The Kazaks of China Essays on an Ethnic Minority

Edited by
Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg
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Uppsala 1988
Distributor:
Almqvist & Wiksell International
Stockholm
The publication of this volume was made possible through a grant from the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and the Social Sciences.

Abstract
The Kazaks of China. Essays on an Ethnic Minority
Edited by Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg

China as a multiethnic society is discussed from the point of view of a specific ethnic group, the Kazaks. The book has two immediate goals. On one hand, it seeks to present an overview of the past and present situation of the Kazaks of China. The formulation and implementation of Chinese policy from the Qing Dynasty until the mid-1980s towards this nomadic group is also treated in some detail as this policy has had a considerable impact on the Kazaks of today. It is based on the most recent sources in Chinese, Turkic, Russian and other languages, and it also presents first-hand information gathered by scholars during recent visits to northwestern China. On the other hand, this work also seeks to present more specialized, in-depth material illuminating various aspects of Kazak society in this century. Chapters by individual authors with a first-hand knowledge of the Xinjiang Kazaks and their contemporary society include studies of social organization, rebellion among the nomads, and linguistics as well as contemporary pastoral life in the Bogda Range. A common theme in the contributions is the relationship between the Chinese state administration and the Kazak nomads of Xinjiang.

(Key Words: Kazaks, Xinjiang, Minority Policy, China Studies, Turkology)
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This book is about the Kazaks of the Xinjiang region of China. It is a collection of original papers which stress various aspects of Kazak history and culture in China. Though not an ethnographical monograph, it covers several vital aspects of the Kazaks as an ethnic group, including their modern political history, Chinese nationality policy, social organization, ethnographical aspects of nomadism, as well as linguistics. It is published as the first volume within the research project entitled The Kazak Minority of Xinjiang which is supported by the Centre for Multiethnic Research, Uppsala University, in collaboration with the Ethnographical Museum, Stockholm, Sweden, and sponsored by the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and the Social Sciences.

As far as we know, this is the first book on any single contemporary ethnic minority in China, published by foreign scholars and based on original research materials. Books on Tibetans, Mongols and Hui have been published, but these works are primarily studies in the history of religion or broad historical surveys rather than studies of the contemporary situation of these minorities within China. The data for the contributions to this book have been obtained from various sources. These include fieldwork in Xinjiang among the Kazaks, as well as interviews within Xinjiang and with Kazak émigrés now resident in several other countries. Unpublished archival sources in Beijing, Hong Kong, Taibei, Washington D.C., and London have provided important information, which has been supplemented with published source material in Chinese, Kazak, Turkish, Russian, English, German, French and Swedish.

Today, China is concerned with publicizing her many ethnic minorities and a growing body of literature is being published. Further, in recent years, many of the minority areas have been opened to visitors and as a result there is now growing international interest in these regions and their populations. One of the most romantic and colourful of the minorities are certainly the nomadic Kazaks of Xinjiang who, although far from being the largest minority in China, nonetheless today number one million. As a people, they have played an important role in modern Xinjiang history, and Kazak unrest due to changing political fortunes in the region has been
endemic throughout most of this century. One of the least Sinicized nationalities in China, they are of great interest to all social scientists concerned with the problems of ethnic minorities and the effects of modernization on traditional societies. Such questions are the concern of virtually all modern governments today and therefore a sharing of knowledge and experience in facing these problems should be of benefit not only to scholars but also to governments that continue to confront the problems of a plural society.

Today it is once again possible for foreign scholars to do field research in China, for the Chinese authorities have opened the door a crack. While researchers do not have the freedom of movement granted them in some countries, there is, nonetheless, more freedom to work and travel independently in the minority areas of China than in the Soviet Union, for instance. Visitors in China today can meet local people freely, talk and exchange views and even stay for rather extended periods among the people in several minority areas. It is to be hoped that the Chinese government will continue to expand this open door policy, enabling foreign scholars within the social sciences and humanities to do independent research. Scholarship in the area of ethnic minorities in China will certainly benefit as a result.

This book has two immediate goals. On one hand, it seeks to present an overview of the past and present situation of the Kazaks in China as a general introduction to this Central Asian people. It is based on the most recent sources in Chinese and other languages, and it also presents first-hand information gathered by scholars during recent visits to the region. On the other hand, this work also seeks to present more specialized, in-depth material illuminating various aspects of Kazak society in this century. The latter goal is served by chapters two through five, which are studies by individual authors with first-hand knowledge of the people and their contemporary society.

As a general introduction to the Kazak people, the first chapter of this book provides extensive background information on the Kazak’s history, distribution, and current status in China. It also introduces the reader to the vast Xinjiang region, formerly called Chinese Turkestan or Eastern Turkestan, which borders on the USSR and the Mongolian People’s Republic. The formulation and implementation of Chinese policy toward this nomadic group is also treated in some detail as this policy has had considerable impact on the Kazaks of today.

The second contribution gives a brief ethnographic description of the nomadism and social organization of the Kazaks in Republican China.
(1911-1949). It also includes a short introduction to the Kazaks' movements into and within the Xinjiang region from neighbouring states.

Unrest has been common among the Kazaks during the 20th century. One of the most important and well-known rebel leaders was Osman Batur, executed in Urumchi in 1951. His name lives on in books published within China, as well as in Kazak émigré literature. His dual function as hero and bandit is analyzed in the third chapter.

The conflict between Chinese warlords and Kazaks during the 1930s are described in chapter four in the reminiscences told by a Kazak refugee living today in Turkey. The story gives a vivid account of the turbulent situation typical for the period. The reminiscences are presented both in Kazak and English. In the introduction a short description of the phonetic peculiarities of the Xinjiang Kazak language is given.

The contemporary Kazak way of life in Bogda Ulu, an area northeast of the regional capital of Urumchi, is described in the fifth contribution. Based on original field research, this study is probably the only such work available on the Kazaks today.

A selective bibliography of the most important books and articles concerning the Kazaks and other minorites of Xinjiang concludes the book.

Generous travel grants from the Vega Foundation and the Scandinavian Institute for Asian Studies have made this book possible.

The editors would like to dedicate this work to Ambassador Professor Gunnar Jarring, the eminent Swedish scholar in Turkology and Xinjiang cultural history.

Uppsala – Taibei – Ithaca, N.Y., Spring 1987
Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg
Notes on Romanization

We have used the Hanyu Pinyin system of romanization for Chinese words in this book. The only exceptions are the names of a few Chinese individuals (Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Yat-sen) and some place names (Ili, Kashgar, Khotan, Urumchi) which are spelled according to traditional English transcription. Kazak words are romanized according to the system used in Philologicae Turcicae Fundamenta, Vol. 1, Wiesbaden 1959. Russian words are transliterated according to the system in The World's Major Languages, Ed. B. Comrie, London & Sydney 1987.

Acknowledgements

The editors want to direct their thanks to Ms. Margareta Eriksson who drew the graphs, to Ms. Ylva Dahlman who skillfully drew the maps, and to Mr. Michael Normann for photographic work.

Contributors

Linda Benson received her M.Phil. from University of Hong Kong and a Ph.D. from University of Leeds in 1986. Her dissertation is entitled The Ili Rebellion. Among her research interests are the 20th century history of the Uighurs, Chinese minority policy, Muslim women in China and modern Xinjiang history.

Thomas Hoppe received his M.A. from Freie Universität, Berlin, in 1975. Since 1982 he has conducted a research project at the Institut für Landschaftsökonomie, Technische Universität Berlin, on problems of land use in the Tarim and Turpan basins, including field work on contemporary Uighur agriculture. Among his publications is the comprehensive Xinjiang – Provisional Bibliography 2 (1987).

Mark Kirchner, a doctoral candidate in Turkology at the Institut für Orientkunde, Universität Mainz, has conducted linguistic field research among Xinjiang-Kazak refugees in Istanbul. He is preparing the publication of a large collection of proverbs recorded among the Kazaks in Turkey.

Ingvar Svanberg, research associate at Centre for Multiethnic Research, Uppsala University, has conducted field work among Kazaks in Turkey, West Germany, Sweden, Taiwan and Xinjiang. He is the author of the forthcoming Kazak Refugees from Xinjiang, as well as numerous articles, chapters and books on ethnic minorities and in the field of Turkology.
THE KAZAKS IN XINJIANG

by

Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg

The Kazaks are a proud, nomadic people whose history is closely bound to that of Central Asia, a vast expanse of land stretching from China to Europe, and home to both nomadic and sedentary peoples who have inhabited the region for centuries. The extension of Czarist Russian control over this seemingly endless tract of steppe and desert in the 18th and 19th centuries led ultimately to the accumulation of the present wealth of information on that part of the Kazak people who today are citizens of the Soviet Union.

But since the 18th century, Kazaks have also nomadized in the westernmost Chinese provinces, predominantly in the region once known as Chinese Turkestan, today's Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. Kazak groups have also ranged further east, entering the Chinese provinces of Gansu, Qinghai and Tibet. Unlike the Kazaks of the USSR, however, the history and the present situation of China's Kazak people has been little studied and today relatively little information on China's Kazak population is available in any language.

Since the opening up of China's northwest to tourism in the early 1980s, there has been an upsurge of interest in this region's fascinating, ethnically mixed population and in the Kazaks themselves. The Chinese government has encouraged publication of several works dealing with the northwest and with the Kazaks in particular which has been a most welcome development. However, information published in Chinese remains accessible only to a limited number of scholars and does not satisfy the need for a general introductory work on this colourful minority nationality of China.

The objective of this chapter is to offer an overview of the Kazaks in China. Because of the dearth of information on China's Kazaks in general, this chapter presents brief surveys of Kazak history, language, social organization and so on — all of which establish a framework for an understanding of the Kazak people in China today. There is also a fairly detailed introduction to Chinese national minority policy in general and policy toward the Kazaks in particular, from the end of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) to the present. As Chinese policy is a vital element in understanding the current situation of the Kazak people, this aspect is dealt with at some length.
Further, as the majority of China’s Kazaks live in the Xinjiang Region, this chapter also includes a survey of Xinjiang’s geography, political history and demography, as well as an introduction to Xinjiang’s other nationalities who, along with the Kazaks, have shared the region’s turbulent history.

Notes on the Name “Kazak”

As recently as the early part of this century, the Kazaks were still being referred to by a variety of names, such as Kirghiz, Kirghiz-Kazaks, Kirghiz-Kassaks or Kazak-Kirghiz. One of the functions of such names was to differentiate them from the Cossacks who where a military unit under the Russian Czar and not a Central Asian people at all. The people we today call Kirghiz (i.e. Qirγiz) were called Kara-Kirghiz or Mountain Kirghiz in earlier literature.

In 1926 the Soviet Union officially introduced the ethnonym Kazakh (казак) in keeping with the Soviet policy of officially recognizing names used by the ethnic groups themselves. As a result, the name Kazakh gained international recognition as the correct term for identifying this nomadic people. In Chinese the Kazaks are called Hasake (哈萨克), while the Kazaks call themselves Qazaq (قازاق) and we therefore prefer to use the more accurate spelling “Kazak” rather than the Russian transcription “Kazakh”.

Scholarship on the Kazaks

Because the majority of the Kazaks have lived in an area which falls within present-day borders of the Soviet Union, there is, as a result, a very rich literature concerning the ethnography and history of the Kazaks in Russian, written primarily by Russian and, later, by Soviet scholars. Among the pioneers in this work were Aleksis Levshin and Vilhelm Radlov, both of whose works are available in French and German, respectively. The Kazak scholar Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov (1835–1865) contributed valuable information on Kazak cultural history and ethnography in the

1. Alexis de Levchine, Description des hordes et des steppes Kirghiz-Kazaks. Paris 1840; Wilhelm Radloff, Aus Sibirien, Bd. 1–2. Leipzig 1884. As a curiosity, it should be mentioned that a 19th century Swede wrote a couple of booklets about the Kazaks using Levchine as a source. See Olaf Gräberg da Hemso, Descrizione delle orde e delle steppe dei Kirghiz-Kazaki. Milano 1840, and —. Cenni geografici e statistici su l’Asie Centrale e principalmente sul paese dei Kirghiz e sui Khanato di Khiva, Milano 1840.
middle of the 19th century. Although Russian educated as an officer in the Czarist Army and clearly Russified, he had great insight into Kazak traditions, unequalled by his contemporaries. The Russian scholars Valentin Riasanovsky and Viktor Dingelstedt also published important works on customary law among the Kazaks. Of great value for our understanding of traditional Kazak way of life in westernmost Russian Central Asia is a travelogue by the German ethnographer Richard Karutz. The French ethnographer Joseph Castagné also wrote about different aspects of Kazak culture with an emphasis on topics in folk religion.

Since the October Revolution in 1917, few European or American scholars have had the possibility to do research on Kazaks in Soviet Central Asia. In 1936, however, the American anthropologist Alfred E. Hudson had the opportunity to do some field research on social organization among Kazaks. His work is still regarded as a minor classic. Later, several American and European scholars, with the help of earlier written sources and modern Soviet scholarly reports, compiled works on Kazak ethnography and social organization. George P. Murdock and C. Daryll Forde have published essays based on several early travelogues and these are still included in anthropological textbooks. Perhaps the most outstanding work in this area is by Lawrence Krader who has written several important


books and articles on the nomads of Central Asia. Elisabeth E. Bacon has contributed some extremely valuable works as well. More recently, Martha Brill Olcott has drawn attention to the Kazaks from the point of view of a political scientist. She has written several essays and a book on the Kazaks in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet literature is, of course, very extensive. Good general surveys of early literature are available in the bibliographies of the above-mentioned works by Krader and Bacon. Another valuable bibliography is given in the ethnographic handbooks on Soviet Central Asia published by the Soviet Academy of Science. Furthermore, there are several bibliographies on Central Asia and Kazakhstan published which could be recommended for further reference and are listed in the bibliography of this book.

While there is a very extensive literature on the Kazaks in Czarist Russia and in today's Soviet Central Asia, information on the Kazaks in China remains scarce. Even for the modern period, only a few descriptive works have so far been published in western languages and many of these offer only brief summaries of very general information. Currently available sources which refer, at least in part, to the Kazaks in China are listed in the Bibliography, along with the scattering of articles on aspects of Kazak life.


12. Many titles are listed in Thomas Hoppe. Xinjiang – Provisional Bibliography 2. Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, China, (Natural Conditions, History, Ethnic Groups, Land Use) With the assistance of Ingvar Svanberg, Mark Oppermann, Peter Turpin and Imke Mees, Wiesbaden 1987 [Also German title].
Given the lack of sources on the Kazaks in China, the following brief summary of Kazak history has been drawn primarily from works on the Kazaks of the USSR. Hopefully, renewed interest in the history of these people in China will ultimately lead to a more detailed record of the Kazak’s role in China and, in particular, in the history of Xinjiang.

**History of the Kazak People**

In the mid-thirteenth century, Batu, a son of Juchi, himself the eldest son of Temüjin (Chinggiz Khan), formed a tribal confederation of mainly Turkic tribes in Central Asia. This confederation was called the White Horde. In 1428, Borak Khan, a candidate for the throne of the White Horde, was assassinated by his rival, Abulkhair Khan. As a result, Borak Khan’s two sons, Janibek and Giray, were forced to flee in the 1450s, with some 200,000 nomad followers. This group fled Abulkhair, who had gained authority over the Central Asian steppes, and sought refuge in Western Mogholistan, between Issyk Köl and Kashgar. Here they settled on lands given them by the Moghol Khan, Esenbuqa, and remained in the area of the River Chu. These nomads were the beginning of the so-called Kazak Khanate. The Kazaks were united during the reign of Kasim Khan (born 1495) who ruled from 1511 until his death in 1523, and who, according to tribal genealogies, was a son to Janibek Khan. From this nomadic confederation the Kazaks were consolidated into a people. In the 1520s and 1530s the ethnonym “Kazak” began to be used among these steppe tribes.

During the 16th century the Kazaks enlarged their territory in the Central Asian steppes. Although they were a united people under Kasim Khan and, for a time, under his successor Tahir Khan, they soon split into smaller nomadic tribal federations. In the beginning of the 17th century the Kazak tribes were divided into three large, territorially based tribal confederations called the Ulu 3üz (‘Greater Horde’), Orta 3üz (‘Middle Horde’) and Kişi 3üz (‘Little Horde’), respectively. This division survives today.

As a result of the expansion of the Oyrat Mongol Empire in Central Asia in the 18th century, Kazak tribes began seeking protection under the Russians. The first to do so was khan of the Kişi 3üz in 1731, followed by the khan of Orta 3üz in 1740 and part of the Ulu 3üz in 1742. When the Oyrat Mongols were finally crushed and dispersed by the Qing army in 1756, the most potent enemy of the Kazaks was destroyed. Many Kazaks of the Orta and Ulu 3üz then started to move into areas left by the Oyrats. Kazaks of
the Ulu ʒüz began to send tribute to the Qing Emperor, as did successive tribal leaders of the Orta ʒüz.

Nominal Russian sovereignty continued without any real Russian interference on the steppe. Kazak nomads constituted a buffer between China and Czarist Russia. The khans continued to have control over the plain. At the turn of the century the Kiši ʒüz split due to the emigration under the leadership of Bukey Khan of 5,000 households to the Astrakhan area. This splinter group formed the Bukey Horde.

Under Czar Aleksander I, a new policy toward the Kazak nomads was introduced. The Orta ʒüz was ruled by two khans, Bukey and the elderly Vali. After the death of Bukey in 1815 and Vali in 1819, the power of the khans was abolished by the Czarist authorities, and in 1822 a new system of administration was introduced in the Orta ʒüz. Its territory was divided into Russian administrative units and Russian military jurisdiction was introduced for criminal offences. The Kazaks were no longer allowed to acquire serfs. In 1824 the power of khans was also abolished in the Kiši ʒüz and Russian initiated reforms were introduced.

These changes in the Czarist policy led to several revolts among the Kazaks. The Russians, however, continued their colonial policy toward the nomads. New taxation methods were introduced and from the 1830s onwards Kazaks were no longer allowed to cultivate land. In 1847 the Ulu ʒüz finally lost their independence when they were forced to pledge their allegiance to the Czarist government.¹³

Pressed by the expanding Czarist empire, Kazaks began gradually to move into Manchu-ruled China, establishing themselves in the mountainous northern part of what was to become Xinjiang. By 1864, when the border between Russia and China was fixed by the terms of the Tarbagatai Protocol, many Kazaks found themselves new subjects of the Qing government.¹⁴

The Contemporary Distribution of the Kazaks

Today the Kazaks are distributed over the Soviet Union, the People’s Re-

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¹⁴. See chapter 2 for further details on the Kazak emigration to Xinjiang.
public of China, and the Mongolian People’s Republic. The total Kazak population is estimated at approximately eight million.

The majority of the Kazaks are living in the Soviet Union. In the census of 1926 they numbered 3,968,289; in 1959 to 3,621,610; in 1970 to 5,298,818 and in 1979 to 6,556,442. The fall in the number of Kazaks between 1926 and 1959 was due to great losses through starvation, but also to emigration to Afghanistan and China in connection with forced collectivization in the 1920s. The main part of the Kazaks in the Soviet Union are living in the Kazakh SSR, i.e. Kazakhstan. In 1979 they totalled 5,289,349. The whole population of Kazakhstan in 1979 was 14,684,283, with Kazaks constituting 36% of the total population of the Republic. Other ethnic groups of Kazakhstan are Russians (40%), Germans (6%) and Ukrainians (6%) with small numbers of Tatars, Uighurs, Özbeks and Koreans. The Kazaks are also to be found in Uzbek SSR where they numbered 620,136 in 1979; in Turkmen SSR there are 79,539 Kazaks and in Russian Federal SR there are 518,060. Many Kazaks are also living scattered in other republics, including the Kirghiz SSR and the Tadzhik SSR.15

There is little information about the Kazaks living in the Mongolian People’s Republic, and even the figures on the numbers of Kazaks in the country vary widely. According to Soviet sources, there were approximately 43,000 in 1963.16 According to the 1976 Kazak encyclopaedia there were about 70,000 Kazaks in the region,17 while an American handbook on Muslim peoples gives the estimate of 71,000 in 1978.18 The number of Kazaks in Mongolia in the mid-1980s was probably around 100,000−150,000, but the exact number remains uncertain.

Most of Mongolia’s Kazaks live in the area called Bayan Ölgii Aymag.19 Smaller groups also live in Kobdo Aymag, and, according to Kazak infor-

19. Historical information on the Kazaks in Mongolia can be find in A. Minis & Askarbay Saray, *Mongol Xalq Respublikasi Bay-ölgiy aymayinin qazaq xalqi tariixin* [A History of the Kazak People in Bayan-ölgiy Province, the Mongolian People’s Republic]. Ölgii 1960; the history of the Kerey Kazaks in Mongolia are dealt with in Qabışuli Islam, *Kereyler kerweni (Tariixiy monografiyaliq qisqaşa şoliw)* [The Caravan of the Kereys (A Brief Historical Monograph)]. Ölgii 1978.
mants from Mongolia interviewed in 1980, there were about one hundred Kazaks families living in the capital, Ulan Batur. Aside from the urban Kazaks, most make their living by stockbreeding.

As a result of the collectivization of Soviet Central Asia in the 1920s, thousands of Kazaks fled into northern Afghanistan, where they settled in towns, living within the poorest stratum of society. Today, most Kazaks are living in the Khanabad region, but some are found in Andkhui. According to one source, Kazaks are also living around Herat and in other parts of northwestern Afghanistan. They subsist mainly on small-scale handicraft, wool trade, smuggling and begging.

Information about their numbers varies slightly. According to a Soviet estimate of 1962, they numbered only 3,000 while an American estimate of 1978 gave their population as around 20,000. Since the beginning of the 1970s there has been a continuing emigration of Afghani Kazaks to Turkey as well as to other places. As this migration accelerated after Soviet troops entered the country in 1978, it is probable that the number of Kazaks has decreased considerably.

Since the beginning of the 1950s some thousands of Kazaks have been living in Turkey. They came as refugees from Xinjiang to Pakistan and Kashmir in the 1940s and in the beginning of the 1950s. In 1952 they were invited to immigrate to Turkey where they settled in Anatolian refugee settlements. Due to contemporary economic and social changes in Turkey most of the Kazaks moved to main urban centers in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, they are to be found in segregated settlements in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana. But there are still Kazaks living in the original settlements in Salihli, İsmil köy (Konya), Altay köy (Niğde) and Sultanhami in Anatolia. The Kazaks of Turkey are employed in the manufacturing of


22. This twenty year old estimate from Bol’shaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija is repeated by Shirin Akiner, op.cit., p. 302.


leather goods, but they also run plastics factories. A few families still practice agriculture.  

Beginning in the 1960s, some Kazaks in Turkey have migrated on to industrialized countries in the west. They have moved to work as labourers and today they constitute small communities within many European cities. The largest groups are to be found in West Germany, France and Sweden, but there are also Kazak immigrants in Austria, Netherlands, Belgium and Norway. In the middle of the 1970s some Kazaks from Turkey emigrated to countries in the Arabian peninsula. 

