 28cd:

\textit{samyayaḥāhram ca vaṭam nānabhupagamya kathayāmāḥ} \mid

"Without having accepted pragmatic usage (cf. MMK XXIV, 10) we do not speak [philosophically];

\textit{Yṣ 8cd:}

de phyir dam pa rnams kyis kyai \mid sgyu ma byas lta'i 'gog pa bzed \mid

"Therefore [P and D read de bān, "thus"] the excellent ones also accept cessation (nīrodha) like that of something projected by magic (mājā);

\textit{Yṣ 46: gañ dag brten nas dño po rnams \mid chu yi zla ba lta bur ni \mid gañ dag ma yin log mìn par \mid "dod pa de dag ltas mi 'phrog \mid
seen to have recognized that a Mādhyamika does have a philosophical system (rnam par bzhag pa = vyavasthā) establishing a doctrine and an affirmation (khas len = abhyupagama) of a doctrine. And one should not therefore imagine that the contrary view represents some acme of philosophical doctrine (grub mtha'); for to do so is simply to proclaim oneself to be one who is, because of lack of philosophical ability due to inferior intellect and capacity, no Mādhyamika of either variety, Prāsaṅgika or Svātantrika.\(^{39}\) (148a1-149b4)

The opponent then asks: Well then, how is one to meaning the the texts cited above? (149b5-6)

mKhas grub rje points out in reply that the above-mentioned verse 29 of the Vigrabhavyāvartanī in which Nāgārjuna states that he has no pratijñā is a specific reply to a particular objection by an opponent who has argued (vv 1): "If all entities are altogether without self-nature, your [i.e. Nāgārjuna's] statement (vacana), [which is therefore also] without self-nature, cannot controvert self-nature [maintained by us]." mKhas grub rje gives the following interpretation of this passage: Were the Mādhyamika, who has affirmed that all entities are without self-nature, then to affirm that a statement propounding that all entities are without self-nature exists by self-nature (raṅ bzin ggis yod pa), that would indeed constitute a defect (skyon = doṣa) for him. But because in the Mādhyamika's doctrinal system (lugs = mata), no statement propounding such a thing is in fact established by self-nature (raṅ bzin ggis grub pa med pa), the defect of internal inconsistency (naṅ 'gal gyi skyon) alleged by the opponent does not arise.\(^{40}\) (150a1-3)

"Holding that entities, which [are born] in dependence, are neither true nor false, like the moon reflected in water, they are not carried away by a view"; MMK XXIV,18ab: yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ sūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe |
"We regard origination in dependence to be Emptiness";
PP on I,1 (54-55): idampratyaṇātāmaṭreṇa saṃvrteḥ siddhir abhyupagamyate | na tu pakṣacatuṣṭayābhūyapagamena sasvabhāvāvadaprasaṅgat, tasya cāyuktavat | idampratyaṇa- tāmaṭṛābhūyapagame hi sati hetupahalāyor anyonyapēkaṇṭatvān nāsti svabhāvīkā siddhir iti nāsti sasvabhāvavādaḥ ||
"The establishment of the surface level is affirmed in virtue of pure conditionship— but not because the four positions [negated in MMK I,1] are affirmed, since [in this case] there would be the undesired consequence of the doctrine of [an entity] having self-nature and this is not correct. When pure conditionship is affirmed there is no establishment in self-nature because of the interdependence of cause and effect, so that there is [then] no doctrine of [an entity] having self-nature"; etc.

\(^{39}\) The opponent also considers the Madhyamaka according to the interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika school to be the highest of the Siddhāntas, or schools of Buddhist thought, recognized in the Grub mtha' literature of India and Tibet. Cf. above, 146b5.

\(^{40}\) Compare below, n.71.
However, mkHas grub rje explains, one must not conclude from this that Nāgārjuna has taught that, in general (spyir), no pratijñā exists for the Madhyamika. And Vigrahavyāvartanī 30cd - "Because of there being no [affirmation and denial, 30ab] due to factors such as direct perception (prayakṣādi), no criticism (upālambha) is [possible] against me" - means: While in accordance with what has been stated previously it is taught that there exist no thing apprehended (dmigs bya) and no apprehender (dmigs byed) established by own being (raḥ gi ṭo bos grub pa) with respect to a valid means of knowledge (tshad ma = pramāṇa) and an object of knowledge (gžal bya = prameya), it has however not been taught that there exist no valid means of knowledge and no object of knowledge arising in conditioned dependence (rten 'byuṅ = pratītyasamutpāda). (150a3-4)

In his Vṛtti on Catuḥśataka XVI,25 - "It is not at all possible to level a criticism against the person who has no position positing [some thing] existent, non-existent, and both existent and non-existent" - Candrakirti has shown that the doctrine of Emptiness (śūnyatāvāda) cannot become the target of a refutation (sun 'byun = duṣaṇa). But, mkHas grub rje points out, since the opponent has stated that he does not accept ('dod pa) even Emptiness, how could there be room for the non-existence of any tenet ('dod pa) whatever? Āryadeva's meaning is therefore that, because it involves no position falling into the extremes (mthar lhuṅ gi phyogs) of postulating existence, non-existence, etc., established by self-nature, the doctrine of Emptiness cannot at all be criticized. (150a4-6)

As for Nāgārjuna's statement in the Yuktisāṣṭikā (51) that great beings keep to non-disputatiousness (rtsod med = avivāda ?) and have no position (phyogs = pakṣa), in his comment on a previous verse Candrakirti has explained (Yuktisāṣṭikāvṛtti) that persons who do not comprehend the reality (dharmatā) of origination in conditioned dependence (pratītyasamutpāda) construct imaginarily specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) of entities, as Nāgārjuna has said in verse 47: "When one makes an affirmation concerning an entity one espouses terrible speculative views in

\[\text{It is only in terms of the theory of śūnyatā that it is possible to have no propositional thesis postulating some kind of entity. In the absence of the theory of śūnyatā, the philosopher inexorably falls either into the extreme of eternalism and substantialism or into the extreme of annihilationism and negativism. But for him who accepts that all entities are empty of self-nature - and for him alone - everything holds together, as Nāgārjuna has observed in MMK XXIV,14 (sarvam ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate | sarvam na yujyate tasya śūnyam yasya na yujyate ||) and VV 70 (prabhavati ca śūnyateyam yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ | prabhavati na tasya kiṃcīna na prabhavati śūnyatā yasya ||).} \]
which attraction and hostility arise, and that leads to disputes resulting from the latter." Therefore, mkhas grub rje explains, he who has no such thesis affirming that an entity is established by specific characteristic (rañ gi mtshan śid kyi grub pa) does not become engaged in disputes involving the establishment of his own position (rañ gi phyogs = svapakṣa) and the rebuttal of another's position (gžan gyi phyogs = parapakṣa), activities that result from conceptual attachment to an entity. However, this is certainly not to say that it has been taught that the Mādhyamika has no doctrinal system of his own (rañ lugs = svamatā). (150a6-b2)

Therefore, when Candrakīrti states in his Prasannapadā (on I.1 [16]) - where the passages in question from the Vigrahavyāvartanī and the Caturśatākā are quoted as testimony - that there is no affirmation of any other position (pakṣāntarābhyupagamābhāva), the meaning is to be understood in the same way as indicated above. (150b2-3)

In Vigrahavyāvartanī 64ab - "I negate nothing and there exists nothing to be negated" - the meaning is: I do not negate anything established by self-nature. This being a case of a negative inferential nexus based on inconsistency ('gal khyab)," no negator ('gog byed) is established by specific characteristic (rañ gi mtshan śid) because there is no imputation (sgro 'dogs = samāropa) whatever of any negandum (dgag bya = pratīṣedhya, pratīṣeddhavya) established by self-nature. In our own doctrinal system also an unreal (rdzun pa = alīka) māyā-like negandum and negator are accepted; and this is what Nāgārjuna has stated in vv 23 where he compares this negation with a magic show. (150b3-4)

Accordingly, when Candrakīrti states in his Prasannapadā: "Because we have no pratijñā", this means that there is no independent propositional thesis (rañ rgyud kyi dam bca' = svatantrā pratijñā), not that
the Mādhyamika has no doctrinal system of his own (*rañ lugs = svamata*). (150b5-6)\(^47\)

Moreover, if there were no *abhyupagama* and no *pratijñā* whatever, there would then be no possibility of taking refuge (*skyabs 'gro = ṣaṇāgamana*) in the ordinary and extraordinary Refuges by admitting the Three Jewels which can, in the future, arise in one's own conscious stream (*rgyud = samtāna*),\(^48\) and also admitting the Buddha already perfected in another's conscious stream as the Teacher (*ston pa = śāstr*), the Dharma as the Path, and the Community (*dge 'dun = saṃgha*) as the Friend on the Path, etc. Nor would it be possible to form the altruistic intention (*lhag bsam = adhyāśaya*) consisting in vowing (*dam 'cha' ba*) to remove the Suffering of all sentient beings,\(^49\) to form the Thought of resolution (*smon sems = praṇidhicitta*) consisting in vowing to attain buddhahood for the sake of others, to form the Thought of execution (*'jug sems = prasthānaçı́itta*) consisting in vowing to observe the practice (*spyod pa = caryā*) of the Bodhisattva,\(^50\) and to form the Thought of elimination (*spoṅ sems*) consisting in vowing to reject all obstacles to the observance (*bslab pa = śikṣā*) of the Bhikṣu. And as a consequence the sprout that gives birth to the great medicinal plant of the Tathāgata healing all living beings would then be uprooted.\(^51\)

**Objection:** There is no fault [in our position] because, although in this case there is no *pratijñā* (*dam mi 'cha' ba*) with respect to a system of one's own (*rañ lugs = svamata*), there is [still] *abhyupagama* with regard to another's understanding only.\(^52\)

**Reply:** It would as a consequence be very clearly established that your discipline (*tshul khrims = śīla*), your production of the Thought of Awakening (*sems bskyed = cittotpāda*) and your taking refuge would all be mere pretence (*smras chos tsam*), and they would not be

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\(^{47}\) The following lines take up some technical points raised by Candrakīrti in his *MA* (VI,171-175 and VI,81).


\(^{49}\) On *adhyāśaya* see Prajñākaramati, *Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇḍika* on III,9-10; Haribhadra, *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* IV,24-26 (585); *Bodhisattvabhūmi* §2,3 (312 f., 333); Asaṅga, *Mahāyānasamgraha* § 2,34.

\(^{50}\) On the *praṇidhicitta* and *prasthānaçı́itta*, see Śāntideva, *op.cit.*, I,15-17.

\(^{51}\) For the *bhaisajyamahāmahīruha* cf. PP on XXII,1 (avataranika, 431,8).

\(^{52}\) *gśan no tsam du khas len pa*. The opponent here extends to the sphere of general ethical and philosophical praxis the principle adopted by the Prāśāṅgika who, when engaging in a discussion by means of *prasaṅga*-type reasoning, argues *ad hominem* (in the non-pejorative sense) with respect to what another has accepted (*paraprasiddha*) and thus rejects - or rather dissolves - others' theses without accepting any contrary theses of his own (*svaprasiddha*); see PP on I,1, pp.18,24 and 34-37. (This is possible for the Prāśāṅgika because his negations are technically of the *prasaṅga-pratiśedha* rather than of the *pāryudāsapratiśedha*; see above, n.36).
sincere (*te bas ma yin*). And were we to agree without compunction to whatever fault [another may] utter on the ground that he [has spoken] thus also, it would be very strange indeed! (151b6-152a6)

Moreover, many who hold themselves to be meditators (*bsam gtan pa*) of the Snow-mountains [of Tibet] talk, in exalted cryptic terms (*skad gsan mthon po*), of theory (*lta ba = darśana*) free from all affirmation (*khas len = abhyupagama*), of meditative realization (*sgom pa = bhāvanā*) free from all mentation (*yid la byed pa = manasikāra*) of [philosophical] practice (*spyod pa = caryā*) free from all denial and assertion (*dgag sgrub = niṣedha-vidhi*) and of a Fruit (*'bras bu = phala*) free from all wishes and qualms (*re dogs*). And they imagine that understanding is born in the conscious stream when - because in a state where there is no mentation about anything at all (*ci yāḥ yid la ma byas par bhag pa na*) there arises something like non-identification of anything at all (*gaḥ la 'aḥ hos gzun med pa 'dra ba tig ṣar bas*) - one thinks that there exists nothing that is either identical or different. By so doing one has proclaimed great nihilism where there is nothing to be affirmed according to a doctrinal system of one's own (*gaḥ yaḥ raṇ urges la khas biaṇ rgyu med pa'i chad pa chen po*), as well as the thesis of the Hvaṣaṇ in which nothing can be the object of mentation (*ci yāḥ yid la byar mi ruṇ ba'i hvaśaṇ gi dam bca'*,). (152a6-b2)

Thus, according to mKhas grub rje and his school, the Mādhyamika's refraining from asserting a thesis (*dam bca'*/pratijñā) or tenet (*khas len/abhyupagama*) is to be interpreted

1) neither as a total rejection of any philosophical and ethical praxis or position in surface-level pragmatic usage,

2) nor, on the contrary, as a quasi-thesis (which would in effect be comparable to position IV of the "tetralemma" [*catuṣkoṭi*] where an indeterminate entity "x" is posited and defined as being

53 Compare Nāgārjuna's discussion of the question whether the theory of śūnyatā cancels the four noble truths, etc. (MMK XXIV).

54 It is, therefore, not legitimate to extend to all cases of ethical and philosophical praxis the logical principle that has been correctly applied by the Prāsaṅgika, but only (according to mKhas grub rje) in his prasaṅga-type arguments dissolving the assertions of other philosophers who postulate some kind of entity. In mKhas grub rje's opinion, then, the two situations are entirely different and exclude the kind of extrapolation to which his opponent has fallen victim.

55 mKhas grub rje thus considers that the Hvaṣaṇ does indeed have a thesis, if only a negativistic and quietistic one. Cf. above, 146b-147a; and n.36 and 37.

56 In the final lines of this section mKhas grub rje has discussed the question of how the Prāsaṅgika really differs from the Svātantrika, criticizing and refuting his opponent's misapprehensions on the subject. Cf. also above, 145b6.
without the predicates "A" and "Ä" - in terms, perhaps, of a logic which is not two-valued and based on the principle of bivalence, or in terms of some "logic of mysticism" postulating an ineffable entity).

3) In particular, the Mādhyamika's theory is not to be identified with what has often been called in Tibet the theory of the Hva śaṅ, namely the idea that philosophical theory is free from all tenets, that meditative realization is free from all mentation, that philosophical praxis is free from both denial and affirmation, and that the Fruit of spiritual insight is free from all hopes and qualms. mKhas grub rje has in fact pointedly referred to this theory as the dam bca' or assertion of the Hva śaṅ. - In this connexion it is to be observed that the bulk of the Tibetan tradition from at least the thirteenth century, the time of Sa skya Paṇḍi ta (1182-1251), has clearly regarded the debate with the Chinese Hva śaṅ (Ho shang) at the "Council of bSam yas" or "Council of Tibet" as bearing on questions of philosophical theory and praxis, and not as a largely political struggle for dominance between Indian and Chinese missionaries and between the Tibetan political factions allied with them. (It has to be recalled, furthermore, that in his treatment of some of these questions in his Bhāvanākramas, Kamalaśīla has already connected them explicitly with classical problems alluded to in the Sūtra literature.) Thus, although the debates at the "Council of Tibet" may have had local as well as international political dimensions, in the Tibetan view from quite early times they were in fact concerned with fundamental - and urgent - philosophical and religious issues.

4) The disowning of any propositional thesis, assertion and tenet cannot represent the total philosophical and ethical outlook of the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika as one who, in contradistinction to the Svātāntrika, would have no philosophical position of any kind. For, according to mKhas grub rje and his school, whereas the Prāsaṅgika does indeed differ from the Svātāntrika by not employing an independent inference with an epistemologically grounded logical reason - let alone a full independent "syllogism" - to establish the theory and understanding of the Madhyamaka, he nevertheless does have a philosophical theory (the śūnyatādarśana and niḥsvabhāvavāda) which he upholds by philosophical investigation, and by prasaṅga-type reasoning which dissolves any propositional
thesis asserting an entity. In fact, in accordance with Nāgārjuna's comment on vv 64, although the statements of the Madhyamika are clearly not supposed to be factitive or to possess apodictic and probative force in virtue of a formal process of independent inference or deduction, they equally clearly have an indicative and communicative (jñāpaka) value revealing a philosophical content: the Emptiness of all entities. And the difference between the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika does not, therefore, lie simply in the latter having a philosophical position while the former does not.

In his exposition in the skal bzah mig 'byed mKhas grub rje has largely followed the explanation given by his teacher Tson kha pa in a work he completed in his middle forties, the Lam rim chen mo. 57

In a later work completed in his early fifties which thus represents his most mature thinking, the Draṅ ņes rnam 'byed legs bshad sniṅ po, Tson kha pa also touched on the problem of the Madhyamika's philosophical thesis when discussing and criticizing the opinions of earlier scholars who held that the Madhyamika employs a logical reason and inference to negate ('gog pa) substantial self-nature (raṅ bzin), but that he never employs a logical reason and inference to prove (sgrub pa) non-substantiality (raṅ bzin med pa) (108a6-112a2, especially 109b6 ff.). According to Tson kha pa their view is incorrect because, for the understanding of Emptiness and non-substantiality, a positive determination (yoṅs su gcod pa) of negation (bkag pa, i.e. niḥsvabhāvatā) is necessary in addition to the negative determination (rnam par bcad pa) of the negandum (dgag bya, i.e. svabhāva) since these two aspects of determination are in fact inseparable (110b2-3). Moreover, in this context Tson kha pa has called attention to the fact that pure exclusion (bcad [pa] tsam) of the negandum is not confined to the Prāsaṅgika's method alone, and that it is employed also by the Svātantrika; for in addition to implicative and presuppositional relative negation (paryudāsapratiṣedha), Bhāvaviveka has fully acknowledged non-implicative and non-presuppositional absolute (or

57 Byaṅ chub lam rim che ba = Lam rim chen mo (1Ha sa edition, vol Pa), 433a6-462a4, especially 438b2-447a3 containing Tson kha pa's reply to an (unknown) opponent's pūrvapakṣa cited in 435b3-436a6, which is the third of four pūrvapakṣas cited by Tson kha pa in his discussion of the difference between the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika branches of the Madhyamaka. (Cf. A. Wayman, Calming the mind and discerning the real, New York 1978, 284 ff.). - This topic has also been treated by Tson kha pa in his commentaries on the MMK - the Rigs pa'i rgya mtho - and on the Madhyamakāvatāra - the dGoṅs pa rab gsal. Cf. also his Lam rim chuṅ ba 171b5 ff.
exclusion) negation (prasajyaapratisèdha) and the method of reasoning which employs it (108b-109a, 110a3-6, 111a5). In sum, it is not possible to maintain that, for the Madhyamaka, there is no content (brjod bya = abhidheya) in scriptural texts (luṅ = āgama), no object of knowledge (šes bya = jñeya) in knowledge (šes pa = jñāna) and nothing to be established (bsgrub bya = sādhya, "probandum") for a logical reason (rtags = līṅga). However, above and beyond pure negation (bkag tsam) of the negandum (i.e. self-nature), prasajya-negation neither presupposes nor implies some putative self-nature of non-existence (dños med kyi ho bo ńid, of an entity) (110b-111a). Accordingly, when it is known that what is to be established in MMK I,1 has the form of prasajya-negation (cf. 109a2), one understands that there is established the pure negative determination of production in ultimate reality (don dam par skye ba rnam par bcad tsam sgrub kyi) without there being an additional establishment of the existence of some (putative) ultimately real non-production (de min pa'i don dam pa'i skye med yod par misgrub pa) (111b2). In other words, beside the negative determination (or exclusion) of establishment in reality (bden [par] grub [pa], i.e. substantial self-nature) there is no positive determination of some non-establishment in reality that could be regarded as established in reality (bden med bden grub); however, the positive determination of bden med must of necessity still accompany the negative determination (or exclusion) of bden grub (111b3-4). And in VV 26 Nāgārjuna has in fact stated: "Were prevention of [things, bhāva, as] having no self-nature affected by [the affirmation of] something [i.e. a sentence] having no self-nature," self-nature would then become established once [this sentence] having no self-nature is stopped [i.e. negated]." According to Tson kha pa, then, Nāgārjuna clearly means that,

58 Compare Tson kha pa's reply to the second pūrvapakṣa in Lam rim chen mo 437b-438a: gţan gyi grub mtha' la sun 'byin pa'i thal 'gyur byed na ni rañ bţin yod pa bkag pa ŋid rañ bţin med pa bsgrubs pa yin par sţar rtsod zlog rtsa 'grel las gsum pa ltar yin pas de la phuṅ gsum med do | de lta min na rañ bţin med pa bsgrubs pa yin gţan rañ bţin yod pa bkag pa min no šes bzig nas smras na lan ci yod | rañ bţin med pa yons su gcod na rañ bţin gdon mi za bar rnam par bcad dgos pas so šiṃ na | de lta na rañ bţin yod pa rnam par bcad na'raṅ gdon mi za bar rañ bţin med pa yons su gcod dgos pa mtshuns pa yin no ||

59 VV 26: naihśvābhāvyānām cen naihśvābhāvyena vāraṇam yadi hi | naihśvābhāvyaniśvṛtav śvābhāvyam hi prasiddham syāt || The Tibetan version reads: gal te rañ bţin med ŋid kyis | ji ste rañ bţin med pa zlog || rañ bţin med pa ŋid log na | rañ bţin ŋid du rab grub 'gyur ||

60 The Vṛtti explains: ...yadi naihśvābhāvyena vacanena naihśvābhāvyānām bhāvānām vyāvartanām kriyate tato 'yam dṛṣṭānta upapannah syāt | iha tu naihśvābhāvyena vacane- na bhāvānām svabhāvapratisèdhaḥ kriyate | ...
if the non-substantiality of things were prevented by means of a sentence which is itself without self-nature, these things would then be found to be actually in possession of a self-nature. But in the Madhyamaka this is not the case. Moreover, Tson kha pa explains, it will not be possible for both existence in ultimate reality and non-existence in ultimate reality to be negated in such a manner; but it nevertheless remains possible for both existence in ultimate reality and the existence in ultimate reality of non-existence in ultimate reality to be negated (111b-112a). Both members of the first (contradictory) pair, where negative determination does not bring with it the positive determination in question, indeed cannot be negated in the process of the Madhyamika's reasoning leading to understanding of reality. But both members of the second (non-contradictory) pair, where negative determination does bring with it the positive determination in question, can be so negated; and this is precisely what the Madhyamika does in his reasoning leading to understanding of reality. In this way the Madhyamika will thoroughly establish, by means of both āgama and yuktī, the profound Middle Way free from objectification (dmigs med/anupalambha) which avoids the twin extremes of maintaining an ultimately real (bden pa) negation and an ultimately real negandum (112a1-2).

For both mkhas grub rje and his teacher Tson kha pa, then, the question whether the Madhyamika entertains a propositional thesis, assertion and tenet is no longer mainly a logical and methodological problem. It has acquired an epistemological, or rather gnoseological, significance of the most fundamental importance; and it turns out to be inseparably linked with the question as to how the theory and understanding of reality arises in the conscious stream according to the two branches of the pure Madhyamaka, the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika.

61 In this connexion Tson kha pa provides a valuable explanation of prasajya-and paryudāsa-negation (108b3 f.)

62 A correlation between positive determination (yonis su gcod pa = pariccheda) and negative determination or exclusion (rnam par bcad pa = vyavaccheda) appears in Dharmakīrti's discussion of the anupalabdhihetu. See Hetubindu (ed. E. Steinkellner), 254f.
mKhas grub rje's skal bzaṅ mig 'byed is cited, together with Tsoṅ kha pa's two larger Lam rim treatises, by 'Jam dbyāns bṣad pa'i rdo rje Nāg dbaṅ brtson 'grus (1648-1721) when discussing the question whether the Mādhyamika maintains a philosophical position.  

'Jam dbyāns bṣad pa observes in the first place that it could not have been the opinion of Pa tshab Nī ma grags (1055- ) - who was largely instrumental in establishing Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika branch of the Mādhyamaka in Tibet in collaboration with the Kashmirian Paṇḍit Jayānanda - that the Mādhyamika maintains no position at all. For in his reply to an enquiry from the dge bṣes Šar ba pa (1070-1141) Pa tshab is stated to have declared that the two truths (bden gnis, i.e. the samvṛti⁶ paramārtha-satya) are both required on the foundational level (gū), that the two forms of Equipment (tshogs gnis, i.e. the puṇya⁶ and jñāna-sambhāra) as well as Intellect and Means are required on the Path (lam), and that the two Kāyas (sku) are both necessary on the level of Fruit (bras bu). ⁶⁴

In the opinion of another Lo tsā ba who followed Jayānanda - identified as (among others) Khu lo tsā ba, a collaborator of this same Kashmirian Paṇḍit - the Mādhyamika, however, only negates the tenets of others without propounding a thesis (dam bca') of his own; and no independent (raṅ rgyud = svatantara inferential or syllogistic) establishment or proof is possible because the subject (chos can = dharmin) and the other component elements of an inference or syllogism are not agreed on in common by both the Mādhyamika and his opponent in discussion (the phyir rgyol = prativādin who advocates the existence of things having a substantial self-nature). This opinion is mentioned by Tsoṅ kha pa as the second pūrvapakṣa relating to the problem of how the Madhyamaka theory (dбу ma'i lta ba) arises in the conscious stream according to the two branches of

⁶³ Grub mtha'i rnam bṣad raṅ gnā grub mtha' kun daṅ zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzaṅ žiṅ gi ņi ma lun rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skon (completed in the year sa mo yos = 1699), Madhyamaka chapter, 29b f. (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. Pha, in the bKra šis 'khyil edition, reprinted by Ngawang Gelek Demo, The collected works of 'Jam-dbyāns-bṣad-pa'i-rdo-rje, vol.14, New Delhi 1973). - The same author has also treated this problem in a refutation of the view of sTag tshaṅ Lo tsā ba (born in 1405) entitled Tshig gsal ston thun gyi tshad ma'i rnam bṣad zab rgyas kun gsal tshad ma'i 'od brgya 'bar ba (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. Da; Collected works, vol.11).

Mādhyamikas, the Śvātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas.

A fourth pūrvapakṣa quoted in the same context by Gsoṅ kha pa mentions the following argument which includes a refutation of the opinion that the Mādhyamika has neither a position corresponding to a doctrinal system of his own (raḥ lugs kyi phyogs) nor a valid means of correct knowledge to establish it (sgrub byed kyi tshad ma). According to this pūrvapakṣa, the Mādhyamika’s procedure consists rather in first negating an objectively gained pramāṇa (tshad ma) - i.e. direct perception and inference - where one accepts a system comprising a means of correct knowledge and its object (tshad ma = pramāṇa and gzhai bya = prameya) established in virtue of the characteristic of reasoned analysis of reality (rigs pas rnam par dpya’i raṅ gi mthaṅ ṇid); and the Mādhyamika then himself establishes, by means of a perfect logical reason, the fact of the non-substantiality of entities by deducing, against the opponent (phyir rgol = pratīvādin who advocates the existence of entities having substantial self-nature), a probative proposition (bsgrub pa’i ḡag = sā-dhanavākya) after having accepted (khas blaṅs nas = abhyupagamya), in pragmatic usage, simply a pramāṇa and prameya recognized in the every-day consensus (‘jig rten grags pa = lokaprasiddha) - a procedure that does not involve philosophical analysis (ma dpya’i) of reality. According to this opinion, this probative procedure does not make the Mādhyamika into a Śvātantrika precisely because it is established here by means of a pramāṇa recognized in the every-day consensus only which, therefore, does not involve philosophical analysis of reality.

From the annotated edition of the Lam rim chen mo it is perhaps not quite clear whether it is the whole of this fourth pūrvapakṣa that is to

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65 Lam rim chen mo 434b-435a. - The identification of the propounder of this pūrvapakṣa as Khu Lo tsa ba is made in a note by ‘Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pa; see mNyams med rje btsun tsoṅ kha pa chen pos mdzad pa’i byaṅ chub lam rim chen mo’i dka’ ba’i gned rnam mchán bu bāz’i sgo nas legs par bṣad pa theg chen lam gyi gsal sgron, vol. Kha, 237a4 (reproduced from a print of the corrected Tsho mchog gliṅ blocks by Chos ’phel legs ldan, New Delhi 1972, with the short title Lam rim mchan bāi sbrags ma).

Khu Lo tsa ba is presumably Khu mDo sde ‘bar, the Tibetan scholar and translator who collaborated with both Jayānanda and Pa tshab Ňi ma grags in translating Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna’s Mahāsvāturasmuccaya and with Jayānanda alone in translating this Kashmirian Paṇḍit’s Tarkamudgara. He must have flourished c.1100.

