CHINA AND TIBET
IN THE EARLY 18TH CENTURY

HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CHINESE PROTECTORATE IN TIBET

BY

L. PETECH

LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL
1950
CHINA AND TIBET
IN THE EARLY 18TH CENTURY
T'OUNG PAO
ARCHIVES CONCERNANT L'HISTOIRE, LES LANGUES, LA GÉOGRAPHIE, L'ETHNOGRAPHIE ET LES ARTS DE L'ASIE ORIENTALE

REVUÉ DIRIGÉE PAR

J. J. L. DUYVENDAK ET PAUL DEMIÉVILLE
Professeur à l'Université de Leyde
Professeur au Collège de France

MONOGRAPHIE I

L. PETECH
CHINA AND TIBET IN THE EARLY 18TH CENTURY

LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL
1950
CHINA AND TIBET
IN THE EARLY 18TH CENTURY

HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CHINESE PROTECTORATE IN TIBET

BY

L. PETECH

LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL
1950
TO MY PARENTS

TO WHOSE LOVE AND EXAMPLE I OWE EVERYTHING

THIS WORK IS DEDICATED
CONTENTS

Preface ..................................................... IX
List of Abbreviations ........................................ XI

I—Sources .................................................. 1
II—Lha-bzaṅ Khan, the last Qośot Ruler of Tibet (1705-1717) ...................................................... 8
III—The Dzungar Invasion of 1717 .......................... 25
IV—Dzungar Occupation and Tibetan Risings ............. 42
V—The Chinese Conquest of Tibet .......................... 55
VI—The Chinese Protectorate during the last years of K‘ang-hsi .................................................. 62
VII—Tibet and the New Policy of Yung-chêng ............. 78
VIII—K‘aṅ-č‘en-nas’s Murder and P’o-lha-nas’s Preparations for War ............................................. 99
IX—The Civil War of 1727-1728 ............................ 108
X—The Trial of the Ministers and P’o-lha-nas’s Rise to Power ..................................................... 126
XI—P’o-lha-nas’s Rule during the Exile of the Dalai-Lama (1729-1735) ............................................. 142
XII—P’o-lha-nas, Administrator and “King” of Tibet (1735-1747) ..................................................... 159
XIII—āGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, the last “King” of Tibet (1747-1750) ..................................................... 181
XIV—The End of the “Kingdom” and the Rise of the Temporal Power of the Dalai-Lama .................. 198
XV—The Administration of Tibet during the First Half-century of Chinese Protectorate .................. 218
XVI—Conclusion .............................................. 240
Appendix: Chinese Documents ............................... 244
Addendum ....................................................... 263
Chronological Lists for the Period 1706-1751 ........... 267
Bibliography ..................................................... 271
Index .......................................................... 274
PREFACE

There is a period in the history of Central Asia which has repeatedly drawn the attention of Western scholars; it is the first half of the 18th century. These fifty years saw the rise and fulfilment of the Manchu empire as the paramount power of Central and Eastern Asia, after having crushed the long and valiant resistance of the Dsungars of the Ili valley. Contemporary events in Tibet may seem to be rather in the nature of a by-play in this tenacious struggle. But Tibet, because of its unparalleled religious influence, played a role much more important than it seems warranted by its strategical and economic position. The history of this particularly intricate period offers therefore an outstanding interest. It is the aim of the present work to give a connected account of the establishment of the Chinese protectorate over Tibet, from its beginnings in 1705/6 to its final organization in 1751. In those fateful years it was the sad lot of Tibet to fall under foreign domination, after having managed to preserve its independence for more than a thousand years (we can safely disregard the shadowy suzerainty of the dynasty of Kubilai); the period 1700-1750 is truly a landmark in the history of the Land of Snows.

My transliteration of Tibetan calls for no special remark, except that the 23rd letter of the alphabet is transcribed with 'a when it is a prefix, but with ' when it is an affix or a vowel-support. After some hesitation, I have maintained the employ of the titles Dalai-Lama and Tashi-Lama, consecrated by long usage, instead of the correct forms rGyal-ba Rin-po-c' e and Pañ-c'en Rin-po-c'e.

Mongol names of Tibetan origin have been transliterated according to the Tibetan spelling. For pure Mongol names I have followed the system of Pelliot, as found in Hambis, Grammaire de la langue mongole écrite, Paris 1946. But here too I have maintained the more usual phonetical transcriptions, such as Tengri-nor for Tänggrinör, Kuku-nor for Kökä-nör, Dsungar for Jä'üün-yar.

My gratitude goes above all to Professor Giuseppe Tucci, who placed at my disposal his unique library of Tibetan woodprints
and manuscripts. With two exceptions, all the Tibetan texts used in this work belong to his collection.

My thanks are also due to Professor J. J. L. Duyvendak, who read the proofs of the Appendix and suggested several corrections and improvements; to Professor Erich Haenisch, who supplied me with some of the Manchu originals of names found in Chinese transcriptions only; to the authorities of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide, who allowed me to delve into the rich treasures of their archives; and to Mr. D. L. Snellgrove, who in several places straightened up my somewhat unidiomatic English.

Rome, June 1950

Luciano Petech.
ABBREVIATIONS

A—Periodicals:

HJAS : Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
IHQ : Indian Historical Quarterly
JA : Journal Asiaticque
JASB : Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
JRAS : Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
PASB : Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
TP : T'oung Pao

B—Tibetan Texts:

ASTL: Autobiography of the Second Tashi-Lama
ATTL: Autobiography of the Third Tashi-Lama
LSDL: Life of the Seventh Dalai-Lama
MBTJ: Mi-dbañ-rtogs-brjod

For further particulars see Introduction and Sources.

C—Documents in the Archives of the Sacra Congregazione de Propaganda Fide. Rome:

Scr. Congregaz.: Scritture riferite nelle Congregazioni Generali (Documents submitted in the General Congregations)
Scr. Congressi: Scritture riferite nei Congressi, Indie Orientali e Cina (Documents submitted in the Committee for Eastern Indies and China)
CHAPTER ONE

SOURCES

The years from 1705 to 1751 decided the future of Tibet for nearly two centuries; the political conditions, then created, lasted till 1912. The importance of the events of those years has been duly appreciated by scholars in Europe and America, and we have at least three good accounts of this period:

A—Rockhill, The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and their relations with the Manchu emperors of China, in TP XI (1910), pp. 1-104. Based mainly on the Shēng-wu-chi 聖武記 of Wei Yüan 魏源 (published in 1842) and the last one of the several works called Tung-hua-lu 東華錄, viz. the one published by Wang Hsien-ch’ien 王先謙 in 1884.


But it is remarkable that all of them are based only on the

1) To these may be added Schulemann, Die Geschichte der Dalailamas, Heidelberg 1911; a good second-hand compilation without independent value. Older authors, e.g. those summarized in Howorth, History of the Mongols, vol. I (London 1876), pp. 521-523, 532-533, 643-644, are now useless.

A translation of the 5th chapter of the Shēng-wu-chi, concerning the Chinese relations with Tibet, was undertaken by Jametel, Histoire de la pacification du Tibet, in Revue de l’Extrême Orient I (1882), pp. 572-592; it was never finished, and the account stops with the year 1718. Another translation of the same text was begun by Ivanovskij, De la conquête du Tibet par les Chinois, in Musion III (1884), pp. 165-181; but this version too never went beyond the first pages.

PETECH, China and Tibet
Chinese sources available at the time, with the addition of part of the material left to us by the Catholic missionaries in Tibet (the Jesuit Desideri and the Capuchins). The Tibetan records of this period have never been utilized; nor have been the “Veritable Documents” (Shih-lu) of the Manchu dynasty, which have become available to scholars only in these last years. The present work is based on all the Tibetan and Chinese material available to me; for the years 1705-1732 the Tibetan sources predominate, while for the years 1732-1751 it is the Chinese documents which are richer and more useful.

There are four chief Tibetan works relating to this period. First, the Life of the Seventh Dalai-Lama Blo-bzan-bskal-bsan-rgya-mts’o (1708-1757). Its author is the well-known Changchua Qutuqtu (in Tibetan: lCan-skya Rol-pa’i-rdo-rje), the editor of the Mongolian bsTan-agyur. He began his work at Lhasa in 1758 and finished it in 1759. The LSDL is arranged in annalistic order, and sometimes even the month and day of the events are given. Being the official biography of the Dalai-Lama who ruled the see during the period under consideration, it ought to be a source of the foremost importance. But upon closer scrutiny it reveals itself as rather disappointing. It is concerned strictly with religion and its ceremonial; even very important events of political history are ignored. Its interest, therefore, lies mainly in the very full lists of Mongol, Tibetan, and Chinese grandees who visited the Dalai-Lama, and in its precise chronology. The literary style is beautiful, easy and flowing, a fine example of Tibetan prose.

The second work is the Autobiography of the Second Tashi-Lama Blo-bzan-ye-ses-dpal-bsan-po (1663-1737). It has no colophon and

---

1) The only exception is that magnificent work Tibetan Painted Scrolls by Professor Tucci, Rome 1949; on pp. 77-80 it contains a very short abstract of the Tibetan texts relating to this period.

2) Full title: rGyal ba’i dbaṅ po t’ams cad mk’yen ge’gigs rdo rje a’c’ān blo bzaṅ bskal bsaṅ rgya mls’o’i zal shia nas kyi rnam par ’ar pa mdo tsam brjod pa dpag bsam rin po c’ei sde ma; ff. 558. Woodprint in the private library of Professor Tucci, Rome. On this work see Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, pp. 168-169. Quoted by the abbreviation LSDL.

3) Died in 1786. Life of the Fourth Tashi-Lama, f. 47b; Life of the Eighth Dalai-Lama, f. 158a.

4) The date of death in his Autobiography (f. 11b) is 15/VII = August 17th, 1663. The date of death is given by the LSDL, f. 232b, as 5/VII = July 31st, 1737. Full title of his autobiography: Śākyā’i dge slos blo bzaṅ ye sēs kyi sphyod ts’ul gsal bar byed pa nor gkar can gnyi p’ren ba; ff. 400. First volume (Kā) of the complete works (gsun ’abum). Woodprint in the private library of Professor Tucci. On this work see Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, pp. 161-162. Quoted by the abbreviation ASTL.
stops abruptly, the last entry being under the date 5/1, 1732; apparently it has been left unfinished by the author. Its arrangement is annalistic, with one of the most painstakingly exact chronologies ever found in Tibetan literature; the day and month of nearly every event is given. Of course, from the modern historian’s point of view it suffers from the same drawbacks as the LSDL. It is written in a peculiar language full of rare words and uncommon constructions, although its syntax is very simple and its style very plain.

The third work is the Autobiography of the Third Tashi-Lama Blo-bzaṅ-dpal-ldan-ye-śes-dpal-bzaṅ-po (1738-1780). It is built on much the same lines as the preceding work, of which it shares all the merits and defects; but its language is much simpler, being the usual standard Tibetan. It stops with the end of 1776.

The fourth source, and by far the most important, is the Mi-dbaṅ-rto-gs-brjod. It is the biography of bSod-nams-stobs-rgyas of P‘o-lha, ruler of Tibet (,,king” for the missionaries) from 1728 to his death in 1747. Its author Ts’e-rin-dbaṅ-rgyal of mDo-mk‘ar was first a finance director under the Tibetan council; in 1728 he was appointed as one of the two ministers who were to govern dBus under P‘o-lha-nas’s supervision; he was also a member of the council of four ministers established in 1751, and died in 1763. He finished his work at rGyal-mk‘ar-rtse (Gyantse) on the I/X = November 7th, 1733. Ts’e-rin-dbaṅ-rgyal wrote during the lifetime of his hero, and his high position gave him every chance of a good inside knowledge of the events of which he was a witness. Thus his work is marked by a high degree of trustworthiness. There is of course the drawback of

---

1) Full title: rJe bla ma srid ści’i gtsug rgyan paṇ c’en t‘ams cad mk‘yen pa blo bzaṅ dpal ldan ye ses dpal bzaṅ po’i ẓal sna nas kyi rnam par t‘ar pa; ff. 375. First volume (Ka) of the complete works. Woodprint in the private library of Professor Tucci. Quoted by the abbreviation ATTL.

2) I may mention in passing that there exists a continuation to this work, which carries the narrative down to the death of the Tashi-Lama at Peking in 1780; it was written by ḡajigs-med-dpal-dkon-mc‘og ḡajigs-med-dbaṅ-po Ye-śes-brtson- quà-grags-grags-pa’i-sde in 1786.

3) Full title: dPal mi’i dbaṅ po’i rto-gs brjod pa qig rten kun tu dga’ ba’i glam; ff. 395. Woodprint in my possession. On this work see Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, p. 169. Quoted by the abbreviation MBTJ.

4) This personage is called by various titles in the Tibetan texts, such as P‘o-lha-nas, P‘o-lha Taiji, dGuṅ-blon Taiji, Mi-dbaṅ. I shall call him P‘o-lha-nas throughout this work, mainly because the title regularly used in Chinese sources is P‘o-lo-nai 頗羅黎.

5) Funeral rites were held for him at bKra-sis-lhung-po during the New Year’s festival of 1764. ATTL, f. 222a. [See also the Addendum].
a strong bias in favour of P'o-lha-nas, of whom the author is an enthusiastic apologist. Another defect is the vagueness of the chronology: only seldom a date is given. But luckily this can be completed from the other sources. In the first hundred or so pages, the work is written in a highly ornate and long-winded style, sometimes quite difficult to understand; occasionally use is made of the rules of Indian *alamkāra* 1), and poems of various lengths are freely inserted in the narrative. As the tale goes on, the style becomes gradually easier, at times even colloquial; and in moments of crisis, while relating events of the highest importance, the author lets himself go, and then he can be delightfully direct and straightforward, even if only for a short time.

Some minor works have been utilized as complement to the four mentioned above. In the first place, two chronological tracts by Kłoń-rdol bLa-ma Nag-dbaṅ-blo-bzaṅ 2); they were written about 1790, as the last date mentioned in them is 1787.

Secondly, a small booklet, the *Loṅ-ba'i-dmigs-bu* (Guide of the blind) 3). It is a kind of manual, intended for the official class, describing the seals of the Dalai-Lamas and of the regents. It is arranged in the form of chronological tables, the year being always given as heading, even if no item is recorded under it. The author is unknown. The work was apparently written in the first years of the present century, but in spite of its being so modern, it gives some data not found elsewhere.

Lastly, there is the collection of the biographies of the K'ri Rin-po-che, or abbots of dGa'^-ldan monastery. These abbots, who rank third in dignity and influence after the Dalai-Lama and the Tashi-Lama, are not incarnations; they are elected for their scholarly merits alone and remain on the see for a period of seven years. The

---

1) The use of Indian *alamkāra* was introduced in Tibet by the Fifth Dalai-Lama. Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*, p. 104.

2) *bsTan pa'i dbyin bdag byun tu'i gyi miṅ gi graṅs*; vol. *Za* of the complete works. *bsTan pa'i dbyin bdag byun tu'i gyi miṅ gi graṅs*; vol. *A* of the complete works. Woodprints in the private library of Professor Tucci. The above two booklets are mentioned also by Stael-Holstein, Notes on two Lama paintings, in *JAOS* 52 (1932), pp. 339 and 342.

3) Full title: *gZuṅ rabs rnams la śe bar mk'o ba bla dpun rim byon gyi lo rgyus t'am deb lio ba'i dmiṅ bs* bu. Copy in my possession, made at Kalimpong in 1939 from a manuscript belonging to Tharchin, a Christian Tibetan residing at Kalimpong as mission teacher and editor of a Tibetan newspaper. On this popular figure, well-known to all travellers passing through Kalimpong on their way to Tibet, see e.g. Kelling, Tibetische Literatur in modernem Gewande, in *Artibus Asiae* V (1935), pp. 95-98.
collection 1) comprises the lives of K'ri Rin-po-che, beginning with the 47th of the series (on the see 1699-1700) and ending with the 71th (on the see 1828-1829). The single biographies were compiled by various authors between 1810 and 1831.

The main Chinese source is of course the series of the Shih-lu (Ta-ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu 大清歷朝實錄) 2). This invaluable collection, officially compiled, of Ch'ing documents is now the most important and authentic source for the history of the Manchu dynasty. It practically supersedes the several Tung-hua-lu, which are only extracts of the Shih-lu 3). A cursory perusal of the Sheng-hsun 聖訓 (Collected Edicts) of K'ang-hsi, Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung showed that practically all of the documents in them are also included in the Shih-lu. Both Tung-hua-lu and Sheng-hsun accordingly are not quoted in the present work.

Among the second-rank sources, the Wei-tsang-t'ung-chih 衙藏通志 stands out. Its anonymous author wrote about the end of the 18th century, but the work was published in 1896 only 4). It is a veritable mine of information on Tibet in the second half of the 18th century. In its 13th chüan (Historical Summary) I found some interesting information. But the main emphasis is placed on much later events, above all on the Gurkha war of 1791/2.

Of hardly less importance for my purpose was the Ch'ing-shih-kao 清史稿 in 536 chüan, compiled between 1914 and 1927 by the Ch'ing Historical Board under the supervision of Chao Erh-hsun 趙爾巽 5); it was intended to be the 25th dynastic history and

1) dGe ldan gser k'ri rin po c'er dbai sgyur ba'i skyes mco'og dam pa k'ri c'en rin byon ruams kyi ruam t'sar rmad byun nor bu'i p'een ba. Woodprint in the private library of Professor Tucci.
2) Published by the Manchoukuo government and photolitographed at Tökyö in 1937. On the Shih-lu see Fuchs, Beiträge zur manjurischen Bibliographie und Literatur, Tökyö 1936, pp. 58-71.
5) The work has had a chequered career; its first edition was banned in 1928 by the Kuomintang government, when their troops reached Peking, and it was not again released for sale till 1937. Cfr. Haenisch, Das Ts'ing-schi-kao und die sonstige chinesische Literatur zur Geschichte der letzten 300 Jahre, in Asia Major VI (1930), pp. 403-444. On its three editions see C. H. Peake, A comparison of the various editions of the Ch'ing-shih-kao, in TP XXXV (1940), pp. 354-363. I have used the first (Peking) edition.
the last to be written on the traditional pattern. Its monograph of Tibet, which forms ch. 525 (i.e. Fan-pu 番簿 ch. 8; the chüans are numbered throughout in the index, but not in the text), brings some material which is independent of the Shih-lu. As to the vast mass of information gathered together in its biographical section, the essentials of it have been rendered accessible by Hummel 1).

The Shêng-wu-chi too has been of some little use. I have also utilized the Chun-ko-érh-fang-lüeh in Haenisch's translation, and the Wei-tsang-t‘u-chih 衛藏圖識, as translated by Rockhill in the JRAS of 1891.

Another set of important sources is represented by the documents left by the Italian missionaries. The Jesuit Ippolito Desideri was in Lhasa from 1716 to 1721; his very important account was rather unsatisfactorily edited (along with five letters) by Puini 2) and translated in English by De Filippi 3). The records left by the Capuchin mission, which stayed in Lhasa in 1707-1711, 1716-1733, and 1741-1745, have been only partially explored and published. The book of the late Capuchin Father Clemente da Terzorio 4) is a useful contribution in this field, because, although absolutely uncritical, it is based on the unpublished documents preserved in the archives of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide. But many more documents in those amazingly rich archives still await publication, and some have been utilized here for the first time.

A last word about chronology. Chinese and Tibetan dates are here quoted by the Arabic number of the day, or by its cyclic name, followed by the Roman number of the moon; e.g. 17/IX or kuei-mao/IV. European dates are written out in full, e.g. November 13th. For Chinese dates the reduction has been made according to the tables of Father Hoang 5). In Tibetan dates we find sometimes the expression “Hor months”; it means Chinese moons, and they are treated accordingly. But even where the word Hor is absent,

1) In his useful biographical dictionary Eminent Chinese of the Ch‘ing Period (2 vols.), Washington 1944.
2) Il Tibet (geografia, storia, religione, costumi) secondo la relazione del viaggio del P. Ippolito Desideri (Memorie della Società Geografica Italiana, vol. X), Rome 1904.
4) In India e nel Tibet; missionari italiani nel paese dei Lama, 1704-1745, Rome 1932.
5) Concordance des chronologies néomeniques, chinois et européenne, Shanghai 1910.
there seems to be little or no difference from the Chinese dates. This can be shown to be true by frequent cross-checking of the Tibetan dates with those of the Chinese texts and of the accounts of the missionaries. An example may suffice. Father Cassiano Beligatti was present at, and describes in great detail, the festival of the New Year's day of the Iron-Bird year; it took place on February 16th, 1741. According to Hoang's tables, the Chinese New Year's day fell exactly on the same date. The Chinese accounts of the Tibetan calendar are short and not very clear; the difference seems to lay mainly in the systems of intercalation. All things considered, I think there is no great harm in treating Tibetan dates as identical with the Chinese; of course the possibility of an error of some days cannot be ruled out.

1) Magnaghi, Relazione inedita di un viaggio al Tibet del P. Cassiano Beligatti da Macerata, Florence 1902, p. 78.
CHAPTER TWO

LHA-BZAN KHAN, THE LAST QOŠOT RULER OF TIBET
(1705—1717)

The supremacy of the Dalai-Lamas over Lamaism, and their temporal power are due to the life work of one of the greatest men Tibet ever produced: the Fifth Dalai-Lama Nag-dbaṅ-blo-bzaṅ (1617-1682). He reached his goal through sheer diplomatic skill and the clever use of the services of Gušri Khan, the chieftain of the Mongol tribe of the Qošots. A' ter the successful conclusion of military operations against the last Tibetan ruler of gTsan (1642), Tibet was placed under a rather complicated form of government. Of course the Dalai-Lama had full religious powers, but he did not concern himself with actual administration. A strong and masterful personality like that of the Great Fifth did, it is true, exercise a powerful if indirect influence upon politics; but this was an exception. The true bearers of political power ought to have been Gušri Khan and his successors. But they were handicapped by the fact that they did not usually reside in Lhasa; they were true nomads and had their usual pasture-grounds in the land aDam 1). They roved there during the summer and came only in winter, though not always, to the capital, where they resided in the dGa'-ldan K'ана-gsar palace 2). These chiefs were in absolute control of the armed forces and everything connected with them; they were also the nominal heads of the civil government. But executive powers were delegated by them to a regent, or sde-srid, the Tisri of the Italian missionaries. At first he was a nominee of the Khan 3). But with the decay of Qošot power under

1) The valley of the Damchu to the south-east of the Tengri-nor. It is still inhabited by the southernmost Mongols, those of the aDam tribe.
3) Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, p. 67.
the weak successors of Gušri Khan, the Dalai-Lama succeeded in gaining influence upon the government. Since the seventies of the 17th century, the all-powerful man in Tibet was the Dalai-Lama’s natural son Saṅs-rgyas-rgya-mts’o, who in 1679 was formally appointed as sde-srid. This clever and energetic man governed Tibet with a strong hand 1), while the Fifth Dalai-Lama in his old age gradually retired into spiritual seclusion. After the Dalai-Lama’s death in 1682 the sde-srid did not actually conceal the event, which seems to have been widely known in Tibet; he also searched for and found the new incarnation, the Sixth Dalai-Lama Ts’aṅs-dbyaṅs-rgya-mts’o 2), and in 1696 even publicly installed him on the see. But till 1697 he avoided officially communicating the change to the court of Peking 3); a shortsighted policy which later gave the Chinese a welcome pretext for interference. The Dalai-Lama grew up as a gifted but high-living and dissolute youth, who has come down to history as one of the finest poets of Tibet, nay, as the only erotic poet of that country. In 1702 he even formally renounced his spiritual prerogatives, although still maintaining his temporal rights and his suzerainty over Tibet. The sde-srid was content with this situation, which promised to leave the reins of government in his hands for an indefinite time. But this curious sort of political equilibrium soon began to crumble. About 1700 a new prince, Lha-bzān Khan 4), succeeded to the rights and titles of the Qośot ruling family. He was, at least in his early years, an energetic man, who soon undertook to retrieve his position of honourable powerlessness. Casting about for support, he found a powerful friend in the Chinese emperor K’ang-hsi (1661-1722), the greatest ruler of the Manchu dynasty. K’ang-hsi, whose politics were then mainly directed against the young and rising kingdom of the Dzungars in the Ili valley, was becoming much interested in Tibetan affairs. This was not so much for strategic reasons (Tibet

---


2) A short biography of the Sixth Dalai-Lama, based mainly on Schulemann, Rockhill and Bell, can be found in Yū Tao-Ch’üan, *Love songs of the Sixth Dalai-Lama Ts’an-s-dbyaṅs-rgya-mts’o* (Academia Sinica Monograph A5), Peiping 1930, pp. 31-36.


4) Called by the missionaries Cinghis Khan, which title occurs also in ASTL, f. 227b (Jin-gir).
was, and has always been, a military backwater), but because of the religious relations between the Holy See of Lhasa and the Lamaist monarchy in Ili. The *sde-srid* had always been notoriously pro-Dzungar 1), and was known to have entered a compact with dGa'-ldan, ruler of the Dzungars from 1676 to 1697. If the Dzungars succeeded in drawing the Dalai-Lama to their side, this would seriously affect the loyalty of the Mongol princes, who occupied an important strategic position and supplied China with a considerable percentage of the troops serving on the Western frontier. K'ang-hsi was therefore eager to secure at the earliest opportunity some political influence in Tibet. To obtain this, it was only necessary to give a positive content, through diplomatic and military action, to the old moral supremacy over Tibet, which the Chinese emperor had enjoyed since the times of the Yüan dynasty. This religious-political incentive is the main spring of K'ang-hsi's actions, and from this angle we must view Chinese activity in the period under review.

Lha-bzaṅ Khan found thus that K'ang-hsi's ideas concurred with his own; backed by the friendship and moral support of the emperor, he took action. In the 6th month of 1705 he left the Nag-c'u region and marched on Lhasa with his army. Sañs-rgyas-rgya-mtš'o had gathered the Tibetan troops in the neighbourhood of Lhasa and tried to offer resistance, but was defeated and took refuge in the fort of sTod-luṅs sNaṅ-rtse 2). Surrounded there by Lha-bzaṅ Khan's troops, he was persuaded to surrender by a false order feigning to issue from the Dalai-Lama; he gave himself up, and on the 19/VII = September 6th, 1705, he was put to death. For the time being, one Nag-dbaṅ-rin-c'en was appointed as regent; but in the next year he too was killed by the order of Lha-bzaṅ Khan, who gathered all power in his hands 3).

As soon as the *sde-srid* had been eliminated, Lha-bzaṅ Khan sent a report of his action to the emperor. K'ang-hsi heartily approved

---

2) Naṅkartsse in the Tolung valley to the west of Lhasa.
3) This account of the end of the *sde-srid* is based on the biography (vol. K'ra of the collection) of the 48th K'ri Rin-po-'c'e Don-grub-rgya-mtš'o (b. 1665, on the see 1702-1709, d. 1727), f. 5b; on *ASTL*, ff. 223a-224b; on the Loṅ-ba'i-dmigs-bu, *sub annis* 1705 and 1706; and on Desideri, p. 148.
of it. He sent to Tibet the Manchu lieutenant-colonel 1) Hsi-chu 席柱 to convey to Lha-bzan Khan the title of I-fa-kung-shun-han 翔法恭順汗 (religious and devoted Khan), and to stiffen his back in the proposed action against the Dalai-Lama 2). But on this point K‘ang-hsi had to walk warily. He had reached the conclusion, to which he was forced chiefly by the general opinion of his court, that the Dalai-Lama was illegitimate and spurious. But, as he expressed himself to his council, “all the Mongols wholeheartedly obey the Dalai-Lama; although he is spurious, he still has the name of a Dalai-Lama and all the Mongols follow him”. Much caution was therefore needed if K‘ang-hsi wanted to avoid a conflagration in Mongolia and Kukunor. Lha-bzan Khan himself recommended prudence. The emperor had ordered the Dalai-Lama to be sent to Peking; but Lha-bzan Khan feared a strong reaction among the Tibet lamas, and begged that the proposed action be postponed. Nevertheless the emperor sent him through spyan-snia rDo-rje (Shang-nan-to-érh-chi 商南多爾濟), the chief lama of Hsining, positive orders to arrest the Dalai-Lama and to send him to the capital 3).

Lha-bzan Khan now had to comply; if he had at first demurred, it was for reasons of opportuneness, but he too was fully convinced of the necessity of eliminating the Dalai-Lama. He tried to carry out his task in a legal way. To this purpose he summoned a meeting of the leading churchmen, presided over by the K’ri Rin-po-c’ce Don-grub-rgya-mts’o, in order to obtain the disavowal of the unworthy Dalai-Lama as an incarnation of Avalokiteśvara. But the K’ri Rin-po-c’ce,

1) Hu-chün-ts‘an-ting 護軍參領. Cfr. Mayers, The Chinese government, Shanghai 1878, n. 398. Mayers is still the best manual available for Ch‘ing official nomenclature. Hoang’s Mélange sur l’administration, Shanghai 1902, adds little material of any importance. Brunnett & Hagelstrom, Present day political organisation of China, Shanghai 1912, gives only Mayers’s materials, completed and brought up to date according to the reforms of the last years of the dynasty, but is of not much use for early 18th century conditions. The Manchu titles are conveniently collected and studied in Nieh Ch‘ung-ch‘i 聶崇岐, Man-kuan han-shih 滿官漢釋 (Manchu official titles with Chinese explanations), in Yenching Journal of Chinese Studies, n. 32 (June 1947), pp. 97-116. A complete manual of 18th century Ch‘ing administration remains a desideratum.

2) Some members of the Chinese mission went to bKra-sis-lhun-po, where they were received by the Tashi-Lama in the 4th month of 1706. ASTL, f. 230a.

3) Shêng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 227, fl. 9a-b, 10a, 24a-25a. Ch‘ing-shih-kao, ch. 8 (Pên-chi 8), f. 6b, and ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 5a.
the great nobleman sTag-rtse-pa and the other members of the meeting decided that Ts'angs-dbyaṅs-rgya-mtṣ'o was the rightful Dalai-Lama; although shocked at his behaviour, they dared not depose him and limited themselves to a declaration that the spiritual enlightenment (bodhi) no longer dwelt in him. Lha-bzan did not succeed in persuading them to go beyond this. Nevertheless he decided to take action even on this doubtful response. On 1/V = June 11th, 1706, the Dalai-Lama was taken out of the Potala and brought to the Lha-klu dGa'-ts'al gardens near Lhasa 1). The Potala and the Lha-klu dGa'-ts'al were surrounded by Lha-bzan Khan's men. A large crowd, foremost among them the monks of the three great monasteries (dGa'-ldan, Se-ra and aBras-spunṣ), massed themselves round the gardens in order to see the Dalai-Lama; but they were driven back by the troops, who made use of their arms. On the 17/V = June 27th the Dalai-Lama was declared deposed. The Chinese envoy Hsi-chu intimated to him the imperial summons to Peking, and the Dalai-Lama started for his last journey on earth. He was followed by an infuriated crowd of monks, some of whom requested the K'ri Rin-po-č'e to place himself at their head. While they passed through Dam-ābag-glin-kca, not far from aBras-spunṣ, the crowd, which was now pressing too closely, was violently driven back by a Qōsot officer. This was the last straw. The mob, led by the monks of aBras-spunṣ, though unarmed, attacked the escort with sticks and stones, overpowered it, released the Dalai-Lama and brought him in triumph to his summer residence, the dGa'-ldan palace in aBras-spunṣ. On the next day, the monks summoned the state oracle (the gNas-c'uṅ C'os-skyon) and asked for a revelation about the Sixth Dalai-Lama. The C'os-skyon proclaimed that whoever denied that Ts'angs-dbyaṅs-rgya-mtṣ'o was the incarnation of the Great Fifth, was snared by devilish illusions. This oracle was greeted with great enthusiasm by the monks, who were ready to defend the Dalai-Lama to the last.

But on the next day (19/V = June 29th) the troops of Lha-bzan Khan advanced from the lCaṅ-bsruņs-k'caṅ house towards the dGa'-ldan palace, supported by artillery fire (me-skyogs). They surrounded the monastery, directed a hail of missiles on it, and

---

1) It is the Lhalu mansions, in the plain to the N.-W. of the Potala, which were the headquarters of the British mission in 1904. Waddell, p. 355.
prepared to set it on fire. The desperate resistance of the ill-armed monks, led by the K'ri Rin-po-che, was clearly useless. In order to avoid a general massacre, the Dalai-Lama came out of the palace with only a few companions, and after these had fallen fighting to the last man, he allowed himself to be taken by the Qoqots. Abraspuñs was nevertheless stormed and sacked. The Dalai-Lama was sent again on his journey to Peking, via Hsining, this time in charge of a Mongol officer in the Chinese service, the bičāči (writer) Padma. But on the way thither, he died near Kun-dga'-nor lake on the 10/X = November 14th, 1706. Popular rumour, preserved by the Italian missionaries, believed him to have been executed or murdered. But the official account, both Chinese and Tibetan, maintains that he died of illness, and I think there is no sufficient reason for doubting that this is true.

Having thus eliminated as spurious the Sixth Dalai-Lama, the consequence was that the true incarnation of the preceding Dalai-Lama, the Great Fifth, had still to be found. And accordingly Lha-bzan Khan presented as such a monk of the Icags-po-ri medical college in Lhasa, bearing the title of Pad-dkar-adzin-pa, who was born in 1686 at Ts’a-oroñ in K’ams and was rumoured to be Lha-bzan-Khan’s natural son. In 1707 the Pad-dkar-adzin-pa was installed on the see of Potala by the Tashi-Lama amidst a large gathering of high lamas, under the style of Nag-dbañ-ye-sës-rgya-mts’o.

4) On këng-hsu/XII = January 29th, 1707, the chief lama of Hsining reported to Peking that the spurious Dalai-Lama had been sent by Lha-bzan Khan to court, that he had arrived outside the frontier pass of Hsining and had died there of illness. The emperor ordered his corpse to be thrown away, a deliberate and deep insult which denied to the dead man the funeral honours befitting his rank. Shêng-tsü Shih-lü, ch. 227, f. 28b. Ch’iing-shik-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 5a.
5) *LSDL*, f. 11a. Re’u-mig (by Sum-pa mK’an-po, edited by S. Ch. Das in *JASB* 1889), p. 82. Same version in Giorgi, p. 252.
7) Loñ-ba’i-dmigs-bu, s.a. 1706. Da Terzorio, p. 146.
8) *ASTL*, f. 236a.
As was to be expected, the action of Lha-bzañ Khan provoked the strongest resentment among the Mongols, and all Kukunor was soon restless. The nobles there were mostly Qösots, belonging to the branch of the clan issued from Gušri Khan’s second son. It was thus a sort of clan affair, and they were keenly debating the question. The emperor did what he could to calm their apprehensions, supporting at the same time his ally Lha-bzañ Khan. Late in 1707 1) he sent the sub-chancellor of the Grand Secretariat 2) La-tu-hun 拉 都渾 to Tibet; he was to bring along with him the representatives of all the Kukunor chiefs, and to investigate the matter in their presence. Everything was done according to the emperor’s orders. Lha-bzañ Khan reported to La-tu-hun the particulars of the installation of the new Dalai-Lama. As this was not enough, in the 7th month of the following year La-tu-hun with the Kukunor chiefs went to bKra-šis-lhun-po and asked for the opinion of the Tashi-Lama 3); of course the second head of the Lamaist Church upheld the legitimacy of the man he had consecrated. Nevertheless, when the findings of this investigation were reported to the emperor, he did not at once draw the logical consequences from it; the fact was that the Kukunor princes had shown themselves bitterly hostile to Lha-bzañ Khan and his puppet. In 1709 K‘ang-hsi decided to delay the recognition of the Dalai-Lama till he was older, and in the meantime not to leave Lha-bzañ Khan alone in charge of Tibetan administration, but to send an imperial representative to supervise him. For this post he selected the vice-president 4) Ho-shou 赫 壽 5). His task was ‘to support


2) Nei-ko hsi̍t-hshih 內閣學士. Mayers, n. 143.

3) ASTL, f. 248b.


5) Chi-hai’ı = March 8th, 1709. Sheng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 236, ff. 17a-18b. Ch’ing-shih-kao, ch. 8 (Pên-chi 8), f. 8b. F. Amiot in Mémoires concernant les Chinois, XIV, 135; and in Eine chinesische Beschreibung von Tibet, p. 20. The biography of Ho-shou is found in the Man-chou-ming-ch’ıen-chuan 滿洲名臣傳, ch. 23, ff. 52a-57b. He was a Manchu of the Plain Yellow Banner. After his short stay in Tibet, he was posted in Kiangsi and was later employed in the Mongolian Superintendency (Li-fan-yuan), where he rose to be its president (shang-shu 尚 書, Mayers, n. 160). He died in October/November 1719.
Lha-bzañ Khan against the disaffected and to finish putting order among the lamas partisans of the sde-srid". Besides, he had another mission, of a quite different order. In 1708 emperor Kʻang-hsi had decided to have his huge empire mapped out, and had entrusted the task to the Jesuit missionaries of Peking, foremost among them Father J. B. Régis. Tibet was not included in their range of work; but the Chinese envoy to Lhasa had been ordered to have a map of Tibet drawn. He "had brought with him some people of his Secretariat, and during the more than two years that he passed in Tibet, he caused them to prepare the maps of all the countries immediately subject to the Dalai-Lama" 1). Upon Ho-shou's return to China, his sketches were presented to Father Régis (1711). They are at the basis of the four maps of Tibet (nn. 16-19) in the older set (in 28 sheets) of the Jesuit atlas of China 2).

The mission of Ho-shou was a first attempt to establish a sort of protectorate in Tibet. But the imperial envoy was not backed by Chinese troops in Lhasa, and was thus depending on the goodwill of Lha-bzañ Khan, in spite of his pompous official title of administrator of Tibetan affairs (kuan-li hsi-tsang shih-wu 管理西藏事务). Kʻang-hsi, always a realist, soon perceived that his scheme did not work, and boldly faced the consequences. On wu-yin/III = April 10th, 1710, he passed orders for the regular installation of the Dalai-Lama, granting him a sealed document of investiture 3). The imperial edict enjoined on all Tibetans obedience to the Dalai-Lama and to Lha-bzañ Khan. In return for this recognition and support, the Qošt Khan had to promise an annual tribute, which the Capuchin missionaries say to have been equivalent to 95,000 Roman scudi 4). A little afterwards (apparently at the beginning of 1711), Ho-shou went back to China. This unknown Manchu official chances to have an important place in history: he was the first Chinese resident in Tibet and at the same time he was the founder of the cartography of Tibet. But for the moment his post

4) Fr. Domenico da Fano's account in Da Terzorio, pp. 147-148.
was not filled again, and the residency of Lhasa was discontinued 1). Lha-bzan Khan was thus left supreme in Tibet.

So far, it seemed that everything had gone according to plan and that Lha-bzan Khan, with his puppet Dalai-Lama, was firmly established as the ruler of the Land of Snows. The country was now so safe, that in the years 1715-1717 the Jesuit cartographers of Peking, having found Ho-shou's materials unsatisfactory, could organize and carry out the great survey of Tibet through two lamas, whom they had trained in geometry and arithmetic 2). The results of this survey were embodied in the map of Tibet included in the great atlas of China presented to the emperor in 1718.

But the quiet and order were only apparent. The fact was that Lha-bzan Khan had made a grievous miscalculation in his church policy. Although the Sixth Dalai-Lama had not enjoyed much personal respect, the Tibetans, and above all the clergy, strongly resented any interference with the consecrated mode of succession. Ts'an-dbya-rgya-mtso, however unworthy, had still been the rightful Dalai-Lama. Lha-bzan Khan could impose his puppet on the lamas by force, but they would not accept him in their hearts as the divine incarnation of Avalokiteśvara. This state of latent tension was sharply increased when a report was heard at Lhasa that the incarnation of the Sixth Dalai-Lama had been found in Eastern Tibet, in accordance with a prophecy made by Ts'an-dbya-rgya-mtso himself.

bSod-nams-dar-rgyas (d. 1744), the father of this new incarnation, is an important figure in the history of this period, as he was for a long time the real power behind his infant son, till his influence was broken by the events in 1727/8. He was born at rGyal-mk'ar-rtse (Gyantse), and belonged to a family from Pcyon-rgyas, who were old retainers of the princes of Nañ-stod 3). A lusty strong man of about six feet and a half, very tall for a Tibetan 4), he became a

---

1) The Ch'ing-shih-kao characterizes accurately the event with the following words: "This therefore was the first time that in Tibet the office of resident was set up; but it was not a permanent institution"; ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 5b.
4) Thus he is described in 1741, when he was about seventy, by Father Cassiano Belgatti. Magnaghi, Relazione inedita, p. 78.
monk at aBras-spuš. Later he was sent by the administrator of that monastery to Li-t'ang in Eastern Tibet; according to the Capuchins, he was expelled from aBras-spuš because of his having relations with women. Anyhow, at Li-t'ang he turned layman and married Blo-bzan-c'os-ats'o, of the A-ži-ts'aṅ village ¹). A son was born to them on the 19/VII = September 3rd, 1708 ²), and the lamas of the local monastery ³) at once recognized him as the reincarnation of the deceased Dalai-Lama. The fame of this event spread very quickly, and soon two Mongol princes of Kukunor, Čingwang Bātur Taiji and Žunwang dGa'-ldan Ārdāni Ju-naṅ ⁴), agreed with the chieftain Ārdāni Ėaisang on the recognition of the boy as a qubilγan or incarnation ⁵). In the meantime Lha-bzan Khan had sent some officers to make enquiries at Li-t'ang. Although the state oracle of Lhasa, the gNas-c'uṅ C'os-skyoṅ, had already recognized the new incarnation, these officers declared him to be a fraud ⁶).

Lha-bzan Khan seems at first to have taken the matter lightly; but in the next years it became apparent that the boy was gaining more and more ground, chiefly among the Mongol tribes. Lha-bzan Khan sent again two envoys to Li-t'aṅ. When the parents of the boy heard of their coming, they grew uneasy of Lha-bzan Khan's intentions, and on the 4/I = February 17th, 1714, they left for sDe-dge (Derge) monastery ⁷). They reached it in safety, under the protection of sDe-dge troops and of Mongol tribesmen. Though the boy was in safety there, it was a makeshift arrangement which could not last. Accordingly, Žunwang dGa'-ldan Ārdāni Ju-naṅ summoned a meeting of the Mongol chiefs of Kukunor to discuss the matter. Although the Žunwang pressed for direct action against Lha-bzan Khan ⁸), the assembly merely decided to offer their protection to the qubilγan, and to apply to the Chinese emperor

1) LSDL, ff. 13a-15a.  
2) According to the Wei-tsang-t'u-chih, in JRAS 1891, p. 41, the Dalai-Lama's birth-place was the hamlet of Ch'a-ma-chung near Li-t'ang.  
4) These were apparently the Bathor Tacy and Amdomba (= A-mdo-ba) of Giorgi, pp. 332-333.  
5) LSDL, f. 17a-b.  
6) LSDL, f. 18a-b.  
7) LSDL, f. 20a.  
8) Giorgi, p. 333.
The boy journeyed to mTs'o-k'a, i.e. the Kukunor region 2), where he was enthusiastically received and fêted by the Mongols. But the second part of the programme failed. When the memorial of the Mongol chiefs was received at Peking, the first reaction of the emperor was an order to send the new qubîlîyan to the capital, so that His Majesty could examine him personally. In 1712, as soon as the rumours about the new incarnation reached Peking, the emperor had sent to bKra-sis-lhun-po a mission headed by the Jasak Lama dGe-legs-c'os-ap'el 3). Their task was to ascertain whether the Tashi-Lama acknowledged or not the legitimacy of the new incarnation. The Mongol chiefs, loth to part with the boy, asked for a delay; it was granted, the qubîlîyan being in the meantime directed to stay in a monastery inside the frontier pass of Hsining. When the imperial messenger came back from Tibet, he brought the Tashi-Lama's disavowal of the boy. Thereupon Daičing Qošůči 4) (Qosiγuči, Ho-shuo-ch'i) and other chiefs applied to the emperor for permission to travel to Tibet to discuss the matter with the Tashi-Lama. But K'ang-hsi would hear nothing more of this troublesome matter. On hsin-wei/IV = May 8th, 1715, he ordered the guards officer 5) Ačitu 阿齊圖 (in the LSDL: A-c'i-t'u K'i-yā) to assemble the Kukunor chiefs and to intimate to them the imperial will: the new qubîlîyan was to be sent to the Hung-shan 紅山 (dMar-po-ri?) monastery near Hsining, to reside there 6). K'ang-hsi had thus decided to keep under his hand the new incarnate, even though he was not ready to recognize him as such. Probably he thought it better to have a reserve pawn in the game, in case Lha-bzañ should fail to impose his puppet on the clergy of Tibet.

The imperial order was badly received by a great part of the Kukunor chiefs. They declared to Ačitu that the new qubîlîyan

---

1) LSDL, f. 22a. We know from Tibetan sources that an invasion from Kukunor was seriously apprehended in Lhasa, and that military precautions were taken on the north-eastern frontier; MBTJ, ff. 90a-91b.
2) Loň-ba'i-dmigs-bu, s.a. 1720.
3) ASTL, f. 263a.
4) On the title qošůči (qosiγuči), meaning chief of a qosiγun-otoq (pasturage and military division), see Vladimirtsov, Le régime social des mongols, Paris 1948, p. 179.
was still too young and had not yet had the smallpox, and that therefore it was inadvisable to make him travel in that year 1). The ferment among the chiefs mounted so high that early in 1716 the emperor was compelled to take some military precautions 2). At the same time the Tashi-Lama sent a mission to conciliate the differences in Kukunor, which reacted unfavourably on the financial situation of the great Tibetan monasteries; the unrest among the Kukunor chiefs and their hostility against Lha-bzan Khan had caused a slackening of the steady flow of donatives which the Tibetan monasteries used to receive from Mongolia 3). The diplomacy of the Tashi-Lama and the firmness of the emperor soon produced their effect. The Kukunor chiefs saw reason and yielded with a good grace, begging only that the qubil-yän be allowed to reside in the great monastery of sKu-ǝbum (Kumbum), the birth place of gTsön-k’a-pa. The request was granted, and on 15/III = April 18th the boy, who was still waiting in mTs’o-k’a, received the imperial order to betake himself to sKu-ǝbum 4). He arrived there in the 7th month (August) of 1715. His father did not lose time there. He cultivated good relations with the Mongol commanders in the Chinese army watching the border against the Dsungars, and started friendships with Tibetan grandees coming there from various parts of Tibet 5).

The presence of the new pretender at Hsining under what amounted to Chinese protection was a definite setback for Lha-bzan Khan. Imperial support, it is true, did not fail him to the end. As late as the beginning of May 1717, shortly therefore the storm broke out, three imperial envoys with their suite had arrived in Lhasa. This mission is mentioned by Desideri 6) and by the Capuchins 7), and is probably identical with the geographical mission

---

1) Information received on hsin-yu/IX = October 25th, 1715. Shêng-tsû Shih-lu, ch. 265, f. 13a-b.
2) jên-wu/XII = January 14th, 1716. Shêng-tsû Shih-lu, ch. 266, ff. 17a-18a.
3) ASTL, ff. 274b-275a.
5) LSDL, ff. 28a and 30a.
7) Letters of Fr. Domenico da Fano dated Lhasa, May 23rd and June 26th, 1717; Ser. Congregaz., vol. 610, ff. 410a and 378a. Desideri and the Capuchins were earnestly requested, nay pressed, by the Chinese to proceed with them to Peking, but refused. Lha-bzan Khan left them free in their decisions, although the Chinese envoy asked him to employ his authority in order to obtain the assent of the missionaries.
sent out by the emperor in 1717 under the command of the secretary of the Mongolian Superintendency Şengju (Shêng-chu 胜主): they had orders to procure more detailed geographical information on Tibet (determination of coordinates and of the altitude of the chief mountains). The mission seems to have had no political importance, and is not mentioned in the Shih-lu and in ASTL. It remained in Lhasa during the first months of the Dsungar war and cooperated in the hasty strengthening of the walls of Lhasa 1). But they left prior to the fall of the city and reached safely Peking 2) with their cartographic material. The latter was employed for the new maps of Tibet in the second woodprint set of the Jesuit atlas (in 32 sheets), published in 1721 3). To them is also due the first draft of the description of Tibet in the Ta-ch'ing i-t'ung-chih 大清一統志 (General Geography of the Ch'ing Empire) 4).

But Chinese support, however strong, could not balance an ecclesiastical policy that was completely wrong. Beside his ill-starred interference with the see of Lhasa, Lha-bzan Khan was perhaps also showing too much attention to the Italian missionaries, and countenanced, or appeared to countenance, their oral and written polemics against Lamaism. Most probably the accounts of the missionaries are over-sanguine on this score, and Lha-bzan Khan, with true Mongol tolerance, did nothing more than interest himself in the peculiar theories and way of life of these foreigners 5).

1) Desideri, p. 155.
2) In 1718 the gave to the Manchu commander Erentei a report on the events in qDam; Haenisch, pp. 218-219.
4) Fr. Amiot in Mémoires concernant les Chinois, XIV, 154-155, and in Eine chinesische Beschreibung von Tibet, p. 28.
5) Lhasa was then open to all traffic with the south. Not only the missionaries had found no difficulty in establishing themselves there, but in 1717 there arrived in Lhasa a Frenchman, the first European layman who set foot in the holy city. But of this pioneer (evidently a trader) we do not know even the name. All that we have is a stray reference in a letter of Fr. Domenico da Fano dated Lhasa, April 25th, 1717 (Scr. Congregaz., vol. 616, f. 376a): "I do not know whether the news is true which I hear from a Frenchman who has arrived in these parts and who has been at Patna for some time, and then has gone to Nepal, and thence has come to Lhasa, without bringing me a single line from the Capuchin Fathers; he excused himself by saying that he had had no intention to make this journey. But he tells me that the yearly remittances from Rome have not arrived" (Non so se sia vera la novella che intendo da un francese capitato in queste parti, il quale è stato in Patna qualche tempo, poi è andato a Nekpal e di là è venuto a Lhasa, senza portarmi neppure un verso de' PP., scusandosi di non havere avuta intensione di fare questo cammino. Egli però mi assicurò non essere venute le annate da Roma). And again (f. 377b): "This Frenchman tells me that in
But it is not to be excluded that this too contributed to make him thoroughly hated by the lamas. And slowly it became apparent that the powerful influence of the clergy was undermining Lha-bzañ Khan’s seemingly unassailable position.

The other political factor in Tibetan history, the aristocracy, had always stood for an independent Tibet dominated by the nobles. They could not but be hostile to Lha-bzañ Khan’s personal rule under Chinese protectorate, a regime which excluded them from the highest offices in the state. Over and above this, inspite of the jealousy felt by the aristocracy towards the clergy, Lha-bzañ Khan’s hostility to the rightful Dalai-Lama was too much even for the nobles, who became either lukewarm or downright hostile. There were of course some notable exceptions; several nobles still held full loyalty to Lha-bzañ Khan. Among them was a young man of great promise, whose future career was to contribute a great deal towards shaping the history of Tibet in the coming years: bSod-nams-stobs-rgyas of P’o-lha. It is therefore not out of place to give here a short sketch of his life before 1717.

His father Padma-rgyal-po had been a general under the Lhasa government and had fought in the Ladakh war of 1681-1683 1). He was afterward governor of gNa-nañ 2), and fought against the Bhutanese and the Nepalese 3). He then married sGrol-ma-bu-k’rid of sTag-luñ sMan-dañ, and was granted the estate of P’o-lha in gTsañ 4). Shortly afterwards (1689) a son was born to him and was called bSod-nams-stobs-rgyas. In 1697 the boy came to Lhasa for the first time with his father and was introduced to the sde-srid 5). He grew up in P’o-lha, in close relations (as was fitting for a gTsañ noble) with his neighbour and spiritual superior, the

---

1) On which see my article The Tibetan-Ladakhi-Moghul war of 1681-1683, in IHQ XXIII (1947), pp. 169-199.
3) MBTJ, ff. 25a-26a.
4) Not found on the maps. It is in the hills to the west of the Nañ-c’u, due west of Gyan-tse. S. Ch. Das, Journey to Lhasa and Central Tibet, London 1904, p. 101; Vasiljev, p. 19, where Sarñ-nañ is to be corrected into Srad-nañ.
5) MBTJ, f. 43a.
Tashi-Lama. He took then a course of studies in the sMin-sgrol-gliṅ monastery 1). About 1707 he married the daughter of bSam-grub-gliṅ-pa, the commander of the Ńaṅ troops 2). Shortly after a nobleman from Kukunor called Ts’e-brtan-rgyal, who had come to bKra-sis-lhun-po in pilgrimage, took a fancy to him, brought him to Lhasa and introduced him to Lha-bzaṅ Khan 3). This was the beginning of a brilliant career. First of all, Lha-bzaṅ Khan confirmed him in his chiefship (his father had died early) and granted him extensive estates in gTsan 4). At the end of 1707 he was present at the reception in Lhasa of the Kukunor princes accompanying the Chinese envoy La-tu-hun 5). Shortly afterwards he received a minor post (bičäči, writer) in the account department (rtsis-k’äń); it was there that he obtained a thorough training in revenue work and administration under the supervision of the governor (bya-pa-gžis-gñer) of the capital 6). After a while, he was appointed district magistrate (k’rims-kyi-k’a-lo-pha) at Gyantse, the headquarters of Ńaṅ 7). When (perhaps in 1714) a conflict was apprehended with DaiČing Qośüči and the Kukunor chiefs, he assembled troops for Lha-bzaṅ Khan and led them to the banks of the Nag-c’u (Kara-usu). There he succeeded in taking prisoner UiČing Taiji, the chief of Hor-k’a-gži, who had rebelled in the vain hope of support by the Kukunor chiefs 8). Having returned from this small expedition, he seized by force the castle of Rin-c’en-rtse in gTsan, on which he claimed old rights. This seizure nearly provoked a conflict with Sikkim, but Lha-bzaṅ Khan supported him and eventually the castle remained in his possession 9). In the war against Bhutan, which will be narrated below, P’o-lha-nas took an important part. His brilliant conduct in that unfortunate campaign drew upon him the attention of Lha-bzaṅ Khan, who suitably rewarded his zeal (with robes of honour etc.) and enrolled him among his personal attendants. In spite of his youth, P’o-lha-nas had thus rapidly risen to be one of the best and most trusted adjutants (gsel-yig-pa-c’en-po) of Lha-bzaṅ Khan, to whom he

---

1) Index (dkar-c’ag) to the bKa’-’agyu of sNar-t’ań, ff. 32b-33a.
2) MBTJ, ff. 71b-76b. 3) MBTJ, ff. 80a-81a.
4) MBTJ, ff. 81b-82a. 5) MBTJ, ff. 85a.
6) MBTJ, ff. 87b-88a; Index (dkar-c’ag) to the bKa’-’agyu of sNar-t’ań, f. 33a.
7) MBTJ, f. 88a. 8) MBTJ, ff. 90a-92a.
9) MBTJ, ff. 93b-94a. Rin-c’en-rtse is on the Srad-c’u (Rhechu or Shapchu), to the south-west of Shigatse.
was very devoted and of whom he spoke with affection even a long time after the tragic death of the Qo'sot ruler.

P'o-lha-nas's career is fairly representative of the conduct of the gTsan nobility, who as a whole seem to have been favourable to Lha-bzañ Khan. But among the aristocracy of dBu's opposition was as strong as it was among the clergy.

On the other hand, the foreign policy of Lha-bzañ Khan was not so uniformly successful as to produce a lasting impression in the country. In his dealings with the Chinese emperor there was nothing to be proud of. The only independent enterprise of Lha-bzañ Khan was his Bhutanese war, and it was apparently no unqualified success. This we shall now proceed to narrate. Besides some stray references in the Chinese texts, our only source is the MBTJ; but its author is so intent in extolling the deeds of his hero, that we gain not much insight in the motives of the war, and still less in its outcome.

The war began in 1714 after a threatening exchange of letters between Lha-bzañ Khan and the Bhutanese ruler, whose name is not mentioned in the text. Lha-bzañ Khan organized his invasion army in three divisions. On the west, he led in person a division on the road to P'a-gro (Paro in Western Bhutan). In the centre, another division was sent towards the Bum-t'añ valley 1) under the command of Ärkä Daičing. Farthest to the east there was a third division under Baring Taiji and other commanders. In the centre division, general Ärkä Daičing commanded personally the centre brigade. Under him served aBum-t'añ pa as commander of the left wing and P'o-lha-nas as commander of the right wing. Thus it happens that while we are fully informed about the movements of the Bum-t'añ force, we do not get even a glimpse of the action of the other divisions.

The advance of the second division began under happy omens. Descending the Bum-t'añ valley, its right wing under P'o-lha-nas attacked and stormed a stockade at Šiin-sgo-ltag-gyön. Continuing to advance, the invaders came up against the strongly fortified castle of Bya-dkar 2). P'o-lha-nas, remembering the experience of his father in the Ladakhi war, advised against an attempt at

1) Pumthang of the maps; in Eastern Bhutan.
2) Chaka-dsong of the maps, Bya-gha of White, Sikkim and Bhutan, London 1909; to the east of Tongsa.
taking the castle by storm. The advice of the young officer remained unheeded, with the result that the assault was bloodily repulsed. The division then sat down before the castle, firmly occupying the surrounding strip of land.

But at this time there arrived a letter from Lha-bzaṅ Khan, ordering the withdrawal of the division. We do not know the reason for this, but it is only too easy to suppose that Lha-bzaṅ Khan had not been successful on his front, and that his retreat entailed that of the other divisions. Of course such a move in the face of the enemy was fraught with great dangers. As soon as the invader moved away, the Bhutanese crowded on their flanks and rear, trying to cut off a part of the Tibetan forces. The rear-guard under ạBum-t’aṅ-pa had a difficult stand, and P’o-lha-nas was ordered to come to their rescue. The dashing young officer carried away his and ạBum-t’aṅ-pa’s men with his example, and this surprise counterattack succeeded in scattering the enemy, who fled headlong as far back as Bya-dkar. After this the retreat was no longer hampered, and six days later the Tibetan border was reached at Mon-la-dkar-c‘uṅ 1). The campaign was over and the army was disbanded. While the other two commanders of his division went straight to Lhasa, P’o-lha-nas travelled to Ňaṅ-stod, where he met Lha-bzaṅ Khan; they went together to pay homage to the Tashi-Lama at bKra-sis-lhun-po; then they returned to the capital2).

Although we do not know the terms of peace (if any was concluded), it is certain that the war had been a failure, or at the very best a draw. This lame result of Lha-bzaṅ Khan’s only great campaign, coupled with the hostility of the clergy and of the dBus aristocracy, was not suited for establishing more firmly his insecure position.

At the beginning of 1717 the situation in Tibet was rather uneasy. The natural trend of events pointed towards an increasing interference of China in Tibetan affairs. But this development was abruptly interrupted by an unexpected event: the Dsungar invasion.

---

1) Monlakachung pass of the maps, at the head of the Punthang valley.
2) MBTJ, ff. 101a-111a. ASTL, ff. 268b-269a.
CHAPTER THREE

THE DSUNGAR INVASION OF 1717

Chinese foreign policy for nearly seventy years (1690-1758) was dominated by the tenacious struggle with the last of the nomad empires of Central Asia, that of the Lamaistic Mongol tribe of the Dsungars. This imposing conflict has been the object of detailed study by Courant in his fine book already quoted, to which I beg to refer for the events of the main campaigns outside the Tibetan theatre of operations ¹). In 1715 open war had broken out again, and each side was spying on the other for a chance to secure strategical advantages for the impending decisive struggle. We are not informed as to how the Tibetan expedition came to be decided on in the councils of Ts'ê-dbañ-rab-brtan, the king of the Dsungars (1697-1727) ²). The ostensible reason was the desire to avenge the death of the sde-srid ³). But the real motives are obvious enough. Ts'ê-dbañ-rab-brtan could not but view with the gravest concern the extension of Chinese influence over Tibet, through the alliance with Lha-bzan Khan and the possession of such a reserve pawn in the game, as represented by the rightful Dalai-Lama. It was of the highest importance for the Dsungars to secure influence over Tibet, not so much on strategical grounds, for that road led nowhere, as because of religious-political reasons. The man who ruled over

---

¹) A good summary can also be found in Grousset, L'empire des steppes, Paris 1941, pp. 605-622.
²) In Rome there are no Mongol texts available which could give an account of these events from the Dsungar point of view. The only source of this kind which I could utilize was the account of the Russian officer Ivan Unkovskij, who in 1722-1724 stayed at the Dsungar court as the envoy of emperor Peter I. His account was edited by Veselovskij, Posol'stvo k Zjungarskomu khun-taiži Tsevan rabtanu kapitana ot artillerii Ivana Unkovskago, in Zapiski Imp. Russ. Geogr. Obščestva, po otdeleniju etnografii X/2 (1887).
³) Fr. Amiot in Mémoires concernant les Chinois, XIV, 134, and in Eine chinesische Beschreibung von Tibet, p. 20.
Tibet in harmony with the lamas was sure to have at his disposal the influence of the Lamaist church, a great factor of power in the Mongol world. As things then stood in Tibet, the only manner in which Dsungar intervention could be attempted with a fair hope of proving acceptable to the Tibetans, was to present it as a restoration of the rightful Dalai-Lama. As he was in the hands of the Chinese, it implied of course also the necessity of a raid to Sku-\textsuperscript{b}ubum, to rescue him and bring him to the Dsungar camp. It was a risky undertaking, but it was worth trying.

The Dsungar expedition was planned a long time beforehand, because the diplomatic preparations were careful and elaborate. Ts\textsuperscript{e}-dba\text{\-}n-rab-brtan did all he could to lull Lha-bz\text{\-}an Khan into a false sense of security. The best means for this purpose was, as so often happened in old Asia, a matrimonial alliance. Ts\textsuperscript{e}-dba\text{\-}n offered his daughter Boitalaq in marriage to dGa\textsuperscript{\text{-}}ldan-bstan-\text{\-}adsin, the eldest son of Lha-bz\text{\-}an Khan, with a dowry of 100,000 silver ounces; but he insisted on the wedding taking place in his territory. Lha-bz\text{\-}an Khan, on receiving Ts\textsuperscript{e}-dba\text{\-}n-rab-brtan's letter, was suspicious and demurred for a long time. But he was finally overruled by his son, who even threatened suicide if not allowed to leave for Ili. Lha-bz\text{\-}an Khan had to let him go with a retinue of 300 men. At the same time he sent his second son Surya with 600 men to the Kukunor region in order to ease possible diffidences on the part of the Chinese; Surya's presence near their frontier was to serve as a token of good faith to them. The marriage took place in 1714. I may add here that the unfortunate prince was put to death by Ts\textsuperscript{e}-dba\text{\-}n-rab-brtan in 1717, as soon as his usefulness as a decoy for Lha-bz\text{\-}an Khan was at an end.

At the same time the Dsungar ruler requested and obtained from his new relative a sum of money (30,000 scudi according to the

---

1) *MBTJ*, ff. 115a-116b. Cfr. *Shêng-ts\text{\-}tu Shih\text{-}lu*, ch. 259, ff. 4b-5b. The Lama surveyors of 1716/7 found prince Surya encamped to the east of Kukunor lake; his camp is marked there in sheet 9 of the Jesuit atlas, as reproduced by Fuchs.

2) The emperor received the news on *i-hai*/VI = July 16th, 1714. Of course he was displeased by the event, and with his usual sharp judgement he foresaw that the Dsungar ruler would detain Lha-bz\text{\-}an Khan's son for several years, and that there was trouble in store for his old friend, for which he had only himself to blame. K\text{\-}ang-hsi knew also that, should anything happen to Lha-bz\text{\-}an Khan, he could not be succoured in time, because the distance was too great. But, as the emperor sadly concluded, he was powerless against Lha-bz\text{\-}an Khan's folly and blindness for the dangers ahead. *Shêng-ts\text{\-}tu Shih\text{-}lu*, ch. 259, ff. 4b-5a.
Capuchins) and 800 soldiers to serve him in his wars 1). I think it is not often that a ruler succeeds in making his intended enemy pay the war expenses in advance!

Another measure taken by the Dsungar king was to place himself in correspondence with the lamas of the three great monasteries of Se-ra, aBras-spuñs and dGa'-ldan. He disclosed to them his intention to crush Lha-bzañ Khan and to restore the rightful Dalai-Lama to his see. He got an enthusiastic support from these seats of Lamaistic learning. The move was very clever; the king was ranging on his side the full-hearted support of what was, for all practical purposes, the public opinion of Tibet. The lamas in their turn by persuasion or bribe won over to the Dsungar cause some of the ministers and retainers of Lha-bzañ Khan. Besides, they secretly sent to Ts‘e-dbañ-rab-brtan, in small batches, a good number of their younger, stronger, and more warlike monks. These hardy mountaineers, fully familiar with the country and hardened to the strain of marching in the desert highlands of north-western Tibet, formed a welcome addition to the Dsungar expeditionary force 2).

After these diplomatic preparations, came the military organization. The expeditionary force numbered 6000 men, and their leader was no less a man than Ts‘e-rin-don-grub, the brother of the king and the second man in the realm 3). Under him served gDugs-dkar, aJe-sañs (or Sañs-rgyas) and two other generals 4). His base was Khotan; from there he intended to march through north-western Tibet to the neighbourhood of Nag-c‘u-k‘a, where he hoped to surprise Lha-bzañ Khan, unaware in his summer resort. At the same time a smaller body of troops (we do not know under whom) was sent through Eastern Turkestan to sKu-ñbum; its task was to surprise the monastery and to carry away the Dalai-Lama. The two

1) Letter of Fr. Domenico da Fano, dated Lhasa, May 29th, 1718. Scr. Congregaz., vol. 625, ff. 121-122; another copy of the same (they were always despatched in duplicate or triplicate), ibid., f. 407.

2) Desideri, p. 153. The Jesuit Father was in a condition to know these things better than anybody else, because at that time he was residing in the Ra-mo-c‘e monastery in Lhasa and at Se-ra; besides, he had no axe to grind when he wrote his account. Tibetan authors are nearly all of them anti-Dsungar (the one exception is Sum-pa mK‘an-po), both because of the odious behaviour of the Dsungar in Lhasa and because of Chinese influence. They do not like to speak of the help which the Dsungar found in Tibet.

3) Even after his failure in Tibet, he was still found by Unkovskij to be the most important man in Dsungaria, though on cool terms with the king.

4) dPag-bsam-lion-bzañ, p. 304; ASTL, f. 284a. These are the Dugar Sanduk and Sanji of Haenisch’s Manchu text.
divisions were then to meet at Nag-c‘u-k‘a, to escort the Dalai-Lama to Lhasa, and to establish him there as the protegee of the Dsungars. In order to screen, as long as possible, the movement from the watchful eyes of the Chinese, the Dsungars spread the rumour that the Khotan army had been sent out to help Lha-bzañ Khan in his (long since finished) war against Bhutan 1).

Ts‘e-riñ-don-grub started for Tibet in the 11th month (December 1716-January 1717) 2). The Dsungar army travelled over a most difficult route, which was later reopened for traffic with Sinkiang by the emperor Ch‘ien-lung, but is now completely forgotten. As it is, on the average, perhaps the highest route in the world and leads over absolutely barren regions, the difficulty and hardships of such a journey can be easily imagined 3).

After the departure of his son, Lha-bzañ Khan had gone to the thermal springs (sman-gyi-c‘u-bo) in ʻOl-k‘a for a bathing cure 4). But there some of his councillors began to grow suspicious (as usual in Tibetan texts these suspicions are couched in terms of dreams and visions); earlier Chinese warnings came back to their minds, and on their advice Lha-bzañ Khan returned to Lhasa. And indeed, the alarm came immediately afterwards. bSod-nams-rgyal-po of K‘aṅ-c‘en in Šaṅs 5) was the chief minister of Lha-bzañ Khan; at the same time he was also holding the governorship of mNa‘-ris sKor-gsum (Western Tibet). He got news of the Dsungar expedition, probably from the trade caravans, and wrote to Lha-bzañ Khan as follows: “Reports following one after the other from Yarkand have reached our ears to the effect that a Dsungar force of 5000 men has left that country and is advancing towards mNa‘-ris. As we cannot know whether they are enemies or friends, I have mobilised the mNa‘-ris contingent and am marching to the border of the badlands (sa-ňan). Kindly send me orders” 6). Lha-bzañ Khan’s officers and courtiers were at first

1) Shêng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 273, f. 8a.
2) According to a report to the emperor by the Manchu general Funingga in Kansu. Haenisch, pp. 208-209 (= Shêng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 273, f. 25b).
4) MBTJ, f. 116b.
5) He is called by various titles in the Tibetan sources; in his last years nearly always he is styled Daśing Bâtür. I prefer to call him K‘aṅ-c‘en-nas, also because of the Chinese transliteration K‘ang-chi-nai 康濟薊.
6) MBTJ, f. 117a.
incredulous of such a treachery on the part of Lha-bzaṅ Khan's new relation. But they were soon undeceived. K‘aṅ-c‘en-nas's information was quite correct, except for the direction taken by the Dsungar troops, who only skirted mNa‘-ris without entering it. A little later Lha-bzaṅ Khan was startled by the news that "a Dsungar army numbering 6000, passing through paths which were unknown till now, has suddenly arrived in Nag-ts‘aṅ¹), proclaiming themselves to be the escort of the returning son of Lha-bzaṅ Khan, and have quartered themselves upon the trusting and misled population, who provide them with supplies)".

The mask was off. Though a tactical surprise had been impossible because of the enormous distances to be crossed, the strategical surprise was complete. Lha-bzaṅ Khan had been caught entirely unprepared. He was by now an easy-going old man addicted to drink; he tried to rise to the occasion, but though he could fight and die like a hero, all his dispositions during this campaign display a lamentable lack of forethought and decision. He had just arrived at his favourite pastures in aDam (June 1717)²). His second son Surya was just back from Kukunor, where he had married a girl of a princely family, and was celebrating the wedding in the company of his father. As soon as Lha-bzaṅ Khan heard the news, he sent a party under a Mongol called Ašita, to reconnoitre and to discover the intentions of the newcomers. On the banks of the gNam-mts‘o (Tengri-nor), Ašita had a brush with Dsungar advanced units, and was able to ascertain and to report to Lha-bzaṅ Khan that a large hostile army was before them. Lha-bzaṅ Khan ordered P‘o-lha-nas to issue immediately written orders for the mobilization of the levies of dBus and gTsan and to go down to Lhasa to organize them. P‘o-lha-nas carried out his task very quickly and was able to join again Lha-bzaṅ Khan in a short time. The Tibetan troops, infantry and cavalry, assembled with remarkable swiftness and were soon concentrated in aDam²). Along with these military preparations,

¹) The region of the lakes to the west and north-west of the Tengri-nor.
²) MBTJ, f. 117b.
³) Desideri, p. 154. The above quoted letter of Fr. Domenico da Fano of June 26th, 1717. Desideri's account more or less agrees with the MBTJ's narrative. According to him Lha-bzaṅ Khan went to aDam believing the false report of his son's return. While engaged in preparations for the feasts, he was warned of the impending surprise by his younger son arriving in all haste from Kukunor. — Nearly the same account was current among the Dsungar. Unkovskij, p. 191.
⁴) MBTJ, f. 118a.
Lha-bzan Khan wrote to his friend the Chinese emperor, informing him that the Dsungar army had arrived in Tibet on 4/VII = August 10th, 1717, after having pillaged the Po-mu-pao clans in Nag-ts‘aṅ, and that Ts‘e-rin-don-grub was advancing against him 1). Incomprehensibly, he did not apply for help, and even left the emperor in uncertainty about his real intentions towards the Dsungars. I shall relate later the measures taken by the Chinese; but even if Lha-bzan Khan had applied at once for Chinese intervention, events moved too swiftly; when Lha-bzan Khan’s letter reached the emperor after a long delay during the 2nd month (March) of 1718, its sender had already been dead about three months. At the same time Lha-bzan Khan tried to shield himself behind, or at least to obtain the mediation of the head of the Church; not his discredited puppet, but the revered and respected Tashi-Lama. He summoned him to his headquarters in ṇa Dam, where he was to try the possibility of negotiations 2).

The Dsungars had not been able to follow up their initial advantage. They needed a short spell of rest after their terrible march through Byan-t‘aṅ. They had suffered serious losses from the hardships of the journey, and had arrived in Nag-ts‘aṅ in a state of complete exhaustion 3). Nevertheless Lha-bzan Khan’s position was worse than theirs. His own Qōsots seem to have been little more than a handful of men 4). What Tibetan troops had been able to join him in a desperate hurry (among others, those sent by the Tashi-Lama 5), were, it is true, fairly numerous 6); but they were not to be trusted beyond a certain point, owing to the avowed hostility of the lamas to Lha-bzan Khan. Only superior generalship would have equalized the chances; and this was sadly lacking with Lha-bzan Khan.

P‘o-lha-nas, with a clever appraisal of the situation, had selected a strong defensive position: a mountain called K‘u-ādus, dominating

---

1) Haenisch, p. 211 (= Shêng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 273, f. 23a-b). According to the ASTL, f. 277b, they arrived in Nag-ts‘aṅ on 10/VII = August 16th.
2) ASTL, f. 287a-b.
4) The army with which in 1705 Lha-bzan Khan marched on Lhasa included only 500 Mongol soldiers. dPag-bsam-ljon-bzan, p. 165.
5) ASTL, f. 278a-b.
6) The Jesuit Fathers in China calculated Lha-bzan Khan’s army at 20,000; Du Halde, IV, 464. This number seems rather exaggerated.
the countryside and easily defended by a few men. He suggested to Lha-bzañ Khan that a company of matchlockmen should occupy the Ku-udus. But he found himself opposed by the Äkä Taiji, Lha-bzañ Khan's father-in-law, an old Mongol who belittled these new-fangled ideas and insisted on the time-honoured manner of Mongol cavalry fighting in the plain. The other members of Lha-bzañ Khan's council ranged themselves on his side 1). Nevertheless P'o-lha-nas's advice was sound. Lha-bzañ Khan, whose army consisted for the greater part of Tibetan infantry, was hopelessly outclassed in the cavalry. A strong defensive position would give him a chance to use his slow-firing matchlockmen with advantage against the Dzungar cavalry, which was still very poorly provided with fire-arms; the Chinese had done so with brilliant success at Gio-modo in 1696. The Swede Renat had begun his activity as gunmaker and cannon-founder with the Dzungars in 1716 only 2), so that we may infer that Ts'e-riñ-don-grub's army was still armed for the greater part in the traditional fashion. But Lha-bzañ Khan was not a great leader; he wavered and put off his decision till the Dzungars advanced towards ḡDam and occupied the Ku-udus, while the Qōsots remained encamped in their beloved pastures; as bad a situation as could be imagined for an army reduced to the defensive 3).