In 1963 some 60 Kazak households in Turkey applied to emigrate to the USA, but their plans were never realised. Only a few individuals went to the USA, where they are living in the New York suburb of Brooklyn. Recently a new immigration wave of Kazaks from Turkey to the USA has reportedly begun. 

There are also small numbers of Kazaks living in Iran, Pakistan, and Taiwan.

The Kazaks in China

Virtually all of China’s Kazaks live in northwestern China, in Gansu and Qinghai provinces and in the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. In keeping with the national minority policy of the People’s Republic of China areas inhabited by national minority groups like the Kazaks have been organized into autonomous units of government, ranging from the county up to the regional level. In Gansu, the relatively small number of Kazaks are concentrated in the Aksay Kazak Autonomous County, established in 1954. In 1972 their number was estimated at 1,600 and in the 1982 census


Table 1. The distribution of the Kazaks in China according to the census of 1982.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centrally Governed Municipalities:</th>
<th></th>
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<td>Beijing</td>
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<th>Provinces:</th>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>26</td>
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<th>Autonomous Regions:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ningxia Hui</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xinjiang Uighur</td>
<td>903, 370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xizang (Tibet)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 907,582


the figure was given as 2,367.29 In Qinghai, another small group of Kazaks (1,497 in 1982) is centered on the Gas Lake, a part of the Haixi Mongol,

Tibetan and Kazak Autonomous Prefecture (*zhou*). The Kazaks in Gansu and Qinghai are mainly descended from dislocated immigrant groups originating from Xinjiang in the 1930s and 1940s. According to information obtained in Urumchi in 1986 the authorities are encouraging Kazaks in Qinghai and Gansu to move back to Xinjiang.

By far the largest number of Kazaks in China live in the northern part of the Xinjiang region which is home to nearly one million Kazaks. Three autonomous Kazak areas have been created in the region and they contain the majority of the region’s Kazak population. They are the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture, and the Barköl-(Balikun-)-Kazak and the Mori-(Mulei-)Kazak Autonomous Counties. Kazaks have also lived in the region’s capital, Urumchi, for decades.

Besides the Muslim Kazaks, there is also a small group of Kazak-speaking Lama-Buddists at Emil Köl in DORBILYIN, especially in the village Da-lin-turgun. They are called Kalmyk-Kirghiz (*Qalmaq Qiryîz*) and numbered about 1,000 individuals in the beginning of the 1960s. They have never been studied at all by scholars. 

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**Xinjiang – The Physical Setting**

Because the vast majority of China’s Kazaks live in Xinjiang, an understanding of this vast arid tract and its tumultuous history is vital to an understanding of the present situation of today’s Kazaks in China. This survey of Xinjiang begins with a brief description of the region’s extremely varied topography.

Xinjiang has the distinction of being China’s largest administrative region, covering approximately 1/6\(^{th}\) of China’s total territory or 1,646,800 km\(^2\). It is also one of the most isolated provinces; between the capital of Urumchi and the capital of the nearest province, Qinghai, are 1,590 km, much of it dry desert which has proved an effective barrier in halting the advance of the agricultural Chinese into Xinjiang. Other natural barriers have proved even more formidable. In the south and southeast are massive mountain ranges, boasting some of the world’s highest mountain peaks. The Altun Shan mountains block off neighbouring Qinghai to the southwest, while the towering Kunlun Mountains of the south effectively barricade Tibet. In the far southwest, three important mountain ranges meet: the Karakoram, the Hindu Kush and the Pamirs, all of which have kept

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Map 1. The Provinces and Autonomous Regions of China.
travel to neighbouring India, Pakistan and Afghanistan severely although not completely limited. In the west, in the Soviet Union, the Tian Shan Mountains rise and enter Xinjiang northwest of Kashgar. The mountains run through the central part of the region dividing it into unequal parts, the north which includes the Dzungarian Basin and the much larger southern part which covers about half of the total region.

Along Xinjiang's northwestern border are the Tarbagatai Mountains which form a barrier between the USSR and Xinjiang. Several passes through these mountains have been used for centuries, providing access to the Russian Steppe. Particularly important are the Dzungarian Gate, north of the Ili River valley, which also offers access to the Soviet Union, an important geographic fact which has influenced the political history of the Ili region on numerous occasions in recent history.

Geographically the region can be divided into three distinct areas: the north, which covers about one quarter of the region and has sufficient rain to allow the growth of forests and abundant pastures; the Tian Shan region, which is the major pastoral area; and the south, which contains the Tarim Basin, the center of which is the Taklimakan desert. The Tarim Basin and its desert again bring Xinjiang distinction as this is the largest such basin in the world, covering approximately 45% of Xinjiang. The Taklimakan itself covers some 370,000 km². Around this basin and its forbidding desert are the numerous oasis cities, spread in a horseshoe from Korla on the northern tip around to Kashgar and Yarkand in the far west, continuing around to Khotan and Keriya in the south; the open end of the horseshoe is the site of Lop Nor, a great salt lake surrounded by marsh and reeds. The lake is fed by the Tarim River, which makes Xinjiang geographically distinctive yet again as it is the longest inland river in China. Over 1,000 kilometres in length, it flows along the northern rim of the Tarim Basin from Aksu to Lop Nor, fed by numerous streams which flow down from the Tian Shan.

In the north is the smaller Dzungarian Basin with another desert, the Gurbantüngüt, at its center. Other small basins also dot the region but none are as large as these two.

In addition to its rather dramatic topography, a further barrier to Chi-

31. A Chinese publication states that the translation for the Uighur name "Taklimakan" is "go in and you won't come out." see China: A Geographical Sketch. Peking 1974. p. 44. However, a Russian geographer insists that this is incorrect and that "abandoned or forsaken place" is more accurate translation of the meaning. see E.M. Murzabaev. Priroda Sin'czjana i formirovание pustyn' Central'noj Azii. Moskva 1966. pp. 350–351. Nonetheless, the Chinese translation appears to be an appropriate enough description.
Map 2. The Administrative Divisions of Xinjiang.

The Chinese development of the area has been its climate. While Xinjiang is located in temperate latitudes, equivalent to southern Europe, the presence of encircling mountains and deserts, plus its isolation from any large body of water, has resulted in a wide range of temperatures and in a marked degree of aridity. Turpan Basin has recorded temperatures of +47.8°C, while Köktogay (Fuyun) in the Altai Mountains has had −50.8°C.

These, of course, are the extremes, but even average winter temperatures in northern Xinjiang are cold: in January they range from −13° to −30° while in July temperatures are a pleasant +18° to +27°C. The southern oasis cities enjoy milder winters and the mean annual temperature is 10° to 12°C.

Precipitation varies in the extreme across the region. While up to 750 mm. fall annually on the northern slopes of the Tian Shan, according to a Russian geographer, the Tarim River receives less than 100 to 200 milli-
metres of rain a year on the edge of the basin and less than 10 millimetres a year in the center. 32

Despite this aridity, the area has been able to grow an abundance of food through extensive irrigation. Local farmers have relied on melting snow in spring to swell streams coming down from the mountains, thus providing adequate supplies of water to feed their irrigation channels. In areas of extreme heat, where rivers run underground, the local farmers have used the kāriz or underground well, to tap this water supply. As a result they have been able to grow crops in some of the hottest areas of Xinjiang such as Turpan and Hami.

Crops planted vary from north to south in accordance with climate and available water. In Yarkand, for instance, the main crop in 1958 was corn, planted on about 40% of the land. Wheat and cotton were next in importance followed by flax and, last, rice. In the Altai area, most of the available land is planted in springwheat (60% in 1958) and less than 10% each in oats, barley, flax, and corn. Legumes and industrial crops have gained in importance more recently, as has the planting of sorghum and sugar beets.33

Some of the best soil in Xinjiang is located in the northern part of the region, especially around the Manas River, in the Aksu valley and on the Ulungur River plain in northern Xinjiang.34 All of these areas, formerly pasture land for nomadic peoples like the Kazaks, are the sites of State Farms established before and during the Cultural Revolution period in Xinjiang, 1966–1976.

The Nationalities of Xinjiang

The Kazaks are only one of the many officially recognized nationalities in Xinjiang today, and their social and political development has been marked by the multiethnic character of the local population. The following is a brief introduction to the other peoples of Xinjiang who share the region’s turbulent history and who have influenced Kazak culture and lifestyle.35

34. A map over soil regions is to be found in Atlas of the Republic of China, Vol. II. Hsitsang (Tibet), Sinkiang and Mongolia, Ed., Chang Chiyun. Taipei 1960, map A 16.
35. There are several general works available dealing with Xinjiang’s nationalities, all of which have been consulted for this chapter. For information on Xinjiang’s nationalities during the Republican era, see Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia. Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia. Boston 1950, pp. 103–151. For the early People’s Republic of China period see S.I. Bruk, “Étničeskij sostav i razmeščenie naselenija v Sin’czjanskom Ujgurskom Avtonomnom Rajone Kitajskoj Narodnoj Respubliki.” Sovetskaja etnografija 1956:2, pp 89–94. For a general survey of China’s northern minorities see Henry G. Schwarz, The Minorities of Northern China. A Survey (Studies on East Asia, 17), Bellingham, WA 1984. Although this work is uncritical and attempts no analysis it includes much basic information and a valuable bibliography. The census-figures from 1982 given throughout this chapter are from Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhiqiu Gaikuang. [A Survey of the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region] Ürümqi 1985, p. 317. The estimates from 1949 and 1984 are from Wang Xianghong, “Xinjiang Xiaoshu Minzu Renkou Fazhan Wenti de Tantao.” [“A Discussion of the Problem of Xinjiang’s National Minority Population Expansion”] Xinjiang Shehui Kexue Yanjiu Dongtai No. 30 (1986), pp. 1–5.
The Uighurs

At over 6 million people, the Uighurs constitute the largest national minority group within Xinjiang. The name "Uighur" derives from an ancient Turkic state, a brief account of which is given below. Modern Chinese historiography tends to portray the modern Uighur people as direct descendants of the ancient Uighur Kingdom but this line of descent remains to be clearly established. Nonetheless, with the growth of a national consciousness among these Turkic people during this century, the name Uighur today describes a coherent ethnic group with a clear sense of its own national identity.

The first Uighur empire was founded in 744 under Kuli Peylo, and had its base in present day western Mongolia, at Karakorum. At the time of the establishment of the Uighur Empire, the Tang Dynasty in China was undergoing a decline which finally culminated in the rebellion of An Lu Shan in 755. The Uighurs were invited by the Tang Emperor to come to the aid of the threatened Chinese state, which they did successfully. For their part in crushing this rebellion the Uighur ruler was given a Chinese princess for his wife, the first of three given to members of the Uighur nobility between 762 and 840. This debt to Uighur military strength resulted in a constant trade of Uighur horses for Chinese silk and was sometimes to the great disadvantage of the Chinese, who often had but little choice in continuing the relationship.

After the defeat of the Tang rebels, the Uighurs were introduced to the Manichaean religion around 762. Their ruler was the first convert to the new religion and later he imposed it upon his people as the state religion. In 768 a Manichaean temple was erected on the banks of the Orkhon river. By the 9th century, the religion was well entrenched.

Uighur power began to decline in the mid-9th century as a result of court intrigues on the part of various tribes of this Turkic confederation, and natural calamities occurring in 839 further weakened the Uighur power. In


the next year, the Uighurs were attacked and defeated by a Kirghiz chief-
tain, Chu Lu Moho, who, with 100,000 troops, reportedly stormed the cap-
ital and beheaded the Uighur ruler. Consequently — as a Chinese author 
 wrote in 1085 — “the Uighurs scattered and fled all over the barbarian 
territory.”

While some remnants of the Uighurs joined other Turkic groups, the 
largest group fled into present day Xinjiang, centering first at Qocho and 
later at Beshbalik and Kucha. Here they had to modify their former no-
madic lifestyle and began to assume some of the characteristics of a seden-
tary oasis population. The year 840 marks the entrance of the Uighurs into 
Xinjiang but the area had already been populated before that time by 
Indo-European people who had built numerous small towns on the banks 
of the Tarim River hundreds of years before the Uighur defeat. Some of 
these early settlements were to serve travellers on the great Silk Route, 
one branch of which followed the Tarim River. The towns and the oasis 
cities further west had been ruled by independent kings until, in 630–635, 
they were forced to submit to Chinese suzerainty. By the time of the Ui-
ghurs entrance into the area, the various kingdoms had been re-established 
although they remained nominally under Chinese rule.

As the Uighurs grew in influence, their domination of the region spread 
through various oasis settlements, stretching from Turpan to Kucha by 
1017.

During the period between the 11th and 13th centuries, Uighur society 
showed a remarkable religious tolerance, allowing Nestorian Christianity 
to flourish along side Zoroastrianism and Buddhism. Bartold comments 
that they appear to have had representatives of all major religious faiths 
among them, except Judaism. By this time, however, the original Mani-
chaean influence had evidently waned to the point of extinction.

The Uighurs were able to extend their influence over their oasis states to 
such an extent that their language was adopted by all their subject peoples. 
Uighur culture was particularly appreciated by Chinggiz Khan whose 
troops entered the area in the early 13th century. The Uighur ruler at that 
time was Barchuq, whose capital was at Beshbalik (east of present day 
Urumchi). He himself went to the Khan in 1211 to offer himself as the 
Khan’s vassal and Chinggiz Khan gave his daughter Al-Altun to Barchuq 
in marriage. Chinggiz Khan then decided that his nobles would be educat-
ed in the Uighur language and his own two sons were given Uighur tutors. 
The Uighur script is still in use among the Mongols in Inner Mongolia and

Xinjiang, but was replaced in 1941 by a script based on the Cyrillic alphabet in the Mongolian People’s Republic.

After the death of Chinggiz Khan, the power of the Mongol state was much decentralized and the oases again fell under Uighur rule. During the 11th century, Islam had extended its influence into the Kashgar area. This new religion gradually spread among the Uighurs, all of whom were converted by the 16th century. The Uighur state was gradually broken up and individual oasis city-states were created in southern Xinjiang. By the early 18th century, there were seven principalities: Khotan, Yarkand, Kashgar, Aksu, Kucha, Turpan, and Komul (Hami).

With the Qing recovery of Central Asia in 1759, the region once again came under direct Chinese influence. As part of the Manchu resettlement policy about 10,000 Uighur families from the Tarim Basin were moved to the Ili area. These Turkic settlers were later called Taranchi (lit. “Tillers of the soil”).

By the time of the Qing Dynasty, the Turkic population of Xinjiang was the result of centuries of intermingling of the many peoples who had inhabited or who had conquered and dominated the region. The original Iranian-speaking peoples of the south, the Mongol invaders from the east and the representatives of the powerful Chinese empire all left their mark, culturally and physically, upon the local population.

By the 19th century, the name “Uighur” had virtually disappeared. The local population was referred to as the “Eastern Turki” or simply “Turki” – which was the name still commonly used by travellers to the region as late as the 1940s. Locally, people often identified themselves by referring to their religion – “Muslim” – or to their native town: a man from Kashgar would identify himself as a Qaşqarlıq, a man from Khotan as a Xotanlıq, and so on. Nonetheless, the sedentary oasis population of the region remained bound by the ties of Islam which served to unite them in the face of threat from the “infidel” Han Chinese.

When the rule of the Qing Dynasty grew oppressive in the 19th century, the flag of rebellion was raised among Xinjiang’s Turkic-speaking Muslims who were joined by the Hui (Chinese Muslims) in opposing the Qing rulers. Uprisings in 1815, 1820, 1825–1826, 1830, 1847 and 1857 finally culminated in a major rebellion which inflamed all of northwestern China. The Great Muslim Rebellion actually began among the Hui of Gansu province but it quickly spread to Xinjiang. By 1864 much of the region was up in arms against the Qing government. The ensuing chaos – and the inability of the Qing to take immediate action against the rebels – led to the rise of Yakub Beg.
From his position as a governor under the Khan of Khokand, Yakub Beg had risen to become military leader of forces in Kashgar, whence the Khan had sent him in 1865. By 1870, Yakub Beg controlled all of southern Xinjiang and part of the north. Although the new ruler was a native of Central Asia, he was not Uighur and his rule was highly unpopular. According to a Russian observer, most peasants were able to keep only 1/4 to 1/2 of their produce, the rest being lost in taxes collected by Yakub Beg. This system of taxation was no doubt one reason why the people of Xinjiang reportedly rejoiced at their liberation by the Qing armies which entered the area to put down the rebellion and end Yakub Beg’s rule in 1877. The region once again came under the influence of the Chinese, represented by General Zuo Zongtang who restored order and firmly re-established Chinese control in Xinjiang.39

Rebellion next occurred under the Nationalist Chinese government. In 1931 a rebellion began in the oasis town of Hami and spread over the province. In 1933 an East Turkestan Republic was established among the Uighurs in Kashgar. One of the leaders of this movement was Khodja Niyaz, grandson of the former Khan of Hami. This republic was shortlived and the situation in the south was soon settled by Xinjiang’s newest military leader, Sheng Shicai, who, with Soviet assistance, defeated all Muslim rebels and established himself as the highest authority in Xinjiang, only nominally under the Chinese Central Government.40

It was under Sheng that the use of the ancient name of Uighur for the sedentary oasis population of the region gained popularity. Sheng’s adoption of this name was clearly in deference to his political mentors, the Soviets, who had revived the name at the request of Uighur emigres living in the USSR. At a meeting in Tashkent in 1921, this group had formally requested that the name Uighur be used as their proper national identification. The Soviet government accepted this and in the Soviet Census of 1926 the name Uighur appears along with those of other Central Asian peoples.

During the 1930s and the 1940s a new sense of Uighur identity was fos-


tered in Xinjiang, in part through the policies of Sheng Shicai who, initially at least, encouraged cultural activities among the various ethnic groups living in the region. Toward the end of Sheng's ascendency in Xinjiang and in the period of Nationalist control in Xinjiang which followed until 1949, the Uighurs as a people developed a national consciousness that was to manifest itself politically in the founding of a second East Turkistan Republic in 1944 — and in an outpouring of nationalistic writings, much of it decrying Chinese oppression of the region's Turkic peoples. After 1949, Uighur national identity was once again boosted by the PRC's recognition of the Uighurs as a national minority and although policy since 1949 has been uneven at best, the Uighurs of today appear firmly established as a nation.

Today, the Uighurs are distributed throughout Xinjiang. In 1982 they numbered 5,949,661. While in 1949 they constituted nearly 75% of the total population, today they retain only a slight majority of 51% of the population — a result of massive Han Chinese migration into the region since the early 1950s.

As in the past, Uighurs today are Sunni Muslims, of the Hanafi school. Traditionally oasis peasants, merchants and traders, they are now also employed as workers in new government enterprises as well as in traditional handicraft industries such as carpet making, leather work, and so on.

Uighur is a Turkic language most closely related to Özbek. Traditionally, the written form has used the Arabic script which was adopted along with the Islamic religion. Printed books were few before 1949, although in Kashgar some Swedish missionaries printed books in Uighur, including texts used in the missionary school. When modern Uighur literature and newspapers began to develop in the 1930s and 1940s, the Taranchi dialect was adopted as the written form of the language, the same as used among


the Uighurs in the Soviet Union. Taranchi dialect remains the standard written form in Xinjiang today. However, in southern Xinjiang where the majority of the Uighurs live, many local dialects continue to be spoken.  

There are several small groups which, although ethnographically distinct from the Uighurs, are today included within the Uighur nationality. These small groups speak separate dialects and their cultures are different from the Uighur oasis-farmers. In the Maralbashi and in the Merkit areas live the Dolans, who were traditionally nomadic cattle breeders and peddlers. Another distinct group is the Lop people or Lopliks, who once lived around Lop Nor and the Konqe River. They were mainly fishermen, hunters and gatherers, but as a result of this area’s current use as a testing ground for nuclear weapons, the fate of the Lopliks is unknown. None of these groups appear to have been studied in any detail. Finally, another small group of interest are the so-called Abdal, a peripatetic group living in southern Xinjiang. They are, in contrast to the other Turkic peoples of the region, Alevi- or Sh’ia-influenced heterodox Muslims. All of the small groups mentioned above are today included among the Uighur for census purposes.


The Smaller Nationalities of Xinjiang

Other ethnic minorities living in Xinjiang today are relatively small in number. One of the largest is the Kirghiz, who numbered 112,979 in 1982. Xinjiang’s Kirghiz have traditionally been pastoral nomads and have lived for many years along the Soviet border in southern Xinjiang, in the Kizilsu Autonomous Prefecture and in the Ili River valley. Like the Kazaks and the Uighurs, they are also Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school.47

A relatively small number of Özbek also live in Xinjiang. They numbered 12,433 in the census of 1982. In 1984 they were said to number not more than 8,800. Most of them live in Yining but there are also Özbek in Urumchi, Tacheng, Kashgar, Yarkand and Kargilik. There were Özbek schools in Xinjiang until the beginning of the 1960s but in 1962 many Özbek evidently chose to leave Xinjiang for the USSR and these schools were closed. According to information from an Özbek scholar in Urumchi, the authorities were considering re-opening Özbek schools in 1986. Today, a few books printed in the Uzbek SSR can still be purchased in Urumchi.

The Tatars are another national minority living in Xinjiang which originally emigrated from Russia at the end of the last century. Sunni Muslims, they are mostly of Kazan Tatar origin. In the census of 1982 they numbered 4,106, living mostly in cities like Urumchi, Yining and Tacheng. Like the Özbek, they decreased in number in the 1960s, mainly thanks to emigration to the Soviet Union. Today there are no Tatar schools, and no Tatar literature is published in Xinjiang. However, as a reminder of their contribution to the region’s history, a mosque known as the “Tatar Mosque” still stands in Urumchi, not far from the University of Xinjiang.

The Salars are a small Sunni Muslim Turkic people, most of whom live in Qinghai province, but a small number also live in Xinjiang. Their language is related to Uighur and they apparently use Uighur textbooks in school. The Xinjiang Salars are rather recent immigrants from Qinghai. According to the census of 1982, there were 2,945 in Xinjiang. Almost no information is available on the contemporary situation of these people, but visitors to Urumchi can see a Salar Mosque not far from the Erdao Qiao bazaar.

Xinjiang is also the home of several Mongolian-speaking peoples, most of whom live in northern and western Xinjiang. Of the 117,416 Mongols listed in the 1982 census, most speak Western Mongolian. They are concentrated in several autonomous areas – the Borotala Mongol Autono-

mous Prefecture, Bayangol Autonomous Prefecture and in the Koluk Saur Mongol Autonomous County. Despite emigration and re-immigration into neighbouring states, the Western Mongols are autochthonous to Xinjiang and most are descendants of the Oyrat Mongols. The small number of Chakhar and Uriangkhai Mongols, on the other hand, are immigrants dating from the Qing Dynasty. The Chakhars speak a Southern Mongolian language and are originally from Inner Mongolia. The Uriangkhais are from the Tannu-Tuva area. They are regarded as a Turkic-speaking people by scholars, despite the fact that their vocabulary is dominated by Mongolian borrowings. Almost nothing is known about the Uriangkhais in contemporary Xinjiang but they are certainly still identified as Mongols rather than as a Turkic people.

