The West Powers and Tibet
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THE WEST POWERS AND TIBET
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Chapter I

Tibetan Society: On the Eve of Imperialist Invasion

I. The Area and Political System of Tibet

1. Name and Area

Tibet stands on the southwestern frontier of China with an area of over 1,200,000 square kilometres, accounting for one eighth of the total area of China. It has a population of 1.89 million (according to the census in 1982), among which 96 percent are Tibetans. Besides, there are also other nationalities such as Han, Monpa, Lopa, Hui, Deng, etc.

The history of Tibet recorded in Chinese can be traced back to the sixth century. At first, Tibet was called Tufa, then in the Tang and Song dynasties it was named Tubo. In Tibetan language Tibet is called "Bod." There are two explanations for its origin: one is that it originated from the word "Pugyal" long before the emergence of the Bon religion, the other is that the name "Bod" was derived from the word "Bon". In the Yuan Dynasty, Tibet was named Xifan, which was changed into Ü-Tsang in the early period of the Ming Dynasty. It was called Xizang in the beginning of the Qing Dynasty and has been known as such in Chinese ever since. The Mongolians and the Manchus translated the name from Uygur as Thubet, the transliteration of Tubo. Hence came the English name "Tibet".

As for the geographic region of Tibet, some foreign authors
often made confusions in their works. They used to incorporate into Tibet the province of Qinghai, the western part of Sichuan Province, and the northern part of Yunnan Province. Hamilton Bower, an Englishman, wrote in his *A Journey Across Tibet* that the origin of the Yangtze River was in eastern Tibet and the Qinghai Lake was located in northern Tibet. Nikolai Prezevalski, a Russian, led an expedition team five times in an attempt to explore Tibet but was held back by the Tibetans each time. Although he had only reached as far as the Qinghai Lake and Lop Nor, he wrote the book *Notes on the Journey in Tibet* after his return to Russia, in which he regarded these places which he had passed through as parts of Tibet. The two foreigners committed the same error of confusing the concept of Tibet with the concept of Tibetan-inhabited regions. Some of the Tibetans live in such provinces as Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan that border on Tibet, but these places can never be included into the regional limits of Tibet.

Nevertheless, some explanations should be made here. For several hundred years, there have been some changes in the regional limits of Tibet. In ancient times, the Tibetans lived and worked in such areas as Ü, Tsang, Ngari, Xikang and Qinghai. In April 1724, the second year of the Qing Emperor Yongzheng's reign, Nian Gengyao reported in his memorial to the throne about the problems of Qinghai: “Qinghai, Kham, Tsang and Ü are the four major tribes of Tangut.” *The Outline of the Border Regions of the Qing Dynasty* also says, “In the beginning, Tsang, Ü, Qinghai and Kham all belonged to Tangut.”

But things changed before long. During the reign of Emperor Yongzheng, Lozang Tenzin staged a rebellion in Qinghai. After its suppression in 1725, the Qing Government reorganized Qinghai into nineteen banners under the control of the Grand Minister Resident in Xining, who was directly
appointed by the Qing Dynasty. Thereafter Qinghai was no longer subordinate to Tibet. Kham, i.e. Xikang, which included such towns as Tachienlu, Litang, Batang and Chamdo, was put under the administration of Sichuan Province in 1726 by the Qing Government and was named Xikang Province in the seventeenth year of the Republic of China (1927). Thus, it was also separated from Tibet. In this way, the geographic region of Tibet now consists of three districts: Ü, Tsang, and Ngari.

The Ü District. Ü in Tibetan language means “centre.” It was called Wusi in the Ming Dynasty and Anterior Tibet in the Qing Dynasty. It was subdivided into two Yu (meaning “part”): one is Wuyu (the Chief Part) which centres around Lhasa and the three great monasteries (Drepung, Ganden and Sera monasteries), including Yedang, Quxu, Yangpachen, Pondo, Medrogongka and other places; the other part is Yueyu, (the Secondary Part) which ranges from Shannan near Lhasa in the Yarlung Tsangpo River valley straight to the Himalayas, including such towns as Tsethang, Yarlung, Chonggye, etc. It also includes the area of Yamdrok Yumtso (“tso”, in Tibetan, means “lake”), Dakpo (near Nepal), Nyang (in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tzangpo River basin), Kongpo (the Kong Tsangpo River basin) and Lhali, etc.

The Tsang District. “Tsang” in Tibetan means “divine and pure.” In the Qing Dynasty, it was called Ulterior Tibet, referring to the upper reaches of the Yarlung Tzangpo River beyond the Quxu River. It is also divided into two Yu: one is Yeyu (the Right Part), which includes the Nyangchu River basin, Shigatse and its northeastern area, Gyantse and Rinpung Dzong; the other is Yongyu (the Left Part), consisting of the vast area west of Sakya. Places like Lhaze, Shekar, Tingri, Dinggye, and Ganba are all in this area.

The Ngari District. Ngari in Tibetan means “territory.” It
is west of Maryong-la, north of the Himalayas, south of the Karakorum Mountains, and in the upper reaches of the Indus and the Sateli River, including Disi, Purang, Guge, and Monyul.

Tibet can be divided approximately into the following areas according to its topographic structure and natural conditions:

(1) Plateau Area in Northern Tibet. It is north of the Gangdise Mountains and lies in the highland between the Kunlun, the Tanggula, and the Nyenchen Tanglha Mountains. In Tibetan this area is called Changtang, which means “northern plateau.” With an average elevation of 4,500 metres, it is about 4,200 kilometres in length and 700 kilometres in width, making up two thirds of the whole area of Tibet. It covers a vast expanse of land with only a few inhabitants. In some lower regions, the weather is mild and there are pastures with abundant water and lush grass — these pastures are the major pastoral areas in Tibet.

(2) River Valley Area in Southern Tibet. It lies between the Gangdise Mountains and the Himalayas, including many of the gorges and basins formed by the tributaries in the middle reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River. It has an average elevation of 3,500 metres. The Lhasa River Valley Plain is the broadest. With its fertile soil, warm weather, and plenty rain, it is the major agricultural area in Tibet, while the mountain slopes and the foot of the mountains provide fine pastures.

This area should also include the 90,000 square kilometres of land (south of the illegal McMahon Line) that is still occupied by India. There is no frost or snow and the trees and grass are green all year round. People grow rice, corn (two or three crops a year), and also tea, bananas, oranges, and some other subtropic fruits.

(3) The Hengduan Mountain Gorge Area. It is in the eastern part of Tibet, with the Hengduan Mountains traversing it. There are many mountains and gorges in this area. The flat
northern part has an elevation of about 5,200 metres, higher than the steep southern part, which has an elevation of 4,000 metres at the highest point, the drop being 2,500 metres. There are large areas of forests in this part. The dense forests half way up the mountains and the evergreens at their foot form a peculiar spectacle. The land along the rivers is for agriculture, while the higher land is for both farming and stock-raising.

(4) The Ngari Area. It lies in the western part of Tibet. Its northern part belongs to the Northern Tibet Plateau and in its middle and southern parts are many mountains and rivers. The river valleys can be used for farming, but on the whole, this area is for animal husbandry.

(5) The Himalayan Area. It is in the southern part of Tibet. The Himalayas lie between China and Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, consisting of several chains which run roughly from east to west. The mountain range is over 2,400 kilometres long and 200-350 kilometres wide. As the highest mountain range in the world, it has an average elevation of 6,000 metres, with quite a few peaks over 8,000 metres. Mount Qomolangma, located on the China-Nepal border, is the highest in the world, having an elevation of 8,882 metres.

2. The Merging of Religious and Secular Rule

Since ancient times, Tibet has been a part of the sacred territory of China. Living from generation to generation on the Qinghai-Tibet plateau, the industrious and courageous Tibetan people, together with other peoples of China, opened up this vast stretch of fertile land, working assiduously and with infinite wisdom. They have made important contributions in the struggle of founding and defending the Motherland together with other fraternal peoples of China.

According to Tibetan historical records, the Tibetan people
had apparently entered the slave society since the sixth century A.D. Among them there was the Yarlung tribe (now living in the Shannan area), which rose in the middle reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River and rapidly expanded its force in the latter half of the sixth century. At the beginning of the seventh century, Songtsan Gampo, chief of this tribe, established a Tubo local government based on the slave system. From the seventh century to the middle of the eighth century, this government formulated laws and unified weights and measures. Thus the Tibetan society was further developed.

In the middle of the eighth century, the class struggle in the Tubo slave society became more and more acute. In the latter half of the ninth century, there took place a large-scale uprising of the slaves and the common people. The slave system was smashed in this revolutionary storm.

In the tenth century Tibet entered the feudal society. Many scattered, feudalistic local cliques of strength appeared and set up one separate regime after another from Ngari in the west to the middle reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River, and even to the present Chamdo area.

Before the eighth century, the dominating religion in Tibet was Bon (also called Black Religion), whose disciples believed in polytheism and witchcraft. Later, Buddhism was introduced to Tibet from China and India. As early as the seventh century, when Songtsan Gampo, King of Tubo, married Princess Wen Cheng of the Tang Dynasty and Princess Bhrikuti Devi of Nepal, some Buddhist scriptures, instruments and statues of Buddha were brought to Tibet by these two princesses from China and Nepal respectively. Then Buddhism was taken seriously by Songtsan Gampo and began to spread in Tibet. In the eighth century, Indian monks Santaraksita, Padmasambhava and others came to Tibet to propagate the doctrines of Mahayana
and Tantricism. At the same time, Han Chinese monks were invited to preach in Tibet. Through a comparatively long time, after it had absorbed some contents of Bon, Buddhism gradually turned into Lamaism which had local characteristics of Tibet. Because it suited the needs of the feudal lords, it was supported and made use of by this newly rising class and quickly became the major religion in Tibet.

In the 11th and 13th centuries, there appeared in Tibet a great many feudal separatist powers which had ties with the monks, bringing into existence many religious sects of Lamaism such as the Red Sect (Nyingmapa), the White Sect (Kagyupa), the Striped Sect (Sakyapa), and the Spiritual Advice Sect (Kadampa). In the 13th century, Phagpa, head of the Sakyapa Sect, was granted the title of “Imperial Tutor” by the Yuan Dynasty. The lamas of the upper strata exercised dictatorship together with the feudal lords and aristocrats, thus gradually giving rise to the politico-religious system of government. At the end of the 14th century, in order to suit the needs of the feudal lords, Tsongkhapa (1357-1419) reformed Lamaism and founded the Yellow Sect (Gelungpa Sect), whose followers all wore yellow hats, for the sake of making a distinction between themselves and other sects.

Lamaism preached the doctrines of “the great disaster of the universe” (i.e. the world will perish in a definite time); and “everything is inconstant” (i.e. everything in the world is subject to change, nothing is fixed and steady); “Samsara and reincarnation” (i.e. all living creatures will have retributions in the next life according to their doings in the present life); “Practise and freedom” (i.e. converting to Buddhism and practising it whole-heartedly will free oneself from disasters). All these preachings were idealistic and fatalistic. Lamaism simplified these elaborate doctrines into the popular ceremonies of
chanting incantations and prayers, affirming that if the believers can combine the three secrets together — secret of the words (chanting incantations), secret of the heart (making a gesture with hands) and secret of the mind (thinking in the mind), he will become a Buddha and thus will be freed from worldly disturbances. Besides, many regulations, taboos, and commandments were prescribed to inhibit the followers' mind, such as giving alms, forbearance, prudence and deep in prayer. All this was intended to deceive and benumb the people, so that they would be meek and obedient under the rule of the religious authority of serfdom.

In the early 13th century, the feudal serf system was universally established in Tibet. From the middle of the 13th century to the mid-16th century, Tibet witnessed a period of development of the feudal society. The reunification of China by the Yuan Dynasty ended the long period of feudal separatist situation and provided advantageous conditions for the development of the feudal society in Tibet. Afterwards, there appeared a comparatively stable period in the Ming Dynasty. As a result, agriculture, animal husbandry and handicraft developed rapidly, and achievements in literature, art, and even architecture and sculpture reached unprecedented heights.

Towards the mid-seventeenth century, with the support of the Qing Dynasty, the Yellow Sect gradually gained an advantage over the other sects in Tibet's political affairs and economy. Because of its broad relationship not only with the local feudal forces of Tibet but also with the ruling class of the Han, the Mongolians and the Manchus, its strength kept increasing. At last it formed the system of the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama with Drepung Monastery in Lhasa as the major monastery, and the system of the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama with Tashilhunpo Monastery in Shigatse as the major monastery.
Both the Dalai and the Panchen became the heads of the Yellow Sect and they were given the titles by the Qing Dynasty in 1653 and 1713 respectively. Thus they gained the authorized right to rule over Tibet.

After it had got the upper hand of other sects, the Yellow Sect not only extended its influence rapidly to the whole area of Tibet, but also created correspondingly a lopsided, enormous ecclesiastical group. Because it forbade its monks to participate in productive labour and to marry and have children, the Yellow Sect greatly retarded the growth of the productive forces and the population, thus relegating the Tibetan society to a state of stagnancy. The reactionary nature of the Tibetan feudal serf system became more evident since the mid-seventeenth century when the Yellow Sect asserted its supremacy and the merged politico-religious institution was established.

II. Tibet: An Inalienable Part of China

1. The Rule of the Central Government over Tibet in the Past Periods

When they invaded Tibet, the British and Russians in modern times, out of ulterior motives, often called Tibet a "state", and even flagrantly wrote this down in the Agreement on Tibet Between Britain and Russia signed in 1907. The purpose of the imperialists in advocating "the independence of Tibet" was to dismember Chinese territory and separate Tibet from China so as to realize their schemes of aggression.

In fact, Tibet is an inalienable part of China. Many centuries before the penetration of imperialist influence, the Han and the Tibetan peoples had both been component parts in the big family of the Chinese nation through long years of close
political, economic and cultural ties.

In 641, Princess Wen Cheng of the Tang Dynasty was married to Songtsan Gampo, King of Tubo. In 710, Princess Jing Cheng of the same dynasty was married to Tride Tsugtsan, another king of Tubo. The matrimonial relations between the Tang and Tubo ruling class reflected not only their close political relationship but also the frequent friendly contacts between the Han and Tibetan peoples. According to incomplete statistics, 191 official visits were exchanged between the Tang Dynasty and Tubo during the two centuries from 634 to 846. In 649, Songtsan Gampo was given by the Tang Dynasty the office of “Imperial Son-in-Law Governor” with the honorary title of “West Sea Prince.” Thus Songtsan Gampo submitted a written statement pledging his allegiance to the Tang court. Therefore, he was given the additional title of “Treasured Prince.” Later, Tride Tsugtsan, the other son-in-law of the Emperor of Tang, said in his memorial to the throne: “As the nephew of the late emperor my uncle, I was bestowed with Princess Jing Cheng. Therefore, we are of one family, and the people under heaven live in peace and happiness.” The still-preserved Tang-Tubo Peace Pledge Monument erected in 823 in front of the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa further indicates the “one family” relationship between the two.

In the middle of the 13th century, when the Yuan Dynasty reunited China, it exercised its full sovereignty in Tibet by stationing troops there, appointing officials, taking population census, and levying taxes. At the same time, the Yuan Dynasty supported and made use of the Sakyapa Sect and granted its ruling lama Phagpa the right to administer both the political and religious affairs in Tibet.

The Qing Dynasty strengthened its administration in Tibet. In 1653 and 1713, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama were
acknowledged respectively by the Central Government of China to administer the local government of Tibet. In 1728, an Imperial Resident Minister to Tibet was appointed to superintend affairs in Tibet. In 1793, "The Twenty-Nine-Article Ordinance for the More Efficient Governing of Tibet" was issued to implement the Central Government's rule over Tibet in a concrete and comprehensive way. This strengthened objectively the relations between the Central Government of China and the local government of Tibet and had positive significance in consolidating the national defence and safeguarding the unity of China. On two occasions, the Qing Dynasty sent troops to Tibet to ensure its safety. The first time was in the 22nd year of Qianlong's reign, when an expeditionary army was sent to suppress the Dzungar riot in Ili freeing Tibet of the menace by the Dzungar Mongols; the second time was in the 57th year of the same reign, when it sent troops to assist Tibet's resistance against the Gurkhas invasion.

After he had suppressed the riot in Tibet, Emperor Qianlong issued in 1792 a promulgation about the system called "Drawing Lots from the Gold Urn" to decide the rightful person for the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. The system was performed in this way: The Qing Government provided a "Gold Urn" to be placed in the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa. Every time a Dalai Lama or a Panchen Lama passed away, those children transmigrated by the Dalai or the Panchen would be reported as candidates, whose names and dates of birth would be written on the lots which were to be thrown into the Gold Urn. Then, having chanted scriptures and prayed to Buddha, one lot would be drawn out before all eyes and shown to all present, and the one whose name was on that particular lot would be declared to be the successor to the Dalai Lama or the Panchen Lama. This way of
choosing the successors could avoid the conflicts among the candidates nominated from various parts of Tibet.

2. The System of Minister-in-Residence in Tibet

In the fourth year of Yongzheng’s reign the appointment of a resident minister in Tibet was discussed in Qing court and in the fifth year the first resident minister assumed office in Tibet. The purpose was to strengthen the Qing Dynasty’s rule over Tibet, avoid the conflicts among the various religious sects and prevent the Dzungars of Xinjiang from harassing Tibet, so as to assure peace and safety there. The setting up of this office fully indicates the absolute sovereign rights of China over Tibet.

The resident minister was very powerful and played a very important role in the various affairs of Tibet. He was equal to a governor and enjoyed the same status as the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. All the important officials in the local government of Tibet were to be appointed by him. After it had suppressed the riot staged by Gyumey Namgyal in 1750 (the 15th year of Qianlong’s reign), the Qing Dynasty, with the view of intensifying its rule over Tibet, rescinded the post of the depa (chief administrator of Tibet) and appointed four Kalons (council ministers) to jointly administer the political affairs in Tibet; nevertheless the important policies were to be adjudicated by the Dalai and the Resident Minister. Afterwards, it was stipulated clearly that the Resident Minister had the same status as the Dalai and the Panchen. All the affairs, big or small, should be reported to the Resident Minister for his decision and all the officials in Tibet should be appointed by him after consultation with the Dalai and the Panchen. His other powers included: checking up the commercial affairs, deciding the number of soldiers and their pay, distributing the weapons, strengthening the disciplines in the army, inspecting the bor-
ders, and minting the money, etc. In short, he was responsible for religious, personnel, financial, and commercial affairs, transportation, judicature, and frontier defense. This system had been carried out until the beginning of the 20th century when Britain launched an aggressive war and the situation in Tibet became serious. At that time, the Resident Ministers like Yu Gang and You Tai were mediocre and incompetent. They committed errors damaging their authority and thus lost the support of the Tibetan people.

From the tenth year of Qianlong's reign, the term of office of each resident minister in Tibet was three years. There were a Chief Resident Minister and an Assistant Resident Minister. But sometimes there was only the chief one and the seat for the assistant was vacant. This system had been carried through till the end of the Qing Dynasty.

III. Customs and Culture of the Tibetans

1. Customs of the Tibetans

The habits and customs of the Tibetans, influenced by the geography, economy, history and Buddhist culture of the region, are imbued with peculiar characteristics.

(1) Food. The main food of the Tibetans is *tsampa*, which is made of highland barley and peas ground into flour after they are parched. The parched flour is mixed with buttered tea or barley beer before it is made into small balls for food. The subsidiary food, beef and mutton, which is made by drying them into raw meat, is excellent for entertaining guests. The everyday drink in Tibet is buttered tea. A Tibetan generally drinks about 30 bowls of buttered tea each day. It is made by blending the black tea juice, butter and salt together. Then it is
made thick by adding *tsampa* and eggs. After that it is poured into a teapot and boiled for drinking. Cream, milk, pancakes, milk residue and yoghurt are also important food for Tibetans. The Tibetans use their hands for holding and knives for cutting instead of using chopsticks. They like to drink highland barley beer. Men and women dance hand in hand when they are drunk.

Killing animals is the biggest taboo for the Tibetans, especially for those initiated Buddhists. Although they eat beef and mutton, they never kill the animals themselves. Even when they have caught bugs or lice, instead of killing them, they just throw them away and let them crawl freely. As for wild beasts and birds such as eagles, crows, wild ducks, dogs, cats, monkeys, they won’t harm them and even refuse to lend utensils to others for cooking these animals.

(2) Clothing. A Tibetan peasant usually wears a broad, woolen robe with large sleeves and a waistband. The robe reaches beneath the knees. On the waist hangs a set of big and small knives, steel knife and a tobacco pouch, with a wooden bowl in the pocket, a Buddhist box hanging before the breast, a felt hat on the head, a pair of leather boots on the feet, a string of beads around the neck, and rings of stone on the ears. A herdsman usually wears a sheepskin robe fringed with leopard skin or woolen fabric, and a hat made of sheepskin. A woman usually wears a long gown with a waistband and her hair in two big plaits. A noble woman usually has on her head a triangle ring of red woollen cloth ornamented with coral and pearls. She has agate around her neck and a Buddhist box before her breast. A woman often applies brown sugar, cream or tea to her face in order to protect the skin.

(3) Marriage. Generally speaking, the Tibetans have three kinds of matrimonial form. The first is polyandry, including the
system whereby brothers share one wife. This phenomenon, which can often be found in peasant or aristocratic families, greatly limits the increase of population in Tibet. The second is monogamy, which is the most popular form in Tibet. The third is polygamy and is popular in the families of the hereditary headmen of the tribes. Hereditary headmen often marry girls from other tribes so as to strengthen the influence of their own tribes and the relations between tribes. For families with no brother but only sisters, the sisters will marry the same husband by asking him to move into their house. The marriage system of the Tibetans is varied and the characteristics of the families are: no surname, no clan, no attention to blood relationship. An aristocratic family usually adopts the name of the fief as its own name, while the common people generally call themselves according to the names in the Buddhist scriptures.

(4) Funeral. There are approximately four forms of funeral: celestial burial, interment, water funeral and cremation. By the celestial burial, an auspicious day is chosen and the body of the dead is carried to the sky burial spot. Then the corpse is cut into pieces and a fire is lit to attract vultures to come and eat them. When the vultures have finished eating, the bones are pounded to pieces and mixed with tsampa for the vultures to come to finish all the leftovers. In this way the dead is thought to have transmigrated into the Sukhavati (Pure Land). If there is anything left it is regarded as ominous and the lamas should be invited to chant scriptures. This form of funeral, still very popular even nowadays, perhaps comes from the spirit of “sacrificing one’s own body to feed the tiger” advocated in the biography of Sakyamuni. Burial in the ground usually applies to those who die of diseases, in which case the corpse is buried under the earth to prevent infection. This form of funeral is not practised among ordinary people. Water funeral is usually
adopted by poor people who can not afford a celestial funeral. In this case, corpses were cut into pieces and thrown into the river to feed the fish. Cremation is a form usually adopted by lamas; the dead body is put into a caldron full of butter and then the dry wood under the caldron is lit to burn the corpse. As for the Living Buddhas such as the Dalai and Panchen, when they pass away, their corpses are preserved with spice and medicine in stupas decorated with gold, jade and jewelry. This is the “stupa burial” that ordinary people can not enjoy. Things left behind by the deceased are usually sold off, half of the money thus obtained being donated to the monastery and the other half spent in inviting lamas to chant the scriptures. For a hundred days during the funeral, men and women do not wear richly ornamented clothes, comb their hair or wash themselves. The women do not wear eardrops. Neighbours do not sing in order to show their sympathy and grief. Friends and relatives send money, \textit{hada}, (celemonious scarf) and butter lamps as a token of mourning for the dead.

(5) Etiquette. When a commoner saw an official, he should take off his hat and stand aside with his hands put together before his breast, or he should bow at the roadside, scratch his cheeks and stretch his tongue out to show his respect. When he saw a high lama, he should bow before the seat, take out a \textit{hada} from his breast pocket and present it to the lama. Then he should step back for a few feet, take off his hat, go down on his knees, kowtow thrice and sit at the side. \textit{Hada} is a kind of greenish-blue or white silk band, which the Tibetans used as a present for thanks, or for wrapping letters to show respect for the receivers.

(6) Festivals. All festivals in Tibet, big or small, are imbued with religious colour. On the first day of the Tibetan New Year, the head of every family rises at dawn and goes to worship
Sakyamuni in Jokhang Temple. The Tibetans think that he who first sees the statue of the Buddha is the most fortunate person, so the temple is always congested with worshippers on New Year’s Day. On that day, government officials, ecclesiastical or secular, all assembled in the Potala Palace to attend the ceremony for New Year celebration. They kowtowed three times before the throne of the Dalai, then presented *hada*, played the music, and offered tea and pancakes. On the second day, in the Drepung Monastery a ceremony of the descent of Buddha was held; the oracle presumably would predict a bumper or poor harvest of the year and the ill or good luck of things. From the third to the twenty-fifth day, various religious ceremonies would be held in Lhasa, and the lamas of the Drepung Monastery would take over the judicial and administrative powers of Lhasa. Thirty thousand lamas from the three great monasteries gathered in the Jokhang Temple to chant scriptures. This is called Monlam (i.e. to pray for blessing and expiate the sins of the dead). Lhasa at this time was full of lamas as if it were “the world of lamas”. On the nineteenth day of the second month, the lamas came again to Jokhang for the Lesser Monlam (i.e. consecration). During the eleven days from the nineteenth to the twenty-ninth day of the second month of Tibetan calendar, Lhasa once more became a world of lamas. All the administrative powers were taken over by the lamas. On the twenty-ninth day of the second month, hays are burned to drive out the ghost whose name is Lu Yao. A man, who disguised himself as the ghost with a face half black and half white, was driven out of Lhasa. The twenty-ninth day of the twelfth month, was another festival for expelling ghosts. On this day, the sorcerers danced in trance and drove the ghosts out in order to say good-bye to the old year and welcome the new. The lamas, disguising themselves as spirits, Buddhas or ghosts, fire guns and shout at
night to drive the evils away.

2. Tibetan Culture

(1) Characteristics. Tibetan culture belongs to the Lamaist culture and all works of art imbued with intense religious colour without exception. Lamaism respects "five luminaries": "esoteric luminary" (Buddhism), "luminary of sound" (philology), "luminary of reason" (ethics), "luminary of medicine" (medical science) and "luminary of skills" (technology). Religious artefacts such as sculpture and the statues of Buddha belong to "the luminary of skills." It is in this field that the highly developed Lamaist culture is reflected.

(2) Written language. It is an alphabetic writing system invented in the seventh century according to the Sanskrit and the scripts of the states of the Western Regions. It consists of 30 consonants and four signs of vowels. During its history of over 1,000 years, the Tibetan written language has its own law of development. The structure of the words, the development of vocabulary, and the grammatical construction all have their peculiarities. Before Liberation, Tibetan monasteries were places for religious activities as well as for educational activities. Therefore, only lamas enjoyed the privilege of learning.

(3) Singing and dancing. Tibetans are excellent dancers and singers. Practically all of them, whether peasants or herdsmen, young or old, men or women, can sing and dance. Their dancing postures, set off by their long-sleeved clothes, are natural and beautiful, just like the dancers' postures on the Xi'an stone tablets carved in the Tang Dynasty. There are three kinds of songs in Tibet. One is folk songs, with long and short sentences, which are sung by peasants or herdsmen while working in the fields. The second kind is xuanzi. There are four sentences to a xuanzi song, each consisting of six words. The
theme is mainly love, so it is favoured by young people. The instruments in accompaniment may be huqin (a two-stringed bowed instrument), lute or bell. The third kind is called gor-shae. While they are free, men and women from the same village gather together to enjoy a potluck. After the feast, they sit in a circle and use their rings to divine. They sing songs to each other to sound what the other has in mind. Then they dance together. The active posture and melodious voice are really a feast for the eyes and ears.

The sorcerers' dance at the end of the year and the theatrical performance in mid-Autumn never go without songs and dances either. The sorcerers' dance is performed by lamas who are disguised in grotesque appearances, such as ox-heads, deer-heads, lions, and ghosts. Accompanied by drums, cymbals and trumpets, they give performances that feature the theme of driving out the evils and celebrating the coming of the new year. The plays are mostly historical and religious.

(4) The Arts. The Tibetans are good at painting and sculpture. The images of the Buddha and their backgrounds, whether painted on walls, on silk fabrics, or on palm leaves, are wonders of art with the evenness of colours, the exquisiteness of drawing, and the lifelike expressions. The colours remain unchanged for centuries. The sculptures, whether figures of the Buddha of scores of metres in height, or figures as small as walnuts, give various expressions, such as joy, affection, cruelty and ferocity. It is said that Khedrup Je, a disciple of Tsongkhapa (founder of the Yellow Sect), could finish within one day the carving of a mandala of vajrapani. On a round area with a diameter of five-feet were carved a two-foot-wide palace, with thirty figures of Buddhas, four decorated archways, a deer, a wheel of dharma, a talisman vase, a talisman pearl, a gem, a horsetail whisk with bells attached to it, Buddhist flags, a storied
building for storing Buddhist scriptures, religious books, etc.; affording a magnificent view.

(5) Architecture. Tibetan architecture is rich and exquisite. Many a monastery was built in the Tang, Song and Ming dynasties, such as the Potala, Jokhang and Ramoche Temples, Samye Monastery, the Three Great Monasteries, Tashilhunpo Monastery, Sakya Monastery, Riwokya Monastery, etc. All these monasteries are magnificent and splendid. The Potala at the section of the Red Palace ranges from the foot to the top of a hill and has thirteen storeys. The halls suit with each other and reaching the acme of perfection. The halls for political activities and halls for religious activities are dignified and stately with carved beams and painted rafters. The gold stupas of the Dalais of various generations are all architectural gems. The gold stupa of the Fifth and the Thirteenth Dalai are as high as five storeys. The gold outside of the stupus is thick and on it are decorated pearls, diamonds, amber, and agate. The gold stupas of the Panchens in Tashilhunpo Monastery are comparable in extravagance to those of the Dalais. Looking up, the worshipers can only see the lower part of the great statue of the Buddha inside the monastery. From this you can imagine how big the monastery is and how high the statues of Buddhas are. As for other monasteries, they also have halls that can hold four to five and even ten thousand lamas. All these buildings enjoy a high reputation for their superb architectural techniques.
Chapter II
The Beginning of British Expansion in Tibet

I. British Covetting Tibet

1. Tibet Regarded as a Breakwater of India

Known as a colonial imperialist country, Britain had secured its colonies in all parts of the world since it began to expand overseas in the sixteenth century.

In history, the British colonies in Asia, which amounted to 5.26 million square kilometres, had a considerably important position in the whole colonial system of the Empire. And India was the most important one among them. Situated in the Indian Ocean, India had a vast territory abounding in natural resources and a very large population. It stretches westward and southwestward to the Persian Gulf, linking the Middle East with the Arabian areas, to reach the Red Sea and Egypt. From India one may go eastward and southeastward to Burma, Malaysia, Indonesian Islands and Australia, and through the Strait of Malacca and Singapore to China. It also has neighbours as China, Afghanistan and Iran.

Precisely owing to these historic and geographic factors, India has been the major area for the western colonialists to expand and compete for several centuries. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, European countries invaded India. Portugal built a stronghold in Kozhikode in 1500 and occupied Goa
in 1506. The British East India Company was established in 1600, while Holland’s and France’s in 1662 and 1664. They all aimed at occupying and conquering India. After the Battle of Plassey in 1757, Britain finally conquered Bengal and kept India underfoot. The subjugated India became a wonderful jewel on the imperial crown of Britain. The wealth and resources plundered unscrupulously from India accelerated the development of the British capitalism, the completion of Industrial Revolution and the establishment of the British hegemony in the world.

Just as what was said by Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, later the Viceroy of India, in 1894, that it was a really great cause for Britain to conquer and rule over India, which made Britain revered by the whole world. Therefore, its reputation and wealth which came from its position in Asia was truly the cornerstone of the Great British Empire. There, in the centre of the old Asian continent, Britain held powerfully the throne reigning over the east for ever, and its prowess was being displayed both on land and on the ocean.

As far as Britain was concerned, it was very clear that India should become a center of the British colonial system in Asia and a base to dominate Asia. Curzon concocted a fallacy saying “... India is like a fortress, with the vast moat of the sea on two of her faces and with mountains for her walls on the remainder: but beyond these walls, which are sometimes of by no means insuperable height, and admit of being easily penetrated, extends a glacis of varying breadth and dimensions. We do not want to occupy it, but we also cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes ... we are compelled to intervene because a danger would thereby grow up which might one day menace our security.... He would be a short-sighted commander who merely manned his ramparts in India and did not look beyond.”

The slopes in the north of India includes Afghanistan, Iran
and Tibet of China. The rival for the British to worry about in these areas was Russia. The slope-view of Britain was a product of the struggle for hegemony in Asia between Britain and Russia. Lenin once said that Sir Curzon had called Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet and Burma an "outside embankment" of India.

Tibet was to the north of India. Since Britain expanded northward, Tibet certainly bore the brunt. After Britain occupied the areas of Bengal, it planned deliberately to push forward in the direction of the slope and forced Tibet to open its door. The British colonialist claimed what Britain demanded was simply the public order of the border and the commercial convenience. In fact, the purpose of Britain was not limited by this only. People in other countries of the world were quite clear about this. For example, a Japanese said, "If Britain really wants to occupy Tibet, it will surely march down to Sichuan by way of Tachienlu (Dar-rtse-mdo, now: Kangding). It will push forward like the solid ice, and its doing so will first be seen in treading the frost." Someone in our country also pointed out: "Britain invades Tibet, it will certainly sail downward through Sichuan Province to Jinmen in Hubei Province, in this way and from these areas it can occupy all the provinces in the south." From this we can see the plan to invade Tibet was from India into Tibet and from Tibet into Sichuan, then to occupy the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, cooperating with its invasion of the southeast coastal areas in our country and from both sides of the south of China, to stretch its invading forces and even to annex the whole Yangtze River valley. And thus Britain could establish its sphere of influence of Far East, with Yangtze River valley as its centre. Therefore, to invade Tibet was part of Britain's plan of invading China and struggling for hegemony on Asia.
2. Early Invasions

Britain had the ambition for invading Tibet long ago. When the East India Company discussed monopolizing the borax trade, it mentioned Tibet as an area for producing borax. But Britain did not expand formally to Tibet until one hundred years later. There had been mainly two roads leading from India to Tibet since ancient times. One was from Nepal to Tibet, and it was the road by which the religious followers usually traversed, the other was from Pali to Tibet, by way of Bhutan and Bengal which was the road taken by merchants. The British East India Company attempted to enter Tibet by way of the two roads. In 1769, the Company meddled in the civil turmoil of Nepal. But the Nepalese Government rapidly suppressed the rebellion and broke its trade relation with Britain. Therefore Britain’s attempting to enter Tibet from Nepal failed. In 1773, the East India Company made use of the contradictions between Bhutan and Cooch Bihar. Britain first annexed Cooch Bihar, then invaded Bhutan. At that time, Bhutan was a vassal state of Tibet. Facing the invasion of the British army, Deb Rajah, the ruler of Bhutan asked the Sixth Panchen for help. The Panchen sent Padma, a Tibetan and Purangir, an India Buddhist medicant monk, to bring gifts and a letter to Warren Hastings, the first Viceroy of India, advising the Company not to interfere with Bhutan: “Deb Rajah is a leader subordinate to the Dalai Lama ruling this area (at present I act as the Regent, for the Dalai is young). If you persist in invading and disturbing Bhutan further more, it would certainly cause the opposition of the Dalai and his subjects”.

As Hastings had then been promoted to the position of the Governor of India, on receiving the letter from the Panchen, he realized that it was a good opportunity for Britain to enter Tibet. He suggested that the board of directors of the Company
in London to make a trade treaty with Tibet. In May 1774, he sent George Bogle, the secretary of the East India Company, to enter Tibet in the name of paying a return visit to the Panchen. But his real mission was to seek for the possibility of trading with Tibet and to reconnoitre the economic and social situation in Tibet. At first the Panchen opposed himself to the East India Company’s sending people to Tibet; he wrote a letter to Hastings to the effect that Tibet was in the territory of China, the Chinese emperor prohibited a foreigner from going to Tibet, and requested that Bogle return to Calcutta. But Bogle bribed the Panchen’s envoy Purangir, and asked him to go to Shigatse to meet the Panchen with lots of generous gifts and to transmit Hasting’s message that the East India Company accepted the Panchen’s mediation and returned the occupied territories of Bhutan and made peace with Bhutan. Bogle was finally permitted to enter Tibet. In October 1774, he got to Shigatse and lived in Tashilhunpo Monastery. He stayed there for five months and went back to India in the spring of 1775.

When Bogle stayed in Tibet, he tried by some means or other to make commercial treaty with the Tibetan authorities, or make commercial treaty exclusively with the Tsang region, which was under the Panchen’s jurisdiction. But Tibetan officials thought that Tibet was under the Chinese emperor’s jurisdiction, however, and that it couldn’t conclude unauthorized trade treaty with foreign countries, so they refused Britain’s demand. Bogle met with a failure in his first efforts for making direct contact with Tibet. But his trip to Tibet was effective. First, he had established the preliminary contacts with the Panchen, and, with his generous gifts and solicitous regards, he misled some Tibetan officials as well as the Panchen. Therefore, he paved the way for further attempts to Tibet; second, though he had not been able to make a commercial treaty with
Tibet, yet he was permitted to communicate with Tibetan merchants, so he came to know some local merchants, Nepalese merchants and Kashmirian merchants, and he drew them over to trade with India; third, what we should mention in particular here is that Bogle made lots of investigations and studies in Tibet and that he gained first-hand information about the topography, national customs, economic life and all the other aspects of Tibet. He thought that it was quite necessary for Britain to establish direct relationship with Tibet, but it was very difficult and even impossible for a European to live and trade in Tibet because of its geographic characteristics. He thought that it was the best way for Britain to make use of Asians to expand its trade in Tibet.

After Bogle returned to India, he kept on planning to invade Tibet. He even had a very fantastic idea of attempting to go to Beijing (Peking) for manoeuvres through the Panchen’s introduction, but all his efforts failed of success. He died in Calcutta in 1781.

In 1783, in the name of congratulating on Panchen’s reincarnation and the appointment of the Regent, Hastings, the Governor of India again sent a mission led by Samuel Turner to go to Tibet in order to open the trade door of Tibet. In September, Turner and his mission arrived at Tashilhunpo Monastery and lived there for three months. He had several conversations with Drungpa Hutuktu, while Drungpa also informed the Dalai by letter for many times of their purpose in coming and asked for a countermeasure. The Dalai persisted in not trading with India without the permission from the emperor of the Qing Dynasty. Turner’s suggestion that a cloth store be established in Shigatse was refused too. Only later when Turner sent generous gifts to the Tibetans, was he finally allowed to let Indian merchants come to Shigatse to do business. When he
returned, Turner summed up the reasons why his trip failed. He adduced two reasons: 1. The Tibetans doubted and distrusted the British; 2. the Chinese officials were very strict in controlling Tibet. The Tibetan authorities certainly did not dare to conclude a trade treaty secretly with Britain without the Central Government’s permission. When Britain’s early invasion of Tibet was prevented, it concentrated its attention on making aggressions against Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, which were located in the Himalayas over the border of Tibet.

Situated between India and Tibet, Nepal had traditional trade relationship with both of them. In November, 1814, Britain launched an aggressive war against Nepal on the excuse of the border dispute between Nepal and India. The Nepalese army won the war first but then was defeated. It was forced to come into Sagauli Treaty, but later the Nepalese Government refused to acknowledge the treaty. War broke out again. The British army attacked Katmandu abruptly, Nepal was defeated and sued for peace. In March, 1816, the Nepalese Government re-signed the Sagauli Treaty. According to the treaty, Britain dominated Nepal completely. So the British aggressive forces expanded to the Tibetan border.

Soon the British began to cast greedy eyes on Sikkim (also called Drenjong in Tibetan, meaning a place of fruits). It is a mountainous country on the border between India and the southern Tibet. In 1835, Britain occupied an area of six miles long and twenty-four miles wide in Darjeeling within Sikkim in the name of leasing, thus it built up in Himalayas a base of invading Tibet.

In 1849, two British men who entered Sikkim illegally were arrested and imprisoned by the Sikkimese for more than one month. On the excuse of the issue, Britain sent soldiers to swallow up Darjeeling and the neighbouring areas of six
hundred and forty square kilometres of Sikkim, which they called the British Sikkim. The British aggression incited the Sikkimese people to rise up against the aggressors. The Sikkimese Government took counter measures against the enemy, which included blocking roads and breaking off trade with British merchants in Darjeeling. In 1860, the British dispatched troops to attack Sikkim, occupied Tumlong and kept the Sikkimese Raja in captivity. In 1861 the British-Sikkimese Treaty was made. Sikkim was forced to acknowledge Britain’s occupation of Darjeeling and give the British the privileges of free trade and building roads and so on within Sikkim. Thus the British aggressive forces approached from Sikkim to the Tibetan border.

Bhutan, the other neighbouring country of Tibet, was also invaded by Britain. Britain annexed Cooch Bihar in 1773 and occupied Assam in 1826. The two places bordered on Bhutan, so border disputes soon arose. The British dispatched troops to take hold of all the mountain passes in 1841 and occupied Kalimpong and other areas in 1864. The government of Bhutan organized a campaign against the British troops but failed in the counterattack, so the Sinchula Treaty was concluded in November, 1865. According to the Treaty, Britain occupied the broad areas of two hundred and fifty miles in length and twenty-two miles in width, including the important traffic town Kalimpong. Bhutan was also placed under the control of Britain. Thus the British aggressive forces also reached the border between Bhutan and Tibet.

In a word, since Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan were conquered and dominated successively by Britain, all the strategic passes as hedges of Tibet were lost. From then on, the British cut into mountains to build roads within these countries, preparing for pushing deep into Tibet.
II. The War Against Tibet in 1888

1. Problems of Travels and Trades Between Tibet and India

When Bogle and Turner's activities in Tibet failed of success, the British East India Company temporarily did not make direct contact with the Tibetan authorities, but it did not stop sending special agents into Tibet. For examples, it sent Colonel Kraffard in 1802, and then Lieutenant Webb, Captain Lapole and Colonel Kirkpatrick in 1808.8

In 1811, the British sent Thomas Manning to Tibet. Manning was the first Englishman who arrived in Lhasa. He slipped to Pali by way of Bhutan. By scraping up an acquaintance with a military officer in the Qing's army stationed in Tibet, Manning detected details inside the troops of the Qing Dynasty. And he came to Lhasa from Pali with the officer acting as his guide. When Manning went back to India, he supplied two pieces of important information to the government of British India: 1. he believed that the Qing's army was extremely poorly equipped and lack of training, so it couldn't be called a real army; 2. he thought the road from Pali to Lhasa was so rugged that it was not fit to use field artillery. The two pieces of intelligence had significant influence on the military action of invasion later taken by Britain towards Tibet.

In the same year, a British official named Moorcroft disguised himself as a trader and climbed over the mountain pass of Niti from Aermola and entered Ngari then to Mapham Tsho (which was called Manasarovar Lake by the British). He investigated some places of Ngari, like Dakpa Dzong and Gartok and drew topographic maps.

Though these efforts were certainly not all the British spying activities, yet they were enough to show that Britain harboured evil intentions to Tibet and glared at it like a tiger
eyeing its prey, it began very early to make preparations for military action.

However, the British did not feel satisfied with merely crossing secretly over the border, they tried to make this kind of action overt and legal. After the Margary Incident occurred, China and Britain concluded the Chefoo Convention in 1876. There was in the Convention a clause which permitted the British to travel and explore roads in Tibet. It was stipulated that the British “could seek for routes from China’s hinterland like Sichuan to India by way of Tibet” or that “if not choosing this way,” the British could “send men to the border area between India and Tibet,” and that the Zongli Yamen (Administrative Council) should give these men passports and send people to “take proper care of” these British men entering Tibet.9

In May next year, an Englishman named William Gill started from Chengdu for Tibet, and from then on, such kind of tourists “went there one after another.” Some big boundary officials of the Qing Government were conscious of the evil intentions of these British tourists. For instance, the Sichuan Governor-general Ding Baozhen said: “The British have had the demand for exploring roads in Tibet before, and their intentions were very sly and evil, so I’m worried about it.”10 But as for how to prevent the British invasions, they did not have any idea and the steps they took were not effective at all. “If one meets a foreigner crossing over Tibet from Sichuan, he must kindly persuade him to go back. If the foreigner does not listen to the advice, he must protect him by any means and at any time and tell the Resident Minister in Tibet to attend the matter properly.”11

The Kashag, the Tibetan local government, opposed themselves resolutely to foreigner’s entering Tibet. “As soon as
people in Tibet heard that foreigners were entering their territory, they gathered soldiers in an uproar to block them and the situation was blustering and truculent.” In 1886, the affairs occurred that Macaulay’s party was prevented from entering Tibet. The British sent in 1885 Colman Macaulay, the secretary of the Indian Government, with his “Commercial Inquiry Mission” to enter Tibet from the Indian border. In 1886, Macaulay and his party got to Khamba Dzong by way of Sikkim. The Dzongpon (equal to county magistrate of the inland) prevented him from marching on, when Macaulay looked thoroughly ferocious. He threatened the Tibetan and said that he would come with three thousand British soldiers to invade Tibet. But his threat was not useful at all, on the contrary, it made the Tibetans more angry. The Kashag of Tibet expressed their indignation to the Resident Minister in Tibet: “If the foreigners challenge to invade Tibet and come from no matter which direction and which road, we would tell them kindly and advise them to go back. If they listen to us and turn back, that’s all right. Otherwise we humble Tibetan monks and laymen would have no other thought but take revenge and try our best to hold them back even if we men and women have to sacrifice our own lives.”

Britain temporarily gave up the demand for entering Tibet, because on the one hand, the Tibetan Kashag were firmly against foreigners’ entering Tibet; on the other hand, Britain had an emergency need for concentrating its strength to annex Burma. While Britain negotiated the Burma Treaty with China, both countries passed a resolution: “The British agree to stop sending people to enter Tibet now, because in view of the present situation China would certainly meet with lots of obstacles. As for the problem that Britain wants to start trade relation in the border areas between India and Tibet, China
would observe the situation and try to persuade the Tibetans to promote commercial affairs. If that is possible, then both sides will be in a position to negotiate regulations. If it is difficult to operate because of many obstacles, Britain should not press China to reply either.” However, the British intentions to enter Tibet did not vanish.

There were problems of trade besides travel. The British put forward a proposal to “negotiate trade in Tibetan-Indian border areas,” but the Qing Government thought it was better for the trade areas to be a little far away from the border. At that time Wen Shuo (the Resident Minister in Tibet) maintained: “If the detail of regulations of the trade treaty be made, it must state clearly the Darjeeling area in Drenjong, i.e. Sikkim, is to be opened as a trading port and that the trade areas should not move inland beyond the port.”

There were two reasons why the Qing Government mentioned Darjeeling as a trading port: 1. to avoid the British operating on the Tibetan border and to stop the British from attempting to enter Tibet; 2. Darjeeling was within the Tibetan-Indian border areas, and had long been the Tibetan-Indian trading centre. Here “more and more tribesmen come to visit, and there are many Hans among the visitors. I hear that foreigners achieved some success in their schemes. They are quite active there. Some foreigners receive the tribesmen, some sell on credit to the tribesmen. Now all the tribesmen are willing to go there.”

No matter how the British demanded to trade in the Indian-Tibetan border areas or how the Qing Government planned on doing trade in Darjeeling outside the border, the Tibetan Kashag showed its firm opposition to the Indian-Tibetan trade. They believed that Darjeeling originally belonged to the Sikkimese territory but was occupied by Britain. The
British were not only "obsessed with the desire for gain," but also "had evil intentions." So they couldn't trade with them, whatever happened.

The British were determined to open the door of Tibet, but the Tibetan people firmly refused to trade with Britain. In such a circumstance, Britain decided to resort to force and challenge the Tibetans to a war.

2. The Dispute on Setting up or Withdrawing the Longtu Blockhouse and the Breaking out of the War

The dispute on setting up or withdrawing the Longtu blockhouse was an incident that touched off the first British war against Tibet.

After Britain occupied Sikkim, it speeded up its preparation for invading Tibet. It began all kinds of preparations such as: building roads, bridges and posts, constructing highways leading to Tibet and "hiring vagrants as guides," climbing stealthily across Longtu Mountain on the Tibetan border to conduct reconnaissances, repairing and broadening the road from Nianna to Longtu Mountain, etc. The British war preparations aroused vigilance of the Tibetan people. They were informed by both the Sikkimese Government and the Nepalese Government of the British schemes of invading Tibet. "The British have decided to go on a pilgrimage to Tibet, saying that nothing would happen if we complied, otherwise they would certainly dispatch troops to enter Tibet."17 The situation in border areas was quite emergent. The Kashag promptly and opportunely set up a blockhouse at Longtu Mountain in order to block the road for the British to invade Tibet and protect the Tibetan territories. It was the indisputable right of the Tibetan people to defend themselves, but the British flew into a rage. They presented notes in succession and threatened the Tibetan people.
In November, 1886, the British Envoy to China Mr. Wall claimed: "(the Tibetans) set up a fort about hundred miles away from Darjeeling outside the border in order to prevent trading. Britain could easily destroy the fort, but has decided instead to ask the Resident Minister in Tibet that he should order the Tibetans not to take rash actions." In May 1887, Wall claimed openly that Longtu Mountain was not in the Tibetan territory. He charged groundlessly that "the Tibetan troops are entrenched in Sikkimese areas, and the Imperial Government of China intends to remain indifferent. They would not leave there except by moving troops to expel them from the country." The Tibetan people firmly refused to accept the blame and thought that the British had no right to interfere in their setting up a blockhouse and stationing troops in their own territory.

After that, in the negotiations between China and Britain, the Qing Government asked to investigate the real case together with the British so as to solve the dispute through negotiation. But the British did not agree and claimed: "If they do not return to the former border, we'll certainly expel them and we'll not wait long." The Qing Government was weak and incapable, and it made concessions time and again. Finally it turned to force Tibetans to withdraw the blockhouse and troops. In its instructions to Wen Shuo, it said: "Now it is emergent. No matter the blockhouse at Longtu Mountain is outside or inside the Tibetan border, you are to effect an immediate evacuation on the excuse of these blocks being in Drenjong’s territory. You must not let the road be blocked as before, which might lead to a war, resulting in bringing calamity to ourselves". However, the Tibetan Kashag defied the order and did not agree to withdraw troops. Together with the representatives of the three big monasteries and all the Tibetan monk and lay officials, they petitioned the Qing Government, arguing strongly on just
grounds and pointing out: “If we gave up Longtu Mountain, our frontier would be left wide open to the invaders. Has there been anything like that in history?” "Whenever the British dare to come to make trouble, what we humble Tibetan monks and laymen can only do is to make concerted efforts to take revenge and never let them pass. We have already made the oath and the decision, and we have no other choice but do what we can and submit to the will of Heaven, even if we should be defeated.”

Thus the British war against Tibet unavoidably broke out.

By the end of 1887, two thousand British soldiers gathered on the border. They made Baidong the general station of rear-areas and employed a great number of the local people to carry the supplies on their shoulders in preparation for the attack. The Tibetan Kashag sent officials immediately to Longtu Mountain to take charge of commanding and to move soldiers to reinforce the prevention. The Longtu Mountain is 12,617 feet high above the sea level, dangerous and short of oxygen. The Tibetan troops built defence works on highland about 9,000 feet high. The defence works used sheer bamboos as walls, with a stone citadel on the peak, the defence is quite strengthened.

On February 22, 1888, the British officer Neil arrived at the front to dispose an attack in person. On March 19, the British troops attacked the valley of Zalu at the foot of Longtu Mountain. At that time the Tibetan soldiers guarding Longtu Mountain were about 200. What they used as weapons were simply bows, spears, broadswords, blunderbusses, stones, artifact fire locks, etc. But they defended their fortification and attacked the enemy calmly. Not long after the battle was fought, they killed a British army officer and forced the invaders to retreat. On the next day the British troops attacked from the same
direction and had a fierce fighting with the Tibetan troops. The Tibetan soldiers “swore to defend to the death and fought bravely for long. They killed more than one hundred British soldiers. When they returned and counted their casualties, one gyapon (officer) and over twenty militiamen were found missing.” The Tibetan troop’s fortification stood rockfirm.

Later the British troops attacked on large scales for many times and bombed the camps of the Tibetan troops. The Tibetans almost used up all the munitions, but the several thousand of soldiers, gathering in their position, shouted all about, used stones, spears and broad swords and fought persistently and bravely. They couldn’t, after all, put up with the gunfires from the British troops. On March 24, Longtu, Natang were occupied successively by the British troops. The Tibetan soldiers retreated to Zhuomayi and Chunbi near Nianna.23, 24

After Longtu and Natang were occupied, the British, on one hand, went on sending troops to the border areas. They built roads and prepared for a new attack. According to the Thames, the British troops had over 2,300 soldiers distributed over the border with nine big cannons.25 On the other hand, Britain attempted to force the Tibetan people to surrender by resorting to diplomatic means. The British instigated the Potang Lama and others of Sikkim to write to the Tibetan Kashag and the Resident in Tibet saying that the British sent troops to invade the border was because Tangut did not reply to their proposal of establishing trade relations”.26 They now expressed their willingness to “mediate” this military conflict between the two sides. The King of Nepal also expressed the same idea. In Beijing, the British envoy to China presented a note to the Qing Government saying “The Indian Government was training his soldiers, but if the Tibetan men didn’t cross over the border, their troops wouldn’t cross Longtu, and everything would
remain the same from now on.”27 Though the British promised of stopping attack was but a lie, yet it prompted the Qing Government to be more willing to stop the war by means of reconciliation.

After Longtu Mountain was occupied, the Qing Government reproached Wen Shuo, the Resident Minister in Tibet who persisted in counterattacking the British troops: “Since you arrived in Tibet you haven’t been dealing with the Tibetan issues according to the Emperor’s instructions, but always have ridiculous opinions without considering the fundamental situation.”28 The Qing Government declared to strip him of the post and appointed Sheng Tai as the Assistant Resident Minister of Tibet. Sheng Tai was asked to go to Tibet at once to carry out the order of stopping fighting and withdrawing soldiers. When Sheng Tai was on the way to Tibet, he was instructed for many times to “advise Tibetan officials immediately not to be perverse, not to cross over the border to take revenge, nor to go forward to build fortifications once more when the British troops retreat, which would make the enemy come further on.”29

The unconquerable people of Tibet still persisted in fighting the enemy and refused to compromise. The Tibetan Kashag thought that the Podang Lama of Sikkim couldn’t be relied on, because “this man is a traitor working for Britain. His letter needn’t be replied.”30 They refused to obey the Qing Government’s instructions and justified themselves for their counterattacking: “Since the foreigners (the British) didn’t keep their promise to withdraw their troops in time, we humble Tibetans could not sit with folded arms and let our land be occupied by these plunderers. Therefore, we had to move our soldiers forward to wipe them out.”31 After the fall of Longtu militia reinforcements from Ü-Tsang and Kham were sent by the
Kashag. The first such contingent, consisting of nine hundred men from Kongpo set out for the front on April 7. It was followed by over one thousand from Kham. Then several thousand more were sent from Pomi, Shopendu and Kachu. Altogether more than ten thousand militia reinforcement troops were rushed to the front. These soldiers, when passing through Lhasa on their way to the battlefield, were blessed by the Dalai Lama by having their head touched by him, and were given for protection specially made white umbrella wheels which had had incantations recited over by lamaist monks. The high lamas of the three great monasteries were sent to the front to help with the planning of operations. The monks of all monasteries were organized as reserve force. Meanwhile, by order of the Dalai Lama, fifteen incantation-reciting lamas chanted The Martial Sutra in secrecy in the Potala to bring curses down upon the British army.  

Sheng Tai, the newly appointed Resident in Tibet arrived on July 5. As soon as he got off, he talked a lot of nonsense. He claimed first that the Tibetan border was at the two mountains of Yala and Zhimu and that Rena Dzong was not the Tibetan territory. He requested the Tibetan troops to withdraw to Pali. What Sheng Tai did and said dampen the spirit of the Tibetan soldiers and disturbed their former plans. As a matter of fact it helped the British aggressors.