A council was finally assembled, and decided to accept battle. P'o-lha-nas was in charge of a Tibetan division. The fighting opened with a general volley of musketry, then the troops charged, and fighting at close quarters became general. At a certain moment some of Lha-bzañ Khan's units gave way, and P'o-lha-nas, who was then a sort of adjutant of Lha-bzañ Khan, was sent to rally the fugitives, which he did with full success. The fight fizzled out without results, and each side returned to their encampments 4). Lha-bzañ Khan highly commended P'o-lha-nas for his valour and appointed him commander-in-chief of his army 5). It was the right decision to take, but unfortunately it was too late, as the mili-

1) MBTJ, f. 119a.
3) MBTJ, f. 119b.
4) MBTJ, f. 120a-b. The encounter took place on I/VIII; ASTL, f. 279a.
5) The peacetime commander-in-chief was the Mongol Don-grub-ts'e-riñ, who received Desideri on his arrival in March 1716; Desideri, p. 91. But he is not mentioned in the MBTJ, and seems to have played only a secondary, if any, part in the war.
tary situation had already worsened after the missed occupation of the fine positions in the hills.

The lack of cohesion and low fighting value of Lha-bzani Khan’s troops was glaringly shown shortly afterwards. An Oirat officer of Lha-bzani Khan had marched all night in order to occupy a hill in the rear of the Dsungar camp. But some traitors in Lha-bzani Khan’s army had sent word of the move to the Dsungars, with the result that the officer found the hill (which he believed deserted) occupied by the Dsungars, and was shot down by a sudden volley while ascending the slopes. His fall utterly demoralized the Tibetan troops from Nags-ron, Dags-po and Ko-n-po, who began plotting to lay down arms. All the influence of P’o-lha-nas was needed to avert the plot and to keep the troops together. Although the MBTJ is silent on this point, we know from Desideri that there was a real conspiracy among some of Lha-bzani Khan’s ministers, which was discovered by the vigilance of prince Surya. “The traitors were seized and the whole plan of battle altered owing to letters and preconcerted signals found in their possession. Thus king Lha-bzani Khan with his small force gained a complete victory and was able to occupy a position commanding the road to Lhasa, and cutting the enemy’s communications with any rebels inside the city” ¹). Giorgi too speaks of the Dsungars being defeated at No-c’u-dkar (sic), and of their half-starved condition, because of which they were even thinking of retreat; he gives also the names of the traitors, who sided with the Dsungars, as Datses (sTag-rtse-pa, on whom see later) and Glag-sgya-ri (the chief of Lha-rgya-ri) ²). This “complete victory” is an obvious exaggeration of the good Father, who felt a good deal of sympathy for Lha-bzani Khan. The MBTJ makes it clear that there was not one great battle, but several encounters drawn out over a lengthy period. And Lha-bzani Khan himself, in a letter to the emperor, stated that in these fights there was neither winner nor defeated ³). He had simply succeeded in stopping for the moment the advance of the enemy, which in itself was no mean achievement.

¹) Desideri, p. 155.
²) Giorgi, p. 334. All the names in Tibetan script to be found in Giorgi are not original, but reconstructed from the Italian transcription, often wrongly. They are therefore to be used with the utmost caution.
³) Haenisch, pp. 219-220 (= Sheng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 277, f. 23b).
But a serious fact had come to light in the meantime. The troops from Central Tibet (from dBu-r11 and gYu-ru in dBus, from gYas-ru and Ru-lag in gTsān, from Byar, Dags-po and Koñ-po), and also some Turks, had been deeply infected by the clever Dsungar propaganda, which was more or less along these lines: “We do not come to fight you in support of the enemies of Lha-bzañ Khan; we are simply cooperating with prince Daičing Qośūči, who, supported by an army, is bringing the rightful Dalai-Lama from the Kukunor lake to the masterless and defenceless Tibetans. As we have in mind only your welfare, it would be better to become friends and to return each to his own country.” Upon a soil so well prepared by the whispering propaganda issuing from the great monasteries of dBus, it is no wonder that this seed took root and prospered. Only P’o-lha-nas, the higher officers of the dBus and gTsān troops, the Mongols, and some soldiers from southern Tibet remained loyal 1).

On one of the following days Lha-bzañ Khan’s troops, with P’o-lha-nas at their head, tried a desperate assault on the enemy camp; they suffered heavy losses, but the Dsungars were pressed so far back, that P’o-lhas-nas could send word to Lha-bzañ Khan that a charge well pressed home by him personally would achieve the rout of the enemy. Lha-bzañ Khan tried to lead forward his household troops, but was held back by his son Surya and his officers. The charge did not materialize, and P’o-lha-nas’s men, unsupported, were driven back. From this time onward the break between Tibetans and Qōsots in Lha-bzañ Khan’s army was complete 2). P’o-lha-nas however, continued leading his men and exposing himself bravely all the time, till at last he was wounded in the legs; nevertheless he refused to quit the army as advised by his friend 3).

All these events had taken a considerable time, which was employed by the clergy, preoccupied by the devastations of the war, in an attempt at mediation. By order of the Tashi-Lama, who was then in Lha-bzañ Khan’s camp, the K’ri Rin-po-c’e and the abbots of the other great monasteries tried to bring about an armistice, to avoid a further shedding of Buddhist blood; but, as was to be expected, the attempt failed 4).

---

1) MBTJ, ff. 121a-122a. 2) MBTJ, ff. 122a-124a. 3) MBTJ, f. 124b. 4) ASTL, f. 278b-279a.
Weak and divided as it was, Lha-bzaṅ Khan’s ramshackle army had succeeded in holding back the Dsungars for more than two months. But the resistance in aDam could not be protracted. The Dsungars bore down from the hills “like a cauldron rolling down a slope” and forced the troops of Lha-bzaṅ Khan back step by step towards Lhasa. It was clear that nothing more could be done in the plains of aDam, and Lha-bzaṅ Khan’s officers advised him to throw himself into the capital, to hold the fortresses of dBus-gTsani, and to wait for the hoped-for succour from China and the Kukunor princes. P’o-lha-nas opposed the proposal on the ground that to pen up the army in Lhasa would mean to ruin it materially and morally and to make it unfit for field service. He suggested that prince Surya should hold Lhasa with a strong garrison, and that the Khan himself should keep the field with the main forces, harassing the enemy. The plan was sound; but once again the advice of the officers prevailed, and in the first half of November Lha-bzaṅ Khan with the whole army retreated into Lhasa, where the Tashi-Lama had preceded him by a few days 1). According to Desideri (p. 155), the retreat was due to the impossibility of holding the field in winter, because aDam, “open to the north, was swept by icy and violent winds in winter”. It may be that climatic reasons contributed to the retreat, but the fact was that the military position in aDam was no longer tenable.

Shortly before, Lhasa had been fortified by Lha-bzaṅ Khan with stout walls and a deep moat 2). These fortifications were in the pink of condition and were still being strengthened. There was a large garrison, reinforced by troops summoned from the outlying districts of Tibet, and now by the whole Qoṣot army. The Tashi-Lama was in Lhasa, and his presence gave moral support to the troops. Last but not least, Lha-bzaṅ Khan had by now realized the seriousness of the situation and had at last grudgingly consented to request Chinese intervention 3). It seemed thus that he could wait with composure of mind for the arrival of the Chinese army. But while all material factors were in his favour, they were set at nought by the moral cancer which ate up his army and his administration.

1) MBTJ, ff. 127b-128b. The Tashi-Lama arrived in Lhasa on 8/X November 9th; ASTL, f. 279b.
3) Haenisch, p. 220 (= Sheng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 277, f. 23b).
The troops had been reorganized. The gTsan division, commanded by P'o-lha-nas, bSam-grub-rtse-pa and bKra-sis-rtse-pa (an officer of the Tashi-Lama), were encamped in the southern section of Lhasa, in the gardens on the banks of the sKyid-c'u (Kichu). But the troops were utterly demoralized and their loyalty more than suspect. P'o-lha-nas suggested therefore that Lha-bzan Khan and his army might leave Lhasa and reach the Kukunor region by a detour through K'ams; thence they could march back to Lhasa with Chinese help. But to this Lha-bzan Khan's pride rebelled. Old and slothful he might be, but he was no coward. In a spirited speech, a fine piece of eloquence, he turned down P'o-lha-nas's suggestion. He remembered his ancestors and their proud deeds; their descendant could not flee away like this. Better to die, dragging to death with him some of the enemies. His forefathers had defeated such foes as Čoqtu Khan 1), Be-re Khan 2), Bušuqtu Khan 3), king gTsan-pa 4), the regent Sañs-rgyas-rgya-mtś'o; if the ancestral blood was still running in his veins, he would yet defeat his enemies 5).

After Lha-bzan Khan's retreat, Ts'e-riñ-don-grub had stopped where he was for about ten days, waiting for the arrival of the division which had the task of rescuing the Dalai-Lama and bringing him to Nag-c'u-k'a. But soon he was bitterly disappointed. That division had been defeated and destroyed by the Chinese; and the Dalai-Lama was still held confined in sKu-ąbum 6). It was a terrible blow to the whole enterprise; it cut at its very root. The Dsungars had started for Tibet with the avowed intention of dominating the country and the other Lamaist lands through the Dalai-Lama. That hope was now shattered, and they could no longer count upon the support of the Yellow Church, which had been so effective till now. If the Dalai-Lama was with the Chinese, the Dsungars had to take into account, sooner or later, the actual hostility of the lamas, who would be very happy to have a pretext for returning

---

1) A Chahar prince, defeated by Gušri Khan in 1637. 2) Ruler of K'ams, defeated and executed by Gušri Khan in 1641. 3) Title of dGa'-ldan, ruler of the Dsungars 1676-1697. 4) Karma-bstan-skyon, ruler of gTsan since ca. 1620, defeated by Gušri Khan in 1642. 5) MBTJ, ff. 127b-128b. 6) Desideri, p. 156. Giorgi, p. 334. It is strange that the expedition against sKu-ąbum should be ignored by the Chinese and the Tibetan texts (and the Manchu, as I am kindly informed by Professor Haenisch). Probably its significance was unnoticed by the Chinese, who classed it as one of the usual frontier raids.
to their traditional pro-Chinese tendencies. It would become very
difficult, as later events proved, to hold Tibet against the Tibetans
and the superior Chinese forces. But what was he to do? Retreat
under these circumstances would have been disastrous. He tried
the bolder way, to take Lhasa by storm and to keep Tibet in sub-
jection by sheer terror, a program which was carried out to the
letter, as we shall see. Of course, the support of the lamas had to be
exploited as long as possible. To this end, Ts'e-riṅ-don-grub gave
out that the sKu-ḥum division had been victorious and was joining
him soon, carrying with them the rightful Dalai-Lama. Having
thus encouraged his soldiers and secured the further support of the
Church, Ts'e-riṅ-don-grub marched on Lhasa.

At daybreak of the 21st November 1), the Dsungars drew near
Lhasa, halted just out of gun range, and separated into four
divisions, which encamped on the four sides of the town, establish-
ing thus its blockade. Ts'e-riṅ-don-grub himself remained to the
northern side of Lhasa near Se-ra monastery. The Dsungars were
enthusiastically greeted by the monks of the three great monasteries,
who brought them food, arms and ammunition; a number of the
younger monks equipped as soldiers joined the army, thus con-
siderably increasing its numbers 2). The blockade of Lhasa was
organized as follows: to the eastern side, the Dsungars encamped
on the banks of the sKyid-c'u; to the northern side, on the desert
plains of Grön-smad, Grva-bźi 3) etc.; to the western side, on the
slopes of sKye-ts'al Klu-sdiṅs; to the southern side, the Dsungars
lost some time on their march round the city and did not complete
the ring for a few days. Giorgi (p. 335) tells us that on the 25th,
upon a signal given by traitors inside the town, an attack was
launched against the eastern sector; it was repulsed by P'o-lha-nas.
This attack is mentioned in no other source, and is probably a
duplicate of the events of the 30th, due to a misunderstanding by
Giorgi or his informants.

In a few days the Dsungars completed their military preparations
outside the city, and agreed on a definite plan of action with their
friends inside. When all was ready, after midnight on the 30th of

1) Desideri's date. The ASTL has 17/X, corresponding to November 19th.
2) Desideri, pp. 156-157. Tibetan version of this in ASTL, f. 280a.
3) Dabchi in Waddells' sketch of the environs of Lhasa; it is the emplacement of the
parade grounds to the north of the town. The other names are difficult to identify.
November 1717 ¹) the Dsungars attacked Lhasa on all sides. In the southern sector, P’o-lha-nas was no longer sure of his men. Shortly before the attack, he had discovered treasonable correspondence with the enemy. Letters were passing to and fro between the Dsungars and his close friend bKra-sis-rtse-pa. He had hushed up the affair by putting to death the man who carried the letters; he wished neither to denounce his friend, nor to betray Lha-bzan Khan, to whom he owed so much. In these conditions he left most of his men behind and sallied forth against the Dsungars only with some trusted men of his personal retinue. By his surprise counter-attack, he succeeded in throwing the enemy into confusion and driving them back as far as the sKu-ţabum plain. In the northern sector the Dsungars from the Grva-bţi plain attacked the Pa-tag-śa-duń gate. They were helped from the inside by some partisans of theirs, headed by one Taiji rNam-rgyal. For a short while neither these nor the Dsungars outside could make any impression on the gate, which, if weakly defended, was very strongly barricaded and difficult to smash in. In many other places in the town, several officers and dignitaries of Lha-bzan Khan had been in correspondence with the enemy, and has sent them word of everything that happened in the city; now, as soon as the Dsungar attack began, they fired a few shots and then abandoned their posts, thus increasing the confusion which was already spreading in the city. A Dsungar lama revolted, occupied some districts of the city and went over to the Dsungars. Everywhere, ladders were being let down from the battlements, to enable the Dsungars to scale the walls. The western gate was thrown open by the commandant of the gate-guard. No wonder that the defence collapsed very soon; we may even say that there was no defence at all, except in the southern sector ²).

The fight, or rather the massacre, raged during the whole night. Lha-bzan Khan, in spite of his brave words, had lost his head and instead of placing himself at the head of his troops, had taken refuge in the Potala. P’o-lha-nas had come into the town to report to

¹) Desideri’s date. The ASTL has 29/X, corresponding to December 1st.
²) The Prefect of the Capuchin Mission, who was an eye-witness, rightly sums up the events in the following words: The Dsungars took Lhasa by dint of intelligence inside the town, but with little force outside. Above quoted letter of Fr. Domenico da Fano, dated Lhasa, May 29th, 1718.
Lha-bzān Khan the successful repulse of the attack in his sector. When the Dzungars broke into the city, he was in the P'un-ts'Ogs-rab-brtan-dpal-abyor, or Paljor-rabtan palace 1). At once panic broke out around him. The defenceless people ran hither and thither like frightened cattle. The palace was crowded with clerks and officials of Lha-bzān Khan, a panic-striken rabble. Some Mongol girls filled the air with their shrieks and wails. Amidst this terrible scene of confusion, P'o-lha-nas left the palace with a small retinue, to try to find his way to Lha-bzān Khan. On his way, in the street called rGya-ḥum-sgan he had an encounter with about 15 Dzungar horsemen, whom he put to flight. But as he saw that it was impossible to get through, he went back to the gardens in the south of the city, from where, in the meantime, his troops had vanished dispersing themselves. Serious fighting, if there had been any, was soon over. At dawn the Dzungars were masters of the city, and Ts'e-riṅ-don-grub was conducted in triumph to the bKra-sis-k'aṅ palace. As soon as he was installed there, he gave permission to his troops to sack the town. Savage scenes ensued; the monks who had joined the invaders became the most greedy and cruel robbers. The houses were looted, including those belonging to men who had actively helped the entry of the Dzungars into the town; even the temples and monasteries of the sacred city were not spared. People were mercilessly tortured in order to compel them to disgorge their wealth. Even the Capuchin friars suffered from the sack. They were stripped of everything, even of the robes and the drawers which they wore on their bodies; they were flogged with horsewhips till blood ran from their backs, in order to make them reveal where they had concealed their money 2). Desideri escaped this fate, because at that time he resided in Se-ra; but he lost all his belongings which he had left in the city. The sack, which its trail of dreadful sufferings, lasted for three days 3).

P'o-lha-nas was still bent on rejoining Lha-bzān Khan. He threw away his arms and rich clothes, donned the dress of a man of the

1) On this palace see S. Ch. Das, Journey, pp. 198-199. It is the "lodging house for Tashilhunpo people" (n. 10) in the plan of Lhasa in Waddell.


3) The above account of the blockade, storm and sack of Lhasa is based on MBTJ, ff. 128b-130b; ASTL, f. 28b; Haenisch, p. 225 (= Shêng-tsu Shi-h-lu, ch. 277, f. 23b); Ch'ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 6a; Desideri, pp. 157-158. Cfr. also Giorgi, pp. 335-336.
people, and set out on foot. On his way he saw a detachment of Tibetan troops of the feudatory chiefs of ‘Od-gsal-lha-rigs in Klu-sbugs and of the Bya-pa myriarch 1), numbering about 500, abjectly terrorized and cringing, being led away by a few lance-brandishing Dsungars. His blood boiled over at the shameful spectacle, and he snatched at a lance in order to attack the Dsungars. He was held back in the nick of time by two old friends, Bon-rigs Nag-dbañ-bde-c‘en and bKra-sis-rtse-pa (already mentioned). They entreated him to take care of himself; he had done enough for Lha-bzañ Khan, and it was useless getting himself killed for nothing. Owing to the awful turmoil in the streets of the looted city, it was clearly impossible to reach the Potala, and P’o-lha-nas gave way to his friends and went back with them to the inner city. Shortly afterwards he left it, and repaired to 3Bras-spuñs monastery. But he was still loth to give up every hope. He bought a good horse and two mules, as the first step to a project of his. He hoped that Lha-bzañ Khan would be able to hold out for a while in the Potala; in the meantime, he would hasten away to meet the army of the Mongol chief Dayan Qungtaiji, which was rumoured to be on the march from the Kukunor towards Lhasa; he would act as a guide to them. But events moved too quickly, and soon he heard of Lha-bzañ Khan’s sad end, which showed a glamour that all his life had lacked 2).

Lha-bzañ Khan, shut in the Potala, recovered his balance of mind and took stock of the situation. The Potala, as rebuilt by the Fifth Dalai-Lama, was a strong palace, not a fortress. At the best, it could only resist for some days more. But there was no chance of timely succour from any side whatsoever. Negotiations with the Dsungars had been tried by the only authority in Tibet who could command their respect; on the day after the fall of Lhasa the Tashi-Lama had tried to negotiate in order to save the life of Lha-bzañ Khan. But they requested the unconditional surrender of the Khan, and he fully knew what this meant; thus this attempt too failed 3). The inevitable end was bound to be the storming of the Potala and the wholesale massacre of its

1) On the Bya-pa myriarchy, which was to the south-west of Yar-kluñs, see Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*, pp. 613-614.
2) *MBTJ*, ff. 130b-131a.
3) *ASTL*, f. 28ob.
The old Khan stoically decided on a course of self-sacrifice. In order to avoid the extermination of all his family and attendants, he decided to sally out of the Potala and to die fighting, keeping the enemies as much and as long occupied as he could. In the meantime his son Surya would lead out the inmates of the Potala and effect their escape northwards. And once he had taken his last decision, he stuck to it; in vain his people tried to detain him. On the I/XI = December 3rd, the Khan came out through the gate of the walled dependency 1) on the eastern side of the Potala, followed only by the Mongol Blo-bzañ-c'os-ap'el and another officer, and rode away on the road to the Klu-sbugs country. The flight was soon discovered, and the Dsungars hastened in pursuit. The fugitives reached a deep ditch with a double palisade, at which the Khan's horse took fright, and instead of jumping the ditch it fell down with its rider. The Dsungars attacked the small party, which held them at bay with matchlock fire, till the ammunition gave out. Then the Dsungars charged down on them. The two officers continued to defend themselves using their matchlocks as clubs, till at last they were cut down. The Dsungars then crowded on the exhausted Khan, without recognizing him. He defended himself valiantly, wounding and killing several of his attackers; with a last stroke he cut off the right arm of the nearest man, then he fell dead 2).

The fate of Lha-bzañ Khan's family is told us by Desideri. Prince Surya, the chief minister K'aañ-c'en-nas (Desideri's Targum-trëescij) and general Don-grub-ts'ë-riñ had broken through the Dsungar lines, killing many of them and getting safely away. In the middle of the night they reached the home of sTag-rtse-pa, the Tibetan governor of sKyid-sod. In the hope of reward by the enemy (and rewarded indeed he was most handsomely), sTag-rtse-pa by an act of the blackest treachery handed over his guests to the Dsungars. Lha-bzañ Khan's wife and youngest son Ts'ë-brtan, who was only 3-4 years old, had not been able to leave the Potala and had been taken by the Dsungars. The Tashi-Lama, who too

1) Lha-žol; this terms indicates "a village or collection of abodes below or belonging to a monastery; thus at the base of the Potala in Lhasa is a large group of houses and huts styled the žol or sde-žol of the Potala". S. Ch. Das, Tibetan-English Dictionary, p. 1077a.

2) The account of Lha-bzañ Khan's end is based on MBTJ, ff. 131a-132b; ASTL, f. 281a; the Biography of the 48th K'ri Rin-po-če, f. 9b; and Desideri, pp. 158-159.
was in the Potala, was able to save their lives for the moment, by dint of entreaties and reproaches to Ts'e-riñ-don-grub, who had once been his pupil at bKra-sis-lhun-po. They were all imprisoned, except general Don-grub-ts'e-riñ, who was set free because he was a Dsungar by birth. The Dsungars sacked the Potala in the most thorough manner, even desecrating the tomb of the Fifth Dalai-Lama. As they knew that the greatest part of Lha-bzān Khan's treasure had been entrusted to the chief minister K'ān-c'en-nas, they put him to the torture, without being able to overcome his stubborn loyalty. Seeing all his efforts to be useless, Ts'e-riñ-don-grub sent his prisoners to Dsungaria. On the road, the party was attacked by the faithful Don-grub-ts'e-riñ; he succeeded in freeing K'ān-c'en-nas, who escaped to mNa-ris; but he was killed in a vain attempt to rescue Lha-bzān Khan's family. The princess and the two princes arrived in Ili and remained there till their death ¹). Only Surya's wife succeeded in reaching the Chinese outpost in the Tsaidam region, where she gave to the imperial commanders an account of the events in Lhasa ²).

1) Desideri, pp. 159-164; ASTL, f. 281a. Cfr. Haenisch, pp. 225-226 (= Shēng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 279, f. 2a-b). In 1731 the Dsungars proposed to restore prince Surya as ruler of Tibet; but nothing came of the attempt. See later pp. 149—150.

CHAPTER FOUR

DSUNGAR OCCUPATION AND TIBETAN RISINGS

The conquest of Tibet had been mainly due to the masterly diplomacy and military organization of king Ts‘e-dbañ-rab-brtan. Ts‘e-riñ-don-grub had not shown, nor was to show in future, any outstanding qualities as a general, as far as we can judge; but he had faithfully and successfully carried out the difficult task allotted to him. The failure of the unnamed commander of the expedition toSKU-abum, though of no consequence from the military point of view, had jeopardised the ultimate success of the enterprise; but he was in no way responsible for this. Now, after the fall of Lhasa and the death of Lha-bzañ Khan, he found himself confronted with the task of organizing his conquest. The situation was by no means rosy. His army was small and tired, and its original Dsungar kernel ¹) had undoubtedly been diminished by the terrible march and the hard fighting. His Tibetan levies were not to be depended upon. He was in deep disagreement with his chief lieutenant Sanji ²), a disagreement which was known even to the Chinese and lasted till Sanji's return to Dsungaria in the 3rd month of 1719 ³).

Thus far, the Dsungars held only Lhasa and the country to the north of it. The situation in the rest of the country can be summarized thus: Western Tibet and gTsan were for the moment politically a no man's land, soon be to galvanized into active resistance by K‘an-c‘en-nas and P‘o-lha-nas; K‘ams was practically independent of Lhasa under its great lamas, and Chinese political influence there was growing stronger and stronger; Amdo and Kukunor were under the sway of Mongol chieftains under Chinese suzerainty; dBus outside Lhasa was the prey of complete anarchy. Lha-bzañ

¹) The Dsungars seem to have formed only a smaller contingent (about one third) of Ts‘e-riñ-don-grub's army. Cfr. Haenisch, pp. 215 (= Shêng-Tsu Shih-lu, ch. 274, f. 20b) and 387 (= Op. cit., ch. 284, f. 21b).
²) This is probably the aJe-saṅs of the dPag-bsam-ljon-bzaṅ, p. 304.
³) Haenisch, p. 392 (= Shêng-Tsu Shih-lu, ch. 284, f. 22b).
Khan’s government had collapsed, his ministers were dead or in flight. It would have been feasible to choose the new administration from among the lamas only if the Dalai-Lama had been under Dzungar influence. But the lamas had at once found out that the Dalai-Lama was not in the train of the invaders; and what was going to be their reaction to this discovery, was at once shown by the highest of them, the Tashi-Lama. Almost at once, on 3/XII = January 4th, 1718, he had left for bKra-sis-lhun-po, where he arrived 17 days later 1). The Dzungars, fervent Lamaists and self-styled defenders of the Yellow Church, could certainly not detain him by force: but the fact showed that the Tashi-Lama was clearly disassociating himself from the new regime.

Tse-'riñ-don-grub found thus himself in a political vacuum. There was absolutely no political party in the country, on which he could rely. Even the aristocrats, anti-clerical and anti-Chinese as they were, had been shocked and outraged by the sack of Lhasa, the indiscriminate slaughter of the people and the barbarous treatment of Lha-bzan Khan's family. Tse-'riñ-don-grub's only way of governing the country was military occupation, leaning only on superior force and imposed by terror on the people. At the centre he formed a puppet Tibetan government, headed by Lha-rgyal-rab-brtan of sTag-rtse in Bye-ri 2), called also the Taiji of dGa’-ldan in sKyid-śod 3), the betrayer of the Qöṣot royal family. At the time of Lha-bzan Khan's coup in 1705/6 he was already a minister 4), and had thus considerable administrative experience. He had played an important part in the abortive negotiations which took place in qAdam on the initiative of the Tashi-Lama, and perhaps it was on this occasion that he entered a secret compact with the Dzungars. The author of the MBTJ, who of course belonged to the opposite party, gives a repellent portrait of him; he was heavy, with a skull-like white face, with hanging jowls, toothless, with a staggering gait and an unclear and stammering speech. He received now the title of sa-sk'yoñ (Protector of the Realm), but seems to

1) ASTL, ff. 281b and 283b.
2) Taktse-dsong on the right bank of the sKyid-c'u to the east of Lhasa.
3) Loṅ-ba’i-dmigs-bu, s.a. 1717. MBTJ, l. 133a. He is the same as the prince Ta-ko-tsan of the Wei-tsang-t'u-chih, in JRAS 1891, p. 74.
4) ASTL, ff. 234a and 236b.
have enjoyed little effective power 1). Every measure taken by the Dzungars was endorsed by him, even those which hurt the religious feeling of his countrymen.

Lha-bzan Khan's puppet Dalai-Lama Nag-dbañ-ye-ses-rgya-mtsö was of course deposed, but allowed, as an act of grace and on the intercession of the Tashi-Lama, to return to the lCags-po-ri as a simple monk; he remained confined in that college. The Dalai-Lama of sKu-ñum, though an absentee in the hands of the Chinese, was proclaimed as the lawful head of the Tibetan Church.

After this reorganization of the administration, Ts'e-riñ-don-grub undertook the effective occupation of the country. He sent out summons to all provinces requesting the whole kingdom to pay homage to him 2). dBus seems to have been soon cowed into submission by systematic raids of Dzungar troops starting from Lhasa. The general policy, which inspired these raids, was a clear-cut programme of persecution of the rÑiñ-ma-pa school of Lamaism. Religious persecution was till then little known in Tibet; the struggle between Reds and Yellows had been of a purely political nature. Now these strangers from the north-west, more Lamaist than the lamas, imported into Tibet a full-dress religious intolerance and persecution. All the images, statues and books of Padmasambhava were burnt 3). The monasteries of rNam-rgyal-glin, rDo-rje-brag, bSam-lidin were stormed, sMin-sgrol-glin was attacked, all of them rÑiñ-ma-pa centres 4). The rNam-rgyal-grva-ts'än school of bSam-gtañ-glin in 'Ol-ka was exiled to rTses-t'askan and then dispersed 5). The abbot of Gunt'än was driven from his see 6). Even the Bon-po sanctuary of Ri-rgyal gSen-dar was pillaged 7). Of course the countryside too suffered heavily of these raids, as the Dzungars scoured it for food and fuel and behaved like a raiding horde, not like occupation troops. One lasting consequence of their activity was the complete denudation of the Lhasa district; all the trees in

1) The unpublished Ragguaqlio of Fr. Gioacchino da Santa Anatolia (1746) says that "although the Dzungars had appointed a Tibetan as king, it was they who governed the country, much more than the king appointed by them". Scr. Congregaz., vol. 730, ft. 251-277, p. 8.
4) Re'u-mig, p. 82. S. Ch. Das, Journey, pp. 186 and 306.
5) dPañ-bsam-ljon-bzan, p. 315.
6) Biography of the 50th K'ti Rin-po-c'e (vol. Na of the collection), f. 5b.
7) S. Ch. Das, Journey, p. 272.
it were cut for fuel by the Dsungars, and the Chinese, who came after them, completed their work by digging up even the roots 1).

But if by these means the Dsungars intended to gain the support of the Yellow Church, they were soon disappointed. As soon as the lamas found out that the Dalai-Lama was still at Hsining, the Dsungars had played out with them. The brutal looting of the rNin-ma-pa monasteries merely fanned their rising hostility against the conqueror. They had also to suffer from the puritan airs which the Dsungars gave themselves. The Mongols undertook even to reestablish discipline in the dGe-lug-pa monasteries, by driving out of them the laymen and those among the lamas, whose virtue and learning were not above doubt 2). This tactless interference soon bore its fruits. And the worst mistake the Dsungars made was a raid, which they seem to have carried out in 1718 against Shigatse. The town was placed in a state of defence by the Tashi-Lama. Its small garrison, composed of the local lamas and of some remnants of the Qōsots, sustained a long siege, inflicting such losses on the assailants, as to compel them to raise the siege and to withdraw. In 1719 the damage sustained by the town was repaired on the initiative of the Tashi-Lama 3).

The regime of terror set up by the Dsungars in Lhasa grew worse and worse with the passing of time. On this we have the unimpeachable witness of the Capuchins: the Dsungars “during the whole of 1718 did nothing but practise unheard-of atrocities on the people of the kingdom”. The missionaries had stuck to their post in Lhasa in spite of the loss of all their scanty property; step by step they had gained some measure of tolerance from the Dsungar authorities by their skill in the practice of medicine. But it was that very skill that exposed them to the danger of being seized and deported to Ili. To avoid this, they left Lhasa and hid themselves in a place called Thueé (?), two days of march away from the capital, where they remained six months. Then the acute discomfort compelled them to return to Lhasa, where they went into hiding. All

---

1) Above quoted Ragguaglio of Fr. Gioacchino da S. Anatolia, p. 31.
3) Puini, pp. 49-50; omitted in De Filippi’s translation. The Tibetan texts are silent about the attack on Shigatse, nay, they show us Ts'e-rin-don-grub in tolerably good relations with the Tashi-Lama. But Desideri’s veracity is such that we cannot dismiss his testimony, even against the silence of the ASTL.
their hopes were pinned on the Chinese troops, whom everybody knew to be on the move towards Tibet 1).

During 1718 opposition against the Dsungars remained more or less fluid and intangible, a state of mind more than a definite movement. Real armed resistance was organized by two capable leaders, both of them former officials of Lha-bzan Khan, both of them having personally suffered from the brutality of the Dsungars: K'añ-c'en-nas and P'o-lha-nas. bSod-nams-rgyal-po of K'añ-c'en was, as we have seen, the chief minister of Lha-bzan Khan. Before the war he had also been governor of Western Tibet (mNa'-ris sKor-gsum), from where he had joined Lha-bzan Khan on the battlefields of aDam. We have already told the tale of his imprisonment and torture by the Dsungars. When he was freed by the devoted sacrifice of Don-grub-tsce-riñ, he fled with all speed towards his old government, which he reached in safety. At Gartok “he sought out, encouraged and organized the survivors of the troops sent by Lha-bzan Khan to defend that extreme frontier of Tibet… His intention was to close the pass between Gartok and Eastern Turkestan, thus cutting all communications between Ts'e-riñ-don-grub and his native country. His design succeeded. The Chinese had occupied the eastern road, so the Dsungar king, being unaware of the snare laid by K'añ-c'en-nas, sent envoys and then troops to reinforce the army in Tibet by the road passing through Gartok. None of the messengers sent from Lhasa to Dsungaria, or any troops sent from there to Tibet, ever reached their destination” 2).

What K'añ-c'en-nas did in mNa'-ris, P'o-lha-nas did in gTsañ. He had of course to wrestle with far greater difficulties, as his land was much nearer to Lhasa and more exposed to Dsungar raids than faraway mNa'-ris. It is therefore worth while to relate this fine feat of organization more in detail. We have left P'o-lha-nas at aBras-spunis, where the news of Lha-bzañ Khan's death had for the moment put an end to his activities. sTag-rtse-pa at first seems to have thought of employing him in his service. The new regent was issuing general summons to the abbots and incarnations of the dBus monasteries to come to Lhasa; thus the former adjutant of Lha-bzañ Khan, the Bakši, was sent with some Mongols to fetch

2) Desideri, pp. 163-164.
the incarnate of sMin-sgrol-gliṅ; P'o-lha-nas and a Mongol called T'os-pa-dga³ were entrusted with the task of summoning the incarnate (rDo-rje-adsin-pa-c'en-po) of rDo-rje-brag. But P'o-lha-nas guessed rightly that this summons had the purpose of laying hold of and imprisoning that great churchman. He sent some men to bribe T'os-pa-dga³ with clothes, silver, horses and mules. The Mongol accepted the bribe and the incarnate of rDo-rje-brag, who was already on his way, was allowed to return to his monastery. When P'o-lha-nas returned to Lhasa, he was severely taken to task by Ts'e-rin-don-grub for the failure of his mission. P'o-lha-nas replied that the incarnate was an old man, near to death, unfit for travelling.' The excuse was too flimsy, and Ts'e-rin-don-grub blamed and upbraided P'o-lha-nas violently; but for the moment the matter was allowed to drop.

Shortly afterwards P'o-lha-nas was informed by a lama from the Dsungar college, that all the old retainers of Lha-bzan Khan were going to be arrested. The kind lama took him to aBras-spuṅs and offered him asylum, if he would renounce the world and take the vows. But P'o-lha-nas refused, and when a Dsungar messenger came to fetch him to Lhasa, he fatalistically complied and followed him. On the edge of the "dust-dam" near Lhasa he was arrested by a score of Dsungars, undressed, bound and marched along; although his wounded leg made it difficult for him to walk, his march was hastened with the whip. They reached thus the Paljor-rabtan palace. P'o-lha-nas was handed over to a Dsungar officer, dressed in lousy old rags and then led into a tent. There he was questioned by the Dsungars and requested to give a full statement of all his estates and movable property. To this he replied that all his movable property was stored in Lhasa and had been looted by the Dsungars, so that he was practically destitute. As to his estates in gTsaṅ, he was unable to say anything about them, because, being on attendance to Lha-bzan Khan since his boyhood, he had never returned home and could not remember conditions there. The Dsungars insisted with promises and threats, but in vain. P'o-lha-nas was then led to the banks of the sKyid-c'u and threatened with drowning, the usual mode of execution in Lhasa; lastly, he was flogged with fifteen lashes. But it was of no avail, so that the Dsungars gave up trying to extort money from him. The next morning he was committed to jail with many others, Tibetan and
Mongols, among whom was the sMin-sgrol-gliṅ incarnate, who in the meantime, less lucky than his colleague of rDo-rje-brag, had been brought to Lhasa. Tiṣri mNaṅ-bdag Brag-pa, alias Myaṅ-ston Rig-ḥdsin-rgya-mtšo (evidently a high lama), tried to intercede for the prisoners, and was thrown in jail for his pains. As usual in Tibetan prisons, P'o-lha-nas would have died of hunger and maltreatment there, if some friends of his, viz. gYag-sde Ram-pa-ba, Bon-rigs Nag-dbaṅ-bde-c'en, ICog-spe-ba, Nor-ḥdsin-dbaṅ-po of gZis-groṅ, and sNid-sbug-pa of Ḍuṣ-byuṅ, had not cared for the welfare of their imprisoned leader. sTag-rtse-pa himself sent him some clothing. Shortly afterwards sTag-rtse-pa went to the Dsungar leaders, pointed out the unpopularity to which he was exposed because of this high-handedness towards a respected nobleman, and by threatening his resignation, obtained the release of P'o-lha-nas 1).

P'o-lha-nas's release was greeted with great rejoicing by the populace and specially by the lamas of the three great monasteries. sTag-rtse-pa offered him the post of minister (bka'i-mdun-na-adon), but P'o-lha-nas would not accept. He recovered his wealth, which had lain buried in various secreted spots in Lhasa, and princely rewarded sTag-rtse-pa for his intervention. His family estates and serfs in gTsaṅ were formally granted back to him, but not so those which had been given to him by Lha-bzan Khan, nor the castle of Rin-c'en-rtse, which sTag-rtse-pa reserved for himself. P'o-lha-nas, in order not to lose it, employed a small trick, very common in Tibet. He put himself in touch with the treasurer (gnas-mdsod-gc'eṅ-ba) of bKra-šis-lhun-po, and made over the castle as a gift to the monastery (which of course was later to give it back to him for a nominal rent). The question became now an issue between the Tashi-Lama's administration and sTag-rtse-pa, and P'o-lha-nas dropped out of it. I may mention that the ownership of Rin-c'en-rtse was recognized to the Tashi-Lama in 1719 2), although it is doubtful that actual possession could be gained until after the expulsion of the Dsungars.

After having thus settled all pending questions, and after having given many presents to several faithful old warriors of Lha-bzan Khan, P'o-lha-nas left for Ḍuṅ, his homeland. The journey showed

---

1) MBTJ, ff. 133a-140b.  
2) ASTL, f. 291a.
that in the country south of the gTsan-po P’o-lha-nas was beginning to be regarded by the people as their natural leader. At P’o-lha, where he was much fêted by his family, he found the financial situation of his estates so flourishing, that it compensated all his losses at the hands of the Dsungars. He took advantage of this by lavishly performing several religious rites, thus conciliating to himself the local clergy. Twelve months passed in this manner. For the moment, P’o-lha-nas could do nothing but wait; the Dsungars were too strong, and he was just only tolerated by them. The little he could do, was to help secretly his old comrades persecuted by the Dsungars. It happened thus that some old Mongol officers of Lha-bzaň Khan were arrested by the Dsungars and sent away to Ili. In Nag-ts‘an they freed themselves, took the way back and arrived at P’o-lha-nas’s castle, where they were gladly received as guests. Soon a dozen of Dsungars, who had come to bKra-sis-lhun-po, got wind of the presence of the refugees at P’o-lha and came thither. The refugees escaped by a secret door to the mountains; the Dsungars searched the castle, found nothing and went away.

It seems that during this period there were some attempts at conciliation, in which P’o-lha-nas had a hand. At least we may guess something of the sort from the very careful and guarded account of the MBTJ. The facts are these: a Dsungar prince, then dwelling in aBras-spuns, requested a secret interview with P’o-lha-nas. He accepted and travelled secretly to aBras-spuns, riding three days and three nights—a rather incredible feat of horsemanship. All we are told of the interview, is in the nature of religious discussions only. Soon afterwards P’o-lha-nas went to bKra-sis-lhun-po and met the Tashi-Lama; here too we are not told of the matter discussed. Apparently nothing came of the negotiations, if there had been any. P’o-lha-nas took the occasion of his stay in bKra-sis-lhun-po to increase his popularity by gifts in cash and estates to the church and by feasts and games to the nobility of the neighbourhood.

On 23/VI = July 20th, 1718, Tsce-rin-don-grub himself visited bKra-sis-lhun-po with a suite of 200 men, and met the Tashi-Lama. We do not know whether P’o-lha-nas was still there and could meet him. Things thus dragged on till the news spread that a Chinese

1) MBTJ, ff. 146b-147a. 2) MBTJ, ff. 148b-152b. 3) ASTL, f. 285a.
army had arrived on the banks of the Nag-c'u (it was the ill-fated expedition of Erentei in 1718). P'o-lha-nas’s first impulse was to go and join it, but luckily for him he was dissuaded by his wife. Still undecided, he went to bKra-sis-lhun-po to take advice from the ministers of the Tashi-Lama. At that very time four Dzungar officers arrived there bringing him a rescript (bilik) from the Dzungar king. As this could be a signal of danger, P'o-lha-nas first sent word to his family to hide in some safe spot in the mountains; then he met the envoys in the P'un-ts'ogs-k'a'n-gsar palace at bKra-sis-lhun-po. But the rescript contained only empty complimentary formulae: "Oh, P'o-lha Taiji! I recognize that what you said when you were detained in prison, was sincere and without guile. Even afterwards you did not place your reliance elsewhere than in the teaching of the Yellows alone. If there is any other tale of virtues fit to be told, without deceit say it!" P'o-lha-nas was much reassured by this document, and sent messengers to P'o-lha to stop the departure of his wife.

This apparent easing of the situation was only a deception. Several old retainers of Lha-bzan Khan were at this time attacked and put to death by the Dzungars, and a friend of P'o-lha-nas sent him a warning, that his ruin too was intended. P'o-lha-nas heeded the warning, and with some twenty men took refuge in a ravine near P'o-lha. Soon afterwards the Dzungars went to gNa'-nañ, where P'o-lha-nas owned some estates, and ravaged several places. P'o-lha-nas thought of going to Lhasa to get an explanation of these hostilities, which were shown to him just after he had received a courteous writing from the king. On his way to the capital, in the Luñ-dmar country 2) he met sTag-rtse-pa and a Dzungar commander with a small troop on their way to bKra-sis-lhun-po. The Dzungar gave him the news of the defeat and destruction of the Chinese force under Erentei on the Kara-usu (Nag-c'u). P'o-lha-nas was deeply chagrined; but nothing could be done for the moment, and he saw that sTag-rtse-pa was even being greeting by outward rejoicing by the people of gTsän 3). The regent went to bKra-sis-lhun-po, where he was received with much honour. He communicated

1) MBTJ, ff. 153b-156a.
2) Unknown. As it is on the Gyantse — Lhasa road, it has nothing to do with the various Lungmar in the Transhimalaya, described by Sven Hedin.
3) MBTJ, ff. 156b-157b.
to the Tashi-Lama an invitation by the Dsungar ruler to come to Ili; of course it was politely refused 1).

But notwithstanding this outwardly correct behaviour, the executions of the enemies of the Dsungars continued, and even two nephews of the Tashi-Lama were put to death. The situation was becoming unbearable and P'o-lha-nas decided to prepare everything for a revolt at the right moment. He had followed sTag-rtse-pa and the Dsungars as far as Shigatse; but there he pleaded ill health and asked for permission to retire to gNa'-nañ. His request was granted. When he arrived in gNa'-nañ, he was greeted by many influential families, who offered him their services; foremost among them was his old friend Nag-dbañ-bde-c'en. His journey soon became a real propaganda tour, with an ever increasing retinue and accompanied by the growing enthusiasm of the population. P'o-lha-nas went to bKra-sis-lhun-po, and thence he travelled to his old estate of Rin-c'en-rtse now held by sTag-rtse-pa, to Lui-nag Sel-dkar 2) to dGa'-ldan P'un-ts'ogs-gliñ 3), to Mañ-mk'ar bDe-gliñ 4) and lastly to the fort of Sel-dkar Mi-agyur-rdo-rje 5). Here his tour came to an end; apparently his political and military organization was complete. The country held passionately to him; some old irreconcilable enemies of the Dsungars, who had fled to Nepal after the fall of Lha-bzañ Khan, came back and placed themselves at his disposal 6). The Tashi-Lama too seems to have taken a hand in the events, by establishing contacts with the Chinese. In the 2nd month of 1719 five messengers of the marshall prince Yun-t'ı, Chinese commander-in-chief in the west, arrived to bKra-sís-lhun-po and were received by the Tashi-Lama. It was the Chinese mission which will be noticed later (see pp. 57-58). Some envoys of sTag-rtse-pa were at bKra-sís-lhun-po at this very time 7), but we do not know whether these and P'o-lha-nas had contacts with the Chinese.

1) ASTL, ff. 286b-288a.
2) Unknown. There is a Luñ-nag district south of Gyantse; cfr. Tucci, Indo Tibetica, vol. IV, part I, p. 63; but this situation does not suit our context.
3) Pindsoling of the maps, on the gTsän-po west of Shigatse.
4) The Mañ-mk'ar river flows into the gTsänpo shortly to the west of Lha-rtse-rdson. It waters the Mañ-mk'ar district, which is at "one day's march beyond Sa-skya to the west". Cfr. the dBus-gtsan-gi-gnas-brten-mdor-bsdu, ff. 19b and 20a. This interesting text, which is a guide to the holy places of Central Ti†bet, will be shortly published by Dr. Ferrari.
5) Sel-dkar-rdo-rje-rdsod in Vasiljev, ! 13. It is the Shekar-dsong of the maps, about long. 87°13', lat. 28°42'.
6) MBTJ, ff. 159a-163b.
7) ASTL, f. 290a.
At this time the first news of K’añ-c’en-nas’s activities in mña-ris reached gTsañ; it was rumoured that he had intercepted and annihilated a party of Dsungars who passed through his land on their way to Dsungaria ¹). This refers probably to the same event which is related in more detail by Desideri: Ts’e-riñ-don-grub was getting anxious at the lack of news from Dsungaria (they had been intercepted by K’añ-c’en-nas) and began to doubt whether he had lost the favour of his king. To mollify Ts’e-dbañ-rab-brtan, if this were the case, he sent a convoy with a strong escort, loaded with all the wealth plundered in Tibet. On its way through mña-ris, the party was invited by K’añ-c’en-nas to a drinking bout, and while intoxicated, they were cut down to the last man. The treasure remained in K’añ-c’en-nas’s hands ²). P’o-lha-nas at once sent a letter to K’añ-c’en-nas by a trusty officer of his; he informed him of his organization work in gña-nañ and proposed open revolt against the Dsungars. Contact was thus established between the two centres of resistance in Tibet. Before open hostilities broke out ³), P’o-lha-nas, who remembered that he owed his freedom and perhaps his life to sTag-rtse-pa, sent him a letter, in which he told him that a great Chinese army was accompanying the rightful Dalai-Lama to Tibet, and that their victory was certain; he suggested that sTag-rtse-pa should come secretly to him and take refuge in the hidden ravines of the Nags-ron country in the south, because, in case of Chinese victory, his life was in danger. But as the country was by now in a complete turmoil, the messenger carrying the letter could not reach his destination and had to come back without having accomplished his task. Military operation were by now in full swing in the gTsañ-po valley. K’añ-c’en-nas and the mña-ris troops had crossed the Maryum-la and had occupied Nam-riñs in La-stod ⁴). The Tashi-Lama sent to him his officer dKa’c’en Blo-bzan-dar-rgyas with a letter entreating him to avoid starting a ruinous war in the country ⁵). But K’añ-c’en-nas took no heed;

¹) MBTJ, f. 166a-b.  
²) Desideri, pp. 164-165.  
³) This must have been not earlier than the beginning of 1720, because Ts’e-riñ-don-grub intervened at the New Year’s festival of that year in bkra-sis-lhun-po (ASTL, f. 293b); he could hardly have done so if the country had been in open revolt.  
⁴) Seems to be different from Nam-riñ which is on the left bank of the gTsañ-po between Lha-rtse and P’un-ts’ogs-glön. It should be somewhere not far from skyid-ron, which too is in La-stod.  
⁵) ASTL, f. 296a.
he advanced as far as Gro-šod 1), where he encamped. The governor of Gyantse and some troops from Lho-dgon were at Lha-rtse; towards them advanced a division of the m Nb-a-ris troops marching towards Śel-dkar under the orders of Nag-dban-yon-tan. But as they thought only of replenishing their stores and of requisitioning whatever they could use, there was no actual fighting. P'o-lha-nas intervened and made a speech to the leaders, which was a kind of political manifesto. He recounted the atrocities committed by the Dsungars, spoke of the advance of the Chinese army and invited all of them to submit loyally to the Chinese emperor. Everybody assented and pledged his faith to P'o-lha-nas. The troops fraternized amidst the general rejoicing. No further military measure was taken, but a strict watch was kept because it was feared that the Dsungars, before abandoning Tibet, would try to carry the Tashi-Lama away with them 2).

Then a chieftain from Nag-ts'añ brought the news that the Dsungars were marching towards m Na'-ris. P'o-lha-nas at once set out with a mixed force from Southern gTsan, some Mongols and the m Na'-ris contingent. But he had only arrived at E-dmar-sgañ 3), when a Mongol deserter from the Dsungar army told him that the main Dsungar forces had passed through sNon-mo K'u-luñ in Nag-ts'añ on their way to Dsungaria. As it was evident that a pursuit would be useless, P'o-lha-nas marched from there in eight days to the Zañ-zañ country 4). There at last P'o-lha-nas after so many vicissitudes met again K’añ-c’en-nas and exchanged gifts with him among the acclamations of the troops. While encamped there, they received a letter from the Chinese commander inviting them to Lhasa. P'o-lha-nas was against immediate acceptance; his reason was that it was doubtful whether the Chinese commander had the power to reward them for their deeds, or whether he had first to report to the court. In this case it was better to wait for the orders of the emperor and not to risk the affront of obeying the summons and then returning empty-handed. But K’añ-c’en-nas’s officers, foremost among them Nag-dban-yon-tan, insisted on

1) Gro-šod (Troshot) is the upper valley of the gTsan-po, from the Maryum-la to the Tsachu-tsangpo.
2) MBTJ, ff. 169a-171a.
3) On the northern bank of the gTsaii-po, not far from Shigatse.
4) Sangsang in the valley of the Raga-tsangpo.
compliance, because they did not wish to be absent from Lhasa when the guilty were going to be punished and the deserving rewarded. Their advice prevailed, and soon the two leaders reached Lhasa ¹).

Thus ended the Tibetan rising against the Dzungars. In mNa'-ris it had from the beginning been organized and led with great energy and decision, and had performed useful work in cutting Tsé-rin-don-grub's communications with his homeland. In gTsaré it had started too late and with too much prudence. Far from being of help to the Chinese, the revolt had been a direct consequence of the Chinese advance. It showed no great feats and had done little harm to the Dzungars, who were already quitting the country when it started. With all due respect for the organizing talents of P'oo-lhanas, history must say that he took action much too late, and that he simply rushed to the help of the winner.

¹) MBTJ, ff. 171b-173a.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE CHINESE CONQUEST OF TIBET

The emperor got the first inkling of Dsungar military movements on ǰён-šeǹ/VII = August 26th, 1717. A report by general Funingga from Hsining stated that in the previous year Ts’e-riṅ-don-grub, Tobci and sDugs-dkar bSam-grub with 6000 men had marched towards mNa’-ris in order to help Lha-bzaṅ Khan in his war against Bhutan¹), and up to the date of writing they had not yet returned ²). The following events are well-known; the tale has been told by Rockhill, Courant and Haenisch. Haenisch’s account ³) is by far the best and most exhaustive; a short outline of the main features of the campaign, drawn from his narrative, will suffice for our purpose. The political aspects of the war will be studied later.

When the emperor heard that Ts’e-riṅ-don-grub was definitely marching south-eastwards, he was at first in doubt about the intentions of the Dsungars. Either they were aiming to conquer Tibet, or they were marching through Tsaidam against Kukunor; in the second case, it was probable that Lha-bzaṅ Khan was cooperating with them. Lha-bzaṅ Khan was a friend of the Chinese; but since his matrimonial alliance with the Dsungars, the emperor did not trust him overmuch. K’ang-hsi prudently took military precautions with a view to both possibilities. But already in the 8th month (September) of 1717 he received Lha-bzaṅ Khan’s letter with the announcement of the arrival of the Dsungars in Nag-ts’aiṅ. In the 2nd month (March) of 1718 he received Lha-bzaṅ Khan’s appeal for help. It was of course much too late, but nevertheless the Chinese offensive began at once on two fronts: in the north from Hsining through Kukunor and Tsaidam, in the south from

¹) Pu-lu-k’o-pa 卜鲁克巴, the Tibetan aBrug-pa.
²) Shéng-ts’un Shih-lu, ch. 273, f. 8a.
³) Haenisch, pp. 200-208. The Shih-lu contain nearly all of Haenisch’s 37 documents, and gives besides some more pieces (chiefly reports by prince Yün-t’i) of little historical importance.
Szechwan through K‘ams in the direction Ta-chien-lu—Li-t‘ang—Batang. The northern army under the Manchu officer Erentei and the Mongol duke Ts‘e-dbañ-nor-bu entered Kukunor, where they were reinforced by 6000 men of local levies. There they received the news of the fall of Lhasa and of Lha-bzañ Khan’s death. The whole strategical outlook was changed by this event; it was no more a question of a rescue expedition, it was a campaign of conquest which had to be organized on quite different lines. The emperor ordered therefore the postponement of operations until the next year. Only a small detachment under an officer called Sereng (Ts‘e-rin) was sent towards Tibet for reconnoitring the enemy. Erentei was to follow with a larger force in support. Sereng marched much farther than previously intended, following the call of the Tibetan populations who begged him to save them from the Dsungars. He encamped on the Nag-c‘u and, repulsing a night attack by the Dsungars, waited for Erentei. The latter had followed Sereng at a distance of some days, had repulsed a Dsungar attack on the banks of the Čino-gol, and joined Sereng on the Nag-c‘u. There they had to resist heavy attacks by strong Dsungar forces. The two Manchu leaders were in complete disagreement, provisions and ammunition gave out, and in the 8th intercalary month (September-October) of 1718 the whole force of about 7000 1) was destroyed.

On the southern front Nien Kêng-yao 年羹堯 2), the governor of Szechwan, had solidly occupied Ta-chien-lu as the base for further advance, and had sent a detachment to Li-t‘ang. In the next year (1719) the Manchu general Galbi took over command in the south; he occupied Batang and prepared everything for an offensive the next spring. In 1720 by a most noteworthy marching feat over a difficult route, the Szechwan army reached Lhasa, which they occupied on 23/VIII = September 24th. They had met with no opposition, because the Dsungars had concentrated in a Dam all the troops available, including even Tibetan infantry and cavalry from dBus and gTsan 3), against the Kukunor army, which was nearer to them and the advance of which threatened their line of

1) This number is given in the above quoted letter of Fr. Domenico da Fano, dated Thueé, February 2nd, 1719.
2) D. 1726. His biography in Hummel, pp. 587-590.
3) ASTL, ff. 296a-297b.
retreat. The Kukunor army was commanded by general Yansin (Yen-hsin 延信) 1); in this sector was also present prince Yün-t'ī 允禩 2), K'ang-hsi's 14th son, the commander-in-chief of the Tibetan theatre of operations. Yansin repulsed three night attacks by the Dsungars during the march, and reached aDam after heavy fighting. He started thence on 8/IX = October 9th, and arrived at Lhasa a week afterwards, bringing with him the new Dalai-Lama. Ts'e-riṅ-don-grub with the remnants of the Dsungar army had fled towards Nag-ts'aṅ and Dsungaria.

Till 1718, life at the court of the boy Dalai-Lama in sKu-ḥum had followed its even course without much change; at least nothing special can be gleaned from the stately account of the LSDL, always concerned only with ceremonies, gifts and state visits of grandees from various countries. But in 1718 the Chinese court began to turn their attention to the boy, who was the rightful, and since the Pad-dkar-ḥadsin-pa's deposition, the only Dalai-Lama. During the spring the treasurer dKa'-bcu Ṇag-dbaṅ-dpal-mgon brought several gifts from the emperor and the Chinese ministers. Generally speaking, there were signs of an increased deference and respect on the part of the Chinese. The officers of Funingga's army, which was then preparing for action against Hami, often came to pay their respects. In the 5th month, two officers of Erentei's force asked for the Dalai-Lama's blessing before their departure. The men who acted for the Dalai-Lama, foremost among them his capable father, seem to have soon understood what was in the wind, and they began to spin their threads with Peking. Their faithful supporter, the Mongol prince Ju-naṅ, who was going to court, was entrusted with a message for the emperor requesting protection and expressing the wish to be escorted to Lhasa. Ju-naṅ had an audience with the emperor, who expressed himself in terms favourable to the request. This news caused much joy at sKu-ḥum 3).

A diplomatic interlude preceded the final resumption of hostilities. In the autumn of 1718 some envoys of king Ts'e-dbaṅ-rab-brtan passed through sKu-ḥum; they were on their way to the Chinese court with a message of Ts'e-dbaṅ-rab-brtan, which

---

1) Dates of birth and death unknown. His biography in Hummel, pp. 907-908.
2) 1688-1755. His biography in Hummel, pp. 930-931.
3) LSDL, ff. 45a-47b.
justified the invasion of Tibet by pleading his loyalty to the Lamaist church and the necessity of punishing Lha-bzan Khan’s misdeeds. In the spring of 1719, the Dalai-Lama’s father, during a visit to the fortress of Hsining, was informed that Ts’e-dbaṅ-rab-brtan’s envoys had been well received at Peking and that they were going back to Lhasa with some Chinese officials. It was then decided to send along with them a representative of the Dalai-Lama and some messengers of the Kukunor princes. And thus on 8/III = April 27th, the treasurer dKa’-bcu āg-dbaṅ-dpal-mgon and E-pa Blo-bzaṅ-dkon-mc’og left for Tibet, ostensibly for the purpose of offering gifts to the two holy images, the Jo-bo Śākya in Lhasa 1). The purpose of the Chinese mission was to secure the peaceful withdrawal of the Dsungar army 2). This of course they failed to obtain, and so force had to be resorted to.

The great Chinese army was then assembling, and the Mongol prince Ts’e-dbaṅ-nor-bu, representing the emperor, came to pay his homage to the Dalai-Lama. He had been sent from Hsining by prince Yūn-t’i, with offerings for the recitation of prayers for the emperor’s life. Shortly afterwards prince Yūn-t’i came personally to sKu-ābum and interviewed the boy Dalai-Lama, showing him much honour. The Dalai-Lama wished good success to the imperial arms and took leave of the prince giving him many presents 3).

The exchange of courtesies, chiefly with the Dalai-Lama’s father, continued afterwards for a long time. It was all part of the Tibetan policy newly settled by the emperor. On 1-wei/IX = November 7th, 1719, K’ang-hsi intimated to the Grand Secretariat his intention of officially recognizing the qubil-yan of sKu-ābum as the legitimate Dalai-Lama, and gave detailed instructions for his safe escort to Lhasa in the train of the advancing army. He also ordered the convocation of an assembly of the Kukunor chiefs, to hear his decision and to give their advice 4). This imperial rescript was solemnly read by special envoys in the Dalai-Lama’s full court. In the words in which the emperor’s Tibetan chancery put it, it

---

3) LSDL, ff. 46b-50a.
Within the 4th month of the next year, four great officials (blon-c’en-mi-drag) together with the commanders of the great army of fulgent splendour, will lead the most excellent Lama towards dBus-gTsang of Tibet; they will place the lotus of his feet upon the great golden throne, built by the five fearless demons, of the matchless grand palace of Lokeśvara, the second Potala' ¹). The rejoicing and merry-making at sKu-ābum was indescribable, and all the chieftains hastened to offer gifts to the future ruler of Tibet. On this occasion E-pa Blo-bzang-dkon-mc’og came back from Tibet and gave an account of his mission. He had been well received everywhere, and sTag-rtse-pa and other Tibetan nobles had entrusted him with presents for the Dalai-Lama. About the end of the 10th month (November-December), E-pa and another monk were sent to Peking to bring a letter to the emperor ²) and to give him an account of their failure.

In the meantime the assembly of the Kukunor chiefs met at Hsihing with Ju-nañ and bsTan-ādsin Čingwang as chairmen. They took cognizance of the emperor’s rescript and approved it. After the New Year’s festival (February 8th), they assembled again at sKu-ābum. Prince Yün-t‘i too came there to explain the emperor’s intentions. He was received by the father of the Dalai-Lama in a scene of great splendour; the prince was accompanied by a brilliant suite and a division of 3000 men. He was received in audience by the Dalai-Lama, to whom he announced the emperor’s plans. The meeting of the Kukunor chiefs ended with their complete approval of the emperor’s message and with the promise of assembling an army for cooperation with the Chinese forces ³). Their decisions were communicated by prince Yün-t‘i to the emperor (kuei-chou/II = March 24th, 1720). Then at last followed the official recognition of the Dalai-Lama, in the form of the grant of a state seal. On 20/III = April 27th, the precious seal was received at sKu-ābum. It was made of gold and jewels and weighed 130 ounces. It bore in Manchu, Mongol and Tibetan the legend “Seal of the Sixth Dalai-Lama, leader of the creatures, diffuser of the Teaching” ⁴). Evidently the Imperial chancery with much elegance had avoided all discussion by ignoring the boy’s two predecessors, Ts’āns-dbyāns-rgya-mts’o

¹) LSDL, f. 53a. ²) LSDL, ff. 53b-54b. ³) LSDL, ff. 55b-58a. ⁴) LSDL, f. 60a; Loṅ-ba’i-dmigs-bu, s.a. 1720. Exactly the same title in Chinese; Hae-nisch, p. 401 (= Shèng-tsū Shih-lü, ch. 287, f. 12b).
and Lha-bzaṅ Khan's puppet, who had both been recognized by the emperor. A second document was represented by a diploma engraved on a gold plate of 150 onces; it bore the date of the day dge-bar of the 2nd month of the 59th year of K'ang-hsi. Seal and plate were accompanied by many precious gifts. They were handed over by prince Yün-t'ī with gorgeous ceremonial 1).

On the 22/IV = May 28th 2), the Dalai-Lama set out on his journey to Lhasa, in the train of Yansin's invading army. For a long distance he was accompanied, as we have seen, by the Chinese commander-in-chief and a considerable escort. At each stage the Mongol chiefs of the neighbourhood presented themselves, offered homage and showered gifts on him. On the shore of the Kukunor it was heard that sDe-pa Na-p'od-pa of Koñ-po had revolted against the Dsungars. Prince Yün-t'ī sent an invitation to him, and in due course the sDe-pa presented himself to the Chinese in the sKar-ma-t'ān plain 3). Of him we know that he was an old minister (bka'-blon) of the Dalai-Lama 4); nothing else is known of the man who was to have such an important share in the events of 1727/8. At this time he does not seem to have been an important personage; but the lucky chance of having been the first Tibetan chief of note to join the new rulers of the country, weighed the scales in his favour, and we shall meet him later in the council of ministers installed by the Chinese.

The journey continued, and on the banks of the aBri-c'u (upper course of the Yangtze-kiang) the T'ū-kuan 土 觀 Qutuqtu ṅag-dbaṅ-c'os-kyi-rgya-mts'o 5) and the bKa'-agyur Ta Bla-ma Blo-bzaṅ-ts'ul-k'risms, sent by the emperor, greeted and made obeisance to the Dalai-Lama. In the same place prince Yün-t'ī took leave with a great feast, and went back to his standing quarters on the frontier. At Toyo-tolowyi (T'o-go-t'o-lo-mgo) the convoy was joined by the Dalai-Lama's faithful sponsor and chief supporter,

---

1) LSDL, f. 60a-b.
2) LSDL, f. 61b; Loṅ-ba'i-dmigs-bu, s.a. 1720.
3) Mongol Odon-tala, the marshy region to the west of the Huang-ho sources.
4) Courant, p. 90.
5) He lived from 1680 to 1736 and was the first of the series of the T'ū-kuan Qutuqtu of Peking. His biography in aJigs-med-rig-pa'i-rdo-rje, Hor-c'os-abyuṅ, transl. by Huth (Geschichte des Buddhismus in der Mongolei, Strasbourg 1896), pp. 280-288. The work was written in 1819. The real name of the author is the one given above, and not aJigs-med-nam-mk'a', which is due to a misunderstanding by Huth. Cfr. Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, p. 149.
dGa'-ldan Ārdāni Ju-nañ, with some thousands of Kukunor Mongols; it must have been the army promised by the assembly of the chiefs. They passed through the gDañ-la and came to aBog, where there was a moment of danger, because of Dsungar bands still roving in the zone. But no untoward accident happened. On the Nag-c'u the Dalai-Lama was greeted by Lotsawa Lha-btsun from bKra-śis-lhun-po. In the gYañ-ra pass 1) many Tibetan grandees presented themselves, among them Lum-pa-nas and sByar-ra-ba, the future ministers, the abbot of Rva-sgreñ and others. At bCom-mdo 2) the representatives of the chief monasteries of northern dBus (aBri-k'uñ, sTag-luñ etc.) gave their welcome to the new head of the Church. At Lhun-grub-rdson 3) the third dignitary of the Yellow Church, the K'ri Rin-po-c'e dGe-adun-p'ün-ts'ogs 4) and the retired K'ri Rin-po-c'e Blo-bzañ-dar-rgyas 5) waited upon the Dalai-Lama, together with the most respected and learned monks of the three great monasteries. At aBrom-ston-p'u the Dalai-Lama received the homage of the leading inhabitants of Lhasa, among whom strangely enough the Dsungars' henchman sTag-rtse-pa. On 15/IX = October 16th, 1720 6), the Seventh Dalai-Lama entered with all pomp the pillaged and desolated Potala. His retinue was a splendid assemblage of Mongol chiefs, Manchu and Chinese officers and Tibetan clergymen and nobles. In one of the foremost places in the procession, walking to the left side of the Dalai-Lama just behind two Chinese generals, was sTag-rtse-pa, who for the moment seemed to stand in high favour. The Dalai-Lama and his father had reached their goal 7).

1) Between Rva-sgreñ and aDam. Cfr. the Chinese itinerary translated by Rockhill in JRAS 1891, pp. 93 and 101.
2) Chomdo of the maps, on the road from Rva-sgreñ to P'o-mdo (Phongdu).
3) Lhundrup-dsong of the maps, on the P'o-mdo — Lhasa road.
4) The 50th K'ri Rin-po-c'e (b. 1648, on the see 1715-1722, d. 1724). His biography is vol. Na of the collection.
5) The 49th K'ri Rin-po-c'e (b. 1662, on the see 1708-1715, d. 1723). His biography is vol. Ga of the collection.
6) LSDL, f. 66b. Wei-tsang-t'ung-chih, ch. 13a, f. 3a. Della Penna's date of October 6th may be due to a slip of the pen.
7) LSDL, ff. 61b-67a.
CHAPTER SIX

THE CHINESE PROTECTORATE DURING THE LAST YEARS OF K'ANG-HSI

Immediately after their entry in Lhasa, the Chinese installed a provisional military government, presided by general Yansin and composed of three Mongol officers in the Chinese army: duke (kung) Ts'e-dbañ-nor-bu, Don-grub Wang (a Khalkha chief) and bsTan-adsin Wang; of the Manchu Efu Aboo 1); and of the Tibetan noblemen Ṇa-p'od-pa and Lum-pa-nas 2). It held office till the spring of 1721, when it gave place to the regular government, which had been formed in the meantime.

The main task of the provisional government was the liquidation of Dsungar rule through the trial and punishment of those Tibetans who had collaborated with the Mongol invaders. Foremost among them was of course the regent sTag-rtse-pa. On the arrival of the Chinese troops from Szechwan he had been enticed out of his fortress of sTag-rtse on the sKyid-c'u, and had accompanied the Chinese to Lhasa. At first his activity under Dsungar rule, albeit not unknown to the Chinese, did not prevent them from treating him with deference; we have seen him taking part in the ceremony of the Dalai-Lama's entry into the Potala. But soon accusations began to reach the Chinese authorities from every side, and soon

1) Chinese E-fu A-pao 额駙阿寶; Ebus Beile in Tibetan texts. He was the son of Ho-lo-li 和羅理 and had been given the rank of imperial brother-in-law (efu, Nieh Ch'ung-ch'i, p. 100), with rights of inheritance. During the wars against dGa'-ldan he had held a command on the frontier. After his return from Tibet he took part in the campaign against Blo-bzañ-bstan-adsin. He was an enemy of Nien Kéng-yao, and the latter's disgrace contributed to his fortune. After having repelled some nomad raids, he came to court and was promoted to chün-wang, or prince of the 2nd class. Chung-kuo jën-ming ta-ts'ü-tien 中國人名大辭典, Shanghai 1933, p. 619d. — See also Haenisch, p. 396 (= Sheng-su Shih-lu, ch. 286, f. 18b).
2) Loi-ba'i-dmigs-bu, s.a. 1720. The provisional government is described also in Desideri, p. 172. De Filippi's translation here is not quite reliable, and his addition of the words by a King, Tisri Telchin Bathur, and in italics is utterly misleading.
sTag-rtse-pa was confined in a small house in Lhasa. There was much discussion among the populace, and chiefly among the lieutenants of K'añ-c'en-nas and P'o-lha-nas, about the treatment to be meted out to those Tibetans who had accepted office from the Dsungars, and many maintained the necessity of exemplary punishment. P'o-lha-nas was decidedly on the side of leniency, and worked hard in favour of sTag-rtse-pa; he remembered that after all he owed to him his freedom and perhaps his life. But soon a definite charge against sTag-rtse-pa was brought before the Chinese general: the betrayal of Surya and of Lha-bzañ Khan's family into the hands of the Dsungars. P'o-lha-nas went to Yansin and pleaded passionately for the accused. His defence ran on the following lines: sTag-rtse-pa's co-operation with the Dsungars was forced, and the betrayal of Surya was the work of his retainers; on the other hand sTag-rtse-pa had always tried to save the Tibetans from the oppression of the Dsungars; he had even protected the rNiñ-ma-pa from persecution; when the Chinese had arrived from K'ams, he had duly paid homage to their generals. Even the Dalai-Lama (or rather his father) was favourable to sTag-rtse-pa, partly because he belonged to a very noble family, and partly because he had been a benefactor of the Church; the Chinese generals were entreated by the Dalai-Lama to spare sTag-rtse-pa's life 1). But it was of no avail. The Chinese courteously but firmly rejected any interference 2). sTag-rtse-pa, the two ministers (bka'i-dguñ-blon) bKra-sis-rtse-pa (P'o-lha-nas's old comrade at the siege of Lhasa) and A-c'os, and several minor officials were manacled and imprisoned after much dishonour and insult in the Chinese camp at the foot of the Potala. This gave an occasion to P'o-lha-nas for repaying sTag-rtse-pa's former kindness, by providing him with food and clothes, and otherwise caring for his welfare. The Chinese found sTag-rtse-pa guilty of co-operation with the Dsungars, which was the charge weighing most heavily with them, and sentenced him to death. sTag-rtse-pa and the two ministers were led with full pomp under a large escort to the execution ground on the bank of the sKyid-c'u. The troops lined up and gave a triple salvo of musketry, and after this military display the three culprits

1) LSDL, f. 72a. 2) Desideri, p. 171; ASTL, f. 299b.
were beheaded (11th month of 1720). P'o-lha-nas did not even succeed in saving the dead ministers' families from deportation to Peking.

After justice had been done, the important problem of the organization of the new Chinese protectorate received its due attention. The situation of the Chinese after the fall of Lhasa was incomparably more favourable than that of the Dsungars three years before. They had the rightful Dalai-Lama with them, with all the glamour and authority of his name in their support. The clergy, always pro-Chinese, rallied to them without difficulty. The nobility, some of whom had been in revolt against the Dsungars, crowded round the Chinese representatives, expecting from them honours, titles and power. Of the provinces, K'ams and Kukunor, always under some measure of Chinese influence, had been effectively occupied during the war. mNa'-ris and gTsan were under the influence of the most bitter enemies of the Dsungars. Tibet had thus come willingly and completely under Chinese sway; there was no necessity for sending out expeditions from Lhasa to bring the provinces under subjection, as the Dsungars had been compelled to do. Lastly, though the possibility of Dsungar intrigues was by no means to be excluded, a second Dsungar invasion of Tibet was unthinkable, firstly because the great war then going on in Kansu and Turkestan needed all the troops the Dsungar king could muster; secondly because communications between Tibet and China were far easier and shorter than between Tibet and Dzungaria. All that was needed now was a good religious, political and military organization.

In a country like Tibet, the religious organization came first in order of importance; it was on the whole ready even before the fall of Lhasa. Lha-bzaṅ Khan's puppet Dalai-Lama, who had been interned by the Dsungars in the lCags-po-ri college as a simple monk, was sent to Peking as a precautionary measure against possible intrigues; there he sank into oblivion and died in 1725 (see later). He owed his life to his absolute insignificance; he had been a victim of Lha-bzaṅ Khan's blundering religious policy, and

---

1) De Filippi's translation of Desideri conveys the wrong impression that the deposed Dalai-Lama Ye-śes-rgya-nts'o was decapited, which of course is absurd. The Italian text (in Puini, p. 358) simply states that the heads of the lamas among the culprits were cut by the hand of the executioner (A' Lama fu tagliata per man del carnefice la testa).

2) The above account of the trial of sTag-rse-pa is based on MBTJ, ffs. 173b-178b and ASTL, f. 299a-b.
had never commanded any following in Tibet or elsewhere. The Chinese court, who had once recognized him, could therefore display generosity and allow him to live, and even give him an honoured position, as it appears from the titles he bore at the time of his death (Dam-pa mK'an-po Qutuqtu).

The Seventh Dalai-Lama was now installed in the Potala 1), and employed his first days there in receiving the gifts and homage of the Mongol and Tibetan nobility and clergy. In the 10th month (November) of 1720 the Tashi-Lama had been invited to come to Lhasa, as his recognition of the new Dalai-Lama was of essential importance. He was accompanied for most of the way by K'ān-c'ea-nas, and was met outside Lhasa by the Dalai-Lama’s father and the Chinese generals 2). In the Potala he met the young Dalai-Lama, whose religious position had not yet been regularized by the necessary vows and initiations. On the 5/XI = December 4th, the Dalai-Lama pronounced the vows of a novice (dge-ts'udl) in the hands of the Tashi-Lama, the K'ri Rin-po-c'e and sKu-mdun sNēgs-ras-tpa bSam-gtan-rgyal-mt's'an; he received the name Blo-bzañ-bskal-bzañ-rgya-mt's'o, by which he was known henceforward. This was the beginning of a shortened but intensive course of studies in the Lamaist theology, as preparation for the exercise of his high office 3). Shortly afterwards the Dalai-Lama and the Tashi-Lama celebrated the New Year's festival (January 28th) of 1721 together in Lhasa 4).