Another small Mongolian-speaking group are the so-called Daur, most of whom live near the town of Tacheng. Until the early 1950s they were called Solon in official records. This name dates from the Qing Dynasty when the Manchu government sent people from Manchuria to Xinjiang as military settlers. It is said that they themselves requested that they be renamed Daurs in 1954. According to the census of 1982, there are 4,369 Daurs in the region. In 1949, they numbered only some 1,800. The majority now live in the Gurbansher-Daur Commune near Tacheng. They continue to speak their Mongolian dialect and recently a Daur-Kazak-Han Chinese Dictionary has been published in Xinjiang.

The Dongxiang are recent immigrants from Gansu province and are another Mongolian-speaking people. In the 1950s there were only a few Dongxiang families living in Xinjiang, but according to the 1982 census, they numbered 40,319. The total number of Dongxiang in China in 1982

49. Information on the Mongol banners in Xinjiang is given in Owen Lattimore, op.cit., p. 134.
52. In a recent survey on Mongolian languages two French scholars give the following information about the Dongxiang in Xinjiang:


was given as 279,397. In contrast to other Mongolian-speaking groups in Xinjiang who are Lama Buddhists by tradition, the Dongxiang are Sunni Muslims.

All of the ethnic groups mentioned thus far speak Turkic and Mongolian languages that belong to the Altaic phylum of languages. A third branch of Altaic languages is the Manchu-Tungus group and Xinjiang is also the home of some small Manchu-speaking peoples. The largest of these is the Xibo, who traditionally have lived along the Ili River, west of Yining. They settled there as part of the Manchu colonization of the border area. Around the turn of the century they numbered about 25,000 and lived in seven villages. They were organized in the Manchu banner-system of the Qing government.53

The number of Xibo in Xinjiang was 27,364, according to the census of 1982. About half of them live in the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture, while the other half is living in Qapqal Autonomous County. Since the beginning of the 1980s there has been an interesting literary revival among the Xibo and many books are now published in the traditional Manchu script.54

In 1953 the Chinese census listed another Manchu group as the Solons, a name which disappeared after 1954, as mentioned above. This group included the people now termed Daur but also included a group which referred to themselves as Evenki. According to turn of the century sources, there was a group of people identifying themselves at that time as Evenki but they were commonly referred to by the Manchau banner name “Solon.” Still in 1962 about 20 Evenki were reported living in Xinjiang.55 Both the names, Solons and Evenki, have disappeared from official records of minorities in Xinjiang and it is not known whether any Evenki remain in the region. As this was originally a very small ethnic group, it seems probable that they have been assimilated among the Daur. In the Altai area there is another small ethnic group, the so-called Kökmonchaq, that is said to speak a mixed Kazak-Mongol-Solon (sic) vernacular. In the mid-1950s they numbered only 200.56

The number of **Manchu** in Xinjiang was reported to be 9,137 in 1982. There is little information available on how the Manchu group is defined, or about the status of their language today. According to some scholars, however, the Manchus in Xinjiang have preserved some distinct cultural patterns as well as their language, but no detailed studies are available. The total number of Manchus in China was 4,299,159, according to the census of 1982.

**Tajik** is the contemporary terms used for Iranian-speaking groups living in the Pamirs, especially in the Tashkurgan Tajik Autonomous County. Small groups of Tajiks also live around Guma, Yarkand, Poskan and other places in southwestern Xinjiang. Earlier names for Xinjiang’s Tajiks were Sarkoli, Mountain Tajiks, Wakhani and Kanyuti. The term Tajik in China seems to include several related groups who speak similar dialects who are Ismailites by religion, and who are mostly herdsmen and peasants. They numbered 26,484 according to the 1982 census.

For the past 100 years or so, **Russians** have also constituted a minority on Xinjiang’s complex ethnographic map. After the Bolshevik Revolution, the number of Russians — termed “White” Russians because of their opposition to the “Reds” — living in Xinjiang increased dramatically, but many of these political refugees soon moved on to Chinese coastal cities. A small number remained in the northwest of China for some years but by 1947 the majority had chosen to move on. By 1949, Xinjiang had 19,500 ethnic Russians but the number steadily decreased so that by the time of the 1982 census only 2,662 were listed. In 1984 the Russians were said to number 4,400, but in 1986 authorities in Xinjiang said there were less than a 1,000 remaining in the region. Despite this decline, Russian athletes were featured in the Third National Minority Games held in Urumchi in 1986 and are still considered a part of the region’s ethnic mix.

Even more recent immigrants to Xinjiang than the Russians are a small number of the **Zhuang** nationality, the largest minority in China, with a population of more than 14 million in the southwest of the country. The Zhuang are strongly Sinicized and many are both culturally and linguistically assimilated among the Han Chinese. Interestingly, some Zhuang

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58. On their history see *Tajikezu Jianshi* [A Brief History of the Tajik Nationality]. Urumqi 1983.

59. The history of the Russians in Xinjiang is described more comprehensive in Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg. “The Russians in Xinjiang,” *Central Asian Survey* [forthcoming].
were evidently sent to Xinjiang as part of the “down to the countryside” movement and according to the 1982 census there were 4,495 Zhuang living in Xinjiang. They very probably live alongside the Han Chinese throughout the region.

Another interesting addition to Xinjiang’s multiethnic population are the Tibetans. A few Tibetan pilgrims and traders have certainly always passed through Xinjiang and some no doubt settled in the region prior to 1949. Tibetans were officially listed as a separate nationality in Xinjiang for the first time in 1982 when their population was given as 1,990. Today, Tibetan peddlars can be seen in Urumchi city markets, but whether such people are itinerant or resident in the city is not known. A small number are living in Mori-Kazak Autonomous County but more information on the location of other Tibetans living in Xinjiang is not currently available.

The Hui
The Hui are Chinese-speaking Muslims living in towns scattered throughout Xinjiang. In earlier literature the Hui of Xinjiang were commonly called Dungans. The Kazaks still call them Düngan. In China today there are over 7 million Hui, and of these 570,788 were living in Xinjiang at the time of the 1982 census. Hui belong to those groups that have moved in or been forced to move into the region since the 19th century until today. In the 1950s, Hui from the Henan province were reported as an important group of Muslim Chinese settlers in the region.

The origins of this group are said to date from the 7th century when Muslim Arabs first began trading with China. By the time of the Yuan Dynasty in the 13th century, Arab traders were being allowed to live in China: records of the period refer to these men and their Chinese families as Hui Hui. Many of the descendants of these mixed marriages became soldiers in the service of the Chinese, beginning a military tradition among the Hui that has lasted down through the centuries. Others became peasants or artisans, while small numbers became government officials, traders as well as religious leaders and scholars.

Over the centuries, the “Hui Hui” became totally assimilated so that by the time of the last Chinese dynasty they spoke and wrote Chinese and followed Chinese traditional customs except where these conflicted with

60. This migration is discussed in June Teufel Dreyer. “Go West Young Han: The Hsia Fang Movement of China’s Minority Areas.” Pacific Affairs, 48:3 (1975). pp. 353–369. See also below.
Islamic practices. For example, the Hui do not eat pork and they continue to observe Friday worship in China’s many Hui mosques.62

Despite their Sinicization, the Hui have nonetheless fought against the Han Chinese, siding with their co-religionists, first against the Qing in the 19th century and later against the Nationalist Chinese during the Republican period. Many of the Hui military leaders gained considerable reputations fighting the Chinese as late as the 1930s. The young Hui General, Ma Zhongying, or “Big Horse” as he was called by the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin, became famous and much feared by Chinese throughout China’s Islamic northwest.63 He figured prominently in the political chaos in Xinjiang and Gansu in the early 1930s, and was considered a threat to the region’s stability by the Chinese who drove him further and further west, until he was finally forced to flee into the USSR in 1934. Possibly this warlike tradition is one reason why the Chinese today recognize this group as a separate national minority. Certainly it is the only one so classified on the basis of religion alone.

The Xinjiang Hui are Sunni Muslims, as are the Turkic-speaking Muslim majority of the region. But unlike them, the Hui belong to the Shafi juridical school rather than the Hanafi school. The Hui are also divided into the “Old Believers” and the “New Believers” but there is no information available on which division predominates in Xinjiang. Hui mosques also differ from those of the Turkic peoples in that they are built in the Chinese architectural style. Excellent examples of these traditional Hui mosques can be seen today in Beijing, Xian, and throughout northwestern China.


The Han Chinese in Xinjiang

Until very recently, the Han Chinese have constituted one of the smallest ethnic groups in Xinjiang. During the limited periods in which the Chinese military dominated the northwest, no attempt was made to fully integrate the region into the Chinese cultural sphere and few Chinese willingly emigrated into what was considered a barbaric and uncivilized area, populated by wild, often hostile, tribes. In the 19th and 20th centuries this situation began to change but the number of Han Chinese remained relatively small until the 1950s. Despite their numbers, however, the Chinese in Xinjiang have represented the ruling elite and therefore exercised an influence far out of proportion to their small number.

During the last dynasty (1644–1911) the Qing court encouraged Chinese settlers to emigrate into what is now Xinjiang. In 1776 an edict was issued which allowed for a subsidy to be paid to all Han Chinese who settled in the far northwest. Nonetheless, as the region was climatically and topographically unsuited to traditional Chinese agriculture few took advantage of this offer.

In the 18th century, a few Chinese settled in Dzungaria. They were mainly Chinese exiles and criminals, but some were also traders, soldiers or peasants. Life for Chinese in the northwest in the 18th and 19th centuries was often precarious. During the rising of Yakub Beg in the mid-19th century, some 40,000 Chinese were killed by rebelling Muslim forces. Between 1862 and 1878 the whole of the Chinese northwest was inflamed by rebellion and countless Chinese were among the victims.

The Manchu government sent the Han Chinese General Zuo Zongtang to put down the rebellion and re-establish Qing dominance. Zuo moved into the northwest gradually, using the tuntian system of having the soldiers stop to grow their own food in military established settlements en route. As the army thus slowly moved into the northwest, traders and merchants followed in its wake. Once the rebellion was successfully quelled, some of the traders and merchants as well as soldiers who had been part of the victorious Manchu army chose to remain in the new land, availing themselves of the rich natural resources of this remote region.

Many of the Chinese who remained were from Zuo’s home province of Hunan. Others came from Yunnan, Gansu and Manchuria. Not a few also originated from Tianjin, former residents of which were so numerous in

64. Owen Lattimore, op.cit., p. 50.
### Table 2. The Growth of Han Chinese population in Xinjiang.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>202,000'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>220,401'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>250,000'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,396,000$^6$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,791,000$^6$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,650,000$' $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3,500,000$^4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>4,554,000$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>5,286,533$^{10}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>5,400,000$^{11}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


the Ili area, for instance, that they were said to form virtually a whole community." During the 19th century, Chinese residents in Xinjiang maintained separate areas of their own in cities and oases and this practice of separate sections of towns for the various ethnic groups continued well into the 1950s.

In addition to the military as a source of Han Chinese settlers, another group had traditionally consisted of Chinese officials sent out to work in the northwest. Some of these officials were sent there as a punishment for affronts toward — or crimes against — the Manchu government. Xinjiang was also the destination of many Chinese criminals who were there as pun-

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68. Uighur and Chinese sections of Ürümchi are clearly divided but the situation appears to be changing with the boom in building of high-rise apartments in the provincial capital.
ishment. Due to this practice, Xinjiang was known as a kind of purgatory - a view which was a further deterrent to Han Chinese settlement in the region.

In the 20th century, there were periodic attempts to encourage Chinese to move beyond the "Jade Gate". The Republican government managed to lure small numbers to the region, especially from such famine stricken areas of China as Hunan and Gansu. However, most of these moved no further than the oasis of Hami, well east of the provincial capital of Urumchi.

The Han Chinese continued to be, for the most part, government officials or associated with the military. They thus constituted a colonial occupation force, imposing Chinese rule on the local non-Chinese population. From the time Xinjiang was officially made a province in 1884, Chinese dominance increased, but the numbers of Chinese nonetheless remained less than 5% of the population well into the 20th century.

In the 1940s a major influx of Han Chinese took place, again military in origin. In response to the 1944 Ili Rebellion, the Central Government despatched large numbers of Chinese troops into Xinjiang, their numbers reaching 80 to 90,000 by 1946. Their presence was a considerable economic burden on the local population, adding to existing tensions between Han Chinese and Muslims in particular. When the region was incorporated into the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Nationalist Army which had surrendered en masse remained. They were put under the authority of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) Production and Construction Corps and were dispersed throughout the northern part of the province to establish State Farms. By 1956, the Production and Construction Corps operated 39 out of a total of 44 State Farms in Xinjiang, most of the labour being supplied by the men of the former Nationalist army, virtually all of whom were Han Chinese.

In addition to these men, in 1957–1958 the new Central Government in Beijing sent out 100,000 Han Chinese settlers to the area. This was followed in 1959–1960 by another 100,000, swelling the Chinese population, especially in the northern part of the region.


A majority of these Han were from Shanghai which alone sent nearly 100,000 youngsters to the work in Xinjiang’s Production and Construction Corps. More than half of these later managed to return to Shanghai according to recent reports, but 47,000 of the Shanghai youth remain, now with families.72

The influx of Han Chinese into Xinjiang constitutes one of the most dramatic demographic changes of the century in China. From a number around 200,000 before 1949, they increased to over 2.5 million by 1970 and now number 5,286,532 according to the 1982 Chinese census.

Today’s Han Chinese in Xinjiang are industrial and farm workers as well as technical advisers, teachers, and government employees. In the larger cities they continue to be a people apart, living primarily in Chinese sections of towns. Other new towns of Xinjiang, developed since 1949, are predominantly Chinese. Examples include the new cities of Karamai, with a population of 160,000 in 1985 and the industrial center of Shihezi, with a population of 119,000 in the same year.73

The provincial capital, which has been a Chinese city for most of this century, remains as such despite the decidedly Islamic influence obvious to visitors. The Chinese language is spoken by most educated people and by a majority of Muslims in the capital, although few Chinese seem to speak any of the local Turkic languages at all. Any Turkic Muslim interested in advancing through the government and/or political system must be well aware of the necessity of learning standard Mandarin.

Never before has Chinese influence been so strong in Xinjiang as today and the ramifications of this for the local national minority population have already been of great importance for Xinjiang’s political and cultural development.

Demography

Population figures for China before 1949 were primarily estimates since the long civil war and the Japanese occupation of much of the country made a proper census impossible. Although Xinjiang was not directly caught up in either war, it was the site of several rebellions against the Chinese prior to 1949. Therefore, figures for the region’s population — especially the non-Han Chinese population — were also only estimates.

However, there are some figures for the 1940s. The earliest are from a survey by the provincial police authorities in 1940–1941 which gave a total population of 3,730,000.\textsuperscript{74}

In 1946 the provincial government conducted a more detailed census. Although there was a rebel government holding three of the region’s districts (Ili, Tacheng and Altai) from 1944 onwards, nonetheless the figures from this census are probably the most accurate available for the 1940s.\textsuperscript{75} A total of 4,015,350 inhabitants is given in this census, distributed as follows:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uighur</td>
<td>2,988,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>438,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>69,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongol</td>
<td>59,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>222,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>99,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Özbek</td>
<td>10,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>5,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taranchi</td>
<td>79,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibo</td>
<td>10,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solon</td>
<td>2,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>19,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>8,210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A rather different set of figures comes from a Soviet estimate of 1944. It is cited here primarily because it includes groups not listed in the Chinese census — Indians and “Gypsies,” perhaps neither of whom were regarded as permanent residents by the Chinese.77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uighur</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>320,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongol</td>
<td>63,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>202,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>93,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Özbek</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other groups</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first census by the CCP government was conducted in 1953. This

76. The “Gypsies” may be Abdals who, in Soviet Central Asia, seem to be regarded as Gypsies.

census has been criticized as unreliable since there were evidently wide-
spread irregularities in reports submitted to the government. Nonetheless it was the only set of official figures available for the country until 1982. Both sets are given here as basis for comparison. Interestingly, the 1982 list contains several new national minority groups not mentioned in the first census:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Census 1953</th>
<th>Census 1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uighur</td>
<td>3,640,125</td>
<td>5,949,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>504,500</td>
<td>903,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>112,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongol</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>117,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>570,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>5,286,533</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


79. No authorized census figures for Xinjiang from 1953 seem to have been published. The figures in the table are compiled from information given in S.I. Bruk, “Ethnicheskij sostav i ...”, p. 91, G.P. Serdučenko, “K voprosu o klassifikacii narodov i jasykov Kitaja,” Sovietskoe vostokovedenie, 1957:4, p. 121, and Harold J. Wiens, “Some of China’s Thirty-five Million non-Chinese.” *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 2 (1962), p. 73. There is, however, no congruence in the figures referring to the 1953 census in the various sources. Most sources give the number 3,640,000 for the Uighurs. However, the total 3,559,350 has also been given. The number for the Kazaks varies from 475,000 to 509,000. The first figure is commonly quoted in western sources, while later Soviet and Chinese sources seem to accept the later. The last figure seems to refer to the total Kazak population of China, not only Xinjiang. But the number of Kazaks in Gansu was only 500 and in Qinghai about 4,000 in 1952 according to Chinese estimates given in *Dagung Bao*, Aug. 11, 1952, transl. in *SCMP*, 403, p. 15. Basil Davidson, *Turkestan Alive. New Travels in Chinese Central Asia*, London 1957, p. 248, quotes population figures from Nov. 1, 1954, without giving any source. His figures, however, are very exact, but the total for the Han seems to be too high despite the influx of immigrants. Davidson’s figures are:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uighur</td>
<td>3,737,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>510,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>70,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongol</td>
<td>59,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>144,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>550,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Özbek</td>
<td>12,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>6,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>15,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>1,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibo</td>
<td>13,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daur</td>
<td>2,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>19,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

80. *Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhiqu* ... p. 317.
The following unofficial figures are estimates of the numbers of non-Han nationalities in Xinjiang in 1984:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1984 Estimate</th>
<th>1979 Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uighur</td>
<td>6,170,000</td>
<td>6,170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>964,500</td>
<td>964,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>119,300</td>
<td>119,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongol</td>
<td>121,400</td>
<td>121,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>588,300</td>
<td>588,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibo</td>
<td>28,700</td>
<td>28,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>28,300</td>
<td>28,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td>8,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daur</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>4,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Özbek</td>
<td>8,800</td>
<td>8,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The growth of the four major nationalities can be seen in the diagram (Figure 2). While Uighur, Kazak, Mongol and Kirghiz have almost doubled their population since the end of the 1940s, the Han Chinese and the Hui have increased dramatically, primarily as a result of Han Chinese immigration into the region. The large decrease in the number of Özbeks, Tatars and Russians has already been noted. The Özbeks have decreased by 28 %, the Tatars by 40 % and the Russians by 80 % between 1949 and 1982, according to Chinese figures. The reason for these decreases in pop-

81. Wang Xianghong, *op.cit.*
ulation lie in these peoples’ long-standing connection with the USSR. All three groups originally emigrated from Russia, and, after 1917, the Soviet Union. Some may have still held dual citizenship which was easily acquired by former residents of the USSR and Russia in the 1940s. In the late 1950s, as relations between the USSR and the PRC deteriorated, members of these groups started to move back to the Soviet Union. When conditions in the Ili area further deteriorated after the Great Leap Forward, there was a mass exodus from that area, with nearly 60,000 persons of various nationalities leaving Xinjiang for the Soviet Union in 1962. Since then, there has been a continued loss of population of these nationalities, indicating that the carefully guarded border between Xinjiang and the USSR remains permeable.\textsuperscript{82}

Chinese Policy Toward Ethnic Minorities

Since 1949 major changes have been wrought by the CCP’s policies in Xinjiang, affecting both the Kazak people and the numerous other national minorities which also inhabit the Kazak homelands. The following introduction to Chinese policy toward national minorities begins with an historical account of policy in Xinjiang and then discusses the specific impact of policy on the Kazak people as a whole.

Many contemporary authors concerned with China’s policy toward her ethnic minorities in recent years have emphasized the changes which have occurred in this sensitive policy area, viewing the end of the Imperial Qing dynasty, the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 and the establishment of the revolutionary Chinese Communist government in 1949 as heralding significant changes in official policy and policy implementation in the minority areas of China.83

It must be remembered, however, that persistence of traditional values is a part of all revolutionary societies and the impact of any revolution on long-established social institutions and social values as well as on traditional lifestyles is often a far more gradual process than the term revolution allows.84 Significant and highly visible changes in many of the ethnic minority areas have, indeed, taken place as a result of the establishment of two revolutionary governments in China during this century, but the measurable changes which have occurred can sometimes mask the continued existence of traditional cultural values and practices.

Cultural persistence is admittedly difficult to measure, for gradual social change is far less amenable to quantitative and qualitative analysis. Such measurement has been made more difficult in China because of the problems of limited access to information and limited opportunity for first hand observation in sensitive minority areas. Furthermore, the information on minorities made available to scholars interested in China’s ethnic groups is


often Marxist pedagogy and excludes information which could lead to a greater understanding of the process of change in these areas and of the impact such change is having on traditional societies.

Recently, however, there has been a great deal of change in China's attitude toward scholarship and, also, toward the minority areas. Many of which have been opened up to visitors for the first time since 1949. Books have been published on several of the country's important national minorities, as they are called in China, and policy towards these peoples has also undergone a transformation since 1980. As a result of the greater availability of materials on the minorities and the opportunity to travel into the minority regions of China, it is now possible to offer some tentative comments on the persistence of traditional institutions and values among the minorities of China, the world's most populous nation.

We begin our discussion of China's policy toward her national minorities by first looking at cultural persistence not among the ethnic groups themselves but in the persistence of certain cultural values and traditional views of the Han Chinese toward their ethnic minorities, views which have persisted from the time of the dynasties to the present. This discussion serves as an introduction to Chinese national minority policy and at the same time demonstrates that, from the authors' viewpoint, policy has been — and continues to be — influenced by a particular Chinese view of ethnic minorities, despite the changes that have taken place in the minority regions in this century.

**Continuity in Chinese Policy toward Ethnic Minorities**

Chinese policies toward the borderlands and their national minority inhabitants have shown a marked degree of continuity, from the Qing dynasty to the present. The most obvious and important examples of this are in four areas: continued Chinese encouragement of Han Chinese migration into — and settlement in — these vast border areas; the reliance on local elites to carrying out policies formulated by Han Chinese authorities without reference to the views or political aspirations of the indigenous populations; the persistence of Han chauvinism and "local nationalism", or growing national consciousness among the local non-Han Chinese populations; and, finally, the continued reliance on the use of military force, under Qing, Nationalist Chinese and Communist Chinese governments to ensure maintenance of these regions as an integral part of the Chinese state.