On July 20 and 25, the British troops began to attack the Tibetan position by gunfire and challenged a new fighting. On August 15 and 16, they came again. The Tibetan troops planned to counterattack on August 17 and 22, but were prevented from doing so by Sheng Tai. Thus the British troops had enough time to prepare for an attack. On September 13, they began to attack the Tibetan troops camped in Nyedu-la. On September 24, the British troops turned to a comprehensive attack. The Tibetan
troops could not hold up. The entire Tibetan army of over ten thousand men was routed and retreated to Rinchen Gang. The passes at Dzaleb, Yadong and Langra all fell to the enemy. In this battle the Tibetan troops were thrown into passivity and suffered heavy casualties. According to the *Thames*, about more than one thousand Tibetan soldiers and common people were killed.\(^{33}\)

After being defeated in this fighting, the Kashag and the three big monasteries recruited and moved again over ten thousand monk-soldiers and militiamen and stationed them in Rinchen Gang area, preparing for a counterattack. But Sheng Tai carried out a compromising policy. He adopted repressive measures against the Tibetan people’s counterattack and ordered the Kashag to dismiss the Tibetan troops. In November, Sheng Tai set out from Lhasa to the front in person. He put up his tent between the British troops and the Tibetan troops, and prevented both sides from fighting with each other and began to negotiate with the British. Then the first British war against Tibet came to a conclusion.

The reasons why the Tibetan people’s struggle against the British was defeated were as follows:

1. The Qing Government carried out a disgraceful policy of reconciliation. It did not lead and support the Tibetan local struggles against the British invaders. On the contrary, it destroyed and cracked down these struggles. On September 25, the Tibetan troops met Sheng Tai’s subordinate officer Xiao Zhanguang, the Gyantse garrison commander, when they retreated on the way to Rinchen Gang and asked him for support. However, Xiao Zhanguang reproached them unreasonably and said: “I came with the instruction by the Resident Minister in Tibet to prevent the war, but you made trouble again out of our expectation and thus were defeated.”\(^{34}\) So the Tibetan
troop’s resistances were isolated and aidless from the beginning to the end.

2. The Tibetan soldiers were recruited temporarily from serfs and poorly equipped with backward weapons. They were in want of training and without rigid discipline as well. When they got the order from the Kashag to move, the Tibetan soldiers set out to the front with spears, broadswords, bows and arrows, and wearing in ragged jackets and bringing tsampa bags. But the weapons used by their enemy were advanced. They were disciplined and well equipped. They could be called a colonial army with rich experience in fighting. The fighting capacities between both sides were as far apart as heaven and earth.

3. The Tibetan troops also made some errors in strategy and tactics. Comparing with the British troops, the Tibetan troops were quite weak, but not doomed to be defeated, because there were often examples for the small to win the big and the weak to defeat the strong among colonial people’s struggles against the imperialists. Besides these, Tibetans had dominant military geographical conditions which were superior to any other place in the world. That is, they could make use of its highland topography of “the world’s roof” as well as the complicated climate. It was not impossible for the Tibetans to defeat the British troops if the Tibetan Kashag could have correctly analized the conditions of both sides and taken effective strategy and tactics in the fighting. At that time, Wen Shuo, the Resident in Tibet, saw this possibility and put it forward in his memorial to the Emperor:

“We may resort the tactic of combating hardness with softness in our fighting with the British. In fighting we should hide in ambushes rather than expose ourselves, the
formation of the troops should be scattered rather than close. In attacking we should intercept the enemy half way rather than fight them face to face. It's better for us to use night raids for a hand-to-hand fight and press forward rather than retreat ... as for how to station and camp our troops ... it's better in general to scatter our tents rather than let them gather in camp positions to avoid sudden attacks of the gunfires”.

“Both their men and horses need food supplies. If we cut off their supply lines and secretly store up our provi-
sions when they come deep into inland, they shall be isolated and have no food to eat. Herein lies our way to victory.”35

In other words, we must utilize our strong points to attack the enemy’s weak points, namely, wage a guerilla war while fighting with the British troops. If the Qing Government had adopted these judicious suggestions to support firmly the Tibetan struggles against the British invaders, the British troops invading Tibet would have certainly stood at bay and even finally been defeated. But it was a pity for the Qing Govern-
ment to decide to compromise with the British and relieve Wen Shuo of his post. Moreover, the Tibetan Kashag did not know how to utilise flexible tactics except recruiting and moving soldiers to the front to fight. The only magic weapons for them were superstitious ones such as praying to Gods and allocating amulets. All this was of course ineffective, and, as a result, thousands of Tibetan soldiers died from the bullets of the British troops. In their first war with the British invaders, however, the Tibetan people showed their unconquerable fighting spirit and strong determination to defend the southwest frontier and the unity of China.
3. The Door to Tibet Was Thrown Open by Britain

Since the ceasefire of the first war against Tibet was achieved when the British troops won one battle after another and the Qing Government made concessions for compromising, the British was in an advantageous position in the negotiations.

Subjugated by the British, Sheng Tai forced the Tibetan Kashag to withdraw their troops from Rinchen Gang for two stations before the negotiation started. Later he ordered that the Tibetan soldiers be dismissed, being afraid that they would precipitate armed conflicts with the British once more while gathering at the front. Sheng Tai promised the Tibetans that “if the Indian soldiers (namely, the British) should come again, only the Resident in Tibet would be responsible.” In this way Sheng Tai sent the Tibetan soldiers away. When he requested the British troops to withdraw from the front correspondingly, however, his request was refused abruptly. The British told him clearly that “We would not retreat until we get what we want.”

On December 22, 1889, Sheng Tai and the British representative Charles Bell held the negotiation in the British military camps. Bell put forward a draft of seven clauses. The main contents were: 1. The problem about Sikkim. It is necessary to acknowledge that the British have the right to control Sikkim and the Tibetans are not to interfere in the internal affairs of Sikkim; 2. The border problem. Both Britain and China should send men to delimit the border between India and Tibet; 3. The problem of trade. The British subjects could enjoy free trade in Tibet, and taxes would be discussed separately.

In the negotiation Sheng Tai again requested that the British withdraw first their troops from Tibet and that each clause of the agreement be given further thoughts and discussed later. But Bell persisted that they “must reach a decision first on the seven
major issues, then we can discuss about withdrawing troops.” 38 It was very clear that the British side would not withdraw the troops but was carrying out a policy of blackmail by force so as to compel the Chinese to make concessions in the negotiation. As a matter of fact, the British not only refused to withdraw the troops but cut into the mountains to build roads, houses and forts, brought more cannons and reinforced soldiers nearby the Tibetan border. 39 In the negotiation Bell was domineering and Sheng Tai was bullied. In his memorial to the Qing Government, Sheng Tai complained: “Bell has made many demands on us. If he is not satisfied, he would say that he is coming to Tibet to negotiate again next March as he can not reach an agreement here. He seems to be threatening and reproaching all the time.” 40

On the problem of Sikkim. The Sikkimese would not like to be a subordinate to Britain. They were still willing to be a subordinate to China. They asked the Qing Government not to delimit them “out of His Majesty’s territory,” and they were even willing to leave their land and immigrate into Tibet to live. But the Qing Government refused their request and thought the situation in Sikkim was irretrievable because it was already a fact that the British had occupied Sikkim. The Qing court tried to save as much as face as possible through negotiations. Thus Sheng Tai put forward that the relationship between Tibet and Sikkim was to remain “as before”, that means Sikkim must still present gifts and letters of congratulation every year to the Resident Minister in Tibet and the Kashag. The British thought, however, “the ruler of Sikkim is a king subordinate to Britain. It does not suit the king’s status for him to present reports and gifts to officials of other countries ... therefore it is difficult for us to agree.” The British persisted in cutting off the traditional intimate relations between Sikkim and Tibet.
On the problem of trade. At first the British representatives asked for free trade in Tibet and the right to go to Lhasa to do business. In the negotiation, “our representatives refused it sternly and argued by every means, so the British said they would go no further than Gyantse. Again they were told that trading in Gyantse was impossible. Soon they expressed their intention to trade in Pali.”\(^1\) In accordance with the opinion of the Tibetans, Sheng Tai insisted on trading outside the border. He suggested Duibang of Yadong as a commercial port. Neither side gave in and they didn’t pass a resolution on it.

Just then, Robert Hart (1835-1911) who controlled the Chinese Customs Tax Bureau, interfered in the negotiation of the Tibetan issue. He helped the British break the deadlock and forced China to sign a treaty. Recommended by Robert Hart, his brother James Hart was appointed by the Qing Government as Sheng Tai’s interpreter and representative. James Hart arrived in Darjeeling in February 1889. He first contacted and discussed secretly with the British-Indian Government before he entered Tibet to report for duty to the Resident Minister in Tibet. During March, Robert Hart ordered secretly James Hart to state the advantages and disadvantages to Sheng Tai: “The British would like to strengthen the Chinese position in Tibet. If China opposes, Britain will certainly cast China aside and negotiate with Tibet directly. Thus military action will be unavoidable. It will be disadvantageous to Tibet indeed, but it will also make China feel very embarrassed.”\(^2\) It was very clear that the British was threatening the Qing Government. On April 6, Robert Hart instructed his brother James Hart and said: “You may try to be the go-between and take the management of affairs in your own hands.”\(^3\) James Hart obeyed his elder brother’s instruction and played freely with Sheng Tai who was fatuous and incapable.
On the problem of the border between India and Tibet (or the problem of the Tibet-Drenjong border). Sheng Tai held that Nianna was to be the border as was suggested by Britain. But the British representative claimed that what was said before the war did not count and refused to accept it. The British now suggested Dzaleb-la as the border and Yadong as a trade mart. In April, Sheng Tai exerted pressure on the Tibetans and the Tibetan Kashag made a concession.

On July 2, James Hart returned to Rinchen Gang from Darjeeling and drew five clauses of the treaty together with Sheng Tai: 1. The peak of Dzaleb-la Mountain was delimited as the Tibetan-Drenjong border; 2. The Sikkimese should present gifts and reports to Tibet as before, and Sikkim was to be protected by Britain; 3. Tibet should stop supplying barley and salt to Sikkim and take back the houses built in Tibet by Sikkim; 4. The British troops promised not to invade Tibet; 5. Customs and market trade would be established in Yadong of Tibet. This draft of treaty was consented by the Qing Government before it was delivered to the British for discussion.

On August 18, the British-Indian Government replied to Sheng Tai and said that these five clauses had no new contents. It refused to accept them and claimed that they would stop the negotiation. Forced to make concession again the Qing Government sent a telegraph to Sheng Tai, ordering him to revise the draft treaty to make sure that Sikkim would be protected by Britain and that Tibet would not concern itself with Sikkim from then on. The British expressed their consent to make revised draft as the basis of the negotiation.

On March 17, 1890, both sides formally signed the eight clauses of the Anglo-Chinese Convention Relating to Sikkim and Tibet in Calcutta of India. The main contents are: 1. The boundary of Sikkim (Drenjong) and Tibet shall be the crest of
the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet; 2. Sikkim is a subordinate state to Britain. It shall not communicate and negotiate with any other foreign country without the permission of Britain; 3. Neither Britain nor China shall violate the border between Tibet and Sikkim; 4. Within six months from the ratification of this Convention, both sides should send representatives to discuss about trade, pasturage, and ways for their officials to negotiate etc. 45

The Convention established Britain’s protectorate over Sikkim. The generalized mentioning of the border in the Convention and resolutions for discussion about trade, pasturage, and official means of negotiation, etc. enabled the British to go on threatening and bullying and enlarged its aggressive rights and interests.

After the Anglo-Chinese Convention Relating to Sikkim and Tibet was ratified, and the ratifications were exchanged in London on August 27, 1890, a negotiation was held in February, 1891, discussing about the unresolved problems mentioned above. Before both sides began to negotiate Robert Hart instructed James Hart to tell the British representatives that they must be swash-buckling and demand as much as possible in order to attain their aim. “No matter you demand one thing or several things, the Chinese side always tries to argue. Therefore it will be helpful for you to demand more.” 46 The British representatives understood it tacitly.

In the negotiation on February 25, the British representatives put forward fourteen requirements. They were mainly as follows: not to pay taxes on the trade between Tibet and India; the British could travel and trade all over Tibet; to open Pali as a trade mart; the British could buy land in Tibet to build houses
and hotels; the British might send agents to reside in Pali and other places; all civil cases would be dealt with by both Chinese and British officials. These unreasonable demands put forward by the British were passed by Sheng Tai to the Tibetan Kashag to discuss. It aroused their fierce opposition. They pointed out that “the places for the British to trade and travel will turn to be the British ones in future. The cases of Darjeeling and Sikkim have proved clearly to be so. We swear not to obey no matter what happens.” Moreover, Sheng Tai was blamed for he curried favour with the British and betrayed the Tibetan. In view of the fierce opposition of the Tibetan people, Sheng Tai immediately informed the Qing Government that the British envoy should be told: “It is extremely impossible at present to move the trade mart to Pali and allow the British to travel all over Tibet.” Under such circumstances, the British had to make some concessions and no longer insisted on these unreasonable demands.

On December 5, 1893, both sides signed in Darjeeling the Regulations Regarding Trade, Communication, and Pasturage to be Appended to the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890, which consisted of nine clauses. The main contents of it were as follows: 1. As to trade, Yadong was to open as a trade mart on May 1, 1890, and free of taxes within five years. When five years were over, regulations on taxing would be made again; 2. As to official contacts between China and India in future, Indian documents would be handed over to the Chinese Frontier Officer by the Political Officer for Sikkim, while Tibetan documents would be handed over to the Political Officer for Sikkim by the Chinese Frontier Officer; 3. As to pasturage, when Yadong had been opened as a mart for a year, the Tibetans who still herded in Sikkim should conduct in accordance with the newly-enacted regulations.
Half a century before, the British forced open the door to the south-eastern coast of China by the Opium War. Now, they again forced open the door to the south-western frontier areas of our Tibet by the 1890 Convention and the subsequent regulations. Britain occupied the Chinese subordinate state Sikkim, and Rena, Natang, even areas nearby Dzaleb-la in the southern frontier of Tibet. After that, the long boundary line of Tibet was placed under the direct threat of Britain. Meanwhile, the British commercial goods could be transported continuously into Tibet, Sichuan, Qinghai and other places by way of Yadong, while farming products produced in these areas also flew steadily into India. From then on, Tibet was involved in the currents of world capitalism, and it was no longer a closed feudal society.

III. The British Economic Invasion of Tibet

1. The Economic Aim for British Invasion of Tibet

The aim for the British invading Tibet was to enslave politically and plunder economically the Tibetans. From the economic viewpoint, Britain tried to plunder Tibet of its raw materials and resources and to dump commodities into Tibet.

First, it wanted to plunder Tibet of its gold. According to the Indian scholar Das, there were four rich resources in Tibetan economy: mineral resources, forests, aquatic products and agricultural products. "Among them, the rich gold mines attracted especially the British attention." From the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth century, Britain sent its special agents to Tibet to investigate gold mines. In 1774 when East India Company sent George Bogle as a special envoy to Tibet, he was ordered to investigate the output of gold, silver, musk,
hornet and other things produced in Tibet. In 1779, Bogle attempted again to go to Tibet to search for gold. In the late eighteenth century, when Samuel Turner went to Tibet as an envoy, he also investigated the output of gold there. In the list of trade commodities between Tibet and its neighbouring countries, Turner pointed out that the large amount of alluvial gold of Tibet had been exported to the inland of China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bengal and other places. Thus Britain was more sure that Tibet was a gold-producing region.

In 1815 The Dictionary of Place Names of East India compiled by Hamilton mentioned that there was a large quantity and in pure quality of gold in Tibet. The gold, found mainly in alluvial materials, was a major export of Tibet.

Waddell, a British, investigated the distribution of Tibetan gold mines and found "there are gold mines in Changtang to the north-east of Lhasa. Thok Jolung (at 32°24'26" N and 81°37'38" E) to the east of Simla, the Yamdrok Lake to the north of Bhutan, Subanisire or the Golden River of Assam to the south-east of Bhutan, etc." He also got the "information from the British consul in Nepal that the gold mines to the east of Litang were the richest." The Indian man Das claimed that gold mines in Tibet were in the following regions: 1. Sathol, Thok Jolung; 2. Thok Amar, Thok Mashrara, Thok Daurakopa; 3. Sarka Shyar; 4. the Kunlun Mountains and other regions. Among British invaders, there was a widely-spread rumour that so far as the rich resources of gold in Tibet was concerned Tibet could be called California the second.

Besides gold, the British capitalists thought there were cheap products of raw materials in Tibet for them to plunder. The Tibetan wool, for example, was five times cheaper than that in Britain. The price of Tibetan leather was twelve times lower than that of Britain. Its musk, borax and other rare products
were a great attraction to the British colonialists.

Secondly, Tibet was regarded as an ideal market for Britain to dump manufactured goods, and tea especially. By 1882, Britain had been troubled by economic crisis for several years. The British capitalists demanded new markets in order to save its industry and trade from sagging seriously. The *Thames* reported: “We hear merchants complaining everywhere about the suspended trade. If we insist on going into Tibet, there will be a big market waiting for us.”

Before large amount of British goods were dumped into Tibet almost all the commodities which the Tibetan people needed were imported from the Chinese inland. The Tibetan people were fond of drinking tea, but Tibet itself didn’t produce tea. They imported tea from Sichuan, and the trade amount of tea was very great. Besides tea, cotton cloth and silk were the most needed commodities in Tibet. According to estimation, the tea transported each year to Batang from Tachienlu of Sichuan was 10,000,000 jin valued about 160,000 liang of silver. The cotton textiles transported each year to Tibet from Tachienlu valued in total 4,650 liang of silver, the silk about 2,150 liang of silver.60

The trade routes from the Chinese inland to Tibet were as follows: 1. From Sichuan to Tibet. The imports were mainly tea, silk, cotton thread, cotton cloth, boots, shoes, caps, cotton, tobacco, etc.; 2. From Yunnan to Tibet. The imports were mainly rice, tea, copper, tin, lead, sugar and so on; 3. From Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang to Tibet. The imports were mainly precious stones, animal skins, horse saddles, sheep, horses, salt, borax and other goods. Besides these, Tibet also imported some rice, wood, perfume, sugar, etc. from Kashmir, Gurkha (Nepal), Blukba (Bhutan), Drenjong (Sikkim) and other places. As for goods transported from Tibet to the inland, they were
mainly gold, musk, wool, medicinal materials, leather, felt blanket, etc. According to Lytton, an Englishman’s estimation, the total value of the trade between Tibet and the inland from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century amounted to 2,085,000 liang of silver. So the British certainly wouldn’t give up this remarkable trade interests.

2. Trade Between Tibet and India After the War of 1888

After the British opened the door to Tibet by force, they opened Yadong as a mart. So the trade between India and Tibet developed rapidly. According to the following British official statistics of the Tibetan trade from 1885 to 1905, we can see clearly that the trade value had increased rapidly since the War.

Statistics of the Trade between Bengal of India and Tibet
unit: rupee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Import to Tibet</th>
<th>Import to India</th>
<th>Total Value</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1885-1886</td>
<td>245,716</td>
<td>372,735</td>
<td>618,449</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886-1887</td>
<td>296,026</td>
<td>213,385</td>
<td>509,411</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887-1888</td>
<td>174,799</td>
<td>190,427</td>
<td>365,226</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888-1889</td>
<td>4,181</td>
<td>3,168</td>
<td>7,349</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889-1890</td>
<td>131,458</td>
<td>149,254</td>
<td>280,712</td>
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<tr>
<td>1890-1891</td>
<td>199,788</td>
<td>180,893</td>
<td>380,681</td>
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<tr>
<td>1891-1892</td>
<td>203,131</td>
<td>618,146</td>
<td>821,277</td>
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<tr>
<td>1892-1893</td>
<td>229,117</td>
<td>351,519</td>
<td>580,636</td>
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<tr>
<td>1893-1894</td>
<td>331,613</td>
<td>358,799</td>
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<td>1894-1895</td>
<td>447,802</td>
<td>701,348</td>
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<td>1896-1897</td>
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<td>1898-1899</td>
<td>1,017,685</td>
<td>1,121,019</td>
<td>2,138,704</td>
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Note: statistics of 9 months
Since 1888, especially after Yadong was opened as a mart in 1894, the Tibetan-Indian trade had developed rapidly. From 1885 to 1888, the annual average value of the trade between Bengal and Yadong was 375,109 rupees. Affected by the war against Tibet in 1888, the trade value was increased to 550,744 rupees a year from 1889 to 1893; increased to 1,403,720 rupees a year from 1894-1904 respectively, as three or two times as the former periods.

Besides these developments, the trade from Assam of India to Dawang of Tibet as well as the trade from Punjab to the western Tibet were developed too. From 1881 to 1888, the value of trade between Assam and Dawang reached an average of 132,954 rupees a year; the value of the trade between Punjab and the western Tibet reached an average of 202,329 rupees a year. From 1889 to 1902, the trade along these two routes were relatively decreased, because the trade between Tibet and India was mainly done through Yadong route in these years. But the value of trade still maintained the sums of 44,736 rupees (Dawang region) and 193,541 rupees (the Western Tibet) respectively. In these twenty years, with the exception of six years, Tibet usually got the favourable balance of trade while India unfavourable. It showed that economic interests Britain acquired from the Indian-Tibetan trade were mainly by plundering raw materials in Tibet but the profits it gained by dumping commodities were far less.

According to the statistics in 1899, one of the characteristics

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Import to India</th>
<th>Total Value</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
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<td>1900-1901</td>
<td>667,000</td>
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<td>1901-1902</td>
<td>724,000</td>
<td>793,000</td>
<td>1,517,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902-1903</td>
<td>811,000</td>
<td>963,000</td>
<td>1,774,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903-1904</td>
<td>392,400</td>
<td>356,800</td>
<td>749,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of the Tibetan-Indian trades was what was transported from India to Tibet was mainly manufactured goods of light industry. Among them, cotton and wool textiles ranked first, amounting to 46 percent of the total import value; while what was transported from Tibet to India was mainly raw materials used in light industry. Among them, wool alone accounted for more than 70 percent of the total export value. We can see the details from the following table.⁶⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Import Value of Commodities of Tibet (rupee)</th>
<th>Export Value of Commodities of Tibet (rupee)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cotton textiles 313,585</td>
<td>wool 581,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wool textiles 136,209</td>
<td>musk 116,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>silk textiles 71,728</td>
<td>yak tail 42,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metal 74,461</td>
<td>sheep skin 14,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese cap 49,214</td>
<td>mule 31,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tobacco 32,486</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coral 26,721</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maize 23,125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cotton-wool textiles 8,188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coarse yarn 7,642</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>twist yarn 6,393</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knitting wool 256</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others 192,629</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the door to Tibet was thrown open by Britain, the consequences were disastrous.

First, the British-Indian commodities not only flooded over Tibetan markets, but were also sold far to Sichuan because of their large imports. Both British and Indian merchants enjoyed the privileges of being free of taxes. According to the Regulations Appended to the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890, goods passed through Yadong would be free of taxes within five years after it was opened as a mart, both sides would not discuss the
problem of goods taxes until five years later. But in fact, the British refused to pay taxes for long. Though the customs was established in Yadong, yet it did not take charge of the customs tariff. “It simply noted down the quantity of goods when they were passed through”. This was the case with the customs in Yadong. As for trade in other regions of Tibet where no customs was established, there weren’t even the registrations formalities. Therefore, British-Indian goods were exported to Tibet in large quantities. According to the notes taken down by some Russian spy who went to Tibet to gather information in 1900: “Large quantity of woolen cloth, mole skins, fine cotton cloth, coarse white cloth, porcelain, household utensils and other cheap British goods is imported from Britain and British India and sold in Tibet.\(^{65}\) In recent years (1899-1902), about 40,000 or 50,000 rupees of British goods in total every year which were not sold out were transported to Tachienlu and Chamdo.”\(^{66}\)

Some Tibetan handicrafts went bankrupt in competition with British commodities. For example, the production of local wool textiles called Pulu had been reduced greatly since British wool blankets were imported in large quantities. The Pulu exported by Tibet in 1898 were 8,262 yards, but it decreased to 818 yards in 1899, namely, it decreased by more than ninety percent within a year.

Large quantity of British goods dominated the Tibetan markets. If this situation lasted for long, it would certainly make Tibet subordinate to Britain in economy and politics and weaken its relationship with the inland of China. By the end of the nineties, the gold transported from Tibet to Sichuan decreased by 4,000 ounces from the original 8,000 ounces.\(^{67}\) So were the wool and musk. The quantities of them transported to the inland of China decreased while the prices raised.
However, Tibetan markets under the backward serfdom could only bear the British goods after all in a very limited way. Meanwhile, the Tibetans hated extremely the British aggressive forces. Though Yadong was opened as a mart to trade with Britain, the Tibetan compatriots were closely linked with the inland of China in feeling, and they were not willing to contact with the British. So British goods did not sell well in Tibet, and the British had an unfavourable balance of trade for a long time. The British invaders were not satisfied with the situation. They attempted to move the trade mart northward, from the small Yadong to Pali, even to Gyantse and Lhasa, so as to enjoy the free trade within Tibet. In November 1895, the Bradford Chamber of Commerce in Yorkshire of Britain declared in its official letter to the British Government that they firmly believed that they would find in Tibet a new valuable market for the Great British Empire. They requested the British Government to further open the door of the country (here means Tibet) so that the British subjects could go to the inland of Tibet to trade, even to Lhasa directly.68

Indian landlords and traders of tea also demanded for ignoring the prohibitions on Indian tea into Tibet. They tried to make Tibet a market for Indian tea. “Let those Tibetans who don’t want Indian tea drink Indian tea”.69

Certainly, the British were more attracted by the Tibetan gold. After Yadong was opened as a trade mart, the value of alluvial gold transported from Tibet to India each year was about 20,000 or 30,000 rupees. Though the quantity was not very large, yet it already became the most conspicuous of all the trades the British carried on in Tibet at that time.70 So the British Government claimed that “it is extremely interested in promoting the development of this kind of trade (in Tibet), the
British Government will use every opportunity to promote it". Claude White, the Political Officer for Sikkim of the British Government, declared that trade marts should be immediately moved to the north, to the inland of Tibet, for there were more scopes and more room for them to expand. The British Government tried every means to seek for excuses to challenge disputes and prepare for a new war against Tibet in order to move trade markets northward and open further the door to Tibet.

NOTES

2. Lord Curson in India, p. 408.
20. Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 12.
22. Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 26; Vol. 7, p. 4.
34. Ibid., pp. 20, 22.
35. Ibid., p. 107.
37. Sheng Tai's Despatches and Memorials to the Throne, Vol. 5, pp. 21, 22.
38. Ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 5, 6.
42. Shen Su, History of British Invasion in Tibet in the Qing Dynasty, pp. 12, 13.
47. Lamb, A. Britain and Central Asia of China, pp. 342, 343, 347, 353.
49. Leontev, Foreign Expansion in Tibet, p. 41.
50. Tsyibikov, Pilgrims of Buddhism in the Holy Place of Tibet, Petersburge, 1919, p. 113.
69. 70. Lamb, A. Britain and Central Asia of China, pp. 280, 300.
Patala Palace Construction of the Palace began in the 7th century.
The regulations of reorganizing Tibet with 28 articles in the fourth year of Daoguang.
The Ling pai of the minister in Tibet Ling Pai: the board-shaped token of authority in ancient China.

Chushul Bridge, the largest on the Yalutsangpo, links Lhasa with Laka Shigatse and other areas.
Tibetan noble man's dress.
Tibetan noble women.
Mr. Bogle, who was sent as an envoy to Tibet in 1774.
The old-type Tibetan infantryman and cavalrman.

Mounted infantry.
The Tibetan court. The three men wearing flat hats in the middle of the picture are judges. The two sitting on the left side are copy clerks.
Chapter III
Russia's Greedy Eyes Cast on Tibet

I. The Beginning of Russian Aggression Against Tibet

1. Prezevalski's Adventures in Tibet

In the early eighteenth century, the Tsarist Russia began to harbour the ambition of invading Tibet. The initial motivation was the attempt to obtain the alluvial gold in Tibet. In 1713, M.P. Gagarin, Governor of Siberia, sent Trushnikov, a noble from Tobol'sk, to the western part of China to reconnoitre the production of alluvial gold there. Trushnikov returned to Tobol'sk around 1716, carrying with him three hundred liang of alluvial gold. He reported to the Governor that the gold was bought at several places, one of which was the area around the Qinghai Lake (Kokonor), and that one liang of the gold cost seven roubles. People panned alluvial gold out from the rivers originated from the mountain streams in this area. In summer, one person could usually get alluvial gold from thirty liang to one hundred liang. To the south of the area, Qoshot Mongols and Tangutans did the panning in mountains and on the banks of a river called Aletanguole which means a river of gold. It was just in this area that Trushnikov heard about Tibet, where the Dalai Lama lived. Gagarin presented the information he had got to the Tsar. On January 30, 1721 Tsar Peter I specially issued an order to Privy Council demanding the Eastern Minister of Russia to see to it that Russia should have trade relations
with the area where the Dalai Lama lived, yet the purpose of it was not to make profits, but to send some quick-witted staff to this area together with the tradesmen, so that they could find out where the gold was produced and what the output was and which way to it was possible, and that no matter how difficult or dangerous the way was, they must find out whether the area was accessible and then occupy it.³

That was the first order the Russian rulers issued to invade Tibet. During the following hundreds of years, the missionaries, spies, investigating adventurers and some important army and political officials sent by every generation of the Tsars performed manyfold invasive activities in Tibet, all of which were to carry out the order of Peter I — to occupy the gold-producing Tibet.

With the Russian forces expanding in the Lamaist area of our country, where the Dzungars lived, more and more clearly did the Russians realize that it was of great importance for them to acquaint themselves with the conditions in Tibet in order to get control of the place where Lamaists lived. So, they began with the study of Tibetan documents. In the spring of 1717, Russians discovered some Tibetan documents when they were building a fort at Yameishewo. Again in 1718, when building a fort in Ust-kamennogolsk, they discovered a lamasery, namely Abalai-Kit, from which many Tibetan documents were unearthed. G.F. Miller, an academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who entered Tibet along with the army, had the collected documents sent to Petersburg Library. In 1835, Miller asked Lama Abipengcuo, a Buriat Mongol, to translate the documents into the Mongol language, from which they were rendered into Russian by the translators of the Foreign Ministry. The “Textual Research with Explanatory Notes of the Tangutan Documents Discovered in Siberia”, sorted out and compiled by
Miller, was published in the tenth volume of Communications of the Academy of Sciences of Imperial Russia in 1747. That marked the beginning of the Russian study of Tibet.

From then on, the Russians collected Tibetan written materials in many ways. Firstly, they went to Buriat Mongols, who believed in Lamaism and lived in the Baikal Lake area, gathering information about the geography, language, politics and religion in Mongolia and Tibet, and collecting hand-copied books and block-printed ones in Mongol and Tibetan; secondly, they looked for documents among Turguts (also called Kalmucks), who kept close contact with China, also believed in Lamaism and lived in the lower reaches of the Volga; thirdly, they obtained information concerning Tibet through the General Branch of the Russian Orthodox Eastern Church Mission in Beijing. In 1825, Tsar Nicholas I dispatched Mortokhevich, a religious spy to China in the name of investigating the Russian churches. The Tsar had ordered this person to investigate the relationship between the Buriats of Russia and the Dalai Lama of Tibet, as well as to study Buddhist scriptures. At the same time, Nicholas I inveigled three lamas of Tibet into going to Moscow to probe into the Buddhist scriptures.4

From 1850s on, Russia’s lust of expanding into Tibet became much stronger. It was shown by the decision of directly sending staff to Tibet conducting reconnaissance while keeping on collecting relevant documents. In this way, a great number of Russian lamas and pilgrims went to Tibet in an endless stream, and the Expedition to Tibet, headed by Colonel Prezevalski, was the most noticeable. It went to Tibet for five times.

First exploration (1870-1873): In November, 1870, Prezevalski, only a captain at that time, set off from Kyakhta, and after overcoming a lot of difficulties he got to the Tongtian
River in Qinghai Province in January 1873. He stayed there for some time, then went to Gansu Province. He travelled through the gobi to Urga (now Ulan Bator) and returned to Kyakhta on 19th September. During this exploration, he only reached some places where the Tibetans resided but did not enter the Tibetan territory proper. However, he figured out a route from Mongolia, Xinjiang and Chaidam (Qaidam) area of Qinghai Province into the northern part of Tibet.

Second exploration (1876-1877): From Yining of Xinjiang, Prezevalski went over the Tianshan Mountains and travelled southward. By way of Lop Nur he reached Arjin Mountains (Altun Shan), which bordered Xinjiang and Qinghai. He went back in November, 1877.

Third exploration (1879-1880): Prezevalski started from Zaisan in March, 1879, crossed the Tianshan Mountains and got to Hami, then went across the desert to Dunhuang. From there, he went southward to Chaidam by way of the Qilian Mountains. In September of the same year, he set out from Zongjia, went across the Tongtian River and the pass of the Tanggula Mountains. At the pass, he cruelly killed four Tibetan herdsmen of the Yarewa Tribe, and wounded many other Tibetans. He went on toward Tibet, and the expedition was stopped by the army officers, monks and civilians in Nagchukha (namely Halawusu or the Black River — today’s Black River Area in Nagchu County) when they got to the Pengza Hill in Nagchukha, about 220 kilometres from Lhasa. The army officers assembled a mounted troop of three hundred soldiers to station there in case of any eventuality. Prezevalski refused to withdraw. The two sides were in a military confrontation from November 26 to the middle of December. The three big lamaseries in Lhasa also sent their representatives. They refused the Russians’ demands of entering Lhasa. After a chain of
frustrations, Prezevalski still played some tricks by bluffing the Tibetan officials. He claimed that they had gone through many places and had been stopped by no one but “the Tibetans” standing in their way, that reasons should be given in written form why they were not allowed to enter after having been prevented for more than 20 days, that they were not afraid because they had a strong army and that they could not wait any longer and had to enter Tibet the next day.⁶

The Tibetan people resolutely denied the Russians the admission to Lhasa by giving Prezevalski a “written message,” which explicitly pointed out that no foreigner had ever entered Tibet, and that was why the officials and monks and civilians had made an oath to prevent their entrance, and that they would rather die than give up.⁷ Prezevalski was compelled to pull down their tents and returned to Qinghai, from where he entered Urga of Mongolia by way of Gansu and got back to Kyakhta in October, 1880. Later, he wrote to Keyande, the Russian envoy to China in Peking, saying that it was beyond his description how depressed he had felt when he was on his way back home.⁸ In an article he again wrote that they had made a long, arduous journey, overcoming all the hardships and obstructions, but when the possibility of reaching the destination had turned into a belief of success, it was only made a clean sweep of, and that when thinking of all that, he could hardly resign himself to defeat.⁹

Fourth exploration (1883-1885): Prezevalski again set off from Kyakhta on October 21, 1883. When they arrived near the Zhaling Lake (Gyarling) of Qinghai Province, they killed and wounded about ten Tibetans of the Guoluo Tribe. A few days later, three hundred people of the tribe made a counterattack, which caused Prezevalski to experience “the most dangerous clash” in his investigating career. But with modern rifles the
investigating group killed thirty people or so of the Guoluo Tribe, and countless people were wounded. Thus they owed the Tibetan people a new debt of blood.10

Fifth exploration (1889-1890): Because of Prezevalski’s death before starting out, the expedition was lead by his two assistants, M. Befutsov and G. Gerum-Gezhimailo. They were active in the area from the west of the Kunlun Mountains to the east of the Tianshan Mountains and the Nanshan Mountains, and their main subject was to investigate a way into Tibet. P.K. Kozlov, a member on the expedition, led a small group of men forcing a way into the northern part of Tibet from the Kunlun Mountains. In December, 1900, Kozlov’s men burned Tibetan civilian houses, robbed the horses, killed and injured about forty Tibetans in Chamdo.11

Thanks to certain kinds of reasons, the Russians, in their several explorations, only reached the edge of Tibet without being able to enter into the Tibetan territory proper and go straight to Lhasa. However, they ascertained a route to Tibet and thus laid a foundation for sending spies to Tibet secretly later on.

It is worth-while to notice that in Prezevalski’s explorations, the Tsarist Government was the elaborate plotter and commander from beginning to end. Russia’s Army Office, Foreign Ministry, especially the Tsar himself, appropriated a huge sum of money for the “support” and protection of his explorations. The appropriations from the national treasury particularly authorized by the Tsar were respectively 6,000 roubles, 19,000 roubles, 29,000 roubles, 42,000 roubles and 48,000 roubles for each of the five explorations. All this solicitude and support made the explorer Prezevalski deeply inspired. In 1883, on the title page of his book Some Notes on the Third Journey to Central Asia, he wrote a compliment specially to the Tsar as follows:
"With the greatest gratitude, I respectfully present this book to His Majesty Alexander Nikolaevich.* By relying on his holy favour and imperial edicts, I managed to make my journey to Central Asia." Late on in 1888, the compliment he wrote on the title page of Some Notes on the Fourth Journey to Central Asia reads:

"With boundless deep thankfulness, I respectfully present this book to His Highness Nikolas Alexanderlovich,** the crown prince and successor of the throne, who is the greatest protector of my journey to Central Asia."

2. Badmayev's Intrigue

By the end of the nineteenth century, while the Tsar was commanding a chain of explorations for the admission to Tibet, Great Britain also began to quicken its steps to expand into Tibet. In 1888, the British launched a war of aggression against Tibet and forced the government of the Qing Dynasty to conclude the 1890 Convention and the subsequent regulations of 1893, which forced open the door of Tibet. When Russia saw that the British had taken the lead in aggression, it determined to catch up forthwith. Tsar Nicholas II even suggested a "Grand Plan" of "merging Tibet into Russia", so that Russia's sphere of influence might extend "from the shores of the Pacific to the heights of the Himalayas". Ukhtomskii, Russian adviser on aggression against Tibet and chief manager of the Russo-Chinese Bank, published an article Way to Lhasa, preaching that Russia must occupy Tibet. In 1904, this man published a pamphlet Random Talk on Lamaist Area, giving out the lamentation "We are too late" when he referred to the British second entry into Tibet; at the same time he claimed that so

*Referred to Alexander III.
**Referred to Nicholas II, the last Tsar.
long as Russia made efforts to control the Dalai Lama thereafter, it was still possible “to conquer and win over this Lamaist World spiritually.” Here, not only did he demand that Russia invade the Tibetan territory, but he meant to include the vast Lamaist area of Mongolia and Qinghai where the Dalai Lama exerted his influence. Peter Badmayev, another adviser, who was a Tibetan physician in the Russian court, presented on February 13, 1893 by Russian Calendar, to Tsar Alexander III an article *The Urgent Task Confronting Russia in the Far East*, in which he suggested that the outer Baikal Lake section of the Great Siberian Railway be extended southward, to run through Mongolia, the Helan Mountains and stretch straight to Lanzhou, so that it might “help to link Russia with Mongolia, Tibet, and the eastern part of Han.” He also suggested organizing secretly an anti-Qing Dynasty rebellion centre of Mongolian, Tibetan and Han residents in this area, so that once there was a rebellion, Russia could rope some “distinguished gentlemen and businessmen” in and ask them to “apply for” Russian citizenship. Thus, this area might merge into Russia without shedding blood. The Buriat Mongol Badmayev asked to be granted the right to gather several thousands of his natives and train them to act as spies and incite rebellions.

Appreciating very much of Badmayev’s suggestion, the Tsar specially appropriated a sum of 2,000,000 roubles from the state treasury as a loan for him to organize “private enterprises” — “The Badmayev Business Company” and “Business Agency in Urga”. Being the contact centres of the Russian colonialists to invade Mongolia, Gansu, Qinghai and Tibet of our country, these organizations “opened up the way for Russia to exert political influence in Tibet.”

In 1895, Badmayev established a secondary school and a professional school respectively in Petersburg and Urga to train
Buriat Mongols to be spies. He "looked for the youths who were willing to study in the Eastern Languages Department of Petersburg University after graduation, gave each of them a good scholarship of fifty roubles every month, and sent them to the east to practise for three years at the public expense, which was concluded in qualifications. Then, the youths could make further studies in the Eastern Languages Department of Petersburg for two years. After graduation, the qualified could be employed as officials of the ninth rank and be sent to the east to perform a mission." According to Tsyibikov’s recollections of the period when he was being trained at Badmayev’s school, Badmayev at the time tried every possible means to persuade him to serve as a spy, promising to give him one hundred roubles as auxiliary fund. So, Tsyibikov was lured to throw himself under Badmayev’s command and was trained in the professional school in Urga, giving up his aspiration to be a medical student. After graduation, he was sent to Petersburg University for "further training." From 1899 to 1902, in the name of the Russian Geographical Society and arranged in particulars by the Russian consul to Urga, Tsyibkov stole into Tibet disguising himself as a pilgrim.

After these specially trained Buriat Mongols entered Tibet in the capacity of lamas and pilgrims, they collected information in every possible way, and tried to claim blood ties with Tibetans in religion, and managed to establish a relationship with Tibetans. They even made efforts to approach some upper-class officials of the Tibetan ruling clique and found out their life experiences, dispositions and even hobbies, so that they could watch for their chances to buy over flunkeys for Russia and make them to incite rebellions. According to records, at the end of the nineteenth century, about one hundred and fifty to two hundred Buriat Mongols and Kalmucks (Turguts) frequent-
ly stayed in the lamaseries in Drepung, Sera, Jokhang and Tashilhunpo. Among them were the famous spies — Ngawang Dorjieff, Balanov, Tsgibikov, Ulanov, Nolzonov, Gatszonov, Tserempil, Mongomuyev, Ulbianov, Baladyin, etc.

II. Russia’s Instigation to Separate Tibet from Her Motherland

1. Dorjieff — A Big Spy in the Garb of Lama

Dorjieff (1853-1938) — His Russian name was Dorjieff and was generally called Ngawang Lozang in the historical records of our country — was a Russian Buriat Mongol. He was born in the province of Verchnyudinsk in 1853, and began to practise monkery in his early childhood. In 1873, he studied in the Drepung Monastery. In 1888, he had got the superior academic degree of Tibet Buddhism — Laranpa Geshe, namely, First Grade of Geshe. He was recommended by Drepung Monastery to be Tsenyi Khenpo and became one of the ten entourage who attended upon the Thirteenth Dalai Lama to study scriptures. Therefore, Dorjieff came to rub shoulders with the supreme officials of the Tibetan ruling circles. At that time, the British was intruding and pressing Tibet; the Tibetans were in high spirits in resisting the British aggressors, while the Qing Government was so weak and incompetent that it adopted a policy of compromise and greatly disappointed the Tibetan people by even pressing them to give in to the British. Dorjieff seized the opportunity to sow discord between Tibet and her motherland. Making good use of the convenience as an attendant, he kept on instilling the pro-Russian idea into the Dalai Lama’s mind. Above all, he boasted without restraint that Russia had a strong national power, that the Tsar sincerely believed in Buddhism,
and that the whole nation was a devout believer in Buddhism, etc. All this created in the Lama a sense of cordiality to Russia. Then, he spread the so-called legendary of “Shambala” among Tibetans everywhere, so that it could increase the Tibetan people’s fancy about Russia. Dorjieff quoted the legendary from the Buddhist Scripture of the Yellow Sect, and wrote a booklet, which told to the effect that:

About 1,300 to 2,000 years ago, the Kashmir area was mild in climate, rich in products, pleasant in scenery, and Buddhism was in vogue. To the north of the area, there was a country called “Shambala”, where the Buddha or the arhat lived, and this beautiful country was wiped out by Islam. But according to the principle of reincarnation in Buddhism, Buddhism would in time revive in this country. Moreover, a “king of Buddhist power” would come into being, who was capable to unify the whole world. The king was no other than the incarnation of Tsongkhapa, founder of the Yellow Sect.

After inventing the above-mentioned vivid story, he claimed that Russia was geographically the country “Shambala” undoubtedly, while the “king of Buddhist power” was no other than Tsar Nichola II. Dorjieff’s booklet was widely spread in Tibet and had a great influence on the sincere lamaists. It was hardly possible for the kind-hearted Tibetan people to see through Dorjieff’s vicious intentions of serving Russia for the expansion to Tibet in the name of Providence.

In order to carry out the political tasks set by the Russian Government, Dorjieff, the spy under the cloak of religion, would often travel to and fro between Russia and Tibet. He used the expenditure for activities from the Russian Intelligence Department to give dinners or send gifts to the upper circles of Tibet, and to make friends widely with the influential officials, and to win the Dalai Lama’s favourable impression and trust.
In the summer of 1894, Dorjieff worked as a private adviser and a secretary of foreign affairs for Shatra Paljor Dorje, the chief Kalon of the Tibetan Kashag. During the War of Resistance Against the British Aggression in 1904, Dorjieff had in his hands part of Tibetan financial and defensive powers for some time. However, this favourite of the Tibetan local government, who had always with him a Russian certificate of envoyship, was a secret political envoy sent to Tibet by Russia. The Dalai group knew Dorjieff's double identity and acknowledged that his "Certificate of Envoyship" was in effect. There was no denying the fact from the Russian Government that Dorjieff had a double political identity both as a high official of Tibet and as a Russian envoy. On July 8th, 1901, the Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorff told Scott, the British ambassador to Russia, that Dorjieff "at present held some post of confidence in the Dalai Lama's service ... but he still retained his original Russian nationality." During the fifteen years from 1898 to 1913, Dorjieff went to and fro between Russia and Tibet for seven times, reporting to the Russian Government and taking orders. At Dorjieff's instigation, the Dalai group of Tibet adopted a policy of "allying with Russia."

In 1898, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama despatched Dorjieff to Russia for a visit and asking the Tsarist Government for aid. By using a false certificate and pretending to be a Mongolian, Dorjieff went to Tianjin by way of India. With the help of Startsev, Russian consul to Tianjin, he managed to meet Ukhtomskii and reported to him the requests of the Dalai group of Tibet. Ukhtomskii recommended him to have an audience with Tsar Nichola II in Petersburg. The Tsar asked Tibet to put forward a formal request in written form before it could gain Russia's help. Dorjieff entrusted another Russian spy Nolzonov to return to Tibet and informed the Dalai group of the Tsar's
opinion. In 1899, the Dalai group sent Nolzonov to Russia to notify Dorjieff to return to Tibet immediately for the discussion of sending a diplomatic mission to Russia for a formal visit. In December of the same year, Dorjieff went back to Lhasa.

2. The Incident of Tibetan Mission to Russia

In September, 1900, the Dalai again sent Dorjieff to Russia, with the general secretary Drunyig Chenmo as entourage. They brought with them the Dalai’s autographic letter to Nicholas II, in which he called the Tsar “Emperor of the protector of Buddhism” and requested Russia to help Tibet. The mission went past Calcutta, Nagasaki, Vladivostok, Khalarovsk, Sretensk and arrived in Petersburg. They first paid a visit to the Foreign Minister Lamsdorff, pleading with him for the permission to call on the Tsar. On October 13th, 1900, Nicholas II interviewed Dorjieff at the “Palais de Liyadia” in Yalta. The Tsar accepted the Dalai’s letter, expressing his willingness to establish contact with Tibet and to exchange information, and promising to give Tibet help and protection. At the same time, Dorjieff interviewed quite a few ministers of the Tsarist Russia in the name of a Tibetan representative, and conducted sinister schemes and intrigues. In January 1901, Dorjieff returned to Lhasa.

In April 1901, Dorjieff was sent by the Dalai to Russia for a visit as a special envoy, leading a Tibetan Mission consisting of eight Kashag officials. The Mission started from Lhasa, went through Nepal, Calcutta, Bombay and reached Colombo; then with the help of the Russian Consul to Colombo, they passed Singapore, Peking, Chita, Siberia and got to Outer Caspian Sea. They arrived in Odessa on June 25. On that very day, Odesskia Novosti printed an article concerning the Mission, and disclosed that “the Mission had come with diplomatic instructions of
importance. "The chief object of the Extraordinary Mission is a rapprochement and the strengthening of good relations with Russia.... At the same time, they would establish in St. Petersburg a permanent Tibetan Mission for the maintainance of good relations with Russia." On July 1st, the Mission arrived in Petersburg.

Nicholas II interviewed the Mission at the Petersburg Palace on July 6th. Dorjieff and his followers subserviently "knelt down before the Russian ruler, presenting the Dalai’s ‘letter of credence’, and presenting to the Queen Mother ten small cases of gold dust and several white Tibetan scarfs (namely hadas)." The so-called "letter of credence" was actually the Dalai’s autographic letter to the Tsar. After accepting the gifts, the Tsar in return bestowed on the Mission generous gifts “including firearms and ammunition.” Nicholas II reassured all the members of the Mission by promising to help Tibet and hoping Tibet to establish a steadfast “friendly relationship” with Russia. Furthermore, the Tsar wrote a letter back laying stress on Russia’s promise that it would try its best to help Tibet. During their stay in Russia, the Dorjieff Mission interviewed respectively some of the influential ministers such as Lamsdorff and Witte. Dorjieff presented to Lamsdorff an autographic letter from the Dalai Lama and an article of his own — Memorandum on Lhasa and Its Diplomatic Position — which emphatically stated "how important it is for Tibet to ally with Russia in order to frustrate the British intrigue." Moreover, Dorjieff put forward a proposal to Lamsdorff that a Tibetan Resident Representative Office be set up in Petersburg. Finally, the Mission and the Russian Government reached a secret agreement, in which both sides agreed to send resident representatives to Petersburg and Lhasa. The members of the mission Khenchung and Jiasang returned to Tibet first, with Nicholas
II’s return letter to the Dalai.

Immediately the Russian mouthpieces cheered in unison to the farce of the Tibetan-Russian “goodwill.” Those eulogists for the colonial policy of the Tsar said with ulterior motives that though Tibet was under the protection of China at present, yet the protection had never been stated explicitly, and added that the Dalai group’s goodwill towards Russia must be the most reasonable step because Russia was the sole power who was capable of smashing the British intrigue. In short, we can see, from a chain of activities and remarks about the so-called Tibeto-Russian goodwill, that Russia’s ambition to annex Tibetan area had been all too clear.

Owing to the rather grand scale of this mission and the Tsarist government’s breaking a rule to give a preferential and polite reception after its arriving and its being actively propagated by the media, the Tibetan Mission caused a great disturbance. Hu Weide, Chinese Counsellor to Russia, was very much shocked at the news of the Tibetan Mission’s acts of treason. He immediately reported it to the Qing Government and asked for counter measures on the very day when the Mission was granted an interview by the Tsar. At the same time, he made a statement to Russia that Tibet was a part of the Chinese territory and it was illegal for anyone to conduct activities abroad on his own authority without the permission of the Chinese Government. In addition, Hu Weide asked to see Dorjieff, but Dorjieff hid here and there to avoid seeing him. Hu Weide had to take the matter with the Russian Foreign Office directly, insisting on seeing the man. The Russian diplomatic officials pretended to be amazed and tried to explain things away — “There are 6,000,000 Russians who believe in Buddhism, so the Dalai Lama’s action is specially for religion and has nothing to do with politics. This is the same as a
religious Pontiff sending an envoy, while the envoy retains Russian nationality, and is director of the Russian Geographical Society.” — And they requested China not to pester him. However, they probably felt that it was no use making Dorjieff hide himself all the time, so they had to let him reappear. When Dorjieff was brought before Hu Weide, he intentionally wore Western clothes and claimed to be a Russian, which indicated that he was not restricted by the Chinese law. Hu Weide told him to explain why he had led the Tibetan Mission to visit Russia and his answer was the same as the Russian officials’. Speaking evasively, he seemed to have been instructed by someone. Out of a sense of justice, Hu Weide sternly refuted Dorjieff’s nonsense, and pointed out that “As for Tibetan affairs, the Resident Minister in Tibet should be asked to report to the court and foreign affairs should be managed by the court.” With a guilty conscience and frightened by Hu Weide’s powerful refutation, Dorjieff had to play a yes-man; but when it was mentioned that he had presented himself before the Tsar, he did his best to excuse himself by saying, “I was led to see the Tsar by Wuke, Prince Ukhtomskii, three years ago. Last year I saw the Tsar again. But the two visits were both private.” Owing to Russia’s harbour, Dorjieff escaped the punishment he deserved. He returned to Lhasa in January, 1902.

Not long after that, the Russian Government sent two caravans to Tibet. One of them with two hundred camelloads of arms and ammunition was put in charge of A. N. Orlov, officer of the Russian Staff Office. It pretended to be a scientific expedition and marched to Lhasa by way of Urga, Qaidam (Chaidam) of Qinghai and over the Tanggula Mountains. The second one was entrusted to Tserempil, with fifty-five horses and two hundred yaks, laden with rifles and ammunition, and his route lay through Toson, Ngoring and the source of the
Yellow River to Lhasa.29 No doubt, this was the direct result of Dorjieff’s mission in Russia.

3. Intensification of Contention in Tibet Between Great Britain and Russia

The British imperialists were greatly alarmed at the fact that Tsar Nicholas II was on intimate terms with the Dalai Lama. They were afraid that the Russian intrigue in Tibet might be successful. One of the British imperialists Younghusband wrote:

“If we still don’t care about it at all, not protesting and letting the Russians establish their influence in Tibet at their will, then all the Tibetan neighbouring countries subordinate to Britain will regard Russia as the real powerful country in Asia, and also a respectable one.”30 If things happened this way, the British hegemony in Asia would be unsteady. So on July 3, 1901, Britain brought Russia to account regarding the Dorjieff Mission. The Russian Government denied that the Dorjieff Mission had anything to do with politics while stepping up their conspiratorial activities in Tibet.31 Lamsdorff claimed, “He happened to come to Russia, only to raise a religious fund from Russian Buddhists.... The Russian Geographical Society was very much interested in his visit. Although some other Tibetans came to Russia with him, it was of no official character.”32

After the Tsar met Dorjieff Mission on July 6, Scott went to see Lamsdorff on July 8, asking again about the nature of the Mission and the details of the interview. A Russian minister repeated what had been said before, and added:

“The principal member of the present Mission, Hambo Akhvar Dorgiew, was a member of the Russian Geographical Society, and at present held some post of confidence in the Dalai Lama’s service, but His Excellency believed that he still retained his original Russian nationality. He had brought Count...
Lamsdorff an autographic letter from the Dalai Lama.” Even though Russia would not breathe a word about the inside information of the Tibetan Mission, the British Government was already sure that Russia had been colluding with Tibet, thinking that the Dalai Lama tried to get protection from Russia and the latter regarded Tibet as its anti-British base. However, Britain was then busily at war with the Boers in South Africa, so it dared not adopt violent antagonistic measures for the time being. On July 25, the British Government stated to Russia that it would not allow any activities possible to change or disturb Tibetan current situation.

In 1902, Dorjieff paid another visit to Russia. When he showed himself before the Tsar, he presented an autographic letter from the Dalai Lama and a report concerning Tibet’s current political situation that was written by himself. Dorjieff told the Tsar:

“The Tibetans placed earnest hopes on Russia, the protector of the eastern religion. They ardently hope that the White Tsar would help them to resist the enemy.”

Dorjieff went to and fro between the Foreign Office and the Headquarters of General Army Staff, “trying to obtain support from influential persons.” He even suggested that a “Russo-Tibet Agreement” be concluded, and submitted a draft of the agreement to Russia. This suggestion “aroused the interest of the Tsar” and attracted Lamsdorff’s attention. The Russian Government held a special meeting to discuss the draft, but came to the conclusion that Russia might intensify the conflict with the British without getting any practical benefits. So, it rejected Dorjieff’s suggestion. In the winter of 1903, Dorjieff returned to Lhasa.

Even though the Russo-Tibet Agreement miscarried, the relevant information was made public by the sensitive press
circles. The agreement with twelve articles all together was first published in China Times (July 18, 1902). Thereafter, many Chinese and foreign newspapers and magazines lost no time in reprinting it, but the contents were a little different. An Indian by the name of Das said in his book that the agreement had four articles: 36

Article I

Since Tibet is located between Central Asia and Siberia, both China and Russia have the responsibilities of maintaining its peace. If something unforeseen happens, China and Russia should exchange notes and both despatch troops, the former for the sake of safeguarding its territorial integrity and the latter for the sake of its border defense.

Article II

If a third country harasses Tibet, both China and Russia are responsible to suppress the disturbance.

Article III

The Russian Catholicism and Lamaism will grant Tibetans freedom of belief, but any other religion is absolutely prohibited.