The only Chinese interference with the Church was the expulsion of the Dsungar lamas from the three great monasteries and from bKra-Sis-lhun-po. They were arrested by the abbots and handed over to the Chinese. Five of them (chief lamas appointed by Ts'e-rin-don-grub) were decapitated, the rest were imprisoned 5). This

---

1) The Potala had been completely despoiled and partly ruined by the Dsungars in 1717. Its restoration was a long and costly affair. The emperor and his sons contributed handsomely towards the expense; so did also the Manchu princes, the chiefs of Kukunor, the Mongol and Tibetan aristocracy, the monasteries of Tibet and Mongolia, and even the faraway Kalmuks on the Volga. It was truly a pan-Lamaist undertaking. After some years the Potala was again its former self, even more beautiful and richer than before. — Mémoire sur le Thibet et le royaume des Eleuths, in Lettres édifiantes et curieuses, vol. III (Paris 1843), p. 521 n.

2) ASTL, f. 296b.

3) LSDL, ff. 70b-71b. ASTL, f. 298b.


5) Haenisch, p. 405 (= Shêng-ts'u Shih-lu, loc. cit.). Dsungar lamas were first sent to Central Tibetan monasteries by the Dsungar ruler dGa'-ldan in the nineties of the 17th century. Ch'ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 3b.
strong measure was necessary in order to eliminate once for all the Dzungar intrigues among the lamas, which had been so effective in 1717.

As to the civil government, the Chinese did away with the office of sde-srid (regent), which placed too much power in the hands of a single individual. The form of government they established was a relatively strict form of protectorate. Its main features were a strong Chinese garrison in Lhasa with safe communications with China, and a council of ministers composed of men that could be trusted. The council was to govern the country under the close supervision of the commander of the Chinese garrison, who could always interfere with the decisions of the council when Chinese interests were directly concerned. Also a territorial re-arrangement took place; partly for securing the communications with Lhasa and partly for satisfying provincial expansionism of Szechwan, the whole of south-eastern Tibet, with Batang, Li-t‘ang, Ta-chien-lu and all the country as far as the borders of Central Tibet, was placed under the Chinese governor of Szechwan. The arrangement proved unsatisfactory in the long run, and had to be partly revised in 1725.

In the rest of that country the council of ministers was supreme. It was composed of the traditional number of four. Fittingly enough, K‘an-c‘en-nas, who had been the first Tibetan leader in the field and the most effective ally of the Chinese, was restored to the post of Prime Minister, which he had held under Lha-bzan Khan. He was given the Manchu title of beise (in the Tibetan texts: Pas-se) and the Mongol title of Daičing Bātur, by which he became henceforward known to the Tibetans. He was entrusted, beside his chairmanship of the council, also with the government of mNa-ris. According to traditional Chinese policy, he was given a colleague, with slightly inferior rank but fully equal powers, it being intended that they should control each other. To this position Na-p‘od-pa rDo-rje-rgyal-po was appointed. He too was granted the title of beise and was confirmed in the governorship of his native country Koñ-po. The two chief ministers had two junior-ministers under them, with whom they were to consult for every matter of impor-

---

1) The dPag-bsam-ljon-bzan is wrong in giving the title of sde-srid to K‘an-c‘en-nas. It may be however that in popular usage the chairman of the council continued to be loosely called by the old title of sde-srid.
2) Haenisch, pp. 402-404 (= Shêng-atsu Shih-lu, ch. 287, ff. 19a-20a).
tance. One was Lum-pa-nas bkra-sis-rgyal-po, a nobleman from the Lohit valley. He had been a finance director (rtsis-dpon) in Lha-bzan Khan's time; as we have seen, he had come personally to submit to the Chinese commanders before Lhasa, and was rewarded by the emperor with the title of ju-kuo-kung 輔国公 (Tibetan gun), or duke of the second class. He too was given the government of his native region. According to the MBTJ, he was a man of strong sympathies, ready to give quick preferment to his friends and to antagonize those who had the misfortune of displeasing him; in the latter class was almost at once included P'o-lha-nas. Lum-pa-nas was to be the chief villain in the drama of 1727/8.—The second junior minister was a man of lesser standing than the others: sByar-ra-ba Blo-gros-rgyal-po, the treasurer (p'yang-mdsod-pa) of the Dalai-Lama. Although a layman, he was probably intended to represent the interests of the church in the council. But he was a man of little importance, bore only the minor title of ta'i, and played an unimportant role. The members of the council were styled in Tibetan bk'ari-mdun-na-adon, or more commonly bk'ari-dguñ-blon, usually shortened into bk'ari-blon.

There were two other personages, who were not members of the council and had no official position in the eyes of the Chinese, but very often took part in the deliberations of the council, and gradually became a kind of unofficial members. One was, quite naturally, the father of the Dalai-Lama. The other was P'o-lha-nas; he had been appointed by K'a'n-c'en-nas as his chief adjutant and main collaborator, and was also entrusted with the government of gTs'an. He soon became a prominent figure in the council, although he was formally appointed as a full member in 1723 only.

The Chinese had come to Tibet with the avowed intention of avenging the death of Lha-bzan Khan. It was also widely rumoured that when peace was concluded, the emperor would obtain the liberation of Lha-bzan Khan's sons and would place one of

---

1) The first tributary of the Brahmaputra in eastern Assam.
2) Mayers, n. 22.
3) On the composition and titles of the council see MBTJ, f. 179b; LSDL, f. 74b; Lon-ba'i-dmigs-bu, s.a. 1721; Haensch, p. 422 (= Shéng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 291, fl. 11b-12a); Ch'ing-shih-kao, ch. 8 (P'en-chi 8), f. 21b; Courant, pp. 90-91; Rockhill in JRAS 1891, p. 74. The Lon-ba'i-dmigs-bu and the Wei-tsang-t'u-chih place P'o-lha-nas among the members of the council since its creation, but are contradicted by the much weightier authority of the MBTJ and of the Shih-lu.
4) Desideri, p. 171.
them on the throne of Lhasa\(^1\)). Popular rumour of course overstepped the mark, and we know that the Chinese never entertained such an intention. Still, the presence of K‘aǒ-n-c‘en-nas at the head of the council seemed to indicate a simple restoration of Lha-bzaň Khan’s government. But in reality it was quite otherwise. The council was sharply divided. On the one side stood K‘aň-n-c‘en-nas, supported by P‘o-lha-nas, both old and faithful officials of Lha-bzaň Khan, both active opponents of the Dsungars, both staunch supporters of the Chinese; territorially, they represented Western and Southern Tibet, the centres of the anti-Dsungar revolt. On the other side, Ná-p‘od-pa and Lüm-pa-nas, typical representatives of the old-style aristocracy; they had held no very high position under Lha-bzaň Khan, had not rebelled against the Dsungars till the last moment, had rallied to the conquerors at the end of the war, and were for the time being lukewarm and unreliable supporters of the Chinese; their main support was to be found in Kôn-po and the lower gTsän-po valley, territories practically untouched by the Dsungars. They were the exponents of the old national aristocratic parties. As to sByar-ra-ba, he was a mere official of the church, and the real brain behind him was the father of the Dalai-Lama. The very composition of the council carried thus in itself the seeds of strife and of the upheaval of 1727. Another strong element of disruption was the fact that, since each of the ministers was the governor of a province, they were pretty often absent from Lhasa in their territories; and the council gradually became a desultory meeting of powerful regional rulers, rather than an administrative body. We shall see that later events developed strictly along the lines sketched above.

As to military organization, it was understood that after the withdrawal of the main Chinese army a strong garrison was to be left in Lhasa. It numbered at first 3000 men (Manchu, Chinese and Mongols) under the command of Ts‘e-dbaň-nor-bu\(^2\)); his chief lieutenant was the Manchu officer Efu Aboo (Ebus Beile). For reasons not very clear to us, the emperor ordered the demolition of the walls built by Lha-bzaň Khan\(^3\)); and Lhasa has remained ever since an open city. Early in 1721 the Chinese army marched back

---

2) Haenisch, p. 422 (= Shèng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 291, f. 11b); Courant, p. 91.
3) Rockhill, in JRAS 1891, p. 71.
to China by the southern road, leaving detachments at Batang, Li-t'ang, C'ab-mdo (Chamdo) and Lho-ro'n-rdso'n, to keep open the communications with the garrison of Lhasa ¹).

The dispositions sketched out above were at first intended as a provisional organization. It was understood that later Yansin should return to Tibet to take charge there. 500 men from Yünnan and another 500 from Szechwan (these last commanded by general Galbi) were to reinforce the Lhasa garrison; Yansin was to travel with the Szechwan force ²). But this scheme was not carried out. Yansin never went back to Tibet at all. Galbi set out with the troops from the zone of the Lu-ting bridge (to the east of Ta-chien-lu), but fell ill and could not travel farther. On the proposal of Nien Kêng-yao, the governor-general of Szechwan through whom at this time all Tibetan military affairs were managed, the emperor on chia-wu/IX = October 26th, 1721, ordered that Galbi's official seal be given to Tsê-dban-nor-bu; this meant the appointment of that Mongol nobleman as Chinese representative and commander-in-chief in Tibet. Efu Aboo was appointed as his assistant for military affairs ³). Thus the provisional arrangement became a permanent one.

About the same time the emperor ordered a visible sign of the Chinese conquest to be set up in Lhasa; it is the famous pillar inscription, the text of which is found in most of the Chinese works on Tibet ⁴).

Coming now to relate the events in Tibet up to the death of K'êng-hsi at the end of 1722, or rather till his death became known in Lhasa at the beginning of the following year, we can dismiss in a few lines the nominal head of the country, the still minor Dalai-Lama. His position under the new form of government was that of an honoured figure-head, with no power whatsoever. But his spiritual influence gave him a real importance, and he was therefore always treated with punctilious deference by the Chinese. Relations with the court of Peking were frequent and cordial. In 1721 an

¹) Haenisch, pp. 419-421 (= Shêng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 290, ff. 8b-9b).
²) Haenisch, pp. 423-424 (= Shêng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 291, ff. 30a-31a). Order given on chi-ch'ou/III = April 24th, 1721. Cfr. also Ch'ing-shih-kao, ch. 8 (Pên-ch'i 8), f. 22a.
³) Shêng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 294, f. 8a-b. Ch'ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 7a.
⁴) Translated by Rockhill, in JRAS 1891, pp. 185-187. The imperial order for the setting up of the inscription was issued on t'ing-szu/IX = November 18th, 1721; Shêng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 294, f. 21a. I was unable to consult Jametel, L'épigraphie chinoise au Tibet, Paris 1880.
imperial message was brought to Lhasa by two envoys 1). In the same year Blo-bzañ-rab-brtan, abbot of Pa-boñ-k, was sent to Peking 2), and in 1722 the emperor replied sending several gifts 3). Another mission from the Dalai-Lama and the Tibetan ministers was received by the emperor on hsìn-yu/III = May 21st, 1722 4).

The relations of the Dalai-Lama with the Kukunor princes were of the best, specially with dGa’-ldan Ārdānī Ju-nañ, now as always his chief supporter in this zone. The Chinese commanders in Lhasa, the highest of whom, prince Ts’e-dbañ-nor-bu, was a Lamaist, took part in all the feasts and religious ceremonies. The settlement of the Tibetan troubles reacted also favourably with the neighbouring countries. Thus we hear of missions to the Dalai-Lama despatched in 1720 by the king of Bhatgaon (Tibetan: K’o-k’om) in Nepal 5); in 1721 by the king of Kathmandu (Yam-bu) 6), the Bhutanese rulers 7), the king of Dsum-li 8), the ruler of Sikkim 9); in 1722 by the king of Pattan (Ye-rañ) in Nepal 10). A curious relic of bygone times presented itself to the Dalai-Lama in 1721: ,,The son of the bdag-po of Guge, of the family of the religious kings of Tibet”, accompanied by the abbot of mTco-ldin (To-ling) 11). In other words the legitimate descendant (son would be chronologically impossible) of the last king of Guge, the protector of the Jesuits, dethroned in 1630 by Señ-ge-rnam-rgyal, king of Ladakh 12). The prince, called in the ATTL Blo-bzañ-padma-bkra-sis, remained at the courts of Lhasa and bKra-sis-lhun-po during the whole of this period, and died in the first half of 1743 13).

Of personal matters concerning the Dalai-Lama, it needs only to be said that he passed several months of each summer in aBras-spunś for his courses of theological studies. His mother died in 1722 14). His father developed a particular attachment for the

1) LSDL, f. 77b.
2) This must correspond with one of the two missions to Peking recorded for the year 1721. The first was received by the emperor on chia-shên’V = June 18th (Shêng-tsú Shih-lu, ch. 292, f. 20b), and the second was received on ting-hai/X = December 18th (op. cit., ch. 295; f. 12a).
3) LSDL, f. 87b; ASTL, f. 317b.
4) Shêng-tsú Shih-lu, ch. 297, f. 8a-b.
5) LSDL, f. 73b.
6) LSDL, f. 74b.
7) LSDL, f. 74b.
8) Jumla (aDsum-lañ) in Western Nepal; LSDL, f. 77b. The rulers of aDsum-lañ had been assiduous in paying homage to the Fifth Dalai-Lama. Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls. P. 74.
9) LSDL, f. 88a.
10) LSDL, f. 88a.
11) LSDL, f. 81a.
13) LSDL, f. 299b; ATTL, f. 47a.
14) Funeral rites were performed for her in the first days of 1723. LSDL, f. 91b.
ancient temple of bSam-yas on the left bank of the gTsañ-po above rTses-t’añ, founded by king K’ri-sron-lde-btsan in 787. He went there at the beginning of 1721 1) and at the end of 1722 the former K’ri Rin-po-c’e Blo-bzañ-dar-rgyas could already betake himself there in order to consecrate and inaugurate the repairs carried out by order of the Dalai-Lama’s father 2).

On the activities of the new Tibetan government, our information is practically limited to the MBTJ. One of the first problems they had to cope with, was that of the rNiñ-ma-pa. P’o-lha-nas had been educated at sMin-grol-glin, a rNiñ-ma-pa monastery, and throughout his life he protected this sect, although he always remained outwardly a follower of the Yellow Church. He was now of the opinion that, as the emperor’s edicts enjoined the return of Tibet to the conditions prevailing under the Fifth Dalai-Lama, the old religious situation had to be restored as well. Through the Dsungar persecution, the rDogs-c’en sect (grub-mt’a-la-ris-su-c’ad-pa-med-pa), the rNiñ-ma-pa and the married monks (gzugs-btsun) 3) had suffered a loss of about 550 monasteries pillaged or destroyed; these had to be repaired and re-endowed. But the proposal met with difficulties in the council and was vetoed by Ts’e-dbañ-nor-bu and the Kukunor princes; the Dalai-Lama too was against it. P’o-lha-nas insisted in his proposals, pointing out the unfairness of upholding a measure taken by the Dsungar usurpers, till at last Ts’e-dbañ-nor-bu and Efu Aboo became angry, and he had to give way. Still, he obtained at least that the rNiñ-ma-pa should be allowed to rebuild their monasteries by their own unaided efforts 4).

With or without pressure from Chinese side, the new rulers thought of giving some sort of military help to the emperor in his war against the Dsungars. At the beginning of 1721, while K’añ-c’en-nas went back to mNa3-ris 5), P’o-lha-nas led a small force through Nag-ts’añ into the desert plains of the North-West. But they suffered so much from fatigue, hunger and thirst, that they had to retreat without even seeing the enemy. In Nag-ts’añ, P’o-lha-nas settled some questions between the Lhasa officials and the local

1) LSDL, f. 77b.
3) I take these gzugs-btsun to be the same as the btsan-btsun or the Fifth Dalai-Lama’s regulations. Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, p. 69.
4) MBTJ, ff. 180a-181b.
5) LSDL, f. 74b.
herdsmen, who were subjects of the Tashi-Lama. When the winter came, P'o-lha-nas with his troops left Nag-ts'a'n and returned through Şaṅs to P'o-lha and hence to bKra-šis-lhun-po, where on the 9/XI = December 27th he paid his respects to the Tashi-Lama. Shortly after New Year's day (February 16th) of 1722 2) P'o-lha-nas was back in Lhasa. He offered his homage to the Dalai-Lama, reported on his negative mission to the Chinese commanders, and regained touch with current affairs through discussions with Na-p'od-pa and the father of the Dalai-Lama. It was on this occasion that Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal, the author of the MBTJ, an old retainer of sTag-rtses-pa, attached himself to P'o-lha-nas.

P'o-lha-nas did not stay for long in Lhasa. As he was the most trustworthy officer available, the Chinese commander Ts'e-dbañ-nor-bu requested him to undertake a survey of the routes in Nag-ts'a'n, by which the Dsungars had come to Tibet, and to prepare a report to be forwarded to the emperor. Efu Aboo took the occasion for asking P'o-lha-nas to procure for him thirty good mNa'-ris horses. P'o-lha-nas first went back to P'o-lha to equip himself for the journey. Thence he set out with a small force. Passing through Šen-rte, Rog-c'e etc., he reached Nag-ts'a'n, where he encamped. From his central point he sent out surveying parties to examine the various roads and paths. No sign of the enemy was seen, though P'o-lha-nas was always on the alert and kept his men fit by continuous and strenuous exercise. In the 10th month (November/December) of 1722 he set out for the return journey, after having procured the horses for Efu Aboo; and soon he was back in P'o-lha.

During his absence the Chinese high command in Lhasa had gone through a crisis. On jën-yin/VII = August 29th, 1722, Nien Kêng-yao, the governor-general of Szechwan, reported to the emperor that he had received a memorial from the lama Ts'ul-k'riṃs-bzañ-po (Chʻu-érh-ch'i-mu-tsang-pu 楚爾齋木藏布) residing in

1) MBTJ, ff. 183a-186a; ASTL, f. 313a.
2) MBTJ, f. 186a, has erroneously Water-Hare 1723. LSDL, f. 81a, places this in the last months of 1721.
3) Perhaps Shentsa-dsong of the maps, about long. 88°47', lat. 30°55'.
4) MBTJ, ff. 187a-189b.
Tibet 1) and Shih Ju-chin 石如 金, a Chinese agent in Tibet 2); it said that officers and troops in Tibet were at loggerheads among themselves, because duke Ts'e-dbañ-nor-bu was a weak man, and because several officials were causing trouble and strife, foremost among them the expositor of the Hanlin 3) Man-tu 满 都 and the second-class secretary 4) Padma (Pa-t'ê-ma 巴特 麻). The memorialists proposed either to keep the troops in Tibet and to recall Man-tu and Padma, or to send all the troops back to Chinese territory and to maintain in Tibet only a well-organized postal stages system, in order to keep the officials at Lhasa in communication with the court; only a reserve force was to be stationed at Chamdo. The latter alternative did not appeal to the energetic old emperor. Besides, he strongly resented that subordinate officials should have dared to advise the evacuation of the Chinese troops from Tibet. He ordered the repatriation of both the mischief-makers (Man-tu and Padma) and the memorializers (the Lama and Shih Ju-chin). The financial commissioner 5) of Sian-fu, called Darin (T'a-lin 塔 林), was to replace Man-tu. The governor 6) Sertu (Sê-êrh-t'u 階 爾 圖) was to go to Tibet and to reestablish order among the Chinese soldiery of the Green Banners, whose discipline had much deteriorated. Padma was to be replaced by an official sent for this purpose, who was to restore order among the clerks of the Chinese command, acting in concert with Ts'e-dbañ-nor-bu. Nien Kêng-yao was to supervise the whole

1) This is Culcim Dsangbu Ramjamba of the Chun-ko-érh-fang-lüek (HAENISCH, pp. 218-219), the lama geographer of 1717 companion of Ņengju. This document disposes of Fuchs's contention (Der Jesuiten-Atlas der Kangsi-Zeit, p. 12) that two lamas are meant. Even without this, philological reasons renders this impossible. Rab-âbyams-pa is a title corresponding to something like Dr. Phil.; and Ts'ul-k'rlms-bzañ-po is a very common name, which cannot be divided in two. There was certainly another lama cartographer; but his name in not mentioned anywhere.


movement 1). The effect of these measures was soon felt. On wutzu/IX = October 10th, Sertu was able to report complete order and smooth working in the Chinese command and troops. Of the 3500 men then in Tibet, 1900 were necessary for security and for the watching of the 66 postal stages newly organized. The remaining 1600 could be safely repatriated, and it was highly advisable to do so, because of the difficulties of supply and of the high expenses of the army in Tibet 2). As we shall see from the Tibetan texts, the Chinese occupation army was indeed a most heavy burden on the poor country.

This movement of officials and the special mission of Sertu are mentioned also in the Tibetan texts, which tell us of the arrival of three Chinese officials (ta-žiṅ, Chinese ta-jén 大人), who were still in Lhasa when the news of the emperor's death arrived 3). Their names, or rather titles, are given as A-sa Am-ba, Pu-cin and Ma-sa-ma sByar-go-c'i. We may as well discuss here the titles of the Chinese officials sent to Tibet in this period, as they appear in their Tibetan garb. As a rule, the higher officials were Manchus and employed the Manchu or Mongol nomenclature. The chief envoy is usually styled A-sa-han Am-ba, a transcription of the Manchu title ashan-i amban, corresponding to the Chinese shih-lang (vice-president of a board) 4), but also more vaguely employed for a member of the Grand Secretariat. His courtesy title was always amban, corresponding to the Chinese ta-ch'én 大臣 5); it remained attached to the office of the two imperial residents in Tibet, and became widely known in Europe at the time of the Chinese-British negotiations over Tibet at the end of the 19th century. But properly speaking, it was always a mode of address, more or less like His Excellency in Europe, and had nothing to do with the office of imperial resident, which was established only after the civil war of 1727/8, as expressly stated by the Chinese texts 6). These first ambans were no permanent residents, had no administrative powers and were without a colleague. They had of course with them a

---

2) Shêng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 299, ff. 5b-6a.
3) LSDL, f. 90a.
4) Nieh Ch'ung-ch'i, p. 104.
5) Nieh Ch'ung-ch'i, p. 99.
6) Shêng-wu-chi, ch. 5, f. 12b.
small staff of junior officers, usually styled sByar-go-c'ī (or a Jar-
go-c'ī) and sBi-c'a'i-c'ī. The first title is the transcription of the Mongol *jaryuči,* Chinese tuan-shih-jén 斷事人 1), meaning judge. The second is the Mongol *bičäči* (bičiyāči), Manchu *bitheší,* Chinese *pi-t'ieh-shih* 筆帖式, which was the title of the Manchu clerks in the public offices. The Tibetan texts give no personal names, and were it not for the Chinese documents, we would be unable to distinguish between the various officials with identical titles who came to Tibet in different times. In this case, A-sa Am-ba evidently refers to the governor Sertu. Pu-cin transcribes *pu-chéng* (-shih-szu), the Chinese title of the finance commissioner Darin. Ma-sa-ma sByar-go-c'ī must be the unnamed official sent to replace Padma.

Soon after P'o-lha-nas had returned home, he received the news that K'aň-c'en-nas was coming from mNa'-ris to Naň. P'o-lha-nas assembled at Luň-nag Šel-dkar all the high officials of gTsan to meet the Prime Minister. The meeting took place at Bo-gdoň bKra-sís-sgaň. There was much pomp, rejoicing and sports; then business began. There was a serious complaint from the people of gTsan about arbitrary taxation and corvées. The matter stood thus: the Chinese commanders had imposed on the population the feeding and care of the horses and mules of the Chinese troops. As the beasts were dying in great numbers because of the difference of climate, the people to whom they were entrusted were compelled to replace them. Besides, the population was hit by several taxes to be paid not in natural produce, but in valuable horses. On the top of all, the ministers Lum-pa-nas and Na-p'o-d-pa were in their turn oppressing the people of gTsan with arbitrary taxation. K'aň-c'en-
nas and P'o-lha-nas were entreated to go to Lhasa and to do some-
thing for the relief of the population, because "even if the Dzungar troops were to come back, what distress heavier than this could befall us?" The blessings of Chinese domination were by now be-
coming apparent to the man in the street. But the natural leaders
of the people of gTsan owed everything to the Chinese, and had to
be very cautious in this matter. Anyhow, K'aň-c'en-nas promised
to refer the question to the emperor and to the Dalai-Lama; P'o-lha-nas concurred with him 2). The pledge was carried out.

---

1) Nieh Ch'ung-ch'i, p. 107. 2) MBTJ, ff. 189b-193b.
as we know from Chinese sources that the Tibetans protested to the emperor against the burdens of the occupation.

We may also mention in passing that the long protracted wars and foreign occupations had caused a sharp increase of the cost of living. The Capuchins repeatedly complained of this fact, and Fr. Gioacchino da S. Anatolia in a letter of September 20th, 1724, wrote that "what in the past year cost one mor 1) now costs three" 2).

On this occasion K'añ-c'èn-nas with a great suite made a state visit to the Tashi-Lama, by whom he was received with much pomp on the 6/XI = December 13th, 1722 3).

At the beginning of winter, K'añ-c'èn-nas and P'o-lha-nas arrived in Lhasa. It is noteworthy that already at that time P'o-lha-nas had anticipated hostility and danger in the capital, and had offered prayers and gifts to the priests, to avert any accident. And indeed the very arrival of the two ministers in the town revealed the changed atmosphere and gave occasion to unpleasantness; the other ministers tried to avoid placing at the disposal of the new-comers a residence fit for their rank, under the plea that all the palaces and finer houses had been requisitioned by the Chinese garrison. The difficulty once smoothed over, K'añ-c'èn-nas and P'o-lha-nas paid their respects to the Dalai-Lama and to the Chinese commanders. After the New Year's festival (February 5th) of 1723, in which they took part 4), they settled down to business.

As the complaints of oppression and arbitrariness in the allotment of taxation were increasing in Lhasa too, P'o-lha-nas undertook personally the supervision of the account department, which was lodged in the dGa'-ldan palace at the end of the town. In the ASTL he is given about this time the title of rtsis-dpon, or finance director. As we have seen, his training in finance work in his young years fitted him admirably for this post. But instead of giving relief to the tax-payers, he devoted his whole energy to increasing the efficiency of the department, in view of the heavy demands which the maintenance of the Chinese army placed on the treasury. He soon reestablished good order in the functioning of the various offices. As some tax-payers were in the habit of notifying their

1) Mohur, an Indian gold piece worth 16 rupees.
3) ASTL, f. 321a.
4) LSDL, f. 90b.
departure from the country in order to avoid paying revenue, P'o-lha-nas caused it to be proclaimed that their houses and estates were to be handed over to any other man who would be willing to pay revenue on them. This drastic measure soon put an end to the practice, because men began looking about for "vacant" houses and estates to be claimed as their own. P'o-lha-nas then regulated the levy of the yearly tax, and determined the powers of the tax-collectors on a more humane basis. He carried out a general revision of the archives, which were very disordered and untrustworthy, and reorganized them in 300 ledgers (deb-t'er).\(^1\)

While P'o-lha-nas was engaged in his financial activities, the news of the death of the emperor K'ang-hsi reached Lhasa. With the decease of the great Manchu emperor, the system of stern and efficient supervision of Tibetan affairs was relaxed; his successor, as we shall see, followed a quite different policy, which soon led to civil war and chaos.

\(^1\) MBTJ, ff. 196a-200a.
CHAPTER SEVEN

TIBET AND THE NEW POLICY OF YUNG-CHÈNG

The emperor Shêng-tsu (K'ang-hsi) died on December 20th, 1722. The Dalai-Lama was much grieved when he heard of the sad event; he had been very grateful to the dead emperor, to whom he owed his present position. Solemn funeral rites were conducted in the hermitages of rTses and O-rgyan-glin; the Dalai-Lama himself through 49 days offered prayers and oblations for the spiritual good of the deceased, and organized various other ceremonies in Lhasa 1); the main rite, to which the Chinese commanders participated, took place on the 8/IV = May 12th, 1723 2). The new emperor Yung-chêng, K'ang-hsi's fourth son, sent at once a mission to Lhasa, headed by a Jasak Ta Bla-ma 3), to communicate officially the news of K'ang-hsi's death and of his own accession 4). The mission visited the Tashi-Lama on the 22/VIII = September 21th 5), but for reasons unknown to us, they did not meet the Dalai-Lama for a long time, till after the departure of the Chinese troops from Lhasa. The mission had also brought to K'än-c'en-nas the order to betake himself to mNa'-ris and to look to the defence of the routes in mNa'-ris, Nag-ts'än and Sa-ga 6), by which Dzungar troops could reach Tibet. K'än-c'en-nas at once complied, and P'o-lha-nas accompanied him for a part of the journey. Through bKra-sis-lhun-po they came to sNar-t'än, where P'o-lha-nas caused the temple to be repaired; it was his first connection with the place through which he was to gain his most lasting fame in Tibet, as the promoter of the sNar-t'än edition of the Tibetan canon. Then K'än-c'en-nas travelled through Šel-dkâr-rdson to mNa'-ris, and P'o-lha-nas went to P'o-lha and thence back to Lhasa. His relations with the Chinese authorities were now of the best, and the clash over the

1) LSDL, f. 92a-b.  
2) ASTL, f. 324b.  
3) On this title see Mayers, nn. 602, 603, 604.  
4) MBTJ, f. 200b.  
5) ASTL, f. 326b.  
6) Or Sa-dga'; a district to the west of gTsân, comprising mainly the valley of the Chak-tak-tsangpo; its capital is Sa-dga'-rdson (Saka-jong of the maps).
rŅīn-ma-pa question was forgotten. There were gorgeous festivals, in which particularly Efu Aboo took part 1).

All this came to an abrupt end. Suddenly an imperial rescript was received in Lhasa, which changed the whole situation. On chia-shên/III = April 9th, 1723, the emperor gave order to his council to consider and submit concrete proposals for the evacuation of Chinese troops from Tibet. The memorial drawn up by the Grand Secretariat set forth that it was feared that a too long stay of the Chinese garrison in Lhasa would place an unbearable economic burden on the Tibetans. It proposed the recall of Ts’e-dbaṅ-nor-bu and of Efu Aboo to the capital, via Hsining. Other units were to march back via Yūnνnα, and the Chinese Green Bannersmen from Szechwan were to return home through Ta-chien-lu. Chamdo was the key of the whole net of communications in Eastern Tibet; it was to be held permanently by a garrison of 1000 picked Green Bannersmen, and governor-general Nien Kêng-yao had to find some trustworthy officers for this important post. The council further recognized the great importance of mNa אזרris, which was Tibet’s frontier territory against the Dsungars. As K’aṅ-c’en-nas must now return to Lhasa and conduct government affairs from there, he could no more give his attention to mNa Azerbaijan; he should therefore be given some able assistants for the administration of that province. As to Hsining, at the head of the Kansu-Tibet route, its normal garrison of 6000 Green Bannersmen was deemed quite sufficient; all the troops above that number were to be withdrawn. The emperor gave his sanction to these proposals 2).

This fateful measure was a part of the retrenchment policy of the new emperor, who intended to put an end to K’ang-hsi’s imperialistic drive, and to reduce the commitments of the empire outside the borders of China proper. In the following year he was even to conclude a short-lived peace with the Dsungars. It was a well-meant decision, but it took no account of the hard facts. If the Chinese garrison was withdrawn, how was the Chinese influence to be maintained? What effective check could there be upon Dsungar intrigues and the yearning for independence of the Tibetan aristocracy? These questions had not even been thought of by the emperor in his hasty decision. The order was operative,

1) MBTJ, fl. 201a-203b.
2) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 5, fl. 2b-3b.
and Ts'e-dbañ-nor-bu and Efuo Aboo at once prepared for their departure. Their parting visit with the Dalai-Lama was very cordial, and he expressed his sincere regrets in seeing them go 1). Before they left Lhasa, they received two messengers from K'añ-c'en-nas in mÑa²-ris. The old minister was much worried by this new turn of Chinese policy, which deprived him of his strongest support and left him exposed to the envy and intrigues of his colleagues in the council. His message to Ts'e-dbañ-nor-bu can be summarized thus: "The departure of the troops had, it is true, the advantage of the cessation of the corvées, requisitions and taxes, which had gone a long way towards creating serious disaffection among the population (a strangely outspoken and bold statement to make!). But the Dzungar menace was by no means over; the Dalai-Lama was young and fickle, the Tashi-Lama was growing old, and the country was turbulent. In these conditions the withdrawal of the Chinese was a great evil. He, K aç-c'en-nas, intended to send a messenger to the emperor, requesting cancellation of the order. Could not one of the Chinese commanders remain in Lhasa till a reply arrived? If this were impossible, would they at least before leaving give him clear instructions and definite directives as to the policy to be followed?"—It was of no avail. The Chinese commanders put off K aç-c'en-nas's messengers with empty words (they would discuss the matter and give a reply later), and marched off without caring what situation they left behind 2).

Perhaps it was in order to balance in some way the disastrous moral effects of this hasty departure, that the Chinese mission headed by the Ta Bla-ma presented themselves to the Dalai-Lama in the Ra-sa aP'rule-snañ and formally announced to him the accession of the new emperor; they were entertained at a great feast and accompanied the Dalai-Lama to Se-ra, where he passed a part of the year 1723 3).

Of course this had no practical significance. But things had been overdone, and the emperor himself must have thought that he had to make some sort of provision for the continuance of Chinese supervision in Tibet. Shortly after the order of withdrawal, on chi-hail  = April 24th, 1723, the emperor "appointed the senior

---

1) LSDL, f. 94a.
2) MBTi, f. 204a-b.
3) LSDL, f. 95a-b.
secretary of the Mongolian Superintendency 1) Orai (O-lai 鄂 龐) 2) to be a sub-chancellor of the Grand Secretariat 3) and a joint vice-president of the Board of Rites 4). He was to go to Tibet to supervise its affairs 5). In the Tibetan texts this Orai is styled as usual the ashan-i amban. He brought the usual complimentary message for the Dalai-Lama 6). But he was no mere ceremonial envoy like the Ta Bla-ma, whom he found still in Tibet and who left for Peking shortly afterwards. As we have seen, he was entrusted with a political mission concerning the government of Tibet. When the council assembled (complete but for K‘añ-c‘en-nas, who was still in mNa-ris), Orai communicated the emperor’s confirmation of the two chief ministers in their office, and the suggestion that P‘o-lha-nas be admitted to the council. It was the deserved reward for his faithful services. Everybody agreed (who would dare to oppose a suggestion by the emperor?), even the Dalai-Lama’s father, and P‘o-lha-nas was duly appointed as minister (bka‘i-dguñ-blon) and member of the council. Strangely enough, this appointment is ignored in the Chinese documents, which till the end know only of the four ministers appointed in 1721, and to which P‘o-lha-nas seems to be totally unknown before 1727. On the question as to who should be appointed as P‘o-lha-nas’s helper (ra-mdā‘), there was a serious disagreement in the council, and several candidates were proposed. At last P‘o-lha-nas and a biñiesi of the ashan-i amban’s suite went to aBras-spuñs and drew lots in the sanctuary for the name. As could be expected in a procedure left to the management and control of the lamas of aBras-spuñs, the name drawn from the copper bowl was sByar-ra-ba, the representative of the clergy in the council; he took accordingly the post of a minister (bka‘i-dguñ-blon). The meaning of this proceeding is not very clear, but we may interpret it in the sense that sByar-ra-ba, till then an extraordinary junior member of the council, was appointed a junior member with full title and rights. After these transactions, the ashan-i amban journeyed to mNa-ris, evidently to inspect the

2) In 1719 he had been charged with a secret mission to Chamdo. Cfr. Haenisch, p. 391.
3) Nei-ko hsüeh-shih.
5) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 5, f. 18b.
6) LSDL, f. 96a.
organization of that important province in accordance with the emperor's edict of April 9th 1).

At this point a sudden and serious crisis arose on the north-western border: the revolt of some Kukunor chiefs headed by Čing-wang Blo-bzaṅ-bstan-ḥdsin, a Mongol prince of the Kukunor branch of the Qōsot family 2). Till then he had been a faithful servant of the emperor and had taken part with the Chinese army in the Lhasa expedition, but in 1723 he began intriguing among the Kukunor chiefs, and in the 8th month (September) of that year he broke out in open rebellion 3). He dreamt of unifying the Qōsots and reviving in his person the imperial dream of Guśri Khan; it was in this spirit that he assumed the lofty title of Dalai Qungtaiji 4). He robbed and treated with indignity the Ta Bla-ma, who was passing through Kukunor on his return journey; he defeated the loyalist forces under Daičing Qośūči and invaded the Chinese frontier territories 5). With great promptness the imperial authorities took steps for the protection of Tibet. "As it was feared that Blo-bzaṅ-bstan-ḥdsin would perturb Tibet, the marshall for the pacification of distant lands 6) Nien Kēng-yao, and the brigade-general 7) of the Sung-pān 松 潘 brigade Chou Ying 周 瑛 led out their Szechwan troops, about 2000 men; they started from Ta-chien-lu, and from the neighbourhood of Ho-érh-kan-tzū 霍 爾 甘 孜 8) they summoned to submission the Fan and I barbarians who had never been pacified before. Then they went straight to Tibet. The emperor also sent the provincial commandant of Yūnnan, Ho Yū-lin 郝 玉 麟 9), as supreme commander of the troops of Yūnnan and

---

1) MBTJ, f. 205a-b.
2) He was the son of Guśri Khan's second son bKra-sis Bātur. dPag-bsam-ljon-bzaṅ, p. 298.
3) Courant, p. 80.
4) E. H. Parker, Campaigns of K'ang-hi, Yung-chêng and K'ien-lung, in China Review XVI (1887/8), p. 110. This article gives a fairly good account of the rebellion.
5) MBTJ, f. 206a-b.
6) Fu-yüan ta-chiang-chün 撫 焉 大 將 軍.
8) Kandse of the maps, in the Horba country on the Na-c'u (Yalung-chiang).
9) His biography in Man-chou-ming-ch'ēn-chüan, ch. 36, ff. 20a-23b. He belonged to the Chinese Bordered White Banner; died in 1745.
Kueichou, about 1000 men, to garrison Chamdo and to function as support’

In Tibet too the authorities took quick action. As soon as rumours of the revolt reached Lhasa, the council recalled in great haste K‘aṁ-c‘en-nas from mNa‘-ris (in one month they sent messengers to him seven times); and soon he was back in the capital along with the ashān-i āmbān Orai. Orai assembled the council, condemned the rebels in strong words and requested help for the loyal Mongol princes still holding out against the revolt. P‘o-lha-nas, the best Tibetan general and the one most trusted by the Chinese, was to lead the expeditionary forces. K‘aṁ-c‘en-nas offered himself for the task, but as his presence was necessary in Lhasa for the defence of the country, the ashān-i āmbān insisted on the choice of P‘o-lha-nas, and his departure was decided. As the council was thinking first and above all of the security of Tibet, a limited task was set to him: he was to take position in Nag-ṣod and to hold that region in subjection. Another measure was taken on this occasion; in the 9th month (October) the Dalai-Lama sent the K‘ri Rin-po-c‘e dPal-lidan-grags-pa to the Kukunor princes; he was to exert the whole influence of the Tibetan church in order to restrain them from siding with the rebels and to keep them in subjection to China.

P‘o-lha-nas hastened to prepare the expedition. His place in the finance department was taken, provisionally and until his return, by his biographer Ts‘e-riṅ-dbaṅ-rgyal. The force which accompanied P‘o-lha-nas was formed mainly by 500 men from ṇP‘an-yul, led by the general Blo-bzan-dar-rgyas. In the neighbourhood of Taṅ-lha, he was joined by other troops, of which he held a great review. The march continued till the army encamped on the banks of the Nag-c‘u. After two days there, they were hard hit by a sudden flood which caused great damage, notwithstanding the clever devices invented by P‘o-lha-nas for giving shelter to his troops. From the camp on the Nag-c‘u the region was scoured for rebels and slowly

---

1) Wei-tsang-t‘ung-chih, ch. 13a, f. 6b.
2) On the 12/XII = January 8th, 1724, he visited the Tashi-Lama (ASTL, f. 329a). But it is to be surmised that he arrived at Lhasa earlier than this.
4) MBTJ, ff. 206b-207b.
5) The 51st K‘ri Rin-po-c‘e (on the see from 1722 to his death at the end of 1729). His biography is vol. Ca of the collection.
6) LSDL, f. 96a-b; ASTL, f. 327a-b.
reduced to normal conditions by appropriate means, sometime stern and sometimes lenient. Once, about a score of rebels were taken prisoner by the local levies of Nag-sod and brought to P'o-lha-nas, who treated them well and set them free. A local Mongol chieftain with the title of Árdání Jinong submitted without resistance and was sent to Lhasa. Rebellious clans were attacked and pillaged. Thus, by these wide-range operations from the Nag-c'u base, the districts to the south of the Kukunor were led back to Chinese sovereignty. They were: Nag-sod, Yul-sul, Hor-k'a-bži, upper and lower aBroň, rDo-śul, K'yuñ-po white, black and yellow; a total of about 20,000 homesteads. P'o-lha-nas remained on the spot during the autumn and winter, till in the spring of 1724 he heard that the imperial generals Nien Kēng-yao and Yūeh Chung-ch'i had completely crushed the rebellion and that Blo-bzañ-bstan-ādsin with only a few followers had fled towards the country of the Dsungars 1). He then issued a proclamation to the people of the region, informing them of the end of the revolt and summoning them back to allegiance. He threatened the rebels with complete destruction if they did not submit, and pointed out the stern punishment meted out to offenders. We may surmise that this proclamation marked the end of operations on the Nag-c'u. These operations had been directly or indirectly supported by the considerable activity of the Chinese light forces in Kukunor. In the process of hunting down Blo-bzañ-bstan-ādsin's associates, these units of light cavalry often crossed into Tibet and penetrated far into the country 2). We may presume that P'o-lha-nas had acted in collaboration with them. As the situation was by now well in hand, he went back to Lhasa. The campaign seems to have been profitable for him, as his biographer takes this occasion for giving us a short inventory of P'o-lha-nas's property other than landed estates. The Dalai-Lama was offered a conspicuous share of the booty, which he gladly accepted and highly praised. The council, with the ashan-i amban and the Dalai-Lama's father assembled and solemnly commended P'o-lha-nas for the fine work done, of which a report had been sent to the emperor. A less happy result was a


2) Pursuit, arrest and execution of Mu-ts'an mK'an-po Bla-ma and Taiji Chi-mu-pa by the officer of the guard Ta-nai. Reported to the court on kuei-mao/III = April 22nd, 1724. Shih-tsong Shih-lu, ch. 17, f. 27a.
quarrel between P'po-lha-nas and Lum-pa-nas because of the latter's envious and insincere behaviour during the campaign. On the whole it had been a successful operation of police, of not much military value. Its importance lay in the fact that it checked the spread of the rebellion southwards and debarred the rebels from help from that quarter ①.

Shortly afterwards, on ting-hai/III = April 6th, 1724, the emperor recalled the ashan-i amban Orai, transferring him to Hsining in charge of Mongol affairs there ②. But Orai delayed carrying out the order and left Lhasa only several months afterwards ③.

The revolt was repressed in the 2nd month (February-March) of 1724 ④). The emperor seized the occasion for establishing solidly his sovereignty in Kukunor, which became from that time onwards an integrant part of the Chinese dominion. But during his flight, before he reached his haven of refuge in Dsungaria, Blo-bzan-bstan-adsin caused a last scare to the Chinese and Tibetan authorities. "In the 6th month (July-August) of the next year (1724) it was spied out and reported that Blo-bzan-bstan-adsin on his flight was crossing the frontier of Tibet at the locality of K'6-li-yeh克哩野 ⑤). The general [Chou Ying] chose 300 picked men and at the same time Beile K'ang-ch'î-nai led out about 10,000 men of Tibetan troops. From Yang-pa-ching陽八井 ⑥) they journeyed together on the same road as far as Ko-lo-tsang Ku-cha噶勒藏骨察 ⑦); then because of the obstacles and of the snow they

① MBTJ, ft. 208a-214a.
② Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 17, f. 15b. MBTJ, f. 214a.
③ The ashan-i amban took leave of the Dalai-Lama in the autumn of 1724; LSDL, ft. 102b.
④ Hummel, p. 958.
⑤ The Keriya-kôtäl pass between Chinese Turkestan and Western Tibet.
⑥ Tibetan Yañs-pa-can. It is a geographical name which was found on the Chinese and older European maps of Tibet, but has disappeared from modern maps. It is also known to Chinese and Tibetan texts; see e.g. Vasiliev, pp. 23, 32, and Rockhill in JRAS 1891, pp. 19, 90. The Yañs-pa-can monastery and pass were an important cross-road. The route from Lhasa bifurcated there, one branch going to Shigatse through the Shan valley and the other to the Tengri-nor. Another route is described in the dBu-sgsan-gi-gnas-bri-en-mdor-bsus, f. 22b: "From the upper part of 'U'-yug, going on after having crossed a pass, one reaches T'ub-bstan Yañs-pa-can, the residence of the red sect of the Karma-pa, and the other the gNam-mts'o (Tengri-nor)". From these descriptions and the old maps we obtain with a tolerable certainty the position of Yañs-pa-can at the head of the valley of the sTod-lung-c'u; it is perhaps the Ang-chan-gompa of the maps, long. 90°23'30", long. 29°59'.
⑦ Or Galtangs Guja. Appears to be at or near the Atag Hopchiga of Prževalskii, ca. long. 92°28', lat. 33°27', to the south of the Murui-usu.
led back their soldiers" 1). The Tibetan texts perfectly agree with this account. They say that a rescript from the Chinese court ordered the A-sa-han back to China and directed that a division under K’aṅ-c’en-nas and the marshall Bra’u Ta-lo-ye 2) should march through the land dGa’-ts’aṅ K’o-ts’a and to pursue and destroy Blo-bzan-bstan-ḥdsin, while a strong corps from Hsining cooperated with them. K’aṅ-c’en-nas and the Chinese general requested the collaboration of P’o-lha-nas, who accepted. The troops set out on their difficult journey. But soon winter set in and the roads were blocked by snow, so that the army had to retreat. The return journey was beset with many difficulties and hardships, but it was successfully carried out, and in the spring of 1725 K’aṅ-c’en-nas and P’o-lha-nas were back in Lhasa 3). The noteworthy thing about the whole campaign is that the Chinese-Tibetan forces did not dare to march straight towards Eastern Turkestan by the terrible route which the Dzungars had followed in 1717, but preferred the enormously longer but easier detour via the Murui-usu region 4). Because also of the length of the road chosen, their expedition was perfectly useless. And doubly so, because it had been occasioned by a false alarm; Blo-bzan-bstan-ḥdsin never entered Tibet at all, but contented himself with the refuge he found in Dzungaria 5). Anyhow, the uneasiness in Tibet had lasted for quite a while; on 15/VII = September 2nd, 1724, the Dalai-Lama’s father and K’aṅ-c’en-nas wrote to the Tashi-Lama excusing themselves for their inability to effect their intended visit to bKra-śis-lhun-po, as the ashan-i amban thought that their presence in Lhasa was indispensable till the Kukunor revolt was stamped out 6). The reason for this was that Lhasa was full of rumours, and the wildest news spread through its bazaars. Once it was even believed that the emperor was going to abolish the auto-

1) Wei-tsong-t’ung-chih, ch. 13a, f. 6b.
2) Chinese ta lao-yeh 大老爺. Lao-yeh is a title of respect commonly given to officials. Laufer, Loan Words in Tibetan, in TP XVII (1916), n. 297. This is possibly the rMa Lo-ye of ASTL, f. 332a.
3) MBTJ, ff. 214a-215a.
4) It is the same Keria-Tengrinor-Lhasa route described in the Hsi-chao-t’u-lueh (Rockhill, in Juras 1891, p. 19). A detailed itinerary of the Lhasa-Galtsang Guja portion of this route is given in the Wei-tsong-t’u-chih (ibid., pp. 90-91).
5) He lived there to an old age, and fell in the hands of the Chinese in 1755, when the Dzungar kingdom collapsed. He was pardoned, given a Chinese title, and allowed to live in Peking. Courant, pp. 103-104.
6) ASTL, ff. 332b-333a.
nomy of the country and to send a Chinese viceroy to govern it 1). This nervousness made the situation at the capital particularly delicate.

Partly because of this military activity, the prestige of the Tibetan government was growing higher, and the Dalai-Lama continued to receive envoys from several neighbouring states, among them from Ñi-ma-rnam-rgyal, king of Ladakh (c. 1700-1734) 2), who had been Desideri's host in 1715. The Nepalese rulers and the king of Sikkim continued to send their representatives to the New Year's festival, which became to occasion for a colourful meeting of envoys from nearly all the Himalayan states 3).

On the events of the year 1725 the MBTJ is nearly silent. But it seems to have been a relatively quiet period in the troubled political situation of Tibet 4). What little we know of this year, concerns the relations with China. In the first months of 1725, the Dalai-Lama sent, through the bičāći Nag-dbañ-blo-bzañ, a letter to the emperor on the subject of the monasteries of Amdo. We know from the Chinese texts that in 1724 "the lamas of Kukunor had supported the revolt of Blo-bzañ-bstan-adsin. The lamas of all the temples of Kukunor, a mass of some thousands in all, started trouble. Things went so far that the great lama Čayān Nomun Qa'ān 5) too allied himself with the rebels, and they offered armed resistance. The prince 6) punished and pacified them. The emperor pronounced the disgrace of their families, than which nothing is worse. He also took back the seals of Teacher of the Empire 7) and

2) LSDL, f. 97b. The Ladakhi mission then continued its journey to Peking, and was received at the Chinese court on i-wei/VI = August 11th, 1724. Shih-tsüng Shih-lu, ch. 21, f. 19b.
3) LSDL, f. 98a.
4) It was also one of the best years for the Italian missionaries in Lhasa. They obtained some good charters from K'añ-c'èn-nas and the Dalai-Lama, the Tibetan texts and Latin translations of which are found in Giorgi, pp. 655-660. They had even begun to build a church. Towards the end of the year a flood caused popular tumults against them (Da Terzorio, pp. 332-334); but thanks to the protection of K'añ-c'èn-nas, things were soon smoothed over. As far as I am aware, the Capuchins are never mentioned in Tibetan texts. Probably this small European community was deemed too unimportant to deserve attention, notwithstanding their repeated interviews with the Dalai-Lama.
5) On this dignitary of the Lamaist church of Mongolia, see Mayers, n. 595.
6) Wang-shih 王 師. It is Nien Kéng-yao, who late in 1724 received privileges normally granted only to the princes of the blood.
7) Kuo-shih 國 師. On this title see Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, p. 25.
Master of Dhyāna 1) of the Ming dynasty from all the temples. At the same time he issued a regulation to the effect that the temple-halls were not to exceed 200 pillars and all [their inmates] were not to exceed 300 men for each monastery” 2). These harsh limitations were only the lesser part of the evil; in the course of the revolt about 700 monks had been killed and various monasteries had been destroyed by the troops of Nien Kêng-yao and Yüeh Chung-ch'î, foremost among them the monasteries of gSer-k'ög and dGon-lun. The Dalai-Lama now begged the emperor to allow their restoration to the former state. On the intercession of the T'ü-kuan Qutuqtu, the emperor, after some delay, assented to the request and even gave the means for the reconstruction of the two monasteries. The work was completed in 1729 3).

In 1725 the Chinese government was twice compelled to take measures in order to prop up their tottering organization of Tibetan affairs. On hsìn-ch'ou/III = April 15th, the emperor gave a reply to Nien Kêng-yao, who had complained that K'ań-c'ën-nas con-tinued to reside in his province of mNa'-ris and came very seldom to Lhasa; Nien Kêng-yao asked for an order to the Tibetan minister to reside in Lhasa. The emperor expressed doubts as to the opportu-nity of such an order. It was unknown whether K'ań-c'ën-nas would conform with it willingly and whether he would be able to work in harmony with Na-p'od-pa, Lum-pa-nas and the others. If K'ań-c'ën-nas were ordered to reside in Lhasa, and then Na-p'od-pa and the others disobeyed him, K'ań-c'ën-nas would certainly do his best, but he lacked the power to keep the other members of the council in order. Besides, K'ań-c'ën-nas would always yearn for his beloved mNa'-ris and would try to go back there at the first opportunity. The emperor thought that the best solution was to order K'ań-c'ën-nas to reside by turns in Lhasa and in mNa'-ris. But as the matter was very important, he gave order to the amban Orai (by now a vice-president of the Imperial Despatch Office)4)

---

1) Ch'ien-shih 禪師.
2) Shêng-wu-chi, ch. 5, f. 12a-b. Ch'êng-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 7a.
3) LSDL, f. 109b; aJigs-med-rig-pa'i-rdo-rje (Geschichte des Buddhismus in der Mongolei), p. 285; Re'u-mig, p. 83.
4) Hui-t'ung shih-lang 會同侍郎. Mayers, nn. 161 and 182/XIV.
to examine the question and to give his considered advice, based on his old experience of Tibetan affairs. Orai suggested that K'añ-c'en-nas should carry on his administrative duties both in Lhasa and in mNa'-ris; that he should travel to and fro between his two residences, as often as his work required him to do so; and that when he went to mNa'-ris, Na-p'o-d-pa should be entrusted with his duties in Lhasa. The emperor passed orders accordingly 1). It had been one of the last memorials submitted to the throne by Nien Kêng-yao before his disgrace, and it failed to secure approval, as indeed happened to all the proposals coming from the doomed man. The responsibility for the muddle in Tibet lay primarily with the emperor himself, who had saddled K'añ-c'en-nas with his two irreconcilable duties, and had ordered him to Lhasa, then back to mNa'-ris, then again to Lhasa. This continuous vacillation reflected itself now in these orders, which were at the best a weak compromise. The whole unhappy arrangement of uniting in the same persons territorial governorship and membership of the council, was fundamentally unsound and was slowly but surely bringing the country to disaster; but the emperor was unable to recognize this evident fact.

Later in the year, on i-wei/XI = December 5th, the Grand Secretariat discussed a memorial sent by Yüeh Chung-ch'i, the new governor-general of Szechwan and Shensi, who in June of that year had taken the place of the disgraced Nien Kêng-yao. The council proposed a reorganization of Chinese administration in the frontier districts of Tibet. At the time of the Chinese conquest, all the country as far as dBus had been placed under direct Chinese administration. But in those pathless and rugged tracts, Chinese bureaucratic machinery was practically ineffective and very expensive. The council proposed: A—to maintain the incorporation of Batang and Li-t'ang, and of the nearby country of the Torguts with China, but to entrust the administration of these tracts to the local chieftains under Chinese supervision; B—to give back to the government of Lhasa all the country between these protectorates and dBus, mainly the region of Lho-roṅ-rdsoṅ. An amban (ta-ch'én 大臣) was to be sent as an envoy extraordinary to Lhasa, to

1) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 30, f. 3a-b.
intimate to the Dalai-Lama the new imperial favour. K’an-c’en-nas and Na-p’od-pa, till then charged with Tibetan administration without an official title, were to be formally appointed as Prime Minister (tsung-li 總理) and Deputy Prime Minister (hsieh-li 協理) respectively, under imperial letters patent. To give an effective support to the Tibetan government, an old proposal of Nien Keng-yao was taken up again; the council advised the establishment of a strong military base at Kata 噶達 (Tibetan mgGar-t’ar) ¹, under a brigadier-general with a sufficient force at his command. The emperor gave his sanction to all these proposals, and appointed the imperial clansman ²) brigadier-general Oci (O-ch’i 翟齊), the chancellor of the Grand Secretariat ³) Bandi (Pan-ti 班第) ⁴) and the Jasak Ta Bla-ma dGe-legs C’os-rje (Ko-lo-k’o Ch’o-érh-chi 格勒克紹爾濟) as envoys to Tibet. The provincial commander of the Imperial Despatch Office ⁵) Chou Ying was to take care of the details of the arrangement ⁶). It was a sound measure, a much needed lightening of the heavy Chinese commitments in Tibet. The cumbersome and unwieldy direct control of the border zones was replaced by a sensible and elastic form of protectorate. But once more the emperor left out of account the hopeless inefficiency of the Tibetan council, which was unable to carry out this new task, or indeed any kind of administrative work. The high-sounding titles given to K’an-c’en-nas and Na-p’od-pa made no practical difference to the situation. We may mention that it was probably on this occasion that P’o-lha-nas received an imperial diploma (aja’-sa) conferring on him and sByar-ra-ba the title of Jasak Taiji ⁷), a trifling promotion after all ⁸). It is peculiar that the diploma came so late, as the title had been granted to P’o-lha-nas already by the late emperor Shêng-tsu ⁹).

¹) To the north-west of Ta-chien-lu on the road to Derge.
⁴) A Mongol general, d. 1755. His biography in Hunancl, ff. 15b-16b.
⁵) Hui-t’ung t’i-tu 會同提督. Mayers, nn. 440 and 182/XIV.
⁶) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 38, ff. 2a-3b.
⁷) Mayers, nn. 537 and 538.
⁸) MBTJ, f. 215b.
⁹) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 76, f. 13b.
In the first days of the 11th month (December) of 1725, the Dalai-Lama and the Tashi-Lama received imperial envoys, who had been sent by the emperor to present them with a complete set of the bsTan-agyur together with its supplements and the complete works of gTson-k'a-pa and of the lCan-skya Qutuqtu 1. This is of course the so-called Red bsTan-agyur of Peking, which had been finished printing in the previous year 2.

During the New Year's festival (February 2nd) of 1726, the Dalai-Lama blessed the merits of the deceased Dam-pa mk'can-po Qutuqtu Ngag-dbañ-ye-šes-rgya-mts'ō, who had died in the previous year 3. This is almost certainly the predecessor of the Seventh Dalai-Lama, the pretender set up by Lha-bzān Khan. The protection of the Chinese court and his own insignificance seem to have cancelled any hostility which the Dalai-Lama could have against him. Yet he must have had at least some followers, because his incarnation was soon afterwards discovered in K'ams; but the child soon died of smallpox, and no further attempt was made in this direction 4.

Since 1724 the Dalai-Lama had prepared himself by an intensive study of the sacred texts under the guidance of the K'ri Rin-po-che. And now on 15/IV = May 16th, 1726 5, the great ceremony of the consecration of the Dalai-Lama, by which he acquired his full spiritual powers, was held at Lhasa in the āP'rul-snañ. The Tashi-Lama had come to Lhasa; with him acting as disciplinary superior (mk'can-po), the K'ri Rin-po-che dPal-lidan-grags-pa acting as teacher of the rules (las-slob) and the rGyud-smad Slob-dpon Nag-dbañ-mc'og-ldan 6 acting as esoteric teacher (gsañ-ste), the Dalai-Lama took the vows of a dge-sloñ. After the ceremony the bTsan-po Nomun Qa'ran (chief Qutuqtu of Kukunor) and Nañ-so Rin-c'en-don-grub were sent to the emperor to announce the event 7.

1) LSDL, f. 114b; ASTL, ff. 339a-340a.
3) LSDL, f. 115a.
4) dPag-bsam-ljon-bsañ, p. 304.
5) This is the true date. European authors have often been misled by the wrong dating of 1724 in Giorgi, p. 337.
6) He became later the 54th K'ri Rin-po-che (b. 1677, on the see 1739-1746, d. 1751). His biography is vol. Na of the collection. He was also the spiritual teacher of the lCan-skya Qutuqtu. Cfr. Klon-rdol, vol. 'A, f. 12a.
7) LSDL, ff. 115b-117b; ASTL, ff. 344a-346a; Biography of the 51st K'ri Rin-po-che (vol. Ca), f. 4a-b; MBTJ, f. 217b.
P'o-lha-nas took no part in the feast; he had gone to invite the Tashi-Lama, and then had remained at Shigatse to procure the means for the great ceremony from the local finance. He came to Lhasa only when the feast was over, and was then received by the Dalai-Lama 1).

At the beginning of the 7th month (July-August) of 1726, the mission sent by the emperor in the 11th month of the previous year arrived at last in Lhasa. Its head is indicated in the MBTJ (f. 218a) and in the ASTL (f. 353a) by the title of Bandhe rdOr-k'e An-pa, and in the LSDL (f. 119) by the title of Dor-ga A-sa-han Am-pa. Bandhe is evidently Bandi, and it seems that he was in the eyes of the Tibetans the chief of the mission, and not the imperial clansman Oci. rdOr-k'e or Dorga A-sa-han Am-ba is the Manchu title dorgi ashan-i amban, a somewaht irregular rendering of nei-ko hsüeh-shih, sub-chancellor of the Grand Secretariat 2), which was Bandi's rank. Nearly at the same time as the Chinese mission, arrived a messenger who had been sent to Peking by K'ań-c'en-nas; he brought an imperial edict, which deserves to be translated in full, from its Tibetan version in the MBTJ:

"Order of the emperor. May the Dalai-Lama realize the self-illumination in the ocean of divine texts of sūtra and mantra. The sMin-grol-glin-pa, who are the followers of the teaching of the essence of the old mantras, and the rDo-rje-brag-pa, may stay together in the temple of Zan-γyañ, or may follow as they wish their religious system (siddhānta), as it has been translated in Tibetan. But the followers of the religious system of the earlier translations (the rNiñ-ma-pa), who dwell in their monasteries, not only their pride must be repressed, but it is inexpedient to allow them to practise irregularities and to attribute usefulness to their working for the welfare of the creatures by initiating converts, explaining the tantras, teaching the moral precepts etc. They shall not perform the repression of demons, the burnt offerings (homa), the throwing of magical weapons [for repelling the terrific deities], all of which are illicit exorcisms (abhicāra), without the evocation of the protecting deities and without lasting embodiment of the mystic with these deities. From now on, those who wish to become monks, shall not have it in their power ad libitum, but shall enter only the teaching community of the Yellow Bonnets". This edict

1) MBTJ, ff. 217b-218a; LSDL, f. 119b.
was given publicity by an official proclamation. And in accordance with it, Bandi told the ministers that they must take steps, through the authority vested in them, to suppress the teaching of the rNīn-ma-pa. It was a definite attempt at interference in the religion of the country. Although measures against the old schools would be of great benefit to the Yellow Church, religious persecution was utterly against Tibetan tradition and spirit. Once before such an attempt had been made, by the Dsungars; and it had contributed in a high degree to turning the people of Tibet against them. Now the attempt was to be repeated, by the order of the almighty suzerain of Tibet; one gets even the impression that he was advised to take this step by the Mongol lamas of Peking, who did not wish to be overdone in zeal by their Dsungar brethren. As to the noteworthy exception in favour of sMin-grol-gliṅ and rDo-rje-brag, it is perhaps due to their sufferings at the hands of the Dzungars. But the imperial edict was badly received in the council at Lhasa. There was no question of parties here; all the ministers were against the proposal. But nobody dared to speak openly against it. Only P'o-lha-nas, whose devotion and loyalty towards China was beyond doubt, rose to speak fearlessly against it. He said that he descended from a family traditionally dGe-lugs-pa; he had been initiated at bKra-sis-lhung-po, and few had honoured and supported the Yellow Church as he had done. But how could the rNīn-ma-pa teaching be called a perverse one? The First Tashi-Lama Blo-bzan-c'os-kyi-rgyal-mts'an and the Fifth Dalai-Lama had studied the prophecies of Padmasambhava. gTsoṅ-k'a-pa himself had respected all the Indian spiritual ancestors of the rNīn-ma-pa and had not rejected the secret mantras. How could the council declare the rNīn-ma-pa to be heretics? Their followers were harmless, even beneficent people; why should they not be left in peace, if the emperor had shown mercy even to such an evildoer as Ts'e-rin-don-grub? The Tibetan people felt much reverence for the teaching of the gSāṅ-c'en-sṛn-īn-po (Guhyagarbha)\(^1\) and no evil consequence had ever been feared from its practice. This impassioned plea, a fine piece of simple and heartfelt eloquence, had its effect. The Chinese envoy not only showed no displeasure, but even caused the speech to be written down. In the evening of

---

\(^1\) gSaṅ-sṛn-īn-po-pa was a common name of the rNīn-ma-pa. Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*, p. 258.
the same day, K’äñ-c‘en-nas, who had been rather frightened by P’o-lha-nas’s boldness, asked privately for an explanation. P’o-lha-nas replied that he had acted not from any thought of popularity or of personal advantage, but only for the good of the country. It was true that, according to the words of the gter-ma (sacred text) concealed by the Rig-adsin-kyi-slob-dpon-c‘en-po, the old faith was decayed and needed reform. “Nevertheless, of the various kinds of paths according to the thought of the siddhānta, some are praised and some are rejected; it is not a matter of choice? And if you, my lord, who are famous for the excellent keenness of your discriminating intelligence, follow these trifles and decide the teaching of the gSañ-c‘en-sñiñ-po to be heretical, you collect a karma which will destroy your great accumulation of merit”. K’än-c‘en-nas did not reply. Then in the council the Dalai-Lama’s father declared under an oath that somebody must go to Peking to get new orders. Lum-pa-nas and K’än-c‘en-nas refused to go, so it was decided to send the Mongol Tśul-k‘rims-t‘ar-pa and the Dalai-Lama’s courtier Dag-pa-rab-ābyams 1). I have rather expatiated on this episode, sometimes translating the MBTJ verbatim, because I think that seldom the cause of religious tolerance has been defended with such noble and simple words. These speeches reveal the statemanslike outlook of P’o-lha-nas far more than all the long-winded phrases of praise of his biographer.

The matter rested at this point, and no sequence was given to it by the Chinese court. But the Chinese envoy (Oci or Bandi), before he left for China, had something else to say to the council. He had it assembled in full pomp and spoke very seriously to them. They should remember that they were the representatives of the Dalai-Lama and held a great reponsibility. He had noticed that they were in deep disagreement among themselves; but they should not send partisan and quarrelsome letters to the emperor (as apparently had been done). The order of His Majesty was that they should consult with each other; this order was to be obeyed. And should the thoughts of some ministers be disaffected, they must remember that “in the end the justice of the emperor, severe and glorious, not hastening on quick ways but difficult to avoid, would certainly overtake them”. K’än-c‘en-nas replied for the council, profusing himself in assurances of loyalty and promises of good

1) MBTJ, ff. 218a-220a.
behaviour, after which the Chinese envoy left 1). It had been a stern and timely warning. The emperor Yung-chêng might be slack and inefficient in action, but he was no fool. He must have perceived at last that there was something rotten in the government of Tibet, and that the ministers were at loggerheads. The unity of the council must be preserved at all costs, unless the whole administration was to collapse. Let us not forget that the ministers were also provincial governors; disunity of the council meant disunity of the country. The only flaw in the emperor’s action was that a warning not backed by a show of force was unlikely to produce any lasting consequence.

Nevertheless the message of the emperor had some effect. P’o-lha-nas discussed the matter with Na-p’od-pa and the father of the Dalai-Lama, pointed out the evils and confusion of the divided government by a council which did not even care to function any more as such, described the blessings of undivided personal rule such as had prevailed at the times of the ancient monarchy, and proposed that by common consent full powers should be conferred of K’añ-c’en-nas, and that the other ministers should act as his subordinates. The father of the Dalai-Lama and Na-p’od-pa assented, albeit not very willingly. The matter was then brought before the full council and approved, then it went to the Dalai-Lama for his sanction. The Dalai-Lama did not give an express approval, but still he granted, in the latter half of 1726, a seal and hand-sign for the new office 2). It seems that Chinese ratification was sought for this arrangement, because we know that on chia-shên/XII = January 18th, 1727, the emperor granted the seal of office to the Prime Minister (tsung-li) for Tibetan affairs Beise K’ang-ch’i-nai 3).

But the new system did not work well. K’añ-c’en-nas, either for personal reasons or because of excessive subservience to the Chinese, began at once oppressing the rin-ma-pa in various ways; of course this made him at once extremely unpopular. Not even his most trusty supporter obeyed him in this matter. P’o-lha-nas had gone to the warm springs of ‘Ol-k’a sTag-rtse. While staying there, a princess of the family of Rig-adsin gTer-c’en C’os-kyi-rgyal-po 4)

---

1) MBTJ, ff. 220b-221b. 2) MBTJ, ff. 222a-223a; LSDL, f. 119b.
3) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 51, f. 34a-b.
4) This rin-ma-pa saint is difficult to identify; he is not mentioned even in the list of the gter-ston in the Padma-bka’-t’pan, ch. 92. Cfr. Toussaint, Le Dict de Padma, Paris 1933, pp. 276-289; corrected and completed in Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, pp. 258-259.
came there. As people were afraid of showing her due honour because of the stern edicts against the rNinma-pa, P'o-lha-nas himself went as the first to offer her gifts and to hear her spiritual teaching. She prophesied the ruin of K'an-c'en-nas because of his persecution of the rNinma-pa, and tried to induce P'o-lha-nas to join her sect; of course he refused and reasserted his dGe-lugs-pa faith). But the accident showed that his rNinma-pa sympathies were very deep, if they compelled him to commit an imprudence of this sort in a moment which he knew to be critical.

P'o-lha-nas returned to Lhasa passing through bSam-yas, where he met the father of the Dalai-Lama; and in Lhasa he spent some uneventful time, amidst of much sport and festivities). But this apparent calm ill concealed the growing estrangement between the two factions in the council and the hopeless rift between the ministers. They quarrelled for the smallest trifle and were always on the alert against each other, while the affairs of the country went from bad to worse. P'o-lha-nas made another attempt. He sent an attendant of his to Na-p'o-d-pa, the most influential man of the opposite party. The messenger told the minister that the main obstacle to the re-establishment of concord in the council was the malignant hostility of Lum-pa-nas towards K'an-c'en-nas and P'o-lha-nas, and that it was rumoured that he intended to kill them both. He begged Na-p'o-d-pa to think of the consequences for the country. Then P'o-lha-nas himself went to the father of the Dalai-Lama and spoke with him more or less on the same lines. The slight hopes raised by these demarches soon faded away, and the tension grew stronger every day).

At last P'o-lha-nas could not hold out any more. He wrote a letter to the Dalai-Lama, in which he recounted all his and his ancestor's merits towards the Church, expressed his exasperation at being thwarted and misinterpreted in every steep he took and every word he said, submitted that he was in immediate danger of murder, and concluded by expressing the wish to retire from his ministership; to this purpose he intended to write a letter to the emperor, and begged the Dalai-Lama's support. Not content with this, he went personally to the Dalai-Lama and repeated verbally his request. But the Dalai-Lama replied that the emperor was un-

1) MBTJ, ff. 223a-225b. 2) MBTJ, f. 228a-b. 3) MBTJ, f. 231a-b.
likely to accept his resignation, and that he must remain at his post. P'o-lha-nas had no choice but to yield and to carry on with his ungrateful work. He tried then to talk the matter over with K'añ-c'en-nas; he said to him that they both were attempting to do their best for country and religion, but were hindered at every step by some officials of the Dalai-Lama and by Lum-pa-nas; the situation badly needed some remedy. But K'añ-c'en-nas was a proud and haughty man, very conscious of his high position and prone to despise all his associates; this trait of his character was observed even by the Chinese, as we shall see later. He now replied that he was doing his duty to the Dalai-Lama and to the emperor, and that he feared nobody, and less than anybody Lum-pa-nas, whom "he could destroy by a mere slap of his hand". This was either meaningless braggadocio or utter misunderstanding of the situation. Still, on two occasions more P'o-lha-nas insisted on his point of view, but K'añ-c'en-nas coldly thanked him and tried again to show him the complete solidity of his position 1). At last P'o-lha-nas in despair gave him up. He still belonged to his party, and of course his loyalty remained unimpaired; but K'añ-c'en-nas's senseless persecution of the rNñ-ma-pa, and now his blind pride and obstinacy, had caused an estrangement between the two old comrades.

Because of a lucky coincidence (as it turned out to be), at that time (spring of 1727) P'o-lha-nas's wife was taken ill and her recovery was despaired of. Her husband took leave from the council and in a great hurry rode to P'o-lha. There, in order to obtain the recovery of his wife, he offered great gifts to the monasteries and caused the religious texts to be read out, even rNñ-ma-pa texts. At the end of the ceremonies he received a letter from the Yoñ-sadsin-c'en-po (spiritual teacher of the Dalai-Lama), advising him, under the form of a prophecy, not to be present at Lhasa during the 6th Hor month (July-August) and not to leave his elder son there 2), because there was danger ahead. P'o-lha-nas at once sent for his son and informed also his most trusted friends in Lhasa of

---

1) MBTJ, ff. 232a-234a.
2) His full name was áGyur-med-ye-ses-ts'e-brtan; it occurs in a contemporary series of woodcut tanikas from sNar-t'ai, which was prepared at his expenses (Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*, p. 534). In the Tibetan texts this all too long name is regularly shortened into Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan. The Chinese instead knew him under the name of áGyur-med-ts'e-brtan (Chu-érh-mo-t'é-ts'é-pu-téng 珠爾默特策卜登).
the warning: the general Blo-bzañ-dar-rgyas, the judge (k’rims-kyi-żal-lce-mk‘an) Bon-rigs Nag-dbañ-bde-c‘en and his biographer Ts’e-rin-dbañ-rgyal, requesting them to warn K’añ-c‘en-nas. Then he posted sentries on the road to Lhasa some miles from P’o-lha to avoid any surprise, and remained in an uneasy expectation, hardly relieved by the obscure warnings and gloomy supernatural visions of the rNiñ-ma-pa seers 1).

1) MBTJ, ff. 234b-238a.
CHAPTER EIGHT

K'AN-C'EN-NAS'S MURDER AND P'O-LHA-NAS'S PREPARATIONS FOR WAR ¹)

About the middle of the year 1727, the situation in Tibet was one of unbearable strain, and everything pointed to an imminent explosion. The best characteristic of the situation is given in a memorial presented to the emperor by the Chinese envoy Oci on his return to Peking. According to Oci there were dangerous personal feuds going on between the ministers. The Dalai-Lama was too young and depended on his father. K'An-c'en-nas was a man of merit, but conceited and overbearing, and therefore hated by all. Na-p'od-pa was treacherous, and so was Lum-pa-nas, who had bound to his interests the father of the Dalai-Lama by giving him two of his daughters in marriage ²). sByar-ra-ba was a non-entity. Oci proposed therefore to deprive Na-p'od-pa of his associates by dismissing Lum-pa-nas and sByar-ra-ba, and to severely admonish the Dalai-Lama, K'An-c'en-nas and Na-p'od-pa, telling them that they must absolutely pull together.—It seems that the emperor did not sanction the dismissal of Lum-pa-nas and sByar-ra-ba; the text is not quite clear on this point. He granted instead a title and some presents to an other wise unknown uncle of the Dalai-Lama, and despatched the sub-chancellor of the grand Secretariat Sen-ge (Sëng-ko ³) and the brigadier-general Mala ⁴) to Tibet. They were the bearers of a rescript ordering the council to cooperate with them for

¹) As the Chinese texts for this period are particularly important and copious, I shall give in the Appendix the full translation of some of them which present a particular interest. Indications in the footnotes like Doc. I refer to this Appendix.