66 dīos po stobs lugs = vastubalapravṛttta. Inferential knowledge may be gained by objective validation (vastubala) and by consensual validation through convention or authority. For the term vastubala (or its synonyms) see e.g. Dharmakīrtī, Pramāṇa-vārttika, Svārthānumāṇa-pariccheda 65, 130; Pratyakṣa 45, 185; and Kamalāśīla, Tattvaśamgrahapānjikā 1395.

67 Lam rim chen mo 436b.
be ascribed to rMa bya, a follower of Pa tshab Lo tsā ba. But in any case, according to 'Jam dbyaṅs bzhad pa's Grub mtha' chen mo, rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus - who had only a partial familiarity with the basic text and the explication of the Madhyamaka (dbu ma rtsa 'grel phyogs byed pa) - held, following vv 29, that for the Madhyamika there exist no theory consisting in a position of his own that is to be affirmed and no valid means of correct knowledge possessing probative force. rMa bya is said by 'Jam dbyaṅs bzhad pa to have maintained this opinion in his comment on the Prasannapadā and in his dBu ma'i stōn thun.

Another early Madhyamika mentioned in this connexion by 'Jam dbyaṅs bzhad pa is rGya dmar ba.

68 See 'Jam dbyaṅs bzhad pa's note in the annotated edition of the Lam rim chen mo (cited above, n.65), vol. Kha, 240b5. This note seems in fact to refer to rMa bya et al. as the propounders of the entire fourth pūrvapakṣa discussion by Tson ḳha pa (rather than just as the advocates of the doctrine rejected in this pūrvapakṣa). (For the problem raised by this ascription see the end of this note.) - According to the Madhyamaka chapter of 'Jam dbyaṅs bzhad pa's Grub mtha' chen mo (103a4), a pupil of rMa Byaṅ named bSod nams rdo rje held that the Śvātantrika used independent (raṅ rgyud) reasoning to establish his own position and to negate the opponent's, whereas the Prāsaṅgika did so by advertising only to arguments recognized by his opponent and dissolving them by prasāṅga-type apagogic reasoning. Against this view 'Jam dbyaṅs bzhad pa remarks that the Śvātantrika as well as the Prāsaṅgika makes use of prasāṅga-type reasoning.

The Tibetan historiographical and doxographical tradition knows of two early Tibetan masters of the Madhyamaka named rMa bya. (1) The first was rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes, who was a disciple of Pa tshab ņi ma grags (see e.g. Padma dkar po, Chos 'byuṅ 193a1). (2) The other was rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, who is recorded to have been a disciple not only of rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes but also of Jayānanda, Pa tshab, Khu mDo sde 'bar, Thāṅ saṅ pa, and Phya pa Choṣ kyi sṛṇ gge (1109-1169). In this case, however, the dates pose a problem; and the name of Phya pa's disciple is also given as rMa bya rTsod pa'i sṛṇ gge. (Is this possibly a third rMa bya, or is he identical with Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, the disciple of Pa tshab?) The traditions appear to be confused on this point. However this may be, it is difficult to ascribe the fourth pūrvapakṣa cited by Tson ḳha pa, and attributed to rMa bya by 'Jam dbyaṅs bzhad pa, to rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus since it does not appear to coincide with the doctrine on this same point ascribed to Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus in 'Jam dbyaṅs bzhad pa's Grub mtha' chen mo (see below). But the doctrine ascribed in the Grub mtha' chen mo to Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus does seem to be consonant with the doctrine rejected in this fourth pūrvapakṣa. It is of course possible that the rMa bya mentioned in 'Jam dbyaṅs bzhad pa's note on the Lam rim chen mo is not Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus but rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes (or even rMa bya rTsod pa'i sṛṇ gge if the latter is different from Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus). The early history of the Tibetan dBu ma requires much further study before it will be possible to clear up such questions.

69 Grub mtha' chen mo, Madhyamaka chapter 30a (passage quoted below, n.71).

70 Grub mtha' chen mo, Madhyamaka chapter 30a. - This is apparently Gaṅs rGya dmar ba Byaṅ chub grags of sTod luṅ(s). He was a disciple of Gaṅs pa ŋe'u (who is recorded to have been the pupil of both rNog Lo tsā ba [Blo ldan šes rab] and of Pa tshab Lo tsā ba) and of ḳhyuṅ Rin chen grags (another master of the Madhyamaka and a pupil of rNog Blo ldan šes rab). He commented on Jñānaagarbha's Satyaśrayaśrīvibhāga. Phya pa Choṣ kyi sṛṇ gge (1109-1169) and Dus gsum mkhyen pa (1110-1193) were among his disciples.
These masters, 'Jam dbyan bzhad pa specifies, held that all extreme positions which unilaterally postulate existence and non-existence are simply to be negated through the prasāṅga-type argument of internal inconsistency (nañ 'gal).\textsuperscript{71} The works of rMa bya Byan chub brtson 'grus (save his commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās) as well as those of Pa tshab ṇi ma grags, Khu mDo sde 'bar and rGya dmar ba are not now accessible; and the views of these early Tibetan masters are known to us from occasional references in later sources.\textsuperscript{72}

One of the earliest extant original Tibetan discussions of the question whether the Mādhyamika maintains a philosophical position and thesis is found in the mkhas pa rnam 'jug pa'i sgo by Sa skyā Paṇḍī ta Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182-1251).\textsuperscript{73} There Sa paṅ first points out that not holding an established philosophical doctrine (grub mtha' = siddhānta) can merely result from either ignorance or a fear of error. (1) The first case is of course of little philosophical interest because nobody would care to engage in debate with an ox-like fool. (2) As for the second case, it is convenient to distinguish between affirmation and non-affirmation of this non-affirmation (khas mi len pa ēid khas len nam mi.len). (a) If one were to affirm non-affirmation, one's thesis of non-affirmation (khas mi len pa'i dam bca') would be undetermined inasmuch as affirming non-affirmation would be no different from giving some thing the name of "nameless". (b) On the contrary, if at this stage one does not affirm non-affirmation, there will inevitably be affirmation; for the negation of a negative (dgag pa = niṣedha) is equivalent to a positive affirmation (sgrub pa = vidhi), in just the same way as the not non-blue is blue.\textsuperscript{76} (212b)

\textsuperscript{71} Grub mtha' chen mo, Madhyamaka chapter 30a: dbu ma pa la rañ phyogs khas blañs rgyu'i lta ba ci yah med ciñ | de ēid kyis sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma yah med la gzan gcig du yod med kyì mtha' thams cad nañ 'gal thal 'gyur gyis 'gog pa yin žes tshig gsal bṣad pa ma po dañ dbu ma'i stōñ thun dag las bṣad pa ltar ro ||

The prasāṅga-type argument based on internal inconsistency in an opponent's proposition is one of the four arguments characteristic of the Mādhyamika mentioned e.g. by dBus pa Blo gsal in his Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bṣad pa'i mdzod 101a-b, and by Tsonṅ kha pa in his discussion of the second pūrvapakṣa (ascribed to Khu) in the Lam rim chen mo 434b-435a.

\textsuperscript{72} rMa bya Byan chub brtson 'grus has very briefly referred to our problem in his commentary on Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikās, the dbu ma rtsa ba šes rab kyì 'grel pa 'thad pa'i rgyan 8a (reprinted at Rumtheg, 1975).

\textsuperscript{73} This work is reprinted in the Complete works of the Great Masters of the Sa skyā pa sect (Sa skyā bka' 'bum, published by bSod nams rgya mtsho, vol.5, Tōkyō 1968).

\textsuperscript{76} śon po ma yin pa ma yin na śon por 'gyur ba bţin no. - Here the negation is of the relative (presuppositional and implicative) kind (ma yin dgag pa = paryūdasapratīṣedha). - Compare mkhas grub rje's observation cited above (p.218) on the question of the
There however exist two additional cases where persons expert in reasoning also make no affirmation. (3) Sometimes such non-affirmation is due to a stratagem (g.yo sgyu). For example, the Vatsiputriya may refrain from affirmation, saying that the self (bdag, i.e. the indeterminable pudgala which he posits) is not describable as permanent or impermanent. (4) Non-affirmation may, however, also be used knowingly and in all straightforwardness (draḥ po). Thus, the theory of the Madhyamaka is correct because the real nature of things, which is free from discursive development (spros pa = prapañca) and is not within the scope of words and cognition (sgra blo'i yul ma yin pa), is beyond [discursive] knowledge and verbal expression (śes brjod las 'das pa); and the Son of the Jina will accordingly remain silent. Indeed, Sa paṇḍita observes following the Ratnāvalī (I,61-62), one should ask people - including the Saṃkhya, the Aulūkya (i.e. the Vaiśeṣika ?), the Nirgrantha (i.e. the Jaina) and the advocates of the pudgala and of the skandhas - if they maintain something going beyond existence and non-existence; and one should therefore know the precious Dharma-heritage declared to be the profound ambrosial essence of the Buddhas' teaching which is beyond existence and non-existence. Just like the heterodox Tīrthika's affirmation, then, non-affirmation as a deceitful stratagem is comparable with the non-acknowledgement of a theft. But the Madhyamika's non-affirmation is altogether different, for it is comparable with non-acknowledgement when no theft has in fact been committed.

assertion of non-affirmation (and also on the thesis of the Hva śāh). (Like mkhas grub rje, Sa skya Paṇḍita does not here make a distinction between "internal" negation of the proposition and "external" negation of the assertion sign. On this distinction see below, § VI.)

75 Is Sa paṇḍita alluding here to the doctrine ascribed to rNogs Blo ldan ṣes rab and gTsaṅ nag pa, in contradistinction to that of Phya pa Chos kyi sen ge (see e.g. 'Gos gZon nu dpal, Deb ther sphon po, Cha, 10a [349 of Roerich's translation])? - Concerning the definition of absolute reality (paramārtha), see for example Prajñākaramati, Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā on IX,2.

76 The silence of the wise Aryan-Bodhisattva is thus altogether different from the mere muteness of the unlearned.

77 See Nāgārjuna, Ratnāvalī I,61-62:

sasāṃkhyauṣṇayigranthapudgalaskandhavādinam

prcccha lokam yadi vadat ayastivatikramanam

dharmayutakam ity asmān nāstiyastitvavatikramam

viddi gambhīram ity uktam buddhānāṁ sāsanāṁtmam

The Tibetan version differs slightly from the Sanskrit. - On a use of the "neither ... nor" formula where it does not correspond to position 4 of the catuṣkoṭi(ka), see above, note 22.

78 This is a case of non-presuppositional and non-implicative absolute negation (med par dgag pa = prasajyapratīṣṭedha). The Tibetan text reads: dbu ma pa khas mi len pa ni ma brkus pa khas mi len pa lta bu yin pas khyad par che'o.
Our complex of problems has furthermore been touched on indirectly, in connexion with the Madhyamika's avoidance of the four extreme positions (mtha' = anta) on the objective (yul) side and with his elimination of conceptual attachment to existence and non-existence on the subjective (yul can) side, by Nag dbaṅ chos grags (1572-1641) in his treatment of the Indo-Tibetan philosophical traditions. This Sa skyā pa master at the same time emphasizes the importance of clearly distinguishing this correct theory from what was known in Tibet as the Hvā śān's theory, that is, the above-mentioned attitude usually described as anti-intellectual and quietistic.

In one of the earliest Tibetan doxographical treatises now available to us, the Grub mtha' by dBus pa Blo gsal who flourished in the early part of the fourteenth century, we also find expressed the view that the Prāsaṅgika has no thesis (dam bca') of his own and no theory to affirm (khas len gyi lta ba), and that he confines himself to as it were dissolving an opponent's doctrine (grub mtha') by an argument reducing it to absurdity without, however, rebutting it in the sense of propounding a counterthesis. On the contrary, the Svātantrika is said to seek to establish his doctrine of Emptiness by means of apagogic reasoning (thāl 'gyur ba = prasaṅga) which has positive and probative force (sgrub pa 'phen pa) in addition to such prasaṅga-type reasoning which simply serves to refute (sun 'byin pa/dūśaṇa) opposed doctrines. dBus pa Blo gsal then links the idea according to which the Prāsaṅgika has no thesis with the idea expressed by Nāgārjuna that one is to be deemed untreatable (bsgrub tu med pa = asādhya) if one becomes attached to the concept of śūnyatā — which is in fact release from (or: the expeller of) all dogmatic opinions (MMK XIII,8, and which, according to MMK XXIV,11, destroys him who wrongly grasps it) — and also with the statement in the Acintyastava, also ascribed to Nāgārjuna, that all dharmas are free from the four extreme positions (mu bṣi = catuṣkoṭi).

79 Nag dbaṅ chos grags, Bod kyi mkhas pa śa phyi dag gi grub mtha'i šān 'byed mtha' dpyod pa daṅ bcas pa'i 'bel ba'i gtam skyes dpyod ldan mkhas pa'i lusrgyan rin chen mdzes pa'i phra tshom bkod pa (Poṣ cen drug gi 'bel gtam) 110b ff. (reprinted at Thimpu 1979).
80 Op.cit. 112b. — See above, p.223, on mKhas grub rje's view on this point.
81 Grub mtha' rnam par bṣad pa'i mdzod 101a-b (sDe dge edition, reprinted at Thimpu 1979). — On dBus pa Blo gsal, see D.Seyfort Ruegg, Life of Bu ston Rin po che, Rome 1966, 22; and K.Mimaki, Zinbun: Memoirs of the Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, Kyoto University, Number 15, Kyōto 1979, 176 ff.
To return now to Nāgārjuna's statement "I have no pratijñā" which was the point of departure for this discussion, in accordance with the second and narrower of the two uses of the term pratijñā noticed above (§ II) it can be interpreted as signifying: "I have no propositional thesis asserting an entity". It is then possible to understand it as a metaphilosophical statement in which Nāgārjuna stipulates that none of his statements is to be taken as an assertion (of an entity). Since Nāgārjuna's philosophy in fact clearly appears not as a speculative and constructive ontological doctrine with a corresponding system of assertions about substantial entities (bhāva), but rather as a discourse concerning non-substantial factors originating in the structured conditionship of pratityasamutpāda, his statement "I have no pratijñā" is readily intelligible. This interpretation also disposes of the supposition that Nāgārjuna's statement was intended as a paradox (comparable perhaps to the liar-paradox of Epimenides and Eubulides). And its prima facie antirational and antiphilosophical appearance is simply due to not recognizing its metatheoretical function.

But this is not all. According to Nāgārjuna's Vv, although the statements of the Mādhyamika are clearly not intended to be factitive and to possess apodictic and probative force in virtue of a formal process of inference and deduction, they are equally clearly regarded as having an indicative and communicative (jñāpaka) value revealing a philosophical content, namely the non-substantiality and Emptiness of all entities originating in conditioned interdependence.

The second, and related, question whether the view that the Mādhyamika's statements are proof against falsification and being countered by an opposed thesis (see § II above) is antiphilosophical has not yet been considered here. Indeed, even if we accept that the Mādhyamika's statements are not supposed apodictically to prove that entities are empty of self-nature and only reveal that this is so, it might still be maintained that his theory and the statements expressing it should at least be open to debate and refutation. In other words, it might be argued (in a Popperian way) that a theory or statement formulated in such a way as to make it immune from objections and refutations is not really meaningful philosophically.

Now it has to be observed in the first place that the Mādhyamika has not expressly set out to develop a theory and to formulate statements in a manner calculated to make them immune from objections and refutation. Their unassailability is, on the contrary, a pure by-product
of the Madhyamaka theory of Emptiness, which does not posit any kind of entity and does not, therefore, make assertions referring to such an entity, and also of its method of prasāhga-type reasoning in which all assertions are neutralized ontologically (because they do not refer to substantial entities) and logically (because they do not give rise to counter-statements). Hence this unassailability cannot properly be used as a ground for accusing the Madhyamika of deliberately avoiding rational thinking and taking up a stance of philosophical indifferentism or facile agnosticism.

The gnoseological and metaphysical constitution of reality in the Madhyamaka as well as the eirenic attitude that the Madhyamika has been seen to adopt (above, p.210ff.) therefore have nothing to do with an anti-rational outlook or philosophical indifferentism. This feature of the Madhyamaka would not be well defined as agnosticism either. Nāgārjuna has indeed himself provided definitions of reality (tattvalakṣaṇa) in MMK XVIII,7 and 9, as well as a positive statement about सून्यतā in MMK XXIV,18 and about the paramārtha in MMK XXIV,8-10, but all the while keeping from making assertions there about an entity in terms of any of the four conceivable positions of the "tetralemma" (catuskoti).

In sum, since Nāgārjuna and his faithful followers have not postulated such an entity and since their philosophy therefore has no place for theses asserting something about its ontological status, the question of falsification and refutation can no more arise than that of verification and proof: niṣedha and vidhi would come into play only in those speculative ontological theories (दर्शन) for which no place exists in the Madhyamaka.

However, according to Tson kha pa and mKhas grub rje, refraining from postulating an entity in a speculative theory and from constructing a propositional system asserting something about the ontological status of such an entity should not be regarded as tantamount to the rejection of any philosophical theory or tenet (दर्शन or वाद) whatever. And, as seen above, they have sought to show that the Madhyamikas, including Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, indeed entertain (non-speculative) philosophical tenets and (non-assertive) pratijñās in conformity with the theory of Emptiness of self-nature. Their school has in particular paid the greatest attention to developing a gnoseological theory that is testable and a mode of reasoning that can be logically validated. In working out this theory and mode of reasoning, their school has elaborated a remarkable synthesis between Madhyamaka thought and certain logical and epistemological methods going back to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti that were also adopted by Bhāvaviveka, Śāntarakṣita and Jītārī. But since their
school has, following Red mda’ ba gдон nu blo gros, built on the foundation of Candrakirti's Prāsaṅgika branch of the pure Madhyama, this synthesis is distinct both from Bhāvaviveka's branch of the pure Madhyama and from Śāntarakṣita's synthesizing Yogācāra-Madhyama.

For this school, then, there can be no question of the Madhyamika's rejecting all tenets and theses in the sense of statements with a meaningful philosophical content, and of renouncing a well-founded gnoseology in its rigs šes leading to the comprehension (rtogs pa) of non-substaneity and Emptiness in which positive determination (goṅs su gcod pa: pariccheda) of negation plays an important part beside negative determination (rnam par bcad pa: vyavaccheda) of the negandum.

On the level of ultimate reality this school has of course recognized, like its Māhāyanist predecessors, that only the silence of the Ārya is appropriate. The absence of pratijñā discussed here is even, in a certain sense, the methodological corollary of this silence. But Tson kha pa and mKhas grub rje seek to show that the principle of the absence of pratijñā and abhyupagama in the Madhyama must not be overextended and applied indiscriminately. In this way they differ both from many other Tibetan interpreters of the Madhyama, and from several modern writers on this school.

VI

The Madhyamika's approach to the problem of the pratijñā appears, then, to derive from his rejection of epistemic commitment to any proposition and assertion - positive or negative - that presupposes an entity (bhāva) existing in terms of the binary categories of dichotomic conceptualization (vikalpa) and the quaternary categories of the "tetralemma" (catuskoṭi[kā]). As for his own statement "All entities are empty [of self-nature]", it is not only exclusively factive and communicative (rather than probative, apodictic or in any way factitive) but it is emptied of all propositional content presupposing the existence of things as substantive entities.

Now, when he subjects a categorical assertion to semantic analysis based on a theory of pragmatics and speech acts, the semiotician and logician finds it to be made up not only of a propositional content (the phrastic component) but of two further illocutionary components often described as the modal (i.e. the it-is-so tropic) and the performative (i.e. the I-say-so neustic). This is so, according to this kind of analysis, whether the utterance includes an explicit sign of modality and
subscription or not. And negation may then relate to any of these three components of assertion, so that the semiotician and logician takes into account (at least) three distinct kinds of negation: the propositional (i.e. negation of the phrastic), the modal (i.e. negation of the tropic) and the performative (i.e. negation of the neustic).

That ordinary context-free propositional negation is not the only kind of negation operating in the Madhyamika's rejection of a pratijñā is probably sufficiently clear in the light of what we now know of Madhyamaka thought. This is so because such propositional negation is logically implicative and presuppositional; that is, in propositional negation (e.g. in the utterance: "The grass is not red") just as much as in assertion (e.g. in the utterance: "The grass is green") the producer of the utterance is committed to (the truth of the underlying proposition) presupposing the existence of an entity (e.g. grass). This is the principle operating in paryudāsa-negation (as opposed to prasajya-negation).

The question then arises whether the Madhyamika's rejection of a pratijñā can be appropriately analysed in terms of the two additional kinds of negation mentioned above that relate to the other two components of an assertion which have not usually been taken into account in discussions of the propositional calculus, viz. modal negation (of the tropic component) and performative negation (of the neustic component). It is in any case fairly clear that a form of "external" negation of the assertion sign (Frege's ⊤) - i.e. negation of the tropic and negation of the neustic - rather than "internal" negation - i.e. negation of the phrastic - is to be taken into consideration when the subject of the embedded proposition (bhāvas, etc.) is empty (śūnya) and null, in other words when the existential presupposition fails or is not determinable in terms of the positions of the binary vikalpa and the quaternary catuskoti.

Certain considerations adduced by the Madhyamika when explaining his rejection of a pratijñā can in fact be cited in support of an analysis in terms of negation of the tropic, it-is-so component of assertion. Historically, the Madhyamika's rejection was no doubt very often a denial in philosophical debate of another philosopher's assertion; and in

83 For this type of analysis and its terminology, see J.Lyons, Semantics, Vol. 2 (Cambridge 1977), 749 f., 768 f., 802 f. In addition to concepts developed by Austin, Searle et al., Lyons has made use of ideas and terms employed by R.M. Hare in his article, Meaning and speech acts, Philosophical review 79, 1970, reprinted in his book Practical inferences, London 1971, 74-93, where the tropic is defined as the sign of mood and the neustic as the sign of subscription.
speech-act theory denial may be defined as context-bound rejection of another's assertion. Against this analysis there stands the Madhyamika's observation that denial of a pratijñā may itself be construed as just another pratijñā; but the reason for this objection seems to lie in the fact that the Madhyamikas in question evidently regarded such denial not as external negation of the tropic but as internal propositional negation - and hence as falling within the scope of implicative and presuppositional paryudāsa-negation where denial of a proposition commits one to the affirmation of the opposite proposition and to admitting its presupposition.

Analysis of the Madhyamaka's rejection of a pratijñā in terms of performative negation - i.e. of the I-say-so neustic component - would seem to be especially appropriate. And this interpretation would be consonant with the Madhyamika's concept of non-implicative and non-presuppositional prasajya-negation whereby he is not committed to the affirmation of the contradictory or contrary of the proposition he is negating. (Context-bound denial by negation of the tropic is, however, also commitment-free with regard to presupposition, e.g. in the classic example of the denial of the proposition that the present King of France is bald.) In speech-act theory such negation is described as the illocutionary act of non-commitment.

In Buddhist thought the perlocutionary effect of such a speech act with non-commitment to the content of any propositional assertion or thesis presupposing or positing a self-nature (svabhāva) for one's own self (ātman) or what is commonly supposed to belong to oneself (ātmiya) would be of gnoseological and soteriological value, and it would conduce to the freedom of sentient beings (sattva).

The notion of performative negation thus appears to approach especially closely purposes envisaged by the Madhyamika in his rejection of a thesis and assertion as well as in his use of prasajya-negation in contradistinction to paryudāsa-negation.

It seems all the more appropriate and legitimate for us to consider the rejection of a pratijñā in terms of a pragmatic rather than of an exclusively propositional analysis of assertion and its negation since, from the earliest time, the Madhyamaka - and indeed the Mahāyāna as a whole - has engaged in the analysis and deconstruction of ordinary language with its conceptual categories. And this approach is, moreover,
especially pertinent for any consideration of the ethical aspect of refraining from taking up a contentious position (pakṣa) to which attention has been drawn above. But it must at the same time be recognized that in the middle period of the history of the Madhyamaka school this concern with the pragmatics of transactional usage (vyāvahāra) became overshadowed by the more specifically logical problems into which the Mādhyamika was obliged to enter in the course of his discussions with other schools of philosophy, and that from the time of Bhāvaviveka in particular Madhyamaka philosophy was deflected from a consideration of pragmatics towards a special preoccupation with the proposition and the logical problems connected with the employment of independent inferences and "syllogisms" in the understanding of reality. And the question of the pratijñā and pakṣa then tended to be treated above all in terms of the thesis in an inference or "syllogism" rather than in the broader context of assertions and speech acts. In later Madhyamaka thought, especially in Tibet, the problem of the pratijñā and its rejection was regularly associated with the division between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas.

In this section we have nevertheless referred to some contemporary work in semantics and the philosophy of speech acts as a possible heuristic instrument and as an aid in explicating what the Indian and Tibetan Mādhyamikas have had to say on the pratijñā. The historian of the Madhyamaka - and of Indian and Tibetan philosophy in general - must of course refrain from anachronistically transposing and arbitrarily imposing the concepts of modern semantics and philosophical theory, which have originated in the course of particular historical developments, on modes of thought that have evolved in quite different historical circumstances, and which have therefore to be interpreted in the first place within the frame of their own concerns and the ideas they have themselves developed. Still, in studying Indian and Tibetan thought, the importance of religious and philosophical praxis, and of pragmatics, must receive due attention.

A consideration of pragmatics proves to be especially useful when studying what we can now perhaps best describe as the Mādhyamika's neutralization of the pratijñā as an assertory philosophical statement and his rejection of the pratijñā as a propositional thesis. This neutralization is found to affect the propositional content of an assertion,

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85 For this periodization of Madhyamaka thought, see our Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India, Wiesbaden 1981.
the ontological presupposition of the proposition in terms of self-nature being annulled together with the question of its truth/falsity. And there is also to be found a cancellation of the two sides of the assertion sign: viz. the performative component - the I-say-so (or pratiṣṭhā-nāmi) commitment to the propositional content - and the assertory component - the it-is-so (or pratiṣṭā) tropic. But despite - or no doubt rather precisely because of - the suspension of all three of these components of a pratiṣṭā, real philosophical activity becomes possible, according to the Madhyamaka, for the philosopher and practiser of the Middle Way. Rather than frustrating the correct gnoseological comprehension of reality on the semantic or pragmatic level by making verification, falsification and any other kind of philosophical activity impossible, this neutralization has been regarded as a necessary - albeit doubtless not sufficient - precondition for this comprehension.86
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Catuḥśataka by Āryadeva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Madhyamakāvatāra. - Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Traduction tibétaine. Ed. L.de La Vallée Poussin, St.-Pétersbourg 1907-12</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMK</td>
<td>Mūlamadhyamakakārikās. - Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti. Ed. L.de La Vallée Poussin, St.-Pétersbourg 1903-13</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti see MMK</td>
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<tr>
<td>VVV</td>
<td>Vighrahavyāvartanīvṛtti see VV</td>
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<tr>
<td>VS</td>
<td>Yuktīgaṇṭikā by Nāgārjuna</td>
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For the CS and VS fragments only of the Sanskrit texts are now extant, but Tibetan translations are available in the bsTan 'gyur.
DIE MADHYAMAKA-PHILOSOPHIE DER SA SKYA PA-SCHULE
- RED MDA' BA GŽON NU BLO GROS -

von
M.SATO (Morioka)


Diesmal möchte ich näher darauf eingehen und Red mda' ba (1349-1412) als bedeutenden Sa skya pa-bla ma und als Lehrer von Tsoṅ kha pa (1357-1419) darstellen, denn das Problem der Madhyamaka-Philosophie von Red mda' ba bis zu Tsoṅ kha pa ist ein zentrales historisches Problem hinsichtlich der Beziehung der Sa skya pa- und der dGe lugs pa-Schule. Red mda' ba war der erste von sechs berühmten Sa skya pa-Kommentatoren des Madhyamāvatāraḥ von Candrakīrti.2 Vor allem scheint es mir, daß die Sa skya pa-Schule, im Gegensatz zu der dGe lugs pa-Schule, kein eindeutiges, festes System der Madhyamaka-Philosophie hat, und somit dem Denken einen freien Spielraum läßt, was sich z.B. in den Werken der eigen-

ständigen Philosophen Ronston šes bya kun rig, Šākya mchog ldan, Red mda' ba und anderer zeigt. Die Sa skya pa-Schule ist lediglich nach dem Ort, aus dem diese Schule stammt, benannt. Sa skya pa ist kein inhaltlich bestimmter Begriff, wie er bei der bKa' gdams (autoritatives Wort) pa- oder dGe lugs pa (die Jugendschaft) Schule Verwendung findet. Obwohl in der dGe lugs pa-Schule jedes Kloster über einen eigenen Lehrtext (yig cha)³ verfügt hat, welcher als Grundlage den Urtext von Tson kha pa hat, besteht trotzdem ein einheitliches Verständnis. In den verschiedenen Klöstern wird zuerst nur das klostereigene Lehrbuch gelesen, also gewissermaßen ein Kommentar zu Tson kha pa. Nicht so in der Sa skya pa-Schule, obwohl es nur ein bedeutendes Lehrbuch von Go ram pa bsod rnam sen ge (1492-1489) gibt, das als fundiert angesehen werden kann. In der Sa skya pa-Schule können wir z.B. für den Begriff śūnyatā (Leerheit) zwei Hauptinterpretationen finden, raḥ ston⁴ und gžan ston⁵ oder prasaṅga und svatantra⁶, was darauf zurückzuführen ist, daß in dieser Schule zwei Hauptrichtungen vertreten sind. Bei der dGe lugs pa-Schule aber ist eine streng einheitliche Interpretation vom Standpunkt des raḥ ston oder prasaṅga feststellbar, mindestens in der exoterischen Madhyamaka-Philosophie.

