NEPAL's Quinquennial Missions To CHINA
Nepal’s QUINQUENNIAL MISSIONS To China

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KATHMANDU
1986
Published by:
Mrs. Purna Devi Manandhar, and
Mrs. Puspa Mishra
Kathmandu.

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First Edition 1986

Price Rs. 10/-

printed at: INAP PRESS, Bangemudha, Kathmandu
To.

Our Daughters
Preface

This book is designed to analyze different aspects of Nepal's quinquennial missions to China, which are still controversial to writers and historians.

The book is divided into six chapters. The first chapter analyzes, in brief, Sino-Nepali relations during the ancient and medieval periods, and the second chapter explains how the mission system started in 1792. In the third chapter a short history of Nepali missions, sent to China from 1792 to 1906, has been discussed, and the fourth chapter analyzes the journey complications of these missions. British and Chinese attitude towards these missions forms the subject of the next chapter, and in the last chapter we have tried to analyze how far the Nepali missions were tributary in nature. At the end we have produced some unpublished documents as appendices.

The book is mainly based on unpublished original sources derived from Indian National Archives, New Delhi; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu; and Royal Nepali Army Head-quarter, Kathmandu. Relevant books and articles have also been utilised at proper places.

We thank Sri Mahesh Kumar Upadhyaya, the then Dean, Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences (now Vice Chancellor, Tribhuvan University) for giving us an opportunity to undertake this research.

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Abbreviations

Bikram Sambat  B. S.
Indian National Archives, New Delhi  INA
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu  MFA
Royal Nepali Army Head-quarter, Kathmandu  RNAH
CHAPTER I

Historical Background

The history of Sino-Nepali relations is very old. Although the political missions were exchanged between the two countries only in the seventh century, Nepal and China had links through cultural delegations much earlier and the chief source of these links was Buddhism. The Nepali chronicles mention that several centuries before the Christian era, a religious divine, Manjushri, came to the Kathmandu Valley from Mahachina (Greater China) to pay homage to Swoyambhu Nath (a Buddhist deity). Further, it is claimed that Manjushri not only made the Kathmandu Valley habitable by draining out the water that filled the area, but appointed Dharmakara to be the first king of Nepal. Thus the Chinese religious divine was credited for starting a new civilization in Nepal.¹

The fifth century A.D. opens a new phase in the history of Sino-Nepali cultural relation. In the beginning of that century, a noted Buddhist monk and scholar from China, Fa-hsien, visited Kapilvastu and Lumbini, the home town and birthplace of Lord Buddha respectively, in course of his fifteen-year long visit to India. The significance of the visit of Fa-hsien lies in the fact that it was followed by the visit of a Nepali Buddhist scholar, Buddha Bhadra, to China, and the Chinese traveller was given credit for making Buddha Bhadra’s

visit to China a success.² Fa-hsien’s visit also encouraged the other Chinese monks to come to Nepal for pilgrimage, and one such Chinese Buddhist monks was Chi Meng, who visited Kapilvastu during the second decade of fifth century i.e. ten years after Fa-hsien.³

After the emergence of the Tang dynasty in 618, Sino-Nepali relations entered into a new phase. Shortly after, another Chinese Buddhist scholar, Hsuan-tsang, visited Nepal in course of his sixteen-year long visit to India. Despite differences between the writers on the question of the Chinese scholar’s visit to the Kathmandu Valley,⁴ his narration about Nepal was rarely challenged. In a way Hsuan-tsang was the first Chinese traveller to introduce Nepal among the foreigners. At about the same time, Nepal and China came closer through a matrimonial alliance, when the strong ruler of Tibet, Srong-tsen Gampo, married a Nepali princess, Bhrikuti by name, and also a Chinese princess, Wen-Cheng Kung-Chu. Though the Nepali writers have identified Bhrikuti in different ways, her marriage with the Tibetan ruler was challenged. This matrimonial alliance was of special importance in the political history of the Nepal. The Nepali monarch, Udaya Dev, who was dethroned by his brother with the help of the powerful Guptas, took political asylum in Tibet and his son,


Narendra Dev was able to take back his throne of Nepal, with the help of the Tibetan ruler. It was during the reign of Narendra Dev that Sino-Nepali relations were formalized through the exchange of political mission. From that time onwards, the Chinese travellers used the new route via Tibet and Nepal to reach India. Similarly it also paved way for Nepal's direct contact with China via Tibet.

A Chinese mission, led by Li-I-Pias and Wang Hsuan-tse and consisted of twenty-two persons, was the first one to use the new route to reach India from China. On its way, in Nepal the mission was cordially received by King Narendra Dev who had just captured power from the hands of the powerful Guptas. It seems that the mission halted at the Kathmandu Valley to congratulate the new ruler. The return journey of the mission also took place via Nepal, and the mission once again got warm farewell from the Nepali Court. The visit of the Chinese mission to Nepal was followed by the return visit of the Nepali mission to China sent by King Narendra Dev in 647.

The Sino-Nepali friendship was demonstrated just after a year in 648, when the Nepali King helped the Chinese envoy by placing more than 7000 cavalry under his (Chinese envoy) command to fight against Arunaswo (a Chieftian of late King Harshavardhan of India), who had insulted the Chinese envoy in public. After three years, in 651, King Narendra Dev sent one more political mission to China under his own son with

5. For details see Hit Narayan Jha, The Licchavis, Banaras; Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1970.


7. Rose, f. n. 4, p. 11.
valuable presents to the Chinese Emperor. It was followed by a Chinese political mission which visited Nepal in 657 under Wang Hsuan-tse, with valuable gifts to the Nepali monarch, a model followed by Nepal six years earlier. Wang Hsuan-tse was the first Chinese official to write a few lines about Nepal, which throws sufficient light on the various aspects of Nepali life during the period of Narendra Dev. Thus it would be appropriate to say that the political relations were established between Nepal and China during the reign of Narendra Dev through the exchange of official missions.

The Sino-Nepali political relations, however, did not continue for a long time. It was discontinued almost immediately after it started. We do not have evidences of any Nepali or Chinese mission visiting each other's country for many centuries. One probable reason, given by historians, for the discontinuance of Sino-Nepali relation was the dissatisfaction of Tibet over these affairs. The historians argue that Tibet closed her route for the exchange of Nepali and Chinese missions, and as a result, the newly established political relations between the two countries was automatically allowed to be terminated. This, however, did not prevent the Chinese monks from visiting Nepal. Firstly because the Tibetans allowed, as usually, the non-political figures to use the Tibetan route to reach Nepal or India, and secondly because, the Buddhist monks and scholars were determined to visit the sacred places of Buddhism even if they had to pass through long route. To give examples: One Chinese mission visited Nepal via Tibet in 665 under the leadership of Huan Chaio, and similar mission visited the Himalayan kingdom during the third quarter of

10. Rose, f. n. 4, pp. 11-12.
Sino-Nepali relations once again revived during the second half of the thirteenth century, when the powerful Mongol ruler, Kubalai Khan, founded Yuan dynasty in China. This time the relations between the two countries revived not in the form of the exchange of political missions, rather a Nepali artist, Araniko by name, could establish his artistic glory in China, demonstrating the superior artistic quality of the Nepali people. The Chinese sources mention that Emperor Kubalai Khan wanted to erect a golden stupa and for this purpose the Emperor’s spiritual teacher requested King Jayabhima Dev of Nepal to send one hundred artists to China. Araniko, a young man of 17 years, was selected to lead the delegation of Nepali artists. Firstly he was entrusted with the task of building a golden pagoda style monastery at Lhasa, just to taste his artistic quality. Being convinced by the working techniques of Araniko, Pags-pa, the spiritual teacher of the Emperor, presented the Nepali artist before Kubalai Khan. The Emperor soon realized the artistic genius of Araniko and made him the Chief Director of workers in bronze. Before his death in China in 1306, Araniko received the high distinction of “Kwang Lue Typhe Liang Ko Kung and Nasathu” from the Chinese Emperor. Even after his death, the Nepali artist was honoured with the order of Minhui (genius). After Araniko’s death, his sons continued to work in China.

13. Ibid.
With the rise of the Ming dynasty in China during the third quarter of the fourteenth century, the system of mutual exchange of missions between Nepal and China was once again revived. But this time the Ming rulers contacted the Rama family (a power section of nobility) by sending missions to and receiving missions from them, ignoring the Malla rulers of the Kathmandu Valley. As regards the question why the Chinese Emperors had direct links with the Rama family instead of the real rulers, one Nepali writer has given two reasons. Firstly the members of the Rama family were the powerful nobles, and failing to suppress them, the Malla rulers had given them key posts to win their favour. As a result, Nepal’s relations with Tibet and China were handled by them. Secondly, the members of Rama family were the Buddhist per excellence, and it was natural that the Chinese missions, sent under the Buddhist monks, were received by this powerful section of nobility in the Kathmandu Valley. Considering the Chinese missions as of cultural than the political nature, the Malla rulers also allowed the Rama family to continue relations with the Chinese court.¹⁵

The first three Emperors of the Ming dynasty sent one mission each to Nepal, and one special mission was sent to Nepal on the occasion of the “Coronation” of Sakti Singh Rama. In return the powerful nobles Madan Rama and Sakti Singh Rama sent several missions to China. A lot of valuable gifts were carried by each of these missions. Valuable clothes and silver coins were the main Chinese gifts to Nepal, whereas Nepal sent books on Buddhism, horses of superior quality and miniature of golden stupas as presents to the Chinese Emperor.¹⁶ It is believed that from 1384 to 1427, Nepal sent seven missions to China and received five such missions from the latter. Afte


the suppression of the Rama family, however, the Malla rulers terminated all diplomatic connections with the Ming dynasty.17

In 1644 a new dynasty (Manchus) came into power in China. But we do not have documents to deal with Sino-Nepali relations during the first few decades of the Manchu rule, rather during that period Nepal-Tibet relations formed the integral part of Nepal's foreign policy. The eighteenth century began with a civil war in Tibet, in which the Manchu ruler of China actively supported one group and established his control over the Tibetan affairs by stationing two Chinese Residents known as Ambans, at the Tibetan capital.18 By mid-eighteenth century, the Tibetans revolted against the Chinese domination but were easily suppressed. In order to prevent such eventualities, the powers of the Ambans were sufficiently increased by limiting the authority of the Tibetan Kajis (Cabinet members).19

At a time when the Chinese were busy in consolidating their position in Tibet, the Malla rulers of Kathmandu Valley fought several wars with the Gorkhali King, Prithvi Narayan Shah. This resulted in the conquest of the Malla kingdoms of the Katmandu Valley and creation of modern Nepal by Prithvi Narayan Shah in 1769.20 After this, Sino-Nepali relations entered into a new but controversial phase, with Tibetan affairs dominating the situation. Despite regular contacts between

17. Rose, f. n. 4, p. 12.
Nepal and China through the Chinese *Amban* at Lhasa, both the countries were placed at uneasy situation due to Tibet’s commercial disputes with Nepal. Nepal wanted Chinese help and support to strengthen her (Nepal) commercial position in the land of the Lamas, but, keeping in view the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, the *Ambans* wanted to intervene in the situation in favour of Tibet. The Sino-Nepali confrontation on Tibetan affairs finally gave birth to the system of sending quinquennial missions by Nepal to China.
CHAPTER II

Origin of The Mission System

The system of sending quinquennial mission to China by Nepal made its beginning in the year 1792 when the latter lost a war in the hands of the former. Thus it is interesting to note that Nepal sent her quinquennial missions to China not as a gesture of friendship but as an obligation imposed upon her by the Chinese Commander. As the system of sending these missions had originated as a stigma of defeat, many writers do not hesitate to mention them as tributary missions. Before to accept or reject this version, it is desirable first to analyze as to how the system of sending five-yearly missions to China started in 1792.

To begin with, the Sino-Nepali war of 1791-92 was not an outcome of any dispute between the two contracting parties, nor was it fought with the aim of seizing Nepal’s territory by China or vice versa, rather the Tibetan affairs dragged both the countries at the battle ground. Nepal argued that China had unjustly interfered in the Nepal-Tibet affairs in favour of the latter, whereas China accused Nepal of having aggressive designs in the land of the Lamas. Both are correct to some extent. Actually, the Sino-Nepali war became inevitable because both the countries failed to solve the Tibetan problem.

The Nepal-Tibet conflict had its origin during the mid-seventeenth century when, exploiting the situation created by the Tibetan weakness, Kathmandu forced Tibet to circulate her coins in the Tibetan markets and allow her merchants to trade
freely at Lhasa. In the beginning, Kathmandu minted pure coins for Tibet and the latter circulated them in the market. This system was beneficial to Kathmandu because Tibet would pay for those coins with gold or would provide the silver required for their minting, from which Kathmandu deducted a certain percentage of silver. But later on, with an objective of getting more profit, debased coins were sent to Tibet and this formed a major reason of friction between Kathmandu and Tibet. After the Kathmandu Valley had been conquered by Prithvi Narayan Shah, there were official negotiations between the two countries to solve the coinage problem. They, however, failed on the question of the exchange of the debased coins. The Tibetan government was prepared to circulate the new coins of Prithvi Narayan Shah but on the condition that the Nepali King take back all the debased coins at their face value. Prithvi Narayan Shah was not prepared to sustain such a heavy loss, rather he was ready to guarantee the pureness of his new coins and to exchange the debased coins on the basis of their relative value of silver.

Prithvi Narayan’s successor, Pratap Singh, sent a delegation to the Tibetan border, Kuti, to renew the negotiation. Though the Nepali delegation succeeded in concluding a treaty with the Tibetan officials, the main issue i.e. the questions of debased coins, was omitted in the treaty, and thus it was unsatisfactory to both the parties. Before the currency problem between the two countries was solved, a political issue

made the situation more complicated. In 1788 a Tibetan religious leader, Shamar Trulku (mentioned as Syamarpa Lama in Nepali documents), came to Nepal as a refugee with his followers. As they signed a dharmapatra with a promise to remain loyal to the Nepal government, he and his followers were given shelter in Nepal. The Tibetan government was greatly annoyed by this incident. In Nepal, Bahadur Shah, the regent of the minor-aged King Rana Bahadur Shah, exploited the situation and tried to solve the coinage question even by using force. Through a Tibetan Lama, who had come to Kathmandu for pilgrimage, Bahadur Shah demanded the soon ending of the coinage issue and threatened to occupy the border areas, Kuti and Kerung, if the Tibetan government took negative attitude. The Tibetan Cabinet (Kashang) rejected the Nepali ultimatum, and in return, ordered to close the trade routes between the two countries as a protest against the Nepali attitude towards Shamar Trulku. Nepal sent a memorial to the Chinese Emperor explaining the coinage problem with Tibet and, presumably, mentioning the negative attitude of the Tibetan government to solve the problem. The Chinese Ambans at Lhasa, however, did not forward the memorial to the Manchu Court, rather, using their discretion returned it to Nepal. In such a situation Nepal decided to resort to war and led her army to the land of the Lamas by conquering the border areas of Kuti, Kerung, Jhunga, and Rangshar. Being unable to resist the Nepali forces, Tibet sent letters to China and the East India Company for help. Lord Cornwallis, the Governor-General of Bengal, refused

6. Ibid., pp. 37-38
to help Tibet, as the campaign would be most expensive.\(^7\) As to China, the Emperor sent his A. D. C., Pa-chung, and the Governor-General of Szechuan to investigate the situation. Although most of the Tibetan officials were in favour of continuing war against Nepal, the Chinese officials were not ready to do so and under their pressure, the Tibetan officers agreed to hold negotiation with Nepal. After a long negotiation, an agreement was signed in 1789 by which the defeated Tibetans agreed upon the terms and conditions imposed by Nepal. As demanded by Nepal, one pure coin was to be exchanged for two debased coins, and along with that, Tibet was to pay Rs. 5000/- to Nepal annually.\(^8\) It is interesting to note here that the Chinese mediators did not take part in the Nepal-Tibet negotiation. Neither did they interfere in favour of Tibet nor did they examine the contents of the treaty. They were satisfied once the Nepali delegates agreed to send a mission to pay respect to the Chinese Emperor.\(^9\)

This treaty is specially significant in developing Sino-Nepali relations after several hundred years. Nepal sent a mission under Hari Shah in September 1789 with valuable presents to Emperor Chien Lung, and the latter bestowed titles to King Rana Bahadur Shah and Regent Bahadur Shah. For the first time the Chinese Amban came to Kathmandu and had an audience with the Nepali King.\(^10\) But the treaty could not bring peaceful atmosphere in Nepal-Tibet relations. The Tibetans were not ready to implement the treaty which was most humiliating to them, and through which Tibet had

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7. Secret Proceedings, 26 January 1789, No. 5 (Indian National Archives, New Delhi—hereafter referred as INA)
9. Rose, f. n. 2, pp. 43-44.
to accept all the terms and conditions imposed by Nepal. Tibet could not openly challenge the treaty, rather placed obstructions on its implementation, which resulted in the outbreak of second Nepal-Tibet war in 1791.11

This time also the Tibetans could not resist the Nepali forces and, as earlier, they requested the Manchu Court for help. At this moment the Chinese attitude towards Nepal also differed and it decided to help Tibet against Nepal. The changed Chinese attitude can be explained in three ways:— First, China realised that the total defeat of Tibet in the hands of Nepal would decrease her (China) own influence in the land of the Lamas. Second, China was also perhaps annoyed by the high handedness of Nepal in dictating peace in 1789 by which Tibet was reduced, though indirectly, to the status of a "Vassal" state of Nepal. And lastly, the Chinese Ambans placed whole blame on Nepal and reported that the war was brought about by the "pillage and aggression of the Gurkhas".