Chinese emigration into the sparsely populated border regions has been regarded by both Imperial and modern Chinese governments as vital to the
country’s security. Through the long course of China’s relations with the western and northern border regions in particular, the peoples of these regions were able to defeat Chinese armies and impose minority rule over the Chinese people. The last of these “barbarians” to control China were the Manchus whose Qing dynasty lasted until 1911. Having conquered China, the Manchus inherited the problem of governance in the peripheral areas of the Chinese empire. In addressing this problem they adopted the traditional Chinese policy of forced and voluntary emigration in order to maintain control of the border areas. Manchu soldiers considered unquestionably loyal to the Manchu throne were sent out to man such important border posts as those on China’s westernmost border, in the Ili valley and in garrison towns of Tarbagatai and Ashan in the northern Altai Mountains, thousands of kilometers from the Manchu capital and months away from China proper by caravan trail.

Another group forced to move to Xinjiang included criminals and officials banished from China for crimes against the Manchu court. Han Chinese were sent to serve under Manchu officials assigned to Xinjiang – no Han Chinese was initially allowed to hold a high government post in this strategic border region, a rule which changed only in the latter part of the 19th century.85

In addition to these involuntary residents of the region, the Qing also encouraged Chinese settlers. As already mentioned, an Imperial edict of 1776 offered settlers land and financial support if they would move into the wild vastness of Xinjiang. Some small groups moved into Dzungaria, the northern part of the region, but Qing efforts at colonization had little impact as Chinese peasants remained tied by cultural and filial bonds to their ancestral lands and were unwilling to depart from them, especially for such a remote and inhospitable land as Xinjiang.

After the 1911 Xinhai Revolution in China, many of the national minority regions fell under individual warlords, almost all of whom were Han Chinese or Hui, so that while the central government slowly developed a policy of sorts toward the national minority peoples, actual control of the minority inhabited regions remained beyond the powers of central Chinese authorities. As the basis of policy under Chiang Kai-shek was ultimately assimilation of all national minority groups, the Nationalist government considered emigration an important part of government plans for development of these regions. Had it retained control of China, doubtless it would have organized large scale emigration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang and

85. Wen-Djang Chu, op.cit., p. 7.
other national minority areas. Several national minority regions received new Han Chinese settlers, primarily refugees from famine and civil war in China proper. In the 1930s, Xinjiang in particular was sent refugee groups to settle near the town of Hami but the numbers were small and the re-settlement could hardly be termed a success." Xinjiang during the Republican period also continued to receive soldiers as involuntary additions to the local population. A thousand Nationalist Chinese troops who had been defeated in Manchuria were repatriated to Xinjiang where they became part of the local warlord's military base in the 1930s. But a far larger consignment of troops arrived in the region in the 1940s when the Nationalists increased garrison strength in response to the Ili Rebellion. Some 90–100,000 Nationalist troops entered the region at that time; the majority of these men remained in the region after they surrendered in 1949 and were later incorporated into the PLA's Production and Construction Corps.

Since 1949 there has existed in China for the first time a government capable of extending Chinese central authority into all border areas. An important facet of policy toward the borderlands under the present government is the encouragement of migration into the border areas to ensure national security and to extend Chinese control throughout the state. As demographic information cited above clearly demonstrates, the movement of Chinese into Xinjiang since 1949 has been on a scale unprecedented in Chinese history. This has resulted in drastic change in the ethnic composition of the region: from less than 5% of the population the Han Chinese now account for over 45% of the region's people. The traditional policy of using Han Chinese settlement to ensure control of border areas has thus been fulfilled, rather ironically, by forces which are attempting to revolutionize traditional Chinese society.

The second area of continuity with regard to Chinese borderlands policy is the use of traditional elites to implement Chinese policy in national minority areas. Under Manchu rule, local Begs in Xinjiang were appointed as officials of the Chinese provincial government to collect taxes and to arbitrate in local disputes. Reliance on such local officials continued under the

87. Owen Lattimore, op.cit., p. 69.
88. Linda Benson. The Ili Rebellion.
first Republican Governor, Yang Zengxin as well as under the second, Jin Shuren. Under General Sheng, Duban and warlord in Xinjiang between 1933—1944, official Chinese titles were still conferred on local leaders and Sheng did not hesitate to use local emissaries to make government policy known to the various local minority groups. Representatives of almost all local nationalities served in the Sheng government; their role was to carry out policies formulated by Sheng under Soviet advice.

With the establishment of Guomindang power, local Muslims were finally consulted on local policy in 1945—1946 but this was only after the Ili Rebellion forced the Central Government to heed national minority demands for representation in the Xinjiang provincial government. However, these policies were never fully supported by the Chinese bureaucrats in Xinjiang and thus were never a real basis for government during the last years of Nationalist control.

Since 1949, in keeping with the new Communist Government’s system of Regional Autonomy established for areas having large populations of non-Han Chinese, representatives of all nationalities have been incorporated into the administrative structure and into the CCP itself. Such representation is considered a fundamental part of CCP policy. As the Chinese Constitution calls for the people ultimately to hold authority within the various levels of government, the autonomous regions could be expected to have a predominance of national minority figures in government and party organizations. However, this has never been the case at the regional level in Xinjiang. Until very recently, ultimate power positions have been held by Han Chinese sent out to Xinjiang from other areas of China, with only token representation of local nationalities in the highest echelons of regional government. The contradiction that this practice has represented in terms of the CCP’s own policy platform is now being confronted and changes in government policy since 1980 reflect recognition of the need for more national minority representation at the highest levels. Nonetheless national minorities in power positions are closely balanced in number and rank by Han officials — an ethnic power sharing now justified by the great increase in Han Chinese living in Xinjiang today.

A third component of traditional policy which continues today is the existence of Han chauvinism and its nemesis “local nationalism” — the phrase formulated by the CCP to indicate the emergence of strong nationalistic consciousness among many national minority groups in China since the turn of the century. Chauvinism has been an element of China’s relations with other peoples since ancient times and the Chinese sense of cultural superiority has been reflected in the choice of names given to non-
Chinese peoples. Using such names for outside groups is certainly not uncommon throughout human history but in China the use of derogatory terms for non-Chinese viewed themselves as surrounded by the si yi or the four barbarians, those of the north, south, east and west. As these barbarians took on more individual identities in ancient Chinese eyes, new, often derogatory, names were given to non-Han Chinese neighbours. In particular, many of the characters used for their names incorporated the "dog" radical, to show the innate inferiority and "beastlike" nature of these un-sinicized neighbours.90

This ethnocentric view persisted throughout the Republican period. Examples of the Han sense of superiority and outright chauvinism abound in works of the period, especially in government documents concerned with national minorities. Sources such as the China Yearbook series published by the Nationalist Chinese, for instance, offer the reader typically chauvinistic descriptions of national minorities as being dirty, lazy, stupid and so on.91

Although certainly not universal, such attitudes among Chinese bureaucrats sent out to remote minority areas were common, among even well-educated officials, and constituted an almost insurmountable obstacle to their understanding of the regions and the peoples they were sent out to govern. The singular lack of success of Guomindang officials in dealing with national minorities owes much to the presence of this traditional Chinese sense of cultural superiority.92

After 1949, the CCP was very much aware of the problem represented by Han chauvinism in its work in the borderlands. This "Great Hanism" as it is sometimes translated, was denounced in the PRC press throughout the 1950s. A conference report in 1953 noted that

90. Examples are the name for "Yao" which was once written 獨. This name is now written with a jade radical instead of the dog radical so that it now appears 獨. Another example is the group once known as "Lolo" 羅羅. In this instance a new name and new character have been given to this group now known as the Yi people or 義.
91. For exemplification see next chapter.
From present conditions, the neglect of the special characteristics of the national minorities and the mechanical application of experiences from the Han Chinese areas is not a phenomenon encountered in individual areas, but rather a universal phenomenon in many areas.¹³

In 1956, Liu Shaoqi found it necessary to lecture his comrades on the national minorities’ cultural level, telling them that “…it is absolutely not true that all of them are backward in all aspects.” He added, “The idea that the minorities are good at nothing and are inferior to the Chinese people in everything is a viewpoint characteristic of Chinese chauvinism.”¹⁴

Elements of Han chauvinism persisted in the Cultural Revolution period when religious and ethnic differences offered a basis for attacks on national minorities by Red Guards.¹⁵ Since the end of that traumatic chapter in the history of the Communist revolution in China, chauvinism has taken more subtle forms. Visitors to Xinjiang today, for instance, are often told by well-meaning Han Chinese that the Uighurs and Kazaks love to sing and dance, a remark that is painfully reminiscent of white American racist remarks about black Americans in the not so distant past.

The persistence of local nationalism is more difficult to assess. In the 1950s its existence was regularly denounced in government publications, usually along with Han chauvinism. The Chinese press alluded to the threat it posed throughout the Cultural Revolution. This was especially common in Xinjiang where local nationalism came sharply into conflict with fanatical Chinese Marxism. A refugee from Xinjiang attested to the continuation of strong local sentiments in 1968, the year he fled from the region into Afghanistan.¹⁶ Rumours of existing independence movements in Xinjiang are also whispered to visitors to the region today, but there is little to support these suggestions of continued organized resistance to Chinese dominance in Xinjiang.

Nonetheless, as many observers have noted, nationalism is a potent force which, once kindled, rarely dies. Both local nationalism and Han chauvinism constitute future sources of instability and/or ethnic conflict in

96. Personal interview with Uighur from the Ili area who was in prison doing luguai, reform labour, from 1956 to 1968 in various work camps in Xinjiang. He is now resident in Saudi Arabia.
regions like Xinjiang which are undergoing rapid transformation as Chinese dominance threatens to overwhelm local indigenous cultures.

Finally, the fourth important area of continuity concerns the use of traditional Chinese border policies, especially the use of military force. Under the Qing court, policies borrowed from traditional Chinese dynasties were relied upon by the Manchus in dealing with border regions. A classic policy was the use of *yi yi zhi yi* or using the barbarian to control the barbarian. By pitting "barbarian" forces against each other, the Imperial court prevented any unification of forces that might threaten the Chinese state. Barbarian vassals or allies were sometimes sent against other barbarians, but more subtle application of *yi yi zhi yi* was in manipulating various groups, playing upon their own divisions in order to prevent the formation of any alliance among border area peoples.

A modern variation of this policy was followed by the first Republican governor of Xinjiang, Governor Yang Zengxin, who successfully balanced Russian and other foreign interests in Xinjiang against each other. He also balanced local minority interests one against the other with considerable success, enabling him to maintain his hold over the region through skillful application of traditional lessons.

A second traditional policy was to join into alliances with strong outside groups, rather than allowing them to form powerful tribal confederations that could threaten the Chinese Empire. Trade and the exchange of brides were two means of forging alliances with powerful outsiders forces such as the Xiongnu during the Tang Dynasty (618–906). Bride exchanges also formed part of the alliance of the Tang with the ancient Uighurs. During the Qing, trade was used in place of this rather symbolic exchange of brides. As the Qing wanted to ensure supplies of the products of nomadic peoples such as hair and wool as well as horses, trade relations were important in themselves, but were also viewed as a means of controlling these nomadic tribes.

When use of *yi yi zhi yi* and alliances failed, Imperial China initiated massive "pacification" campaigns against non-Chinese who periodically posed a threat to the Chinese Empire as the fortunes of both Han and non-Han waxed and waned throughout the course of China's history. Such campaigns became increasingly frequent in the 19th century as the forces of rebellion tore at the Qing empire. In both the north and southwest of China, Muslim resistance to the Qing burst into rebellion in the mid-19th century. The Qing ultimately defeated Muslims in both border regions but only after prolonged and bloody fighting. As a result, these areas were formally incorporated into the Chinese empire, with their large non-Han
Chinese populations becoming subjects of the now Sinicized Manchu court. War and military domination as well as diplomatic policies of balancing power among various ethnic groups and the formation of alliances were all part of the traditional means of dealing with non-Han Chinese peoples on the vast perimeters of China proper.

After the 1911 Revolution, Nationalist Chinese control in the borderlands was, as noted previously, virtually non-existent. However, in an effort to establish control in these regions, the government sometimes attempted to use what appears to have been a rather crude application of the yi yi zhi yi policy. In dealing with the Beidashan incident of 1947 in Xinjiang, for instance, the central government sought to use the affair to discredit the USSR and Mongolian governments. The government presented the event as an example of Soviet and Mongolian designs on sovereign Chinese territory, and thereby sought to enlist US sympathy and, possibly, US intervention in Xinjiang on behalf of the Nationalist Chinese. But because the Chinese authorities had delayed informing the American representatives for some days and had initially been unclear even as to where the incident had taken place, the US saw through the thinly veiled attempt at arousing US concerns for the Chinese position in Xinjiang. While this particular attempt to pit two powerful “barbarians” against each other to China’s benefit did not succeed, it does exemplify the continued Chinese belief in the desirability of balancing powers against each other to the advantage of the Chinese central government.

Since 1949, traditional Chinese policies such as yi yi zhi yi and formation of alliances have been submerged in more modern forms of power balancing and international agreements, in which the Chinese now assume a more sophisticated international role. However, at the domestic level elements of the old policies persist in Chinese dealings with national minorities. The use of “pacification” in particular has been deemed necessary in several minority regions. Xinjiang and Tibet in the 1950s and 60s provide the most prominent examples of traditional military policies as a means of establishing Chinese control over non-Han Chinese regions.

These four areas of persistence in traditional policy and attitudes – the use of settlement of Han Chinese in minority areas, the use of local elites to carry out Chinese policies, the use of the military to ensure continued Chinese control of the border lands and the persistence of Han Chinese

chauvinism and local nationalism — have influenced the formation of official policy throughout the 20th century and can be clearly seen in the implementation of national minority policy under both the Chinese Communist Party and its predecessor, the Guomindang.

**Official National Minority Policy in the Republican Period, 1911–1949**

The earliest official recognition of China’s multiethnic composition was embodied in the early Republican doctrine of the five nationalities that together were believed to comprise the Chinese nation. These were recognized as being the Manchus, the Mongols, the Tatars, the Tibetans and the Han Chinese. These five were seen as fundamentally Chinese peoples, divided through long years of shared history by geographical and linguistic variations. Sun Yat-sen envisaged the existing cultural divisions/distinctions as eventually dying out, resulting in a new single nation able to “satisfy the demands and requirements of all races and unit them in a single cultural and political whole.”

Sun and other early nationalists’ understanding of China’s national minorities was initially limited by a general lack of information regarding such people as well as a lack of awareness about their political aspirations. As Sun became more and more influenced by Soviet advice, however, he increasingly advocated self-determination for China’s larger non-Han Chinese peoples. Sun’s Fundamentals of National Reconstruction called for self-determination and self-government for any racial minority which desired to be separate from China.

After Sun’s death, the basis of Nationalist policy changed drastically under Sun’s successor in the Guomindang, Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang personally espoused the very traditional Chinese view that all the peoples of China were strictly Chinese in origin. Ethnic minorities were not minzu or minority nationalities, but were zhongzu, branches of a single tribe. Thus Chiang advocated assimilation — or re-assimilation — as the ultimate solution to ethnic divisions in China, returning the Chinese to their original state of a single nationality. While Guomindang policy under Chiang recognized that many of the zhongzu were “backward” and that special policies were necessary to overcome economic and cultural differences, Chiang’s view was basically assimilationist and policies were directed to this ultimate end. Even in the late years of Nationalist rule, when the Guo-

mindang influence had contracted to small enclaves in China proper, the "frontier regions" were still considered indivisible parts of the Chinese state, without the right of self-determination advocated by Sun.

Policy Implementation

For most of the Republican period, the Nationalist Chinese were not in a position to implement policy of any sort in most national minority regions. Government machinery nonetheless existed to guide implementation in the event Nationalist control extended into these regions. Existing plans of the government indicate further the general thrust of Guomindang policy. The primary institution in minority affairs was initially the Mongol-Tibetan Ministry of the early Republican period, an institution which was directly responsible to the President. This institution appears to have accomplished little and it was re-organized and re-named the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in 1928, with the status of a Ministry under the Executive Yuan.

One important function of this Commission was planning, and various schemes for the development and construction of border areas were drawn up, based on reports of officials sent to explore possibilities in border regions. The need for basic construction work in the areas of transportation and communications and for the general economic development of these regions were particular areas of concern in such reports. The natural resources of these vast regions were a matter of special concern to the central government and Xinjiang in particular was seen as an area of vast potential wealth for the nation. Plans for the future exploitation of the region’s wealth were given in government sponsored reports.

With regard to what was termed frontier education the Nationalist government demonstrated its concern by establishing provincial level departments of the Mongolian and Tibetan Education Department, which, despite the name, was charged with overseeing the development of education among all national minority groups in China. A major feature of education programs was the promotion of an understanding of the Chinese nation and the responsibilities of citizenship. Also the teaching of the Chinese

102. Ibid.
104. See C.C. Ku, op.cit.
language to non-Chinese peoples was a fundamental part of policy until 1945 when this requirement was relaxed since, as the government freely admitted, little headway had been made in teaching Chinese to minority peoples. In fact, illiteracy remained the rule in most minority regions and only a few groups such as the Xibo and the Russians and some of the more Sinicized minorities had high literacy rates.

Another area of policy already alluded to was the re-settlement of Han Chinese in minority areas. As noted, only small groups were moved into regions like Xinjiang, but the results were often disastrous for the people involved in such officially inspired population transfers.

In sum, official Nationalist policy sought to secure the Chinese borderlands as an integral part of the Chinese state. Policy was based on the assumption that the non-Chinese indigenous people of these regions were basically Chinese and therefore assimilation was the ultimate policy goal. This view also precluded the granting of any self-determination to non-Han peoples, since they were Chinese in origin and therefore had no territorial or ethnic basis from which to ask for consideration as individual peoples. The land of the national minorities, comprising some 60% of China's total territory and rich in natural resources, was viewed as an indivisible part of the Chinese state, and the people of such regions were subject to the same laws as Chinese in any other part of the nation. Only Mongolia and Tibet were accorded special recognition of historic divisions but in neither instance was this difference considered by the Nationalists as a basis for their separation from the Chinese state.

Chinese Rule in Xinjiang during the Republican Period

Yang Zengxin was appointed Governor of Xinjiang by the first Chinese Republican government in 1912 but ruled without reference to any central Chinese authority until his assassination in 1928. An Imperial Chinese bureaucrat, Yang, ruled according to traditional Chinese principles previously discussed, yi yi zhi yi, and balancing of both foreign and native interests with success all the more remarkable because of his relatively meagre military base of only 10,000 troops. Central government policy toward national minorities, vague as it was in the early period, was without means of implementation under Yang. The situation did not change under Yang's

107. See discussion of Yang in Owen Lattimore. op. cit., pp. 52–64 and in Lars-Erik Nyman. op. cit., pp. 19–25. That Yang had only 10,000 men is noted in Lattimore. p. 61.
successor, Jin Shuren, who governed briefly and inexpertly from 1928 until 1931 when he was deposed in a coup d'état led by disaffected White Russian troops in his provincial capital.\(^{108}\)

Jin in turn was succeeded by a warlord equal in strength and ability to Governor Yang. Duban Sheng Shicai was not officially governor of Xinjiang but he was nonetheless the ultimate authority in the region from 1933 to 1944. Like Jin and Yang, Sheng forged his own policy despite the presence of the Guomindang in the provincial capital. In the early part of the decade of Sheng’s rule, policies conceived by the Duban were marked by the relatively progressive influence of the Soviet model. Bolstered by Soviet economic and military support, Sheng was able to establish himself over the various warring factions within the region and to begin implementation of his program for reform.

One of Sheng’s earliest moves with regard to Xinjiang’s national minorities was to encourage the growth of separate national identities among the region’s various non-Chinese ethnic groups. The people of the region were now identified as fourteen separate nationalities: Uighur, Taranchi, Kazak, Kirghiz, Özbek, Tatar, Tajik, Manchu, Xibo, Solon, Han, Hui, Mongol, and Russian.\(^{109}\)

Sheng’s decision to identify and encourage ethnic divisions was certainly based on Soviet policy line then followed in Soviet Central Asia where such divisions led to the formation of Soviet republics in the 1920s and 1930s. Significantly, the “14 nationalities” were also recognized by the Guomindang upon their assumption of power in Xinjiang in the 1940s.

Sheng also espoused principles of democratic government as outlined in his “Eight Point Policy” and later in his “Six Great Policies.” The initially reform-minded nature of his political program was embodied in the eight points which included nationalities’ equality, freedom of religion, relief for rural areas; financial, juridical and administrative reform; extended education and eventual self-government for the area. The much-publicized “Six Great Policies” were actually a simplification of the original eight points, with added elements influenced by Xinjiang’s international position: anti-imperialism, friendship with the Soviet Union, equality, clean government, peace and reconstruction. As in the case of the eight points, Sheng’s “Six Policy Program” was vague enough to leave wide leeway for interpretation.

108. See especially a Chinese official’s account of the coup and the establishment of Sheng in power, Aitchen K. Wu, *op. cit.*

Sheng's reformist attitude resulted in a brief upsurge of national awareness in Xinjiang and doubtless contributed to the growth of national consciousness among many urban Muslims. To promote a sense of national equality, for instance, Sheng encouraged the publication of newspapers in various national minority languages as well as in Chinese. Further, cultural associations were also established for each nationality group and these organizations continued to operate throughout the province through 1949. They were used both for political and cultural activities. In the 1940s they became a source of membership for the increasing number of local political organizations which rose in competition with the Guomindang. Sheng also guaranteed religious freedom throughout the region.

Economically, during the first part of Sheng's rule, Xinjiang benefited from a resurgence in Soviet trade. The official Soviet trading organ, Sovinstorg, had opened branches in eight cities in Xinjiang beginning in 1931 and once Sheng had re-established order, the sale of Xinjiang’s raw materials to the USSR expanded rapidly.

Soviet aid in exploitation of natural resources was also an important part of economic policy under Sheng. The Altai gold mines were worked under the direction of Soviet engineers, as were oil wells at Usu and Dushanzi. Other mineral exploitation included mining operations which netted profit for Xinjiang and Sheng as well as for the USSR.

An aspect of Sheng’s policy which was considerably less positive were the numerous “pacification” campaigns undertaken by Sheng against the Kazaks of the Altai region. Kazak resistance to Chinese control of Xinjiang had been a persistent element of northern Xinjiang’s modern history and Kazak raids were endemic in the Dzungarian area when Sheng came to power. Chinese sources typically recorded “plots” to foment chaos perpetrated by Kazak leaders such as Sharip Khan as early as 1933. Turkish language sources proclaim a Kazak resistance movement against “tyrannic” Chinese rule dating from 1934, led by men such as Zayif Taği, who convened a meeting in the Altai in 1933, attended by Kazak representatives from all over Xinjiang to discuss resistance organization.