Article IV

Both China and Russia should help Tibet to establish an internally independent government of its own. Russia takes the job of rearranging and training Tibetan army troops, while China plays the role of developing the Tibetan economy. 37

Russia had certainly considered to conclude the Russo-Tibet Agreement, so the hearsay concerning the agreement was not a
fantastic talk. But it was very difficult to figure out what the exact content really was. At the same time, it was a “Russo-Tibet Agreement”, not a “Sino-Russia Secret Treaty Concerning Tibet” that Russia and Dorjieff had discussed to conclude. Because the news about the agreement did not seem true enough, the press circles were half in belief and half in doubt. The French newspaper *Journal de France* once pointed out that the agreement might well be fabricated by the Japanese or someone sent to Japan by the Indian Governor Curzon so as to befuddle the world opinion and create disturbances.\(^{38}\)

After the secret agreement was made public, it led to a negotiation between Britain, Russia and China. On August 2, 1902, Sir E. Satow, British Envoy to China, reported to the British Government the relevant information concerning the agreement.\(^ {39}\) On August 5, he sent back a special dispatch, in which the contents of the Tibetan secret agreement were copied. At the same time, he claimed that he had no reason to believe such an agreement could have been signed.\(^ {40}\) Lansdowne sent a telegram to E. Satow, ordering him to issue a warning to the Chinese Government.\(^ {41}\) Meanwhile, Hardinge, British Envoy to Russia lodged a protest to Russia in October. But both China and Russia denied any performances to change the status quo of Tibet. Russia even recriminated Britain, censuring it for planning to build a railway to Lhasa.\(^ {42}\) The British Foreign Office warned Russia: “If you send a mission or an expedition, we should have to do the same, but in greater strength.”\(^ {43}\) The Russian answer was: “we could not remain indifferent to any serious disturbance of the status quo in that country.”\(^ {44}\) Thus, due to the intrigue of the Russian spy Dorjieff, Britain and Russia were at daggers drawn with each other in respect to the Tibetan problem. The current situation of Tibet became much tense with each passing day.
Dorjieff lived in Tibet for a long period of time, stopping at nothing in committing all kinds of evil. He returned to Russia after the October Revolution, and played the role of Pandita Khenpo Lama in Irkutsk. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, he played the same old trick by spreading his “Shambala” fallacy among the Buriat Buddhists. This time, however, he regarded far-fetchedly “Shambala” as Japan and was engaged in anti-China and anti-Communism activities. He betrayed his motherland and sought refuge with a new master. In 1937, he was arrested by the Government of the Soviet Union because he acted as a Japanese agent. In 1938, he died in Ulan-Ude Prison.

NOTES

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10. From Prezevalski’s third report on his exploration, p. 20.
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26, 27. Odesskia Novesti, June 25 and July, 1901.
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38. “Comment on Britain and Russia in Tibet” from Foreign Department News, No. 200, p. 16.
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Chapter IV

The War of Aggression Against Tibet by Britain in 1904

I. The Brewing of the War of Aggression Against Tibet

1. The Rise of Border Disputes

The policy of the British Government was to further expand its force into Tibet, and the first step of its aggression was to provoke new border disputes between Tibet and India.

The first article of the Tibet-India Treaty in 1890 stipulated that the boundary line between Tibet and India was the watershed of the Teesta River. The wording was rather ambiguous. When signing the Treaty, the Chinese representative Sheng Tai thought that the article was not contradictory to the Ebo Line (i.e. the Line from Najin to Taila, Luonakela, Giagong and Dongjiela), as the line set up in the 59th year of Qianlong’s reign, was just near the watershed of the mountain. But the British Government demanded to delimit a new boundary line just in the area of Sibubuna, which lay north of the Ebo Line. Thus the border disputes arose.

In September 1894, Elgin, the Viceroy of India, delivered a note to Kui Huan, the Imperial Resident in Tibet, censuring the Tibetan troops for violating the Treaty by crossing the boundary of Sikkim and stationing in Giagong Area. He demanded that officials be sent to survey the border and delimit the boundary line.1 This accusation of Britain was an unwarranted
one. In fact, the original boundary between Tibet and Sikkim was the Ebo Line, on which the Giagong sentry post was set up. The Tibetan troops had guarded the post for a long period. The boundary had never been crossed. However, Kui Huan yielded to the pressure of the Viceroy of India. He agreed to send officials (Li Dengshan, a Chinese major, and Shilong Tobgyal, dapon of Ü) to survey the border jointly with Claude White, the British commissioner. This compromise of Kui Huan met with violent objection of the Kashag. Not only did they refuse to send representatives but also they issued an order to the Tibetans, prohibiting them from providing any means of traffic, so as to make it impossible for the Chinese officials to get to the border region. Kui Huan was obliged to inform the British side of putting off surveying the boundary. But the British side ignored the demand of the Chinese side. They decided to delimit the boundary unilaterally. In June 1895, White piled up stones and erected boundary markers presumptuously in the area of Dzaleb-la, Donchukla, and Dokala. Hearing this, the Tibetans were furiously indignant. They destroyed the illegal boundary markers at one stroke. The Viceroy of India delivered a note to the Imperial Resident in Tibet, calling him to account. Kui Huan yielded to the British side again, promising “to find out those who stole the boundary markers and to punish them severely.” However, he felt it rather knotty when facing the indignant Tibetans. So he had to propose to the British side that the survey of the boundary be deferred. “Five years later”, he suggested, “when it is time to draw a new treaty, proper measures may be adopted through negotiation.\(^2\)

Between August and September, 1898, Wen Hai, the new Imperial Resident in Tibet, sent Li Yusen, Commissioner of Frontier Affairs, Dapon Phuntsok Wangdu of Ü, Dronyer
Tenzin Wangpo, and Chanzodpa Badu of Tsang, to survey the old Ebo Line in the area of Khamba Dzong and Giagong. After the survey, Li Yusen and his fellows reported:

"The most proper way is to delimit the line according to the old Ebo Line. No other ways should be adopted, or it will effect things adversely. Only in so doing, the frontier affairs will be helped a lot".3

According to the report, Wen Hai delivered a note to the Viceroy of India, pointing out:

"This time I myself have sent Chinese officials to survey the boundary with the Tibetan officials. As reported, the boundary line was set up according to the old Ebo Line. There has been no intruding into the Drenjong territory. So the boundary being surveyed now is the one set in the former treaty. However, the former wording of ‘watershed’ is somewhat ambiguous. It will easily lead to disputes. This time the officials have been sent there to survey it thoroughly, we should note that there has not been anything in violation of the treaty. Nor do we want to change the boundary."4

Wen Hai’s assertion of delimiting the boundary line according to the old Ebo line was so reasonable and well-grounded that the British side was unable to refute. Even Younghusband was obliged to admit:

"It is not only unwise but also unfair for the British side to neglect this demand of the Tibetans."5

However, the British side still demanded that the trade mart be moved from Yadong to Rinchen Gang before they promised to delimit the boundary line according to the old Ebo Line. When Wen Hai consented to this demand, the British side raised a further demand of removing the trade mart to Pali. Such a fickle and insatiable attitude greatly enraged the Tibetans. The Dalai stated firmly:
“Originally the Tibetans are not willing to set up any trade mart. If you (the British) find any inconvenience, you can remove the mart to any place outside the boundary. But it’s utterly impossible for you to remove it further into our territory. And what’s more, the British officials, citizens and tax collectors are not allowed to come across the Yadong Pass. This is an agreement already reached, not to be altered. As to the frontier affairs, the Tibetan administration is within the old Ebo Line. Please demarcate the boundary according to this line. It allows of no alteration.”

Since the British side had no sincerity to settle the problem of boundary demarcation, it was thus postponed.

2. The Bankruptcy of the Plot of “Direct Contact”

Through the negotiations of the boundary disputes, the British side realized that the furious anti-Britain feeling of the Tibetans was the greatest obstacle to its expansion. The only way to solve the problem was to leave aside the Chinese Government and to contact the Tibetan authorities directly. On June 2, 1899, Hamilton informed Curzon, the Viceroy of India, that according to the Prime Minister Salisbury’s thinking, under the present circumstances, they should seek ways to contact directly with the Tibetan authorities so as to force them to open Pali as a trade city. In October, Curzon reported to the British Government that he would blaze the way for direct contact with the Dalai Lama. On December 8, Hamilton, on behalf of the British Government, approved Curzon’s measures of aiming at establishing direct contact with the Tibetan authorities.

The purpose of the so-called “direct contact” was to deny the Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and to split Tibet off from China. An Englishman named Parr, then the Commissioner of
Customs in Yadong, exposed the nature of "direct contact" to An Cheng, Assistant Resident Official in Tibet:

“1) Seeing that the Chinese officials have so little real power to administer Tibet, the Indian Government wants to conclude new treaties with the Tibetan officials in power. Then the Chinese officials will have no right to administer Tibet. 2) If the Tibetan Government does not send representatives to negotiate with them, they will seize the opportunity to enter Tibet and rule it instead of the Chinese officials.”

Evidently, the purpose of “direct contact” of Britain was to establish its power to rule Tibet.

In December, 1899, Curzon sent Ugyen Kachi, the Bhutanese representative to Darjeeling, to deliver a letter to the Dalai Lama. The letter read:

“You should send representatives here. The British Government will reach a good understanding with you, which will guarantee Tibet to resist any aggression from China and Russia.”

However, the Dalai refused to accept the letter and it was returned to Curzon unopened.

In August, 1900, Curzon wrote his second letter to the Dalai. Captain Kannion, the Vice Administrator of Kashmir, sent the letter to the Dalai in care of the gyapon (a battalion commander) of Gartok. As Curzon expressed in the letter, the British Government hoped that the Tibetan side would have confidence in Britain’s goodwill and free itself from the aggression from others. He again suggested to the Dalai that he should send representatives to negotiate directly with the British side, so as to institute the commercial and political measures of mutual benefit between India and Tibet. Six months later, the gyapon of Gartok returned the letter to Kennion, telling him that he did not dare to send the letter...
to Lhasa, as there was a regulation forbidding foreigners to intrude into Tibet.\textsuperscript{10}

In June 1901, Curzon wrote his third letter to the Dalai. At this juncture, Ugyen Kachi was going to buy elephants for the Dalai. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Curzon asked him to carry the letter to Lhasa and hand it to the Dalai personally. He put forward two suggestions in the letter. One was about the boundary problem. He promised to demarcate the boundary line between Tibet and Sikkim according to the old Ebo Line. Secondly, he demanded Pali be opened as a trade city. But he threatened the Dalai at the end of the letter, saying that if the suggestions were still grossly neglected, the British Government would reserve the right and take the measures which they thought necessary.\textsuperscript{11} However the Dalai refused to accept his letter for the third time. And he stated that he could not correspond to any foreign governments without consulting the Tibetan Kashag and the Imperial Resident in Tibet.\textsuperscript{12} In August 1901, Curzon’s letter was once again brought back to Darjeeling by Ugyen Kachi. Thus the British plot of “direct contact” fell through shamefully.

\textbf{3. The Decision on the Policy of Armed Aggression Against Tibet}

For three times had Curzon written personally to Dalai, but the three letters were all returned unopened. It made him feel rather embarrassed and annoyed. So, in his report to the British Government on June 8, 1903, he put forward formally the policy of armed aggression against Tibet. He claimed that China had no sovereignty over Tibet, even the “suzerainty” was a kind of “fabrication” and “affectation”. “The two Chinese Residents in Tibet were not Governors of Tibet, but ambassadors”. Therefore, Curzon hoped that a British mission would be sent
to Lhasa without asking permission from China or getting China’s passports. And if the plan was reached as a final decision, it should be carried out in spite of whatever protests it might give rise to. After arriving in Lhasa, the mission should force the Tibetan officials to negotiate directly. “The highest peak for the negotiation to reach should be the accrediting of British resident consuls or diplomatic representatives to Lhasa.” Curzon thought it feasible to launch an armed intrusion, because the military strength of Tibet was not worth mentioning. There was no need to imagine that there would be a strenuous resistance.

The bourgeoisie of Britain had a strong desire to expand into Tibet. They kept on advocating sending troops to “occupy Chumbi” and “drive straight on to Lhasa” in official documents, newspapers and magazines. Therefore, when Curzon’s plan of armed invasion against Tibet was under debate in the Parliament, it won a unanimously warm appreciation from the bourgeois politicians. Those people thought that even if the mission might eventually force them to declare a system of protection and the stationing of troops in Lhasa, it was still necessary to do it.

Hamilton agreed to Curzon’s plan of armed invasion against Tibet, but viewing from the overall situation concerning the policy of invading China, he thought it was still necessary then for them to acknowledge that Tibet was one of China’s provinces. So the march into Lhasa might be regarded as an attack on the integrity of the Chinese Empire. Therefore it was necessary to be cautious. He also held that the conditions were not yet ripe for invasion. Seeing that Russia certainly harbored great ambitions for Tibet, the armed invasion of Tibet might result in the interference from Russia. It would make the problem more complicated. So, he pointed out:
“The British Government holds that the wise practice is to seize the chance to press Russia to issue a clear statement on its policy and to warn them that as a response to their action, we are ready to take stronger measures than those for keeping balance. Only after the British Government receives the statement from the Russian Government, can they decide more properly the scope of negotiation with China and the steps to protect India against the danger caused by foreign influence in Tibet.”\textsuperscript{16}

In order to urge the Russian Government to make a statement of its stand to the problem of Tibetan affairs as soon as possible, Lansdowne, the British Foreign Minister, made many appointments to hold talks with Benckendorf, the Russian ambassador. After repeated talks, the Russian side was forced to make concessions. On April 8, Count Benckendorf, on behalf of the Russian Government, made the following statement:

“Russia is still unwilling to interfere in the Tibetan affairs, because the policy of Russia is that of noninterference in Tibet in any case.” He also stated that Russia acknowledged “the commercial convenience in Tibet enjoyed by Britain”.\textsuperscript{17}

After obtaining the diplomatic guarantee from Russia, the British Government telegraphed Curzon on April 14, asking him what course of action he would take to invade Tibet. On the 16th, Curzon suggested that an armed mission be sent into Tibet to hold negotiations in Khamba Dzong so as to stir up troubles. On this excuse, they could push deep and drive on to Lhasa, so as to make the Tibetan authorities surrender. On May 28, the British Government approved Curzon’s plan for invading Tibet.

Curzon started to prepare for invading Tibet in full swing. First, he greatly increased the military expenditure of India. From 1902 to 1903, the military expenditure of India accounted
for 57% of the total military budget of the British Empire. And from 1903 to 1904, it increased to 67%. That was a rather alarming figure. The war between Britain and Boer had no sooner finished in 1902 than Britain transferred to India General Kitchner, the Commander-in-chief of the British army in South Africa, who reorganized and expanded the military forces vigorously to raise the fighting capacity. The British-Indian Government also disposed large numbers of troops on the border between Tibet and Sikkim. In the area of Natang, they "stationed troops, transported grains and hastened to build Western-style houses." And in the border region, they sped up to build a highway for military use from Sikkim to the Pass of Dzaleb-la.

The British troops sharpened their swords to get prepared for the invasion. The Qing Government seemed conscious of it to some extent. On April 26, 1903, Yu Gang, the Imperial Resident in Tibet, reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "According to the secret report of the commissioners, in Sikkim, they constructed forts, brought armaments, built roads within a set time, and the project was quite urgent. There were British soldiers who went to Darjeeling by train." But what was the use of knowing about the enemy's situation? Facing the critical situation in the Southwest border area, the weak and overcautious Qing Government felt quite helpless. They could only let things take their own course. So, after Britain had disposed his troops properly, they started the armed invasion of Tibet as planned.

4. Talks Held in Khamba Dzong
   Curzon provoked the border dispute again. He sent troops to Khamba Dzong on the pretext of holding talks.
   Early on June 26, 1902, Claude White, the Political Officer
of Sikkim, led 150 British soldiers to intrude into the Giagong Area as ordered. They drove off both the Tibetan officials and the ordinary people, and destroyed the sentry posts of the Tibetan army. Arbitrarily, they erected boundary markers in the area of Mount Nanlibubuna in Khamba Dzong. They surveyed topography, drew maps, took photographs, collected specimens, "built up heaps of stones and erected their flags in 21 places."23 White stayed in Tibet for over two months. He made a long trip around the border region and then returned to India.

His incursion attained at least two goals. Firstly, it provoked the border dispute which attracted the attention of the Chinese Resident in Tibet and the Tibetan people to the Giagong Area so as to make them slacken the defense of the Pass of Dzaleb-la. Secondly, the British troops seized this opportunity to make a reconnaissance march in the mountainous border region. They gathered lots of meteorological and geographical materials to be referred to in case of any military actions. In his Report on the Inspection Tour of the Border Region between Tibet and Sikkim,24 White made a detailed analysis of every strategically important pass in the border region of Tibet and pointed out that special attention should be paid to the peculiar conditions such as the hard travel and the thin air when military actions were to be taken on the Tibetan Plateau with an elevation of 15-20 thousand feet. He suggested that the British army improve the outfit for keeping out the cold, that the troops march with packs as light as possible and that impediments and supplies be carried by yaks instead of by people or by vehicles. The British-Indian Government thought all these suggestions quite precious and useful and adopted them during the armed intrusion.

The intrusion of the British army shocked Yu Gang, the Imperial Resident in Tibet. He hastened to send He Guangxie,
an official of the third rank, to the border region to meet the British commissioners to discuss possible ways to solve the problem. The Dalai sent Tibetan officials to negotiate, too. In Beijing, the Qing Government addressed a note to Satow, the British minister to China, on August 22, demanding that "both sides negotiate with sincerity and the British side stop the advance of troops by all means." But Satow claimed that the Giagong Area belonged to Sikkim and he falsely accused the Tibetans of intruding into it. At the same time, he pretended to be polite and compliant, saying that everything would be discussed properly and all the misunderstanding over the years would be dispelled. But after the arrival of He Guangxie, the Chinese representative for negotiation, in the border region in August, White found excuses to refuse holding talks. In October, Yu Gang once again asked White to come to the border and talk with He Guangxie. However, He Guangxie kept waiting in the border region for half a year without seeing White make his appearance.

Not until early in June, 1903, did the British Government suddenly deliver a note to the Chinese Government, deciding unilaterally to hold talks in Khamba Dzong on July 7. Then the Viceroy of India sent a trade mission headed by Younghusband and White, leading 200 soldiers to break into Khamba Dzong. They drove out the defending soldiers with sticks and whips, destroyed the Tibetan sentry posts, forcibly occupied the landed estate of the inhabitants for their own camping, plundered oxen and sheep from the Tibetans and forced them to offer provisions. All these barbarous acts of aggression roused great indignation of both the monks and the laymen of Tibet.

Early at the end of 1902, the Qing Government appointed You Tai, Sheng Tai's brother, as the Resident in Tibet in place of Yu Gang. After the appointment You Tai separately paid
official visits to Townley, the British minister to China, and Hart, the Chief Commissioner of Customs. He expressed "his heartfelt hope to keep the best relations with the Indian Government." He also said: "The Tibetans are as ignorant as the blind. When I get there, I am to do my utmost to enlighten them and widen their horizon." 

Before You Tai arrived at his post, the officials from China and Britain met in Khamba Dzong on July 22, 1903. At first, He Guangxie, the Chinese representative, pointed out that it was wrong for the British representatives to lead the troops to cross the boundary by force. He requested that the British troops withdraw from the boundary before the start of the negotiation. Younghusband tried by all means to argue sophisticatedly, claiming: "The former treaties concerning the boundary demarcation were all concluded in British territory. However, the Tibetans pretended not to know it. This time we want to negotiate and conclude treaties in Tibetan territory so as to leave no excuse. As for the 200 soldiers, they are escorts, not to be used in fighting. In addition, their crossing the boundary doesn't mean the breaking of good terms." Many talks having been held. Younghusband still refused to withdraw his troops. He made the excuse that he entered Tibet as ordered, that the change of location for negotiation should be reported to the Viceroy of India, asking him for instructions, and that the negotiation could be reopened only after receiving the instructions and the qualifications of the Tibetan representatives be confirmed. Then Younghusband took out two notes, one in English to the representatives of the Qing Government and the other in Tibetan to the Tibetan representatives. He deliberately read out the note in Tibetan to the Tibetan representatives, indicating that he was directly negotiating with them, thus showing slight and despite to the representatives of the Qing
Government. Younghusband claimed to the Tibetans: “The Viceroy of India does not want to occupy an inch of your territory. This time we negotiate to conclude a new treaty. If the Tibetan side means to be on good terms with us and gives us real benefits in trade, the area near Giagong will be conceded to Tibet with due respect, so as to be on good terms with each other.”

Obviously, the British side, following its original policy, inveigled the Tibetans into agreeing to open Pali as a trade city.

The Tibetans firmly demanded that Younghusband’s mission and all his troops withdraw to the outside of the boundary line of Giagong. Otherwise they would refuse to hold talks. At the end of July, He Guangxie proposed to Younghusband that the talks be held in Yadong, also within the Tibetan territory, just in agreement with the demand of the British side, i.e., the talks be held within the Tibetan territory. But Younghusband refused the proposal.

Younghusband’s mission went on provoking dispute in Khamba Dzong. In July, two British spies sneaking into Tibet were captured. This served the pretext on which Younghusband commanded his troops to plunder the Tibetans of more than 200 heads of oxen and sheep near Khamba Dzong. And he demanded unreasonably that the Tibetan troops stationing in Giagong, Zuolama and Luonake withdraw. On September 2, Younghusband asked the Viceroy of India for 100 more soldiers to reinforce the troops which had entered Tibet, deliberately to make the situation worse.

Now Curzon thought the preparations for the armed invasion against Tibet were completed. There was no longer any necessity to go on with the play of Khamba Dzong talks. Therefore, on September 10, he delivered a note to Yu Gang, claiming that He Guangxie and Parr were “rather low in rank,”
and that the Tibetan officials Drungyig Lozang Trinley, Dapon Wangchu Gyalpo and others were eccentric and failed to keep appointments repeatedly. He demanded that other officials of higher ranks be sent to the Khamba Dzong talks. He also claimed that if there was any delay, then, on account of the coldness in Khamba Dzong, the British troops would have to choose other places in Tibet to pass the winter.\footnote{32} Satow, the British minister to China, also played the trick of putting the blame on his victim. At the end of September, he delivered a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to accuse the Tibetans of being reluctant to negotiate and release the two English men captured, and of gathering troops to prepare for fighting.\footnote{33} Indiscriminately and instantly, the Qing Government delivered a despatch to Yu Gang, ordering him to tell the Tibetan officials to release the two Englishmen at once, warn them of the consequences, and hasten them to talk with the British side in Khamba Dzong, in fear that opportunity might be lost and thus leading to great trouble. The Qing Government also urged You Tai, the newly-appointed Resident in Tibet, “to rush there at double speed and to make arrangements quickly and properly.”\footnote{34}

Yu Gang wrote a letter to Curzon on October 17. Just as demanded by the British side, he dispatched Zhao Yu, a brigade commander, to negotiate in Khamba Dzong. While Yu Gang hoped that the British army would not shift their campsite so as to avoid conflicts, Curzon played a joke on him. In his letter in reply dated November 8, Curzon said that the rank of the new commissioner Zhao Yu was even lower than that of He Guangxie, and that the British side had no alternative but to transfer the troops to a more suitable place where negotiations could be held.\footnote{35}
II. The Process of the War of Aggression Against Tibet

1. The British Troops Pushing Deep into Tibet

On October 1, 1903, Hamilton telegraphed Curzon, telling him that the British Government had sanctioned his proposed plan of invading Chumbi and pushing deep to Gyantse, demanding him to put forward a detailed plan of invasion. Curzon immediately telegraphed Younghusband, asking him to come to Simla to plot for invasion. On October 26, Curzon reported to the British Government that they had got ready for the invasion, "for the following reasons, an advance to Tibet seemed indispensable: (1) Though Dalai Lama had agreed to the Commissioners meeting at Khamba Dzong, the Tibetan delegates had refused to hold any communication with the British Commissioner; (2) no Chinese delegates of suitable rank had as yet been sent; (3) the procrastination of the Chinese Government; (4) the warlike preparations of the Tibetans; (5) the arrest and imprisonment of two British subjects; (6) the complete failure of the policy pursued for twenty-five years, the only result of which was that the Tibetans mistook our patience for weakness, and despised our strength. They recommended, therefore, the advance should extend to Gyantse, and should not be confined to the Chumbi Valley."36

On November 6, Hamilton telegraphed Curzon announcing that the advance of the mission to Gyantse had been sanctioned. He pointed out at the same time: "This step should be taken purely for the purpose of seeking a satisfactory solution; it should not be allowed to lead to occupation, or any form of permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs; and the mission should withdraw as soon as the reparation is obtained."37

At the end of November, the Indian Government organized
a composite brigade to invade Tibet. MacDonald was appointed
the commander. The brigade was at the command of Younghusband’s mission for all its actions. The composite brigade con-
sisted of 2,000 infantrymen (3 battalions) and 100 cavalrymen,
as well as a team of engineers, a battery of artillery, a company
of machine guns, field hospitals, the rear-service personnel and
so on. There were about 10,000 men in total.38

On December 5, the troops started out from Darjeeling and
on the 10th arrived at Longtu. They made a surprise attack on
the Pass of Dzaleb-la. At that time, part of the British troops
stayed in Khamba Dzong Area, inducing the Tibetan troops to
intercept them, so as to neglect their defense at Dzaleb-la. As a
result, Younghusband’s army broke through this strategic pass
without shooting a bullet. On the 13th, the British troops
occupied Rinchen Gang. On the 14th, they drove to Chumbi
Valley. A war correspondent of the Thames wrote triumphantly
that the British occupation of Chumbi was a great surprise to
the Tibetans.39 Indeed, not only were the Tibetans caught
unprepared, but also the officials of the Qing Government were
taken by surprise. During November, the negotiation in
Khamba Dzong came to a deadlock. The Qing Government still
begged Britain “not to let Younghusband’s mission march
further into Tibet before You Tai, the newly appointed Resident
in Tibet, arrived in Lhasa.” “When You Tai arrived there,
friendly negotiations were due to be held immediately”.40 But
the British Government ignored it. Lansdowne claimed that it
was impossible for the British Government to stop the measures
sanctioned”.41 Meanwhile, on the march into Tibet, Younghus-
band repeatedly threatened the Tibetans with war, claiming: “If
the march of the mission meets with any hindrance, General
MacDonald will clear the way with military force. If there is no
hindrance, then MacDonald will not attack the Tibetans. We
are ready to fight at any moment when the war is imposed on us."42

After Younghusband occupied Chumbi, part of the mission and the troops staying in Khamba Dzong came over to meet them there. On December 21, the British army occupied Pali. On January 4, 1904, they occupied Tuna. So within 20 days from December 1903 to January 4, 1904, the British army pushed deep, covering one-fifth of the distance to Lhasa.

2. The Heroic Resistance of the Tibetans Against Aggression

Facing the savage invasion of the British army, the Tibetans immediately went into action to resist the enemy and defend their homeland.

Early in June 1903, the Kashag Government issued an official notice of conscription, pointing out: "The commissioners from China and Britain are meeting on the border (i.e. in Khamba Dzong). Though they are negotiating, it is difficult for the two sides to listen to each other's opinion peacefully. If the British side still insists on its unreasonable demands, we have no alternative but to give our lives for Buddhism — the basis of peace and happiness of the world. We should never have our hands tied and wait here. We should rise to fight against their unjustifiable actions so as to uphold the stipulations of the treaty signed by both sides." The notice called on the Tibetans to be ready to join the army. Besides, the name, age and other things of each man should be registered in the new enrollment so that he can be drafted according to the stipulation when necessary.43

After the British troops entered Tibet, the Qing Government still uphold the principle of compromise and suing for peace. Yu Gang sent Li Fulin to Pali, together with the delegates from the three big monasteries in Lhasa and a dapon of Ü. He
asked the British troops to return to Yadong to hold negotiations. Younghusband flatly refused it. Fearing that the situation might grow worse, Yu Gang issued an absurd order, stipulating that the Tibetans were not allowed to have trouble with the British soldiers, who could only be persuaded. He repeatedly prevented the Kashag from gathering forces to resist the British army. The Tibetans censured Yu Gang angrily, saying: “Though the Tibetans failed in the Battle of Longtu, they can still recover the land lost. But Sheng Tai, the Imperial Resident in Tibet, made every effort to prohibit fighting, thus resulting in the loss of the land. If the fighting is now prohibited once again, the Resident is sure to bungle matters.” So they refused to carry out this order of compromise. They went on making preparations for fighting.

At the end of January, 1904, the Kashag Government in Tibet gathered 3,000 Tibetan soldiers from various areas, and sent them to Guru area near Lamuo Lake to build up defence works for intercepting the enemy. After disposing the troops, the Tibetan commander Dapon Lhading and the representatives of the Kashag Government carried on repeated negotiations with the British troops, asking them to retreat to Yadong, where talks would be held. Seeing that the British troops staying in Chumbi had not arrived yet and military supplies had not come either, Younghusband pretended to be willing to negotiate so as to slacken the vigilance of the Tibetan army. When the reinforcements arrived, his attitude immediately changed to an uncompromising one. On March 14, You Tai, the new Resident in Tibet, delivered a note from Lhasa to the Viceroy of India, asking the British side to start negotiation again. The Viceroy of India ignored it, and Younghusband delivered a note to You Tai on March 21, saying: “I shall soon go to Gyantse and hope you will come to meet me there. We shall discuss all the things
You Tai thus met with a soft rebuff.

On March 31, the British army surrounded the position of the Tibetan army, compelling them to lay down their weapons. Dapon Lhading and some others came out to negotiate with the British army, only to be killed by them. Then the British soldiers strafed the Tibetans with cannons and machine guns. With the loss of the commander, the Tibetan troops, now like a host of dragons without a head, met the enemy in panic, only to meet with crushing defeat. The casualties reached 1,400. Actually, the Battle of Gulu was sheer bloody slaughter of Tibetans by British troops with modern guns. Candler, a correspondent to Daily Tribune who joined the battle, confessed: “Among the victorious battles won by Britain, the Hot-spring Battle (i.e. the Battle of Guru) might be the most unwelcome one to the public. Though the officers had successfully accomplished their task, they certainly had no interest in doing so. At first the Tibetans failed to run away. Then they gave up resistance and thus there was no fighting at all, but only the slaughter of hopeless and helpless people.” The battle being over, Younghusband reported triumphantly to Curzon: “I believe that this terrible punishment to the Tibetans will prevent them from fighting any more and eventually make them accept negotiation.”

But the bloody slaughter did not scare the Tibetan people. A multitude of troops were gathered from Ü-Tsang, Qinghai and Chamdo, and then sent to Kangma, Samada and other places to resist the enemy. They hit the enemy with local guns, broadswords and slings (a local weapon with which stones can be thrown). The British troops could not move a step forward without bitter fighting and paying a heavy price. On April 11, when the British troops invaded Gyantse, the Tibetan troops retreated purposely to lie in ambush near the suburbs, kept
watching the enemy. At the end of April, Younghusband attacked Gerela. The Tibetan troops concentrated the superior force to hit the enemy. At one stroke, they recaptured the Gyantse fort and some of the nearby strongholds. And they surrounded the British troops. Between May and June, the Tibetan troops fought fiercely with the British troops for many times. They gave the enemy a heavy blow. Though the British troops maintained their positions, they were short of ammunition and food and were in low spirits. In the second ten days of June, Younghusband abandoned the city and fled to Chumbi to organize relief troops for a counter offensive. At the end of June, the relief troops moved from Chumbi to Gyantse and the counter offensive began. At first they destroyed the strongholds of the Tibetan troops in the nearby villages one by one. Then they besieged the Gyantse fort. During the battle, the British troops viciously cut off the water supply of the Tibetan troops and put them in a dilemma. What’s more, during the bitter fighting, the ammunition depot of the Tibetan troops was hit and exploded. In this way the fort was occupied by the enemy. The Gyantse Battle against the British troops lasted for over two months, but finally ended in failure.

The Tibetan people were brave in fighting. Even the invaders could not help admiring. “Dozens of Tibetans would rise to attack violently the much more powerful enemies who would make their fighting hopeless. And they fought desperately to the fall of the last one. A small group of peasants compelled to join the army would all die for defending a village, just as the ancient Roman patriots did.... Someone said they were ignorantly brave. This estimation of the Tibetan spirit was evidently unfair, considering the fighting in the battles of Pali, Naini, Gyantse and other places.”

Waddell, a surgeon in the British troops wrote of the fight
in Gyantse: “The bravery of the Tibetans was indisputable. When our shrapnels were exploding over their heads, they just held their position bravely, and they calmly counterattacked with their rifles one shot after another against our guns, keeping on like this one hour after another.”

Candler, a correspondent with the army, said: “I admire their courage and heroism. I hope people will not think that I side with the Tibetans merely for this sake.”

All these comments can be taken as the proof of the dauntless fighting spirit of the Tibetans. Though the British troops were well-trained and had fine weapons, they couldn’t adapt themselves to the plateau circumstances in Tibet. Owing to the thin air, the cold weather and the arduous march, the British soldiers frequently suffered from frost bite. Many of them were infected with diseases and then fell. In addition, there were many others who deserted. In face of the surprise attack of the Tibetan troops, they made a spectacular exhibition of themselves. “Panic-striken, they pressed close together into a corner, jostling one another, bare-footed and with no coat on.”

The deeper the British troops got into Tibet, the longer their supply line became, and the more trouble they were afflicted with. On the way, the invaders were attacked by the Tibetans unexpectedly and violently. They had to stop frequently during the march. They looked ahead and behind and were quite nervous. At first, Curzon and Younghusband thought that after the surprise attack on the Pass of Dzaleb-la, they could arrive in Lhasa in four months. But in fact, it took them nine months to cover this hard journey. Even so, the Tibetans were far from being completely conquered as had been expected. Staying in Lhasa, Younghusband was on tenterhooks all the time. He was now in the desolate country in which “(we found ourselves,) with practically no supplies and with a lofty pass
behind us, we might find ourselves in a very awkward predicament.” Facing such a situation, he found himself in a fix. What terrified him most was the Lamaist “ruffians,” 20,000 strong, who were entrenched in the city of Lhasa and its suburbs. They could probably launch a surprise attack at the last moment, or “inflict atrocity” upon the enemy besieged in the inner palace, utterly at the mercy of the Tibetans.53

However, the British troops, though beset with difficulties, were unexpectedly rescued from the desperate situation and finally won the victory. The Tibetans’ war of resistance thus failed. The prime reason was that the Qing Government pursued the policy of capitulationism. “Internally, they blindly brought pressure to bear on the Tibetans; and externally, the only thing they did was to obey Britain.”54 You Tai condemned the Tibetans repeatedly as “ignorant and stubborn.” He announced openly: “The Tibetans are stubborn, unreasonable and reckless.... If we want to persuade them, the only way is to let them fight and fail.”55 As the Imperial Resident in Tibet, he went so far as to assume the attitude of taking pleasure in the misfortune of Tibetans. A monstrous absurdity indeed! Judging from this, the failure of the war of resistance of the Tibetans resulted from the Qing Government’s capitulatory policy to the enemy and connivance at their aggression. And secondly, the Tibetan war of resistance was carried out without a strong leadership and in an extremely difficult situation. The ruling circles with the Dalai Lama at the head had the determination to resist British aggressors, but had no experience in organizing fighting. Their weapons were backward and the tactics was monotonous. In the Gyantse Battle, the Tibetan troops were over 10,000 strong.56 Although they encircled the enemy for a long period and they were far superior to the enemy in number, they had no unified command, and different routes of troops
did not cooperate well, each fighting in its own way. Therefore, their attack was not powerful, and they lost the opportunity for winning the battle. They were defeated one after another after the arrival of reinforcements of the enemy. Staying in the palace, the ruling circles of Tibet were divorced from reality. They did not know the actual fighting on the front, and they did not study seriously the feasible tactics. What they did was to boost the morale with superstitious measures such as “chanting incantations,” “sending off ghosts” and “charm water.” In fact, they were pushing the Tibetan soldiers to the gun muzzle of the enemy. Thousands of soldiers fell in the pool of blood with the faith of ascending to the Heaven.

The British invaders brought disaster to Tibet. They plundered everywhere herds of yaks, horses and sheep, as well as grain, forage and firewood. As Younghusband frankly confessed, his soldiers were ordered to take away Tibetan yaks and horses for use wherever they found them.\textsuperscript{57} According to some fragmentary records now available, in Khamba Dzong, the invaders plundered 200 yaks and 50 sheep.\textsuperscript{58} In Pali, Gyantse and other places, the invaders opened the depots and granaries and robbed them of several hundred tons of grain and ammunition.\textsuperscript{59} The cultural relics and books plundered were uncountable. They looted every monastery in Tibet and continuously carried bags of booty to India through the paths in the mountains.\textsuperscript{60} Among them, “the pearls and jewels taken by Weddell and MacDonald were numerous, enough for more than 400 mules to carry. Included in the booty were many rare and precious Lamaist books, statues of gods, religious writings, armour suits, weapons, pictures, utensils and other things.”\textsuperscript{61} During the war, at least 4,000 Tibetans were killed.\textsuperscript{62} As a result of the war, countless Tibetan families were ruined. Bones of the dead scattered everywhere. Nine houses out of ten were
empty. The Tibetans would never forget all these crimes, all these heavy blood debts of the invaders. Many of the Dzong governments (Dzong is equal to a county) and monasteries recorded in books in detail the crimes the invaders had committed there. Moreover, the Tibetans expressed their own deep hatred against the invaders in vehement folk songs. One song is as follows:

On roll the waves of the Nyangchu River,
Unable to wipe out the burning hatred of the people of Gyantse, never.
The water of the Yarlung Tsangpo River,
Foams with indignation of the Tibetans forever.

III. The Result of the War of Aggression Against Tibet

1. The Leaving of the Dalai Lama

Shortly after the occupation of Gyantse, the British troops got ready to march into Lhasa. For many times did the Dalai Lama send representatives to negotiate with Younghusband, sparing no effort to prevent the British troops from marching forward. But Younghusband paid no attention to them. He ordered his troops to cross the Yarlung Tsangpo River and drive toward Lhasa. On July 27, seeing the desperate situation, the Dalai Lama assigned a person to deal with the aftermath. (He gave the seal to Ganden Tripa Lozang Gyaltsen.) Under the escort of Dorjieff and 70 Buriat guards, he left Lhasa for Urga by way of Qinghai, Yumen and the Prairie of Mongolia.

After the Thirteenth Dalai Lama left Tibet, he still kept worrying about the situation in Tibet: though he had delegated his power to Ganden Tripa. Soon after he left Lhasa, he wrote
to the Kashag, warning them against the cunningness and sinisterness of the British invaders. He also told them to be extremely cautious against the forced conclusion of any treaty for fear of being bound hand and foot. During the period when the Thirteenth Dalai Lama was absent, the officials of the Kashag still asked him for advice about all the important things concerning the safety of the country. They asked for his instructions for practically everything. According to the Dalai’s instructions, they waged another kind of struggle against the British invaders.

Hearing of the leaving of the Dalai, You Tai became very angry. He filled a complaint against the Dalai with the royal court, saying that the Dalai disobeyed the orders of making peace, insisted on fighting against Britain, ran away presumptuously and so on. You Tai wrote in his memorial to the throne:

“In March this year, Younghusband’s troops advanced on Gyantse and he asked me to go there. But the Dalai still held slyly on to his own opinion. He refused to provide me with horse-drawn carriage, but secretly sent Kalon Lama Champa Tenzin and others to go fighting...... When the British troops were about to reach Lhasa, I immediately ordered the Tibetan officials to tell the Dalai to return to Mount Potala to safeguard respectfully the portrait of Emperor Gaozong, I considerately comforted him and informed him of everything in written form, but he gave me no reply. To my surprise, he ran away in the night of July 27, I asked the Tibetan ecclesiastical and lay officials, but none of them knew where he had gone. The Dalai Lama is required to inform the Resident of his departure from the Potala and his return from a journey so that the Resident may report them to the Court. The current Dalai Lama took liberties with this regulation; he went on a long journey without
informing the Resident. It is difficult to conjecture whether his departure is part of any conspiracy, but if he is not denounced for his unsubordination, for the loss of the war and his outrageous acts, potential imitators may be encouraged and neighbouring states disappointed. A message is delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to give them this information. And I ask Your Majesty to deprive him of the title of Dalai Lama, and summon Panchen Erdeni to \( \hat{U} \) to administer the Yellow sect and carry on the negotiations. In addition to these, I report to Your Majesty in my memorial the misdeeds of the Dalai in detail. I kneel to beg for the consideration of Your Majesty, the Empress Dowager and the Emperor."\(^{65}\)

From the above-mentioned memorial of You Tai, we can see that the contradiction between You Tai and Dalai was very sharp. That was the struggle between two lines: the line of resistance and the line of capitulationism. Seeing the failure of the resistance of Tibetans against Britain and the forced leaving of the Dalai, not only did You Tai take pleasure in the misfortune, but also seized the opportunity to trample on the Dalai relentlessly. As a result, the Qing Government made a wrong decision, declaring on September 4 that the Dalai was to be removed of his titles temporarily. Not only did this rouse great resentfulness of the people of all nationalities in Tibet and Mongolia, but also this deepened the fissure already existing between Tibet and the Central Government. At first, You Tai felt complacent about the success in his scheme of impeaching the Dalai. Seeing that the people were all furious, he began to realize that he had courted a disaster. That was really “to lift a rock only to drop it on his own feet.” On August 18, 1905, You Tai was obliged to present another memorial to ask the Qing Government to rehabilitate the Dalai to his original post. Later when the
Dalai left Urga and arrived in Beijing, the Qing Government afforded him much consolation. The disturbance of depriving the Dalai of his title was thus quieted.

2. The Conclusion of the Lhasa Treaty

After the British army entered Lhasa, the first thing they did was to conclude an enslaving treaty with the Tibetans. Early in the last-ten days of June when Britain reinforced its army in Gyantse, Curzon sent a telegram to Younghusband in which he listed “the terms which should be demanded” when they forced the Tibetans to sign a treaty.

1). Post a Resident at Lhasa. Failing this, an agent should be posted at Gyantse with the right to proceed to Lhasa, as occasions may require, to discuss matters with the Imperial Resident or Tibetan Officials.

2). Require formal recognition of both the Tibetans and the Chinese of Britain’s exclusive political influence in Tibet. And they should not enter into relations with any foreign power about Tibetan affairs without previous consent of the British.

3). Demand indemnities at the rate of 100,000 pounds for every month dating from May 4 when the Mission was attacked at Gyantse till one month after the signature of the Treaty.

4). Chumbi be occupied as security for payment of indemnity and fulfilment of the Treaty.

5). All fortified positions which might impede communication between Lhasa and the border be razed.

6). Trade marts be opened at (a) Gyantse, (b) Shigatse, (c) Lhasa, (d) Gartok, and (e) other places.

7). Details, including trade regulations, terms of customs duties, mining rights, and the settlement of boundaries stand over till after discussion with the Tibetans.

The instructions to Younghusband from the Government
of India later became the chief source of the Lhasa Treaty. Following the instructions, Younghusband sent a draft treaty to You Tai and forced him to accept it. He claimed:

"I was prepared to explain any point in the final draft which they did not understand, but I could not further discuss the terms. They had been especially framed with moderation. They embodied the commands of the British Government, and would have to be accepted."

Younghusband also said that the treaty must be signed by the Tibetan side before September 3. After the deadline, an indemnity of 50,000 rupees should be added each day. In Lhasa, the invading troops were drilled, to make a show of their force. Putting on blood-thirsty airs, they mounted their cannons in front of the gates of monasteries to extort army provisions, and threatened the Tibetans with a new war.

The Tibetans did not yield to the blackmail of the British Government. They refused to provide the enemy with grain. They refused to sign the enslaving treaty. Ganden Tripa, the acting regent of Tibet, told the British invaders:

"It is a thing of great importance, so we can reply only after the discussion at the National Assembly of Tibet. And what is more, our holy master Dalai is not in Lhasa now, so the Kashag can not arrive at any decision."

At that time, 20,000 militiaman gathered in and outside the city of Lhasa. All of them rolled up their sleeves, itching for the battle. They had the determination to "have another fight if necessary". They launched surprise attacks on the enemy now and then. So all the invaders felt perilous. They did not dare to leave their camps. The British force penetrating deep into Tibet was isolated. If the situation went on like this, the consequences would be unthinkable to the invaders. But You Tai adopted a treacherous policy. In coordination with the
invaders, he brought pressure to bear on the Tibetans. He told them “not to stubbornly adhere to their opinions and do harm to the whole situation.” “No provocation of boundary disputes is to be allowed any longer.” Finally, on September 7, You Tai decided presumptuously to “lead the Tibetans to sign the treaty.” Thus the Lhasa Treaty was concluded. The Tibetans felt very indignant at You Tai’s treacherous act of “collaborating with Britain.”

The Lhasa Treaty, originally called the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet, consists of ten articles including indemnity, boundary demarcation, trade, military control and political privilege.

1) To pay an indemnity of 500,000 pounds (equivalent to 7,500,000 rupees) to Britain. It shall be paid in 75 years, 100,000 rupees a year.

2) To delimit the boundary line between Tibet and Sikkim according to the demand of Britain. The Giagong Area is to be incorporated into Sikkim.

3) To open trade marts at Gyantse and Gartok. And the trade at the marts shall be supervised by a British Agent together with a Tibetan Agent.

4) The British troops shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley as a security for the fulfilment of the Treaty “until the indemnity has been paid and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the latter.”

5) Raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments between Lhasa and the frontier.

6) Without the previous consent of the British Government: a) no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power; b) no such Power shall be permitted to inter-
vene in Tibetan affairs; c) no Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet; d) no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power; e) no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power.

Viewed from the contents mentioned above, the Lhasa Treaty is a typical enslaving and predatory treaty. Britain extorted a vast sum of indemnity, annexed the border region of Tibet, extorted the trading privilege, and especially put Tibet under its direct military and political control. Even recently when the British colonialists talked of the Treaty, they were still wild with joy.

They said: “The Treaty at least put the British Empire in a special position as a protector to Tibet if not established as a suzerain.”74 “The various events taking place afterwards directly originated from the Treaty.”75 Therefore, after the signing of the Treaty, the British Government gave an order to commend those colonialists such as Younghusband and MacDonald. They were granted special medals for their service.76

After the signing of the Lhasa Treaty, the British Government instructed Satow, the minister to China, to “press the Chinese Government to give their early adhesion.”77 But this scheme was not easy to fulfill.

3. Conclusion of the Second Sino-British Treaty on Tibet

The British armed aggression against Tibet and the imposition of the Lhasa Treaty upon the Tibetans roused great national indignation of the Chinese people. They declared solemnly that the so-called Lhasa Treaty, neither signed by the Chinese representative nor by the Dalai, the chief leader of the Kashag, “could never be regarded as a reliable document in the interna-
tional affairs." The Chinese authorities should not accept it whatever happens." Simultaneously, the world opinion reproached Britain for its act of aggression. There was an article entitled "What Is the Influence of the Expedition to Tibet upon India" published in the Manna Market Paper, Calcutta, India. It condemned Britain for sending expeditionary troops to invade the people who knew nothing about foreign oppression. Many other countries also expressed their great resentment against Britain for invading Tibet and establishing its special position in Tibet. The ministers of various countries to Beijing all rose to argue with the Qing Government, pointing out that if the Qing Government acknowledged the result of such aggression, they would follow the example of Britain to obtain similar privileges in various areas of China. Even in Britain, the problem of Tibet also became the central issue in the struggle between political parties. The Liberal Party, then out of office, took this chance to vehemently assail the Cabinet organized by the Conservative Party. Curzon who had plotted the invasion against Tibet was removed from office in 1905. The British Parliament also condemned Younghusband with the mission as "an ignoble little raid and his invasion against Tibet as an illegal act," adding that "the raid had been based upon the most trivial and factitious excuses ever invented by designing bureaucrats."

The Qing Government were greatly furious at You Tai's arbitrary decision to have let the Treaty between Britain and Tibet be concluded without the permission of the court. In examining the Treaty, they felt it to be intolerable because too many privileges and interests were to be extorted by Britain, especially it established the exclusive British political privilege in Tibet without mentioning China's sovereignty over Tibet. Therefore when You Tai asked for permission for him to sign the Treaty at a future date, the Board of Foreign Affairs refused
him flatly, pointing out that the Lhasa Treaty was unlawful and "a treaty in place of it should be concluded by Britain and China." And they pointed out simultaneously:

"The ten articles in the Lhasa Treaty should be reconsidered, especially the ninth article, which is the real obstacle. Firstly, whenever a trade treaty is concluded by China and other countries, interests are shared equally. Tibet belonging to China, there should be no exception to this rule. Otherwise other foreign countries will demand the same interests. Secondly, the Lhasa Treaty has been reported in various newspapers and our Board have been questioned by many countries. If we agree to accept it, the ministers from various countries will come to argue with us. Surely it will be very difficult for us to handle and it will not be good for Britain, either."

As for the ninth article, they bade You Tai to "negotiate with the British side tactfully and properly".

According to the instructions from the Qing Government, You Tai asked Younghusband to amend the Treaty. But Younghusband offered an excuse, saying that since the Treaty had already been signed, he would return to England. He told You Tai to negotiate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India or with the British minister to Beijing.

In January 1905, the Qing Government appointed Tang Shaoyi, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the plenipotentiary to be sent to Calcutta to negotiate with the Government of India. During the first negotiation, the British representative Fraser asked Tang Shaoyi to sign in Lhasa Treaty. Refusing flatly, Tang Shaoyi demanded a new treaty be concluded. On February 2, Tang Shaoyi put forward a draft treaty in which the ninth article in the old treaty was deleted and the sentence "Britain has no intention of invading Tibet" was added in. Fraser did not agree to conclude a new treaty. As he said, the
Lhasa Treaty was brought into being at the cost of several years of strenuous efforts, 800,000 pounds worth of military expenditure, and sacrifice of more than one hundred soldiers.\(^8^6\) Tang Shaoyi also took an uncompromising stand. He claimed: "If the Lhasa Treaty is not revised, I will never write down my signature on it."\(^8^7\)

Then the negotiation reached an impasse. On February 26, Fraser left without announcing departure. He went for his holidays to Simla, the summer resort, to leave Tang Shaoyi and his followers in Calcutta. He told Walton, a member of the British delegation, to pass on messages. Evidently this was an intentional slight to Tang Shaoyi, the Chinese special envoy. Tang Shaoyi took a tit-for-tat action. He returned to Beijing, leaving Zhang Yintang, his counsellor, to deal with the British representatives perfunctorily. The negotiation was prolonged to November 12, and then came to a standstill.

In April 1906, the negotiation was resumed in Beijing. Tang Shaoyi was still the Chinese representative while Satow was the British representative. On April 27, they concluded the Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Convention, consisting of six articles, the gist of which is as follows: 1) Britain engaged not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. 2) China undertook not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet. 3) The original Lhasa Treaty was attached to this convention as an annex. The rights specified in Article 9 (d) of the Lhasa Treaty were denied to any state other than China.

The conclusion of the Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Convention actually made the Qing Government confirm the Lhasa Treaty, although Britain made some modifications as concessions so as to pacify the Qing Government.
NOTES

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   Ibid., 3, 4 p. 12-15
   Ibid., 6 p. 16-17
   Ibid., 20 p. 50
   Ibid., 25 p. 20
   Ibid., 26 p. 22
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   Ibid., 32 p. 45-46
   Ibid., 35 p. 51-52
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   Ibid., 57 p. 60
   Ibid., 85 p. 64

5. India and Tibet by Younghusband p. 53


8. White to the administrative official 1900, 3, 20, Accounts and Papers printed by Order of the House of Commons cd. 1920 No. 37

9. Indian Viceroy to Dalai Lama 1900, 8, 11, id. cd. 1920 No. 37 (11)


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22. Resident Yu Gang’s telegram to the Foreign Minister Mar. 29, the 29th year of Guangxu
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36. p. 116 (53) p. 192 (67) p. 239 (81) p. 231 (82) p. 343
39. Foreign Expansions in Tibet by Lionchev p. 76-77 (80) p. 105
40. Chinese Envoy Zhang Deyi to Lansdowne 1903, 11, 19; 1903, 11, 23, id. cd. 1920 No. 143, 146
41. Lansdowne’s note to Zhang Deyi 1903, 11, 23, 28, id. cd. 1920 No. 145, 148
44. Resident’s telegram to the throne via the Foreign Ministry 1903
47. Indian Viceroy to Indian Minister of General Affairs, 1904, 4, 4, id. cd. 2054 No. 12
52. 1903, 11, 4, id. cd. 1902, No. 126
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86.87. He Xiang *The Tibetan Language* p. 21
The Dalai Lama XIII.
The Buyat spy Dorjieff, who was sent to Tibet by Russia.
The fort in the battle against Britain in Jiangzi.
Seals affixed to Lhasa Treaty.
Signing Lhasa Treaty under the stress of Britain on September 7, 1904.
Sepoys “Shouldering” Tibetans from position: Guru, March, 1904.

Gyantse Jong.
Sonan Biandju, a veteran of the defence of Gyantse Fort against the British Younghusband expedition in 1904 – photographed in 1955.
Ti-Rimpoche Lama, who acted as regent after Dalai ran away.
Chapter V

Intensification of Contention Between Britain and Russia in Tibet

I. Negotiations Between Britain and Russia During the War of Aggression Against Tibet in 1904

1. Negotiations Between Britain and Russia After the Outbreak of the War

The contradictions between Britain and Russia sharpened immediately after Britain started the war of aggression against Tibet. Both Britain and Russia were intending to control Tibet and closely watching the actions of the opposite side between them. Russia responded strongly to the armed aggression against Tibet, just as Britain was very sensitive to the incident of Tibetan Mission. The British troops led by White crossed the border and occupied Giagong in 1902, and in early February, 1903, Russia presented a note to Britain, declaring that the Russian Government had got reliable news that British troops were moving northward by way of Chumbi and had reached Kangbaabualike. Since the Russian Government stressed that China should not be given a chance to intervene, it regarded action of the British Government as a threat to the general situation, and demanded that the British Government should take means to protect Russia's rights in Tibet. However, Britain replied that the so-called reliable news of Russia was utterly
groundless. Investigation revealed that there was no such a place called Kangbaabualike. Then it briefly mentioned the Tibetan-Sikkim border conflict and evaded the incident of Giagong. Meanwhile, Britain tried carefully to find out the Tibetan policy of Russia, urged the Russian Government to clearly declare its policy and warned the Russians that it would adopt measures stronger than those taken by the Russians. That is, if Russian dispatched troops into Tibet, Britain would certainly follow suit and dispatched even more troops. Britain forced Russia to declare its Tibetan policy. Russia finally declared on April 8 "that up to then Russia had no Convention regarding Tibet and had no intention of sending agents or missions there." Subsequently, Britain dispatched the Mission led by Younghusband to Tibet, thus the balance in Tibet was upset. On 17 November, 1903, Russia lodged a protest against Britain, claiming that the Russian Government could not but deem the aggression against Tibet by British troops would cause chaos in Central Asia. It was really unfortunate that such an incident, which aroused the distrust of Russia, should occur at the time when it was preparing to hold cordial discussions with Britain on relations concerning the interests of both countries.

Britain’s policy with regard to the censure was to mitigate contradictions, pacify Russia and reduce the external resistance to the invasion of Tibet. So Britain put on a show of surprise, claiming that geographically, Tibet was close to India, but it was far from the territory of Russia. Therefore, the interests of Britain in the Tibetan affairs were thoroughly different from that of Russia. At the same time, it also claimed that it met with very serious provocation of the Tibetans, who thought that they could bully the British unscrupulously because of the tolerance and forbearance shown by the latter. The British tried to prove that they
were forced to invade Tibet under the circumstances. The British Foreign Minister said that "I was firmly convinced that the Russian Government would not have shown as much patience as we had and that they would have been at Lhasa by this time." Finally, the British answered back sarcastically and pointed out that Russia was aggressive by nature and that "If the Russia Government had a right to complain of us for taking steps in order to obtain reparation from the Tibetans by advancing into Tibetan territory, what kind of language should we use in regard to Russian encroachments in Manchuria, Turkistan, Persia and elsewhere. In negotiations, Russia tried to force Britain to guarantee that it would not change the status quo. However, Lansdowne "objected to committing himself to a statement so vague and liable to misrepresentation, and he insisted upon their absolute right to do what they were doing."

While negotiating with the Russians, the British stepped up their armed aggression. In December 1903, Younghusband's Mission and the British troops attacked Dzaleba-la Pass and occupied Yadong, Rinchen Gang, Chumbi, Pali, Tuna and Guru soon afterwards. On April 11, 1904, their vanguards reached Gyantse, the third biggest city in Tibet, threatening Lhasa.