²) This statement is supported by Fr. Cassiano Beligatti. Magnaghi, p. 79.

³) Mala was a Manchu officer of the Plain Yellow Banner and belonged to the Fuca clan. B. 1673, d. 1735. His biography in Man-chou-ming-ch'ên-chuan, ch. 25, f. 39a-40b.
the good administration of the country; but is seems that they were not empowered to take definite measures 1).

Oci's noteworthy memorial saw things clearly, but did not go deep enough. It was not merely a question of personal feuds between the ministers. Na-p'od-pa and his associates were, as already hinted elsewhere, the representatives of the old aristocratic party, strongly nationalist and traditionally anti-Chinese; it also still had some leanings towards the Dzungars, in spite of the bitter experience of 1717-1720. K'a-n-c'ên-nas and P'o-lha-nas represented that part of the nobility which had rallied wholeheartedly to Lha-bzan Khan first and to the Chinese afterwards; they saw the safety and welfare of Tibet in the strong protection which only the Chinese empire, then the mightiest in Asia, could afford. The father of the Dalai-Lama had rallied to the nationalist party, but he stood alone among the clergy. The old lama party was for the moment inoperative; the monks as a body followed the Dalai-Lama and nobody else; as the sovereignty and legitimacy of the Seventh Dalai-Lama was by now unquestioned even by the old aristocracy, the lamas took no part in the conflict. As we shall see, they only tried several times to stop the civil war, which ruined the country and the estates of the church.

A strange contrast with the clear and acute memorial is presented by the inept and inconclusive orders passed by the emperor. They implied of course an approval of K'a-n-c'ên-nas's policy, and so far they were appropriate to the situation. But it was useless to try to boost up the uncle of the Dalai-Lama, who is unknown to history and is certain to have been a mere cipher. It was worse than useless to send out a mission with undefined powers and without a single soldier at their disposal to enforce their authority. It was a half-measure, and like all half-measures it led to disaster. The whole mission was foredoomed to failure; however, it could not even reach the stage of practical execution. It started so late or travelled so slowly, that after five months it had barely reached the border of Tibet, when the civil war broke out.

Still, it was the unlucky mission of Señ-ge and Mala which set the stone rolling. We remember that Dag-pa-rab-ābyams and Ts'ul-k'rims-t'ar-pa had been sent to Peking by the council in the

1) Doc. I. Cfr. Wei-tsang-t'ung-chih, ch. 13a, f. 7a, where some other trifling particulars concerning the personnel of the mission are given.
previous year. The two envoys, on their back way to Tibet, sent ahead a letter informing the Tibetan council that the emperor had given his approval to K'añ-c'èn-nas and his policy and was sending him a document (se-l'äm), and that two Chinese ta-ch'èn with a proper staff and retinue were coming to Lhasa, being entrusted with full powers to supervise the administration of Tibet 1). Lum-pa-nas and his associates boiled over with anger at this piece of news. It meant that the emperor was backing K'añ-c'èn-nas to the full; the arrival of the Chinese mission at Lhasa, even if as usual without troops, would discourage their partisans and proportionately increase the following of K'añ-c'èn-nas. It was decided to strike at once, before the Chinese arrived. Lum-pa-nas's hand was forced; and this fact explains the hurry and disorder of the measures of the rebels. In a last meeting the particulars of the action were decided, then the plot was carried out.

On 18/VI = August 6th, 1727 2) the council was holding a sitting in the øP'rul-snañ. K'añ-c'èn-nas was completely unaware of the impending doom; he smiled and jested with the other members. At a certain moment an attendant handed him a long letter; while he was reading it, a man called Blo-bzañ-don-yod went behind him and seized him by the ornaments of his hair. All the other ministers drew their knives and attached K'añ-c'èn-nas, while their retainers entered from outside with drawn swords. K'añ-c'èn-nas, pierced by hundreds of thrusts, fell down; he still could drag himself towards the gate, but before he reached it, he was finished off. His attackers continued hacking at his body, so that many wounded each other in their eagerness to strike. K'añ-c'èn-nas's two chief attendants too were killed, the others bound and thrown into prison. On the next day K'añ-c'èn-nas's wife and her sister were arrested in the Rab-brtan-dpal-abyor palace and butchered in cold blood. Two men were sent to kill the two governors of the Nag-c'ù region; the task was duly carried out. The same attention was shown to P'o-lha-nas: sKyid-pa-t'añ-pa, bKra-sis-dpal-ra-ba, sKya-k'añ-pa and others

1) MBTJ, f. 239a.
2) MBTJ, f. 239b; Loñ-ba'i-dmigs-bu, s.a. 1727; Doc. II. — ASTL, f. 363a, has the erroneous dating 18/VII. Della Penna, p. 286, and Giorgi, p. 338, give the 5th August. This last date is supported by an unpublished letter of Fr. Gioacchino da S. Anatolia, dated Lhasa, July 20th, 1731; Sc. Congressi, vol. 20, f. 430. It gives us the date of August 5th and the interesting information that K'añ-c'èn-nas „was killed by the order of the Grand Lama“. The difference in the dates can be explained with the error of one day, which can easily be met with in Hoang's tables.
were sent with some soldiers towards P'o-lha, to kill its master; we shall see later the result of their attempt. The officials of P'o-lha-nas in Lhasa were arrested and imprisoned. Even the great prayer-wheel which he had set up in the market-square of Lhasa was destroyed. Ts'e-rin-dbañ-rgyal, the author of the MBTJ, was not disturbed, which he attributes to his devotion to religious practices. As soon as K'añ-c'ên-nas was killed, the signal for revolt had been given in dBus, Koñ-po and other provinces. The troops of these regions gathered and "started northwards to attack the remnants of the Mongols" in aDam 1).

Of the events in Lhasa during the eleven months, which lapsed before P'o-lha-nas took the city, we know very little. If we are to believe the LSDL, the Dalai-Lama was much grieved by the event. He at once informed the Tashi-Lama, and then took steps to relieve the sufferings of the people caused by the revolt. But “before the emperor's orders came”, that was before the arrival of Sen-ge and Mala, the war broke out and there was no decisive result till the 5th month of the next year. The remarkable thing is that, notwithstanding the outbreak of civil war, the Chinese mission succeeded in reaching Lhasa without being opposed by the new rulers; they were received and presumably protected by the Dalai-Lama 2), and stayed undisturbed in Lhasa during the whole war. Some official of the mission could even cross the theatre of the war and reach bKra-sis-lhun-po, where 6/X = November 18th they laid before the Tashi-Lama the complimentary presents of the emperor 3). But the political influence of the mission was nil. The only thing on record is that soon after the news of the outbreak reached Peking, the emperor issued an edict to the Dalai-Lama ordering him to allow the Ölöts and Kukunor men, who were in the retinue of K'añ-c'ên-nas, to join Señ-ge and Mala and to retire to Kukunor; the Szechwan provincial treasury was to supply the funds for the movement and for a suitable reward to these men 4). We do not

---

1) MBTJ, ff. 239a-242b.
2) LSDL, f. 122a. Sen-ge is given the usual title of A-sa-han Am-pa (ashan-i amban). Mala is styled Me-rin Dsan-gi, which is the Manchu title meiren-i janggin, corresponding to the Chinese fu-tu-t'ung, brigadier-general. Mayers, n.381: Nieh Ch'ung-ch'üi, p. 109. Mala's biography in the Man-chou-ming-ch'ên-chuan, ch. 25. f. 39b, says that Señ-ge and Mala "protected the Dalai-Lama in the Potala".
3) ASTL, f. 364b.
4) Chi-wei/IX = October 20th, 1727. Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 61, ff.5b-6a.
know whether this order was carried out with regard to the retainers of K'añ-c'en-nas; but in any case the Chinese envoys did not move from Lhasa. In the summer the Dalai-Lama had his usual spell of residence at Se-ra. At the end of the year he received messengers from his old friend Ju-nañ in Kukunor, presumably telling him of the intended Chinese expedition 1). And this is about all; the LSDL skips over these months in one page only. It desires to convey the impression that the Dalai-Lama had no part whatsoever in the revolt, and even disapproved of it. We may readily believe this of the young Dalai-Lama, but not of his father, who was certainly privy to the plot.

Apart from this, we do not know the administrative steps taken by the new rulers to consolidate their power. Lhasa was ruled by a triumvirate composed of Na-p'od-pa, Lum-pa-nas and sByar-ra-ba, and we know that they used new seals of their own 2). But what really happened in Lhasa during their rule, is not told by anybody, not even by the Capuchins who resided there during the whole time.

At the time of K'añ-c'en-nas's murder, people at P'ö-lha were busy with the preparations for a religious feast. The first warning was given by one sKyi-sbug dBan-adus, who on his way back from Lhasa to his home had heard the news and had sent at once a messenger to P'o-lha. P'o-lha-nas, in order not to alarm his household, had the preparations carried out and held the feast regularly. But in the meantime he had sent his men to procure swift horses at Gyantse and bring them to P'o-lha. At midday he assembled his closest friends, told them of the news of the Lhasa outbreak and laid before them three different plans: either to quit the country and to take refuge with the Chinese at Hsining, or to summon together the fighting men of mNa'-ris and gTsañ and to fight the rebels, or to occupy the towns and villages of Sa-dga, Gro-śod and mNa'-ris (abandoning for the moment gTsañ) and to prepare their return from that secure base. The third alternative was chosen, and P'o-lha-nas himself undertook to travel to mNa'-ris and to assemble an army there. As his wife was still too ill to travel with him, he arranged for a strong guard and defence of P'o-lha and gave

1) LSDL, f. 122a-b.
2) Loñ-ba'i-dmigs-bu, s.a. 1727. According to the Raggio of Fr. Gioacchino da S. Anatolia, p. 14, "the Grand Lama assumed the temporal government through a minister of state, whom he appointed regent of the kingdom". I doubt that there was a formal appointment by the Dalai-Lama.
orders to his officers to defend his castle at all costs for a month, after which time he would be back with the mNa'ris troops 1).

One of the first things P'o-lha-nas must have done, was to inform the Chinese emperor. It was a very important step to take, because it was to be feared that his enemies in Lhasa, holding the capital and with a Chinese mission in residence there, would try to get the emperor's approval for their deed; if this happened, it meant the end of P'o-lha-nas. It was a matter of who would be quicker, and P'o-lha-nas won the race. His report of the outbreak, announcing that he was taking the field in order to defend his home and to fight the rebels, and urgently requesting Chinese armed help, reached Peking in an amazingly short time, and was laid before the emperor on kuei-yu/VII = September 4th, less than a month after K'añ-c'en-nas's murder 2).

P'o-lha-nas set out from P'o-lha with a few companions, and on the next day he arrived to Rin-c'en-rtse, where he began collecting weapons and soldiers. The Tashi-Lama heard of his activity there, and as he wished to avoid bloodshed, he advised P'o-lha-nas to write to the Dalai-Lama, his father and the ministers, in order to obtain from them a promise of safety. P'o-lha-nas's reply to the Tashi-Lama was an indictment of the ministers, an account of their misdeeds and an assertion of their unreliableness and of their firm decision to destroy him; he must therefore fight them to the last. At the same time he wrote a sort of manifesto in which he spoke of K'añ-c'en-nas's good deeds to the people, of his base murder and of the necessity of punishing his slayers. He caused this document to be read out in the full congregation of bKra-sis- lhun-po. Then he entrusted Rin-c'en-rtse to three loyal officers, again with orders to hold out for a month till he came back with more troops. He resumed his journey with his two sons and some sixty companions, and from the road he sent letters to the generals of the gTsañ troops residing at Šel-dkar-rdson, called lCañ-lo-can-pa and bSam-grub-gliñ-pa. To the general Nu-ma-ba, who was then in Ňam-rīnš, he wrote requesting from him, as from an old friend of K'añ-c'en-nas, active collaboration. The general was to leave for Sa-dga' and to inform its governor Uičing Noyan of the events; then he was to visit dGa'-bži-ba

1) MBTJ, ff. 242b-245a.
2) Doc. II.
Ts‘e-brtan-rab-abyams, the elder brother of K’añ-c‘en-nas and his deputy as governor of mNa-ris, and to take counsel with him; then they were to concentrate their forces in Sa-dga’. Nu-ma-ba acceded to the request of P‘o-lha-nas, but, as we shall see, was very slack in carrying out his instructions. ICañ-lo-can-pa joined P‘o-lha-nas and pledged his loyalty to him. Then P‘o-lha-nas passed through sPo-ro, where he won over the local chieftain. Continuing his march, he fell upon and confiscated 80 yaks and other cattle belonging to sByar-ra-ba, overcoming the resistance of the herdsmen. The same was done with a score of mules carrying a load of silver ingots belonging to Na-p‘od-pa, which were arriving from Kon-po. The muleteers were sent to prison in gNa-na and sKyid-ro. The chief of rDso-n-dga was arrested and imprisoned in mNa-ris. Then the rTa-mc‘og-k’a-‘abab (gTsa-n-po) was crossed. From the other bank P‘o-lha-nas sent a message to Ui‘ing Noyan, the governor of Sa-dga’, announcing his arrival. Ui‘ing was at first uncertain about P‘o-lha-nas’s intentions, and suspected that he had been sent against him by the ministers; the unreliable Nu-ma-ba had not informed him at all. He therefore gathered some troops in order to be ready for all events. But he was soon reassured. Ui‘ing received friendly P‘o-lha-nas at Gro-sa-lhas, and swore loyalty to him. With the winning of Sa-dga’, the first part of Po-lha-nas’s task was completed.

Of common accord, P‘o-lha-nas and Ui‘ing Noyan sent a messenger to dGa-bzi-ba in mNa-ris. He carried a long letter, which gave a full account of the latest events; we learn from it, among other things, that two officers sent with 300 men to kill P‘o-lha-nas had arrived at Gyantse, but had not been able to take P‘o-lha and had returned to Lhasa (on this see later); and that the secretary (gsen-yi-g-pa) of the Dalai-Lama, Legs-glin Na-dba‘-ajam-dpal, and the ministers of dBus and Kon-po had assembled, had forged letters of the Dalai-Lama and had caused them to be proclaimed by the public criers in gTsa‘n; no hint as to their contents is given.

1) Strangely enough, his personal name is nowhere mentioned in the Tibetan sources, which call him always only dGa‘-bzi-ba, and is to be found only in Ch‘ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 7b.

2) Tsonka or Jongkha of the maps, south of Sa-dga‘ on the Nepalese border. See Vasiljev, p. 10.


4) MBTJ, ff. 242b-252a.
The letter then explained that P'o-lha-nas's purpose was to requit the benefits once showered upon him by K'aṅ-c'ėn-nas and to hinder a conquest of mNa'-ris and gTsaṅ by Lum-pa-nas. To this end he had gathered his followers and was coming to get the help of dGa'-bži-ba. He begged the governor to join him with the troops of Ru-t'og and of sGar-t'og (Gartok), which would then march directly against Koṅ-po; they were certain to get Chinese support sooner or later. He gave a list of the regions and chiefs who had offered their support, and ended expressing his firm decision to conquer or to die, and calling upon dGa'-bži-ba to avenge his murdered brother. By a great effort the messenger reached sGar-t'og in 6 days. dGa'-bži-ba at once agreed with P'o-lha-nas's proposals and ranged himself wholeheartedly on his side. The all-important support of Western Tibet was thus secured, and the gTsaṅ-mNa'-ris coalition of 1719-1720 was revived ¹).

P'o-lha-nas personally enjoyed much popularity in the region, because since his birth he had been regarded as the incarnation of the Mongol lama dGa'-ldan-ts'e-dbaṅ who had conquered mNa'-ris for Tibet in 1681-1683. Partly on account of this, and partly because of the desire to avenge K'aṅ-c'ėn-nas's death, the call to arms met with a hearty response in mNa'-ris. Only the abbot of mT'o-lديث exerted his influence against the enlistments for the mNa'-ris army; but shortly afterwards he was killed by magic (draṅ-sroṅ-gi-gnod-pas, Sanskrit ṛṣibāḍhā). dGa'-bži-ba organized also the defence of the mNa'-ris against a possible attack by the Dzungars, by leaving there a sufficient covering force. Then he set in march his troops, which numbered 2000 horsemen ²). A good equipment for the army (horses, weapons etc.) had been secured from the monasteries of the region. P'o-lha-nas appointed UiČing Noyan's brother and Ts'a-roṅ-pa to look to the commissariat arrangements and the amenities for the advancing mNa'-ris troops, such as tea (ja-siṅ) and tobacco (t' ā-mi-k' ā koṭa). He himself, without waiting for them, on the 17/VII = September 2nd, 1727, only a month after the

¹) MBTJ, ff. 252a-255a.
²) MBTJ, f. 255b. Cfr. Wei-tsang-t'ung-chih, ch. 13a, f. 7b. We hear no further of dGa'-bži-ba, who evidently remained in mNa'-ris and took no part in the war. He died in 1729 or 1730, and mNa'-ris passed out of the hands of his family. But the dGa'-bži clan retained all their influence, and we shall see how duke (kung) dGa'-bži Pandita played a great role in the events of 1750.
murder of K'ān-c'en-nas, started on his return journey to gTsaṅ ¹).
P'o-lha-nas had done a good piece of work in the short time. His outstanding organizing talent had much profited by the experience of 1719/20, and he had been able to forestall his enemies and to take the field before they had the time to organize efficiently the forces of dBus and Koṅ-po. This advantage of time weighed heavily on the final outcome of the civil war. It was but a fitting recognition of his merits that P'o-lha-nas, hitherto usually called by the title of dGuṅ-blon Taiji, began to be famous in Tibet and all neighbouring countries by the name of Mi-dbaṅ, ruler of men, with which he afterwards passed to history ²).

¹) MBTJ, ff. 255a-256a.
²) MBTJ, f. 257a.
CHAPTER NINE

THE CIVIL WAR OF 1727-1728

P'o-lha-nas was marching back to gTsañ, receiving on his way pledges of support from various local lamas (Sañs-pa Ras-c̱en etc.). He encamped at Lu-ma-dgo-dmar, where he decided, as an auspicious deed of propitiation for victory, to restore the decayed stupa of Bya-rūn K’a-śor 1) in Nepal. He issued orders that the revenue of K’yuñ-rdoñ-dkar-po, sKyid-roñ and Sa-dgā 2) should be set aside for this purpose, and deputed two officials for the task, which was to be finished by the 11th month of the same year. Likewise, he caused gifts to be offered and the Canon to be read at aP‘el-rgyas-gliñ in rDsoñ-dga’. These measures, besides being dictated by the deeply religious nature of P’o-lha-nas, answered also the purpose of ingratiating the lamas and drawing them to his party.

His journey continued till Lha-rtse-rdoñ, while small bands of soldiers continued to join him on the route. There he received an encouraging message from the abbot of Sa-skya. Moreover, a revered ascetic called A-jo Bla-ma, who resided in the cave of Kom-kre, issued a widely-circulated prophecy, in which he invited people to refrain from going to dBus for trading purposes and to refuse paying taxes to the Lhasa government, because a hero was coming to overthrow the sinners at Lhasa. It was a means of propaganda which hit deeply the economic base of the power of the triumvirate, and could not fail to be effective. Then P’o-lha-nas and his army passed through P’un-ts’ogs-glin and continued their march towards gTsañ 2).

In the meantime the officers sent by the ministers to eliminate P’o-lha-nas, viz. sKyid-pa-t’añ-pa, sKya-k’añ-pa etc., arrived from the Dol region with 300 men. They attacked P’o-lha with the utmost determination during five days, but were repulsed with losses by

1) Or Maguta; two miles to the north-east of Kathmandu; Waddell, Notes on the Magu-ta or Charung Khashar stupa, in PASB, 1892, pp. 186-189. Id., Buddhism of Tibet pp. 315-317.
2) MBTJ, ff. 257b-259b.
the small garrison of about 60 men). sKyid-pa-t’an-pa had to retreat; but he found his chance elsewhere: by a surprise coup he got possession of Gyantse. The commandant of Gyantse and his officers with about 100 men escaped to the fort of Shigatse. This fort was soon placed in a state of defence under the supervision of two officers sent for this purpose by P‘o-lha-nas 2). In the meantime, the peasants of gTsaṅ, encouraged by the retreat of sKyid-pa-t’an-pa, took arms under the lead of Žal-ňo Kun-bzaṅ-can, and besieged the Lhasa troops in Gyantse; but of course this ill-armed rabble was unable to take the fort.

With great sorrow the Tashi-Lama saw his beloved gTsaṅ on the verge of a ruinous war, and he began that mediating activity by which he was so conspicuous throughout the war. He sent a messenger to Lhasa with a letter to the Dalai-Lama begging him to order the ministers to lay down arms, and another letter to the triumvirate asking them to think of the welfare of the country and to avoid an armed conflict. Another messenger (dKa’-c’en bKra-šis) was sent to P‘o-lha-nas to the same purpose, but as the addressee was then at Rin-c‘en-rtse, the letter could not be handed over 3). On the top all these worries, in the southern districts an epidemic of smallpox was raging, and it soon began to spread even to bKra-šis-lhun-po 4).

The Tashi-Lama’s efforts at peacemaking yielded no fruit, and soon it was heard that a strong army from dBus, Dags-po, Koň-po and Mongol tribes, commanded by Lum-pa-nas and sByar-ra-ba, was advancing to the relief of Gyantse. The noblemen of Northern gTsaṅ gathered together in order to stop this army and to cover the blockade of Gyantse; they built for this purpose some strong stockades on the Ka-ro-la, blocking the main Lhasa-Gyantse route. The Lhasa army attacked this fortified position, and the struggle lasted for a long time with losses on both sides. At last the ammunition of the gTsaṅ troops gave out, the pass was forced and the defenders scattered each to his home. The nobles of Šaṅ (P‘o-lha-nas’s own country), who were encamped at the foot of the fort of Gyantse, had to raise the blockade and to retreat. They sent a

1) MBTJ, f. 259b-260a.
2) ASTL, f. 363a.
3) This is most probably identical with the event referred to above (p. 104). The sequence of the events in the MBTJ and the ASTL is for once diverging.
4) ASTL, f. 363b.
message to P'o-lha-nas, informing him of the defeat and urgently requesting the help of the mNa'-ris troops; only by a forced march could they arrive in time 1). P'o-lha-nas started at once with the utmost celerity of which his troops were capable. But he could not make it in time. The dBus army soon reached Gyantse and advanced as far as rNam-nub-glin 2).

At this time some officers of P'o-lha-nas intercepted a letter sent by Nu-ma-ba, who was then a general of the gTsan forces; the letter was addressed to the Dalai-Lama's father in Lhasa, and impressed upon him the necessity of conquering gTsan before P'o-lha-nas's relieving army from mNa'-ris and the Mongol chieftains of aDam could join hands and crush the Lhasa troops. Po'-lha-nas was much incensed at the treachery of Nu-ma-ba, who had been a protegee of K'añ-c'en-nas, had married his sister and had been friend with P'o-lha-nas since Lha-bzañ Khan's times. He detailed his officer Glo-ba-ñe-ba bsTan-adsin-dgos-skyes with some ten men, to kill Nu-ma-ba. With the support of 30 men from Rin-c'en-rtse, he was to entice Nu-ma-ba to come to the fort of Shigatse for consultation; there he was to cut him down. The task was duly executed. Nu-ma-ba was lured to Shigatse, arrested, bound and executed by throwing him down from the battlements of the fort. P'o-lha-nas thus stamped out treachery in his ranks and effectively cowed any possible opposition to his rule in gTsan 3).

When P'o-lha-nas got intelligence of the advance of the Lhasa army against him, he left Lha-rtse and by forced marches arrived at a meadow called Le-ne-k'a, in the neighbourhood of Shigatse, where he encamped. In view of the impending battle, he summoned his still ailing wife from P'o-lha and sent her first to sNar-t'añ and then to a remote spot on the Tibetan-Nepalese border. Then by a well-calculated act of mercy he pardoned and set free three dBus noblemen who had been imprisoned at Shigatse; they were simply restricted in their movements to bKra-Sis-lhun-po and some neighbouring places. After these measures of internal security, P'o-lha-nas again turned his attention to the war. His general lCañ-lo-can-pa with 300 men advanced from Pa-snam-rdson by the road on the southern bank of the Nañ-c'u, while P'o-lha-nas himself with the main forces advanced by the road on the northern bank. The dBus army, led by Lum-pa-nas and sByar-ra-ba, after

---
1) MBTJ, ff. 260a-261a.  2) ASTL, f. 363b.  3) MBTJ, ff. 261a-263a.
the relief of Gyantse had passed through aBron-dkar-rtse (Drongtse on the Na-n-c'ut), continuing its advance; and after a short time the two adversaries came within sight of each other at aBras-k'ud. I cannot positively identify this locality, but it must be sought for between Drongtse and Panam-dsong; it cannot therefore have anything to do with the aBras-k'ud monastery near Samada, to the south of Gyantse 1). The Lhasa army was ascending the slope of a hill in order to draw itself up near the summit. P'o-lha-nas planned to send lCañ-lo-can-pa with some swivel guns 2) to ascend a hill on the enemy's back to open fire by surprise, while his main forces occupied the houses in the neighbourhood; his plan was to compel the enemy to retreat without hand-to-hand fighting. But before he could issue his orders, Uiicing Noyan, P'o-lha-nas's younger son and others, without waiting for support, swept forward against the enemy. Lum-pa-nas's division advancing in dispersed order ascended the hill. When it was on the top, and while the mNa'-ris and gTsan troops were still advancing in a disordered fashion, the enemy suddenly effected his concentration and charged down on P'o-lha-nas, who had remained with a score of companions only. The charge was valiantly withstood and thrown back, with the loss of five men. The fighting was then broken off, and the two armies encamped at a short distance from each other 3).

In the meantime the Tashi-Lama had sent an official of his court, styled Sa-k'ud-pa, to the leaders of the Lhasa troops, in a last attempt to avoid the slaughter of a battle. The messenger was coldly received and was told to address himself to P'o-lha-nas, who had assembled troops to resist the forces of the lawful government. The envoy went accordingly to P'o-lha-nas and tried to convince him of the uselessness and evil results of fighting. P'o-lha-nas gave an uncompromising reply, repeating his usual reasons; the one important information we gather from his speech is that the Lhasa troops had by now succeeded in dispersing in all directions the aDam Mongols 4).

2) Me'i-mda'-c'en. They were long-barrelled small-bore weapons. In 1904 they were still in use and played a great part in the siege of the British mission at Gyantse. Waddell calls them by the Anglo-Indian name jingal (on which see Yule & Burnell, Hobson-Jobson. London 1886, p. 285, s.v. gingall). It was not cannon; that is called in the MTBJ meskyogs.
3) MTBJ. ff. 263a-265a.
4) MTBJ, f. 265a-b; ASTL, ff. 363b-364a.
On the next day the Lhasa troops advanced to the attack, some of them in the open country and some on the bank of the Nañ-c'u. The melee became general, and soon P'o-lha-nas's troops were in full retreat on all sides. P'o-lha-nas with his small body-guard threw himself desperately against the advancing enemy, carrying aloft his banner. His charge succeeded in checking the enemy, and Lum-pa-nas and sByar-ra-ba retreated to their trenches.

On the following day at dawn, P'o-lha-nas's infantry moved up the hill, and his cavalry advanced in the plain. At sunrise his swivels opened fire and the troops charged. The sleeping camp of the Lhasa army was completely surprised and a scene of indescribable confusion ensued, as the men, most of them naked or only partly armed, ran about without being able to offer serious resistance. Also the Lhasa troops on the hill-top were put to flight, all their commanders being slain or taken. P'o-lha-nas supported the action of his troops by the fire of his swivel guns from a hillock nearby. Lum-pa-nas and sByar-ra-ba, surprised in their sleep like everybody else, had to throw themselves in the ditch of the camp, to escape the first rush of the charge. When they were able to come out, they found their army in dissolution, but for a small nucleus still intact, the Mongol and Turk contingents. By an enormous bribe the ministers succeeded in persuading these crack troops to move to the counter-attack. The troops of P'o-lha-nas had been disorganized by their own victory, and the counterstroke took them completely by surprise; some of them fled, some quitted the Lhasa camp and retreated to the hill, where they offered resistance. P'o-lha-nas, who was already quitting the field of what he believed to be his victory, tried to turn back and to resume the fight, but it was a hopeless undertaking and he was held back by his officers. The fight was over; nothing remained for P'o-lha-nas, but to collect the remnants of his troops and to flee in the direction of Sa-dga'. The Lhasa troops followed him till sBel-sñon-na-k'a near Shigatse. It makes rather comical reading when the MBTJ tells us that P'o-lha-nas, thinking of the unbearable miseries inflicted by the foreign troops on the innocent peasants, considered that, though he had taken Shigatse and spa-nam-rdson, a long protracted fighting in the neighbourhood would ruin the peasantry, and therefore decided to go back to Sa-dga' and to try another effort from there. Sober history cannot accept this distortion of truth.
P'o-lha-nas had been well and truly beaten in the three days' battle of aBras-k‘ud 1).

Lum-pa-nas and sByar-ra-ba, encamped near Shigatse, tried to obtain an audience from the Tashi-Lama, but were refused on account of the risk of smallpox contagion. But a great feast had to be offered to their troops, who also otherwise oppressed the countryside and insulted the dignity of the Tashi-Lama. Then the army marched away westwards and reached _NM-ri_ by easy stages. But the Lhasa troops too had been terribly battered in the battle and had no more stomach for fighting; pursuit of P'o-lha-nas in Sa-dga 3 was clearly out of question. All that could be done was to defend the approaches of gTsañ against a second offensive by P'o-lha-nas, which was to be expected sooner or later. The large and small forts of the region were garrisoned, and the great Lhasa army was demobilized and disbanded. It was probably anticipated that the fighting was over for the season. To keep together Tibetan levies for a long time has always been difficult, and this was clearly a task beyond the poor organizing qualities of the two ministers. As we can gather from the ASTL, the above events happened before the beginning of the 10th month (November-December) of 1727 2).

The Dalai-Lama tried now to utilize what promised to be a long pause in the hostilities for an attempt to put an end to the civil war. He sent to the Tashi-Lama a man called gZims-agag Žal-ño, together with three or four monks of Se-ra and aBras-spuins. They could not be received, but the Tashi-Lama accepted the gifts and letters from the Dalai-Lama, his father and the ministers. As a consequence of this, the Tashi-Lama again sent Sa-k‘ud-pa to the two parties. We do not hear of the result of this mission, but it must have been negative 3).

The efforts of the Tashi-Lama had a curious repercussion in far-away Peking. It seems that the attempt of the Dalai-Lama was supported by his guests, the Chinese mission at Lhasa. P'o-lha-nas was much worried by this intervention, which could be interpreted by the populace as Chinese disinterest in the struggle going on in Tibet. Señ-ge and Mala were proving a nuisance to P'o-lha-nas. It seems that he wrote to the emperor, respectfully begging him to tell his envoys at Lhasa to be quiet. On chi-hai/X = November

---

1) MBTJ, ff. 265a-269b; ASTL, f. 364a.
2) MBTJ, f. 269; ASTL, f. 364b.
3) ASTL, f. 364a.
29th the emperor accordingly passed orders to send word, secretly and by trusted men, to Seü-ge and Mala, not to do anything capable to prejudice P'o-lha-nas's action 1).

On the whole, P'o-lha-nas's situation was by no means rosy. gTsañ could not be left to the tender mercies of the enemy. The Lhasa troops had dispersed the monks of bKra-sis-lhun-po and insulted the Tashi-Lama. The Gandhola and the monastery of sNar-t'ai had been destroyed. The country was oppressed by the invaders, and many sacred places had been defiled. Houses were burnt, women were raped; the general misery was great. There was, however, one great advantage, the hasty demobilization of the Lhasa army; if it could be exploited at once, it gave a fair chance of victory. It all depended on the ability of P'o-lha-nas to effect what Lum-pa-nas and sByar-ra-ba had not been able to do: to keep together his army. P'o-lha-nas spoke to his men, gave them the reasons for his retreat, recounted the atrocities of the enemy, and gave orders to prepare for resuming the advance. But he met with no response from the men. The troops of mNa'-'ris and gTsañ had not recovered from their defeat and hurried retreat; they were tired and yearned for demobilization. They begged P'o-lha-nas to retire for this year to mNa'-'ris; thence they could return later with a larger army and destroy Lum-pa-nas. If this were too difficult, P'o-lha-nas could still bribe the emperor (pa-c'a, Padshah) of Delhi to send him troops, and the job would be done in ten days. Besides, why not wait till the Chinese emperor had stamped out the revolt? And the men stuck to their point and absolutely refused to move. But P'o-lha-nas was not a Lum-pa-nas for giving in so quickly. He again appealed to the troops. To call in the Moghuls from India was unthinkable, it would mean the end of Buddhism in Tibet. If the men refused to march, they could go back to their homes. But he himself with some ten followers would march to Nam-rinis and fight; everybody was free to go home, to retreat to mNa'-'ris or to join him. This last appeal succeeded. P'o-lha-nas's men were carried away by his magnificent bravado, and with one voice they declared themselves ready to follow him; they realized also that to return to their homes in gTsañ meant to end in the prisons or before the executioners of Lum-pa-nas. P'o-lha-nas had

1) Doc. III.
won his point, and had won it in time. Only a short while after his arrival in Sa-dga', he was able to take again the field 1).

The mNä'-ris and gTsañ troops advanced upon Ňam-rinya. The joy of the local population, freed at last from the marauders of the Lhasa army, was indescribable. Po-lha-nas issued a manifesto to the whole country, announcing his advance, threatening death to resisters and promising full protection to non-combatants; he expressed his intention to march as far as Koñ-po. The skeleton garrisons left by Lum-pa-nas in the gTsañ forts were seized by panic when they heard of Po-lha-nas's advance, and hastily and in disorder evacuated the fortresses. Some of them were slain by the peasants, some taken prisoners, some robbed of all their equipment, some made for their homes. Thus without striking a blow all gTsañ was free and the occupation army had vanished 2).

Lum-pa-nas in the meantime had returned to Lhasa; but after some days there, he heard the news of Po-lha-nas's renewed advance. He at once sent out orders for the concentration of the great army, which had given him the victory at aBras-k'ud. Most of the men had not yet reached their homes, or had only been there for a few days, when they received the summons; and soon the army gathered again, but probably weaker than before and rather discontented because of the failure of the demobilization. As soon as he was ready, Lum-pa-nas marched to gTsañ, to recover that region for the Lhasa triumvirate. Po-lha-nas, still in Ňam-rinya, was prompted by a dream (does this mean secret intelligence?) to send Uicing Noyan with a division to occupy Gyantse before the enemy could reach it. By a swift march, Uicing succeeded in forestalling Lum-pa-nas, and occupied Gyantse. After two days the Lhasa army arrived at a day's march from Gyantse; finding that they had arrived too late, they occupied a village nearby, called rGyañ-mk'ar 3). Meanwhile Po-lha-nas had followed his lieutenant by easy stages. On 24/X = December 6th, he arrived in the neighbourhood of Shigatse. To him too audience with the Tashi-Lama was denied because of the danger of smallpox; but the customary exchange of compliments took place. On the full moon day of the

1) MBTJ, ff. 269b-271a.
2) MBTJ, ff. 271a-272a.
3) Probably the rGyañ-dkar-goñ-ma temple (simply Gompa in the maps) in the hills a short distance to the north-east of Gyantse. Tucci, Indo-Tibetica, IV/1, pp. 60-61.
red half of the 10th month (December 12th), P'o-lha-nas arrived at Gyantse 1).

There were small brushes between the two armies every day, but no decisive battle. But time was working in favour of P'o-lha-nas. Public opinion, meaning that of the lamas, was now veering decidedly towards P'o-lha-nas, as shown by various prophecies of high incarnates predicting his victory; one of them could even foretell that even if in the 2nd month of the next year he could not be in Lhasa, by the 5th month he would have his wishes fulfilled. All the same, P'o-lha-nas felt bound to provoke a decision, because the prolonged stay of the mNa'-ris and gTsan troops near Gyantse added to the difficulties of finding a regular supply of food and water, and was also becoming an intolerable burden on the peasantry of the district, mostly P'o-lha-nas's tenants. He therefore sent his troops to attack the Lhasa division occupying the "northern hill". The hill was taken, and it afforded the possibility of bringing up P'o-lha-nas's swivel guns, which from there could hit the Lhasa camp. But the enemy had been warned by a traitor in P'o-lha-nas's ranks, and on the next day all the fire arms in their camp were ready to muzzle the fire of P'o-lha-nas's swivels, while their cavalry was deploying outside the camp, out of reach of those primitive weapons. There was a small fight of little account. On this occasion the author of the MBTJ, Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal, who served in the Lhasa army under the orders of the prince of Guge, fell into the hands of the gTsan troops; but P'o-lha-nas pardoned him and set him free. The situation was at a dead end. The undisciplined dBu's troops were looting and destroying monasteries all over the country (dGa'-ldan-c'os-ap'el of K'ye-rag, Brag-dgon of gTsan etc.); in the house of Nu-ma they destroyed a bKa'-agyur; they employed the wooden blocks of the printing presses for making war equipment; they robbed the monks and beat them; in short, they behaved as perfect barbarians. There was no possibility of attacking their entrenchments near rGyañ-mk'ar and bKra-šis-sgañ (unidentified). On the other side, the fort of Gyantse repelled all attempts of the Lhasa troops to storm it, and inflicted heavy losses on them with its fire, so that the main camp of the Lhasa army had to be shifted to dGa'-ldan-c'os-ap'el 2).

1) MBTJ, ff. 272a-273a; ASTL, f. 364b.
2) Unidentified. MBTJ, ff. 274a-277b.
Once again the untiring Tashi-Lama sent messengers to the Dalai-Lama and his father begging them to restrain their troops. Then he decided to travel to Sa-skya and to arrange for common action with the abbot of that famous monastery; but he was detained by his courtiers on account of the smallpox, and he had to send a messenger instead. After this, he tried once more to negotiate at least a suspension of arms, which would give relief to the miseries of war. But Lum-pa-nas, who was waiting for reinforcements, put off the messenger with evasive words, and P'o-lha-nas replied in the negative. Still the Tashi-Lama’s envoy continued his efforts, with the cooperation of a representative of the abbot of Sa-skya. Their proposals contemplated the end of the war and the disbandment of the armies. If this was impossible, then at least the contending parties should agree to suspend hostilities till the decision of the Chinese emperor arrived, and in the meantime the armies should be demobilized. The two parties seemed to agree in principle to the proposals, but could not agree on the oaths to be taken and the guarantees to be given, and each of them feared a trap. So the war had to go on 1).

In the meantime a division of P'o-lha-nas’s troops had been operating in gTsañ-ron 2) with such complete success that the remnants of the Lhasa troops in that region had to evacuate it; they joined the main army at dGa'-ldan-c'os-ap'el. This arrival increased the famine in Lum-pa-nas’s overcrowded camp. There was no means of fetching supplies from dBu; the neighbourhood had been scoured and devastated, and yielded nothing; the grass was consumed, and foraging parties found the countryside hostile and were set upon and destroyed by P'o-lha-nas’s men. Lum-pa-nas thought of a way out of the impasse; he would fetch a big cannon (me'i-skyogs) from dBu and batter down the defences of Gyantse. And indeed, the unwieldy weapon was hauled with great difficulties all the way from Lhasa to dGa'-ldan-c'os-ap'el. After its arrival, the Lhasa army left the camp, and dragging the gun in its midst, drew up near bKra-sis-sgañ; then the gun opened fire. The troops of P'o-lha-nas were impressed by the roar of the explosions and grew anxious. But P'o-lha-nas reassured them and told them that his own experience of artillery in the Bhutanese and Dsungar wars

1) ASTL, f. 365a; MBTJ, ff. 277b-278b and 281a.
2) The valley of the gTsañ-po between Shigatse and the confluence of the skYid-c'u.
showed that it was not much to be feared. In view of the imperfection of artillery in those places and times, he proved to be right; the gun did no harm whatsoever to P'o-lha-nas's troops, and the day ended with a fruitless cannonade. All the same, it is not easy to understand why the gun was employed in the open field and not against the fort of Gyantse, where it would have proved more effective. This affair is probably identical with the battle of rGyal-mk'ar mentioned in the ASTL, which took place a short while before the end of the 12th month 1).

The Lhasa army, in order to lighten their crowded camp, sent some troops to brGya-gron, on the south-western bank of the Na'-c'u. It was of little use; weeks and months went by, and the distress in their camp grew worse and worse. The camp reeked with the stench of the corpses of men who had died of hunger and want. The few horses left were unserviceable. Among the men there was much discontent against Lum-pa-nas. In the meanwhile the representatives of the Tashi-Lama and of the abbot of Sa-skya were still continuing their efforts between the two camps. P'o-lha-nas at last thought that the unbelievable obstinacy of Lum-pa-nas was ruining the country and the army, which he could not wish to see destroyed; he therefore formed the plan to shift the theatre of operations northwards, to join the aDam Mongols and to march together down to Lhasa, to finish the war in a pitched battle. Only an armistice in gTsai could give him the possibility of carrying out this plan. He listened therefore to the entreaties of the two envoys, who after New Year's day (February 10th) of 1728 had redoubled their activity, and began an exchange of correspondence with Lum-pa-nas, to settle the conditions of the truce. The stipulations finally accepted were those first proposed by the two envoys: suspension of hostilities till the decision of the emperor arrived; remission of revenue for that year in the ravaged districts of gTsai; disbandment of both armies. The negotiations had been long and difficult; but the Dalai-Lama himself and his father exerted all their influence in favour of peace. Lum-pa-nas requested that the agreement should be confirmed by a meeting and an oath taken by the two leaders, and that the document should bear the palm-sign of the two envoys as a guarantee; P'o-lha-nas agreed. Then Lum-pa-nas began making difficulties about the form of the oath,

1) MBTJ, ff. 278b-280a; ASTL, f. 365b.
about the powers of the envoys to sign etc., till the two envoys, confused and overawed, had to place their palm-signs on a document which was not exactly as it had been agreed. On the 3/III = April 11th, 1728, the armistice was signed amidst much rejoicing of the population. The war prisoners in the various fortresses of dBus and gTsan were set free, and the state prisoners in Shigatse fort were given a gift of foodstuffs 1).

The insistence during the negotiations on the necessity of waiting for the emperor’s decision was based on the fact that both sides had appealed to the emperor, and that it must have been already known in Tibet that a Chinese special envoy, backed by a strong force, had been sent to quell the disturbance in Tibet. What was not yet known, was that the decision had already been taken in favour of P’o-lha-nas, as we shall see later.

The main condition in the agreement was the disbandment of the armies. This was faithfully carried out by the Lhasa triumvirate; their great army was demobilized and dispersed at once. But P’o-lha-nas had concluded the armistice only in order to put an end to the devastating and inconclusive warfare in gTsan. He never intended to be bound by it longer than he could help. In this he was assisted by the behaviour of his troops. Quite to the contrary of what had happened in the previous autumn, they were now dissatisfied with the lame result of the campaign and felt themselves aggrieved; there was no talk of demobilization among them, nay, they yearned for the resumption of war. A pretext was soon found. Some of the conditions of the agreement had not been completely carried out by Lum-pa-nas. He had not recalled the commanders and garrisons which he had placed in several forts of gTsan, specially in sNañ-dkar-rtse 2). There had also been an incident. During the truce one A-jo-dpal-

1) MBTJ, ff. 280a-282b; ASTL, ff. 366b-367a. The Capuchins in Lhasa heard only incorrect reports of this campaign. Thirteen years later Fr. Francesco Orazio della Penna wrote that the fort of Gyantse, „is the fortress where in 1728 the present king of Tibet Mivagn-cugiab (Mi-dbañ-sku-tscpab) lay for six months with 30.000 soldiers besieged by the party of the Grand Lama, on whose orders the king had been killed. The above-mentioned Mivagn-cugiab, who was then the fourth minister of state, in order to avenge the death of this king collected a quantity of soldiers and posted himself to the defence of the fortress, till there arrived in his favour a succour from the emperor of China, with which having put to flight the army of the Grand-Lama, he triumphantly entered Lhasa, where he was declared head of all Tibet by order of the emperor“. Letter of April 1st, 1741; Scr. Congressi, vol. 22, f. 651b.

2) Nangkartse-dsong on the western shore of lake Palti.
bzaṅ of Nag-tsaṅ had been accused of stirring up trouble; besides, some Lhasa officials arrested and killed a few gTsaṅ men in Nag-tsaṅ, under the charge of being troublemakers and causes of disorder through their ignoring the conditions of the armistice. P'o-lha-nas declared this to be a breach of the truce; he stated that, as he could not be sure that the enemy army was not going to make a surprise attack against him, he could no longer stay in gTsaṅ. The Lhasa authorities maintained that these events represented no infringement of the truce, that the agreement forbade continuation of fighting and that this had been carried out, but that the gTsaṅ people must, on their part, carry out the stipulation which forbade the maintenance of an army. P'o-lha-nas replied that the Lhasa government could not be relied upon; he could not remain silent, while everybody knew that he was going to be attacked by an army. The drift of the events was now clear; P'o-lha-nas was trying by all means, fair or foul, to find a good pretext for breaking the truce. The Tashi-Lama wished to go personally to try once more a conciliation, but was again detained by his courtiers on the usual plea of the smallpox. He sent a messenger with many presents to P'o-lha-nas at Pa-snam-rdoṅ, entreating him to keep the agreement. It was of no avail.

P'o-lha-nas at last came out in the open. He wrote a letter to the Tashi-Lama, in which he declared that if he observed the agreement, it would stultify his efforts for the welfare of religion and of the people. He then sent the Mongol Omosu to fetch his elder son from Šel-dkar; he sent a reinforcement of 300 men to two officers of his who were at mT'oṅ-lcags-rdoṅ (unidentified); Noyan Qošūči and ICaṅ-lo-can-pa with 2000 men remained at the fort of Gyantse; Dayan Taiji with 1000 men was sent to Rin-c'en-spuṅ ¹; Lha-luṅ-rtse-pa with 500 men went to Gliṅ-dkar (unidentified). P'o-lha-nas directed all these movements from his camp at Pa-snam-rdoṅ. Having thus provided for the safety of gTsaṅ, he waited till his son and ICaṅ-lo-can-pa joined him. Then he ordered them to march with their troops through Gar-ābrog to the southern border of dBu; they were evidently intended as a diversion, to draw upon themselves the attention of the Lhasa commanders. When this order was carried out, P'o-lha-nas left Pa-snam-rdoṅ

with his personal troops, and travelled by forced marches night and day on the northern road 1), till he arrived at Yaṣ-pa-can 2).

Yaṣ-pa'd-pa and the other ministers in Lhasa were taken completely by surprise. They sent messengers to recall the troops of ḫBus and Koni-po from Nangkartse to Lhasa. When they arrived, they encamped in the meadows (ne'u-siṅ) below the Potala.

In the north, P'o-lha-nas seems not to have found a situation quite as favourable as he expected. One of his main reasons for coming there was that, as both he and the late K'aṅ-c'’en-nas had been faithful followers of Lha-bzaṅ Khan, and in a certain sense represented the traditions and memories of the Qośots rule in Tibet, he had expected the fullest support from the Qośots and other Mongols nomadising in ĀDam. But the tribes had been attacked and cowed into submission by the Lhasa triumvirate soon after the murder of K'aṅ-c'’en-nas, and they were not ready to join P'o-lha-nas at once. The chieftain of the Mongol nomads near Yaṣ-pa-can was one of those who had submitted to the Lhasa government; to give an example, P'o-lha-nas ordered him to be flogged and put to death. It seems that this timely act of energy improved his situation at once. When he reached the T'o-lo-k'o, country, the Mongol nomads in that zone, till then dispersed and uncertain, rallied to him. They brought him a much-needed reinforcement of fine soldiers. While encamping in that zone, P'o-lha-nas heard a rumour to the effect that Yaṣ-pa'd-pa with 2000 men was marching to P'o-mdo 3), seeking a pitched battle. P'o-lha-nas with 2000 Tibetan and Mongol soldiers remained for two days and one night in the valley of gYaṅ-ra in ĀDam, waiting for the enemy; but nobody came and the rumour proved to be false.

P'o-lha-nas received support also from other elements than the Mongols. A high church dignitary, Grub-dbaṅ-sems-dpa'c'en-po, sent him a letter with his good wishes and a present of fine horses for him and his men. All the same, it must not be believed that the lamas were without exception rallying to his party. We know e.g. that Sum-pa mK'aṅ-po, since 1726 abbot of the sGo-maṅ college in ĀBra-spūṅs, successfully prevented his monks from

1) He may have followed either the route from Shigatse through the Šaṅs-c'u valley and the Khalamba-la, or that through 'U-yug (on which see back the note on Yaṣ-pa-can on p. 85).
2) MBTJ, ff. 282b-283b. ASTL, f. 365b.
3) Phondū on the sKyid-c'u.
taking sides in the civil war and compelled them to observe strict neutrality ¹).

At P'ō-ts'añ-sum-mdo (unidentified), P'ō-lha-nas received the submission of a Mongol clan which was subject to the Dalai-Lama’s father, and of the Sog tribes of the Nag-c’u region. There a council of war was held. Some of P'ō-lha-nas’s officers maintained that they must remain in the Tengri-nor andqaDam zone. As it was certain that the Chinese troops would advance towards Lhasa, the triumvirate would probably seek a decisive battle with P'ō-lha-nas before the arrival of the Chinese; fighting in qaDam must end with P'ō-lha-nas’s victory. But P'ō-lha-nas was against prolonged idleness, and pleaded for a march straight to Lhasa. It was his ambition to confront the Chinese as the undisputed master of the capital, so as to compel them to recognize the de-facto situation and to entrust him with the government of Tibet. We may readily suppose that he did not wish to risk the arrival of the Chinese taking place earlier than he expected, so that he should have to enter Lhasa in their train. The council ranged itself to his views.

At this juncture a last attempt was made by the church to avoid a battle near Lhasa. A commission of church dignitaries, which had assembled for the purpose of trying to put an end to the civil war, sent to P'ō-lha-nas asking for an interview. The commission comprised the envoys of the Tashi-Lama and of the abbot of Sa-skya, the K'ri Rin-po-c’e dPal-lidan-grags-pa, and representatives from various monasteries. But together with this request, P'ō-lha-nas received the news that a large Lhasa division had been completely defeated and dispersed at Yul-sbus-sde by his troops advancing from Nañ-roñ under the lead of his son. P'ō-lha-nas now felt sure of victory; he flatly refused to see the commission, and began immediately the march towards Lhasa with an army of 9000 men ²).

His march went through qaP’an-yul ³); his troops were held under strict discipline, and did not cause any harm to the peasantry. Having crossed the mountains, on the 25/V = July 2nd P'ō-lha-nas encamped near the village of Gar-pa ⁴). The only serious obstacle

---

¹) S. Ch. Das, The life of Sum-pa-mk’ an-po, in JASB 1889, p. 38. It must be remembered that Sum-pa mK’ an-po was pro-Dsungar and therefore presumably unfriendly to P’o-lha-nas.

²) MBTJ, ff. 283b-286a; ASTL, f. 368a; Ch’ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 7b.

³) The valley to the north of Lhasa beyond the Kam-la.

⁴) Not on the maps. From the Chinese itineraries (Rockhill in JRAS 1891, p. 94) we gather that it was only a short distance from Lhasa.
between Gar-pa and Lhasa was the fortified defile (p'rañ) of dGa'-mo, and P'o-lha-nas at once sent some parties to reconnoitre in that direction. One of these parties, advancing along the bank of the sKyid-c'u, took prisoner about 30 men of the garrison, and brought them bound and fettered before P'o-lha-nas; he set them free with a gift of tobacco for each. By this examples and by the disciplined behaviour of his troops, he went a long way towards winning the hearts of the dBus peasants. In the meantime the Lhasa army was still concentrated on the field beneath the Potala. Lum-pa-nas with some troops went out to defend the dGa'-mo defile; he found it deserted and placed a small garrison in it. The entrenchments formed a very strong position, as to the north they lay over a deep ravine of difficult access and towards the south they were protected by the sKyid-c'u. But Lum-pa-nas's men were by now utterly demoralized and discouraged, and had no more stomach for fighting. No wonder that in the following night an officer of P'o-lha-nas, despatched to the defile with some 300 matchlockmen (1000 according to the Chinese), had no difficulty in taking the entrenchments by surprise and putting the garrison into flight. This small defeat had a disastrous influence on Lum-pa-nas's dwindling army, and during the same night all his forces holding the outposts around Lhasa went over to P'o-lha-nas. On the next day at dawn P'o-lha-nas with his whole army in full battle array began the advance on Lhasa. This time there was little or no fighting. Lum-pa-nas's army simply melted away, his men disbanding without resistance in a complete rout. The troops of P'o-lha-nas advanced through the mass of the fugitives without meeting with opposition. Only a small remainder of the dBus and Koñ-po troops entered the Potala through the gate of the walled dependencies ¹), and from this outwork Lum-pa-nas and some of his men kept the enemy at bay by the fire of their matchlocks. But this small resistance could be safely disregarded. The gTsañ army streamed into the city, occupying the P'ruł-snañ cathedral and other public buildings. The war was over. On the 26/V = July 3rd, 1728, Lhasa, except for the handful of men ensconced in the Potala and its dependencies, was in the hands of P'o-lha-nas ²).

---

¹) Lha-sol; see back p. 40.
²) MBTJ, ffl. 286b-289a. Index to the bKa'-rgyur of sNar-t'añ, ff. 35b and 36b. Doc. V. Ch'ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 7b.
Looking back to the civil war, we can see that it was sharply divided in three periods: the first gTsan campaign, the second gTsan campaign and the northern campaign. The first two had as objectives the control of the region governed by P'o-lha-nas and of his private estates. In the first, the Lhasa troops took the initiative, but they limited themselves to the defensive as soon as they heard of P'o-lha-nas's advance. The energetic offensive of P'o-lha-nas led to the only pitched battle of the war. P'o-lha-nas presumed too much of his still raw troops, and was beaten at aBras-k'ud, partly through his own carelessness. In the second gTsan campaign the initiative belonged mainly to P'o-lha-nas, but there was no military decision, and the stalemate was ended only by P'o-lha-nas's superior but rather dishonest diplomacy. In the northern campaign, the contest was decided by the better strategy of P'o-lha-nas, mainly because he had completely worn down the enemy in the preceding campaign.

It is interesting to compare the two opposite commanders. Lumpa-nas was a sound tactician, as he showed at aBras-k'ud. But strategically he always left the initiative to his adversary, limiting himself to a narrow and unimaginative defensive. The idea of crushing his adversary by resolutely taking the offensive and seeking him out in his lairs of Sa-dga' and mNa'-ris, never seems to have entered his head. As an organizer, he was much inferior to his enemy. He allowed his army to be twice disbanded and twice reassembled, which sapped its fitness for combat far more than any lost battle could have done.

P'o-lha-nas, quite on the contrary, was better in strategy than in tactics; but he went on improving in both fields as the war dragged on. His first campaign in gTsan shows no leading idea; he simply tried to get the most urgent job done, the liberation of gTsan. The second campaign showed already a more mature judgment and a clear strategic conception: no battle, but the wearing down of the enemy through his masterly inactivity at Gyantse. Then follows his master-stroke, which brands him as the best Tibetan general of his day: the reversing of the direction of attack. The idea of getting to Lhasa from the north instead of the south-west is of such a well-calculated audacity, that it reveals a generalship of high order. It was the crowning feat of his military career. As a tactician, P'o-lha-nas badly blundered at aBras-k'ud, where he showed himself a brave soldier, but not a good leader. The
tactics of the second campaign were far better; this time he kept his head cool, and successfully avoided being inveigled into a decisive action. In the northern campaign, the storming of Lhasa was a feat of no military importance, because of the absence of real opposition. But as after ążBra-kʿud there was never again a regular battle, we cannot judge whether this noticeable improvement would have enabled Pʿo-lha-nas to win a fight in the open field. As an organizer, he showed himself at his best. After the first campaign he succeeded so completely in keeping his troops to the colours, that they never again gave him trouble on that score, and even became a driving element in his action. Pʿo-lha-nas fully deserved his victory. A pity only that he won it through what was and remains, in spite of all his biographer’s whitewashing, a useful piece of rascality.
CHAPTER TEN

THE TRIAL OF THE MINISTERS AND P'O-LHA-NAS'S RISE TO POWER

As far as we know, P'o-lha-nas's entry into Lhasa was not accompanied by the wild scenes of pillage which characterized the storming by the Dzungars in 1717. But some looting did take place. In a still unpublished letter dated Lhasa, July 21st, 1731, Fr. Francesco Orazio della Penna states that "three years ago the present Viceroy took Lhasa, and there was a sack, during which we lost nearly everything; and if the Viceroy had not posted some soldiers on guard of our convent and of us, they would have taken away all the woodwork and destroyed the convent and perhaps killed us too, as they did to some. They also destroyed a few houses" 1). P'o-lha-nas found it also necessary to issue a proclamation to his troops ordering that the houses of his friends Blo-bzan-dargyas, Bon-rigs Nag-dbañ-bde-c'en and Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal were on no account to be touched 2). Anyhow, from the Chinese documents we learn that the next day order was restored.

The Potala still remained untaken, and P'o-lha-nas established a strict blockade around it, so that nobody could leave. The blockade soon had its moral effects on the inmates of the sacred castle. The two Chinese envoys Señ-ge and Mala had taken refuge in it on the day of the fall of Lhasa; but as soon as order was restored, they hastened to leave the Potala and to take up their residence in the town (27/V = July 4th). The Dalai-Lama too was still in the Potala, and this was a source of alarm for the monks, as his sacred person was in some danger there. The principal church dignitaries in the city assembled to consider the matter; they were the bTsan-po Nomun Qa'ian, the K'ri Rin-po-c'e and the chief lamas of the three great monasteries. They had an interview with P'o-lha-nas

---

2) MBTJ, f. 289a-b.
and told him that the Dalai-Lama and his father were completely innocent of the murder of K‘aṅ-c‘en-nas and of the civil war, and that on this they (the monks) were ready to take an oath. P‘o-lha-nas replied protesting his utmost respect for the church and his deep reverence for the Dalai-Lama. He suggested that the Dalai-Lama and his father should retire out of danger to Se-ra or ṭBras-spun, as it was not fitting that they should continue to reside with the wicked ministers. As to Lum-pa-nas and the others, they should come out of the gate of the dependencies and fight it out with P‘o-lha-nas in the open. The Dalai-Lama and his father, informed of the proposals, gave their assent. The ministers on the contrary thought that if they could hold the palace for two or three months, the Chinese troops would arrive and rescue them. This obstinate delusion on the possibility of China deciding in their favour is indeed strange; it receives however an interesting sidelight from a passage of the Ragguaglio of Fr. Gioacchino of S. Anatolia, which says that both sides had sent envoys to the emperor, and that “the emperor of China with a peculiar kind of politics tried to make both parties believe that he was satisfied with the action of the one and of the other side, and secretly promised his succour by sending private messengers to the one and to the other; so that each side believed China to be favourable to them. But really this was in order to keep in suspense the rebel party and to support that of the fourth minister of state, called Calon Poletagy (bka’-blon P‘o-lha Taiji)” (p. 14). The Capuchin Father is of course merely repeating what was the popular rumour in Lhasa; and I believe that the rumour was right. A more real hope, though a not very bright one, was represented by the troops of Na-p‘od-pa’s son, garrisoning the capital of his province of Koṅ-po. But in the general collapse of the vanquished party, it could not be seriously hoped that these troops would be able to reverse the decision.

While the ministers still fondly gave themselves to these vain hopes, the Dalai-Lama and his father abandoned the sinking ship. The bTsan-po Nomun Qa’an went in the Potala and asked for the particular wishes of the Dalai-Lama concerning his future residence. The Dalai-Lama reiterated his innocence of K‘aṅ-c‘en-nas’s death, accepted the guarantee of P‘o-lha-nas and requested to be allowed to retire to ṭBras-spun. P‘o-lha-nas, to whom the matter was referred, gave his assent. It was agreed that the Dalai-Lama with
four attendants, and his father with three, should leave for aBras-
spuṅs, accompanied on the way by 2000 monks of Se-ra and aBras-
spuṅs. But the agreement was not carried out in this form. The
Dalai-Lama left the Potala, met P'o-lha-nas in the dGa'-'ldan
K'añ-gsar palace and effected a complete reconciliation with him.
This happened apparently on the day following the fall of Lhasa;
it may even be that the Dalai-Lama left the Potala together with
the Chinese envoys.

The Dalai-Lama then suggested that, although he was perfectly
willing to go to aBras-spunṣ, it would be still better if he could
remain in the Potala; if the ministers were allowed to come down
to the town and to reside there in full safety, he could return to the
Potala and act from there, in complete agreement with P'o-lha-nas.
It may be surmised that the Dalai-Lama made this proposal on
the request of the ministers; they had very soon understood the
hopelessness of their situation and acquiesced to the inevitable,
deciding to throw themselves on the mercy of P'o-lha-nas. The
death blow to their hopes was dealt by the arrival of P'o-lha-nas's
son at the head of the southern army of 3000 horse and 9000 in-
fantry. After his victory on the southern front, prince Ye-ses-ts'e-
brtan reached Lhasa and surrounded the Potala, preparing to storm
it. With his arrival, any hope of succour from Īa-p'od-pa's son
disappeared. We are completely in the dark about his eventual
fate. But he could not have represented a serious threat, because
he is not mentioned in the Tibetan texts at all; and anyhow he
never had a chance of success, because the Chinese army was
preparing to meet the contingency, even should he overpower
P'o-lha-nas's forces. Seeing the preparations for the storm of the
Potala, the ministers appealed to the Dalai-Lama, who once again
interceded with P'o-lha-nas, offering rich presents and asking for a
promise of safety for the three men. P'o-lha-nas agreed, and the
three ex-ministers came out of the gate of the dependencies and
offered homage to him. The conqueror held his word and promised
full protection to them, their followers and their property, till the
arrival of the Chinese army. He could well afford to be generous,
as he knew that the arrival of the representatives of the emperor
would take the matter out of his hands; and he said so to the
ministers, declaring that the final judgment between them and him
belonged to the envoys of the emperor. The ministers were placed
under a guard of 300 men each, but otherwise treated honourably; they could meet their friends and freely dispose of their property. The surrender took place on the $28/V = July 5th$).

It is no wonder that this apparent generosity irritated P'oo-lha-nas's officers and men. They protested in a body against such a lenient treatment of the persons chiefly responsible for the civil war. They requested the immediate execution of the three ministers, because, among other reasons, they were uncertain about the view which the Chinese would take of the question. But P'oo-lha-nas reassured them on this score; he said that the prisoners were doomed, and that it would not be well to take them away from the grasp of Chinese justice.

P'oo-lha-nas was now sure of his ground. Not only his several reports to the emperor during the war were bound to procure him the full favour of the Chinese government; but, to be doubly sure, on the same day on which the ministers had surrendered, he had visited Sên-ge and Mala, had given them a report on his activities, and had expressed the wish of returning to Ulterior Tibet, in order to provide for the defence of the mountain passes in that region. He begged also that his report might be forwarded to the emperor, for eventual rewards and commendations. The intended retirement was of course only a polite formality, and with this sham modesty P'oo-lha-nas merely gave a delicate hint to the Chinese government that he expected recognition of his authority. As we shall see, he was not deluded in his expectations, thanks also to the warm recommendation of Yüeh Chung-chi. As to P'oo-lha-nas's soldiers, the emperor decreed a reward of 30,000 taels for them. It is noteworthy that there is not the slightest hint of these transactions to be found in the *MBTJ*. More than this, this work absolutely ignores Sên-ge and Mala, and were it not for our other sources, we should be totally in the dark about the presence of a Chinese mission at Lhasa throughout the war. What purpose the author of the *MBTJ* meant to serve by this obstinate silence, is beyond our understanding.

The visible seal on the official recognition of P'oo-lha-nas's paramountcy in Lhasa was placed on an auspicious day of the 6th
month (July-August), when P'o-lha-nas, along with the bTsan-po Nomun Qa'an, the incarnate of bSo, the K'ri Rin-po-c'ê, the abbots of Se-ra and aBras-spuñs and his officers, went to the Potala and presented himself in full pomp to the Dalai-Lama. It was the formal audience, in which the Dalai-Lama solemnly approved P'o-lha-nas's action. A private interview then followed, to which only the Dalai-Lama's father and two other high officials were present. The Dalai-Lama suggested that he could retire as usual for a spell to aBras-spuñs, while P'o-lha-nas cleansed sKyid-sod (the Lhasa district) of the marauders and brigands who were a legacy of the civil war. The proposal was not carried out, because of the arrival of the Chinese army.

We shall now briefly tell the story of the Chinese expedition to Tibet in 1728. As it was a simple military promenade and no fighting occurred, I shall avoid entering into particulars; these will be found in the Chinese documents of the Appendix. The first military precautions were taken by the emperor already in the 9th month of 1727, mainly because he feared that the outbreak in Tibet was due to intrigues of the Dsungars, with whom in that period he was at peace. But when he heard that it was a quarrel between the Tibetan ministers, he considered it a matter of little importance, and in the same month he ordered all the preparations to be suspended. Apparently P'o-lha-nas had not yet succeeded in impressing him with the importance of the events. But soon the Chinese government realized the seriousness of the Tibetan outbreak and the importance of the high stakes involved. In the 11th month of 1727 the expedition to Tibet was decided. It was to be commanded by the president of the Censorate Jalangga, with the brigadier-general Mailu as second in command. The expeditionary forces consisted of 400 Manchu soldiers from Sian-fu and 15,000 Chinese Green Bannersmen from Shensi, Szechwan and Yünnan. Very careful arrangements were made for the organization and financial support of the army. On the whole,

1) MBTJ, ff. 295b-297a.
2) Kêng-shên/IX = October 21st, 1727. Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 61, f. 6a-b.
3) Tso-tu-yü-shih; Mayers, n. 185.
this edict is an interesting document of the military administration of China in the early 18th century 1). Jalangga was to leave Peking for Hsining in the first month of 1728, and the campaign was to begin in the spring, as soon as the climatic conditions allowed it.

The plan was duly carried out. The army left Hsining on the 6/V = June 13th, 1728, and reached Lhasa on the 1/VIII = September 4th 2); nearly the same date (30/VII) is given in the Tibetan texts 3). The titles of the two Chinese commanders in the MBTJ and in the Index of the bKa'-agyur of sNar-t'ān are A-li-han Am-pa and Me-riṅ Dsaṅ-gi. The first is the Manchu aliha amban, or president of a board. The second is, as we have already seen, meiren-i janggin, the Manchu equivalent of the Chinese title fu-lu-l'ung, brigadier-general.

The Chinese commanders brought the praise of the emperor, who had offered prayers in the imperial temples of Peking for the victory of P'o-lha-nas, as soon as he had heard of the revolt. This is of course an exaggeration of the MBTJ; the Chinese documents do not mention such a thing, but on the contrary speak of the hesitation of the emperor before he ordered the expedition to Tibet. Then the main task of the Chinese expeditionary force was taken in hand: the punishment of the rebels. Soon after their arrival, Jalangga and Mai lu, together with Seṅ-ge and Mala, constituted themselves as a high court of justice, and summoned the three ex-ministers to their presence. Na-p'od-pa, Lum-pa-nas and sByar-ra-ba were formally indicted, the charge being of having acted against the orders of the emperor. They were then put in chains and handed back to P'o-lha-nas's men for custody. On the next day the actual trial began in a solemn form, the Chinese commissioners with P'o-lha-nas sitting in a magnificent tent erected in the middle of the Lha-klu-dga'-tscal park. The enclosure was surrounded by Chinese soldiers in parade uniforms. The three ministers and their followers were brought to court in chains. Their plea consisted in a long indictment of K'aṅ-c'en-nas; they referred to a petition which they had sent to the emperor soon after the death of K'aṅ-c'en-nas. There is no trace of this memorial in the Chinese documents, but as it is mentioned in two independent sources such as the MBTJ

---

1) Doc. IV. 2) Doc. VI. 3) MBTJ, l. 298a. The text has ston-zla-t'a-c'ūn (10th month), but this is an evident mistake for dbyar-zla-t'a-c'ūn (7th month).
and the *Ragguaglio* of Fr. Gioacchino da S. Anatolia, it bears all the marks of authenticity. The ministers accused K’añ-č’en-nas of having paid lip-service only to the Yellow Church, of having felt not the slightest reverence for the Dalai-Lama, of having exerted himself in favour of the Dsungars, of having boasted to know all the facts of religion and law, of having entertained correspondence with all the neighbouring kings in order to gain their friendship, of having shown little respect for the emperor, of having sent letters to the Dsungar ruler Ts’e-dbañ-rab-brtan, and so on; seventy charges in all. Their statement was checked by the commissioners with the original memorial in their possession; the meaning of each charge was discussed, and the ministers insisted on all their accusations. Their line of defence was of course that of presenting K’añ-c’en-nas as a traitor and a potential rebel and their action as a just punishment; it was probably the only justification which could be attempted with any chance of success. Then P’o-lha-nas made a lengthy speech, refuting each charge and showing its falsity. A long and heated discussion followed, till it was closed by the Chinese commissioners, who expressed their approval of P’o-lha-nas’s contentions. The trial then continued for several days.

An element of complication was introduced by the fact that the ministers had enclosed with their petition to the emperor a list of their chief supporters (as well as of their chief opponents); and now, while the trial went on, these men were one by one arrested and imprisoned by order of Jalangga. But it was not in the interest of P’o-lha-nas that the small fry in the ministers’ party be punished; such an excessive severity would be of no advantage and would make him unpopular. He therefore begged from the commissioners that these men be pardoned. With great difficulty the pardon was granted. The greater part were released, some were admonished, some were put in the cangue and set free. This of course concerned only those men over whom the Chinese court claimed jurisdiction. Outside this, P’o-lha-nas absolutely refused the requests reaching him from many sides for a stern punishment of those who had fought against him in the war; he even accepted some of them in his service. P’o-lha-nas’s old friends Blo-bzan-dar-rgyas, Bon-rigs Nag-dbañ-bde-c’en and Ts’e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal, as well as most of his officers,

sent him a letter in which they expressed their preoccupations for his safety and their indignation and discontent at seeing him surrounded by his one-time enemies. P'o-lha-nas replied by a letter assuring his old comrades of his heartfelt affection and gratitude. Not even in the formation of his government did P'o-lha-nas draw any distinction between friends and former enemies. He chose as his ministers (dgun-blon) Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal and Sri-gcod-ts'e-brtan, chief of T'oñ; both had fought against him in the civil war, and the latter had been taken prisoner near rGyal-mk'ar. The names of the two men were submitted to the emperor for his approval, which, as we shall see, came in due time. But without waiting for the imperial sanction, they were duly installed in their new office with the full approval of the Chinese commissioners. Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal had expressed some fears on this account, as once he had been a retainer of sTag-rtsa-pa, the henchman of the Dsungars. But P'o-lha-nas’s recommendation was enough for Jalangga, and he did not care about the past of the new ministers 2).

About this time the imperial edict concerning the reward to the soldiers of P'o-lha-nas 3) together with a sum of 30,000 taels, reached Lhasa; document and money were handed over to P'o-lha-nas by the commissioners. He duly acknowledged the gift, and distributed it in a fashion slightly different from that intended by the emperor. The Dalai-Lama and his father received 2000 taels each, the clergy 3000 taels, and an unspecified sum was appropriated for offerings in the Potala and the aP'rup-snañ; only what was left was then distributed to the soldiery 4).

Then at last the long-protracted trial of the three ex-ministers drew to an end. The culprits and their followers were sentenced to death. On the 30/IX = November 1st, 1728 5) the Chinese army assembled in full parade behind the Potala. The sentenced men, seventeen in all, naked and chained, marched in an open space in the midst of the troops. They were led to the “tent of death” in a meadow on the banks of the Ba-ma-ri canal, a short distance south by west of the Potala 6). Four scaffolds (k'rim-sñoñ) were
prepared there. On them the executioners tied Na-p’od-pa, Lum-pa-nas, the lama of sKyor-lun and the administrator (gñer-gāsin) of the rNam-rgyal-grva-ts’an college. The troops gave three salvoes from their matchlocks, then the executioners set about their gruesome work. Na-p’od-pa and Lum-pa-nas were done to death by the slicing process (ling-ch’ih 凌遲), the two churchmen were slowly strangled, the remaining thirteen were decapitated by three cuts of the sword. The terrible scene made a deep impression on the populace, as indeed it was meant to do. After five years, the author of the MBTJ still feels gloomy and depressed in relating it. P’o-lha-nas too was dejected at the spectacle, and in the following days he presented offerings in the temples of Lhasa for the spiritual good of the executed men. The work of Chinese justice was completed by the traditional execution of all the nearer relations of the culprits, small children not excepted. Only sByar-ra-ba’s family was sentenced to deportation; it was a doubtful mercy, because it meant slavery and because of the cruel manner in which such a sentence was invariably carried out by the Chinese, most of the people concerned dying on the way. The lesson had been terrible and Tibet was effectively cowed into submission for a long time 1).

Concerning the trial of the ministers, one feels inclined to ask a question: what was the purpose of the revolt, and against whom was it directed? The later Chinese official version, as consecrated in 19th century historiography, is that the revolt broke out in collusion with the Dzungars and was directed against China 2). This is quite comprehensible; a century after the events, the Chinese-Dzungar conflict is the only angle from which Chinese writers could view this period of Tibetan history, even where quite different problems were concerned. This version has been presented to the European public by Rockhill and Courant and has remained till now unquestioned. But I think the truth lies elsewhere. After the murder of K’an-c’en-nas the ministers had allowed the Chinese envoys to arrive and to remain undisturbed in Lhasa. They took pains to explain their action to the emperor in a long memorial. In no Tibetan text do we read of any hostile act or preparation

---

1) MBTJ, ff. 304a-310b. Doc. VI. In Della Penna’s already quoted letter of April 1st, 1741, there is a gruesome description of the scene, tallying point by point with the account of the MBTJ.

2) Shêng-wu-chi, ch. 5, f. 12b. Ch’êng-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 7a.
against China. When shut up in the Potala, they even expected rescue from China. Their trial is narrated by the biographer and friend of their arch-enemy; but neither in his work nor in Jalangga's report of the trial do we find them charged by P'o-lha-nas with treacherous correspondence with the Dsungars. If he had brought such a charge, surely it would have been recorded in the MBTJ, which is so full of accusations and insults to the ministers. They accepted the armistice of the 3rd month and the surrender of the 6th month on condition that the arrival of the Chinese commissioners should be awaited; evidently they counted on the justice of their case and on a fair judgment by the Chinese. What does all this mean? It can mean only one thing, that the revolt was mainly, if not purely, an internal Tibetan affair. It was a clash of personalities, and it was above all the conflict of two old parties, which once again tried to settle their differences by force of arms and by calling in foreign intervention. Both of them recognized Chinese suzerainty, and both of them tried to obtain Chinese support. The abler diplomat won. But his victory and the subsequent tendentious interpretations of the events cannot blind us to the fact that it had been a civil war, not a revolt against Chinese protectorate 1).