This made Chinese intervention in the trans-Himalayan politics unavoidable and Emperor Chien Lung sent a huge army under General Fu Kang-an to make campaign against Nepal. The Chinese participation completely changed the war picture, and the Nepali forces were defeated in most of the corners, though the Chinese army was also facing difficult problems. Finally in September 1792 Nepal was compelled to accept the peace formula prepared by the Chinese Commander. By the new arrangement, Nepal lost everything she gained before three years. She had to abide by the arbitration of China in her

future disputes with Tibet and her boundary with the land of the Lamas was to be fixed by the Chinese officials. In addition to this, Nepal was to return the whole property seized from the Tibetan monastery and was to surrender the remains of Shamar Trulku to the Chinese officials. More than that, Nepal had to promise that she would not raise any claim based on the 1789 treaty or on coinage question. 

One of the special features of this new arrangement was the beginning of the system of sending quinquennial missions to China by Nepal. It reads:

Nepal would send a mission to Peking every five years with gifts for the Emperor. The Chinese government would arrange facilities for the mission in China i.e. bear the cost involved and would send gifts to the Nepali Raja in return. 

Thus the system of sending quinquennial mission began in the history of Sino-Nepali relations. 

Here, it is desirable to explain as to why the Chinese Commander imposed upon Nepal the provision of quinquennial mission. Though Nepal sent several missions to China during the ancient and medieval periods, they were never regarded as an imposed routine business. Even in 1789 Nepal herself had proposed to send a mission just to please the Chinese authorities. The situation, however, was different after three

12. It seems that this agreement was not made in written form. All the issues were settled either verbally or through letters.

years. Two explanations may be given for the inclusion of mission provision in the new arrangement.

First, as pointed out by one writer, the Sino–Nepali war was of a punitive nature. China did not have any territorial designs on Nepal, rather wanted to check the dominant position of Nepal in the land of the Lamas. For this purpose, Chinese arbitration in the future Nepal–Tibet disputes was made obligatory and the introduction of new Nepali coinage into Tibet was strictly forbidden. The mission provision, though had nothing to do with Nepal–Tibet relations, was also a way to downgrade Nepal's status at least in the Chinese eyes. The sending of mission to China, which the Chinese termed as tributory, was based on the ancient Chinese maxim that "the Chinese rulers exercised power over all peoples of the world through the will of the divine overlord". The mission provision morally binded Nepal to abide by the Chinese decisions on all her transactions, specially with Tibet.

Second, China had realized that her war with Nepal was largely the outcome of the Tibetan miscalculations. Believing on what the Tibetan authorities had said, China made a campaign against Nepal, which proved to be most expensive than it was expected. In order to prevent such eventualities in future, China, now, began to tighten her grip in the land of the Lamas, which had been manifested, among others, by the upgradation of the status of the Chinese Ambans at Lhasa. These Chinese Residents were placed at the status of the Governor-General.

of Szechuan, and it was directed that all petitions to the Chinese Emperor must come through them. But this provision created a problem. The Manchu Court could gather information about Nepal only through its Residents, and thus it was realized that some sort of direct contact should be made with Nepal. The five-yearly mission provision provided an opportunity to the Manchu Court to have direct contacts with Nepal at higher level. That is why the Chinese officials always insisted that the mission should be led at least by a person of Kazi rank.

To end this chapter, it is desirable to examine the viewpoint of a writer who argues that the system of sending quinquennial mission to China had started in 1789 following the defeat of the Tibetan forces by Nepali army. To quote him:

It has been generally accepted that the origin of the quinquennial missions was the outcome of Nepal's humiliations and defeat in the second Nepal-Tibet war of 1792. It was, in fact, regarded as one of the conditions imposed by the victorious Tibeto-Chinese army. However, a careful scrutiny of the Chinese presents conferred to the Monarch of Nepal in 1790 indicates that the first five-yearly mission to China was sent in 1788; and thus it seems more on outcome of victory rather than one of defeat of 1792. 17

The above version seems to be faulty on following grounds. First, though we do not have an authoritative copy of the 1789 treaty there are at least three versions of the said treaty—Nepali, Tibetan and Chinese. Despite some differences

in these versions, none of them speaks of the sending of quinquennial mission as a part of the treaty, whereas each and every copy of the treaty of 1792 (so far available) mention about the quinquennial mission in detail. Moreover the Tibetan and Chinese sources indicate that the 1789 treaty was signed by the Nepali and Tibetan officials without the approval or even knowledge of the Chinese officials. How is it possible to include the quinquennial mission provision in the treaty which had not been participated by the Chinese Officials?

Second, it is not possible to send the quinquennial mission in 1788 (as mentioned in the above version), since the Nepal-Tibet treaty, ending the war between the two countries, had been signed only in 1789. It is true that one mission led by Hari Shah was sent to Peking in September 1789, but that was a special (as sent by Nepal during the ancient and medieval periods) and not a quinquennial mission. Moreover, the decision to send a special mission to the Chinese Court was

18. Padma Jung has produced the text of the so-called Sino-Nepali treaty of 1792 by which both Nepal and Tibet were to send missions in every five years. The concerned part of the treaty runs as follows:—

That the two brotherly states (Nepal and Tibet) would send to China some produce of their country every five years in token of their filial love;

That the Chinese government would, in return, send to Nepal a friendly present, and would make every necessary arrangement for the comfort of the mission to and from Pekin.


19. Quoted in Rose, f. n. 2, p. 43.
made only after a treaty had been signed between the Nepali and Tibetan delegates, which means that the question of mission had nothing to do with the treaty of 1789. The Chinese sources state that the Chinese officials gave approval to the treaty (possibly without examining its provisions) once Nepal agreed that she would send a mission to pay respect to the Chinese Emperor. Third, the Chinese presents conferred to the Nepali King in 1790 did not mention anything about the quinquennial mission. Instead of that, in his letter to the Chinese Emperor the Nepali King had clearly mentioned Kazi Dev Dutta Thapa (who had led Nepali mission to China in 1792) as the first Nepali official to lead a quinquennial mission to Peking.²⁰

Thus it is beyond doubt that the system of sending five-yearly mission to China began in 1792, as an imposition on Nepal by the Chinese officials. No doubt, the Nepali mission of 1789 was the first one to reach Peking in modern times, but that was not a quinquennial mission. The system as such started only after three years of the same.

²⁰ Nepali King to Chinese Emperor dated 1899 B. S. Ashad 2 Gato Roj (17 June 1842), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu (hereafter mentioned as MFA). Unnumbered Poka.
CHAPTER III

Short History of Missions

Altogether eighteen quinquennial missions were sent to China by Nepal in a period of about 115 years i.e. from 1792 to 1906, out of which three missions (that of 1802, 1807, and 1866) did not reach Peking. For the first sixty years i.e. from 1792 to 1852 Nepal was quite regular in sending missions and altogether thirteen missions were sent in this period. After the Nepal-Tibet war of 1855-56, the system moved slowly and irregularly, which has been evidenced by the fact that during the fifty-year period, only five such missions were sent. It was partly due to Nepal's allegiance towards the British and partly because of the decreasing power of the Chinese empire that Nepal took less interest in sending missions in time. In other words, till the rise of the Ranas in 1846 Nepal took it as an obligation to send five-yearly missions to China whereas later on it was considered a voluntary job on the part of Nepal. The Rana Prime Minister sent missions to China only when they were to get recognition from the Chinese Emperor to their post. For example, immediately after becoming the Prime Minister, Ranaudip Singh sent a mission to China. Bir Shamsher repeated the same practice after he usurped the power. Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher even did not think it necessary to send quinquennial mission to get the Chinese recognition. Only after six years of his coming into power, Chandra sent a mission which proved to be the last Nepali mission to Peking. Thus the term “quinquennial” can be applied to the Nepali missions to China only from 1792 to
20/ Nepal's Quinquennial Mission

1852, after which the system was so irregular that the missions cannot be called as five-yearly. However, it is interesting to note that the Chinese Emperor always defended the irregularities on the part of Nepal in one or another way. For example, Nepal did not send any mission in 1857 and 1862. The Chinese Emperor allowed to do so, by mentioning the former, the great loss to Nepal caused by the Nepal-Tibet war,¹ and, in the latter, the trouble created by the revolters in some Chinese provinces.² Nepal also satisfied the Chinese Emperor by sending a formal letter of respect arji instead of huge presents carried by a number of persons, in all irregular periods.³

Not only regular, the Nepali quinquennial missions for the first sixty years reached Peking and returned home in time as scheduled. It took less than two years for those missions to complete the journey. Sometimes, the mission returned home after a lapse of only fourteen months. But later on the duration of these missions became quite longer. The 1877 mission returned home after a lapse of five years. Same was the case of the succeeding mission of 1886. The next mission, sent in 1894, has a record of longest duration. It took nearly seven years to complete the journey.⁴

1. Chinese Amban to King Surendra, Han Fong, 7th. year 2nd month, 8th day (March 1857), MFA, Poka No. Pa. 64.
2. Same to Same, Han Fong 10th. year, 11th month, 17th day (December 1860), Ibid.
3. Royal Nepal Army Head-quarter, Kathmandu, (hereafter mentioned as RNAH), File No. 56.
4. In 1877, Nepali mission left Kathmandu in the month of July and returned home in June 1882; The 1886 mission started in September and was back in June 1891. Regarding the mission of 1894; it left Kathmandu in June and returned home in March 1901.
The longer duration of the later missions was largely due to their own smuggling activities. Specially after the rise of the Ranas, the quinquennial missions changed their character from political to commercial. The ruling family itself was involved in the illegal trade of opium through these mission members, and that is why the mission had to stay for a long period in the Chinese territory to sell opium and other materials as directed by the ruling family.

The system of sending quinquennial missions to China was terminated after 1906. It cannot be said definitely as to why the system was abolished so suddenly. One version is that the Rana Prime Minister, Chandra Shamsher, terminated the system on the advice of the British government, the powerful ally of Nepal. Two reasons were forwarded to support this argument, Firstly, as the Nepali Prime Minister was insisting for the recognition of Nepal's independent status by the British government, the British authorities presumably advised Chandra to discontinue the mission system first. Doubtless to say that the British considered these Nepali missions to China as of tributary nature at least in theory and took Nepal as under the satellite of the Chinese Emperor at least in theory.

Secondly, in 1910 China formally claimed her suzerainty over Nepal. Possibly, the mission system provided a good ground for the Chinese to assert their claim of suzerainty. But the British were not prepared to accept the Chinese version, and so they advised Nepal to discontinue the system of sending quinquennial missions which would automatically thwart Chinese claim of suzerainty.5

5. Memorandum on the letters from the Resident of Nepal, Foreign Secret E, October 1911, Nos. 270-72, INA.
Some writers, however, have rejected the above version, and argued that the British never considered the mission issue so seriously. They put forward the view that by the turn of the 19th century, the Chinese authorities made several rules to discourage the illegal trade carried on by the members of the Nepali missions, and thus Nepal had to abolish the system as it was less possible, under new circumstances, to continue the smuggling activities through these missions. This view has been supported by a letter sent by Bhairab Bahadur (leader of the last Nepali mission to China) from Peking which mentioned the strict implementation of the new opium rules making it most difficult for him to sell the prohibited goods. Bhairab Bahadur clearly admitted his inability to sell the opium, as the Chinese people were not ready to accept them possibly because of the strict Chinese regulations. 6

Whatever may be the real cause of the termination of more than a century old mission system, the Chinese revolution of 1911 provided an excuse for the Nepali rulers to end the system. With the fall of the Manchu dynasty, Nepal considered herself as not bound to continue the system imposed upon her by the former Chinese royal house. Nepal was in an easy position to discontinue the system when the new Chinese leadership made a unilateral declaration to cancel engagements signed by the Manchu rulers. 7

6. Bhairab Bahadur also told the British Minister at Peking that the only advantage of the continuance of Nepali mission was the opportunity of acquiring first hand information about China. See Jordon to Minto 25 May 1908, Foreign Secret E, October 1908, Nos. 696–717, INA.

It is not possible, even not desirable, to trace the history of all the quinquennial missions to China sent by Nepal during the period of 115 years. Thus we present a brief chronological picture of these Nepali missions, so as to give a background information to understand clearly the following chapters.

Immediately after an agreement was reached between Nepal and China in 1792, the first Nepali mission led by Kaji Dev Dutta Thapa left for Peking along with the Chinese Commander and his followers. The mission carried a letter from the Nepali King to the Chinese Emperor along with huge presents to the latter. The second mission was scheduled for the year 1797, but it had to leave for China more than a year before. The sole reason of the soon despatch of the second Nepali mission was the abdication of the Chinese Emperor, Chien Lung, in 1795 in favour of his son. The Chinese authorities insisted that Nepal should send a special mission to pay respect to the new King with special presents. The request of Nepal that she would send a single mission with presents to the new King and the usual five-yearly presents was accepted by the Chinese authorities, and thus the second Nepali mission left for China in 1795 under the leadership of Kaji Narashingh Gurung. The warm welcome accorded to this mission was evidenced by the fact that the mission members got audience of the Chinese Emperor for twenty-five times.9

The third Nepali mission was due to leave for Peking in 1800; but considering the political turmoil in Nepal created by the enthronement of the baby King, Griwan Yuddha Bikram, and by the self-exilement of the ex-king, Rana Bahadur Shah, the Chinese Ambans, on behalf of the Emperor

8. The details of this mission has been recorded in MFA, Poka No. Pa 64.

Ibid.
permitted the Nepal government to send the scheduled mission a year later. The political situation of Nepal did not improve in the following year, rather it became more complicated by the activities of the ex-king at Benaras. Possibly on the request of Nepal, the Chinese Ambans allowed the Nepal government to send a high-level official with usual five-yearly presents, meant for the Chinese Emperor, to the Nepal-Tibet border area, from where the Chinese officials were to carry the presents to Peking. Accordingly a mission led by Kaji Sarvajit Pande left for the border area in 1802, where the presents and arji to the Chinese Emperor were handed over to the Chinese officials. As usual, the Chinese Emperor sent return presents to the Nepali king and mission members along with a letter (parawana) to the king of Nepal. Kaji Sarvajit and his party had to go to Tingri Maidan (near the Nepal-Tibet border) to receive the presents.

The story of the fourth Nepali mission to China is similar to the previous mission. This time also the mission was not to visit the Chinese capital, rather was to hand over the presents to the Chinese officials at the border area of Kuti. Although the political situation of Nepal had largely improved with the assassination of Rana Bahadur Shah and the emergence of a powerful statesman, Bhimsen Thapa, Nepal pleaded that she would send a mission to the border area (instead of Peking), as the Nepali King was still a minor. This being granted, a Nepali mission under the leadership of Kaji Bhakta Bir Thapa left the country in 1807. As in the

10. Chinese Amban to King (Girwan Yuddha), 1859 B. S. Baisak Badi 10 Roj 3 (27 April 1802), Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Amban to King of Gorkha and his Bharadars and Four Kajis, Chyachhin 8th year, 1st Month, 24th day (February 1804), Ibid.
previous case presents and arji were handed over to the Chinese officials at Kuti. After a year or so, Kaji Bhakta Bir went to Lhasa to receive presents and parawana from the Chinese Emperor. 13

When the question of sending fifth Nepali mission came after five years, it seems that Nepal once again pleaded that she would send a mission to the Nepal Tibet border area (as she had done in two previous cases), on the plea that the Nepali King was still a minor. The Chinese Ambans, however, did not appreciate the Nepali plan, possibly with the fear that Nepal would abandon the mission system in near future if she was allowed to handover presents and arji at the Tibetan border for many times. Accordingly, the Ambans firmly instructed the Nepal government to send the Nepali mission to Peking, with usual presents and arji, in time "as the Nepali King has now become able to control the state affairs" 14 Following the Ambans' instruction, Nepal sent a mission to China in June 1812 under the leadership of Kaji Bhakta Bir Thapa (who had led the previous mission to the Nepal-Tibet border area) who returned home after a lapse of about fifteen months.