Meanwhile, diplomatically Britain's intention of approaching the French-Russian group became clearer. On April 8, 1904, Britain concluded the British-French Entente with France, the ally of Russia, which mitigated their contradictions in Africa. Britain supported France in its efforts to capture Morocco, whereas France recognized Britain's occupation of Egypt. The two former hostile states established friendly relations between them. They united to oppose their chief enemy — Germany. The British-French Entente paved the way for Britain to ap-
proach Russia. Lamsdorff, the Russian Foreign Minister, said with joy that the friend of Russia’s friend was also Russia’s friend. At the moment, Britain began to express her willingness to establish friendly relations with Russia on the basis of mutual trust. Of course, Russia was very pleased with it, but the development of events in Tibet made Russia feel uneasy. On April 13, the Russian ambassador again inquired Britain of its intention of entering Tibet. This showed Russia’s anxiety about the issue. The ambassador bluntly pointed out that the most important thing was Colonel Younghusband’s Mission. He also asked Britain whether it still pursued its former objects. Lansdowne answered that nothing new had taken place imperative to change its former intention of sending Colonel Younghusband’s Mission to Tibet.\(^{10}\)

However, this general and ambiguous answer did not free Russia from doubts. On May 10, the Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorff required Britain to present a memorandum to guarantee the status quo in Tibet so as to show the British Government’s willingness to establish Russian-British relations on the basis of mutual trust. And once Russia received such a memorandum from Britain, it would declare officially not to raise any objection to the Egypt Declaration appended to the British-French Entente of April 8.

Britain hoped Russia would support its occupation of Egypt and therefore it agreed to meet Russia’s requirement at once. Lansdowne presented to Benckendorf a memorandum of Tibet:

“In their telegram to the Government of India of the 6th November, 1903, His Majesty’s Government, in sanctioning the advance of Colonel Younghusband’s Mission to Gyantse, announced that they were clearly of opinion that this step should not be allowed to lead to the occupation of Tibet or to permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs. They stated that the
advance was to be made for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction, and that, as soon as reparation had been obtained, withdrawal would be effected. They added that they were not prepared to establish a permanent Mission in Tibet, and that the question of enforcing trade facilities in that country was to be considered in the light of the decision conveyed in the telegram."

Even so, the Russian ambassador still did not have confidence in the memorandum and continuously inquired Britain if the above-mentioned policy might be altered because of the Tibetans’ opposition to the Mission.

Considering Russia’s doubts, the British Foreign Minister stated emphatically that it could not assure Russia that it would not change its policy no matter what happened. But it could assure that “so long as no other Power endeavours to intervene in the affairs of Tibet they will not attempt either to annex Tibet, to establish a protectorate over it, or to control its internal administration.” The reason Britain made such a definite diplomatic pledge was that it hoped to win Russia’s support for British-French Entente and Britain’s occupation of Egypt. During its marching into Tibet, Britain had made such pledges to Russia many times.

Russia regarded the guarantee of the British Government with satisfaction, so the Russian Government informed the British ambassador of Russia’s “sympathy” with the British military operations in Tibet.

2. Negotiations After the Signing of the Treaty of Lhasa

Britain’s aggression, however, obviously ran counter to its guarantee, especially after the British troops occupied Lhasa. Under the threat of armed intervention the Tibetan Government was forced to sigh the Treaty of Lhasa. Apart
from expanding the border and extorting an indemnity, the British Government obtained economic and political privileges in Tibet. It turned Tibet into a sphere of influence monopolized by Britain. Once the treaty was announced, people found that Britain's so-called guarantee an utter falsehood. Russia felt very indignant because it had been deceived. The Russian press all sternly criticized the anti-Russia nature of the treaty. On September 22, Lamsdorff received the British ambassador Hardinge and lodged a protest in person. He pointed out that the articles of the Treaty went against the memorandum to Benckendorff and turned Tibet into a protectorate in fact. Russia felt especially resentful on the following points: First, Britain exacted an indemnity which the Tibetans were unable to pay, so that it could prolong its occupation of Chumbi indefinitely to achieve its aim of controlling Tibet; Secondly, Britain prohibited Tibet from granting any commercial privileges to other foreigners. This could only be regarded as Britain's interference in Tibet's internal affairs and an actual protective system.

Hardinge firmly refuted and denied Lamsdorff's accusation. He said that Britain had sent neither political representatives nor troops to Tibet except a small group of British soldiers stationed at a very remote corner of the country. Therefore, it was absolutely ridiculous to talk about a Tibetan Protectorate.\textsuperscript{14}

However, once the quarrel started, Russia would not give it up. On April 27, Russian Charge d'Affairs to Britain Suzonov met with Lansdowne and lodged an official protest to him, calming that the Russian Government thought the articles of the Treaty were inconsistent with his assurance about the issue of Tibet on June 2. Suzonov also cited two facts: Firstly, in Article VII concerning the occupation of Chumbi Valley, Britain had promised that it would not allow
Younghusband’s Mission to occupy Tibet. Since Chumbi Valley was within Tibetan territory, then the Russian Government could not understand how Britain would defend the article. Secondly, Article IX also went against the promise made by Britain, because in fact it allowed Britain to establish an actual protective system in Tibet.

In order to ease the antagonistic sentiment of Russia, Britain was prepared to make a concession in connection with Article VII. Lansdowne vindicated energetically that Britain did not intend to occupy Tibetan’s territory for a long period of time, asserting that the sum of the indemnity and the deadline for paying it was still under discussion, alluding that Britain might reduce the sum of the indemnity to enable Tibet to pay it within a short period of time, so that the occupation of Chumbi Valley would not be prolonged. But Britain firmly denied the accusation against Article IX and refused to make any concessions. Lansdowne said that Article IX was a kind of self denying ordinance which affected themselves as well as other powers. Meanwhile, he pointed out that because of the geographical location of Tibet, it was absolutely necessary for Britain to be its protector and to play a dominant role in the Tibetan affairs. Then, Lansdowne sternly warned those countries that opposed Britain in its efforts of gaining a dominant role in Tibet. He said he should remind them of the aggressive actions taken by them to divide China, for example, what Germany had done in Shandong and Russia in Manchuria. If people looked over the treaties signed by these countries, they might “find that the terms they insisted upon were of a very different character from those with which we had been contented.” Since Britain did not intend to make any concessions, the negotiations between Britain and Russia reached an impasse.
II. Contention Between Britain and Russia Concerning the Problem of the Deposition of the Dalai Lama and the Installation of the Panchen Lama

1. Britain’s Intention of Replacing the Dalai Lama by the Panchen Lama

In the course of Britain’s armed aggression upon Tibet, Russia repeatedly brought pressure on Britain to force it to make a guarantee; at the same time Russia sped up sending spies to Tibet. In January 1904, British aggressive troops occupied Pali. Russia felt deeply disturbed and hastily sent Karlmac and Ulanov to Tibet to gather intelligence about the activities of the British troops. Tsar Nicholas II ordered Ulanov to instigate the Tibetans there to rise up against the British and to prevent them from moving forward. By the time when the Tibetans were defeated by the British and Younghusband’s Mission came near to Lhasa, the Russians induced the Dalai Lama to flee to Russia through the notorious spy Dorjieff, for the Russian Government was afraid that it would lose a trump card in the struggle if the Dalai Lama was controlled by the British army. On July 27, the Dalai Lama and his party fled from Lhasa, escorted by Dorjieff and seventy Buriat armed Lamas. They marched northward by way of Qinghai and Anxi in Gansu and reached Urga of Mongolia on November 25.

The Dalai Lama presented a memorial to the Chinese Government through Delin, the Minister Resident in Urga. The Dalai Lama gave a detailed description in his memorial of the course of struggle against the British and the reasons for his leaving Lhasa. He said that Britain availed herself of opportunities to stir up troubles in the past few years. Officials were repeatedly sent by the Resident Minister in Tibet to negotiate for peace, but they were driven back again and again. The
British troops forced their way through places where they killed many defenders and Tangut (Tibetan) soldiers. They occupied monasteries and many other places and burned all things concerning Buddhism, killing and looting wherever they went. Again officials were sent to seek peace, but the British refused their proposals and said that they wanted to see the Dalai Lama. He was afraid that the title-conferring golden albums and seals of authority bestowed by emperors upon the successive Dalai Lamas might be robbed, so he left Lhasa. As to how to recover all the lost territories and monasteries, he besought the Chinese Government to deal with the British Government immediately.  

This memorial showed that the Dalai Lama did not want to betray his motherland and that, on the contrary, he always tried to secure the support from the Central Government in order to recover the lost territory, though he had thought of going to Russia to seek help when the Tibetans failed to repulse the British. When the Qing Government knew that the Dalai Lama had reached Urga, it sent immediately an imperial commissioner to Urga to express its sympathy and solicitude for him. Both the Emperor Guangxu and Empress Dowager Cixi sent gifts to him. They also sent guards to escort him and tried to persuade him to give up his tour to Russia. At that time Russia was defeated time and again in the war with Japan. This situation made the Dalai Lama feel disappointed in the great power in the north, so he changed his plan of going to Russia for help. After he lived in Urga for some time, he began to form the idea of returning to his hometown.

However, You Tai had requested the Emperor to denounce the Dalai Lama’s title in his memorial, when the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet. This made the highest position both of the church and of the local government vacant, as the Dalai Lama
was deposed and the Panchen Lama was only the acting head of Tibet, Britain availed itself of the opportunity to carry on an intrigue to force the Panchen Lama to go to India and win him over by all means in order to let him declare independence of Tibet. On October 26, 1905, the Indian Viceroy sent O'Conner, the commercial delegate in Gyantse with more than 50 British soldiers to go to Shigatse to meet the Panchen Lama and tried to force him to go to India under the pretext of inviting him to attend the grand ceremony of an audience of the British Prince of Wales (later George V), but he declined the invitation and said: "It is not difficult for me to go to India, but I have to report my trip to the Imperial Resident in Tibet and get the permission of the great Emperor; otherwise I could not comply with your wish." ^18 O'Conner paid no attention to what he said and insisted on his going. O'Conner said to him, "You must go. Please think it over." At that time the Panchen Lama knew the situation clearly. "I know that the British are very ambitious indeed. So I can not foretell the results of my trip to India this time. O'Conner likes to domineer others and his intimidation can not be described by words. If I do not go, I am sure something dangerous will happen to me, so I have to run the risk of going there." Thus the Panchen Lama was "invited" to go to India without informing the Resident in Tibet. On the way to India he was "under the so-called protection of the British soldiers armed with rifles, but in fact he was under escort as a prisoner without any freedom and he was living without a free will of his own". ^19

Zhang Yintang, the Chinese delegate to the treaty talk with the British in Calcutta, found out the intrigue and was greatly alarmed. He telegraphed the Chinese Government at once on October 28 to the effect that the Indian Government had taken advantage of the situation of the Dalai Lama's leaving Lhasa and
had sent men to Tibet to induce the Panchen Lama to go to India under the pretext of inviting him to attend the ceremony of welcoming the British Prince of Wales, while actually they plotted to depose the Dalai Lama in order to occupy Tibet. He said, “this is of vital importance. I propose the Foreign Ministry should telegraph Resident You Tai the news, and ask him to watch closely the development of the situation and try his best to prevent that from taking place.” Soon You Tai also gave a memorial to the Chinese Government in the light of the conditions reported by Tibetan officials.

However, the Chinese Government was weak and incompetent. It felt anxious but quite helpless when it was informed that the British had escorted the Panchen Lama on his way to India. As soon as he arrived in Calcutta in India on November 23, the British took him to visit monasteries, worship Buddhas, meet the British Crown Prince, inspect the British barracks, fortresses and gave a banquet in his honour. In a word, they tried every means to win him over to their side. The Indian Government treated him as a king with the intention of securing his support. They plotted to prop up the Panchen Lama as a puppet to rule Tibet, seizing the opportunity when the Dalai Lama was out. According to Zhang Yintang, “The Indian Government gave the best treatment to the Panchen Lama and built a temporary grand dwelling palace for the Lama across Zhang’s residence. The British Prince was preparing to give the Lama a return visit. The Indian newspapers said that the Panchen was invited to India not only for meeting the British Prince but also for other reasons and that the British Government should not ask China and Tibet to recognize the Lhasa Treaty. Their statements were satirical expressions.” However, their schemes were of no avail. In dealing with the British officials, the Panchen Lama remained unswayed in front
of their inducement and temptation, and declared repeatedly his loyalty to his motherland. He would not beg their support to win independence.\textsuperscript{22} The British found no opportunity to exploit and their plot failed, so they decided to send him back.\textsuperscript{23} Finally the Panchen Lama returned safely to Tibet.

2. Russia Attempting to Send Guards to Escort the Dalai Lama Back to Tibet

The Dalai Lama had already realized that Russia was not as strong as it appeared to be, but under the threat of Britain’s inversion, he still hoped that he could get Russia’s help to overcome his difficulties and, particularly, that Russia would send guards to escort him back safely to Tibet. So in the spring of 1905, through Dorjieff, the Dalai Lama asked the Russian consul in Urga to report to the Tsar about the situation in Tibet and his hope to get Russia’s support. For winning over the Dalai Lama, the Russian Government ordered D.D. Pokotilov the newly appointed Minister in China to call on the Dalai Lama in Urga on June 14, 1905, to express that Russia would give him as much support as possible. In March 1906, the Dalai Lama again sent Dorjieff and Drungyig Tsering Tenpa Setzen to Petersburg to have an audience with Nicholas II and presented the Tsar some gifts and a letter in his own handwriting. In his letter he showed his greatest esteem for the Tsar, but owing to his responsibilities he had to return to Lhasa. If Russia could not send guards to protect him, his security could not be obtained on his way to Tibet or after he returned to Lhasa.\textsuperscript{24} Obviously the mission of Dorjieff’s trip was to discuss secretly with the Russians how to “protect” him to return to Tibet.

Owing to Dorjieff’s influence, Tsar Nicholas II, on April 10, 1906 telegraphed the Dalai Lama to express his sympathy and called him “the supreme leader in Tibet”. The Tsar said
that a great number of his subjects believing in Buddhism had shown their respect to the highest leader when he was living in the north of Mongolia, the neighbouring country of the Russian Empire. The Tsar was to learn that his subjects had received holy bounties from the Dalai Lama.\textsuperscript{25} Clearly it was at a time when the Chinese Government had temporarily stripped the Dalai Lama of his title and the British were attempting to help the Panchen Lama to take the Dalai Lama’s place that the Tsar sent this telegram. This once more showed the Tsar’s support for the Dalai Lama to oppose Britain. Meanwhile, the Russian spy Kozloff, who was “investigating” in Mongolia, also went to Urga to call on the Dalai Lama and had a private conversation with him in order to draw him in.\textsuperscript{26}

The Chinese Government was very much worried when it found that the Dalai Lama had been associated with Russian diplomatic officials and agents. So on October 4, 1905 it instructed the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. The Dalai Lama obeyed the order and set out from Urga in May 1906. He made many stops en route to pay homage to monasteries and to give sermons. On the eve of his departure “Russia sent forty Buddhists to escort him and gave him a medal.”\textsuperscript{27} The Chinese Government opposed Russia’s interference in the Tibetan affairs. It telegraphed Hu Weide, Chinese Counsellor to Russia, on May 7, saying, “The Dalai Lama has been favoured by the state from generation to generation, being in charge of the Buddhist church. The route of his journey is within the boundary of our country and our government has already sent troops to escort him. There is no need of other country’s interference. It is absolutely impermissible for the Russians to send Buddhists to escort him. You must try your best to prevent the Russian Foreign Ministry from doing so.”\textsuperscript{28} In the meantime, the Chinese Government telegraphed the commanding officer
in Mongolia to send 30 soldiers to escort the Dalai Lama on his way back to Tibet.

The British Government paid special attention to the Dalai Lama’s activities after he fled from Tibet, and was particularly sensitive to the relationship between the Russians and the Dalai Lama. On April 10, 1906 the British Government was greatly alarmed to learn from the newspaper *The Official Messenger* that the Tsar had telegraphed the Dalai Lama to convey greetings and sent a team to escort him. It was afraid that when the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa he would continue to carry on his work in an anti-British mood. Sir C. Spring-Rice, the British ambassador in Russia, received an order to negotiate with the Russian Foreign Ministry. The British Government considered the Russian Government’s action a violation of China’s sovereignty and thought that this would probably make an unpleasant impression in Britain. The British Government required the Russian Government to account for this. The Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorff immediately assured that Russia’s policy toward Tibet was absolute non-interference. The Russian Government hoped that neither Russia nor Britain nor any other big powers should interfere in the affairs of Tibet which should be stable both at home and abroad. Meanwhile, he declared again that the friendly telegram sent by Tsar Nicholas II was to encourage the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. Spring-Rice expressed at once that Britain was opposed to the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet. The British thought that the Dalai would try his best to serve the Russians if he went back to Lhasa, and they would be most displeased to see this.

On May 2 Spring-Rice again met with Lamsdorff, to whom he submitted a memorandum in which he expressed clearly his opposition to the Dalai Lama’s going back to Lhasa and declared that the British Government was afraid that he might create
disturbances when the Dalai Lama went back to Lhasa. And if he had the Russian armed escort with him on his journey, he would, due to various reasons, take an antagonistic attitude toward Britain and make troubles. In this case, the British Government would have to interfere again.

However, Lamsdorff did not give way to the British. He insisted on sending Buriat soldiers to escort the Dalai Lama back to Tibet. He only promised not to let the escorting team enter Lhasa and ordered the team to stop at the Tibetan border.

This struggle between Russia and Britain over the Dalai Lama’s returning to Tibet was a special struggle for dominating Tibet. The envoys of the two countries expressed their non-interference policy in Tibet again and again, but in fact, they tried their best to interfere in the Tibetan affairs to strengthen their own position and to weaken the other’s position in Tibet. In the course of negotiation over the problem of domination, the two countries insisted on their own point of view and would not compromise, and therefore the negotiation at last came to a stalemate. Subsequently, the Dalai Lama followed the instruction of the Chinese Government not to return to Tibet but to go straight to Beijing. Finally the Russian Government had to order the Buriat soldiers to stop escorting the Dalai Lama, and then the struggle came to an end temporarily.

NOTES

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4. Despatch from Lansdowne to Scott, the British ambassador to Russia on
Feb. 18, 1903, British Parliamentary Papers, Vol. 1920, p. 189
5. Huang Hongzhao: The Strife in Tibet between Russia and Britain, Materials in Modern History, 1982, No. 2, p. 4
10. Lansdowne to Scott on April 13, 1904, ibid. pp. 7, 8.
11.12. Despatch from Lansdowne to Spring-Rice on May 10, 1904, ibid. pp. 7, 8
15. Despatch from Lansdowne to Hardinge. C. on Sept. 27, 1904, ibid. pp. 17, 18
17. Despatch from the Minister Kulun to the Department of External Affairs. Nov. 28, 1904
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21. Ibid. p. 8
22. Bell Tibet: Past and Present, p. 78
23. Selected Materials in Tibetan Local History, p. 223
25. Despatch from Spring-Rice to Grey, on April 10, 1906
26. P.K. Kozloff. Tibet and Dalai Lama, p. 1, the Preface
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Chapter VI
The Booty Negotiation About Tibet Between Britain and Russia

I. The Problem of Negotiation Raised Between Britain and Russia

1. The Emergence of the Conciliation Between Britain and Russia

From 1906 to 1907, Britain and Russia, having ever fought desperately for the possession of Tibet, colluded again with the change of situation.

The conflict in Tibet between Britain and Russia was restricted and influenced by the general situation of the international struggles. The conflict between Britain and German became more acute, the general tendency of the international struggles drove the British to approach the group of France and Russia. The agreement signed between Britain and France in 1904 created the pre-supposition for Britain and Russia to draw close to each other.

In fact, after the war between Japan and Russia and the British war fought against Tibet came to an end, it had already been impossible for Britain and Russia to fight each other violently though there still existed contradictions between them. Since the Tsarist Government was defeated in its war against Japan and pounded by the revolution in 1905, its true strength
was greatly weakened. Therefore it hoped to settle the dispute and mitigated the contradictions with Britain. Having realized its plan to invade Tibet, Britain was also willing to restore good relationship with Russia in order to deal together with the challenge of German, their old enemy.

As early as in September, 1905, when Russia signed Portsmouth Treaty with Japan, the King of Britain, Edward VII, invited the Russian representative Walt, the Minister of Finance, to visit England. The British King suggested to Walt an alliance between Britain and Russia, and he delivered a draft of the agreement between them. After the Liberal Party came to power, it was particularly active in establishing an alliance with Russia. On December 13, Grey, the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs made a friendly gesture to Russia on his own initiative. He said to Benckendorf, the Russian ambassador in Britain, that he hoped “Britain and Russia would reach an agreement on the unsettled problems concerning both countries.” The Russian Government felt excited about the information of friendship between Britain and Russia,” and thought that Grey was inclined to decrease, but not to increase the contradictions between them and that therefore “the British policy would not be much aggressive.” However, since Russia was in the storm of the revolution at that time and the domination of the Tsarist Government was in imminent danger, it was not the time yet to solve the essential problems in the relationship of both countries.

By the beginning of 1906, the high tide of the Russian revolution had passed. The political situation within Russia had gradually become relatively stable. Izvolski, who advocated the establishment of friendly relation between Britain and Russia, now became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, Nicholson, the newly-appointed British ambassador in Russia,
who acted as the friendly messenger, arrived at Petersburg. On May 29, Nicholson called on Izvolski and proposed many concrete suggestions in solving the conflicts between the two countries. He asserted that Britain hoped to exchange opinions on Tibet and other important issues. He suggested that they should negotiate first the Tibet issue and then the issues of Afghanistan and Iran, because the conflicts of the interests of both sides on the Tibet issue were easier to solve than those on the other two issues. To begin with the Tibetan issue could create a good atmosphere for negotiation. Izvolski agreed to this suggestion and assured him that they would carry on the negotiation in earnest.

On June 4, Nicholson had an audience with the Tsar Nicholas II and presented the credentials as of the newly appointed ambassador. After the delivering ceremony, Nicholson reported to the Tsar face to face that he wished to hold talks immediately with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs about some important problems concerning both countries. The Tsar agreed at once to his request and hoped to reach a satisfactory agreement. The talks between Nicholas II and Nicholson created good atmosphere for the negotiation of both sides. When reporting to Grey, Nicholson said excitedly, "What the Tsar said obviously gave others an impression of his inner warmth and kindness. It was very clear that he expected the talks to be held immediately would reach a satisfactory agreement on time. No doubt, his expectation will have beneficial effect on the attitude of the Minister of Foreign Affairs."

On June 6, the Tsar called in Izvolski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He told him the content of his talks with Nicholson and instructed him "to reach an agreement to the best of his ability." After the interview, on the same day, Izvolski presided over the meeting on the Tibetan issues held by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After the discussion, they thought that Russia “had no direct interests” in Tibet and so decided to seek compromise with Britain on the Tibet issue.

2. The Beginning of The Negotiations Between Britain and Russia

Before he went to Russia to take up the post, Nicholson had held consultations with the Indian Government about the negotiation on the Tibet issue between Britain and Russia, and submitted a basic plan to be discussed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and then five principles were determined as the basis for its negotiation with Russia.  

On June 7, Britain and Russia held talks in Petersburg. The British representative was Nicholson, and the Russian representative Izvolski. In Asia, the contradictions of both sides concentrated on Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia (now: Iran). Russia thought “the Tibetan issue was the one which could be used most easily as the basis for reaching an agreement with Britain,” and it might also be used as the “touchstone” in this negotiation. Britain also thought that the negotiation should start according to the principle from the easy to the difficult and it had better begin with the Tibetan issue. Nicholson suggested to Izvolski that the discussion of the disputes should be arranged according to this order: Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia and other issues, and then solution would be reached one by one. After having discussed all the problems and reached an agreement, they should draw up together a document containing all the problems they discussed and sign a treaty. Izvolski agreed to his opinion and then Nicholson proposed the five principles as the basis to solve the Tibetan issue.

1. Russia to recognize (as Great Britain has done) the suzerainty of China over Tibet, and to engage to respect the
territorial integrity of Tibet, and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.

2. Subject to the above stipulation, Russia to recognize that, by reason of its geographical position, Great Britain has a special interest in seeing that the external relations of Tibet are not disturbed by any other Power.

3. The British and Russian governments to undertake respectively not to send a representative to Lhasa.

4. The British and Russian governments agree not to seek or obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining, or other rights in Tibet.

5. The British and Russian governments agree that no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to them, or to any of their subjects.

On June 12, Izvolski reported the British five principles to the Tsar and analysed them one by one. Unlike the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lamsdorff, he was calm and could estimate practically and realistically about Britain and Russia’s struggle in Tibet, he realised that the strength of the two countries was not equal. Evidently Britain had greater influence in Tibet than Russia which had actually no influence at all. He thought: “Britain has raised the problems in general and can meet our requests. But in fact, Britain loses nothing because its relation with Tibet is so dominant that it might make use of the influence which we are too far behind to catch up”. So, Russia “has to consider the existing rights of the British and their dominant position in Tibet.” And in comparison with the much stronger power of the British, “we Russians can not put forward any requirement as the British”. What the Russians grasped was only the “religious interests”, which was not only
a means to be used to exert influence on Tibet but also the only reason to negotiate with Britain. And all these were “based on nothing but the Dalai Lama Pro-Russia intention”. Izvolski pointed out, “generally speaking, it is unwise to base our policy on an individual’s attitude; it is especially so in Tibet.” Such being the case, Russia could only keep and uphold in the negotiation its benefits in Tibet as much as possible under the premise of acknowledging Britain’s superior position. Just as Pokotilov, the Russian ambassador to China, pointed out in the ciper telegram on June 5, “All the problems lie in how far the British concession on the Tibetan issues and its compensation to us can satisfy us.”

On June 19, 1906, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia held again a meeting on the Tibetan issues. Those who took part in the meeting were Izvolski, Oldenburg, Shishmaiov and other officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and some experts on the Mongolian and Tibetan affairs: Semionov, Pozdneev and Kozlov. In the meeting, the draft agreement on Tibet between Britain and Russia drawn up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was discussed and agreed upon. They advocated the agreement should take the form of “the agreement on compensation”.

II. Several Problems Discussed in the Negotiations

Later the negotiation about the Tibetan issue between Britain and Russia was concentrated on the following problems.

1. The Problem of the Dalai Lama

Russia had always taken the Dalai Lama as a trump card to maintain its own interests and fight against Britain. Though it failed to send Buriat soldiers to protect the Dalai Lama to return
to Tibet, in the negotiation it still tried its utmost efforts to request to let the Dalai return to Tibet and resume his post. The Russians declared to Britain again and again that the Dalai was “the spiritual leader of a considerable proportion of the Russian people and that they did not hope to hurt their religious feeling at all, so it was suitable for the Dalai to return to Tibet.” Russia insisted on getting “a clear solution” of the problem. But Britain opposed firmly to let the Dalai to return to Tibet, because the Dalai had colluded with Russia. “If the Dalai Lama should go back to Tibet, the Russians will certainly try to keep close relation with him,” and it would threaten the British hegemony in Tibet. Therefore, the British claimed: “Now it is not suitable to let the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. His behaviour in the past was so hostile to us that it caused the previous interference of the British Government and might possibly cause another interference.”

Then, in his talks with Poklevsky, a Russian diplomat in Britain, Hardinge, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated more clearly the British viewpoint, “In principle, the British Government does not oppose to the Dalai’s returning to Tibet, but it is worried that the situation will become turbulent when he returns to Tibet. Besides, after his behaviour caused a war against the country, it is impossible for us to have any confidence in him or guarantee that he wouldn’t provoke another conflict. So, the British Government hopes that he will not return rather than he will.”

Because of the uncompromising attitude of Britain, Russia decided to give in. At the same time, by making use of the Dalai Lama’s intention of approaching Russia and his influence in Mongolia, it tried to make him serve for Russia in splitting Mongolia off from China. Therefore on July 13, Izvolski told Nicholson that after he had made a study of the Dalai Lama
and his conducts, he came to think that for the interests of both sides it was not suitable for him to return to Lhasa. He also proposed that both sides reach an understanding about his future. On July 18, Izvolski further stated his viewpoints to Nicholson: in order to clear up all doubts about the Russian Government’s attitude on the Dalai Lama issue, he ardently hoped the two governments would agree with each other not to take any measure to urge the Dalai to return to Tibet and let the Chinese Government handle the problem as it liked. To this Russian proposal, the British Government expressed at once its “happy reception”. So the dispute on the Dalai Lama’s affairs between both sides was finally solved.

2. The Problem of “Tibet’s Foreign Affairs not to Be Interfered by Any Big Power”

The second clause of the five principles raised by Britain said: “Russia admits that because of its geographical position Britain’s special concern about Tibet’s foreign affairs should not be interfered by any big power.” This clause restricted evidently the Russian interests of invading Tibet and immediately caused a strong reaction from Russia.

On June 13 when he met with Nicholson, Izvolski pointed out that “he had examined the British five demands and thought it was not difficult to reach an agreement on the clauses 1, 3, 4 and 5. But he wasn’t clear about the meaning and range of clause 2.” And he pointed out particularly that the word “interference” in clause 2 made him extremely puzzled. He expected that Britain could explain its exact meaning. Izvolski pointed out that “all kinds of obligations had been listed clearly in the clauses 1, 3, 4 and 5, and any kind of interferences which might happen had been already generalized. In this case, was it necessary to particularly point out in clause 2 that the Tibetan
external affairs should not be interfered by any big power?" "At the same time, if Russia acknowledges Britain’s special interests on the ground of its geographical position," then, the British Government "should also acknowledge Russia’s religious interests in Tibet."12

Britain, of course, knew clearly why Russia opposed to clause 2. Nicholson thought that Russia only wanted to keep communication with the Dalai Lama so as to make a stand against Britain. As for this, Britain made some concessions. On July 6, Grey instructed Nicholson to make some revision in the second clause and change “shouldn’t be interfered by any power” into “shouldn’t be disturbed by the participation of any big power,” for example, not to establish the protective relationship or the relationship of some special agreement.13

Britain had thought the revised sentence could solve the controversy on Clause 2. But in fact it was not the case. Izvolski went on demanding a complete rewording of the second clause. On October 7, Russia put forward the rewritten sample of the clause. Its content was as follows:

"Clause 2, according to the already admitted principle that China has sovereignty over Tibet, Russia and Britain agreed not to negotiate directly with Tibet except through the Chinese Government. This agreement does not exclude the direct relationship between the British commercial agent and the Tibetan local authorities, which were stipulated in the agreement between Britain and Tibet in 1904. Of course, the Russian or British Buddhists still have the right to communicate directly with the Dalai Lama and other representatives of the Tibetan Buddhist circles about the aspects of the religious affairs."14

The rewriting made by the Russian Government not only blotted out at one stroke “the British special interests” but also added that “the Russian Buddhists still had the right to com-
communicate directly with the Dalai Lama.” This couldn’t be accepted by Britain. Then both sides exchanged views again and again, weighed every word. They didn’t finalize the manuscript until the middle of February in 1907. And the sentence “Britain owns special interests” was written in the preface.\textsuperscript{15}

3. The Problem of the Religious Connections Between the Russian Buriats and Tibet

The Russian Government had always made the Buriat Buddhists act as spies and tried to drive its political forces into Tibet. The main divergence between Britain and Russia was that Russia attempted to keep this religious communication while Britain tried to cut it off. On July 13, the Viceroy of Indian claimed: “Under no circumstances should Russia be allowed to send representatives to Tibet. It’s impossible to distinguish between religion and politics in a place like Tibet. The appearance of one representative will lead to disturbance.” On July 16, the British Government passed the Indian Viceroy’s opinion on to Nicholson. On the same day, Hartinge, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, held talks on this problem with Poklevsky, an official of the Russian Embassy in Britain. Poklevsky pointed out that long before the arrival of the British Mission at Lhasa, Buriat pilgrims had already had contacts with the Dalai Lama and offered money and presents to him. The Russian Government only desired the continuance of this practice and had no wish to have an agent at Lhasa since His Majesty’s Government had no intention of appointing one. On July 20 when he held talks with Nicholson, Izvolski also stated that he would like the relations between the Russian Buriats and the ruling Lama in Tibet to remain as before, but without any agent in Lhasa.\textsuperscript{16}

On October 7, the second clause of the “Tibetan Agreement” (the draft) submitted by Izvolski said: “Both the Russian
and British Buddhists maintain the rights to communicate directly with the Dalai Lama and other representatives of the Tibetan Buddhism on religious affairs." For this reason, on December 5, Grey indicated Nicholson to supplement the clause as follows: "No communication between Great Britain and Russia and any Tibetan authority should pass through the instrumentality of Buddhist pilgrims, and the two governments would take such steps as were necessary and possible to prevent the relations of British and Russian Buddhists with the representatives of Buddhism in Tibet from assuming a political character."

Finally, Russia yielded after it made several contacts with Britain and received the British opinion. The revised draft of the second clause submitted by Izvolski on January 15, 1907 read as follows: "It is quite self-evident that both the Russian and British Buddhists can communicate directly with the Dalai Lama and other representatives of the Tibetan Buddhism about pure religious affairs. As far as both the Russian and British Governments are concerned, they promised that they wouldn't allow the communications to go against the rules of the agreement." On February 8, the British Government finally stated it would accept the draft of the clause revised by Russia.

4. The Issue of Scientific Investigation Teams

The geographical investigation and explorations were another form of fighting for Tibet between Britain and Russia. Both countries had made a lot of investigation in Tibet and gained a great deal of geographical and mineral information. In the negotiation, Britain did its utmost to oppose the Russian officials' going to Tibet in the name of scientific investigation but in fact trying to retain contact with the Dalai in some way. Izvolski provided an explanation that the Russian Geographical
Association sent people into Tibet and did a great deal of work on the geographical science. He said that it was completely non-political but purely scientific activity and shouldn’t be forbidden. Moreover, he said that while the British Government created all sorts of obstacles for the Russians to go into Tibet, it sent its own people into Tibet and that it was unfair to deal with things like this. The British made some concessions according to the Russian requests. First, the British parliament refused to ratify the Sven Hedin investigation team to go into Tibet by way of India to show its principle of equal treatment. At the same time, Nicholson informed the Russian Government that Britain was not opposed to sending geographical exploration teams into Tibet, but that it only suggested postponing the problem for several years till the Tibetan situation should become better and could be solved more satisfactorily. In the middle of July, Benckendorf, the Russian ambassador to Britain, proposed to the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs that if the British Government suggested the Russian and British people were not to organize or form scientific investigation teams to go into Tibet within five years and this matter would be discussed again five years later, the Russian Government would agree to this proposal. On July 21, Izvolski put forward in his meeting with Nicholson that the issue had better be solved by exchanging notes, but not by making a special agreement. At the same time, he proposed again: “It’s better for both sides to agree not to contact directly with the Tibetan authorities except by the medium of the sovereign state.” Nicholson then agreed to this proposal on behalf of the British Government.

In February, 1907, Nicholson submitted the draft note of the British Government, which stipulated that no scientific group would be allowed to go into Tibet to make investigations within five years. In March, Izvolski also submitted a draft note
with similar content to the British Government, but changed five years for three years. On April 15, Nicholson informed Izvolski that the British accepted the plan in the draft raised by the Russian Government. The agreement on the scientific investigation teams was signed.

During the negotiation, regardless of the British opposition, the Russian ratified Kozlov to lead the Tibetan investigation team into Tibet. On July 26, 1907, the Russian official government newspaper “Russia” published this piece of news: Being ratified by the Tsar, Lieutenant Colonel Kozlov would go to the Middle Asia to have a new investigation. He planned to carry out the investigation along the same route of his previous trip to Tibet from 1899 to 1901.

The Counsellor of the British Embassy in Russia Auburn inquired Izvolski about this matter and asked him to explain it. Izvolski answered:

“The route of Kozlov’s investigation agreed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is out of the Tibetan territory.”

Being opposed strongly by Britain, Kozlov was forced to change the investigation route and didn’t go straight into Tibet. But during his investigation, by the end of February in 1909, he left the investigation team for the Kumbum Monastery in Xining, Qinghai, to meet the Dalai Lama. On March 13, he arrived at the Kumbum Monastery and stayed there for a week and his behaviour was very secret. It proved sufficiently that the activities of the so-called scientific investigation team of Russia was often connected with Russia’s political schemes.

5. Other Issues

(1) The problem of the deadline for the British army’s occupation of Chumbi Valley

The Russian Government thought that the British army’s
The occupation of the Chumbi Valley broke the balance of power between the two countries in Tibet. So, though the agreement stipulated the deadline for the British army's occupying the valley, the Russian still did not feel secure enough. It tried to force the British to take a clear-cut stand. The Russian Government requested Britain to restate the temporariness of its occupation of the valley by way of exchanging announcement notes, not including in the agreement on Tibet. The British agreed to this request. On January 16, 1907, the British submitted the statement as the appendix to the Tibetan agreement between both sides. It claimed that the British army would not withdraw from Chumbi until Tibet had paid off the reparations of 2,500,000 rupees within three years, the trading cities been opened for three years and each clause of the agreement in 1904 been carried out earnestly. "If there were any reasons which made the British army in Chumbi unable to withdraw within the time limit stipulated in the above declaration, the British Government would exchange opinions in a friendly way with the Russian Government."  

(2) The problem of Mongolia

During the negotiation between Britain and Russia, Russia, who cherished the ambition to invade Mongolia, speeded up its steps for expanding to Mongolia and expected to get the British support on its expansion in Mongolia through its concessions on the Tibetan issues.

In July, 1906, Poklevsky, the first secretary of the Russian Embassy in Britain, put forward the Mongolian problem to Hardinge and asked the British to support Russia's invasion of Mongolia. Hardinge replied: "It seems that no doubt some people in Russia approve of the policy of annexing Mongolia."

Britain looked closely at the Russian activities in Urga and hoped to maintain the status quo of Mongolia. But Poklevsky
again claimed that there were Japanese spies in Mongolia, who instigated the Chinese authorities to strengthen the administrative control of the area. Thus it would certainly cause conflicts among the Mongolian princes and dukes. And he asked the British Government to assist in dealing with this problem. Hardinge pointed out: “What Britain can do is to give diplomatic assistance and make the Chinese Government admit the Russian boundary and stop invading it. Japan may also give assistance in this aspect.”

The British Government told the Russian Ambassador Benckendorf: “All proposals made by the Russian Government about maintaining the status quo in Mongolia will be considered conscientiously by the British Government.”

Russia still wasn’t content with Britain’s promise. On January 5, 1907, Izvolski again urgently asked the British, whether the maintaining of the status quo in Mongolia might be properly mentioned, when the main problems of the agreement have been solved. As Mongolia was beyond the reach of the British power and its interests were not so important to Britain as those in Tibet, Britain thought it would be better to do a favour at little cost to itself. However, there should be a limit to the concession it would make lest Russia should be insatiably avaricious, reaching out for a yard after taking an inch. Therefore, on February 8, 1907, Nicholson replied to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and said: “In negotiation, we wouldn’t discuss such kind of problem as Mongolia which has no direct connection with Tibet. But in whatever case, at most we can only say that we would admit Russia’s special interests in its neighboring Mongolian areas. However, Russia has to define at first its special interests and its extending area before we admit these.” With the support of Britain, not long afterwards Russia held Mongolia in its arms.
On the limits of the Tibetan administrative area

On June 20, 1906, when Britain and Russia were disputing on the problem of not allowing the Buriats and scientific investigation teams to go to Tibet, Izvolski inquired Nicholson what was the implication of the British concept of Tibet. "Whether the British Government took Tibet as a geographical concept, that is to say, as a definition of its geographical ranges, or as an administrative unit?"27

Nicholson couldn't reply at the moment. After that, according to the opinions of the Governor of Indian, the British Government thought the whole Tibet included the south of the Kunlun Mountains and its east and north extended to Chaidam region. Besides, Tibet also included the upper Chaidam and west of Garze. Meanwhile Britain also thought "Tibet was not one of the ordinary provinces of China, but a feudal state under the Chinese suzerainty, it had ample rights for self-governing and the right to conclude treaties with its neighbouring countries on trade and boundary lines". It proved obviously that Britain itself attempted to separate Tibet from China. The Russian Government didn't dare to agree to the administrative area delimited subjectively by the British Government. On July 20, Izvolski put forward again in the negotiation with Nicholson: "The Tibetan geographical region must be delimited to the bounds that China could accept."28

III. Conclusion of the "Anglo-Russian Agreement Concerning Tibet"

1. The Conclusion of the "Anglo-Russian Agreement"

After repeated negotiations for over one year, the main
differences between the two countries were solved and the agreement was reached at last. On August 31, 1907, the Anglo-Russian Agreement Concerning Tibet was concluded. The Agreement consisted of three parts about Tibet, Persia and Afghanistan respectively. It marked that in the international politics Britain and Russia came to collaborate with each other instead of opposing each other.

The Agreement consisted of the main body, appendixes and mutual notes. In the preface of the Agreement, they pointed out that both sides admitted the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, meanwhile they emphasized the Britain’s special interests in fully maintaining the status quo of the Tibetan external relationship due to the geographical position of Tibet. The main-body of the Agreement included the following five items.

1. Both sides concluding the Agreement respected the territorial integrity of Tibet and abstained from all interferences in the Tibetan internal affairs.

2. According to the above principle, Britain and Russia could only contact Tibet through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. But Britain still could contact directly with Tibet according to the old treaties signed with Tibet. Meanwhile both Britain and Russian Buddhists could have the purely religious connections with Tibet.

3. Neither Britain nor Russia could send representatives to Lhasa.

4. Both countries must not seek or obtain concessions for various kinds of rights in Tibet.

5. Both countries agreed on that the Tibetan land tax and other levies shouldn’t be mortgaged or made over to both governments or their subjects.

In the appendix of the Agreement, the British restated that when the reparations of 2,500,000 rupees were paid off by Tibet
within three years, the British army would immediately withdraw from Chumbi Valley.

And moreover, Nicholson and Izvolski on behalf of Britain and Russia respectively sent diplomatic notes to each other and agreed that scientific investigation teams mustn’t be sent into Tibet within three years without the mutual agreement. Three years later, the two countries would talk on how to send scientific investigation teams into Tibet.

On September 23, 1907, the representatives of both British and Russian governments exchanged the instruments for the ratification of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. On September 24, both countries gave the agreement public notice to the world. On September 26, the agreement was formally promulgated. On the afternoon of September 27, Pokotilov and Jordan, the British and Russian envoys in Beijing sent the French transcript of the Agreement to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Government to notify them and attempted to force the Qing Government to admit it.

The Anglo-Russian Agreement was an agreement by which Russia and Britain divided their spoils. After the long-term rivalry, Britain and Russia compromised to each other and acknowledged mutually the vested interests of the other side in Tibet. On the one hand, the special interests gained by the British through two wars against Tibet were acknowledged by Russia. On the other hand, the Russian religious connection with Tibet was also approved by Britain. Then the two countries announced hypocritically to maintain the Tibetan status quo, not to interfere in the Tibetan internal affairs and acknowledge the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, etc. In fact, it only moved the struggles for Tibet to the “Imperial Court” in Beijing, while both Britain and Russia announced to stop fighting temporarily. This agreement flagrantly violated the Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. In the name of
acknowledging the Chinese suzerainty, it made Tibet a relatively independent country. At the same time, their negotiation from beginning to end was carried on clandestinely behind the back of the Chinese and their government. All these proved sufficiently that both Russia and Britain cherished the wild imperialist ambition and hostility towards the Chinese people. Though the Agreement had made Britain and Russia collude together under the presupposition of preparing for the "fighting against Germany," yet the open strife and veiled struggle for Tibet between them did not really stop for a moment.

After the Agreement was promulgated, the Russian bourgeoisie acclaimed for it. Their newspapers and periodicals made enthusiastic comments on it and praised it as "fair and reasonable", because it was absolutely favourable to Russia. But the response from the British was somewhat different. The Agreement got both praise and censure because of the struggles among the bourgeois parties. Some people headed by Curzon, the former Indian Governor and a member of the House of Lords then, from the viewpoint of the colonial expansionism, attacked violently the Agreement as unequal and unreasonable, and they thought that the signing of this agreement was nothing less than surrender unconditionally to Russia. The other group headed by Grey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, expressed their satisfaction at the Agreement and thought that from the clauses of the Agreement what Britain gained was real and concrete, while what Russia gained was vague and general.

Some members of the House of Lords defended the Agreement and said, "Our chief aim is to make us be ensured through the clauses of the Agreement that the Russians will not advance further toward the Indian border. The Russians must stop bullying and harassing the relationship between Britain and India, which is the terrifying diplomatic weapon possessed by
Russia. Now it gives up this weapon forever. We have gained a lot. We have cast off what often worried the British Government and got rid of the possibilities of frictions and wars.”

The conclusion of the Agreement greatly irritated the masses of the Chinese people. The Chinese newspapers and periodicals published articles one after another to expose its invasive essence and condemn angrily the crimes of the two imperialist countries attempting to carve up and encroach upon Tibetan rights and interests. The Agreement will go down in history forever as an evidence of the crime that Britain and Russia committed in colliding with each other to oppress and exploit the Tibetan people.

2. The British Influence Penetrating Further into Tibet

In the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain conclud ed successively through war and diplomacy, the Lhasa Treaty, the Sino-British Convention of 1890 and Regulation of 1893, the Anglo-Russian Agreement Concerning Tibet, etc, and acquired a series of privileges. Later through the implementation of these treaties, the British moved its political and economical forces further into Tibet.

First, Britain stationed an Army in the Chumbi Valley and carried out the military occupation of it as the mortgage for Tibet to pay the reparations. Chumbi was only a valley in the col between Pali and Yadong before it was occupied by the British. It was 21 li away from Yadong and 120 li from Pali. The headquarters of the British army was stationed in Chumbi. But the British soldiers were stationed in Gyantse and Yadong. Meanwhile the British had ulterior motive “to call the whole area of nearly one hundred li in length from Yadong to Pali as Chumbi, so as to extend its sphere of the influence and attempted to station its army permanently.”
Besides the military occupation, the British also carried out administration there, appointing administrative officials in Chumbi, dividing the area from Yadong to Pali into five districts, appointing the administrative officials of each district, ordering them to collect taxes and levies illegally, and apportioning penal servitude in their dominating district.

In order to make its military occupation last for a long period, Britain first stipulated that the reparations of 2,500,000 rupees should be paid off within 25 years. Later on, it agreed to have it paid off by the Qing Government within three years, but it still made some troubles and attempted to occupy the Chumbi region over a long period. Only when the Qing Government had the representatives to negotiate for a long period of time, did the British army withdraw from Chumbi in February, 1908. But Britain still concocted various pretext for stationing more than "sixty bodyguards of the trade agent" in Gyantse.  

Secondly, the British was able to take Gyantse and Gartok in Tibet as trade marts according to the Treaty. Especially after Gyantse was opened, it gradually became one of the most important bases of the British aggressive forces in Tibet. Britain set up a trade agent in Gyantse, illegally and forcibly bought land and built official residence, which occupied more than 20 mu of land. Again on the bank of the Nyangchu River, Britain forcibly occupied more than 400 mu of land for opening up markets. The British officials interfered in the Chinese internal affairs, extorted property and taking goods by force. What they did there aroused the indignation of the Tibetan masses.  

At the same time, Britain speeded up drawing in and splitting up the elements of the Tibetan upper class. It tried to prop up a group of pro-British elements by every possible means. In October, 1905, the British-Indian government fo-
mented the incident of holding Panchen under duress to India. At the beginning of 1906, it schemed to hold a "Buddhists Congress" in India, in which the Panchen Lama was chosen as the Chairman of the Buddhist Association. But the Panchen had not been misled by the British. He was unwilling to split Tibet and betray his motherland as the British wished.

After 1907, since Britain failed to draw in and prop up Panchen, it began to prop up the pro-British force among those in power in Tibet and take measures to draw in the Dalai Lama. The British trade agents in Yadong and Gyantse often presented gifts to the Tibetan officials. They had frequent contacts with them and gradually made some Tibetan officials have the pro-British intention. With the Tibetan markets opening up to Britain, the trade between Tibet and India developed rapidly. More and more Tibetan officials and nobles were doing business with the British. They changed their attitude towards Britain naturally, from hating and resisting it to admiring and approaching it. While drawing in the Tibetan officials, the British never forgot to sow dissensions between the Hans and the Tibetans. They instigated the people of Tibetan nationality to oppose the Hans so that they might win round the Tibetan officials. Under the influence of the Tibetan pro-British forces, the Dalai Lama's attitude towards Britain also changed. It was very evident that the Dalai's former anti-British stand was not due to his personal love and hatred at all, but represented the interests and desire of the Tibetan ruling class. Now that the attitude of the ruling class had changed, it was inevitable for Dalai to turn to be pro-British.

The British demanded again to revise the regulations of trade between Tibet and India so as to further extend its aggressive forces in Tibet. On September 12, 1907, the plenipotentiary officials of both China and Britain held negotiation
on the trade regulations between Tibet and India, at Simla in India. The Chinese representative was Zhang Yintang, and the British representative was Dainow, the Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Besides, yielding to the pressure from Britain, the Qing Government sent Kalon Wangchuk Gyalpo as the representative of Tibet. In the negotiation, it was decided that both sides draw up its own draft regulations respectively, “list their own clauses and then revise the clauses by the other side.”

On September 25, they began the negotiation. They exchanged their respective draft regulations and decided to carry out the negotiation on the basis of the 22 clauses of the draft regulations raised by the Chinese representative. But on October 17, the British “deleted and changed the twenty-two clauses as they thought unfit. And on October 31, the British raised 16 clauses. Having made a comprehensive survey on the draft regulations raised respectively by the Chinese and British, we could see that both sides had disputes on the following aspects:

1. On setting up markets in the newly-opened trade-marts of Gyantse and Gartok. The Chinese insisted that they had to delimit the boundary line of the markets and that the merchants of Britain and other countries could only rent land of the markets to reside and trade. The British was against it and demanded that the British merchants be allowed to rent land to build houses and to do business anywhere in the trade-marts as they liked. Finally, both sides resolved that as for the British merchants “renting land to build houses and shops” in the trade-marts, it should be discussed and delimited by the Chinese and Tibetan officials and the British trade agents.

2. On the eleven hotels built by the British army along the road from the Indian border to Gyantse. China insisted on its redeeming them and managing them, but this was opposed by Britain. Later Britain agreed to this, but it demanded that the
telegram office opened by Britain be allowed to manage the hotels. It was refused by China; however, finally both sides resolved that these hotels should be “redeemed according to the original price” by China and then rented to the Indian Government and that “half of each hotel should be managed by Britain ... the rest should be for the dignified officials coming and going from China, Tibet, Britain and India.”

3. On not allowing the British to enter into the Tibetan inland by a roundabout route from the trade marts. Though Britain expressed consent to it, yet it demanded to regard the inhabitants on the Indian border as exceptions. At first, China did not agree, because the whole Tibet would be open to trade if some British people were allowed to go into the Tibetan inland by a roundabout route. But under the pressure of Britain, China accepted its plan, allowing the inhabitants on the Indian border to trade in other Tibetan regions according to traditional practice.

4. On levying taxes on the Indian tea into Tibet. The Chinese Government allowed the transportation and sale of the Indian tea in Tibet, but it insisted that the criterion of levying taxes on the Indian tea should be equal to that of the Chinese tea into India. The taxes imposed on the Chinese tea into Tibet had always been 55.6. But as for the Indian tea into Tibet, Britain demanded that the import taxes imposed on it should be only 5%. There was great difference between them. The Chinese Government opposed this unfair deal and demanded the rate of taxation on the Indian tea should also be 55.6%, but it was refused by Britain. Both sides refused to give in, so the Chinese Government prevented Indian tea from entering into Tibet temporarily.36

5. On Britain’s direct contact with Tibet. Britain regarded Tibet as an independent country and it tried hard to squeeze
into the Agreement the content of Britain’s being able to negotiate directly with Tibet. In the regulations, for example, China, Britain and Tibet stood side by side. And Britain insisted that the regulations be also made in the Tibetan language and that Britain negotiate with Tibet directly, etc. The Chinese representative firmly opposed to list in the regulations the content which damaged the Chinese sovereignty. But in the final draft of the agreement, there were still some articles which mentioned that the British trade agents might make inquires together with the Chinese and Tibetan officials in dealing with all disputes.

On April 20, 1908, the fifteen regulations of trade between Tibet and India were signed in Calcutta. This was another unequal treaty imposed on China by Britain. Through these regulations, Britain got a series of invasive privileges. They were mainly the right of renting land to build houses and shops in the trade-marts, the trial right of the British trade agents, the right to negotiate directly with the Tibetan officials, the extra-territoriality of the British merchants, the right to manage mails and telegrams, the right to make arrangements for policemen in all the trade-marts and station the commercial armed escorts, etc. In short, the conclusion of these trade regulations not only legalized the privileges acquired by Britain since the invasive war in 1904, but also created favourable conditions for Britain to extend its invasion and carry out positively its scheme of splitting China.

NOTES

1. Benckendorff’s cipher telegram on December 13 and 22, 1905. Russian magazine New East the twentieth and twenty-first combined issue, p. 46
on the Origins of the War by G P Gooch, Vol. 4, p. 237
5. Pokotilov’s cipher telegram on June 5, 1906, from “Russia and Tibet” by Popov in *New East*, in 1928, the twentieth and twenty-first combined issue, p. 52
7. Pokotilov’s cipher telegram on June 18, 1906. Nicholas II commented on the telegram: “I think Pokotilov’s opinion is right”. (Russia) *New East* in 1928, the twentieth and twenty-first combined issue, p. 49
8. Izvolski’s Memorial to the Throne on June 12, 1906. (Russia) *New East* in 1928, the twentieth and twenty-first combined issue, p. 49
9. Pokotilov’s cipher telegram on June 5, 1906. (Russia) *New East* in 1928, the twentieth and twenty-first combined issue, p. 49 and 52. Nicholas commented on the telegram: “right”.
11. Memorandum on the Correspondence Relating to the Proposed Agreement Between Great Britain and Russia on the Subject of Tibet, British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in *British Documents on the Origins of the War* by Gooch, p. 336
12. Memorandum on the Correspondence Relating to the Proposed Agreement Between Great Britain and Russia on the Subject of Tibet, British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in *British Documents on the Origins of the War* by Gooch, p. 343
22. *British Blue Book* cd. 5240, pp. 128-130
23. See 12-21
25. Grey to Nicholson on Feb. 8, 1907, F.O. 53519, No. 53
27. See 12-21
30. *Tibet Today and Yesterday* by Li Tizheng, p. 123-124
32. *The Chronicle of Serving as an Envoy in Tibet* by Zhang Yingtang, Vol. 4
34. Zhang Yingtang’s *Memorial to the Throne*, Vol. 4, pp. 2-3
35. Zhang Yingtang’s *Memorial to the Throne*, Vol. 4, pp. 8-12
36. *Selected Historical Materials of Tibet* in 1963, p. 249

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Younghusband (right) and the Shigatse Abbot (left) are holding talks.
The order of Qing Government to dethrone Dalai Lama XIII.
Chapter VII

The Tussle Between British and Russia in Tibet Around the Revolution in 1911

I. The Qing Dynasty’s New Policies in Tibet and the Interference of Britain

1. The Qing Dynasty’s “New Policies”

At the beginning of the 20th century, the increasingly deepening national crisis and the people’s lasting struggles against feudalism and imperialism shattered the decadent reign of the Qing Dynasty. In order to mitigate the people’s protest and consolidate its tottering regime, the Qing Government carried out some new policies successively. In 1904, Britain launched an aggression and occupied Lhasa. The aggressors forced the Tibetan local government to sign a treaty and extorted indemnities and stationed troops at Chumbi. As a result, Tibet was further reduced to a colony. Besides, during the period of the Tibetan people’s anti-British struggles, the betraying policy flagrantly followed by You Tai, the Resident, ruined drastically the reputation of the Qing Dynasty. The Tibetan people had no longer faith in You Tai; they often put his orders aside though they were outwardly obedient. The worsening relationship between the Qing Dynasty and the Tibetan local government made the Qing Dynasty feel acutely that if no new measures were taken to rectify the mistakes in
the political affairs, not only Tibet could not remain under the control of the Central Government, but the neighbouring provinces such as Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai would fall into the hands of the imperialist powers in the following years. Therefore, on April 29, 1906, the Central Government appointed Zhang Yintang as a Major General, and sent him to Tibet as Assistant Resident to “make investigation into Tibetan affairs and to mete out due decisions”, for the sake of retrieving the critical situation in Tibet.

Zhang was the first Han who was appointed as a Resident in Tibet. Before this, all Residents had been Manchu officials. However, among officials of the ruling class of the Qing Dynasty, Zhang was the one of the few who were far-sighted, ambitious, liberal-minded, and bold to reform. He entered Tibet and made a thorough investigation. Then, he impeached the incompetent You Tai and a dozen of other officials of the Manchu, Han, and Tibetan nationalities, exposing their corruption and degeneration and the betraying activities in the fightings against the British invaders. On November 29, 1906, the Central Government ordered that You Tai be dismissed and punished. This greatly encouraged the Tibetans.