110. Owen Lattimore, op. cit., p. 67. The eight towns were Urumchi, Chuguchak (Tacheng), Gulja (Yining), Kashgar (Kashi), Aksu, Kucha, Yarkand and Khotan (Hoten).


ing Kazak bands also raided settlements of Uighur and/or Han Chinese peoples, partly as general resistance to Chinese dominance but also in search of booty. Chinese garrisons thus periodically launched "pacification" campaigns against Kazaks, and under Sheng the military began to systematically disarm them.

Sheng considered the Kazaks an obstacle to the peaceful development and construction of Xinjiang as well as to his continued friendship with the USSR. During the period of Sheng's rule, thousands of Kazaks were forced out of traditional pastures. Some moved into the Barköl area (between Hami and Urumchi) but others were forced out of Xinjiang altogether, moving into Gansu and Qinghai. 114 Sheng's campaign against the Kazaks continued through the course of his presence in Xinjiang and ended only with his transfer to the national capital in 1944.

By the early 1940s, Sheng had abandoned both his alliance with the USSR and his attempts at reform and democratization of the province. With his government in disarray as a result of his own indiscriminate and unpredicatable arrests of people he himself had appointed, Sheng most likely welcomed the Guomindang offer of a safe ministry post in 1944. The stage was set for Nationalist rule in Xinjiang for the first time in the Republican period. The Chinese government now had its first opportunity to implement its national minority policy which had, up to this point, remained largely rhetorical.

Before the newly appointed Guomindang Governor, Wu Zhongxin, could arrive in the province, however, rebellion broke out in the Ili area, contiguous with the Soviet border. The rebel force composed of Uighurs, Kazaks, and other national minority groups drove the Han Chinese out of three districts of the province before agreeing to a ceasefire and peace negotiations in September of 1945. As a result of these negotiations, the Guomindang was forced to make major concessions to the rebels who afterwards announced that they had rebelled only in order to secure the right to govern their own affairs at the provincial level. Members of the rebel movement, which had resulted in the formation of the "East Turkestan Republic" in 1944, now joined the new provincial coalition government, serving with Guomindang appointees in governing the province. This uneasy coalition ruled Xinjiang for less than a year. In May of 1947, the government broke apart when the diplomatic and able General Zhang Zhongzhong was removed from his post as Chairman of the province by the central government and replaced by a man distrusted by the Ili delegates –

114 See Ingvar Svanberg. Kazak Refugees from Xinjiang . . .
Mesut Sabri, an Uighur medical doctor long absent from the region. Mesut himself was in turn replaced in January 1949 by Burhan Shahidi, a Tatar long active in Xinjiang political affairs and a compromise figure. Neither of these Guomindang appointees, however, was able to make any significant progress in the implementation of Nationalist Chinese national minority policy in Xinjiang.

Throughout the period 1911–1949, Nationalist China had only brief opportunities to influence events in Xinjiang at the domestic provincial level and had little chance to attempt implementation of its official national minority policy. During the period 1944–1949 when the Guomindang was in authority in seven out of ten districts in the region, the central government failed to implement any significant aspect of its policy. It also failed to follow the terms of the Peace Agreement it had signed giving major concessions to the rebel forces of the Ili area. It did, however, succeed in retaining the Xinjiang area as an integral part of China, thus enabling the Chinese Communist Party to inherit the traditional Chinese state intact in 1949.

National Minority Policy in the People’s Republic of China

CCP policies inaugurated after 1949 have reflected traditional Chinese concern for national security and for the integration of all the borderlands and their non-Chinese populations into the Chinese state. In pursuing this broad policy objective, the CCP continues the age-old concern with the integrity of the traditional Chinese borders.115

A more sophisticated attitude toward national minorities emerged in China in the early 1950s. Little study of the many non-Han Chinese peoples had been done prior to 1949 but after establishment of the PRC many of the ethnic groups were studied for the first time by a small group of trained Chinese scholars. Under the leadership of the anthropologist Fei Xiaotong, teams were sent into minority areas in order to assess language, history and culture with a view to determining which groups should be classified among the national minorities of China.116 In the end, 54 minor-

115. For instance, in 1930 the young Chinese Communist Party declared that it would recognise the rights of national minorities within China to secede or to federate with the Chinese state. However, by 1938 Mao Zedong had decided that China would remain a unified state, where rights of minorities would be respected but in which the right of secession was no longer recognized. See discussion in June Teufel Dreyer, *China’s 40 Millions. Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People’s Republic of China*, London 1976. pp. 63–67.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
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<td>Pumi</td>
<td>24,237</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>26,503</td>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nu</td>
<td>23,166</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinuo</td>
<td>11,974</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Özbek</td>
<td>12,453</td>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>2,935</td>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evenki</td>
<td>19,343</td>
<td>Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>4,127</td>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benglong</td>
<td>12,295</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baoan</td>
<td>9,027</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugur</td>
<td>10,569</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jing</td>
<td>11,995</td>
<td>Guangxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dulong</td>
<td>4,682</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oroqen</td>
<td>4,132</td>
<td>Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monba</td>
<td>6,248</td>
<td>Tibet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezhe</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


...cities were officially recognized. But the basis for identification remains unclear. If linguistic divisions were of primary importance, we might expect to see some recognition of southern Chinese dialects such as Cantonese, for instance. Also we might expect the Hui people, who speak Chinese and who differ from other Chinese only in their adherence to Islam, to be...
classified as Han Chinese. The same could be expected of the virtually totally assimilated Manchus. Yet southern dialect speakers are included as Han Chinese while Hui and Manchus are both designated as national minorities.

The problems of identification clearly were and remain complex issues. Research in this area, as in other areas of academic work, has suffered from the political struggles which have shaken China since the late 1950s. As a new generation of young scholars emerges to continue the ground breaking work of Fei Xiaotong and other scholars, hopefully the store of information on these little known peoples will be considerably expanded and a more systematic and detailed identification will be possible. The official list of nationalities in China today (Table 3), is, with few exceptions, the same as it was when first published in 1954.

**Policy Basis: Official Documents and Statements**

The first official document referring specifically to China’s national minority peoples and their homelands was the “Common Program” of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference of 1949. Five articles of the Program are relevant to national minorities. First, Article 9 declares that no area of China may secede. Originally the CCP had declared that non-Chinese areas of the country would be allowed to secede or to federate with the Chinese state, according to the will of the peoples involved. This right was still a part of the Party platform in 1931. However, by 1938 this right had been dropped, doubtless in recognition of the efforts of foreign powers to dismember the Chinese state in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Second, Article 50 stated that Han chauvinism and local chauvinism (later translated as local nationalism) were to be opposed. As discussed previously, chauvinism had been a part of Chinese attitude in general to national minorities and the CCP was very aware of the obstacle this constituted to work in national minority areas. Likewise, the history of rebellion and concomitant growth of nationalistic sentiments in predominantly national minority areas such as Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia was also recognized by the CCP in this article.

Third, Article 51 stated that autonomous organs of government were to be set up in areas entirely or largely inhabited by national minorities.

Fourth, Article 52 guaranteed equal rights for all nationalities in China and, further, stated that all Chinese citizens have freedom of religion and of culture as well as of traditional practices. Such freedoms had, of course, been guaranteed to the national minorities of Xinjiang several times previously by various Chinese rulers, but without any real change in local conditions. Nonetheless, in keeping with the spirit of this new revolutionary government, guarantees were once again extended, to a no doubt dubious population in Xinjiang.

Fifth, Article 53 stated that the Central Government would aid in the development of the national minority areas. From a national minority viewpoint this could be interpreted in a rather ominous way as such aid could entail greater central government involvement in local affairs.

Of these articles, the fifty-first in particular was considered to be a fundamental part of the Chinese solution to the "national question" in China. In this instance, the CCP did not follow the Soviet model in which individual republics were formed and technically retained the right of secession. In China, all territories were indivisible parts of the state.

In 1953 specific details for the implementation of Article 51 were given in the "Program for Enforcement of National Regional Autonomy." This program outlined three types of areas which could organize autonomous governments; 1) Districts inhabited by one larger national minority; 2) Districts where one large and several smaller national minorities lived together; 3) Areas inhabited by two or more nationalities. These areas would form governments run "principally" by national minority peoples of the regions.

In implementing this Program, few districts qualified under the first definition. Those that did were predominantly at the lowest levels of autonomous government, where local authority was still divided among representatives of all nationalities in any given area.

The largest autonomous units, the regions, were technically of the first type. However, all of them included other nationalities within their borders and as these were all entitled to some representation in government there was no region whose government was composed of only one national minority. Today, with the settlement of millions of Han Chinese

120. In fact, a similar program of autonomous governments for China had already been outlined by the Guomindang which had considered local autonomy of government suitable for the development of national consciousness throughout China.
in the minority regions, the indigenous peoples are now truly minorities in virtually every region and in almost all autonomous governments as well.

Technically, the powers to be wielded by the autonomous governments were considerable. They could, within the limits of overall State law, enact their own laws, organize local militia, develop local culture, use local languages as their official language and control local finance. If such powers had been fully utilized as outlined in official documents, national minorities would have controlled vast areas of modern China. However, two factors mitigated against such a possibility from the beginning. First, as noted above, no national minority autonomous governments were composed of a single national minority and thus it was impossible for any national minority to control an autonomous government anywhere in China. Secondly, actual power in minority districts, as elsewhere in China, has been vested in the CCP and in the PLA as well as in the government itself. As a result, ultimate authority in most minority regions has been concentrated in the hands of Han Chinese representatives of the PLA and the Communist Party. Although national minority representatives were placed in visible positions near the top of regional governments, authority remained the prerogative of the Chinese as it had done for the preceding centuries.

By 1957, there were 87 autonomous districts, 31 autonomous prefectures (zhou) and 54 autonomous counties (xian) in China. At the highest level were the autonomous regions, four of which were established by 1958: the Xinjiang-Uighur, Ningxia Hui, Guangxi-Zhuang and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Regions, the latter having already been established in 1947. Tibet became an autonomous region only in 1965.

National minority rights embodied in the Common Program of 1949 and the Regional Autonomy Program of 1954 were included in the first Constitution of 1954, but by then the reality of the situation in the national minority areas had made the government more cautious in dealing with these regions. In the new Constitution, the governments of the national minority regions were now to be composed of an "appropriate" number of national minority representatives rather than "principally" of national minority peoples. This change was government recognition of the fact that there would be a need for Chinese leadership in national minority areas for a fairly lengthy period if social reform was to be properly implemented, and that national minority cadres were too few in number and too inexperienced to lead government and party organs in sensitive border areas.


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Chinese constitutions between 1954 and 1978 consistently referred, in brief form, to five basic propositions with regard to China’s national minorities. These were:

1. China is a multinational and unitary state and no area may secede;
2. Regional autonomy is the basic form of government for areas inhabited by national minorities;
3. There is equality for all nationalities within China;
4. There is freedom to believe and not to believe in religion;
5. National minority peoples have the right to use their national language in written and spoken forms.

The 1982 Constitution reaffirmed these five basic points, adding greater detail. For instance, Chapter One, Article Four of both the 1978 and 1982 constitutions calls for equality of all nationalities, and for the protection of such rights by the State. Each also prohibits any discrimination against any nationality, but the 1982 Constitution adds the line “any acts that undermine the unity of the nationalities or instigate their secession are prohibited.”

More importantly, the new section on organs of government for national autonomous areas — those inhabited by national minorities — contains a total of 11 articles, in comparison to the 1978 Constitution’s 3. The new articles introduce both new responsibilities and obligations for such governments.

The new section still calls for the usual “appropriate” number of national minority representatives in the governments of autonomous areas, but Article 113 states that the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen shall include a citizen or citizens of the nationality or nationalities exercising autonomy, thereby guaranteeing one of the highest government posts to one or more national minority representatives for the first time. Going even further, Article 114 calls for the administrative head of an autonomous unit of government at regional, prefecture (district) or county level to be a citizen of the nationality exercising autonomy.

Other new provisions herald further changes for the governments of autonomous areas. Article 117 calls for revenues accruing to national minor-

ity areas to be managed and used within the autonomous unit itself. Article 118 states that the autonomous areas may independently arrange and administer local economic development. Article 119 specifically calls for the independent administration and development of such key areas as education and culture. These three articles constitute a major departure from former constitutions with regard to the autonomous areas, and they clearly demonstrate the new policy line from Beijing which emphasizes more local and regional control over affairs within China in the 1980s.

Although the 1982 Constitution allows for greater independence of action in the national minority areas, it must be remembered that the Chinese Communist Party continues to exercise decisive power and, along with the predominantly Han Chinese military, the Party is firmly in the hands of Han Chinese, even in national minority regions.

**CCP’s Role in National Minority Regions**

The role of the Communist Party in all national minority areas has been presented as being essentially that of a leader and a teacher, assisting in the minorities’ evolution toward the socialist and, ultimately, communist form of society envisioned for the China of the future.

The CCP views the assimilation of all nationalities into one great Chinese people as the ultimate solution of the nationality question. This final goal, however, is viewed as a long-range objective, and great attention is paid to emphasizing this long-term nature of the process of assimilation in statements aimed at national minorities. For instance, in 1962, national minorities “special characteristics and national differences” were expected to exist throughout the evolutionary period of national minority societies, and “for a long historical period after the communist society has been reached.”

In a collection of articles on national minority policy published in 1986, only one, dating from 1958, deals with the question of assimilation. This article stresses CCP opposition to Guomindang assimilationist policies and once again proclaims the long term nature of any assimilation in China. Instead of assimilation, Party pronouncements of the 1980s have empha-

124. Ibid., p. 87.
sized the need for unity and cooperation among all the country’s national-
ities.

While such CCP statements attempt to distance the Party’s policy from
that of the Guomindang, there are nonetheless some interesting similar-
ities in the choice of language and of political slogans used in expressing
official party line by both parties. Leaders and spokesmen of both refer to
all China’s nationalities as xiong di or brothers. More specifically, the Han
Chinese have often been described as the “elder brother” of the national
minorities. In traditional Chinese society, an elder brother has inescapable
responsibilities to the younger brother – who in turn owes respect and
subservient obedience to the elder. The Han Chinese reference to the mi-
norities as didi is paternalistic and patronizing in tone rather than frater-
nal. While it connotes a close relationship, that relationship is traditionally
unequal.

Both Chinese parties also refer to the “backwardness” of the national
minority regions and peoples. Major CCP speeches in the 1980s continued
to use the term luohou to refer to the minorities, just as the Guomindang
did in the 1930s and 1940s while trying to persuade un-cooperative and
openly defiant national minorities that they could not progress without the
guidance of their “elder brother,” the Han Chinese.

Both also use the same political slogans of tuanjie and tongyi – both
referring to national unity – in virtually every speech on – or to – national minority groups. The need for the continued use of such slogans is clear: national minority groups in China are obviously not yet convinced of the need for either an elder brother – or for eternal unity with the Chinese state.

In addition to the similarities in rhetoric used by the two Chinese parties, there are also similarities in the guarantees of personal freedoms offered in the official documents of both parties. Both have shown concern for national minority rights and have consistently offered written guarantees of equality, religious and cultural freedoms and “self-government” or regional autonomy as a means to guarantee national minority representation in government. The desirability of national minorities direct participation in government and in party organizations is officially acknowledged by both.

However, despite such pronouncements, at no time in this century have the national minorities had control over their own affairs within their own homelands. It is only in the 1980s that there has been a concerted attempt by the Chinese government to expand minority role in government and the results of this effort remain to be seen. Given their experience under decades of Chinese rule, hearing slogans of equality and fraternity and yet receiving the same harsh treatment at the hand of these “brothers,” China’s minorities may be forgiven a certain amount of scepticism concerning the sincerity of Chinese promises.

From 1949 onwards, policy implementation has been inconsistent and often at variance with the statements contained in official documents of the People’s Republic of China and the Party itself. National minority policy implementation has reflected the political upheavals that have periodically affected all of China. Thus, from the standpoint of minorities, especially those of Xinjiang, life under the present government has been a repetition of the same cycle of periods of tolerance followed by political upheaval orchestrated by Han Chinese at both the regional and national levels in China. Rather than inaugurating a new period of peace and reconstruction in Xinjiang, Chinese policies under the CCP have been a continuation of the unpredictability that has marked Chinese political history during this century.

**PRC National Minority Policy Implementation in Xinjiang, 1949–1986**

From 1949 to 1955, Xinjiang was administered locally by military control committees whose job was to meet with local leaders and people at the
grass roots levels to begin the process of establishing Chinese Communist Party authority in the region. The PLA’s role in this process was described by Liu Shaoqi as follows:

The military control of the People’s Liberation army is the initial form of the dictatorship of the people’s democracy, which suppresses the reactionaries by force and at the same time everywhere protects the people, inspires them, and helps them to set up Conferences of People’s Representatives, organs of people’s power at all levels, which, as conditions become ripe, are gradually given full power.\(^{127}\)

Armed resistance in Xinjiang was dealt with by PLA units who eliminated such leaders as Osman Batur by 1951. Ending the more subtle forms of resistance to the new Han Chinese government among local Muslims, however, was not simply a matter of removing local leaders or redistributing land. Distrust of Han Chinese intentions in the region was an established part of Muslim attitudes among both elites and peasant/herders. In recognition of this, the CCP and PLA sought co-operation of local national minority leaders in order to establish control in the region. This “United Front” policy also justified the continued participation in government of officials who had served under the Guomindang. For example, Burhan, the last Governor of the Nationalist Chinese government, continued at his post; his Deputy Governor was Saifudin Azizi (Seypidin), who had been a member of the provincial coalition government of Xinjiang in 1946–1947, representing the Ili forces that had so successfully rebelled against the Chinese in 1944. The Guomindang-appointed Garrison Commander, Tao Zhiyue, also remained in Xinjiang as second in command of the region’s forces.

At the highest government levels, however, there was no proportionate national minority representation as called for in the Common Program. In Xinjiang, each national minority was given at least one representative on the first Government Council. Uighurs, who constituted approximately 75% of the population at the time, held only 29% of the Council seats. When the council was enlarged to 71 members, Uighurs held 24 seats or 34% of the seats. The Han Chinese, then only some 6% of the populations, held 15 seats or 21%. The rest of the positions were held by representatives of all the various nationalities so that it was impossible for any nationality to dominate the highest government organ.

Table 4. Autonomous Prefectures and Counties in Xinjiang in the mid-1950s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Administrative Unit (Zhou, Xian)</th>
<th>Number of Different Minorities</th>
<th>Largest Ethnic Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bayangol–Mongol A.P.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mongol (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kizilsu–Kirghiz A.P.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Kirghiz (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borotala–Mongol A.P.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mongol (24.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changji–Hui A.P.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Hui (37.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ili–Kazak A.P.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Kazak (53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barköl–Kazak A.C.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kazak (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mori–Kazak A.C.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kazak (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxkorgan–Tajik A.C.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tajik (38.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanqi–Hui (Karashar) A.C.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Hui (32.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoboksar–Mongol A.C.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mongol (58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qapqal–Xibo A.C.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Xibo (28%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations:  
A.P. = Autonomous Prefecture (Zhou)  
A.C. = Autonomous County (Xian)


By 1953, the government officially recognized 13 nationalities in Xinjiang. Seven of these were given some form of autonomous government in the year 1954. It is interesting to note that the Ili-Kazak Autonomous Prefecture was further subdivided in a way found in no other district in the province. This is partly in recognition of the multiethnic composition of this area — but it is also probable that the divisions are recognition of the recent history of this area which had separated itself from China for the six years preceding the formation of the new PRC in 1949.

Once the lower levels of government were organized, the autonomous regional government itself was established: the area was re-named the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region on October 1, 1955. The first Chairman of the new government was Saifudin, the Uighur from the Ili area who had participated in the “Three Districts Revolution” — or Ili rebellion — in 1944. The People’s Congress Standing Committee had 44 members, 33 of whom were representatives of various national minorities. Xinjiang thus had a government that appeared to be overwhelmingly national minority;

1. Bayangol-Mongol Autonomous Prefecture  
   Subdivisions: 1 City, 7 Counties  
   1 Autonomous County: Yanqi-Hui Autonomous County

2. Kizilsu-Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture  
   Subdivisions: 4 Counties

3. Changji-Hui Autonomous Prefecture  
   Subdivisions: 1 City, 6 Counties  
   1 Autonomous County: Mori-Kazak Autonomous County

4. Boratala-Mongol Autonomous Prefecture  
   Subdivisions: 3 Counties

5. Ili-Kazak Autonomous Prefecture  
   Subdivisions:  
   a. Directly Administered Units  
      1 Autonomous County: Qapqal-Xibo Autonomous County, 2 Cities, 7 Counties  
   b. Tacheng Area  
      Subdivisions: 6 Counties  
      1 Autonomous County: Hobaksar-Mongol Autonomous County  
   c. Altai Area  
      Subdivisions: 7 Counties

but at the same time, as on earlier governing committees, the practice of giving all national minorities a representative meant that the Uighurs, who were the dominant majority in the region, were not given a proportionate majority in the government itself. Their 19 seats gave them 46%; other nationalities had 34% with Han 19.5%. In the CCP organization which ultimately held power in Xinjiang, as elsewhere in China, Chinese maintained control. Xinjiang's Communist Party was led by Wang Enmao, a young cadre who had initially worked with Wang Zhen, Commander of
the First Army Corps in Xinjiang from 1949 to 1952 in Kashgar. When Wang Zhen moved to Beijing to take up a higher government position, Wang Enmao moved to Urumchi as Party Chief. In 1956 his efforts in Xinjiang were recognized by the government in the form of an appointment as a full member of the Party Central Committee.

Official reports on national minority work and progress in the Xinjiang region were generally positive, reflecting the idealistic and patriotic tone of the period. There were, nonetheless, indicators that dissatisfaction with the new CCP rule among local nationalities was growing by 1955. The source and extent of this restiveness were officially revealed at a meeting in Urumchi in May of 1957 when national minority cadres officially criticized implementation of policy in the region. For example, one minority cadre, Hussein, said:

The problem in existence is that at present there are not enough nationalities cadres but too many Han cadres. I wanted to say something in this connection but because of my of fear of the charge of local nationalism, I did not raise the question.129

Another minority representative claimed that, "... in actual work there is the phenomenon for the Han nationality cadres to accept the tasks assigned to them without implementing them."130

In autumn of 1957, Deng Xiaoping announced that the national minorities of China would now participate in the national "Rectification Campaign";131 this signalled the beginning of a period of intolerance toward minorities throughout the country. In Xinjiang, the focus of the new campaign were "counter-revolutionaries" and "local nationalism" — the latter replacing Han Chinese chauvinism as the major problem in minority regions according to the press. In October, a Judicial Work Conference was called to organize a winter campaign against all bad elements in the region who were reportedly involved in criminal activity in several areas, including Yining, the capital of the Ili-Kazak Autonomous Prefecture. A press report of November 1957 condemned a counter-revolutionary organiza-

129. *Renmin Ribao*, May 30, 1957, transl. in *SCMP* 1551, p. 28. Also a refugee from Xinjiang now living in Saudi Arabia referred to several meetings held by local national minorities in Xinjiang as early as 1955 and 1956. Saifudin refused to attend to answer questions about when real autonomy would be implemented. The informant was arrested after speaking out at such a meeting in 1956 and did laogai until his escape from Xinjiang in 1968.


tion in Xinjiang called the "China Peasant Party" which operated among men in the "labor for reform" camps and which had planned a general mass uprising in the region. While membership in such an organization appears to have been primarily Han Chinese, as reflected in the name, local national minorities also began agitating for greater autonomy and local nationalities' control of Xinjiang. Demands were made for the establishment of a local Communist Party on nationality lines (that is, separate party organizations for local nationalities and for Han Chinese), the expulsion of Han cadre and settlers, and even for the formation of a new and totally independent "Eastern Turkestan."