After 1812 Nepali quinquennial missions visited Peking and returned home regularly for the next four decades. Despite her war with the British, Nepal sent a mission to China in time in 1817 under the leadership of Kaji Ranajoor Thapa. In 1820 the Chinese Emperor, Chia Ching, died and thus the question of sending a special mission to congratulate the new Emperor again arose. As earlier Nepal requested for permission to send a single mission a year later with usual five-yearly presents and special presents for the new Emperor.

14. Chinese Amban's letter dated Chyachhin 17th year 2nd month, 29th day (March 1812), ibid.
This being accepted by the Chinese Ambans at Lhasa, a Nepali mission led by Kaji Dalabhanjan Pande left for Peking in 1822.\(^\text{15}\) This was Nepal's seventh mission to China.

Nepal's next to missions, sent in 1827 and 1832 respectively, were led by Kaji Bir Kesher Pande. One of the special features of the 1827 mission was that the leader of the mission got audience of the Chinese Emperor for seventeen times.\(^\text{16}\) Chautaria Pusker Shah led the tenth Nepali mission in 1837.

Nepal sent her next mission in 1842 under the leadership of Kaji Jagat Bam Pande. As fate would have it, the prominent Pandes were executed in Nepal while the Nepali mission was on its way back to home country. Despite the assurances of the Nepal government that no action would be taken against him, Jagat Bom Pande did not think it proper to return to Nepal and he escaped to India from Tibet.\(^\text{17}\)

In 1846 there were major political changes inside the Nepali Court. Jang Bahadur came into power after the Kot and Bhandarkhal massacres. Queen Laxmi Devi was exiled to Benaras, and King Rajendra also followed the queen appointing Prince Surendra as his representative in Nepal, As soon as the opportunities provided, Jang installed Surendra to be the new king of Nepal in May 1847.\(^\text{18}\)

15. For details see MFA, Poka No. Pa 64.
16. Amban to Nepali King, Tau kwang 8th sear, 5th month 19th day (June 1828), \textit{Ibid.}
17. \textit{Arji} to the Chinese Emperor, dated 1900 B. S. Magh Badi 9 Roj 1 (14 January 1844) \textit{Ibid.}
These political changes, however, did not affect Sino-Nepali relations. Leo E. Rose has written that "one of the side effects of Jang Bahadur's rise to power in 1846 was the decision to cancel the quinquennial mission to Peking scheduled to depart in 1847." This view is not correct. Jang wanted to get Chinese recognition to the new ruler of Nepal and so he himself took first initiative to send quinquennial mission to China. Accordingly in June 1847 Nepal despatched a mission with Surath Singh Pantha as its leader, which returned home sometime after twenty-two months. It was due to this mission that the Chinese recognition to the Nepali ruler came earlier than the British recognition. But on the negative side, both the leader and deputy leader of the mission died while they were on their way back to Nepal.

The thirteenth Nepali mission to China, sent in 1852, proved to be most crucial. The alleged abuse of this mission by the Khampas of Tibet induced Nepal to declare war against Tibet. The ill fate of the mission was demonstrated in the very beginning when the leader and deputy leader designate Kazi Rana Mehar Singh Adhikari and Sardar Bir Man Thapa were to be dropped because of their illness. In their place were

appointed Kazi Gambhir Singh Adhikari and Sardar Samsher Thapa. As in the earlier mission, both the leader and deputy leader passed away while they were returning home from Peking. Serious of all was the alleged maltreatment of the mission members by the Khampas.23

When time came for the next quinquennial mission in 1857, the situation was completely different. Tibet had been defeated by Nepal in war, and China did not help Tibet against Nepal. Considering the situation, the Chinese Emperor, through the Ambans, instructed Nepal to send only arji instead of mission with huge presents.24 After five years in 1862, the internal situation of both Tibet and China was not satisfactory. Tibet was at the verge of civil war, and China was also being troubled in some provinces. In such a situation the mission of 1862 was also allowed to be cancelled.25

After the lapse of more than fourteen years Nepal sent her another mission in 1866 lead by Kazi Jagat Sher Sijapati. This mission was greatly humiliated when it was not allowed to visit Peking on the plea of a muslim rebellion in western China. Jagat Sher waited for nearly two years at Tachien-lu for permission to proceed to Peking but had to return home from there.26 In reply to this humiliation, Nepal sent a letter to the Chinese Ambans in 1871 that she would send her next

23. The British sources, however, indicate that Jang Bahadur exaggerated the issue of the maltreatment of Nepali mission as a pretext to make an attack on Tibet.

24. Chinese Amban to King Surendra, Hon Fong 7th year 2nd month 8th day (March 1857), MFA, Poka No. Pa.64.

25. Chinese Emperor’s Parawana, Throndi 1st Year 7th month 1st day (August 1862) Ibid.

mission if it would be allowed to reach Peking without any trouble. The Chinese Emperor could not give this assurance rather allowed the Nepal government to send arji and presents only to the Nepal-Tibet border. Nepal was not satisfied with this reply and wrote that she would send her mission to Peking when the Emperor would instruct her to do so. Finally, the proposed mission was allowed to be cancelled.

In 1877 Jang died and was succeeded by his brother, Ranaudip Singh. Within four months, the new Prime Minister sent a mission to China under the leadership of Tej Bahadur Rana. This mission was also humiliated when it was stopped at Techien-lu and was ordered to return from there after surrendering the presents they brought. Tej Bahadur refused to do so, and finally on the request of the Nepal government, the mission was allowed to visit Peking.

Nepal did not send any mission in 1882, the official explanation given for it was the death of the Chinese Emperor's Dowger, Tsu Shi. In 1885 the Nepali Prime Minister informed the Chinese Ambans his desire to send the quinquennial mission in time. But before he could do so, the Prime Minister was assassinated and his successor Prime Minister sent next mission in 1886 under Rana Bikram Rana. The

27. Shree Panch to Amban, 1928 B. S. Kartik Sudi 4 Roj 5 (16 November 1871), MFA, Poka No. Pa. 64.
28. Shree Panch to Amban, 1929 B. S. Marga Sudi 12 Roj 5 (12 December 1872), Ibid.
30. Peking Gazette, 17 April 1885, Cited in Foreign Secret F, June 1885, No. 311 (INA).
Chinese officials cooperated with the mission in several ways for which the Nepal government offered thanks to the Ambans.\textsuperscript{31} Another mission was sent to China after more than 7 years and no explanation was given for this delay. This time the leader of the mission was \textit{Kaji} Indra Bikram Rana who left Kathmandu for Peking in June 1894.\textsuperscript{32} The duration of this mission was longest of all, as it returned to Nepal only in March 1901. Before the mission returned home, Nepal had to be prepared for sending another mission, because five years had already been lapsed. But the Chinese \textit{Ambans} allowed to postpone it on the ground of famine at the Chinese provinces of Shansi and Shensi. The decision of the Chinese \textit{Ambans} was greatly appreciated by Nepal, and she expressed her readiness to send mission to China as soon as the Emperor instructed for the same.\textsuperscript{33}

The last or the eighteenth Nepali mission was sent by Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher in 1906 with \textit{Kaji} Bhairab Bahadur Gadhatola as its leader, which returned home, after the lapse of four years, in 1910.\textsuperscript{34}

Thus out of the total eighteen quinquennial missions sent by Nepal over a period of about 115 years, fifteen reached Peking and got audience of Chinese Emperor.\textsuperscript{35} Two missions (that of 1802 and 1807) proceeded only up to the border area and handed over presents meant for the Chinese Emperor and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Draft letter from Nepali King to Amban 1946 B.S. Baisak Badi 15 Roj 4 (15 May 1889), MFA. Poka No. Pa. 64.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Commander-in-Chief to \textit{Dhewas} of Kuti, 1951 B. S. Jestha Sudi 8 Roj 2 (11 June 1894), \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{33} Shree Panch to Amban, 1958 B. S. Baisak Badi 10 Roj 1 (14 April 1901), \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Nepali King to Chinese Emperor, 1967 B. S. 4th Srawan Tuesday (19 July 1910), MFA, Ununumbered Poka.
\end{itemize}
others to the Chinese authorities there, while a third one (that of 1866) was not allowed to visit Peking by the Chinese authorities and had to return from Chen-tu (a few miles inside the Chinese border).

35. It is to be mentioned here that Nepal had sent a special mission in 1805 or 1806 under the leadership of Sura Bir Thapa, possibly to mark the occasion of “China’s victory over her enemies”. It seems that this mission went up to Lhasa and surrendered presents, meant for the Chinese Emperor, there.
CHAPTER IV

Journey of The Mission

One of the peculiar features of the Nepali missions to China was their journey complications. In this chapter we intend to discuss the journey experiences of those missions along with their composition and the list of the presents meant for the Chinese and Tibetan authorities.

Composition:

The Chinese authorities wanted that the Nepali missions should be of superior status, and they should be led by the Nepali authorities of higher posts. It seems that in the course of negotiation in 1792, the Chinese commander had laid down the condition that either the king or his regent should visit Peking to pay respect to the Chinese Emperor. The Nepali officials, however, objected to it on the plea of "long difficult way" but agreed to send Kaji and Sardar as leader and deputy leader of the mission. At that time these two posts were supposed to be most superior in the administrative hierarchy of Nepal. Bhimsen Thapa himself was a Kazi when he came into power in 1806. Kirkpatrick, who visited Nepal during the last decade of the eighteenth century, has placed Kazi and Sardar at the second and third highest posts in the hierarchy and mentioned that there were only four Kazis and four Sardars throughout the kingdom of Nepal. The viewpoint of Kirkpa-

trick has been supported by Hamilton who visited Nepal in the beginning of the nineteenth century. In such a situation, the Nepali missions were generally headed by junior officials, but the Nepal government addressed them as Kazis and Sardars all through the duration of the mission they led. As to the Chinese Ambans they never questioned the status of the leader and deputy leader of the mission. It is true that the Nepal government had to send the name of leader and deputy leader of the mission to the Ambans beforehand for confirmation but the Chinese Resident never rejected these names. The designation of these officials was never challenged, though at one time, the Chinese authorities at Peking insisted that the Nepali Prime Minister should visit Peking to pay respect to the Emperor.

One British writer, Captain Cavenagh, wrote in 1851 that the Nepali mission to China always "consists of 27 persons, as in the event of any variation taking place in the number, it would not be received by the Chinese authorities..." The contemporary documents, however, indicate that the mission generally consisted of forty-five members. It comprised a leader, a deputy leader, Subedars, Kharidars, Jamadars, Nayaks interpreters (Dobhase) and a number of junior staff. It seems that the British writer counted only the officials of superior status as the mission members. Cavenagh is correct to say that the variation in the number of mission members rarely occurred, but his version that the Chinese authorities

2. Foreign Secret Consultation, 26 May 1854, No. 50, INA.


4. There are occasions when the Chinese Ambans made an arbitrary screening in the composition of the Nepali mission.
never allowed any variation in number seems not to be correct. It was more a mutual understanding between the Nepali and Chinese officials, and less an imposition by China upon Nepal. No doubt, the Chinese Ambans used to screen the members of the mission sent by Nepal and only those, approved by the Chinese Residents, could visit Peking but it seems that the Ambans did not reject the members arbitrarily. For instance, in 1812, Nepal proposed to send a 91-member mission to China. The Ambans objected to it but permitted a mission of not more than sixty persons.\[5\]

**List of Presents.**

The Nepali mission to China carried a number of items as presents to the Chinese and Tibetan authorities, specially the Chinese Emperor, and received similar presents from the Peking Court to the Nepali King and other higher authorities. To begin with the Nepali present, the Chinese sources refer them as the “produce of the land”, but in real practice most of the items were imported by Nepal from India (specially Calcutta & Benaras) in order to send them to China. A few Nepali businessmen were employed for this purpose, and they were given some amount of money in advance. Further, no custom duty was levied on these goods, and the government paid wages to the labourers who carried those items from India to Nepal.\[6\] Here also the Chinese officials never questioned whether the presents were the “produce of the land” or not.

5. *Amban* to Nepali king, Chyachhin 17th year 4th month 17th day (June 1812), MFA, Poka No, Pa. 64

6. *Purji* to *Bhansar Hakim*. 1942 Srawan Sudi 11 Roj 6 (21 August 1885). This document has been preserved in the Research Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, No. 251.
The Nepali documents mentioned these presents as *memuli saugat*, which means general presents, and so the Nepal government did not consider them as special presents. It is evidenced by the fact that the presents sent through the quinquennial mission were of inferior value than those sent on the occasion of the Emperor's ascending the throne. In 1795 Nepal sent her mission to China with five-yearly presents and special presents to the Emperor on the occasion of his becoming the new ruler. The general presents were valued at Rs. 4829/- whereas the value of special presents was fixed at Rs. 14902/-.

Nepal sent five-yearly presents not only to the Chinese Emperor but also to the other authorities such as the Chinese *Ambans*, Dalai Lama and his four kajis of Lhasa, Panchen Lama of Shigatse, *Dhewas* of Kuti, Raja Lama of Takyali (?), *Talloye* of Shigatse and others. Items of present to the Emperor included necklaces of corals, *Kimkhap* (cloth of special quality), and special kind of weapons such as guns, *Tarawars* (sword), and *Khukuris*. Also included in the list were the different kinds of *masalas* such as *Jayafal*, *Supari*, *Lwang*, and *Dalchini*. Other Chinese and Tibetan authorities got *Kimkhap* and some other items as presents from Nepal. It is interesting to note that Nepal respected the Chinese *Ambans* much than the Dalai Lama. The former received more items as presents than the latter. In the 1822 mission, the presents for the Dalai Lama was valued at Rs. 150/- whereas the Chinese *Ambans* received items of nearly 600 rupees.

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7. For the details of presents and their value see RNAH, File No. 56, See Appendix A.

8. *Ibid*, See Appendix B.
As mentioned above, the Nepali King and other higher received valuable presents from the Chinese Emperor. As mentioned in the Nepali and Indian documents, the Chinese presents included “24 pieces of Kochin known as Tachiang Pastung, 4 pieces of Tangtwang Kochin, 4 pieces of blue Mantwang Kochin, 4 pieces of Yanfaichin Kochin, 4 pieces of Chintwang Kochin of Bakkha class, 4 pieces of Tanrung, 8 pieces of Tangrung sheets or Carpets, 2 silver tea pots, 2 silver dishes, 2 ‘phalachhis’, 2 ‘polis’ 4 cups of ‘usay’ colour, 4 cups of uchhai colour, 1 Rui studded with ‘Sanisan’, 2 articles of Sangisan, 1 Rosary of Sootoo beads, 2 Tyaochhifur, 2 Malouchhi fur, 2 yellow dishes, 2 ‘handochhis’, 2 pairs of large purse, 4 pairs of small purse, and 8 packets of tea.” Thus it seems that the Chinese presents meant for the Nepali King were of more value than the Nepali gifts to the Chinese Emperor. Chandra Shamsher clearly wrote to the British Resident that the missions were “merely a means for the party to get access into the country under very advantageous circumstances and to dispose of with very great profit of large quantity of goods which they take with them.” The version of the Nepali Prime Minister has been endorsed by the British Resident who wrote that “the mission costs Nepal about Rs. 15000/- while it costs China over 6 lakhs.” Apart from the usual presents, the Nepali King sent a special letter (arji) to the Chinese Emperor, covered with the valuable golden cloth and received similar “golden parawana” from the Chinese Emperor. It is surprising to note

9. His Highness the Maharaj Dhiraj to His Majesty the Emperor of China 1958 B. S. Jestha Sudi 15 Roj 1 (2 June 1901) MFA. Unnumbered Poka, See Appendix E.