Then Zhang Yintang began to take some reform measures in Tibet. He drafted twenty-four clauses, aiming at “enlightening the people and making Tibet prosperous.” The purport of these clauses was as follows: urging the Tibetan officials to be loyal to the Central Government, resisting foreign goods and making more effort to benefit the people; making a check-up of the number of local households and land taxes; making preparations for the construction of a trade mart and improving diplomacy; training the army and raising money for its supplies; reorganizing the local army and strengthening the discipline; and sending 6,000 troops from the Beiyang Army to
station in Tibet and calling up the cadets from the military college for training 100,000 Tibetan troops; developing industry, agriculture, and commerce; opening up mines; planting tea trees to boycott the tea from India; making contact with Nepal and Bhutan to resist Britain together; abolishing tyranny and abrogating ula service (in Tibetan ula means corvée); lightening punishment; initiating education and setting up schools in which every course was taught in Chinese; publishing newspapers in both current Chinese and Tibetan languages; building roads, innovating upon customs, and limiting the number of monks, etc.¹ Zhang suggested two million silver coins be appropriated by the Central Government every year for all these new policies. In order to carry out the policies smoothly, Zhang also suggested that nine new offices be set up in Tibetan local government. They were 1. the office of communication, 2. the office of supervision and training, 3. the salt and tea office, 4. the office of finance, 5. the office of trade, 6. the mine and road office, 7. the office of education, 8. the agricultural office, and 9. the police office. Besides, a botanical garden was established as an auxiliary facility, consisting of five sections: the crop section, the vegetable section, the fruit section, the tree section and the flower and grass section. The Kashag officials discussed all these measures and they agreed to act in compliance with Zhang's instructions. To propagate the significance of the new policies in Tibet, Zhang wrote and published some pamphlets such as "On Cultivating Customs" and "The Reform of Tibetan Customs", which were easy to understand and had a widespread influence. He himself went to Jokhang Temple (a famous temple in Lhasa) to read the first two chapters of "Evolution and Ethics and Essays" to the Tibetan officials and tell them how to make China rich and strong.

A comprehensive survey of all these measures shows that
the aim of the reform was to develop national industry and commerce and to head for the path of the Western capitalism without affecting the rotten political system of the Qing Dynasty and the feudal serfdom in Tibet. However, Zhang’s measures were resisted by both the conservatives from the Qing Dynasty and the Tibetan serf owners. Besides, the Central Government was somehow suspicious of him. In order to place him under surveillance, soon after Zhang’s appointment the Qing Government sent Lian Yu, a bureaucrat of the Manchu nationality, as another Resident in Tibet. Being quite envious of Zhang, Lian Yu did a lot to trouble him and even spread slanderous rumours. In his secret report to the throne, Lian Yu said that Zhang had ordered “all the lamas should resume secular life and wear Western clothes, Zhang fired a number of staff members and reduced the quantity of horses.” Fearing that incidents might occur, the Qing Government ordered in May 1907 that Zhang should leave Tibet and go to India to rectify a commercial pact. However, Lian Yu continued to carry out the new policies after Zhang had gone.

At the same time, the Qing Government made some reforms in the Tibetan areas in the western part of Sichuan Province. In the autumn of 1906, after it had ruthlessly suppressed the anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist struggle of the Tibetan people in Batang and other places, the Qing Government appointed Zhao Erfeng the Minister of Border Affairs of Sichuan and Yunnan. His task was to safeguard the frontier region of Sichuan as to secure Tibet. Zhao abolished the Tusi system and appointed officials who could be replaced at any time. The Qing Government even directly appointed some officials to rule over such places as Batang and Litang which had been governed by Tusi before. Furthermore, Zhao also put a series of reformative measures into practice, including re-
measuring land, adopting new tax regulations, training troops, opening up wasteland, mining, building highways, setting up inns, initiating schools, limiting the number of monks, etc.² In a way, these measures played a progressive role in defending the unity of China and pounding at the serf system. However, national exploitation and discrimination were adopted while these measures were carried out. With the interests of the Tibetan serf owners harmed, these measures were strongly opposed. Thus, the contradiction between the Qing court and the Tibetan local government were deepened. In turn, these contradictions were exploited by the imperialists, who, seizing the chance, sowed dissension between the Chinese and the Tibetan nationalities and tried to inveigle the Tibetan ruling class headed by the Dalai into separating from China.

On March 6, 1908, the Qing Government appointed Zhao Erfeng Minister of Tibetan Affairs and granted him the title of Shangshu (a minister) for the sake of strengthening his power. This appointment caused the uneasiness and opposition of the Tibetan ruling class, who, having heard through hearsay that the Qing Government would change Tibet into a province, were afraid that they might encounter the same fate as that of Tusi and upper-class lamas in Sichuan Province who had been dismissed. Therefore, they pleaded Lian Yu time and again to present to the throne their entreatment to postpone the decision of transforming Tibet into a province. Furthermore, they sent secretly the Tibetan troops to the boundary areas of Sichuan Province and stirred up Tusi to oppose the new policies so that Zhao Erfeng might be stopped from entering Tibet.

All these activities were under the direct command of the Dalai Lama, who, after leaving Tibet, had always wandered over Qinghai, Mongolia and Wutai (a very famous Buddhist site in Shanxi Province) till he reached Beijing in September 1908. The
reason why the Qing Central Government called the Dalai Lama to Beijing was to eliminate the existing contradictions so as to calm the local people. However, after Emperor Guangxu and Empress Dowager Cixi passed away successively in August, the Qing Dynasty was in a precarious state. Therefore, the Dalai Lama set out for Tibet on August 21. When he reached Qinghai, he learned that both Zhao Erfeng and Lian Yu (the former in the border region of Sichuan, and the latter in Tibet) were carrying out actively the new policies and that they burnt down temples and slaughtered monks. The Dalai Lama was enraged by this piece of information. He ordered that the Tibetan officials and the lamas present their accusations of Zhao and Lian Yu to the Qing court. Besides, he called on the Tibetans to start a boycott and stop providing supplies for Lian Yu. Then the Dalai Lama designated Shatra Paljor Dorje and some others to gather military forces to prevent the Sichuan troops from entering Tibet.

2. Great Britain in Collusion with the Dalai to Sabotage the Reform in Tibet

The serious situation in Tibet provided a good chance for the imperialists. Various countries (e.g. Britain, Russia, France, Germany, USA, Japan, etc.) sent their representatives to get in touch with the Dalai and go in for canvass. Seeing that the role of the Dalai in Tibet getting more and more important, Great Britain tried hard to adjust its relationship with the Dalai. In 1907, Britain dispatched to Beijing a group of officials (including Johnston, O'Connor who were very familiar with Tibetan affairs, the Prince of Sikkim, and Das, who had a good command of the Tibetan language). The task of the group was to help Sir John Jordan, the British minister to China, so that they could win over the Dalai and to make him change his
anti-British attitude. Because his contradictions with the Qing Government were becoming acute, the Dalai turned to Great Britain and even fancied that, with Britain's influence, he could consolidate his position and prevent the Qing Government from carrying out the new policies in Tibet. Therefore, while he was staying on Wutai Mountains, he sent agents to Beijing to contact with Jordan, the British minister, in order to sound out the British attitude toward his returning to Tibet. Jordan stated that "he could not say how His Majesty's Government would view his intended return to Lhasa. During his absence relations between India and Tibet had improved...."3

When the Dalai reached Beijing, Jordan went to meet the Dalai in his dwelling place. Their talks proved successful. The Dalai said, "All the unfortunate things in the past were not my real intention. I hope sincerely that Tibet and India can have friendly and peaceful relations forever. Please take my message to the British King."

Jordan answered that the British Government also hoped that peaceful and friendly relationship between Tibet and India might be established.4 This showed that the Dalai began to pay attention to restoring good relations with the British Government. On November 20, the day before the Dalai returned to Tibet, he sent two trusted followers to the British Embassy to meet Jordan. They expressed the Dalai's confidence that he could keep a friendly relationship with the British-Indian authorities and that the bettering of the relationship with Britain was one of the most important rewards during his visit to Beijing.5

In order to continue the new policies in Tibet and suppress the rebellion of the Tibetan people, in early July 1909 the Qing Government ordered Zhong Ying, a Sichuan Prefect, to lead 2,000 troops for Tibet. In the middle of July, this army was
obstructed by Tibetan troops in the western area of Chamdo. Then the Qing Government commanded Zhao Erfeng to send troops to escort the Sichuan troops to Tibet. The Tibetan situation became serious.

In November, the Dalai reached Nagchu (Nagchukha in Tibetan) from Xining. There he stayed for a month and a half. There the Dalai sent secretly his followers to Gyantse. Acting on the Dalai's order, the men asked thrice the British trade agent to send telegrams for the Dalai to the British and the Russian Ministers to Beijing. In these telegrams, the Dalai censured the measures taken by Zhao Erfeng and Lian Yu which were unfavourable to the Tibetans. He also criticized strongly that Zhao and Lian Yu had not reported the actual situation of affairs in Tibet to the Central Government and thus caused the Qing court to dispatch troops to Tibet to wipe out the religion of Tibet. Then the Dalai sent another agent to Beijing with the message written by the Dalai himself to get in touch secretly with the British and the Russian Ministers. In these letters the Dalai required openly that Great Britain and Russia meddle with China’s domestic affairs. After he had reached Lhasa in December, the Dalai began managing the Tibetan affairs again. On December 19, in the name of Tsongdu (the National Assembly) the Dalai wrote to Wen Zongyao, the Assistant Resident in Tibet, enumerating 19 crimes of Lian Yu. The Dalai pleaded Wen to transfer to the Imperial Court his message in which the Dalai asked for the removal of Lian Yu from his office. At the same time the Dalai moved over 1,700 soldiers to Chamdo to intercept the Sichuan troops. On January 30, 1910, he sent his trusted followers to Gyantse to get in touch with the British trade agent. Meanwhile, the Dalai dispatched a few Tibetan officials to Calcutta to plead Great Britain for help.

The British Government caught this chance immediately
and declared openly its intention of interfering with the internal affairs in Tibet. On January 31, 1910, after he had received the report from the British trade agent in Gyantse, Lord Minto, the Viceroy of India, suggested that the British Government lodge a protest against Beijing. He was well aware of the fact that the Tibetan problem was the domestic affairs of China. Nevertheless, he asserted that the confusion outside the Indian borders could not be ignored, for it might result in a complete change of the present situation. He regarded the confusion in Tibet as against the spirit stated in the Sino-British Agreement on Tibet. Furthermore, he said if the chaos in Tibet could not be appeased, the British Government would have to strengthen the garrisons in Gyantse and Yadong.  

It seemed that the tension in Tibet might be relaxed for a time. At the end of January, the Dalai and Wen Zongyao held an interview at the Potala. They reached an agreement on Sichuan troop's entering Lhasa. The Dalai promised to withdraw the Tibetan troops which were intercepting the Sichuan army and to resume all the supplies for the Resident. Wen promised that after the Sichuan troops entered Tibet, they would abide by strict disciplines, maintain social order, and they would not disturb the locality, nor violate the religious rights of the Dalai, nor kill the monks, nor burn the temples down. On February 12, the Sichuan army entered Lhasa. However, on that very day they conflicted with the Tibetan troops and one lama was shot to death. The whole city was shocked and was in a state of restlessness. At night, escorted by more than 200 bodyguards, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa together with Shatra and several other Tibetan officials. On February 21 the Dalai reached Yadong through Pali. Then he was coaxed to go to Darjeeling by MacDonald, the British trade agent at Yadong. On leaving Yadong, the Dalai made a declaration, asking Great Britain for
After the Dalai had fled to India, the Qing Government issued an order that the title of the Dalai be abolished and that a new reincarnation be found to replace him. By now, the relationship between the Dalai and the Imperial court was actually broken off.

The British Government brazenly interfered with the internal affairs of China. On February 26, Max Müller, the British Chargé d’Affaires to China, lodged a protest against the Qing Government, claiming that Great Britain could not ignore the chaotic situation in Tibet and that it had the right to demand a detailed explanation before the Chinese Government adopted any policies in Tibet. Otherwise the British Government would think that the Chinese Government violated the treaty intentionally. Müller also opposed the abolition of the title of the Dalai, warning the Qing Government to consider the consequence carefully. On January 27, the Board of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Government sent an official message to Müller, explaining the cause of stationing troops in Tibet and the reason of the abolition of the title of the Dalai, and stating that China would abide by the treaty just as usual and that the situation in Tibet would not be changed whether the Dalai left or not.

On March 5, Müller again accused the Qing Government of its sending troops to Tibet and the abolition of Dalai’s title. Four days later, the Qing Government gave this British Chargé d’Affaires a formal reply. It announced the crimes the Dalai had committed and restated that China would abide by the Convention Between China and Great Britain. It also declared that the purpose of sending troops to Tibet was to safeguard Tibet. The document also pointed out emphatically: “In short, the abrogation of the title of Dalai is the sovereign right of our govern-
ment. The Tibetan-Indian Treaty was concluded by India and the Tibetan local government, not by the Dalai Lama. Therefore, the abolition of the title of Dalai has nothing to do with the Tibetan system of administration. As for the other officials, they can hold their office as usual. No system has been changed.”

However, the British Government would not leave the matter at that. They continued to put pressure upon the Qing Government by seeking excuses. On April 11, Müller again presented a note to the Qing Government, demanding not only the security of the gained privileges, but also a rapid solution to preferential tariff and the import of Indian tea. He clamoured for more British troops in the Sino-Indian border areas, on the excuse that changes in the Tibetan domestic affairs would affect the state system of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim.

At the same time, the British Government acted in collusion with the Dalai who had escaped to India. In order to develop the relationship between Britain and Tibet the British Government watched for the chance to give the Dalai a very warm entertainment, such as presenting gifts, providing the Dalai with a dwelling and places for recreation. The British and Indian officials went now and then to visit and pay their respects to the Dalai so as to draw him over. As a result, on March 14, the Dalai set out for Calcutta from Darjeeling to see Minto, the Viceroy of India. He asked the British to help drive the Han force out of Tibet and to recognize “the independence of Tibet.” This was just what the British hoped for, but they were afraid that if they violated the treaty and openly supported Tibet to break away from China, they would meet the strong opposition from the Russians, and the newly-established Russo-British alliance would be broken. Therefore, on May 4, 1910, the British Government stated that it could not interfere with
the affairs between the Tibetan and the Chinese, but that the Dalai Lama and his followers would be welcome and respected so long as they stayed in India. The Dalai was so disappointed at this declaration that he turned to Russia for help.

After the Dalai had fled to India, Korostovetz, the Russian Ambassador to China, presented a note of protest to the Qing Government on February 25, 1910. In it he claimed that if the Qing Government employed coercive methods, the 1,500,000 Russian Buddhists who worshipped the Dalai would rise in protest, then the situation would be hard to handle. However, the Russian influence in Tibet had already been weakened, (besides, they were bound by the Russo-British Treaty), the Russians dared not take reckless actions. They bluffed and blustered, but could have no effect on the situation.

In March, 1911, the Dalai wrote to Tsar Nicholas II, pleading the Russian Government either separately or with Great Britain to send a message to the Chinese Government for the resumption of his title and to invite him to visit Petersburg. But the Tsar didn’t value him as important as before. In particular, the Dalai had already settled down in Darjeeling for a long time and was under the control of Great Britain, the Russians couldn’t do much for him. Furthermore, they didn’t want to offend Great Britain for breaking the Russo-British Treaty. The Russian Government thought that under the present circumstances their inviting the Dalai to Petersburg meant they would have to undertake certain obligations, for example, the problem of the Dalai’s returning to Lhasa. However, “It was destined to failure if they talked with the Dalai his future way out, so it was very harmful.” Therefore, Nicholas II put the letter aside and didn’t answer him for a long time. Nevertheless, the Tsar didn’t want to lose totally his influence on the Dalai. Therefore, after eight
months with a shilly-shally attitude, on November 23 the Tsar wrote a letter of consolation which was presented to the Dalai himself by the Russian Consul General to Calcutta. The letter said: "You know that I am very worried about Your Holiness’ predicament. My government is paying close attention to the development of the situation in Tibet. We fully approve of your resolution to defend your legal right within the limit of the present treaties. In order to achieve this, I think it a very important condition to pursue a policy which is in coordination with that of the Great Britain. I also think that it would be much help to extricate yourself from the present difficult situation, if you could act according to my opinion." However, with nothing substantial the Tsar showed only his sympathy and support in the letter. He didn’t invite the Dalai to visit Russia. Furthermore, he emphasized that the Dalai should act coordinately with the Great Britain. This shows that on the one hand, the Russian Government still want to win the Dalai over to keep its influence in Tibet, on the other hand, it tried hard not to infringe upon the British-Russian Agreement which was the strategy of opposing Germany together with Great Britain. On December 6, 1912, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs secretly telegraphed Levilioch, the Russian Consul General to Calcutta, informing him to go to Darjeeling and present the letter mentioned above to the Dalai Lama. To avoid their suspicion, the Russian Consul was ordered to visit the Dalai together with British officials. When he received the letter the Dalai said to the Russian Consul: "I was much moved by His Majesty’s solicitude. I will act on His Majesty’s will all the time." It seemed that this political operation of Russia achieved the desired result.
II. The New Step of Splitting Tibet Off China

1. “The Tibetan Independence” Directed by Great Britain

In China in 1911 there took place a revolution which overthrew the Qing Dynasty and led to the foundation of the Republic of China. In 1912, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in the name of Provisional President, issued the Declaration of the republicanism of five nationalities. The Declaration said that “the uprising in Wuchang resulted in the successive independence of more than a dozen provinces. The so-called ‘independence’ is to detach from the Qing Court but to unite with other provinces, including Mongolia and Tibet.” In October that year, the new government, while rehabilitating the title of the Dalai Lama, also offered the Panchen Erdeni a title and telegraphed that a commissioner would be sent to deal with the Tibetan affairs.

The news of revolution evoked a strong response in Tibet. The Qing troops stationed in Lhasa and other places staged an armed uprising on the pretext of asking for pay. They imprisoned Lian Yu, the Resident, and made his secretary He Guangxie the military governor and declared that an interim government was established. The Revolution strongly destroyed the Qing Dynasty’s rule over Tibet.

Unfortunately, the leadership was usurped by Zhong Ying, who had sneaked into the revolutionary ranks. He set Lian Yu free and assassinated He Guangxie. Then he restored the system of the resident. As for Lian Yu, he handed out the official seal and let Zhong Ying be the acting Resident.

The revolution in China aroused from the imperialists the strong desire to rob China and carve up the territory of China. In December 1912, the British invaded Lhoyu and other places. At the same time, the British Government instigated the Dalai who had fled to India to build an independent Tibet. At the
end of the year 1911 Minto, the Viceroy of India, went to Darjeeling to visit the Dalai and plotted with him. Now, supported by Great Britain, the Dalai provoked Tibetans and the Qing troops into armed conflicts in Yadong and Pali. Then MacDonald, the British trade agent in Yadong came out to act as an intermediary. He forced the Qing troops to give up their weapons and surrender, then returned to the inland by way of India. In March, armed with British weapons, over ten thousand Tibetan troops made an assault on the Qing troops in Gyantse. Being short of manpower and ammunition, with no help from the Qing troops in Lhasa, the troops there were besieged by the Tibetan troops and entrenched near the Gyantse Paper Mill. In early April, MacDonald went to Gyantse to watch the fight. He thought that "the Tibetan troops lacked in combat effectiveness ... they hadn’t had any military training and had no competent commanders,"\textsuperscript{21} and it would be very difficult for them to defeat the Qing troops. Therefore, he acted as an intermediary and forced the Qing troops to give up their weapons which were said to be sealed up, and then he forced the troops to go back to the inland by way of India. Then, in the same way, he drove away the Qing troops in Shigatse. In April, the Tibetan insurgent troops assaulted the troops led by the acting Resident Zhong Ying. The splitting activities instigated by the Dalai clique got more and more rampant and the situation in Tibet was extremely strained.

During this period the President of the Republic of China issued on April 22 a command, reiterating: "Now our country is a republic of five nationalities — Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui and Tibetan — with a unified territory. All the land in Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang is a part of the territory of the Republic of China, and all people in those districts are the subjects of the Republic of China." "Since a united government
is founded now, all the nationalities affairs are to be taken over by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.”

On May 10, the Government of the Republic of China formally appointed Zhong Ying as the Commissioner in charge of all affairs in Tibet. The government also brewed suppressing the riot by sending troops to Tibet. The reaffirmation of the sovereignty of the Central Government over Tibet and the just measures taken to promote the reunification of China were strong counter-blows to the imperialists who had interfered with the domestic affairs of Tibet by now. Fearing that once the Chinese troops entered Tibet, the plotted riot would be doomed to failure, the British Government took a series of measures to speed up its pace of invading Tibet.

In May, an army of thousands of British soldiers were directly sent to Gyantse and Lhasa, the British Government “carried out the interfering in the name of protecting the British nationals”. On June 24, the British-Indian officials escorted the Dalai back to Tibet to direct the rebel forces. On departure, the British-Indian officials said to the Dalai that their hope was “to see an autonomous Tibet under the condition that China had its suzerainty over Tibet without meddling with the internal affairs of Tibet.” Actually what Great Britain really hoped for was to split Tibet off China and make Tibet into its colony.

Having fought for three months, the army led by Zhong Ying lacked in provisions and landed in a predicament of being attacked front and rear. On July 30, the British urged Nepal to act as an intermediary, forcing Zhong Ying to negotiate with the rebel forces. The two sides reached four conditions of making peace: (1) The Chinese army surrendered their weapons to the Nepalese for safekeeping; (2) All Chinese soldiers should be dismissed and should return to China by way of India, but the officials might keep their positions. (3) The officials in
Tibet might keep some weapons (30-60 rifles); (4) Compensate for the damage of houses and property.\textsuperscript{24} Thus, the whole army led by Zhong Ying surrendered and all the officials and soldiers went back to China by way of India. This was the so-called Ren Zi Incident (Ren Zi means the name of that year in Chinese calendar).

Then, the British-Indian Government instigated the rebel forces to attack the troops in the western part of Sichuan Province where lived the Tibetans. The aim of the British Government was enlarging the land occupied by the Tibetan separatists. In the middle of June, 1912, supported by Great Britain, the rebel forces occupied such places as Zhaya, Jiangka, Yanjing, Daocheng, and Litang (all these towns are in Sichuan Province near Tibet) and besieged Chamdo and Kangding (Tachienlu, in Sichuan Province). For the safety of the two provinces of Sichuan and Yunnan, the Government of the Northern Warlords ordered Yin Changheng, the Sichuan General, to suppress the riot in Tibet. Yin Changheng divided his army into two. The one, going along the northern route, defeated the rebel forces and rescued Chamdo and Batang (in Sichuan Province) from the siege. The other, going along the southern route, recaptured Hekou and Litang. Thus the situation in the border area of Sichuan became steady on the whole.

The Sichuan troops won many victories in succession. This made Great Britain come out impatiently to interfere with the Tibetan affairs. On August 17, Jordan, the British Minister to China, delivered a note to the Foreign Ministry of China, putting forth five unreasonable demands: 1. China was not allowed to meddle with the internal affairs of Tibet; 2. Great Britain was opposed to the Chinese officials' seizing the administrative power in Tibet and didn't acknowledge that China regarded Tibet as a province; 3. China was not allowed to
station too large an army in Tibet; 4. Great Britain would not recognize the Republic of China before all the above-mentioned points were stipulated in a treaty; 5. The passage from China to Tibet via India was to be closed temporarily. On September 7, instructed by the British Government, Jordan again peremptorily warned the Foreign Ministry of China that if the Republic of China persisted in conquering Tibet and ordered the Chinese army to advance further, the British Government would not only refuse to recognize the Republic of China, but also assist Tibet in its independence with firm strength.

Soon afterwards, Great Britain presented another note to the Chinese Government, claiming that China had only suzerainty but not sovereignty over Tibet. Great Britain allowed only 200 Chinese soldiers to station in Tibet to protect the Resident. Depending politically and financially on the imperialists, the Northern Warlord Government headed by Yuan Shikai yielded before the interference and agreed to suspend the sending of troops to Tibet. At the same time, the government adopted a reconciliatory attitude towards the Dalai Lama, trying hard to solve the Tibetan problem peacefully.

As for the Dalai Lama, under the persuasion of the patriotic people of the Tibetan upper strata, he was gradually sobered up from revenge and gave up the policy of breaking away from the Central Government. In the middle of October, the Dalai Lama proposed five conditions of peaceful settlement through Zhong Ying to the Government of the Northern Warlords. On October 28, the government rehabilitated the Dalai Lama. Soon afterwards, it sent Yang Fen to Tibet as the soother for negotiating the Tibetan affairs. Then on December 23, the government delivered a note to the British Government, declaring solemnly that Tibet was a part of China and that the Chinese Government had the right to send troops to Tibet and
to change Tibet into an administrative province. Great Britain had no right to meddle with this.27

Nevertheless, Great Britain continued its scheme of an "independent" Tibet, despite the note of the Chinese Government. In early 1913, the British Government attempted to force the Tibetan authorities to conclude secretly an illegal treaty, which include the following contents: 1. After Tibet had declared its independence, all its guns should be provided by Great Britain; 2. Tibet should agree that Britain sent people to Tibet to supervise finance and military affairs as the reward to Britain's assistance in Tibet's independence; 3. Britain provided a loan of three million pounds to Tibet, and Britain could decide whatever it chose as the mortgage; 4. If the Chinese troops entered Tibet, British troops would be responsible for the resistance; 5. When Tibet declared its independence, Great Britain would be the first to recognize it and would persuade other countries to do so; 6. Tibet should open its door to the outside; the British citizens could enjoy freedom within Tibet.28

Evidently, Britain intended to convert Tibet into one of its colonies through this treaty. Although this plot didn't succeed, the relationship between Tibet and the Central Government was in a state of division for a time.

2. "Mongolian-Tibetan Treaty" Created by Russia

After the revolution of 1911 in China, Russian troops steadily entered Mongolia in the middle of October 1911, hastening its scheme of splitting Mongolia off China. Supported by Russia behind the scene, rebels put up a "Proclamation of Independence" on the streets in Urga, Outer Mongolia on December 13. On December 28, a ceremony of the so-called "ascending the throne" by the Emperor of "the Great Empire of Mongolia" was held. Then on November 3, 1912, Russia
compelled the dukes and ministers of the Outer Mongolia to conclude a "Russo-Mongolian Treaty", which stipulated that Russia had the privileges of "protecting" the independence of Outer Mongolia, assisting Outer Mongolia in the training of troops, preventing China from stationing troops and migrating to Outer Mongolia, and the exclusive commercial privilege which could not be shared with other countries. If Outer Mongolia intended to conclude any treaties with other countries, it should have the permission of Russia in advance. The "Russo-Mongolian Treaty" was one of Russia's important steps to annex Outer Mongolia. According to the Treaty, Outer Mongolia became one of the protectorates of Russia.

The Russian Government thought that China had lost control over Tibet as well. Therefore, while plotting an independent Outer Mongolia, the Russian Government instructed Dorjieff, a notable spy, to incite Tibet to seize the chance to declare independence in the way Mongolia did. He was also ordered to instigate the Tibetan authorities to form an alliance with Russia and the "independent" Outer Mongolia. In the spring of 1912, Dorjieff went to Pali by way of Nagchu and Gyantse. On meeting the Dalai Lama, Dorjieff told him the way Russia incited Outer Mongolia to be independent, and advertised "an independent Tibet." Being especially fond of him and having trust in him, the Dalai decided to watch for a chance to declare the independence of Tibet. After their secret discussions he also entrusted Dorjieff two diplomatic missions: one was to conclude a "Mongolian-Tibetan Treaty" with Outer Mongolia in order to form a political alliance, and the other was to hold negotiations with Russia to sign a Russo-Tibetan Treaty.29

Toward the end of 1912 Dorjieff reached Urga. As a delegate of the Dalai, he held talks with the Jebtsun Dampa rebellious clique of Mongolia and declared "the independence
of Tibet.” On January 11, 1913, Dorjieff and Lama Rabdan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Outer Mongolia signed the “Mongolian-Tibetan Treaty.” Then Dorjieff notified in detail the content, the process of negotiating and signing of the treaty to the Russian envoy to Outer Mongolia Korosvetz, who later wrote in his memoir that he had indeed learnt that the “Mongolian-Tibetan Treaty” was signed.30

There were nine articles in this treaty. The first and the second articles stated that both sides recognized each other’s independence and recognized the chief of each country — Jebtsun Dampa Lama and the Dalai Lama — had the highest authority; the third article guaranteed that the two countries would take measures to prosper Buddhism; the fourth stipulated that when either one of these two newly-born countries suffered from invasion, the other should help to resist the enemy; the fifth and the sixth were that the two countries should enhance their trade and people of the two countries might contact freely but the loans should have the permission of the two countries. The seventh and the eighth articles were about the additional sections of the treaty, deciding that the two governments would send plenipotentiaries to sign other special agreements. The ninth article approved that this treaty became effective immediately upon signature without any special procedure of ratification.31 It was evident that it was the Russian spy who instigated the two border areas of China to conclude privately this illegal treaty. The abject action of creating a splitted China fully exposed the ambition of Russia to annex the border areas of China.

The treaty was an undisguised violation of China’s sovereignty, so neither Britain nor Russia dared to acknowledge it. So far as Russia was concerned, the treaty was favourable for Mongolia and Tibet to break away from China and for Russia
to enhance its aggressive influence in these two regions, but it harmed the interests of Great Britain. Because of all these factors Russia had to be careful in its activities. So far as Great Britain was concerned, it regarded the treaty as abetted by Russia. With Mongolia being one of the dependencies of Russia and Mongolia and Tibet being allies, the treaty would get Tibet under the Russian influence. Certainly the British Government paid close attention to any move towards the signing of this treaty. Nevertheless, no definite answer was reported for the existence of this treaty, although inquiries had been made in many ways. The Dalai Lama denied that he had ever empowered Dorjieff to sign this treaty. It seemed that this treaty could merely be regarded as an illegal one created by Dorjieff and a few others, even if it really existed.

In January 1913, after he had signed the treaty, Dorjieff went to Petersburg from Urga. He presented the Dalai’s letters to Tsar Nicholas II and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs; he also reported to the Russian Government about the ousting of the Chinese officials and troops by the Tibetans. He proposed a prepared draft of “Russo-Tibetan Treaty”, which had been drawn up with reference to “Russo-Mongolian Treaty”. The draft included the following main contents: both Russia and Great Britain would be the Protectors of Tibet; China’s suzerainty over Tibet should be deprived of: the Russians and the British could enter Tibet freely; the Tibetan Government should invite counsellors and instructors from Russia and Britain to help establish financial and military organizations; Russia should enjoy the privilege of free trade with Tibet and of excavating natural resources in Tibet; Russia and Great Britain should provide weapons to Tibet, etc.

But this project was given a cold shoulder by outstanding personalities of the Russian Government, particularly by the
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was strongly in favour of an intimate relationship with Great Britain, so it was not carried out. Before Dorjieff had left for Petersburg, Korostovetz, the Russian special envoy to Urga, had pointed out to him that this project was unacceptable, because it contradicted with the “Russo-British Agreement about Tibet” and the Sino-British Treaty. As the relationship between Russia and Great Britain got more and more intimate, the Russian Government would certainly avoid all possible unhappiness on the part of Britain. The Russian Government thought that should Tibet become independent, it would surely become one of British colonies, not a dependency of Russia. D.D. Pokotilov, the Russian Minister to China, had definitely pointed out that once Tibet was “separated from China, it would become a region where Great Britain could do whatever it liked, because it was adjacent to India”. Evidently, the Russian Government would never hope to see such a political situation in Tibet.

NOTES

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Chapter VIII

The Simla Conference and the McMahon Line

I. Britain’s Scheme to Hold the Simla Conference

1. Preliminaries

The negotiation between China and Britain came to a deadlock in the latter half of 1912. In early January 1913, it was rumoured that the Mongolian-Tibetan Treaty and Russo-Tibetan Treaty had all been signed, which greatly shocked Britain. The British Government attempted to consolidate and expand its privileges in Tibet by calling a meeting so that new conventions might be signed. In March 1913, Jordan made some suggestions to the British Government. He said,

“These new facts — the elimination of Chinese influence in Tibet and the establishment of the connection between Tibet and Russia through Mongolia — seem to me to demand a revision of our Tibetan policy.... The most essential point of such a change would be the establishment of closer relations with the Dalai Lama and a fuller knowledge of what arrangements the Tibetan Government are prepared to make ... a tripartite agreement between Great Britain, China and Tibet would probably be the best solution, and negotiations in India between the three parties would serve as a useful preliminary to such an agreement; even their failures would leave us in a better position to negotiate with Tibet independent of China.”
This suggestion made by Jordan agreed with Britain’s demands of aggression and in fact became the blueprint at the Simla Conference.

In the early years of the Republic of China, the domestic political situation was very unstable. So the then government was unable to resist the pressure and had to inform Jordan on March 27 that the Chinese Government was willing to accept the conditions put forward by the British on August 17, 1912. The British succeeded in their interference in Tibet, so they became very greedy and unscrupulous, sparing no efforts to entrap the Chinese Government.

Before the Simla Conference, the disputes between China and Britain focused on the following:

1) Location of the conference

The Chinese Government held that the conference should be held in London for the conflict between different political parties there might, to some extent, check the momentum of Britain’s aggression. Thus China would not lose greatly in the negotiation. But in May, the British informed the Chinese that the conference was to be held in Darjeeling. In June, the British changed their mind and decided to hold the conference in Simla. However, they did that not because Simla was a summon resort, but because the British found it easier to control the procedures of the meeting there. And the delegates from Tibet would be influenced more by the British than by the Chinese.2

2) Choice of delegates

At the end of May, the Chinese Government appointed Wen Zongyao, former Chinese Assistant Resident in Tibet, to be the Chinese delegate. But after learning that the place of the conference had been changed to India, Wen Zongyao resigned his position to show his disapproval. Then, in June Yuan Shikai planned to appoint an experienced diplomat by the name of
Zhang Yintang. The British knew full well that Zhang was difficult to deal with, so they disagreed. It was not until Yuan Shikai nominated Chen Yifan for the post that the British gave their consent. To the British, he was friendly and easy to cope with, for he had been worked in the Chinese embassy in Britain for several years. The Chinese Government might have noticed this factor and appointed Hu Hanmin, who was known to be anti-British, to be the representative for negotiation and stipulated that he had the same power as Chen Yifan. Hearing this news, the British protested against the appointment, which resulted in Yuan’s cancellation of the appointment. Meanwhile, the British-Indian Government appointed McMahon to be the delegate for negotiation. And the Dalai Lama appointed Lonchen Shatra the local representative from Tibet.

3) Powers and titles of the delegates

The Chinese Government denied that the delegate from Tibet could enjoy the plenipotentiary power, insisting that the five nationalities in China should be taken as one unit and that the Tibetan nationality was a major member in the big family of China. At the same time, the Chinese Government gave Chen Yifan another title — Commissioner for Tibetan Affairs — in order to make clear China’s sovereignty over Tibet.

On July 15, Gu Weijun (known as Willington Gu), an official in the Foreign Ministry of China, announced solemnly to Alstone: “The delegate from Tibet cannot be appointed casually. Under no circumstances will China recognize any Tibetan delegate who assumes the role of minister plenipotentiary without permission.” He suggested that the Tibetan delegate be called “Official in Power” to attend the conference according to the practice during the revision of the Trade Regulations of 1908. Only then could he take part in the negotiation. But the British stubbornly insisted that the dele-
gates from China, Britain and Tibet must attend the conference on equal footing, otherwise they would never agree. The British also demanded Chen Yifan’s title, Commissioner for Tibetan Affairs, be cancelled and, instead, be given a new title, Commissioner for Negotiations. In June, Alstone told the Chinese Government in a diplomatic note, “If China treats Tibet as one province of China by appointing a Commissioner for Tibetan Affairs, the British Government will not recognize it.” Alstone did not give in until Lu Zhengxiang, the Chinese Foreign Minister, told him that it was done only for domestic reasons and was not directed against any foreign countries, therefore it must not be cancelled.

4) The ways to conduct the negotiation

The Chinese agreed to attend a tripartite conference, but suggested two bilateral negotiations be held respectively, namely, the Chinese delegate first talk with the Tibetan representative and then negotiate with the British. After the negotiation, the Chinese would sign a convention with the British and the Tibetans could only put their names at the end, or the representatives from China and Tibet could sign a new treaty called Sino-Tibetan Treaty according to the content of the Sino-British Convention. Gu Weijun was strongly opposed to the idea that the representative of Tibet could sign together on equal footing. If China accepted this idea, it would mean China admitted Tibet was equal to an independent country having the power to sign treaties. Of course, the British would not agree since they had their own ax to grind. Alstone replied: “Our government won’t give its consent if two separate conventions are to be signed.”

Though it was weak and incompetent at that time the Chinese Government did not give in to the British on some issues of principles. For example, the Chinese Government firmly denied the so-called independence of Tibet and opposed
to the idea of the three parties attending the conference on equal footing. In the meantime, the Chinese attempted to settle the dispute through direct negotiations with Tibet. In May, 1913, Lu Xingqi, Chinese Commissioner stationed in Tibet, wrote to Yuan Shikai that there was still some hope of solving the Tibetan question independently, for the Dalai Lama, so far, hadn't openly refused to be loyal to the Central Government and the British still considered Tibet as part of China. During the summer of that year, in an effort to solve the problems existing between the Central Government and Tibet, Yin Changheng held a talk with Kolun Lama, the Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan forces on the Sichuan border.

While the Chinese Government was attempting to solve the Tibetan question, the British did their utmost to instigate the Tibetan separatists and draw them to their side. Charles Bell personally instructed Lonchen Shatra in Gyantse, saying that before the conference was to be held, he should try to collect all kinds of materials in the archives, which could be used as evidences to prove the so-called independence of Tibet. To Bell's mind, the British could easily gain profit when the Tibetan representative was attacking the Chinese delegates at the conference.

2. The Simla Conference

On October 13, 1913, the Simla Conference finally opened. A big conspiracy was brewing. Indian Foreign Minister Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, the British delegate, acted as Chairman of the conference, at which the delegates from three parties all put forward their draft treaties. The draft treaty put forward by the Chinese consisted of seventeen articles and the British draft treaty contained 6 articles. What was eye-catching at the conference was the draft treaty put forward by the representa-
tive of Tibet. It was identical with the British draft treaty and also contained 6 articles:

1) The independence of Tibet;
2) The Tibetan territory should include Qinghai, Litang, Batang and Tachienlu;
3) The Trade Regulations Between Tibet and India signed in the 19th year and the 34th year of Guangxu's reign is to be revised by Tibet and Britain. China should not concern itself with it;
4) China should not send its officials and army to Tibet;
5) As the monasteries in China and Mongolia recognized the Dalai Lama as their religious leader, all their abbots should be appointed by the Dalai Lama;
6) All the taxes illegally collected in Nyarong (modern Xinlong County, Sichuan) should be returned to Tibet and the losses sustained by Tibetans be compensated for.⁵

As a matter of fact, these six articles were worked out secretly by Bell and Shatra in advance. It shows clearly the British plot to control the upper elements of Tibet and to separate Tibet from China. According to the archives in the British Foreign Ministry, the purpose of doing so is "to make Tibet totally depend on the Indian Government. Thus, China and Russia will be driven out of Tibet."⁶ This draft treaty not only cut off the relationship between the Chinese Government and the Tibetan region, but also attempted to expand the Tibetan territory to Qinghai Province and the western part of Sichuan Province. No doubt a treaty of this kind was more than the Chinese Government could accept.

On November 1, the Chinese delegate countered with their draft treaty which consisted of 7 articles:

1) Tibet should be recognized as an inseparable part of the Chinese territory;
2) The Chinese Government retains the right to appoint a Resident Official in Lhasa;

3) In foreign, military and political affairs, Tibet should act on the instruction of the Chinese Central Government and must not sign any treaties with foreign countries without being permitted by the Chinese Central Government;

4) All those who stood with the Chinese and are now being imprisoned by the Dalai Lama must be released; and their sealed estates be restored;

5) Article 5 of the draft treaty put forward by the Tibetans can be negotiated;

6) If it should be found necessary to revise the Tibetan-Indian Trade Regulation signed in 1908, the revision should be made through negotiation by the Chinese and the British in accordance with the Sino-British Agreement Concerning Tibet signed on April 4 of the thirty-second year of Guangxu’s reign.

7) The boundary between Tibet and China has been indicated on the map attached to the draft treaty. (Note: On the map Dangla Range and Gyamda are demarcated within Sichuan Province.7)

By these refuting articles, the Chinese basically negated the so-called independence of Tibet. The Chinese stuck to the original boundary line between Tibet and its neighbouring provinces. As a result, there was a hot dispute and the negotiation didn’t make any progress.

3. The Miscarriage of the Simla Convention

At the beginning of the Simla Conference, the British incited the Tibetan authorities to assert their independence from the Chinese Central Government and watched with folded arms while the two sides were attacking each other. By the time when neither side could win, the British delegate began to play the
role of a mediator and on March 11, 1914, proposed another draft as a compromise. It was called “Agreement of Mediation” containing 11 articles. Besides repeating the old statement that Tibet was only under China’s suzerainty, the new draft raised the question of Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. It said that Tibet, Qinghai, Xikang and the Tibetan areas in Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan should all be called Tibet. The areas to the east of the Jinsha River were to be termed Inner Tibet while the areas to the west of the river, Outer Tibet. The latter included Tibet, the border areas of Sichuan and most part of Qinghai Province. It stipulated that Outer Tibet should have autonomy and the internal affairs of Outer Tibet should be solely controlled by the Lhasa Government. Neither China nor Britain had the right to interfere. The Chinese Resident official to Tibet together with his 100 guards could reside in Tibet, but no other officials and soldiers should be sent to Tibet. Certain regulations formulated in 1893 and 1908 concerning the trade between India and Tibet should be revised or abolished and Tibet and Britain could sign trade agreements directly. If necessary, the British Trade Commissioner could reside at Lhasa with his escort. The so-called “Agreement of Mediation” was almost the same as the six articles submitted by the Tibetan delegate, only with a few changes in wording. The so-called autonomy in Outer Tibet actually meant the separation of Tibet from China. Outwardly, the agreement stipulated that China could send its Resident Official and 100 guards to Tibet, which seemed to have retained the old practice. However, in essence, the Chinese Resident Official in Tibet was a mere formality playing the same role as an ambassador or a consul of a foreign country because of the autonomy of internal and foreign affairs in Outer Tibet. Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was completely lost. Instead, the British commissioner was given various privileges, such as the
stationing of guards at Lhasa and direct negotiation with the Tibetans. Moreover, the British could directly sign trade agreements with Tibet, which would enable them to obtain different political and economical privileges. Gradually, Tibet would be turned into one of the British colonies.

During that time the Republic of China was founded, and the domestic situations were not very stable. The provinces in the south started a second revolution to oppose the rule of Yuan Shikai. Since Yuan was busy dealing with the turbulent situation at home, he became very weak in dealing with foreign affairs and made quite a few concessions on the Tibetan problem. The Chinese Government, on the whole, agreed to the Agreement of Mediation except the demarcation of Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. Afterwards, the Chinese made another four concessions on the boundary line on March 18, March 28, April 3 and April 20 respectively. Whereas the British only made two amendments on their original draft on April 17 and April 27. According to the last concession made by the Chinese, the land to the north of the Tanggula Range belonged to Qinghai Province and the boundary remained unchanged. Batang, Litang and Adunzi, considered as part of China proper, would be under the direct control of the Chinese Government. The land to the east of the Salween River, including Derge, Nyarong and the Tsoba Sogu became a special zone called Kang, namely, Xikang.

According to the first amendment made by the British, the land to the northeast of Jagchuka Mountain (in Qinghai, also called Koknor), Jinchuan (in Sichuan Province), Tachienlu and Adunzi (in Yunnan Province) would be under the direct control of China. Nyarong and Derge would be ceded to Tibet. The British maintained that the Chinese should not station their troops within the areas of 300 miles around Lhasa for the sake
of the autonomy and safety of Tibet. They denied China's legitimate demand to demarcate the boundary on the Tanggula Range and, instead, suggested that only the land to the northeast of Shuhanfu Mountain and Amne Machin Mountain belonged to Qinghai Province. In fact, the land mentioned by the British in the draft of amendment were originally under the control of the Chinese Government. So China was asked to give large stretches of its land to Tibet. China flatly refused to accept the draft. On March 7, Chen Yifan informed Shatra, "The Republic of China has no right to change any part of its territory inherited from the Qing Dynasty, so it must adhere to the original map." On April 15, he called at the Indian Foreign Office, strongly opposing to give Tibet the equal status with China and Britain. He said, "... it's impossible to recognize that Tibet has the equal status with China."

The British Government tried to make the Chinese yield to their demands by exerting great pressure both in and outside of the conference in order to fulfill their goal of aggression. On April 6, Jordan, the British Minister in Beijing, demanded that Yuan Shikai change his policy towards Tibet, saying, "It would be better if the Chinese Government spend more energy consolidating its position at home rather than debate in vain about the position of Tibet."

Nevertheless, the Chinese delegate still tried to stick to his statement by using delaying tactics and argued endlessly with the British over the problem of Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet.

At that time the guiding principle of the Chinese Government was very definite. That is, to do whatever they could to preserve the territorial integrity. On April 20, 1914, the Chinese Foreign Ministry sent a telegram to Chen Yifan, which said, "Although the British delegate stated that their proposal was the last concession they would make, we will make no more
compromise and concessions, since the problem being discussed now has very much to do with our sovereignty.” Several days later, Chen received another telegram demanding that he should tell the British, “We have made the concession we can afford concerning the boundary problem. Now it is time for the British to make some concessions in order to continue the negotiation.”

On April 27, the British delegate brought forward the second amendment of the Agreement of Mediation after they slightly white-washed the first amendment. They agreed that some regions originally belonging to Qinghai Province would still be put under the control of Qinghai Province. After that, they immediately announced the discussion of the convention ended and the convention was first signed by the British and the Tibetan delegates. Thus, they intended to exert great pressure on Chen Yifan, saying that if China refused to sign, Britain and Tibet would sign it formally and would cross out the articles concerning China’s interests (namely, Article 2 and Article 4). Then, neither the British nor the Tibetans would negotiate the Tibetan problem with the Chinese delegates. In order to continue the negotiation, Chen Yifan yielded to Britain’s pressure and was forced to sign the Convention.

After the content of the Simla Conference was disclosed by the Chinese press and the news of the signing of the Convention reached China, people all over China showed disapproval with great indignation. Chen Yinfan was strongly condemned by the Chinese people. He was unanimously described as an irresponsible official betraying the nation and was considered to have committed a serious crime. The Chinese Government declared at once that the signing of the Simla Convention was null and void. On April 28, Chinese Foreign Ministry sent Chen Yifan a telegram, telling him, “We were shocked to hear
that the British delegate forced our delegate to sign on the Convention by promising to ceding a piece of land to Qinghai Province. The Chinese Government will not recognize the Convention and you must make a statement at once to cancel it.¹²

In the meantime, the Chinese Government showed its willingness to continue negotiating with the British. On May 10, the Chinese Government informed the British Minister to China in an official note that China would accept the Convention on the whole apart from the articles concerning the boundary of Tibet. The British Government would not take their failure lying down and kept forcing the Chinese to sign on the Convention drafted solely by itself. On June 6, Jordan, the British Minister to China, sent the Chinese Government a hard note, saying, “The Convention signed by the three parties at the Simla Conference on April 27 is the only solution to the Tibetan problem. If China still opposes it and refuses to sign on it, China will no longer enjoy the rights stipulated by the tripartite convention.¹³ But the Chinese Government didn’t change its attitude on that issue. On July 2, the British delegate informed Chen Yifan of the decision to sign the convention formally on July 2. Abiding by the instruction of the Chinese Government, Chen Yifan still refused to sign on the Convention formally.

On July 3, the British and Tibetan delegates signed the illegal Simla Convention. On that day the Chinese Government issued a formal statement refusing to recognize any convention or treaty signed by the British and Tibetan delegates at that time or at any later date.¹⁴ And on July 6, the Chinese Government instructed the Chinese ambassador to Britain to send the British Government a note expressing the same idea. From then on, every new Chinese Government had adhered to this stand.
Thus, the illegal Simla Convention was preserved only as an evidence of the British aggression of Tibet.

China's sovereignty over Tibet was the main issue negotiated at the Simla Conference, which lasted for nine months (from October 13, 1913 to July 3, 1914). The purpose of the British was to convert China's sovereignty over Tibet into the so-called "suzerainty over Tibet" which was coined by the British and the Russian in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. The British also tried to legalize it by making it more concrete. Imitating the method of creating Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia which the Russians had used when invading Mongolia, McMahon divided Tibet into two special regions — Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. The British advocated the autonomy of Outer Tibet. In this way Tibet could be separated from China and be supervised directly by the British-Indian forces. As for Inner Tibet, they regarded it as a region different from other provinces in China. They planned to annex this region after they controlled Outer Tibet. But their plot didn't succeed because the Chinese Government firmly refused to sign on the Convention.

II. The Illegal McMahon Line

1. How the McMahon Line Came into Existence

During the Simla Conference, Henry McMahon, the British delegate, negotiated secretly with the Tibetan delegate Shatra without telling the Chinese delegate Chen Yifan. They came up with a so-called "Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations" to replace the Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908. The new regulations stipulated that British subjects might lease lands for the building of houses. If British subjects committed crimes, they would not
be punished in Tibet. Whereas, if a Tibetan committed a crime towards British subjects, he or she would be severely punished. According to the Regulations, the British businessmen could do their business without any restriction in Tibet and even could hire any kind of vehicles to import weapons and ammunitions. Since the new Regulations and the Simla Convention were illegal and invalid, the British Government had a guilty conscience and dared not let it be known to the world. But they still tightened their political control over Tibet and continued to plunder Tibetan resources according to the new Regulations.

Moreover, during the month before the Simla Convention was initiated, McMahon and Shatra had secretly divided the eastern border between India and Tibet by exchanging letters. The boundary line started from the northeast of Bhutan and ended in the east at the contiguous areas of Tibet, Yunnan Province and Burma. The British attempted to occupy this area of about 90,000 square kilometres, which consisted of three parts — Monyul, Lhoyul and Zayul in the southeast of Tibet. During the time before and after the 1911 Revolution, they conducted a series of aggressive activities concerning this region, which they had driven with envy for a long time. Nevertheless, on account of his guilty feeling, McMahon did not dare to openly put forward the demand to cede this region from China. He induced the Tibetan representative Lonchen Shatra to draw the boundary line between India and Tibet by exchange of secret notes. In return, he sent 5,000 rifles and 500,000 bullets to Tibet free of charge. All this was done in New Delhi behind the back of the Chinese delegate.

On March 24, in New Delhi McMahon sent to the Shatra an official note together with two maps, on which the eastern border line between India and Tibet was clearly marked. The note read, "The settlement of the Indo-Tibetan border this time
would help to prevent further disputes. Therefore it would serve
the interests of both governments."

On March 25, Shatra also sent McMahon a note in reply,
saying that he would accept the boundary line marked with a
red line. He told McMahon, “You mentioned in your letter
which reached me yesterday that the two maps bearing your
signatures would be sent to me by Mr. Bell. I have also signed
on the maps and will keep one for myself. The other will be
returned to you.”

Thus, a sordid deal was done. The notorious McMahon line
came into existence. This line pushed the Indian border north-
ward for about 60 miles, raising the boundary line from the foot
of the Himalayas to the top. How this line came into existence
was so mysterious that nowadays few people know anything
about it. No files about the details of the negotiations between
Britain and Tibet can be found in the Indian Archive and the
Archive of the Foreign Office. So, Lamb once said the details
of the negotiation might not have been reported to London. A
lot of officials in charge in the British and Indian governments
were also ignorant of the secret deal. This issue, of course, had
not been put on the agenda of the Simla Conference, nor had
the Chinese Government been informed of it, so the Chinese
Government knew nothing about it.

2. The Illegality of the McMahon Line

McMahon played some tricks at the Simla Conference in
order to make the secret boundary line appear legal. The dirty
trick he played to deceive the Chinese Government was to mark
the dividing line between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet on the
map attached to the Simla Convention. The Tibetan boundary
was marked with a red line and the proposed dividing line
between the two parts of Tibet was marked with a blue line
which, in the south, extended into a curve indicating the Indo-Tibetan boundary line, namely, the McMahon Line. So, if China had agreed to the proposal of dividing Tibet into two parts and signed on the Simla Convention at that time, China would have fallen into the trap set by the British delegate, and taking advantage of it, the British could have stated that China had also accepted the McMahon Line. However, the Chinese delegate did not sign on the Convention; thus McMahon was foiled in his plot.

Ten years later, some people in Britain attempted to cover up the historical fact by perpetrating a fraud. It happened like this: There is an authoritative account of the Simla Conference in Acheson’s Collection of Treaties (first published in 1929). It reads, “In 1913, the plenipotentiaries from Tibet, China and Britain convened in India, trying to settle the boundary disputes between China and Tibet. They drafted a tripartite convention and initialed it in 1914. But the Chinese Government did not permit its delegate to sign on the convention formally.” This record is consistent with the historical fact. But in 1937, the British Government ordered the first edition of the book be destroyed and be replaced by a new edition. Of course, no trace of the account of the McMahon Line could be found in the book any more. By doing so, the British Government attempted to mislead the public. As Maxwell put it, the purpose of the British Government was that they could argue in the future that they had considered the Simla Convention to be valid over since 1914. But how can this fraudulent act cover up the historical fact? In the library of Harvard University there is a copy of Acheson’s Collection of Treaties published in 1929. Beijing Library also has such a copy.

The British Government did not succeed in concealing the historical fact. Instead, the fact became known to more and
more people. Moreover, the McMahon Line had not been marked on any maps published in Britain before 1937. Even the Indian Bureau of Surveying and Mapping had not marked this line until 1937 and in an attached note said, “The boundary line has not been demarcated.” K. Gupta, a well-known Indian historian of foreign affairs said, “According to the files kept in the Archives of Indian Affairs in London, the McMahon Line has no valid treaties to depend on.” “Before 1947, no treaties, nor habits, nor geographical conditions could be used to prove that it was an established boundary line.”

In researching the McMahon Line, many scholars in our country have pointed out that Tibet has been an inseparable part of China’s territory since ancient times. Tibet is not a sovereign state, so, as a rule, it can’t sign any treaties with foreign countries. Treaties between nations, especially those concerning the boundary line, must be formally signed by the plenipotentiaries of the signatory states and will come into effect only after the respective governments have approved them. The Chinese delegate did not sign any formal documents at the Simla Conference. Therefore, the so-called “Simla Convention” and the McMahon Line are illegal and invalid. Even the British Government itself was quite clear about it. That is why the illegal McMahon Line was not marked on the Map of Tibet and Its Neighbouring Countries published by the Indian Bureau of Surveying and Mapping in 1936 or on the map attached to volume 24 of the 14th edition of the Encyclopedia of Great Britain published in 1929. The eastern border between China and India on those two maps was the same as the map published in China. Also, the British Government, creator of the illegal McMahon Line, did not dare to invade the area south of the McMahon Line for a long period of time, which was to the north of the original line between China and India. Not until
the end of the Second World War did the British begin to invade a part of this area furtively.\textsuperscript{17}

3. Anglo-Russian Negotiations Before and After the Simla Conference

After the 1911 Revolution in China, great changes took place in Tibet, which gave rise to more intense competition between Britain and Russia, for both had their own interests in this area. The Anglo-Russian Agreement Concerning Tibet of 1907 stipulated that the two countries would respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and pledged that under no pretext should they interfere in Tibetan political affairs. They also promised not to send representatives to Lhasa and agreed not to seek any commercial concessions in Tibet. But, in fact, neither of the two governments strictly abided by the regulations. Taking advantage of the unstable situation in China at that time, they encouraged the Tibetans to establish an independent state by rebellion and driving out the Han people. By 1914, the Chinese Government could hardly control the situation in Tibet. Because of those changes, the British and the Russians began to bargain with each other and scramble for special interests in Tibet. Since the Russians focused their attention on the invasion of Mongolia, they demanded to maintain the status quo of Tibet according to the Anglo-Russian Agreement. But the British did not want to be bound by the Agreement of 1907 any longer because they resolved to control Tibet. So they attempted to get the understanding of the Russians and to revise the Agreement through the negotiations with Russia.