In December of 1957 Saifudin replied to such demands in the press but the nationalistic feelings among local nationalities clearly continued. In April of 1958 an article entitled "Marxism vs. Nationalism in Xinjiang, A Major Debate" was published in China. It indicated that some local nationalists in Xinjiang were even basing their claim for self-determination on Marxism. Further, they suggested that the Soviet system serve as a model for the Chinese Communists:

The nationalists argue that the establishment of an Uighurstan or an Uighur Republic does not necessarily mean its separation from China, but that it may form a part of the Chinese union. They think that [...] since the Soviet Union adopts such a system it should be followed in China.

During this period of public debate on the nationalism which persisted in national minority areas, the CCP also began a rapid drive to establish communes throughout China, including the minority areas. This "Great Leap Forward" began in 1958. Between 1958 and 1962, the central government demanded that Xinjiang conform more fully to policies being implemented at the national level. "Special characteristics" and the need for patience and gradual development in the borderlands were no longer mentioned. At the same time as the commune system was being established in Xinjiang, a steady stream of Han settlers also began entering the region. These two policies inevitably brought tension to the region and by 1962

132. Xinjiang Ribao, Nov. 13, 1957, transl. in SCMP 1698, p. 16.
133. NCNA Urumchi, Nov. 30, 1957, transl. in SCMP 1672, p. 67.
dissatisfaction had grown to such an extent in the westernmost districts that a mass exodus occurred; thousands of people crossed the border into the USSR. Although no official report was made of this important event at the time, later reference to the incident gave the figure of 60,000.  

Perhaps as a result of this ignominious loss, conditions from 1962 to 1965 were once again marked by greater tolerance toward national minority sensibilities. For instance, Muslim religious festivals, celebration of which had gone un-reported in 1960, were now well publicized. In 1964, a three day religious holiday was announced and heavy attendance at many mosques was reported throughout the region.  

In the period of 1962 to 1965, Xinjiang’s Party leader, Wang Enmao, was strengthening his own position. He was already the First Secretary of the local Party; in February of 1964 he became Secretary of the CCP’s Northwest China Bureau and in January 1965 became a member of the National Defence Council, partly in recognition of his region’s position on the sensitive Soviet border. In March of 1966 he was made First Secretary for the Production and Construction Corps as well.  

By 1965, Saifudin had been Chairman of the region for more than ten years. During this decade, Xinjiang had experienced great changes, especially in economic development. The region’s total grain production, for instance, had risen from 2,035,273,000 catties in 1949 to 6,105,819,000 in 1965. Cash income had reportedly risen three times the pre-liberation level while retail prices for manufactured goods dropped four times between 1956 and 1964. Land reclamation and water conservancy projects had been carried out by the government, using most Han Chinese labour,
and huge state farms had been built, primarily in northern Xinjiang, on lands that included former pastures of nomadic peoples such as the Kazaks, but also on lands laboriously reclaimed from marginal areas and deserts. Industry, too, had grown in Xinjiang in these ten years: from an estimated total industrial production of 81 million yuan in 1949, output valued 636 million yuan by 1965.  

Saifudin described these changes as "earth shaking" and certainly the Xinjiang region had changed dramatically in the decade since it had become the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. But these changes were not all viewed as positive by the local population and nationality tensions continued in the area on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. In the same year, 1965, Saifudin was called upon to reply to what was perceived as the growing threat of local nationalism in Xinjiang. He did so by first calling for a greater number of national minority cadre to be trained in order that the region could defend itself against the threat from the USSR "to split Xinjiang from the great Fatherland." He then condemned local nationalists who continued to advocate the establishment of a Communist Party in Xinjiang on nationality lines. Clearly, despite the economic advances in the region, dissatisfaction among the local ethnic minorities remained a problem on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, which reached Xinjiang in the late summer of 1966.

The Cultural Revolution in Xinjiang

Officially, the Cultural Revolution began in Xinjiang on August 3, 1966, with a radio broadcast from Zhou Enlai over Radio Urumchi, asking the people of Xinjiang for their support in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. On September 2, Urumchi officially welcomed 400 newly arrived Han Chinese Red Guards; the following day a serious incident occurred involving local Muslims and these young people. Wang Enmao was suspected of having arranged the incident in order to discredit the Red Guard movement and possibly with the intent of having the movement


144. Renmin Ribao, Sept. 30, 1965, transl. in Current Background, 775, p. 31.


kept out of the region altogether. As various "Red" units were formed in Xinjiang it became obvious that many were loyal to Wang while others were formed primarily in opposition to Wang and other leading Han Chinese in the region.  

Initially, Wang certainly held the upper hand. Apparently angered by the introduction of the Cultural Revolution into Xinjiang, which already had its own tensions without the added confusion of Red Guard elements, Wang himself went to Beijing in December of 1966. On January 26, 1967, the Military Commission of the Central Committee decided that areas on "China's first line of defence" such as Xinjiang were to postpone the Cultural Revolution in their regions. February 26, 1967, Zhou Enlai himself called for an end to the Cultural Revolution in Xinjiang, and by mid-March Wang was being heralded in the press as a true follower of Mao Zedong. It appeared that he had successfully opposed the introduction of the Cultural Revolution.  

But the forces unleashed in 1966 were not so easily deflected. In summer of 1967, there were violent and bloody clashes in Xinjiang. Red Guard bulletins claimed that truckloads of bodies were hauled away after clashes between Wang's August First Field Army and the Red Guard units who had entered the region.

Early in 1968, Saifudin, still Chairman of the Xinjiang region, became the object of Red Guard attacks when his house in Urumchi was ransacked. Zhou Enlai again intervened directly, reprimanding members of the "Red Second Headquarters" who were reportedly responsible for the incident.

Tension continued in the summer of 1968 when the first attacks began on national minority members of the regional government. Vice Chairman Iminov, an Uighur, and the ex-governor, Burhan Shahidi, were both attacked in the press and were subsequently stripped of their posts. But Wang Enmao and Saifudin seemed inviolate. When in 1968 the region announced the formation of its Revolutionary Committee, the new govern-

147. Pro-Wang groups were reportedly the "Xinjiang Red Revolutionary Rebel First Headquarters," and the Production and Construction Corps' "August First Field Army Swearing to Defend the Thought of Mao Zedong to the Death." Ibid.
152. Xinjiang and Tibet were the very last to announce the formation of these revolutionary government organs.
ment organ which replaced previous government organs throughout China, both Wang and Saifudin were listed as Committee members and remained on government rosters for the next two years as “responsible persons” in the region. The new head of the government was Long Shujin, a military commander from Hunan.

Despite guarantees that national minority rights and religious beliefs were to be respected, during the Cultural Revolution zealous Red Guard factions saw Islam as a holdover from feudal society and condemned it as one of the “Four Olds.” Copies of the Koran were reportedly burned and mosques and cemeteries desecrated.\(^\text{153}\)

Xinjiang Muslims’ tenuous ties with the Middle East which had been based on the pilgrimages of small groups from Xinjiang to Mecca in the 1950s and 1960s, halted during this period and such visits were not resumed until 1980. The Xinjiang branch of China’s Islamic Association disappeared as well re-emerging only with renewed government approval in the early 1980s.\(^\text{154}\)

The Cultural Revolution in Xinjiang was ultimately curtailed by circumstances peculiar to the region: in December 1968 three violent border clashes with the USSR took place near the city of Tacheng on the Soviet border. In May and June of 1969 further clashes occurred in the same area.\(^\text{155}\) This international threat to national security now took precedence over domestic politics and the Cultural Revolution, with its disruption and open confrontation, was brought to a halt in the region in the summer of 1969.

Although it appears that most of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution ended by the early 1970s in Xinjiang, as late as 1975 articles in the Xinjiang press still referred to “a handful of national splittist elements and counter-revolutionaries under the cloak of religion who throw themselves into the arms of the Soviet revisionists.”\(^\text{156}\) An atmosphere of unease continued.

Recovery from the Cultural Revolution was slow in Xinjiang. Only in 1973 was military leader Long Shujin removed as head of the Xinjiang Revolutionary Committee. He was replaced by Saifudin, former Chair-

154. Between 1955 and 1960 there were seven hajj missions to Mecca from Xinjiang led by the Chinese Islamic Association. These missions resumed in 1980. see Oskar Weggel, op.cit., p. 197.
man of the region, who, having successfully survived the Cultural Revolution, now consolidated a great deal of power in his own hands. By 1974 he was made the First Secretary of the Party and First Political Commissar of the PLA in Xinjiang, as well as Chairman of the Regional Revolutionary Committee. At the national level, he became an alternate to the Polit Bureau of the CCP’s Central Committee and was also named a Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Wang Enmao’s return to power in Xinjiang was somewhat later than Saifudin’s, but he, too, weathered the political storm and became First Secretary of the Party in Xinjiang once more in 1981.

With the death of Mao and the fall of the “Gang of Four” in 1976, the Cultural Revolution finally ended throughout China. In Xinjiang and other minority areas, national minority policy again shifted to a re-newed tolerance of national minority “special characteristics”. A new attempt to win the loyalties of the minorities began.157

One way in which the new shift in policy manifested itself was in the increasing number of national minorities appearing in government posts in regions like Xinjiang. For instance, of 11 Vice Chairmen serving in the regional government under Saifudin in 1973, only two were national minority members: Ismayil Aymat, an Uighur, and Zuya, a Kazak. In 1978, when the Xinjiang Regional People’s Congress convened under Han Chinese Chairman Wang Feng, five of the 13 Vice Chairmen were national minority.158

Since 1979, a clear effort has been made to promote national minority cadres to higher government posts. At the 1979 and 1983 People’s Congresses in Xinjiang, both of which were convened by Uighur Congress Chairman Tömör Dawumut, half of the serving Vice Chairmen were national minorities. The Provincial Government officials that these assemblies elected reflect the same proportion of Han to national minorities. The 1979 government, led by Ismayil Aymat, included a group of 12 Vice Chairmen: 6 of the 12 were from the minorities. Ismayil’s 1983 group of Vice Chairmen was smaller with only six Vice Chairmen and two alternates; but once again half were national minority members with three of

157. For the development among the Yi people in Yunnan see Thomas Heberer, Nationalität enpolitik und Ethnologie in der Volksrepublik China (Veröffentlichungen aus dem Übersee-Museum Bremen, Reihe D. Völkerkundliche Monographien, Bd. 11). Bremen 1982.

158. Xinjiang Weiwiuer Zizhiqü... pp. 311–316.
the Vice Chairmen and one alternate from the national minorities.\textsuperscript{159}

At lower levels of government, all chairmen of standing committees and many of the leadership posts are reportedly held by national minorities, except in the northernmost part of Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{160}

Concern has also been shown for the development of minority cadres in general. Prior to the Cultural Revolution the number of such cadres had grown from 12,841 in 1950 to 106,000 in 1965.\textsuperscript{161} However, after the Cultural Revolution the number had fallen to between 71,000 and 80,000 in 1974. By 1979 national minority cadres accounted for only 29\% of the regional total.\textsuperscript{162} Since the resumption of Party leadership under Wang Enmao in 1981, great efforts have been made to increase party membership and train cadres from among the national minorities. In 1983 the region reportedly had 181,860 national minority cadres – an increase of 75,000 over 1965. One reason for the increase given by recent Chinese sources is that the cases of former cadres who had evidently been expelled during the Cultural Revolution were investigated and many were re-instated in the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{163}

Chinese policies toward the minorities in Xinjiang since the end of the Cultural Revolution to the present have undergone a remarkable transformation. One of the most visible changes has been a resurgence of public observance of religious belief. Mosques throughout Xinjiang have been repaired and redecorated. Those which were destroyed or badly damaged during the Cultural Revolution are being rebuilt and Friday worship is once again a feature of Muslim life in northwest China.

In the region today the brimless Uighur cap is ubiquitous, as are jewelry and high heels for women. Signs appear in the old Arabic script which has now replaced the unpopular Latinized form.

These obvious signs of new tolerance toward the nationalities' special characteristics are also a part of the new phenomenon in the PRC to pro-

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid. In 1979 Ismayil Aymat was also a member of the Central Committee and a Secretary of the Regional Party Committee as well. For a comprehensive discussion on minority cadres in the 1950s and 1960s see James Nichols, \textit{Minority Nationality Cadres in Communist China}, Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford University 1969.


\textsuperscript{161} 1950 figure from \textit{SCMP} 1689, p. 115; 1965 figure is from \textit{Current Background} 775, p. 30. Other figures are in \textit{Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizihiqu} . . . , p. 53.


mote tourism all along the course of the ancient Silk Road. Hotels are being built to house hordes of new invaders intent not on plunder but on sightseeing in this vast cultural crossroads. Retaining local colour is now recognized as an important element in fostering tourism. Plans call for an increase in the number of tourists to the region as quickly as possible.164

As early as 1979 other kinds of visitors were also being encouraged. Xinjiang people of any nationality who left to resettle outside China were invited to return to visit relatives.165 A warm reception was assured them and such indeed has been the case. Kazaks and Uighurs in Turkey and Europe as well as Hui residents of Taiwan and elsewhere, for instance, have been welcomed back in recent years and have reported favorably on the conditions they have met there.166

Yet another manifestation of recent policies are the free markets to be found in major cities in the region. Imported blue jeans are sold by independent traders who have their stalls next to sellers of traditional wool carpets from Khotan and Kashgar. Kebab sellers do a thriving business on street corners as well as in the markets, the aroma tempting both Chinese and Muslim customers.

While all of the above changes appear to be welcomed by national minorities, they are unquestionably welcomed by the many Han Chinese who now form such a substantial proportion of the region’s population. In particular, Han Chinese who form part of a trade network that links Xinjiang gold to Taiwan-made watches and clothing are clearly benefiting from the new policies of individual enterprise. For both Han and Muslim, Xinjiang in the 1980s certainly has the look of an economic boom area.

In August 1986, to publicize the new look of Xinjiang, the third “All-China National Minority Games” were held in Urumchi. Hundreds of the nation’s minority athletes made the journey to the region to participate in this televised event. National and international coverage of these games added to the new stature of the region as a growth area. Xinjiang is becom-

164. See, for example, an article by Hu Zuyuan, “Tuchu ‘Qi’ Zi Fazhan Xinjiang lüyouye.” [“Stress the Feature of ‘Strange’ For Developing the Tourist Trade]. Xinjiang Shehui Kexue 1985:3, pp. 30–34. Pamphlets for tourists, in many languages including Russian, were readily available in Urumchi in 1986, a sign of the new “times” in Xinjiang.
165. See, for example, Beijing Radio, English. 8 Nov. 1979. “Ismayil Aymat Urges Contacts with Xinjiang Residents Abroad,” Broadcast. BBC 9 Nov. 1979.
ing China’s new “Old West” where the average income reportedly already surpasses that of many other regions in China.167

In the midst of what appears to be a new prosperity, however, notes of discord remain. Tensions between the ever-increasing number of Han Chinese and local Muslims appear to erupt at the slightest provocation. Visitors in 1986, for instance, could witness the arrogance of Han Chinese ticket sellers who speak only Mandarin Chinese, even to elderly Muslims who clearly speak only their own language — the use of which is supposedly protected by law. On Urumchi city buses, which are usually packed at any time of day, arguments seem inevitably to fall along nationality lines, pitting Muslim passengers against Chinese bus conductors and ticket sellers (victory usually going to the Muslims). These are small incidents but they clearly reflect the potential for more protracted and less easily reconcilable conflicts among local nationalities.

An area of possible future conflict lies in the region’s birth control policy. While Han Chinese couples are allowed only one child in Xinjiang as elsewhere in China, no such restrictions have applied to the national minorities. According to an interview with an official of the Minority Affairs Department of the Xinjiang government in 1983, there will be no change in this policy until the people of the national minorities themselves ask for such change.168 However, discussion on this sensitive issue has already begun in the Xinjiang region. Any national minority government official, for instance, is already being asked to set an example by limiting the size of his or her family.

The impact of these and other policy changes currently being promoted in Xinjiang may be among the most important changes for minorities in Xinjiang so far in this century. China’s search for an answer to the “national question” has now led to both increased prosperity and a return to tolerance of traditional cultural practices and of religion among minority peoples. Whether this constitutes the final Marxist Chinese solution to the many problems posed by an ethnically diverse population remains to be seen.

167. According to a 1985 pamphlet, the annual average income per capita for state wage earners in Xinjiang was 1,104 RMB or an average of 92 yuan a month, while savings were reportedly 208 RMB per capita. Average income among Uighurs may well be higher, as their complaints are more often about a shortage of consumer goods than about low wages; however, in view of the lack of figures for income among each nationality, this view remains purely impressionistic. For figures, see A Survey of Xinjiang Economic Development (Pamphlet in the series Xinjiang Today). Urumqi 1985. p. 13.
Policy in Xinjiang’s Pastoral Areas: The Kazaks

While it appears that Chinese authority over the settled districts and cities of Xinjiang is now well established, the extension of such authority to the pastoral areas has been more recent and appears to be much less certain. Although information on individual pastoral groups such as the Kazaks, with whom we are primarily concerned here, is rare in Chinese sources, there is some information available on the pastoral areas as a whole, and, recently, more detailed accounts of the three Kazak areas in Xinjiang have been published in China. From a careful reading of Chinese press reports and recent sources on Xinjiang, an outline of policy over the past four decades emerges that indicates prolonged resistance by this nomadic minority to the Chinese government in Xinjiang from 1949 onwards.

In current PRC literature on Xinjiang, great care is taken to stress that Xinjiang’s liberation in 1949 was peaceful. In September of 1949, the provincial government led by Burhan Shahidi wired its surrender to Mao Zedong, followed by the surrender of the Guomindang Garrison Commander, Tao Zhiyue, who thereby paved the way for the unresisted entrance of the PLA into the provincial capital in October of 1949. From the very limited information available, it appears that the PLA entry into the region as far as Urumchi was totally unopposed.

Urumchi at that time was, as now, a Chinese city. The PLA entrance into predominantly Muslim towns in the southern and northern areas remains undocumented by any neutral source, but as many cities were controlled by the large number of Guomindang troops then stationed in Xinjiang it is likely that resistance to the PLA was very limited. There is no question, however, that opposition to the PLA in the pastoral areas was both fierce and widespread. The full extent of this opposition is difficult to determine exactly, but it was of a scope wide enough to merit the PLA’s “Movement to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries of 1950–52” as well as a policy entitled “Political Struggle, Military Suppression” carried out by the PLA during the same period. During this counter-revolutionary campaign, some Kazak and other national minority leaders were captured and executed by the PLA for crimes ranging from murder and destruction of property to “estrangement of nationalities” in Xinjiang. As a result of this action, various groups of Kazaks and other minority refugees left the region between 1949–1952; many moved first to Muslim Pakistan or to Af-

ghanistan. Of these the majority of the Kazaks moved on to Turkey during the 1950s, while many Uighurs later settled in Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{170}

An amnesty was extended to groups who surrendered to the PLA. Such groups were pardoned because they had “rendered meritorious service” to the people or because they were willing to compensate the people for their crimes. Others were granted pardons because they convinced the PLA they had been forced into counter-revolutionary activities.\textsuperscript{171} Underlying these official reasons for surrender were other factors. Like many other traditional peoples, Kazaks and other nomadic groups were unwilling to leave their homelands. They therefore sought an accommodation with the new government, as they had been forced to do on many previous occasions in the long course of their relations with the Chinese. Certain, some were influenced by Communist propaganda and decided to follow the example of several Kazak leaders who had shifted allegiance to the CCP in the autumn of 1949 for reasons of their own.\textsuperscript{172}

There was evidently passive resistance to the PLA’s early attempts to persuade Kazaks to support the new government as well. An anecdote illustrates the problem: two Chinese political cadres reached a remote Kazak camp in the early 1950s and called all the Kazaks together in order to explain the new government’s policy toward minorities. The Kazaks listened politely and, after feasting in accordance with Kazak hospitality, they offered the cadres a place to sleep for the night. When the two awoke next morning, they discovered the entire camp had disappeared in the night.\textsuperscript{173} Whether such stories are true or not, it is clear that initial overtures to some Kazaks were not accepted.

After the PLA’s successful suppression campaign, the new government in Xinjiang felt compelled to call a special meeting in summer of 1952 in order to formulate a policy to guide work in the pastoral areas. It was decided, after the two preceding years of armed conflict, that the government would follow the principle of “democratic consultation” in pastoral areas. The government was to be guided by “three nos and two benefits”: these were \textit{bu dou, bu fen, bu huajieji} and \textit{mugong muzhu lingli} which can be translated as “no struggle, no redistribution, no differentiation between

\textsuperscript{170} Ingvar Svanberg, “Turkistani refugees” . . .
\textsuperscript{171} Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhiqu . . ., p. 39.
\textsuperscript{172} For instance, the family of former Guomindang official Qatewan chose to support the new government, a decision for which many Kazaks outside Xinjiang today still respect her.
\textsuperscript{173} Interview with Uighur refugee from Ili, see footnote 96.
classes” and “benefits to both herders and herd owners.”174 In other words, the policy of class struggle adopted elsewhere in China to eliminate landlords’ power over the peasants was not to be followed in Xinjiang among the nomads. Rather, the CCP worked toward establishing a basis for later reforms on socialist lines by reaching out to the local peasant/herder. In keeping with this line, both the herders and the herd owners were assured of their rights under the new constitution and, according to PRC sources, practical assistance was given to herders in order to win their support and confidence. Assistance included animal disease prevention work, the killing of wolves and of rodents, cutting fodder for animals, as well as offering financial assistance in the form of loans and through the establishment of co-ops to buy herders’ produce. In these early years, according to a refugee from Ili, no one spoke of communism, only of democracy.175

Tax reforms were also inaugurated. Half of the herders were initially exempt from any tax, while others had their taxes lowered.