Welche Bedeutung hat dann Red mda' ba in dieser Sa skya pa-Schule? Nach den Angaben des Geschichtswerkes Deb gter s dön po,⁶ des religionsgeschichtlichen Werkes Byaṅ chub lam gyi rim pa'i bla ma brgyud pa'i rnam par thar pa rgyal bstan mdzes pa'i rgyan mchog phul byuḥ nor bu'i phren ba⁷ und Thu'u bkavns philosophischen Werkes Grub mtha' thams

⁴ Nach gžan ston dbu ma sniḥ po von Tāranātha (fol.7b) zitierte ich beispielsweise eine Definition von raḥ (das eigene) und gžan (das andere): "Die Weisheit, d.h. die dharmatā, ist nach ihrem eigenen Wesen von Anfang an vollendet und wird nimmer mehr entstehen. Deshalb ist sie nicht durch das eigene Wesen śūnya geworden, sondern existiert immerwährend. Auf die Frage, ob die Kanons nicht besagen, daß diese Wirklichkeiten auch śūnya sind, wird geantwortet, daß sie allgemein śūnya realisieren, ebenso wie die śūnyatā durch das eigene Wesen nicht śūnya zu werden braucht. Die Weisheit (ye śes) hat die Verneinung (śūnya) der von ihr verschiedene Zeichen habenden Mannigfaltigkeit und des Subjektes und des Objektes im ganzen, und daher wird sie śūnyatā geheißen."
⁵ svatantra heißt hier selbständige (positive) Schlußfolgerung. Deshalb muß der Svātantrika die Körperlichkeit als saṃvṛtiṣatya anerkennen.

Prof. G.Tucci sagte schon: "g\#on nu blo gros (Kumāramati) of Re mda' (1349-1412), one of the greatest man Lamaism has had between Buston and Tson k'a pa. He had been a disciple of the Ńa dpon Kun dga' dpal, he had commented on the prajñā with penetrating research, continuing a tradition derived from the lotsāva rNog and his followers; then, after leaving his work as a teacher to meditate in a hermitage, he had particularly studied 'Maitreya's five lows', laying down, on the base of those texts, the principle that cosmic consciousness is the only reality, and that, being inborn in each of us, it represents a necessary passport and the cause of that return to the purity of 'Buddha's essence' which is identified with nirvana.'\# Professor Tuccis Darlegung im obgenannten Werke ist nicht so ausführlich. Ich habe dies etwas ausführlicher auf japanisch in meinem Auf-

\# d\$on lun Ausgabe, Sa skya pa-Kapitel 10a.
\# Z.B. in der Madhyamaka-Philosophie zitierte Tson kha pa als Prāsaṅgika in seinem Buch d\$oňha pa rab gsal (Pekinger Ausgabe 72a) die Erklärung aus dem philosophischen Werk Madhyamakāloka von Kamalaśīla als Svātantrika.
satz Die philosophische Geschichte des tibetischen Buddhismus vor Tson kha pa (I) - Red mda' ba gön nu blo gros, im Jahrbuch der Universität Hiroshima 1977, behandelt, sowie die Bedeutung von Red mda' ba für die tibetische Philosophie und Religion dazwischen versucht. Nach dem religionsgeschichtlichen Text Byaṅ chub lam gyi rim pa'i bla ma brgyud pa'i rnam par thar pa rgyal bstan mdzes pa'i rgyan mchog phul byuṅ nor bu'i phreṅ ba schrieb Red mda' ba insgesamt 16 Werke, alles Kommentare zu den wichtigsten Texten, von denen bisher nur drei publiziert worden sind:

1) dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bṣad de kho na ŋid gsal ba'i sgron ma (Maḥyamakāvatāraḥ-Kommentar). New Delhi 1974

2) lϕu ma bṣi bṛgya pa'i 'grel pa (Catuḥṣatakam-Kommentar). Varanasi 1974

3) bṣes pa'i spriṅs gi gi 'grel pa don gsal (Suḥṛllekhaḥ-Kommentar).

Darjeeling 1974


Nach dem Grub mtha', Kapitel Sa skya pa, gab es damals drei Denk- richtungen der Madhyamaka-Philosophie in der Sa skya pa-Schule:

1) 'Jam mgon sa paṇ und Roṅ ston ṣes bya kun rig und andere, welche die Leerheit (śūnyatā) durch die Schlußfolgerung beweisen woll- ten;  
2) Red mda' ba, der nur die Prasāṅga-Methode anwendet; und  
3) Śākya mchog ldan, der zuerst die Madhyamaka-Philosophie, dann die Vijñānavāda-(Nur-Bewuβtsein-Lehre) und zuletzt die Jo naṅ pa-Phi- losophie studiert hatte.


Bevor ich eine Übersicht über die historisch-philoso- phischen Hintergründe Red mda' bas und seiner Zeitgenossen gebe, möchte ich nun näher auf allgemeine Einzelheiten eingehen.


Red mda' ba schreibt in der oben genannten Stelle folgendes: "Dieses Verstehen von mir ist nicht von anderen anerkannt worden." Diese Aussage besagt auch etwas über die damalige allgemeine schwierige Si- tuation des Verständnisses der Madhyamaka-Philosophie in Tibet, wie sie auch in oben erwähnten Geschichtswerken erscheint. Daraus erkennen wir Red

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15 Vgl. 7b-8b, Roerichs Übersetzung 341-345.  
16 Vgl. 10a.  
17 Vgl. 10b und Ye ṣes rgyal mtshans Werk 477a-479b.  
18 Vgl. 153b.  
18' Vgl. 156a.


Er erwähnt dharmacakra (Rad der buddhistischen Lehre) und saṃgīti (Sammlung der Fassung der buddhistischen Kanons), um dann eine entscheidende Richtung zu der tiefen Einsicht und der breiten Übung einzuführen, dann zeigt er von seinem Standpunkt aus die endgültige Richtung unter den verschiedenen Lehren. Im Buddhismus tritt man durch die vollkommene Wahrheit, die zwei Mittel, puṇya (moralischer Verdienst) und prajñā (Einsicht oder Weisheit), in das Meer der prajñāpāramitā, bekommt die vollkommene Wahrheit und dreht dann das dharmacakra für den Menschen. dharmacakra beinhaltet śīla (sittliches Verhalten), dhyāna (Meditation) und prajñā, als Bedeutung 12 Sūtren und - je nach den Bedürfnissen und dem Vermögen der verschiedenen Menschen – vierundachtzißtausend Eingänge.


19 Vgl. 3a-b


26 Vgl. bKra šis lhun po - Ausgabe 13a-b. Dasselbe Zitat finde ich auch im rGyud sde spyi'i rnam par bṣag pa rgyas par bṣad pa von mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzaṅ, bKra šis lhun po - Ausgabe, Pha 12a-13a.

Diese praxisbezogene Darstellungsweise findet sich auch im Suhṛllekhaḥ (Brief an einen Freund)-Kommentar; hier zitiert Red mda' ba aus folgenden Texten: Madhyamaṅkāvatāraḥ (4 mal), Uttaratantram (1 mal), Ratuṃvalī, Abhidharmakośaḥ (4 mal), Śatapāñcaśatakam (1 mal), Bodhiśākyavatāraḥ (4 mal), Sūtram (5 mal), Madhyamaṅkakārikā (2 mal), Catuhśatakam (1 mal), Lokāttastavāḥ (2 mal), Vṛttiṣastikām (1 mal), Sūtrālaṅkāraḥ (5 mal), Saṃcayaṅgāthā (1 mal), Pratītyasamutpādaḥdayakārikā (1 mal) und Madhyantavibhāgaḥ (1 mal). Daraus können wir seine grundlegenden und umfangreichen Kenntnisse vom damaligen Buddhismus ersehen.


In Tson kha pa pas Prajnāpāramitā-Kommentar (gsGr gi phreN ba), der den Epilog zufolge in seinem 31. Lebensjahr geschrieben hat, finde ich noch nichts Eigenständiges. Wie bekannt, begründet Tson kha pa nach dem Treffen mit bLa ma dBu ma pa in seinem 35. Lebensjahr seine Autorität auf der Begegnung mit Maṇjuśrī und der Kenntnis von der Entwicklung der Geschichte des tibetischen Buddhismus. Erst später, in seinem 50. Lebensjahr, schreibt Tson kha pa das bedeutende Werk Drah ba dahn hes pa'i don rnam par 'byed pa'i bstan bcas, Legs bšad sNīṇ po23, nimmt er die Ein-

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22 S.117.
23 Vgl. bKra šis lhun po - Ausgabe, Pha 12a-13a.

"Wenn man nicht weiß, wie alle Sachen als wirklich nichts entstehen und wie man sie als wirklich erfaßt, wenn man sie als wirklich erkennt, kann man die Einsicht in die Wirklichkeit verfehlen. Aus dem Bodhicaryāvatāraḥ: 'Ohne die falsch verstandenen Sachen zu berühren, kann man die Sachen als Nicht-Sein erfassen.' Wenn man so die allgemeine Struktur der falsch verstandenen Sachen, nämlich des zu Vernichtenden, im Geist nicht klar erfaßt, kann man dieses zu Vernichtende als Nicht-Sein nicht exakt erfassen. So wird erklärt. Wenn man deshalb das Wahrsein als Nicht-Sein und die Struktur des Nicht-Seienden als Leerheit in der Lage des Denkenden nicht tatsächlich weiß, dann kann man das Nicht-Sein der Wahrheit und Leerheit an sich nicht verstehen. Wenn man nur schnell durch das System der Philosophie oder nur mit dem Erkennen der falschen Vorstellung die Wirklichkeit zu kennen versucht, soll man durch die Philosophie die ohne Anfang bewahrte falsche Vorstellung von der Wirklichkeit, die in der Entstehung der Wirklichkeit und in keiner Entstehung des Geistes zusammen entsteht, und die damit begriffene Existenz der Wirklichkeit gut erkennen.

Das ist der wichtigste Schwerpunkt.
Wenn man die Existenz der Wirklichkeit durch die Vernunft als das Nicht-Seiende annimmt, ohne die Existenz der Wirklichkeit klar zu erkennen, kann die ohne Anfang bewahrte falsche Vorstellung von der Wirklichkeit gar nicht verhindert werden. Deshalb muß man die falsche Vorstellung von der Wirklichkeit im Bewahren des Selbst, des Subjektes und des Objektes, verneinen. Dadurch muß man die Art und Weise des Prozesses der Vernunft in der Verbindung mit der wirtschaftlichen Situation erkennen.  

Tson kha pa übt Kritik an der falschen Vorstellung von der Wirklichkeit. Diese falsche Vorstellung (bden 'dzin) ist in dem gewöhnlichen Leben tief verankert, deshalb weist Tson kha pa deutlich darauf hin. Vor Tson kha pa gibt es - auch bei Red mda' ba - in der allgemeinen Terminologie eine "falsche Vorstellung vom Selbst oder dem Wesen" (bdag 'dzin); das heißt vom Ich als Subjekt und von Sachen als Objekt. Tson kha pas Hinweise auf die falsche Vorstellung von der Wirklichkeit finde ich zum ersten Mal bei ihm, allerdings finde ich schon vor Tson kha pa Hinweise im Avatamsakasūtra im in Indien und auch beim Zenbuddhismus in China. Aber Tson kha pa analysiert original die falsche Vorstellung von der Wirklichkeit und der Existenz der Wirklichkeit (bden grub) und demgemäß erklärt er das Nicht-Sein der Wirklichkeit (bden med).


Wenn ich noch meine hypothetische Interpretation äußern darf, möchte ich es vielleicht so darstellen, daß Tson kha pa den Begriff der Erscheinung (snaḥ ba, skt. prabhāsa, pratibhāsa) als analysierende Kritik zum ersten Mal benutzt. Und darauf reagieren die anderen alten Schulen


Die *prajñāpāramitā* ohne Erscheinung heißt die absolute Erleuchtung, die von den erscheinenden Mannigfaltigkeiten entfernte Erleuchtung, die Realisierung der Gleichheit der Wirklichkeit und die Vernichtung des gewöhnlichen Verständes. Die *prajñāpāramitā* mit Erscheinung heißt die Weisheit nach der Erleuchtung, die Vernichtung der Wesenheit nur nach der Kette der bedingten Entstehung der Leerheit, und die durch diese Einsicht bekommmene, von den erscheinenden Mannigfaltigkeiten entfernte Sache als bloße Erscheinung. Red mda' ba schrieb, daß man die zwei Phasen der *prajñāpāramitā*, nämlich die zentrale Bedeutung und die sich daraus entfaltende Bedeutung, verstehen muß.

Diese Erscheinungsart erläutert Tson kha pa weiter ausführlich beschreibend, systematisch in seiner repräsentativen Einführung in die Praxis, *skyes bu gsum gyi ūams su blaṅ ba'i rim pa thams cad tshaṅ bar ston pa'i byaṅ chub lam gyi rim pa (Lam rim chen mo). Tson kha pa erklärt dabei die Erscheinung durch das Gleichnis des Trugbildes (*māyā*), besonders Personen betreffend. Es gibt bei dem Trugbild der Erscheinung zwei Sorten.

"*paramārtha satya* ist wie ein Trugbild; es besteht zwar, aber als wesenlos. Körperlichkeit u.a. sind wie ein Trugbild; sie sind an sich ūnyatā, aber ihre Erscheinung als Körperlichkeit erscheint wie bei einem Trugbild. Dieses beinhaltet jenes, aber jenes hat nicht immer dieses. Die Art des Entstehens der Bedeutung des Trugbildes besteht aus dem Erfassen der Erscheinung und aus dem endgültigen Verstehen der ūnyatā. Zum Beispiel: Ein Pferd und eine Kuh erscheinen vor Augen als ein Trugbild. Man sieht sie mit den Augen, aber erkennt durch das feine Erkennen, daß sie gleich einer Erscheinung nicht existieren. Dadurch weiß man entschieden, daß ihre Erscheinung wie ein Trug-

'Wenn es so ist, wie könnte das Dasein nicht wie ein Trugbild sein?' so steht im Catuḥṣatakam\textsuperscript{31}; in dem Kommentar Bodhisattvayoga-gacaryācatuḥṣatakatakā zum Catuḥṣatakam folgendes:\textsuperscript{32} 'Wenn man den pratītyasamutpāda richtig betrachtet, ist dieser wie ein gemachtes Trugbild, nicht wie das Kind einer unfruchtbaren Frau. Wenn jemand mit dieser Überlegung denkt, daß es das Entstehen der Veränderlichkeiten nicht gibt, dann schätzt er es nicht wie ein Trugbild ein, sondern wie das Kind einer unfruchtbaren Frau. Aus Furcht, daß dabei der pratītyasamutpāda zu Nichts wird, können wir seiner Meinung nicht nachfolgen. Ohne den Widerspruch mit dem pratītyasamutpāda folgen wir der Lehre vom Trugbild. So wird erklärt: Auch wenn man deshalb die Bedeutung vom Nur-Trugbild durch das logische Wissen, ob es die Wesenheit gibt, ergreift, ist es ein Fehler. Wenn man dagegen aber die Wesenheit durch das echte Wissen vernichtet und das Wesen śūnya wird, so begreift man die Sachen im ganzen als Bedeutung des Trugbildes. Dies soll bestimmt entstehen. Das ist fehlerlos!'\textsuperscript{33}


\textsuperscript{31} Vgl. Kārikā 360cd.
\textsuperscript{32} Vgl. Pekinger Ausgabe 255b-246a.
Erklärung.

Bei Red mda' ba gibt es ein ähnliches Verständnis. Er verneint nicht das Gleichnis, "daß der pratītyasamutpāda wie ein Trugbild ist, weil die Verneinung unnötig ist. Wenn es auch verneint wird, würde man den Fehler begehen, den pratītyasamutpāda als minder zu behandeln. Solange der Übende das kostbare Einverständnis ohne Erscheinung bekommen kann, verneint die Madhyamaka-Schule diese Erscheinung des Trugbildes des pratītyasamutpāda nicht." 34

Also finde ich dabei eine, im Vergleich mit Tson kha pa nicht so stark aktive, sondern beschränkte Bedeutung. Thu'u bkvan erklärt später die Erscheinungs-Lehre der Sa skya pa-Schule im allgemeinen. 35 "Wenn man die Erleuchtung erlangt, erlöschen die falschen Vorstellungen, nämlich die Erscheinung, die Vermehrung des Wissens um das Objekt als Erscheinung und die Überzeugung (von der Existenz) des Objektes. Dafür soll man stufenweise durch die drei Praxen Unwissen an den Tag bringen, um Erleuchtung zu erlangen." Red mda' bas Erläuterung der Erscheinung gilt auch bei dieser Bestimmung. Das heißt, er ist in dem Kreis von Sa skya pa geblieben. Also hat Red mda' ba keine Betonung der Erscheinungslehre wie Tson kha pa. Die Anerkennung dieser Erscheinung gefällt den Sa skya pa von der absoluten Wahrheit her nicht. Zum Beispiel die Aussage des Philosophen Go ram bsod nams sen ge in lTa ba'i śan 'byed theg mchog gnad kyi zla zer:


34 Vgl. 198-199.
35 Vgl. 19a.
36 Vgl. Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum. Vol.13, Tokyo 1969, Ca 14a2f.: weiters 5a4: ma rṇed pa'i bden pa dka' tsam gyi sṇad nīd med dga g de nīd dbu ma'i rta ba mtha' thug pa yin. Dieselbe Richtung vertritt auch rDo sbyi lha ram pa śes rab rgya mtsho (14./15. Jh.) in seinem mTha' brad dbu ma chen mo' i gtsan du bya ba yān dag lha ba' i 'od 'byin. ('Bras klu 'bum rdo sbyi lha ram pa śes rab rgya mtsho'i gsum 'bum. New Delhi 1979, Ka 281-290.)

Dabei kann Tson kha pas Lehre von der Erscheinung keinen Platz finden.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{17} Diesbezüglich gibt es noch mehrere Probleme. Ich habe meine Untersuchung nur vom religiösen Standpunkt aus dargestellt. Das Absolute und seine Wirkung oder die Erhebung nach der Wahrheit und die Entfaltung aus der Wahrheit und auch Mißverständnisse möchte ich in einem anderen Rahmen behandeln.
THE DARŚANAMĀRGĀ SECTION OF THE ABHIDHARMASAMUCAYA
AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY TIBETAN COMMENTATORS
(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BU STON RIN CHEN GRUB)

by
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1.

The Path of Vision (or Insight) (darśanamārga, mthoh lam)\(^1\) is the
first immediate and truly adequate full comprehension of Truth by a giv-
en person, or arising in a given stream of personality. It is the phase
which for the first time eradicates Defilements (kleśa, hon moḥs),\(^2\) or
Obstacles (āvaraṇa, sgrab pa),\(^3\) though, it is true, not yet all of them.
But even the further stages of (at least the Supramundane) Path largely
consist in a kind of repetition of the darśanamārga.\(^4\) The latter may
thus well be called the decisive stage of the Buddhist Path to Salvation.

While investigating a certain line of thought in the Yogācāra treat-
ment of the darśanamārga,\(^4a\) I had to deal with the exposition of this
subject in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (mKhon pa kun btus = AS)\(^5\) ascribed
to Asaṅga. In addition to the Indian commentary, viz. the Abhidharmasamuccaya-

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\(^1\) Cp., e.g., E.Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus. 3.Aufl. Berlin 1969, 127
and 331; Abhidharma-Studien III. WZKS 15, 1971, 83f. and 86ff.; H.V.Guenther, Phi-
L.Schmithausen, Zur Struktur der erlösenden Erfahrung im indischen Buddhismus.
Transzendenzverfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils. Hrsg. v. G.Oberhammer, Wien 1978,
104ff. and 110ff.

\(^2\) E.g. AS 66,15f.


\(^4\) See references in n.1.

\(^4a\) A detailed exposition of the result of this investigation will be presented in a
later publication which is still in progress.

\(^5\) AS 66,3-68,2; AS 110b1 - 111b5. The Sanskrit text of the passage is not preserved in
manuscript form; what we find in Pradhan's edition is only the editor's reconstruction,
mainly from the Chinese, with the help of the pratīkas includet in the AS Bh. Additional
help for - at least approximately - restoring the original wording is offered by a
quasi-quotation in AAA 347,1-5, 7-14, and 20f. - AS 67,5-13 does not form part of
the text of the AS but belongs to the AS Bh (see n.52).
bhāṣya⁶ ascribed to one Jinaputra by the Tibetan tradition,⁶a there are several autochtonous Tibetan commentaries on the AS. So far, I have examined five Tibetan commentaries, viz. those written by Bu ston Rin chen grub⁷ (1290-1364), rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen⁸ (1364-1432), Bo doṅ paḥ chen Phyogs las rnam rgyal⁹ (1376-1451), gSer mdog paḥ chen Śākya mchog ldan¹⁰ (1428-1507), and Mi pham 'Jam dbyaṅs rnam rgyal rgya mtsho¹¹ (1846-1912). As for the passage concerned, Bo doṅ's commentary¹² is by far the most detailed one; next in length and substance are the commentaries of Bu ston¹³ and Śākya mchog ldan,¹⁴ whereas rGyal tshab rje's¹⁵ is significantly shorter and less substantial. Mi pham's commentary to the passage¹⁶ is hardly more than excerpts from AS and ASBh.

In the present paper, I shall limit myself to a discussion of Bu ston's commentary on the passage, and to a provisional one at that. The other Tibetan commentaries will be referred to only occasionally. In order to understand and evaluate Bu ston's explanations it is, however, necessary to see how the topic of darśanamārga is treated in the basic text itself as well as in the Indian commentary which is of course authoritative for the Tibetans. This means that I have to begin with an outline of the darśanamārga section of the AS and the ASBh.

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⁶ The paragraph on darśanamārga is explained in ASBh 76,19-78,22 (= § 85); Peking Tanjur, Sems tsam, 5i, 69a3ff. and 259a4ff.
⁶a For other ascriptions see J.W.de Jong, in: TP LIX, 340ff. (= Buddhist Studies by J.W. de Jong, ed. G.Schopen, Berkeley 1979, 602ff.).
¹¹ mḤon pa kun btus kyi rnam ćraṅs sna tshogs bṣad pa. Collected Writings of 'Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham-rgya-mtsho. Vol.70, Gangtok 1975, 401ff.
¹² Bo doṅ 658,6-699,5. As also indicated in the edition, a piece of text reaching from 692,4 to 696,6 is misplaced (it has to be inserted in 701,2) and belongs to the section of the bhāvanāmārga.
¹³ Bu ston 578,4-585,1.
¹⁴ Śākya 220,5-227,1.
¹⁵ rGyal tshab 154b3-156b1.
¹⁶ Mi pham 466,2-468,5.
The Abhidharmasamuccaya offers four definitions, or characterizations, of the darśanamārga, three being styled a "summary" (samāsataḥ, mdo rbsrud na), the fourth being "detailed" (prabhedaṭaḥ, rab tu dbyen na). All these definitions can be traced back to other, mostly clearly older, sources, though to this a proviso applies in the fourth case.

The first definition characterizes the darśanamārga as "a concentrative absorption and comprehension ... consisting in non-perception, or non-apprehension" (anupalambhaḥ samādhiḥ prajñā ..., mū dmigs pa'i tiṅ he 'dzin daṅ ses rab ...), i.e., as another passage of the AS makes clear, non-perception of [the dichotomy of] what is apprehended and what apprehends (grāhya and grāhaka, gzuh ba and 'dzin pa), i.e. of object and subject imagined as separate entities.

This definition of the darśanamārga as "non-perception" or "non-apprehension" (anupalambha), reminiscent of the terminology of the Prajñāpāramitā, closely resembles the characterization of the darśanamārga found in the Yogācāra works ascribed to Maitreya(nātha) and especially in some verse fragments closely related to these, one of which is actually quoted in the AS as stemming from a Sūtra. According to the Maitreya texts, "non-perception" does not mean complete cessation of all experience but only cessation of ordinary experience, viz. experience dichotomized into object and subject, this cessation resulting at the same time in the manifestation of non-dichotomic absolute reality (dharmadhātu, chos dbyiṅs).

The second definition of the AS describes the darśanamārga as a comprehension in which what is cognized and what cognizes are completely...
the same, or: alike (samasamâlambyâlambakajñâna).  

This expression stems from the Śrāvakabhūmi where it is, however, not applied to the darśanamārga but to the consummation of a certain stage of the Preparatory Path, a stage at which the mental activity which investigates the four Noble Truths makes itself its object and, starting from the perception of its own impermanence, comprehends the four Noble Truths as bearing also on itself, or, to look at it from another point of view, comprehends even itself as also being characterized by these Truths. In the Mahāyānasamgraha, as in the AS, the same expression is used but now, in contradistinction to the Śrāvakabhūmi, applied to comprehension free from imaginative and conceptualizing activity (nirvikalpa-jñāna), i.e. to the darśanamārga. In this case, the expression should mean, in analogy to its usage in the Śrāvakabhūmi, that the nirvikalpa-jñāna, the true essence of which is True Reality (tathā, de bzhin ŋid), comprehends this tathatā as its own essence, or comprehends itself as being, on the absolute level, nothing but this tathatā.

There can be no doubt that this definition, like the preceding one, is, in spite of its terminological roots in the Śrāvakabhūmi, essentially Mahāyānist. But it is expressed in positive terms, in contrast to the first which is negative.

The third definition of the AS characterizes the darśanamārga as comprehension cognizing dharmas

1) in the case of one's own person, without applying the conventional notion of "living being" (sattva);
2) again in the case of one's own person, without applying the conventional notion of "dharmas";
3) in the case of everybody and everything, without applying either notion.

25 AS 66,4 = ASBh 76,20 (-ālambana- has to be changed into -ālambaka-: cp. the following note and Tripākabhāṣya 43,18 where we should of course read samasamālambyālambakaṃ). AS, 110b2 renders the compound by dmigs par bya ba dañ dmigs par byed pa mñjam pas mñjam par šes pa, possibly implying an interpretation similar to that of the ASBh (76,20ff.; cp.n.50).
27 Ib. 498,2ff.
28 III.9 (p.53,6f.).
29 AS 66,5 (= ASBh 76,21ff.): pratyātmaṃ-apanītasattvasaṃketa-dharmasaṃketa-sarvato-'panī- tobhayaasaṃketa-ālambanadharmajñānam api tat. As 110b2f.: so so rañ la sems can gyi brda dañ | choś kyi brda bsal ba dañ | thams cad du ghi ga'i brda bsal ba la dmigs pa'i choś šes pa'an de yin no ||.
This definition, almost unintelligible in the wording of the _AS_, is taken from the _Viniścayasaṃgraha_ section of the _Yogācārabhūmi_ where it is found in a more extended form. It analyzes the _darśanamārga_ into three successive comprehensions the first two of which, to say it in other words, cognize the constituents of one's own person under the aspect of "Essencelessness of Person" (pudgalanairatya, gah zag gi bdag med) and under the aspect of the "Essencelessness of dharmas" (chos kyi bdag med), respectively, whereas the third moment extends this two-fold insight to all dharmas. This definition can be characterized as a kind of combination of a typically (though not exclusively) "Hinayānīst" and a specifically Mahāyānist element, and as using, though still rather economically, an analytical pattern.

The fourth and most detailed characterization looks purely "Hinayānīst" and describes the _darśanamārga_ as a process of sixteen moments, the number sixteen resulting from the fact that it is now the traditional four Noble Truths that are regarded to be its object and to be cognized successively, each of them, again, requiring a set of four cognitive phases. Structurally and also terminologically, this description agrees with the _darśanamārga_ theory of the _Vaibhāṣikas_. But the concrete interpretation of the functions of the four phases, actually given for one but valid for all four Truths, is, in the _AS_, highly artificial and completely different from the more natural one offered by the _Vaibhāṣikas_, and it is not known to me from any source prior to the _AS_.