10. Chandra Shamsher to Manner Smith, 19 April 1906, Foreign Secret E, June 1906, Nos. 241-45, INA, See Appendix G.

11. Resident in Nepal to Secretary, Government of India, 28 June 1902, Foreign Secret E, September 1902, Nos. 127-33, INA, See Appendix F.
that the letter to be sent by the Nepali King to the Chinese Emperor was drafted not by the Nepali officials but by the Chinese *Ambans* and that was the reason why those letters had in them the exaggerating words of respect for the Emperor.\textsuperscript{12}

Cavenagh is of opinion that the Chinese authorities were very particular in the items sent to the Emperor as presents. He writes that the mission should "have under its charge exactly the same articles, as originally prescribed by the treaty of 1792, not the slightest deviation from the rules then dictated being allowed".\textsuperscript{13} This version of the British writer seems not to be correct because we do not have evidence to prove that the items of gifts to the Emperor were fixed by the treaty of 1792. Moreover, the documents deposited in the Royal Nepali Army Head-quarter indicate the variation of presents meant for the Chinese Emperor in different years, not only in items but also in quantity.\textsuperscript{14} It seems that the items could be altered considering the convenience of both the countries. For example, in its first mission (1792), the Nepal government sent some elephants and horses. As it was felt difficult to carry them to China, the *Ambans* informed the Nepali king not to send those animals in future.\textsuperscript{15}

In fact the Chinese authorities were not so much particular about the presents or gifts, rather were conscious that

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\textsuperscript{12} *Ambans* to four *Kajis* of Nepal, Chyachhin 7th year 10th, month 19th day (November 1802), MFA, Poka No. Pa. 64.

\textsuperscript{13} Cavenagh, f. n, 3, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{14} See RNAH, File No. 56, See also Appendix A and B (for comparison).

\textsuperscript{15} *Ambans* to Nepali King, 1833 B. S. Ashwin Sudi 8 Roj 1 (9 October 1796); Same to same, Chyachhin 5th year 5th. Month 15th day (July 1800), MFA, Poka No. Pa. 64.
Nepal should show her due respect to the Emperor. As the British Resident heared a rumour, in 1852 the Chinese Emperor refused to accept the presents brought by the Nepali mission, on the ground that the Nepali Prime Minister had shown disrespect to the Emperor by paying visit to England by himself and by sending only his subordinates to China.\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{Journey Complications:–}

One of significant aspects of Nepal's mission to China is the journey complications from Kathmandu to Peking. The hardship in journey can be well explained by the fact that the death of one or two mission members was almost a regular feature. In the missions of 1847 and 1852 both the leader and deputy leader lost their lives on way. The miserable condition of the mission members had been analyzed by Captain Cavenagh in these words:

\begin{quote}
......at the same time should one of their number be in a dying state, he would not to allowed to halt, but in the event of a plankeen not being available, which is the case for some part of the way, he would be tied on to his saddle and compelled to continue his journey.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

The above version of the British writer may be a slight exaggeration, but the members of the mission suffered a lot sometimes by the illness and even death of some of the members, sometimes due to the manhandling by Tibetans, and sometimes by the thieves and robbers.

\begin{itemize}
\item[16.] Ramsay to Government of India, 6 May 1854, Foreign Secret Consultations, 26 May 1855, No. 50, INA.
\item[17.] Cavenagh, f, n. 3, pp. 64
\end{itemize}
For the first sixty years, Nepal sent her missions to China regularly and the journey of each mission was completed in less than two years. The mission travelled about 2500 miles distance from Kathmandu to Peking in six months, remained at the Chinese capital for about forty-five days, and completed its return journey in another six months. That is why in 1837 the Nepali mission led by Pusker Shah completed its journey in less than fourteen months. But for Surath Singh (who led the Nepali mission in 1847) it took about twenty-two months to complete the journey due to some complications on way. Even then the Nepali government was not so much willing to send its mission to China, possibly because of journey complications. On the plea that the king was a minor, the Nepal government sent missions in 1802 and 1807 only up to the Tibetan border. In 1812 also Nepal repeated the same ground and hesitated to send mission to Peking. But the Chinese Ambans did not appreciate Nepal’s version and insisted to send her mission to China.

With the rise of the Ranas in 1846 the situation changed completely. In his mission of 1852, Jang Bahadur supplied opium of nearly three lakh rupees under diplomatic privilege to sell them in China, despite its legal ban in that country. This aroused suspicion in the minds of the Chinese, and that

18. The Indian archival documents mentioned the distance between Kathmandu and Peking as 2530 miles, but the Nepali source recorded it as 1283 Kosa i.e. 2486 miles. See Tirtha Prasad Mishra, “Nepal-China Sambandha”, Gorakhapatra, 2040 B. S. Chaitra 5 Gate (18 March 1984), p. 4.
19. Nepali King to Ambans, 1895 B. S. Ashwin Badi 5 Roj 7 (8 September 1838), MFA, Poka No. Pa. 64.
20. Chinese Amban’s letter dated Chyachhin 17th year 2nd month 29 th day (March 1812), Ibid.
is way the Nepali mission of 1866 was not allowed to enter the Chinese territory on the plea of a Muslim rebellion in western China. Jagat Sher, the leader of the mission, waited for nearly two years in an effort to visit Peking, but he was not permitted to do so. Finally, the mission was allowed to go a few miles inside the Chinese border where it sold the opium it had and returned home from there surrendering the presents, meant for the Chinese Emperor, to the local Chinese authorities.21 In 1877 also the Chinese authorities tried to stop the Nepali mission at the border area of China, but on the request of the Nepali King and Prime Minister, the mission was allowed to visit Peking but was lodged in the dirty building assigned to the missions of the tributary nations.22 With the involvement of Nepali missions in trading activities, their journey became quite longer. It took about five years for Tej Bahadur Rana (who led the Nepali mission of 1877) to complete his journey, whereas the 1894 mission returned home only after the lapse of seven years.

Coming to the routine business of sending missions to China, generally, the Chinese Ambans took initiation in it. Months before the scheduled time, the Chinese Residents sent letters to the Nepali King reminding the latter to despatch the quinquennial mission in time, and send the names of the leader and deputy leader of the proposed mission for the former's confirmation. As instructed, the Nepal government would send the names of leader and deputy leader (sometimes other members too) of the proposed mission for the approval of the Ambans. These names were rarely objected by the Ambans. Confirming the leader and deputy leader of the

21. For details see Foreign Political A, March 1868, No. 208 INA.
22. T. F. Wade to Viceroy of India, 16 January 1880, Foreign Political A, April 1880, No. 98, ibid.
mission, the Chinese Residents usually sent a draft of *arji* to be submitted by the Nepali King to the Chinese Emperor, through the leader of the quinquennial mission.\(^{23}\) It seems that the Nepal government could not change even words in the draft, but sometimes the Nepali statesmen succeeded in convincing the *Ambans* to plead in Nepal's favour, which is evidenced by the *arji*, sent through the missions of 1837 and 1842, requesting Chinese help against the British.

After these formalities were over, the mission was finally sent usually in the month of June or July. Cavenagh is incorrect to write that the Nepali mission "must also invariably arrive on the frontier on the same day... as originally prescribed by the Treaty of 1792."\(^{24}\) It seems that no such date was fixed by the agreement of 1792, though in practice the missions were sent at about the same time once in five years, at least up to 1852. For example in 1827 the Nepali mission left Nepal a little earlier, and the Nepali King informed the Chinese *Ambans* that the mission was sent on the auspicious day fixed by the astrologers.\(^{25}\)

\(^{23}\) *Ambans* to four *Kajis* of Nepal, Chyachhin 7th year 10th month 19th day (November 1802), MFA, Poka No. Pa. 64. It, however, seems that Nepal echoed the voice of the *Ambans* only in the beginning years. Later on the Nepal government drafted the *arji* on its own instance, but did not challenge the right of the Chinese Residents to change the words and add some "extravagent honorific foems considered appropriate by the Peking Court." See Foreign Secret E, January 1886, No. 37, INA.

\(^{24}\) Cavenagh, f. n. 3, p. 64.

\(^{25}\) Shree Panch to *Amban*, 1884 B S. Ashad Badi 8 Roj 1 (17 June 1827) MFA, Poka No. Pa. 64.
As already mentioned, the mission consisted of forty-five members, including a Kaji and Sardar as leader and deputy leader respectively. The other members of the mission were Subedars, Kharidars, Jamadars, Nayaks, interpreters (Dobhashes), and other junior staff. The leader of the mission was authorised to appoint additional interpreters in case of need, but was not allowed to make major changes in its composition.

The leader and other members of the mission were given some instructions, which they were to observe strictly. The Nepal government wanted that the mission members should behave politely and remain in disciplined way so as to have good impression on the Chinese authorities. For this purpose, Nepal always requested the Chinese Ambans to acquaint the mission members with the Chinese and Tibetan customs, so that they (mission members) could behave to the satisfaction of the Chinese Emperor. The mission members were strictly instructed to behave politely and to work in accordance with the tradition and customs followed in the past. They should be satisfied with the presents given by the Chinese Emperor to them, and should, in no circumstance, request for more gifts and presents.

The leader and deputy leader of the mission were also equipped with some judicial powers. Specially they were instructed to hear complaints against the Nepali Vakil or Nayak—as the case may be—from the Nepali inhabitants of Tibet and decide them without any delay. It seems that they were also authorised to revise the cases decided by the Nepali


27. Ibid.
Vakil of Lhasa or the other Nepali judicial officials of Shigatse, Gyantse, Kuti etc. Sometimes the mission had to stay at the Tibetan territory for some weeks to decide the pending cases. If the cases could not be decided, either by the lack of time or the complicated nature of the case, the leader or deputy leader would take-up them on their way back to Kathmandu from Peking. 28

After the rise of the Ranas, the mission was engaged more on smuggling activities. The ruling family supplied prohibited goods like opium through the mission members to sell them in China. It seems that the mission members were also allowed the take some quantity of opium at their own instance; but they were strictly warned to sell articles belonging to the ruling family first. If any member of the mission tried to sell his own article neglecting the goods belonging to the ruling family, he was to be fined by the leader of the mission on the spot. 29 It is clear, if the leader himself was involved in such activities, the Nepal government would fine him on his return to Nepal.

The Nepali statesmen utilized the mission members as spies to know the actual state of things in Tibet and China. That is why they were instructed to send details of news they got from different sources. The information supplied by the mission were transmitted by the Rana Prime Ministers to the British Resident just to win favour of the British. 30

28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. That is the reason why the Chinese officials closely examined the mission members while entering and leaving the Tibetan territory to prevent any Englishmen travelling in disguise. For details see Foreign Political A, August 1867, Nos. 53–54, and October 1867, No. 127, INA.
As soon as the Nepali mission crossed the Nepal border, they were received by the Tibetan officials. Sometimes the local Chinese officials were also present to receive the mission. At Lhasa they met the Ambans, Dalai Lama and four Kajis (Cabinet) and surrendered the presents meant for them. Generally a feast was arranged by the Ambans in the honour of the mission. After the mission entered the Chinese territory, one Chinese official of higher rank (with his followers) escorted them to Peking. At the Chinese capital they got the audience of the Chinese Emperor, surrendered the presents they brought and received awards from him. A golden paraswana, meant for the Nepali king, was handed over to the mission, and the members of the mission were also duly rewarded. A great feast was arranged in their honour and they were allowed to meet the visitors from other countries. The mission members were also entertained in many ways. Sometimes they enjoyed the Chinese plays and dance, and at other times they were entertained by fire works (Atoshbaji) and similar other activities such as swimming and wrestling. Referring to the treatment of the Nepali mission by the Chinese authorities, Cavenagh writes:

...the mission experiences favorable treatment. An officer of Rank with an Escort is appointed to accompany it, and he is responsible for the members being supplied, at the expense of his own government, with everything which may conduce, to their comfort. To such an extent is this complaisance carried, that even the gratification of their

31. Amban’s letter, Tau Kwang 3rd year 7th month 16th day (August 1823), MFA, Poka No. Pa. 64.
32. Description of the activities of the 1842 mission at Peking recorded possibly by a mission member (undated), MFA, Unnumbered Poka.
sensual desires is not forgotten, and arrangements made accordingly.33

The viewpoint of the British writer, however, seems to be exaggerated. Leave the question of fulfilling their sensual desire, the mission members were troubled by the thieves and robbers several times on their way. Many times they lost their property in the hands of those thieves and robbers. In the 1847 mission some of the presents given by the Chinese Emperor to the Nepali king were also lost.34 The contemporary documents also hinted that the mission members, sometimes, had to suffer due to the lack of adequate food and water on way. This clearly explains the negligible attitude of the Chinese authorities towards the mission.

On their way back to Nepal the mission members freely gambled at Lhasa for some days. One document indicates that the Newar merchants at Lhasa were compelled to gamble with the mission members. Even gunmen were sent to bring the Newar merchants by force at the Vakil office for gambling.35 Arriving at Nuwakot (north-west of Kathmandu), the mission members were to undergo some Hindu rituals in the way of prayaschitta to recover their original castes which they supposed to have lost during their journey. Cavenagh writes:

To a Hindu Nation, a constrained Mission to an infidel country where little regard is paid to their prejudices, must, it is evident, be considered in the light of a national

33. Cavenagh, f. n. 3, p. 64.
34. Nepali King to the Chinese Emperor, 1905 B. S. Falgun Sudi 13 Roj 4 (7 March 1849), MFA, Poka No. Pa. 64.
35. Commander-in-Chief to Jit Bahadur, 1967 B. S. Baisak 31 Gate Roj 6 (13 May 1910), MFA, Poka No. 80.
disgrace, indeed, all the Members are deemed so completely to have lost caste during their journey, that on their return they are obliged to halt for 3 days at Nyakot, 18 miles from the capital, in order to perform certain religious ceremonies as a purifications, and even then it is thought necessary, to prevent their being reproached with having forfeited their religious rights, that the Rajah should present them with water out of his own lota, as an acknowledgement of their having been re-admitted into the pale of the Church.36

When the mission arrived at Balaju (about two miles north of the royal palace), it was accorded a warm welcome. The mission members were escorted by the high-level Nepali officials along with the musical bands and dancing groups to the royal palace, where the parawana sent by the Chinese Emperor was duly presented to the Nepali King. King Prithvi Bir Bikram, in his letter to the Chinese Emperor, Kuang-hsu, described this moment in these words:

As soon as the information of the expected arrival of the parawana graciously vouchsafed by His Celestial Majesty the Emperor of China was received, Sardars and Gentries of the palace accompanied by soldiers, elephants, horses, dancing parties and tamashas (shows) went out far from here to offer welcome and having respectfully saluted the Imperial Parawana and brought it up in possession to the Kantipur palace with incense and lighted typers scattering vermilion and firing feu-do-joï and placing it on a throne with bended knees and reverential main we saw it open.37


About the purification Coremouy and recaption of the mission at Balaju, Oldfield writes:

On their arrival at Nayakot all the members of the mission received back their castes by a written order from the Guru; they had to pay certain fees to perform certain ceremonies for a prescribed number of days. They brought back with them about one hundred China Pumi ponies. They halted a day or two at Balaji till they had an audience of the Minister, on which occasion the Lieutenant and his companions were all dressed in silk robes and sable caps given them at Peking by the Celestial Emperor. They brought back a letter from the Emperor of China to the King of Nepal, which was presented to the King in full Durbar, with a salute of twenty-one guns.38

CHAPTER V

British And Chinese Attitude Towards The Missions

As Nepal was sandwiched between the two powerful neighbours viz British-India and China (having control over Tibet) one of the serious problems she faced after her unification was to make a balance between those two powerful neighbours. Within half a century after unification, Nepal had wars both with China and the British. In 1791-92 she fought with the Chinese and in 1814-16 the British declared war against her. On both occasions Nepal was defeated and was forced to accept the humiliating terms dictated by the victors. However, Nepal tried her best to use both her neighbours against one another at least during the war periods, possibly with the conviction that it was the only means to protect the identity of Nepal as an independent state. But she did not succeed in either occasion. In 1792 the company's government refused to help Nepal against China and sent a mission under captain Kirkpatrick, who arrived in Nepal only after the cession of hostilities with China and who engaged himself in collecting valuable information about Nepal instead of working as a mediator in Nepal-China affairs. Similarly, in 1814-16 when Nepal was involved in a war with the British, the Nepali King requested the Chinese Emperor to help him against the Firangis (British) in accordance with the "agreement of 1792", by which China was bound to help Nepal if the latter was attacked by a foreign power. But the Chinese Residents at
Lhasa (Ambans) not only rejected Nepal's request but also refused to submit the Nepali king's letter to the Chinese Emperor. Not only that, a higher Chinese official, who came to investigate the "real facts", wholly blamed Nepal for her war against the British. China was not prepared to have confrontation with the British in Nepal's favour, nor were the British ready to antagonize China by taking the side of Nepal. Neither China nor the British wanted to interfere in Nepal's affairs in a way to affect one another's interest in that Himalayan kingdom. One of the reasons the British forwarded in not incorporating Nepal into the British dominion after defeating her in 1816 was the "fear of China", with whom Nepal had traditional relations. Similarly during the Anglo-Nepal war the Chinese Emperor instructed his Ambans in these words:

As a matter of fact they can join the Feringhi rule if they like, so long as they send us tribute and as long as the Feringhi do not cross the Tangut (Tibetan) frontier.