As early as September, 1912, Britain and Russia had held negotiations about the situations in Tibet. At that time, Mr. Grey, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1905-1916) stated that the Chinese invasion of Tibet, as he put
it, might do great harm to the British interests. To prevent unpredictable troubles, Britain had better send some businessmen to Lhasa so that the British could be well informed of the changes in Tibet. Sozonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, said he was quite interested in the British demands, yet he wanted Britain to give something in return to Russia. He added that the Mongolian question had not been included in the Anglo-Russian Agreement. So, it should not be treated in the same way as the Tibetan problem. The British were upset by the Russian demands for compensations. In October, 1912, the Indian Government stated that Russia had already gained a lot of interests in Mongolia and should let Britain gain the interests in Tibet exclusively. The Russians were also asked not to interfere in Tibetan affairs in order to compensate for Britain. The reasons the Indian Government gave were as follows:

1. Britain was the only country having the right to interfere in Tibetan affairs;
2. Britain had the right to contact the Tibetan officials directly;
3. The British had the right to occupy the Chumbi Valley in order to protect the British subjects and to maintain social order.18

The British Government decided to hold talks with the Russians and used attacks as a means of defence. That is, the British planned to make the Russians yield on the Tibetan problem by interfering in the Mongolian question. On January 24, 1914, Grey wrote to Buchanan, asking him to explain to Sozonov that the changes of status quo in Mongolia had a rather severe impact, though indirectly, on Tibet. Therefore, it was necessary for Britain to protect its interests in Tibet. But when Buchanan was negotiating with Sozonov, the Russian Foreign Minister said, "How can Britain announce repeatedly,
without any reason, that Britain has the right to protect Tibet while the Anglo-Russian Agreement Concerning Tibet still exists?” He added that he would be accused of betraying the Russian interests by the Russian people if it were to happen. Sozonov said it was not reasonable to get the Mongolian question involved only because the Russians demanded the British should make concessions on the Tibetan question. The two questions are of different nature and should not be mentioned in the same breath.

During February and March, 1914, the British and the Russians went on bargaining. The Russians did not agree to the idea that Tibet should be dominated entirely by the British only because they had already controlled Mongolia. Thus, the negotiation was deadlocked.

Just then, Buchanan advised the British Government to adopt a new tactic during the negotiation. He said that since the British could not achieve their aim of dominating Tibet without paying a price, they should try to pay the least. However, the Indian Office did not like this suggestion very much. It insisted the Russian should make unilateral concessions on the Tibetan question. In their opinion, the Anglo-Russian Agreement Concerning Tibet was signed according to the situations in the past. Now that great changes had taken place since then, it was necessary to revise the Agreement. In particular, they wanted the Russians to agree to revise Article 3 and Article 4 of that Agreement. Thus, Britain could send its subjects to Lhasa and could get various concessions in Tibet. If the Russians wanted to get the same rights, the British could negotiate with them by that time.

After the Simla Convention was initialed on April 27, Buchanan, the British Ambassador, on the instruction of his government, sent the full text of the Convention and the maps
attached to it to the Russian Government and briefed them on the Simla Conference. From May 15 to May 19, Buchanan held negotiations with Sozonov on the Tibetan question. Sozonov said Russia did not oppose what the British were doing in Tibet, but the Russians wanted to have some compensation. He was especially opposed to Article 6, 8 and 10 of the Simla Convention. Article 6 stipulated that Article 3 of the Convention of 1906 was cancelled, but in Article 9 of the Convention of 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, the term “Foreign Power” did not include China, and British officials could get the treatment of a most preferential country. Article 8 stipulated that the British trade agent who resided in Gyantse could visit Lhasa with his guards. Article 10 stipulated that in case of disputes between the Chinese Government and Tibet, the British Government would act as an arbitrator. Sozonov was especially opposed to Article 10. He said this article actually gave the British the right to protect Tibet. Also, some changes must be made in Article 6 and Article 8 in order that Russia and Britain would gain equal rights.

Buchanan argued that the Russians had got the governing position in Urga, and, in fact, prevented the British from contacting directly with Mongolia. Russia had had no economic relations with Tibet. And now because of the British actions, the Russians also wanted to establish a trading base in Tibet. The British would like to know the motive behind all that.

After both sides had argued for some time, Sozonov showed his willingness to accept the British opinion. Yet, he also wanted the British to make some concessions so as not to make him lose face.

On May 18, Buchanan asked Sozonov whether the Russian Government would accept Article 6 and Article 8 and would like the Simla Convention to take effect after the British
cancelled Article 10. Sozonov replied if the British decided to cancel Article 10, it would show the friendliness of the British. As to Article 6 and Article 8, only a few changes were to be made in order to reach an understanding.  

In early June, the British ambassador to Russia formally informed the Russian Government that the Simla Convention had been revised and Article 10 had been cancelled as the Russians had wished. Meanwhile, he proposed to announce several documents at the time when the Simla Convention was being signed. Those documents stipulated:

1) The British Government and the Russian Government promised not to seek concessions in Tibet for their subjects respectively without having reached agreements on those problems beforehand.

2) The British Government promised that the rights given by Article 8 of the Convention would never be used without gaining the assent of the Russian Government in advance.

Through secret negotiations, the British and the Russian governments readjusted their interests of aggression. The Russians made some concessions to the British by acknowledging special interests of the British in Tibet. After both countries came to an agreement, the British delegate felt that they had strong backing and unscrupulously compelled the Chinese Government to sign on the Convention, which the British concocted in January. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government did not yield to their pressure. The British failed to achieve their goal of aggression in the end.

NOTES

2. Viceroy of India to Secretary of State, June 15, 1913. See The McMahon
3. *Agreements Concerning Tibet in Qing Dynasty*, No. 97, Part Three, Book 7, by Lu Qiwen, p. 230

4. P. Mehra, *Documents* p. 147


6. *The Indian War Against China* by Maxwell, N. p. 14

7. *Tibetan Question* compiled by the Foreign Ministry of the Northern Government


12. Telegram to Chen Yifan by the Foreign Ministry of the Government of the Northern Warlords, 28 April, 1914

13. *Brief Tibetan Files*, p. 19


15. Leonov, *Foreign Expansion in Tibet*, pp. 171-172


20. *International Relations During the Age of Imperialism*, Part 3, Book 3, p. 212
Qi army withdrew from Tibet.

Tibetan bill.
The Tibetan Council officials.
Chapter IX

Great Britain’s Aggressive Policy Towards Tibet During the Reign of the Republic of China

I. Instigation to a Riot in Tibet and Coercion on China into Concluding a Treaty

1. Support for the New Policies Carried out in Tibet

In World War I, Great Britain and Russia, two major members of the Entente countries, actively participated in the war but they didn’t abandon the ambition of invading China, especially Great Britain, which regarded Tibet as a piece of delicious meat at the tips of its fingers. During the War, it continued to manipulate from behind the scenes the pro-British forces to create incidents for the deepening of division. At the same time, it waited for the opportune moment to instigate the Tibetan troops to invade Xikang and Sichuan so as to put pressure upon the Chinese Government and to coerce it into acknowledging the illegal Simla Treaty.

After the Simla Conference, Great Britain, in the disguise of supporting the “new policies” carried out in Tibet, infiltrated its aggressive force into every aspect of Tibetan affairs — politics, military affairs, economy, and culture. In political affairs, Great Britain played an active role in helping the Dalai to carry out reforms in administrative system, and strengthened
its control over Tibet through those pro-British officials who had usurped high positions. The Dalai set up an official position called Silon to be the head of the Kashag. This position was equal to the rank of "Prince" at the beginning of the Qing Dynasty. There were four **Kalons** under him to tackle the routine affairs of Tibet. Lonchen Shatra, being the head of the pro-British officials, was appointed as the first Silon. This official position actually replaced the Resident sent by the Central Government since the reign of Emperor Qianlong, weakened and even repelled the Central Government's administration of Tibet. On the other hand, through the Silon Great Britain could exert its influence over and control the Dalai, and then manipulate the internal affairs of Tibet.

In military affairs, since 1912, the Tibetan troops had been in the hands of the pro-British forces, who, with the support of Great Britain, reorganized the army and enlarged the establishment. They employed British military instructors and bought weapons and ammunitions from India. The whole army was an imitation of the Indian army. Great Britain helped the Dalai set up headquarters of the Tibetan army in the Kashag (in Tibetan it was called Majikang). Dazang Dadul was chosen as the commander who was responsible for establishing a new army. This army had 10,000 men. Every five hundred men formed a battalion, which had a battalion commander (**dapon**), four company commanders (**rupons**), ten platoon leaders (**gyapons**) and fifty squad leaders (**chupons**). All the high ranks in this army were held by pro-British aristocratic officers. Along with them, those middle and low level officers also turned to Great Britain. They were sent to Indian barracks in turn to be trained and to be imbued with pro-British ideas and a sense of inferiority that were peculiar to the British colonies. From then on, this army, which had had the glorious history of resisting
the British troops, degenerated into a reactionary army which incited civil wars, opposed the Central Government and split ted China. Charles Bell, the British representative in Tibet for a very long time, recalled: “Since 1913 we have encouraged the Tibetans to rely on us. When the Treaty was signed in 1914, the British Government promised to support them in foreign affairs and give assistance to them in arms and ammunition to a certain extent. Hence we now and then allow them to buy arms and ammunition from India.”

Bell admitted that the aim of doing so was to make Tibet prosperous so as to resist China.

In economy, Britain quickened its plunder in Tibet according to the new illegal British-Tibetan Trade Regulations. During this time, the route from Tibet to inland was obstructed, so the volume of trade decreased drastically. On the other hand, the volume of trade between India and Tibet increased rapidly. According to records, from 1914 to 1915, the total volume of trade between India and Tibet was 5,056,000 rupees. It increased to 6,405,000 rupees between 1915 and 1916, and reached 7,140,000 rupees from 1916 to 1917, which was twice as much as that by the end of the nineteenth century. Tibet exported such raw materials as wool and leather, and mainly imported products of light industry. The colonization in Tibet deepened. Now Tibet had become a market place for English goods and a place providing raw materials for Great Britain.

In culture, Britain established schools in Tibet and admitted Tibetan students to enter the colleges in Britain. As early as 1912, the British Commercial Agent in Yadong had set up a private school in which both English and Indian languages were taught. In 1913, Lhasa sent four children of Tibetan aristocrats to England to study such new subjects as military science, surveying, mining, and electrical machinery. In 1915, persuaded
by Bell, the Dalai again sent a group of students to England to study military science, telegraphy, electrical machinery, and mining. After they returned to Tibet, these students generally acted as the tool of Great Britain for invading Tibet. Bell once mentioned in his book the example of a returned student, Gokhawa, who had been to England to study military science. After returning, he acted on the orders of his British boss to train the Tibetan troops.\(^4\) Thereafter, more and more Tibetan students were sent to Great Britain and India, with the result that a group of pro-British intellectuals emerged in Tibet. In short, the so-called “new policy” practised by the Tibetan local government caused the British force to go further into Tibet and deepened the colonization of Tibet.

2. Tibetan Troops’ Intrusion Upon the Sichuan Border Area at the Instigation of Britain

In 1915, China and Britain negotiated again on the problem of delimiting the boundaries of Tibet. At that time, World War I was on and Great Britain was busy with a desperate war with Germany, but it never relaxed its aggression upon Tibet. China also faced the threat of her powerful neighbour Japan, which proposed the infamous Twenty-one Demands that would subjugate China. The Japanese Government compelled the Chinese Government (with Yuan Shikai as the President) to accept the Demands by using ultimatum. Yuan succumbed to Japan because he needed urgently the support of big Powers for his plot of becoming a monarch. Afterwards, he attempted to yield to Britain, Japan’s ally, on the Tibetan problem, in order to gain the support of Great Britain for his restoration of autocratic monarchy. On June 28, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted a negotiable plan to the solution of Tibetan problem and presented it to the British Government through the hands of
Gu Weijun (Wellington, V.K. Koo), a counsellor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the plan, China yielded on the problem of territory and agreed to put Chamdo under Outer Tibet and change the name of Inner Tibet into Kangzang. The plan stated clearly that “Tibet is a part of China.” At first, the British Government agreed to revise the Simla Treaty, but later, it refused to give way. In August, acted on the orders of Yuan Shikai, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made further concessions, but Great Britain didn’t abandon its uncompromising stand. After Yuan Shikai failed in his plot of becoming a monarch and died in misery, the negotiations of the issue of Tibetan border was suspended.

Great Britain decided to use armed forces to expand Tibet’s border area, so as to force China to accept a fait accompli and conclude a new treaty. At that time China was in a tumult. After Yuan Shikai had failed in claiming himself emperor and Zhang Xun in his restoration of the dethroned monarch, China was torn apart by warlords. The political situation was unsteady and national defense was very weak. Great Britain thought that it was a good chance for the well-equipped Tibetan troops to invade the Sichuan border areas.

After the Simla Conference in 1914, the Dalai appointed a “governor-general of Kham” and transferred in succession the Tibetan troops from Lhasa, Gyantse, Shigatse and Dingri to Gyamda. They deployed troops for the preparation of attacking the region east of Tibet. At that time, the Sichuan army was stationed in Chamdo, Riboche, and the Tsoba Sogu with three well-equipped battalions headed by Peng Risheng. However, they were insufficiently paid, because it was an era during which the warlords were engaged in tangled warfare and the border areas were ignored.

In September 1917, when several Tibetan soldiers were
cutting grass near Riboche, they crossed the border and conflict-ed with the Sichuan troops. The Sichuan soldiers captured two Tibetan soldiers and escorted them to Chamdo where Peng Risheng, the commander, had the two Tibetan soldiers beheaded without any investigation into the cause of the conflict.

The British Government seized this chance, presented the Tibetans with 5,000 rifles and 5,000,000 cartridges and insti-gated the Tibetan army to invade Sichuan Province until they reached the western bank of the Jinsha River. Because the invasion of Sichuan Province had been premeditated for a long time and the Tibetan army was well-equipped and well-trained, it advanced with irresistible force and occupied Riboche, Nganda, and Draya in less than four months. Peng Risheng was besieged in Chamdo. Chen Xialing, the general in charge of the Sichuan border area, hurriedly ordered Jiang Guoling to head one batallion to rescue the besieged Sichuan soldiers. Having misappropriated the soldiers’ pay, Jiang Guoling defected to the enemy.

By April 1918 Chamdo and Jiangka also fell into the hands of the Tibetan army and Peng Risheng was captured. After that, the Tibetan army’s offensive became even fiercer. It attacked and occupied altogether twelve counties: “in the northern route were Gonjo, Tongpu, Derge, Baiyu, Dengke, Sershud and Zhanhua, in the southern route were Wucheng and another county.” The whole Sichuan Province was shocked. In July, the Sichuan troops fought a bloody fight in Rongbacha near Garze and held back for the moment the impetus of the Tibetan troops.

Seeing that the Tibetan troops had already won many victories and occupied most part of the Outer Tibet area delimited by the illegal Simla Treaty, the British Government hurriedly ordered Teichman, the vice consul of the British
Embassy to "mediate" the fighting. The Dalai also replied to Chen Xialing on August 8, saying that he would not betray China and that he agreed to a truce. He suggested that China, Tibet and Britain send representatives for negotiation. The purpose of those actions on the part of Great Britain was to enable the Tibetan troops to consolidate the occupied regions and create an irrevocable situation, forcing China to acknowledge the Simla Convention. In August, Teichman went to Chamdo to meet with the Kalon Lama. After they had discussed the way to deal with the situation, they invited Liu Zanting, Deputy Commander, of the Sichuan troops, to go to Chamdo for negotiation. During the negotiation, Teichman proposed an armistice of thirteen articles, compelling Liu Zanting to accept. The main contents of this armistice were: (1) The places where Sichuan troops could station for the moment were as follows: Ba'an, Yanjing, Yidun, Derong, Lihua, Garze, Zhanhua, Luhuo, Dawu, Yajiang, Kangding, etc; the places for the Tibetan troops to station were Riboche, Nganda, Chamdo, Tongpu, Dengke, Sershud, Derge, etc. (2) If conflicts happened between the two sides, they must ask the British consul to act as an intermediary. (3) Both sides should reduce the number of soldiers. The Sichuan soldiers in Batang and Garze should be limited to 200; the Tibetan soldiers in Chamdo and Jiangka should also be confined within 200. (4) If the situation in Dingxiang and Zhanhua was normal and stable, the Sichuan troops should withdraw from these two counties. (5) No fighting were allowed before the two governments acknowledged the Treaty; etc.6

Liu Zanting refused to accept this armistice. He only telegraphed the original version to the Chinese Government. Chen Xialing also refused to accept the Treaty because he thought that it was harmful to the sovereignty of China. Then
Chen sent Han Guangjun as another representative to negotiate at Garze front with Dapon Khyungrampa, the commander of the Tibetan troops. Teichman again acted as an intermediary and put pressure upon Han. At last, they signed an armistice of four articles: (1) The Sichuan army retreated to Garze and the Tibetan troops retreated to Derge. The two sides suspended fightings for a year, waiting for the negotiative result between the Central Government and the Tibetan government. (2) This agreement only provided the conditions for a truce and withdrawal of troops; it was not a formal peace treaty. (3) The time for the withdrawal was from January 18, 1919 (the seventeenth day of the twelfth lunar month) to January 31, 1919 (the thirtieth day of the twelfth lunar month). (4) The agreement was signed by Chen Xialing, Han Guangjun and the Tibetan representatives. Teichman, the British consul, was the witness and mediator. The agreement became effective after the governments of both sides ratified it.⁷

The Chinese Government was forced to approve of this agreement. Towards the end of 1918, the border conflicts between Tibet and Sichuan suspended for the moment. The Sichuan troops controlled Batang, Litang, Nyarong, Garze and the eastern area, while the Tibetan troops occupied Chamdo, Draya, Markam, Derge and the western area.

3. Coercion Exerted upon China into Delimiting the Border Line of the Outer Tibet

The diplomatic pressure of Great Britain and its military aggression were closely united. When the conflict arose, Great Britain kept on demanding the Chinese Government to resume the talks on the Tibetan problem. From February 1918 to the end of the year, Jordan, the British Minister to China, urged the Chinese Government for nine times to resume the talks and
pressed the Chinese Government of Northern Warlords to recognize the boundaries of Inner and Outer Tibet delimited by the Simla Treaty, claiming that if the problem was not solved, Tibet would be a follower of Korea.

After many negotiations with Great Britain, the Government of Northern Warlords realized that the British Minister's assertion that the Tibetan troops were ferocious and that Sichuan troops were doomed to failure was actually bluff. "It is evident that he is on the one hand inciting the Tibetans, on the other hand compelling our government to sign a treaty." Therefore, the Government of the Northern Warlords adopted a dilatory policy, suggesting the talks be postponed on the ground that China's domestic political situation was unstable and that the War against Germany had not come to an end. The moment when the situation became stable, the talks could be resumed.

After World War I, Great Britain again raised the Tibetan problem. In May 1919, Teichman arrived in Beijing to conspire with Jordan. They urged the Chinese Government to incorporate the areas occupied by the Tibetan troops into Outer Tibet, because the Tibetan troops had extended their occupation to the Jinsha River, almost in accordance with the border line designated by the Simla Treaty. The Government of Northern Warlords could do nothing but negotiate. On May 30, the Chinese Government put forward the revised version of the last compromise made by Yuan Shikai in 1915, which included four clauses: 1. Tachienlu, Batang and Litang all belonged to Sichuan; 2. Chamdo, Basho, Riboche, and the area under the Tsoba Sogu all belonged to the Outer Tibet; 3. Nyarong, Derge, the Dangla Range (Tanggula) south of the Kunlun Mountains, Chamdo and the area north of Derge and south of Qinghai all belonged to Inner Tibet; 4. The border line of Yunnan and
Xinjiang remained unchanged.\(^9\)

Then the two sides of China and Great Britain held talks on how to demarcate the frontiers of Tibet. On August 13, Jordan delivered a counter proposal to the Chinese Government, saying that there were two ways to settle the Tibet's border problem. One was to cancel the designations of Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet and divide the area of Inner Tibet specified by the Simla Treaty into two parts; the one including Batang, Litang, Tachienlu, Dawu, Luhuo, Nyarong, and Garze was to be put under Chinese rule, while the other, consisting of the area west of Derge, should be incorporated into Tibet. The other way was to maintain the designations of Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet, with Batang, Litang, Tachienlu, Nyarong and Garze incorporated into inland China, and the area south of the Kunlun Mountains and north of Dangla Range (Tanggula Mountains) incorporated into Inner Tibet, where China should not appoint officials or station troops, and Derge incorporated into Outer Tibet.\(^10\) The Government of Northern Warlords was in favour of cancelling the designations of Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet, but it was strongly against the way to delimit the border of Tibet and Sichuan.

When he saw that the Chinese Government had an uncompromising stand, Jordan made a little concession by agreeing to incorporate Gangtok into Sichuan Province, which was on the western bank of the Jinsha River. In order to induce the Chinese Government to submit, Jordan said that Nyarong and Gangtok were very important to China because the former was rich in gold mines and the latter stood on the main passage to Ü (Dbus), and though the area west of Derge was vast, it was of little use to China because it was barren and unpopulated.

The Foreign Ministry of China proposed that the area south of the Kunlun Mountains and the north of the Dangla Range
should be incorporated into Qinghai Province. But Jordan said: "This area is very near to Lhasa. If China should station troops there, there might occur conflicts, which is not at all our intention. Besides, this area is barren and deserted. I don't know why China contend for it."

The Foreign Ministry of China replied: "This area is under the jurisdiction of Qinghai Province: the Chinese Government has no right to disclaim the land, so we have to adhere to our stand. China will take special care to prevent any conflicts and guarantee to maintain the situation in that area." Seeing that China had no intention to yield, Jordan altered his tactics. He claimed that the division of Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet would be remained unchanged and demanded the Chinese Government to accept his second scheme.

From this we can see that Britain assumed itself as a protector and regarded Tibet as its dependency. It demanded that a part of Qinghai and Sichuan should be incorporated into Tibet, just as it drew the McMahon Line and devoured vast tract of land of Tibet at its own free will. This wild act of Britain was unreasonable and illegal. It had no right at all in doing so. In October of the same year when Zhu Xiu and others visited Tibet, the Dalai said that he was quite ignorant of the talks on border problems between China and Great Britain. It could be seen clearly that Britain did not represent Tibet. This act only exposed Britain's true colours of imperialism.

On August 26, the Chinese Government held a state conference to discuss the Tibetan issue. Awed by the strong opposition of the whole Chinese people, most members of this conference decided not to accept the last proposal made by Great Britain and suspend the talks on border problems. When he was informed that the talks would be put off, Jordan was alarmed. On August 27, he made a note in reply, declaring his opposition. On August 29, he
visited Gong Xinzhan, the Premier of the Government of Northern Warlords. On September 4, he called on Xu Shichang, the President, and insisted that the talks should be continued. But Xu replied: "The Government must examine carefully the public opinion, ask for the permission of the Parliament and seek advice from Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan and other provinces. So it is really hard to settle quickly".\(^\text{12}\)

On September 5, the Foreign Ministry of China gave publicity in an open telegram to the demand made by Britain and sought advice from the whole nation. The telegram made known some of the things concerning the talks on Tibet since the Simla Conference and solicited opinions from the general public, emphasizing: "The British say that the borderline they suggested is much more reasonable than that discussed in previous meetings, and that if the problem can not be solved this time, the misunderstanding between Tibet and China will become worse and might not be easily dispelled."\(^\text{13}\)

Britain's plot of manipulating the members of the upper strata in Tibet to create an "independent" and "autonomous" Tibet and its threatening, intimidating and blackmailing China now became known to all. A wave of opposition started in the Parliament in Beijing and the officials and troops in those provinces (Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai) which were adjacent to Tibet also rose in protest. The whole nation was angry. The parliaments of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou and Shaanxi provinces issued telegrams, appealing to the whole nation "to unite together at this crucial moment and keep watch on the government's actions towards Tibet. Meanwhile, we must employ every possible way to arouse the masses and, backed by national diplomacy, be ready to die in the struggle for the final victory."\(^\text{14}\)

The Chinese students studying in Japan also issued an open
telegram which further pointed out that "the British Minister's way to delimit the Tibetan border is to incorporate over ten thousand square kilometers of land of the adjacent Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Xinjiang into Tibet. In this way, the national defense in Southwestern China will be destroyed and endless disasters will follow. We must not give in, for it concerns the life and death of our country. If the British Government once controlled over Tibet, it will soon encroach on Sichuan. If Sichuan is under its control, the British will go down along the Yangtze River and invade other provinces."

Under the pressure of the whole nation, the Government of Northern Warlords decided to suspend the talks. Jordan intended to force a breach on the officials of high position in the Chinese Government. He went between the Premier and President of the Chinese Government, urging them to resume the talks. Nevertheless his efforts were in vain. In 1920, he again suggested that China, Great Britain and Tibet held a meeting in Lhasa to solve the border problem and that the India representatives should be also invited. However, the Tibetan issue was suspended because Jordan soon left office and returned to England.

On January 15, 1921, Alston, the new British Minister to China, visited Yan Huiqing, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and expressed his hope of resuming the negotiation on Tibetan problem. The Chinese Government agreed to resume the talks, on the condition that the following principles should be observed during the talks:

1. Those articles in the Simla Treaty which had not been approved of by the Chinese Government should not be acted upon as principles of the talks.

2. The articles proposed by China in 1915 should be regarded as principles of the talks.
3. China has sovereign rights over the internal affairs, foreign affairs and communications of Tibet.

4. The Chinese Government has the right to levy the customs duty in Yadong and Gyantse.

5. The Tibetan border should be delimited according to the geographical line.

6. The Chinese Government is responsible for the suppression of the riots made by the Tibetans on the border of Garze.

7. The form of the meeting of three sides should be in accordance with that of the Chakthu Meeting.16

As the Washington Conference was drawing near, the Foreign Ministry of China put aside the new British Minister and demanded of the Washington Conference to discuss the outstanding Tibetan problem. But at the Conference, the dispute about the Shandong problem became the focus of the world's attention and took much of the time, so the Tibetan problem remained unresolved.

After that, Britain kept on pressing the Chinese Government to conclude a treaty on Tibet. In 1922, the British Government proposed three principles to the Chinese representative in London for the solution of the Tibetan problem:

1. The foreign affairs in Tibet are to be handled by Tibet itself.

2. Tibet has absolute independence in administering internal affairs.

3. Great Britain has the right to build the railway leading from India to Tibet.

In 1924, the Labour Party of Britain won the general election and formed the cabinet. The Foreign Ministry of China once wished to hold talk on the Tibetan problem with the British Government which was under the signboard of socialism. But later, as the situation in China became unsteady and
wars broke out, the Chinese Government did not bend its energy on solving this problem. Therefore, despite the great pains of Britain, a treaty was never concluded which would recognize the aggressive rights and interests of Great Britain.

II. Great Britain’s Obstruction to the Improvement of the Relationship Between Tibet and the Central Government of China

1. The Tension Between Tibetan Local Government and the Central Government Relaxed for a Time

Under the pressure of the national opinion, the Government of Northern Warlords determined to take measures for restoring gradually the friendly relationship with Tibet. In 1919, Gansu dispatched a delegation with Zhu Xiu, Li Zhonglian and Kulangtsang (a Lama of the Red Sect of Lamaism) as the commissioners to Tibet to seek direct contact with the Dalai. The delegation reached Lhasa on November 24 and had a cordial talk with the Dalai. They decided to stop the fighting in Sichuan border and settle the dispute through negotiation. Next year in September, Zhu Xiu and the delegation returned to Gansu. At the send-off party, the Dalai said sincerely: “My favouritism to Great Britain is not out of my own heart. It was the Resident who drove me to the British. I am now quite grateful that you distinguished representatives have come to Tibet. I hope the Great President will send a plenipotentiary as soon as possible to settle the unresolved problem. I guarantee that I will collaborate with him in achieving the happiness of the whole nation. As for ‘The Draft of the Simla Conference’, it can be revised.”

This showed that the Dalai had come to reality from the illusion that he could split Tibet from China by the aid of Great Britain.
The relationship between Tibet and China has now taken a turn for the better. This certainly caused the attention of Great Britain.

In order to offset the influence of the delegation led by Zhu Xiu, in November, 1926 the British Government sent a delegation led by Charles Bell to Tibet, declaring that his purpose was to say hello and explain the political situation to the Dalai. While this delegation stayed in Tibet carrying out its intrigues, "the Tibetan opinion of Great Britain had greatly changed, and the Tibetans detested the delegation, but Bell did not pay the least attention to it." There often appeared in his dwelling place some warnings like "For your life, get out of Tibet." Bell felt frightened. He asked the Dalai to protect his life. But the Dalai said to him: "The Tibetans hate you very much. If you don't leave quickly we can't protect your life." Bell was so disappointed that he left Tibet for England.18

After that, there happened a series of incidents which estranged Tibet from Britain. In May, 1924, the British Police Commissioner to Lhasa was removed from office because of the opposition of the Tibetans. In 1926, a British school in Gyantse was closed. Great Britain intended to employ postal cars for quickening the delivery of post between Gyantse and Pali, but it met the prohibition of the Tibetan local government. The Dalai Lama also frustrated Britain in its plan to construct a hydraulic power plant and a telephone system and to exploit jointly the mineral resources in Tibet. All this showed that Great Britain's control over Tibet had been much weakened.

At the same time, the contact between Tibet and the Central Government of China was much more frequent. Although many incidents had happened since the Revolution in 1911, the Dalai always kept contact with the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs of the Government of Northern
Warlords. He also sent his representatives to reside in the Yonghegong Lamasery in Beijing and to attend the meetings of both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Britain's interference in Tibetan affairs had already harmed the Dalai Lama's interests, so he desired to resist the British aggression with the help of his motherland. In 1928, the Dalai dispatched a representative to Nanjing to meet with Chiang Kai-shek, who in turn wrote a letter to the Dalai. This is the beginning of the contact between the Tibetan local government and the Nationalist Government. In 1929, the Nationalist Government set up the Mongolian-Tibetan Commission (subordinated to the Administrative Council) to take charge of the Mongolian and Tibetan affairs. In July of the same year, the Nationalist Government sent Liu Manqing, a woman clerk in the Civil Official Office, to Tibet. Ms Liu was born in Lhasa in 1906. Her father was a Han-Chinese and her mother was a Tibetan. She received her education in Beijing and graduated from a normal school. She had a good command of both the Chinese and Tibetan languages. On her arrival in Lhasa on February 7, 1930, she was warmly welcomed by the Tibetan people and the local government. On March 18, she had a talk with the Dalai and expressed the solicitude and expectation of the Central Government for the Tibetan people. The Dalai said happily that "both Tibet and Xikang belong to China, there's no need to distinguish between you and I". During the interview, the Dalai made an exception by putting his holy hand on the head of Ms Liu to honour her.

In his last interview with Ms Liu on May 25, the Dalai expressed his gratitude for the loving care of the Central Government. He showed his expectation that China would eventually be united and realize the actual consolidation and peace.

When he talked of his relations with Great Britain he said:
"The British, indeed, have a mind to draw me to their side. Nevertheless, I know the importance of guarding the national sovereignty and I have never surrendered a bit of it in spite of the necessity of having to deal with them, their character and customs being so different from ours."

Liu Manqing returned to Nanjing on July 17 by way of India. Her visit to Lhasa successfully paved the way for resuming the normal relationship between Tibet and the Central Government. However, her task was semi-official and she was only a good-will messenger, not a representative for negotiation. When it came to some important political event, the Nationalist Government would have a dialogue with Tibet through Kunchok Jungnas who was a representative of the Dalai’s. Four months after Liu Manqing started for Tibet, Kunchok Jungnas also left Nanjing for Tibet. He reached Lhasa on January 16, 1930, i.e., three weeks earlier than Liu Manqing, because he travelled by sea while Liu travelled by land and was impeded for a long time. Kunchok Jungnas brought with him eight questions proposed by the Nationalist Government. The Dalai answered them one by one which was reported to the Nationalist Government by Kunchok Jungnas. The questions and answers are as follows:

1. Q: How might the relations between Tibet and the Central Government be restored?
   A: If the Central Government would treat the patronage relationship between China and Tibet with sincerity and good faith as it previously did, Tibet on its part, having always shown sincerity in its dealings in the past, would from now on make an even greater effort to give full support to the Central Government.

2. Q: How shall the Central Government exercise admin-
istrative control over Tibet?

A: It would be advisable to work out a written understanding on the measures to be taken for securing a fundamental stabilization both in the political and the religious affairs of Tibet.

3. Q: How shall the autonomy of Tibet and its scope be defined?

A: As from now on, the patronage relationship between the Central Government and Tibet is going to be faithfully observed and the Central Government is to show sincerity to make Tibet feel safe and secure; the area over which autonomy is to be exercised should naturally be the same as before. It is expected that the Central Government will return to Tibet those districts which originally belonged to it but which are now not under its control so that a perpetual peace and harmony will surely be the result.

4. Q: Shall the Dalai and Panchen Lamas join the Kuo-mintang?

A: On account of his advanced age and the tremendous burden in managing temporal and religious affairs and also of the fact that he is not able to proceed to the capital before the consent of the three leading monasteries and of the members of the Tsongdu (National Assembly) is obtained, the Dalai Lama is not at the present time in a position to join the Kuomintang. As the Panchen Lama is now residing in China Proper and his duty has always been confined to the religious affairs of Tashilhunpo, for he has no political affairs to attend to, he should be available for the membership of the Kuomintang. It must be understood, however, that he has never had any say in the settlement of Tibetan affairs.

5. Q: Shall the relative position of the Dalai and the Panchen Lamas and their respective jurisdiction in political as well as religious affairs be maintained as before or new provi-
A: Political and religious affairs have always been administered by the Tibetan Government at Lhasa. The Panchen Lama has had only the Tashilhunpo monastery in his control. Actually the Tashilhunpo monastery was built by the first Dalai Lama. It was the second Dalai Lama who entrusted the administration to a fellow monk and conferred upon the latter the honorary title of Panchen, when he moved his seat to Lhasa. Later, in view of the tutor-disciple relationship existing in turn through generations between the Dalai and the Panchen, the fifth Dalai Lama awarded this monastery to the fourth Panchen Lama. If this age-old practice were to be continuously observed, all Tibetans would be only too pleased.

6. Q: How shall the Dalai welcome the Panchen back to Tibet and how shall the Central Government escort him?

A: Among the Panchen’s retinue, many employed the terms “Anterior” and “Ulterior” Tibet with intent to sow discord. They disobeyed orders of the Tibetan Government and acted frequently against their superiors. Both their thought and conduct are corrupt. In the year of Jia Chen (1904), the Panchen went to India and conspired with the British, but all his efforts were of no avail. In the year of Xin Hai (1911), he intrigued with the Resident Lian Yu and made an attempt to seize the reins of government and control of the church during the absence of the Dalai Lama. But his efforts were thwarted by the opposition of the people and especially of the clergymen of the three leading monasteries. According to an established practice, the Panchen should contribute one quarter of the provisions for the Army. He failed to make such contributions, so he committed acts in violation of laws. Had the offenders been punished strictly in accordance with the letter of the law, there would have been no such state of affairs as now exists. It
is only in consideration of the long-standing and close tutor-disciple relationship between the Dalai and the Panchen through generations that a policy of tolerance and forgiveness has been followed. Yet these people not only remained unrepentant, but further advised and urged the Panchen to flee away from Tashilhunpo. A dispatch inviting him back was soon sent to the Panchen, but he refused to accept. He then fled to Urga and had secret dealings with the communists. Only upon the death of the Chief Lama of Mongolia, Jebsun Dampa, was he obliged to come back to China Proper. Consequently, the Tibetan Government dispatched officials to Tashilhunpo to take proper care of the monastery. Now, these offenders are still conspiring and making trouble. As the matter stands, Tibet would find it very difficult to welcome them unless they can give a satisfactory explanation as to their reason for taking to flight.

7. Q: Has the Dalai Lama the intention of setting up in the capital an office for the convenience of keeping closer contact? As to its expense, the Central Government is prepared to grant the necessary funds.

A: At first, offices are to be set up in Nanking, Peiping, and Xikang. If and when such offices are required for other places, applications will be filed accordingly.

8. Q: Is there anything else that Tibet expects of Central Government?

A: For the purpose of protecting itself against aggression, Tibet’s hope for the present is only that the Central Government will supply it with arms. In case any other help may be needed in the future for strengthening its security, it will make requests to the Central Government.

The Government examined the Dalai’s talk carefully. They discussed and decided to send Xie Guoliang, a member of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to negotiate
with the Dalai in Lhasa. The Central Government gave Xie ten instructions which would serve as the basic principles for solving the Tibetan affairs:

1. Tibet should restore its close relationship with the Central Government.
2. Tibet should not foster any political relationship with any foreign state.
3. All treaties and agreements still in force between Tibet and foreign states should be submitted to the Nationalist Government for reexamination.
4. The Dalai Lama should welcome the Panchen Lama back to Tibet.
5. The Dalai Lama should restore to the Nationalist Government all the districts of Xikang which he had occupied.
6. Important diplomatic, military, and political affairs of Tibet should be the responsibility of, and administered by, the Nationalist Government.
7. The Nationalist Government should grant Tibet the right to complete autonomy.
8. The secular and religious authority of the Dalai and the Panchen Lama should be maintained as before.
9. The Nationalist Government should appoint a special Commissioner to be stationed in Tibet "to conduct Tibetan affairs."
10. Tibet might set up an office in Nanjing and the Nationalist Government should make an appropriation for the expenses of that office.²²

Xie Guoliang didn't fulfill his mission for he died of disease in Qushui the day before he reached Lhasa. Nevertheless, the relationship between the Central Government and the Tibetan Local Government had already been linked up and was developing towards the better. In 1930, the Mongolian-Tibetan
Conference was held in Nanjing. The conference invited delegates from various parts of China, including those who were from Tibet. In that same year, the Dalai appointed Kunchok Jungnas as the General Delegate and Permanent Representative in Nanjing. Then in next year, the Tibetan Kashag set up the Tibetan Office in Nanjing.

In 1931, the Nationalist Government held a National Congress, which invited deputies from both the Dalai group and the Panchen group — six delegates from the former and four from the latter. In July 1931, the Central Government bestowed on the ninth Panchen the title of “Great Master of Protection, Propagation and Wide Intelligence”, a jade seal, a jade certificate bearing the title and a yearly salary of 120,000 yuan. Because the Dalai was not granted a title at the same time (he had already been granted a title in 1911), the Dalai was angry and was difficult with the Panchen. He accused the Panchen of bribing the Central Government for the title. On the other hand, the Panchen accused him of ten big crimes. It was very interesting to note that both sides regarded the title from the Central Government as an honour. They both pointed out the crimes of Great Britain’s invading Tibet and creating an “independent” Tibet, and also expressed their sincerity for China, hoping to gain the support and trust of the Central Government. This was a reflection of the mood of the Tibetans for their motherland.

2. Britain’s Provocation to War Between Xikang, Qinghai and Tibet

While the relationship between Tibet and Central Government was improving, Britain tried hard to provoke incidents to sabotage the close relations between the Chinese and the Tibetans.
In 1929, some Nepalese merchants refused to pay commercial tax and started a dispute with the Tibetans. In order to put pressure on the Dalai group, the British abetted the Nepalese to attack Tibet. Although the Dalai asked the Central Government to mediate, he disliked the slow pace of the Government to solve the dispute, so he turned to ask the British to act as an intermediary. The response of the British was very active. In January 1930, the Indian Government dispatched a delegation to intervene and the dispute between Tibet and Nepal was settled. As a result, the relations between the Dalai and the British became closer than before. The British Government gave the Dalai 3,000 rifles and pistols to arm the bodyguards and the police. It also sent police officers to train the Tibetan police and the 1,000 newly-armed bodyguards.

In June 1930, the Dargye Monastery and Beri Monastery in Xikang Province clashed for the control of fifteen serf households. Relying on its own strength, the Dargye Monastery did not accept mediation and occupied Beri Monastery in one stroke, so the troops in Xikang interfered. Some of the pro-British Tibetans caught this chance and added fuel to the flames by dispatching troops to support the Dargye Monastery. Thus the conflicts between the two monasteries escalated into war between Xikang and Tibet.

The Tibetan troops seized Garze and Zhanhua successively. In August 1931, the British Government sent its Political Officer in Sikkim to Lhasa to meet with the Dalai, provoking the Tibetan troops to reinforce the offensive and seize the part of Qinghai where Tibetans lived.

Because the Dalai was dissatisfied with the Panchen’s title granted by the Central Government, he wanted to enlarge the areas he occupied in Qinghai and Xikang with the support of Britain and those young Tibetan officers who were in favour of
the British. Therefore, he sent Ngoshi Thubtan, secretary-general of the Kashag, to administer military and political affairs in Yushu.

On March 24, 1932, according to the command of the Dalai, 4,000 Tibetan soldiers equipped with canons gathered in Chamdo. They invaded Yushu District and occupied the Greater and Lesser Zurmang, Xiewu and the area of the Tongtian River. In July, the Qinghai relief troops arrived from Xining. They counterattacked and defeated the Tibetan troops. They recovered not only Zurmang, Xiewu and the Tongtian River area, but also those regions such as Sershud and Dengke which were on the eastern bank of the Jinsha River in Xikang. Meanwhile, the Frontier Commander Liu Wenhui dispatched a brigade to attack Zhanhua and Garze, together with the Qinghai army. The Tibetan troops had to retreat to the western bank of the Jinsha River. Now, the two sides confronted each other along the bank of the river.

In attacking Xikang to the east and Qinghai to the north, the Tibetans were provided not only with weapons by Britain but also with British officers, who were hiding among the Tibetan troops. Therefore, from July to October in 1932, the Foreign Ministry of the Chinese Government time and again made many representations to the British Ambassador to China, demanding Britain to stop the provision of weapons for the Tibetans. But the representations met with unreasonable refusals. The British Government claimed that the provision of weapons for the Tibetans was fulfilling the obligations of the Indian-Tibetan Treaty signed in 1921. However, the British Government claimed that it was willing to act as an intermediary, intending to interfere directly in the internal affairs of China. Of course, this was refused flatly by the Chinese Government. Because this war in the border areas of Xikang,
Qinghai and Tibet broke out just at the time when the Japanese invaded Northeastern China in September 18, 1931, it brought about the strong opposition of the progressive opinion of the whole nation. On the other hand, the war was mainly confined in the region where the Tibetans lived, so the quiet life of the Tibetans was disturbed. The Tibetan people and the monks demanded strongly that the war should be ended as soon as possible. In addition, the Sichuan and Qinghai troops won victory after victory and recaptured those districts east of the Jinsha River.

As a result, the Tibetan local government had to abandon the project to annex with armed force the areas of Qinghai and Xikang where Tibetans lived. It asked the Central Government to mediate, so Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Qinghai and Xikang troops to stop the offensive and open negotiations with the Tibetans. In October, 1932, Xikang and Tibet signed “The Gantok Truce Agreement” and in April 1933, Qinghai and Tibet signed “the Badatang Truce Agreement.” Thus Great Britain’s efforts of inciting the Tibetan troops to invade Xikang and Qinghai ended in failure. The Tibetan troops had fought for years and had suffered great loss. This caused the opposition of the majority of monks and Tibetan people. On December 7, 1933, the Dalai died of shame, for he had been used by the British.

After the Thirteenth Dalai Lama had passed away, the Tibetan local government sent an obituary to the Central Government and chose Radreng to take charge of political and religious affairs in Tibet. Meanwhile, they cleared the pro-British officials out of the government and prevented their usurpation of power and sabotage. When news came to Nanjing that the Dalai had passed away, the Central Government held a big memorial meeting to show mourning over the Dalai’s
death, but also gave money for his funeral and sent a telegram of condolence, granting the Dalai posthumously the title of “Great Master of Patriotism, Magnanimity, Benevolence and Sagacity.” It also authorized Radrang to manage temporality the administrative and religious affairs of Tibet. Meanwhile, it sent Huang Musong, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, to Tibet to take charge of the memorial ceremony and the granting of the Dalai’s title. General Huang arrived in Lhasa from Xikang in August 1934. The Tibetan local government held a grand welcome ceremony, in accordance with the previous examples when they welcomed the imperial envoys from the Qing Government. General Huang also acted like a Resident Minister of the Qing Dynasty. He first went to the Jokhang Temple and Ramoche Temple to pay homage to the Buddha, then gave alms to the three big monasteries. On September 23, the ceremony of granting the Dalai the posthumous title of “Great Master of Patriotism, Magnanimity, Benevolence and Sagacity” was held in the Potala, a jade certificate bearing the title and a jade seal presented to the portrait of the Dalai. On October 1, the memorial ceremony was held in the mourning hall in the Potala. All this again showed China’s sovereignty over Tibet and made Great Britain helpless.

III. Great Britain’s New Scheme of Splitting Tibet from China

1. Support for the Pro-British Force to Prosecute the Patriots

The Living Buddha Radrang, who was temporarily in charge of the Dalai’s administrative and religious rights, was a local nationalist. He was inclined to China and opposed to the imperialist forces in Tibet. Local nationalism was generated
when the Han chauvinism was in ruling position. Its basic attitude was against the British and willing to improve the relations with the Chinese Government. Therefore, Radreng could be said to be a patriotic leading figure in Tibet. When he was in power, he was supported by the Tibetans and the monks from the three big monasteries and did many valuable things by working assiduously, clearing away the pro-British force, and strengthening the relations with China. He dismissed the Pro-British Kalon Tsarong and Khyungram Dapon, banished Gongbi, the flavoured courtier of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, confiscated the property and gouged out the eyes of Lungshar, the Defense Secretary.

In 1934 when he was dispatched by the Central Government to Tibet for inspection and granting a title to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Huang Musong formed a good relationship with Radreng. They even talked about establishing an office of the Mongolian-Tibetan Commission in Lhasa. The search for reincarnation of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama was carried out under Radreng’s arrangement and direction.

In 1940 when the installation ceremony of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama was held, Radreng again invited Wu Zhongxin, a Commissioner of the Central Government, to attend the ceremony. All this was a heavy blow to the aggressive scheme the British adopted and would surely lead to the deep hatred of British imperialists. Therefore, incited by the British secret agents, the Tibetan pro-British members and the frustrated officials united to oppose Radreng. They claimed that Radreng was inclined to the Han and forced him to ask for a three-year retirement in 1941. Taktra Rinpoche, Radreng’s former tutor, was to replace him. At first, Taktra had for a time been in favour of Radreng’s idea. But he was aged and muddle-headed. After he came to be the regent, he clung to the power and
became the puppet of the anti-Radreng camp composed of the Pro-British members. Succumbed to the pressure of the pro-British members, he changed Radreng’s administrative policies and appointed the pro-British members Rampa, Kashopa, Surkhang, and Lhalupa (son of Lungshar) as Kalons to replace Tenpa Jamyang, the chief Kalon and other Kalons such as Bonsho, Phunkhang, and Langchung. Since then the pro-British force was again in control of the Tibetan local government.

The pro-British member’s gaining power and their altering Radreng’s administrative politics caused the dissatisfaction of many Tibetan officials, who opposed the pro-British line and demanded to resume the policies pursued by Radreng. Taktra, aged and tired, expressed for several times his willingness to retire. So news spread in Tibet that he would retire soon and that Radreng would come to power again. The pro-British members were in a state of anxiety. Instigated by the British spies, they decided to fabricate a charge upon Radreng so as to put him to death. In early April 1941, a grenade was found in Yigtsang (i.e. the secretariat) of the Kashag Government. The pro-British members claimed that Radreng wanted to assassinate Taktra and regain power. So he sent an assassin to present Taktra a time-bomb which had been disguised as a gift, thus caused the explosion in Yigtsang. Taktra was convinced, so in wild anger he ordered to arrest Radreng and his relatives.

On April 14, Lhalupa and his followers led five hundred Tibetan soldiers to Radreng monastery. They lured Radreng to Lhasa and imprisoned him. Radreng’s followers and relatives were also arrested. The monks in the three big monasteries, who were always opposed to the British aggressors, were afraid that Radreng might be killed, so they sent militiamen to intercept Lhalupa for the purpose of rescuing Radreng. All the monks in Sera Monastery set out and started an armed conflict with
Lhalupa and his followers. This is a courageous struggle for the sovereignty of Tibet and against the control of the imperialist powers. However, the monks’ struggle was suppressed after a week’s fighting, because the forces controlled by the pro-British group were too strong.

During this time, the Central Government telegraphed to the Lhasa authorities, demanding of them to be responsible for Radreng’s safety. However, this telegraph quickened Radreng’s death. The pro-British group threatened that they would rather suffer a defeat and surrender to Britain than set Radreng free. On May 7, Radreng was poisoned to death in prison. Thereafter the patriotic force in Tibet was given a heavy blow and was never able to recover. The pro-British aristocratic bureaucracy firmly controlled the Tibetan local government.

2. The Tibetan Authorities Instigated to Establish Direct Diplomatic Relations with Western Countries

In 1937, when Japan provoked the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 7), a full-scale Sino-Japanese war broke out. During the hard times of the Anti-Japanese War, the Chinese Government was too busy to attend to the affairs on Tibetan frontiers. Taking advantage of the situation, Britain thought it an excellent opportunity to invade Tibet. So, Britain employed various means to rope in the Tibetan officials through the British Political Officer in Sikkim. At that time, the Chinese Government planned to build a Sino-India highway in Tibet for the convenience of transporting military materials. Great Britain even incited the Tibetan local government to oppose this project and check the surveyors from entering Tibet. The British also created difficulties for the Chinese merchants and merchandise when they were entering Tibet via India.

In July 1942, the Tibetan Kashag suddenly declared the
establishment of the "Bureau of Foreign Affairs" and informed the Tibetan Office of the Central Government that "all affairs should be handled by this bureau from now on." This was another scheme of splitting Tibet from China plotted by Britain and the United States. The moment the "Bureau of Foreign Affairs" was established, Britain and the United States immediately cheered and formed relations with this bureau. The United States dispatched a military delegation and got into direct contact with the bureau without the permission of the Chinese Government. Seeing that the situation was getting grave, the Chinese Government issued a statement to the Tibetan Kashag, insisting that the way of contact between the Central Government and Tibet should remain unchanged, without the interference of the "Bureau of Foreign Affairs." Meanwhile, the Central Government deployed troops for battle against the Tibetan troops. Seeing that the scheme of using the "Bureau of Foreign Affairs" could not be realized for the time being, the Tibetan Kashag decided to establish another office to get into contact with the Central Government's Office in Tibet, if the Central Government refused to give in.

Britain tried to take the advantage of the Anti-Japanese War to invade Tibet. In 1944, Basil Gould, the British Political Officer in Sikkim, went to Lhasa and put pressure upon the Tibetan Kashag, demanding the cession of the land south of Baimagang and Mendawang. The Tibetan Kashag held a meeting of Tsongdu (National Assembly), resolving unanimously that "the land of Tibet will never be ceded to Britain. All present signed and decided that they would bear all the serious consequences". Gould's plot of occupying the land came to nothing but failure.

After it had established the Bureau of Foreign Affairs, the Tibetan Kashag came into more and more contacts with the
United States. It also engaged in arms expansion with the support of Great Britain. In March 1947, engineered by the USA and UK, the Tibetan Kashag, like an independent state, sent a three-member delegation to attend the Asian Relations Conference held in New Dehli, India. In the conference hall, the national flags of all Asian countries were hung. Strangely enough, the “lion in the snow mountains” standard of the Tibetan Buddhism was among the flags. Meanwhile, a huge map of Asia hanging in the hall excluded Tibet from China and the head of the Tibetan delegation was invited to sit in the rostrum, enjoying the treatment for a country’s delegation. It is evident that India, the host country, acting on the orders of Great Britain, intentionally created the fact of the “independence” of Tibet, so as to compel other countries to recognize it. This scheme aroused angry protestation of the delegation of the Chinese Government; Nehru, the Premier of India, was forced to make corrections in the map of Asia and included Tibet into China.

In October of that same year, the Tibetan Kashag dispatched an illegal “Commercial Delegation” headed by Tsepon Shakabpa to visit the United States and Britain in the name of promoting trade. The delegation received the strong support of the imperialists. Before it left for the United States, the American businessmen acted as its go-between and the US Consul General in Hong Kong signed the visa without the consent of the Chinese Government. When it reached the United States, it was warmly welcomed by the American Government. After Shakabpa presented to the US Government the Dalai’s letter and photo for the US President, the US President prepared to have an interview with this delegation. Later, this interview was cancelled because of the protest of the Chinese Ambassador to the United States. Gu Weijun, the Ambassador, pointed out in
his report to the Chinese Government that "the reason why the US Government was well disposed towards Tibet was perhaps it wanted to employ Tibet as its air base against Russia." Therefore, the US Government gave a warm welcome to the Commercial Delegation of Tibet for no other reason than to attain its imperialistic ambition.

After it left the United States, the Commercial Delegation visited Great Britain and Italy. The British Government also signed the visa without the Chinese Government's consent and gave this delegation a warm welcome upon its arrival. For this, the Chinese Ambassador to Great Britain lodged a protest to the British Government.

3. US Interference in Tibet

Just before Tibet was liberated, the US influence rapidly penetrated into Tibet, and the USA became another big power, besides Britain and India, that invaded Tibet. At that time, the US Government thought that Tibet provided a natural defense for the non-communist countries in Southern Asia. In order to hinder this area from falling into the hands of the communists and becoming a communist base for infiltration to Southern Asia, the United States had to do all it could to prevent the Chinese Communist Party from liberating Tibet.

However, among the officials of the US Government, there were two different views for the US policy to Tibet. One view was in strong support of the Tibetan independence, represented by Loy Henderson, the US Ambassador to India. On January 8, April 12 and July 2, 1949, Henderson telegraphed for three times to the US State Department to explain his stand. He thought that once the Chinese Communist Party had the control of Tibet, the US position of opposing itself to worldwide communism would be weakened. Meanwhile, the com-
nist force would use Tibet as a base for further penetration into Southern Asia, particularly to India, and the long Sino-Indian border was poorly fortified. Furthermore, if the Chinese Communist Party should have controlled the Dalai Lama, by exploiting the Dalai’s influence among the Buddhists, it would have its force penetrated into Central Asia. Henderson also proposed to the US State Department to send to Tibet a diplomatic delegation headed by experienced diplomats and with highly trained members in it so as to be prepared to stay in Lhasa when possible. In this way, the development of CPC could be closely watched and the “friendly” relations between Tibet and the USA could be reinforced.

Henderson’s proposition was favoured by the US diplomats in China and in Russia. On June 4, the US Chargé d’Affaires to Russia telegraphed to Acheson, the Secretary of State, and explained his support for Henderson’s stand. He also suggested that the US Government should try to win India over so as to form a united front which could oppose the “communist’s further wibbling” at Southern Asia. On July 8, Leighton Stuart, the US Ambassador to China also telegraphed to Acheson, claiming that he was in favour of any actions that would lead to the recognition of an independent Tibet.

However, another opinion inside the US Government thought that the United States should not hastily support Tibetan independence. Instead, it should take a wait-and-see attitude and go into action at an opportune moment. On February 17, Ruth Bacon, an official in the Far East Bureau of the US State Department, wrote in a memorandum that if the United States recognized Tibet as an independent country, it would run counter to USA’s consistent stand of respecting the sovereignty of China. Thus it would greatly weaken the influence of USA over China and harm greatly the US prospect of
making the Chinese stand in opposition to Russia by using the Xinjiang and the Northeastern issues. Meanwhile, geographically speaking, Tibet was out-of-the-way and secluded from the outside world. Besides, the strategic significance of Tibet was limited, for the US Air Force could not build an air base or a missile launching site in an area where the topographical and weather conditions were poor and the people had a peculiar belief. For the moment the United States should not deny China's sovereignty over Tibet, on the other hand, it should avoid mentioning China's sovereignty over Tibet, so as to leave possible room for action.

The responsible officials in the US Government were in favour of Bacon's memorandum. On July 28, Secretary of State Acheson telegraphed to Henderson, replying that he did not agree to his proposition for the Tibetan affairs. But Acheson said that the State Department was considering sending more diplomatic personnel in order to make a comprehensive investigation of Tibet. They would wait for the opportune chance to involve in the Tibetan affairs.

NOTES

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Chapter X

Peaceful Liberation and Democratic Reform of Tibet

I. Peaceful Liberation of Tibet

1. Situation on the Eve of the Liberation of Tibet

The victory of the Chinese democratic revolution and the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 opened up a bright future for the liberation of the Tibetan people. “The Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference” issued on September 29, 1949 claimed that New China abrogated the system of national oppression in history and pursued a policy of regional national autonomy so as to make the people of all nationalities form a big, friendly and co-operative family. This policy also contributed to the liberation of Tibet.