Such policies bore fruit. Rather than killing their flocks and herds to avoid their takeover by the government, as happened in the USSR, the number of domestic animals in Xinjiang in the first four years of CCP governance increased from 11.8 million in 1949 to 15.4 million in 1953.176

In 1953, the Administrative Committee of Northwest China resolved to grant aid to the Kazaks in order to assist them in transition to settled life. Such a transition has consistently been viewed by the CCP as a necessary prerequisite for the development of socialism among the nomads. Between 1949 and 1953, grants amounting to 14,800,000,000 yuan were given to livestock raisers in Xinjiang. In 1953 through 1954 another 12 billion were allotted, followed in 1954–1956 by a further 2.7 million to aid livestock production in Xinjiang.177 By 1956, Xinjiang sheep supplied 60% of all China’s wool.178

Some of these funds most likely did go to Kazaks to help encourage their cooperation with the new government as well as to increase the livestock holdings within Xinjiang. However, there were, by the mid-1950s, large numbers of Han Chinese also engaged in livestock raising. No doubt some of this money went to the Production and Construction Corps of the PLA which operated 16 livestock farms in 1955.179 Funds also must have gone to

175. Interview with Uighur refugee from Ili.
the new state-run stock farms — 42 of which were run separately from the Production and Construction Corps projects. 180

While the extending of financial aid was one means of persuading the Kazaks to support the new government, the CCP also looked upon the holding of elections as another means of establishing its authority in Xinjiang. Local elections were held in the region beginning of May, 1954 “almost everywhere” in Xinjiang. Elections were not, however, held in the pastoral areas. A Soviet observer noted the reason:

This is explained by the fact that here [in the non-voting area] the necessary conditions had not been created and socialist transformation had hardly been carried out, because these districts are cattle-raising and semi-cattle-raising districts. 181

When work did begin, the changeover from private to communal ownership followed a similar pattern in the three Kazak autonomous units, the largest of which was the Ili-Kazak Autonomous Prefecture. No real work was begun in the collectivization of herdsmen and herd owners in Ili until after 1954. In that year, a government meeting was called to discuss programs, and work subsequently began to bring herdsmen into herder co-operatives. By spring of 1956, there were 2,300 mutual aid teams — the precursors of the co-operatives — which included one third of the district’s herdsmen. By 1957, the first co-operatives were established: 558 of these included 40.5% of the district’s herdsmen. A year later, there were 939, including 71.5% of the herdsmen. 182

Many of these co-ops were jointly held by the state and by private individuals who had been the area’s large herd owners before 1949. In 1958 there were 59 of these state-private co-ops bringing interest to herdsmen of 2–4%.

Similar gradual methods were followed in the two autonomous Kazak counties. In Barköl, the process began earlier. In 1952, a former landlord, Hawan (who later became the Deputy Head of the County) led 40 households of herdsmen in Sujizaoyuan to establish the first mutual aid team. Organization on a wider scale began in 1954 and by 1955 there were 21 mutual aid teams in Barköl. These reportedly included 95% of all the herdsmen, the total population of which at that time included about 13,000 Kazaks. Com-

munes were established as early as 1956 in the county when 69 households joined two state-run communes for herders. In 1957, herder co-ops increased to 25 and included 699 households. Joint state-private enterprises were also set up and at the end of 1957, 1,121 households or 92% of all the Kazak families were in some form of co-op.  

In Mori-Kazak Autonomous County the same policy of “no struggle, no division, no class differentiation” and the “two benefits” was followed. Mori’s total population was smaller than Barköl with only 22,000 people in 1953, less than 7,100 of whom were Kazak. Work therefore went faster than in the other two Kazak areas. Initially, twelve households of herders were organized into two mutual-aid teams and each of these was given 250 sheep. Three more teams were quickly organized after this. Another 304 herder households were given loans to establish themselves in agriculture. By 1955, there were thirty-six mutual aid teams which had herds and farmed as well. By 1956, 75% of the county’s Kazaks were in co-ops and in 1958, 24 pastoral communes were organized, incorporating 86% of the herders. Joint state-private enterprises also existed, and these included 18 herd-owner families.

By autumn of 1959 and the Great Leap Forward, official reports from Xinjiang claimed that the process of changing nomads over to a socialist economy was “basically complete.” Saifudin, Chairman of the Regional Government, explained the process:

With regard to the transformation of the herd-owner economy, we have adopted a policy of “buying out” the capital of the herd owners, in accordance with which public-private jointly operated stock farms were formed, with the private herd owners retaining their shares in these farms and receiving dividends out of these shares. After the establishment of the people’s communes, these shares of animals were converted into money at a certain price and a fixed interest was paid the private owners, and the private owners given suitable jobs in the farms.

After a suitable period, all these public-private jointly operated stock farms will be gradually transformed into State-owned farms. With regard to the transformation of the individual economy of the herdsman, the same measures as taken in agricultural cooperativization were adopted. The animals owned by these herdsmen were pooled


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Livestock</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>14,430,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>12,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>15,430,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>17,100,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>20,460,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>22,230,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>24,200,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>27,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>26,730,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>30,240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>36,388,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As a result of these careful measures, Saifudin declared that the transition had been a smooth one, “losses were avoided,” and expansion of herds was encouraged.

However, figures available for the total number of animals in Xinjiang since 1949 do not really support Saifudin’s optimistic assessment of the impact of the collectivization movement among the Kazaks. Between 1950 and 1957, the number grew by approximately a million animals a year.

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However, in the next 8 years, from 1958 to 1965, the total increase was only 2 million or an average of some 250,000 animals a year. It seems fairly clear that the Kazaks had not accepted the change to socialism as easily or as peacefully as the official reports claimed (Tables 6 and 7).

The press also tried to present a rosy picture of Chinese attempts to settle Kazaks in new villages and to end their nomadic lifestyle. In 1960 glowing reports described how the villagers now received the benefits of education and medical care. The former hardships they had suffered due to their nomadic existence had disappeared in the new lifestyle advocated by the government.\(^\text{186}\)

Such glowing reports are at sharp variance with political development between 1958 and 1960. In 1958 national minority leaders of the newly established Ili-Kazak Autonomous Prefecture were purged. Among top minority cadre ousted in the “Rectification Campaign” was the Kazak chairman of the district, Yahuda (Chia-ho-ta), a man who had, ironically enough, vigorously denounced local nationalists the previous year.\(^\text{187}\) In January of 1959, another policy change was made which affected minorities: the legal age for marriage was adjusted to conform more closely to the national average. Previously, marriage age had been 18 for men and 16 for women, although marriages were often negotiated at much earlier ages in accordance with Muslim tradition. The new law decreed that the age for men was 20 and for women 18. Monogamy was to be enforced, as was the legal sanction of divorce, because these measures were, according to the press, “spontaneously sought” by the masses.\(^\text{188}\)

As noted previously, the period between 1958 and 1962 was a period of harshness in Chinese dealings with national minorities and conditions in many of Xinjiang’s pastoral areas declined during this time. It was no doubt in reaction to this crackdown that many people, including many Kazaks from the Ili district, crossed the border to seek asylum in the USSR in 1962.\(^\text{189}\)

Another factor in the continued dissatisfaction of Kazaks with the government established in 1949 was its policy of re-settlement of Han Chinese in minority areas such as Xinjiang. Migration was heaviest into Xinjiang in

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186. NCNA Urumchi, July 29, 1960, transl. in SCMP, 2312, p. 23.
187. Guangming Ribao, Sept. 11, 1958, transl. in SCMP, 2108, p. 11.
188. Xinjiang Ribao, Jan. 31, 1959, transl. in SCMP, 2108, p. 11.
the period between 1959 and 1961 — and some of these settlers were sent to the Manas River valley, which had been Kazak grazing grounds in much of the 20th century. Others were sent to various sites in northern Xinjiang, home of a majority of the Kazaks. While locations of many of the new settlers are unclear, the population figures for various cities in northern Xinjiang indicate that several of them received fairly substantial numbers of new residents before 1965. Cities in the northern part of the region which grew include the town of Shihezi, which grew from a small village to a town of 70,000 by 1964, the small town of Usu which reached 200,000 in 1981, the new town of Kuytun which grew from a small village to a city of 50,000 by 1985, and the provincial capital itself, which grew from 80,000 to 850,000 by 1981. As oil fields in northern Xinjiang were developed in the 1950s the Han Chinese population in these areas also grew. Karamai, for
example, had only a few houses before 1949 but it had 50,000 people by 1959.  

Another source of dissatisfaction among Kazaks as well as among other national minority groups was the growth of the Production and Construction Corps in Xinjiang. By 1958 the existence of this force had already become a target of many national minorities who resented this massive Han Chinese organization that flourished throughout northern Xinjiang. According to the press:

The opposition to the PCC in Xinjiang PLA military district is the most outstanding expression of the opposition to the Han people engaging in socialist construction in Xinjiang, for most of the participants are Han people [...] Some people may say that they do not oppose or attack the PCC itself, but oppose and attacks its mistakes and short-comings. If they really do so, [...] they are doing a good thing. But the local nationalists do not do so at all. They do not love the PCC but attack it. They oppose the PLA and the Han people engaging in socialist construction in Xinjiang.  

By 1960, the Production and Construction Corps had established 182 State Farm enterprises and by 1961 was cultivating 1/3 of the region's arable land on mechanized farms. By 1965 the Corps had reclaimed more than 10 million mu. Some of this land was certainly in areas that once provided pastures for Kazak herds. Between 1965 and 1985, the Production and Construction Corps continued to increase its influential role in the local economy. By 1984, for instance, it accounted for 1/4 the total value of Xinjiang's total output and employed over one million workers. In addition to the State Farms (the number of which was cut to 169 by 1984), it also ran 729 industrial enterprises. As the Production and Construction Corps projects remain concentrated in the northern third of the region, its presence doubtless has a direct impact on the Kazak population of Xinjiang. 

Having already been influenced by these local political and economic developments the Kazaks were next imbroiled in the turmoil that resulted from the unleashing of the Cultural Revolution in China in 1966. Information from Chinese and other sources published since the end of the Cultural Revolution agree that this period of political upheaval was extremely

190. The figures from Linda Benson, *National Minority Policy* . . . . 
difficult for China’s national minorities as a whole. Although, as noted in preceding pages, the Cultural Revolution officially ended in Xinjiang in 1969, the region nonetheless continued to be influenced by the Cultural Revolution until its conclusion in 1976.

Like other national minorities in Xinjiang, the Kazaks, too, were drawn into the internecine struggles. Kazaks were persecuted on various pretexts, according to a Hui official interviewed in Xinjiang in 1983. Some were labelled “local nationalists” and were accused of having relations with foreign countries, namely the Kazakstan Republic of the Soviet Union. Kazak cadres were jailed as a result of such accusations.  

In the Barköl-Kazak Autonomous County, which had a Kazak population of between 10,000 and 15,000 in 1966, there were several serious incidents, including a case of people choosing to flee the country, which presumably involved Kazaks fleeing to the neighbouring USSR. Other incidents probably involved more Han Chinese than national minorities as

they occurred in the principal county coalmine and on Dahe Commune.\textsuperscript{196} After the Cultural Revolution ended, the government announced that in Barköl alone there had been 1,410 cases of erroneous accusations. Many of these cases were investigated and the people concerned were cleared of any wrong-doing. Another 320 cases, one of which involved 66 former Guomindang members, were handled under a new policy of “forgiving past deeds.”\textsuperscript{197}

Much less detailed information is available on the course of the Cultural Revolution in the other two Kazak minority areas. But there are indications of the extent of the Cultural Revolution’s impact in the figures for total animal population in the three areas and for gross production of food stuffs in two of them. The losses were staggering. Officially, in the Ili Prefecture alone some 30\% of all animals died in 1969, indicating that while the Cultural Revolution was officially supposed to have ended in that year,
turmoil continued.\textsuperscript{198} Losses were also grave in the Altai area; by 1975 the region had not yet regained 1965 production levels.\textsuperscript{199} These losses were only slowly replaced. Even by 1975, the overall number of animals in Xinjiang was still a million less that the 1965 figures. See Table 7 for comparison of the three area's losses.

Agricultural production also fell during the 1966–1976 decade, in both the Ili Prefecture and in Mori County (No data is available for Barköl County, which may possibly be because it suffered more in the Cultural Revolution than the other two). Although it is unclear when the Ili area began to recover from the fall in production it experienced in the Cultural Revolution, the Prefecture evidently regained and then passed its 1966 level of production only in the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{200} In Mori County, the greatest losses clearly occurred between 1966 and 1974. In 1966 the county had produced a total of 54 million jin of food products, but in 1974 this had fallen to 19 million jin.\textsuperscript{201}

Production in both animal and agricultural industries has now apparently recovered. While political stability has certainly been one factor, another important element is the great population increase in all the Kazak areas, caused by the large numbers of Han Chinese who have moved into the three autonomous areas.

In the Ili Prefecture before 1949, Kazaks were the overwhelming majority of the population, numbering nearly 400,000. In contrast, Han Chinese numbered only 57,494. By 1982, the Chinese population had reached nearly 1.4 million, while the Kazaks numbered 709,000. As many of the Han Chinese are agricultural and industrial workers, their presence is certainly a major factor behind the increased agricultural output.\textsuperscript{202}

During the 1949–1953 period, the traditionally Kazak area of Barköl had seen its population double. Increasing numbers of Han Chinese settled in the county in the 1950s and 1960s so that by 1979 they constituted a majority of 60,900 in comparison to 20,000 Kazaks. The re-settlement and the resulting drastic demographic change may be one factor behind the animal losses in 1958 and 1965, and may also explain why the area was evidently so deeply affected by the Cultural Revolution, which may well have been fuelled by the increased numbers of Han Chinese.\textsuperscript{203}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{198} Yili Hasake . . . , p. 84.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid. p. 84.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid. p. 84.
\textsuperscript{201} Mulei Hasake . . . , p. 58.
\textsuperscript{202} Yili Hasake . . . , p. 13.
\textsuperscript{203} Balikun Hasake . . . , p. 108.
\end{flushleft}
Table 7. Animal Population in the Three Kazak Autonomous Units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ili Prefecture</th>
<th>Altai Area</th>
<th>Barköl County</th>
<th>Mori County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>151,870</td>
<td>174,800</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>215,400</td>
<td>116,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>8,530,000</td>
<td>2,654,000</td>
<td>188,000</td>
<td>310,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>7,352,000</td>
<td>2,054,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>8,540,000</td>
<td>488,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>280,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Agricultural Production in the Three Kazak Autonomous Units. (Figures in jin).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ili Prefecture Gross Product</th>
<th>Barköl County Gross Product</th>
<th>Mori County Gross Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>340,000,000</td>
<td>No information available</td>
<td>16,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>840,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1,350,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>54,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>19,881,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>41,750,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>52,580,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>92,600,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1,630,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources for both sets of figures are: 1944 figures are from *Tianshan Yuegan* October 15, 1947, pp. 16–17. All other figures are derived from data given in the following three Chinese sources: *Yili Hasake Zizhizhou Gaikuang* (Ürümqi, 1985); on animals, pp. 81–84; on agricultural output, pp. 97 and 99; *Balikun Hasake Zizhixian Gaikuang* (Ürümqi, 1984), on animals see p. 117; on agriculture no information is given; *Mulei Hasake Zizhixian Gaikung* (Ürümqi, 1984) on animals pages 4, 39, 45, 51, and 57; on agriculture, pp. 77–78.

One possible reason for the lack of data on Barköl is the fact that industrial output has become of great importance; total industrial output reached 15 times that of 1949, and was valued at over 7 million Renminbi in 1979. See *Balikun* . . . , p. 134.
Table 9. Demographic Changes in the Three Kazak Areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hi-Kazak Autonomous Prefecture</th>
<th>Barkol-Kazak Autonomous County</th>
<th>Mori-Kazak Autonomous County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazaks</td>
<td>383,569</td>
<td>410,750</td>
<td>709,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>57,994</td>
<td>1,393,500</td>
<td>11,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uighur</td>
<td>90,222</td>
<td>470,700</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>21,309</td>
<td>211,800</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongol</td>
<td>43,164</td>
<td>52,100</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>759,297</td>
<td>775,000</td>
<td>2,933,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Mori-Kazak Autonomous County was also settled by Han Chinese in proportionately large numbers. Although the actual periods of growth in the Han Chinese population are unclear, by 1979 there were 57,000 Chinese in comparison with 13,000 Kazaks, a drastic change from the almost 50/50 division of Han Chinese and Kazaks in the pre-1949 period. This strong Han Chinese presence in Mori is certainly reflected in the agricultural output figures for the county in the late 1970s. Figures given in Table 7 indicate extremely heavy losses between 1966 and 1975 when the total output fell by 35 million jin. This suggests that the Cultural Revolution was most intense among the Han Chinese agricultural workers who may have stopped producing to participate in the political struggle. Whether such was the case or not, when order was restored, production soared. From a post-Cultural Revolution low of only 19 million jin in 1974, the county’s total agricultural output reached 92 million jin in 1979. Mori is clearly changing from a traditional pastoral economy to agriculture and industry (especially mining) and this changeover is the direct result of Han Chinese movement into this former pastoral region.204

In addition to the increased Han Chinese population, another factor which has helped to boost production – both in Xinjiang and throughout China – is the new policies being promoted by the government under

204. *Mulei Hasake* . . . , p. 3.
Deng Xiaoping. One of these new policies since 1980 has involved the dismantling of the commune system and an upsurge in private enterprise. The influence of this change in policy has clearly reached Xinjiang’s urban centers, where free markets have proliferated, but the exact situation in the rural, pastoral areas is less clear. It is not known, for instance, whether herds and grazing lands have been divided. However, a description of the current situation in one Kazak area is outlined in Chapter 5 of this work, which describes a Kazak settlement near the capital city of Urumchi.

Another of the policies promoted by the central government since 1980 is to publicize the nation’s ethnic minorities and, specifically, to make known the role of the autonomous government system in China. As noted before, the autonomous system was to ensure a national minority voice in local governments. In the early 1950s an attempt was made to ensure that in the Kazak autonomous areas there were large numbers of Kazaks present as delegates at the People’s Congresses and in the Standing Committees of the Congresses at all levels. In 1952, the Ili Prefecture’s People’s Congress had 271 representatives; the Kazaks, who then constituted 53% of the population, had 50% of the delegates with the rest divided between the Uighurs (26%), the Han Chinese (7%) and the Mongols (3%), with remaining seats going to small national minorities like the Xibo and the Tatar.205 For Barköl’s 13,000 Kazaks, the situation in the early 1950s is less clear, as few details are available on the People’s Congresses held in this county. However, in 1954, the Standing Committee of the Barköl County People’s Congress had a total of 19 members, 10 of whom were Kazaks, making their 52% presence on the Committee greater than their proportion of the population which was then about 31%. The Chairman of the County Government was also Kazak, supported by a Han Chinese deputy.206

A similar pattern was seen in the Mori County’s People’s Congress where of 81 members, 49% were Kazak, although the Kazaks only constituted 34% of the total county population at the time. Han Chinese, who were more than half of the population, had only 38% of the delegates, with the remaining seats distributed among other national minorities in the county.207

Since 1980, the percentage of Kazaks in all the Kazak autonomous areas has decreased due to the settlement of Han Chinese in these areas, but the percentage of Kazaks at the People’s Congresses has remained high. For

207. Mulei Hasake . . . , p. 47.
instance, in the Ili Prefecture the 1983 People’s Congress of 555 seats included 40% Kazaks although they accounted for only 24% of the Prefecture’s total population. On the Standing Committee they held 39% of the 43 seats. In Mori, the 15 representatives to the County’s People’s Congress included 6 Kazaks, although Kazaks were only 17% of the county’s greatly changed population. No details are available on Barköl’s national minority participation in local government, although it is known that the 1985 head of the county government was a Kazak.

The People’s Congresses are primarily consultative bodies, which have only met irregularly over the past 30 years. The power wielded by these bodies is therefore extremely limited. While the Standing Committees have a rather greater role in influencing policy, they, too remain subordinate to the local Party organization. In any case, a majority of membership on these Committees is never held by any one national minority group but is divided among all nationalities resident in the area. The percentage of Kazaks in the Congresses or on the Committees does not equate to politi-

208. Yili Hasake . . . p. 64.
cal power within the three Kazak autonomous units. It does, however, demonstrate that the Chinese government in Beijing is concerned about the appearance of national minority figures in such governments and that, despite the movement of Han Chinese into these traditional Kazak homelands, the government is also concerned with continuing the autonomous system in minority areas.

The Chinese Communist Party has also been concerned over the number of national minority cadres and Party members. As local leaders such individuals are an important link in the plan to integrate minorities into the mainstream of Chinese socialism. Within the Kazak areas of Xinjiang, the CCP has sought to extend its base of support by recruiting and training Kazaks as well as other national minority members for party work and, eventually, for party membership. While national minority membership as a whole declined during the period of the Cultural Revolution, party membership began expanding in the 1980s. In Ili, in 1982, out of a total 78,002 cadres, 21,796 were Kazaks, or 3% of the prefecture’s total Kazak population. Barköl and Mori County Kazaks have been slightly less willing to become active in party work, with only 2% of the 1982 Kazak population in each county being classified as cadres. As for CCP membership, the Ili Prefecture has 18,171 Kazak members, while Barköl has roughly the same number of party members as cadre, namely 363 cadres and 392 party members. The lowest number of Party members is in Mori, where of the 308 Kazak cadre, only 30% are members of the Chinese Communist Party. 209

The full impact of the more tolerant policy line being taken in national minority areas since 1980 will take some time to assess. However, the current direction is clearly indicated in several sensitive areas of policy concerned with the continuation of traditional Kazak culture. These include language policy, education policy, and policy toward traditional arts and music. Discussion of these especially important cultural policies begins with a description of the Kazak language and the various language reforms initiated since 1949.

The Development of the Kazak Language

The Kazak language, Qazaq tili, belongs to the so-called Kipchak languages which are sometimes called the Northwestern or, according to professor Karl H. Menges’ terminology, the Aralo-Caspian Turkic lan-

209. Yili Hasake . . ., p. 63; Balikun Hasake . . ., p. 106; Mulei Hasake . . ., p. 49.
Soviet scholars classify Kazak within the Kipchak-Nogai subgroup. The Kazak language is related to the Kirghiz, Kazan Tatar, Mishar Tatar, Bashkir, Nogai and Karaim languages, as well as to some dialects of Özbek and to the Karakalpak language. There is a high degree of mutual

intelligibility among these languages. During the 19th century the intellectuals of Central Asia used a common literary language called Chagatay, written with the Arabic script. At the end of the last century several spoken dialects of Central Asian Turkic languages were written for the first time, and these gradually replaced the increasingly archaic Chagatay form. Despite similarities and mutual intelligibility, the Soviet language policy has been to emphasize the differences between the languages. For instance, while many scholars in the West regard Karakalpak as a codified dialect of Kazak rather than as a separate language, in the USSR it is treated as a distinct language in its own right.

By tradition, Kazak has been written with an Arabic script. As a result of script reform in 1924 it was well adapted to the Kazak language. Kazak
intellectuals in the Soviet Union, therefore, were among those who most strongly objected to Soviet language reform which introduced a Latin script for written Kazak. Nonetheless, when it was finally adopted in 1928 it was well received among Kazaks, many of whom became literate for the first time in this written script. In 1940, a second reform movement introduced modified Cyrillic scripts for all the Turkic languages, including Kazak; this is the form used in the USSR for the Kazak language today.