Nepal's defeat in the hands of the Chinese in 1792 and her obligation to send quinquennial missions to China was "an unwelcome political development" for the British. The East India Company suspected the Sino-Nepali reproachement harmful not only to the British commercial relations with Nepal but also to her interests in China and Tibet. Enquiries

were made secretly through Abdul Kadir in 1795 and Captain Knox in 1802 on the possible impact of Sino–Nepali relations on British interests in the Himalayan Kingdom, and the British were satisfied that the Sino–Nepali ties through the Nepali mission did, in no way, endanger their interests in Nepal, Tibet, and China also. It was also reported that “the Ambans attempt to influence Nepal’s internal politics had been failed by a strong anti-Chinese element in the Court of Kathmandu.”

In 1801 the Company’s government signed a treaty of friendship with the Nepal government only after Lord Wellesley (governor-general of Bengal) was satisfied that Nepal was “not in any degree dependent on the Chinese empire,” and that “no connexion subsists” between Nepal and China to a nature “to limit the Raja of Nepal to contract engagements with Foreign Powers or to render the proposed alliance... a reasonable subject of complaint or jealousy to the Chinese government.”

Irrespective of the viewpoint of Nepal and China, the Indian government viewed the Nepali missions to Peking as of more symbolic importance to both Nepal and China; and so from the British interest point of view they were unobjectionable. Although it was recognised that “these missions kept upon artificial importance for the Chinese throne which its military power could never have gained for it,” the Indian government had no locus standi in the matter. It clearly stated that the “governor-general in Council has no reason to apprehend that this periodical interchange of presents with China will lead to complications.”

4. Foreign Political Consultation, 7 March 1796, No 9.INA.
6. For details see Foreign Secret, September 1876, Nos. 129-33, INA.
Nepal received valuable gifts from China by sending presents of "trifling value," the Indian government expressed its reaction on these quinquennial mission in these words:—

We have no reason to question the loyalty of Sir Jang Bahadur, but rather the contrary, and it appears in the highest degree improbable that this periodical interchange of presents will lead to a reproachement with China in a sense hostile to us. The fact is that Sir Jang Bahadur's cupidity is the motive spring. He sends Yak's tails and gets back gifts, *pictai vestis et auri*. He gives a front and catches a salmon. Any attempt on our part to interfere would be unwise.7

The Indian government thus concluded:—

The government of Nepal is not, in fact, in the position of the feudatories of the Indian Empire. It enjoys an independent national life, and possesses the power of making war, entering into treaties and sending embassies without let or hindrance from the British government....8

Thus the Indian government was less disturbed by Nepal's quinquennial missions to China, as it believed that the mission was only an old custom and that it had very practical aims of obtaining free access to China and bringing back tax free goods from there. But in due course of time, some sort of misunderstanding developed between the governments of Nepal and British-India on the question of these periodical missions. Such a situation arose mainly because of three factors:— (a) anti-British nature of these missions (b)
submissive words in letters by the Nepali King to the Chinese Emperor, and (c) rumours of Chinese missions to Nepal.

Nepal's quinquennial missions visited Peking and returned home without any hindrance for the first few years, but after her defeat in the hands of the British in 1814-16, Nepal tried to make use of these missions against the British. Partly with hope to get the Chinese favour against the British and partly with the motive of getting some concession from the British by initiating anti-British activities, Nepal began asking help from the Chinese Emperor to fight the British, through her mission. Specially the missions of 1837 and 1842, when the anti-British camp was strong inside the Nepal Durbar, were highly anti-British in their nature and character. To summarize the concerned part of the letter sent by King Rajendra to the Chinese Emperor through Jagat Bom Pandey, leader of the 1842 mission:–

Our nation has been protected by the great Emperor of China since 1792, but now the British are trying to convince us through several means to sever connections with China and to accept them as our suzerain. As a subordinate state, we request you to help us by sending your army to fight the British. The Chinese army can reach Calcutta within 20 or 25 days if it moved through the eastern way i.e. Sikkim, and it takes about 35 or 40 days to reach Delhi if the imperial army marched through the western side i.e. Taklakhar. Be it not possible to send army so far, give us some 70 or 80 million rupees so that we can expel the British Resident from our country and make and attack on India. If the Chinese
Emperor did not help us in either way, it became very
difficult for us to protect our country.9

These Nepali missions made the British statesmen in
India alert and they began to make plans to fix their future
relations with Nepal and China. But they did not react sharply
against Nepal’s anti-British policies, possibly waiting for the
Chinese response to Nepal’s call. The problem was soon
over, firstly because China did not respond to Nepal’s request
positively and secondly because the anti-British camp inside
the Nepali Court disappeared very soon. With the rise of
Jang Bahadur in 1846 the situation completely changed.

Next problem arose during the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century when the British Minister at Peking took
alarm over the wording of the Nepali King’s letter sent
through the mission, where the ruler of Nepal was represented
as the “devoted and submissive vassal of the Emperor of
China”. Although a shadowy claim of suzerainty should not
be interpreted as constituting a real state of vassalage, the
British Minister emphasized that “the uncertainty at present
attaching to the political condition of China appears to me
to render it of importance that the relations between Nepal
and China should be clearly defined.”10

Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India, appreci-
ciated the British Minister’s view and felt it necessary to
clarify the British version of the Nepali mission to the

9. *Arji* to the Chinese Emperor dated 1899 B. S. Ashad 2
Gate Roj 6 (17 June 1842), MFA, Unnumbered Poka, See
Appendix C.

10. Asad Husain, *British India’s Relations with the King-
dom of Nepal*, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
Peking Court. The Indian documentary evidences show that the Nepali Prime Ministers had assured the Indian government so many times that the mission was merely a traditional form and that the servile abasement and humble obedience expressed by the Nepali King's letter to the Chinese Emperor was only the immemorial diplomatic formula required when one addressed the Emperor of China. Accordingly the British Minister at Peking was instructed to make the position of the British government clear to the Peking Court. On instruction, the British Minister told the Chinese government that

... ... the submissive expression in the letters from Nepal . . . . are not regarded by Her Majesty's government as an acknowledgement of Vassalage, or indeed anything more than a purely formal and complimentary style of address.11

The Chinese ministers discussed the issue among themselves, but no decision was taken. Possibly the Chinese authorities saw no benefit by involving in such an issue and that is why the question was allowed to be dropped.

At about the same time, one more issue on Sino-Nepali relations placed the British statesmen in a difficult situation, the issue being the rumour of a Chinese mission to Nepal. In 1889 the British Resident at Kathmandu informed the Indian government that a Chinese mission was coming Nepal.12 Few months after, the Senior Dowager Queen of Nepal, who had been exiled by Prime Minister Bir Shamsher, irritated the Indian government by informing a rumour that Bir had concluded a secret treaty with China "favourable to his own

11. Ibid.
12. For details see Foreign Secret E, August 1889, Nos. 27-28, INA.
personal interests, but prejudicial to the British alliance.”¹³

Though the new governor-general, Lord Landsdowne, considered the issue as a more exaggeration of facts and allowed to drop the matter expressing a word of thanks to the Senior Dowager Queen, the Indian government discussed the issue in detail. Almost all the high officials viewed the issue as of serious nature that could adversely affect British interests in Nepal and Tibet also. They argued that the inter-exchange of missions between Nepal and China would decrease, sooner or later, British influence in Nepal, but were not prepared to intervene in the situation, for it would show that the British attached importance to the Chinese move. The issue, however, did not take a serious turn, as the much rumoured mission was nothing but simply a Chinese delegation which came to Nepal to decorate the Nepali Prime Minister with the Chinese title. The rumour of a Sino-Nepali treaty prejudicial to the British interest also proved to be wholly untrue.

In the final analysis it can be said that the British attitude towards Nepal’s quinquennial mission was mainly based on the policy of non-interference on Sino-Nepali relations, until the British interests were threatened or endangered. The British statesmen in India did not reprimand Nepal for her missions of 1837 and 1842, as the Chinese Court did not respond to Nepal’s call. The issues connected with the submissive words in Nepal’s letters to China and the rumour of Chinese mission to Nepal were also allowed to be dropped silently, as they posed no threat to the British interests either in Nepal or Tibet. After the rise of the Ranas in Nepal these quinquennial missions served, for the British, as useful means

of obtaining information about inner regions of Tibet and China. Specially in the beginning of the present century, the information, supplied by Nepal, on the inner Tibetan politics was of immense value to the British in wiping out Russian influence in Tibet. That is why, as the British Resident reported, the Nepali missions were suspected of indulgence in espionage for the British and mission members were closely examined while entering and leaving the Tibetan territory to prevent any Englishmen travelling in disguise.

Turning now to Chinese attitude towards these quinquennial missions, it has already been mentioned that the system has been imposed by China on Nepal mainly to retain the ancient Chinese maxim that “the Chinese rulers exercised power over all peoples of the world through the will of the divine overlord”. That is why the Peking Court wanted the missions to be led by higher Nepali officials viz Kazi and Sardar. The Chinese authorities were also particular about the regularity of the mission, and no major alteration in the list of presents to the Emperor was allowed. Reportedly in 1852 the Chinese Emperor refused to accept presents brought by the Nepali mission on the ground that the Nepali Prime Minister himself went to London to pay respect to the British Queen but sent only his officials to pay respect to the Chinese Emperor. But the fact that the suzerainty claimed by China over Nepal was purely nominal has been evidenced by several factors. First, China did not help Nepal when the latter was involved in a war with the British, rather allowed her to join the British, provided that she (Nepal) should send “tributary” missions as

15. Ramsay to Government of India, 6 May 1854, Foreign Secret Consultation, 26 May 1854, No. 50, INA.
usual. Second, Nepal declared war against Tibet contrary to the wishes of the Chinese, and it was only after the strong opposition of the Chinese Court that China was mentioned as the superior power in the Nepal-Tibet treaty of 1856. Third, whenever Nepal hesitated to send mission to Peking, the Chinese authorities allowed her to send the mission up to the Tibetan border. Lastly, when Nepal did not send her mission in fixed period, the Chinese government allowed to do so by issuing a formal notice giving one or another reason for doing so.

For the first sixty years i.e. 1792 to 1852 Nepal regularly sent her missions, and altogether thirteen missions were despatched during this period. Considering them as purely political missions, the Chinese authorities provided every possible facilities to the members. At Peking they were entertained in several ways, and were awarded huge gifts. As reported by the British Minister at Peking:

The envoy (leader of the mission) and principal members of his staff were all dressed when leaving in Chinese official costume and wore the decorations which had been conferred upon them by the Emperor. A Chinese Guard of Honour was at the station. . . .16

The situation, however, was different after 1852 due to two reasons viz. commercial activities of the mission and the espionage works by the mission members.

The commercial activities began with the 1852 mission when Prime Minister Jang Bahadur allowed the members to

carry a lot of commodities for trading purposes and also the opium of nearly three lakh rupees under the diplomatic privileges. This aroused suspicion among the Chinese authorities, who did not like to entry of opium in their country despite its legal ban. The Chinese authorities, however, did not react immediately but in 1866 when Nepal sent another mission it was greatly humiliated. The Chinese authorities at Ta-tsian-lu (near the China-Tibet border) told Jagat Sher, the leader of the mission, to hand over the presents meant for the Emperor to them and return to Nepal. The mission waited for nearly two years for permission to proceed to Peking, but no such permission was given. Finally, the mission had to return from Chen-tu (few miles inside the Chinese border) where it sold the opium it had.

Another Nepali mission, sent in 1877, was also treated in a similar way. As soon as the Chinese authorities at Peking knew the despatch of a mission by Ranaudip, the new Prime Minister of Nepal, they sent an urgent instruction to the Ambans that “owing to the interruption of communications along the post roads caused by the unusual severe famine in the provinces of Shansi and Shensi” the Nepali mission should be asked to surrender the gifts and presents to them (Ambans) to be forwarded to Peking and to return from there to their country. But before this instruction reached Lhasa, the Nepali mission had already left Lhasa for Peking. The Ambans, however, brought the instruction to the notice of the Nepali Prime Minister. When Ranaudip knew of it he (in the name of the king) sent letters to the Ambans requesting them to allow the Nepali mission to visit Peking. The Prime Minister argued

17. Ramsay to Government of India, 6 May 1854, Foreign Secret Consultation, 26 May 1854, No. 50, INA.
18. For details see Foreign Political A, March 1868, No. 208, INA.
that it would be a great humiliation to Nepal if her mission would be compelled to return form mid way.¹⁹

The mission was stopped by the Chinese authorities at Ta-tsian-lu, who asked the mission members to surrender the presents and return from there. The leader of the mission, Tej Bahadur Rana, refused to obey the Chinese order and told that he would not return until "my government orders to do so." It seems that there was exchange of correspondence between the Peking authorities and the Ta-tsian-lu officials for several months, and finally the mission was allowed to visit Peking.²⁰ Although the mission reached Peking, it felt much humiliated, as "its members were lodged in the dirty building assigned to the missions of tributary nations" and the leader of the mission received audience in the Chinese Court as "Vassals."²¹

All these measures, however, could not check the smuggling activities of the Nepali missions. That is why by the turn of the present century the Chinese government made strict rules imposing restrictions on the sale of prohibited goods like opium. This Chinese move proved to be more effective, as the leader of the last Nepali mission, Bhairab Bahadur, told the British Minister at Peking that the missions suffered a monetary loss by the new Chinese law and that the future Nepali missions would be of doubtful utility. Bhairab Bahadur also noted that the only advantage the mission got was an

¹⁹. Shree Panch to Ambans, 1934 B. S. Chaitra Sudi 12 Roj 1 (14 April 1878), MFA, Poka No. 30.

²⁰. Peking Gazette, 24 March 1879, Foreign Secret, June 1879, No. 23, INA.

²¹. British Minister at Peking to Ripon, 1 November 1880, Foreign Political A, January 1881, No. 84, Ibid.
opportunity of acquiring first hand knowledge about China.\(^{22}\)

As the leader of the mission made a forecast, the system of sending quinquennial mission was soon ended by Nepal mainly because of the new Chinese law restricting the sale of opium in China.

The mission members were also suspected by the Chinese authorities of having involved in the espionage activities in favour of the British. False rumours were also circulated that some Englishmen were also included in the mission in disguise. That is why the mission members were closely examined while entering and leaving the Tibetan territory to prevent any Englishmen travelling in disguise. At Peking also the mission members were kept aloof from the foreigners specially the British. In 1880 the British Minister at Peking reported that the arrival and departure of the Nepali mission was kept absolutely secret and the members were not allowed to meet the foreigners. It was only after much persuasion that the British Minister could talk with the leader of the mission for a short period.\(^{23}\)

Similarly, in 1908 it was reported that the mission members were “lodged in the extreme north of the city... guarded by an escort of Chinese troops which keep a careful watch on all comings and goings.”\(^{24}\) The British Minister at Peking believed that “Chinese selected this locality with a view to removing the envoy from foreign influence.”\(^{25}\)

\(^{22}\) Jordon to Minto, 5 June 1908, Foreign Secret E, October 1908, Nos. 696-717, \textit{ibid}.

\(^{23}\) T. F. Wade to Indian Viceroy, 16 January 1880, Foreign Political A, April 1880, No. 98, \textit{ibid.}, See Appendix D.

\(^{24}\) Jordon to Minto, 29 April 1908, Foreign Secret E, October 1908, Nos. 696-717, \textit{INA},

\(^{25}\) Same to Same, 5 June 1908, Foreign Secret E, October 1908 Nos. 696-717, \textit{ibid}. 
This type of Chinese attitude, together with the strict law (prohibiting the sale of opium), was largely responsible for the discontinuation of quinquennial mission by Nepal after 1906.

It would not be out of place here to write a few words about the Tibetan attitude towards these Nepali missions. As a matter of fact, Tibet was not so much connected with these missions, as it was a direct link between Nepal and China. The Tibetan involvement was limited only in some presents brought by the mission to the Dalai Lama and four Kajis, and arranging a feast by the Tibetan authorities in the honour of the mission. But in actual practice, the Tibetan authorities did not like this direct contact between Nepal and China, as they believed that the close ties between these two countries would downgrade the independent status of Tibet. They also were of opinion that if they could create problems in Sino-Nepali relations, it would be an opportunity for them to assert the independent status of Tibet. That is why there were many reports of the manhandling of Nepali missions by the Tibetans inside their territory. It seems that these Tibetans (mostly khampas) were indirectly encouraged by the Tibetan authorities in their anti-mission activities. Although the Tibetans succeeded in looting the property of the mission members several times, the Tibetan government did not succeed in its plan. Whenever such incident took place, Nepal and China were united to take action against the concerned Tibetans, and as a result the Tibetan government was more humiliated both by Nepal and China.
CHAPTER VI

Final Observations

In the previous chapters we have surveyed the different aspects of the quinquennial missions sent by Nepal to China between the period 1792 and 1906. Particularly we made references to the origin of the system, its short history, composition and list of presents, the journey complications, and finally the British and the Chinese attitude towards the mission. In this final chapter, we raise some fundamental questions relating to the mission system and try to find answer of them.