In the fall of this year, however, when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army were marching towards the southwest of China and approaching Tibet, Britain, the United States and India speeded up their schemes to invade Tibet and tried in vain to prevent the Chinese people from liberating their own territory. At first, they stirred up “the incident of driving away the Hans” in Tibet. On July 8, the Tibetan local government, in a surprise move, notified the Lhasa office of the Kuomintang government to evacuate its staff and their families from Tibet within two weeks as a necessary measure to “make sure that no
Communists remain in Tibet in disguise.” And then happened a series of violent incidents: “The wireless station of the Ministry of Communications was destroyed, with its head, Mr. Xi, injured by an assassin, ... all the Hans engaged in trade in Lhasa were expelled, even the monks of the Han nationality were not spared.”

The Central Daily, organ of the Kuomintang government, reported this news and said: “This news is very surprising. How could there be so much influence of the Communist Party in Lhasa? Why were the staff in our government institutions and schools in Tibet and even the monks of Han nationality expelled? This is a mystery difficult to explain.”1 It is very clear that Britain, America, and India and the Tibetan reactionary forces, making use of the opportunity of Kuomintang’s power being overthrown, fomented this incident in order to clear off all the Hans, break off all relations between Tibet and its motherland so as to split Tibet from its motherland and make it a colony of the imperialists.

On September 2, 1949 the Xinhua News Agency in an editorial exposed their plot, and meanwhile it declared: “The People’s Liberation Army must liberate all the Chinese territory including Tibet, not allowing a single inch of its land to be left outside the domain of the People’s Republic of China.” On September 7, the People’s Daily published another editorial entitled “The Chinese People Must Liberate Tibet,” giving a further warning to the imperialists and their followers and at the same time appealing to the Tibetan people to unite together and “get prepared for welcoming the PLA into Tibet to liberate Tibet and the whole China.”2

The foreign forces standing in the way of the liberation of Tibet didn’t stop their activities immediately. In August 1949, in the capacity of the commentator of the Columbia Broadcast-
Company, after the incident of driving away the Hans, the American spy, Lowell Thomas came to Lhasa to engage in conspiracy. He organized a so-called touring party, completed necessary formalities of entering into Tibet with the help of the Indian Foreign Ministry. He brought high-grade gifts which were carried by 15 mules, such as film cameras, tape-recorders and presented them to the Tibetan officials separately. During his stay in Tibet, Thomas got in wide-ranging touch with the Dalai and members of the Kashag and discussed with them the policy of being independent and against the Communist Party. After he returned to U.S., Thomas wrote in his book Out of This World about this travel, and he revealed some details of how he had hatched a plot with the Dalai group. At that time, the Tibetan rulers were very much afraid of the PLA entering into Tibet and hoped that America would promise to give help. The members of the Kashag asked Thomas: “If the Communists attack Tibet, will America come to our aid? And to what extent?” Thomas answered: “If the Communists attack Tibet, they will certainly come from the north of Tibet and the east of Xikang. By either of the two routes, they will have to cover 600 miles. It is easy to cover the first 200 miles. But then, it will be terribly difficult to march on. If Tibet organizes guerrilla forces, they can hold back the aggressors, cut off their supply lines and make the aggressors cost a great deal. To set up such a professional unit, two conditions are required: (1) suitable weapons should be provided for; (2) The troops should receive technical training. The Tibetans, if provided for with suitable weapons and given technical training, are able to shoulder such a defensive duty.”

After returning to the United States from Tibet in October, Thomas gave it enormous publicity that “the Tibetan leaders are willing to get military aid from the Americans. In Novem-
ber, he requested an interview with President Truman and presented the Dalai’s letter for aid to the American Government and reported the details about his travel in Tibet. He emphasized particularly the independence of Tibet being threatened and the aid most needed. Truman showed sympathy for Tibet and promised to give unofficial aid to it.

Just then, the negotiation on the peaceful liberation of Tibet was proposed. After the founding of new China, the Tenth Panchen sent a telegram to the Central Government and expressed his hope for Tibet to be liberated soon. Chairman Mao Zedong and Zhu De returned a telegram jointly, fully affirmed the patriotic zeal of the Tibetan people and said: “The Central People’s Government and the PLA will certainly satisfy this desire of the Tibetan people. We hope that you and all other patriotic personages in Tibet work together and fight for the liberation of Tibet and the unity of the people of both the Han and Tibetan nationalities.” And then, the Central People’s Government notified the Tibetan local government to send representatives to Beijing to negotiate the ways of the peaceful liberation of Tibet.

The development of the situation made some people in the Tibetan local government feel confused and uneasy. On November 2, the Tibetan local government sent a telegram to Mao Zedong, assuming the tone of an independent country, demanded the Central Government to guarantee not to let “the Chinese army cross over the Tibetan order” and return to Tibet “the Tibetan territory which has been annexed as one part of the Chinese territory.” On November 4, it sent representatives to the American Ambassador in India to present a letter to Acheson and asked the U.S. to help the Tibetan authorities keep the PLA from entering into Tibet. At the same time, it also raised similar requests to the British and Indian governments. On December
3, the Tibetan authorities sent a telegram to Acheson, asking the U.S. to help Tibet to join the United Nations. On December 22, it sent telegrams to President Truman and Mr. Acheson again and said that it would send a diplomatic corps to visit the U.S. to strive for the American assistance.

The U.S. was prepared to take vigorous actions to interfere in the Tibetan affairs. But while discussing with Britain and India on how to take measures to support the independence of Tibet and let it join the United Nations as well as other problems, these countries had doubts in their minds and didn’t make positive answers. This made Acheson and Henderson greatly disappointed. They were forced to “advise” Tibet not to apply for the membership of the United Nations and also not to send diplomatic corps to visit America for help. At the same time, the U.S. would not send any delegation to Tibet right away; it also abstained from setting up any diplomatic organ in Tibet but remained watching the change of the situation in Tibet.

At the beginning of 1950, the advance troops of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had arrived at Garze, Batang and other regions in Xikang where Tibetans inhabited. The situation took a sudden turn and then developed rapidly. The U.S. immediately gave up its attitude of look-on and began to interfere. In May, Henderson, the American minister in India, reached an agreement with India Government, which stipulated that the U.S. could transport a great number of rifles, machine guns, handguns, grenades and a great deal of powder to Calcutta and unloaded them there, and then transported them into Tibet through Darjeeling. When being transported and unloaded in India, the weapons made in the U.S. could pass without examination and conveyed by armed American soldiers.

The British Government also supported the Dalai group to
prevent the PLA from entering into Tibet. H.E. Richardson, the former head of British delegation in Lhasa, was a colonialist of resource astuteness. He was very sinister and also familiar with the situation in Tibet. So he still remained on his post after India proclaimed independence and gave advice and suggestions for India to invade Tibet. Another British spy Ford was the chief of the British Radio Station in Chamdo. In April, 1945, he was sent to the British Radio Station to work. On July 20, 1949, he carried three Britain-made transmitter-receivers and some military radios from Lhasa to Chamdo and set up a station, by which he collected military information and hotly engaged in espionage. With the station, he kept contact with American, British and Japanese spies, such as the American spy Lowell Thomas. He also had frequent contacts with the Tibetan high-ranking officials in Chamdo, stole information from them and sowed dissensions between the Han-Chinese and Tibetans. When Chamdo was liberated, he was arrested and confessed all his crimes.\(^5\)

Supported and instigated by the U.S., Britain and India, the Taktra clique went on engaging in activities for the independence of Tibet. In November 1949, under the pretense of preventing the Army of the Communist Party from attacking Tibet, Taktra sent telegrams to all the countries for assistance and declared publicly that “Tibet was an independent country.” On January 14, 1950, in the name of “the Tibetan National Assembly,” the Taktra clique sent a telegram to the United Press International Co-operative Office and declared to “send goodwill delegations to every country and also to China so as to explain and declare its independence to the Chinese Communist authorities.”

The patriotic Tibetan people were firmly against the Taktra clique’s betraying their motherland. On October 1, 1949
Panchen sent a telegram to the Central Government saying: “The successive Panchens have received favour from the Central Government for generations and I have been given special treatment. For more than 20 years, I have moved around with unremitting efforts and appealed for the integrity of territory and sovereignty. I earnestly hope Tibet to be liberated soon.”

On January 31, 1950, the Panchen’s Council of Khenpos sent a telegram to the Central People’s Government and stated: “Tibet belongs to China, as has been generally accepted by the whole world. All the Tibetan people also consider themselves as one branch of the Chinese nation. The current act of the Lhasa authorities destroys in fact the territorial integrity of our country and goes against the will of the Tibetan people. We, on behalf of the Tibetan people, request the sending of a righteous army by the government to root out the reactionary elements, drive the imperialist forces out of Tibet, consolidate the southwest national defence and liberate the Tibetan people. We vow to lead the Tibetan patriots and arouse the Tibetan people to take concerted action with the PLA, pledge our loyalty to our motherland and struggle till our last breath.”

The Lhasa authorities held a meeting to discuss how to send goodwill delegations respectively to the U.S., Britain, India, Nepal and other countries to ask them to assist the Tibetans in their struggle for independence. At the meeting, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, the representative of the patriotic force, prevailing over all dissenting views and delivered a statement that “all those who have learned history know that Tibet belongs to China. If counting from the Yuan Dynasty, Tibet has been one part of China for over 700 years. This can not be changed or denied. The so-called independence of Tibet was groundless. No country in the world ever acknowledged the independence of Tibet. The relation between Tibet and the Central Government
is an internal affair of China. The Chinese internal affairs can only be discussed and solved within China. We had rather send representatives to the inland for discussing than to foreign countries for aid."  

The Central People’s Government upheld its stand of liberating Tibet and opposing its independence. On January 20, 1950, while talking about the Tibetan affair, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out: “Everyone in the world knows that Tibet is part of Chinese territory and no one has ever refuted that.” Such being the case; of course, the Lhasa authorities have no right to send any delegation without authorization, still less the right to announce its so-called independence. That the independence of Tibet should be propagated to the U.S., the British, Indian and Nepalese governments and publicized by the United Press International proved that what is reported in the news dispatch, if not the fabrication of the U.S., is nothing but the puppet show directed by the American imperialists and their accomplices who attempt to invade Tibet.  

The spokesman pointed out, “If the Lhasa authorities send representatives to Beijing to negotiate about the peaceful liberation of Tibet under the premise that they acknowledge Tibet as a member of the big Chinese family and agree to carry out the regional autonomy, the representatives will, of course, be accepted.” On the contrary, if they receive the order of the imperialist invaders and send illegal delegations to engage in disrupting activities in betrayal of the motherland, the Central People’s Government will not tolerate their treacherous act, and any country accepting such a delegation will be regarded as hostile to the People’s Republic of China.”  

Because of the resolute opposition of the Chinese Government, the U.S., Britain and India were forced to change their minds. They made a reply to the Tibetan authorities through
the Indian representatives’ organization in Lhasa, to the effect that the Tibetan affairs were Chinese internal affairs. It was not convenient for them to interfere in and so they couldn’t receive the Tibetan delegations.\textsuperscript{10} Under such circumstances, the Tibetan authorities were forced to cancel the plan of sending goodwill delegations to those countries but send a delegation to Beijing to discuss the Tibetan affairs with the Central People’s Government.

2. Failure in the Sinister Scheme of Obstructing the Liberation of Tibet

In February, 1950, the Tibetan authorities sent a delegation headed by Shakabpa to Beijing by way of India and Hong Kong. After the delegation arrived in India, they were prevented by Britain. The British High Commissioner in New Delhi tried energetically to persuade the delegation not to go to Beijing for negotiation. The British Government even took the mean measure to prevent the delegation by not granting the Tibetans the visas to pass by Hong Kong.

In order to hold negotiations and reach an agreement of peaceful liberation as soon as possible, in July 1950, the Central Government sent the Living Buddha Getag, Vice-Chairman of the Xikang Provincial People’s Government to Tibet to try to persuade the Tibetans. After the Living Buddha Getag arrived at Chamdo, Ford, the British spy, instigated the reactionaries among the upper circles to send Tibetan soldiers to prevent him from going to Lhasa. Ford twice put poison in Getag’s food on August 21 and Getag died of poisoning. His skin turned black and would come off when touched by hand. In order to wipe out the evidence of the murder, Ford and his group burned his body and had his entourage sent under escort to Lhasa.

In response to the demand of the whole people of our
country on October 7, 1950, the PLA divided their forces in several routes, crossed the Jinsha River, Nu River and Lanchang River and marched towards Tibet according to their predetermined plan. On October 15, the PLA wiped out 5,738 men of the Tibetan main force and occupied Chamdo. The liberation of Chamdo threw the imperialists and the Tibetan separatist clique into great confusion.

At this time, the U.S. and British governments became even more frenzied in their clamouring. On November 4, the American Information Service issued a news bulletin and said: “The Chinese Communists have invaded into Tibet and are now at the gate of India. It has caused wide attention ... this is one more example of the violent invasion of the style of the Communist Party.” On October 13, Washington Evening Star in an editorial said, “If Tibet falls into the hands of Red China, India will face a dreadful future that the Communist Party will attack directly its back along the northern boundary.” The former British political representative in Tibet, Mr. Gould said: “I believe the final destination of China will be India. China attempts to have its feet planted on the southeast of Tibet and then creates a severe confusion in India from there.” On November 20, Mr. Blackburn, a British M.P., said that the British Government should ask Indian and Pakistan governments to offer one brigade to be transported by air to Tibet ... one brigade can rescue Tibet.¹¹

India had always considered itself the inheritor of what was left by the British invaders in Tibet. In order to have Tibet under its control forever, on October 21, 1950, India presented a memorandum on Tibet to China and attempted to prevent the PLA from entering into Tibet. It said: “If those countries which are against China’s being admitted into the United Nations get a chance because of the military action of China in
Tibet to distort the peaceful aim China pursues, then the position of China will be weakened.”

On October 28, India again addressed a note to China saying: “Under the current international circumstances, the invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet can not but be regarded as deplorable.... The Indian Government can only express its deep regret for it.”

In response to the irrational reproach of India, on October 30, the Chinese Government presented a note to India and pointed out solemnly: “Tibet is one indivisible part of the Chinese territory. Tibetan affairs are completely China’s internal affairs. The PLA must enter Tibet to liberate the Tibetan people and guard the Chinese frontiers. This is the resolved policy of the Central People’s Government.... Therefore, with regard to the viewpoint of the Government of India on what it regards as deplorable, the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet and hence expresses its deep regret.”

The Indian Government went on interfering in our internal affairs and opposed the PLA’s marching into Tibet. On November 1, the India Government presented a note to China, declaring: “In view of these developments, the Government of India are no longer in a position to advise the Tibetan Delegation to proceed to Peking, unless the Chinese Government think it fit to order their troops to halt their advance into Tibet and thus give a chance for peaceful negotiations.”

Soon afterwards, the Chinese Government returned a note to the Indian Government on November 16 and reiterated the principled stand of liberating Tibet and pointed out: “However, when the Chinese Government begins to exercise its sovereign rights over Tibet, to liberate the Tibetan people and to drive
out foreign forces and their influences so as to ensure that the Tibetan people will be free from aggression and will realize regional autonomy and religious freedom, the Indian Government attempts to influence and prevent the Chinese Government from exercising its sovereignty over Tibet. This can not but make the Chinese Government greatly surprised.”

At the same time, as the Indian Government tried to put pressure on China by preventing the Tibetan delegation from coming to Beijing for negotiations, the Chinese Government reiterated that no matter whether the Tibetan local authorities were willing to negotiate or not and what the result of the negotiations would be, any interference of foreign countries was not allowed. It was decided that the PLA would enter Tibet to liberate the Tibetan people. Because the Chinese Government had firmly expressed its principled stand again and again, the attempt of the Indian Government to interfere in Chinese internal affairs ended in failure.

But the imperialists and Tibetan reactionary forces didn’t stop their intrigue to prevent the liberation of Tibet. On November 1, 1950, Acheson, the U.S. Secretary of State, viciously slandered China’s liberating Tibet as an invasion at a press conference in Washington and declared: “The U.S. thinks it is one of the most unfortunate and serious incidents.”

On November 8, the Tibetan delegation detained in India presented a letter of appeal to the United Nations in the name of the so-called “Tibetan National Assembly.” It said that the PLA’s entering Tibet will most probably deprive Tibet of its independence which they have long been enjoying. They asked the United Nations to make a resolution “not to allow China to destroy our country by brutal means.” Then on November 13, Henderson issued a statement in New Delhi that the U.S. was interested in the Tibetan situation. On November 15, New
York Times issued an editorial which more publicly urged the United Nations to interfere in Tibetan affairs. On the same day, the U.S. State Department instigated the representative of El Salvador to put forward a motive at the U.N. General Assembly to interfere in Tibetan affairs. It slandered the PLA liberating Tibet as “a foreign country’s aggression” and asked the General Assembly “to set up a committee to work out appropriate measures for the adoption by the General Assembly to deal with the Tibetan issue.”

The reactionary forces of foreign countries deliberately instigated the United Nations to interfere with Tibet. This aroused the strong indignation of the Chinese people. On November 22, the People’s Daily issued a comment entitled “Denounce the American Scheme on Tibet” and pointed out seriously: “If the General Assembly of the United Nations should once again accept the irrational demand of the U.S. to interfere in Chinese internal affairs, it will prove once again that the so-called representation of the majority of countries of the United Nations have become the ignominious tool by which the American imperialist aggressors set themselves against the People’s Republic of China.” Owing to the strong protest of the Chinese people and the cold response of most countries towards the scheme of interfering with Tibet, which was hatched by the U.S., on November 24, the General Affairs Committee of the U.N. General Assembly decided to put off the discussion of this proposal indefinitely.

3. Negotiations for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet

In the winter of 1950, realizing the disadvantageous situation, the Tibetan Taktra clique abducted the Fourteenth Dalai Lama to Yadong, attempting to go to India and wait there for the fancied outbreak of the Third World War, when they could
stage a comeback. This act of the Taktra clique aroused the opposition of not only the Tibetan broad masses but also the three great monasteries. Even many of the attendant monk officials serving the Dalai and some Kalons were also against the Dalai’s flight to India and stood for negotiation with the Central People’s Government to solve Tibetan issues. Under the powerful pressure of the Tibetan patriotic forces, the Taktra clique had no way out; they landed in an awkward predicament and was forced finally to come off power. In January 1951, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, only 16 years old, took over the reigns of government. In February, the Dalai appointed a five-person delegation headed by the Kalon Ngabo Ngawang Jigme to go to Beijing for negotiations. The former representatives Shakabpa and others, however, still stayed in India and late betrayed their motherland publicly.

The Tibetan delegation arrived at Beijing in late April. They held negotiations with the representatives of the Central Government and made very good progress. Within only one month, agreements were made on all important problems. On May 23, General Zhang Jingwu and Kalon Ngabo Ngawang Jigme representing respectively the Central Government and the Tibetan local government signed an agreement on the concrete measures of the peaceful liberation of Tibet. This agreement achieved a correct solution of the relationship between Tibet and its motherland, and also the disunity for thirty years between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas inside the Tibetan nationality.

The Peace Agreement consists of 17 articles, the main points of which are as follows:

1. To drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet and realize the reunification between Tibet and its motherland. The Tibetan local government shall give positive assistance for the PLA’s entering Tibet to consolidate the national defence. The
Tibetan troops will be gradually reorganized into the PLA.

2. Under the unified leadership of the Central People’s Government, Tibet will carry out the regional national autonomy. And at the same time, all the Tibetan affairs concerning foreign countries will be dealt with by the Central Government.

3. Various reforms in Tibet must be put into practice. The Tibetan local government should carry out reforms on its own accord. When the people raise demands for reform, they shall be settled by means of consultation with the Tibetan leaders.

4. To realize the unity and reunification among the Tibetan nationality, mainly the unity between the Dalai and the Panchen.

5. To realize the reform of religious freedom and respect the religious beliefs and customs of the Tibetan people.

6. In accordance with the Tibetan actual conditions, to develop gradually its agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, commerce, culture and education and improve people’s livelihood step by step.

After the signing of the Peace Agreement, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa from Yadong on August 17, 1951. On October 24, he sent a telegram to Chairman Mao Zedong, expressing that the Tibetan local government and all the monks and laymen of Tibetan nationality endorsed unanimously the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, and they would give active assistance to the PLA’s entering into Tibet in order to consolidate the national defence, drive the imperialist forces out of Tibet and defend the integrity of territorial sovereignty of our motherland. On October 26, the PLA troops arrived at Lhasa to the welcome of the lay and monastic population.

As the Central Government insisted on the principle of the unity among nationalities and inside the Tibetan nationality, the
disunity over a long period of time between the Thirteenth Dalai and Ninth Panchen instigated by imperialists was eliminated. The Tenth Panchen also arrived at Lhasa from Qinghai in April, 1952, and had a friendly and intimate meeting with the Fourteenth Dalai. In June, Panchen returned to Tashilhunpo monastery and held the ascending ceremony.

The signing of the Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet was the epoch-making turning point in the history of the development of Tibet. Ever since, the Tibetan people cast off the yoke of the imperialist forces and returned to the embrace of the motherland. The schemes of the U.S., Britain, Indian and other countries to obstruct the liberation of Tibet all ended in ignominious defeat. The time when imperialists enslaved Tibet was gone forever.

II. The Tibetan Democratic Reform

1. New Aspects in Tibet After Its Liberation

After the signing of the Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, Generals Zhang Jingwu, Zhang Guohua and Tan Guangsan, the representatives of the Central Government, led the PLA units to Tibet quickly. And it was the beginning of executing the Agreement. The feudal serf system had to be reformed for the development, prosperity and progress of Tibet. But under the complicated conditions both in history and in reality at that time, the Central Government always adopted the principle of slowing down the process and waiting patiently in order to defend the national unity. At the end of 1956, the Central Government declared to the Tibetan local government that the democratic reform might not be carried out in Tibet during the Second Five-year Plan (before 1962) because the
conditions did not measure up to the requirements yet. Whether the reform should be carried out during the Third Five-year Plan would be decided together by the Tibetan leaders, representatives and people according to the circumstances at that time. So, even up to 1959, the Central Government had not changed the Tibetan political system at all. The Dalai Lama not only retained his former position and power, but also became the Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. One of the leaders of the country, he was also appointed Director of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region. All the internal affairs of the Tibetan local government had all the time been dealt with by itself headed by the Dalai.

At that time, the Central Government adopted a prudent and steadily advancing policy, took tortuous measures, kept in mind to influence the masses, win over the majority of the ruling class, create conditions to realize gradually the Agreement and push forward the political and economical reform. They did a lot of things that were essential and indispensable.

First, the PLA men were garrisoned in Tibet. They guarded the frontiers and consolidated the national defense. In 1954 and 1956, on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the Chinese Government signed with Indian and Nepalese governments the agreements on commerce and communications with Tibet, eliminated vestiges left over by the imperialist aggressors, and established peaceful and friendly relations between Tibet and its neighbouring countries.

Second, the religious policy was implemented, the religious belief of the Tibetan people was duly respected, the income of monasteries and monks was protected. On each important Buddhist festival, the Central Government’s representatives in Tibet would make “donations” to the three great
monasteries and other monasteries. Besides, the Commission of the Tibetan Religious Affairs and the Tibetan Branch of the Buddhist Association of China and other organizations were founded.

The Central Government respected the right of the Tibetan people to realize regional autonomy. In April, 1956, the Central Government sent a delegation headed by Vice-Premier Chen Yi to see the setting up of the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region and make all kinds of preparations for Tibetan autonomy. More than 90 percent of the members of the Preparatory Committee were of Tibetan nationality. The representatives of the local government had very large proportion in the Committee, while the cadres sent by the Central Government were not over one tenth. The official documents of the Preparatory Committee were mainly in Tibetan. Most of the meetings of the Committee were presided over by the Dalai Lama himself.

The Central Government also took a series of measures to give energetic support to the construction of Tibetan economy and culture. In order to improve the road communication between Tibet and other parts of China, the PLA men, working together with both the Hans and the Tibetans, conquered high mountains and glaciers and built highways of 7,000 kilometres long in total. In 1954, the Sichuan-Tibet highway (from Ya’an to Lhasa) and the Qinghai-Tibet highway (from Xining to Lhasa) were open to traffic. In 1957, the Xinjiang-Tibet highway (from Yecheng to Gartok) and other five main lines, from Nagchu to Ngari, Lhasa to Yadong, Lhasa to Zedang etc., were open to traffic. The construction of the highway network on the worldroof proved to be very difficult. For example, the construction of Sichuan-Tibet highway of 2,271 kilometres long in total required to cross 14 mountains, which were in general
over 4,000 metres above sea level. The highway is above the snow line and some parts are even high above the clouds. It crosses ten wide rivers. Only in the part from the Jinsha River to the Lanchang River, more than 150 big and small bridges had been thrown across above sheer precipices, deep valleys and terrifying waves and torrents. The highway also goes through a several-hundred-kilometre long primitive forest, boundless stretches of grass land, swamps and areas with few inhabitants or even none. These several highways linked up Tibet with China’s inland and changed fundamentally its state of inaccessibleness to traffic over a long period of time in the past. This network of highways has greatly facilitated the exchange of goods inside Tibet and between Tibet and the inland. So, the broad masses of Tibetan people acclaimed those highways as the “golden bridges leading to happiness.”

The Chinese air force made the first successful flight from Beijing to Lhasa in 1956 and since then regular air services have linked Tibet and the inland.

The Central Government also helped Tibet set up some industries, mines and enterprises. Power plants were built successively in Lhasa, Shigatse and Chamdo. And then the biggest power plant in Tibet was set up, which powered 6,000kw electric energy. In 1958, the first coal mine in Tibet was put into production, and the ancient city Lhasa, where cow dung had been used as main fuel for more than one thousand years, began to use the coal produced locally. Besides, some small iron, serum, leather, sodium berate, motor repair, brick and tile factories and timber mills, etc. had also been put up.

The Central Government took great concern with the development of the Tibetan agricultural production. In the time of spring ploughing each year, the Central Government would send lots of work groups and grant interest-free loans
to the poor Tibetan peasants. Up to August 1959, the interest-free agricultural loan amounted to 1,553,000 yuan. The Central Government, in addition, allocated 1,000,000 yuan to buy large quantities of production tools to be used in agriculture and animal husbandry, to help the Tibetan peasants to develop their backward farming methods and relieve the lacking of farm tools.

The Central Government paid great attention to the Tibetan medical conditions. Big hospitals were built in Lhasa, Shigatse and Chamdo and other big towns, and community hospitals were built in middle-sized and small towns to provide free medical care for the Tibetan people. Besides, mobile medical teams were organized to go into remote areas to treat the sick peasants and herdsmen free of charge. Smallpox and venereal diseases which had long threatened the Tibetan people’s health were checked. Cataract patients once more saw the light. The lives of both lying-in women of dystocia and their children were saved. In addition, the Central Government erected scores of veterinary stations in various areas in Tibet. In each season when the pestilence was prevalent, a lot of work of prevention and cure would be done. The animal diseases which had been called the evil of the grasslands for hundreds of years on the vast southern and northern grasslands were under control.

The Central Government also paid great attention to the development of Tibetan culture and education. There was no regular school in Tibet in the past. The Tibetan working people had no chance to receive education. After liberation, the Central Government’s organizations in Tibet set up many schools in different places of Tibet. Other undertakings in the cultural field, such as literature, art, films, broadcasting, television, publication, sport, etc., gradually developed. The Tibet Daily, first issued on April 22, 1956, published in both Tibetan and
Chinese. This was a great event in the cultural life of the Tibetan people.

To train the cadres of Tibetan nationality and develop the united anti-imperialist and patriotic front was also a very important work. After the liberation of Tibet, there still existed the feudal serf system. Under this condition, to train the cadres of Tibetan nationality was greatly limited. In spite of this, many advanced elements and patriotic young serfs broke through the obstruction to take part in work and study sponsored by the government. At the same time, the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region passed a resolution to relieve the poll tax of the working staff and learners in national institutions, thus providing advantageous conditions for training the Tibetan cadres. In this way, up to 1957, there were already 5,000 Tibetan cadres and learners. In the fall of 1957, the Tibetan Institute and the Tibetan Youth League School, which were set up specifically for training the Tibetan cadres were set up in Xianyang, Shaanxi Province. Later, they were combined and renamed as the Tibet Institute for Nationalities.

Besides speeding up the training of Tibetan cadres, to improve the united patriotic front and strive for uniting the religious upper circles of Tibetan nationality were also very important in constructing the new Tibet. The political base of this united front was anti-imperialism and patriotism. The Central Government, on the one hand, gave those religious personages of the upper strata suitable political position and guarded their justifiable economic interests; on the other hand, it organized them actively to look around and visit the inland, study the current affairs and absorb them to take part in various activities arranged by the united front in order to expand the Tibetan patriotic and anti-imperialist forces.
2. The Tibetan Reactionary Group’s Rebellion Instigated by Foreign Countries

After the peaceful liberation of Tibet, the Central Government took a lenient attitude towards the pro-imperialist elements and let them still hold office in the former local government, awaiting their awakening. If they should cut off the relationship with the imperialists and other foreign intervenors and no long engage in sabotage, the Central Government would let bygones be bygones. However, they complied in public but opposed in private the Peace Agreement. They went on colliding with the imperialists and foreign intervenors and attempted to realize the so-called “independence of Tibet” to their demand.

In the winter of 1951, when the PLA men entered into Tibet, the Chief Ministers Lukhangwa and Lozang Drashi organized the so-called “People’s Assembly” in Lhasa, opposing publicly the agreement of the peaceful liberation of Tibet and demanding that the PLA withdraw from Tibet. Afterwards, being severely rebuked by the Central Government, the Tibetan local government was forced to announce the “People’s Assembly” to be an illegal organization and dismissed Lukhangwa and Lozang Drashi from their posts. Later on, the “People’s Assembly” disappeared in name but actually still existed and had all the time been supported publicly or privately by the Tibetan local government.

The reactionary forces not only didn’t stop their sabotage, but further intensified it. At first, they took vigorous actions to undermine the Central Government’s reform in Tibet. In order to refuse to reorganize the Tibetan troops, in 1956 in the name of the Tibetan local government, they called the meeting of the top- and middle-level officers under the six Dapons to scheme for a rebellion. They made use of the Tibetan troops to attack
the sentries of the PLA, arrest the Han-Chinese officials and made trouble by shooting off weapon at the Central Government’s institutions in Tibet as a sign of demonstration. When they assembled and had drill, the Tibetan soldiers held high the “lion on snowy mountains” banners and shouted “Independence of Tibet” and “Off the Hans” and other slogans.

In order to retain the cruel and savage feudal serf system and maintain their bloody control over the serfs, the Tibetan local government controlled by the reactionary forces tried every means to obstruct the various measures adopted by the Central Government in Tibet. They ordered publicly that the Tibetan people should not receive interest-free grain and goods-loan from the working teams of the Central Government. In March 1955, according to the request of the Dalai and the Panchen, the State Council allocated 1,000,000 yuan to buy large quantities of new styles of tools for farming and herding and prepared to grant them to the peasants and herdsmen free of charge. But the Tibetan local government refused to distribute these tools to them under the pretext that “the peasants and herdsmen in Tibet were unwilling to use new tools.” Finally, except in Chamdo and some other regions where 57,000 farm and animal herding tools were granted, in many other places, the new tools were not distributed.

The Tibetan local government took vigorous actions against building highways in Tibet. They forbade the masses to take part in the construction under the pretence that it would irritate “Holy Mountains,” blaspheme “Gods” and destroy “geometric omen.” They also opposed the Central Government to look for coal mines for the Tibetan people and declared that “the Hans came to steal our treasures.” They ordered the Tibetan people not to act as guides for the prospecting teams. To those who didn’t obey their prohibitions, they would punish them severe-
ly, even inflict the cruel torture to gouge out their eyes.

In 1956, the Central Government decided to build a hydro-electric station on a barren mountain on the northeastern outskirts of Lhasa. But the Tibetan local government at first did not agree under the pretence that the mountain had "divinities" and "the local masses were against the plan", and then extorted compensation from the Central Government. In 1956, the Central Government opened a primary school in Ngari, but the local officials forbade the children to go to school. The school was forced to close down at last. In 1957, the Central Government allocated money to build some houses for poor people, beggars and tramps in Lhasa; however, the plan was also obstructed through every means by the local government and could not be carried out.

Taking advantage of their position among the Kashag and making Kalimpong in India a centre to collide with imperialists and foreign intervenors, the Tibetan reactionary forces took vigorous actions to muster rebel bandits and gather up forces. They thought they were able to fool the Tibetan people for a long period of time by resorting to religious superstition. They thought imperialists and foreign interfering forces would become their backing and regarded the patient waiting and magnanimous attitude of the Central Government as weakness and incompetence. So, they schemed for organized and planned rebellions unbridledly and unscrupulously. For instance, the 1955 rebellion in the Kham area was instigated by the Tibetan reactionary forces.

In the summer of 1955, when Surkhang Wangchin Gelek, Trijang Lozang Geshi and some others, came back from Beijing, where they attended the National People's Congress together with the Dalai, to Lhasa via Sichuan, they instigated rebellions separately along the southern and northern routes of the Garze
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture when they returned by way of Sichuan. In Litang, they called over 20 reactionary headmen of the Kham district (i.e. modern Garze prefecture) together and decided to organize armed revolts in Kham while engaging in political struggles with the Communist Party at Lhasa. Thus, by resorting to military violence on the one hand and political tactics on the other, they strove to attain the aim of Tibetan "independence." Surkhang said to the reactionary elements in Kham: "You yourselves must be united. In the world, there are great contradictions between socialist countries and capitalist countries. We must rely on the capitalist countries. You should try by all means to delay and obstruct the democratic reform. If obstruction fails, we will organize armed rebellions. In that case, we must have connections with foreign countries in order to attain our aim of an independent Tibet."

After the rebellion in Kham broke out, Surkhang and others kept close connections with the rebel bandits. They issued instructions and offered weapons, ammunition, etc., attempting to sustain and expand the rebellion. But it was soon quelled down. The surviving rebel bandits crossed the Jinsha River and sneaked into Tibet and were housed and sheltered by the reactionaries in the Kashag.

After the rebellion in Kham was suppressed, the Tibetan reactionary forces did not take their defeat lying down. They still carried out actively their rebellious schemes. Two men among the six Kalons of the Tibetan Kashag were patriotic; they were Ngabo Ngawang Jigme and Sampo Tsewang Rinchen. The other four were reactionary elements; they were Yuthok Drashi Dondrup, Surkhang Wangchin Gelek, Neusha Thubten Takpa and Shekar Gyumey Dorje (Shasur). These reactionary elements commanded the most reactionary big serf-owners in Kham and Tibet. They organized rebellious troops in many places to the east, north, and south of the Yarlung Tsangpo River to oppose
the Central Government and betray their motherland. The commanding centre of the rebellion was at Kalimpong in India. Its leader was the former Chief Minister Lukhangwa Tsewang Rabtan. Yuthok Drashi Dondrup also fled to Kalimpong in 1957. Many of their weapons were imported from foreign countries. They founded a rebel base in Shannan to the south of the Yarlung Tsangpo River and to the north of the Himalayas.

On April 20, 1958, the heads of the more than 5,000 rebels who scurried to Lhasa from the neighbouring province, and the representatives of Tibetan Army and the three great monasteries, gathered together secretly and formed an alliance, unifying all the armed forces into an organization called “Four Rivers and Six Mountains” and signing an alliance agreement. Each side undertook the duty they should shoulder at the rebellion. And then on June 24, the “Guarding Buddhism Troop” was formed. This rebellious army was provided with weapons and ammunition by foreign forces through air dropping and land transportation; most of the officials of the Kashag also offered help secretly. In May and June, the reactionary elements in the Tibetan Kashag instigated rebel bandits to harass Chamdo, Dengchen, Nagchu, Shannan and other districts, destroying communications, looting, raping, burning and killing, and attacking the Central Government’s institutions and troops there.

Out of the sense of national unity, the Central Government had once and again instructed the Tibetan local government to be responsible for punishing the rebels and guard the public security. The Central Government had once and again declared that if the rebels could mend their ways, it still would forgive their misdeeds. But the reactionary elements regarded the utmost tolerance of the Central Government as weak and easy to bully. They said that the Hans might be frightened away, and
for nine years the Han dared not even touch their most wonderful and holy serf system. When they hit the Hans, the latter would only parry the former's blows but not be able to hit back. The Central Government dared not put down their rebellion, and could only ask the rebels to be responsible for it. If they moved a large number of rebel armies to Lhasa from other places, the Hans would surely run away once attacked. If the Hans didn't run away, they would carry the Dalai Buddha to Shannan to gather up forces and then make a counterattack to recapture Lhasa. If they failed finally, the rebels could flee to India. India was sympathetic with and could help them. The powerful U.S. could also give them support, etc. Thus they gathered up quite a number of reactionary troops in Lhasa. At last, on March 10, 1959, they tore up the Agreement of 17 articles publicly and started an armed rebellion.

It was previously arranged that the Dalai Lama would go to the auditorium of the Tibetan Military Area Command of the PLA to watch a performance on March 10. To watch a performance in the auditorium of the Military Area Command was suggested by the Dalai Lama himself over a month before. The date, March 10, was also decided by the Dalai himself. On this day, however, the Tibetan rebel group spread widely the rumour that the PLA officers in the Tibetan Military Area would detain the Dalai Lama. Under this pretence, they started the armed rebellion and held the Dalai Lama under duress. They put forward reactionary slogans as "Drive out the Hans," "Independence of Tibet," etc., and killed Khanchung Sonam Gyatso, an official of the Preparatory Committee of the Autonomous Region who was against the rebellion, and wounded Sampo Tsewang Rinchen, a vice-commander of the Tibetan Military Area Command, and others. The rebel troops encircled the headquarters of the Military Area Command of the PLA.
and the Central Government's institutions stationed in Lhasa.

On March 10, the rebels gathered up in Norbulingka to have a meeting and decided to control the Dalai Lama. They added guards to station at Norbulingka. At that time the Dalai Lama was completely deprived of his freedom.

The rebellion in Lhasa was extending rapidly. The rebels publicly posted up notices everywhere in the name of the "People's Enlarged Conference of the Independent Tibet." They organized the "Commanding Centre of the Guarding Buddhism Voluntary Army," appointed the military heads of the rebellion and ordered them to muster rebel troops in all places. They threatened and intimidated the Tibetan people who were working in all the Tibetan institutions and schools, demanding them to confess their crimes to "the Tibetan Independent State" within a limited time. They forced women to take part in the demonstrations and forced monks and laymen to take part in the rebellion. They committed robbery everywhere; destroyed the highways for national defence, bridges and water gates; cut down wire poles and burned the houses of the Central Government's institutions in Tibet, etc.

The rebel elements were bent on making the Tibetan affair internationalized. They attempted to realize their political aim of splitting Tibet off by the aid of foreign countries. On March 16, the rebel bandits sent a telegram to Shakabpa, the leader of the "Committee for Tibetan Social Welfare," a counter-revolutionary organization in Kalimpong, asking Shakabpa to request the Indian Government and the United Nations, etc. to "send representatives at once to observe the real facts," and also to "try to send a telegram to the Indian Government's representatives in Lhasa and ask them to find out about the situation beforehand."

At this time, the Dalai was being kept under duress. On
March 11, 12 and 16, he sent three letters successively to Tan Guanshan, the Central Government’s representative in Tibet, explaining that he had been kidnapped by the reactionary elements. In his letter of the eleventh, he wrote: “I decided yesterday to go to the auditorium of the Military Area Command to watch the performance. But because a few bad men spread rumours and the monks and the laymen who didn’t know the real fact followed them, I was stopped and couldn’t go to visit you.... The reactionary elements are taking actions to endanger me under the pretext of safe-guarding me.” In his letter of the twelfth, he wrote: “Yesterday, I notified the Kashag and instructed that the illegal People’s Conference must be dissolved at once and the reactionaries stationed presumptuously in Norbulingka in the name of safeguarding me must withdraw from there immediately.”

These letters indicated that at first the Dalai was unwilling to oppose the Central Government and take part in the rebellion. General Tan Guanshan wrote back to the Dalai, acclaiming his attitude and showing sympathy with him in his affection. At the same time, he expressed the hope that the Kashag would change their wrong attitude and take up the responsibility to put down the rebellion. However, the reactionaries had no intention of mending their ways. They determined to spread the rebellious force. On March 17, they outrageously abducted the Dalai out of Lhasa by force. On March 30, they crossed the border secretly and went to India. The Dalai’s entourage numbered about 80, including his mother and other relatives and his secular and monastic high officials.

On March 26, the Dalai and his party arrived at Lhunze Dzong, where the reactionaries held a mass meeting at which Surkhang declared the “independence” of Tibet, and the Tibetan provisional government was founded with Lhunze Dzong
as the provisional capital, Lukhangwa and Lozang Drashi were appointed Silons. And orders were issued in the name of the provisional government to demand that the Tibetan monks and laymen obey all the provisional government decrees and struggle for the independence of Tibet.

After they abducted the Dalai by force and fled out of Lhasa, the reactionaries started an all-out attack on the troops of the PLA in Lhasa on the evening of March 19. At 10 a.m. on March 20, the PLA troops stationed in the Military Area Command in Tibet were ordered to suppress the rebel group who had committed the most heinous crimes. Assisted by the Tibetan patriotic monks and laymen, the PLA smashed completely the rebellion in Lhasa city within two days. Up to March 23, the PLA had captured over 4,000 of the rebel troops and seized over 8,000 rifles of all kinds, 81 light and heavy machine guns, 27 mortars, 6 mountain guns and 10,000,000 cartridges. Besieged by the PLA, many rebels surrendered one batch after another.

Then, on March 28, Zhou Enlai, the Premier of the State Council, released orders, instructing the Tibetan Military Area Command to put down the rebellion completely, dismissing the former Tibetan local government (Kashag) and appointing the Preparatory Committee of the Tibetan Autonomous Region to exercise the authority of the Tibetan local government. During the period when the Dalai was kidnapped, Panchen Erdeni, Deputy Director of the Preparatory Committee acted as the Director and Pabalha Gelek Namgyal and Ngabo Ngawang Jigme were appointed the Deputy Directors.

Though the Central Government took an understanding and lenient attitude towards the difficult situation the Dalai was in, the Dalai completely changed his attitude after he entered India, being surrounded by the Tibetan and foreign reactionary
elements. On April 18 and 22, he issued two statements at Dispur in India, opposing publicly the Agreement of the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet and advocating the independence of Tibet. From then on, he began to deny that he was abducted; the Dalai said: "It was of my own accord that I left Lhasa. Besides, it was decided by myself to flee away; I was not abducted by my followers." As for his several letters to Tan Guangshan, they were intended "merely to appease the anger of both sides." Thus in fact, the Dalai joined in the Tibetan rebel group and became its leader. According to these facts, on December 17, 1964, in the one hundred and fifty-first conference of the State Council, a decision was made to dismiss the Dalai Lama from the post of the Director and member of the Preparatory Committee of the Tibetan Autonomous Region.

On April 8, 1959, the Preparatory Committee of the Tibetan Autonomous Region passed a resolution to call all the subordinate personnel of the committee at all levels and all the monks and laymen to unite and work together to assist the PLA to put down the rebellion quickly under the leadership of the Communist Party and the Central People's Government.

On the same day, the troops to put down the rebellion marched southward and crossed the Yarlung Tsangpo River along three routes to mop up the rebels without allowing them to regain their breath. Wherever the troops arrived, the Tibetan people welcomed them with food and drink, mended bridges and roads and led the PLA to pursue and wipe out the rebel bandits. Under the pursuit of the PLA by different routes, the rebels collapsed at the first encounter and fled halter-skelter. After a battle of more than 10 days, the PLA successfully occupied more than thirty dzongs and many villages to the south of the Yarlung Tsangpo River, the east of Gyantse, the north of the Himalayas and the west of Ze La. Under the strong
attack of the PLA, the rebels collapsed. Many people who were coerced to join the rebellion ran away from the rebel troops and handed in their weapons to the PLA and then returned home to engage in production. Some rebel bandits, however, fled to India.

The rapid suppression of the Tibetan rebellion was a fatal blow to the Tibetan rebel group and also a heavy blow to the imperialist and the foreign expansionists. It not only strengthened greatly the country’s reunification and national unity, but also further consolidated the southwest national defence of the country and maintained the integrity of the territorial sovereignty of China. When the PLA stationed in the important positions of the national frontier, the imperialists and foreign reactionaries couldn’t freely send spies and transport arms and ammunition into Tibet as they did before, thus they couldn’t engage in aggressive activities any longer. Their fancy to start a rebellion and split China was also evaporated completely.

In the process of putting down the rebellion, the PLA were fervently supported by the Tibetan people. This was the important reason for the rapid and complete victory over the rebellion. The Tibetan people were patriotic. They supported the Central People’s Government, loved the PLA and opposed the imperialists and the traitors. There were about 1,200,000 people in the three regions of Tibet including Chamdo, Ü, and Tsang. The rebellion was only spread in the Ü region and there were only about 20,000 rebels, among whom the majority were fooled and coerced into the rebellion. If not counting about one third of the Khampa rebels, who fled to Tibet from the east of the Jinsha River and Sichuan Province, the rebels accounted for only about one percent of the total Tibetan population. Most of the Tibetan people were extremely poor peasants and herdsmen. They desired to be liberated from the darkest serf system
in the world. There were also many progressive patriotic personages among the Tibetan upper and middle classes. They supported the Central Government, opposed the rebellion and advocated democratic reform in order to wipe out the irrational social system and gradually make Tibet civilized and progressive. So the PLA enjoyed the ardent support from the Tibetan people in putting down the rebellion.

The correct policies of the Central Government accelerated the victory of the PLA. In the course of putting down the rebellion, the Central Government’s policies towards the rebels were as follows: the chief criminals must be punished, the reluctant followers wouldn’t be blamed, and those who rendered meritorious services would receive awards. The Central Government instructed that the PLA troops in Tibet should unite all the Tibetan compatriots who didn’t take part in the rebellion, be responsible for guarding the lives and property of the Tibetan people of all walks of life including those engaging in agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, commerce, politics and education, respect the customs and religious beliefs there, protect monasteries and cultural relics and historic sites, safeguard the masses’ interests and the social order. They were not allowed to retaliate, hurt, or insult the captives and all the enemies who had laid down their weapons. The fact proved that these correct policies were carried out powerfully.

The rapid suppression of the Tibetan rebellion was an important event in Chinese people’s political life. Since then, the Tibetan people had got rid of the backward and dark life and marched on the bright road of the democratic reform.

3. The Implementation of Democratic Reform in Tibet

Before the democratic reform, Tibet was under the feudal serf system in which religion and politics integrated under the
dictatorship of the upper-class monks and nobles. Under this integrated system of religion and politics, religion not only had been an ideological belief but integrated together with the dictatorship of the feudal serf-owners. The chief officials in the Tibetan local government at all levels were all monks. Monasteries possessed not only manors, but also their own courts and prisons. They had the right to wantonly interrogate serfs and slaves, and punish them and even condemn them to death.

There were two major classes in the Tibetan society. One was the class of the serf-owners, accounting for about 5% of the whole population. They were what the masses called the three feudal lords: the officialdom (official of the feudal local governments), the clergy, and nobilities. They held more than one thousand manors and pastures and occupied all the arable land, grassland and most of the animals. They cruelly exploited and savagely controlled the serfs and slaves. The other class comprised of serfs, accounting for about 90%, and of slaves, accounting for about 5% respectively of the total population in Tibet. The serfs had no land, and they had to rely on the land of the serf-owners and were forced to work hard for them. They shouldered the heavy corvée and land tax; the slaves had neither land nor animal, nor any personal freedom.

The serf-owners held some fertile land as their "private plot" and made use of the serfs to do unpaid labour on it or ordered slaves to till it; the rest of the land was rented out as "rent land" to the serfs. They levied rent in kind and rent in corvée. The serfs were tied on the land of their masters, exploited through various exorbitant taxes and usurious loans, in addition to paying land rent and doing corvée labour. Many serfs and slaves could not stand the exploitation and oppression, they fled their native place and led a vagrant life. If captured back, they would be given a variety of cruel punishment, such
as chopping off the hands, cutting off the feet, gouging out the eyes, pulling out a tendon, etc. So, before the democratic reform the Tibetan labouring people led a miserable life; the Tibetan productive force was backward, and the development of the Tibetan nation met a bad fortune. It was quite obvious that the Tibetan people’s happy life could only be guarded and the society could only make progress when its feudal serf system was abolished.

The reactionary group of the Tibetan upper class started an all-out armed rebellion in order to defend the feudal serf system. The great majority of serfs and the patriotic upper-class personages were firmly against it and demanded the democratic reform. Conforming to the strong demand of the Tibetan people, the Central Government rapidly carried out the democratic reform after the suppression of the rebellion.

In the democratic reform, the Central Government adopted the policy of differentiating accordingly between the serf-owners who took part in the rebellion and those who did not. In the countryside, the land, animals and other productive materials of the rebel serf-owners were confiscated and then allocated to the masses. To those who didn’t take part in the rebellion, the Government redeemed their surplus land, animals and other productive materials and allocated them to the masses. In the pastoral areas, as the herds were the means both of production and subsistence and could easily be butchered when they were redistributed, it was decided not to redistribute the herds. To the herds of the rebel serf-owners, the policy of “whoever herds owns the herds” was carried out. To the herds owned by serf-owners who didn’t take part in the rebellion, the policy of “benefiting both the herdsmen and the herd-owners” was carried out, while lightening the herd-owners’ exploitation of the herdsmen, abolishing the personal appendage, ensuring
the political rights of the herdsmen and improving the living conditions of the herdsmen appropriately. In addition, in the reform, the serf-owners who didn’t take part in the rebellion were protected in politics and given suitable jobs.

It might be said to be a very benevolent and generous reform of peace that the Tibetan democratic reform carried out the buying-out policy to the serf-owners. It was also a pioneering work in the world. The Preparatory Committee of the Autonomous Region issued the "Measures of payment in redeeming the surplus means of production of the serf-owners and their agents who didn’t take part in the rebellion." Towards the beginning of 1961, redemptive payment had been paid for more than 1,300 families who had received means of production. Tashilhunpo Monastery in Shigatse received over 5,900,000 yuan. Each family of some big nobles received several hundred thousand yuan. The redemption payment provided for the living expenses of these families for forty or fifty years. In addition, the nobles were given suitable jobs and could get splendid salary each month.

After about two years, in the first half of 1961, the Tibetan democratic reform was completed successfully. The feudal serf system was abolished. The ownership of the serf-owners became the individual ownership of the peasants and herdsmen, about one million serfs and slaves became the masters of the society. They had land, herds and moved into new houses. Their productive enthusiasm was rising to an unprecedented height. In 1959, the first year of the reform, in agricultural production they had a bumper harvest. The total output of grain amounted to 320,000,000 jin, increasing 4.8% than that in 1958. It amounted even to 410,000,000 jin (catty) in 1960, increasing over 27% than that in 1959, and the amount of living livestock by the end of that year reached 10,500,000 head, increasing 10%
than the previous year. By 1965, the total output of grain had amounted to 580,000,000 jin, increasing 88.6% than that in 1958, the amount of livestock on hand reached over 18,000,000 head, increasing 54% than that in 1958. The living conditions of the peasants and serfs liberated had been greatly improved.

On September 1, 1965, the First People’s Congress of the Tibetan Autonomous Region was opened. In the meeting the leaders of the Autonomous Region were elected and the People’s Committee of the Autonomous Region was set up. The formal establishment of the Tibetan Autonomous Region marked that the Tibetan people marched into a new era in which they could enjoy their rights as masters of their own.

III. The Interference of India in the Tibetan Revolution and the Boundary Clash

1. India’s Interference in the Tibetan Rebellion

The rapid suppression of the Tibetan rebellion made the imperialists, who had long schemed and supported the rebellion, very depressed and fury. They stood publicly on the side of the rebel elements, raising a terrific hue and cry. They defiled the Chinese people’s putting down the Tibetan rebellion and defending the national reunification as “suppressing the human freedom,” “destroying the religion and culture of the Tibetan people,” “armed interference,” “invasion,” “savage expansionism,” “colonialism,” “imperialism,” etc., while they called the rebellion as “the national uprising,” “anti-invasion,” etc. The Indian expansionists first started an anti-Chinese movement. They cherished the sinister ambition for Tibet of China and attempted to interfere publicly in China’s internal affairs. Before the rebellion took place, they had already shown their exultant
and impatient feeling with dancing eyebrows and radiant face. In the Indian newspapers and periodicals, they gave speeches predicting that the rebellion would happen soon in Tibet. After the rebellion broke out, the Indian newspapers as if celebrating a happy occasion, published a great number of speeches to slander China. Some personages in the Indian Government attacked China savagely, being swollen with arrogance at that time. They showed “sympathy” and “care” for the Tibetan reactionaries and stated that “Tibet is an independent country,” “China has invaded Tibet,” “destroyed the five principles” and “threatened the security of India.” They abused China as a “new and fierce imperialism,” “expansionism,” and slandered the suppression of the rebellion as a “colonial act,” “robbery,” etc. They claimed that India and Tibet were like “mother and son.” India had the duty to defend Tibet. A leader of the Indian People’s Socialist Party, defiled the suppression of the rebellion as “a kind of imperialist aggression.” In India, they founded the “Committee Supporting the Tibetan People,” “Delhi Supporting Tibet Committee” and other organizations, demanding publicly to refer the Tibetan affair to the United Nations. They clamoured to hold another Simla Conference in which India, Tibet and China would take part in order to solve the Tibetan issue which was merely Chinese internal affair.

The reason why the India expansionists made a big fuss on the Tibetan affair is that they wanted to inherit the legacy left by Britain which invaded Tibet, namely, the British previous privileges in Tibet. They had been colluding with the Tibetan reactionaries all the time, interfering in China’s internal affairs and attempting to split China until they schemed the rebellion. They intended to break Tibet away from China and made it an Indian protectorate under the slogan of the so-called “Independence of Tibet.” So, when the Tibetan rebellion was rapidly
quelled down and their scheme fell through, they wouldn’t conceal their sadness and fury any more and laid bare their true intention completely.

Even some leading personages of the Indian Government and the Indian Congress Party also interfered publicly in the Chinese internal affairs. Nehru, the Indian Premier, delivered many statements and speeches before and after the Tibetan rebellion. On the one hand, he acknowledged Tibet as one part of China. On the other hand, he said that “the Tibetan people are not Chinese” and took the suppression of the rebellion as an “armed interference,” “oppression and suppression,” and a “tragedy.” He stated that he would not interfere in the Chinese internal affairs while he “sympathized” and supported the Tibetan reactionaries. The two houses of the Indian parliament also argued in rapid succession on this merely internal affair of China. Actually it was also an interference in the Chinese internal affairs. Especially on April 28, the same day when China held the Second National People’s Congress, in which Zhou Enlai delivered the “Report on the Government Work,” the Indian Foreign Ministry sent out the so-called the “Dalai Lama’s Statement” to the embassies of all countries. The expansionists attempted to make use of this statement to resist the report of the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and exert pressure on China.

Facing these hostile challenges, the Chinese people couldn’t control their intense indignation any longer and had to counterattack. All the speakers in the Second National People’s Congress condemned severely the crimes of the Tibetan reactionaries who intended to destroy the national reunification. Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, the Deputy-Director and the General Secretary of the Preparatory Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region exposed completely from his personal experience
that “the Dalai Lama’s Statement” was a lie, for it slandered that the Central Government forced them to sign the Agreement of 17-articles. Then other representatives of minorities expressed their opinions one after another and declared solemnly: “The unification of our motherland and the national unity are the highest interest of all the Chinese people. Any imperialist and foreign reactionary forces attempting to destroy them will receive a resolute blow.” The representatives of all democratic parties and people of all walks of life including workers, peasants, merchants, students, soldiers, overseas Chinese and the religious circles pointed out together that Tibet was an unalienable part of China and they couldn’t allow the imperialists and Indian expansionists to interfere in the Chinese internal affairs.

At the same time, the angry tide covered over all parts of China. People read newspapers, listened to the radio, discussed and pasted up big-character posters, etc., counterattacking resolutely the imperialists and Indian expansionists’ attempts to interfere in the Chinese internal affairs.

2. The Sino-Indian Border Conflict Provoked by India

When the Indian Government failed in interfering in the Chinese internal affairs and supporting the Tibetan rebellion, it provoked the Sino-Indian border conflict.