According to the _AS_, the first phase, viz. the _dharmaśaṅnakṣānti_ (chos šes pa'i bzod pa), is an undefiled immediately perceiving comprehension of the respective Noble Truth itself. Through it one abandons the Defilements to be abandoned by the [first] vision of that Truth. The second phase (_dharmaśāna_, chos šes pa) is an immediately perceiving comprehension of the Liberation from Defilements effectuated by the first phase._

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30 Yt Zi 72b3ff.  
31 AS 66,6-10; cp. AAA 347,2-4.  
33 AS 66,12ff.; cp. AAA 347,7ff. and _AS Bh_ 77,2ff.  
34 AS 66,15 = _AS_ 111a1: s dug bshal gyi bden pa minon sum du 'gyur ba'i zag pa med pa'i šes rab = duhkhasaty(apratyakṣ)ānubhāvīn anāsravā praṛjā (cp. AAA 347,8 and _AS Bh_ 77,3f.).  
35 AS 66,15f. = _AS_ 111a1: gah gi<s> s dug bshal mthoṅ bas spah bar bya ba'i ŋon mohs pa spoṅ ba ste = yāyā duḥkhadarśanapraḥātavyām klešāṃ praḥātāti (cp. AAA 347,8f. and _AS Bh_ 77,4f.).  
36 AS 66,17f. = AAA 347,9f.: yena jñānena ksāntyanantarām vimuktilām sāksātkaroti.
The third phase (anvayajñānakṣānti, rjes su rtogs par śes pa'i bzod pa) cognizes the first two phases,\(^37\) and the fourth phase (anvayajñāna, rjes su rtogs pa'i śes pa) confirms the third.\(^38\) Thus, the first two phases comprehend an object (grāhya, gzūn ba, viz. the respective Truth and Liberation), the last two comprehend the subject (grāhaka, 'dzin pa, i.e. comprehension itself).\(^39\)

There can hardly be any doubt that these four definitions or descriptions of the darśanamārga offered by the AS are heterogeneous, both historically and from the point of view of content. Some even seem to be contradictory, esp. the first definition which has to be understood, in the light of its sources as well as of the AS itself, as defining the darśanamārga as non-perception or non-apprehension of grāhya and grāhaka, and the fourth which expressly declares the darśanamārga to consist in comprehensions of grāhya and of grāhaka, respectively. It seems that the author of the AS has simply juxtaposed several heterogeneous definitions of darśanamārga he had found in his sources (perhaps reinterpreting the last one for reasons I could specify only hypothetically\(^40\)). In juxtaposing these heterogeneous definitions, the author of the AS has, however, quite apparently arranged them according to a deliberate principle, proceeding from the apophatic and unitary to the cataphatic and analytical, and at the same time from the purely Mahāyānist to the mixed and finally to the essentially "Hinayānist" characterization. But beyond this attempt at systematically arranging the materials, there does not seem to be any attempt at uniting the heterogeneous elements into a philosophically or doctrinally coherent system.

Several patterns by means of which this could have been achieved had already been developed in different passages of the Yogācārabhūmi. One of these patterns was the distribution of different descriptions of the darśanamārga to different Paths of Salvation: to that of the Śrāvakas (and Pratyekabuddhas) on the one hand, and to that of the Bodhisattvas on the other.\(^41\) In the AS, too, there are, indeed, one or two pas-

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\(^{37}\) AS 66,19f. = AS\(_x\) 111a3f.: ... sdug bṣaṅla la chos śes pa'i bzod pa daṅ | sdug bṣaṅ la chos śes pa ... mhon sum du 'gyur ba'i zag pa med pa'i śes rab = duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣāntau duḥkhe dharmajñāne ca ... pratyakṣānubhāviny anāśravā prajñā (cp. AAA 347,10ff. and ASBh 77,10).

\(^{38}\) AS 66,22 = AAA 347,12: yena jñānena tām anvayajñānakṣāntim avadhārayati.

\(^{39}\) AS 67,1f. (read dharmajñānakṣāntijñānair with ASBh 77,13f. and AS\(_x\) 111a5 <chos> śes pa'i bzod pa daṅ śes pa rhams kyis).

\(^{40}\) For this I have to refer to the study in progress mentioned in n.4a.

\(^{41}\) E.g. Bodhisattvabhūmi (ed. Dutt, Patna 1966) 25,22ff. - For a detailed exposition and discussion of this and the following theories and passages, I must, once more,
sages favouring such an interpretation, but they are just another heterogeneous element not applicable to the present passage which by choosing the merely formal distinction of "summary" and "detailed" seems to preclude any material distinction.

According to another model, the darśanamārga proper consists in the Mahāyānist uniform awareness of True Reality (tathatā, de bīn ēid), and the "Hīnayānist" type of darśanamārga is nothing but a subsequent analytical conceptualization. This model, too, is hardly applicable to the AS because in another passage of this text it is clearly stated that not only this subsequent conceptualization but also the darśanamārga proper consists of 16 moments.

A further model tries to cope with the difficulties by distributing the different characterizations of the darśanamārga to different levels of establishing Truth. But this model, too, can hardly be intended by the merely formal distinction of "summary" and "detailed" definitions in the AS. This distinction leaves us with the result that the author of the AS has, at least in the present context and perhaps with the exception of the reinterpretation of the "Hīnayānist" detailed description, confined himself to collecting and arranging heterogeneous traditional materials without achieving, or even attempting, doctrinal consistency. This task was, as it were, left to the commentators.

3.

The Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya (AS Bh), goes beyond the AS mainly in two ways:

Firstly, it shows a tendency towards assimilating the content of the four characterizations to one another. Of primary importance in this context is its interpretation of "the fourth description, i.e. of the darśanamārga in 16 moments: The AS Bh takes the first moment of each set of four as a perceptual comprehension not of the respective Truth itself

refer the reader to the prospective publication announced in n.4a.

Cp. esp. AS 94,7ff. (1.8: prativedhaviśeṣah!).

E.g. Y. Zi 302b4ff.; 'i 15a5ff.; cp. also Zi 73a5ff.

AS 93,9ff. = AS. 131a5ff.: tattvābhisamayāḥ katamāḥ [gaḥ mthoḥ ba'i lam gyi sms kyi skad cîg bcu drug po dag thob pa'o (= *yah śoḍaśadarśanamārgacittakṣanapratilambhaḥ)] mthoḥ ba'i lam la ni satavyayasthāpanāṁ abhisamayāntikāṁi samvṛtijñānāṁi pratilabhate, na tu sāmukkhi karoti (cp. AS Bh 122,18ff.).

Y. Zi 123b6 (ff.); cp. Bu ston 578,6ff.
in the concrete-collective sense of all individual factors as characterized by that Truth, but as a comprehension of the uniform true essence (tathatā, de bzin ńid) of that Truth.\textsuperscript{46} And the second moment of each set is understood as referring to the "transformation of the basis" (āśrayaparivṛtti, gnas gyur pa)\textsuperscript{47} which, as another passage\textsuperscript{48} suggests, is to be understood as that same tathatā, although now freed from the respective Defilements.

In this way at least these two phases have become, to a certain extent, compatible with the first three definitions of the AS. As to these, the \textit{ASBh} does not seem conscious of any incompatibility between them. On the contrary, it suggests that they are to be understood to refer to different aspects of one and the same experience. The first definition is interpreted as intending what I would call the formal aspect of the darśanamārga, viz. its being a synthesis of mental calmness (śamatha, ži gnas) and clear insight (vipaśyanā, lhag mthoṅ) free from imaginative, conceptualizing and reflecting activity (vikalpa, rnam par rtog pa).\textsuperscript{49} The explanation of the second definition can be understood as clarifying what is the content of the darśanamārga, viz. tathatā, this time, it is true, characterized by the non-existence of grāhya and grāhaka,\textsuperscript{50} whereas the third definition seems to be interpreted as stressing what is not the content of the darśanamārga, viz. the nimi-ttas (mtshan ma),\textsuperscript{51} i.e. the pseudo-objective correlates of vikalpa.

Thus to the \textit{ASBh} the main difference between the definitions would lie in their indicating different aspects of the darśanamārga, and, of course, in the different degree of their analytical elaboration. The

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{ASBh} 77,2ff.: tatra duṅkhe dharmajñanakṣāntiḥ ... duṅkhasatye tattathatā-pratyakṣānu-bhāvinī ... prajnā.
\textsuperscript{47} \textit{ASBh} 77,6ff.: tayā kṣāntyā ... parivartita āśraye tadanantaram yena jñānena tām āśrayaparivṛttiṃ pratyanubhavati, tad "duṅkhe dharmajñānam" ity ucyate; cp. also 76,13.
\textsuperscript{48} Cp. \textit{ASBh} 77,12f. saying that the [Supramundane] Path, insofar as it belongs to the dharmajñana group (i.e. the first and second moment of each set), has tathatā for its object (dharmajñanapakṣasya mārgasya tathatā viṣayaḥ); cp. also Bu ston 581,6: rnam grol te | bden pa'i de bzin ńid gnas gyur de (text: te) | Šākya 225,7ff.: "dharmatā (=tathatā) is twofold: pure by nature and pure in the sense of being freed from [accidental] impurities; insight into it is [accordingly] also twofold: dharmajñāna)kṣānti and dharmajñāna" (chos hid la gñis te | raṅ bzin rnam dag gi dañ | glo (text: blo) bur rnam dag gi'o || de šes pa la yaṅ gñis te | chos bzod pa dañ | chos šes so ||).
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{ASBh} 76,19f.
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{ASBh} 76,20f.: tena grāhyagraḥahābhāvatathatāprativedhāt.
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{ASBh} 76,21-26.
secondary importance of such differences in the view of the AbSh - and this leads us to the second important contribution of the AbSh going beyond the AS itself - is evinced by its assertion that the whole prolix treatment of the darśanamārga in the AS is only a makeshift (vyavasthānamātra) for the sake of instruction and preparation, the real nature of the supramundane state of the darśanamārga being accessible to personal experience only.\(^{52}\)

Inspite of these important contributions to a doctrinally consistent interpretation of the AS, the AbSh does not, at this point, discuss the question whether there is any difference between the darśanamārga experience of the Bodhisattvas and that of the Śrāvakas (as one would be inclined to assume on the basis of other passages\(^ {53}\)) and in what relation the definitions of the AS stand to this difference.

4.

This problem leads me to Bu ston.

The first thing to state is that Bu ston makes ample use of the explanations of the AbSh, sometimes rendering them more explicit, as, e.g., in the case of the first definition where he expressly states that nirvikalpa in the AbSh corresponds to anupalambha in the AS.\(^ {54}\)

Sometimes Bu ston supplies additional word-explanations, as, e.g., when analysing the compounds dūkhē dharmajñānakṣānti, etc.\(^ {55}\) Such explanations are usually helpful but occasionally questionable, e.g. when he understands the last words of the third definition\(^ {56}\) as a separate, positive element, interpreting the word chos (dharma) as referring to

\(^{52}\) AbSh 77,23ff. (= § 85C which, although it has somehow crept into the Chinese version, has to be included from the text of the AS on the basis of AS\(_{\text{T}}\)).

\(^{53}\) E.g. AbSh 123,5-7.

\(^{54}\) Bu ston 580,4: ... rnam par mi rto g pa dmigs pa'i rnam rto g gi gñen por gyur pas mi dmigs pa ...

\(^{55}\) Bu ston 581,2ff.; of the two analyses of the compound dharmajñānakṣānti, it is obviously the second one ((chos) ses pa'i dbaṅ du byas nas sūg bden la bzod pa) which suits the peculiar interpretation of this term given in the AS (AS 66,13ff.: dharma-jñānaṇaṃ katamā | prayogamārga ... dharma-vicārapañjānānaṃ | kṣāntib katamā | pūrvavi-cāraṇām adhipatim kṛtvā ... dūkhasaty(apratyakṣa)nubhāvini ... prajñā | ; text changed acc. to AS\(_{\text{T}}\) and AAA 347,7ff.); the first analysis (chos kyi de kho na hid ses pa'i phyir bzod pa), on the other hand, agrees, at least structurally, with the analysis of the term given in Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 350,5 (dharmajñānārtham kṣāntib).

\(^{56}\) See n.29.
the tathatā. 57 Such an interpretation is hardly justified, neither by the wording of the AS nor by that of its source, the Viścayāsamaṃgraḥaṇī. 58 Another example is Bu ston's explanation of the word dharma in the expression duḥkhe dharma jñānakṣānti, where he takes it to indicate the specific and common features [of the entities included in the Truth of Suffering] expounded in the Sūtras, viz. impermanence, etc. 59 This interpretation, though reconcilable with the Tibetan text of the AS, 60 is at variance with the interpretation of the AS Bh, 61 which is almost certainly right in understanding dharma in this passage as "doctrinal texts (dealing with the Truth of Suffering)".

It is, however, other aspects of Bu ston's commentary which are more interesting.

Although Bu ston reproduces, 62 almost literally, the remarks of the AS Bh on the makeshift character of all analytical treatment of the darśanamārga, he himself seems to take the analytical description in the AS much more seriously:

When explaining the detailed analysis (=fourth definition) of the darśanamārga, Bu ston points out that the statement of the AS 63 that the first two phases of each set comprehend the object, i.e. the tathatā, 64 whilst the last two phases comprehend the subject, i.e. [the respective-ly preceding phases of] correct comprehension (yaḥ dāg pa'īye śes, samyag- jñāna) 65 [itself], excludes [by its wording] both the theory that the darśanamārga does not have any finite entity as its object 66 as also the view of A bhya (Abhayākaragupta) who explains this statement of the AS in the sense of [comprehension of] the Essencelessness of

57 Bu ston 580,6f.: ... brda ste | 'du śes bsal ba ste | ma dmigs par gtogs (read rtogs) pa dañ (!) | de bžin gšegs pa'i chos de bžin ŋid śes pa'o ||.
58 See n.30.
59 Bu ston 581,3: de'i dbaḥ du byas pa'i chos mi rtag pa la sogs mdo sde las bstan pa raḥ mtshan spyi mtshan rnam s so ||.
60 AŚ 110b7: s dug bshal gyi bden pa' i dbaḥ du byas pa' i chos bstan pa raḥ nams so ||.
61 AS Bh 77,2: duḥkhasatyādhikārika sūtram idharma ; cp. also the Tibetan translation (Śi 69a8): s dug bshal gyi[s] bden pa' i dbar du byas pa' mdo la sogs pa' i chos ... 
62 Bu ston 583,3ff.
63 AS 67,1f. (see n.39).
64 Cp. AS Bh 77,12f.
65 Bu ston 582,3f.: 'dis mthoñ lam chos can yul du mi byed zer ba bṣal žiṅ | ... according to my colleague Tsultrim Phuntsog, chos can means kun rdo bden pa (which would, in the present context, especially consist of samyagjñāna in opposition to tathatā = chos ņid).
both object and subject.  

Moreover, Bu ston precedes the presentation of his own interpretation of the wording of the *AS* with a section where he refutes other theories of how to understand the purport of the *darśanamārga* section of the *AS*, discarding, in favour of the 16 moments theory, the opinions that the *darśanamārga* consists of one, two, or four moments only. Bu ston does not specify these theories; they are, however, more extensively described and discussed in the commentaries of Bo don and Sākya mchog ldan, but a detailed investigation of this matter would exceed the limits of this paper.

Finally, at the end of his commentary on the *darśanamārga*, Bu ston adds a paragraph in which a theory suggested by a passage of the *Vibhāṣikas*, which agrees with the fourth theory of the *AS* in acknowledging 16 moments (though limiting the *darśanamārga* to the first fifteen moments and grouping the sixteenth

66 Bu ston 582,4: ... *A bhya | gzūň 'dzin raň bzin med pa la 'chad pa'aň bzal lo||. Cp. Abhayākara gupta, *Munimatālāṅkara* (Peking-Tanjur, Dbu ma, Ha), 243a8ff., where the passage under discussion (viz. *AS* 67,1f.) is explained as expressing that "in the [darśanamārga] object and subject are comprehended to be without essence (nihsvabhāva)" (b2: 'dir gzūň ba dāň 'dzin pa dag raň bzin med pa ŋid du rtozs so ||). - The position of Abhayākara gupta seems to have been accepted by Bo don, who glosses the passage *AS* 67,1f. accordingly (697,2): ... *chos bzo dāň chos šes kyi s bsūň (read: gzūň) ba raň bzin med par rtozs la|tīes bzo rjes šes kyi s | 'dzin pa raň bzin med par rtozs so||. Cp. also Bo don 689,5 stating that anupalambha (*AS* 66,3) does not mean not perceiving anything at all but means comprehension of object and subject as lacking essence: ... *mi dmigs pa šes pa yan ci yan mi dmigs pa min gyi < > bsūň (read: gzūň) 'dzin raň bzin med par ... šes pa yin la|| ...  

67 Bo don 689,5f., referring to statements on the *darśanamārga* occurring in other texts/systems (gzūň gzăn).

68 Bo don 662,5ff., adding (665,2ff.) a theory according to which the *darśanamārga* consists of eight moments.

69 Sākya 224,5ff. (one moment); 225,4f. (two moments); 226,4f. (four moments).

70 Bu ston 584,6-585,1.

71 Yt zi 134a1.
with the bhāvanāmārga) and in using for them the same terms, is grouped by Bu ston under the heading of "positions to be established or affirmed" (gząg), along with the exposition of the AS itself but expressly set off from it as not forming part of the AS's own system. In another passage, by the way, Bu ston states that the system of the Śrāvakas, though not primarily and clearly set forth in the AS, is largely in agreement with [the doctrine of] this text.

The three "summary" definitions of the AS are regarded by Bu ston as describing the nature (ño bo) of the darśanamārga (i.e. of the daīsanamārga as a whole, and therefore of any of its moments), thus not at all as alternatives to the 16 moments theory.

For the third theory of the AS, this seems to imply that Bu ston understands it as not referring to three successive moments but to three aspects of the darśanamārga which would be included in each of the 16 moments.

Let me now return to the question which could not be answered in the case of the AS Bh, viz. the question whether this harmonized structure is meant to describe the darśanamārga of Śrāvakas, or Bodhisattvas, or both. Fortunately, Bu ston's commentary contains some pertinent remarks which suggest at least a tendency to consider the exposition of the darśanamārga in the AS as valid for all vehicles, though Bu ston is obviously aware of the fact that the wording of most of the different elements of that exposition seems to fit one vehicle better than the others.

E.g., the wording of the 16 moments theory is, it is true, primarily Śrāvakayānist, but Bu ston asserts that it is also valid for the darśanamārga of Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas, provided that it is given some additional qualification: The AS does not, admittedly, mention any removal of the respective Obstacle to [knowing all] that has to be known (jñeyāvaraṇa, ses sgrib) but only speaks of the removal of the respective [Obstacle consisting in] Defilements

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72 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Patna 1967) 352,19ff.; cp. Bu ston 579,6 and 585,1; Bo doṅ 660,6ff.
73 Bu ston 579,1 + 579,4: dgag gżąg spāṅ gsum gyi ... gñis pa la | mdzod daṅ raṅ lugs gñis ... 
75 Bu ston 580,3ff.
76 Cp. also Śākya 222,5f.
(kleśa, hon moḥs); yet a removal of the jñeyāvaraṇa, too, has, according to Bu ston, to be considered as being implied with regard to Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas, the former being freed from the concept of object to be apprehended (gzuṅ rtog, grāhyavikalpa) but not from the concept of apprehending subject (grāhakavikalpa), whereas the Bodhisattva is freed from both.  

However, such a doctrine with regard to the Pratyekabuddha, especially, is alien to the AS and, as far as I can see, to the older Yogācāra school as a whole. It rather belongs to the tradition of the Abhisaṃyālaṅkāra, a text which, as is well known, has been very influential in Tibetan Buddhism and has been commented upon by many Tibetan scholars, including Bu ston himself.  

This connection with the Abhisamayālaṅkāra tradition is also confirmed by another passage where Bu ston says that according to the method of describing and practising the darśanamārga insofar as it is common to all Vehicles, i.e. as it is practised also by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, [the darśanamārga forms, to be sure,] an uninterrupted series of "equiposed" (māham bṭag, samāhita, i.e. non-conceptualizing) mental phases, whereas in the specific practice of Bodhisattvas it is said to be interspersed with "subsequent" (rjes thob, pṛṣṭhalabdhā, i.e. conceptualizing) mental phases as, e.g., cultivating the Unlimited [Meditations] (tshad med, apramāṇa, viz. friendliness, compassion, etc.) or urging other persons to perform good deeds or praising them [for performing them on their own account]. That this view, too, stems from the Abhisamayālaṅkāra tradition is shown by a quotation from the Ni khri snaḥ ba, i.e. Āryavimuktisenas AbhisamayālaṅkāraVyāpti, adduced by Bu ston in another place. This passage points out that for a Bodhisattva

77 Bu ston 581,5f.: 'dir mthoh span  ṣes sgrib spoṅ ba ma smos kyaṅ raṅ rgyal gyis gzuṅ rtog daṅ | byaṅ sems kyis gnis ka spoṅ ba don gyis thob bo ||

78 Cp. esp. AA II.8 (grāhyārtakalpanāhānaḥ grāhakasyāprahāṇataḥ ... vijñeyāḥ khaḍgamaṅgasya samgrahaḥ); AAA 345,14-16: tatra grāhavikalpaprahaṇena pratyekabuddhiprahaṇaḥ saṁgraham prāvakebyo viśīnaṣṭi, grāhavikalpaprahaṇaḥbhāvena ca pratyekabuddhebyo 'nuttarabuddhiprahaṇamam; cp. also AAA 403,25ff.


80 The Luh gi sńe ma (Collected Works, pt.18).

81 Bu ston 583,2f.: thun moḥ gi lugs kyis | māham bṭag phreṅ (Text: breṅ?) gcig yin la | phar phyin pas tshad med sgom pa daṅ | gţan dge ba la 'god ciṅ bshāgs pa brjod pa soṅs rjes thob kyaṅ bar du bṣad do ||

82 Cp. E.Obermiller, History of Buddhism (Chos-ḥbyun) by Bu ston, II,155.

83 Bu ston 579,3f.; the passage is found in Peking-Tanjur, Šer phyin, Ka, 114b6-8; see also AAA 354,16f.: ata evoktam Āryavimuktisenena: aṣṭame hi darśanamārgakṣaṇe prayojanan bodhisattvasāyāpramāṇaḥ; itaratḥā hi navame kṣaṇe sattvadhātunirapekṣo nirodhe prapated iti.
it is necessary to interrupt the series of the constitutive phases of the darśanamārga after the eight moment by an exercise of friendliness, etc., in order to avoid becoming, for want of concern for other living beings, inclined to premature Nirvāṇa when subsequently comprehending the Truth of Cessation. Encouraging and praise of other persons are attributed to the 15th phase of the darśanamārga in Haribhadra's Abhisamayālaṅkāra-lakāra.  

Bu ston thus, at least in the case of the darśanamārga, systematically supplements the exposition of the AS by materials stemming from the Abhisamayālaṅkāra-tradition. The way for such a fusion had already been paved by Haribhadra who in his Abhisamayālaṅkāra-lakāra uses, though without any explanations, the darśanamārga exposition of the AS, especially the detailed analysis into 16 moments, in order to concretize the darśanamārga of the Bodhisattvas (!).

Bu ston, we saw, supplements the fourth definition of the AS to make it applicable to the darśanamārga of not only the Śrāvakas but also the Pratyekabuddhas and the Bodhisattvas; similarly, he renders the third definition, too, suitable for not only the Bodhisattvas but also the Śrāvakas. For it includes a comprehension free from the conventional notion of dharma, which obviously implies a comprehension of the essencelessness of dharma accessible to Bodhisattvas only. Bu ston, however, remarks that even Śrāvakas, though, it is true, they cannot directly perceive dharmanairatmya, do not actually apprehend the conceptual-imaginary mark of an Essence (bdag gi mtshan ma) of dharma either, during the darśanamārga, and that this is considered sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the definition which is, in fact, a negative one.

A problem is posed, however, by the second definition of the AS - the darśanamārga as comprehension in which what is cognized and what cognizes are completely the same (or alike). This is interpreted by the ASB as comprehension of True Reality as [characterized by] the non-existence of the [imaginary dichotomy of] object and subject (grāhyagrā układ bhāvatathā). This explanation, which is essentially adopted also

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54 AAĀ 357,16ff., esp. 18.
55 AAĀ 347,1ff.; cp. also Bo don 667,4ff.
56 Bu ston 581.1: 'dir ṇan thos kyis chos kyi bdag med dnos su mi mthoṅ yāṅ chos bdag gi mtshan mar mi 'dzin pa'i phyir de skad bṣad zer ro || Cp. Šākya 221.3: dman pa'i mthoṅ lam gyis chos kyi bdag med ma rtoṣ kyaṅ chos kyi bdag tu mi 'dzin pa la bsams pa yin no ||.
57 ASB 76,20ff. (see n.50).
by Bu ston, by preclude an application to the darśanamārga of the Śrāvakas, and in fact Bu ston himself, in a later passage, makes use of it in order to characterize the Full Comprehension (abhisamayamaya, mñon rtogs) of the Bodhisattvas as distinct from that of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. But he is silent in the present passage. rGyal tshab rje, on the other hand, expressly states that this definition is specific (thun mohn ma yin pa), i.e. refers to Bodhisattvas only. A similar view is indicated by Bo don, whereas Śākya mchog ldan tries to render this definition, too, applicable to both vehicles by distinguishing two sets of imagined object and subject – one referring to persons and the other to dharmas – and by assigning insight into the non-existence of the first set to the Hinayānist darśanamārga, while insight into the non-existence of the second set is achieved [only] by the Mahāyānist darśanamārga.

5.

I hope it has become clear from my exposition how the commentaries – Indian as well as Tibetan – try to draw doctrinal consistency out of the heterogeneous materials merely juxtaposed in the AS. One could perhaps say that they explicitly and legitimately accomplish a task necessarily arising out of that very juxtaposition. But it would be more risky to assert that also the specific form of their solutions is already implied in the basic text. Especially, the elements from the tradition of the Abhisamayālākhāra brought into play by Bu ston are definitely alien to the basic text and its tradition. But this does not, of course, mean that his attempt at doctrinal harmonization of the AS material (with itself but also with another tradition) is not highly interesting in its own

88 Bu ston 580,5: dmigs bya gzuh ba danh dmigs byed 'dzin pa med par mñam pas de bzin nidd danh mñam par ñeas pa'an de yin te |
89 Bu ston 691,3f.: sa rab dga' (read: dgar?) ... dmigs bya dmigs byed mñam ñid du ñeas pa'i ye ñes thob ste |
90 rGyal tshab 154b5: thun mohn min pa'i dbañ du byas na | gzuh 'dzin rzas tha dad kyis stoh par rtogs pa'i bden pa mñon par rtogs pa'o ||
91 Bo don 662,2f.: ñan thos pa* ... dmigs bya dmigs byed mñam ñid du ñeas pa'i ñeas rab ... med pa'i phyir ... *Read la.
92 Śākya 220,7f.: gzuh 'dzin kun brtags la'añ gñis gñis te | gñan zag gi dbañ du byas pa'i gzuh 'dzin danh | chos kyi dbañ du byas pa'i gzuh 'dzin no || dman pa'i mthon lam gysis danh po gñis danh | theg chen mthon lam gysis phyi ma gñis med par mthon ba'o ||.
right. Moreover, Bu ston is, from the historical point of view, obviously right in giving so much weight to the fourth, highly analytical characterization of *darśanamārga* in the *AS*, and also in taking comparatively seriously the "Śrāvakayānist" character of much of the materials contained in the *AS* as a whole.

Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td><em>Abhisamayālaṅkāra</em></td>
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<td>AS</td>
<td><em>Abhidharmasamuccaya</em>, ed. P. Pradhan, Santiniketan 1950</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>ASₜ</em></td>
<td>Tibetan translation of the <em>AS</em> (Peking-Tanjur, Sems tsam, vol. Li, 51a2ff.)</td>
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<td><em>ASBh</em></td>
<td><em>Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya</em>, ed. N. Tatia, Patna 1976.</td>
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<td>Bo doh</td>
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< > in Sanskrit and Tibetan texts = to be added  
[ ] a) in Sanskrit and Tibetan texts = to be deleted  
   b) in translations = added by the translator

In quotations from the Tibetan commentaries, simple underlining means that a word or passage corresponds to the wording of the *ASBh*, whereas double underlining marks correspondence to the wording of the *AS*. 
The term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* occurs in numerous passages\(^1\) of the works of rGyal tshab rje (1364-1432) and mKhas grub rje (1385-1438) that belong to the epistemological and logical literature, the "*tshad ma*"-literature, and is well-used in the later kindred literature of the dGe lugs pas. The "earliest" text it can be found in, is rGyal tshab's *Tshad ma'i brjed byaṅ chen mo*;\(^2\) and this text is a compilation of notes taken down by rGyal tshab at the occasion of Tsoṅ kha pa's lectures on *tshad ma*.\(^3\)

The term is easy enough to understand and to interpret within its context. The genitive characterizing the compound is simply attributive; the word literally means, therefore, that the person (*skyes bu*) is a means of valid cognition (*tshad ma*), and I translate the term as "a person of authority". The word designates the Buddha, of course, the authority par

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1. E.g. in the *Tshad ma'i lam khrig* of rGyal tshab (Ca/VIII, 1b5, 3a1 and passim) and of mKhas grub (Ta/VI, 1b3, 4a4 and passim). For rGyal tshab's and mKhas grub's works I am using the microfiches of the Lhasa-edition of the *Yab sras gsuṅs 'bum* prepared by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York.