Writers and historians have categorised Nepal as a state under the suzerainty of China. They have based their argument on three grounds viz. the Sino-Nepali agreement of 1792; decoration of Nepali Kings and Prime Ministers with the Chinese titles; and the system of quinquennial mission.

It has been argued that China had established her suzerainty over Nepal through the agreement of 1792 by which China became the protector of Nepal by promising to help her against foreign attacks and the arbitrator in all disputes between Nepal and Tibet, in addition to an obligation on the part of Nepal to send a mission in every five years to China. This argument, however, is far from true. As a matter of fact the agreement of 1792 was not in written form and all the issues were settled either verbally or through letters, and so it was not a treaty in legal sense of term. Later events also proved that neither China nor Nepal acted accordance with the provisions of the
China refused to help Nepal in her war with the British. Not only that, Nepal was allowed to join the British rule provided that she should send "tributary" missions to China regularly. Similarly, in 1854 Nepal did not submit her dispute with Tibet to the arbitration of China and declared war against the land of the Lamas much to the annoyance of of the Chinese Ambans. Thus the agreement of 1792 did not guide the future relations between Nepal and China, except the system of sending quinquennial mission.

Acceptance of Chinese titles by the Nepali Kings and the Prime Ministers formed another ground for China to claim her sovereignty over Nepal. Here we should remember that only at one time in 1790 that King Rana Bahadur Shah of Nepal was decorated with the Chinese title, Ertini Wang. The later rulers of Nepal were not formally decorated with this Chinese title, though the Nepali Kings used the term wang for themselves while addressing the Chinese Emperors, and the latter also continued to follow the same style in their letters to the former (Nepali Kings). The case of the Nepali Prime Minister, however, was different. Specially from the time of Jang Bahadur, the Nepali Prime Ministers received the Chinese title, Thong Ling Pimma Ko Kang Wang Shang and every time a Chinese mission or representative visited Kathmandu to decorate the new Prime Minister of Nepal with this Chinese title and the robes connected with it. The system of decorating the Nepali Prime Ministers with Chinese title continued even after the fall of Manchu dynasty in China when the 1792 agreement was formally nullified and the system of quinquennial mission was ended for ever. Here we should bear in mind that the Rana Prime Ministers were not the De Jure sovereigns of Nepal, although the supreme power of the state and the government had been delegated to them by the rulers of Nepal. Hence it is illogical to treat Nepal as a feudatory state of China merely on the ground that the Nepali
Prime Ministers were decorated with the Chinese title. As regards the Chinese title awarded to the Nepali King, it had been already mentioned that Rana Bahadur was the only Nepali King to get it. On the basis of this solitary evidence, Nepal cannot be categorised as a state under the suzerainty of China.

Now we come to the main point of our discussion i.e. the political status of Nepal vis-a-vis China on the basis of quinquennial missions sent by the former to the latter.

The system of sending missions to China (which the Chinese called tribute) had started sometime before 3500 years. The literary and historical sources of the Zhou period (11th to 3rd centuries B.C.) indicate that the tribal leaders were sending tribute and making ritual visits as early as the reign of Cheng Tang (1600-1587 B.C.). It is also said that the principle of compiling tribute from locally-obtainable goods was established in the 16th century B.C. Further the Chinese sources state that Yi Yin (Chief advisor of Cheng Tang), on Cheng Tang’s order, formulated a detailed set of rules relating to the tribute to be offered by the “four countries of the world” i.e. tribes of the north, south, east and west. Later on during the Zhou period, a doctrine, with the expression “son of heaven” developed, according to which the earthly ruler (Chinese Emperor) held heaven’s mandate to govern all under the heaven. An idea was thus propagated that the Chinese rulers exercised power over all peoples of the world through the will of the divine overlord, and this idea through the tributary mission system continued to flourish in substantially augmented from into the 19th century.¹

By 1818 more than ten countries were sending tributary missions to China. Among them Korea was to send tribute to the Chinese Emperor four times a year (presented altogether at the end of every year), whereas Laos and Burma were to pay tribute only once in ten years. Some other countries sent tribute once in two years, once in three years, and once in four years, as the case might be. For some countries of farest regions, the period was not fixed. It seems that these countries were to send tribute as soon as the Chinese Emperor ordered them to do so. Even a great country like England sent an embassy with presents to China by the end of the 18th century. While acknowledging the English "tribute", the Chinese Emperor replied, "...commending your humble loyalty to our Celestial Dynasty, we now present you with further gifts and command you to display energy and dutiful loyalty so as to deserve our perpetual favour." 

The tributary missions had at least two benefits for them. First, these missions got valuable return gifts from the Chinese Emperor. The Chinese maxim was that the return gifts should be more qualitative and more in number than the mission submitted to the Emperor. Second, trade followed immediately upon the presentation of tribute to the Emperor at the capital. The tribute missions were usually accompanied by merchants who were freely permitted to trade at Peking. This explains why some countries sent tributary missions to China even up to the 19th century.


Turning now to the question as to how far Nepal remained a state under the suzerainty of China, let us first explain the term suzerainty from western viewpoint. Suzerainty from the western point of view has primarily a political connotation—(a) a suzerain not only claims but exercises exclusive political influence on the feudatory, and (b) a suzerain has the corresponding obligation for the latter’s defence against external threat.5

It is clear that China never exercised her exclusive political influence on Nepal. In Tibet, the two Chinese Residents, Ambans, were appointed to control the state of affairs there. There was no such provision of stationing any Chinese Resident in Nepal. The only thing Nepal should do was to contact the Peking Court only through the Ambans at Lhasa, which never meant that China exercised her control over Nepal. Further, Nepal did not obey the Chinese instructions in her dealings with Tibet. In 1883 when Nepal was involved in a serious dispute with Tibet, the Chinese mediators tried to intervene in the situation in Tibet’s favour. But Nepal did not follow the Chinese directions, and in the long run the Chinese mediators had to accept Nepal’s demands.6 As to the question whether China acted as the protector of Nepal against external threats the answer is purely negative as the Chinese Emperor refused to help Nepal against the British in 1814–16.

Coming to the question as to whether the Nepali quinquennial mission could be termed as tribute missions, we should


6. A detailed study of this crisis has been made in Tri Ratna Manandhar, Nepal-Bhot Bibad, Kathmandu: Research Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, 2041 B. S.
quote the conditions laid down by the strong Chinese ruler, Kublai Khan, in 1267 for the tributary missions. The conditions were:—

(a) The ruler of the feudatory state should personally seek audience of the Chinese Emperor,
(b) The rulers of the concerned feudatory states should send their sons to China as hostages,
(c) A census of population of the concerned state should be made periodically, to be submitted before the Chinese Emperor,
(d) The people of the feudatory state were to provide military corvee,
(e) Fixed taxes were to be regularly paid to the Chinese Emperor, and
(f) A Mongol governor was appointed to be in-charge of the concerned state. 7

If we were to accept the above Chinese version of the tributary state, Nepal can, in no way, be classified as such. None of the above mentioned conditions were ever fulfilled by Nepal in her dealings with the Chinese Emperor. That is why, while categorising countries like Korea, Annam (Vietnam), Laos, Siam, Burma and others as Ching tributaries of 1818, Nepal was excluded from that list.

The Nepali documents referred to the presents meant for the Chinese Emperor and others as Mamuli Saugat which literally meant ordinary present. The only thing that complies with the ancient Chinese maxim was that the presents should be the "produce of the land". On the basis of above mentioned terminology, some writers refused to accept Nepal's quinquennial

missions as of tributary nature. Furthermore, no specific tribute, either in case or in kind, was fixed for Nepal, rather the presents differed from mission to mission, although no major deviation was permissible. If we consider the Nepali missions as of tributary nature, then why should not we regard Tibet a tributary state of Nepal, since the former paid Rs. 10000/- a year to the latter for nearly a century, as imposed by the treaty of 1856.  

One more significant thing to be noted here is that the Nepali statesmen did not follow the timetable of the quinquennial mission strictly. Although she sent missions to China regularly for the first sixty years, some of them went only up to the Nepal-Tibet border to submit presents there. After 1852 Nepal discontinued the system several times, but all the time the reason for such discontinuance was clarified not by Nepal but by China. After 1906 Nepal ended the system unilaterally.

The above mentioned facts strongly suggest that the Nepali missions, sent in every five years, cannot be termed as tributary missions. Neither China could assert her political influence in Nepal, nor did the former accept the latter as her suzerain. However, it would not be justified to call these missions as embassies sent by an independent country to another independent state. We should mention some points which signified the subordinate status of these Nepali missions, and which clarified Nepal's dependence on China at least from theoretical viewpoint.

8. The 1856 Treaty gave Nepal the right to post her Vakil at Lhasa, who was authorized to decide the case involving the Tibetans and Nepali subjects at Lhasa. For the detailed study of the position of Nepali Vakil at Lhasa see Tri Ratna Manandhar Some Aspects of Rana Rule in Nepal, Kathmandu: Purna Devi Manandhar, 1983, pp. 1-31.
First, the words and phrases used in the letter sent by the Nepali King to the Chinese Emperor through the Nepali mission clearly indicate the subordinate status of Nepal. It seems that usually the Chinese *Ambans* at Lhasa drafted the letter and Nepal was to follow the *Amban's* dictation. Whenever Nepal wrote such letters on her own instance, the *Ambans* modified them using the extravagant honorific forms considered appropriate by the Peking Court. To quote a line from such a letter:

> Regard your humble servant as a slave, and extend bounty and leniency to him as such, that he may for your ever be the humble recipient of the heavenly bounty for which he will be infinitely grateful.  

The Chinese Emperor also replied the Nepali King in a similar fashion. His letter contained only instructions, and not any gesture of friendship. To quote the concluding lines of such a letter:

> Continue to follow as before the advice of the *Ambans* at Lhasa, bearing in mind our kindness. Keep those under you well in hand. Make yourself comfortable and happy. Cherish our kindness towards you. Don't find or be lazy in your duty. These are my instructions.  

When the Nepali mission was back to Kathmandu, it was accorded a warm welcome, quite contrary to the practice  

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10. Chinese Emperor to Nepali King, Kwang Sui 34th year 11th month 4th day (December 1908), MFA, Unnumbered Poka, See Appendix H.
of an independent state. On one occasion in 1833 King Rajendra accompanied by his Crown Prince, all his chiefs, and 300 regular troops went a few miles far to receive the mission members. The British Resident describes the scene in these words:—

The envoy (head of the mission) had the imperial epistle suspended round his neck in a large cylinder covered with brocade, when Maharaja reached the spot where he stood. His Highness descended from his elephant and made three profound Salams to the Emperor’s letter...11

Chandra Shamsher defended the submissive wording of letters sent by the Nepali Kings to the Chinese Emperor and vice versa by saying that they carried “the truely oriental style of exuberant but meaningless politeness and follows a stereotyped rule.”12 But the above mentioned deliberations definitely represented Nepal as a subordinate state, though the Nepali missions could not be termed as purely tribute missions.

In the final analysis it can be said that Nepal’s quinquennial mission was a careful compromise between China and Nepal. It was a compromise between the Chinese Emperor, who, at least in theory, wanted to preserve the ancient doctrine of “son of heaven” and the Nepali statesmen who wanted to

11. Resident in Nepal to Political Secretary, 9 November 1833, Foreign Political Consultation, 21 November 1833, No. 36, INA.

be benefited in more than one way by paying due respect to the Chinese Emperor. The Chinese were satisfied that Nepal sent her periodical missions (although with some gaps) with “the produce of the land” as presents and the arji in submissive language to the satisfaction of the Chinese Court. The Nepali statesmen were also equally happy as they were financially benefited in many ways. The Nepali King got valuable return gifts by sending presents of trifling value. The Nepali statesmen (particularly the Ranas) were benefited by the sale of opium and other smuggling activities of the mission members, and the members of the mission also got valuable presents from the Chinese Emperor. In addition to that, by joining hands with China, Nepal could dominate Tibet in many aspects. But by the turn of the present century the basic ground of compromise existed in the form of quinquennial mission was greatly threatened, when China tried to establish her suzerainty over Nepal in a more formal way and in addition

13. Chandra Shamsher told the British Resident that the Kaji, who led the Nepali mission to Peking, got one lakh rupees and others members also got similar monetary benefits. See conversation between Chandra Shamsher and British Resident in Nepal, 2 April 1910, MFA, Unnumbered Poka. The Nepali Prime Minister also told the British Resident that “there was great competition (among Nepali officials) to be a member of it (mission)”, as the mission members were loaded with valuable presents and also could earn some money by selling Nepali goods at their own instance. See Resident in Nepal to Secretary, Government of India, 28 June 1902, Foreign Secret E, September 1902, Nos. 127-33, 1NA., See Appendix F.

14. When China formally claimed her suzerainty over Nepal, the only way for Nepal to frustrate the Chinese attempt was to terminate the mission systems. In a
Nepal's Quinquennial Mission

attempted to frustrate the smuggling activities of the Nepali missions. Both these Chinese attempts were intolerable to Nepal, as she was not prepared to serve the master who wanted to curb her financial benefits. As a result, the mission system, which was quite effective for more than a century, ended like a house of cards.

memorandum submitted to the Indian government, the British Resident in Nepal wrote:–

“China claims to suzerainty over Nepal has been definitely rejected by the Durbar who could have emphasized the rejection by refusing to send the usual mission.” See Foreign Secret E, October 1911, Nos. 270-72, INA.
Appendix A

५२ साल (बिो सं् १८५२)

चीन भी बादसाहान्दे रुगाल गवाको गावि ममार र मेवल मार्फत
काज नरसि जेटाबुढा माथि-साहित्मि मिति भावन वदी
४ रोज़—

पी बादसाह के—

सोगत—

मुगा माला १ के तोला २६१५। के — १६८७।।।
मुनोला तास धान २ के तोला के — १५६।।।।
किपाप धान २० के — १४५०।।।
सुतानन बतान द्वारा १ के — १०५०।
बुटेदार प्रतलस धान ४ के — ३६।
सेक्रेटर बजर १ के — २००।
हाती दांत ४ के — १६०।
बंबं घानी ६ के — २६४।
जापल गोटा १००० के — १२।
पाक गोटा २ के — १०।
दलबिनी संदुक १ के धान दे — ३२।।।
रसान तापा ५ के — ५५५।
टरियार ४ के — १२।
कटार २ के — ३५।
दलिणी मुगारो धान ६ के — १५।
मुगारो धान १० के — १५।
पुहार २ के — २०।
पुकरी २ के — १४।
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वपनी द्वार यात्रा ६ के — ६६

*Source:- RNAH, File No. 56.
Appendix B

75 साल (बीस साल १५७५)

चीन श्री बादसाह के पांच वर्षको कोपाग गवाको माखल काबो दुः बंजन पाडे ग्रामाङ्ग वदी १०

पांच वर्षको कामानको

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कासिवाल घाट २ के —
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सुपारी धारी १ के —
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Nepal's Quinquennial Mission

*Source:* RNAH, File No. 56.
Appendix C

হজ্জত ১৪৬৬ সাল প্রাপ্ত ২ গতে রোজ ৬ মা দামোদর পাঁচকা নাতি কাজী জগতবর পাড়িলাই চীন পথাউদা শ্রী চীন বাদসাহলাই লেখী গোয়াকে প্রার্থনা করান