The real relation of the Tibetan civil war with Dsungar-Chinese politics is shown in its true light by the contemporary Chinese documents. As we have seen, the Chinese government at first entertained the suspicion that Dsungar intrigue was involved. But this proved incorrect, and it nearly caused the abandonment of the proposed Chinese intervention 2). There was then peace between China and the Dsungars; and at the beginning of 1728 a Dsungar embassy was received in Peking. The new Dsungar ruler dGa'-ldan-ts'e-rin (1727-1745) requested, among other things, the permission to send to Lhasa the offerings to the Tibetan clergy called mañ-ja (collective tea-party to the monks), for the sake of the diffusion of Buddhism and of the appeasement of the country. The reply of the emperor was rather ironical and politely negative: “This is none of your business. The Dsungars are a small tribe in the north-western corner; what relations can there be between the diffusion or non-

1) Schulemann, *Geschichte der Dalailamas*, p. 181, says that “we know that the Dalai-Lama was so foolish and shortsighted as to declare, after the deed, Tibet as independent”. This statement, for which no source is given, is absolutely unwarranted.

2) See back, p. 130.
diffusion of Buddhism and your offering of a *mañ-ja*?" 1). It is difficult to get a precise idea of what the Dsungars meant by this step, but it looks like a clumsy attempt at fishing in the troubled waters of Tibet with Chinese acquiescence. For me, it is indirect evidence that the civil war in Tibet had not broken out in collusion with the Dsungars. If they had had a part in it, they would not have tried this peculiar way of entering Tibet with Chinese permission.

We can tell with some precision how the official Chinese version came into being. It is contained in germ in the proclamation which the emperor issued on *kuei-szu/II* = March 17th, 1729, as a war manifesto against the Dsungars. In this long document the emperor says that the ministers murdered K'añ-c'æn-nas "in order to support the evil cause" of the Dsungars, who rejoiced in the murder of a tried friend of the empire. Further on the emperor states that the ministers were caught while trying to escape to Dsungaria 2). In another manifesto dated *k'eng-tzu/IV* = May 13th, 1731, the emperor again avers that, when Na-p'od-pa killed K'añ-c'æn-nas, he banked on the fact that the land of the Dsungars was near and that Blo-bzan-bstan-adsin, who had fled there, was his relative, whom he trusted implicitly 3). These statements look suspiciously like war-propaganda; and from them to the pseudo-historical account of the *Shêng-wu-chi*, the way is easy and natural.

We come now to speak of the reorganization of the protectorate. The Chinese had arrived at the conclusion that the court of the young Dalai-Lama was the centre of all intrigue and mischief, and that the main responsible for this situation was his father. Any strong action against their sacred persons was of course impossible; but at least they could be placed in conditions of doing no more harm. Accordingly, it was decided to remove the Dalai-Lama from Lhasa 4). The form employed in carrying out this measure was polite and

---

2) *Shih-tsung Shih-lu*, ch. 78, ff. 19b and 20a.
3) *Shih-tsung Shih-lu*, ch. 105, ff. 8b-9a.
4) The *Shêng-wu-chi*, ch. 5, f. 12b, says that the Dalai-Lama was sent to K'æms in order to protect him against an intended Dsungar raid. But the *Wei-tsong-t'ung-chih*, ch. 13a, f. 8a, which is much more trustworthy and nearer to the events, states that the Dalai-Lama was brought to Li-t'ang "in order to avoid trouble" (以杜覇端). This statement is supported by the relations of the Italian missionaries. The contemporary documents in the *Shih-lu* are silent on the motives of the removal of the Dalai-Lama from Lhasa. The version of the *Shêng-wu-chi* is given for the first time in a document of the time of the Dalai-
courteous to the utmost degree; not the slightest hint of disrespect was shown to the Dalai-Lama; but under the velvet glove the iron hand was felt. In the 10th month (November) of 1728 Jalangga and his colleague had an audience with the Dalai-Lama in the Potala. They invited him to come to Peking for a stay of one year. The Dalai-Lama begged to be excused from the journey for a time, on account of his not having yet finished his studies and not having yet quite recovered from the smallpox; he promised compliance in a near future. The commissioners granted a short respite. P'o-lha-nas got wind of the matter. He feared that a journey and prolonged stay of the Dalai-Lama in Peking would smack too much of deportation for the taste of the Tibetans; perhaps he even feared for the life of the young Dalai-Lama. He privately interviewed Jalangga and entreated him earnestly not to deprive the Tibetans of their spiritual father. The reply was a refusal. On the next day P'o-lha-nas came again, this time accompanied by all the foremost dignitaries of the church and the principal monks in a solemn procession. They went to the tent of Jalangga, threw themselves on their knees and repeated their supplications. Again they met with a stern refusal accompanied by threats. They still insisted, and even the Tashi-Lama, who in the meantime had arrived in Lhasa, joined in their supplications; but it was all in vain. More than this, the aliha amban limited the Tibetan retinue of the Dalai-Lama (who was to travel to K'amis under Chinese escort) to 80 men only. But at least in this small matter P'o-lha-nas was able to obtain permission for a retinue of 200 men 1).

The curious thing in the whole proceedings was that it was never intended that the Dalai-Lama should go to Peking; no such order was ever given by the emperor. And even in the Tibetan texts, not a single word more is said about the Dalai-Lama's journey to the capital, as soon as he had agreed to leave. Thus it seems that the Chinese commissioners simply employed the pretence of an imperial invitation as a decoy for the Dalai-Lama, who could not very well refuse such a high favour. Once the journey was agreed to by the Dalai-Lama, the mask was dropped, even before the actual depa-

---

1) MBTJ, ff. 311b-313b; ASTL, ff. 371b-372a.

Lama's return to Lhasa in 1735; Shih-tsong Shih-liu, ch. 145, f. 8b. By this time the need was felt for some sort of moral justification for the Dalai-Lama's exile. But it is evidently an afterthought, and no such reason was the mainspring of the Chinese action in 1728.
ture. And indeed, when the Dalai-Lama officially announced his decision to leave Lhasa, he simply stated that he had accepted to travel to K'ams for the welfare of the people, notwithstanding the supplications of the Tashi-Lama and of the K'ri Rin-po-c'e not to leave Tibet. On the 23/XI = December 23rd 1) the Dalai-Lama left Lhasa, accompanied by Jalangga and the greater part of the Chinese expeditionary forces.

The Capuchins tell us that when the Dalai-Lama left Lhasa, the emperor appointed the K'ri Rin-po-c'e as the Dalai-Lama's vice-gerent, and that he continued in this position till his death (perhaps from poison) in 1734 2). This information is not quite correct. There was no imperial appointment, because it is not mentioned in Tibetan or Chinese texts. When the Dalai-Lama left, the see of dGa'-ldan was still occupied by dPal-ladan-grags-pa, who died a year later on the 20/XI = January 8th, 1730. He was succeeded by šag-dbaṅ-c'os-ap'el 3), who died in 1734. We know from his biography that he was an important man during the Dalai-Lama's exile, and wielded much influence. It seems that he had to resign his office long before his death, because we know that his successor rGyal-mts'an-senge 4) ascended the see in 1732. The latter was a protégé of P'o-lhanas, who showed him many favours. It is thus clear that, as there were three K'ri Rin-po-c'e in the period under consideration, the Capuchins' account cannot be upheld. It may be that the K'ri Rin-po-c'e held some sort of disciplinary power over the monks in the Dalai-Lama's absence; this fact, and šag-dbaṅ-c'os-ap'el's influential position may have given origin to the opinion that they acted as vice-gerents of the Dalai-Lama, which they certainly did not.

While the Dalai-Lama was sent into exile, the treatment of the

1) LSDL, f. 24b; ASTL, f. 372b; Wei-tsang-k'ung-chih, ch. 13a. f. 8a. Same date in Della Penna, p. 286 and Giorgi, p. 338.
2) Giorgi, p. 338; Della Penna, p. 286; Da Terzorio, p. 334 (where the name of the lama is wrong). The Propaganda Fide memorial to the king of Spain (on which see later, p. 220) says that in 1728 the emperor ,,appointed a Vice-Lama, giving him all the spiritual faculties enjoyed by the Grand Lama, as well as all the revenue which belonged to the same Grand Lama". Della Penna's report to Propaganda Fide on the re-establishment of the Tibetan mission (Rappresentanza dei Padri Cappuccini missionari nel Thibet etc.) says that this vice-gerent received only "the exercise of the spiritual jurisdiction and the absolute direction of the clergy" (p. 29).
3) The 52nd K'ri Rin-po-c'e (b. 1668, d. 1734). His biography is vol. C'a of the collection.
4) The 53th K'ri Rin-po-c'e (b. 1678, on the see 1732-1739, d. 1756). His biography is vol. Ja of the collection.
second head of the Lamaist church was quite different. As soon as they arrived, Jalangga and Mailu had insisted on the Tashi-Lama coming to Lhasa. He tried every way possible to avoid the unpleasant journey. But the customary pretext of the smallpox did not work with the Chinese and on 13/IX = October 15th, 1728, the Tashi-Lama had to leave for Lhasa, where he arrived about ten days later. He was received by P'o-lha-nas, the Dalai-Lama’s father and the Chinese commissioners with all honours due to his rank. On the 26/IX = October 28th the Tashi-Lama was presented with an imperial edict granting to him the sovereignty of gTsan and Western Tibet as far as the Kailasa, the districts being listed as follows: Lha-rtsa, P'un-ts'ogs-gliṅ, Nam-rin, rDo-n-k'a, sKyid-ron, mNa-ris sKor-gsum. After a convenient reluctance, in Chinese fashion he accepted the three first districts and refused the rest, which was the more valuable part of the donation 1). Although the Tashi-Lama does not mention it in his autobiography, we know from the Tibetan texts utilized by S. Ch. Das that, in return for this, he had to renounce in favour of the Lhasa government all his rights and pretensions in Eastern gTsan, including the districts of P'ag-ri (Phari), Gyantse and of lake Palti, the border being settled to the west of Pa-snam-rdoṅ 2). This day marks the creation of the Tashi-Lama’s temporal rights in gTsan and of his political importance as some sort of balance against that of the Dalai-Lama. By way of thanks for the imperial favour, he sent a mission of homage to Peking 3).

Before leaving Lhasa with the Dalai-Lama, Jalangga settled the form of the new government. He proposed the following arrangement to the Chinese government. P'o-lha-nas was to remain as before in charge of Ulterior Tibet (gTsan), for which post he had proved eminently fit. For Lhasa and Anterior Tibet (dBus), P'o-lha-nas had recommended two men (Sri-gcod-ts'e-brtan and Ts'e-rin-dban-rgyal), honoured and trusted by the people; they were to get the official appointment as ministers (bka'-blon) and to be placed in charge of Anterior Tibet. P'o-lha-nas was appointed, provisionally and on probation, to supervise both provincial

1) ASTL, ff. 368b-370a.
2) S. Ch. Das, Contributions to the religion, history etc. of Tibet, in JASB 1882, p. 29.
3) The mission of the Tashi-Lama, together with one sent by the Dalai-Lama, was received at court on ksin-wei/1 = February 23rd, 1729. Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 77, f. 14a.
administrations. Although Jalangga’s proposals went farther than his original instructions, according to which the two provincial administrations were to be kept separate, they were approved by the emperor at the beginning of 1729\(^1\). Some days later the emperor gave the formal sanction to P'o-lha-nas’s new rank and dignity, by granting him, by a most gracious rescript, the title of *beise* \(^2\). This new administrative system proved sound. As P'o-lha-nas himself had nominated the new ministers, they were completely subordinate to him, eliminating thus the danger of a revival of the four-headed hydra of 1721.

Also in the matter of Chinese supervision of the Tibetan government, there was a return to the administrative ideas of K'ang-hsi, the value of which had been shown by the foolish retrenchment policy of Yung-chêng and by the disaster of the civil war. Jalangga had come to Tibet as a kind of envoy extraordinary, with powers to regulate Tibetan affairs. He had acted in concert with Sen-ge and Mala, who were the residents in Tibet, but all the new regulations had been issued by him personally. As he now went back to China via Szechwan accompanying the Dalai-Lama, he handed all his powers of supervision back to Sen-ge. Sen-ge’s colleague was no longer Mala, who went back with Jalangga, but the brigadier-general Mailu. These two men, called in the *MBTJ* Sen Ta-žiñ and Me Ta-žiñ, may be accepted as having been the two first ambans of Tibet, an institution which was to last till 1912. The senior amban (Sen-ge) was in control of Anterior Tibet (dBus), and the junior amban (Mailu) of Ulterior Tibet \(^3\).

The Chinese residents had a strong force at their disposal. It was about the size of this force that a long discussion took place between P'o-lha-nas and Jalangga. The Chinese commander at first had fixed it at 10,000 men. The supplies of food, fodder and wood necessary for so large a force were clearly beyond the possibilities of the poor district of Lhasa, ravaged by so many wars. P'o-lha-nas represented these difficulties to Jalangga. After a long consultation, the commissioners granted a reduction to 5000. This was still too much, and P'o-lha-nas resumed his protests and entreaties, till the commissioners saw the justice of his reasons and reduced the garrison to 2000

---

1) Doc. VII.  
3) *Shêng-wu-chi*, ch. 5, f. 12b.
men'). This is the account found in the Tibetan texts; but the Chinese documents reveal us the surprising fact that it was all a ludicrous comedy, intended to make an imperial order, issued several months earlier, look like a generous concession to the Tibetans. This order had been given even before the news of Jalangga's arrival to Lhasa reached Peking; on chi-hai/VIII = September 24th, 1728, the emperor had issued a rescript according to which the future garrison of Lhasa, first determined as 3000 men, was reduced to 2000 because of the expected difficulties of supply.

In execution of this order, on chi-szu/XI = December 23rd, 1728, Jalangga submitted to the emperor a memorial, in which he specified the strength and dislocation of his troops and gave a detailed account of the dispositions taken for the return march to China, which was to take place in five columns. He reported that he intended to leave in Lhasa a garrison of 1000 Chinese soldiers from Shensi and 1000 from Szechwan, commanded by Mailu, Chou Ying and other officers. A strong garrison of 1000 men from Yunnan was to remain at Chamdo, to secure the communications. So it was all settled beforehand, but the Tibetans had to thank Jalangga for the great favour which he consented to do, by reducing the garrison from 10,000 to 2000.

1) MBTJ, fl. 315a-316a.
2) Shih-tingsh Shih-lu, ch. 72, fl. 12a-b.
3) Shih-tingsh Shih-lu, ch. 75, fl. 18a-19a.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

P'O-LHA-NAS'S RULE DURING THE EXILE OF THE DALAI-LAMA (1729-1735)

As soon as Jalangga and the Dalai-Lama had left, the two ambans Señ-ge and Mailu set to work on the military reorganization of the country. They commanded all the fire arms in possession of the Tibetan subjects to be gathered together and stored in a single place. They ordered also the departure of the Tibetan troops for the northern districts as soon as summer set in, and the provision of good weapons and horses for these troops 1). The first measure was aimed at the disarmament of the country; the other two were intended for the training and proper equipment of an efficient and reliable little Tibetan army, recruited from among the veterans of the civil war. This army in due course would be able to take over most of the duties now imposed on the Chinese occupation corps, permitting thus a substantial reduction of the latter; we shall see that this aim was reached in about four years' time. P'o-lha-nas gladly supported the efforts of the ambans in this direction.

Generally speaking, it was a period of consolidation of the new regime and of slow recovery from the effects of the civil war. After his long experience, P'o-lha-nas fully realized the importance of enlisting the support of the lamas for his government. To this end, he showered on them the highest favours on every fitting occasion. He granted to the monastery of aBras-spuñs the possession of bSam-grub-sgañ in the sTod-luñ valley, together with all its dependencies. Other landed estates were donated to Se-ra. The festival of the New Year (January 29th) of 1729 was performed on a particularly lavish scale, and so was the feast of the Buddha's birth in the month of Vaiśākha (fourth of the Tibetan calender). Several other measures were taken for the restoration of the monasteries in and around Lhasa, which had suffered in the Dzungar

1) MBTF, f. 318a.
invasion and the civil war 1). This policy of blandishments to the clergy was crowned by a state visit to the Tashi-Lama at bKra-sis-lhun-po (21/X = December 11th, 1729), in which the two envoys of the emperor also participated, accompanied by the Jasak Ta Bla-ma sByin-pa-rgya-mtso and two lower officials (Jarγuḍi) 2).

P'o-lha-nas then turned his attention to the most urgent needs of the country. He soon reestablished law and order everywhere, repressing the robber bands, which were a legacy of the civil war. The postal stage system, which seems to have been handed over to him by the Chinese, was reorganized on a sound basis. Particular care was devoted to it, as it was an essential condition for efficiency in the provincial administration. The proper distribution of taxation and the freedom of trade were cared for 3).

An important role in this consolidation process was played by the opportune death of the governor of mNa'-ris, dGa'-bži-ba Tse-brtan-rab-abyams, which happened in 1729 or 1730. His son rNamrgyal-ts'e-brtan, later known by his title of Pandita, was still a minor, and the government of mNa'-ris was lost to the dGa'-bži family. P'o-lha-nas seized the occasion for rendering his control of this most important frontier region more effective; he entrusted it to his elder son Ye-šes-ts'e-brtan, who received from the emperor the title of a first class Jasak Taiji 4). As to dGa'-bži Pandita, he had a brilliant future before him; but his hour was to come much later, after the upheaval of 1750.

With the return to normality, the visits of the Kukunor princes became again as frequent as in the past. These visitors carried with them rich gifts for the absent Dalai-Lama and for the great monasteries 5) and represented thus a not inconsiderable source of income for the Tibetan exchequer. The visits became the occasion for colourful feasts and sport contests in the meadows below the Potala, and for imposing receptions in the dGa'-ldan K'aṅ-gsar palace, which was the official residence of P'o-lha-nas 6) as it had been of Lha-bzan Khan and K'aṅ-c'en-nas.

The court of bKra-sis-lhun-po took part, on a smaller scale, in

---
1) MBTJ, ff. 318b-321b. 2) ASTL, f. 382a; MBTJ, f. 324a-b. 3) MBTJ, f. 326a-b. 4) Ch'ing-shih-kuo, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), ff. 7b-8a. As in the case of his father, duke Pandita's personal name is unknown to the Tibetan texts and to the Shih-lu, and is found in the Ch'ing-shih-kuo only. 5) MBTJ, f. 330a-b. 6) Magnaghi, p. 79.
these activities. Thus we hear of a mission with presents from the Kukunor princes which was received in bKra-sis-lhun-po on 13/X = November 22th, 1730 1). The Tashi-Lama, now a sick old man, maintained good relations with the Chinese court. On 12/IV = May 28th, 1730, he despatched the sku-gner-c'en-po Ye-ses-ap'rin-las on the usual ceremonial mission to Peking. The envoy was back in bKra-sis-lhun-po on II/XI = December 9th, 1731 2).

In the year 1730 there was another Dsungar alarm. According to reports received at Lhasa, the Dsungars had violated the Tibetan border and had occupied the frontier post of Pa-li-k'un. The amban Señ-ge left Lhasa with the Tibetan levies and some Chinese troops and took up a defensive position in aDam and on the Tengri-nor. It soon appeared that the place was well chosen even for a permanent establishment; it allowed the creation of a defensive system covering Lhasa, and gave a chance of good practical training to the Tibetan troops. Señ-ge therefore sent a memorial to Peking urging the formation of a strong detachment of 1500 imperial and 1000 Tibetan soldiers, to be stationed in a fortified camp in aDam, covered by four outposts held by a dozen of men each. This camp was to be occupied in summer only; in winter all the troops were to be withdrawn to Lhasa, because of the improbability of an invasion and of the hardships to which the troops were exposed in gale-swept aDam 3). On wu-yin/VII = August 24th, the Grand Secretariat and the emperor approved the scheme and granted an extra allowance of 10,000 taels for the Chinese troops of the Green Banners, while P'o-lha-nas was to provide for the pay of the Tibetan troops 4). As we hear in the following year, the whole defensive system of aDam was placed under the command of the brigade-general Mala, who had come back to Lhasa from Li-t'ian.

It was about this time (first half of 1730) that P'o-lha-nas began thinking about a great project, intended to enhance his religious merits,—a new edition of the Canon. He took the measures necessary for this purpose, and after all the preparations had been completed, on an auspicious minute of the 24/VIII = October 5th, 1730, the work for the engraving of the planks was begun in the bDen-bzi-c'os-ak'or-k'añ, a printing house in the neighbourhood of Šel-

1) ASTL, f. 389a. 2) ASTL, ff. 385a and 395b. 3) Wei-tsang-t'ung-chih, ch. 13a, f. 8b. 4) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 96, f. 11a-b.
dkar-rdson: the spot being probably selected with a view to the facilities for wood supply. In order to secure a speedy execution of the work, P'o-lha-nas summoned a great number of skilled workmen from various regions of Tibet. With their help and the great means placed at their disposal, it was intended to finish the engraving of the bKa'-agur sixteen months later, at the end of 1731 1). This short term was overstepped only by very little, and on 26/1 = February 21st, 1732, the complete set of planks for the bKa'-agur was ready. In the middle of 1733 it was presented to the Tashi-Lama for his blessing, and was then deposited in the temple of sNar-t'aan, where it remains to this day 2). The bsTan-agur was taken in hand ten years later. According to the account found in its dkar-c'ag 3), it was begun on 27/III = May 12th, 1741, and finished on 25/X = November 21st, 1742 4). At the end of 1742 the new edition was presented to the Dalai-Lama, who ordered a set to be preserved in the Kun-dga'-ra-ba of the ḡK'ruṅs-rabs-lha-k'aṅ 5).

The foreign policy of P'o-lha-nas scored a great success in this period. For some time his attention had been turned to the events on the southern border, where a civil war was going on in Bhutan. In that country a dispute had raged for some time about the legitimacy or spuriousness of the Ba-dan-dkar-po, the incarnation of Nāropā, who was the highest religious authority in Bhutan. The temporal ruler of the country, the Waṅ-p'a-jo, to whom belonged the last word in this matter, gave his decision in favour of Bla-ma P'yogs-las-rnam-rgyal, his own chief councillor, who was duly installed as incarnation. But this award, combined with the carelessness and inefficiency of the ruler, produced much dissatisfaction in the country. After a time that portion of the clergy which did not believe in P'yogs-las-rnam-rgyal, took up arms and marched on the capital with the avowed intention of killing the ruler. The Waṅ-p'a-jo fled from his capital bKra-Sis-c'os-rdson (Tashisudon) and took refuge in a fortress called Zab-don-lhun-rtse. There he soon became involved in a quarrel with the lords of dGa'ldan-

---

1) MBTJ, ft. 340a-342b. Index of the bKa'-agur of sNar-t'aan, f. 55b.
2) MBTJ, f. 378a. Index of the bKa'-agur of sNar-t'aan, f. 62a.
3) Index of the bsTan-agur of sNar-t'aan, f. 7b.
4) These dates partly confirm and partly correct those given by K. S. Ch'en, The Tibetan Tripitaka, in HJAS IX (1946), p. 56 [See now also Tucci, Tibetan Notes, I, in HJAS XII (1949) pp. 477-481].
5) LSDL, f. 289b.
p'o-brañ, and they entered the fray; but because of the rugged and impassable terrain, there was no occasion for a decisive action. The Wañ-p'a-jo was a proud man, who had offended everybody by his haughtiness; it was he who had waged war against Lha-bzañ Khan. Nevertheless, overwhelmed by his enemies, he now took the desperate step of sending a message to P'o-lha-nas begging him to intervene and to send an army to his help. After mature deliberation, P'o-lha-nas replied, without further committing himself, promising that he would do his best. Mere words were of course useless, and Wañ-p'a-jo was soon driven out of his last refuge, hunted down and slain. The former incarnation was reinstalled and a new ruler was elected. But immediately afterwards the victorious party began quarrelling among themselves, and soon a fresh civil war was started. P'o-lha-nas till this moment had limited himself to sending soothing letters; but soon he became involved in the struggle. The troops of the new ruler and those of Bla-ma Don-grub of Ka-spe were marching against each other, and the Ka-spe troops, being somewhat the weaker, sent an urgent request for help to P'o-lha-nas. He again sent them encouraging letters; but he did not at first think of granting armed support. But soon matters passed out of his hands. The commanders of the Tibetan frontier forces thought this a fine occasion for submitting Bhutan to Tibetan suzerainty, and crossed the border. The Bhutanese forces were not able to withstand their onslaught, and soon the united Ka-spe and Tibetan troops occupied Rin-c'en-spuñ-pa, the capital of the sPa-gro (Paro) region, and aBrug-rgyal-rdson 1). But the enemy was really undefeated and remained encamped in the neighbourhood. The situation soon became dangerous for the Tibetan forces, who could neither advance nor retreat; and then at last P'o-lha-nas decided to send them help. It was only a small force comprising some Tibetan troops under three officers from dBus-gTsaiñ and bStan-adsin Noyan of aBron-dkar-rtse (Droingtse), stiffened by some Mongol soldiers. At their approach the enemy fled, and some of their forces took refuge in a fort called sTag-gon-rgyal; but soon they were all dispersed or massacred. At this moment the Tashi-Lama, the abbot of Sa-skya and the heads of the Karma-pa sect intervened with P'o-lha-nas, begging him to stop the war. P'o-lha-nas at once acquiesced. An armistice was concluded and the prisoners were released. At the

1) Druggye-jong, to the north-west of Paro on the road to Phari.
beginning of the next year (1731) a messenger was sent to the emperor, carrying a report of these events and the news of the conclusion of peace.

The Bhutanese question was settled in the following terms. The ruler of Bhutan, Lho-p’yogs Rin-c’en-ap’rin-las-rab-rgyas, sent his uncle Dam-pa Ts’eu-rin-dbañ-c’en to bring presents and to pay homage to P’o-lha-nas. Also Ka-spe Bla-ma Don-grub sent tribute. The incarnation Ba-dan-dkar-po, who had been at the root of the trouble, was finally confirmed on the see 1). Thus P’o-lha-nas succeeded with a minimum of exertion in imposing his suzerainty on Bhutan, by cleverly exploiting the dissensions in the country. He obtained also a weakening of the central power in Bhutan, as the Ka-spe Bla-ma became now practically the equal of the ruler; and this superior power of the nobles as against the nominal ruler lasted till the reform of Bhutanese government in 1910. The Tibetan suzerainty over Bhutan gradually became purely nominal, but for the moment the congratulatory envoys of the Bhutan ruler and of the Ka-spe Bla-ma came regularly to pay their respects at Lhasa on or after each New Year’s festival.

The messenger sent by P’o-lha-nas to China reached Peking on keng-tzuI/II = March 14th, 1731. At once the emperor in a provisional rescript approved P’o-lha-nas’s action and promoted him to the rank of beile. His elder son Ye-ses-ts’e-brtan was granted the title of ju-kuo-kung 2). As P’o-lha-nas had entrusted his elder son with the government of mNa’-ris, henceforward he is referred to in Tibetan texts by the title of mNa’-ris-guñ, duke of mNa’-ris. On i-szu/II = March 19th, the emperor, after due deliberation, issued an edict to P’o-lha-nas. It told again the story of the events, how civil war had broken out in Bhutan and how P’o-lha-nas together with the Tashi-Lama had sent messengers to quell it. The suzerainty over Bhutan was formally assumed by the emperor. Return gifts were granted to the Bhutanese ruler Noyan Rin-c’en-ap’rin-las-rab-rgyas (No-yen Lin-ch’in-ch’i-lei-la-pu-chi 諾顔林親齊雷喇布集) and special praise and a reward were bestowed on Ka-spe Don-grub Bla-ma (Ka-pi Tung-lo-pu La-ma 葛碧東羅布喇嘛) for his good behaviour 3).

1) MBTJ, ff. 344b-349b. 2) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 103, f. 4b. 3) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 103, ff. 8b-9b.
After this conspicuous success the smon-lam festival was performed with unwonted magnificence. Some months later P'oo-lha-nas visited Se-ra and aBras-spuñs, where gorgeous ceremonies were held. They must have been something quite unique in their way, because Nepalese artists and woodcarvers from Šel-dkar-rdson were fetched for their preparations 1). It was probably on this occasion that P'oo-lha-nas and his son sent rich gifts and a message of loyalty to the Tashi-Lama (20/V = June 24th, 1731) 2).

During the summer of 1731 Señ-ge had betaken himself again to the military zone of aDam and Teng-nor 3). At the beginning of the same year the emperor had given orders for the replacement of the Lhasa garrison, which had been on that duty already for three years. It was to be relieved by 2000 men of Szechwan troops; Shensi this time could not contribute its quota, because the troops of that province were fully occupied with the Dsungar war 4). In the 6th month a relief of 1500 men under brigadier-general Cingboo (Ch'ing-pao 靑保), the director of the Grand Court of Revision 5) Miyoošeö (Miao-shou 苗壽), and the lieutenant-colonel of T'ien-ning (Ka-ta) promoted to brigade-general Yang Ta-li 楊大立 reached aDam, and Mala with his 1500 veterans received his recall 6). But as he delayed his departure, for which he did not seem very eager, the emperor on wu-shên/VIII = September 18th gave again to Mala the order of departure, as there were enough officers in Tibet and he was no longer needed there 7). In the 11th month at last Mala left for China. About the same time also the Chamdo garrison was relieved by fresh troops from Yün-nan 8).

Shortly afterwards a curious accident happened in Lhasa. After the death of the old Khan of the Volga Kalmuks, Ayuki (1724 according to Courant, 1730 according to Della Penna), his widow and son sent to Lhasa an embassy, composed of some Torgut (Kalmuk) grandees with an escort of 300 men. They travelled via Siberia-Kiakhta-Mongolia-Western China. In October 1731 they arrived

1) MBTF, ff. 350a-352a. 2) ASTL, f. 392b.
3) Wei-tsang-t'ung-chih, ch. 13a, f. 8b.
4) I-szu/II = March 19th. Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 103, f. 8a-b.
7) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 109, f. 15a-b. 8) Wei-tsang-t'ung-chih, loc. cit.
in Lhasa. They were seen there by Fr. Della Penna, who had several interviews with them through the medium of interpreters ¹). The mission was not wholly composed of gentlemen; on several occasions their ruffianly retinue molested the Tibetans and the Chinese soldiers alike. At last some of these rascals, while completely drunk, entered the house of the junior amban Mailu and insulted and beat his servants. They were accompanied in this exploit by a Tibetan, whom they had brought with them. Mailu, much incensed at the insult, ordered P'o-lha-nas to sentence this man to death by the sword. P'o-lha-nas vehemently protested because of the unfairness of letting the main offenders go free and of punishing a mere hanger-on; besides, Tibetan law did not provide for death sentence in such trifling cases. The amban saw the justice of this protest, and the matter was settled with a great feast and sport contests offered by the Torgut nobles ²). This little incident of no importance is interesting because it had repercussions in many places: Lhasa, Peking, Ka-ta. It had been known even at the Chinese court that the Torgut party was composed of particularly troublesome fellows. On wu-shén/VIII = September 18th, the emperor directed brigadier-general Neige (Nai-ko 黃格), the Chinese resident at Ka-ta, not to allow them to proceed to Tibet. If the Torguts had already come to the court of the Dalai-Lama, then the Chinese authorities in Ka-ta were to send them back, for which the governor-general of Szechwan was to provide the financial means ³). But the order arrived too late. The Torguts had already passed through Ka-ta, where they paid homage to the Dalai-Lama ⁴), and had arrived unhindered at Lhasa.

During the summer of 1731 there was another attempt at Dsungar intrigue in Tibet. Strangely enough, the MBTJ breathes not a single word of it, and we have only the Chinese documents to rely upon. P'o-lha-nas had memorialized the throne, reporting that it was heard that the Dsungars intended to send back to Tibet Surya, Lha-bzan Khan's second son, whom they had taken prisoner at Lhasa in 1717. The matter was delicate, because the son of Lha-bzan Khan could revive old memories in the hearts of a part of the Tibetan aristocracy, and above all of P'o-lha-nas himself. On

¹) Della Penna, pp. 202-203.
²) MBTJ, f. 356a-b.
³) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 109, f. 15b.
⁴) LSDL, f. 144b.
September 18th, the emperor therefore issued a rescript, in which he insisted on the treachery of the Dsungars and reminded P'o-lha-nas that the same pretext (return of a son of Lha-bzan Khan) had been used for masking the invasion of 1717. As the Dsungars were spreading the rumour that they were dispatching 5000 men to accompany Surya to Lhasa, military precautions must be taken. The Lhasa garrison was to be reinforced by that of Chamdo, and Mongol soldiers were to be enlisted. In mNa-ris, where several military posts had been established, a good watch was to be kept. There was no question but that the Dsungars must be turned back by force. As to Surya himself, the emperor was less definite. In any case the advice of the Dalai-Lama and of the Tashi-Lama must be taken. Should Surya have escaped from the Dsungars bent on avenging on them the death of his father, and should he reach Tibet with a few men only, P'o-lha-nas was to receive him in a friendly manner, to report it at once to the court, and to wait for further orders. For the rest, the emperor counted on the loyalty of P'o-lha-nas and on his gratitude for the many benefits which he had received from China ¹). Urgent orders were sent for the Chamdo garrison to march at once to Lhasa ²), and shortly afterwards further precautions were taken for the protection of the Dalai-Lama ³). We do not know the result of the consultations with the Dalai-Lama and also with the Tashi-Lama, when P'o-lha-nas, together with his wife and sons, paid a state visit to him on 3/XI = December 1st, 1731 ⁴). But we hear nothing further about the whole matter, and thus it must have been a false alarm after all.

The affair of Surya was apparently not unconnected with an attestation of imperial confidence, which P'o-lha-nas received about this time. On the moment of leaving aDam, Mala, now a captain-general of the Guard ⁵) with the honorary title of administrator of Tibet, had memorialized the emperor requesting that a seal of office be granted to P'o-lha-nas. The emperor, who just then needed the full loyalty and cooperation of P'o-lha-nas, ordered the Board of

---

¹) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 109, ff. 15b-17a.
⁴) ASTL, f. 398b
⁵) Hu-chün-t'ung-ling 護軍統領, Mayers n. 397.
Rites to engrave and despatch to Lhasa a silver seal bearing the titles of administrator of Tibet, *bka’-blon* and *toro beile*, to be employed on official correspondence with the court 1). When the imperial messenger reached Lhasa, he consigned to P’o-lha-nas not only the seal, but also a document which granted him full judicial powers in Tibet. It was the final confirmation of the functions entrusted to him provisionally in 1728. The imperial message was solemnly received with a great ceremony in the dGa’-ldan K’aṅgsar palace 2).

Shortly afterwards it was heard in Lhasa that, as the Dzungars were preparing a great army to be sent against Tibet, the emperor, much concerned about this, was sending a division of 3000 men as garrison to Lhasa; these troops had already started and were marching towards K’aṁs 3). This rather exaggerated information concerned of course the troops from Chamdo, who, as we have seen, had been ordered to Lhasa by the emperor. Such a large force would have presented an insoluble problem for the Tibetan capital, which was already scarcely able to bear the weight of the 2000 men quartered in it since 1728. In an interview with the ambans in the aPṛul-snaṅ, P’o-lha-nas drew their attention to this fact and pleaded for a rescission of the order and for the sending back of the troops before they reached Lhasa. The ambans after some difficulties consented to forward P’o-lha-nas’s petition to the emperor. It was sent in all haste by an express messenger, and very soon the emperor’s reply was received; it granted P’o-lha-nas’s demand and countermanded the movement of the troops (last months of 1732) 4). The Dzungar scare had definitely passed.

During the summer of 1732 the new commanders Cingboo and Yang Ta-li went out as usual to the fortified zone of the Tengrinor. In the 7th month (August-September) Cingboo was promoted to lieutenant-general 5). On jen-ch’ēn/IV the emperor ordered the brigadier-general Li-chu 李柱 to go to Tibet to replace Mailu,

2) *MBTJ*, ff. 357a-358a.
3) In an unpublished letter dated Lhasa, July 20th, 1731, Fr. Gioacchino da S. Anatolia writes that 2000 Chinese soldiers were expected to reach Lhasa in a short time. *Scr. Congressi*, vol 20, f. 430. The date is interesting; it shows that military precautions were started much earlier than would appear from the Chinese documents.
4) *MBTJ*, ff. 360a-361b.
5) *Wei-tsung-t’ung-chih*, ch. 13a, f. 9a.
who was recalled to court 1). It was part of a greater movement in the high spheres of the Chinese command in Tibet. The Hsining commandant Chou Ch'i-fêng 周起鳳 and the lieutenant of the Szechwan governor's bodyguard Chang K'o-ts'ai 張可才 were ordered to Lhasa with 1000 men each, to take the place of Señ-ge, Mailu and of the Shensi and Szechwan troops of the garrison. Li-chu died of illness on the road. But Chou Ch'i-fêng and Chang K'o-ts'ai reached Lhasa in the 12th month (January-February 1733), and four months later 1000 men of Szechwan troops marched back to their country 2).

The New Year's festival of 1733 (February 14th) was marred by a misunderstanding due to the pride and unreasonable pretensions of the amban Mailu. P'o-lha-nas at last excluded Mailu from the feast, which was a bold show of disrespect. Of course Señ-ge too avoided participating in the festival. But this did not hinder the ceremony being held with more than the usual splendour 3). The incident had no bad consequences and was soon forgotten.

Shortly afterwards P'o-lha-nas's aged mother fell ill, and all cures proving useless, she expired on 1/II = March 16th. Her funeral rites occupied a long time and were held on a most pompous and lavish scale 4).

The year 1733 was marked by a reorganization of the Chinese military forces in Tibet. On wu-tszû/I = February 19th, the emperor informed of the death of the brigadier-general Li-chu, sent Mala, as an expert of Tibetan affairs, to supervise the change-over in the command at Lhasa. Cingboo and Miyooseo were to take over the posts of first and second amban, and as soon as they and Mala had arrived, Señ-ge and Mailu were to return to court 5).

In the meantime, P'o-lha-nas had begun to think seriously about the advisability of a reduction of the Chinese garrison of 2000 men, whose needs of food, fodder, fuel, and above all lodgings, represented an unbearable burden for the town. The economic consequences had been serious, and prices in Lhasa had soared by 50% since the Chinese soldiers had taken up their quarters there 6). P'o-lha-nas

---

1) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 117, f. 6a-b. 2) Wei-tsong-t'ung-chih, loc. cit.
3) MBTJ, ff. 362a-363b. 4) MBTJ, ff. 366a-367b.
petitioned the emperor asking for a reduction of the garrison to 500 men; the troops should also quit the city itself and be quartered to the north of it, in new barracks to be built on the Grva-bṭi plain. This memorial was the object of great misgivings by P'o-lha-nas's councillors: they feared that it might awaken the emperor's suspicions and lead to the disgrace of P'o-lha-nas 1). But the result fully corresponded with P'o-lha-nas's hopes. As the Dsungar danger had faded away, the emperor found no difficulty in complying with these requests. The wording of the edict was very flattering for P'o-lha-nas: "The officers and soldiers garrisoning Lhasa were originally intended for the protection of the Tibetans, in order to repel the raids of the Dsungar bandits... P'o-lha-nas has been very active, and the Tibetan troops have proved their valour in war. Now Tibet is quiet and the Tibetan troops are numerous... We think that they can suffice for the defence of Tibet." The emperor ordered Chou Ch'i-fêng to accommodate the reduced garrison in new quarters. It was to be brought down from 2000 to 500 men, and the remainder were to be repatriated. These 500 men were to be regularly replaced every three years by Szechwan troops. Also the Chamdo garrison was reduced to 500 men, and their relief was to take place every three years 2).

In the meantime Cingboo and Chang K'o-ts'ai during the summer had performed the usual period of command in the Tengri-nor zone. But before they had been there for a long time, the imperial order for the reduction of the Chinese forces was received in Lhasa 3). If we are to believe the MBTJ, the two ambans were discontented with the order, and there was much heartburning among the soldiers, many of whom had taken a Tibetan wife and had built up a family in Lhasa 4). But nothing could be done, and the imperial command had to be obeyed. The new barracks, forming a little garrison town, were rapidly built on the Grva-bṭi (Cha-shih 札什) plain between Lhasa and Se-ra. In the 4th month Mala arrived in Lhasa 5). Between the 10/VII and the 20/VII (August 19th-29th) the troops were divided according to their new des-

1) MBTJ, f. 382a-b. The mission bringing the memorial to Peking passed through Ka-ta and met the Dalai-Lama. LSDL, f. 150b.
3) Wei-tsang-tsung-chik, ch. 13a, f. 9a. 4) MBTJ, f. 383a.
4) He had passed through Ka-ta and had visited the Dalai-Lama. LSDL, f. 149b.
tination, and Señ-ge, Mailu and Chang K‘o-ts‘ai with 1500 men set out on their return journey 1). They were given a grand parting feast and a royal send-off by the Tibetan government 2). In the 8th month (September-October) the Grva-bži barracks were ready, and of 4/IX = October 11th, the troops were shifted thither 3). The immediate derequisition of the houses in Lhasa formerly occupied by the Chinese officers and soldiers brought much relief to the population. The city was at once cleansed and purified of the defilement caused by the wholesale butchery of the cattle which served as food to the meat-eating Chinese. To speed up the economic recovery of the town and of the country, P‘o-lha-nas granted remission of all arrears of taxation still due 4).

On the events of the next two years we are but ill informed. Our two best Tibetan sources, the MBTJ and the ASTL, leave off at this point. The LSDL and the ATTL give no help, because the Dalai-Lama was absent from Lhasa, and the Third Tashi-Lama was not born till 1738. Besides, their information is quite scanty and can in no way replace the full and connected account of the MBTJ. From now on the Chinese texts become our main authority, and the only one for the years 1734 and 1735.

On chia-hsii/II = April 1st, 1734, the new ambans Cingboo and Miyoošeo were brusquely removed from office “because of some questions” and recalled to court. An old retired official, the count (po 伯) A-êrh-hsün 阿爾琿, and the Mongol brigadier-general of the White Banner Nasutai (Na-su-t‘ai 那蘇泰) were sent to Tibet to take their places 5). The new ambans passed through Ka-ta on the 25/VI = July 25th 6) and arrived to Lhasa during the 8th month (August-September); but A-êrh-hsün died immediately after his arrival. In the same year the Chamdo garrison was completely withdrawn, and also the garrison of Li-t‘ang was reduced from 1000 to 600 men 7). After the withdrawal of the troops, Mala had remained in Lhasa, we do not know in what capacity. He died there in the 8th month (September-October) of 1735 8). And this

---

1) Wei-tsang-†ung-chih, ch. 13a, f. 9a-b.
2) MBTJ, f. 384a-b. During the summer Señ-ge passed through Ka-ta on his way to Peking. LSDL, f. 152b.
3) Wei-tsang-†ung-chih, ch. 13a, f. 9b. 4) MBTJ, ff. 385a and 388a-b.
6) LSDL, f. 155b. 7) Wei-tsang-†ung-chih, loc. cit.
8) Man-chou-ming-ch’ên-chuan, ch. 25, f. 40b.
is all we know about Tibetan affairs till the return of the Dalai-Lama to his see.

As we have seen, the Dalai-Lama had left Lhasa on the 23/XI = December 23rd, 1728. He arrived at Li-t'ang on the 8/II = March 7th, 1729 1). The Chinese had taken all possible care for the safety and dignity of his journey to, and stay in Li-t'ang. He was escorted by Jalangga and the greater part of the Chinese expeditionary forces. At Li-t'ang, where the Dalai-Lama was accomodated in the local monastery, a garrison of Szechwan troops had already been posted for his protection, under the command of the brigade-general Jén Kuo-jung 任國榮 2). Over and above this, Mala and the brigadier-general Neige were ordered to remain for the moment at Li-t'ang, officially for protecting and really for watching the Dalai-Lama 3). Mala went back to Tibet shortly afterwards, but Neige became the Chinese resident with the Dalai-Lama. Once the Dalai-Lama was removed out of Tibet, the Chinese government could safely take to task the man who had been the centre of all intrigues at the court of the Potala. The father of the Dalai-Lama was summoned to Peking for an enquiry 4). He was presented to the emperor chained together with his two wives 5). But the Chinese sovereign saw the inadvisability of meting out a serious punishment to this respected personage, now that his power for mischief was completely broken. And thus it is not surprising that this resourceful man succeeded at once in making his peace with the emperor. He offered handsome presents and gave an assurance never again to meddle with Tibetan politics. In exchange for this guarantee he received the title of fu-kuo-kung 6). In the 9th month he rejoined his son at Li-t'ang, being assured of the Chinese favour, and carrying with him precious gifts from the emperor 7).

But the Dalai-Lama's stay at Li-t'ang was but a stage towards the final destination. On hsin-ch'ou/VI = July 3rd, 1729, the emperor sanctioned the transfer of the Dalai-Lama to the Chinese garrison

1) LSDL, f. 129a.
3) Jén-yin/II = March 26th, 1729. Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 78, f. 34b.
4) LSDL, f. 130b. 5) Della Penna, p. 286; Magnaghi, p. 79.
5) Ting-ch'ou/VI = June 29th, 1729. Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 82, f. 4a; LSDL, f. 132a. Henceforward this title was always conferred, as a matter of tradition, on the father of a Dalai-Lama. Bell, Tibet past and present, Oxford 1924, p. 54.
6) LSDL, f. 132a.
town of mGar-t'ar (Ka-ta), where it was apparently easier to watch him. The garrison of Ka-ta was heavily reinforced, and a strict control was imposed on the Tibetans coming to visit the Dalai-Lama; they might be allowed to pass only if they produced stamped passports issued by the Tibetan government 1). The courteous form in which the new destination was intimated to the Dalai-Lama stands in marked contrast to this careful and suspicious surveillance. The imperial message said that because of the danger of smallpox it was impossible to invite the Dalai-Lama to Peking. The emperor would meet him, when His Majesty would come to visit his outer territories. In the meantime a fitting seat was provided for the Dalai-Lama in a place near Li-t'ang, and he was respectfully requested to reside there till such time when he would be able to return to Lhasa 2). After some delay, on 21/I = March 9th, 1730, the Dalai-Lama left Li-t'ang, and on 3/II = March 21st he arrived at his new abode, where he was installed with great honours by brigadier-general Neige 3).

mGar-t'ar (Ka-ta) was a brand-new Chinese garrison town, and we do not know whether anything more than a small hamlet existed there before this time. Now, being ennobled by the presence of the Dalai-Lama, a mythical connection with the glories of ancient Tibet was soon found; its foundation was attributed to mGar, the great minister of king Sroñ-btsan-sgam-po in the 7th century. The mGar-t'ar monastery, called Hui-yüan miao 惠遠廟 in the Chinese texts, had just been built by order of the emperor. It had cost 140.000 taels and had been decorated by artists from Ch'eng-tu 4). There the Dalai-Lama passed some uneventful years, varied only by the frequent visits of Kukunor chiefs and of messengers carrying gifts from P'o-lha-nas or from the emperor and his grandees 5).

After four years the reasons which had dictated the removal of the Dalai-Lama to K'ams were no longer operative. The Dsungar menace was for the moment removed. The Dalai-Lama's father was no longer an element of disturbance. In Tibet itself the admini-

---

1) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 82, f. 31a-b.  
2) LSDL, f. 131b.  
3) LSDL, ff. 135a-136a.  
4) LSDL, f. 136a-b. Cfr. Klo-i-rdol, vol. 'A, f. 11a. A Chinese inscription, commemorating the stay of the Dalai-Lama in the monastery, was later placed at its gate. It is reproduced in the Wei-tsang-t'ung-chih, Introduction (chüan-shou), ff. 5a-6a.  
5) A particular solemnity was attached to the imperial rescript issued on k'eng-shên/V = May 27th, 1732, in reply to a complimentary message from the Dalai-Lama. Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 118, f. 3a-b. LSDL, f. 146b.
stration of P'o-lha-nas had struck deep roots and could be absolutely relied upon. Thus there was no point in keeping the Dalai-Lama away from his see for a longer period. On kuei-szu/VII = August 18th, 1734, the emperor issued a rescript, in which for the first time he gave the official justification for the Dalai-Lama's exile, viz. the Dzungar menace. He further stated that now, thanks to the exertions of P'o-lha-nas, the Tibetan army was in the pink of conditions and the country was well defended and completely at peace. On the other side the Tashi-Lama was old and infirm; the presence of the Dalai-Lama was therefore needed in Lhasa. The emperor's 17th son Yün-li 允禮, prince Kuo 果 1), was ordered to travel to Ka-ta for the purpose of notifying to the Dalai-Lama the imperial assent to his return to Tibet. The lCañ-skya Qutuqtu was to accompany the Dalai-Lama, and the arrangements for the journey were to be entrusted to brigadier-general Neige 2). Prince Yün-li journeyed to Ka-ta, where on 23/XI = December 17th he was solemnly received by the Dalai-Lama. After having received the imperial rescript, the Dalai-Lama replied with an address of heartfelt thanks and of full submission to his imperial protector 3). The prince, having thus accomplished his mission, returned to Peking, and the Dalai-Lama began the preparations for his journey.

On the day selected by the astrologers as auspicious, viz. the 20/III = April 13th, 1735, the Dalai-Lama left Ka-ta, escorted by 500 Chinese soldiers 4). His progress through Eastern and Central Tibet was triumphal, the local grandees and lamas vying with each other and with P'o-lha-nas's envoys in honouring the august traveller and ministering to his needs. He was met on the way by P'o-lha-nas's second son Dalai Bātur aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal; near Rva-sgreñ, P'o-lha-nas himself with his two ministers, the K'ri Rin-po-c'e rGyal-mtšan-sen-ge and a host of high dignitaries of the church and government presented themselves to pay homage to the Dalai-Lama. Before Lhasa he was met by the Chinese amban Nasutai. He reached the town on 13/VII = August 30th and waited for a few days till the preparations for his reception were completed. On 17/VII = September 3rd the Dalai-Lama, accompanied by the

1) B. 1697, d. 1738. Hummel, p. 331. 2) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 145, fl. 8b-9a. 3) LSDL, fl. 157a-161a. Report by prince Yün-li received on keng-wu/IV = May 22th, 1735; Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 155, f. 1a-b. 4) LSDL, f. 167b.
lCaṅ-skya Qutuqtu, entered for the second time the Potala, this time not to leave it again except for short journeys inside Central Tibet 1).

But under all this glittering splendour there was a galling humiliation, about which Tibetan and Chinese texts alike keep silent; it is the strict conditions under which the Dalai-Lama and his father were allowed back to Lhasa. Della Penna, in his already quoted letter of April 1st, 1741, writes that "the Grand Lama has been restituted to his former state in Lhasa, but under very great restrictions; he must attend only to his spiritual duties. His father is permitted only once a year to come to the capital, and dwells now in a village three days away from it". And indeed we know from Tibetan sources that shortly after his arrival in Lhasa, the father of the Dalai-Lama betook himself to his beloved temple of bSam-yas, where he had his permanent residence till his death 2).

1) LSDL, ff. 181b-184a. Wei-tsang-fung-chih, ch. 13a, f. 1oa.
2) LSDL, f. 200a. Also Fr. Cassiano Beligatti says that the father of the Dalai-Lama, whom he met in 1741, was compelled to reside in a valley to the east of Lhasa, and was allowed to stay in the capital for a month at the utmost. Magnaghi, p. 79.
CHAPTER TWELVE

P’O-LHA-NAS, ADMINISTRATOR AND „KING”
OF TIBET (1735-1747)

As far as we can gather from our sources, the next few years were nearly eventless. The emperor Shih-tsung (Yung-chêng) died on October 8th, 1735, and was succeeded by his fourth son Ch‘ien-lung, in whom revived something of the energy and statemanship of K‘ang-hsi. The death of Yung-chêng became known in Lhasa in the last months of 1735, and the customary ceremonies were performed in his memory 1). In the first months of 1736 a Chinese mission headed by the Ta Bla-ma C‘os-ap‘el-dar-rgyas and Ta Bla-ma Blo-bzañ-dpal-abyor arrived in Lhasa and officially informed the Dalai-Lama of the demise of Yung-chêng and of the accession of the new emperor 2). The mission brought the usual complimentary gifts from the emperor and also many presents from prince Kuo, presents which were repeated rather frequently in the following years; it seems that a real friendship had sprung up between the prince and the Dalai-Lama during the former’s visit to Ka-ta.

The lCan-skya Qutuqtu, who had accompanied the Dalai-Lama, remained only for a short while in Tibet. On 25/IX = November 9th, 1735, he paid a visit to the Tashi-Lama in bKra-sis lhun-po, and returned to Lhasa before the end of the year 3). He then made a pilgrimage to bSam-yas, and shortly afterwards he left for Peking together with the Szechwan troops who had accompanied the Dalai-Lama to Lhasa 4).

In the 8th and 9th months of 1736 the Dalai-Lama made a state progress through gTsan, enthusiastically greeted everywhere by nobles and priests. The old Tashi-Lama, now seriously ill, had

1) LSDL, f. 190a-b. 2) LSDL, ff. 198b-199a.
3) LSDL, f. 189a-b. Wei-tsang-t‘ung-chih, ch. 13a, f. 10a.
4) LSDL, f. 201a-b. Wei-tsang-t‘ung-chih, loc. cit.
excused himself from attendance, but had caused valuable presents to be offered to the Dalai-Lama, when the latter visited bkra-sis-lhun-po and paid his respects to the tomb of the First Tashi-Lama. Such is at least the official account; and in view of the great age and infirmity of the Tashi-Lama, there is no ground for doubting its substantial correctness. But it is not the whole truth. Why should the Dalai-Lama so soon after his return to Tibet hasten to make an official tour precisely in gTsas and to bkra-sis-lhun-po? We must remember that at the moment of the Dalai-Lama’s deepest humiliation in 1728 the Chinese had granted to the Tashi-Lama the temporal rule of Western gTsas. The Dalai-Lama was neither at that time nor later in a condition to register a protest, but he took the earliest occasion for affirming, by a state progress with all the pomp of the Lamaist church, his suzerainty over the whole of Tibet, including the Tashi-Lama’s new possessions. No wonder that the old Tashi-Lama avoided openly accepting and recognizing this, by a personal meeting with the young and ambitious Dalai-Lama.

In the meantime the new emperor had been busy reorganizing his frontier garrisons. Concerning Tibet, he entertained the project of withdrawing the small garrison of 500 men from Lhasa; but he was not so rash as his father, and, before he took his final decision, he sent the vice-president Hanggilu (Hang-i-ku 杭奕祿) on a special mission to Lhasa, to investigate conditions on the spot and to advise the Chinese government about the feasibility of the withdrawal. Hanggilu arrived at Lhasa in the 10th month (November) of 1736, shortly after the Dalai-Lama had returned from his tour. He discussed the matter with Nasutai, and after some months the latter reported to the emperor that Hanggilu suggested the withdrawal of the troops. But in the meantime the emperor had gained a deeper insight into the Tibetan situation. He realized that the small garrison cost comparatively little and represented a big political asset. On ping-shen/IX the emperor accordingly ordered the post-

1) LSDL, ff. 200b and 206b-216a.  
2) His biography in Ch'ing-shih-kao, ch. 201 (lieh-chüan 78), ff. 3a-5a, and in Man-chou-ming-ch'eu-chuan, ch. 36, ff. 1a-8b. A Manchu of the Bordered Red Banner. In the first years of Yung-ch'eng he was employed in the diplomatic relations with Annam. In 1732 he became provincial commander of Si-an fu. During his stay in Tibet, he arranged for a tribute embassy of the Nepalese kings. Died in 1748.  
3) Ping-hsü/IV = June 1st, 1736. Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 17 f. 11a.  
4) LSDL, f. 216b.
ponentment of the withdrawal for a couple of years, after which period he would take the final decision. In the meantime the troops were to be relieved at the usual interval. Nasutai was recalled to court and Hanggilu was ordered to remain in Tibet as amban. A general replacement of the subalterns and clerks of the Lhasa command was also ordered 1). The new officials presented themselves to the Dalai-Lama at the end of 1737, and about the same time Nasutai left for China 2).

It had been a wise decision. Although P'ō-lha-nas was thoroughly loyal, the Chinese garrison in Lhasa was a political necessity. The Chinese paramountcy over Tibet depended in the last instance upon it. It was an important steadying factor and greatly contributed to the growing political influence exerted on the surrounding countries by P'ō-lha-nas and his imperial suzerain. As we have seen, Bhutan had accepted the suzerainty of P'ō-lha-nas and of China. During this period even far away Ladakh was drawn into this political system. Already in 1732 the Ladakhi king bDe-skyoṅ-rnam-rgyal had sent an embassy to P'ō-lha-nas, who reported it to the emperor 3). In the 5th month of 1737 No-no bSod-nams-can, envoy of king bDe-skyoṅ-rnam-rgyal of Ladakh, arrived in Lhasa 4). P'ō-lha-nas reported the fact to his suzerain, who on ping-hsü/XII = January 22th, 1738, issued an edict of commendation 5). The importance of the Ladakhi friendship lay in the accurate information which the king could provide about Dsungar movements in Kashgaria. These relations continued also in the following years 6).

The always strong spiritual influence of the see of Lhasa contributed to widening the range of the external relations of Tibet. The Volga Kalmuk embassy of 1730 had been answered by a mission of investiture sent in 1735 by the Dalai-Lama to the Kalmuk Khan Ts'e-riṅ-don-grub. In their turn, the Kalmuks despatched in 1737 another embassy to their spiritual father in Lhasa 7). These

1) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 52, f. 3a-b. It must be observed that when the amban A-erb-hsun died in 1734, he was not replaced; during the whole of the remaining period of P'ō-lha-nas's rule, there was only one amban in Lhasa.
2) LSDL, ff. 237b-238a.
3) Shih-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 116, f. 14a-b; Ch'ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-ṣu 8), f. 8a.
4) LSDL, f. 223a.
6) In the first half of 1743 a mission of the king of Ladakh, whose name is not given, was received at Lhasa and bKra-sis-ilhun-po. LSDL, ff. 291b-292a; ATTl, f. 47a.
7) On the Tibetan mission of 1735 see Courant, p. 135. The Kalmuk embassy of 1737 was studied by Palmov in the 4th chapter of the 2nd part of his Etudy po istorii privel'zhk Kalmkov XVII i XVIII veka, Astrakhan 1926; but this work is not available to me.
relations continued more or less regularly even afterwards, and I may mention in passing that the influence of the Eighth Dalai-Lama had a great share in the Kalmuks' decision to undertake their famous trek from the Volga to the Ili in 1771.

The Tashi-Lama, who had been ill for a long time, died at bKra-sis-lhun-po on 5/VII = July 31st, 1737. The temporalities of the vacant see were for the time being entrusted to the administration of the finance director (ḥyag-mdsod) of bKra-sis-lhun-po, Lhunggliṅ Blo-bzaṅ-dge-ṭsun-dun (d. 1741). Great ceremonies of mourning were held in Lhasa, while the search for the new incarnation began1). The news was communicated to the emperor, who sent a condolence mission to Lhasa 2).

The financial situation of the holy see of Lhasa was at this time receiving the attention of the Chinese government. As a result of his Tibetan journey, the lCañ-skya Qutuqṭu had submitted to the emperor a memorial on the difficulties experienced by the Dalai-Lama's treasury. The Dalai-Lama yearly incurred expenses for subsidies to the countless Tibetan monasteries and institutions. But with the annexation of Batang, Li-t'ang and neighbouring tracts to Szechwan he had lost the revenue of those places. The territories handed back to the Lhasa government in 1725 yielded very little. The Qutuqṭu asked for the restitution of Batang and Li-t'ang, and stated that in any case financial help from the imperial exchequer was necessary. On kēng-wu/V = June 23rd, 1738, the emperor ordered an annual grant of 5000 taels out of the Ta-chien-lu customs 3). As to the restitution of Batang and Li-t'ang, the emperor requested the advice of Jalangga, the governor-general of Szechwan and Shensi, who on wu-yin/XI = January 9th, 1739, memorialized the throne opposing the proposal. The emperor accordingly refused his sanction 4).

In the 3rd month (April-May) of 1739, the Manchu brigadier-general of the Plain Red Banner Chi-shan 續山 arrived at Lhasa to replace Hanggilu recalled to court. Hanggilu was given a cordial

1) LSDL, f. 232b.
2) It was received by the Dalai-Lama in the spring of 1738. LSDL, f. 242a.
3) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 69, ff. 10a-11a. Ch'ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 8a. LSDL, ff. 244b-245a. The LSDL gives here an abridged but otherwise literal translation of the imperial rescript found in the Shih-lu.
4) LSDL, f. 253b-254b.
send-off by the Dalai-Lama, who entrusted him with some presents for the emperor.

In this period P'o-lha-nas's small council of ministers underwent an expansion. The first addition to it was that of dGa'-bźi Pandita Ts'ab-rdo-rin rNam-rgyal-ts'e-brtan. The dGa'-bźi family, the second in the country, was thus at last reinstated in its due place. dGa'-bźi Pandita was appointed by the emperor as bka'-blon and given the title of duke (kung); the news of this promotion reached Lhasa towards the beginning of 1740. About the same time another bka'-blon was appointed, one AbRon-btsan (Pu-lung-tsan 布隆簪 of the Chinese, Bronze of the Italian missionaries), bringing thus the number of the ministers from two to four. AbRon-btsan seems to be hardly known to the Tibetan texts, and what little we know about him we owe to the Chinese documents.

The quiet and order in Tibet were so complete, and the benefits of P'o-lha-nas's efficient administration were so evident, that on i-yu/XII = January 11th, 1740, the emperor felt compelled to give him a high mark of his favour, by the grant of the title of chün-wang 羯 王 or prince of the 2nd class, a rare distinction. The edict announcing the new honour, along with a message returning the Dalai-Lama's compliments, reached Lhasa in the 4th month (April-May). The original meaning of the title wang is "king", and thus it has also been understood by the Italian missionaries. In Chinese official usage of the 18th century, of course it indicated merely a rank, albeit a lofty one, in the imperial peerage. But nevertheless the missionaries were right. The power of P'o-lha-nas was absolute, the authority of the Dalai-Lama was in abeyance, the supervision by the Chinese nominal. Truly P'o-lha-nas was a king, the first Tibetan king after the tragic end of the last gTsan ruler in 1642.

---

1) LSDL, ff. 253b-254b. According to the Man-chou-ming-ch'ên-chuan, ch. 36, f. 7 b, Hanggilu was recalled to court in the 6th month (July) of 1739.
2) LSDL, f. 267a. He remained a member of the council for more than forty years. In 1783 he was dismissed by a decree of the emperor and replaced by his son bsTan-ādsin-dpal-abyor; Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 1172, ff. 4a-5a; Life of the Eighth Dalai-Lama, f. 134a; the date of 1789 assigned to this event by Rockhill (in TP 1910, p. 53) is wrong. His last mention in Tibetan sources is in 1788; Life of the Fourth Tashi-Lama, f. 54b. He may thus be assumed to have died about 1790.
3) Unless he is identical with AbRon-rtes bsTan-ādsin Noyau of the Bhutan war.
5) LSDL, f. 268a.
The search for the new incarnation of the Tashi-Lama having been brought to a successful end, in the 4th month of 1740 the finance director of bKra-sis-lhun-po applied to the Dalai-Lama for recognition as the Third Tashi-Lama of a child born on 11/IX = December 21st, 1738, at Nan-ts’a-ni bKra-sis-rtse in Šaṅs. The Dalai-Lama’s approval was granted at once, and on 6/IX = October 26th, 1740, the boy was proclaimed as the Third Tashi-Lama under the style of Blo-bzaṅ-dpal-ldan-ye-ses 1). On 1/VI = July 13th, 1741, the boy was brought to bKra-sis-lhun-po, and on the next day he was formally enthroned 2). The emperor had been notified by a mission from the Dalai-Lama 3) and he too had given his approval. A Chinese envoy was present at the ceremony.

The above-mentioned mission of the Dalai-Lama to the Chinese court returned from Peking, carrying an imperial message, in the middle of 1742 4). About the same time the mgroṅ-gnér Sa-k’ud-nas 5), administrator of bKra-sis-lhun-po since the death of Blo-bzaṅ-dge-ṭsun-duṅ, had also sent a mission to the emperor; it left for Peking in the 6th month (July-August) of 1741 and was back in bKra-sis-lhun-po on 3/X = October 30th, 1742 6). These two contemporary missions gave the occasion for regulating the official intercourse between the two sees of Lhasa and bKra-sis-lhun-po, and Peking. It had been the custom for the Dalai-Lama and Tashi-Lama to send each a mission every alternate year, and P’o-lha-nas used to send his own envoys along with those of the Dalai-Lama. After the death of the Second Tashi-Lama, the emperor had requested that the Dalai-Lama’s (and P’o-lha-nas’s) envoys should come to court every year. But this meant a heavy burden on the Lhasa government; and now the resumption of the Tashi-Lama’s missions called for new regulations. On the proposal of the amban

1) LSDL, ff. 267a-268a. ATTL, ff. 19b-20a, 26b.
2) ATTL, ff. 27b-28a. LSDL, f. 273b. The delay between recognition and installation was probably due to the terrible epidemic of smallpox which was then raging through the country and which had necessitated the closing of the frontier to all foreigners. Letter of Fr. Della Penna dated Kathmandu, August 25th, 1740. Scr. Congregaz., vol. 709, ff. 97b-98a.
3) LSDL, f. 272a.
4) The envoys were the mk’an-po Byaṅ-ṛtsa Slob-dpon Nag-dbaṅ-lhun-grub and the Naṅ-so Se-ra gZims-k’aṅ-gaṅ-pa, the K’aṅ-pu 堪布 and Nang-su 囊蘇 of the Chinese. LSDL, ff. 275a and 283a.
6) The mission was headed by the dKon-gnér-c’en-po Rab-ḥyams-kun-bzaṅ. ATTL, ff. 332a and 40b.
Chi-shan, the emperor reestablished the old rule. The Dalai-Lama and Tashi-Lama were to despatch their missions on alternate years, and P'o-lha-nas was again to send his men with those of the Dalai-Lama, as before 1).

Another, much more important question was settled about this time: the commercial and religious intercourse of the Dzungars with Tibet. Since 1734 negotiations had been opened between China and the Dzungars. Although they did not lead to a formal peace, the result was an exchange of letters between the two rulers (middle of 1740), which had as a consequence the cessation of active hostilities and a sort of informal truce. In this exchange of letters it was agreed, among other things, that a Dzungar caravan of pilgrims and traders, composed of a maximum of 300 men, should be allowed to travel to Lhasa via Hami and Tangkar 2). The Chinese authorities were to afford full protection and transport facilities to the caravan 3).

This stipulation was the source of heavy worries for the Chinese authorities on the Western frontier and in Tibet. A pilgrim caravan reopened the possibility of Dzungar intrigue in Tibet; it conjured up the ghost of the events of 1717-1720 and 1727-1728, and the Chinese dreaded above all a repetition. It is but natural that they were highly suspicious, took the strictest precautions, and obstructed as much as they dared the execution of this clause.

Already on \( \text{wu-hsü}/VI = \text{July 22nd}, 1740 \), the Chinese government prescribed the strictest surveillance on the traffic which was going to be opened; marshal Uqatu (Wu-ho-t'u 烏赫圖) was entrusted with this task 4). A Dzungar caravan headed by one Ch'i-mo-t'e 齊默特 (?âCî-med) presented itself at Tangkar on \( \text{I/IV} = \text{May 15th}, 1741 \). It stayed there for some months, and on

---

1) \( \text{Wu-chên}/I = \text{February 12th}, 1742. \text{Kao-tsung Shih-ju}, \text{ch. 158, ff. 4b-5b.}

2) Tibetan sToň-kořor, Chinese Tung-ka-ěrh 東噶爾. Half-way between Hsining and lake Kukunor.

3) Parker, Campaigns of K'ang-hi etc., p. 113; Courant, pp. 86-89. But this caravan was a special concession, and not a yearly affair as understood by Courant. — The Dzungar-Chinese negotiations gave rise to all sorts of wild rumours in the countries neighbouring to Tibet. Thus for a moment it was common belief in Nepal that "the emperor of China intended to give the eastern half of Tibet to a Tartar king and the other, western half to the Tibetan king now reigning; and that the latter opposed himself to this decision and had assembled his army in order to prevent it being carried out". Letter of Fr. Della Penna, dated Kathmandu, September 29th, 1740; Scr. Congregaz., vol. 709, f. 100a. And that only a few months after P'o-lha-nas had received the royal title!

4) \( \text{Kao-tsung Shih-ju}, \text{ch. 119, f. 30a-b.} \)
20/VII = August 30th, Ch'i-mo-tê interviewed the Chinese commander Uqâtu, told him that the season was already too advanced and his animals too tired for continuing the journey, and begged to be allowed to barter his wares on the spot and to return in the following year. Uqâtu referred the matter to the emperor, giving it as his opinion that this was only a pretext for obtaining fresh camels and horses from the Chinese; his advice was to refuse admission to Tibet. But the emperor would not withdraw his pledged word, and confirmed the travel permit for the caravan. But as the whole matter gave rise to suspicions and could indicate bad faith on the side of the Dsungar ruler dGa'-ldan-ts'e-rinâ, the emperor ordered to notify the caravan leaders that, if this time they returned home without entering Tibet, they would not be allowed to come again next year. Uqâtu shortly afterwards reported to the throne that on the 18/VIII = September 27th he had intimated the imperial will to Ch'i-mo-tê. The later had merely averred that the Dsungar ruler knew nothing of the matter before he, Ch'i-mo-tê, had informed his sovereign of the difficulties to his entry in Tibet. Uqâtu in his report added that he could not say whether this was the truth or not, but the Dsungsars could not be trusted in any case. Upon this, the emperor confirmed his decision and ordered the caravan to be escorted back to Hami 1).

It happened thus that no caravan presented itself in 1742. At the beginning of 1743 the Chinese redoubled their precautions, and the vice-president Yü-pao 玉保 2) was appointed as colleague to Uqâtu in the task of supervising the Dsungar traffic. At the same time the emperor wrote to Lhasa, where P'o-lha-nas had grown uneasy about the whole business. This time at last Ch'ien-lung took his final decision on the withdrawal of the Chinese troops from Tibet; the plan was definitely shelved. The emperor instead administered a sound reprimand to the amban So-pai 索拜, whose slackness and inefficiency rendered him unable to cope with the situation, so that P'o-lha-nas had gradually risen over his head and was overriding Chinese authority. In spite of P'o-lha-nas's loyalty, this would not do. So-pai was invited to follow the administrative

2) His biography in Ch'êng-shih-kao, ch. 314 (lieh-chüan 101), ff. 3a-4a. He was a Mongol of the Bordered White Banner; died in 1756.
practices of his predecessor Chi-shan, to take a grip of himself and to avoid all indecision and procrastination 1).

On kuei-hai/VI = August 1st, 1743, the commander of the Hami garrison reported that a Dsungar caravan had arrived there bound for Tibet, but would go no farther. As his orders were not to allow any trade to be carried out in Hami, he wanted to drive them back. But the caravan people pleaded that their horses and sheep were too tired for undertaking the return journey, and requested to be allowed to sell them on the spot. The Chinese commander refused permission for the horses, but allowed, as a matter of grace, 2000 sheep to be sold to the garrison and population of Hami. Then the caravan turned back 2). Perhaps this had been a private undertaking; in any case the attempt was repeated immediately afterwards in a more serious fashion, because on chia-hsü/VI = August 12th, 1743, Yü-pao reported favourably on the composition of a fresh caravan arrived at the frontier, and on the high quality of the wares they carried with them. The emperor ordered the caravan to be allowed to pass and to be treated (as an experiment and without setting a precedent for the future) with particular consideration and helpfulness; every possible facility was to be given to it. Yü-pao was placed in charge of all arrangements 3).

This Dsungar caravan, the first to reach Lhasa after 1720, was evidently a very important affair, and it is indeed given its full weight in the Tibetan texts. It reached Lhasa on the 5/X = November 20th, escorted by Yü-pao, Uqātu (U-k‘ar-tā of the Tibetan texts) and other Manchu and Chinese officers. The Dsungar leaders (the Bla-ma Pcyag-mdsod-pa, Bla-ma gNer-pa Jaisang C’os-nam-mk’a’, Bayasqulang rDo-rje Jaisang etc.) and the Chinese officials were received in a state audience by the Dalai-Lama, to whom they presented rich gifts 4). Soon afterwards they travelled to bKra-Sis-lhun-po, and at the beginning of the 11th month they visited the Tashi-Lama, to whom they gave a letter from the Dsungar ruler accompanied by great presents. On 16/XI = December 31st they took their leave, carrying with them letters for the emperor and the Dsungar ruler 5). The returned to Lhasa, and thence before

---

4) LSDL, ff. 302b-303b.
5) ATTL, ff. 48a-50a.
the end of the year the Dsungar caravan started on its journey home, while the Chinese officials stayed in Lhasa for some days more 1).

This caravan caused a disproportionate amount of flutter and worry at the Chinese court. Several reports of its doings and orders concerning its treatment are duly registered in the Shih-lu. On ンェンヒン/I = February 24th, 1744, the amban So-pai reported to the emperor on the dealings of the Dsungars with P'o-lha-nas. The former had brought with them a sum of money as a gift from dGa'-ldan-ts'e-riň towards the restoration of the temple of rTses (Ts'e 策), which had fallen in disrepair. P'o-lha-nas had refused to allow the repairs to be carried out without the sanction of the emperor, and had shown himself not very eager about the affair (22/X = December 7th). Four days later the Dsungars requested from P'o-lha-nas a statement of the needs of the Tibetan church, to be laid before dGa'-ldan-ts'e-riň, who was able and willing to give substantial support. Again P'o-lha-nas refused to accept anything from anybody else but the emperor. Upon this report, the emperor praised P'o-lha-nas for his loyal behaviour 3) and sent him some gifts of silk cloth in token of appreciation for his careful handling of the Dsungar caravan 4). Some days later P'o-lha-nas reported through the amban So-pai that, on the day before they left, the Dsungar envoys had visited him and had sounded him on the Dsungar-Chinese relations. P'o-lha-nas had replied with warm praise for the emperor and the beneficent effects of his protection. The Dsungars tried again to draw the old statesman out of his reserve by extolling the efficiency of his new Tibetan army. P'o-lha-nas retorted by attributing the armaments of Tibet to a natural reaction against the Dsungar invasion and to the favour and care of the emperor. After this the envoys left without trying further approaches 5). Of course these conversations are known from the Chinese documents only and can be suspected of having been "cooked" by P'o-lha-nas for the use of the Chinese government, so as to show his zeal. But in the main lines the narrative must be true. P'o-lha-nas could never forget his terrible experience and his sufferings at the hands of the Dsungars in 1717. Even without his

1) LSDL, ff. 304b-305a. 
2) Chhe of the maps, on the left bank of the sKyid-c'u opposite Lhasa. 
3) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 208, ff. 11b-13b. 
unreserved and convinced loyalty to China, there was no love lost between him and the killers of Lha-bzan-Khan. Though compelled by the imperial orders to receive and help the Dsungar caravan, he had not failed to take secretly the appropriate military precautions, and a net of military posts, under the command of his son Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan, had surrounded the capital as long as the Dsungars had stayed there 1). He had always shown himself coldly hostile, and the Chinese had encouraged him in it.