2. E.g. 3b5.

3. It is therefore often included in Tsoṅ kha pa's collected works too (cf. Tohoku 5400 = 5438, Lhasa Pha/VII = Rgyal Tshab NA/III). Although written by rGyal tshab these notes could be considered as representing a truthful mirror of the contents of Tsoṅ kha pa's lectures. Since our term does not occur in Tsoṅ kha pa's only *tshad ma*-work, the *sDe bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo*, its appearance in the *Tshad ma' brjed byaṅ* can indeed be considered as the "earliest".
excellence and thus the final source and judge of any validity and usefulness in any kind of cognition.

It is also easy to show the original source of the concept meant by this term. This concept has been introduced by Dignāga in the first words of the benedictory verse of his Pramāṇasamuccaya, the verse which contains the key to the religious meaning of the whole Buddhist epistemological and logical tradition. The word used by Dignāga is the attribute pramāṇabhūta, the technical meaning of which is somebody "who has become a means of valid cognition".5

Both Tibetan translation of the verse and its commentary show tshad mar gyur pa - a correct translation of pramāṇabhūta. And that the term was only understood as an attributive adjective is also clear from various commentarial notes on -bhūta-. Jinendrabuddhi, e.g., gives the synonyms utpanna (skyes pa)6 and prādurbhūta or prajāta7 (for byuṅ ba), while Devendrabuddhi-Śākyamati also give -jāta with a corresponding Tibetan 'khrûns pa.8

Important as it is for fundamental Buddhist reasons, that the attribute includes the notion that the Buddha "has become" or "developed to be" a pramāṇa, tshad ma, the essential meaning of the term definitely is, that the Buddha is a means of valid cognition.9 Nowhere, however, is the Buddha called a tshad ma'i skyes bu (Skt. 'pramāṇapuruṣa) in the relevant Indian texts.10 Neither do the Tibetans use that term when explaining Dignāga's benedictory verse, but they keep to the correct form of the attribute tshad mar gyur pa.

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5 Hattori, loc.cit. 74, explains: "'to have come into existence' (bhūta) as a 'means of valid cognition' (pramāṇa)" and translates p.23: "who is the personification of the means of cognition." The explanation of the compound as a kind of dvandva (pramāṇaḥ caisa bhūtaḥ ceti pramāṇabhūtah), E.Steinkellner, Some Sanskrit-Fragments of Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī. A Corpus of Indian Studies - Essays in Honour of Professor Gaurinath Sastri, Calcutta 1980, 100: fragment 1) has exegetical purpose mainly.

6 Fragment 1, E.Steinkellner, loc.cit., 100.

7 Cf. E.Steinkellner, loc.cit., n.16.


9 Cf. Dharmakīrti's tadvat pramāṇaḥ bhagavān (PV II, 9a).

Should we then consider the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* just to be a sloppy and more or less unintentional substantiation of the original adjective? Or is there more behind this seemingly clear and harmless term? I think that its immediate context and a survey of the history of the Buddhist attitude towards its own epistemological tradition clearly indicate that this term has been created by somebody who was fully aware of what he wanted to express by it.

At another occasion I dealt with the various modern misconceptions regarding the problem of the development of a seemingly irreligious tradition of epistemology and logic within the context of Buddhism.\textsuperscript{10a} The spiritual place of this tradition in Indian Buddhism has been clearly identified by Vetter in his study of 1964, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharma-kīrti* (31ff.), and we need not deal with his results here in detail. Suffice it to state, that the Buddhist philosophers and scholars whose work represent about 700 years of the tradition in India, did certainly not consider their work as a secular, non-religious occupation, but as a necessary part of their kind of Buddhist belief, or - in traditional words - as a part of the path.

This self-interpretation of the school centers around Dignāga's benedictory verse mentioned above, and then particularly on the second chapter of Dharmakirti's *Pramāṇavārttika* which is a lengthy commentary on just this verse and carries the title *pramāṇasiddhi* ("Establishment of the means of valid cognition"). But although there has been a great emphasis on this chapter within the school itself until its final stage in India, and when most of its works had already been translated into Tibetan, it seems that the Tibetans understood the import of that tradition at its surface value only when in the 12\textsuperscript{th} and 13\textsuperscript{th} century they began to incorporate the school's tenets and problems into their own spiritual and cultural life. According to all that we know of this first strictly speaking Tibetan period of the school's history - and we do not know very much due to insufficient materials available and only a few studies having been done so far\textsuperscript{11} - the Tibetans seemed to consider the tradition of epistemology and logic as a branch of the secular sciences, together with grammar, poetics and others.

\textsuperscript{10a} The Spiritual Place of the Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism. *Nanto Bukkyō* 49, 1982, 1-18.

This attitude towards the pramāṇa-tradition is reflected in the fact that the early Tibetan scholars who started to give their own interpretations and explanations of Dharmakirti's works, evidently concentrated on Dharmakirti's Pramāṇaviniścaya - it may of course also be considered as the result of this fact. Before the Sa skya Paṇḍita's revision of the Pramāṇavārttika's translation in the beginning of the 13th century it is indeed difficult to imagine that the study of the then available Tibetan translation would make much decent sense, and van der Kuijp even thinks with good reasons, that Phya pa Chos kyi sen ge (1109-1169) did not know the Pramāṇavārttika at all. But the Pramāṇaviniścaya does not deal with the religious aspects of the pramāṇa-theory, and it is quite uncertain whether on the basis of the study of such material, these early Tibetan scholars were in a position to be aware of the problem.

According to a note in gZon nu dpal's (1392-1481) Deb ther sgon po (BA 335), the spread of the Pramāṇavārttika was due to the Panchen and his pupil U yug pa Rigs pa'i sen ge (middle of the 13th cent.). And that the shift of interest from the Pramāṇaviniścaya to the Pramāṇavārttika took place gradually, and was generally accepted only towards the beginning of the 15th century, can be taken from gZon nu dpal's words: "In my younger days the inmates of gSah-phu used to study the Pramāṇaviniścaya, but now-a-days they have changed over to the Pramāṇavārttika." (BA 335). Since the Pramāṇaviniścaya is a perfectly clear and well-organized text, in fact a much maturer work of Dharmakirti's than the Pramāṇavārttika, and as such quite sufficient to represent Dharmakirti's teachings on epistemology and logic, the reason for the shift of interest to the Pramāṇavārttika can only lie in the latter text's, especially its second chapter's, substantial and essential discussion of the foundation of valid cognition, and thus of the Buddhist meaning of epistemology in general.

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13 L.W.J. van der Kuijp, who dealt with this question in his Introductory Notes ... (cf. n. 11), 6ff., mentions a number of scholars with a positive approach towards a possible religious significance of the pramāṇa-tradition: Sa skya mchog Idan (1428-1507), Bo doṅ pa chen Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1376-1451), bSod nam grags pa (1478-1554) and finally 'Jam dpbyahs bzhad pa'i rdo rje (1648-1721/22). There are differences among these scholars as to how the relation between the tshad ma-theory and the Buddhist path is accounted for, but for the very idea itself that there is such a relation, all these scholars are certainly indebted to the early dGe lugs pas and their possible predecessor(s).
It is Tson kha pa who still states in his mdun legs ma,16 a kind of autobiography, that "there are many in Tibet, learned and unlearned in the tshad ma-texts, who unanimously say that in the Sūtra (i.e. the PS) and in all the Seven Treatises (of Dharmakīrti) there is no (spiritual) stage to internalize (ḥams len) for proceeding towards enlightenment."15 But he continues, claiming that there exists a decisive clue to the function of the tshad ma-tradition with regard to the Buddhist path.16 For he says that "the meaning of the benedictory verse of the Pramāṇasamuccaya as an establishment of the means of valid cognition (tshad ma grub par = pramāṇasiddhi) is the establishment forwards and backwards (lugs 'byüh lugs ldog)17 of the Venerable one as the means of valid cognition for those who strive for liberation!"18

Both Obermiller and Wayman, who previously referred to these lines, misunderstood the exact connotation particularly of the words "forwards and backwards" (lugs 'byüh = anuloma, lugs ldog = pratiloma). Tson kha pa's disciple rGyal tshab, however, gives in his Tshad ma'i lam khrid (f.4b4-5a1 = p.14,15-16,5) a short sequence of four proofs that establish forwards (lugs 'byüh) that the Venerable is a means of valid cognition. And then, f.5a1-4 (=p.16,5-17,3) he gives a sequence of three proofs that establish backwards (lugs ldog) how we can know that he is of such kind.19

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16 Ed. and transl. by A.Wayman, Observations on Translations from the Classical Tibetan Language into European Languages. IIJ 14, 1972, 175-185.

15 | byüh phyogs 'di na tshad ma'i gzhū lugs la ||sbyaṅs daṅ ma sbyaṅs du ma mgrin gcig tu || mdo daṅ sde bdun kun la byüh chub tu | bdrgod pa'i ḥams len rim pa yod min zer || (Wayman, loc.cit. 180; also translated in Matsumoto Shirō, sTag tshaṅ pa no Tsoṅ kha pa hiḥan ni tsuite. Report of the Japanese Association for Tibetan Studies 28, 1982, 12).

16 Wayman, loc.cit. 180f.: the same passage referring to the pramāṇa-tradition has already been interpreted by E.Obermiller, Tsoṅ-kha-pa le Pandit. MCB 3, 1934-35, 334f.

17 This has been misunderstood by both, Obermiller and Wayman. The former thought that lugs 'byüh lugs ldog gis meant "par la méthode positive et négative (anvayavyatireka)", the latter translates "by the forward and the reverse order (of Dependent Origination), proving logically" and adds in a footnote that "Tsoṅ-kha-pa refers here to the contemplation of dependent origination as idampratyayatā, 'state of having this as its condition (for arising)'." 18 | tshad ma kun las btus pa'i mchod brjod don ||tshad ma grub par lugs 'byüh lugs ldog gis || rnam grol don du gher ba bcom ldan 'das || tshad mar bsgrub sīh ... || (Wayman, loc.cit. 181)

18 Page-references are to the new Indian edition, Vāraṇāsi 1969. Also in Tsoṅ kha pa - rGyal tshab's Tshad ma'i brjed byañ 5b5ff. the two ways of explaining "forwards and backwards" are directly applied to the first half of the Pramāṇasamuccaya's benedictory verse, always of course with reference to Dharmakīrti's elaboration in the second chapter of the Pramāṇavārttikā. Cf. also mKhas grub rje's Tshad ma'i lam khrid 3a3-5 and 3b6ff.
It is not necessary to show these two chains of proofs in detail. Suffice it to realize that these proofs are closely connected with the structure of the Pramāṇavārttika's second chapter - they are in fact a logical formulation of the essential ideas of this chapter. That such a concise formulation is possible only after a careful analysis and a scrupulous knowledge of the details of the basic text need hardly be pointed out. In other words, if Tson kha pa in his autobiography uses these methodological terms, he refers to a very complex summary of the essential arguments of the second chapter based on a careful analysis of this text. This, however, is not the result of his own work, it can only be attributed to scholars who worked on the Pramāṇavārttika before Tson kha pa and evidently found the latter's approval. The two methodological terms and the corresponding steps of the proofs are mentioned, in fact, already by an Indian exegetical school, since they appear in Vibhūticandra's "notes".20

Once the religious significance of the theory of valid cognition has been accepted - with all its corollaries, "down" to the art of disputation -, the question remains still why the dGe lugs pas talk of the Buddha as a tshad ma'i skyes bu.

The term itself suggests that it is related to the terminology of the "three (kinds of) persons" (skyes bu gsum) as it is known from the beginning of Atiśa's Bodhipathapradīpa (vv.3-5), and then in the whole lam rim-literature which later follows this text.

These three kinds of persons are: "the inferior or lesser" (chuñ nu, tha ma), who pursues his own objectives in the pleasures of this world; "the mediocre or middling" (briṅ ba), who turns away from worldly pleasures and sinful actions, pursuing his own quiescence; and finally "the superior" (mchog pa) who pursues the cessation of suffering for the other beings because of his own experience of suffering.21

Indeed in his Tshad ma'i lam khrid rGyal tshab devotes a whole introductory division, the second (2b5-4a5), to - and these are the words of this heading (sa bcad) - "the way how the stages of the path of the three (kinds of) persons are indicated directly and indirectly"22 in the Pramāṇa-Śāstra, particularly the Pramāṇavārttika. rGyal tshab takes pains in showing especially how the lowest kind of person has been referred to,

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22 skyes bu gsum gyi lam gyi rim pa dnos šugs la ji ītar 'phaḥs pa'i tshul (Tshad ma'i lam khrid 1b4 and 2b5).
since according to him it is the "middling" who is specially meant in the second chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika, and "when reference is to the person of authority (tshad ma'i skyes bu), who promotes this (middling person), the stages of the path of the superior (person) are being taught."23

In this chapter rGyal tshab, therefore, not only identifies the tshad ma'i skyes bu with the skyes bu chen po, but clearly displays a keen interest in showing that and how the teachings of the Pramāṇavārttika are in accord with the religious "anthropology" of the lam rim-theory. He even refers in the beginning24 of this chapter to a discussion on whether the inferior person was only implied by meaning (don gyis 'phaḥs pa) or was actually taught (dhos su bstan par) in the course of argumentation.

There are also other indications that the purpose of this whole division is to reconcile the tshad ma-tradition with the lam rim-tradition. E.g. when rGyal tshab feels that he has to deal with the question, where in the Pramāṇavārttika Dharmakīrti teaches the "selflessness of the phenomena" (chos kyi bdag med), and why he does not teach it in the second chapter.25 The general character of this whole division is not explanatory - as is the rest of the text -, but clearly apologetic. But why? There is only one reason for such an attitude, and that is that the idea brought forward is still a rather new one, and a not generally accepted one.

The apparent sign of the new system to combine the tshad-ma-tradition with the path-theory seems to be the term tshad ma'i skyes bu. In its unspectacular and seemingly traditional form it is the result of a flash of genius. The simple compound word, indeed, symbolically combines two cultural traditions inherited from India and separately dealt with for a considerable period. Not only does it indicate thereby that the level of understanding has been reached in Tibet too, on which the Indian pramāṇa-tradition interpreted itself originally, it also shows that finally the theoretical frame was found to give the strong rational tendencies in Tibetan Buddhism a natural place within the practice of the path.

As a final question we may ask whether it is possible to determine, who first propounded this new theory of the tshad ma-teachings as being a part of the path or - as we could call it in agreement with a title to be found with rGyal tshab as well as with mKhas grub - this theory of a "tshad ma'i lam"?

23 de rjes su 'dzin pa'i tshad ma'i skyes bu'i dbah du byas nas chen po'i lam rim bstan ciḥ ... (loc.cit. 2b6f.)
24 loc.cit. 2b5f.
25 loc.cit. 4a2-4.
rGyal tshab in the postscript to his Tshad ma'i lam khrid mentions Red mda' ba, Blo bzañ grags pa and Kun dga' dpal - in this sequence - as the ones he feels obliged to with regard to the tenets presented. Kun dga' dpal is known as one of rGyal tshab's teachers.²⁶ Whether he is the same as Ňa dpon Kun dga' dpal,²⁷ who is mentioned as the author of a Prajñā-pāramitā-commentary and Red mda' ba's and Tsoṅ kha pa's teacher in this subject, I cannot say. I found no hint in the biographical literature that would relate this Kun dga' dpal to tshad ma-studies. Quite clear, however, seems to be that Red mda' ba gtson nu blo gros (1349-1412) played an important role in shaping the major theoretical ideas of Tsoṅ kha pa and his pupil rGyal tshab. Only eight years senior to Tsoṅ kha pa he is not only in high esteem as Tsoṅ kha pa's teacher in two subjects, dBu ma and Tshad ma,²⁸ he is also considered as one of his two most important (gtso bo) teachers.²⁹

G.Tucci has already inferred from biographical statements and the allusions of Tsoṅ kha pa's disciples that "it appears that he developed and gave greater depth to ideas already elaborated by a great master, at whose school he had his training: gtsun nu blo gros of Red mda".³⁰ This assumption can only be corroborated by the possible conclusions from the context of the tshad ma-tradition. Tucci notes (loc.cit. 120) that the exegetical tradition which "acknowledges Logic as a fundamental part of Religion" begins with Kumāramati, i.e. gtsun nu blo gros, but in his note he only refers to Stcherbatsky's meagre remarks on p.46 of his Buddhist Logic I. As far as I can see, no further sources of such knowledge are indicated - evidently the circle of scholars around Stcherbatsky, particularly Vostrikov and Baradijn, had access to oral or other information.

I have no reasons to doubt that this information is correct. My reasons are: It is evident that Tsoṅ kha pa is not the creator of the "tshad ma'i lam"-system. If Red mda' ba had no part in its development, Tsoṅ kha pa's disciples would not have acknowledged such a part. The shift from studying the Pramāṇaviniścaya to studying the Pramāṇavārttika is attested by the Deb ther sgon po for the first half of the 15th century. Red mda' ba wrote at least three works of relevance.³¹ And finally - Tsoṅ kha pa

²⁸ R.Kaschewsky, loc.cit. 24, 83f., 86, 88f.
²⁹ R.Kaschewsky, loc.cit. 24.
³⁰ Tucci, loc.cit. 118f.
also studied U yug pa's commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, with special emphasis on the second chapter, as noted by one biography. U yug pa Rigs pa'i seng ge, the pupil of the Sa skya Paṇḍita, seems to have written the first Tibetan commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika* in the middle of the 13th century, but there is nowhere a hint to be found, that Tsoṅ kha pa, besides studying it, has been particularly influenced by this explanation, which almost certainly must have been written in the secularistic mode generally attributed to the earlier Sa skya pa.

Of course, such cumulative evidence would be superfluous if only we had access to one of Red mda' ba's *tshad ma*-works. It is one of the odd features of the Tibetan literary history that most of the works of one of their supposedly important and perhaps original minds are lost or forgotten, although he has been truly esteemed by the founder of the dGe lugs pa-tradition and his immediate disciples, and although as Tsoṅ kha pa's teacher and friend he has been always highly venerated - at least verbally - by this tradition until today.

The following three *tshad ma*-works of Red mda' ba are known from A khu Rinpoche's Tho-yig. Nr.11820: *rNam 'grel gyi spyi don* ("The general meaning of the *Pramāṇavārttika*"), Nr.11822: *rNam 'grel tīkk, Rigs pa'i 'dod 'jo* ("*Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā, Wishing Cow of arguments*"), and Nr.11821: *rNam 'grel rgyan gyi 'grel bṣad chen mo* ("Great sub commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttīkālaṃkāra*"), i.e. Prajñākaragupta's commentary which is famous for its elaborate development of the theme of the second chapter.

None of these works seems to be extant nowadays, although not everything Red mda' ba wrote is lost. His commentaries on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, on the Catuḥśataka, and on the *Suhaṅklekha* were recently published in India. Could it be that other texts of this important Tibetan master and evidently original thinker have been kept in Sa skya pa circles? Let us hope that these works of Red mda' ba are not irretrievably lost, and will eventually be recovered and published.

*Non est in verbo, quod non est in cogitatione!*
Abbreviations


**PVT** Pramāṇavārttikatīkā (Śākyamati)

**PVT** Pramāṇavārttikatīkā, Tibetan translation: Peking Edition Nr.5718

**PVV** Pramāṇavārttikavṛttiḥ. Ed. R.Sāṅkṛityāyana, Patna 1938-1940

**BA** George N.Roerich, The Blue Annals. Calcutta 1949, 1953

Postscript: János Szerb reminds me of the fact that Bu ston's teacher bSod nams mgon was also called Tshad ma'i skyes bu according to sGratshad pa's biography which was completed in 1366 (cf. D.Seyfort Ruegg, The Life of Bu ston Rin po che. Roma 1966, 70, 74, 146). This would qualify my attempt to pin down a first propounding of the new theory to Pedmda' ba who was born only in 1349.
ON THE MYAñ 'DAS

by

J.TAKASAKI (Tokyo)

1. The Myañ 'das, i.e. Yoḥs su mya han laš 'das pa chen po'i mdo (Ma-
hāparinirvāṇasūtra) is an important Mahāyāna scripture famous with its
doctrine of the Buddha's nature or the tathāgatagarbha and the eternity
of the Buddha. There are two translations kept in the Tibetan Kanjur:
one being of 13 bampos translated from a Sanskrit original, the other be-
ing of 56 bampos translated from Chinese materials, namely Dharmakṣema's
translation of the same scripture in 40 fascicles combined with Jñāna-
bhadra's translation in 2 fascicles as a kind of an annex to it.¹

   In the following I wish to give a survey on the latter, i.e. the
Myañ 'das in 56 bampos.

2. The Myañ 'das in Tibetan Kanjur Catalogues

   The Myañ 'das is described in Tibetan Kanjur catalogues in the fol-
lowing ways:

1) lDan dKar ma (c.812/824 A.D.)
   (Lalou² no.249; Yoshimura³ no.248)
   theg pa chen po'i mdo sde, rgya las bsgyur ba la
   'Phags pa yoḥs su mya han las 'das pa chen po, 12600 §ls., 42 bps.

¹ Taisho Tripitaka, No.374 & 377, respectively.
³ The Denkar-ma. An Oldest Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons. Indo-Daijobukkyo-
shiso-kenkyu. Kyoto 1974, vol.2, 99-199. (This article was originally published in
1950).
2) Bu ston, Chos 'byun chen mo (IV. dKar chags) (c.1322 A.D.)
(Nishioka no.368)\(^4\)
(VII) theg pa chen po'i mdo sde sna tshogs la ....
Mya han las 'das pa chen po'i mdo, rgya las bsgyur ba, 56 bps.

3) sNar thang bKa' 'gyur (1730-32 A.D.)
(Takasaki no.361, Cases.78-79)\(^5\)
Myan 'das Ka pa (bps.1-28, le'us 1-9) & Kha pa (bps.29-56, le'us 10-15)
Myan 'das chen po ..... rgya nag gi mkhan po Wañ phab shun dan| dharmag ti 'dzin dGe ba'i blo gros | lo tsa ba rGya mtsho'i sde rnams kyis bsgyur ba ..... 

4) lHa sa bKa' 'gyur
(Takasaki no.368, Cases.77-78)\(^6\)
Myan 'das Ka pa & Kha pa.

5) sDe dge bKa' 'gyur dKar chags (1733 A.D.)
(Tohoku no.119)\(^7\) mDo, Ña & Ta.

6) Peking Ed. (1724 A.D.)
(Otani no.787)\(^8\) mDo, Ju & Ñu.

7) Co ne bKa' 'gyur
(Mibu no.790)\(^9\)


\(^5\) J.Takasaki, A Catalogue of the Lha sa Kanjur kept in the University of Tokyo (facsimile edition), 1965 (Text number of the Narthañ Kanjur is given in the comparative table.) Also see, Shodo Nagashima, A catalogue of the Narthañ Kanjur kept in Taisho University, Taisho Daigaku Kenkyu Kiyo 61, 1975, 760-726.

\(^6\) J.Takasaki, ibid.

\(^7\) A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons, ed. by H.Ui & others, Sendai 1934.

\(^8\) A Comparative Analytical Catalogue of the Kanjur Division of the Tibetan Tripitaka, Otani Daigaku Library, Kyoto 1930-32.


In the Conference a kind information was given by Dr.G.Bethlenfalvy on the Urga Kanjur. This edition has a similar arrangement with the Derge Edition, and the Myan 'das of 56 bps. is located in Mdo sde Na pa & Ta pa (No.119). G.Bethlenfalvy, A Catalogue of the Urga Kanjur, Šaka-piṭaka Series 246, New Delhi, 1980.
3. Date of Translation

There is no record on the date of translation of the Nyah 'das. Pelliot in his article on the Catalogue of Kanjur (JA 1914), referring to the transcription of the Chinese name of the translator Wan phab shun (Wang Fa-chouen), said that the date may be before 1000 A.D. in the light of transcription phab, instead of fa, for the term signifying dharma or chos. While Sakurabe in the Otani Catalogue indicates the identification of the name sGe ba'i blo gros with a co-translator of Atiśa, who belongs to the 11th century A.D. The fact that the Nyah 'das is mentioned in the ldan dkar ma may show an earlier date of its translation. Only difficulty of the identification of the Nyah 'das in the ldan dkar ma with that preserved in the present Kanjur is the difference of the number of bampos given there. But we may construe that 42 is the number of fascicles in the original Chinese text (40+2) and that at the beginning the Tibetan translation had the same division of fascicles as the Chinese texts.

4. Characteristics of the Chinese original

The original of the Nyah 'das is, as mentioned above, a combination of Dharmakṣema's text and Jñānabhadra's one. According to biographies of Dharmakṣema, he brought at the beginning the first 10 fascicles with him from India in c.412-5 A.D., but in the thought of its being incomplete, he went back to India, when he met his mother's death, and on the way back to China, he obtained at Khotan the continued portion up to fascicle 20. Afterwards he sent a messenger again to Khotan to get the re-

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10 P. Pelliot, Notes à propos d'un catalogue de Kanjur, JA, Juillet-Août 1914, 130-131.
11 Otani Catalogue (n.8 above), 287.
12 According to the information given by Dr. H. Eimer, Bonn, after the Velim conference, the Nyah 'das among the hand-written manuscripts of the Kanjur kept in the British Library in London occupies vols.98-100, and consists of 42 bampo (vol.98, bps.1-14, 315 folios, vol.99, bps.15-28, 318 folios; vol.100, bps.29-42, 309 folios). So the identification is mostly made sure.
As an example of the Tibetan text translated from Chinese source which has the same fascicle division with the original, we have the rDo rje tiṅ ṇe 'dzin gyi chos kyi yi ge. It is however curious enough that the Denkar ma records this sūtra as of 6 bampo. (Lalou, No.254, in the same section as the Nyah 'das).
13 e.g. Kao seng chuan, fasc.2 (Taisho No.2059, vol.50, 335c-337b. See Fuse Kogaku, Nehan-shu no Kenkyu, (Studies on the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sect in China), Tokyo 1942 (Reprint 1973), Vol.1, 100-138.
maining parts and finally completed the translation in 40 fascicles in 421 A.D. Later on, however, a monk come from Central Asia told him the incompleteness of the text (probably because his translation has no scene of the Preceptor's funeral and distributions of his relics as told in the Hinayāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra.). So he asked his sponsor Tsū ch'ū Měng sun, e the Lord of Pei leang, f for permission to go abroad in search of the remaining text, but soon after started, he was killed by subordinates of the lord who was afraid of his venerated great master's being carried off by the strong Pei Wei power. Thus in China people began to make their efforts of seeking for this illusory text and continued until finally they were satisfied with getting Jñānabhadra's translation in two fascicles, which was brought by his disciple to the then capital Ch'ang an g in c.676 A.D. and permitted by the Empress Tsē t'ien wu hou h for its propagation in 695. The text was regarded as the continuation of Dharmakṣema's text and was called "the latter part (hou fen)" i of the Mahāparinirvāṇa. 14

There are however some doubts about the origin of this new text. The text was originally found at Java where Jñānabhadra lived. Its main part is mostly a description of the facts around the Buddha's mahāparinirvāṇa as in the Pāli Canon and few Mahāyānistic ideas such as the eternity of the Buddha's body scattered between lines. Textual continuation from the final portion of Dharmakṣetra's text is technically not perfect. Namely Dharmakṣema's text ends with Subhadra's attainment of arhatship, while the beginning of the "Latter Part" starts with his getting the pure dharma eyes after attending Preceptor's teaching. 15 Tibetan translation is quite true to follow the Chinese idea of combination of the both texts and seems not to have noticed of this contradiction. 16

4.2.