শ্রী ১ পেচীন বাদসাহ

শ্রী সিলাল

১

উপাষ্ঠ ১ বাহলীবাট ধর্মপত্র এ পাতিরজামাকো পঞ্জা হাম। মাদাজু শ্রী রণ বহাদুর সাহালাই বক্ষণ্ডু ভায্যাকো রহিন্ত তিমীলে নিমেষকো সোকো চিতাতু দপিন ঢোকা নেপালকা তিমী ছি তহাকা প্রজা প্রাণিকো পালনা গন্তু বর্ষকো মামুলীত লো হাম হুজুরমা দসনগন আটকু তাহা তিমী সানা পুনঃকো রাজা ছো তিমী মানিকেরী কুরাকো যদি হাম লাগ্ন মান্যা তিমী সানা গ্যান্যা হামীরা ছিদু ছি দপিন তর এ মঞ্জাত মুনুফকো নেপাল লীনাকো মনসুর গরী কোন্তে প্রায় তহাকা প্রজা প্রাণিহলাই হু দিন লাগ্নো তোমোলাই মীরী চীনলাই নন্দ হামিলাই মান মনি কোন্তে সন্ন আটা এন্যা যে মুলত গোর্খাকে গাদী ১ বাজ হুমিলাই বক্ষযাকো ১ লাই মান জালিচী গ্রহু হামী কোটে জাতীন মনি হাম লাগ্ন স্বরীলাই জাতক পথাহু তিমীলে খিলাক লাগী দৈ মানেন মন্যা সাঁচো কুক্ক ঠহরাই চীন হাম হুজুরমা শ্রী লেখী তাহা তিমী দর্শাকো পত্যার ভায্যাকো কাজীলাই যাহা পাঠাই দিনু এ হাম হুজুরমা বজবিজ গরী হামী ফৌজলাই ধামন সক্যো ভায্যা ফৌজ বকসীলা ফৌজ ধামন সক্যো ভায্যা দৈলয় বক্ষী পতি তিমী মানি হাম লাগ্ন স্বরীলাই জাতে মানীলে বকসীলা ছো প্রজািত দেবী পতি তিমীলে পীরামীলে লিয়ে লী সাঁচো কুরাকো প্রজা লেখী চীন পথাহু দুটো নেপাল মন্যা হুকুম মী ধর্মপত্র এ পাতি রজামাকো প্রামানালী ১ কা হুজুরবাট বকস মী লীয় প্রাপ্ত কাজী দেউদাল পাপা ৪৯ সালকো প্রাণিন মানামা হী উসী হুকুমকো প্রাধার রাজ প্রাচ তক ১ কা প্রতাপালী যে মুলত গামীয়াকো ছো
नेपालको प्रासाद राष्ट्रीय हास्य बुवाज्यू गिराइन जुट विक्रम साहा। रह्मन
अभाको भौगोलिक बिवाहका प्रकार, दरेले विशेष तरक, तिरप दरुपन तरक जीवन की रामरामकी गौरव रामको वहुँ छ। गार्डम संग चलनु हुँन मनु हजुरको दरेले विनायक मेरा बुवाज्यू गिराइन जुट विक्रम साहा र
मेरा मुमाल्यू। १०।१२ दिनको फरक भए २ का माखामारीले १५ वर्षका
मेंरमा म्यां हुँ मैंने उस वेलामा मेरो उमेर देट वर्षको वाल्प रह्याखान
प्राप्त २ बाट हान्या पुर्वलाई धर्मप्रेत गरी भक्तिका प्रभावाः २ मन्नवा वेहोरा
र कुरा मलाई कसली कहियाँन म वाल्प हुनाले कहि बाहा। पाइन अधिक बाहा
हास्या पुर्वलाई नेपाल राजको भोग गराइ दिन्याः र ५ निःशामा। मलाई राजी
दिन्या हास्या पुर्वलिङ्ग पत्यको जंगको पस्नी रक्षकी राजको बाजी दामोदर
पेड़लाई हो हास्या दर्शको पुरानु बुन्धाद १ का हुजुरमा पनि जाैँ हेतु अभाको
प्राप्त भक्तिको धर्मप्रेत गरी भक्तिका प्रभावाः २ मन्नवा वेहोरा, जः चा पनि होको काली दामोदर पाड़े मन्ना
पछि हास्या दर्शकमा पुरानु भक्तिका बाहीरीराहा साहु मानिस मामलेको जानाङ
मुख्यार बन्न गराइट र प्राप्त २ बाट भक्तिको धर्मप्रेत गरी भक्तिका प्रभावाः २ दिव्या
फिर्तिङ्गरीसंग मौलि ७१ सालमा ग्रहानु भाना कोई फोर्गोलाई
किको मीतारीराहा हास्या दर्शक देशी अभाको उत्तर रामीवारीमा कोठी
लाउन दीयो केही परिष्कार मलुक र केही दर्शको मलुक ५० नौतिक
प्राप्तका हास्या सोकी गर्न मेयाड मार्दार पर सारी फोर्गोलाई धाक देपाह
मलाई पनि मार्दारलाई पनि हुपकाय वर्ष ३४ सम्पाद अवी मालिक भक्तिको
रहेछ फीरकी नेपालमा त्याद राजको २५ वर्ष मध्ये म १७।१७ वर्षको उमेर
भयापछि मलाई बाहा हुन जान्दा यो मुलुक १ कहछले हामिलाई वकसतु
भक्तिको हो । १ हुकुम नर्मी कस्कर हुकुमले फोर्गोलाई यहा त्यिः भनी
मीमेन शापालाई साना गर्नको मन्नु। गर्न फोर्गोलाई लीयो मलुक पनि
ल्याउँ दिछ यहा वस्तुङ्गको फोर्गोलाई धापाई दिछ मनी ९२ सालमा
भयाना छोरा माथवर शीलाइ कलकता लाउस्त्रेत पठाइ फोर्गोलाई लीयोको
मलुक पनि त्याउँ दक्षिण पनि नेपालमा राज्यको फोर्गोलाई पनि धापाउँ त्रस्तेन
१ हुकुम नपाई मलाई त्याद फोर्गोलाई पत्याउँ त्यिः निमेच्छाई फिर्तिङ्गरीसंग
मिल्या त्यि होस पनी ९४ सालको भात्र सहेलामा मामलामा मीमेन शापालाई
कैपैरी राज्यको दीयो त्यि हुसी गायमा दामोदर पाड़े। छोरा राणकुङ्
पेड़लाई मुस्तियारी दीयो दीयो मीमेन शापालाई राफङ्को मुनासीवि
फिर्तिङ्गरीसंग मौलि को त्यि १ हुजुरमा पुल्न जाला र मेरी ज्ञान साना होला
Appendix C

Y3ource:- MFA, Unnumbered Poka.
Appendix D

From Sir T. F. Wade, Her Majesty's Minister at Peking.
To H. E. Viceroy and Governor General of India.

Dated 16 January 1880.

... A mission from Nipal, of the approach of which have been hearing for months, arrived here some 3 or 4 weeks ago. Its members were lodged in the dirty building assigned to the missions of tributary nations, at no great distance from this legation ...

The Chinese in charge of the mission made some slight attempt to prevent (my) intercourse with it. I applied to the Tsungli Yamen, and after a little longer delay, succeeded in getting into communication with the Nipalese.

The Chief (of the mission) did not like to say that its object was commercial, as I take it is reality to be. Like most missions from all countries to China this one has brought various articles of home manufacture, some of course to be presented tribute, but the rest for sale.

*Source;- Foreign Political A, April 1880, No. 98, INA.*
Appendix E

Translation of a Kharita from His Highness the Maha-raja Dhiraj to H. M. the Emperor of China——

As soon as the information of the expected arrival of the Parawana graciously vouch safed by His Celestial Majesty the Emperor of China was received, Sirdars and gentries of the palace accompanied by soldiers, elephants, horses, dancing parties and tamashas (shows) went out far from here to offer welcome, and having respectfully saluted the Imperial Parawana and brought it up in procession to the Kantipur palace with incense and lighted tapers, scattering vermilion and firing few-do-jo'i and placing it on a throne with bended knees and reverential mien, we saw it opened. With wrapt attention I listened to the contents of the said Parawana addressed to me on the day of the month of the 22nd year of Shri kwengsui. Your Majesty has been pleased to state “I am very glad to see that since you were granted the throne of your father you have acted in accordance with the advice of the Ambas at Lhassa with a sincere and true heart, living under our protection. Kaji Indra Bikram Rana deputed by you was here to pay his respects to me. The petition and presents sent by you arrived here and were laid before me. Appreciating your sincere devotion I granted audience to the said Kaji Indra Bikram Rana and his party and I have sent by his hands for being taken on his return to you one golden Parawana, 24 pieces of Kochin known as Tachiang lastung, 4 pieces of Tangtwang Kochin, 4 pieces of blue Mantwang Kochin, 4 pieces of Yanfaichin Kochin, 4 pieces of Chintwang Kochin of Bakkha class, 4 pieces of Tangrung, 8 pieces of Tangrung sheets or Carpets, 2 silver tea pots, 2 silver dishes, 2 “phalachhis“, 2 “polis“ of “usay“ colour, 4 cups of
uchhai colour. ...Rui studded with “Sangisan“, 2 articles of sangisan, 1 Rosary of Sootoo beads, 2 Tyaochhi fur, 2 Maloufur, 2 yellow dishes, 2 hunnochhis, 2 pairs of large purse 4 pairs of small purse and 8 packets of tea which please take delivery of on arrival. Continue to follow as before the advice of the Ambas of Lhassa bearing in mind our kindness. Keep those under you well in hand. Make yourself comfortable and happy. Cherish our kindness towards you. Don't fail or be lazy in your duty.” Hearing these advice and instructions so graciously vouchsafed and also hearing in detail that kaji and his party having arrived at Peking and presented the customary quinquennial presents to Your Imperial Majesty and that they, after having had many opportunities to pay thir profound respects to your Majesty and having received gifts and khillats had returned bidding farewell to your Majesty and regarding all these as marks of Your Majesty's high favour, myself, my Prime Minister, Kazis, Bharadars, gentries and all others of my people have been delighted. Your imperial gifts have all arrived and I have respectfully accepted them with pleasure. My ancestors had respected and enjoyed the protection of Your Majesty and I for my part have also been truely and sincerely respecting your ...according to the direction of the Ambas at Lhassa. Formerly too the Ambas were the mediums for the representations of our grievances or troubles and now too with the hope that our troubles, brought to Your Majesty's notice by the said Ambas, would come to an end, it is my desire to remain fai-thful for ages to come and secure Your Majesty's goodwill by our services. I pray that Your Majesty will be graciously pleased, taking me as a ward or child, to overlook the faults of Commission or omission in this petition of me who living in a far off country serves Your Majesty and is ignorant of manners and customs.

Dated the 15th Jestha Sudi Sunday Sambat 1958.

*Source:– MFA, Unnumbered Poka.
Appendix F*

Nepal  Dated 28th June 1902 (Confidential)


To the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Dept.

I asked him (Chandra) the other day what object was gained by the quasi-dependence of Nepal on China marked by the quinquennial missions to Peking, he replied Nepal was not particularly anxious to keep it up and did not understand why China was.... Financially it was a gain to Nepal, as the mission directly (?) crossed the frontier was paid and kept by the Chinese government, the Kazi or head official receiving Rs. 600/- per mensen, and all the the members returning with their pockets well lime (?) and substantial presents in excess value to those sent being received by Nepal State. The mission cost Nepal about Rs. 15000/- while it cost China over 6 lakhs. I referred the maltreatment of the mission by Tibet and Chinese officials. he said that certainly had occurred once but usually the mission was well treated and there was great competition to be a member of it. I have no doubt, however, if occasion arises, the Chinese suzerainty would help us as an aegis.

*Source:- Foreign Secret E, September 1902, Nos.127-33, INA.
From Chandra to Manner-Smith, 19th April 1906.

I am in receipt of your letter of 15th instant together with the enclose which is returned herewith as desired. I thank you for the copy of the English translation of the Amban’s letter that appeared in the Peking Gazette. I need not say that the language of the so-called memorial does not correctly represent, the actual but rather undefined relations existing between this country and China. It is couched with the high flown language peculiar to Chinese official documents. It evidently refers to the customary quinquennial mission sent by this country with presents for the Emperor of China. The last time that a mission went from here was in 1951 S. E. A famine having broken out at the road side districts, and the Emperor with his courts being absent from Peking, the mission which was to have left in 1956 S. E. was postponed at the request of Amba acting under orders in 1957 S. E. as arrangements for transport etc. could not then be conveniently made by the Chinese government. I had mentioned this fact to Col. Ravenshaw to which you refer. I lately heard from our representative at Lhasa that instructions regarding the safe convey and supply of transport etc. to the next mission from Nepal had been received by the Amban at Lhasa from China, but up to this time no official intimation on the subject has been received from the Amban himself on receipt of which the mission will start from Nepal, which may be in Ashar or Srawan next.

I may here add that the practice of sending a mission was inaugurated soon after the war between this country and
China in 1792 A. D., and this practice has since been kept up more commercial advantages than for any thing else. The few presents which the mission carries to Peking are not of much value and certainly not in the nature of Tribute. The customary letter which is sent on the occasion is written in the truely oriental style of exuberant but meaningless politeness and follows a stereotyped rule. They are merely a means for the party to get access into the country under very advantageous circumstances, and to dispose of with very great profit of large quantity of goods which they take with them. It may be known to you that all goods belonging to the party are carried free from our frontier to Peking and back by the transport provided by the Chinese government which also provides our men free with all necessaries on the road. It was very little political significance, and I wonder therefore, to find the said encloser the presents are described as a tribute from Nepal. In the letter to the Emperor it is distinctly written the word "Saugat" which means "present". Moreover our relation with and the trade and other facilities which we enjoy in Tibet make it in contact upon us to keep this harmless and friendly practice, as this country has a very considerable interests as well as various rights and privileges in the said country commercial and otherwise.

*Source;– Foreign Secret E, June 1906, Nos. 241-45, INA.
Appendix H*

Command of the Emperor who being an incarnation of the supreme being exists for the protection of the world.
To the Gorkha Erteni Wang Raja Prithvi Bir Bikram Shamsher Jang Bahadur Shah Deva.

I have meted out in this year to all living creatures impartial and equal treatment and it is my wish that all countries may ever enjoy peace and happiness through my blessings.

I am very glad to see that since you were granted throne of your father, you have acted in accordance with the advice of the Ambas at Lhasa with a sincere and true heart, living under our protection. Kaji Bhairab Bahadur Garhtora Chhetri deputed by you was here to pay his respects to me. The petition and presents sent by you arrived here and were laid before me. Appreciating your sincere devotion I granted audience to the said Kaji Bhairab Bahadur Garhtora Chhetri and his party and I have sent by his hands for being taken on his return to you, 24 pieces of Kochin known as Tachen ustwan, 4 pieces of Tangtwang kochin, 4 pieces of Saintwang kochin, 4 pieces of Mantwang kochin, 4 pieces of Chung kochin, 4 pieces of Tangrun. 8 pieces of Tangrun sheets or carpets, 2 silver tea pots weighing 17, 1/5 taks of silver 2 silver dishes weighing 18 taks of silver, 2 Tamappopates, 2 polisis 2 pairs cups, 2 wooden artinles (?), 2 pair cups for milk, 2 Eau Rui, 1 Taotoo, 2 Yangtis, 2 Tiaochhin fur, 2 Mallochli fur, 2 Maiyoos, 2 Wondursis (?), 2 pairs of large purse, 4 pairs of small purse, 8 packet of tea which please take delivery of on arrival. Continue to follow as before the advice of the Ambas
at Lhasa bearing in mind our kindness. Keep those under you well in hand. Make yourself comfortable and happy. Cherish our kindness towards you. Don’t find or be lazy in your duty. These are my instructions.

Dated the 4th day of the 11th month of the 34th year of Shri Kwangsui.

*Source:– MFA, Unnumbered Poka.*
Appendix I

Historical Note on Relations between Nepal and China.

(Confidential.)

It is perhaps unnecessary to trace back the history of Nepalese foreign relations to a prehistoric period. It is sufficient to say that early in the sixth century Nepal became a feudal territory of Tibet—which was then a powerful and independent kingdom (Levi, "Le Nepal," ii, 52)—and so continued until the ninth century, when, the collapse of Tibet, it drifted gradually into the Indian sphere of influence. The Chinese do not appear on the scene until the end of the fourteenth century. In 1381 the King of Nepal received a seal from the Emperor, and from that year to 1427 presents were regularly interchanged between Nepal and Peking (id. ib. i, 67, ii, 228). In the latter year the Emperor Huien-ti’s mission to Nepal met with no response, and relations seem to have been interrupted until the beginning of the eighteenth century. In the meantime, Nepal had divided into three kingdoms, of which China, by its conquest of Tibet in the reign of the Emperor Kang-hsi (1662–1722), became the powerful neighbour (id. i, 71). The three Nepalese kings thought it prudent in 1731 to send to the Emperor Yong Tcheng a gold-leaf petition and "tribute" consisting of local products. It does not appear whether this tribute was rendered a second time.