There were some aftermaths of the Dsungar mission, which caused much worry to the Chinese. Some Tibetan lamas, who had resided for many years in Dsungaria, foremost them Blo-bzan-bstan-âdsin (Lo-pu-tsang-tan-tsen 羅布藏丹怎) and bKa'-drin-rin-c'en (Ka-chin-lin-ch'în 噶津林沁), had seized the occasion of the pilgrim caravan for returning home in its train. Perhaps rightly, the Chinese suspected these lamas of being political emissaries sent by the Dsungars to intrigue in Tibet. The emperor had on principle decided that they must be sent to Peking. P'o-lha-nas, whose advice was requested, wrote that bKa'-drin-rin-c'en and the Ladakhi lamas who were with him, were old pupils of the Tashi-Lama and well-known at bKra-sis-lhun-po. To send them to Peking would mean to antagonize the Ladakhis, whose informations about Dsungar movements in Kashgaria were much appreciated at the court. Besides, bKa'-drin-rin-c'en was over seventy and infirm and could not stand the long journey to Peking. As to Blo-bzan-bstan-âdsin, he could travel to the capital as desired. The ambans forwarded this memorial to the emperor, who sanctioned the proposals 2). bKa'-drin-rin-c'en was interned in bKra-sis-lhun-po, and Blo-bzan-bstan-âdsin was sent to Peking. But on the road thither, near Chamdo, he escaped with some companions (7/VII = August 14th). The news caused great alarm in Peking, as it was feared that Blo-bzan-bstan-âdsin would carry Dsungar intrigue into the important strategical region of Chamdo, of which he was a native. The thunders and lightnings of Chinese bureaucracy rumbled and crashed on the unhappy man, and everybody high and low, concerned with his escape. The commander of the escort was brought to court for punishment. The governor of Szechwan was ordered to

hunt down the fugitives at any cost and to warn the people that whoever tendered them help, would be arrested and sent in chains to Peking. So-pai was reprimanded for having sent a mere subaltern officer in charge of the escort 1). Eventually the incident cost So-pai his place. He was deposed and summoned to Peking to stand an enquiry before the Grand Council. The brigadier-general Fucing (Fu-ch'ing 傅 清) was sent to Lhasa to take charge, while P'o-lha-nas was enjoined to do his utmost in cooperating for the arrest of the miscreants 2). Fucing arrived in Lhasa at the beginning of 1745 and So-pai left immediately afterwards 3). At last on hêng-wu/XII = January 29th, 1745, the court received the news that Blo-bzan-bstan-adsin had been caught and was in the safe custody of the Szechwan authorities. The emperor ordered him to be sent in chains under a strong escort to Peking, for condign punishment 4).

Perhaps in order to show to the Dsungars that he was not entirely dependent on the Chinese, but was able to defend himself by his own force, P'o-lha-nas begged from the emperor permission to station his troops in the zone of Hajir (Hajir Debter, Ha-chi-érh Te-pu-t'ê-érh 哈渾爾得卜特爾) 5), to build up there a defensive position against the Dsungars. The emperor postponed a decision, but ordered P'o-lha-nas to send a trusted officer with some 15 men to Ha-la-ha-ta 哈喇哈達 (Qara-qada, "black rock"; unidentified) to the north of the Murui-usu, to stay there during the summer; his duty was to gather information about Dsungar movements, extending his reconnaissances to Hajir. The Chinese government would then decide according to his report 6). The order was carried out, and on i-hai/XI = November 30th, 1745, P'o-lha-nas communicated the information obtained by his men concerning the return journey of the Dsungar caravan, which had suffered heavy losses on the march. But no further mention is made of movements of Tibetan troops, and the matter was evidently dropped 7).

To complete the tale of worry, on jên-yin/III = May 1st, 1745,

---

3) LSDL, ff. 317b-318a.
4) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 231, f. 12a.
5) At the western end of the Tsaidam marshes.
7) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 252, ff. 18b-20b.
Chi-shan, the governor of Szechwan, sent a memorial to the throne on the trail of restlessness left in Chamdo by Blo-bzani-bstan-\(\tilde{a}\)-dsin's adventure, reported the disloyalty of a few local grandees and suggested the detailing of 1000 men to be stationed in watchtowers to guard the communications \(^1\). These fears were not exaggerated, because this restlessness probably had something to do with the Chin-ch'\(\tilde{u}\)-\(\tilde{a}\)n revolt of 1747-1749 in Western Szechwan.

Of course the Dsungars tried to draw political advantages from their resumed intercourse with Tibet. On \(\text{chi-hai}/\text{I} = \text{February 27th}, \text{1745}\), a Dsungar ambassador was received at the Chinese court. He brought the thanks of his sovereign for the support given to the caravan of 1743, and requested permission to fetch some good Tibetan lamas, perfectly conversant with the \(\text{s\(\tilde{u}\)tras}\) and \(\text{mantras}\), in order to maintain in all its purity the Lamaist Church of Dsungaria. They also complained of the ill-will of P'o-lha-nas in making arrangements for the caravan \(^2\). The emperor replied that P'o-lha-nas in the meantime had written stating that no Tibetan lama was willing to go to Dsungaria, owing to the devastations perpetrated by the Dsungars against the Tibetan monasteries in 1717-1720. As to his behaviour toward the caravan, P'o-lha-nas had strictly obeyed the orders of the emperor; beyond this he was not obliged to go. As he was an old retainer of Lha-bza\-\(\tilde{a}\)n Khan and honoured his memory, he could not be expected to show cordiality to Lha-bza\-\(\tilde{a}\)n Khan's killers. The emperor added drily that if the Tibetan lamas were unwilling to go to Dsungaria, he certainly could not compel them \(^3\). And as he anticipated trouble between P'o-lha-nas and the Dsungars because of this affair, he sent word to P'o-lha-nas to act with prudence and to be on his guard \(^4\). On \(\text{chia-yin}/\text{II} = \text{March 14th}, \text{1745}\), the emperor directly and formally replied to dGa'-ldan-ts'e-ri'n's request, repeating his statement to the envoys and asking ironically whether they had no learned lamas of their own, that they were compelled to look for them in Tibet \(^5\).

Very little else happened in Tibet during these years. The father of the Dalai-Lama died on 16/11 = March 29th, 1744 \(^6\). His funeral

\(^{1)}\) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 237, f. 16a-b.
\(^{2)}\) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 231, f. 12a.
\(^{3)}\) K\(\text{\'i}\)-\(\text{tsu}/\text{I} = \text{February 28th}.\) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 233, ff. 12-13a.
\(^{4)}\) I-\(\text{szu}/\text{II} = \text{March 5th}, \text{1745}.\) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 234, ff. 1b-2a.
\(^{5)}\) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 234, ff. 12b-14a.
\(^{6)}\) LSDL, f. 307a.
was performed with lavish pomp and magnificence, and a mission from the Tashi-Lama took part in the ceremonials ⁴). The amban So-pai informed the emperor of the event, and Ch‘ien-lung despatched the meiren-i janggin Arantai (A-ran-t‘as) ²) with a gift of 500 taels, a message of condolence and the grant of continuance of the title of duke (ju-kuo-kung) to the son of the deceased (the younger brother of the Dalai-Lama) Kun-dga‘-bstan-adsin ³).

On the 10/IX = October 15th, 1744, the boy Tashi-Lama took the vows of a novice (dge-ts‘ul). P‘o-lha-nas and dGa‘-bzi Pandita took part in the ceremony, which was quite a state event ⁴).

The year 1745 saw the final closing of the Capuchin mission in Lhasa. It had been established in 1707, abandoned in 1711 for lack of financial means, reestablished in 1716, abandoned in 1733 for the same reason as before, reestablished a third time in 1741. But the lamas now became decidedly hostile and strongly insisted with P‘o-lha-nas for the expulsion of the missionaries ⁵). P‘o-lha-nas did not wish to antagonize the Tibetan church for the sake of a handful of foreigners, and gave way. The Tibetan converts were arrested and flogged, and the freedom of movement of the missionaries was much restricted. The situation soon became impossible for them, and on April 20th, 1745, the Capuchins left Lhasa forever ⁶). Twice did they try again to enter Tibet. Once it was in November 1747, when they were turned back by the governor of Kuti; they had appealed also to Ye-ses-ts‘e-brtan, who refused to interfere. During the winter they secured the assent of the new king, and in March 1748 they presented themselves again at Kuti. But once more they were turned back, on the excuse of smallpox epidemic. Fr. Tranquillo d’Appecchio supposes, perhaps rightly, that the permit had been really granted, but then it was withdrawn on the pressure of the lamas ⁷).

---

1) ATTL, f. 51a; LSDL, f. 309a.
2) His biography in Man-chou-ming-ch‘en-chuan, ch. 41, ff. 26a-30a. He belonged originally to the Mongol Plain White Banner; died in 1760.
3) LSDL, ff. 311a-312a. Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 221, f. 1a-b (hsin-mao/VII = August 23rd, 1744). The new duke became a member of the council of ministers in 1763 after the death of Ts‘e-riin-dba‘i-rgyal. He died in 1773. ATTL, f. 327a.
4) ATTL, ff. 53b-54b.
5) In a letter dated Kathmandu, November 4th, 1745, Fr. Tranquillo d’Appecchio, the successor of Della Penna as Prefect, says that the king gave him to understand that the Dalai-Lama, the Tashi-Lama and the abbots of the three great monasteries opposed themselves to further missionary work of the Capuchins in Tibet. Scr. Congregaz., vol. 722, f. 70a.
After 18 years of good and efficient rule, P'o-lha-nas was now drawing towards the evening of his life, and the question of his succession was becoming actual. P'o-lha-nas was a loyal servant of the empire, and the emperor had to take into account his faithful services and the long years of peace which he had given to Tibet. The Tibetan ruler was therefore allowed to recommend one of his two sons as heir-apparent (chang-tzu 將太子); on P'o-lha-nas's death, his heir would be granted his fathers' ruling powers and the title of chün-wang. P'o-lha-nas's natural heir was of course his elder son Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan, the duke of mNa'-'ris, who had proved his capacities and had gathered much military and administrative experience in the civil war and the transactions with Bhutan. But P'o-lha-nas passed him over because of his bad health; at least this is the reason he gave to the emperor. He proposed instead his younger son aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, usually called in the Tibetan texts by his Mongol title Dalai Bātur.

The real reasons behind this choice can be guessed from what we know of the situation in 1741, as depicted by Fr. Cassiano Beligatti. According to the Capuchin Father, Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan "had been appointed by the emperor of China as heir to the kingdom in case of death of his father (?: there is no trace of this in Chinese or Tibetan texts). But the latter was more attached to his younger son... The first born was much addicted to devotional practices and, in spite of his having two wives and several children, wore the dress of a lama and showed great affection for the clergymen, at least in appearance. The younger son instead, who was already commander-in-chief of the army and head of several thousands of Tartars, had a warlike, resolute and proud character" 1). We may therefore conclude that not only P'o-lha-nas felt a stronger affection for his younger son (of which fact the Ch'īng-shih-kao too is witness), but also that he believed that aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal would have made a better ruler than his brother, who promised to become a mere tool in the hands of the clergy. But in deciding on this choice, P'o-lha-nas himself felt rather uneasy about the consequences, since he felt bound to assure the emperor of the complete good understanding and mutual love between the two brothers, and of the agreement of all the ministers and grandees on the justice and

---

1: Magnaghi, p 70.
opportunity of the choice he had made. P’o-lha-nas was also careful to prepare the ground for aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal’s selection by a marriage alliance; on February 9th, 1743, the prince married a daughter of Ts’e-riṅ-dbaṅ-rgyal, who was at the time perhaps the most influential man in the council 1). Then, on chia-hsü/I = January 28th, 1746, the emperor formally appointed aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal as heir-apparent to P’o-lha-nas; Ye-ses-tse’e-brtan received, along with warm commendations for his past merits, the promotion to the rank of chēn-kuo-kzung, or duke of the first class 2). The proclamation of the appointments and the delivery of the seals of rank were the occasion for much rejoicing and a great feast at Lhasa 3). Nobody at that time foresaw the disastrous results of P’o-lha-nas’s choice.

The long years of profound peace, which Tibet owed to P’o-lha-nas, were drawing to a close. We do not mean that there were open revolts, but a certain amount of restlessness reappeared on the Tibetan-Chinese border. It was merely an increased activity of the robber bands so common in those regions, but nevertheless it was symptomatic of the changed atmosphere. The communications between Lhasa and Szechwan, guarded only by the small garrison at Chamdo supported by local levies, became gradually insecure. The governor-general of Szechwan proposed a rearrangement of the scanty troops available in order to obtain a better protection of the routes. But a mere shifting of garrisons without a substantial increase of the troops would not serve the purpose, and the emperor deferred any measure till the question had been studied thoroughly 4). There is also a good deal of official correspondence preserved in the Shih-lu about one Riṅ-rdson-nas (? : Leng-tsung-nai 冷宗彌), a Tibetan officer of P’o-lha-nas posted on the border. At first he was a zealous and capable commander, but later he became addicted to drink; the post under his command gave much reason for complaint, and P’o-lha-nas recalled him. But Riṅ-rdson-nas refused to hand over his command to the officer sent to replace him. P’o-lha-nas was indignant and requested the emperor to treat Riṅ-

1) Rogguaglio of Fr. Gioacchino da S. Anatolia, p. 52.
3) LSDL, f. 330a.
4) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 259, ff. 2b-3b.
rdsoñ-nas as a common rebel and to have him executed. But the emperor was loth to precipitate a little frontier war over such a trifling question, and after causing the matter to be thoroughly investigated by his representatives in Tibet, he reprieved Rin-rdsoñ-nas from death, and ordered his punishment to be decided in consultation between P'o-lha-nas and the amban Fucing 1).

Another question which loomed up after the settlement of the first, was that of the brigand chief Pan-kun 班滚, who was operating in K'ams and rendered the communications between Tibet and China unsafe. He was hunted down by Chinese troops, all his followers were slain and he escaped to Tibet, where he laid in hiding. The Dalai-Lama, P'o-lha-nas and perhaps also the Tashi-Lama 2) had interposed, begging the emperor to pardon the robber. Ch'ien-lung sternly rebuked the Dalai-Lama and P'o-lha-nas for their interference with his justice, and reprimanded also Fucing for having forwarded their petition. The amban was ordered to have the brigand executed as soon as he was caught 3).

This sort of general uneasiness soon spread also to Central Tibet. Already in 1745 there had been a small isolated outbreak at Gyantse, where the southerners (Lho-pa; Bhutanese and Sikkimese) residing in the town had killed the administrator (gñer-adsin) of the gNas-rñiñ monastery. P'o-lha-nas had sternly punished the guilty and had handed over the southerners as serfs to the Tashi-Lama 4). But what was infinitely more serious was the rift, which now came to light, between P'o-lha-nas and the Dalai-Lama. The latter, now a man in his prime, was apparently chafing under the absolute powerlessness, to which the regulations of 1728 had condemned him; politically, P'o-lha-nas was everything, while he was a mere cypher. There was nothing which he could do openly in order to better his situation, and the terrible lesson of 1728 was still fresh in his mind. The only way open to him was to try to undermine P'o-lha-nas's seemingly unassailable position at the Chinese court. He sent his cup-bearer (gsol-dpon) Blama Brag-pa (?) Dayan (Cha-k'o-pa Ta-yen 扎克 巴達頌) to Peking, to protest

---

1) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 257, ff. 21b-22a: ch. 259, ff. 8b-10a, 19b-20a.
2) There is an entry in the ATTL, f. 61b, which I take to refer to these events. The Tashi-Lama petitioned (2nd month of 1746) the emperor and the general commanding the troops in K'ams in favour of some prisoners (kags-mdud-pa) charged with serious crimes.
3) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 267, ff. 7b-9b, 9b-10b, 10b-11b.
4) ATTL, f. 60a-b.
against some unspecified measures of P'o-lha-nas (*i-ch'ou/XII = January 14th, 1747). It must have been a secret mission, as there is not the slightest hint about it in the LSDL, which records only the regular biennial mission sent out as a matter of routine in 1745 and 1747 under the *mgroc-gnor* Yon-tan-legs-sgrub and the *nañ-so* bsTan-adsin-yon-ap'el\(^1\). The emperor took the matter to heart. He had seen for some time the growing estrangement between the highest religious and the highest political authorities in Tibet. But as a cordial agreement between the two was of the foremost importance for the peace of the country, the emperor ordered Fucing to avoid offending P'o-lha-nas in any way and to try to smooth over the pending questions as well as he could\(^2\). At the same time he sent an autograph letter to P'o-lha-nas, impressing upon him the necessity of a good understanding with the Dalai-Lama, and entreatting him to remember the favours showered upon him by the emperor and not to disturb the quiet of the country\(^3\). On its way this document must have crossed a memorial sent to court by P'o-lha-nas, which was received in Peking on *ping-hai/II = March 5th, 1747*. This memorial, which was judged by the emperor as rather confused, expressed the fears and worries of the Tibetan ruler about the whispering campaign of slander which was waged against him. The emperor placed the blame for this memorial on Fucing, who evidently had not communicated to P'o-lha-nas the afore-mentioned imperial rescript of the 12th month\(^4\). There must also have been some opposition in the high official circles of Lhasa, and it seems that P'o-lha-nas had taken a high hand in dealing with it. On *chi-ch'ou/II = March 8th, 1747*, Fucing reported that, acting upon a petition filed by P'o-lha-nas, he had sought out, arrested and executed one Ts'e-brtan Taiji and his uncle, the abbot of sGo-maṅs (Kuo-mang 果 莞)\(^5\). It seems thus that P'o-lha-nas's position, so secure for the last 18 years, was now beginning to totter. His hasty and nervous reaction to this change of atmosphere betrays the bad condition of his health. The Tibetan "king" was now seriously ill; and before the situation could mature

---

1) LSDL, ff. 322a and 340b.  
2) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 280, ff. 3b-4a; Ch'ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (*Fan-p'u* 8), f. 8a.  
3) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 280, ff. 4a-5a.  
4) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 285, f. 6a-b.  
5) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 285, f. 15a-b.
along its natural lines, events were precipitated by the sudden death of P'o-lha-nas on the 2/II—March 12th, 1747 1).

P'o-lha-nas is one of the most interesting figures of Tibetan history. Belonging to the landed aristocracy of gTsaṅ, the rank he inherited from his father was already high enough to give him a good start in life. But from this base he rose by sheer strength of will and by the clever exploitation of the peculiar conditions of Tibet and of its traditional parties. He was no outstanding genius and had no lofty patriotic ideals; he never tried to see something beyond his own domination over a quiet and peaceful Tibet. Out of political necessity, he made himself the tool of the Chinese. But he was clever enough to manage and to preserve as much independent importance of his own as was necessary to give him a real standing in the eyes of the Chinese and to compel them to accept him as irreplaceable. On the other hand, he took scrupulous care to offer no ground for suspicion to the jealous government of Peking.

His actions were dictated by circumstances. After its short-lived unity had collapsed in the 9th century, Tibet for the next eight centuries had been a mosaic of larger and smaller chieftainships, and had received some sort of unity only at the hands of the foreign conqueror Gušri Khan. But its aristocracy was hopelessly torn by internal feuds, and the religious element represented by the Lamaist church introduced a serious factor of complication. Besides, at one time Tibet had been caught in the conflict between two empires, the Dsungar and the Chinese, and tossed to and fro like a ball in the great game of Central Asiatic politics. It emerged as a Chinese dependency. In the turmoil P'o-lha-nas had cleverly found his way to a steady rise. But when in 1728 at last he found himself at the top, independent action in the field of external relations was no longer possible. It was absolutely out of question for Tibet to have a policy of its own. Chinese tutelage was too close, and Tibet had no material force of its own to throw on the scales, except for the great religious influence of the Yellow Church, which was not

1) The exact date is given only in the History of the chiefs of sTag-luṅs, f. 410b (see Addendum). The LSDL, f. 334b, the chronology in which becomes less precise towards the end of the work, does not even give the month. The news reached Peking on 1-szū/III = April 24th, 1747. The nearest approach is given by the ATTL, f. 65a-b, according to which the messengers bringing the news of P'o-lha-nas's death arrived at bKra-sis-lhun-po on 6/II = March 16th.Klon-rdol, vol. 7A, f. 16 b, gives only the month. The dPag-bsam-ljon-bzaṅ, p. 166, gives only the year, and that too is wrong: 1748.
under P'o-lha-nas's control. On the other side, these very conditions formed the basis of his power. The aristocracy of gTsan was deeply hostile to that of dBus. It was a legacy of the days in the twenties and thirties of the 17th century, when the rulers of gTsan had dominated for a short while Lhasa and dBus, till they were swept away by a combination of the Church, the Qošots and the nobles of dBus. An heritage of hatred and mistrust was the consequence; it went so deep, that the nobles of gTsan, when they came to Lhasa, did not even trust the skill of the local doctors, but preferred almost without exception to have recourse to the care of the foreign white doctors, the Italian missionaries 1). P'o-lha-nas, leaning heavily on China, exploited in his favour these internal conflicts. He destroyed the power of the dBus aristocracy with the forces of gTsan and mNa'-ris, caused the church to be momentarily checkmated by the Chinese, and reached thus a well-balanced equilibrium. It lasted for a long time, but it began crumbling even before P'o-lha-nas's death, and was soon shattered under the fumbling hands of ăGyurmed-rnam-rgyal, who possessed neither P'o-lha-nas's diplomatic skill nor his outstanding merits in the eyes of the Chinese. P'o-lha-nas had tried to found an hereditary rule. But here, and here alone, this disillusioned and realistic politician allowed himself to be carried away by his secret dreams. His government was based only on his personal influence with the Chinese court, on the terror inspired in the hearts of the Tibetan aristocracy by the bloody repression of 1728, and on the sullen acquiescence of the clergy. All of them were negative elements; positive factors there were none. Behind him stood only his small band of devoted personal retainers and the major part of the gTsan aristocracy, but no great territorial backing, no traditional party, no great vested interests. He had reached the utmost that could be reached with the means at his disposal; but that utmost was low enough, and by far insufficient for the founding of a dynasty.

P'o-lha-nas was a man of cold, calculating temper. Of his military qualities we have already spoken. In diplomacy he excelled, it was really the craft which he understood best and in which he scored his greatest successes. Withal he was not a ruthless man. He suffered sincerely from the tragic executions of 1728. He was also

---
capable of deep affection, as shown by his lifelong devotion to Lha-bzan Khan and his memory, and by the loving care bestowed upon his own family in 1717-20 and 1727-28. But Tibetan politics were not the proper field for practising these qualities, and he pursued his aim with all the means at his disposal, fair or foul, even to the point of breaking his pledged word, if necessary.

Of his administrative methods we shall speak later. Suffice it to say here, that his rule was strictly personal; he concentrated all power in his own hands, and the council of ministers which he formed was never more than his subservient tool; it is barely mentioned here and there in our sources. By his training he had a special competence in financial matters, and we know that he paid great attention to this department, at least in his early days; for the period of his personal rule, the texts are silent on this subject. In the last period of his life his attention was chiefly devoted to the new Tibetan army, which he created out of the armed mobs of the civil war. He trained, armed, and entertained this army with loving care throughout his life, without ever having the occasion to put it to the test.

Over all his multifarious activity hung the shadow of Chinese supervision. It was always there, but was not normally felt and it hardly ever interfered with the administration of the country. Only at the very last the amban Fucing, probably at the suggestion of his government, began tightening the screw, thus giving some more reality to Chinese suzerainty.

P'o-lha-nas's relations with the Lamaist church were always most correct formally; but it is to be doubted whether they were at any time cordial, in spite of the great religious merits of the editor of the bKa'ag-yur and bsTan-agyur of sNar-t'ana. P'o-lha-nas was a tolerant man, but was above all a politician. It was an open secret that at heart he was a rNin-ma-pa 1), but he did not allow this to interfere with his church policy. The same must be said of his tolerant and sympathetic attitude towards the Catholic missionaries. He was a benevolent protector of the mission, but as soon as the Lamaist church seriously began to request its suppression, he sacrificed it without a pang. In spite of this, the Church never supported him wholeheartedly, and toward the end of his life a conflict was definitely brewing between them. Relations with the

1) dPag-bsam-ljon-bzan, p. 166n.
Lamaist church have always been the most difficult and delicate point in the policy of any lay ruler of Tibet; and it remained to be seen, whether P'o-lha-nas would have been able to maintain un-impaired the favour of the emperor against the intrigues of the clergy. Perhaps we are justified in saying that for his fame he died in time, just when his star showed the first signs of decline.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

ÂGYUR-MED-RNAM-RGYAL, THE LAST “KING” OF TIBET (1747-1750)

The transfer of power from P'o-lha-nas to his appointed successor Âgyur-med-rnam-rgyal was smooth and without the slightest hitch. As soon as the funeral ceremonies of P'o-lha-nas were at an end, Âgyur-med-rnam-rgyal summoned a great assembly of the leading lamas and laymen, and caused himself to be invested with his new dignity, after having promised to maintain and follow the policy of his father 1). Nor was the Chinese confirmation much delayed. The emperor at once wrote to Fucing, approving of Âgyur-med-rnam-rgyal’s succession. He also ordered a grant of 1000 taels as a contribution towards the expenses of the funeral, and sent the retired amban So-pai on a mission of condolence, to carry out in Lhasa the prescribed sacrifices in honour of the deceased 2). At the same time the emperor, who clearly recognized the implications of the event, wrote to Fucing expressing his doubts on Âgyur-med-rnam-rgyal’s ability to maintain the strong administration of his father. Fucing must watch him and report on his capacities and intentions, with particular reference to his relations with the Dalai-Lama. As a legacy of P'o-lha-nas’s last months, these relations were rather strained; Fucing must try and effect a reconciliation. For the rest, Âgyur-med-rnam-rgyal should be advised to keep the old tried ministers of his father and to continue in the old administrative methods 3). In the course of the 6th month, the imperial sanction to Âgyur-med-rnam-rgyal’s new dignity was officially proclaimed both in Lhasa and in bKra-sis-lhun-po 4).

Shortly afterwards So-pai arrived in Lhasa 5). His and Fu-

---

1) LSDL, ff. 335b-336a.
2) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 286, ff. 25a-26a; ch. 287, f. 2a.
4) LSDL, f. 339a. ATTL, f. 66b.
5) LSDL, f. 340b.
cing's joint efforts succeeded in reconciling aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal and the Dalai-Lama. According to So-pai's report, as soon as P'o-lha-nas died, the Dalai-Lama had expressed his intention of presenting his condolences and of offering the ritual libations and reading the sacred texts for the welfare of the deceased. But aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal did not allow it. On Fucing's intervention, however, he withdrew his opposition and requested the Dalai-Lama to perform the rites, after which good relations were established between the two men 1).

In the meantime Fucing had taken appropriate measures for the defence of Tibet against all eventualities. mNa²-ris was the fief of Ye-šes-ts'e-brtan, who normally resided there. But when P'o-lha-nas died, he was ailing in the legs (gout perhaps), and was staying in Lhasa to recover his health. His legs gradually improved, and Fucing ordered him back to mNa²-ris to organize the defence of that region. In P'o-lha-nas's time the military system of the northern marches used to be commanded by aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal. Now that he had to reside in Lhasa, Fucing ordered him to appoint Jaisang Nag-dbañ-dge-ødun to the command of the Kara-usu troops and Ts'e-riñ-bkra-šis to the Tengri-nor defence system 2). These orders were duly carried out. Ye-šes-ts'e-brtan took his leave of the Dalai-Lama and started on his journey to mNa²-ris, passing through bKra-šis-lhun-po 3).

After the government of Tibet had been settled on what seemed to be a firm basis, the emperor turned his attention to another matter which had awaited decision for some time. The Dsungar ruler dGa²-ldan-ts'e-riñ (1727-1745) had died, and his young successor Ts'e-dbañ-rdo-rje-rnam-rgyal (1745-1750) soon after his accession had sent to Peking a mission headed by his Muslim subject Mahmud. This envoy requested, among other things, permission to send a mission to Lhasa to offer prayers and gifts for the spiritual welfare of the deceased dGa²-ldan-ts'e-riñ. The emperor granted the permission and appointed the vice-president Yü-pao (the same who had escorted the mission of 1743) to discuss the necessary measures

3) On 19/VIII = September 23rd he had an audience with the Tashi-Lama. LSDI. f. 340a; ATTL, f. 68a.
with the Dzungar envoys 1). The death of P'o-lha-nas and the administrative activity it entailed, delayed the matter. But the emperor did not think it necessary to go back on his promise because of the change of ruler in Tibet. Mahmud had arranged with Yü-pao that the Dzungar mission should arrive about the middle of the 8th month of 1747 at Hajir, on the Tsaidam marshes, for the usual trade mart; after which, they were to leave for Tibet in the 9th month. Mahmud undertook to organize the mission with all possible speed in the short time available 2). On their side, the Chinese authorities took care of the financial arrangements and of the supplies for the mission and its escort; 150,000 taels were earmarked for this purpose 3).

The Dzungar mission comprised Mahmud and other three ḋaisangs, three chief lamas and several lesser ones, and 300 men 4). It is surprising to see a Muslim in charge of a Lamaist mission, whose purpose was in the main religious; it is a striking example of the good understanding reigning between the various religions in Central Asia in this period. Of course the utmost care was devoted to the organization of a strong escort and to the strict surveillance on the route and the activities of the mission. Fucing had submitted to the throne proposals for elaborate precautions both on the road and on the frontier, including the mobilization of 15,000 men of Tibetan and Chinese troops. The emperor could not give his sanction to these extravagant plans, but ordered 1000 men to be kept in readiness. ḡGyur-med-rnam-rgyal was to be kept informed, and all steps were to be taken in consultation with him. Yü-pao was appointed, as in 1743, to supervise the whole movement; he was ordered to exercise the utmost care and to take all necessary precautions 5).

The mission lost much time with the difficult crossing of the Tarim, and this delay excited Chinese suspicions. The emperor gave orders to hurry the Dzungars away from Lhasa immediately after they had participated in the smon-lam festival in the first

2) Memorial received on i-ch'ou/IV = May 14th, 1747. Kao-tsung Shih-lu ch. 288, ff. 13b-15a.
3) Memorial of the governor of Kansu, received on chia-hsu/IV = May 23rd, 1747. Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 288, ff. 33a-35a.
5) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 292, ff. 6b-8a; ch. 293, f. 6a-b; ch. 298, ff. 12b-14a.
fortnight of 1748 1). But apparently Yü-pao did not judge it expedient to show such an unseemly haste. The Dsungsars and their Chinese escort arrived at Lhasa in the last days of the 12th month (end of January 1748). They were met outside the town, welcomed and accompanied inside by duke Pandita. A great feast was given in their honour, and a few days afterwards they took part in the smon-lam ceremonies. The Dsungar envoys offered precious gifts on behalf of their ruler, among which stood out a gold lump (t'igs-pu) of 163 ounces. Two lamas of the mission received the mystic initiation from the Dalai-Lama. The party was lavishly entertained in the dGa'-ldan-k' an-gsar palace by aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, who showed himself on this occasion as a liberal host 2). Except for two lamas, who remained in Lhasa to continue their studies under the Dalai-Lama, the mission, accompanied by Yü-pao, journeyed to bKra-sis-lhun-po, to pay their homage to the young Tashi-Lama. They reached the great monastery on the 11/II = March 9th, 1748, and left again a few days later, after having had an audience with the Tashi-Lama and having presented the gifts they had brought for him 3). Back in Lhasa, they could not be received again by the Dalai-Lama, but were nevertheless entertained at a great feast given in their honour. And after this the Dsungars, always accompanied by Yü-pao, left on their journey home 4).

The reason why the Dalai-Lama could not grant a last audience to the Dsungar mission was a terrible epidemic of smallpox. This all too frequent scourge of Tibet had broken out again. This time it was not the ,,diplomatic" disease so much heard of at the time of the civil war, but a severe outburst which began during the New Year's festival and was obviously facilitated by the insanitary crowding of religious and lay pilgrims, who took part in the ceremonies. aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal advised the Dalai-Lama to retire to Rva-sgren, away from the dangers of the capital. But the Dalai-Lama steadfastly refused; he merely took the precaution of shutting himself in the Potala, where he spent his time meditating and offering prayers for the cessation of the scourge 5). This retirement caused some uneasiness in Peking. It was remembered there how

2) LSDL, ff. 342b-345b.
3) ATTL, ff. 70b-71a.
4) LSDL, f. 345b.
5) LSDL, ff. 345a-b and 350b.
once another Dalai-Lama, the Great Fifth, had retired for meditation, never to emerge again, while a craftly regent substituted another person in his place. The emperor ordered the ambans So-pai and Fucing to be on the alert and to watch events closely 1). But this time the mistrust of the emperor was dispelled first by the harsh reality, and eventually by the gradual abating of the plague.

The Dsungar mission left in its trail the usual worries and suspicions. It is true that this time the Chinese authorities felt fairly sure of the Tibetan government. Their preoccupations on this score were limited to the possible reactions on the Tibetan situation of the serious and long rebellion in Chin-ch‘uan, the “land of the gold river” in Western Szechwan. This revolt lasted from 1747 to 1749 and was at last suppressed not so much by force of arms, as by the overpowering influence of the fearless personality of Yüeh Chung-ch‘i. An ominous peculiarity had been the great part played by the local lamas in organizing resistance to the imperial troops 2). But the unfailing watchfulness of the Chinese authorities prevented any playing over of the Chin-ch‘uan revolt into Tibet. The worries of the Chinese government this time concerned more the Dsungar mission itself. It was strongly suspected that its main purpose had been that of spying out conditions in Tibet. And there was therefore a big alarm, when the report was received in Peking that on the road taken by the returning Dsungars there were to be found traces of great body of men, numbering about 1000. This caused a great deal of correspondence and investigations, but finally proved to have been a mare’s nest. The rumours and the subsequent scare had been wholly unfounded 3).

Besides this alarm, there was also a complaint lodged by aGyurmed-rnam-rgyal about the financial burden which this mission had placed on the country. We must remember that while in Tibetan territory the Dsungar mission travelled at the expenses of the Tibetan government. It was evident that, all things taken into account, these missions presented more drawbacks than advantages. The emperor at any rate took pains to reassert by an edict the standing

1) Kuei-mao/III = April 16th, 1748. Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 311, ff. 6b-7a.
3) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 322, ff. 24b-25b, 25b-26a, 26a-27a, 28a-29a; ch. 323, ff. 12a-13b, 13b-14b; ch. 324, ff. 35b-36b.
prohibition of Dsungar intercourse with Tibet, stressing the fact that the last two missions had been of an exceptional nature only, and had been permitted as an act of grace granted for very special reasons 1). Ṣgyur-med-rnam-rgyal was rewarded with gifts of silk cloth for him and for his ministers. On this occasion we meet again with the names of all of P'o-lha-nas’s old officials, such as Pandita, Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal, Sri-gcod-ts'e-brtan etc. 2); we gather from this document that Ṣgyur-med-rnam-rgyal had indeed maintained P'o-lha-nas’s men at their posts, as he had been advised to do by China. A little later the order prohibiting intercourse with the Dsungars was made even more stringent, and the ambans were directed to cooperate with Ṣgyur-med-rnam-rgyal to see that no Dsungar could enter Tibet 3).

After the mission of 1747/8, as after that of 1743, the Dsungar ruler tried again to obtain concessions from China concerning the relations with the Lamaist church of Tibet. On wu-wu/I = February 20th, 1750, a Dsungar embassy begged the emperor that twenty or thirty men should be allowed to travel every year to Lhasa, and requested permission to fetch some Tibetan lamas to serve in the Dsungar temples. The emperor flatly refused to grant the first request. As to the second, either ironically or seriously he put forward a counter-proposal: the Dsungars should send ten or twenty of their most learned lamas to undergo a course of training of three of four years in one of the great Tibetan monasteries at Peking, after which they would be able to take proper care of the Lamaist church in Dsungaria 4). The matter rested at this point. Ts'e-dbañ-rdo-rje-rnam-rgyal was deposed and blinded in the summer of 1750, and when his successor repeated the request, the outbreak in Lhasa had given quite another turn to the events.

In this year 1748 a movement of officials took place in Tibet. Fucing went back to China (in the 3rd month = April). So-pai too was recalled, but could not actually leave till his successor Labdon (La-pu-tun 拉布敦) 5) reached Lhasa; it was only in the 10th month (November) that he could pay his parting visit

1) Kao-tsun Shih-lu, ch. 314, ff. 8b-9b.
2) Kao-tsun Shih-lu, ch. 314, ff. 9b-10a.
5) A Manchu of the Plain Red Banner. His biography in Man-chou-ming-ch'ên-chuan, ch. 36, ff. 56b-60a.
to the Dalai-Lama ¹). For the rest of this year there is little to notice, except perhaps a state visit of the usual kind paid by aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal and his ministers to the Tashi-Lama (5th and 6th months = June and July) ²).

It was probably about this time that the emperor allowed himself to be cajoled into a very foolish step. Acting upon a memorial submitted by aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, he consented to the practical withdrawal of the Chinese garrison of Lhasa. 400 soldiers were recalled to China, and only a small personal escort of 100 men remained with the ambans ³). From every conceivable point of view it was a grievous mistake. Experience had taught that only an adequate, even if small, garrison in Lhasa could effectively back the authority of the ambans. Besides, the emperor should have remembered the evil effects of Yung-chêng's order of withdrawal in 1723.

But for the moment there seemed to be little occasion for worrying. The year 1749 began serenely and calmly, with the usual fervent religious life going on in the capital and in the greatest monasteries. The Tashi-Lama solemnly visited the Dalai-Lama at Lhasa. This visit, carried out with the gorgeous ceremonial which is characteristic of Lamaism, is described in detail in the Tibetan texts, but there is no point in fatiguing the reader with these descriptions, which are so frequent and so monotonously alike. Suffice it to say that on the invitation of the Dalai-Lama and of aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, the young Tashi-Lama left bKra-sis-lhun-po on the 19/III = May 14th by the usual route of the Karo-la, arrived in Lhasa on the 10/IV = May 25th, was lavishly entertained by aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, met the Dalai-Lama on the 15/IV = May 30th, left on the 29/IV = June 13th by the Yans-pa-can route, and was back in bKra-sis-lhun-po on the 15/V = June 29th ⁴).

But shortly afterwards the horizon began to cloud. aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal addressed to the Chinese government, through the amban Labdon, a petition concerning those parts of Tibet which had been taken under direct Chinese administration during the

---

¹) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 311, f. 7a-b; ch. 322, ff. 26a-27b. LSDL, f. 354a.
²) ATTL, ff. 72a-74a.
³) The document has not been included in the Shih-lu. But see Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 377, f. 2a; Shèng-wu-chi, ch. 5, f. 13a; Ch'ing-shih-kao, ch. 312 (lieh-chuan 99), f. 1b; and the stray references in Doc. VIII.
⁴) ATTL, ff. 79b-90b; LSDL, ff. 358b-360a.
K'ang-hsi period; he applied for permission to sent to these regions, still deeply influenced by the various Red sects, some lamas from the three great monasteries, in order to spread there the teachings of the dGe-lug-pa school. This proposal awakened at once the suspicions of the Li-fan-yüan (Mongolian Superindendency), who scented under it an attempt at regaining political influence in those territories. The emperor reserved his reply and ordered a supplementary investigation, which was a way of allowing the matter to drop without a formal refusal ¹). But once awakened, the emperor's mistrust grew apace. Labdon was replaced by the old amban Chi-shan, who was reputed to have more experience of things Tibetan ²). He evidently was charged with the particular task of keeping aGyurmed-rnam-rgyal under observation and to report to the throne on the trend of Tibetan politics.

When he arrived in Tibet, he found that aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal was on bad terms with his minister and brother-in-law duke Pandita, whose little son he had taken away, presumably as a kind of hostage. Pandita secretly approached the Chinese envoy, to whom he gave his own version of the quarrel and his not very flattering appreciation of aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal's character. Chi-shan was of course influenced by what Pandita told him, and accordingly his first memorial was rather unfavourable: aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal was very proud and obstinate; his subjects were already grumbling under his oppressive rule, and the Dalai-Lama simply could not stand the sight of him. The discontent was only too likely to increase. Chi-shan suggested that Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan be recalled from his mNa³-ris fief to Lhasa and be given a share in the government, in order to divide and weaken aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal's power; the Dalai-Lama was to be sent again to Ka-ta, to keep him out of the strife. These proposals were hardly workable, and the emperor sharply rebuked Chi-shan, telling him to confine himself to observing and reporting sober facts, and to leave to His Majesty the care of settling the Tibetan question ³). At the same time the emperor took exception to the fact that there was now only one amban in

²) LSDL, f. 362a. Till April 1747 Chi-shan had been governor of Szechwan, were he had signally failed to stamp out the Chin-ch'uan rebellion in its beginnings. But evidently he had not fallen in disgrace on this account.
³) I-wei/X = November 29th, 1749. Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 351, ff. 6b-7b. Ch'ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 8b.
residence at Lhasa; he prescribed the re-enforcement of the old rules about the double ambanship. Fucing, at that time holding a post in Kansu, was promoted to brigadier-general and was sent back to Tibet as Chi-shan's colleague 1).

Upto this time the emperor was not inclined to dramatize the matter. In his considered instructions to the Grand Council, he announced his decision to overlook aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal's inconsiderate behaviour on account of his youth and inexperience, and of his father's merits; this decision was to be communicated to him by the amban. Still, it was advisable to take some precautions, chiefly because the Chin-ch'uan rebellion had kept Tibet in a state of latent tension. The lCañ-skyä Qutuqtu too, on whose advice the emperor laid much store, advised caution. Chi-shan was ordered to give his whole attention to the matter, collaborating with Fucing as soon as the latter arrived in Tibet. To provide them with moral and material support and with an instance nearer to Lhasa than faraway Peking, the ambans were ordered to keep in touch with Yüeh Chung-ch'i, the old warrior who, after a long period of disgrace and after his brilliant action in finishing the Chin-ch'uan war, had been appointed again to Szechwan as provincial commander. All documents to the court were to pass through his hands and those of the governor-general of Szechwan, the Manchu duke Ts'e-riñ (Ts'e-leng 策楞) 2).

Step by step the situation grew more tense. aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal began showing his hand. He was aiming against his elder brother Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan, who was peaceably governing his territory of mNa-ris. Elder brothers, who have been passed over in the succession, even if unambitious, are always a thorn in the side of young uncontrolled rulers. No wonder that aGyud-med-rnam-rgyal was bent on eliminating his brother; we must even be surprised that he set about it so late. Very cleverly, he began by forestalling any possible appeal of Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan to China, by accusing him of oppressing the monasteries of mNa-ris, plundering the traders and cutting the routes to Central Tibet. aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal was therefore preparing troops in order to protect the mon-

2) Wu-hsi/X = December 2nd, 1749. Kao-tsung Shih-ju, ch. 351, fl. 10b-13a. On Yüeh Chung-ch'i's activity in this period see Hummel, p. 959. The biography of duke Ts'e-riñ (d. 1757) is in Ch'ing-shih-kao, ch. 314 (lieh-chüan 101), fl. 1a-3a; cfr. Hummel, p. 73.
asteries, appealing at the same time to his suzerain. The accusation was very grave; it amounted to a charge of rebellion. But the emperor was not taken in so easily. His first reaction was heavy misgivings about aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal’s motives; as he was known to be cruel and overbearing, was he perhaps trying to get rid of his brother through Chinese agency? Anyhow, the matter required careful handling. The emperor ordered Chi-shan to send a trusted officer to Ye-ses-ts’e-brtan to investigate the truth on the spot. The officers in Szechwan, on the other side, saw trouble ahead; in forwarding these letters, Yüeh Chung-ch’i had said as much, and had discussed the possibility of removing the Dalai-Lama to a safe place, for example to the garrison town of Chamdo, away from the hotbed of intrigues in Lhasa 1). But the emperor decided that it was not advisable to remove the Dalai-Lama again. He gave orders to summon Ye-ses-ts’e-brtan to Lhasa, to refute the charges brought against him by his brother and to justify himself before the ambassadors. aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal was rebuked for his unauthorized troops movements, reminded of his father’s loyal behaviour, and ordered to keep quiet and to send some officers of his to escort the Chinese official despatched to Ye-ses-ts’e-brtan. The rescript impressed aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal with the fact that the emperor alone was entitled to judge between him and his brother 2).

But for the moment aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal’s clever diplomacy placed him in the advantage. On 5/IX = October 15th, 1749, after his return from dGa’ldan to Lhasa, he visited the amban Chi-shan, paid his respects to him, flattered him and offered him many presents. Chi-shan was outwardly very reserved; but he accepted aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal’s presents in order not to offend him, and it was noticeable that his hostility was somewhat allayed 3). The emperor was quite a different proposition; with his innate astuteness he saw through the game. But surprisingly enough he took no definite action; he fondly hoped that Fucing’s arrival would put matters right 4). As to Chi-shan, the emperor was lenient towards the old amban and fully realized his difficulty in getting exact information, surrounded as he was by aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal’s

---

4) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 355, ff. 15a-18a.
followers. But Chi-shan's continuous wavering and evident nervousness were difficult to understand 1). So much was certain, exact information was the most urgent need. As Chi-shan was obviously incapable of supplying it, the emperor recalled him and sent Labdon in his place 2).

Of course these changes of personnel took time to be carried out, and the course of events was too swift. Although nearly every imperial rescript admonished and entreated aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal to keep quiet, he only persisted on his course. On hsìn-yu/l = February 23rd, 1750, a memorial from aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal was received at court, in which he accused his brother of having occupied with 700 soldiers a town on the border of gTsān and mNa-7-ris. The emperor replied, advising aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal not to drive his brother to desperate steps, such as fleeing to Dsungaria, but to allow him to come to Lhasa to justify himself; an imperial arbitrator had already been appointed for this purpose 3).

 Shortly afterwards Ts'e-riṅ and Yüeh Chung-ch'i memorialized the throne, asking for permission to lead 3000 men to Tibet to settle the matter by drastic means, going even as far as the execution of aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal; but the emperor was loth to resort to such extreme measures 4). This continuous procrastination could have but one result. aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal was led to believe that the emperor would acquiesce in the fait accompli, and carried out his scheme to the bitter end. Probably an energetic action on the part of the Chinese government would yet have saved Ye-šes-ts'e-brtan. Such as they were, the emperor's advice, objurgations and entreaties were absolutely useless. The Dalai-Lama had tried to mediate between the two brothers for the sake of the quiet and welfare of Tibet. He planned to send to mNa-7-ris a high lama with a letter for Ye-šes-ts'e-brtan, but aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal did not allow the envoy to pass. The Dalai-Lama then wrote to the Tashi-Lama to try and help the messenger to go through. The Tashi-Lama apparently did not do so, but on 3/XI = December 12th he wrote directly to aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, in a last attempt at appeasement; but his effort too was of no avail 5).

1) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 355, ff. 15a-18a.
3) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 357, ff. 1b-3b.
5) LSDL, ff. 364b-365a; ATTL, f. 93a.
On 18/XII = January 25th, 1750, poor Ye-ses-ts'eq-brtan died in mNa^2-ris, without even having received the Chinese summons to Lhasa 1). His demise is shrouded in mystery. aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal tried to give out that he had died of illness, and for the moment the Chinese court seemed to accept this version. After the upheaval of 1750 it transpired that Ye-ses-ts'eq-brtan's death had been violent; he had been cut down by some soldiers sent by his brother. But for the moment aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal upheld his farce. He even induced, by guile or force, the Dalai-Lama and the Tashi-Lama to hold great ceremonies for the deceased during the New Year's festival (February 7th) of 1750. He was brazen enough to preside as the chief mourner at the rites held in Lhasa, after which he offered a funeral banquet! 2).

If the Dalai-Lama and the Tashi-Lama had meekly acquiesced to the will of the fratricide, he met with resistance in an unexpected quarter. The 55th K'ri Rin-po-che Na-dban-nam-mk'a-brzan 3) had been invited by aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal first to practise magic for the ruin of Ye-ses-ts'eq-brtan, and then, after the sad end of the prince, to offer gratulatory gifts (legs-abul). He firmly refused to do either thing. This refusal was more than aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal would brook. With the unwilling consent of the Dalai-Lama, the young ruler pronounced the deposition of the K'ri Rin-po-che. The latter's attendants wanted him to offer resistance; but he refused to become the cause of a conflict and abandoned his see without opposition, amidst the sincere regret of the monks. He retired to the quarters in dGa'-ldan destined for the monks of T'e-bo in Eastern Tibet (T'e-bo-k'ams-ts'ana). Soon afterwards he died, hardly of a natural death 4). The 56th K'ri Rin-po-che Blo-bzan-dri-med 5) was appointed in his place.

After having eliminated his brother, aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal tried also to get rid of the murdered man's two sons, who were then in gTsan. He went there himself with his soldiers and succeeded in getting hold of the elder of the two brothers, P'un-ts'og-dban-po. He quietly had the youth killed and gave out that he had fled away.

1) The exact date is given in Kao-tsun Shih-lu, ch. 358, f. 10b.
2) LSDL, f. 365b; ATTL, f. 94a.
3) B. 1690, on the see since 1746. His biography is vol. Ta of the collection.
4) Life of the 55th K'ri Rin-po-che, f. 123b; LSDL, ff. 374b and 375b.
5) B. 1683, on the see 1750-1757, date of death unknown. His biography is vol. T'a of the collection.
But the younger son aGyur-med-dbaṅ-rgyal evaded his grasp and took refuge with the Tashi-Lama, becoming a monk in bKra-śis-lhun-po. Not even aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal would dare to violate that sanctuary, and aGyur-med-dbaṅ-rgyal was secure there ¹). But if he had saved his life, he did not save his inheritance. The news of Ye-šes-ts'e-brtan’s death, reported by Chi-shan, had reached Peking on chi-mao/II = March 13th, 1750. The first question that arose was the appointment of a new ruler for mNa`-ris. Two courses were possible: either to appoint aGyur-med-dbaṅ-rgyal as his father’s successor, or to abolish this semi-independent governorship altogether. The latter course was strongly advocated by aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal; he applied for the guardianship of his nephew, which meant practically the annexation of mNa`-ris. The emperor saw the importance of a well-considered deliberation and did not think the matter urgent. He reserved his decision, and in the meantime he directed Fucing and Labdon to act according to circumstances and to exploit any favourable occasion that might arise ²). This meant giving wide powers to the men on the spot and shifting the responsibility on their shoulders,—perhaps a not unwise step to take. But the emperor’s slowness and dilatoriness were not to the taste of aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal. On ping-yin/III = April 21st, he petitioned the emperor, requesting to be allowed to send his own son Dar-rgyas-ts'e-rin to occupy mNa`-ris ³). Again the emperor gave no definite reply, and we know from following events that aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal took the law into his own hands and occupied mNa`-ris without further ado.

As to the circumstances of the death of Ye-šes-ts'e-brtan, in a secret rescript to the Grand Council the emperor expressed his doubts about its being due to natural causes. But at that distance it was difficult to form a judgment. What had become abundantly clear was that old Chi-shan was useless as news reporter, and that it was high time that Fucing and Labdon took his place ⁴). The change had already taken place when the emperor was writing. Fucing had been in Lhasa since the 12th month (January), and Labdon arrived there shortly after New Year’s day ⁵).

¹) Ch’ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 9a.
²) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 358, ff. 8a-10a, 10b-12a.
³) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 361, ff. 11b-12a.
⁴) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 358, ff. 12a-13b.
⁵) LSDL, ff. 366a and 375a.

PETECH, China and Tibet
It cannot be denied that Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan's death simplified the situation. But the emperor took a wrong view of this event; he interpreted it as the final solution, right or wrong, of the knotty situation in Tibet. Accordingly, he countermanded the movements of troops started on their own responsibility by the Szechwan authorities, and ordered the men back to their garrisons 1). For the same reason he denied his approval to a proposal by Labdon to increase the Lhasa garrison 2). That the emperor really believed the situation to be stabilized, is shown by the willing consent which he gave about this time to the wedding plans of aGyur-med-nam-rgyal. The latter had insisted with the Chinese court in order to get their approval for his marriage, already arranged in the lifetime of P'o-lha-nas, with the elder daughter of the Čingwang dBa-n-p'yg (Wang-shu-k'o 旺淑克) of Kukunor. There was a hitch now, because the Čingwang refused to give away his elder daughter and offered instead the younger in marriage. The emperor arranged matters in such a way, that the elder daughter was to marry aGyur-med-nam-rgyal's son,— a change for which no apparent reason can be seen 3). But the marriage did not take place. When the bride reached Lhasa with a brilliant retinue (11th or 12th month), the tragedy had already occurred and aGyur-med-nam-rgyal was no more. Thus nothing was left for the damsel but to pay the customary visits to the Dalai-Lama and the Tashi-Lama, and then to return whence she had come 4).

Other items of news that the emperor at the moment took as a symptom of lessened tension, were the travels and inspections of aGyur-med-nam-rgyal. The latter had left Lhasa in the 1st month (February) to deal with the sons of Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan. The excuse he gave out for this movement was that he was going on a tour in the Sa-dga' region (?; Sa-hai 麋海), in order to pacify these areas, which had been somewhat disturbed by the crisis centering round Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan. Later he inspected the military zone of the Kara-usu, starting on his journey on 1/III = April 7th 5). Two months later he was in Gyantse, and thence he journeyed to

2) Same date as preceding. Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 359, f. 13a-b.
3) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 357, ff. 1b-3b; ch. 359, ff. 11b-12a.
4) LSDL, ff. 38a-b and 38b; ATTL, f. 97a.
5) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 362, ff. 7a-8a.
bKra-sis-lhun-po, where on 28/V = July 1st, accompanied by his ministers, he had an audience with the Tashi-Lama 1). It was only afterwards that the purpose of these tours became apparent. In the meantime the emperor, almost reassured, went as far as to contemplate the recall to court of Fucing and Labdon; the latter had been at court only for a short while, when he was sent back post-haste to Lhasa because of the Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan affair. Now that the crisis was over, it was but fitting that he should resume his service at court. The emperor therefore ordered the vice-president T'ung-ning 同寧 to replace Labdon at Lhasa. After he had gathered experience there for a couple of years under the guidance of Fucing, the latter too was to be recalled to Peking. But as T'ung-ning showed much unwillingness to take up that post, he was dismissed from it. Bandi, then holding the post of Chinese resident in Kukunor, was ordered to Lhasa, being in his turn replaced in Kukunor by Chi-shan. T'ung-ning was administered a sharp reprimand for his negligence 2).

But the rosy illusions of the emperor were destined to last only a short time. aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal had merely paused for a moment, and soon he went relentlessly forward with his schemes. At once the worries began again for Ch'ien-lung and his representatives in Lhasa. On ping-wu/V = June 6th, Fucing and Labdon reported that aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal's travels were more than simple inspection tours. He intended to reduce Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan's old retainers to obedience; they had remained bitterly hostile to him. But his journeys merely alarmed and excited the people. Besides, without any apparent reason he had begun moving some troops and shifting his guns out from Lhasa. aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal himself was, or pretended to be, suspicious that the arrival of the two ambans early that year was a sign that the emperor contemplated his deposition and arrest. All this began to look much like preparations for revolt. Still, the emperor would not believe that aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal could be such a fool as to plan a rebellion in earnest. He ordered Fucing and Labdon to investigate the matter carefully. Bandi was to keep secret his appointment, in order not to alarm aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal; in any case he was not to

---

1) ATTIL, fl. 94a-95a.
2) In the 4th month = May. Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 362, f. 9a-b; ch. 363, fl. 21a-22a, 25b.
leave for Tibet before Chi-shan, who was then at court for consultation, reached Kukunor. It was thus anticipated that Bandi would be able to start for Lhasa in the course of the winter 1).

The next report of the ambans (received on jen-wu/VI = July 19th) was even more alarming. aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal was going to bring 49 loads of gunpowder and 1500 men from Kon-po into Lhasa. Clearly an armed action was intended. But Ch'ien-lung seemed blind to the tempest which was brewing. He hit upon the preposterous idea that the report of Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan’s death had been false, and that aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal was now secretly preparing to attack his brother. He ridiculed the mere idea of a rebellion, and repeated his order to the ambans to await aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal’s return to Lhasa, and then to have the matter investigated 2).

But in the following weeks several small events concurred in pointing towards an imminent showdown. Chi-shan had returned to court and had given a short report on Tibetan affairs. According to him, aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal was cruel and haughty and was hated by his subjects; immediate measures were imperative, otherwise the worst would happen 3). On the other side, Bandi’s appointment was common knowledge in Tibet; there was no point in keeping it secret any longer, and the emperor had to order its publication 4). On ping-wu/IX = October 8th, another report by Fucing and Labdon came in; it stated that several old officials of Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan had been executed and their property confiscated upon faked charges; all his old servants were persecuted, robbed or killed outright. aGyur-med-dbañ-rgyal, the son and heir of the murdered duke, had been expelled from his estates and had taken refuge with the Tashi-Lama. aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal himself was in gTsän at the head of about 2000 men 5). Fucing and Labdon, as the men on the spot, saw things much clearer than the hesitating emperor. They clearly perceived that a conflict was unavoidable, and that it was better to nip the mischief in the bud, before it grew to a full-sized rebellion or civil war. They informed therefore the emperor of their intention, as soon as aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal returned to

---

1) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 364, ff. 6a-8b.
5) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 372, f. 9a-b.
Lhasa, to entice him into their yamen and to kill him. The emperor was displeased that the two amбанs could not even wait for an imperial rescript. He gave orders to the Szechwan officials to investigate the matter. To Fucing and Labdon he recommended great prudence and secrecy, but gave them permission to act as circumstances required. It was however unlikely, as the emperor himself foresaw, that this rescript would reach the amбанs in time. As a matter of fact, it had been issued on *ting-ch‘ou/X = November 6th, only five days before the tragedy in Lhasa* 1).

1) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 374, ff. 10a-11a; ch. 375, f. 10a-b.
What happened now was a sudden outbreak, not unexpected by thoughtful observers in Tibet and China, but the consequences of which were more far-reaching than could be reasonably anticipated. The tension which had slowly risen for the past three years unloaded itself in a one-day orgy of violence. Like a thunderstorm, it broke out, destroyed everything within its reach and ceased at once, leaving the air much cleaner.

Fucing and Labdon were two honest and courageous Manchu officers, even if somewhat limited in outlook. They had perceived that the emperor's continuous procrastination could only result in making matters worse. They decided not to wait for a reply to their last memorial, but to act on their own responsibility and to shoulder the consequences. The emperor's unwise withdrawal of the Lhasa garrison had left them without the means for enforcing their authority; only a daring coup, something which in normal circumstances would have amounted to pure and simple murder, could retrieve the position. Their decision must be frankly admired, as they must have been aware that they doubly risked their heads, firstly because it would have been something of a miracle if they escaped with their lives, and secondly because they were acting without the emperor's approval, and Ch'ien-lung had very stern ways of dealing with officials who presumed to act without or against his orders.

Their action was quick and ruthless. As soon as aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal was back in Lhasa, on the 13/X = November 11th, 1750, the two ambans summoned him to the Chinese residence ¹) under the pretext of a conference. He was received in a room on the second floor; the ambans then invited him to a secret conference in their

---

¹) K'rom-gzigs-k'añ, "the palace overlooking the market".
sleeping room. He went in without suspicions, but once the door was safely closed, Fucing spoke to him bitterly, reproaching him for his treachery, which had made him unworthy of any regard, even that due to him on account of his father’s memory. And then, without giving him a chance to reply, Fucing jumped up and seized him by his arm, while Labdon drew his sword and ran the Tibetan ruler through the body (according to others, Fucing did it himself). aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal was finished off at once, and his four or five attendants in the outer room were cut down on the spot. The ambans then sent a sergeant 1) to duke Pandita, ordering him to take the reins of the government provisionally. In doing this, they acted on their own initiative, wholly without authority from the emperor, who later could and did freely disavow this step. What they probably meant, was that duke Pandita should simply guarantee law and order in the town till the emperor made his will known. But the new arrangement had even not the time to begin functioning. Pandita 2), surprised and bewildered like everybody else, went first to the Potala to consult with the Dalai-Lama; but while precious time was lost in these discussions, the storm broke out in the town.

aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal had been thoroughly hated by his subjects, and none of his ministers or high officials thought of protesting against his murder. There was thus all likelihood that no violent reaction would have occurred, but for a lower official of aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, a mgon-gîner (steward) called Blo-bzañ-bkra-sis. He had accompanied aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal to the Chinese yamen and he alone had escaped alive, jumping from the window. It was he alone of all the staff and household of the murdered ruler who went out to avenge his death. This small man, utterly unknown till then and of no political standing whatsoever, became the tool

2) According to the Ch’ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 9a, Pandita and the other minister aBron-btsan after the murder of Ye-šes-ts’e-brtan had left Lhasa and had retired to aDam. They had collected some 2000 men and had remained there in sullen defiance, without returning to Lhasa, and sending message upon message to the Chinese authorities to warn them against aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal. The Ch’ing-shih-kao is always well informed, and it is only with the greatest reluctance that I feel compelled to call in doubt this piece of information. But this action of Pandita’s is nowhere mentioned in the Tibetan sources or in the Shzh-lu, and the fact remains that at the time of the outbreak Pandita was present in Lhasa, which of course excludes any open defiance towards aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal. It seems very hard to reconcile the account of the Ch’ing-shih-kao with the known facts.
of fate in shaping the course of events and the destinies of Tibet. He did not think of the consequences of his act and of the foolhardiness of provoking the Chinese empire to harsh retaliatory measures by an action which in no case could have more than a passing success. He gathered a crowd of about 1000 men and succeeded in firing this rabble to frenzy against the Chinese murderers. The mob rushed towards the Chinese residence and began a desultory musket-fire against it. As there were no regular soldiers of the Tibetan army present in Lhasa, Pandita was powerless to do anything. As to the Dalai-Lama, when he heard and saw the turmoil, he at once sent his secretaries to the spot, to argue with the mob and to dissuade them from violence. But they would not listen. Then the Dalai-Lama caused a proclamation to be posted on the walls and pillars of Lhasa, in which he announced that aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal had been justly executed for his crimes, and threatening with punishment by the emperor anybody who dare lay hand on the ambans. He himself came out of the Potala and addressed the mob. But the crowd had by this time reached a state of white-hot frenzy. They did what normally no Tibetan would dream of doing; they shouted down the Dalai-Lama, tore away the posters of his proclamation, and went as far as turning their weapons against his sacred person, so that he had to take refuge in the Potala. This last bulwark gone, the tempest burst in all its fury. The residence was surrounded, attacked and set on fire. Fucing and Labdon defended themselves desperately to the bitter end. Fucing killed with his dagger several of the assailants, but then he received three wounds on his body and the loss of blood weakened him so that he was soon unable to fight any more; rather than be taken alive, he committed suicide; Labdon too was wounded several times and died fighting. Most of their officers committed suicide or perished with them by the sword or in the flames, foremost among them the assistant secretary 1) Ts'é-t’a-érh 策塔爾 and the lieutenant-colonel 2) Huang Yüan-lung 黃元龍, who vainly endeavoured to shield their commanders. With the superior officers perished two lieutenants, 49 Chinese

2) Ts’an-chiang 参將. Mayers, n. 443.
soldiers and 77 civilians. The mob then turned to the nearby office of the military paymaster¹), which was looted with the loss of 85,000 tael. Then the night fell on these scenes of horror and confusion.

The next day brought the reaction. Blo-bzañ-bkra-šis was no leader and had no real following. The mob he had collected was composed of the dregs of the populace, and had dispersed with their loot as soon as everything was over. Blo-bzañ-bkra-šis had neither the possibility nor the capacity nor perhaps even the intention to seize power. There was no faction or party which would support him. P'o-lha-nas had relied mainly on his own personality, _CART_ only on the memory on his father, Blo-bzañ-bkra-šis could rely on nothing at all. So he did the only thing that was left for him; he gathered some friends and fled from the town, trying to effect his escape to Dsungaria, the only haven of refuge open to an enemy of the Chinese. After his flight, the Dalai-Lama took a firm grip of the situation. On the 15th = November 13th, he provisionally appointed Pandita as administrator of the realm, to carry on the government till the arrival of the Chinese officials and troops, whom everybody knew would arrive in Lhasa in a short time. He posted a proclamation forbidding all Tibetans to give help or refuge to Blo-bzañ-bkra-šis and his followers. They were energetically hunted down, and by the 23rd = November 21st Pandita could report that Blo-bzañ-bkra-šis had been caught and imprisoned, that more than half of the rebels had been arrested and the greater part of the treasure had been recovered. The Dalai-Lama had also admitted in the Potala all those Chinese who had escaped the fury of the mob, and had fed, clothed and equipped them. Only lesser men were left alive: two bícäči, some accountants and personal attendants of the ambans, about 80 soldiers and some 110 or 120 civilians, mainly Chinese merchants and foodshop-owners in the town, about 200 men in all ²). On the 24th = November 22nd the situation had become so completely normal, that these refugees could return to their dwellings. The Dalai-Lama had thus done all that was in his power. He then sent by an express

¹) Cfr. Waddell, p. 335. It is n. 60 in Waddell's map.
²) 247 according to the *ATTL*, which perhaps includes in this number also the Chinese residing in Shigatse.
courier a report of the events to the emperor, and set himself to
await the arrival of the imperial troops.

The news of the tragedy reached the emperor on kuei-ch’ou/X =
December 12th, through a report from the Szechwan authorities.
The forerunners of the storm had been some disturbing reports of
open boasts by aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal that he would soon wipe
out the Chinese in Lhasa. Then the Szechwan authorities got word
that all the communications with Lhasa had been interrupted; the
postal stages system was exclusively in the hands of the Tibetans,
and an order by aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal had sufficed for stopping
the passage of travellers, couriers and letters. After a short, ominous
silence of about 10 days, a letter sent by a Chinese non-commis-
sioned officer, a survivor of the massacre, informed the Szechwan
authorities of the events. Governor-general Ts’e-riin promptly
forwarded the letter to Peking, along with other secondary reports
which had come in shortly afterwards.

The Grand Council advised immediate action, and the emperor,
fully concurring with their views, at once ordered Yueh Chung-ch’i
to take position at Ta-chien-lu with 3000 men; his task was to keep
that most important zone quiet and to support the action of Ts’e-
riin. The latter was to march to Lhasa with 3000 men in order to
reestablish the imperial authority there. Another force of 2000 was
to follow him after a short while. As to Bandi, he must be already
on his way from Hsining and probably would soon arrive in Lhasa
with his small personal escort, but without troops; it was clearly
too late for countermanding his journey. Some other officers were
ordered to Szechwan to support these preparations, and the vice-
president rNam-rgyal (a Mongol) was appointed as a colleague of

1) My narrative of the tragedy of 1750 is based mainly on the unusually full account
in LSDL, ff. 378a-379a, with some additions from ATL, f. 96a. Next in order of impor-
tance come the Chinese accounts, chiefly Docs. VIII, IX and X in the Appendix,
and the Lhasa Chinese inscription of 1793 translated by Jametel, Inscription con-
memorative du meurtre de deux ambassadeurs chinois au Tibet, in Revue d’histoire diplomatieque,
I (1887), pp. 446-452; there are several mistakes in the translation (dates wrong by two
years, aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal has been divided in two princes, Tchou-eur-mo-te and
Na-mou-tch’a-eur, etc.) and we cannot rely overmuch on this document, as I am unable
to check it with the original. Cfr. also Kao-tsong Shih-лу ch. 377, ff. 1b-5a; Wei-tsang-
t’ung-chih, ch. 13a f. 1ob; Ch’ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 9a and ch. 312 (lieh-chuan
99), f. 2a; Hummel, p. 250; Courant, p. 96. The Capuchins were no longer in Tibet, and what
they heard of these events in Nepal was only rumours distorted by popular fancy. Cfr.
Giorgi, p. 340, and the completely wrong account in Gli scritti del Padre Marco della
Tomba, ed. by De Gubernatis, Florence 1878, p. 62.

2) Doc. VIII.
Bandi in quality of second amban¹). Yin-chi-shan 尹維善, the governor-general of Shensi and Kansu, was to take care of the commissariat arrangements ²).

These measures suffered from the haste with which they were taken; they evidently erred on the side of excessive strength. But almost at once the emperor realized the real importance of the events. He perceived that everything was already over. There was no rebellion to put down, since the Dalai-Lama and duke Pandita had quelled the uprising in Lhasa. A full-sized expedition to Tibet seemed clearly out of place and likely only to produce mistrust and unrest in the country; there was also the heavy financial cost to be considered. Yüeh Chung-ch'i and Ts'e-ri'n were therefore ordered to study the situation and to decide whether a large scale expedition was advisable or not. Already in these first days the emperor was able to sketch out in a few lines the main features of the reorganisation of the Tibetan protectorate, the necessity of which was fully realized in Peking. Pandita might be loyal and useful, but he had done nothing to save the ambans and commanded little respect in the country. It seemed inadvisable to invest him with the royal title and the office of ruler of Tibet; anyhow, the matter must be thoroughly investigated. But there were two points which the emperor perceived at once to be most important: the establishment of a permanent garrison in Lhasa and the reorganization on a sounder basis of the postal stages system ³). Of course for the moment the very first thing to do was to round up Blo-bzañ-bkra-śis and his accomplices. As a matter of fact this had already been done; but, as the news had not yet reached the capital, the emperor organized the hunt in a thorough manner. Above all, he was bent on precluding to the criminals all possibilities of escape to Dsungaria. Chi-shan, who was then in command at Hsining, was to take particular care of the matter ⁴). A circular letter was also sent to the chief lamas of Kukunor, instructing them to cooperate with the Chinese authorities ⁵).

During the following days we have a series of edicts to the
Grand Council. They vividly reveal the process of clarification in the emperor’s mind, as he struggled with the Tibetan problems and tried to find a permanent solution for them. Slowly things shaped themselves clearly in his mind. It was now or never; this was a unique occasion for securing the final pacification and submission of Tibet. To reach this goal, advantage could be taken of the presence of the troops who were shortly to arrive in Lhasa. The emperor was under no obligation to Pandita, as his appointment by Fucing as ruler of Tibet had been wholly unauthorized. Pandita showed no particular merits and had failed to rise to the occasion; therefore, he was not particularly deserving of promotion. From the point of view of expediency, the office of ruler of Tibet and the title of wang had outlived their usefulness; there were more drawbacks than advantages in reviving them for the sake of Pandita. Such a sudden and undeserved honour might turn his head and he might even be tempted to follow in the footsteps of aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal. At the utmost, he could be appointed a member of the council of minister (bka'-blon), which it was intended to revive. The emperor awaited proposals from his officials on the spot; but once more he insisted on the necessity of taking the responsibility for the postal system away from the Tibetan government and of placing it under direct Chinese management. A single word from aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal had sufficed for interrupting all communications with Lhasa; at all costs this must not happen again 

Eventually on ting-szü/XI = December 16th the emperor put these thoughts into final shape by a rescript to the Dalai-Lama and Pandita; it was intended as a reply to the detailed report which they had forwarded to court. In this rescript the emperor recounted his past benefits to P'o-lha-nas and the shocking misdemeanours of aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal. He excused with kind but rather contemptuous words Pandita’s failure to rescue the ambans, and courteously but firmly refused to sanction his appointment as wang and ruler of Tibet. Two bka'-blon were to be nominated, one of whom was to be Pandita and the other was to be selected by Ts'e-rin acting in consultation with the Dalai-Lama. These bka'-blon were to be subordinate to the Dalai-Lama and to conduct the government of

1) Besides the two documents quoted above (p. 203 n. 3), see Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 377, ff. 8a-10b, 12a-15b.
Tibet in agreement with the ambans. While this new council was to be responsible for the general administration, some matters were to be exclusively reserved to the judgement of the ambans, viz. the drafting and forwarding of official correspondence to Peking, the commissariat arrangements for the garrison, the supervision of the mail stages etc. The rescript closed with exhortations to loyalty and the request for a pledge of immediate compliance 1). An explanatory instruction to the ambans advised them not to allow Pandita any influence in the choice of the second bka’-blon, but either to leave the selection to the Dalai-Lama, or to effect it themselves from among the noblest families of the country 2).

In the meantime the emperor received the much gratifying report that Blo-bzaṅ-bkra-sis and his accomplices had been arrested by Pandita, and that everything was quiet in Lhasa. Accordingly, Ts’e-riin could advise the emperor to give up the planned expedition and to limit the force proceeding to Lhasa to a bare 800 men, who were amply sufficient for the purpose. The emperor agreed that a large force was useless, and ordered Ts’e-riin to march to Lhasa with the number of men proposed by him. He was to act there in concert with Bandi, rNam-rgyal and the vice-president Chao-hui, who shortly before had been sent to join him. Thus a commission of four members was formed under the chairmanship of Ts’e-riin, with the task of giving effect to the reorganization sketched out by the emperor’s edicts. As to Yüeh Chung-ch’i, for the moment being he was to remain at Ta-chien-lu with his division, to act as reserve and support 3).

On ting-mao/XI = December 26th the emperor addressed another edict to the Dalai-Lama and Pandita, praising them for the quick arrest of Blo-bzaṅ-bkra-sis. He informed them of his new military dispositions and reassured them about the intentions of Ts’e-riin and his small army. He announced also the despatch of some (rather paltry) presents, to be brought to Lhasa by Ts’e-riin. The

1) Kao-tsong Shih-lu, ch. 377, ff. 15b-19a. This document was deemed so important in Tibet, that it is included in full in LSDL, ff. 379a-381b. It is a rare example of faithful literal translation of an official document from the Chinese (or rather from the Manchu) into Tibetan. It offers considerable lexicographic interest because of the Tibetan words chosen for expressing the technical terms of Chinese and Manchu chancery.


arrested criminals must be held for judgement by the imperial commissioners. The greater culprits were to be executed, the lesser ones to be dealt with leniently. As for the stolen money, the emperor was content with what had been already recovered, and condoned the balance 1).