Furthermore another kind of mistery exists concerning Dharmakṣema's text. Almost the same year as his completion of translation, Fahien finished his own translation of the Mahāparinirvāṇa in 6 fascicles at Chien

14 Fuse, op.cit., 139-146.
15 Fuse, op.cit., 148-149.
16 ... śin tu bzah po ni dgra bcom pa'i 'bras bu thob par gyur to || de'i tse śin tu bstan pos bcom ldan 'das las yoñs su mya han las 'das pa chen po'i chos śin tu zab mo thos nas chos la chos kyi mig rnam par dag par gyur to || ... de bzin gšegs pa las rab tu 'byuḥ bar gsol to || (Peking Ed., Mdo, Nu 319a2-4).
k'ang (418 A.D.)¹⁷ This text is equivalent to the first ten fascicles of Dharmakṣema's text. Its authority was lost and replaced by the latter when the latter was brought to the Southern China in c.436 probably in the thought of the latter's being more exhaustive and having a deeper consideration on the problem of ācānantikas. Monks in Chien k'ang made revisions of Dharmakṣema's translation and arranged the text in 36 fascicles¹⁸ in which is utilized the detailed chapter division of Fa hien's translation.

Fa hien brought the original text directly from India, the text having been found in a house of a Brahmin at Pātaliputra between 404-409 A.D. Though being short, this text seems to show the original form of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra of Mahāyāna and is completed by itself. The reason for this hypothesis is that the Mahāyāna scriptures are composed not for describing the death of the Buddha, but, borrowing its scene, to express its significance in the light of the Mahāyāna doctrines, and that this purpose is enough fulfilled in Fa hien's text. At the same time, however, the expression of such ideas has no literal limitation unless it contradicts against the facts believed by the followers. In other words, there are rooms for fantasy and any continuation is possible and thus the text is open to a further expansion, but is not necessarily given an end by the death of the Buddha. In this way Dharmakṣema's text also shows a kind of completeness.

Then where was this extension of the text done? It was at least not in India proper, because another Tibetan translation of the Mahāparinirvāṇa in 13 bampus, which was brought to Tibet directly from India before the beginning of the 9th century, has the equivalent portion to Fa hien's text and is nearer to it in the contents than to Dharmakṣema's one which has a certain amount of enlargement between lines even in the first 10 fascicles. Another material to prove this fact is the fragmentary Sanskrit manuscript of the Mahāparinirvāṇa in the collection of Hoernle found in the Eastern Turkistan and identified by K.Watanabe. (Hoernle, Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature, 93-97) It is equivalent to the passage towards the end of fasc.9 and the beginning of fasc.10 of Dharmakṣema's text,¹⁹ where an important insertion is made by the latter.

¹⁷ Taisho No.376. See Fuse, op.cit., 72-81.
¹⁸ Taisho No.375. See Fuse, op.cit., 156-176.
¹⁹ Equivalent to Myah 'das, Peking Ed. Mdo Ju 160b4-162a1.
5. Characteristics of Tibetan Translation

The technical terms used in the Myañ 'das are mostly following to the skad gsar bcad method. Some important terms different from those used in the text of Indian origin are as follows:

1) sahs rgyas kyi rañ bzin, for the Buddha's nature, f\u015fr\u1033\u0142\u0101 in the Chinese original, which is usually used for the translation of skt. buddhadh\u0111tu. This is suggested by the term sahs rgyas kyi khams used in the equivalent passage in the other version.

2) log sred can for icchanta\u1102kha, which is usually translated into 'dod chen po.

3) The term tath\u0155atagarbha is translated into de bzin gs\u0111gs pa'i s\u0111i\u0101h po as usually found in the texts of Indian origin when Dharmak\u0111sena uses the word ju lai ts'ang\u1033\u1015\u0101 or ju lai pi ts'ang\u1037\u1015, while it is translated into de bzin gs\u0111gs pa'i gsah bai s\u0111i\u0101h po when he uses terms ju lai wei mi ts'ang\u1035\u1015 or ju lai pi mi ts'ang\u1033\u1015.

4) rtag pa gnas pa mi 'gyur mi 'pho ba for ch'ang chu wu you pien i\u1107\u1033\u1037\u1015, which is sometimes for nitya, rtag pa, and sometimes for nitya-dhruva-\u1120\u1033\u1037\u1033\u1015\u0101, rtag pa brtan pa ther gsug pa.

5) bkri ba'i don for ney\u1102rtha, which is usually translated into drañ don.

6) The following case is an example of incorrect translation.

\texttt{| thog ma yod la da ltar med || thog ma med la da ltar yod |}
\texttt{| dus gsum srid pa'i chos thams cad || de ltar bu ni ma yin no |}
\texttt{| (ben you jin wu \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qanda{\text{This verse is what I regard as the link. The same verse appears again in facs. 17, 27 and 28 in Dharmakṣema's Text.}}
no. Chinese term *wu you shih ch'u* is usually for skt. *naitad sthānam*.

6. In my first thought, I wished to make clear the reason why the *Myah 'das* of 56 *bampos* alone is separated from the other version and is treated as in independent section in some editions of Tibetan Kanjur. But due to my laziness I could not find any material which answers to the question. Only Bu ston's treatment of the *Myah 'das* gives us some hint. He puts the *Myah 'das* of 56 *bampos* at the end of the group of Mahāyāna sūtras and before the Pāli *Pārītta* which was newly translated by his teacher.

In sNar than Kanjur these latter were put at the end of the *mDo pa*, that is to say, just before the *Myah 'das pa*.

Also I did not make any effort to find out how far the *Myah 'das* was used or referred to by Tibetan authors. If we examine these points, we make much clear the position of the *Myah 'das* in Tibetan Buddhism.

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22 According to the information given by Dr. H. Eimer at the Velm Conference, the *dKar chags* of the London manuscript (mentioned above n.12) makes the *Myah 'das* as an independent section (in three volumes) and puts it after the *rGyud 'bum* and *mDo* and before *Ser phyin* and others. In his opinion, another manuscript Kanjur kept in the Toyo Bunko Library (Kawaguchi Collection), Tokyo, is also to be brought into the same order because it has the same division of sections and the same number of volumes in respective section, and this arrangement of the Kanjur represents an old West Tibetan tradition. sNar than and lHa sa Editions, both having the *Myah 'das* as an independent section, seem to belong to this Western group.


### Chinese and Japanese Characters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Chinese and Japanese Characters</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Wang Fa-chouen 王法順 or 王法淳</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Kao sêng chuan 高僧傳</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Fuse Kogaku 布施浩岳</td>
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<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Nehan-shu no Kenkyu 濟煥宗の研究</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Tsū ch'ü Mêng sun 漸渠蒙遜</td>
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<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>Pei leang 北凉</td>
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<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>Ch'ang an 長安</td>
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<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>Tsê t'ien wu hou 則天武后</td>
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<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>hou fen 後分</td>
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<tr>
<td>j</td>
<td>Chien k'ang 建康</td>
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<td>k</td>
<td>fu sing 仏性</td>
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<td>l</td>
<td>ju lai ts'ang 如來藏</td>
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<td>m</td>
<td>ju lai pi ts'ang 如來秘藏</td>
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<td>n</td>
<td>ju lai wei mi ts'ang 如來微密藏</td>
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<tr>
<td>o</td>
<td>ju lai pi mi ts'ang 如來秘密藏</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>ch'ang chu wu you piên i 常住無有變易</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q</td>
<td>ben you jin wu ben wu jin you san shin you fa wu you shih ch'u 李有今無今有三世有法無有是處</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>wu you shih ch'u 無有是處</td>
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SOME PROBLEMS OF TEXTUAL HISTORY IN CONNECTION WITH THE TIBETAN TRANSLATIONS OF THE MADHYAMAKĀVATĀRAH AND ITS COMMENTARY

by

H. TAUSCHER (Vienna)

I am afraid I am going to stick to the title of my paper very literally, and offer problems rather than solutions, problems that occurred during the translation of Madhyamakāvatāraḥ VI,166-226. Thus the actual instances I deal with will be restricted to chapter VI, but there is no reason to assume that with the other chapters the situation is different.

Anybody who has ever worked with any Tibetan canonical text - I dare say - would have very much appreciated a critical edition, but such editions exist only for rather few texts. In the case of Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāraḥ and its bhāṣya we do have the one of L. de La Vallée Poussin (furtheron refered to as MAV), which is based on the Tibetan canonical edition of P to which N has been compared, as well as a non-canonical edition which he got from Stcherbatsky, and occasionally J. But in many cases it is not clear which sources the variant readings given by La Vallée Poussin originate from, and more material - especially D - is available now than it was then. So, in order to constitute a somewhat "correct" Tibetan text, even in this case one can hardly avoid using additional sources, not only the canonical editions of N, P and D, but also non-canonical editions.

Texts of great importance for the Buddhist tradition, like e.g. the Madhyamakāvatāraḥ, have been handed down separately to the big canonical collections from early times onward, and - D.S.Ruegg in his paper presented at the 1st Csoma de Körös Symposium at Mátrafüred in 1976¹ has dealt with this matter in detail - since none of the available editions

of the canon reach beyond the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, these non-canonical traditions may represent a much older state of the text, and one cannot afford to neglect such editions whenever one is able to get hold of them.

What has been said for the non-canonical editions is also true for quotations within other texts, mainly in the various commentaries, especially those of early times.

Among these \textit{Ts} offers some information beyond mere explanation of the text and variant readings: In some cases - I counted seven in chap. VI\textsuperscript{2} - he quotes another Tibetan translation, written by Nag Tsho, sometimes clearly stating that he considers it better than the one by P\textit{atshab}, which is extant in the canon.\textsuperscript{3} This translation by Nag tsho is not otherwise completely unknown; the one of the \textit{kārikā} is extant in \textit{P}\textsuperscript{4} (and most probably also in \textit{N}), but not in \textit{D} and \textit{C}, the translation of the \textit{bhāṣyam} has not come down to us at all.

\textsuperscript{2} 1. \textit{Ts} 128a3ff. \textit{lo rnam pa shu ni med pa de bzin ya\d{a} dag par tshogs pa di ya\d{a} bita bar bya} - "The years do not pile up in a heap. In the same way this accumulation (of good and bad deeds?) has to be seen (in reality?)" for \textit{MAv} 127,6ff. \textit{lo la shu ni med sgrub pa de ya\d{a} de da\d{a} mtshu\d{u}ls} - "On peut parler ainsi; mais les années ne s'accumulent pas en tas: chacun l'admet. Ceci aussi est semblable à cela." (Translation of \textit{MAvL}, \textit{Le Muséon} 8, 1908, 318).

This is a quotation from a yet unidentified sūtram (cf. \textit{MAvL}, loc.cit. n.2), illustrating that destruction exists only as worldly convention. As no Skt. version of this verse has been found yet, \textit{R} does not quote it at all, and the other sources give the version of \textit{MAv}, it is only from the context that we can assume Nag tsho's translation to be better. Taking this version into consideration, La Vallée Poussin's French translation seems problematic as well as his re-translation into Skt., \textit{siddham} for sgrub pa. I would suggest to assume \textit{samud\d{a}na} (acquisition, especially of \textit{kusalamūla} - cf. \textit{BHS\d{u}}) or a similar expression for tshogs pa, even more so as also ya\d{a} dag par sgrub pa is recorded as a translation of \textit{samud\d{a}na} (cf. L.Ch.: samādā\d{n}a being an error for \textit{samud\d{a}na} - cf. \textit{BHS\d{u}}).

2. \textit{Ts} 188b3 for \textit{MAv} 208,20 - cf. n.17.
5. \textit{Ts} 237b5 for \textit{MAv} 306,18f. - cf. p.296
6. \textit{Ts} 238b6f. \textit{... de la 'di ltar mchog tu 'dzin pa\d{a} med pa'i phyir da\d{a} kun rdzob tu don ji ltu ba bzin du bgsrubs pa'i phyir ro} - "... because they (fire, heat etc.) are not viewed in this way (i.e. as existent) and because the object (of our argumentation) is duly proved according to the relative reality" for \textit{MAv} 308,14ff. \textit{... de la ës bya ba 'dis mchog tu 'dzin pa'a dhos po med pa'i phyir la kun rdzob tu rnam pa de lta bu'i don bstan pa'a phyir te} - "... because by (the expression) 'with them' a judgment (of them as existent) is made and because an object of that kind has been taught according to the relative reality." - cf. \textit{WSTB} 5, Anm.163.
7. \textit{Ts} 245a6 for \textit{MAv} 339,19 and 340,1 (VI, 222 b,d) - cf. n.17.

\textsuperscript{3} P 5263 (vol.98), 3 3862 (vol. Dbu ma 7), N dBu ma 'a 226a5-415b2, C dBu ma 'a 217a1-349b2.

\textsuperscript{4} P 5261 (vol.98).
For constituting the canonical text of the *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* this translation by Nag tsho seems to be irrelevant, since from a strictly tibetological point of view it could be considered a different text. It is true, its importance is mainly in order to understand Candrakīrti's original, as in some cases it really does - as stated by bTson kha pa - offer a better version.

But this does not necessarily mean that Pa tshab's translation had been incorrect in its original form. It could also hint at some fault in the tradition of the text, and although it does not help directly to reconstruct it, at least it can show that originally Pa tshab's translation must have been different, even if none of the sources based upon this version show any essential divergence.

The most striking of these cases is the *bhāṣyam* to VI,182ab: *ther zug gnas pa ma yin dān | 'jig pa ma yin ŋid kyi phyir*, said as reason for emptiness. This is the usual formulation to be found in the Prajñāpāramitā-texts. In Pa tshab's translation this is explained as follows: *ther zug tu gnas pa ma yin pa ŋid ni raṅ bzin mi 'dor ba la bya'o* (MAv 305, 4f.) - "Unchangeability is called a nature that does not alter", taking *ther zug tu gnas pa as "changeable"*. And for pāda b: *de yan dus cuṅ zad cig gnas nas ldog par yan 'gyur bas 'jig pa ma yin pa ŋid kyi phyir Žes gzuṅs so* (MAv 305,5ff.) - "Because even these (senses) change again after having stayed a little while, it is said: 'because of the not being destroyed'."

Not counting the fact that this explanation of pāda b does not make any sense at all, according to this version the dharmas would be empty because they do not change and are not destroyed - i.e. they are eternal.

Nag tsho, on the other hand, explains *ther zug tu gnas pa as "unchangeable"* (*ther zug ni ņams pa med pa'i ho bo la brjod la ... Ts 263a3f.*). And the commentary on pāda b reads in his version: ...

*NEGATIONS OF THE QUESTION, CONSISTING OF THE AVERSIVE ARGUMENT.*

"... he negates the question: 'Is it true that even sight etc., after having stayed a little in (their) time, are destroyed later by way of contrast (?) ?' and says: 'because of the not being destroyed'."

According to this version the reason for emptiness is the "being neither unchanged nor destroyed", which actually makes much more sense.

In fact the term *ther zug tu gnas* (*kūṭastha*) is used in both meanings in the literature, (a) as unchangeable, eternal, and (b) as changeable, bound to causality, due to the double meaning of *kūṭa* - mountain, summit, and heap, accumulation. Candrakīrti himself uses the term in the
first meaning, and Pa tshab's translation - at least in the form it has come down to us - is wrong in this case.\(^5\)

But if one takes into consideration that Pa tshab is famous not only as a translator, but also as a teacher of Madhyamaka, who made the works of Candrakīrti known in Tibet and taught Madhyamaka primarily by means of these works,\(^6\) it is hardly believable that he misunderstood Candrakīrti that essentially, misunderstanding even the concept of emptiness. I would rather assume that this part of the version handed down in the canon was totally corrupt even at bTsoṅ kha pa's time.

Another example: MAV 306,18f., within a quotation from the Ratname-gṣuṭram\(^7\), reads: ... don dam pa ni de bzin gṣegs pa rnams byuṅ yah ruṅ ma byuṅ yah ruṅ ste. This sentence looks a little strange and does not quite correspond to the sūtram, but could nevertheless be translated by "... the absolute reality is the Tathāgatas, regardless whether they have appeared or not." But bTsoṅ kha pa quotes, as a better version, the translation of Nag tsho, which corresponds to the sūtram not literally, but in meaning.\(^8\) Thus one could conclude that the text of MAV can simply be replaced by that of the sūtram, which reads: don dam pa ni ... mi 'jigs pa ste - "The absolute reality is not destroyed, regardless ..." and that here, too, we have an old fault of tradition rather than a diverging quotation of the sūtram by Candrakīrti or a faulty translation by Pa tshab.

But this second translation also poses a number of questions. With regard to this translation of the Madhyamākāvatāraḥ, which Nag tsho did together with the Indian paṇḍit Kṛṣṇapāṇḍita, some facts have to be noted:

a) The translation of the kārikā is extant in P and (most probably) N.

b) It was revised by Pa tshab ņi ma grags and Tilakakalaśa, i.e. by the authors of the translation of the canonical version.

c) It is the basis for R.

d) Occasionally it is quoted in Ts.

Now let us take closer look at these facts. La Vallée Poussin has stated in the preface to his edition that Nag tsho's translation of the kārikā differs from that of Pa tshab by the number of syllables. At least

\(^5\) cf. WSTB 5, Ann.133.


\(^7\) P 897, 105b3-7.

\(^8\) Ts 237b5 ... ma byuṅ yaṅ ruṅ don dam pa ni ŋams pa med pa yin pas ...
for chap. VI this is not true of all the verses. A great number of them are practically identical in both translations, except for minor variants; others differ either in the number of syllables or - to varying degrees - in substance, and some of them do so in both respects. Five verses show a different number of pādas. But this could be explained as mistake of some writer or wood-carver, even more so as only once is the divergence confirmed by R. Dropping a pāda, taking in a prose-sentence or the quotation of a previous verse from the bhashyam or repeating a line from the preceding verse does not seem very extraordinary.

Now it is striking that the more or less identical verses and the diverging ones are not irregularly distributed. Substantially important passages, e.g. the discussion of the two truths, the refutation of the Yogācāra-doctrine of perception without exterior object, the discussion of pratītyasamutpāda or the various kinds of emptiness, show relatively few differences, the most and the strongest being in introductory passages, summaries or elaborate examples, even though the change from identical to differing verses does not correspond exactly to the systematic divisions.

As Nag tsho's translation was revised by Pa tshab, the presumption lies at hand that the identity of some verses in both versions is due to

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9 The following examples I have picked rather at random. The versions of Pa tshab are quoted according to MAV, regardless of any possible variant readings.

v. 16b-d

Pa tshab: sa lu'i myu gu skyed par byed par 'dod min nus ldan min |
| rgyud gcig khois su gtogs min 'dra ba ma yin ṇid de bzin |
| sa lu'i sa bon yaṅ ni de yī min te gzan ṇid phyir |

Nag tsho: nub (R: nus) pa med daṅ rgyud gcig min daṅ 'dra ba min pa dag |
| sa (R: sā) lu'i myu gu (R: gu'i) skyed byed min par 'dod pas (R: pa) de bzin du |
| sa (R: sā) lu'i sa bon ṇid kyaṅ de bzin ṇid gzan ṇid phyir |

v. 143a-c

Pa tshab: bdag ni gzugs ldan mi 'dod gaṅ phyir bdag |
| yod min de phyir ldan don sbyor ba med |
| gzan na gnag ldan gzan mi gzugs ldan na |

Nag tsho: bdag ni gzugs daṅ ldan min med ba'ī phyir |
| de phyir (R: om) ldan don sbyor ba med pa can (R: med de ba can daṅ) |
| gzugs can tha dad tha dad min brjod la |

10 v. 42: 5 pādas; d (according to K) mthoṅ gi dnos gzan rnam par ma yin thar is a repetition of v. 41c;

v. 171: 5 pādas; c giñis po span s nas rtog pa gzan yaṅ yod ma yin is the quotation of v. 169d (MAV 293,2f.); this divergence is confirmed by R;

v. 185: 3 pādas; c (according to MAV) is missing;

v. 186: 3 pādas; d is missing;

v. 206: 6 pādas; cd mya ṇan 'das par 'gro phyir ro || 'ga' la'aṅ chags pa med phyir ro correspond roughly to the prose-sentence MAV 318,1f. mya ṇan las 'das par bgrod pa'i phyir 'ga' la yaṅ chags pa med pa'i phyir ro.
Pa tshab's corrections. This again could mean that he did not go through the whole of Nag tsho's translation carefully, but merely chose those parts he considered to be most important. If this assumption is true at all, could it be a hint towards the way a Tibetan revisor usually worked?

Comparing K with the verses quoted in R it becomes obvious that Red mda' ba used this translation as a basis for his commentary. But still there are some instances where he clearly follows Pa tshab. Only once does he take a whole verse from this translation, but several times he uses a certain phrasing or wording that is obviously Pa tshab's. This shows that he knows both versions very well, and in verses that do not show too great divergences, Red mda' ba's occasionally quoting parts from Pa tshab could be explained easily as an involuntary contamination of the two traditions. But there are cases where this is hard to believe - trusting that a scholar like Red mda' ba knows his texts by heart well enough.

In v.137 e.g. he takes half of the verse from Nag tsho and the other half from Pa tshab. In cases like this I would assume - although I am aware of the fact that this is highly hypothetical - that he tacitly takes from Pa tshab those parts he considered a better translation than Nag tsho's, whose version he prefers as a whole.

11\footnote{v.111}
Pa tshab, R: mo g\textsuperscript{6}sam bu la r\textsuperscript{6}ani gi bdag \textsuperscript{6}n\textsuperscript{6}id kyis |
| skye ba de \textsuperscript{6}n\textsuperscript{6}id du med 'jig rten du 'a\textsuperscript{6}nih |
| yod min de 'b\textsuperscript{6}zin d\textsuperscript{6}nos 'd\textsuperscript{6}i (R:'dir) kun \textsuperscript{6}no bo |
| \textsuperscript{6}n\textsuperscript{6}id kyis 'jig rten de \textsuperscript{6}n\textsuperscript{6}id du ma skyes |

Nag tsho: mo g\textsuperscript{6}sam bu la r\textsuperscript{6}ani b\textsuperscript{6}zin skye ba ni |
| de \textsuperscript{6}n\textsuperscript{6}id du med 'jig rten du ya\textsuperscript{6}nih med |
| de 'b\textsuperscript{6}zin d\textsuperscript{6}nos kun r\textsuperscript{6}ani b\textsuperscript{6}zin g\textsuperscript{6}yis skye ba |
| de \textsuperscript{6}n\textsuperscript{6}id du med 'jig rten du ya\textsuperscript{6}nih med |

12 E.g.: v.113a bum ... de \textsuperscript{6}n\textsuperscript{6}id du med ci\textsuperscript{6}nih |
| : ji \textsuperscript{6}itar bum ... de \textsuperscript{6}n\textsuperscript{6}id du |
| b 'jig rten ... yod ji b\textsuperscript{6}zin |
| : med ci\textsuperscript{6}nih 'jig rten ... yod |

v.124d rig min : mi \&\&s
v.217c ther zug g\textsuperscript{6}nas min 'jig min pas |
| : ther zug g\textsuperscript{6}nas d\textsuperscript{6}an 'jig min pas |

v.220a mdor b\textsuperscript{6}nds na ni d\textsuperscript{6}nos med par (MAv. pa) |
| : mdor na d\textsuperscript{6}nos po med pa ni |

13 Pa tshab: len po r\textsuperscript{6}ani \&\&er len gcig r\textsuperscript{6}igs d\textsuperscript{6}nos min |
| de l\textsuperscript{6}ta na las byed po gcig \textsuperscript{6}n\textsuperscript{6}id 'gyur |
| byed po med las yod s\textsuperscript{6}nam blo yin na |
| ma yin ga\textsuperscript{6}nih phyir byed po med las med |

Nag tsho: \&\&e bar len po bla\textsuperscript{6}ns bya d\textsuperscript{6}nos gcig tu |
| mi r\textsuperscript{6}gs las d\textsuperscript{6}an byed po gcig 'gyur phyir |
| byed po med la las ni yod ce na |
| ma yin byed pa med las min phyir ro |

R: \&\&e bar len po bla\textsuperscript{6}ns bya d\textsuperscript{6}nos gcig tu |
| mi r\textsuperscript{6}gs las d\textsuperscript{6}an byed po gcig 'gyur phyir |
| byed po med las yod s\textsuperscript{6}nam blo yin na |
| ma yin ga\textsuperscript{6}nih phyir byed po med las med |
So far my observations are based upon the kārikā only. I am unable to decide to what extent the same is true also for the bhaṣyam, as it is characteristic for R, our only source for Nag tsho's translation of the bhaṣyam, that it often only paraphrases the text, and even where it gives quotations, they are not always indicated as such, which makes it almost impossible to recognize passages strongly diverging from Pa tshab. Furthermore Red mda' ba usually does not comment upon texts quoted in the bhaṣyam or upon parts of the bhaṣyam he seemingly thinks to be selfevident.

bTson kha pa, too, uses both translations for his commentary, but he prefers Pa tshab's version in general and quotes Nag tsho only occasionally as the better translation, and he is kind enough to indicate these passages clearly.

But these quotations do not only occasionally offer better versions of the text, they also cause some problems. First of all it is very disappointing that in none of the seven cases where bTson kha pa quotes Nag tsho in chap.VI, is this version confirmed by R. Either the divergencies are within texts quoted in the Madhyamakāvatārabhaṣyam — they are either completely missing in R, or, at one occasion, they correspond to Pa tshab's version; or they are within parts of the bhaṣyam either not explained in R at all or only paraphrased. bTson kha pa only once quotes part of a verse from Nag tsho's translation. This is the most mysterious case, as the version given by bTson kha pa is confirmed neither by R nor by Nag tsho's translation of the kārikā extant in the canon, which both correspond — except for minor variants — to Pa tshab's version.

Secondly it is not always clear for what reason bTson kha pa quotes Nag tsho, as occasionally his version is obviously not to be preferred. E.g. within the quotation of Haribhadra's Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccayābh v.82 (MAv 208,17ff.) Nag tsho's version does not only make no sense in the given

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15 cf. n.3.
16 v.222

Pa tshab; K: saṁs rgyas rnams ni byuṅ (K: 'byuṅ) ba 'am |
| ma byuṅ 'yaḥ ruḥ (K, R: ruṅ ste) dṅos su na |
| dṅos po kun gyi (R: gyis) ston pa 'nād |
| gzan gyi dṅos po rab tu bsgrags |

Nag tsho (according to Ts 245a6): saṁs rgyas rnams ni byuṅ ba 'am |
| ma byuṅ yaṅ ni raṅ bṭin 'nād |
| dṅos po kun gyi ston ba 'nād |
| gzan gyi 'no bo ston par bsgrags |

cf. WSTB 5, Anm.494.
context, it also contradicts the Skt. version of the quoted text. In this case it is not even clear whether bTsoṅ kha pa thinks Nag tsho's translation to be better, as the usual zes bsgyur ba legs so or a similar expression is missing. - So, if he does not, why does he quote it at all, and if he does, for what reason?

Regarding a quotation from the Pitāputrasamāgama-Sūtram (MAv 262,15f.) bTsoṅ kha pa explicitly states that he thinks Nag tsho's translation to be preferable, but for obscure reasons. Red ma' ba quotes this passage according to Pa tshab's version, the sūtram itself as well as the quotation of the same passage in BCAP and Ṣikṣ - both texts as well in Skt. as in Tib. - and a parallel passage in MN, they all back Pa tshab's version in general. Only a minor variant - though not really necessary - could be justified. The questions remain unanswered: Why does bTsoṅ kha pa prefer this translation? And: Where is it from? Is it possible that he could have used a completely different version of Nag tsho's translation than Red ma' ba, his teacher? Or is it one of those (hypothetical) cases, where Red ma' ba tacitly adopts Pa tshab's version,

17 Pa tshab: mdzes ma legs par spyod ciṅ bza’ bar gyis | | lus mchog 'dae gaṅ de khyod la mi 'byuṅ | | lus 'di tshogs par gyur pa tsam ŋig ste | | 'jigs ma sōṅ ba ldog par mi 'gyur ro | "Oh beautiful one, eat and drink! Oh fairlimbed one (varagztri), what has passed is not yours (any longer). This body is nothing but an aggregate; oh faint-hearted one, what has passed does not return."

According to Ts 186b3 Nag tsho translates pāḍā d as follows: "das pa'i 'jig pa 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ma yin - "a gone fear does not arise (again)". But the Skt. version (DS v.82) leaves no doubt that this translation is wrong: na hi bhīru gataṃ nivartate - bhīru being clearly a vocative singular of bhīruḥ (a fearful female).