In 1742, Prithi Narayan succeeded to the throne of Gurkha, and by 1769 the Gurkhas had conquered and consolidated their control over the whole of Nepal. In 1788 they invaded Tibet and the Thibetan and Chinese troops being unable to
resist them, a secret arrangement was concluded with the approval of the Chinese General. The Gurkhas were to withdraw and the Tibetans to pay an annual tribute. "The Chinese General then reported to the Emperor of China that the Gurkha Chief only wished to send a tribute mission to China, and that he had settled the little frontier incident without the loss of a single soldier or the spending of a single tael. The Gurkha mission was thereupon allowed to proceed to Peking, and the Emperor, in blissful ignorance of the attack on the Tibetan frontier, sent the Gurkha Raja, on dismissing it, a patent of King." (Rockhill, "Dalai Lamas," p. 51 from Chinese record). This characteristic piece of makebelieve was, however, spoiled by the refusal of the Lhasa Government to pay the tribute; whereupon in 1791 the Gurkhas again invaded Tibet. Both sides then appear to have turned to the East India Company for help, and in 1792 Lord Cornwallis received a memorial from the Gurkha Government and a letter from the Dalai Lama (translations printed in Kirkpatrick's "Embassy to Nepal," pp. 345-349). He replied to both that the company wished "to maintain the most cordial and friendly terms with all the powers in India." and could not interfere in a hostile manner; but he proposed after the rains to send a gentleman who was in his confidence to mediate. To the Raja of Nepal he explained that while the policy of non-interferences was in general the policy of the English Government, "the connection that has been formed with the Emperor of China renders a due observance of it still more necessary. The English company have for many years carried on extensive commercial concerns with the subjects of the Emperor of China by sea, and have actually a factory established in his dominions. To assist Nepal with a military force against the Raja of Lhasa, who is dependent on the Emperor of China, would be inconsistent with the connection that has so long prevailed between the company and the Emperor." (Lord Cornwallis to Raja of Nepal, the 15th September, 1792, Kirkpatrick, p. 349.) The comment of the Chinese General on this incident is very
Having first represented Lord Cornwallis as saying to the Nepalese envoy:— "Hereafter you must be diligent in discharging your duties to the Throne [i.e., of China], frequently sending tribute" (of which there is not one word in the letter), he proceeds: "when last year I summoned all the Chiefs of the tribes to send troops to stop the trouble, I had only in view the desirability of diminishing the strength of the Gurkhas, without counting particularly on the aid of the foreign barbarian soldiers. Here we have this headman of the Peling [i.e., Lord Cornwallis] receiving the summons from Your Majesty's Minister with every sign of the profoundest respect * * * This tribe [i.e., the British], which trades at Canton, and always experienced the gracious kindness of the Imperial Court, spontaneously tell the Gurkhas that Tibet has been for ages a dependency of China, and that they must not seek a quarrel with it. How profoundly just and right are these words!" (Quoted by Rockhill, op. cit. p. 62.

In accordance with his promise, Lord Cornwallis sent Captain Kirkpatrick in February 1793. But, in the meantime, the Chinese troops had defeated the Gurkhas within a march of Kathmandu, and the latter had been fain to make peace in September 1792. The exact terms of the treaty are not forthcoming. Markham ("Narratives," p. 77), says:— "The Gurkhas agreed to restore all their plunder; to pay an annual tribute to the Emperor of China; and to send an embassy to Peking once in every five years". Rockhill (op. cit. p. 52), drawing from Chinese sources, does not mention the annual tribute. Kirkpatrick (p. 275) speaks of the Nepal Raja as "having relinquished all his conquests in that quarter, and formally recognised the paramount authority of the Emperor of China over the Nepal dominions." The contemporary Chinese history of the campaign, "Cheng vou tsi" (translated by Imbault-Huart, "Journal asiatique," vol. xii, 1878, p. 348)
saying that the Nepalese prayed 'qu'il leur fut permis de vivre éternellement sous les lois de la China.'

Parker ("Nepaul and China," in "Asiatic Quarterly," 1899 vol. vii, p. 72), quotes a "synopsis of a decree by the Emperor," issued in 1792, after the war, in which the following passage occurs:— "On the whole [the Gurkhas'] submission is more humble than that of the usurping King of Annam, and perhaps hearing of his recent visit to Peking, they may be induced also to come later on. Under these circumstances I will pardon them and withdraw * * *. As matters stand, the success is not such that I can celebrate a formal triumph in the temple. If, therefore, the plunder taken at Tashilhumpo is returned, with Shamarpi's corpse and retainers, you may accept their offers. They can send tribute on the same footing as Annam, Siam, Burma, and Korea." Some further light is thrown on the point by a memorial addressed in 1842 by the Gurkha King to the Emperor, in very submissive terms (translated by Imbault-Huart and quoted by Levi op. cit. i, 188), in which is quoted an Imperial decree addressed to the Gurkha King in 1793, as follows: "Vous etes souverain d'un petit Etat; vous viendrez a la cour une fois tous les cinq ans. S'il y a des gens du dehors qui vous troublent ou envahissent votre territoire, vous pourrez rediger un placet pour porter ces faits a ma connaissance ; j'y enverrai alors des hommes et des chevaux ou je vous ferai don d'une certaine somme d'argent pour vous venir en aide. Respectez ceci."

In the same year a Gurkha mission took the tribute to Peking. In 1799 the Gurkha King, Rana Bahadur, asked for and received Royal rank for his son and eventual successor. But the general policy of China seems to have been one of indifference; and, perhaps in consequence of the injunction given by the Emperor Kien-lung to his successor in 1796-not to intervene in the affairs of Nepal without absolute necessity (Levi, i, 181)—
they rejected appeals for help on various occasions. In 1815, according to Parker (l.c., p.78), who unfortunately does not state his authority,—“When the Nepalese tried to force China’s hand by saying that the English would probably disapprove of tribute being sent to China, the Emperor said[l.e., to the Amban at Lhasa]: ‘Tell them you dare not report this language to me. As a matter of fact they can join the Feringhi rule if they like, so long as they send us tribute, and so long as the Feringhi do not cross the Tangut frontier.’ Tribute was sent in 1813, 1818, 1822, 1837 (when it was sent in the name of the Rani, and refused as coming from a woman). In 1842 the Nepalese King, in the memorial referred to above, sought to hold China to the promises of help given in 1793, but the Emperor extricated himself from all of them (text quoted in Levi, p. 191). In 1856, after a series of aggressions on Tibet, Nepal concluded a treaty with that country, in the preamble of which, as it appears in Aitchison, ii, 97, the words occur: “We further agree that the Emperor of China is to be obeyed by both States as before.” The Prime Minister of Nepal having recently challenged the accuracy of this translation, a revised translation has been prepared by Major O’Connor, in which the passage appears: “Both parties paying respect as always before to the Chinese Emperor,” &c. In 1858 the Prime Minister received a mandarin’s button and the title “General in Chief of the Army, truly brave Prince and Prime Minister.” (Levi, i, 185, who says that it was also borne by his successor, Bir Shamsher Jung. Wright, “History of Nepal,” p. 66, gives the date as 1873.)

Reference has been made above to the story derived from Chinese records of a Nepalese mission to China at the close of the earlier and successful war of 1788. This story (which also appears in “Cheng vou tsi,” l. c., p. 361) is confirmed by the Nepalese memorial already referred to, which was sent to Lord Cornwallis in 1792. The memorial does not of course mention the Chinese General’s “explanation,” nor does it explain why a mission was sent. It merely says that, after the
evacuation of Tibet by the Gurkhas, "the Gurkha sent a deputation, consisting of Hurry and Bhulbudder Khuwas and five-and-twenty others, with presents and an 'arzee' [memorial] to the Emperor of China." The deputation remained forty-five days at Peking and was received fifteen times. Finally, "they were all honourably dismissed with suitable presents, and charged with a firman to the Gurkha conveying to him a title and dignity, together with a splendid dress and honourable presents." (Kirkpatrick, p. 343.)

It appears therefore, on the evidence of both parties, that the first mission to Peking was the result of a victorious and not of a disastrous campaign, and this is worth bearing in mind. Whether or not the nature of the mission was misrepresented to the Emperor by the Chinese General, the fact remains that it was first sent by the Gurkhas in the hour of victory; and from the mere fact that such a mission was sent bearing presents and bringing back presents and a title, on admission of dependence can necessarily be inferred.

But whatever the origin of the custom, there is no doubt that it is firmly established. More than once, however, it has been pretermitted. Thus it is said that, owing to the unfavourable reception which is received at Peking in 1852, relations between Nepal and China were interrupted, and no mission was sent until 1866, when, however, owing to the disturbed state of intervening country, it did not succeed in reaching Peking (Elles, 'Report on Nepal,' p. 38). Again, in 1900, owing to famine in Shansi and Shensi, the Chinese were not prepared to find the necessary transport, and requested the Nepalese Government not to send the mission. In 1895, the wording of the Nepalese letter presented by the mission was brought to the notice of Her Majesty's Government by the British Minister at Peking (Sir N. O'Conor). He pointed out that the ruler of
Nepal "is therein represented as the devoted and submissive vassal of the Emperor of China," and added.

"The uncertainty at present attaching to the political condition of China appears to me to render it of importance that the relations between Nepal and China should be clearly defined, and that a shadowy claim of suzerainty should not be interpreted as constituting a real state of vassalage." (No. 164 of the 30th April 1895.)

Lord Salisbury shared this view, and after it had been ascertained from the Government of India (Lord G. Hamilton’s Secret despatch of the 12th July 1895; Government of India’s Secret letter of the 10th September 1895) that the language used was traditional, and was believed to date from the end of the eighteenth century, Her Majesty’s Minister at Peking was instructed to speak to the Chinese Government. He accordingly visited the Tsung-li Yamen On the 20th December 1895, "and took an opportunity of informing Cheng and the other Ministers present that the submissive expressions in the letters from Nepal* are not regarded by Her Majesty’s Government as an acknowledgment of vassalage, or, indeed, as anything more that a purely formal and complimentary style of address. Weng Ta-jen observed to his colleagues that Nepal had for many years past been a tributary to China, and the Ministers exchanged some remarks upon the subject amongst themselves"; but Mr. Beauclerk "considered it advisable to allow the subject to drop without further discussion."(Mr. Beauclerk’s despatch No. 508 of the 22nd December 1895.)

As already mentioned, no mission was sent in 1900; but in 1905, when it was reported that the Amban at Lhasa had memorialised the Throne for permission to send the mission forward, the Resident in Nepal asked the Maharaja what were the acts. The Maharaja replied in writing that the "high-flown language," of the Amban’s memorial (in which Nepal was spoken
of as "a dependency beyond the borders of China," whose "tribes have always displayed a loyal devotion to the Throne") "does not correctly represent the actual, but rather undefined relations" existing between Nepal and China. He explained that "the practice of sending a mission was inaugurated soon after the war between this country and China in 1792 A.D., and this practice has since been kept up more for its commercial advantages than for anything else. The few presents which the mission carries to Peking, are not of much value, and certainly not in the nature of tribute. The customary letter which is sent on the occasion is written in the truly oriental style of exuberant but meaningless politeness and follows a stereotyped rule. They are merely a means for the party to gain access into the country under very advantageous circumstances and to dispose of, with very great profit, the large quantity of goods which they take with them. It may be known to you that all goods belonging to the party are carried free from our frontier to Peking and back by the transport provided by the Chinese Government, which also provides our men, free, with all necessaries on the road. It has very little political significance, as I wonder, therefore, to find in the said enclosure, the presents described as a tribute from Nepal. In the letter to the Emperor it is distinctly written, the word 'saugat' which means 'present'. Moreover our relations with, and the trade and other facilities which we enjoy in, Tibet make it incumbent upon us to keep this harmless and friendly practice, as this country has a very considerable interest as well as various rights and privileges in the said country, commercial and otherwise." (Prime Minister of Nepal to Major Manners-Smith, 19th April 1906.)

The mission on this occasion seems to have been treated en route with sanctified courtesy by the Chinese provincial authorities, and Nepalese envoy told Sir J. Jordan that "the question of continuing these missions appeared to him to be
of doubtful utility, and he was reporting on the subject. Former missions had been largely in the nature of commercial speculations, and had proved very successful in this respect. Little profit was now to be made.* On the whole he was now inclined to think that the mission was a relic of the past which might be discontinued, although the process should be a gradual one.” (Sir J. Jordan’s despatch No. 260 of 5th June 1908.) Before leaving Peking, however, he was “less disposed than on a previous occasion to advocate the discontinuance of these missions. He spoke of them as a ‘harmless and friendly practice,’ and considered them of some use in promoting friendly relations between Nepal and China in Tibet.” (Sir J. Jordan’s despatch No. 308 of 7th July 1908.) It should be noted that when the mission was received by the Emperor and Empress Dowager “the Ceremony of Kotow was not performed, nor does it seem to have ever been the custom as these missions are concerned.” (Mr. Grant Jone’s Memorandum of 5th July 1908, enclosed in above.)

How little real significance attaches to such missions and yet how jealously the Chinese cling to them, is illustrated by the history of the Burma Mission. As soon as it was known that Her Majesty’s Government intended to send an expedition to Burma in 1885, the Chinese Government represented that Burma was tributary to China, and in the negotiations that followed they were prepared to go to any lengths in recognising the annexation, provided that their face was saved by the continuation of the decennial present-bearing mission which the Kings of Ava had sent to the Chinese Emperor. At first they accepted a proposal that the Emperor should nominate a Buddhist hierarch who should send the mission. This proved impracticable. It was then proposed that the Queen and the Emperor should exchange presents, but the Chinese rejected this, because “the Empress of India being the equal of the Emperor of China could not send tribute.” As a compromise they suggested
that the mission should be sent by the Local Government of Burma. Her Majesty's Government accepted this, but when it came to drafting the Convention, further difficulties arose. The draft put before the Chinese ran:—"England agrees that the highest authority shall continue to send customary ten-yearly missions sent from Burma to China"; but the Chinese insisted on substituting "sent with offerings" for the words in italics, and would not accept "presents" instead of "offerings". Her Majesty's Government then proposed "ten-yearly missions sent from Burma to China in the customary manner", and the Chinese counter-proposed "In conformity with the old Burmese custom of sending offerings to China, England agrees that the highest authority in Burma shall send a ten-yearly mission with articles of local produce", and it was explained that in the Chinese text the word "with" meant "to present". The finally adopted was "Inasmuch as it has been the practice of Burma to send ten-yearly missions with articles of local produce, England agrees that the highest authority in Burma shall send the customary ten-yearly missions". No mission was, in fact, ever sent, for, in consequence of the misbehaviour of the Chinese Government in other matters, it was decided to inform them in 1896 that owing to altered circumstances the mission was abandoned. But the point is that Her Majesty's Government did not consider the payment by the Chief Commissioner of Burma of what the Chinese doubtless still regarded as tribute to be inconsistent with the status of Burma as a province of British India.

During the negotiations of 1886 the idea of tribute as understood by the Chinese was examined. Sir Robert Hart (who served as a private channel of communication between the Chinese and Her Majesty's Government) stated that the term was employed in Peking in three senses:—

1. Tribute proper, from fief to liege, with investiture, e.g., Corea.
2. Limited tribute, periodically sent, but without investiture, e.g., Burma.

3. Any present from a foreign Government to the Chinese Emperor, e.g., from England.

"First is dependent, and must be protected; second is independent, and can claim assistance; third will always have sympathy. (Mr. Neel's Memorandum, Chap. i, p. 9). Nepal would presumably be claimed as belonging to the second category. Colonel Yule gave the following list of States sending tribute to Peking (from the collection of administrative statutes of the reigning dynasty called Tehou-khe thsing-li sse):

1. Corea.
2. Loochoo.
3. Tonking.
5. Siam.
6. The Philippine Islands.
7. Holland (i.e., perhaps Batavia).
8. Ava.
9. The Kingdom of Europe (sic).

And, he added, "this list in itself seems a reduction ad absurdum of the Chinese claims." (ib., Appendix (C), p. 5.) The list, it will be seen, with all its absurdity, does not include Nepal. On the other hand, in Imperial decree quoted above (p. 2), Nepal is put, as regards tribute, on the same footing as Annam, Siam, Burma, and Corea.

Colonel Yule also quoted a remark of Professor Douglas's which is probably applicable to the Nepalese tribute also:"
"I suspect that both the Chinese and Burmese courts are deceived as to the political relations implied by the presents interchanged; the Chinese believing that the presents they receive from Burma are tribute, and that those which they send are given as a token of patronage, and the Burmese believing that the exchange is such as should pass between equals". (Ib., Appendix (E), p. 12.)

F. A. H.

4th November 1910.

*Source:– Foreign Secret E, July 1911, No. 250.*
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Printed at: Inap Press, Kathmandu.