The Sino-Indian border was 2,000 kilometres long in total. It was divided into three parts. The eastern part was from the east of Bhutan to the Burma border; the disputed area was about 90,000 square km. The middle part was the contiguous area between the Tibetan Ngari District and Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh of India; the disputed area was about 2,000 square km. The western part was the contiguous area between China’s Xinjiang and Tibet and the Ladakh region of India; the disputed area was about 33,000 square km. The whole Sino-Indian border
line had never been delimited in history, but the traditional line formed by the administration of both sides had existed for a long time. The problem of the so-called Sino-Indian border was caused by the British who had all along carried out colonial expansion towards China’s Tibet and Xinjiang with India as its base.

As early as 1914, during the Simla Conference, the British representative McMahon exchanged notes privately with the Tibetan representative behind the Chinese representative and drawn the so-called “McMahon Line” on the eastern part of the Sino-India border. Since the British Government had a guilty conscience, it had not dared to promulgate this illegal treaty for a long time. All the previous Chinese governments had never recognized it. In the western part, in order to look for a short cut to the hinterland of Xinjiang, Britain once coveted the Aksai Chin District and designed various plans to split Xinjiang, but they didn’t succeed.

In 1947, after its independence, India inherited the mantle of the British colonialism and took Tibet and Xinjiang as its important expansion targets. In 1951, taking advantage of China being busy with its internal affairs, India sent troops to march on a large scale toward the illegal “McMahon Line” and invaded and occupied large areas of Chinese territory. Afterwards, it invaded and occupied successfully the Chinese territory in the middle and western parts. In the official maps published in India in 1954, India unreasonably revised the traditional border line between China and India; it tried to force China to accept the Sino-Indian boundary line plotted by the British imperialists as an already-fixed national boundary. In 1958, the Indian Government formally raised the demand for a vast stretch of Chinese territory. During the Tibetan rebellion in 1959, the Indian Government took the advantage of the occa-
sion to provoke the Sino-Indian boundary conflict. On March 22, India Premier Nehru sent a letter to the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and demanded irrationally that 125,000 square km. of Chinese territory in total be incorporated into India.

In August, the Indian troops crossed the ‘‘McMahon Line’’ on the eastern part and marched into the Chinese inner part, firing at the Chinese troops at the frontier and provoked the first armed conflict of the Sino-Indian border. The Chinese frontier forces fought back in self-defence and the Indian troops were forced to withdraw to the south of the ‘‘McMahon Line.’’ Afterwards, in order to avoid the conflict and strive for the peaceful solution of the boundary dispute, the Chinese Government suggested to the Indian Government that the both sides withdraw by 20 km. from the actually controlled line of the Sino-Indian border and stop patrolling.

In April 1960, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai went to New Delhi in person and held talks on the border disputes with the Indian Premier Nehru. But the Indian Government took the Chinese Government’s sincerity for conciliation as weak and easy to bully. They made use of China’s stopping patrolling one-sidedly and crossed the border on the western part and set up fortified points, some of which were even built behind the Chinese sentry posts.

On the eastern part of the border, from June 1962, the Indian troops once more crossed the ‘‘McMahon Line,’’ nibbled China’s territory and killed and injured the Chinese frontier men. And the Chinese side had all along maintained great self-control and forbearance. But the Indian Government miscalculated the situation, it founded new corps particularly to deal with China and closed the door for negotiation.

On October 20, they started military attacks on a large scale on the whole Sino-Indian boundary line. The Chinese frontier
army were forced to counterattack in their defence. On October 24, the Chinese Government suggested three proposals: the armed troops of both sides withdraw by 20 km. from their actually controlled lines; both sides guarantee not to cross their own actually controlled lines; the Premiers of both sides hold talks once more and to affirm that the Sino-Indian border disputes must be peacefully solved through negotiations. But the proposals were refused on the same day.

On November 4, the Indian troops started large-scale attacks again on the eastern border. The Chinese frontier troops counterattacked. They rooted out the Indian troops and wiped out their fortified points. On November 21, the Chinese Government delivered another statement to announce that the Chinese frontier troops, on their own initiative, would stop fighting from the next day on the whole line. From December 1 on, the Chinese frontier troop withdrew by 20 km. from its actually controlled line. Then the Chinese side returned all captured military materials to the Indian side and set free all the captured Indian military men, about 4,000 strong.

At present, the eastern part of the Sino-Indian boundary line, the area to the south of the “McMahon Line”, was still controlled by India. And in February 1987, India formally announced the establishment of Arunahal Pradesh in that area. The Chinese Government made a solemn statement to condemn this illegal act and has never recognized it. At the same time, the Chinese Government once and again expressed its desire for a peaceful solution of the Sino-Indian border disputes. The Chinese Government's consistent position is that China and India should, on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and mutually understanding and accommodation, strive for the overall, just and rational solution for both sides through negotiations.
NOTES

1. Selected Historical Materials of Tibet, p. 373
2. People's Daily, September 3 and 7, 1949
3. Selected Historical Materials of Tibet, pp. 376-378
4. Selected Papers on Tibetan History, p. 451
5. Selected Historical Materials of Tibet, p. 379
6. People's Daily, Nov. 24, 1949
7. People's Daily, February 7, 1950
9. Selected Historical Materials of Tibet, p. 381, and People's Daily, Jan. 21, 1950
10. Collected Works on Tibetology, p. 29
11. Selected Historical Materials of Tibet, pp. 388-391
13. People’s Daily, Nov. 17, 1950
14. People’s Daily, Nov. 22, 1950
15. Our Motherland’s Tibet by Cheng Enyan, p. 39
The booklet and seal, with which the Kuomintang Government granted Rezheng Chanshi in 1935.
The jade booklet, with which the Kuomintang Government granted Dalai Lama XIII. Tudeng Jiacuo after his death.
Bancan XIV.
Ngapo Ngawang-Jigme.
Mao Zhe-dong’s personal hand-written message to Dalai XIV (December 24, 1955).

Mao Zhe-dong’s personal, hand-written message to Bancan. (November 24, 1955).
Signing the “Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” on May 23, 1951.

The version in Chinese and the version in Tibetan Language of the agreement on the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.
The meeting to celebrate the founding of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. (1955)
The Vice-premier Cheng Yi, Dalai, Bancan and Zhang Jing-wu are on the rostrum.
Sonam Tsering, herdsman, ex-serf of Sera lamasery tortured and blinded in 1951.

Celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, Lhasa, 1981.
Appendix I

A Survey of Foreign Tibetology

1. The Origin of the Foreign Studies of Tibet

It is very important and practical to study of the question of Tibet.

(1) Tibet has a vast territory. It covers an area of about 1.2 million square kilometers, comprising one-eighth of the total area of China’s territory. It was even larger when people regarded the areas inhabited by Tibetans in Qinghai and Xikang provinces as part of it. Therefore, it is a most important part of our motherland.

(2) Tibet is located in the southwestern border area of China, serving as a natural barrier of our motherland. If it is lost and the southwestern door is forced open, the whole southwestern hinterland of our country will be threatened. Therefore, it is a place of extreme importance in our national defence.

(3) Tibetans are a chief national minority of our country. Questions concerning the areas inhabited by them and the relations between the Han people and the Tibetans are very important and complicated ones and remain unresolved up to the present time. If they are handled improperly, the stability and prosperity of Tibet would be undermined and its safety would be threatened.

(4) Tibet has always been coveted and often invaded by the imperialists; Britain and Russia, especially, have contended for
it. Thus, its current situation cannot but arouse a universal interest.

Over a long period of time, it has been fashionable to study the questions concerning Tibet in the world, and little by little a new branch of learning — Tibetology — has come into being.

The earliest overseas studies of Tibet can be traced back to the seventeenth century. Even before that, some Arabian geographers and the great traveler Marco Polo had mentioned Tibet in their books even though they had never seen this area for themselves and only repeated what they had been told about it. From the 17th century on, however, Western colonialists began to study Tibet for aggressive purposes. In the years between 1620s and 1740s, several groups of European Catholic missionaries entered the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau through the Himalayas or by way of inland China to do missionary work in Ngari, Ü and Tsang. This continued for quite a long time. According to what they themselves had seen, they wrote reports on the religion, history, and society of Tibet, which provided the earliest on-the-spot investigation materials for the study of Tibet. In 1750s, G. Deguignes the Frenchman published his great book *Historie generale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mongols et des autres Tartares Occidentaux*, in which, using Chinese historical records and contemporary records written by members of the Society of Jesus, he gave an account of the history of Tibet. This can be regarded as the beginning of historical works on the subject.

Just as the earlier activities of European Catholism in China were more aimed at making use of members of the Society of Jesuits as the forerunners of capitalist expansion than at mainly carrying out a religious mission, the earlier Tibetology was more a necessary preparation for the invasion of Tibet by European colonialists than supplying a purely academic activity. There-
fore, when we talk about the origins of Western Tibetology, we must remember that it was motivated by the aggressive purposes of the capitalists. In short, modern Tibetology may be considered as a part of the policy of imperialist expansion.

Then, which of the capitalist countries in modern times had the greatest ambition towards Tibet? Doubtlessly, one was Britain, the other was Russia. Their governments and their Oriental scholars were especially interested in Tibet and made special efforts to study it. It is necessary, therefore, to present an outline of Britain and Russian Tibetology.

2. The British Study of Tibet

The purpose of British study of Tibet was to expand into Tibet. In the middle of the 18th century, when Britain began to establish colonial rule in India, it also began to covet Tibet, and this resulted in their first serious study of Tibet.

British studies of Tibet may be divided into three stages: the first stage (1750’s-1880’s) was the preparatory period for expansion into Tibet; the second stage (1888-1947) was the period of invasion; and the third stage (1940s- ) was the period of British withdrawal.

The First Stage

After the British conquest of India in the middle of the 18th century, the East India Company began to collect information on the Tibetan areas bordering India. Britain was at the time in a period of non-monopoly capitalism, which after gaining access to foreign countries eagerly demanded the establishment of trade relations with them in order to carry out economic plunder, to annex territories, and then to establish colonial rule. To suit its
requirements in aggression, the East India Company urgently needed to know about the politics, economy, culture, religion, nationality, language, and history of the Tibetans. This need launched British Tibetology.

The situation at the time provided favourable conditions for the British to carry on the study of Tibet.

First, Britain had gradually gained control of the Sino-Indian borders along the Himalayas, that is to say, it actually controlled a number of important lines of communications between India and Tibet, which made the study of Tibet rather convenient geographically.

Second, Britain could send government officials to Tibet in the name of trade negotiation and the like or under the cover of doing missionary work through the Society of Jesus, supported by the European Catholism.

Third, Britain could carry on activities by making use of the traditional relations between India and Tibet and by employing Indian intellectuals to infiltrate into Tibet; the British could also buy over certain intellectuals and monks of Tibetan nationality living in Sikkim and Ladakh and other places, and make use of their relations with the lamaseries to carry on activities in Tibet.

These favourable conditions were not possessed by any other Western capitalist countries at that time. They account for the reason why the British study of Tibet was earlier and more effective than that of other foreign powers.

One of the famous Europeans who were the earliest to be employed by the East India Company to study Tibet was Csoma de Körös.

Csoma de Körös (1784-1842, Hungarian) was graduated from Göttingen University in Germany. In order to determine whether the nationality of his motherland had originated in
Asia, he set off from Budapest and travelled to Ladakh by way of Central Asia. Supported by an Englishman, W. Moorcroft, he lived in the lamaseries in Ladakh for nine years, meticulously studying the Tibetan language. Later, he was employed by the East India Company, acting as an associate librarian to the Asian Society Library of Bengal. The library had collected many Tibetan books, which made it possible for him to dedicate his life to the study of Tibetan language, history, and religion. During the years of 1834 to 1836, Csoma printed a grammar book of the Tibetan language and a *Tibetan-English Dictionary*, both written by himself. Later, he published a thesis introducing two series of books — *Kagyur* and *Tangyur* — on Tibetan Buddhism, which initiated the study of Tibetan history by using Tibetan documents.

Around the time Csoma was sent to Tibet, B. Hodgson, British representative to Nepal, acquired, in 1824, from the temples of Nepal, a large collection of Buddhist scriptures in Sanskrit which had been lost in India. And he presented them as gifts to the Asian Societies in London and in Paris. Not long afterwards, through the relations with Nepal, he carried away two series of Tibetan Buddhist Scriptures of *Kagyur* and *Tangyur* from Lhasa and gave them to the East India Company. This was the beginning of the looting of Tibetan documents by the West.

It is also worthwhile to mention the Indian Das, who during this period was employed by the British Government in India and sent to Tibet.

Das (Sarat Chandra Das, 1849-1917) was quite a well-known character in Tibetology. In 1874 he held the post of headmaster in a school in Darjeeling, India, and became interested in the study of Tibet. In 1879 he was employed by the British Government in India and with the help of the upper-class of
Sikkim he entered Tibet. He stayed in Tashilhunpo lamasery for about half a year perusing the library of the lamasery and stealing more than two hundred volumes of valuable works in Sanskrit and Tibetan, all of which were manuscripts or block-printed editions. During 1881-1882, he re-entered Tibet and continued his activities in Lhasa and Yalung. In 1885, he got to Beijing. After he returned to India, he remained in Darjeeling acting as Tibetan translator for the British Government in India. From the years 1881 to 1915, he published eight or nine works on Tibet and over fifty theses, including a *Tibetan-English Dictionary with Sanskrit Synonyms* (1902), *An Introduction to the Grammar of the Tibetan Language* (1915) and other works on the Tibetan history, geography, Buddhism and the history of Bon-po, which are thought to be necessary reference books for the study of Tibet even today.

We can say that during this period of over one hundred years the British Government conducted a series of investigations on Tibet in an organized and planned way, obtaining important primary materials and laying a foundation for British Tibetology. During this time, the British acquired a general knowledge of Tibet, including the subjects of nationality, history, religion, customs, resources and spoken and written Tibetan. All this provided Britain with materials for its invasions of Tibet.

The Second Stage

In the middle of the 1880s, Britain began to invade Tibet. It fomented the first aggressive war against Tibet in 1888 and launched another in 1904. In this way, Britain forced open the door into Tibet and gradually established a privileged position both in politics and in economy, which greatly promoted the British study of Tibet and created favourable conditions for the
study. During this period, British Tibetology flourished; indeed it reached the climax of a period of rapid development. The remarkable feature was that wherever the British military expedition advanced, large groups of scholars and experts followed them and openly made investigation. Before this, only a few hired intellectuals and monks could be sent discontinuously and irregularly to Tibet under the cover of some acceptable identity to make secret investigations and collect relevant materials. After the armed invasion, the British openly settled down in Tibet, gathered materials and looted cultural relics.

During the second aggressive war of 1904 especially, many scholars and experts went all the way to Lhasa along with the army and robbed the lamaseries of innumerable cultural relics. After the war, army commanders and army reporters wrote a number of books describing what they had seen, for example, *India and Tibet* by Younghusband and *Tibet and Its Secret* by Waddell, etc. By the beginning of the 20th century, many books on Tibet had been published in Britain, and the so-called “China Experts” such as C. Bell (1870-1945) began to appear. Bell held an important administrative office in Sikkim for seventeen years altogether. He had a good knowledge of the Tibetan language and wrote books such as *Tibet, Past and Present* (1931), *Portrait of the Dalai Lamas* (1946) and others, which were easy to read and understand. For many years he took part in planning and carrying out the politics for invading Tibet from British India. In accordance with this experience, he invented a theory of his own to justify invading Tibet and to distort the general features of the Tibetan social history. This theory had a great influence in Europe and America.

**The Third Stage**

India gained independence from Britain in 1947, and the
British withdrew from India accordingly from Tibet. After this, the British study of Tibet began to show new characteristics. They studied Tibet chiefly for academic reasons rather than for aggressive purposes. This can be seen by the subjects they chose which laid particular stress on textual research and the classification of ancient culture and religion, and the research attained a certain depth. However, the phenomenon of taking the standpoint of imperialist invasion to analyze the Tibetan history was not uncommon, and it accounted for a fairly large proportion. This can be regarded as the continuation of the previous policies of aggression. H.C. Richardson was just such a person. From 1936 to 1950, he was the British (Indian since 1947) commercial agent in Gyantse and British (later Indian) representative in Lhasa and spent fourteen years in Tibet. Later, he became a college professor with some knowledge of the Tibetan language and became famous as a "Tibet expert" after Bell. He wrote many research articles on textual problems as well as some political pamphlets. For example, he published A Short History of Tibet in the U.S. in 1962, which was written as a reflection on the arguments put forward in the United Nations about the Tibetan issue. By inventing historical facts and distorting history, he presumptuously declared that from ancient times Tibet had been an independent country and thus attempted to separate Tibet from China.

Some serious scholars more respectful of historical truth, however, gave a more objective account of Tibet. A. Lamb was one of them, for instance.

Lamb, a college professor, specializing in Modern Sino-Indian relations, wrote Britain and Chinese Central Asia, which related in factual detail the history of the British invasions against Tibet, Xinjiang, and Yunnan of China. The first volume of the book (1960), The Road to Lhasa 1767-1905, made use
of a large amount of historical material. *The McMahon Line* (1966) and *The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh* (1975) gave a systematic and profound analysis of the two disputed borders on the east and west of the Himalayas, rich in materials, precise in description and rather fair in attitude.

The British reactionary standpoint of the study of Tibet was reflected in their academic organizations. In 1960, i.e., the first year after the Dalai Clique’s rebellion, an organization called the Tibet Society of the United Kingdom & Tibet Relief Fund made its appearance in London. It had as many as two thousand members and had close relations with the Dalai clique. The purpose of the organization was to carry out reactionary activities by inciting Tibetan independence.

Another reactionary organization, the Institute of Tibetan Studies, formed in 1966 by five people, including Richardson and Snellgrove (Director of the Institute). It also had close relations with the Dalai. They launched an attack upon the radical change in Tibet effected by the Chinese Communists, saying that the change had almost eliminated Tibetan traditional culture, which survived only because of the brave struggle of the clique of Tibetan exiles. They declared that their task was to help record and interprete the Tibetan culture and works that existed before the abolishment of the former regime in Tibet; i.e., they claimed themselves to be the protectors of Tibetan culture and boasted that they had protected one of the greatest cultures in the world — the special form of Tibetan culture.

3. The Russian Study of Tibet

The object of the Russian study of Tibet was also to invade the area and cannot be separated from the Tsarist policy of
expansion to the east and the south. As early as the 18th century, Tsar Peter I ordered that the Russian Government gather Tibetan documents and watch for its chance to have trade relations in hope of eventual occupation. At the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, Russia expanded eastward and reached as far as the Bering Strait, including the whole area of Siberia. After that, the Tsarist Russia concentrated on pushing southward, where China was one of the three major objectives. The plan to expand into China was to annex Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. In order to carry out this policy of expansion, Russia, ever since the 19th century, gradually accelerated its efforts to study Tibet.

Russian Tibetology can be divided roughly into two periods: the period of Tsarist Russia and that of the Soviet Union.

1. The First Period

People who studied Tibet in the period of Tsarist Russia were generally of three kinds: first, missionaries of the Orthodox Eastern Church Mission in Beijing; second, armed investigation groups formed by Russian officers; and third, Buryat spies who believed in Lamaism.

In 1715, by Peter I's order the Russian Government sent to China the first Russian Orthodox Eastern Church Mission. The mission, which became a permanent organization after the conclusion of the Kyakhta Convention (1728), was the official mission sent to China by the Tsarist Government. While carrying on religious activities, it was actually the centre of the Russian aggression against China in politics, economy, and culture. At first, the mission only went to Beijing; but after 1860 it expanded into North China, East China and Northwest China; and a network of missionaries came into existence, serving the political motive of Tsarist Russia. From 1715 to 1949, there were altogether twenty missions coming to China.
in relays and each one consisted of about ten people. In China, the missionaries, while engaging in religious activities, were able to gather information everywhere, to steal state secrets, and under the cover of being "China Experts" to take part directly in every kind of subversive activity to implement the Tsarist incursions. Among the missionaries, a group of the so-called "Sinologists" appeared. One of them was N. Bichurin (1777-1853), head of the ninth of the missions. He was the first Russian Sinologist to study Tibet. He did not go to Tibet or even its neighbouring areas to investigate, but only translated certain Chinese historical records concerning the area. This may be regarded as the beginning of the Western study of the Tibetan history by using materials in Chinese.

Since the middle of the 19th century, with its invading forces coming closer and closer to our western frontiers, Tsarist Russia was not satisfied with the study of Tibet only from written materials. It began to despatch investigation groups to Tibet for the purpose of further exploration. After the 1870's, Prezevalski and K. Kozlov investigated the geography and nationalities in Qinghai and Xinjiang, but were prevented from entering Tibet. Although they could not enter the area, they worked in the area in Qinghai where the Tibetans inhabited and gathered some data about the Tibetans. During the second half of the 19th century, there were some well-known Tibetologists in Russia including V.P. Vasilev, I.P. Minaev, A.M. Pozdneev, etc., who made a study of Tibetan history, geography, language, and religion. At the beginning of the 20th century, more people in Russia studied Tibet, among whom the following three were quite famous: T. Tsyibikov, a Buryat Mongol of Russian nationality, was sponsored by the Russian Geographical Society and, from 1899 to 1902, was sent to Tibet. Later, he became a professor of the Tibetan Language at Eastern Institute in
Vladivostok. Baradün, from 1905 to 1907 was sent by Russia to “study abroad” at Lapubai Temple and worked there. Later, he also became a professor of Tibetan in the Eastern Languages Department of Petersburg University. N. Kchoner, who was engaged in the study of Tibet at Eastern Institute in Vladivostok, wrote *Annals of Tibet*, Book One was *History of Westerners’ Investigations in Tibetan Areas*, and Book Two was *Annals of Tibetan Nationality*.

2. The Second Period

The centres of the study of Tibet at this period were usually located in three places — Moscow, Leningrad and Ulan-Ude.

In Moscow there is the Oriental Institute of the Soviet Union Academy of Sciences. A Tibetan Section was set up in the institute, the head being H. Pepun (1902-1960). This Russian, who spent a long time in Kalimpong, India, studying Tibet and writing and translating many books, was a learned Tibetologist of great accomplishment. In 1957, he was called back to his homeland by Khrushchev to head up Tibetan studies, and this resulted in their considerable advancement.

In Leningrad, there is a branch of the above-mentioned institute. This is the main centre for Russian Tibetology, and most of the Russian Tibetologists gather there. For example, B.A. Dobrovsky was one of them. His important works are *An Outline of the History of the Tibetan People* (1962), *The Introduction of Buddhism into Tibet, Divine Right in Tibetan Country Structure* (1970), and *Tibetan Lamaism and Its Status Quo* (1976). In addition, he edited a number of books on Tibetology and wrote prefaces for their authors. All this began to show that he is one of the outstanding Tibetologists of the Soviet Union.

Ulan-Ude is the capital of the Autonomous Buryat Republic of the Soviet Union. People there believe in Lamaism and have traditional religious affinities with Tibet, so many research
workers gather there to study Lamaism and Tibet. At the Buryat Institute of Social Sciences, K.M. Erasimov was quite a well-known scholar, whose most important work is *The Policy Towards Lamaism in the Region of Lake Baikal and National Colonialism of Tsarist Government from the 19th Century to the Beginning of 20th Century* (1957).

### 4. Contemporary Developments in Tibetology in Foreign Countries

At present, Tibetology in foreign countries is rather a popular field: more and more people are engaged in it; special organizations are being founded; regular meetings are held; and journals and books on Tibetology are frequently published. A number of institutes and organizations have been established specially in the study of Tibet. They are to be found in Japan, the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Hungary, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, India, Sikkim, Australia and Hong Kong.

On the basis of the study of Tibet in these countries, international academic conferences concerning Tibet have been held, and more societies formed. The most famous are the following:

1. The International Conference on Han-Tibetan Linguistics was sponsored by Yale University of the United States in 1968, and is held once a year. Its connections extend to many countries in Western Europe, Northern Europe and Asia.

2. The Symposium of Tibetologist Youth was proposed by the University of Zurich, Switzerland, and Oslo University, Norway, and held in Zurich from June 27th to July 1st in 1977. Scholars from more than ten countries attended it.
3. The Körösi Csoma Society is an international academic organization in Hungary established in memory of Csoma de Körösi, founder of modern Tibetology.

Another important aspect of Tibetology is the publication of articles and theses. Occasionally theses on Tibet are carried in journals concerned with Asia and Orientalism. Special publications devoted to the subject of Tibetology are as follows:

a. *Bulletin of Tibetology*  It is published by Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, Gangtok, Sikkim. This irregularly issued publication was first printed in 1964 and many Tibetologists in the world wrote articles for it.

b. *The Tibet Society Bulletin*  It is a scholarly journal published in the United States, and has close relations with the Dalai clique, but the articles in it are of some academic value.

c. *Tibet Society Newsletter*  This is a new journal published in the United States since 1972.

d. *Japanese Tibet Society Bulletin*  It started publication in 1953, and produces ten issues every year.

e. *Tibetan Bulletin*  Published in India.

f. *Tibetan Messenger*  Published in Holland.

g. *Tibet in Exile*  A quarterly published in Switzerland.

Besides these publications, some countries have issued series of books on Tibet, e.g., the *Satpitaka Series* published in India.
Appendix II

Regulations Regarding Trade, Communication, and Pasturage to Be Appended to the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890

I. — A trade-mart shall be established at Yatung, on the Tibetan side of the frontier, and shall be open to all British subjects for purposes of trade from the first day of May, 1894. The Government of India shall be free to send officers to reside at Yatung to watch the conditions of British trade at that mart.

II. — British subjects trading at Yatung shall be at liberty to travel freely to and fro between the frontier and Yatung, to reside at Yatung and to rent houses and godowns for their own accommodation, and the storage of their goods. The Chinese Government undertake that suitable buildings for the above purposes shall be provided for British subjects, and also that a special and fitting residence shall be provided for the officer or officers appointed by the Government of India under Regulation I to reside at Yatung. British subjects shall be at liberty to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities in kind or in money, to hire transport of any kind, and in general to conduct their business transactions in conformity with local usage, and without any vexations restrictions. Such British subjects shall receive efficient protection for their persons and property. At Lang-jo and Ta-chun, between the
frontier and Yatung, where rest-houses have been built by the Tibetan authorities, British subjects can break their journey in consideration of a daily rent.

III. — Import and export trade in the following Articles — arms, ammunition, military stores, salt, liquors, and intoxicating or narcotic drugs,

may at the option of either Government be entirely prohibited, or permitted only on such conditions as either Government on their own side may think fit to impose.

IV. — Goods, other than goods of the descriptions enumerated in Regulation III, entering Tibet from British India, across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, or vice versa, whatever their origin, shall be exempt from duty for a period of five years commencing from the date of the opening of Yatung to trade, but after the expiration of this term, if found desirable, a tariff may be mutually agreed upon and enforced.

Indian tea may be imported into Tibet at a rate of duty not exceeding that at which Chinese tea is imported into England, but trade in Indian tea shall not be engaged in during the five years for which other commodities are exempt.

V. — All goods on arrival at Yatung, whether from British India or from Tibet, must be reported at the Customs Station there for examination, and the report must give full particulars of the description, quantity, and value of the goods.

VI. — In the event of trade disputes arising between British and Chinese or Tibetan subjects in Tibet, they shall be enquired into and settled in personal conference by the Political Officer for Sikkim and the Chinese frontier officer. The object of personal conference being to ascertain facts and do justice, where there is a divergence of views the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide.

VII. — Despatches from the Government of India to the
Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet shall be handed over by the Political Officer for Sikkim to the Chinese frontier officer, who will forward them by special courier.

Despatches from the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet to the Government of India will be handed over by the Chinese frontier officer to the Political Officer for Sikkim, who will forward them as quickly as possible.

VIII. — Despatches between the Chinese and Indian officials must be treated with due respect, and couriers will be assisted in passing to and fro by the officers of each Government.

IX. — After the expiration of one year from the date of the opening of Yatung, such Tibetans as continue to graze their cattle in Sikkim will be subject to such Regulations as the British Government may from time to time enact for the general conduct of grazing in Sikkim. Due notice will be given of such Regulations.

**General Articles**

I. — In the event of disagreement between the Political Officer for Sikkim and the Chinese frontier officer, each official shall report the matter to his immediate superior, who in turn, if a settlement is not arrived at between them, shall refer such matter to their respective governments for disposal.

II. — After the lapse of five years from the date on which these Regulations shall come into force, and on six months' notice given by either party, these Regulations shall be subject to revision by Commissioners appointed on both sides for this purpose, who shall be empowered to decide on and adopt such amendments and extensions as experience shall prove to be desirable.
III. — It having been stipulated that Joint Commissioners should be appointed by the British and Chinese governments under the 7th Article of the Sikkim-Tibet Convention to meet and discuss, with a view to the final settlement of the questions reserved under Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the said Convention; and the Commissioners thus appointed having met and discussed the questions referred to, namely: Trade, Communication and Pasturage, have been further appointed to sign the agreement in nine Regulations and three General Articles now arrived at, and to declare that the said nine Regulations and the three General Articles form part of the Convention itself.
Appendix III

Convention Between Great Britain and Tibet, Signed at Lhasa on the 7th September, 1904

Whereas doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government under these agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Tibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F.E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty’s Government and on behalf of that said Government, and Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three monasteries Se-ra, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Tibet.

I. — The Government of Tibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, as defined in Article I of the
said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II. — The Tibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade-marts, to which all British and Tibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyantse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade-mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Tibetan governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishment trade-marts at the places mentioned, the Tibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade-marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III. — The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Tibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorized delegates to negotiate with representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV. — The Tibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V. — The Tibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyantse and Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade-marts that may hereafter be established, a Tibetan Agent, who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Tibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Tibetan Agent shall also be
responsible for the due delivery of such communications, and for the transmission of replies.

VI. — As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the despatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for breaches of treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to an attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Tibetan Government engages to pay a sum of pounds five hundred thousand — equivalent to rupees seventy-five lakhs — to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate, whether in Tibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual instalments of rupees one lakh each on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 1906.

VII. — As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfillment of the provisions relative to trade-marts specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid, and until the trade-marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII. — The Tibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhasa.

IX. — The Government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government,—

(a) No portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power;

(b) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in
Tibetan affairs;
(c) No Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet;
(d) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government;
(e) No Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power.

X. In witness whereof the negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa this 7th day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the 27th day of the seventh month of the Wood Dragon year.

Declaration Signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and Appended to the Ratified Convention of 7th September, 1904

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India, having ratified the Convention which was concluded at Lhasa on 7th September, 1904, by Colonel Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government; and by Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three monasteries Sera, Dre-pung and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly, on behalf of the Government of Tibet, is pleased to
direct as an act of grace that the sum of money which the Tibetan Government have bound themselves under the terms of Article VI of the said Convention to pay to His Majesty's Government as an indemnity for the expenses incurred by the later in connection with the despatch of armed forces to Lhasa, be reduced from Rs. 7,500,000 to Rs. 2,500,000; and to declare that the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley shall cease after the due payment of three annual instalments of the said indemnity as fixed by the said Article, provided, however, that the trade-marts as stipulated in Article II of the Convention shall have been effectively opened for three years as provided in Article VI of the Convention; and that, in the meantime, the Tibetan shall have faithfully complied with the terms of the said Convention in all other respects.
Appendix IV

Convention Between Great Britain and China, Dated 27th April, 1906

(Received in London, 18th June, 1906)
(Ratifications Exchanged at London, July 23, 1906)

Whereas His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exist between their respective Empires;

And whereas the refusal of Tibet to recognize the validity of or to carry into full effect the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of the 17th March, 1890, and Regulations of the 5th December, 1893, place the British Government under the necessity of taking steps to secure their rights and interests under the said Convention and Regulations;

And whereas a Convention of ten Articles was signed at Lhasa on the 7th September, 1904, on behalf of Great Britain and Tibet, and was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India on behalf of Great Britain on the 11th November, 1904, a Declaration on behalf of Great Britain modifying its terms under certain conditions being appended thereto;

His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of
China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject, and have for this purpose named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, Sir Ernest Mason Satow, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order, St. Michael and St. George, His and Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of China; and His Majesty the Emperor of China; His Excellency Tong Shaoyi, His said Majesty’s High Commissioner and Plenipotentiary, and a Vice-President of the Board of Foreign Affairs;

Who, have communicated to each other their respective full powers, and finding them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in six Articles:

**Articles I.** — The Convention concluded on the 7th September, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are attached to the present Convention as an annex, is hereby confirmed, subject to the modification stated in the Declaration appended thereto, and both of the High Contracting Parties engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfillment of the terms specified therein.

**Article II.** — The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign State to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.

**Article III.** — The concessions which are mentioned in Article IX (d) of the Convention concluded on the 7th September, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet are denied to
any State or to the subject of any State other than China, but it has been arranged with China that at the trade-marts specified in Article II of the aforesaid Convention Great Britain shall be entitled to lay down telegraph lines connecting with India.

Article IV. — The provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and Regulations of 1893 shall, subject to the terms of this present Convention and annex thereto, remain in full force.

Article V. — The English and Chinese texts of the present Convention have been carefully compared and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

Article VI. — This Convention shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both countries, and ratifications shall be exchanged at London within three months after the date of signature by the Plenipotentiaries of both Powers.
Appendix V

Convention Between Great Britain and Russia, 1907

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the Right Honourable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias;

His majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master of his Court Alexander Iswolsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:
Arrangement Concerning Tibet

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognizing the suzerain rights of China in Tibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations of Tibet, have made the following Arrangement:

Article I. — The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.

Article II. — In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Tibetan authorities provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet of the 7th September, 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April, 1906; nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama, and the other representatives of Buddhism in Tibet; the governments of Great Britain and Russia engage as far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present Arrangement.

Article III. — The British and Russian governments respectively engage not to send Representatives to Lhasa.
Article IV. — The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any Concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Tibet.

Article V. — The two governments agree that no part of the revenues of Tibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

Annex to the Arrangement Between Great Britain and Russia Concerning Tibet

Great Britain reaffirms the Declaration, signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratification of the Convention of the 7th September, 1904, to the effect that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by British forces shall cease after the payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity of 2,500,000 rupees, provided that the trade-marts mentioned in Article II of that Convention have been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Tibetan authorities have faithfully complied in all respects with the terms of the said Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood that if the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces has, for any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russia governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject.
Appendix VI

Chronology of Important Events

641 Princess Wen Cheng of the Tang Dynasty (618-907) was married to Songtsan Gampo.

649 The Tang Dynasty conferred on Songtsan Gampo the title of "Imperial Son-in-Law Governor," and "Prince of Western Sea."

710 Princess Jin Cheng of the Tang Dynasty was married to Tride Tsugtsan.

13th Century The Yuan Dynasty (1206-1368) stationed troops in Tibet, appointed officials, checked on residents, and levied taxes. The Sakya sect was propped up by the Yuan Dynasty, and Phagpa, leader of this sect, was empowered to administer the political and religious affairs in Tibet.

1653 The Dalai was authorized by the Qing Dynasty (1616-1911) to take charge of the Tibet local government.

1713-1716 Sent by the Russian Government, Trushnikov went to Tibet to gather information about the production of "alluvial gold."

1721 Peter I, the Russian Tsar, issued an order that the output of gold in Tibet and the possibility of occupying Tibet should be found out.

1728 The Qing Dynasty began to send Resident Ministers to Tibet to supervise the Tibetan affairs.
1774 George Bogle of the East India Company came to see the Sixth Panchen in Tashilhunpo Monastery in Tsang, trying to sound out about the possibility of trade between India and Tibet, which was refused by the Panchen.

1783 Samuel Turner, a British, again came to Tashilhunpo Monastery, asking to be introduced to the authorities in Lhasa for the sake of discussing mutual trade. The Tibetans again rejected this demand because they thought that Bogle and Turner were spies prying into the rich resources of Tibet.

1792 The Qing Dynasty issued the system of “Drawing Lots from the Gold Urn.”

1793 The Qing Dynasty promulgated a twenty-nine-article “Imperial Ordinance”, which implemented the control of the Central Government over Tibet concretely and comprehensively.

1811 Thomas Manning went to Lhasa to call on the Ninth Dalai Lama. He roused the disgust of the Tibetans and was driven out of Tibet.

1840 The Opium War broken out. Great Britain began to invade Nepal.

1856 Great Britain controlled Nepal and instigated the Nepalese to invade Tibet. The Tibetans were forced to sign an unequal treaty “The Tibetan-Nepalese Treaty”, which stipulated the privilege of the Nepalese in Tibet. This was the first unequal treaty forced upon Tibet.

1860 Great Britain invade Drenjong (Sikkim) and seized the right of constructing the road to Drenjong.

1865 Great Britain invaded Bhutan. Thereafter Nepal, Drenjong, and Bhutan were under the control of Britain, acting
as Britain’s gangplank for invading Tibet.

1870-1873 Prezevalski, a Russian, explored Tibet for the first time.

1876 Britain forced the Qing Dynasty to conclude an unequal treaty, “The Chefoo Convention”, stipulating that the British could enter Tibet for “exploration” via Gansu, Sichuan, or the Indian-Tibetan border.

1876-1877 Prezevalski entered Tibet for a second exploration.

1879-1880 Prezevalski entered Tibet for a third exploration.

1883-1885 Prezevalski entered Tibet for a fourth exploration.

1884 Great Britain sent presumptuously Colman Macaulay to Tibet via India, but the Tibetans refused to allow him in.

1886 Britain forced the Qing Government to conclude “Sino-British Convention Relating to Burma”. Britain annexed Burma, promising that it would not make further explorations in Tibet. But the Qing Government was to persuade the Tibetans to carry on trade relations with the British.

1887 Tibet set up defenses in the pass of Mount Longtu, situated in the southern frontier of Tibet.

1888 Britain attacked the pass of Mount Longtu. The Tibetan troops retreated after a violent resistance. The British troops occupied the Chumbi Valley.

1889-1890 Prezevalski entered Tibet for a fifth exploration.

1890 China and India concluded the unequal Sino-British Convention Relating to Sikkim and Tibet. The Qing Dynasty acknowledged Britain’s “protection” of Drenjong.

1893 China and Britain concluded an unequal treaty, the Regulations Regarding Trade, Communication and Pasturage to
Be Appended to the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890. Yadong was made into a trade mart. The British enjoyed economic and political privileges in Tibet. The Tibetans were restricted in Drenjong while moving in search of pastures.

1894 Thubten Gyatso, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, took up the reins of the Tibetan local government and insisted on his policy of opposing the British imperialists.

1898, 1900, 1901, 1902 The Thirteenth Dalai Lama sent Dorjieff to head a Tibetan delegation to visit Russia.

1904 The British troops invaded Tibet. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama fled to Mongolia. Younghusband, commander of the British troops, forced the Tibetan officials to sign “The Lhasa Treaty”, attempting to change Tibet into one of Britain's colonies. Under the pressure of the whole nation, the Qing Court ordered the Resident Minister in Tibet not to sign the treaty.

1905 The British imperialists sent William O'Connor, a spy, to Tashilhunpo Monastery to force the Ninth Panchen Erdeni to India, with the attempt to split up Tibet. The Panchen refused to talk about political issues, so this plot came to a failure. The Tibetans rose in rebellion in Batang and killed Feng Quan, the Assistant Resident, and the imperialist missionaries. The rebellion awakened a strong response among the Tibetans in Litang and the border area of Yunnan. The Qing Court sent Zhao Erfeng to manage the Sichuan border area.

1906 The Ninth Panchen Erdeni came back to Tibet from India. A second treaty relating to Tibet was concluded between China and Britain with the Treaty of Lhasa attached to it as an annex. Zhao Erfeng was appointed as the Commissioner of Sichuan-Yunnan Borderland Affairs, carrying out the “New
Policy” in Sichuan borderland. This is what is called “Replacement of the hereditary headmen with officials appointed by the government.” Appointed as the Assistant Resident to Tibet, Zhang Yintang was sent there to manage Tibetan affairs while carrying out the “New Policy.”

1907 Russia and Great Britain concluded the Convention Between Great Britain and Russia, changing presumptuously the absolute sovereignty of China over Tibet into suzerainty.

1908 China and Britain signed the unequal treaty “Sino-British Revised Regulations of Tibetan-Indian Trade Relations”, in which the aggressive actions of the British imperialists in Gyantse, Yadong, and Gartok were restricted. However, Britain still enjoyed economic and political privileges in the trade marts. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama went to Beijing to have an audience with the Emperor and was given the title of “Loyal, Submissive, Great Benevolent, Self-Existent Buddha of Western Paradise.”

1909 Thubten Gyatso, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, went back to Lhasa. The Sichuan troops, headed by Zhong Yin, entered Tibet through the Sichuan border.

1910 General Zhong Yin led the Sichuan troops to Lhasa with the help of Zhao Erfeng. The Dalai Lama, under the threat of the Sichuan troops, exiled himself to India.

1912 The troops stationed in Tibet responded to the 1911 Revolution but were suppressed by the reactionary forces. The Republic of China was founded in Beijing. The troops led by Zhong Yin plundered in Lhasa and was besieged by the Tibetans. The Qing troops withdrew from Tibet and returned to China proper via India. The Resident Minister system collapsed. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama Thubten Gyatso arrived in Lhasa from India. Operated by the British imperialists, the pro-British
members in Tibet declared the so-called “The Independence of Tibet”, and ousted the Hans out of Tibet. This was the “1912 Incident.” The British imperialists incited the Dalai Lama to appoint a Silon in the Kashag, who would be in charge of the local political affairs. The pro-British members headed the troops to attack the Sichuan border area. But this move was opposed by the Tibetan people.

1913 Britain put forward in the Simla Conference an absurd draft which divided Tibet into “Inner” and “Outer” Tibet and forced Yuan Shikai to acknowledge it. Strongly opposed by the whole nation, the conference came to be a failure.

1917 Britain again instigated the Tibetan troops to attack the areas east of Tibet.

1918 Teichman, a British spy, incited the Tibetan troops and the Sichuan troops to conclude the “Rongbacha Truce Agreement,” which stipulated that Tibet and Sichuan were divided by the Jinsha River.

1919 The May 4th Movement. The Government of the Northern Warlords published part of the contents of the Simla Convention, which aroused a strong opposition of the whole nation.

1923 The British Government created division within Tibet. On Nov. 15, the Ninth Panchen Erdeni left Tibet for inland China with more than a hundred of his followers.

1924 The British Government instigated Tsarong to stage a coup d'état, which was suppressed by the Dalai Lama. The Ninth Panchen Erdeni reached Taiyuan via Anxi, Lanzhou and Xi’an.

1925 The Ninth Panchen Lama arrived in Beijing.

1928 Qinghai and Xikang became provinces.
1929 The Ninth Panchen Lama established his office in Nanjing.

1930 The Central Government sent representatives to get in touch with the Dalai. Great Britain instigated Nepal to invade Tibet so as to compel the Dalai to change his pro-China attitude. The upper-class Tibetans sent troops to attack and occupied the two counties of Garze and Zhanhua on the pretext of the dispute between the Dargye Monastery and the headman of Beri.

1931 The September 18th Incident broke out. The Dalai had his office established in Nanjing. The Kuomintang government conferred on the Panchen the title of “Great Master of Protection, Propagation and Wide Intelligence.”

1932 The upper-class Tibetans ordered the Tibetan troops to attack Qinghai on the pretext of the dispute in the Zurmang area of Yushu (Jyekundo), Qinghai. The troops were defeated and so retreated. The Xikang troops recaptured the area east of the Jinsha River. The Tibetan troops and Xikang troops concluded the “Gangtok Truce Agreement.” The Ninth Panchen Lama went to Nanjing to take the office of Western Borderland Publicity Commissioner.

1933 The Tibetan troops and the Qinghai troops concluded the “Badatang Truce Agreement.” The Thirteenth Dalai Lama passed away on December 7, at the age of 58. Radreng acted as the regent.

1934 The Central Government sent General Huang Musong to Tibet as a special envoy to hold a memorial ceremony for the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and conferred on him posthumously the title of “Great Master of Patriotism, Magnanimity, Benevolence and Sagacity.” The Kuomintang government decided to
establish in Lhasa a Tibetan Office under the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs.

1935 Great Britain established illegally a British office in Lhasa.
1937 The Anti-Japanese War broke out. The Ninth Panchen Lama died on December 1 in Yushu, Qinghai, at the age of 55.
1939 As the reincarnation of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso went to Lhasa from Qinghai.
1940 The Kuomintang government sent Wu Zhongxing to Tibet to preside over the installation ceremony of Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama. The Tibetan Office of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs was formally established in Lhasa.
1941 Radreng retired and Taktra acted as the regent.
1942 The Tibetan local government established a "Foreign Affairs Bureau" without the authorization of the Central Government.
1949 July 8 Instigated by the imperialists, the Tibetan authorities cut off the telecommunications between Lhasa and other places and informed the staff of the Lhasa office of the Kuomintang government that they should withdrew from Lhasa. They also closed the Chinese school in Lhasa and ousted the Chinese out of Tibet.
1949 Oct. 1 The Panchen congratulated in his telegraph to Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Zhu De on the founding of the People's Republic of China and expressed his support for the Central People's Government and his hope of
liberating Tibet as soon as possible.

1950 July 10 The Living Buddha Getag, a member of the Southwestern Military and Administrative Committee and Vice-Chairman of the Xikang Provincial People’s Government, left Garze for Tibet for the peaceful liberation of Tibet.

1950 Aug. 22 The Living Buddha Getag was poisoned to death in Chamdo by a British spy.


1950 Oct. 21 The Indian Government delivered a memorandum to the Government of the People’s Republic of China, attempting to prevent the People’s Liberation Army from entering Tibet.

1950 Oct. 28 The Indian Government presented a note to the Chinese Government, attempting to prevent China from exercising sovereign rights in Tibet. The note said that “the entering of the Chinese army into Tibet can only be regarded as deplorable.”

1950 Oct. 30 The Chinese People’s Central Government answered the memorandum and the note of the Indian Government delivered respectively on October 21 and October 28, declaring that “Tibet is an inseparable part of China and the Tibetan problem is entirely a domestic problem of China.”

1950 Nov. 1 The Southwestern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Southwestern Military Area Command of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the Headquarters of the Second Field Army jointly issued the order of political mobilization to the troops that had received orders to march forward to Tibet.

1950 Nov. 1 The Indian Government delivered another note
on the Tibetan issue, reiterating that “the Indian Government has no political or territorial ambition for Tibet.” Still it opposed the PLA’s entering Tibet.

Winter of 1950 The pro-British members of the Tibetan local government, headed by Taktra the Regent, abducted the Fourteenth Dalai to Yadong with an attempt to take the Dalai abroad.

1950 Nov. 16 The Chinese People’s Government replied to the note of the Indian Government on Tibetan issue delivered on Nov. 1. The Chinese Government pointed out that Tibet was an inalienable part of China and that the Tibetan issue was entirely a domestic problem of China.

1951 Feb. Taktra fell out of power. The Fourteenth Dalai took over the reins of the Tibetan local government. He sent Ngabo Ngawang Jigme as the head of the Tibetan delegation to hold talks in Beijing on the peaceful liberation of Tibet.

1951 April 29 Li Weihan, the plenipotentiary of the Central People’s Government, held talks on the peaceful liberation of Tibet with Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, plenipotentiary of the Tibetan local government.

1951 May 21 The talks came to an end. The Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Tibetan Local Government on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet was signed.

1951 Aug. 17 The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa from Yadong.

1951 Oct. 24 The Dalai Lama telegraphed to Chairman Mao, declaring that he supported the Agreement on the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.

1953 Feb. 24 The Dalai Lama’s Office in Beijing was estab-
lished.

1954 April 29 The People’s Republic of China and the Indian Republic signed in Beijing the Agreement on Commerce and Traffic between India and Tibet. The five principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence were for the first time put forward. On that same day, the two sides exchanged documents, which stipulated the withdrawal of Indian forces from Tibet and other issues.

1954 July 11 The Dalai Lama left Lhasa for Beijing.

1954 Sept. 27 The Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso was elected as the Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the First National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. Panchen Erdeni Choskyi Gyatsan was elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the First National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China.

1954 Dec. 25 A grand ceremony was held in Lhasa, celebrating the completion of the Sichuan-Tibet Highway and the Qinghai-Tibet Highway.

1955 April 1 The Government of the Indian Republic handed over to China twelve posts, the facilities of postal service, telegraph and telephone. The handing-over ceremony was held in Lhasa.

1956 Nov. 22 The Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni left Shigatse for India by way of Yadong to attend the 2500th anniversary of Sakyamuni’s nirvana.

1956 Nov. 25 The Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni reached New Delhi, India.
1957 Jan. Yuthok Drashi Dondrup, a former Kalon of the Tibetan local government, and ex-chief Kalon Lukhangwa betrayed China and fled to Kalimpong, a centre for the rebels in India.

1957 Jan. 22 The Dalai Lama and his staff reached Kalimpong from Calcutta.

1957 Jan. 29 Panchen Erdeni came back to Lhasa from India.

1957 Feb. 15 The Dalai Lama came back to Tibet from Sikkim.

1958 April 22 Celebration for the second anniversary of the founding of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region. An informal discussion was held by outstanding personalities of various circles. The Dalai Lama, Panchen Erdeni, and Zhang Guohua gave speeches at the discussion, calling on the Tibetans to strengthen national unification.

1958 May 6 Instigated by the reactionary forces in the Tibetan local government and the upper-class members, the rebel bandits harassed such areas as Chamdo, Dengchen, Nagchu, Shannan and established openly a “base” in Shannan area, a dropping ground in Chigu Dzong in order to receive aids by imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek.

1959 March 10 The Tibetan local government and the reactionary members of the upper-class tore to pieces the 17-Article Agreement on the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. They raised such reactionary slogans as “Away with the Hans!” and “Independence for Tibet!” and rose in armed rebellion in Lhasa. Khenchung Sonam Gyatso, a Tibetan official with the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous region, who was against the rebellion, was beaten to death. Sampo Tsewang Rinchen, Vice-Commander of the Tibetan Military Area Command of the PLA, and some others were wounded. The
Headquarters of the Tibetan Military Area Command of the People’s Liberation Army and the Tibetan offices of the Central People’s Government were besieged.

1959 March 17 The Dalai Lama was kidnapped out of Lhasa by the rebellion group.

1959 March 19 The rebel forces launched an all-out attack on the PLA troops stationed in Lhasa.

1959 March 28 The State Department of China issued an order, instructing that the Tibetan Military Area Command should suppress the rebellion thoroughly and that from this day the Tibetan local government should be dismissed whose functions should be exercised by the Preparatory Committee of the Tibetan autonomy.

1959 March 28 Xinhua News Agency published a press communiqué on the rebellion in Tibet. It pointed out that the PLA men had quickly suppressed the rebellion in Lhasa and were now advancing on the crest of this victory in order to mop up the rebel bandits in other places in Tibet.

1959 March 31 The Dalai Lama, now a rebel, entered India.

1959 April 24 Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, had an interview with the Dalai Lama at Mussoorie.

1959 April 28 "The Resolution on the Tibetan Issue" was passed in the first session of the Second National People’s Congress. The deputies thoroughly approved of all the measures adopted by the State Department concerning the Tibetan local government and the reactionary upper-class group after the rebellion of March 10, 1959.
Postscript

As a hard collective project, the English version of my manuscript is completed with the enthusiastic help of many friends. Those who participated in the translation of the manuscript are as follows: Lecturer Li Baoping (Preface, Chapter I, VII, IX, and Bibliography of Important Events), Dr. Fan Chengdong (Chapter II, and half of Chapter V), Lecturer He Chengzhou (Chapter VI, X), Lecturer Zhong Jin (Chapter III and A Survey of Foreign Tibetology), Lecturer Xu Hongbing (Chapter IV, IIX) and Lecturer Pan Xingming (half of Chapter V).

The first draft of the translation was proofread by Pro. Xie Chunan, Pro. Zhang Xueqin, Pro. Wu Keming, Pro. Xiang Shujuan, Pro. Huang Henyi, Lecturer Chen Xiaolu, Dr. Fan Chengdong, and Pro. Huang Hongzhao. The version was eventually finalized by Pro. Xie Chunan and Pro. Huang Hongzhao.

On the occasion of the publication of this book, I express my sincere thanks to all the friends above for their great efforts in the translation of this book.

Huang Hongzhao
Chapter 1.
Patala Palace Construction began in the 7th century.

The regulations of reorganizing Tibet with 28 articles in the fourth year of Daoguang.

The Ling Pai of the minister in Tibet.
Ling Pai: the board-shaped token of authority in ancient China.

Chushul Bridge, the largest on the Yarlung Tsangpo, links Lhasa with Shigatse and other areas.

Tibetan noble man's dress.

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Tibetan noble women.

Chapter 2.
Mr. Bogle, who was sent as an envoy to Tibet in 1774.
The old-type Tibetan infantryman and cavalryman.
Mounted infantry.
The Tibetan court. The three men wearing flat hats in the middle of the picture are judges. The two sitting on the left side are copy clerks.

Chapter 3.
The Thirteenth Dalai Lama.
The Burjat spy Dorjieff, who was sent to Tibet by Russia.

Chapter 4.
The fort in the battle against Britain in Gyantse.
Seals affixed to Lhasa Treaty.
Signing Lhasa Treaty under the pressure of Britain, September 7, 1904.
Sepoys "shouldering" Tibetans from position: Guru, March, 1904.
Sonan Biandju, a veteran of the defence of Gyantse fort against the British Younghusband expedition in 1904 — photographed in 1955.
Gyantse Dzong.
Tri-Rimpoche, who acted as the Regent after Dalai ran away.

Chapter 5.
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The order of the Qing Government to dethrone the Dalai Lama XIII.

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The certificate bearing the title of "Buddhist Master of Patriotism and Universal Doctrine" and the seal the Kuomintang government granted Radreng Rinpoche in 1940.
The jade certificate bearing the posthumous title of "Great Master of Patriotism, Magnanimity, Benevolence and Sagacity" the Kuomintang government granted the
Thirteenth Dalai Lama Thubten Gyatso in 1934.

Chapter 10.
Mao Zedong’s personal, hand-written message to the Fourteenth Dalai Lama (December 24, 1955).
Mao Zedong’s personal, hand-written message to the Tenth Panchen Erdeni (November 24, 1955).
Ngabo Ngawang Jigme.
Signing the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet on May 23, 1951.
The Chinese Text and the Tibetan Text of the Agreement on the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.
On a meeting celebrating the founding of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region (1956).
Vice-Premier Chen Yi, the Dalai Lama, Panchen Lama and Zhang Jingwu are on the rostrum.
Sonam Tsering, herdsman, ex-serf of Sera Monastery, was tortured and blinded in 1951.
Celebrating the 30th Anniversary of the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, Lhasa, 1981.
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Nagchu County
Naini
Neusaha Thubten Takpa
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Nianduna
Nian Gengyao
Northern Tibet Plateau Area
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Pondo
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Princess Wen Cheng
Purang

那曲县
奈尼
柳霞·土登塔巴
阿沛·阿旺晋美
阿里
阿里地区
歐細娃圖丹貢丹
念都納
年羹堯
藏北高原區
怒江
娘部
年楚河(Nyang Qu River)
聶朗
念青唐拉山
帕里
邊覺多吉
班禪額爾德尼
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北京(Beijing, Peking)
北京(Beijing, Peiping)
彭日升
崩雜山
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彭措旺堆
旁多
布達拉宮
金城公主
文成公主
布浪
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Sheng Tai
Shigatse
Shilong Tobgyal
Shuhanfu Mountain
Sichuan Province
Songtsan Gampo
Southern Tibet River
Valley Area
Sun Yat-sen
Surkhang
Surkhang Wangchin Gelek
Tachienlu

Taktra
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Thok-Daurakopa
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Yan Huiqing
Yarlung
Yarlung Tsangpo River
Yecheng
Yedang
Yin Changheng
Yili
Yingban
Yining
You Tai
Yuan Shikai
Yu Gang
Yunnan Province
Zaisan
Zhaling Lake
Zhang Guohua
Zhang Jingwu
Zhang Xun
Zhang Yintang
Zhao Erfeng
Zhima Mountain
Zhongtang
Zhong Ying
Zhou Enlai
Zhu De
Zhu Xiu
Zongjia
The book gives you full and accurate materials, a minute narration with convincing arguments, and logical conclusions on the events occurred in the 19th century — the British and Russian Empires' intrusion upon Tibet, China. It includes: Historical background of Tibet; Britian's aggressive policy and new scheme towards Tibet in the 20th century. Peaceful liberation and democratic reform of Tibet since 1953; Appendixes.