The imperial orders were duly executed. Yüeh Chung-ch'ü took position at Ta-chien-lu with 200 men, and Ts'ê-riin set out with 800 men; both commanders began arranging for the gradual building up of the new Lhasa garrison, whose strength was fixed at 1500 2). One modification was made to the scheme: the number of the bka'-blon was increased from two to four, in order to diminish proportionately the individual power of each. This was the sequel to a protest voiced by a sde-pa (district governor) of gTsan against too much power being allowed to Pandita, who was not popular in that region. The sde-pa was reassured on that score and was commanded to keep the populace quiet 3).

At this point things took a slightly different course owing to the fiery energy of Bandi. This rash old warrior had arrived in Lhasa, practically alone, on the 21/XII = January 19th, 1751. He at once began investigating the matter, without waiting for the arrival of Ts'ê-riin and of the other commissioners. We can surmise with all certainty that he had never received the news of the latters' appointment. Bandi sent to court a full report of the happenings of the 13th of November, and this report represents one of our major sources on the event. Then he took over from Pandita the persons of Blo-bzan-bkra-sis and of twelve other rebel leaders. He questioned them severely, employing torture. The confessions, which he extracted from them, implicated 14 other ringleaders. Their trial was summary, if indeed any took place. Randi did not lose time; only four days after his arrival he had finished the investigation of the case. The Dalai-Lama tried in vain to intercede for the accused men. All that he obtained was the release of the small fry. The leaders, of whom none was a man of influence or standing, had to pay with their lives for the death of the ambans 4). On the 25/XII =

1) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 377, ff. 32a-34a. This document too is embodied in a somewhat different version in LSDL, ff. 381b-382b. A similar rescript (not in the Shih-lu) can be found in LSDL, ff. 382b-383a.
2) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 377, ff. 43a, 43b; ch. 378, ff. 4a-6b, 7b-8a.
3) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 378, ff. 6b-7b.
4) LSDL, f. 384a-b.
January 23rd, 1751, Lhasa witnessed another gruesome example of Chinese justice, similar to that of 1728. Blo-bzan-bkra-sis and six other rebel leaders were executed by the slicing process; others were beheaded, others strangled. The heads of the executed men were planted upon poles, for all the populace to gaze upon. The remaining ringleaders were banished and their property was confiscated 1).

This unnecessarily hasty action nearly landed Bandi into trouble. Ts'e-ri'n on his way to Tibet was met in Chaya by a courier from Bandi informing him of the rebels’ execution. Ts'e-ri'n, who was higher in rank than Bandi, took offence at being thus forestalled, and protested to the emperor. At the same time he quickened his pace, taking with him 200 men only and leaving the main body to follow more slowly. He wished to reach Lhasa as soon as possible, in order (as he said in his report) to avoid the possibility of some mistake by Bandi; this concerned mainly aGyur-med-nam-rgyal’s wife and son, whom the emperor had commanded to be sent to the capital. The emperor blamed Bandi for having acted with uncalled-for and unseemly haste; but really it made little difference, because those men were to die in any case; and the breach of discipline was overlooked. But Bandi was to refrain from any more independent action; for the reorganization of the protectorate and the selection of the bka'-blon, the emperor gave strict orders that nothing should be done before all the four commissioners (Ts'e-ri'n, Bandi, rNam-rgyal, Chao-hui) were on the spot. The forms of the execution had been unduly harsh and revolting to Buddhist feelings. The emperor ordered therefore that the Dalai-Lama and the people should be assured that no more executions were intended; the exposed heads of the criminals were to be at once removed 2). It was expedient to maintain the political status-quo unchanged till the final settlement. All encroachments had to be strictly repressed. Thus, when it was reported that Pandita was appointing a new governor to mNA'-ris (the old one had been killed together with aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal) and was granting him the title of juriqtu Taiji, the emperor sternly ordered his representatives to keep Pandita in his place; he was not the ruler of Tibet and had not the power to grant office or rank on his own authority. But the report had been in-

1) Doc. X.
correct, because the title had been granted by the Dalai-Lama, who was fully entitled to do so 1; and the unpleasantness blew over.

On ting-yu/II = March 26th, the court was informed that at last Ts‘e-riṅ had reached Lhasa. He began at once his consultations with Bandi and the Dalai-Lama on the selection of the bka’-blon and with Pandita and the mgron-gñer (secretaries of the council) for the reorganization of the administrative machinery. He awaited the arrival of his other colleagues before submitting definite proposals 2). With Ts‘e-riṅ’s safe and unimpeded arrival to Lhasa, the military situation had been finally clarified. There was no further need of military movements beyond the normal ones, and Yüeh Chung-ch‘i was ordered back from Ta-chien-lu to Szechwan. At the same time a new schedule was approved for the distribution of the Chinese garrisons in the troubled and strategically important borderland between Tibet and Szechwan 3).

Chao-hui and rNam-rgyal reached Lhasa with 500 men during the first month (February) of 1751 4). With their arrival the commission was complete and could start its work. The reorganization of the Chinese protectorate in Tibet included two sets of problems: the liquidation of the past and the building up of a new administrative system. As for the first item, the Tibetan “kingdom” had disappeared with aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, leaving behind few regrets and no particular institution to be done away with. It had used the machinery of government which it had inherited from the council of 1721-1727, adding nothing of its own. All that remained to be done in this connection was to reward the faithful and to punish the guilty.

As soon as he received the news of the upheaval of November 13th, the emperor had expressed his regrets for the death of the two ambans. At first, he felt rather irritated because they had really acted against the letter, if not the spirit, of his orders. But soon he reached a better appreciation of their devoted sacrifice; and then his gratitude showed itself in a truly imperial fashion. Fucing and Labdon were postumously created earls’ (po), and their descendants were given the hereditary rank of viscounts.

2) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 383, f. 23a-b.
4) ATTL, f. 98a.
Their families were granted a substantial allowance. A temple commemorating their sacrifice was erected in Peking. Their names were also entered for worship in the Hall of Eminent Statesmen and in the Hall of the Zealots of the Dynasty. Their remains were sent home with the highest honours, the Dalai-Lama himself giving a parting audience to the *bičāci* in charge of the transport. The room in the *K'rom-gzigs-k'ān*, in which they had perished, was transformed into a worship-hall dedicated to their memory 1).

Concerning the punishment of the guilty, among the Chinese the worst offender was undoubtedly the emperor himself, whose blindness to facts and ill-conceived and weak measures were not a little to blame for what had happened. Such as things were, a scapegoat had to be found, and it was quite easy to get one. Chi-shan was now taken to account for his hesitations and his intimacy and good relations with *aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal* during his period of office in Tibet. He was recalled to court and tried on these charges. On *i-ch’ou/III* = April 23rd, 1751, he was sentenced to imprisonment awaiting execution. In remembrance of his previous faithful services, the emperor graciously permitted him to commit suicide 2).

In Tibet itself, after Bandi had liquidated the men responsible for the uprising, the next people due for punishment were, according to Chinese ideas, the relatives of *aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal*. At first the emperor had ordered the execution of *aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal*’s wife and of his son Dar-rgyas-tse’-rin and the confiscation of their estates, which were to be appropriated for the maintenance of the ambans 3. Later imperial instructions went into details: *aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal*’s property was to be surveyed. All that he had unlawfully appropriated for himself, must be given back to the original owners; foremost under this item was the property plundered from Pandita. As Ye-šes-ts’e-brtan’s innocence was now fully established, his son *aGyur-med-dbaṅ-rgyal* was to be given the title of duke (*kung*), the nominal governorship of mNa’-ris and the estates which he should have inherited from his father and which had been seized by *aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal*. But this did not

---

1) Kao-tsung *Shih-lu*, ch. 376, fl. 32a-33a; ch. 377, fl. 1b-5a, 7b, 7b-8a, 37b; ch. 387. f. 14a. Wei-tsang *4’ung-chih*, ch. 13a, f. 10b. Ch’ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 9a, LSDL, f. 384b. Hummel, p. 250. The *K’rom-gzigs-k’ān* was repaired by Fu-k’ang-an in 1793; Jametel, Inscription commémorative etc., p. 451.

2) Kao-tsung *Shih-lu*, ch. 382, ff. 14a-15a; ch. 385, fl. 12b-14a.

3) Kao-tsung *Shih-lu*, ch. 376, ff. 33a-35b; ch. 377, fl. 8a-10b.
mean the resurrection of the semi-independent governorship of mNa²-ris; the young duke was required to reside permanently in Lhasa, while the actual government of mNa²-ris was entrusted to loyal officers selected by the Tibetan council and responsible to them. Only aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal’s private property was confiscated for the use of the ambans. His family was no longer to be executed, but merely to be sent to the capital 1).

But at this point a most important discovery put the seal on the fate of these unhappy people. It came to light that aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal had been in correspondence with the Dsungar ruler, to whom he had sent presents and letters requesting military help. The Dsungars were asked to send secretly some troops with cannon to Tibet; they should enter gTsan unobtrusively, where they would be enrolled in the official list among the local nomads, till the moment came for action 2). aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal’s messengers were caught on their return to Lhasa, and the proofs of the conspiracy fell into the hands of the Chinese. They had already more than suspected such a thing, because shortly before his end aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal had boasted of his connections with the Dsungars and of the help they were going to give him for the extermination of the Chinese. The full rigour of Chinese law then fell on the doomed family. The execution of Dar-rgyas-ts’e-rin and of his mother was ordered 3). The estates of P’o-lha and Rin-c’en-rtse were confiscated, and their revenue (2600 taels yearly) was henceforward to be paid into the Tibetan treasury. The emperor did not think it fit to appropriate it for the use of the ambans, except for 500 taels set apart for the supplies of the garrison of Lhasa 4). On the request of the Dalai-Lama, the estates seized by aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal from the native nobles were restored to their owners 5). Some of the dependencies of P’o-lha, such as Šel-dkar-k’ul-mk’ar and sTag-rtse sKul-sgrub, were later given back to the young duke aGyur-med-dbaṅ-rgyal 6). But P’o-lha itself, the ancient seat of the family, was lost forever to the descendants of P’o-lha-nas.

2) Ch’ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 9a.
3) Ping-shén/II = March 25th, 1751; Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 383, ff. 7a-8b; cfr. also ch. 386, f. 23a-b. Shéng-wu-chi, ch. 5, f. 13b.
4) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 385, ff. 14a-b, 14b-15b.
5) LSDL, f. 383b.
6) 10th month = November 1751. LSDL, f. 401a.
The work of the Chinese commission on the reorganization of Tibet resulted in a series of proposals embodied in a long memorial to the emperor. They may be summarized as follows. The council of bka'-blon was to consist of four members. Of these, three were members by right; they were duke Pandita and P'o-lha-nas's old ministers Ts'e-riň-dbañ-rgyal and Sri-gcod-ts'e-brtan, who already held their ranks by Chinese grants. The fourth member of the old council, aBroň-btsan, had become blind and had therefore been dismissed by aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal. As he was unfit for official work, he could not be reinstated. His place was to be taken by a learned lama, to represent the interests of the Church in the council. The bka'-blon must transact business collectively in the council house; any departmental specialization of the single members was strictly prohibited (at least in the first years after 1751). They must employ official staff only, and all private secretaries and other helpers must be abolished. Provincial governors were to be appointed by the Dalai-Lama acting on the advice of the ministers in agreement with the ambans. No absentee governors were to be tolerated (a bad practice which had crept up under P'o-lha-nas). The right of appointment of the heads of monasteries was to rest, as before, with the Dalai-Lama alone, to the exclusion of any other influence. The lower officials to be appointed by the Dalai-Lama; the appointments made by P'o-lha-nas and aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal to be revised and if needs be cancelled. The responsibility of military defence and of maintaining law and order in the provinces was to belong to the mda'-dpon (two in dBus, three in gTsañ) 1); they had the functions of a provincial commander and were appointed by the council, but they held an imperial commission 2). Compulsory labour was to be regulated; in future it was due to the Dalai-Lama alone. 'U-lag service of mail was to be reserved for official communications only, certified as such by a sealed document issued by the Dalai-Lama. None but the Dalai-Lama himself was to control the management of the state granaries. The ąDam Mongols were to be enrolled in a Banner organization and to supply men for the personal service of the ambans.—The emperor sanctioned all these proposals; but he insisted again on the necessity of making

1) We find the "three mda'-dpon" of gTsañ mentioned in ATTL, f. 249a.
2) For a sketchy account of the lower officials of the Tibetan government at the end of the 18th century, see Wei-tsang-t'u-chih, in JRAS 1891, p. 203.
proper provision for the mail service, which was the backbone of the Chinese supervision machinery \(^1\).

Shortly afterwards an additional report was submitted by Tse-riṅ (on \(wu\-\text{yin/IV} = \) May 6th). He confirmed his nominations for membership of the \(bka'-\text{blon}\) council; for the vacant place, he proposed the name of Bla-ma ṇi-ma-rgyal-mts'an of ḡP′yons-rgyas, till then a clerk (\(rtse\-drui\)) in the offices of the Potala, holding the office of \(mgron\-\text{gner}\) (secretary) \(^2\). The lama had been selected by common agreement of the three \(bka'-\text{blon}\), on the proposal of the Dalai-Lama. The emperor expressed his approval and granted the imperial commission to the new ministers, along with a series of moral instructions, enjoining them to obey the Dalai-Lama and to cooperate loyally with the ambans \(^3\). But the Chinese commissioners had not awaited the imperial sanction before formally appointing the \(bka'-\text{blon}\) to their office. The solemn ceremony of taking office was held on 1/11 = February 26th, with a great festival and amidst the rejoicings of the populace \(^4\). The periodical missions of the Dalai-Lama and of the Tashi-Lama to Peking were regulated according to the old practice \(^5\). The postal service was organized on an autonomous basis, quite independent of the Tibetan authorities \(^6\). Its paramount importance was now clearly recognized, and it was built up so solidly, that it could carry out its work faithfully and reliably until the collapse of the old order of things in China. The commissariat arrangements were duly cared for \(^7\), and regulations were framed for the commercial traffic with Szechwan \(^8\). The strength of the Lhasa garrison was settled at 1500. Lastly, it was prescribed that henceforward no Tibetan could be granted the titles of Khan, \(wang\) or \(beise\) \(^9\).

With the laying down of this series of regulations, the task of the Chinese commission was at an end. Immediately, afterwards Ts'e-riṅ and Chao-hui took their leave from the Dalai-Lama and left

---

\(^1\) Doc. XI.  
\(^2\) Died in 1767; \(ATTI\), f. 265b.  
\(^3\) Doc. XII; \(LSDL\), f. 386a; Klon-r dol, vol. 'A', ff. 16b and 18a.  
\(^4\) \(LSDL\), f. 387a.  
\(^5\) \(Kao-tsung Shih-lu\), ch. 387, ff. 4b-5a. Rockhill in \(JRAS\) 1891, p. 205.  
\(^6\) \(Kao-tsung Shih-lu\), ch. 387, f. 5a-b; ch. 388, ff. 1b-2b, 2b-3a.  
\(^7\) \(Kao-tsung Shih-lu\), ch. 387, ff. 24b-25a.  
\(^8\) \(Kao-tsung Shih-lu\), ch. 397, ff. 33b-34a.  
\(^9\) \(Sheng-wu-chi\), ch. 5, f. 13b.
Lhasa with part of their forces, while Bandi and rNam-rgyal took over their duties as regular ambans

In all these proceedings the sovereignty of the Dalai-Lama is always understood, but nowhere expressly affirmed in the Chinese documents. The bka'-blon must report to the Dalai-Lama, must obey him, but nowhere in the Chinese documents are we told in so many words that the Dalai-Lama has been recognized as ruler of Tibet. The reason is that the Chinese believed that they were merely restoring the regime which had existed in the time of the Fifth Dalai-Lama, but had fallen in abeyance in the times of Lha-bzan Khan, Po-lha-nas and Gyurmed-rnam-rgyal. No formal appointment was therefore needed. And indeed the official proclamation of the new government in Lhasa merely stated the fact that “the Dalai-Lama is the ruler of Tibet”, and that the bka'-blon must obey him, as it had been the rule since the times of the Fifth Dalai-Lama

The act was thus conceived as a restoration of ancient rights, not as a new organization. Whether this belief was correct or not, must be left for discussion later on.

To close the tale, we must still speak of the part played by the Dsungars in the whole affair. Their decaying state, already on the verge of dissolution, was then ruled by Bla-ma Dar-rgyas (1750-1753). The Dsungar kingdom was now but a shadow of its great past, and was no longer in a condition to carry out an aggressive policy towards China. But its ruler, although fully occupied with the caotic conditions in the interior, continued to try his intrigues in Tibet whenever the occasion presented itself. The ineptness of such a policy becomes clear if one thinks that the Dsungars were absolutely unable to back their intrigues with the force of arms. Gyurmed-rnam-rgyal’s approaches were welcome to Bla-ma Dar-rgyas; but the catastrophe in Lhasa was so sudden, that it crushed any hope that he may have entertained in that direction.

The Dsungars then turned their attention to the extreme West of Tibet. On *i-hai* = March 4th, 1751, news reached Peking that

---

1) *LSDL*, f. 387b. Bandi was replaced in the 5th month of the same year 1751 by the brigadier-general rDo-rje; *Wei-tsang-Iung-chik*, ch. 9, f. 12a. Actually he did not leave Tibet until the 9th month of 1752; *LSDL*, f. 411a; *ATTL*, f. 108b. rNam-rgyal was replaced in the 7th month of 1752 by the brigadier-general Shu-ch‘un; *Wei-tsang-Iung-chik*, loc. cit. He left Lhasa towards the end of the year; *LSDL*, f. 417a.

2) *LSDL*, f. 386b.

3) For the last years of the Dsungar kingdom see Courant, pp. 97-114.
the king of Ladakh had reported to Lhasa that Dsungar merchants had reached Ladakh from Yarkand and had inquired about the Dalai-Lama, the Tashi-Lama and general conditions in Tibet. The emperor at once ordered precautions to be taken in mNa3-ris, not against any military danger, which was no longer feared, but against penetration of Dsungar emissaries and propagandists from the north-west 1). The real explanation of this move by the Dsungars was given by the intercepted letters of aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal; he had invited the Dsungar ruler to send troops to Ladakh, in order to threaten Tibet from that side 2). Again on i-hai/XI = December 29th, 1751, the king of Ladakh reported that Dsungar envoys had interviewed him, inquiring about conditions in Tibet and requesting the king to give them some lamas for the temples in Ili,—the usual request of the Dsungars for the last twenty years. The king informed the Dalai-Lama and the ambans, who replied with a request to keep them informed of any further move 3). The Dsungars evidently soon perceived that nothing could be done in that direction, and these feelers were not followed up, owing also to the heavy precautions which the Chinese had taken in the meantime on the roads leading from Tibet to Dsungaria 4).

Once again, for the last time in history, the Dsungar ruler appealed directly to the emperor, repeating the same requests as in 1750, viz. permission to send an embassy to Tibet and to fetch some lamas to Ili. The Chinese reply was somewhat less uncompromising than in 1750. Of course no embassy to Tibet was allowed. The emperor maintained his useless offer to have Dsungar lamas trained in the Tibetan monasteries of Peking and Jehol. But he yielded to a personal entreaty of the Dsungar envoy to the extent of giving permission for four or five learned lamas from Tibet to betake themselves to Ili, to hold there courses of higher Lamaistic studies; but after some years they were to return home 5). We do not know whether this concession was really carried into practice; in any case, it was a big exception to the stern rule which had been enforced, viz. the absolute prohibition of any contact between Dsungars and Tibetans 6). And this is the last of the troubled Dsungar-

1) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 382, ff. 9a-10a.
2) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 386, f. 23a-b.
3) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 402, f. 12a-b.
4) Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 388, ff. 7a-8a, 9a-b.
6) Shêng-wu-chi, ch. 5, f. 13b.
Tibetan relations, so often looming in the background during this period. Six years more, and the Dsungar kingdom and nation had become a thing of the past. Dsungaria passed forever out of Tibetan politics, leaving the field undisputed to the Chinese.

How are we to understand the events of 1750? There are several factors which must be kept in view. In 1750 there was no civil war as in 1727/8, but the suppression of a too powerful and unreliable protegee by the Chinese representatives. What followed was more in the nature of an outbreak of town violence and rowdyism than of a revolt. But there is no doubt that the prompt and ruthless action of Fucing and Labdon prevented a serious revolt. ążGyur-med-rnam-rgyal intended to rebel against China and had made all preparations towards this end. Of course the ultimate Chinese victory was beyond doubt, but it would have meant a long, arduous and very costly campaign. Thanks to the self-sacrifice of the two ambans, Chinese protectorate over Tibet was finally consolidated without need of military action.

And thus we perceive that the upheaval of 1750 is utterly different from that of 1727/8. Then we had a war between two opposite Tibetan parties, with Chinese armed intervention at the end, and the establishment of the permanent and hereditary authority of a lay ruler. In 1750 we have the ruler, in peaceful and secure possession of sovereignty, planning revolt against the irksome Chinese tutelage. This time, we see no more Tibetans against Tibetans, but Tibetans (or rather one Tibetan) against Chinese. In the background hover the Dsungars, pledged allies of the intended rebel; and this time it is the real thing, they are not merely a propaganda slogan as employed by the Chinese for justifying their intervention of 1728. The swiftness of the repression did not allow the Dsungars time for setting their troops in motion. But it is also much open to doubt whether they still had the means of organizing an expeditionary force on the scale of that led by Tsė-riṅ-don-grub in 1717.

The plot failed mainly because of the shortcomings of ążGyur-med-rnam-rgyal himself. Although we must concede that he had some talent for organization, ążGyur-med-rnam-rgyal was no P'o-lha-nas. He lacked the ability and perseverance of his father, and had disgusted the nobility, the clergy and the common people by his oppressive rule. He had only the revered memory of his father to support him. His fall showed that his seemingly unassailable power
was hollow and rotten to the core. After he had allowed himself to be forestalled by the Chinese, his murder caused no natural reaction, except the purely local outburst in Lhasa, organized and led by his small personal retinue. Nobody among the great nobles in Tibet ever dreamt of attempting to place aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal’s young son on the throne of his father and grandfather. The times of the old kings, and even of the P‘ag-mo-gru rulers, had passed forever; in Lamaistic Tibet a lay dynasty had now become an anachronism, impossible to maintain in the long run. That of P‘o-lha-nas had been the last attempt of this kind; but it reposed on nothing more than the outstanding merits and cleverness of a single man. It was the last effort, made by a member of the old aristocracy, to build up a national state. P‘o-lha-nas was not supported by his fellow nobles; his son was even worse off, as he had antagonized them. And thus the structure, which P‘o-lha-nas had built, collapsed like a house of cards, leaving the field clear for the natural factors of Tibetan politics in the 18th century: the spiritual power of the dGe-lug-pa sect and the military force of the Manchu emperors. In that moment and for a long time afterwards they needed each other, and the result was that curious and unique form of dual government, which lasted without serious challenge till the crisis of 1904-1912.
CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE ADMINISTRATION OF TIBET DURING THE FIRST HALF-CENTURY OF CHINESE PROTECTORATE

In dealing with the administrative organization of Tibet, we must of course distinguish between the Tibetan government and the Chinese supervising bodies.

I—The Tibetan government

To give an account of the Tibetan government between 1705 and 1751, we meet with a difficulty concerning the theoretical foundations of the state: it is difficult to give a satisfactory solution, according to our Western ideas, of the question of the headship of the Tibetan state. The only way of throwing light upon this problem lies through a detailed enquiry into the true character of the highest offices of the state.

As for the lower sections of the administrative machinery, on which the information available is rather scanty, they remained throughout this period much the same as they had gradually come into existence during the preceding century.

We shall now proceed to examine one by one the principal organisms of the Tibetan government.

A—The Dalai Lama

The temporal rights of the Dalai-Lama go back to the donation made in 1642 by the Qoṣot ruler Guṣri Khan to the Fifth Dalai-Lama. Its terms are not very clear, at least not from our Western point of view. So much is sure, the donation recognized to the Dalai-Lama the undisputed supremacy over the Tibetan church. It placed also all the resources of the state at his disposal for the purpose of

furthering the welfare of the Lamaist religion, through the grant of sovereign rights over the 13 provinces (k’ri-skor) of Tibet.

At that time the Dalai-Lama was not equipped with the proper machinery for undertaking the actual administration, nor possessed an adequate military strength of his own to give it a solid backing. Perhaps also it was not expected of a holy personage of such a high standing that he should directly concern himself with administrative work 1). It was on these considerations that the office of sde-srid was created, to carry on the government of the country; the only temporal right reserved to the Dalai-Lama was to decide the appeals brought before him against the judicial decisions of the sde-srid 2). But only a few years afterwards the Fifth Dalai-Lama asserted his capacity and willingness to carry on a personal government, by appointing the sde-srid at his will for rather short terms (a nominal right of confirmation remaining with the Qōsot Khan), by closely controlling him, and quite often by taking direct action without reference to the sde-srid. When the Dalai-Lama in his old age left the reins of the government in the trusted hands of his son Saṅsr-gyas-rgya-mts’o (1679), the above-sketched process underwent an involution, and the Dalai-Lama seemed once more to drop out of active politics. The personality of the Sixth Dalai-Lama was certainly not made for stopping this development; that gay toper was more than content to leave the worries of government to the experienced sde-srid. But a new principle had been established once and for all, viz. that the Dalai-Lama, besides his undisputed theoretical right of sovereignty, was able and willing to act as the head of the state, if circumstances were favourable.

The catastrophe of 1706 sharply changed the situation, and the factual conditions of the Dalai-Lama in the following 45 years influenced also his political status. From 1706 to 1720 there was a complete eclipse. First the see was practically vacant for several years, because the puppet of Lha-bzan-Khan, unrecognized by the greater part of the church, enjoyed no authority whatsoever, not even in the spiritual sphere. Then for three years the Dsungars maintained the fiction of governing in the name of an absent Dalai-Lama. All this completely ruined his temporal prospects.

---

1) This dislike was still felt even in the present century. Bell, The Religion of Tibet, Oxford 1931, p. 191.
2) Rappresentanza dei Padri Cappuccini etc., Rome 1738, p. 27.
When the Chinese installed the Seventh Dalai-Lama in Lhasa (1720), they completely ignored his theoretical rights; neither was he in a position to stand up for their enforcement. The Tibetan government then set up did recognize the religious supremacy of the Dalai-Lama; but politically it was and remained a creation of the Chinese. This is what makes the great difference between the period before 1706 and that after 1720. Before 1706 the government was practically (not so theoretically) appointed by the Dalai-Lama and controlled by him; the long minority of the Sixth Dalai-Lama under the tutelage of the sde-srid is an exception in appearance only. After 1720 the government was appointed by the Chinese, and, because of the distance and bad organization, was little or not at all controlled by them. Nevertheless it was to be expected that with the slackness of Chinese supervision and the coming of age of the Dalai-Lama, the latter would have slowly increased his influence; there were several signs pointing that way. But the outcome of the civil war of 1727/8, which was partly also an attempt at restoration of the power of the Dalai-Lama, seemed to ruin forever all his prospects of a temporal rule. Suspected of complicity in the murder of K'ān-c'en-nas, he was exiled to Ka-ta, and all temporal authority became vested in P'o-lha-nas. Even after the Dalai-Lama’s return, he had absolutely no political power and was strictly limited to his religious functions 1). We are justified in saying that the donation of Gušri Khan, unrecognized by the Chinese, lapsed in 1717/20, and that the Dalai-Lama returned to the conditions in which he was in the 16th century: a much respected spiritual chief without a valid title to temporal rule. The events of 1750 and his firm and able handling of the situation offered him a chance of reaching at last that worldly power after which he and his predecessors had striven for some centuries. The Chinese emperor thought it advisable to tacitly recognize the right of the Dalai-Lama to the sovereignty in Tibet. This right was not sanctioned in a formal act,  

1) On this fact both the Chinese and the Italian missionaries agree. A Chinese document of i-ch’ou/XII = January 14th, 1748, states clearly that “the Dalai-Lama presides over Buddhism in the western countries, while P'o-lha-nas governs the Tibetan people”; Kao-tsung Shih-lu, ch. 280, ff. 44-5a. Father Costantino da Loro, in a letter dated Lhasa, September 22th, 1741, writes: “The Grand Lama at present has not the slightest power; he must only attend to the welfare of the living, transferring on them his merits”; Ser. Congressi, vol. 23, f. 110a. For a biographical sketch of Fr. Costantino da Loro, see Cicconi, Il Tibet dagli scritti di un missionario francescano lorese nel secolo 18°, in Atti e memorie del Convegno dei geografi orientalisti, Macerata 1911, pp. 144-151.
but was taken as granted and considered as having been always exercised, even if through deputies. In any case, the year 1751 saw not so much the revival of Gušri Khan's old donation, as the establishment of a quite new title of sovereignty for the Dalai-Lama. And indeed he had become not so much the successor to the power of the Fifth Dalai-Lama, who had controlled the government without actually undertaking it, but the heir, with some limitations, to the sovereignty of P'o-lha-nas; that is, he conducted the government with the assistance of his council, but was in some degree controlled by the Chinese. In 1642 there had been no actual differentiation between religious and political power. In 1706 this distinction was sharply drawn, and the two powers rested in separate hands. In 1751 the two powers were reunited in the same person 1).

The powers of the Dalai-Lama after 1751 are set forth with sufficient clearness in Doc. XI and in the Wei-tsang-t'u-chih. They were considerable, because every important decision of the ministers must be referred to the Dalai-Lama for his sanction; the appointments of the district governors, provincial commanders and officers of the army were made by him on the proposal of the council and with the approval of the ambans. On the other hand, he could act only through the medium of the council of bka'-blon. But this system of government was organized in such a way that it allowed ample scope for the energy and enterprise of the Dalai-Lama, particularly if Chinese supervision was inefficient. What an energetic pontiff could do under this system, without substantially modifying it, is shown by the life work of the Thirteenth Dalai-Lama.

1) This development and changing conditions of the powers in Tibet did not pass unperceived by the keen intelligence and great experience of the members of the Congregation of Propaganda Fide in Rome, who from the letters despatched by the Lhasa missionaries drew nearly the same conclusions as I have. In the archives of Propaganda Fide (Scr. Congress, vol. 22, ff. 196-218) there is extant the minute (in Italian) of a memorial sent by Cardinal Belluga to the king of Spain in order to obtain from him funds for the Tibetan mission. The situation in Tibet is summarized as follows (ff. 198b-199b): "Before 1720 Tibet belonged to the Grand Lama, both in the spiritual and in the temporal. He appointed a man with the title of king (the Qöṣot Khan) to defend the realm, giving him powers over everything connected with military affairs, with the faculty of appointing the officers of the army. He appointed also another man to act as his vice-gerent (the sde-srid) to govern the whole kingdom in his name, in respect of both civil and political affairs, with his council of state composed of four persons .... In 1721 the emperor placed on the throne a Tibetan, giving him complete powers in things temporal, which earlier belonged to the Grand Lama, and left to the latter the spiritual power only, with the revenues sufficient for his support".
B — The Qośot Khan

Guśri Khan conquered Tibet with his own forces and gave it as a gift to the Fifth Dalai-Lama. His position henceforward was that of a “defender of the faith”, i.e. he had the responsibility of the military defence of Tibet and of the protection of the Dalai-Lama. The army and everything connected with it were in the exclusive charge of the Khan. Though Guśri Khan and his successors were not in permanent residence in Lhasa, we see them intervening personally every time a danger from outside is threatening the Tibetan government. Apart from this, they did not interfere with the government. Even the appointment of the sde-srid, at first a right belonging to them, soon slipped out of their hands. Their relations with the Dalai-Lama in this period were somewhat indefinite. They were not his subordinates; they could not dictate their policy to him. Theirs was rather the position of a powerful ally, not that of a protecting power in the modern sense.

When Lha-bzañ Khan carried out his coup in 1705/6, he took over all the powers formerly belonging to the sde-srid. In his double capacity as political and military chief, he was to all purposes the absolute ruler of Tibet; the Dalai-Lama was a puppet in his hands and the Chinese emperor only a benevolent and distant ally. Thus he wielded such power as not even Guśri Khan had ever enjoyed. It looked like the establishment of an absolute and hereditary Mongol monarchy in Tibet. But the Dzungar storm shattered at one blow the Qośot power. The reason for this is that the basis had become too slender for supporting such a far-reaching policy. We must remember that about 1660 the two sons of Guśri Khan had divided the heritage, the elder soon keeping the Kukunor territories along with the greater part of the clansmen, and the younger inheriting his father’s rights in Tibet and the headship of the remaining clansmen 1). When the storm broke out, the Qośots under Lha-bzañ Khan were too few to oppose effective resistance to the invader, and their power was easily crushed beyond possibility of redress.

C — The regent

Under this title I gather two distinct though related offices:

the sde-srid of 1642-1706 and the "king" of 1728-1750. Enough has already been said of the character of both. The sde-srid was originally only an official (though the highest in the state) appointed by and depending from the Qosot Khan at first, and later from the Dalai-Lama. During the Fifth Dalai-Lama's old age and the Sixth's minority, Sans-rgyas-rgya-mts'o gathered all power in his hands and made his office the actual head of the state, practically uncontrolled and acting quite on his own authority even in matters of foreign policy 1). But this disproportionate increase of the sde-srid's authority depended merely on the overpowering personality of its holder and on the non-entity of the Dalai-Lama; it can be doubted whether it would have survived the death of Sans-rgyas-rgya-mts'o. Such as it was, Lha-bzang Khan cut short to the importance of the office. The sde-srid appointed by him after the murder of Sans-rgyas-rgya-mts'o was a mere tool in his hands, and after some months the office was abolished altogether.

The office of sa-skyon filled by sTag-rtse-pa under Dzungar occupation was closely connected with that of sde-srid, but had not by far the same importance. It enjoyed little authority, and the country was ruled, or rather ruthlessly kept in submission, directly by the Dzungar commander.

In 1721 the Chinese refused to reestablish the post of sde-srid, which reminded them of Sans-rgyas-rgya-mts'o's unfriendly policy towards them during the nineties of the 17th century. It is true that the president of the council of ministers was given the title of sde-srid by the people, but his office bore quite a different character, as he was only a primus inter pares.

The new regent appointed, or rather recognized, by the Chinese in 1728 bore after 1740 the title of wang, or "prince" for the Chinese, but "king" for the European missionaries. And a king in truth he was. Po-lha-nas and after him aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal exercised their power in their own name and authority, without reference to the Dalai-Lama. The Chinese supervision was merely nominal; it was non-existent in internal affairs and limited itself to the control of external relations. The rule of the regent was absolute. The council of ministers had sunk to a mere executive organ, and the provincial administration was controlled by the nominees of the

regent. The right to 'u-lag, or compulsory transport service for government officials, had become a monopoly of the regent. The aristocracy was repressed and kept strictly under control. As the office was hereditary, none of the conditions for the continuance of a royal dynasty were lacking; the Chinese would perhaps have placed it under stricter control, but certainly would not have abolished it. But aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal's folly destroyed the work of P'o-lha-nas. The office and the title were done away with, never to return again.

The "regents" (rgyal-ts'ab) that we meet again in Tibetan history 1), represent no permanent office, but, like the regents in European monarchies, they manage the government of the Dalai-Lama during the latters' minority; they were mostly high dignitaries of the church. When the Dalai-Lama came of age at 18, the office of regent naturally ceased. This is the reason why more than one regent was tempted to poison the Dalai-Lama before he reached his 18th year, in order to perpetuate his own authority. But these officials were only a sort of temporary caretaker of the Dalai-Lama's sovereignty, and enjoyed no independent authority.

D — The council of bka'-blon

The executive duties under the head of the state, whoever he might be, were performed by a council of four ministers called bka'-blon. This council is known to have existed between 1642 and 1705/6, but we hear very little about its activity. Under Lha-bzan Khan it enjoyed little standing or power, and as a matter of fact is never mentioned in Tibetan or Chinese sources. But we know from the Breve Relazione of Fr. Domenico da Fano that during the period 1707-1711 the council existed and was composed of four Mongol faisang, to the exclusion of Tibetans. Their main functions seem to have been judicial 2).

The council was renewed by the Chinese in 1721, but was given a very different character. Its status was no longer that of an ad-

1) E.g. the lama De-mo Nag-dbañ-ajam-dpal, who with the title of srid-skyon or rgyal-ts'ab held office from 1757 to 1777 during the minority of the Eighth Dalai-Lama a Jam-dpal-bde-legs-rgya-mts'o.

2) "When the king is absent, there are four princes with the title of Ciesani, who govern the country; these are at present Tartars". Scr. Congregaz., vol. 591, f. 205b. This important passage, as well as the following concerning the judicial organization, have been omitted by Fr. Da Terzorio in his edition of the Breve Relazione (In India e nel Tibet, pp. 142-173).
ministrative body, but it ranked as the head of the state; it was a sort of collective praesidium (as in the Soviet constitution) or directory (as in the French constitution of 1795), with no authority superior to it, except for loose Chinese supervision. Its composition had also changed. The members were no longer Qūsot chiefs or Tibetan professional officials accustomed to routine work under the superior direction of the head of the state; they were great Tibetan nobles, hereditary chiefs of districts, each of whom cared above all for his own territory and considered the council only as the fighting ground for his personal ambitions, not as a living organism. This change in character was much for the worse. Free from efficient supervision and unaccustomed to team work, the members soon ceased to function collegiately, and each of them acted for himself, not departmentally but territorially. If this council had lasted, it would have dissolved Tibet into a loose federation of feudal states. But the result of the struggle in its midst was its utter collapse and the civil war of 1727/8.

The council as reconstituted in 1728 had again a different character. Composed at first of two members, then of three, then once again of four, it was the executive organ of the regent. Its members were at first trained professional officials, who came from the finance department or from other public offices. Its authority was at first limited to dBṣus, gTsaṅ being placed under the direct administration of the ruler. When the council was expanded, the representatives of the old territorial aristocracy found again their entrance in it; probably about the same time its authority was tacitly extended to gTsaṅ. These ministers can scarcely be said to have formed a council. Each bka'-blon was in charge of a department of the administration (the texts do not give particulars on this score) and was responsible directly to the “king” and not to the council as a whole. In the last part of P'o-lha-nas’s reign the ministers even ceased to hold regular meetings in the council house, each bka'-blon transacting his official business at his home and reporting directly to the “king”. It was a state of affairs which reminds us vaguely of the U.S.A. cabinet.

The council of 1721 had been too powerful. After it was smashed, the Chinese court went to the opposite extreme, and the council of 1728 was again, as under Lha-bzaṅ-Khan, a shadowy body unable to check or restrain the power of the “king”. It was only in 1751
that the just balance of powers was found. The personnel of P'o-lha-nas's and aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal's council was taken over by the Chinese, as they had taken over Lha-bzañ Khan's officials in 1721; in their dependencies the Chinese always stood for continuity of the tradition. But the nature of the council changed again. By law, the number of members was fixed at four. The Chinese insisted on its resuming the character of a collective body. It was to meet in the council-house and all decisions were to be taken by common agreement and under common responsibility; no departmental specialisation was allowed. The character of the council as a committee of professional administrators was on the whole maintained, although it was not always possible, specially under minorities of the Dalai-Lama, to avoid its being influenced by the most powerful noblemen. On the whole the council, or bka'-s'ag as it is usually called, may remind us of a Western European council of ministers, and the more so since in the course of time a measure of departmental specialisation had been gradually established. It has served its purpose remarkably well and has maintained its character for 200 years to this day.

The highest officials under the council seem to have been in this period the mgon-gñer. But of their functions we know nothing; we may only surmise that they were charged with transmitting the orders of the council and supervising their execution 1).

In the same way little is known about the several departments of the central government during these years. We only have some scattered information about the judiciary, the finance department, the army, the 'u-lag and postal service, and the provincial government.

E — J u d i c i a r y

On the organization of Tibetan justice the Tibetan texts are nearly silent. According to the Wei-tsang-t'ù-chih, at the head of the judi-

---

1) We know from Fr. Beligatti that there were also some mgon-gñer at the court of the ruler, with the functions of comptrollers of the household (maestri di casa); Magnaghi, p. 70. Fr. Gioacchino da S. Anatolia describes these court mgon-gñer as chamberlains (camerieri); Ragguglio, p. 39. In these functions they were attached also to great personages other than the Dalai-Lama. Fr. Gioacchino da S. Anatolia (letter of September 20th, 1724) mentions a mgon-gñer of the father of the Dalai-Lama; Scr. Congressi, vol. 17, f. 353b.
ciary there was the *nañ-so-p‘yag* ¹). But I never met with such a title in the Tibetan texts of this period.

Fr. Domenico da Fano, writing in 1713, give a sketch of the judiciary under Lha-bzen Khan’s rule. Criminal justice belonged to the council of ministers. Cases in which no capital offence was involved, were heard by a lesser council formed of eight *jaisang*. For civil suits, in Lhasa there was the governor of the town and a law officer with the title of vice-governor. The task of the governor was to examine the cases, to preside over the proceedings and to supervise the execution of the sentence. But death sentences were given by the king alone, or in his absence by the council of ministers ²).

Fr. Orazio della Penna too (pp. 288-289) gives us a short and less clear sketch of judicial organization in 1730. The lowest magistrate were the *mi-dpon* ³), of whom there were three in Lhasa. From their decisions litigants could appeal to the officials whom Della Penna calls “revisors of the cases”; they are identical with, or at least descended from, Domenico da Fano’s college of eight *jaisang*. I suppose these are the magistrates called in the *MBTJ* with the title of *k‘rims-kyi-zal-lce-mk‘an*, judges of the law. From these revisors the appeal went through the council of ministers to the ruler, and in very special cases to the Dalai-Lama. Fr. Orazio seems to make no distinction between civil and criminal cases.

Fr. Cassiano Beligatti does not speak of the judiciary; he merely mentions in passing the three *mi-dpon* of Lhasa, whom he calls *kutubal* (Hind. *kotval*); their retinue included twelve korciapa (*skor-kag-*pa) or policemen ⁴).

Although it is nearly impossible to check the accounts of the Capuchin Fathers with other sources, still, as the authors were eye-witness, we can assume them to be fairly accurate, with due allowance made for possible misapprehensions and inaccuracies.

In the times of the Qosot Khans, judicial power in the provincial towns seems to have been in the hands of a provincial magistrate

¹) *JRAS*, 1891, p. 220; Rockhill wrongly reconstructed the title as *nañ-mdsod-p‘yag.*—We may recall that at the court of the princes of gTsain in the 15th century there was a *nañ-so-cuen-mo*, with the functions of a chief justice; Tucci, *Indo-Tibetica* vol. IV, 11, p. 276; and Tibetan Painted Scrolls, p. 35.

²) Scr. Congregaz., vol. 591, f. 205b. As said above, this passage is missing in Da Terrizio’s edition of *Breve Relazione* of Fr. Domenico.

³) This title means “chief of men” and is applied today to the village headmen. But for the 18th century the Lhasa *mi-dpon* are well attested in the *LSDL* (e.g. f. 498a etc.).

⁴) Magnaghi, p. 93.
But no trace of this office is found after the Dzungar invasion, and in the times of P'o-lha-nas judicial power lay with the civil governor (rdson-dpon). He was assisted by two petty judges called gser-dpon (hsieh-èrh-po-mu 謝爾布木 \(^1\)). The appeal from these tribunals, if allowed, went to the council of ministers at Lhasa.

The law applied in Tibetan courts was the old code traditionally attributed to king Sron-btsan-sgam-po and revised first by Bya'cub-rgyal-mts'an of P'ag-mo-gru and a second time by the Fifth Dalai-Lama and the sde-srid Sa'ns-rgyas-rgya-mts'ö \(^2\). The final edition of this code comprised 41 sections in three volumes \(^3\).

On the practical working of Tibetan justice we are informed by the Italian missionaries and the Chinese documents. In Lhasa the seat of the tribunal was in the buildings alongside the Bla-bran temple. Litigation was discouraged by the parties being compelled to deposit a certain sum with the court; small disputes were therefore usually settled out of court. Criminal law was very severe, even barbarously so. Capital punishment was inflicted for a large number of crimes. Its forms were beheading, drowning, or the brkyan-sin, a square vertical frame crossed by two beams in the shape of an X, to which the culprit was tied and shot at with arrows. Highway robbery with murder was usually punished with the brkyan-sin; for less grave cases there was exile to a fortress in the southern districts, where the criminals invariably died of hunger and thirst in the jails of the governor. Simple robbery was punished by cutting off the right hand, or (in lighter cases) by the bastinado. Adultery was punished by a fine or a whipping; common brawls by a fine. For many other crimes there was imprisonment, of the particularly cruel Tibetan kind; no food and no clothing was provided for the prisoner, who was dependent on the support of his relatives. Private vengeance was strictly forbidden. The fines realized were kept by the mi-dpon, who at the end of each year handed over the total amount to the council of ministers.

---

\(^1\) Fr. Amiot in Mémoires concernant les Chinois, vol. XIV, pp. 142 and 150, and in Eine chinesische Beschreibung von Tibet, p. 22. But perhaps there is a mistake here. On the one side the gser-dpon nowadays are, as indicated by their name, the two superintendents of the state gold-washings. On the other side the Ta-ch'ing i-t'ung-chih (Hangchou edition of 1897), ch. 413, f. 2b, lists the two hsieh-èrh-po-mu among the big officials of the central government.

\(^2\) Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, p. 37.

\(^3\) Wei-tsang-tcu-chih, in JRAS 1891, p. 216.
Procedure was swift and the case was judged at once, normally on the day after its filing. The employment of advocates was permitted, but the time allowed to them for their speeches was severely limited. In civil suits the proofs admitted were written documents or oral witness. In criminal cases ordeal was freely used, mostly by compelling the accused to extract a white stone out of a cauldron of boiling oil, or by licking or grasping a red-hot iron 1).

F — The finance department

The finance department (rtsis-k’aṅ) was given special care. We have already spoken of P’o-lha-nas’s reforms there. Otherwise, for this period we have only stray references in the Tibetan texts, but no direct evidence 2). What we can glean from our texts is this. The department seems to have been under the particular control of one of the ministers. The managing directors were one or more rtsis-dpon (finance director), who often went on tours to control the finances of the provincial governors.

The most important part of the finance department was the central treasury, situated then as well as now in the Bla-braṅ palace; at its head there was one (perhaps more) official called p‘yag-mdsod-pa (treasurer) 3). After the reorganization by P’o-lha-nas, it was a well-arranged establishment, and the accounts were carefully kept on ledgers (deb-t’er) 4).

Of course the autonomous temporal dominion of the Tashi-Lama had a separate financial organization, with its own finance-directors and treasury.

Tibetan finance was then wholly based on natural produce. In this period and for a long time afterwards there were no Tibetan coins. For centuries the only minted metal in circulation had been the rupees coined by the three kingdoms of Nepal (till 1768). The

---


2) The Chinese manual of administration Li-fan-yüan tsé-li 理藩院則例 (edition of 1816) partly translated by Rockhill in JRAS 1891, refers to a later period, after the reforms of 1792. So does ch. 9 of the Wei-tsang-t’ung-chih (on administration).

3) The Bla-braṅ p‘yag-mdsod is mentioned also in LSDL, f. 538b.

4) The treasury and finance offices in the Bla-braṅ are described by Desideri, pp. 135-136. This description still holds good also for modern conditions; Bell, The religion of Tibet, p. 196.
Chinese introduced their silver taels, which soon became very popular 1). But although important for trade purposes, money had little or no importance in the finance administration.

The income was mainly derived from direct taxation. We may safely surmise that, notwithstanding the lapse of years and the many abuses which crept in and which P'o-lha-nas strove to eliminate, the assessment was still based on the general census taken by order of the Fifth Dalai-Lama in 1663. Its results were carefully recorded, and to these records probably refer the mention of 300 ledgers at the time of P'o-lha-nas's reorganization. These ledgers contained also the cadastre or land survey, and all rentals due and changes of property were duly registered in them 2). It seems that in the capital all the ground belonged to the government, and purchases of plots of building land were more in the character of a perpetual lease 3). Monasteries and their property were exempt from taxation. For the remaining population, the tax-paying unit was the t'eb or household (lit. threshold). Each t'eb must pay a fixed contribution yearly (lag-yon, lag-abab), consisting basically of a certain number of k'al (about two pounds) of barley 4). Taxation was always in kind, several other items being accepted instead of barley: cattle, sheep carcasses, cloth, butter, iron, rarely cash. Owing to the exemptions granted to the enormous estates of the monasteries, the tax-paying population was comparatively small and composed of the poorest elements of the people. No wonder that taxation was quite oppressive and that the taxpayers often complained of their unbearable conditions.

The taxes were collected and stored by the provincial governors. Each of them had under him two p'yang-mdsod-pa (treasurers) in charge of finance, customs and public works 5). Once a year the

---

1) Desideri, pp. 173-174. Bogle's Memorandum on the trade of Tibet (of December 12th 1774), in Markham, pp. 128-129; better and more detailed is Bogle's Memorandum on the money and merchandise of Tibet (of April 19th, 1779), published by D. B. Diskalkar, Bogle's embassy to Tibet, in IHQ IX (1933), pp. 431-432.

2) In 1724 the purchase by the Capuchins of a piece of land in Lhasa, for the purpose of building a small convent and a church, was registered in the books (libri camerali) of la varanga (sic, for lavaranga, Bla-braï). Fr. Gioacchino da S. Anatolia's Ragguaglio, p. 10.

3) In a report of the Procurator General of the Capuchins to the Congregation of Propaganda Fide about the financial situation of the mission, dated November 9th, 1730, it is stated that "in Lhasa it is not permissible to sell immovable property, which according to the law of the realm remains as property of the Varanga (Bla-braï), which is like the Reverend Apostolic Chamber in the Church State". Scr. Congressi, vol. 20, f. 286b.

4) Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, pp. 69-70.

5) Fr. Amiot in Mémoires concernant les Chinois, p. 150.
governors transmitted their accounts and the net balance of their revenue to Lhasa.

Another source of income was derived from the custom duties of the various barriers and toll-gates at the frontier. We know these duties to have been heavy and practically left to the will of the custom officers; the letters of the Italian missionaries are full of complaints about the irritating oppressiveness of the customs people, and this in spite of the letters of exemption which the missionaries nearly always obtained from the government. The market duties too yielded a considerable income. Since 1738 a small yearly contribution of 5000 taels was also regularly paid by the Chinese treasury out of the custom revenue of Ta-chien-lu.

The main items of expense, besides the costs of general administration were firstly the subsidies regularly paid to some of the great monasteries, the occasional gifts to sanctuaries or to great lamas, and the sums spent on certain periodical feasts, particularly the great smon-lam festival held yearly at Lhasa during the first fortnight of the first month ¹). Secondly there was (chiefly for the period of P'o-lha-nas's rule) the military expenditure, both for the Tibetan standing army and for the contribution towards the supplies of the Chinese garrison.

G — The army

The Tibetan standing army was created by P'o-lha-nas. Before his time, the Tibetan government had depended on the regional and feudal levies, which were summoned every time an emergency occurred. As a general rule, every five families had to give a soldier for the militia and had to supply him with arms, accoutrements, food and pay. An exception was mNa-ris; in this important strategic region every single family had to give a soldier. The militiamen were gathered together by the provincial governors and assigned to the various corps (infantry and cavalry) according to the financial means of their families. The officers were drawn from the more well-to-do families. The general expenses of the militia were paid by the province to which they belonged. As soon as the war for which they were summoned was over, the militiamen returned to their homes. The higher ranks of the militia were formed by the military

¹) Beligatti gives a detailed account of the enormous expenses of the smon-lam ceremonies. Magnaghi, pp. 80-85.
commander at the district headquarters, with a staff of six subalterns (ldin-dpon). The military commander was equal in rank to the district governor (rdson-dpon). This fact gave origin to the system of dual governorship, which is prevalent today in Tibet. An exception in this organization was again mNa-ris. For military reasons, supreme authority, civil and military, was vested there in only one rdson-dpon. The arms were swords, lances and bows and arrows, with some blunderbusses. The artillery consisted mainly of swivels, though there were some large cannon mounted on carts with large wheels; but their use in open warfare was quite exceptional 1).

The Tibetan militia described above was not very reliable, took time to assemble, was undisciplined and ill-armed and, being composed of husbandmen, could not be kept under arms for any long period. P'o-lha-nas saw the inconvenients of this state of affairs, and after the civil war he began organizing and training a small but efficient professional army of 10,000 horse and 15,000 foot, on which he bestowed much care. Well officered by the most trusted comrades of P'o-lha-nas, men who had proved their mettle in the battles of the civil war, this army soon became a quite respectable force. No part of it seems to have been quartered in or near Lhasa, a town which had already the Chinese garrison to lodge. It was distributed in various provincial garrisons and in great detachments in the northern districts, on the watch against the Dsungars. Its absence from the capital prevented it from taking part in the upheaval of 1750 and saved it from disbandment. But of course the new ecclesiastic government did not bestow on the army the same fostering care as the regent had done, and its efficiency declined; this was sadly experienced during the Gurkha war of 1791/2. To the side of the standing army, the militia organization was of course still maintained.

H—P o s t a l s e r v i c e a n d ґ u - l a g

For the conveyance of travelling officials and of government despatches, the system prevailing in Tibet from olden times was that of the ґu-lag, a word of Turkish origin denoting socage, or

1) Extracts from the Ta-ch'ing i-tung-chih made by Fr. Amiot, depicting conditions about 1740, in Mémoires concernant les Chinois, vol. XIV, pp. 142-143 and 147, and in Eine chinesische Beschreibung von Tibet, pp. 22 and 24. Cfr. also the short account of the Tibetan militia in the time of Lha-bzañ Khan, in Desideri, pp. 175-176.
compulsory labour due by the population to the government. In this case it meant (and still means today) the supplying of porters, drivers and horses or yaks sometimes for quite long periods. As the travelling season coincides with the agricultural season, it meant a heavy burden on the shoulders of the people, who had to give away men and beasts sometimes even for three or four months, just at the time when they were most needed in the fields. Besides being oppressive and irritating, the system was not made for efficiency or speed. In 1729 P'o-lha-nas reformed this service too, on the model of the Chinese mail stages system, which he had seen at work since 1721. The service was entrusted to officers sent from Lhasa and was carried out by means of good horses belonging to the central government. It stretched from Lhasa to mNa-ris on the one hand and to mDo-k'ams on the other 1). This system was expensive, but so efficient that the Chinese entrusted to it the carriage of their own mail. We have seen how this gave origin to a grave inconvenience, viz. that the Tibetan government could stop at will communications between Lhasa and Peking. The Chinese therefore after 1751 resumed their own postal service; P'o-lha-nas's mail disappeared and the Tibetan government again employed the 'u-lag, or else used the Chinese mail, when the ambans chose to authorize it.

'U-lag was also due for public works and for several other purposes. It should have been a service due to the Dalai-Lama alone, but P'o-lha-nas appropriated it more and more for his private use, making money out of it. When Fr. Beligatti journeyed to Lhasa in winter 1740/41, he found that 'u-lag service was granted by P'o-lha-nas to travelling merchants, evidently against payment 2). Of course it was of common occurrence that P'o-lha-nas allowed his favorites to enjoy the same privilege. One of the first thing the Chinese did in 1751, was therefore to remove these abuses. Henceforward and till the present day 'u-lag was only due to officials or other men holding a document to this effect issued case for case by the Dalai-Lama's government, the use of which was strictly controlled 3).

1) MBTJ, f. 326a.
2) Magnaghi, p. 34.
3) Several European travellers have given accounts of 'u-lag travelling arrangements. A graphic description can be read e.g. in chapters 23-25 of Filchner, Om mani padme hum, Leipzig 1929.
I—Provincial government

The government of the districts had been traditionally the right and privilege of the local aristocracy. Even when the political power of the nobles declined, the Lhasa government continued to appoint the local aristocrats to these posts; basing themselves on their private estates, they could be trusted to administer a district more easily and with less expense than a governor sent out from Lhasa. The title of these district governors was sde-pa, and the office not seldom passed from father to son 1). Of course when the central government grew weak, these governors became half independent and acted quite at their own will. Of greater units, in this period there were only three, the governments of dBus (always under direct control of the central government), gTsaṅ and mNa-ris. There were apparently no single officials appointed to control the district governors of the east and north of the country. The district governor was thus the basis of the government machinery outside Lhasa. The Chinese recognized their importance and tried to bring them together to rule the whole country. But this attempt to entrust the biggest provincial rulers with the central government failed lamentably. In the civil war we see gTsaṅ, mNa-ris and the districts of the other regions acting as independent units, forming alliances and raising armies on their own account. This sliding back of Tibet towards the century-old anarchy which had been ended in 1642, was energetically halted by Pho-lha-nas. gTsaṅ he maintained under his personal rule (except for the new temporal rights of the Tashi-Lama), and dBus was governed as before directly from Lhasa. As to the south-eastern, eastern and northern districts, the details of his action against the local governors escape us. The process was very gradual and moderate, and provoked no concerted resistance. Step by step he placed his own men in charge of the districts. As these favourites often preferred to remain in Lhasa, actual government of the districts was carried out by their protegees or even slaves; this made provincial government still more strictly dependent from Lhasa. At the end of his twenty years’ rule, the great provincial lords had disappeared from the scene. Tibet was divided in 23 provinces; of these, 22 were governed by officials appointed by and dependent from the government of Lhasa. The 23rd pro-

1) On the provincial sde-pa see Desideri, p. 173.
vince was represented by the small domain of the Tashi-Lama 1).

It is always difficult to distinguish in our sources between the larger units (what we have called provinces) and the smaller subdivisions (our districts). Probably there never was a sharply-drawn distinction. Moderate-sized provinces would sink to the rank of districts, large provinces would be dissolved and the districts in them would come to depend directly from Lhasa. In the 19th century the only administrative unit was the district, of which in all Tibet there were 53, of very different sizes 2); except for mNa'-ris, there was no trace of something like larger provinces comprising several districts. The present organization of the districts in its broad outlines goes back to the reforming work of P'o-lha-nas, of which the main characteristics were the following. At the head of a district, of which there were thirty in dBus alone, there was a civil governor (rdson-dpon) and a military commander with equal status. The former was exclusively charged with the administrative affairs and with the maintenance of law and order. He was assisted by some lower officials, called (as in the central government) bka'-blon 3). This system then underwent a slow evolution, and nowadays the two governors (both called rdson-dpon), appointed usually for a period of three years, are on a foot of complete equality and the distinction between civil and military has become obsolete.

An exceptional position was, and still is, occupied by mNa'-ris. This great province was a late addition to Tibet (1681) and was still considered as a territory enjoying a special status. Since the times of Lha-bzan Khan, it had been the fief of K'an-c'en-nas and of his brother. About 1730 P'o-lha-nas took it away from the dGa'-bzi family, entrusting it to his elder son Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan. After the death of P'o-lha-nas, the murder of Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan and the end of aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, the Chinese did away with this last remnant of feudal independence, and refused to recognize more than the bare title of duke of mNa'-ris for the son of Ye-ses-ts'e-brtan, without political rights. Still, the administration of mNa'-ris continued to present deep differences from that of the rest of Tibet. In

1) Letter of Fr. Costantino da Loro, dated Lhasa, October 11th, 1741, preserved in the Municipal Library at Fermo. Extracts published by Cicconi, Il Tibet dagli scritti di un missionario francescano lorese nel sec. 18°, in Atti e memorie del Convegno dei geografi orientalisti a Macerata, p. 148.
2) S. Ch. Das, Journey to Lhasa and Central Tibet, pp. 233 and 241.
the four districts which compose the province, there was (and is) no dual government; there is only one *rdson-dpon*, in charge of both civil and military affairs ¹). Over the four *rdson-dpon*, there are at the head of the province two governors called *sgar-dpon* ²). mNa'-ris is thus the only greater province which has preserved its individuality.

As we have seen, the militia depended from the district governors. The standing army instead depended from the central government. There was a moment in which its commanders seemed to be about to become a political power; that was in 1751, when the four *mda'-dpon* (generals) in dBus and gTsan received a greater sphere of influence and seem to have exercised a short of supervision over the local government. But these political powers did not last for long, as it was but natural in a country governed by an ecclesiastic government.

Provincial finance was in the hands of the district governors, who remitted the surplus to Lhasa. The regular control and audit by government accountants appears to be a later institution.

Summing up the changes of the Tibetan government from 1642 to 1751, we may conclude that the *sde-srid* can be counted as the actual head of the state from 1642 to 1705, except in the years from 1655 to 1679, when he sank to a mere puppet whose strings were pulled by the Dalai-Lama. From 1706 to 1717 Lha-bzañ Khan was the absolute ruler of Tibet. Then for three years Central Tibet was under military occupation by the Dsungars. From 1721 to 1727 the supreme power was wielded by the council of ministers under the chairmanship of K'añ-c'en-nas. From 1728 to 1750 we have the hereditary monarchy of P'o-lha-nas and aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal. It is only from 1751 that we may date the actual sovereignty of the Dalai-Lama. This statement may appear to contradict some of the accepted opinions. But I think that in replying in this manner to the question put at the beginning of this chapter, I am expounding the only conclusion we can reach after a careful perusal of contemporary sources.

¹) Fr. Amiot, loc. cit.
²) For present-day conditions in mNa'-ris see Tucci & Ghersi, *Cronaca della Missione scientifica Tucci nel Tibet occidentale* (1933), Rome 1934, p. 251; Tucci, *Santi e briganti nel Tibet ignoto*, Milan 1937, pp. 177-178.
A—The ambassadors

With the solitary exception of Ho-shou, sent out by K'ang-hsi in 1709, there was no permanent representative of the emperor residing in Lhasa till after the conquest of that city by the Chinese in 1720. Even afterwards, the representative was withdrawn in 1723, and during the following four years we find only officials sent to Lhasa on a special mission, but none in permanent residence. The office of the two ambans 1), as it existed till 1912, was established only in 1728. There was a senior and a junior amban, but the distinction has been always a purely formal one, both enjoying in point of fact the same authority. After the death of A-ērh-hsün in 1734, one post remained vacant during the following years, and there was only one amban in Lhasa. It was only in 1748 that the emperor reenforced the old rule, which was then scrupulously observed as long as the office lasted. The first ambans (Señ-ge and Mala) held office for five years, but after them it became the practice, and soon the rule, that an amban should remain in Tibet for a maximum of three years; and sometimes he was recalled home even before the end of his term.

During the rule of P'o-lha-nas and his son, the duties of the ambans consisted mainly in holding the command of the small Chinese garrison, ensuring communications with Peking and reporting to the emperor on the doings of the „King“'. We hear sometimes of their intervention in matters of external relations; but otherwise they never interfered with the Tibetan government 2). In 1751 the powers of the ambans were greatly increased. Besides commanding the garrison and having exclusive charge of the postal service, their advice had to be taken by the council of bka'-'blon on every important affair; this gave them a broad right of supervision on the actions of the government. Still, direct intervention of the ambans in

1) For the meaning and origin of the name, see back p. 74. The Chinese official title was chu-tsang ta-ch'ên 軍藏大臣.

2) Fr. Francesco Orazio della Penna, in his already quoted letter of April 1st, 1740, writes (f. 652b) that the amban “does not interfere on any account with the government of Tibet, but attends only to the command of the Chinese soldiers”. The above quoted letter of Fr. Costantino da Loro, dated Lhasa, April 22nd, 1741, says that the whole kingdom “is subject to the great emperor of China; but he does not interfere on any account with its government, as he has granted its despotic rule to the present king Mivagn Cugiaib (Mi-dbañ sKu-ts'ab)".
administrative work was at first of rare occurrence 1). As a regular practice, it came later, as the result of the reforms carried out in 1792 after the Gurkha war 2).

The staff of the ambans in the period under consideration was not large. It comprised one or two military officers of rank not above lieutenant-colonel, and several jarγući and bitāči. The latter were the writers of the ambans, and it was to them that the clerical work of the residency was entrusted; they also formed the personal suite of all officials sent to bKra-sis-lhun-po to pay homage to the Tashi-Lama. As to the jarγući, the meaning of this name as given by the dictionaries is „judge”. But they hardly can have functioned as such in Lhasa, because there was no independent Chinese judiciary in Tibet during this period. From the Tibetan sources we gather firstly that they were superior in rank to the bitāči and secondly that they were quite often sent out on mission to bKra-sis-lhun-po and elsewhere, when the amban himself preferred to remain in Lhasa. They must have been therefore the Chief Clerks of the Mongolian Office of Rockhill’s sources 3); and their functions were probably those of a secretary to the residency. It was only in 1751 that the offices of the ambans were organized in a proper manner, with the employ of a sufficient number of Manchu banner officers 4).

B — The garrison of Lhasa

A Chinese garrison in Lhasa was first established in 1721, and its commander then carried out the same functions as the ambans after 1728. It was withdrawn in 1723, and permanently reestablished in 1728 after the civil war. In 1748 or 1749 its strength was reduced to a mere skeleton of a few officers and men, but after 1751 it remained till the 20th century a considerable body, numbering (at least on paper) 1500 men. It was composed of Manchu banner-men and Chinese soldiers from the western provinces in varying proportions. At first it was quartered in Lhasa itself, but it was shifted in 1733 to the Grva-bzi barracks north of the town, which remained henceforward their permanent quarters. The garrison was commanded directly by the ambans, but we may suppose that

1) George Bogle writes that the ambans „seldom interfere in the management of the country”. Letter of December 5th, 1774, published by Diskalkar in IHQ IX (1933), p. 424.
2) On the reforms of 1792 see Rockhill, in TP 1910, p. 53.
3) JRAS 1891, p. 238.
4) Ch‘ing-shih-kao, ch. 525 (Fan-pu 8), f. 9b.
the actual command of the force was held by the senior military aide-de-camp to the ambans. The troops were paid by the Chinese exchequer, and the money arrived regularly from China in heavily escorted convoys 1). The supplies were partly purchased on the spot (with funds contributed by the Tibetan government) and partly imported from China 2).

In the period under consideration the garrison was always concentrated in Lhasa. The only exception was the field force of 1500 drawn from the garrison and stationed every summer from 1730 to 1733 in the fortified military zone of the Tengri-nor. It was commanded by officers appointed directly by the emperor, but a right of inspection was reserved to the ambans. Apart from this, there were no other detachments. It was only after 1792 that a small force was permanently stationed at Shigatse, to guard the Tashi-Lama.

C—The Chinese mail service

Immediately after their expedition of 1720 the Chinese organized a postal relay system on their usual model 3) on the Ta-chien-lu—Li-t‘ang—Batang—Lha-ri—Lhasa route. It was based on a series of relay stations, providing food, lodging and fresh mounts for the official couriers. The stages were guarded by Chinese soldiers distributed along the route and based on the two garrisons of Chamdo and Lha-ri. The system ceased to function at the time of the civil war, and in 1728 the Chinese preferred to entrust their communications to P‘o-lha-nas’s newly established mail service; hence the breakdown of 1750. The postal service was reestablished on the old lines in 1751, and functioned remarkably well for a century and a half, even after the old stage system had fallen into decay in China proper with the advent of Western systems of communication.

D—Tibetan affairs at Peking

In Peking Tibetan affairs were at first managed through the Grand Secretariat (nei-ko 内 閣 ). When the Grand Council (chün-chi-chʻu

2) Shêng-tsu Shih-lu, ch. 299, f. 5b.
3) On the Chinese postal service under the Manchu dynasty see Fairbank & Têng. On the transmission of Ch‘ing documents, in HJAS IV (1939), pp. 12-46.
軍機處) was established in 1729, at first with the character of a Bureau of Military Affairs, it took over also the responsibility for Tibetan affairs. The ambans in Lhasa normally corresponded directly with the Grand Council. But in times of crisis they were directed to forward their despatches through the provincial governor of Szechwan. The reason for this seemingly peculiar reason was that any military action in Tibet, if such became necessary, would have to be organized by the Szechwan authorities. It was better therefore that they should possess a direct knowledge of the relevant documents and memorials (of which a copy always remained with them), than if they had to be informed of Tibetan events by despatches sent out from Peking.

Questions concerning Tibetan tribute missions and the trade relations between Tibet and Kukunor-Kansu-Mongolia were treated by the Mongolian Superintendency (li-fan-yüan 理藩院), which seems at times to have had some say also in the appointment of lower officials to Lhasa.
CHAPTER SIXTEEN

CONCLUSION

If we analyse Chinese policy towards Tibet during the reigns of K'ang-hsi, Yung-chêng and Ch'ien-lung (1661-1796), we may divide it into the following periods:

1—Till 1705; this period is characterized by the absence of direct political action in Tibet, the Manchu emperors possessing only that shadowy form of suzerainty, which they inherited from the Yüan and the Ming dynasties.

2—Between 1706 and 1717 K'ang-hsi tried to exercise a protectorate over Tibet without military occupation and (except at the beginning) without a regular resident in Lhasa, banking only on the personal loyalty of his friend Lha-bzan Khan. The year 1710 saw the formal proclamation of the Chinese protectorate.

3—After the Dsungar storm had blown over, from 1721 to 1723 the Tibetan government was supervised by the commandant of the Chinese garrison in Lhasa.

4—From 1723 to 1727 Yung-chêng tried a return to the methods of the second period, withdrawing the troops and leaving the Tibetan government without control.

5—Between 1728 and 1750 the leading ideas of the third period were taken up again, and there were two residents with a garrison; but they had no powers of intervention and their task was only to keep the emperor informed.

6—In 1751 the organization of the protectorate took its final shape, which it maintained, except for some modifications in 1792, till its end in 1912. The ambans were given rights of control and supervision and since 1792 also a direct participation in the Tibetan government.

The Chinese government thus wound their way through several experiments to the only possible form of control over Tibet, the one which was to last for 160 years without serious challenge, and was to disappear only with the collapse of the order of things in China itself.
The intimate political connection established between China and Tibet in the early 18th century favoured of course some degree of reciprocal influence between the civilizations and the ways of life of the two countries. But this opportunity for cultural relations was to a great part nullified by the fact that both the Chinese and the Tibetan civilizations had already reached and surpassed their highest point and had to a great extent crystallized along fixed and immovable lines, beyond any possibility of deep-going changes. This is especially true with regard to religion. Orthodox Confucianism would not and could not possibly seek to establish its influence in Tibet. Lamaism on the other side found much favour at the court of the Manchu emperors. Temples were built, texts were printed, great incarnates were recognized and installed; in short, Peking became what to a small extent it remains to this day: a centre of Lamaism. A most important step in this direction was taken in 1732, when emperor Yung-chêng transformed the palace, where he had lived before ascending the throne, into the Yung-ho kung

The high favour enjoyed during the Yung-chêng and Ch'ien-lung period by the T'u-kuan Qutuqtu and the ICañ-skya Qutuqtu contributed to enhance the position of the Yellow Church. The climax of its ascendancy was marked by the visit of the Third Tashi-Lama to Peking in 1780. But this favour was limited to the court circles and to Peking, Jehol and one or two other places. Lamaism never became popular in wider circles. In China proper it did not penetrate among the common people, being limited to Tibetans, Mongols and perhaps some Manchu. As to the Confucianist ruling class, it was as contemptuous and coldly hostile towards Lamaism as towards every other foreign religion.

Nor can we speak of any appreciable mutual influence of the two literatures. Both were too standardized and linked to fixed traditional patterns to be able to accept any external influence. Tibetan literature was almost exclusively religious and failed to impress the Chinese literati for the same reasons, wherefore Lamaism could not penetrate China. The Chinese residents in Lhasa, mostly of Manchu extraction, were as a rule no scholars and were too contemptuous

---

of everything Tibetan to concern themselves with native literature. The patronage of the Manchu emperors towards Tibetan scholars resident in China (the lCañ-skya Qutuqtu, the T'u-kuan Qutuqtu etc.) did, it is true, substantially favour the development of that copious production of encyclopaedic and compilatory character which marks the 18th century in Tibetan literary history. But these works cannot be said to reveal any appreciable Chinese influence, at least as far as goes our scanty knowledge of them.

Thus the connection between China and Tibet reflected itself mainly in the smaller things of everyday life. Tibet, as the conquered country, was much more frequently the receiver than the giver. It was in this period that many words borrowed from Chinese found their way into Tibetan, while a few Tibetan words became part and parcel of the language of Chinese traders, remaining of course debarred from literary usage.

Also in other fields the influence was wholly one-sided. The dress of Manchu and Chinese officials became popular among the Tibetan ruling classes, which adopted it as state dress in preference to the Tibetan one; and this fashion survived even after the fall of the Manchu dynasty. Chinese cooking too found its way into the Tibetan homes of the upper classes, where it still reigns supreme.

The one big exception in this list of small unimportant things is the deep influence exerted by China on Tibetan painting. The vicissitudes of Tibetan painting have been reconstructed in masterly fashion by Tucci, to whose monumental work I beg the reader to refer. Suffice it to say that Tibetan painting, which had already incorporated some Chinese elements in the 14th and 15th centuries, was subjected in the 18th century to a very deep and far-reaching Chinese influence. In Tucci’s words, “a new Tibetan art was then developed, which in a certain sense was a provincial echo of the Chinese 18th century’s smooth ornate preciosity”. But Tibet “worked out the Chinese style in its own way, so that the model translated in its own language took on a local colour and this new

1) Perhaps there was some trace of Chinese influence in the technique of Tibetan historiography of the late 18th century.
2) Laufer, Loan words in Tibetan, in TP XVII (1916). Of the loanword from Modern Chinese (nn. 253-311) not a few appear to have been introduced during this period.
3) See, e.g. the portrait of the Maharaja of Sikkim in full Chinese dress, opposite p. 26 in Schäfer, Geheimnis Tibet; and the portrait of the rdsoñ-dpon of Tsaparang, in Tucci & Ghersi, Cronaca della Missione scientifica Tucci, p. 253.
born painting, although inspired by Chinese art, was something different and peculiar”\(^1\). Also Chinese architecture, particularly the typical Chinese roof, influenced to some extent the building fashion in Lhasa and in the greater provincial centres. The artistic influence of China was perhaps the best and most lasting fruit of the renewed contact between the two countries.