18 Pa tshab (MAv 262,15f.); R 220,2: ... khams drug daṅ | reg pa'i skye mcød drug daṅ yid kyi né bar rgyu ba bco brgyad do - "(A person consists of) the six elements (dhātu), the six spheres of contact (spaṛśāyatana) and the 18 spheres of mental activity (manopavīcāra)." Nag tsho (TS 215b3): khams drug 'dus pa | reg pa'i gzi drug pa | yid kyi né bar spyod pa bco brgyad pa'o. The expression khams drug drug 'dus pa is unclear. Even if one reads 'dus te reg pa (saṃsparśa) instead of 'dus pa | reg pa, I cannot see any reason for preferring this version:

PPS 145b8f.: ... kham drug pa | reg pa'i skye mcéd drug pa | yid kyi né bar spyod pa bco brgyad ste; BCAP 508,7ff.; Śikṣ 244.11f.: saḍdāṭur ... saḍsparśāyatanaḥ aṣṭādaśāmanopavicāraḥ; BCAPṭib 279b8f.: Śikṣṭib 157b1 give the version of MAv with the following variant reading: BCAPṭib né bar 'khor ba, Śikṣṭib né bar spyod pa: né bar rgyu ba; MN III. 239,10f.: chadhāturo ... chadhāṣṭātanaḥ aṣṭādaśāmanopavicāro ... Only the change from né bar rgyu bar into né bar spyod pa could be justified. Although both terms are possible translations for upavicāra, né bar spyod pa seems to be the more common one. It is confirmed by PPS and Śikṣṭib and to some extent also by J 307a5, although the expression has obviously been misunderstood and changed into né bar lohs pa (upayabhoga).
and bTson kha pa simply does not share his opinion concerning the correctness of the two versions?

I am unable to answer these questions, and I doubt whether it will be possible to answer them in the future. And - I would like to add - although it might be very interesting to find all these answers, it is not really important in this particular case.

In general the importance of bTson kha pa's quotation of Nag tsho's version as well as Red mda' ba's deviations from it lies rather in the fact that they do exist, not so much in the reason for their existence. They have to serve as a sign of warning.

a) Within bTson kha pa's vast literature on Madhyamaka and his frequent quotations from the Madhyamakāvatāraḥ, divergencies from the canonical text need not necessarily be due to slips in memory, mishearings or similar shortcomings, but might also have their origin in this second Tibetan translation.

b) After bTson kha pa, Nag tsho's translation seems to have been forgotten. At least to my knowledge it has not been used any more in later times. All the same the possibility cannot be excluded altogether that also in later quotations from the Madhyamakāvatāraḥ there occur variant readings that originate from the use of this different tradition, maybe not in its pure form, but contaminated with others, based e.g. on texts of bTson kha pa or Red mda' ba, where the two traditions are already mixed.

Although the Madhyamakāvatāraḥ is doubtlessly a text of great importance for the Buddhist tradition, as such it is by no means unique. What is true for the Madhyamakāvatāraḥ might very well be true for other texts of similar importance and with a similar textual situation as well, and with them, too, we have to consider the possibility of two or even more Tibetan translations - in some cases we know about them, regardless of whether we know the translations themselves or not - which occasionally were contaminated in later times.

Even if one is unable to decide where certain variants originate from and which one is to be preferred and is closer to the original in a particular instance, at least one might be able to recognize that one does not know, and not mistake a possible different tradition for a faulty one.

I said in the beginning that I am going to offer questions rather than answers; so, for the time being, this possibility - which might turn out to be a necessity in some cases - of asking more questions will have to serve as an answer. Maybe it really can do so, as to questions not put forward there will never an answer be found.
Abbreviations

BCAP  Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā. Bodhicaryāvatara by Śāntideva with the Commentary of Prajñākaramati. Ed. by L. de La Vallée Poussin, Calcutta 1901-1914

BCAP tib  Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (Prajñākaramati). P 5273 (vol.100)


Blue Annals  The Blue Annals, by G.N. Roerich. 2 vols., Calcutta 1949 und 1953

C  Edition of Cone

D  Edition of Derge = Sde dge Tibetan Tripitaka, Bstan ḫgyur - preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Ed. J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, Y. Ejima, Tokyo 1977 -

J  Jayānanda, Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā. P 5271 (vol.99)

K  Madhyamakāvatāraṇārikā (Candrakīrti). Translated by Kṛṣṇapaṇḍita and Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba. P 5261 (vol.98)


M Av  Madhyamakāvatāraḥ. Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Traduction Tibe taine. Ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, St.-Pétersbourg 1907-1912

M Av L  L. de La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra. Introduction au Traité du Milieu de l’Ācārya Candrakīrti avec le Commentaire de l’Auteur, traduit d’après la version tibétaine. Le Muséon N.S. 8, 1907, 249-317; 10, 1911, 271-358; 11, 1912, 236-328


N  Edition of Narthang


PPS  Pīṭāputrasamāgamasūtram. P 760(16) (vol.23)
The Tibetan translations of the Madhyamakāvatāraḥ

**R**

Red mda’ ba gzhon nu blo gros, dbu ma la ‘jug pa’i rnam bṣad, De kho na ñid gsal ba’i sgron ma. Ed. by Ngawang Topgay, Delhi 1974

**SūD**

Ṣaḍdārāṇasamuccayāḥ - Shaḍdārāṇa-Samuchchaya by Haribhadra with Guṇaratna’s Commentary Tarkarahasya-Dīpikā. Ed. L.Suali, Calcutta 1905

**Śikṣa**

Śikṣāmuccayaḥ - Čikṣhāsamuccaya. A Compendium of Buddhist Teachings, Compiled by Ĉāntideva chiefly from earlier Mahā-yāna Sūtras. Ed. C.Bendall, St.-Petersbourg (1897-)1902

**Śikṣaṭib**

Śikṣāmuccayaḥ (Śāntideva). P 5336 (vol.102)

**Ts**

bTsön kha pa, dbu ma la ‘jug pa’i rgya cher bṣad pa, dGoṅs pa rab gsal. P 6143 (vol.154)

**WSTB 5**

THE "NEITHER ONE NOR MANY" ARGUMENT FOR ŚŪNYATĀ, AND ITS TIBETAN INTERPRETATIONS
by
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Opening remarks

Arguments as to whether the self is one with or different from the aggregates (skandha) abound in such Mādhyamika literature as the Mādhyamakāvatāra, the Bodhicaryāvatāra and numerous other texts.¹ They do constitute a variety of the "neither one nor many" argument (ekānekaviyogahetu; gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs), but one which will not be my primary focus of interest in this paper. What I shall mainly deal with is rather the type of argument which Tsoṅ kha pa, rGyal tshab rje and Se ra Chos kyi rgyal mtshan term "the neither one nor many argument", and which finds its classic exposition in Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṃkāra.²

Śāntarakṣita's version of the argument differs from the first variety in that it uses "oneness" (ekatva; gcig) and "manyness" (anekatva; du ma or tha dad) in what a modern logician would term a one-place or monadic sense of the form Fx, whereas the first sort involves a two-place or dyadic relation Fxy.³ Less technically, Śāntarakṣita is asking whether a certain phenomenon is one thing or many different things, where these predicates simply show a quality. The self-aggregate arguments speak about "... is one (identical) with..." or "... is different from...", thus involving a relation. (Note that in what follows I will often follow Ka-

¹ cf. Madhyamakāvatāra VI, 124 and 127, also VI, 150: phun las gsal min phun po'i ho bo min "[The self] is not other than the aggregates, nor is it of the nature of the aggregates".

² It would be a mistake however, to think that this form of the argument was confined to Mādhyamika-svātantrikas. Prāsaṅgikas like Atīka and others also made use of it. cf. Bodhipathapradīpa 276b7: yaḥ ni chos rnams thams cad dag | gcig daṅ du mas rnam dpyad na | ho bo ṛd ni mi dmigs pas | raṅ bīṃ med pa ṛd du ṛes |

³ cf. for example A. Grzegorczyk, Outline of Mathematical Logic, 3-5, or B. Mates, Elementary Logic, 36-37.
malaśila's advice and use "difference" (tha dad) instead of "manyness" (du ma)." Similarly, context will often dictate that I use "identity" instead of the clumsy "oneness", although here the Tibetan correspondent simply remains gcig. In the dyadic relational sense I shall use "...is different from..." (...daḥ tha dad) and "...is identical with...". The important thing to remember is that the switch from "manyness" to "difference" is one which Indian and Tibetan authors found perfectly natural.

The heart of the paper consists in a quote from Tsonḵa pa which is an attempt to summarize Śāntarakṣita's argumentation. Tsonḵa pa explains the impossibility of oneness (i.e. the monadic sense) by showing that all phenomena must have parts (cha ṣas), and that the parts cannot be one with their part-holders (cha can), nor different from them. Thus on Tsonḵa pa's account, Śāntarakṣita's argument works only if it makes use of considerations involving the dyadic relational sense, in particular those which I have numbered points (3) and (4) below.

Tsonḵa pa's account is taken up by rGyal tshab rje in rNam bṣad sṽiḥ po rgyan and by Chos kyi rgyal mtshan in his textbook (yig cha) on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, the skabs daḥ po'i spyi don; it can be said to constitute a major strand in the prevailing dGe lugs pa interpretation. I shall argue that it seems to be a fair resume of Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's views. The last half of the paper will consist of a point by point analysis of Tsonḵa pa's arguments concerning parts and part-holders, and will necessitate a brief excursion into Pramāṇa texts to better understand the concepts of identity and relatedness involved in these arguments.

The Indian and Tibetan Formulations of the Argument Compared

Here, then, is kārīkā No.1 of Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamaśāmaśālaṃkāra:

Entities as asserted by ourselves and others, in reality have neither the nature of oneness nor manyness. Thus, they are without own-being (svabhāva; raḥ bzin), like a reflection.6

6 Madhyamaśāmaśālaṃkārapaṇḍhikā, 89a: cig ṣos ṣes bya ba ni du ma ṅid de tha dad ṅid ces bya ba'i tha tshig go
5 rNam bṣad sṽiḥ po rgyan 13a-14a; skabs daḥ po'i spyi don 24a-27a.
6 nibsvabhāva amībhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat cited in Bodhicaryāvatāraṇāpiṇḍikā 173, 17-18. The Peking bsTan'gyur 5284, 48b gives:
rGyal tshab rje transforms kārikā N.1 into the following parārthānumāna (gñan don rjes dpag):

Whatever is not established as being truly (bden pa) one or many is not truly existent (bden par med), like a reflection. The bases (gzi), paths (lam), and aspects (rnam pa) are not established as being truly one or many.⁷

Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan follows rGyal-tshab-rje's formulation, but gives a hetu-argument (rtags sbyor):

Let the subject (chos can) be the bases, paths, and aspects; they are not truly existent because they are neither truly one nor truly many.⁸

The major difference between Śāntarakṣita's and the Tibetan formulations - apart from differing logical forms - is that the subject (dharmin; chos can) is no longer entities as asserted by ourselves and others, but rather the bases, paths, and aspects, or in other words, persons, the śrāvaka, pratyeka, and bodhisattva paths, and all dharmas.

rGyal tshab and Chos kyi rgyal mtshan are commenting on the hommage (mchod rjod) of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra; in particular, they are expanding on a line in the Sphutārthā in which Haribhadra describes the difference between the dull (dbah po rtul po) and the intelligent approach to understanding the three wisdoms (mkhyen pa gsum) mentioned in Abhisamayālaṃkāra's hommage, viz. the knowledge of the bases (vastujñāna; gzi šes), the knowledge of the paths (mārgajñāna; lam šes), and omniscience (sarvā-

bdag dañ gñan smra'i dhos 'di dag
yañ dag tu na gcig pa dañ
du ma'i rañ bžin bral ba'i phyir
rañ bžin med de grugs brhan bžin

A curious discrepancy is that rañ bžin med (niḥsvabhāva) in the last line of kārikā 1, is changed to bden par med by both rGyal tshab rje and Chos kyi rgyal mtshan in their formulations of the argument; Chos kyi rgyal mtshan even misquotes Śāntarakṣita and substitutes 'bden par med for rañ bžin med in kārikā 1. Tsön kha pa, in dbu ma rgyan gyi zin bris and dbu ma dwongs pa rab gsal, does not usually employ bden par med, but rather don dam par rañ bžin med ("ultimately without own-being"). It may very well be that rGyal tshab rje wished to avoid jeopardizing the view tha sñad du rañ bžin yod pa ("conventionally, there is ownbeing") - a position which dGe lugs pa attribute to the Svātantrikas. As a result he chose a completely different term, bden par med instead of don dam par rañ bžin med pa.

⁷ rNam bṣad sñiñ po rgyan, 13a
⁸ skabs dañ po'i spyi don, 25a
The intelligent disciple uses the "neither one nor many" argument to arrive at the conclusion that these three wisdoms, which perceive the voidness of the bases etc., are justified and attainable because the objects of these wisdoms do in fact lack any true existence.

Tson kha pa on Śāntarakṣita

In the Draṅ ṇes legs bṣad siniḥ po we find the following summary of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra argumentation:

He first shows that those entities as accepted by ourselves and others cannot be partless (cha med) in the sense of not having many parts, whether these parts consist in temporal stages, [physical] parts of an object, or aspects (rnam pa) of the object of consciousness. Now suppose something is established as having many parts. Conventionally, it is certainly not contradictory for one phenomenon (dharma) to be of the nature (bdag ŋid) of many parts. But in terms of ultimate establishment, if the parts (cha) and part-holder (cha can) were essentially different (ho bo tha dad), then they would be unrelated other objects ('brel med don gšan). Moreover, if they were essentially identical (ho bo gcig), then the various parts would have to be identical, and the part-holders would have to be many. Thus having shown these absurdities, he [i.e. Śāntarakṣita] refutes ultimate phenomena.¹⁰

We can sum up Tson kha pa's presentation as follows:

1. all entities have parts, be they temporal parts, physical parts or aspects.
2. if an entity is ultimately established (truly existent), its parts are either truly essentially identical with, or essentially different

¹⁰ Draṅ ṇes legs bṣad siniḥ po, 137.
from their part-holders.\(^{11}\)

(3) if the parts were truly essentially one with their part-holder, then either the parts would all be identical or there would be many part-holders. Thus, this alternative is absurd.

(4) if the parts were truly essentially different from the part-holder, then they would be unrelated with the part-holder. Also absurd.

(5) therefore, entities are not ultimately established (truly existent).

How well does Tson\'kha pa account for the *Madhyamākālaṃkāra*'s arguments?

**Methodological considerations**

Let us first examine points (1) - (4) in more detail.

(1) It seems to be a fair characterization of Śāntarakṣittra's enterprise to say that much of the *Madhyamākālaṃkāra* argumentation is simply to show that entities have parts, where "parts" is understood as temporal stages, physical parts or aspects. 1Caṇ skya rol pa'i rdc rje explains that pointing out the existence of temporal stages is used to refute "prakṛti, puruṣa, īśvara and the permanent ātman etc., as well as the Vaibhāṣikas' three unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) permanent entities". These were all accepted by their proponents as being partlessly single entities (cha med pa'i gcig pa). Showing physical parts is directed against "gross (rags pa) physical objects such as vases etc., as well as partless subtle atoms". Pointing out aspects of the objects of consciousness is directed against "consciousness as asserted by the five Outsider traditions, the two Buddhist traditions which assert objects [i.e. Vai-bhāṣika and Sautrāntika], and the two Cittamātra schools [Sākāravāda and Nirākāravāda]."\(^{12}\) One can consult M.Ichigō's *Synopses of the Madhyamāka-laṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita*, as well as rGyal tshab rje's *dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byaṅ* to verify which *Madhyamākālaṃkāra* verses refute which traditions; suffice to say here that Tson\'kha pa as viewed through 1Caṇ skya seems to give an elegantly simple and accurate classificational scheme in speaking of temporal stages, physical parts and aspects.

A more difficult point is to what degree the various traditions under attack by Śāntarakṣittra understood "one" to mean "partlessly one"

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\(^{11}\) Tson\'kha pa in *Draṅ gbes legs bṣad sṅāṅ po* and other texts, such as *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, repeatedly stresses that conventionally, one can and should say that parts and part-holders are essentially identical. It is from the point of view of ultimate truth that the problems would arise. Cf. *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* 40.

\(^{12}\) *Grub mtha’ thub bstan lhun po’i mdzes rgyan* 390-391.
Kamalaśīla, in the Madhyamakālaṃkārapaṇḍjakā, makes the blanket statement that the word "oneness" in kārikā 1 means "partlessness" (cha med pa 'nid).13 While it seems true that many Hindu and Buddhist schools held partlessness as a necessary property of certain entities, it seems farfetched to think that all the traditions under Śāntarakṣita's scrutiny, themselves, meant "partlessness" by the word "oneness". If that were the case, then all refutations of oneness would simply consist in pointing out that a thing had parts. There would be no need to establish an entailment (khyab pa) between "having parts" (cha bcas) and "not being truly one", a point which Chos kyi rgyal mtshan and rGyal tshab rje find necessary to justify and difficult to understand.14 Ultimately, the explanation may be that Kamalaśīla just presupposed the absurdity of the part-whole relation, and thus thought that "in reality one" could only mean partlessness.

(2) Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla both stress that oneness and manyness are mutually exclusive (phan tsun spaṅ 'gal), with no third alternative (phuṅ gsum);15 in other words, if x is not one, it is many, and vice versa. Tsoṅ kha pa, however, has introduced the terms "essential oneness" and "essential difference", terms which play a very small role in Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, but about which we shall have more to say below. At any rate, it seems that Tsoṅ kha pa is transposing the same mutual exclusivity onto essential identity and essential difference.

(3) Śāntarakṣita relies on principle (3) at many points, notably the refutation of the single nature of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's "all-pervasive space" (vyāpakākāśa; khyab pa'i nam mkha'; cf. kārikā 10), as well as in the various arguments against Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Outsider's view of consciousness. For example, in kārikā 22, he describes a Sautrāntika Sākāravādin school (sna tshogs gñis med pa) which held that the manifold of aspects produced from a multicoloured painting, were not distinct (tha dad) from consciousness. In such a case "it is not logical that there be a manifold (sna tshogs) of aspects. As these aspects are not different

13 Madhyamakālaṃkārapaṇḍjakā, 89a: gcig tes bya ba cha med pa 'nid do.

14 rNan bsd 'shī pa rgyan, 13a: rtags dahn dgag bya'i chos kyi gzi mthun 'gog pa rtogs par dka' bas de rjod na...
"Since it is difficult to understand how to refute a common point between the reason ["having parts"] and the property to be denied ["being truly one thing"], I shall speak on this..."

15 Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti, 66b: gcig pu'i bdag 'nid dahn du ma'i bdag 'nid ni phan tsun spaṅs te gnas pa'i mtshan 'nid yin pas phuṅ po gžan sel to.
"neither one nor many" argument for śūnyatā

(tha dad) from one consciousness, they would share its single nature." Further on he argues, "if consciousness were not something different from the many aspects, then like the varieties of aspects, it too would become many". There are numerous other examples which could be cited, but in general, it is sufficient to say that it is principle (3) which establishes the key entailment: given that x has many parts, and that the parts are essentially identical with x, principle (3) establishes that x cannot be truly one thing.

(4) In Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśīla's texts principle (4) is little invoked. This might be explained by the fact that most traditions which Śāntarakṣita is seeking to refute, hold that the part-holder - be it consciousness, the atom etc. - is in some way one with its parts. An example where something vaguely like (4) is used, however, is the refutation of the Nirākāravādins (kārikā 47-57). Śāntarakṣita argues that consciousness would not experience many aspects because, according to the Nirākāravādins, these aspects are not real entities (abhāva; dōs med). Thus, the aspects would be unrelated with consciousness; they would neither have a one nature relation (tādātmya; bdag gcig tu 'brel), nor a causal relation (tadutpatti; de byuh 'brel) with consciousness.

I should, however, explain my hesitations about the Nirākāravādin example, and the introduction of the terms "essential identity" and "essential difference"; this will in turn lead to a question of methodology.

In general, Tibetans speak of "unrelated other objects" ('brel med don gzhan) in cases where both objects exist; e.g. the pillar and the vase, or the yoghurt and the basin ('khar gioh). In that sense, as the Nirākāravādins do not consider aspects as being real entities, one could only consider the above example as a bona fide case of principle (4) if one loosened the strictures on the notion of "unrelated other objects". If Tson kha pa did have any actual kārikā in mind as being examples of principle (4), it seems that 47-57 would be the only candidates. But it may well be that Tson kha pa was not thinking of any particular kārikā at all.

In fact, this latter approach seems the most plausible. "Unrelated other objects" is a notion that was successfully used in Tibetan discussions of the Madhyamakāvatāra, while "essential identity" is a key term

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16 Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti, 57b and 58b:

rnam pa de dag sna tshog pa 'di ni rigs pa ma yin te rnam par šes pa gcig dañ tha dad pa ma yin pa'i phyur šes pa de'i rah gyi ho bo bzin no.
rnam par šes pa de rnam pa du ma dañ tha dad pa ma yin pa'i lus yin na ni rnam pa de dag gi bye brag bzin du du mar 'gyur ro.
in Pramāṇa philosophy. Their introduction here serves to create a rap-
prochament, a continuity between three otherwise distinct problem-
situations.

Now, I think it is fair to say that Tson kha pa was less concerned
with what Śāntarakṣita and others said, than with rationally recon-
structing the logical situations they faced. We follow Imre Lakatos and
make a distinction between internal and external history, the former be-
ing primarily logical deductions of what could have been
said, given the key ideas of the philosopher in question, the latter be-
ing what was actually said, what actually took place. In this light,
there is no doubt that Tson kha pa, the great debater, was a specialist
at internal history; as such his stretching of terminology, his imposi-
tion of concepts which have no obvious textual justification, should
not be judged by the severe criterion of the external historian. Bearing
this distinction in mind, we deprive neither Tson kha pa, nor for
that matter, ourselves, of the possibility of using fertile but
foreign concepts.

Essential identity and difference

To resume the discussion, obviously the key concepts in Tson kha pa's
version of the "neither one nor many" argument are essential identity
(ho bo gcig) and essential difference (ho bo tha dad). Let us first try
to clarify these concepts, in order to be able to meaningfully ask the
following questions: why does it follow that, if x is essentially iden-
tical with y, and y has many parts, then x must also have many parts?
Why is it that, if x and y are essentially different, x and y must be
unrelated?

Chos kyi rgyal mtshan speaks of six types of identity and difference
in Buddhist philosophy: substantial identity (rdzas gcig); co-extensive-
ness (don gcig); identity of own-being (raṅ bzin gcig); identity of na-
ture (bdag ḥid gcig); essential identity (ho bo gcig); identity of ne-
gatives (ldog pa gcig). A full study of all these notions is, of course
impossible here. But fortunately we can simplify a bit by noting that
three of the six (viz. identity of own-being, identity of nature and es-
sential identity) are the same relation, and are used interchangeably.

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17 Cf. his History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions, 102-105, 118-121.
18 skabs daṅ po'i spyi don, 102h.
Substantial identity — in the Tibetan tradition at least — is a subset of essential identity, applying to cases of impermanent phenomena, or what is the same thing, phenomena which have substance (rdzas yod). In particular, x and y are substantially identical if they "appear non-distinct (so sor mi snaḥ ba) to a direct perception (pratyakṣa; mhon sum)." A persual of rGyal tshab rje's dbu ma rgyan gyi brjed byaḥ reveals that most of rGyal tshab's paraphrasing of Śāntarakṣita's arguments is in terms of substantial identity and difference. The difference between substantial and essential identity can for all intents and purposes be overlooked in this discussion — it is often overlooked in other contexts.

Take some examples of substantial or essential identity:
(a) product-hood (byas pa) and impermanence (mi rtag pa); (b) subjects (chos can) and their qualities (chos); (c) particulars (spyi ldan) and universals (spyi); (d) activity (bya ba) and the agent (bya ldan); (e) the two truths; (f) parts and part-holders (at least conventionally, they are said to be essentially identical).

Clearly the notion of identity here is a strange one, and can not be reduced to a standard logic textbook definition of identity, as in first order predicate calculus with identity. Take (b) above. Let the subject be a vase, and the properties be impermanence, and "being bulbous and able to carry water." By the normal criteria of "=" (viz. transitivity, symmetry and reflexiveness), if vase = what is impermanent, and vase = what is bulbous and able to carry water, then it would follow that what is impermanent = what is bulbous and able to carry water. Absurd. However, I think that there is a clear notion here, one which can be understood with the aid of Pramāṇa texts. The Pramāṇavārttika states:

In all cases, there is only a difference between the words which describe substances [i.e. subjects] and entities [i.e.

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19 cf. Yoḥn 'dzin phur bu lcog byams pa, bsDus grwa 'briṅ, 9a for a brief discussion of btags yod and rdzas yod.
20 An example of this definition in use is found in rGyal-tshab-rje's rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed, Vol.I, 101: rdzas tha dad du thal | blo ma khrul ba'i gzuṅ nor so sor snaḥ ba'i phyir. Here blo ma khrul ba means direct perception (mhon sum).
21 For (b), (c), (d) cf. rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed, 97. In sKabs daṅ po'i spyi don, 102b it is said that "the two truths are essentially identical (ho bo gcig), but have different double negatives (ldog pa tha dad)".
22 cf. Grzegorczyck, op.cit. 3-8. As for "bulbous and able to carry water", this the usual definition (mtshan ḥid) of a vase (bum pa); cf. bsDus grwa chuṅ, 7a.
qualities]. Their denotations admit of no difference what-
soever.\textsuperscript{23}

In \textit{Thar lam gsal byed}, rGyal tshab rje explains this \textit{kārikā} as follows:

"Take as the subject of debate all cases of words describing substances or subjects, and entities or qualities. Although one grasps them [i.e. subjects and qualities] as being substantially different, there is in fact no substantial difference with regard to their denotations (\textit{brjod bya}) as the difference is confined (\textit{zad pa}) to one of understanding one object (\textit{don gcig ñid}) by means of different symbols. Although one might speak about qualities (\textit{yon tan}) and quality possessors (\textit{yon tan can}), actions and agents, universals and particulars, and although one might grasp them as substantially different, this is merely a difference imputed by the conceptual mind (\textit{rtog pas btags pa'i tha dad tsam du zad pa}); nonetheless these notions are intelligible (\textit{go bar byed})."\textsuperscript{24}

The picture begins to gradually emerge. Essential identity, or more particularly substantial identity, is identity for a direct perception - what looks the same to someone who is non-deluded. Based on the speaker's intentions, there is a separation made between subjects, qualities, universals, etc., but these are only mind-invented differences; the actual denoted object (\textit{vācyā; brjod bya}) is as it appears to direct perception, and admits no such differences. In the above-cited examples it is possible that \( x \neq y \), but these differences will be mind-invented; the actual denotation of "\( x \)" = the actual denotation of "\( y \)". We can frame the following bi-conditional using "\( = \)" in its usual sense: \( x \) and \( y \) are essentially identical, if and only if, the actual denotation of "\( x \)" = the actual denotation of "\( y \)", where "actual denotation" is understood to mean the object free of mind or language invented differences.

Now suppose that the actual denotation of "part" = the actual denotation of "part-holder", as follows from the hypothesis of principle (3) that parts and part-holder are essentially identical. Then given the usual understanding of "\( = \)" , and the premise that the actual denotation of "part" has the property of manyness, it would follow that the actual de-

\textsuperscript{23} Svārthānumānapariccheda, Kārikā 62:
\textit{Bheda 'yam eva sarvatra dravyabhāvabhedaśyinoḥ | šabdayaranataaya vācyeviśeṣoṣ tena kaś cana}||

\textsuperscript{24} rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed, vol.1, 97.
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notation of "part-holder" should also have the property of manyness. Mutatis mutandis, the singleness of the partholder would also transfer to the parts, and the parts would all have to be identical. Thus, the two absurdities mentioned in principle (3) can be derived.

A possible objection at this point might be to ask if it is at all meaningful to say "the actual denotation of 'parts' or 'part-holder' is many." Syntactically, it is anomalous to predicate "manyness" of a singular noun. There are two problems here: one is linguistic, and stems from the fact that "cha šas" and "cha can", and such nouns do not show a singular-plural difference; the other is logical, and stems from the fact that neither Śāntarakṣīta nor Tsoṅ kha pa rely on set theory.

Be all this as it may, the problems are relatively easily surmounted if we take the responsibility for introducing some elementary set theory and speak about the cardinality of a set of objects X (i.e. CN (X)). The basic move is to say that the set of objects actually denoted by "parts" has many members while the set of objects actually denoted by "part-holder" has only one member. Let us call the first set "p" and the second "PH". Thus CN(P) > 1 and CN(PH) = 1 (What we have just done is a typical internal history move. We have placed Tsoṅ kha pa in a problem situation which he himself was, of course, never confronted with. But such a reconstruction is, I think, justified given the syntactic demands of our language, and the high level of familiarity and clarity which set theory has in our logic.) If we wish, we can reconstruct the preceding paragraph's arguments as follows:

(1) P = PH
(2) For all sets, X,Y: if X = Y, then CN(X) = CN(Y)
(3) CN(P) = CN(PH)
(4) CN(P) > 1 and CN(PH) = 1
(5) CN(P) = 1 and CN(PH) > 1

The contradiction, CN(P) = 1 and CN(P) ≠ 1, follows from (4) and (5), and can be used to infer P ≠ PH by modus tollens. Lines (1) - (5) constitute a reconstruction of Tsoṅ kha pa's argument up until his conclusion that the parts must be one or the part-holder must be many; the inference that the parts can not be truly essentially one with their

25 Frege's formulation was: for all properties F: if x = y, then if x is F, then y is F. (F) (x=y → (Fx → Fy)).
part-holder (i.e. \( P \neq PH \)) is left implicit in Tson kha pa.

What about the second question which I posed? Why is it that if \( x \) and \( y \) are essentially different, \( x \) and \( y \) must be unrelated ('brel med)? There are according to Pramāṇa texts, two and only two types of relatedness: one nature relation (tāḍātmya; bdag gcig tu 'brel) and causal relation (tadutpatti; de byuñ 'brel). To postulate a third type would, according to Dharmakīrti, destroy the necessity for there being only three types of valid reasons, and would hence bring about an enormous rupture in the Pramāṇavārttika system.

1Cañ skya, in discussing the Madhyamakāvatāra's seven-fold reasoning (rnam bdun gyi rigs pa), states the following concerning the chariot and its parts:

> Take the chariot as subject; it is not by nature different from its various parts; because otherwise if it were, the parts and the chariot would be essentially different, and if two things are simultaneous (dus mñam) and essentially different, then they would have to be unrelated other objects ('brel med don gñan). Thus, the chariot and its parts would have to be separately apprehended (dmigs pa), just as a horse and a ox are separately apprehended. But such is not the case.²⁶

Now in general, if two phenomena are essentially different, it does not follow that they are unrelated. A causal relation, as it involves substantial difference (rdzas tha dad) of the relata, implies that these relata are essentially different.²⁷ But this substantial, and hence essential difference, is due to the fact that cause and effect cannot exist simultaneously. However, in the case of parts and part-holder, it is not a causal relation that is involved. The part-possessor must exist at the same time as its parts (the key words in 1Cañ skya are ho bo tha dad dus mñam). As a result only a one-nature relation would be possible. But since by hypothesis parts and part-holders are essentially different,

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²⁶ Grub mtha' thub bstan lhun po'i mäzes rgyan, 432. It should be clear that Tson kha pa's principles (3) and (4) are not just restricted to Mādhyamika-Svētānterika argumentation, but also play a major role in Prāṣaṅgika texts - for example, the Madhyamakāvatāra's arguments concerning the self and the aggregates, as well as the arguments known as "the seven-fold reasoning" VI, 127: gal te phuñ po bdag na de phyir de | māh bas bdag de dag kyah mān por 'gyur; VI, 124: deli phyir phuñ po las gñan bdag med de | phuñ po ma gtoogs de 'dzin ma grub phyir.

²⁷ cf. bsDus grwa 'briñ. 5b: chos de dañ rdzas tha dad pa'i sgo nas chos de'i 'bras bu'i rigs su gnas pa chos de dañ de byuñ 'brel gyi mtshan ŋid...
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and hence not of one nature (bdag ’kid gcig), they would be completely unrelated. Nor can one sanguinely accept this conclusion; unrelatedness would imply that they could be perceived separately, and moreover, that one could exist without the other - the part-holder ought to be able to exist without parts.

There is one last point to be mentioned, and I shall give it as short shrift as does Śāntaraksita himself. The paper so far has dealt with arguments against oneness, and has left manyness untouched. Śāntaraksita devotes only two kārikā (61, 62) to arguments against manyness, but the reasoning is cogent and easily laid out: if there is no phenomenon of which we can say that it is one individual thing, then we also cannot meaningfully speak of "many phenomena". Manyness is a collection (bsags pa) of individuals, a collection of ones. If we prefer a set-theoretic formulation, we may simply say "sets with many members are impossible if there are no unit sets".
Summary and conclusions

(a) We began by making a distinction between two sorts of "neither one, nor many" arguments, those which simply spoke of the qualities oneness and manyness, and those which were phrased in terms of "... is one with ..."). Śāntarakṣita's version was of the former variety, although seen through Tson kha pa's interpretation, it ultimately depended on arguments involving "... is one with ...").

(b) Tson kha pa's account of Śāntarakṣita is in many places an accurate reflection of the latter's text. But it is also more than that. It is an attempt at internal history, a rational reconstruction of Śāntarakṣita's thought, first of all placing it in a conceptual framework to Pramāṇa and Mādhyamika philosophy, and then imagining how the discussion could reasonably proceed in such a context.

(c) The notions of essential identity and difference, so important to Tson kha pa's and hence Śāntarakṣita's argumentation, can be rationalized by recourse to Pramāṇavārttika's theory of meaning, plus some modern logic. Given this account of these key terms, as well as Pramāṇavārttika's notion of relatedness, Tson kha pa's principles (3) and (4) seem to follow.

Finally, although I have only touched on a few aspects of this key argument for śūnyatā, I hoped, above all, to show that the arguments need to be understood in terms of a whole background network of logical notions. As is so often the case in the history of philosophy, sophisticated argumentation ultimately seems to rest on philosophies of language and logic.

28 Various important points remain undiscussed so far, but I shall only mention one of them here:
In dByu ma dgo'ns pa rab gsal (135-136) Tson kha pa presents another line of reasoning, which he claims - with non-obvious justification - to be the position of Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla (zi ba 'tsho yab sras). The argument is also used in rNam bshad shiṅ po rgyan and skabs dahn po'i spyi don as well as other texts, and represents the other major strand in the dGe lugs pa view of the "neither one nor many" argument. It can be summarized as follows:

(i) Parts and part-holders are conventionally essentially identical.
(ii) Parts and part-holders appear as being essentially different to the conceptual mind which thinks about them (rtog pa la ḥo bo tha dad du snāḥ ba).
(iii) Therefore, the way in which parts and part-holders appear (snāḥ tshul), and the way they are (gnas tshul) are not in accord (mi mthun pa); thus, they are like an illusion, and are deceptive (bdzun pa).
(iv) Whatever is truly established (bden par grub) can not be deceptive in any way (rnam par thams cad du bdzun pa spāṅs te).
(v) Thus, parts and part-holders are not truly established.

I hope to say more about this argument and other aspects of the "neither one nor many" argument at a later date.
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ON RANG RIG

by

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It is well known that Candrakīrti, in his discussion of the two satyas in the Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya, placed under mithyāsaṃvṛtisatya the philosophical views of his opponents. That is, all the philosophical activity of those thinkers who aren’t Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika is incorrect even from the conventional everyday point of view, without beginning to consider its pretensions to revealing ultimate truth.¹

In his commentary on the Madhyamakāvatāra (the Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta), however, Mi bskyod rdo rje, the eighth Karma pa, tells us that there were many earlier commentators who understood Candrakīrti’s refutation of the substratum consciousness (ālayavijñāna), self-referring consciousness (svasaṃvitti), the external object and the person (pudgala) to be only a refutation from the ultimate point of view, and not conventionally (tha snyad du).² Tsong kha pa certainly held that the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka accepts conventionally the external object and the person, when these are understood correctly.³ But Mi bskyod rdo rje singles out for particular mention the Sa skya lamas Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge and Shā kya mChog ldan, and I want to look briefly at two things: First, the issues involved in urging the acceptance or otherwise of self-referring, reflexive consciousness; and second, some philosophical dimensions of the dispute between Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge and Mi bskyod rdo rje.

¹ See Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya on Madhyamakāvatāra VI, 26. See also Atīśa’s Satyadvayāvatāra 70a: dang po gnyis te chu zla dang | grub mtha’ ngan pa’i rtog pa’o |
² Dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta 457: go shāk sogs bod kyi ’jug ’grel byed pa mang pos slob dpon zla grags kyi bzhes par gzhung ’dis tha snyad du rang lugs la rang rig yod pa yin par sgrub po | zhes dang | de bzhin kun gzhī rang rig phyi don gang zag rnam lugs ’dis tha snyad du ’gog pa min kyi | dpyad bzod du grub pa’i kun gzhī sogs ’gog par byed pa yin lo |
³ For Tsong kha pa’s acceptance of the conventional existence of the external object see, for example, his rTsa ba shes rab kyi dka’ gnas chen po brgyad kyi bshad pa 15ff. On the status of the person see the same text, 40ff.
Mi pham, in his lucid commentary on Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, explains that for Śāntarakṣita consciousness in its occurrence is in all important respects the exact reverse of insentient phenomena. Consciousness has as its nature luminosity and awareness, "whatever is by nature not dead, not insentient, is conscious of its very self, self-aware, self-luminous". Self-consciousness is what distinguishes sentience from insentience, in the case of consciousness, and uniquely in the case of consciousness, there is self-reference, self-consciousness in the very same act. By "self-consciousness", Mi pham explains, is meant that in one nature (ngo bo gcig) there is both awareness of object and of subject. Śāntarakṣita and his commentators assert emphatically that consciousness is unitary and partless, and cannot be judged on the model of unconscious beings, "chariots, a wall and so on". It is pointless to argue in the case of self-consciousness that an act cannot be directed towards itself. Act, agent, object, knowing, knower, knowable—none of these categories applies in the case of a partless consciousness which is in its very nature, and not as an additional act, self-conscious.

There is an argument, familiar in the West from Aristotle's *De Anima* and, more recently, the work of Franz Brentano and Jean-Paul Sartre, to the effect that if consciousness isn't conscious, that is, conscious of

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6 See Mi pham's *dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa'i zhal lung 141ff. de ltar bem po min pa'i rang bzhin gang yin pa de lta bu 'di ni bdag rang nyid shes pa'am rang rig gsal zhes pa yin no|. This is an expansion of Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* v.16bc: bem min rang bzhin gang yin pa| de 'di bdag nyid shes pa yin||, given in the Sanskrit text of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, v.1999b: iyam evāta-saṃvittir asya yā'jaḍaruṇatā|| and also quoted in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapuṇḍarīkā* on BCA IX, 20.

5 *dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 141-142: de'ang gzung char snang ba'i rnam pa de'ang shes pa yin| de 'dzin pa'ang shes pa yin cing de gnyis ngo bo gcig yin ... An opponent is here raising an objection that if this were the case then act and agent would be the same thing. Śāntarakṣita, and Mi pham, go on to explain that this in fact doesn't follow.

6 Ibid. 142: 'di ltar gzhal bya bya stshogs pa snang ba'i yul dang| de 'dzin pa'i yul can so sor yod pa lta bu'i snang tshul gyi dbang du byas te gzung rnam dang 'dzin rnam zhes bzhag kyang don la rnam par shes pa gang zhi shing rta dang rtsig pa la sogs pa bem po'i rang bzhin gsal rig dang bral ba dag las bzlog pa gsal zhing rig pa'i mtshan nyid can du rab tu skye ba ste| I am grateful to Tom Tillemans and Achok Rinpoche for correcting a misreading of this verse. This incorporates *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* v.16ab: rnam shes bem po'i rang bzhin las| bzlog pa rab tu skye ba ste||, which equals *Tattvasaṃgraha* v.1999a: vijñānān jaḍaruṇepbhoyo vijñāyate||, and is also quoted in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapuṇḍarīkā* on IX, 20.

7 See the *dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 142-143 on Madhyamakālaṃkāra* v.17: gcig pu cha med rang bzhin la| gsum gyi rang bzhin mi 'thad phyir| de gyi rang gis rig pa ni| bya dang byed pa'i dngos por min||. This equals *Tattvasaṃgraha* v.2000: kriyākāra-kabhāvena na svasaṃvittir asya tu| ekasyānaṃśarūpasya trairūpyānupappattitaḥ||, and this verse is also quoted in BCA IX, 20.
itself as well as conscious of the object, then, being unconscious, there could be no conscious awareness. Thus far Śāntarakṣita. Self-consciousness is the very nature of consciousness, if consciousness isn't self-conscious then it is bem po, jaḍa, dead. If luminosity isn't luminous, says Kamalaśīla in his Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā, then it cannot apprehend other objects. It is worth noting that the (misleading) metaphor of light for consciousness, a metaphor which reoccurs here in the example of light illuminating itself in the very same act of illuminating others, has been traced by the philosopher Gilbert Ryle to the Protestant need to know the state of his soul without recourse to confessors and scholars - thus the God-given "light" of conscience. Whether there is any conceptual similarity here with Buddhism I leave to a different occasion, but it is clear that the image of light for consciousness was very old in India and had no need of Protestants for its revelation!

If consciousness is known in another, reflective rather than reflexive, act of consciousness then we face an infinite regress, since the second act would have to be known in the same way as the first, and so on. Or, Tsong kha pa points out in his commentary on Madhyamakavatāra VI, 73a (the dbu ma dgongs pa rab gsal), representing the pūrvapakṣa, if the second act doesn't require to be itself illuminated by another act, then why is it necessary for the first to be so illuminated? But what is wrong with an infinite regress? The problem, Tsong kha pa notes, is that in the case of an infinite regress the initial perception of, say, blue, is never founded, never established. Moreover if an infinite regress of consciousness were required in order to found one consciousness then there could be no progression beyond the first attempt at objective knowledge. For Tsong kha pa, clearly, to complete an infinite series requires an infinite time. There could be no delimitation of other objects,

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8 See Aristotle, De Anima III:2, Franz Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (English trans.), 121ff, and Sartre's Being and Nothingness, lix-lxvii (English trans.) and The Transcendence of the Ego, passim. For an influential criticism of consciousness, self-consciousness and this argument in particular, see Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 148-189, especially 150-156.

9 Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā 98b: gsal ba yang gsal ba ma yin na ni gsal ba gsal ba ma yin pa'i phyir mi gzhon gyi mngon sum bzhin du mdun na rnam par gnas pa'i don kyang mngon sum du mi 'gyur ro |

10 See The Concept of Mind 152-153.

11 dbu ma dgongs pa rab gsal 285: de la de 'jal byed kyi shes pa don gzhon dgos sam mi dgos | mi dgos na shes pa snga la yang mi dgos par 'gyur la |

12 Ibid.: thug med du song na ni sngo 'dzin dang po la myong ba mi 'grub pa'i skyon yod do |
forms, sounds and so on. Thus, to quote Brentano, "The presentation of the sound and the presentation of the presentation of the sound form a single mental phenomenon."  

Now, it's not clear to me this train of argument is valid or even coherent. To deny that consciousness is conscious of itself at the same time as it is conscious of objects is not necessarily to claim that it is unconscious, anymore than to deny that whiteness is itself white is thereby to claim that whiteness is black, or indeed any other colour. It is to deny that a category is necessarily applicable to itself. The negation of "conscious" is not "unconscious" but rather "not conscious". If I claim to be conscious of blue but not conscious of being conscious of blue I am not thereby claiming that I am unconscious. Moreover we might anyway choose to deny, with Tsong kha pa, that saying "I am conscious of seeing blue" adds anything to saying "I see blue". Whether something is nevertheless lost in this analysis, a distinction perhaps between being of x and conscious that x is, is, of course, a different issue.  

There is another argument used by Buddhists in support of self-reflecting, reflexive consciousness which I am not familiar with from any Western context. This is the argument from memory. Put by Tsong kha pa in its simplest form, the argument runs as follows: When I remember that I sensed blue at a former time the sensation is a cause, although not the only cause, of the memory. In remembering - and in the Buddhist discussion of memory I think we can see an example of a particular case of reflective awareness, awareness taking as its object another awareness which has occurred previously - the awareness which serves as the referent of the memory act is seen to have both subjective and objective elements. That is, Tsong kha pa explains, when we remember, the memory image is seen  

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13 Ibid.: gnyis pa yul gzhan yongs su mi gcod par thal ba ni | shes pa snga ma phyi mas gcod na ni gzugs sgra la sogs pa'i yul gzhan mi gcod pa dang | de la mi 'pho bar 'gyur te |  
14 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 127.  
15 See Tsong kha pa's dKa' gnas chen po brgyad 26-27: sngon po myong ba'i rtags las sngon po rig pa sngon du song bar grub la | sngon po rig par grub pa nyid kyis rig pa tsam du grub zin pa'i phyir | rang rig la sogs pa'i sgrub byed gzhan rtog pa don med do | This argument is used by Tsong kha pa in the context of the "memory argument" which will be dealt with subsequently. Its generalization seems to be in keeping with Tsong kha pa's overall position. A similar argument may be indicated by Wittgenstein's treatment of pain in his Philosophical Investigations, paras. 416ff. That self-consciousness is indicated in the distinction between being conscious of x and conscious that x is persuasively argued by Pratima Bowes in her book Consciousness and Freedom. Among the views she treats in this book are two Indian views, Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta.
to be composed of "formerly this was seen" and "it was seen by me". Or, as Tsong kha pa expressed it elsewhere, when I remember that I truly saw blue there is a memory of blue and a memory of seeing blue. Thus in the original act there must have been the sensation of blue and also the sensation of seeing blue. These two formulations of the same argument are worth noting, for they indicate that reference in the first formulation to perception by me is intended to indicate self-consciousness in the sense of reflexive consciousness of itself, not consciousness of a self, perception by a self. That these two issues are different is seldom sufficiently realised in Western philosophy, their confusion was fatal for Descartes, who concluded from the argument that consciousness in being conscious is conscious of being conscious, reflexive self-consciousness, to the existence of a substantial Self.

But it is at least debatable whether a reflection on consciousness, introspection, can establish what is actually present to consciousness in lived experience. The presence of a number of elements in the verbal formulation of a reflective awareness "I saw blue" doesn't indicate that these elements correspond to epistemological elements in the original experience. As Kant pointed out, there is an "I think" which is capable of accompanying all my mental acts, but the only significance of this is that all my mental acts are mine. It is not quite clear what it would be for me to have someone else's mental acts, and thus the "I saw blue" carries with it no implications as to the status of self-consciousness or a self. Tsong kha pa points out that one can infer simple sensation from memory, but one is unable to infer self-consciousness. On the basis

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16 See Tsong kha pa's Drang nges legs bshad snying po 175: de yang snagar 'di mthong ngo zhes yul dang nas mthong ngo zhes yul can dran pa yod pas snagar gyi sngo 'dzin gyi shes pa lta bu de la myong ba yod do

17 In his dKa' gnas chen po bryad 25: bye brag tu ngas sngon po yang dag par mthong ngo snyam du dran pa'i tse sngon po dran pa dang | sngon po'i mthong ba dran pa | dran pa'i 'dzin stangs la yod la | des dpag par bya ba'i sngon po nyams su myong byed dang | sngon po mthong ba myong byed gnyis yod par grub pas

18 See, in particular, Descartes' Discourse on Method 4, where he concludes, from the fact of doubting, his own existence - "I think, therefore I am" - and sees this as equivalent to being "a substance, of which the whole essence or nature consists in thinking". That this inference is problematic was noted at length by Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Kemp-Smith transl.), 330ff.

19 Critique of Pure Reason 152ff. Cf. Strawson's The Bounds of Sense 165: "It would make no sense to think or say: This inner experience is occurring, but it is occurring to me? ... Again, it would make no sense to think or say: I distinctly remember that inner experience occurring, but did it occur to me?" Tshong kha pa makes more or less the same point in his Drang nges legs bshad snying po 176: rang lugs kyis rang rig med kyang dran pa skye ba mi 'gal ni | gang phyir gang gis yul myong gyur de las | dran pa 'di gzhan nga la yod min pa
of sensing blue one can conclude in memory that formerly there was the awareness of blue, but this only allows the establishment of simple awareness, not self-awareness. On the other hand if there is a memory of simple awareness of blue it is unnecessary to postulate self-consciousness. That is, if I remember seeing blue, and I am remembering the objective part, "blue", this is sufficient for memory. It is possible, but not necessary, to add on top of this an additional awareness that it was me who saw blue but, apart from Kant's contentless "I think", the memory of seeing blue itself doesn't require this additional awareness and therefore will not indicate a self-consciousness present in all consciousness. If I remember seeing blue, through a memory of blue, Tsong kha pa wants to claim, then if I am mistaken and I didn't see blue this is not a case of memory but of imagination. And if I really did see blue then in remembering blue it would be absurd to say that there is for me a memory of blue but not a memory of seeing blue or indeed that I saw blue. How could my memory of blue pertain to anyone or anything else? And thus the simple memory of blue is sufficient; to say "I saw blue" adds nothing to this simple awareness, it doesn't allow us to infer self-consciousness as an aspect of the initial experience.

I want now to look at some aspects of Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge's portrayal of Candrakīrti's position in his critical summary commentary on the Madhyamakāvatāra (the dbu ma la 'jug pa'i dkyus kyi sa bcad pa dang gzhung so so'i dka' ba'i gnas la dpyad pa lta ba ngan sel). If the claim is that self-consciousness is truly established based on the memory argument then this is refuted by the refutation of the four sorts of production - from self, other, both or neither. That is, there is no way that memory could really be the result of sensation given the refutation of causality. But if the claim is that self-consciousness exists conventionally in all mental acts then there is uncertainty of pervasion. It is like when one establishes that there is fire in a certain place and then, using the logical mark of smoke, wants to prove that there is fire elsewhere. It has yet to be shown that wherever there is smoke there is fire. Likewise it has yet to be shown that wherever there is memory there was self-consciousness. Candrakīrti gives as examples, in order

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20 See the dKa' gnas chen po brgyad, quoted in n.15 above.
21 dbu ma la 'jug pa'i dkyus kyi sa bcad pa dang gzhung so so'i dka' ba'i gnas la dpyad pa lta ba ngan sel 62b.
22 Ibid.: rang rig bgrub pa la khyab pa ma nges te | gzhi gzhon gyi steng du me gzhon sngar tshad mas grub na phyis du ba'i rtags las gzhi 'ga' zhig tu mi grub pa 'thad pa bzhiin du | sngar spyir rang rig tshad mas grub na | dran pa'i rtags las de sgrub pa 'thad kyang | phyir rgol gyi ngor sngar rang rig spyi ldog nas ma grub pa da lta dran pa'i rtags kyis mi 'grub pa'i phyir ...
to show uncertainty of pervasion, according to Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge, the fact that one cannot prove that a magnifying glass was used just because one sees fire, and so on. Conventionally memory certainly occurs as a result of sensing the object previously, even without sensing the consciousness itself.

But Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge's subsequent discussion shows how he failed to realise the distinction, implicit in Tsong kha pa's discussion, between reflexive consciousness of itself and reflective consciousness of self. For he takes Candrakīrti's analysis of how it is possible to say in everyday parlance "I saw blue" as a demonstration of how self-consciousness occurs conventionally. Conventionally self-consciousness does occur, he says, since there is memory directed to the object, arising from sensation of the object, and memory of oneself arising from sensation of oneself. In other words, contrary to Tsong kha pa's position above, Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge wants to maintain that while we can't infer from memory self-consciousness, memory of the objective part "seeing blue" or "blue" is sufficient to establish memory without postulating its constant accompaniment by self-awareness, nevertheless in that it is possible for me to direct an additional awareness to the fact that "I saw blue", the subjective part, so self-consciousness is an everyday, conventional possibility. The fact that inference from memory to self-consciousness is uncertain doesn't necessitate that self-consciousness never occurs, or that memory may not serve to reveal it. Thus Candrakīrti's choice of examples, the fact that fire can be produced by a magnifying glass, although it can also be produced by rubbing two sticks together, shows that he didn't want to refute the possibility of the conventional occurrence of self-consciousness. Otherwise he would have shown not uncertainty of pervasion but rather contradictory pervasion, examples where the occurrence of the one is never accompanied by the occurrence of the other.
But let us just note that Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge's argument rests here on the ambiguity of "self-consciousness", for the very position of Śāntarakṣita, for example, requires that self-consciousness in the sense of reflexive awareness distinguishes consciousness from dead objects through its universal presence in consciousness. It is the very mode of being of consciousness, it is what consciousness must be, there is no question of its being present at some times and not at others. If consciousness isn't self-conscious then it is unconscious. It is known through memory because in memory we remember blue and we remember sensing blue, as Tsong kha pa explained. The example of remembering "I saw blue" is a misleading alternative variant of this, but it is a variant which led Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge into identifying the possibility of a conventional awareness of self in memory with a mere possibility of reflexive self-consciousness. But Śāntarakṣita could simply reply that the possibility of directing the attention to the subject in a reflective awareness presupposes the constant occurrence of a reflexive self-consciousness, but is not the same as this self-consciousness.

I want finally to indicate one aspect of Mi bskyod rdo rje's impatient critique of Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge's position which raises broadly philosophical problems, without going so far as to suggest even an attempt at their solution.

Mi bskyod rdo rje points out, correctly, that for Candrakīrti reflexive self-consciousness represents a theoretical tenet of certain Sautrāntikas and Cittamātrins. It isn't a matter of everyday, pre-critical, pre-reflexive concern, it isn't a tenet of what philosophers have sometimes rather vaguely called "commonsense", and as such there is no question for Candrakīrti of the conventional existence of self-consciousness. It either really, truly, ultimately exists, or it is simply an erroneous tenet, it doesn't exist even conventionally. For Mi bskyod rdo rje Candrakīrti's conventional truth is simply, and only, what is held to be true in pre-critical, non-philosophical worldly commerce.

26 Dwaqs brgyud grub pa'i shing rta 457: gzung 'dis rang rig ces mdo sems kyi bstan bcos la grags pa'i mtshon bya'i ming de 'jig rten spyi la tha snyad du ma grags pas

27 Ibid., continuation of above: de 'jig rten pas tha snyad du'ang byas pa min gyi

28 For Mi bskyod rdo rje on the two truths see the Dwaqs brgyud grub pa'i shing rta on Madhyamakāvatāra VI, 23-30, pp.274ff. This lengthy section includes an extensive critical discussion of various Tibetan views on the two satyas.
And in worldly commerce people consider themselves just to experience sensations, and then to remember them later. It is sufficient conventionally to talk of sensation and memory as it is of act and effect, but this is certainly not to be examined critically in order to seek for an explanation or founding of the world. When examined critically it is simply the case that all conventions, all "commonsense" collapses and is seen to be ultimately unfounded. For Mi bskyod rdo rje it is true in the strongest sense, and in a way that it is not true for Tsong kha pa, that the Madhyamaka holds no positions, it has no explanations.

Now, the problem for the philosopher which I want to suggest arises out of this part of Mi bskyod rdo rje's critique of Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge is this: To what extent is self-consciousness a philosophical explanation of everyday experience, and to what extent is it a presupposition of such experience? This question cannot be disposed of by pointing to the fact that some philosophers deny self-consciousness and refute those who maintain its existence. For one can still ask of those philosophers who adhere to self-consciousness whether they consider themselves to be engaged in a project of revealing a presupposition of everyday experience, that is, a fundamental structure of experience such that experience is experience, a phenomenological investigation, if you like, or whether they consider themselves to be explaining everyday experience, perhaps as some phenomenalists have explained that the everyday world is a construct out of sense data, which form the immediate given of experience. On the former model the philosopher is, in this instance, simply making clear dimensions of everyday experience which may not be clearly articulated by the "man in the street" but which the man in the street can willingly assent to as being a necessary dimension of, or prerequisite for, his everyday experience.

I'm not sure how one would settle which of these is the case as regards self-consciousness. One relevant point in deciding may rest on whether we can think of an everyday context where, in answer to the question

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29 Ibid. 457, continuation of n.27 above: rang rig ces pa'i mtshon bya ming de gang la gdaqs pa'i gzhis myong tsam de dang | de phyis dran tsam 'jig rten pas tha snyad du brjod pa yod pas |
30 Ibid. 458: las 'bras dang myong dran tsam tha snyad kyi gzhir rung bas de dag ma dpyad pa'i tha snyad kyi tha snyad de dag 'jig rten na rnam par bzhag go zhes gsal bar bshad pa'i phyir |
31 Ibid. 457-458: ... rang rig rnams ma grub pas de dag 'jig rten gu'i tha snyad du tha snyad byed ched du de ltar sgrub pa 'jig rten na'ang don med pa'i phyir ro |
32 Ibid. 457ff.
whether someone really knows something or other he would reply, "Oh yes, certainly I do, for I am conscious and even vividly conscious of doing so. The case is from Gilbert Ryle, and Ryle maintains that this in fact never occurs." Self-consciousness is not part of everyday experience. But all this seems to indicate is that in normal, everyday activity people don't operate on the level of sophistication which involves uncovering the presuppositions of experience. The contemporary Indian philosopher J.N. Mohanty has claimed that immediate self-consciousness uniquely occupies neither a practical nor a theoretical mode, or, in terms of the previous discussion, it is neither part of familiar, everyday commonsense activity, nor is it simply deduced in reflection, in this case philosophical reflection. Rather it transcends this distinction and yet it accompanies all our awarenesses. If so, then it doesn't follow, in spite of Mi bskyod rdo rje, that to claim that self-consciousness exists is to make a purely theoretical, or, as I have put it, explanatory claim. In postulating self-consciousness it is claimed that it is undeniably present in everyday conscious acts, its postulation uncovers descriptively a presupposition of all experience. For those who deny self-consciousness its postulation is said to be unnecessary to experience, but in both cases the issue has an immediacy not borne by abstract metaphysical explanations of the world.
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