\(^1\) Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*, p. 283.
APPENDIX

CHINESE DOCUMENTS

A—Selected documents from the *Shih-tsung Shih-lu* concerning the civil war of 1727/8

Doc. I

(ch. 52, ff. 29b-30b)

(*Ting-szu/I = February 20th, 1727*) The members of the Office for Administrative Deliberations (*i-chêng wâng ta-chên* 議政王大臣) ¹ discussed and reported on a memorial by the imperial clansman brigadier-general Oci which ran as follows: I have gone to Tibet and have carefully investigated the conditions of the country. The men who are at the head of its administration do not agree among themselves; very often this becomes apparent from their words and mien. The Dalai-Lama, although very wise, is still young, and it is unavoidable that he should be biased in favour of his father bSod-nams-dar-rgyas. K‘an-c‘en-nas personally is a very fine man; but he trusts overmuch in his merits, despises all the *bka’-blon* (ka-lung 賴隆)² and is hated by all. Na-p‘od-pa (A-érh-pu-pa 阿爾布巴) has a treacherous character, and he acts in opposition to K‘an-c‘en-nas. Besides, bSod-nams-dar-rgyas has married two daughters of Lum-pa-nas (Lung-pu-nai 隆布囊). These three men form a clique. If they instigate the Dalai-Lama to quarrel with K‘an-c‘en-nas, certainly it will come to open strife and revolt. Again; if the *bka’-blon* are very numerous, this contrariwise [to what might be expected] would increase the complexity and trouble. The behaviour of Lum-pa-nas is treacherous and rebellious. sByar-

¹) The *i-chêng-ch‘u* 議政處 was the immediate forerunner of the Grand Council during the first years of the Yung-chêng period. See Fairbank & Têng, On the types and uses of Ch‘ing documents, in *HJAS* V (1940), p. 21.
²) This transcription is used in all the documents of the present Appendix. Another common transliteration, both in the *Shih-lu* and in other texts, is *ka-pu-lun* 葛布倫.
nas (Cha-érh-nai 札爾彌) is a weakling, without abilities. It is necessary to order these men to retire from their posts of bka'-blon. Then Na-p‘od-pa will have nobody to support him; of course his influence will be weakened and there will be nobody to rebel. I pray that a rescript may be issued, proclaiming to the Dalai-Lama, K‘an-c‘en-nas, and Na-p‘od-pa that they must govern the country in good accord.

[The Office proposed]: All these requests should be granted. An amban (ta-ch‘én) should be sent to carry this rescript and to proclaim [in Tibet] that they are ordered to carry on the government by common agreement. Again; the uncle of the Dalai-Lama, Kun-tu-a-la-mu-pa 庞都阿喇木巴, is sincerely protecting his nephew; we must grant him the title of targon and give him six pieces of silk cloth. — The following rescript was issued. The sub-chancellor of the Grand Secretariat Señ-ge and the brigade-general Mala are sent to the residence of the Dalai-Lama; they will be given 1000 taels each.

Doc. II
(ch. 59, f. 22a-b)

(Kuei-yu/VII = September 4th, 1727) The bka'-blon of Tibet, Āsak Taiji P‘o-lha-nas, and others report to the throne: K‘an-c‘en-nas had waged war with the Dzungars. All the measures which he took were really beneficial. But Na-p‘od-pa, Lum-pa-nas and sByar-ra-nas, acting in concert with the chiefs of Anterior Tibet, on 18/VI have murdered K‘an-c‘en-nas. I have collected at once the troops of Ulterior Tibet, to defend my residence. Na-p‘od-pa and the others repeatedly have sent troops to raid it, but these have been killed and wounded by me without numbers. Now I will lead my soldiers to fight and capture Na-p‘od-pa and the others. I humbly beg the emperor to send quickly governmental troops to Tibet, to exterminate the rebel chiefs and to pacify Tibet. — Report received and submitted to the emperor.

Doc. III
(ch. 62, ff. 21b-22b)

(Chi-hai/X = November 29th, 1727) Imperial edict to the Office for Administrative Deliberations. — Na-p‘od-pa has sent
troops against mNa’-ris, wishing to destroy P’o-lha-nas. But the soldiers sent by him have been completely wiped out by P’o-lha-nas. Already troops are being led to [the country that] has invoked [our assistance], in order to destroy Na-p’od-pa. This undertaking, if it can be carried to an end, will be advantageous for Tibet. But at present there are in Tibet the imperial envoys Mala and Señ-ge. I fear that either they may be misled by Na-p’od-pa to act as mediators for arranging a settlement, or that they may be deceived by Na-p’od-pa etc., so that P’o-lha-nas may be damaged by this. This can have serious consequences. We order Yüeh Chung-ch’i to select from among the officials serving in Szechwan and Shensi some who are conversant with the peculiarities of the Tibetans, who know perfectly the Tibetan language, and are fit to be sent to Tibet. They must be ordered to start at once. All the circumstances are to be secretly told to Mala and Señ-ge, to enable them to have the matter clear in their minds. Then everything will be easy. Let the sub-chancellor Bandi be despatched, and let him orally transmit the details.

Doc. IV

(ch. 63, ff. 1a-3a)

(Kuei-ch’ou/XI = December 13th, 1727) Edict to the Office for Administrative Deliberations. At present P’o-lha-nas of Tibet, having led his troops to avenge K’añ-c’en-nas, is fighting against Na-p’od-pa. It is necessary to send an official (la-ch’één) on duty to command our troops and to conduct the administration. The edict notifying the Dalai-Lama [to this effect] has been already transcribed. Now, with regard to the official to be sent next year, it is necessary to prepare now the troops which he is to take along, so that they shall leave as soon as the young grass grows. About these troops which will be sent, We order the Office for Administrative Deliberations to deliberate and report.

Formerly, when troops were sent out, apart from the funds being provided for official rewards and prepared for the bestowing of favours, whenever there were small shortages, it was expected that these would be mostly advanced by them from their pay. This time in sending governmental troops this [practice of] borrowing shall be stopped, and We shall order
them to be generously paid. We order the President of the Censorate Jalangga and the brigadier-general Mailu to go ahead, to organize the affairs of military supply inside Tibet. They will select 400 men from the Manchu troops of Sian-fu to accompany them. As to the Green Banner soldiers of Szechwan, We order the commissioner of the Equipage Department 1) with the rank of an assistant chamberlain2) Chou Ying to take their command. As to the Green Banner soldiers of Shensi, We order the brigade-general of Hsining, Chou K'ai-chieh 周開捷, to take their command. As to the Green Banner soldiers of Yünnan, Jalangga and Mailu together with O-èrh-t'ai 鄂爾泰 3) must consult and nominate a brigade-general and a colonel 4). We order that one of them be kept stationed at Chamdo, and one should command the troops which will enter Tibet. Chou Ying will be paid 4000 taels. Chou K'ai-chieh together with the brigade-general sent from Yünnan will be paid 3000 taels each. The colonels will be paid 1000 taels each. The lieutenant-colonels will be paid 500 taels each. For the salaries of the majors 5) and of the subaltern officers you will deliberate and present a proposal.

[The Office] examined the matter and advised: As these officials are going to Tibet to reduce it to order, they cannot but take troops with them. Therefore, for the 400 men of the Manchu troops of Sian-fu, whom they will take with them, we must appoint a colonel 6), two majors 7), two captains 8), four lieutenants 9), to command them for the march to Tibet. Furthermore, we shall send 8000 men of the Green Banners of Shensi, 4000 of the Green Banners of Szechwan, 3000 of the Green Banners of Yünnan. For every 2000 soldiers, a colonel will be appointed; for every 1000, a lieute-

---

1) Luan-i-shih 愛儀使, Mayers, n. 111.
2) San-chih-ta-chên 散秩大臣, Mayers, n. 94.
4) Fu-chiang 副將, Mayers n. 442. 5) Yu-chi 遊擊, Mayers, n. 444.
8) Fang-yü 防禦, Mayers n. 430.
9) Hsiao-ch'i-hsiao 騒騎校, Mayers n. 431.
nant-colonel or a major will be placed in charge. As to the second-captains, lieutenants, sergeants and other officers, we shall order the governor-general, the provincial commander etc. concerned to send them out as it is fit and proper. As for their pays, each of them will be generously paid in accordance with the edict. The majors will receive 400 taels; the second-captains 300; the lieutenants 200; the sergeants 160; the troopers 20; the infantrymen 16 taels. Everything should be made ready beforehand. They will wait until next year, and they will march out at the time when the green grass grows. We shall order the president of the Censorate Jialingga to start on his journey within the 1st month of the next year, from Peking through Sian-fu to Hsining; together with Chou K‘ai-chieh he will leave for Tibet. They must take with them four able secretaries 1) of the governor’s office 2), four bičači, two quartermasters 3) of the Mongolian Superintendency; each of them to be paid with salary and rations. They are to arrange for the departure. — These proposals were agreed to.

Doc. V
(ch. 71, ff. 17a-18b)

(Hsin-yu/VII = August 17th, 1728) The governor-general of Szechwan and Shensi, Yüeh Chung-ch‘i, reports to the throne: According to a report by the lieutenant-colonel Yen Ch‘ing-ju 颜清如 residing in Tibet 4), on 25/V P’o-lha-nas led the troops under his orders through the pass of aP‘an-yul (P‘an-yü 彭玉) to the locality of Gar-pa (K‘a-pa 嘎巴). He sent forward about 1000 men to attack the barrier 5) of dGa‘-mo (K‘a-mu 嘎木). There was a fight with the troops of Lum-pa-nas. That night all the soldiers in the outposts of Lhasa joined P’o-lha-nas. On the 26th day P’o-lha-nas, leading his troops, marched straight into Lhasa.

The ambans resident in Tibet, Mala and Señ-ge, at once went

1) Szü-kuan 司官, Mayers n. 166.
2) Pu-yuan ya-mén 部院衙門.
3) Ling-ts‘ui 領催, Mayers n. 546.
4) Apparently a member of the staff of the Chinese mission of Señ-ge and Mala.
5) K‘a-lun 卡倫; Manchu karun.
into the Potala, to protect the Dalai-Lama. P'o-lha-nas on the
one side pacified Lhasa, on the other sent troops to surround the
Potala. On the 27th day Mala and Señ-ge returned to Lhasa. On
the 28th the lamas of all the monasteries arrested and handed over
Na-p'od-pa, L um-pa-nas, sByar-ra-nas etc.; P'o-lha-nas placed
them under custody. Then he went to visit Mala and Señ-ge to
make his report [as follows]: Now at the head of the troops of
mNa-ris and of those of Ulterior Tibet, more than 9000 men
in all, I have advanced on Lhasa. As I have already arrested the
rebels and wish to return to Ulterior Tibet at once, to defend and
garrison the passes etc., I pray that you make a report to the
emperor, mentioning [also the appropriateness of granting tokens
of his] favour, rewards etc.

I (Yüeh Chung-ch'i) have examined the statement of P'o-lha-nas.
Before our army arrived, he had exerted himself to avenge [K'ai-lu-
c'en-nas] and had arrested the rebels. All this has been caused by the
gracious majesty of the emperor spreading far out. But although the
rebel chiefs have already been made prisoners, Na-p'od-pa's son
mGon-po (Kun-pu 總布) is still in Chiang-ta 江達 1), being posted
there at the head of some troops. I have given orders to the com-
missioner of the Equipage Department Chou Ying to keep himself
strictly on the defensive, to wait till our great army arrives in Lhasa,
and then to attack in cooperation with it. As to the troops of P'o-
lha-nas, who number about 9000 men, I beg that they may be re-
warded, and this proclaimed in public, in the way of encouragement.

The following rescript was issued: The troops of P'o-lha-nas
have made great efforts. We order Jalangga and the others to draw
30,000 taels from the taxes levied for providing the military
supplies, to hand them out to P'o-lha-nas and to order him to
reward the troops as may seem appropriate.

Doc. VI
(ch. 73, ff. 26a-27a)

(Ting-chou/IX = November 1st, 1728) The president of the
Board of Civil Office 2) sent to Tibet, Jalangga, and the others

1) rGya-mdas, Giamda-dsong of the maps, the capital of Kon-po, about 92° 37'
long., 30° lat.

2) Li-pu 吏部, Mayers n. 153.
report: Complying with the edict, I took the command of the army. On the 6/V we left Hsining. On 1/VIII we reached Lhasa. At once we, together with the brigadier-general Mala and the sub-chancellor Sei-ge who were already in residence in Tibet, tried Na-p'od-pa, Lum-pa-nas, sByar-ra-nas and the others. According to the confession of Na-p'od-pa etc., it was true that they had plotted the murder of K'aïn-c'en-nas. Considering that, although Na-p'od-pa and the others had personally received many favours from our empire, they did not even think of attempting to repay them, but in their hearts they bred rebellion, they have greatly offended against the law. We had to differentiate the punishment according to the circumstances. Na-p'od-pa and Lumpa-nas were both sentenced to death by slicing to pieces. Na-p'od-pa's sons dGa'-ldan-p'un-ts'ogs (K'a-érh-tan-p'ën-ch'u-k'o), dKon-mc'og-lha-sgrub (Kun-ch'u-k'o-la-ku-pu) and rNog(?) Tarqan bsKal-bzai-c'os-adar (O-ta-érh-han-k'a-érh-tsang-ch'ui-ta-érh), and Lum-pa-nas's son gZims-dpon C'os-ac'ad (?: Hsi-mu-pen ch'ui-cha-t'ê) were all sentenced to decapitation. sByar-ra-nas was sentenced to decapitation; his wife with his sons Lhag-gsan (?: La-k'o-sang) and Byams-pa (Cha-mu-pa), together with the wives and daughters of the two culprits and with the elder and younger full brothers were all sent into exile. Furthermore, there were the lamas and common people, who had collaborated with Na-p'od-pa and the others; here too, we discriminated in punishing the crimes. The nature of the Tibetans is cruel; in the case of Na-p'od-pa and the others, we had to order the Tibetans to be present at the execution, so as to show them an example. On the one hand we submit the above to the emperor. On the other, as to Na-p'od-pa and those criminals in the case who had to be decapitated, we proceeded at once to the execution. With regard to those men who must be exiled, we shall consult together and charge some from among the soldiers, who are sent back, with delivering them to the marshall-residences of Chiang-ning, K'ang-chou and Ching-chou; [the deportees] will be given to the soldiers as slaves. — The above report was received and presented to the emperor.

Doc. VII
(ch. 76, f. 4a-b)

(Ting-hai/XII = January 20th, 1729) The Office for Admini-
Administrative Deliberations, following an imperial edict, deliberated and submitted [the following]: The administrator of Tibetan affairs, President of the Board of Civil Office Jalangga and the others report: The original residence of P'o-lha-nas is in Ulterior Tibet. He has lived together with the Tanguts (Tibetans) for a long time, and the populace has come to trust him. According to orders received, we were to appoint P'o-lha-nas as Chief Administrator for the affairs of Ulterior Tibet. From Ulterior Tibet to the Kai-lasa 1), mNa²-ris and other districts, all of them we were to entrust to his administration. As to the affairs of Anterior Tibet, we were to seek out two men usually trusted by the native Tibetans, and to appoint them as bka³-blon. Accepting the guarantee given by P'o-lha-nas, we have selected two men; the one is called Sri-gcod-tsce-brtan (Sê-chu-tê-sê-pu-t'êng 甘特 布路), the other is called Tsê-rin-dbaṅ-rgyal (Tsê-ling-wang-cha-érb 策陵旺扎). Both of them are sons of high officials; they are commonly respected by the people. We consider these men to be sincere and intelligent. We shall entrust them with the administration of Anterior Tibet and shall nominate them to bka³-blon. However, the land that has invoked [our assistance] has only just been pacified, and it is to be feared that the two bka³-blon just appointed will not be able to give satisfaction in their administration. P'o-lha-nas [on the other hand] is transacting the business of a bka³-blon in such a way that he makes the people feel contented. Now, Anterior Tibet and Ulterior Tibet are not very distant from each other, and their affairs can be managed together. We therefore shall provisionally appoint P'o-lha-nas to govern Anterior Tibet and Ulterior Tibet. We shall wait till the transfer of the Dalai-Lama has been completed and we have withdrawn our troops from the country that has invoked [our assistance], and then again we shall appoint P'o-lha-nas to deal particularly with Ulterior Tibet.

[The Office for Administrative Deliberations says that] all these requests should be granted. — It was agreed to.

1) Kang-ti-szü, Tibetan Gaüns Ti-se.
B—Selected documents from the *Kao-tsung Shih-lu* concerning the upheaval of 1750

Doc. VIII

(ch. 376, ff. 29b-31b)

(*Kuei-ch'ou* XI = December 12th, 1750) The governor-general of Szechwan, Ts'ë-rii, and the provincial commander Yüeh Chung-ch'i report: Earlier we had received a report from the assistant sub-prefect of the paymaster's office 1) of Tibet, Ch'ang-ming 常明, to the effect that aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal had proclaimed to his subjects that he had already contrived to have about 400 men of the Chinese troops sent back; the rest of them, if they did not find an opportunity for returning home quickly, certainly would be completely massacred; and other words to this effect.

Also the first-class assistant department magistrate 1) detailed to the supply office of Lha-ri, Tung-kung 董恭, reports that aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal has ordered that on the roads neither troops nor civilians, Chinese or native, and no written communication should be allowed to travel to and fro, and so on.

Now according to the report of the non-commissioned officer residing in Tibet Wang T'ing-pin 王廷斌 and others, aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal had plotted to revolt. Fucing and Labdon, the two officials resident in Tibet, on 13/X = November 11th enticed him into the K'rom-gzigs-k'aṅ palace (T'ung-szü-k'ang ya-mên 通司岡衙門) for an interview. There they cut him down. As the rebel *mgon-gnyer* Bبو-bsaṅ-bka'-śis (Cho-ni Lo-pu-tsang-cha-shih 卓呢羅卜藏札什) and others got intelligence of this, he at the head of a crowd of several thousands surrounded the building, discharged guns and swivels at it, and set [the palace] on fire on all sides. The Dalai-Lama sent many monks to save [the inmates], but they could not effect an entrance. In the uproar, Labdon was wounded by a sword-cut, and Fucing was hit by a gunshot; immediately afterwards he committed suicide.

1) *Liang-wu t'ung-p'an 糧務通判*, Mayers n. 283.

Most of the civil and military officers there were killed. In the \( ya-m\text{è}n \) of the paymaster’s office, the treasury was looted with a loss of more than 85,000 taels. On the 14th, the \( m\text{gr}on-g\text{ñ}er \) Blo-bzañ-bkra-śis at the head of his men fled away. On the 15th, the Dalai-Lama first commanded duke Pandita, the brother-in-law of aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, to discharge provisionally the duties of a king of Tibet. The lamas of the neighbourhood and all the Tibetans gave him their allegiance. The military and civil personnel who have escaped the catastrophe, are now cared for by the Dalai-Lama. And so on.

Then again, following the report of the major (\( yu-chi \)) commanding the frontier posts, Yin-jui 艾瑞, on the 18/X and on the following days the Dalai-Lama published an order to the effect that all the postal stations must transport the governmental troops as before. As soon as they heard the proclamation of the Dalai-Lama, no single Tibetan did any more harm to the Chinese. And so on.

Again, according to the report of the assistant sub-prefect Ch’ang-ming, on the 23/X and on the following days, more than half the rebels, according to the report of duke Pandita, had been already arrested. The rest too will be caught without difficulty. The pay funds are now searched for, and already more than 20,000 taels have been recovered. Everywhere on the entrances to routes of strategical importance, soldiers have also been posted to guard them. And so on.

Again, we received two memorials by the Dalai-Lama and Duke Pandita, forwarded by the officers of the frontier guards. We, (Ts’e-riūn and Yüeh Chung-ch’i) have studied these events. That aGyur--med-rnam-rgyal has been killed by surprise, corresponds to the truth. His rebellious followers too, according to the Dalai-Lama and duke Pandita, are being sought out and arrested one after the other. \( m\text{Gr}on-g\text{ñ}er \) Blo-bzañ-bkra-śis dared lead the mob to attack the ambans; this is a heinous crime. It is therefore necessary forthwith to send troops to have him executed. Perhaps this terrible calamity is not yet at an end, and there may be disturbances also in future. We therefore advise: Yüeh Chung-ch’i must go in all haste to Ta-chien-lu. First, from among the provincial troops of the garrison of Chien-ch’ang 建昌 he shall mobilize 3000 men and send them outside the passes. As second echelon, he shall
mobilize 2000 men and he shall order brigadier-general Tung-fang 董芳, commanding the garrison of Chien-ch’ang, to follow him. Ts’e-riň, in his turn, at the head of 3000 men shall go to Ta-chien-lu to keep order there. According to circumstances, he will decide whether to attack and destroy [the enemy] or to come to the assistance [of the others]. Now some able officers must be sent to issue proclamations along the route to the Tibetan population. Besides, the Dalai-Lama and duke Pandita are being informed of the reasons why troops are being sent out to arrest the rebels, so that the minds of the Tibetan populace may be reassured. — Again, the brigadier-general Bandi is now travelling from Kukunor to Tibet with his suite of only about 20 men. The Dalai-Lama and the others perhaps do not yet know the reason why he comes to Tibet. We shall at the same time inform the Dalai-Lama, commanding him to send some men to meet and escort him on the road.

Doc. IX
(ch. 377, ff. 29b-30b)

(Ting-mao/XI = December 26th, 1750) The governor-general of Szechwan, Ts’e-riň, and the others report: On 20/X, according to the report of the assistant sub-prefect Ch’ang-ming [the situation was this]: After aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal’s execution, duke Pandita is provisionally regulating the affairs of Tibet. The fighting has ceased. When the lieutenant-general Fucing and the others were killed, there were about 80 soldiers left, and of the common people 110 or 120. All of them entered the Potala, and everybody received from the Dalai-Lama a sufficient allowance of money and food. On the 23rd, duke Pandita reported that the rebel chief mgron-gner Blo-bzañ-bkra-šis had been caught and imprisoned. More than half of the rebels had been already arrested. The stolen pay funds too had been found for the greater part. The K’rom-gzigs-k’añ and the other places were already calm. On the 24th, Ch’ang-ming together with the soldiers and civilians were brought back to their lodgings. And so on.

Now the army which has been despatched, probably has been sent out uselessly. We pray that we should enter Lhasa with only 800 men. As in former times, we consider that troops should be posted in Ta-chien-lu to maintain order.
An edict was received to the effect that a rescript would be issued separately.

Doc. X

(ch. 379, ff. 22b-24a)

(Wu-hsü/XII = January 26th, 1751) The brigadier-general resident in Tibet, Bandi, reports: On 21/XII I have arrived in Lhasa. I have gathered together the officers and men still surviving, and have questioned them on the particulars of the rebellion. Thus I heard that on 13/X Fucing and Labdon invited a Gyur-med-rnam-rgyal inside their palace. When he arrived upstairs and met them, Fucing drew his sword and cut down a Gyur-med-rnam-rgyal. At the same time the latter’s attendants, four or five men in all, were killed. When mgon-gñer Blo-bzañ-bkra-sis heard of it, he jumped down from the upper storey and went to call his comrades. He gathered soldiers and surrounded the house; he fired at it guns and swivels. Fucing sent somebody to summon Pandita to his rescue. But Pandita’s power was small and he was unable to save him. He informed in all haste the Dalai-Lama, who thereupon sent messengers to stop [the mob]; but the rebels did not obey them. They set fire to the house and burnt it down. Fucing received three wounds on his body and at once committed suicide. Labdon was wounded several times and was killed by the rebels. The second-class assistant secretary 1) Tsė-t’a-ěrh and the lieutenant-colonel Huang Yüan-lung too committed suicide. The bičäči Ch‘i-ch‘éng 齊誠 cut his own throat, but did not die. The assistant sub-prefect Ch‘ang-ming too was wounded by arrows and stones. Two lieutenants 2), 49 soldiers and 77 servants and traders died fighting. All the funds that were kept in the paymaster’s office were looted. mGron-gñer Blo-bzañ-bkra-sis and the rest utilized the pause [after the massacre] for escaping. On the following day the Dalai-Lama gathered all the remaining soldiers and pacified the mob. Duke Pandita arrested the criminal mgon-gñer Blo-bzañ-bkra-sis and others, 13 in all, and kept them securely imprisoned. I have further severely questioned

1) Chu-shih 主事, Mayers n. 166.

2) Ch‘ien-tsung 千總, Mayers n. 447.
them under torture. They implicated as accomplices Tê-shih-nai 阿喇卜坦 and others, 14 altogether. All these rebels had gathered together for sedition, had killed the ambans, had looted the monies. Their violence and insolence has been extreme. It was necessary to restore the laws of the empire at once. Therefore, on the 25th, mgrün- gêr Blo-bzaṅ-bkra-sis who had been the leader, Rab-brtan (A-la-pu-tan 阿喇卜坦) and Ch'ui-mu-chê 呼木札特 who had led the mob to kindle the fire and to loot the monies, Sâchân Hašha (Chê-chên-ha-shih-ha 車臣哈什哈) who had killed many persons, Tarqan Yišor (Ta-ěrh-han Ya-hsun 達爾汗雅遜), Padma-skurje-c'os-ap'el (Pa-tê-ma-ku-éhr-chî-ch'un-p'î-lo 巴特馬古爾 濟樞丕勒) and dBaṅ-rgyas (Wang-chieh 安介) who had fired with fowling pieces and bows and arrows to wound the ambans, all of them died by the slicing process. P'yang-mdsod-pa Lha-skyabs (Shang-cho-tê-pa La-cha-pu 尚卓特巴拉札卜) who, in obedience to the rebel leader had killed some men, had carried straw and kindled the fire and as the first had mounted upstairs to help the criminals, rDsoṅ-dpon dBaṅ-rgyal (Tsêng-pên Wang-cha-lo 曾本旺扎勒), Man-chin Tê-shih-nai 曼金得什鼐 and others were all beheaded. The messenger bKra-sis-rab-brtan (Châ-shih-la-pu-tan 札什喇卜坦) and others, who had followed the rebels, were strangled. As to Pei-lung-sha-k'o-pa 杯隆沙克巴, who fearing punishment had committed suicide, and to Lag-mgon-po (?; La-k'o-kun-pu 拉克溎布), who perished in prison, they were both decapitated; together with the other criminals whose bodies had been torn apart, their bones were crushed. As customary, all the severed heads were exposed to the view of the populace. The remaining rebels were banished to different places. Their property was sold and the proceeds paid into the treasury.

Doc. XI
(ch. 385, ff. 15b-19b)

(I-ch'ou/III = April 23rd, 1751) The governor-general of Szechwan, Tsê-riñ, and his colleagues report: We have considered and decided the measures for the reorganization of Tibet.
Firstly: The *bka'-blon* who govern Tibet are customarily four. *bKa'-blon* aBroñ-btsan had become blind and had been relieved of his post by aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal. Now the following three are left: Pandita, Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal and Sri-gcod-ts'e-brtan. Pandita has received a special rescript as duke exercising the functions of *bka'-blon*. As to Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal and Sri-gcod-ts'e-brtan, it has been ascertained that they showed no rebellious behaviour; besides, they have a rescript which appointed them as *bka'-blon* and at the same time gave them the rank of Taiji of a first-class Jasak. It is expedient to keep them as before in the office of *bka'-blon*. In the place of aBroñ-btsan, a lama deeply learned in the doctrines of the Yellow Church shall be selected and appointed. He will be granted the title of Jasak Ta La-ma.

Again: The joint management of affairs by the *bka'-blon* was formerly transacted in the official building of the *bka'-šag* (ka-sha 聲沙). Since the time of P'ø-lha-nas, every *bka'-blon* has carried out his official work in his private home. They discontinued, as not necessary, the officially appointed executives, and increasingly employed their favourites for the purpose. Henceforward they must as before betake themselves to the official buildings for transacting business jointly. Privately appointed officials must be eliminated.

Again: the officials, such as the *sde-pa* (tieh-pa 輯巴), of every district are responsible for the administration of their zone and for the instruction of the people. aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal had appointed his favourites to all these posts. These men did not go there personally, and sent their household slaves to act for them. This caused trouble in the districts. Henceforward the *bka'-blon* shall conjointly report to the Dalai-Lama as well as to the ambans resident in Tibet about the filling of any vacancies. [Officials], whose household slaves officiate for them, shall be removed. Officials unsuited for their regions shall be replaced. In every temple the *mk'yan-po bla-ma* (abbot) shall be appointed as heretofore by the Dalai-Lama.

Again: the *mgtron-gñer* (cho-ni-érh 卓呢爾), p'yan-mdsod-pa (shang-cho-t'é-pa 商卓特巴), rdson-dpon (ts'éng-pén 曾本), gsol-dpon (sui-pén 隨本), all these titles of officials, the Dalai-
Lama alone had formerly [the power of bestowing them]. After P'o-lha-nas had been appointed wang, he too accordingly made additional appointments. These must be examined and cancelled. Only the two mgon-gêr appointed in the council house, and the druû-yig bičik (chung-i pi-ch'i-ko 仲意筆七格) who have received their original appointment, along with them, shall transact official business.

Again: Formerly the bka'-blon took care only of the government of the districts. Soldiers, horses and frontier guards, all this was the responsibility of the mda'-dpon (tai-pên 代弁). Ulterior Tibet is small, and yet three mda'-dpon have been appointed there. Although dBus is large, there is only one mda'-dpon there. In case of mistakes, there would be nobody to keep in order that region and to protect the Dalai-Lama. An additional officer must be appointed, together with the existing mda'-dpon; at the time of filling the vacancies, all of them will be given an imperial commission.

Again: all the people of Tibet were once subjects of the Dalai-Lama. Compulsory labour was regulated for each person according to the size of the district and to the number of the population. P'o-lha-nas and the others arbitrarily appropriated it, trading it underhand or giving excessive rewards, so that they even dared to issue documents granting exemptions from corvée duties, while the man whom they hated was ordered for service more often than his due. Henceforward the bka'-blon, mda'-dpon etc. shall officially examine the old documents. With the exception of rewards for encouraging merits, which need not be refunded, all those who have been privately rewarded or granted excessive exemption should be examined and reported by the bka'-blon to the Dalai-Lama for restitution [of the sums unduly received]. [The turns of] those ordered for service more often than their due shall be diminished.

Again: the duty of messenger of the Dalai-Lama formerly had to be filled by the common people of the districts. Since P'o-lha-nas etc. took office, every bka'-blon, mda'-dpon etc. sends men to Hsining, Ta-chien-lu, Sê-êrh-k'o-ma 色爾喀馬, mNa'-ris sKor-gsum and other regions for trading; they also privately issue official orders, so that ’u-lag service is oppressive for the common
people. Henceforward this must be stopped. When official business is at hand, it shall be reported to the Dalai-Lama and he will issue a stamped document which shall be obeyed.

Again: the Dalai-Lama's granaries and treasury. Formerly there were the abru-pa (chu-pa 諸巴) of the granaries in exclusive charge of them. When there were needs for the public business, the bka'-blon begged the Dalai-Lama to act for them, because in order to open or close [the granaries], everybody considered a sealmark of the Dalai-Lama as the [necessary] credential. P'lo-lha-nas etc. first began taking [grain] arbitrarily. Henceforward they must proceed as in former times.

Again: the Kara-usu is the region bordering with Kukunor, and mNa'-ris is the region bordering with the Dsungars. It is necessary to invite the Dalai-Lama to send officials in residence there, and to address at the same time a communication to the Board requesting the issue of nominative papers.

Again: the aDam Mongols. In the past P'lo-lha-nas petitioned that the said wang be empowered to commission them. After the execution of aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, they stealthily returned to aDam. We find that the above-mentioned Mongols are all of them innocent people. Since they wished to return to aDam and to wait there till they were given commissions again, of course they must be satisfactorily organized. They have now eight chiefs, whose title are either jaisang or taiji. They all have been abusively appointed by P'lo-lha-nas etc. It is necessary to change them into Banner commanders¹). The subordinates will be chosen and appointed as [Mongol] lieutenant-colonels ²) or subalterns ³). All the eight chiefs will be granted rank buttons. They shall be under the general command of the amban resident in Tibet. As before, each lieutenant-colonel must be ordered to supply 10 men, who will stay in Lhasa ready for employment. As to the several scores of Mongol families who reside in Lhasa to gain their livelihood, we shall examine them and keep their names on record; these we shall allow to remain in Lhasa.

¹) Gusai da (ku-shan-ta 固山達); in the 18th century corresponding in rank to the hsieh-ling, Manchu colonel. Nieh Ch'ung-ch'i, p. 112.
²) Tso-ling 佐領, Mayers n. 544.
³) Hsiao-ch'i-hsiao 駿騎校, Mayers n. 545.
The following rescript was issued: [Order] to write in accordance with what has been decided. Send it down to the Board, so that it may take note of it. Order to the Grand Council: Concerning what Ts'é-rin submits in order to provide for Tibetan affairs, We have decided to endorse his proposals and approve them. Now, in the relations with Tibet, which are of the utmost importance, emphasis should be laid on the frontier posts; this is where the pivot of traffic lies. We must consider the fact that in the past aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal did not allow the postal stations to forward the official despatches, and the courier traffic was interrupted; then Pandita sent orders to forward the mail, and only then the communications were resumed. All this resulted from the fact that [the service] is placed under their administration, and the ambans residing in Tibet cannot regulate its functioning and its omissions and commissions. How to obtain its control? It is absolutely necessary to give full attention to the handling of this problem. Even previously We repeatedly issued rescripts about this. Why in this memorial of Tsé-rin etc. they wrongly treat this matter as if not yet deliberated upon, when at present we have reached a decision a short while ago? As whatever slackness happens in this matter results in its turn in the suspicions of all men in Tibet, it is but fitting to order Bandi and rNam-rgyal to pay attention to it. After a couple of years they may undertake to apply again for an edict.

Among the present proposals there is also the appointment of officials like the sde-pa etc., to be responsible for governing the district and instructing the people; concerning their appointment for the future, this right should belong exclusively to the Dalai-Lama and the ambans resident in Tibet; and so on. [Now we ask]: What are the affairs, what are the districts that this sort of sde-pa and headmen govern? The postal stations of a single zone, such as Batang and Li-t'ang, are they or are they not under the management of these headmen? If they are under the management of these headmen, then the Dalai-Lama and the ambans resident in Tibet have already the authority necessary for not allowing it to happen again, that the mail service be interrupted; then it is no longer necessary to make arrangements in the matter which the present rescript enquires about.

Again: When Chao-hui was specially sent out from the capital,
it was in order to take all suitable measures with regard to Tibet; of course the only proper thing for him to do, would have been to wait till all the affairs had been reported, approved and a rescript concerning them had been received, before he should have reported that in the near future he would return to the capital. However, after having just made his proposals, without awaiting the imperial rescript, on the one hand he presents his memorial, and on the other he reports that he is starting on his journey [back], having, moreover, the intention to hurry. Should he adduce [as reason] the conditions of that country, then [We would observe that] We have known these perfectly for a long time, and that we have no need of a personal report by Chao-hui in order to learn them. What kind of matters are there in the capital of such an urgent character that he cannot wait like this? In former times, to be as rapid as the stars [on an Imperial mission] meant earnestness and zeal for the public welfare; but if in coming and returning he acts precipitately, it means that he has only his private concerns in view. — Let this rescript be transmitted to reprimand him.

Doc. XII

(ch. 386, ff. 17b-19a)

(Wu-yin/IV = May 6th, 1751) The governor-general of Szechwan, Ts'e-riin, reports: We have received the rescript ordering that several men should be appointed as bka'-blon in Tibet, so as to divide their power. At once we instituted a secret and deeper inquiry in this country. We understand that according to the old rule the bka'-blon were normally four. One was duke Pandita. The others were Jasak Taiji Ts'e-riin-dban-rgyal, Sri-gcod-ts'e-brtan and aBro'n-btsan. These three are issued from the noblest families in Tibet, and for a long time they have been men obeyed by the Tibetans. Among them, aBro'n-btsan is blind in both eyes. It is difficult to choose him a second time for appointment. Ts'e-riin-dba'n-rgyal and Sri-gcod-ts'e-brtan are both aged, experienced and wise; they are fit for this post. We therefore think it expedient to pray that they may be appointed to the post of bka'-blon as before. As to the place which is left free by aBro'n-btsan, since according to the Dalai-Lama the Tibetan laity cannot be
deeply learned in the tenets of the Yellow Church, he recommends Bla-ma Ni-ma-rgyal-mtshan (La-ma Ni-ma-chia-mu-ts'an 喇嘛尼瑪嘉木燦), who is wise and trustworthy. We therefore suggest to grant him the rank of Jasak Bla-ma and to appoint him bka'-blon, to hold office concurrently with the others.

The report was approved. Edict to the bka'-blon duke Pandita, Jasak Taiji Ts'e-riñ-dban-rgyal, Sri-gcod-ts'e-brtan and Jasak Bla-ma Ni-ma-rgyal-mtshan, as follows. In Tibet the Yellow Church is widely flourishing; it is a most pure good land. The Dalai-Lama is presiding over the Buddhist Church of the western countries. He amply explains the sūtras and the dharma. Formerly he fed and maintained the lamas, while for all the affairs of state there were originally the four bka'-blon. Then aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal arbitrarily concentrated in himself all authority. He did not consult the bka'-blon, but ungratefully followed his own will. He secretly entertained rebellious plans. Therefore, the ambans resident in Tibet had him executed. Now inside Tibet everything is already peaceful again. The business of bka'-blon cannot be managed by one man alone. We therefore specially entrusted the governor-general Ts'e-riñ with the task of choosing good and competent men. According to the ancient rule, We have separately appointed four bka'-blon, to hold office jointly. You must be grateful for Our favours. You shall obey and honour the Dalai-Lama, shall exert yourself in a friendly manner, shall do your best in your office, shall not think of your private interests so as to arouse distrust or suspicions. You shall not be distrustful of each other, but shall esteem one another. Whatever important question arises, inform the Dalai-Lama and the ambans resident in Tibet, follow their directions and act accordingly. Grateful for this favour, exert yourselves in supporting Our wish to propagate the Yellow Church and to pacify mankind.
When this book was already in the press, Professor Tucci had the kindness to show me a manuscript in his possession, concerning the history of the chiefs of sTag-luñ¹. It is a valuable local chronicle, rich of interesting side-lights on Tibetan history. Of particular interest to us is its 36th and last chapter (ff. 387-442), containing the biography of Ts'e-rin-dban-rgyal, the author of the MBTJ. As Ts'e-rin-dban-rgyal played a not unimportant part in the history of the period, I shall proceed to give a short abstract of this text.

Ts'e-rin-dban-rgyal was the son of bKra-sis-c'os-rgyal of mDo-mk'ar in the territory of sTag-luñ, and was born in 1697. After having finished his studies in Lamaist theology, he was brought by his father to Lhasa at the court of Lha-bzañ Khan. In 1716 he was appointed tax-collector at Shigatse, and had occasion to meet the Tashi-Lama. In the next year he was acting as rdson-dpon of Shigatse, when the Dsungars stormed Lhasa. He accepted the de-facto government of the invaders, and stayed on at Shigatse in a doubtful position. When sTag-rtse-pa went to offer his prayers at bSam-yas (see back p. 50), Ts'e-rin-dban-rgyal accepted office under him, with the titles of mgron-gñer (steward) and druñ-yig (secretary); he acted as such on occasion of the state entry of the Seventh Dalai-Lama in Lhasa.

The disgrace and execution of sTag-rtse-pa dealt a sharp blow to his promising career. Ts'e-rin-dban-rgyal and his father were summoned by the Chinese to justify themselves; the son went into hiding in gNas-ts'an, the father was arrested, but later released on the intercession of P'o-lha-nas. In 1722 Ts'e-rin-dban-rgyal went to pay homage to the Dalai-Lama, and on this occasion P'o-lha-nas took him in his service as druñ-aṅkor (p. 72). In the next

¹) Full title: dpal stag luñ ga ziñi gduñ rabs zam ma c'ad par byon pa'i rnam t'ar no mts'ar nor bu'i do šal skye dgu'i yid aṅ'rog; ff. 448. Compiled by various authors between 1767 and 1769.

sTag-luñ is Talung of the maps, north-north-east of Lhasa on the road to Rva-sgrun.
year P'o-lha-nas was sent to the Hor country, and Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal remained in Lhasa as his vice-gerent in the office of risis-dpon (finance director) (p. 83). After his master's return, he seems to have gone on leave and to have resided for some time in his native place. On the occasion of the consecration of the Dalai-Lama (pp. 91-92) he returned to Lhasa, where he married.

When the civil war of 1727-1728 broke out, Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal continued to serve the Lhasa government. He was sent to the Tengrinor to lay hold of the soldiers of K'añ-c'en-nas. The Mongols of aDam gave him some troops, whom he led to join the Lhasa army in gTsañ. He took part in the battle of aBras-k'ud (pp. 111-112), as commander (ru-dpon) of the right wing. After the battle he was to go to Shigatse, but obtained instead leave to return for a spell to Lhasa; when the gTsañ troops resumed the offensive, he went back to his post. During the siege of Gyantse his headquarters were first at Mañ-ra. Then during the long months of inactivity at rGyal-mk'ar (rGyañ-mk'ar of the MBTJ, see back p. 115) he scoured the country with about 80 men to fetch victuals, sustaining several brushes with P'o-lha-nas's men (p. 116). The camp of the Lhasa army was shifted to Groñ-goñ (brGya-gron of the MBTJ, see back p. 118); then the armistice was concluded, after which the army retired to sNañ-dkar-rtse. When the news arrived of P'o-lha-nas's march to the north, Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal returned with Lum-pa-nas and sByar-ra-ba to Lhasa, but seems to have taken no further part in what little fighting still occurred.

After the surrender, the three bka'-blon gave large sums of money to P'o-lha-nas, in return for which he guaranteed their safety and allowed them plenty of freedom. As to Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal, P'o-lha-nas had decided to employ him again, and invited him to resume service. He hesitated for a while, fearing reprisals, but then presented himself (p. 133) and was very cordially received by P'o-lha-nas, who maintained his friendliness even against the protests of the noblemen of gTsañ. After the arrival of the Chinese and the trial of the ministers, Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal was deputed to accompany the exiled Dalai-Lama as far as aDam-t'ān. On his return to Lhasa, he was given the formal appointment as bka'-blon, the emperor sent him the seal of Taiji of a first-class Jasak, and P'o-lha-nas presented him with a dress of honour (pp. 139-140).

In the Bhutan affair Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal seems to have taken
no direct part. We read only that P'o-lha-nas and the Chinese representative Go (?) Lao-yeh went to Gyantse and despatched thence sPol-goñ Tarqan and sMan-t'eañ-ba to Bhutan; these two officers succeeded in establishing peace in that country (p. 147). When the Dalai-Lama returned to Lhasa, Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal went with P'o-lha-nas to meet him at Rva-sgreñ (p. 157). In 1736 he accompanied the Dalai-Lama and P'o-lha-nas on their visit to bKra-śis-lhun-po (p. 160). In the other big events of P'o-lha-nas's reign (death of the Tashi-Lama, installation of his successor, Dsungar embassy of 1743) Ts'er-riñ-dbañ-rgyal took also a great part, and the narrative in his biography usually confirms point by point the account given in Chapter XII of this book, without adding anything substantially new.

After the death of P'o-lha-nas and the accession of ḡGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal was in charge, together with duke Pandita, of the reception of the Dsungar embassy of 1748, and on their departure accompanied them as far as the Nag-c'u (p. 184). Shortly afterwards ḡGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, intoxicated with pride and lust of power, began behaving as a tyrant. The four ministers disapproved of his conduct, but remained silent, fearing for their own lives. During this period ḡGyur-med-rnam-rgyal used to carry out large hunting expeditions in the northern part of the country with a terrible slaughter of game, which scandalized an orthodox Buddhist like Ts'er-riñ-dbañ-rgyal. Early in 1750 the young king went to Rin-c'en-rtse. There he called Ts'er-riñ-dbañ-rgyal in his room, and before three witnesses accused him of writing seditious letters to the duke of mNa₂-ris. The minister tried to calm him, but ḡGyur-med-rnam-rgyal went berserk; he hurled at him a spear, which wounded instead a horse outside the room, and then another, which killed one P'un-ts'ogs-don-grub. With this, ḡGyur-med-rnam-rgyal seemed to be content, and Ts'er-riñ-dbañ-rgyal went off unscathed. From the whole account it seems that this was really a pathological case; like so many young and pampered princes succeeding to absolute power, this young Tibetan Caligula was slowly becoming insane. Ts'er-riñ-dbañ-rgyal was then sent to the Nag-c'u to meet and escort the daughter of the Čingwang, who was coming to Tibet (p. 194). We know that she was very late; while waiting on the Nag-c'u and suffering from discomfort and hunger, he received letters from officials in Lhasa advising
him to come back with some troops, as a revolt had taken place.

Events followed each other in quick succession: aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal and the ambans were killed, Pandita took power, Bandi tried and executed the culprits (according to our text, this happened at lCañ-lo-can), the Chinese commission arrived. Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal happened to be ill at that time, and this perhaps prevented him from exploiting the fluid situation in his favour. But he was no P'o-lha-nas; he was only a good official, with no taste for risk and without that streak of genius, which characterized his great dead master. When he recovered, he paid a visit to the Chinese commission, and Bandi, speaking with him in Mongolian, told him that he was confirmed as bka'-blon (p. 212). On 7/II = March 4th, 1751, the four new ministers presented themselves to their new sovereign the Dalai-Lama. On these and other occasions Ts'e-riñ-dbañ-rgyal acted as the chairman of the council, perhaps on account of his seniority. Even after the death of the Seventh Dalai-Lama in 1758, he maintained his post of minister under the De-mo Qutuqtu, who was appointed by the emperor as regent during the vacancy of the see and the minority of the Eighth Dalai-Lama; but he seems to have played a rather defaced role during those uneventful years. His death took place on the 6/X = November 10th, 1763.
CHRONOLOGICAL LISTS FOR THE PERIOD 1706-1751

I—Tibetan

A—The Dalai-Lama

6—Ts'an-s-dbyaṅs-rgya-mts'o 1683-1706
(Ye-šes-rgya-mts'o 1707-1717)
7—Blo-bzaṅ-bskal-bzaṅ-rgya-mts'o [1708] 1720-1757

B—The Tashi-Lama

2—Blo-bzaṅ-ye-šes-dpal-bzaṅ-po 1663-1737
3—Blo-bzaṅ-dpal-l丹-ye-šes 1738-1780

C—The K'ri Rin-po-che of dGa'-ldan

46—bSam-blo-sbyin-pa-rgya-mts'o 1692-1695
45—Ts'ul-k'rims-dar-rgyas (provisionally for a second term) 1695-1699
47—Blo-bzaṅ-c'os-ap'el 1699-1701
48—Don-grub-rgya-mts'o 1702-1708
49—Blo-bzaṅ-dar-rgyas 1708-1715
50—dGe-adun-p'un-ts'ogs 1715-1722
51—dPal-lDan-grags-pa 1722-1730
52—Mác-dbaṅ-c'os-ap'el 1730-1732
53—rGyal-mts'an-sen-ge 1732-1739
54—Mác-dbaṅ-mch'og-lDan 1739-1746
55—Mác-dbaṅ-nam-mk'a'-bzaṅ 1746-1750
56—Blo-bzaṅ-dri-med 1750-1757
57—bSam-gtan-p'un-ts'ogs 1757-1764

D—The Qōsot Khans in Tibet

Gušri Khan bKra-šis Bātur

1642-1655
1655-1660

1) I begin this series with the 46th K'ri Rin-po-che in order to form a continuation of the series given by Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*, List D in the Genealogical Tables after p. 706. Names and dates of my list are drawn from the *Collection of Biographies of the K'ri Rin-po-che*.


3) Died 17/XII of the year Wood-Horse = January 24th, 1655.

4) About 1660 divided his father's dominions with his brother, keeping the Kukunor region. He was the ancestor of most of the Kukunor khans.
Dayan Khan 1655–1668
bsTan-âdsin Dalai Khan 1668–1696
bsTan-âdsin dBañ-p'yug 1696–1697
Lha-bzañ Khan 1697–1717

E—The Tibetan government

*sde-srid* Sañs-rgyas-rgya-mts'o 1679–1705
*sde-srid* Nâg-dbañ-rin-c'en 1705–1706
direct government of the Qōsot Khan 1706–1717
*sa-skyon* sTag-rtse-pa Lha-rgyal-rab-brtan 1717–1720
Chinese military provisional government 1720–1721
Council of *bka'-blon*; chairman: K'añ-c'en-nas bSod-nams-rgyal-po 1) 1721–1727
Triumvirate 2) 1727–1728
P'ôlha-nas bSod-nams-stobs-rgyas, administrator, since 1740 "king" 1728–1747
âGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, "king" 1747–1750
dGa' bži Pandita, acting administrator 1750–1751
Dalai-Lama with council of four *bka'-blon* 1751–

F—Genealogy of the P'ôlha family

```
P'od-rgyal-po

| bSod-nams-stobs-rgyas, d. 1747 |
```

```
| Ye-ses-tsé-brtan, d. 1750 |
| aGyur-med-rnam-rgyal, d. 1750 |
```

```
P'un-ts'ogs-dbañ-po, d. 1750
```

```
| P'un-ts'ogs-dbañ-po, d. 1750 |
| aGyur-med-dbañ-rgyal |
```

```
Dar-rgyas-tsé-rin, d. 1751
```

G—Genealogy of the dGa' bži family

```
Unknown
```

```
dGa' bži-ba Tsé-brtan-rab-âbyams K'añ-c'en-nas, d. 1727
```

```
dGa' bži rNam-rgyal-tsé-brtan (duke Pandita), d. ca. 1790
```

2) Members: Na-p'od-pa, Lum-pa-nas, sByar-ra-ba.
CHRONOLOGICAL LISTS

II—Chinese

A—Emperors

Shêng-tsü (K‘ang-hsi) 1661-1722
Shih-tsung (Yung-chêng) 1722-1735
Kao-tsung (Ch‘ien-lung) 1735-1796

B—Chinese representatives in Lhasa

Ho-shou, envoy 1709-1711
Yansin, commander of the army 1720-1721
Ts’e-dbañ-nor-bu, commander of the garrison 1721-1723
Orai, amban 1723-1724
vacant 1724-1726
Oci and Bandi, ambans 1726
vacant 1726-1727
Señ-ge and Mala, envoys 1727-1728
Jalangga, commander of the expeditionary forces 1728

Ambans

Señ-ge and Mailu 1728-1733
Cingboo and Miyooseo 1733-1734
A-érh-hsün and Nasutai 1734
Nasutai alone 1734-1737
Hanggilu 1737-1739
Chi-shan 1739-1742 (?)
So-pai 1742-1745
Fucing 1745-1747
Fucing and So-pai 1747-1748
So-pai alone 1748
Labdon 1748-1749
Chi-shan 1749-1750
Chi-shan and Fucing 1750
Fucing and Labdon 1750
vacant 1750-1751
Bandi 1751
Chinese commission presided by Ts’e-riñ ²) 1751
Bandi and rNam-rgyal 1751-1752

¹) The dates are not those of appointment or dismissal, but those of actual taking or leaving office in Lhasa.
²) Members: Ts’e-riñ, Chao-hui, Bandi, rNam-rgyal.
III—Dzungar rulers 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bātur (Qutuyaitu)</td>
<td>162-1653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sean-ge</td>
<td>1653-1671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sāčān Khan</td>
<td>1671-1676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dGa’-ldan</td>
<td>1676-1697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ts’e-dban-rab-brtan</td>
<td>1697-1727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dGa’-ldan-ts’e-riñ</td>
<td>1727-1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ts’e-dban-rdo-rje-rnam-rgyal</td>
<td>1745-1750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bla-ma Dar-rgyas</td>
<td>1750-1753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zla-ba-çu’i</td>
<td>1753-1755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese occupation</td>
<td>1755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amursana</td>
<td>1755-1757</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Based on Courant.
I—CHINESE TEXTS

Ch'üng-shee-saō (for particulars see pp. 5—6).
Chung-t'ung jên-ming la-ts'au-tien, Shanghai 1933.
Man-chou-ming-chê'n-chüan (Biographies of famous Manchu officials); privately printed from archives.
Shêng-wu-chi (for particulars see p. 1).
Ta-ch'ing li-chao shih-lu (for particulars see p. 5).
Wei-tsang-t'ung-chih (for particulars see p. 5).

II—TIBETAN TEXTS

Autobiography of the Second Tashi-Lama (for particulars see pp. 2—3).
Autobiography of the Third Tashi-Lama (for particulars see p. 3).
Biographies of the K'ri Rin-po-che (for particulars see pp. 4—5).
Chronicle of the chiefs of sTag-lun (for particulars see p. 263).
Index (dkar-c'ag) to the bKa'-agyur of sNar-tza.
Klön-rdol Bla-ma, Chronological tracts (for particulars see p. 4).
Life of the Seventh Dalai-Lama (for particulars see p. 2).
Lon-ba'i-dmigs-bu (for particulars see p. 4).
Mi-dbari-rtags-brjod (for particulars see p. 3).
Sum-pa MK'ian-po, dPag-bsam-ljon-bsan (2nd part), ed. by S. Ch. Das, Calcutta 1908.

III—WORKS AND TRANSLATION IN EUROPEAN LANGUAGES

Bell, The religion of Tibet, Oxford 1931.
——, Tibet past and present, Oxford 1924.
Brunnert and Hagelstrom, Present day political organization in China, Shanghai 1912.
Cicconi, Il Tibet dagli scritti di un missionario francescano lorese nel secolo 18°, in Atti e memoria del Convegno dei geografi orientalisti, Macerata 1911, pp. 144-151.
Courant, L'Asie Centrale au XVIe et XVIIe siècles; empire kalmouk ou empire mantchou? (Annales de l'Université de Lyon, Nouv. Série, II, fasc. 26), Lyon 1912.
S. Ch. Das, Contributions to the religion, history etc. of Tibet: V, The lives of the Panchhen Rinpoche, in JASB 1882, pp. 18-52.
——, Journey to Lhasa and Central Tibet, London 1904.
——, The life of Sumpa-mkhanpo, in JASB 1889, pp. 37-84 (tables of the Re'u-mig).
——, Tibetan jails and criminal punishments, in PASB 1894, pp. 5-8.
Desideri, An account of Tibet, transl. by De Filippi (revised edition), London 1937.
Diskalkar, Bogle's embassy to Tibet, in IHQ IX (1933), pp. 420-438.
Du Halde, Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique et physique de l'empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise (4 vols.), Paris 1735.
Fairbank and Têng, On the transmission of Ch'ing documents, in HJAS IV (1939), pp. 12-46.
Filchner, Om mani padme hum, Leipzig 1929.
Fuchs, Beiträge zur mandjurischen Bibliographie und Literatur, Tôkyô 1936.
——, Der Jesuiten Atlas der Kanghsi-Zeit (Monumenta Serica Monograph IV), Peking 1943.
Giorgi, Alphabetum Tibetanum, Rome 1762.
Grousset, L'empire des steppes, Paris 1941.


Ivanovskij, De la conquête du Tibet par les Chinois, in *Muséon* III (1884), pp. 165-181.


Mémoires concernant l'histoire, les sciences . . . des Chinois (16 vols.), Paris 1776-1795.


Schäfer, *Geheimnis Tibet*, Munich 1943.

Schulemann, *Die Geschichte der Dalailamas*, Heidelberg 1911.

Terzorio (Fr. Clemente da), *In India e nel Tibet, Missionari Italiani nel paese dei lamà*, Rome 1932.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

—__, Tibetan Notes, in *HJAS* XII (1949), pp. 477—496.
—__, and Gherzi, *Cronaca della missione scientifica Tucci nel Tibet occidentale* (1933), Rome 1934.


—__, Notes on the Ma-gu-ta or Charung Kashar stupa, in *PASB* 1892, pp. 186-189.
—__, *The Buddhism of Tibet or Lamaism*, London 1895.

INDEX

I—TIBETAN 1)

Ka-spe 146
Ka-spe Bla-ma Don-grub 146, 147
Ka-ro-la 109, 187
Kam-la 122n
Karma-pa 85n, 146
Kun-dga'-'bstan-adsin 172
Kun-dga'-'nor, 13
Kon-po 32, 33, 60, 66, 68, 102, 105–107, 109, 115, 121, 123, 127, 196, 249n
Kom-kre 108
Klu-sbugs 39, 40
Kloṅ-rdol Bla-ma Ngag-dbaṅ-blo-bzaṅ 4
dKa'-'bcu Ngag-dbaṅ-dpal-mgon 57, 58
dKa'-'c’en bKra-sis 109
dKa'-'c’en Blo-bzaṅ-dar-rgyas 52
dkar-'c’ang 145
dKon-m’og-lha-sgrab 250
dKon-gner-'c’en-po Rab-ḥbyams-kun-bzaṅ 164n
bKa'-'agyur 22a, 116, 145, 179
bKa'-'agyur Ta Bla-ma Blo-bzaṅ-tsul-k’rims 60
bKa'-'drin-rin-'c’en 169
bka’-'bIon 60, 67, 127, 139, 151, 163, 190-192, 211-213, 220, 223, 224, 234, 236, 244, 245, 251, 257, 258, 261, 262
bka’-'sag 225, 257
bka’-'gdo-bIon 63, 67, 81
bka’-'mdun-na-adon 48, 67
bKra-sis-k’ana’ 38
bKra-sis-sgan 116, 117
bKra-sis-c’os-rgyal 263
bKra-sis-c’os-rdoṣ 145
bKra-sis-dpal-ra 101
bKra-sis Bātur 267
bKra-sis-rtses-pa 35, 37, 39, 63
bKra-sis-rab-brtan 256
bKra-sis-lhun-po 3n, 11n, 14, 18, 22, 24, 41, 43, 48-52n, 61, 65, 70, 72, 78, 86, 93, 102, 104, 109, 110, 114, 143, 144, 159-162, 164, 167, 169, 177n, 181, 182, 184, 187, 193, 195, 237, 265
sKar-ma-t’an 60
sku-gner-'c’en-po 144
sKn-mdun sNags-rams-pa bSam-gtan-rgyal-mtsan 65

sKu-‘bIon (Kumbum) 19, 26, 27, 35, 36, 42, 44, 57, 59
sKu-‘bIon (near Lhasa) 37
skor-lcag-pa 226
sKya-k’ang-pa 101, 108
sKyi-sbug dPa-baṅ-adus 103
sKyid-c’u 35, 36, 43n, 47, 62, 63, 117, 121n, 123, 168
sKyi-pa-taṅ-pa 101, 108, 109
sKyi-r’on 21n, 52n, 105, 106, 139
sKyi-lod 40, 43, 130
sKye-ts’al-klu-sdins 36
sKyor-lun 134
sKyi-lun 227

K’aṅ-c’en 28, 46
sKam 13, 35, 42, 56, 63, 64, 91, 136n-138, 151, 156, 175
k’al 229
K’u-adus 30, 31
K’o-k’om 70
K’yun-po 84
K’yun-rdoṣ-dkar-po 108
K’yé-rag 116
k’ri-skor 218
K’ri Rin-po-c’e 4, 5, 138, 267
K’ri Rin-po-c’e dGe-adun-p’un-ts’ogs 33, 61, 65, 267
K’ri Rin-po-c’e rGyal-mtsan-seṅ-ge 138, 157, 267
K’ri Rin-po-c’e Ngag-dbaṅ-c’os-ap’el 138, 267
K’ri Rin-po-c’e Ngag-dbaṅ-m’og-lordan 91n, 267
K’ri Rin-po-c’e Ngag-dbaṅ-nam-mk’a’-bzaṅ 192, 267
K’ri Rin-po-c’e Don-grub-rgya-mtsan 10n-13, 267
K’ri Rin-po-c’e dPal-lordan-grags-pa 83, 91, 122, 126, 130, 138, 267
K’ri Rin-po-c’e Blo-bzaṅ-c’os-ap’el 267

1) Tibetan words in phonetic transcription are found in the General Index.
INDEX

275

K'ri Rin-po-che Blo-bza-dar-rgyas 61, 71, 267
K’ri Rin-po-che Blo-bza-dri-med 192, 267
K’ri Rin-po-che Ts’ul-k’rims-dar-rgyas 267
K’ri Rin-po-che bSag-gtan-pun-ts’ogs 267
K’ri Rin-po-che bSam-blo-sbyin-pa-rgya-mts’o 267
K’ri-sro’i-lde-btsan 71
k’rims-k’yi-ka’lo-po 22, 227
k’rims-k’yi-tal-lce-mk’ian 98, 226
k’rims-sin 133
k’rom-gtigs-k’ian 198n, 209, 252, 254
mk’ian-po 91, 257
mKCan-po
mk’ian-Po
mKCan-po
Gun
guKruils-rabs-lha-k’ian
Gun-t’ail
GuSri
Gar-abrog
Gar-pa 122, 123, 248
Gar-ar-brog 120
Gu-ge 70, 116
GuSri Khan 8, 9, 14, 82, 177, 217, 219-221, 267
Gun t’ail
Gu-ge
GuSri
36,
Grub-mt’as-la-ris-su-ccad-pa-med-pa 71
Grub-dban-sems-dpa-’c’en-po 121
Grva-bsh 36, 37, 153, 154, 237
grub-mt’as-la-ris-su-ccad-pa-med-pa 71
Grub-dban-sems-dpa-’c’en-po 121
Gro-sod 53, 103
Gro-sa-lhas 105
Gro’gon 264
Gron-smad 36
Glag-sgya-ri 32
Glin-dkar 120
Glo-ba-fe-ba bSag-gtan-adsin-dgos-skyes 110
DGa’l-lan (Dzungar ruler) 10, 62, 65, 270
DGa’l-lan (monastery) 4, 12, 27, 43, 138, 190, 192, 267
DGa’l-lan (palace in aBras-spun) 12
DGa’l-lan (palace in Lhasa) 76
DGa’l-lan-k’ian-gsar 8, 128, 143, 151, 184
DGa’l-lan-c’os-ap’el 116, 117
DGa’l-lan-bstan-adsin 26
DGa’l-lan-pun-ts’ogs 250
DGa’l-lan P’un-ts’ogs-glin 51; see P’un-ts’ogs-glin
DGa’l-lan-p’o-bran 145
DGa’l-lan-ts’e-dban 106
DGa’l-lan-ts’e-rin 135, 166, 168, 171, 182, 270
DGa’l-lan l’rdani Ju-na’n 61, 70
DGa’l-mo 123
DGa’l-ts’an-k’o-ts’as 86
DGa’l-bzhi family 143, 163, 234, 268
DGa’l-bzhi Pandita Ts’ab-rdo-rin. rNam-rgyal-ts’e-brtan 106n, 143, 163, 172, 268; see Pandita
DGa’l-bzhi-ba Ts’e-brtan-rab-abyams 104-106, 143, 268
dgun-blon 133

dGu’i-blon Taiji 107
dge-ts’ul 65, 102
dGe-lugs-pa 45, 93, 95, 188, 216
(Jasak Ta Bla-ma) dGe-legs C’os-rje 90
dGe-legs-c’os-ap’el 18
dge-slo’i 91
dGon-lun 88
mGar 156
mGar-t’ar 90, 156; see Ka-ta
mGo-po 249
mgton-gsher 164, 176, 199, 208, 212, 225, 252-258, 263
aGyur-med-dban-rgyal 192, 196, 209, 210, 268
aGyur-med-ts’se-brtan, aGyur-med-ye-ses-ts’se-brtan 97n
rGya-mdas 249n
rGya-abum-sga’n 38
rGyan-dkar-gon-ma 115n
rGyan-mk’ar 115, 116
rGyal-mk’ar 118, 263
rGyal-mk’ar-ts’se 3. 16; see Gyantse
rgyal-t’sab 223
rGyud-smad Slob-dpon Nag-dba-n-me’og-lan 91; see K’ri Rin-po-che N.
SGar-t’og 46, 106
sgar-dpon 235
sGo-mans 121, 176
sGrol-ma-bk’ri ride 21
brGya-gron 118, 263
Na-p’od-pa rDo-rje-rgyal-po 60, 62, 68, 72, 75, 88-90, 95, 96, 99, 100, 103, 105, 121, 127, 128, 131, 134, 136, 244-246, 249, 250, 268n
(Jaisang) Nag-dba-n-dge-adun 182
Nag-dba-n-bde-’c’en 51; see Bon-rigs N.
Nag-dba-n-blo-bzan 87
Nag-dba-n-blo-bzan 8; see Dalai-Lama, Fifth
Nag-dba-n-rin-’c’en 10, 268
Nag-dba-n-ye-ses-rgya-mt’so 13, 44, 91; see Dalai-Lama, puppet Sixth
Nag-dba-n-yon-tan 53
Nam-rins 52, 104, 113-115, 139
mNa’ris-gnu 147
INDEX

279

Zaï-thaï 53
Zaï-wyaï 91
Zab-don-lhun-rtsé 145
Zla-ba-qi 270
gZims-agag Zaïl-nô 113
gzugs-bsun 71

3U-yug 85n, 121
3u-lag 211, 223, 225, 231, 232, 258
3Od-gsal-lha-rigs 39
3Ol-k'a 28, 44
3Ol-k'a sTag-rtsé 95

Yaïs-pa-can 85n, 121, 187
Yam-bu 70
Yu-lsbus-sde 122
Yu-sul 84
Ye-raï 70
Ye-sê-rgya-mts'o 64n, 267; see Dalai-Lama, puppet Sixth
Ye-sê-s-p'run-las 144
Ye-sê-s-ts'e-brtan 97n, 128, 143, 147, 169, 172-174, 182, 188-196, 199n, 209, 234, 268
Yons-adsin-c'en-po 97
Yon-tau-legs-sgrub 176
gYag-sde Ram-pa-ba 48
gYaï-ра 61, 121
gYaś-ru 33
gYu-ru 33

Rva-sgreï 61, 157, 184, 263n, 265
ra-ma? 81
Ra-mo-c'e 27n
Ra-sa aPrul-snaï 80
Rab-btani 256
Rab-btanz-dpal-aybor 101
Rab-abyams-pa 73n
Ri-rgyal gS'en-dar 44
Rig-adsin gTer-c'en C'os-kyi-rgyal-po 95
Ri-rdsoi-nas 174, 175
Rin-c'en-spons 120
Rin-c'en-spons-pa 146
Rin-c'en-rtsé 22, 48, 51, 104, 109, 110, 210, 265
Ru-t'og 106
ru-dpon 264
Ru-lag 33
Rog-c'e 72

La-stod 52
Lag-ngon-po 256
lag-âbâ 229
lag-yon 229
las-slob 91
Li-t'ai, see Litang
Li-t'ai T'ub-c'en-byans-glaï 17
Lu-ma-dgo-dmar 108
Lu'nag Ŭel-dkar 51. 75

Lu'n-dmar 50
Le-ne-k'a 110
Legs-glaï Nag-dbañ-ajam-dpal 105
legs-abul 192
Lotsawa Lha-bsun 61

Šaïs 28, 72, 85n, 164
Šaïs-c'u 121n
Šaïs-pa Ras-c'en 108
Śin-sgo-Ihtag-gyon 23
Śel-dkar-k'ul-mk'ar 210
Śel-dkar-(rdson), 53, 78, 104, 144, 148
Śel-dkar rdO-rje-rdson 51n
Śel-dkar Mi-agyur-rdo-rje 51
Sa-skya 51n, 108, 117, 118, 122, 146
sa-skyon 43, 222
Sa-k'ud-nas 164
Sa-k'ud-pa 111, 113
Sa-dga?-rdson 78n
sa-n'an 28
Saïs-rgyas-rgya-mts'o 9, 10, 35, 218, 222, 227, 268
Sum-pa mK'an-po 27n, 121, 122n
se-t'am 101
Se-ra 12, 27, 36, 38, 80, 103, 113, 127, 128, 130, 142, 148, 153
Sen-ge (Dzungar ruler) 269
Sen-ge (Mongol officer) 99, 100, 102, 113, 114, 126, 129, 131, 140, 142, 144, 148, 152-154, 236, 245, 246, 248-250
Sen-ge-nram-rgyal 70
Sen Ta-thi 140; see Šen-ge
Seü-rtse, 72
Sog 122
Srad-c'u 22n
Srad-nañ 21n
Sri-gocd-ts'e-brtan 133, 139, 186, 211, 251, 257, 261, 262
srid-skyon 223n
Sroñ-btsan-sgam-po 156, 227
gSaïs-c'en-saï-po 93
gsaï-ste 91
gSer-k'og 88
gser-dpon 227
gser-yig-pa 227
gser-yig-pa-c'en-po 22
gsol-dpon 175, 257
bSam-grub-glaï-pa 22, 104
bSam-grub-rtse-pa 35
bSam-sgrub-sgañ 142
bSam-gtan-glaï 44
bSam-Ldïi 44
II—GENERAL

Numbers printed in Clarendon indicate that the Chinese characters of the name may be found on that page.

abhicāra 92
Ačitu 18
A-ērh-hsün 154, 161n, 234, 269
A-ērh-pu-pa 244; see Na-p’od-pa
Áká Taijí 31
alakāra 4
A-la-pu-tan 256
aliha amban 131, 137
amban 74, 89, 151, 153, 157, 161, 164, 169,
175, 179, 187, 189, 190, 197, 200, 203,
205, 206, 208, 210-215, 236-240, 248,
256, 259, 260, 262, 269
Amdo 42, 87
Andombá 17n, 25n
Amursana 270
Angchen-gompa 85n
Angelico da Brescia 21n
Añam 160n
Anterior Tibet 139, 140, 245, 251
Arantai 172
Ārdānī Jaisang 17
Ārdānī Fjiong 84
Ārkā Daicing 23
ashan-i amban 74, 81, 83-86, 102n
Aṣīta 29
Assam 67n
Atag Hopchiga 85n
Avalokiteśvara 11, 16
Ayuki 148
Baksi 46
Bandi 90, 92-94, 195, 196, 202, 203, 205-
209, 213, 246, 254, 260, 266, 269
Baring Taijí 23
Batang 56, 66, 69, 89, 162, 238, 260
Bathor Tacy 17n
Bátur 269
Bayasqulang rDo-rje Jaisang 167
beile 147
beise 66, 140, 212
Beligatti, Cassiano 7, 16, 99n, 133n, 158n,
173, 225n, 226, 230, 232
Belluga 220n
Bhatgaon 70
Bhutan 21-24, 28, 55, 70, 145-147, 161,
163n, 173, 264, 265
bičāli 13, 22, 75, 87, 201, 209, 237, 248, 255
biči'yāli 75
bili 50
bīhesi 75, 81
Boitalaq 26
Bonaventura dalla Pedona 21n
Brahmaputra 67n
Bronze 163
CHINA AND TIBET IN THE EARLY 18TH CENTURY

Murui-usu 85n, 86, 170  
Mu-ts’an mk’can-po Bla-ma 84n

Nai-ko 149; see Neige
Nangkartse, see sNa-h-dkar-rtse
Nang-su 164n
Nārōpā 145
Nasutai 154, 157, 160, 161, 269
Neige 149, 155-157
nei-ko 238
nei-ko hsüeh-shih 14n, 81n, 92
Nepal 20n, 21, 51, 70, 108, 165n, 228
New Year’s Day 7, 52n, 59, 65, 72, 76, 87, 91, 118, 142, 147, 152, 184, 192, 193
Nien Keng-yao 56, 62n, 69, 72, 73, 79, 82, 84, 87n-90
Noyan Qosüei 120
No-yen Lin-ch’iin-ch’i-lei-la-pu-chi 147n

Oci (O-ch’i) 90, 92, 94, 99, 100, 244
Odon-tala 60n
O-erh-tsai 247
Office for Administrative Deliberations 244, 246, 250, 251
Oirat 32
O-lai 81; see Orai
Ölöt 102
Omosu 120
Orai 81, 83, 85, 88, 89, 269
O-ta-erh-han-ka-erh-tsang-chu-ta-erh 250

Padmasambhava 44, 93
Padshah 114
Pa-li-kun 144
Paljor-rabtan 38, 47
Palti lake 119n, 139
Pan-kun 175
Pan-ti 90; see Bandi
Paro, see P’sa-gro
Pa-te’ma 72; see Padma
Pa-te’ma-ku-erh-chi-ch’un-p’i-lo 256
Patna 20n, 21n
pa-tsung 199n
Pattan 70
Pei-lung-sha-kho-pa 256
Peking 5n, 9, 11-13, 15, 16, 18-20, 57-60, 64, 69, 70, 81, 87n, 91-94, 99, 100, 102, 103, 113, 131, 135, 137, 139, 141, 144, 147, 149, 154n-157, 159, 164, 169, 170, 175-177, 182, 184-186, 193, 195, 202, 203, 205, 209, 212-214, 232, 236, 239, 241, 248
Peter I (of Russia) 25n
Phari 139, 146n
Phongdu 61n, 121n
Pindsoling 51n
P’u-te’ieh-sihh 75
Po, 54, 208

P’o-lo-nai 3; see P’o-lha-nas
Po-mu-pao 30
Potfa 12, 13, 37, 39-41, 59, 61-63, 65, 102n, 121, 123, 126-128, 130, 133, 135, 137, 143, 155, 158, 184, 199, 200, 212, 249, 254
Prževalskij 83n
pu-ch’eng shih-szu 73n, 75
Pu-lu-k’o-pa 55n
Pu-lung-tsan 163
Pumthang 23n, 24
pu-yuan ya-mén 248n

Qaraqada 170
qosi-yuci, qosi-yun-odo 18n
Qosots 8, 9, 12-15, 23, 30, 31, 33, 34, 43, 44, 82, 121, 178, 217, 218, 220n-222, 224, 226, 267, 268
qosi-ti 18n
qubilyan 17-19, 58
Qutuyaitu 269

Rangchu 120n
Régis, J. B. 15
Renat, J. G. 31
Rinpung-dsong 120n
risbādha 106

Sācān 269
Sācān Hāsīha 256
Sa-hai 194
Saka-jung 78n
Samada 111
san-chih ta-ch’ên 247n
Sanji 27n, 42
Sé-chu-té-sé-pu-t’êng 251; see Sri-gocdtš’e-brtan
Sé-erh-k’o-ma 258
Sé-erh-tu’ 73; see Sertu
Sengju (Sheng-chu) 20, 73
Sèng-ko 99; see Sen-ge
Sereng 56; see Ts’e-riin
Sertu 73-75
shang-ch’o-t’ê-pa 257
Shang-ch’o-t’ê-pa La-chapu 256
shang-shu 14n
Shekar-dsong 51n
Shéng-tsan 78, 90, 268
Shensi 89, 130, 141, 148, 152, 162, 203, 246-248
Shentsa-dsong 72n
Shigatse (g2is-dkar-rtse) 22n, 45, 51, 85n, 92, 109, 110, 112, 115, 137n, 119, 121, 201, 201n, 238, 263, 264
Shih Ju-chin 73
shih-lang 14n, 74
Shih-tsung 159, 268
shih-tu hsieh-shih 73n
shih-wei 18n
Western Tibet 28, 42, 46, 68, 85n, 106, 139
Wu-ho-tu 165; see Uqatu

Yalung-chiang 82n
Yang-pa-ching 85
Yang Ta-li 148, 151
Yangtze-kiang 60
Yansin 57, 60, 62, 63, 69, 269
Yarkand 28, 214
Yen Ch'ing-ju 248
Yen-hsin 57; see Yansin
Yin-chi-shan 203
Yin-jui 253

Yüan 10, 240
yüan-wai-lang 73n
yu-chi 247n, 253
Yüeh Chung-ch'i 84, 88, 89, 129, 185, 189-191, 202, 203, 205, 206, 208, 240, 248, 249, 252, 253
Yung-ch'eng 5, 78, 95, 140, 159, 160n, 187, 240, 241, 268
Yung-ho-kung 241
Yün-li 157
Yün-nan 69, 79, 82, 130, 141, 148, 247
Yün-t'i 51, 55n, 57-60
Yü-pao 166, 167, 182-184