The Kazak language is very uniform, but some scholars still divide it into several dialects. These dialects have, however, never been studied in any detail. The divergence between the dialects is said to be rather limited, but traditionally scholars divide Kazak into southern and northern dialects. The written language used in the Soviet Union is based on the northern dialect. A newer Soviet classification divides the Kazak dialects into a northern, southern and a western dialect group.\footnote{211} The Kazak of China are considered as belonging to the southern dialects.\footnote{212}

The Kazak language in China was written with the same Arabic alphabet that had been used by the Soviet Kazaks until 1928. In China, the use of the Arabic script continued until the mid-1950s when the Chinese government began its own language reform program. At a conference held in Urumchi in August 1956 it was resolved that Kazak, as well as the other Turkic languages of Xinjiang should be written with Cyrillic scripts. The


\footnote{212} For a description see Hasakeyv Jianzhi. [A Brief Introduction to the Kazak Language] Beijing 1985, which also includes a short wordlist (pp. 205—244).
Özbek and the Tatars were to use the same Cyrillic script as was used by their Soviet counterparts, while the Uighurs, Kazaks, and Kirghiz were to use a modified Cyrillic script.\footnote{213}

Attempts to introduce the Cyrillic script, however, appear to have been rather half-hearted. According to the proposed plans, it was expected to take some ten years before the new written forms would be fully utilized. But worsening Sino-Soviet relations apparently interrupted attempts to change to the Cyrillic script. There is no evidence that any Kazak literature, for instance, was ever printed with the Cyrillic script in China.\footnote{214} It is, however, quite possible that Kazak books printed with the Cyrillic script in Soviet Union were used for a time in China as is still the case among the Kazaks in the Mongolian People’s Republic.

In 1958, the Chinese authorities announced that a Latin script would be developed for the minority languages in China instead of the Cyrillic. According to an official report, this script reform was necessary “because the complicated written form [i.e. the Arabic script] now in use prevents the languages from meeting the needs of the swift development of socialist construction.”\footnote{215} The Kazak Latin script was based on the Pinyin system used for phonetic transcription of the Chinese language.

In 1966, a massive campaign was launched to introduce the new scripts among the nationalities of Xinjiang. A Kazak newspaper in Ili, as well as two Uighur magazines, had completely changed to the new form by 1966.\footnote{216}

During the Cultural Revolution very little literature in any language was published in China, and there was little information available about the progress of the language reform. Only in 1973 was it announced that the new scripts were widely accepted by the local minorities of Xinjiang and were now used by every middle school and primary school where instruction was given in Uighur and Kazak.\footnote{217}


\footnote{214. Cf. below.}

\footnote{215. \textsc{NCNA}, June 22, 1958, in \textit{SCMP}, 1799, p. 28.}


It is clear today, however, that the Latin script was never widely accepted by Xinjiang Turkic speakers. In 1982 the authorities decided to reintroduce the Arabic script again among the Uighurs, Kazaks, and Kirghiz. The Mongols were allowed to reintroduce the Mongol script, and the Xibo once again used their traditional Manchu script.\footnote{218}

Today, most of the Kazak books published in China are printed with the Arabic script although there were still some books in Kazak and Uighur written in the Latin script available in the bookstores in Xinjiang in 1986. The two main bilingual Kazak dictionaries, as well as Uighur dictionaries, recently published in China were still being printed with the Latin script. According to information obtained in Urumchi in 1986, new dictionaries are being prepared.\footnote{219}


As a result of the changes in language policy over the past decades, there is now a phenomenon in Xinjiang of a young generation of Uighurs and Kazaks, who were in school in the late 1970s, who can not read their own language in the Arabic script. With the re-introduction of the traditional form, the Turkic minorities of Xinjiang now have a lost generation illiterate in their own mother tongue. However, young Turkic-speaking people (Uighurs and Kazaks) interviewed in Urumchi in 1986 can read Chinese — and therefore have access to the same materials as Turkic-speakers, albeit not in traditional written form.

The Education System

Although only a few figures are available on Kazak literacy and on education in Xinjiang either before or after the establishment of Communist rule in 1949, they offer some indication of formal education in this century.

Prior to 1949, Kazak children went to Koran schools where they were taught by religious teachers, using the Arabic script. Since most of the nomads seldom had any use for a written language, the extent of literacy among the Kazaks is uncertain. Most sources say that the illiteracy rate was very high among the Kazaks until 1949. However, some efforts toward educating Kazaks were made in Xinjiang during the Republican era. In the 1930s, the warlord Sheng Shicai introduced some progressive reforms, including expansion of education opportunities. Local nationalities were allowed to open their own schools. There were also cultural associations for Uighurs, Kazaks and others which supported schools and also conducted teacher training classes and adult education courses. The degree to which Kazaks had access to such education programmes is not known. Figures for July 1938, however, state that Xinjiang had 1,540 Uighur schools with 89,804 pupils, 275 Kazak schools with 14,322 pupils, 1 Hui school with 44 pupils and 24 Mongol schools with 917 pupils. A recent Chinese source states that in 1941 81,900 textbooks were published in Uighur for elementary schools, 15,400 in Kazak, 12,400 in Mongol and 109,000 in Chinese. This publishing activity, however, declined and almost stopped between 1944 and 1949.

The only tertiary education available in Xinjiang was at the so-called "College of Law and Political Science" in Urumchi. According to a Chi-

nese report, it had about 100 students in the mid-1930s, including a special class for Uighurs and Kazaks.  

Wealthier members of all the nationalities sought to educate their children outside the province. Sons of such families were sent to Chinese cities as well as to the Soviet Union in the 1930s for technical and/or university education. The wealthiest families have by tradition been able to send their children to the Middle East and Europe. For example, Mesut Sabri, the governor of Xinjiang in 1947–1948 received his education as a medical doctor in Istanbul, and his successor, Burhan Shahidi, had gone to Germany for his education.

The Sheng progressive policies were, however, soon abandoned. But with the outbreak of the Ili Rebellion in 1944 a new step toward schools for the nationalities was taken. As a trading center, the city of Yining (Gulja) near the Soviet border was already greatly influenced by the Soviet Union. In 1941 a Tatar school had been established offering a modern education; also, the Russian school in Yining was reportedly regarded as better than any of the local schools.

A contemporary Chinese source states that the illiteracy rate among the Kazaks in the three northwesternmost border districts of Xinjiang was over 80% in the mid-1940s. By 1944, however, there were only 79 elementary schools in these districts with about 6,200 students altogether. In 1949 the number of elementary schools had increased to 489 with 52,719 students. In addition, there were 30 middle schools with 1,610 students. In the town of Yining there were separate middle schools for girls and boys. One leader of the Ili rebels, Ahmetjan Kasimi, also established a Science and Technological School in Yining in 1946 to train specialists in government, animal husbandry, finance and in technical training. Although the total number of Kazaks receiving any formal education before 1949 was small, there was great respect for learning and a small number at least was literate. An educated elite certainly existed on the eve of establishment of the new government in 1949.

An important part of new policy inaugurated by the CCP after 1949 concerned national minority education. The first priority in this area was to increase the number of schools and to reduce illiteracy among the local

224. Interview with Xibo from Ili now living in Taiwan.
Table 10. Numbers of Schools and Students 1952–1983.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary schools</th>
<th>Primary pupils</th>
<th>Secondary schools</th>
<th>Secondary pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td></td>
<td>307,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>16,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td></td>
<td>365,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>28,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>400,000(^1)</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>4,434</td>
<td>718,000</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>61,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>146,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4,500(^1)</td>
<td>957,000(^1)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000,000(^1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>10,051</td>
<td>1,292,000</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>8,261</td>
<td>1,941,000</td>
<td>2,123</td>
<td>873,657</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Includes both primary and secondary


population. Information on the expansion of the education system in Xinjiang is summarized in Table 10 which indicates the increasing number of students of all nationalities, including Han Chinese. As stated above, there has been a large increase of Han Chinese in the region during the post-1949 period and their presence has served to swell the number of students since 1956.

These figures can be compared with recently published information about the number of national minority students since 1949. In 1957, 424,500 national minority students were reported to be in elementary school, while the number in middle schools was 49,500. In 1965, the numbers were 704,002 and 76,000 respectively. In 1983, the total number of middle schools for national minorities only was given as 1,509.\(^{226}\)

Recently published sources also give information about the progress of education in the three Kazak autonomous areas within Xinjiang. This data gives some indication of the development of education in predominantly Kazak areas.

\(^{226}\) *Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhiqu* . . . , p. 206.
Fig. 10. Front page of a primary school text book in Kazak published in 1986, Uranchi.
In the three autonomous Kazak areas of Xinjiang, the new PRC government initially seems to have followed the Soviet system of using tent schools. In the Barköl area, there were reportedly 10 tent schools for Kazaks on an elementary school level, with 328 students in 1951. While there was some progress in the expansion of education among nomadic families, the pace was very slow and the authorities admitted a serious lag in the education among the nomads. In 1972, the local regional press stated that in nomadic areas, the popularization of primary education was the central task of education. Reports from 1974 indicate that part of the effort to educate the nomadic groups included part-time study classes but they also continued the system with mobile tent schools that moved with the nomads. Today the nomads’ children attend boarding schools. In 1983 there were 265 such elementary boarding schools in Xinjiang and 116 middle boarding schools in the pastoral areas.

Recent sources also comment upon the progress of education in the three Kazak autonomous areas within Xinjiang. In Barköl, the number of students going to school in town increased from only 45 in 1949 to 460 in 1952 in elementary school; in middle school 90 students increased to more than 290. In 1965 there was a total of 7,700 elementary students in 27 schools in Barköl. Seven elementary schools were for the Kazaks only, and were attended by 1,500 pupils. At the middle school level there were only 110 students. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, however, school attendance has increased. By 1979 there were 3,379 Kazak students in elementary school, and 549 in the middle school.

The information from the Mori Kazak Autonomous County is more scant. In 1949 there were only 11 schools, 24 teachers and 600 students in the area, among whom only 31 were national minority students. By 1964 there were 29 elementary schools with 4,500 students but there is no information on how many Kazaks this included. There was only one middle school, with 400 students, among whom were 100 Kazaks. There were 240 elementary school teachers including 45 Kazak and other national minorities. After the Cultural Revolution, the increased population in Mori was reflected in the number of elementary school students which reached

228. Balikut Hasake . . . , p. 141.
229. Linda Benson, National Minority Policy . . . , p. 205 based on Urumchi Radio broadcast reports.
20,305 in 1981. About 1/4 or 4,315 were students of the national minorities. Seventeen of the county’s elementary schools were in pastoral areas and three middle schools had been established for national minorities only. Another 13 middle schools included 11 for Han Chinese only, and 2 for both Han and national minorities.232

For the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture, home of the majority of the Kazak population in Xinjiang, we only have information from more recent years. In 1966, there were 880 elementary schools with 169,579 students and 69 middle schools with 23,661 students. No information on the number of Kazaks or other national minorities is given. In 1982 there were 842 elementary schools for national minorities alone, with a total of 231,128 students; 112,128 of these were Kazaks. At middle school level, 204 schools were for national minorities, with a total of 81,491 students, among them 38,984 Kazaks.

Serving areas which remained predominantly nomadic were 125 boarding schools for nomad children with 29,901 students by 1982. As of the mid-1980s, about 80% of the herders’ children had access to education. Teacher training had also made much progress. In 1982, out of a total of 31,547 teachers, 10,124 were Kazaks and 7,553 belonged to other national minorities.233

Textbooks for use in national minority education initially came from the USSR. School books in Uighur, Kazak and Özbek were imported but whether these books were printed in the Cyrillic script or in Arabic is not known. In 1952, Xinjiang began publishing textbooks in Uighur, Kazak and Mongol, but books were still imported from USSR as well, and in 1955 168,000 texts covering some 72 different titles in Uighur, Kazak and Özbek were imported for use in middle schools.234

In 1962, a publishing house for educational materials opened in Urumchi. Operations stopped in 1966 and nothing was published until 1973 when the authorities again began printing textbooks. Between 1974 and 1977 only textbooks were published in the national minority languages. but in 1978 other books were also published and the authorities have greatly expanded publication in national minority languages since 1980. In 1981 they also started to publish textbooks in Kirghiz and Xibo.235 In 1986 textbooks for elementary school students covering different topics were pub-

234. Xinjiang Weiwuuer Zizhiqu . . . p. 211.
235. Ibid.
lished in Uighur, Kazak and Mongol. According to a pamphlet published in Urumchi, books for schools in the minority languages include a set of primary and middle school language and grammar text books, primary civic readers and a set of middle school texts on "the Party's nationality policy and national unity." 236

Xinjiang has also established several institutions of higher education. At the highest level is the University of Xinjiang, located in Urumchi. Since 1949 it has graduated more than 36,000 students. In 1957 there were 2,537 university students and in 1965, 3,129. 237 By 1986 there were about 5,000 students and 500 teachers at the University. No figures are available on the total number of Kazak students. However, attempts are made to encourage the national minorities to continue in higher education. A national minority person requires a considerably lower level of marks to get into the university in comparison with the Han Chinese. 238 In the 1950s some Kazak students went to the Soviet Union for higher education. Today, a small number of Xinjiang students have been offered the possibility of studying in the USA.

There are 14 institutions for higher education in Xinjiang, which can be classified as teachers' colleges. In 1983 these had a total of 16,438 students, but only 1,496 belonged to national minorities. Other higher education institutions include 104 technical training schools which had 22,493 students in 1983. 239 However, no information on the number of Kazaks in such schools has been made available. Today the Xinjiang region has a total of about 120,000 teachers, most of whom are reportedly from the local teacher-training institutes. 240 Unfortunately, there is no break-down by nationality of the teachers and it seems highly possible that the number of Kazak teachers within the region remains small, making it difficult to ensure adequate education in the Kazak language to all who choose to be educated in their native tongue.

Literature

Traditional Kazak literature was oral, the form of most Central Asian literature. The main body of Kazak literature included epics, fairy tales, rid-

236. Education in Xinjiang (Pamphlet in the Xinjiang Today series,) Ürümqi 1985, p. 10.
237. Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhiqü . . . . , p. 211.
239. Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhiqü . . . . , p. 211.
240. Education in Xinjiang (Pamphlet in the Xinjiang Today series) Ürümqi 1985, p. 10.
Today most Kazak literature is being published for the first time. The largest book store in Urumchi, not far from the University, had a large section of only Kazak books, mostly in the Arabic script in 1986. These included original works as well as translations of Chinese and foreign books. Also available were books originally published in Kazak Cyrillic script in the USSR and transliterated into the Arabic script. Among the titles available were novels and poems, but also books about animal care, botany and forestry, medicine, agriculture, etc. For younger readers there were comics in Kazak! More than 20 journals in Kazak were reportedly published in 1986, and the number of newspapers was ten, including a Kazak edition of the *Xinjiang Ribao*.

**Mass Media**

Besides the growing number of books, newspapers and magazines available in Kazak, some radio and TV broadcasts are also in Kazak. Local radio stations have broadcasted in Xinjiang since the 1950s, while television is a more recent development. In Barköl a local station reportedly broadcasts in Kazak for 7 hours a day. The radio is also used for educational programs: in 1982 educational courses in all national minority languages began in the Ili-Kazak Autonomous Prefecture.

Of the three colour-TV channels available in Urumchi, only a few hours of Kazak programming was offered each week in 1986, but possibly the amount of Kazak TV-broadcasting to the Ili area is greater. Most Kazak language programs feature vocal and instrumental Kazak music as well as traditional dancing.

**Persistence and Change**

Although changes between 1949 and 1986 have resulted in material gain for some groups of Kazaks in Xinjiang, as a whole they remain outside the mainstream of the Chinese political and cultural system. Not all Kazak children were receiving a formal education in the year 1986 and very few Kazaks appear to have been incorporated into the new agricultural and industrial centers emerging in Xinjiang. They remain a predominantly rural people and as such retain many of the old beliefs and customs of pre-

242. The information on literature and mass media is based on our notes taken in Xinjiang in 1986.
revolutionary China. For instance, the traditional adoption system in which the first-born is given to the father’s parents to raise continues, as does the custom of bride price, although it does so without official sanction.

Since 1980, not only has there been a new tolerance of national minority traditional customs and practices, but also there is no indication that the Chinese Communist Party is discouraging such traditional festivals and holidays as Kurban and Ramadan; nor is there evidently any attempt to compete with such festivals by the observance of new, socialist-oriented types of public observance. Indeed, the old holidays continue to be celebrated with great enthusiasm, in the traditional way, with much feasting, visiting of neighbours and relatives, and holidays from work.

Many aspects of traditional culture in Xinjiang thus persist today, and if the tolerance of the 1980s continues, their future role in Kazak culture would seem assured. The Han Chinese, themselves heirs to an extremely persistent cultural tradition, have sought to formulate an answer to the phenomenon of cultural persistence, but it remains to be seen whether the policy lines followed thus far will lead the People’s Republic of China any closer to a solution to the age-old problems presented by plural societies to central governments intent on the integration and modernization of their ethnic minorities.

The Kazaks in China have traditionally been regarded as a warlike and fierce tribe. Travellers in the 1920s and 1930s described them stereotypically, saying they "are lazy, they are thieves and rascals," or they are "wild and utterly undisciplined nomads without any fixed abode." A Chinese writer, in accordance with the common Chinese opinion of the time, even described them in an official handbook as "lazy, cunning, hot-tempered and capable of doing nothing except tending livestock, they, as a rule, lead a bandit's life when winter comes."

During the 1930s and 1940s the Kazaks in Xinjiang took part in several rebellions against the authorities. In the Ili rebellion of 1944 they even played a dominant role. The causes of these rebellions can certainly be explained in several ways, but they are clear evidence of the ethnic conflicts typical of the area. Xinjiang has always been marked by tension between the various ethnic groups living there and the Chinese authorities. This chapter, however, is not intended as a discussion of the political implications of the nomads in a sensitive border area of China. Rather, this chapter will instead deal with some ethnographical characteristics of the Kazak nomads and will stress their economic role as part of an ethnic pluralistic society. As there is very little information available on the Xinjiang Kazaks during the period of the Chinese Republic, this account will be descriptive and seeks to give a cultural-historical overview of the Kazak society during that time.

Since this was a turbulent period in Xinjiang history, few data are avail-

able on the Kazak nomads and their movements. But by putting together fragmentary information from various sources, in accordance with relevant ethnohistorical methods, it gives a general picture of Kazak life during the 1920s to 1940s, which can be used as background for studies on social change and cultural persistence within contemporary Kazak society in Xinjiang, as well as among émigrés in Turkey.

The Nomads in Xinjiang

Xinjiang may be divided into several geographic zones. South of the Tian Shan range, stretching in an east-west direction, is Kashgaria, which is

4. Ethnographical data for this chapter was collected mainly by interviews in 1979–1985 with Orta 3üz Kazak refugees from Xinjiang now residing in Turkey and Europe. See Ingvar Svanberg, Kazak Refugees from Xinjiang. A Study of Cultural Persistence and Social Change, (Studia Multiethnica Upsaliensia) [forthcoming].

Literature of the period, foreign as well as Chinese, has very little to say about Kazak ethnography in China. Travelogues, intelligence reports and newspaper articles, however, include some information, which has been used here. The only ethnographer, as far as I know, who conducted some kind of field research among the Kazaks, is Frank Bessac. He stayed among a group of uprooted Kazaks in Xinjiang during the winter 1949–1950 as the Communists were taking over. He later wrote a dissertation with the title Cultural Types of Northern and Western China, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin 1963. It is however, from my point of view, a disappointment. Of much greater interest is Milton J. Clark’s dissertation on Kazak leadership, completed in 1955, with the title Leadership and Political Allocation in Sinkiang Kazak Society, Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University 1955. He conducted field work among a small group of Kazak refugees in Kashmir 1952–1953. His work is rich in detail and gives a reliable account of the Kazaks of Xinjiang in the 1940s. In 1979, I interviewed several of Clark’s informants in Turkey and could compare the information given by them.

In the 1950s, Chinese ethnographers collected a lot of material on various minorities. Unfortunately, most of that is still unpublished or available only in neibu literature (for internal use) and thereby mostly inaccessible for foreign scholars. Ethnology was branded as a reactionary science during the 1960s and 1970s, and only recently has ethnology, as well as many other disciplines within social sciences and humanities, recovered a degree of respectability in China. See Thomas Heberer, Nationalitättenpolitik und Ethnologie in der Volksrepublik China, (Veröffentlichungen aus dem Übersee-Museum Bremen. Reihe D., Volkerkundliche Monographien. Bd. 11) Bremen 1982, pp. 47–86. From information obtained in Xinjiang in 1986, I understand that there are several works currently in progress related to the Kazaks, and it is hoped such studies will be published in the near future.

mainly composed of the Tarim Basin, a dry basin ringed with green oases. North of the snow-crowned Tian Shan is Dzungaria which consists of steppes up to the Irtish area. North of Irtish River is the mountainous Altai area. The main pastoral areas are to be found in the Altai, on the northern slopes of Tian Shan, and in the Ili River valley.

The three largest groups of pastoral nomads in the Republican period in Xinjiang were traditionally the Kazaks, Kirghiz and the Mongols. The Kirghiz were found mainly south of the Tian Shan range along the border with the Soviet Union. There were also some Kirghiz in the Ili Valley. In the south, i.e. Kashgaria, there were, in addition, some other pastoral groups such as the Dolans in Maralbashi and Merkit, and the Iranian-speaking group in the Pamir.

The Mongols and the Kazaks were the main nomadic groups in the north, partly residing in the same areas. The Mongols numbered about 60,000 (2% of the total population in Xinjiang) in the mid-1940s, while the Kazaks numbered almost 450,000. Part of the Mongols, especially the Western Mongolian-speaking groups, could be regarded as autochtonous in Dzungaria. The Kazaks, however, have moved into the area in successive waves following the defeat of the Oyrat Empire in 1757.

The Historical Framework

Imperial China traditionally claimed jurisdiction over Central Asia, but in reality the Chinese have seldom been able to control this region and Chinese agriculture has never been able to get a foothold here. Instead, the area has often been controlled by nomadic confederations. Nomadic chieftains had periodically paid tribute to the Chinese Emperor, but it was not uncommon for them to be in conflict with the Emperor and opposed to Chinese influence in Central Asia.

The last nomadic confederation to gain control over Central Asia was that of the Oyrat Mongols. During the second half of the 17th century, the Oyrat Mongols, under the leadership of Galdan Khan, extended their influence over a large part of Central Asia and created an independent nomadic state. The Oyrats held the area for almost a hundred years. In the

middle of the 18th century, the Oyrats, however, due to internal struggles, were politically splintered, and in 1754 the Qing Imperial Army under General Zhauhui started a campaign to recover the area from the Mongols. The Oyrats were also weakened by epidemics and the Qing army defeated them in 1757. About 80% of the 600,000 Oyrats are said to have been destroyed by disease and war, and the remainder fled to the Volga River area in 1760 after a last uprising under the self-appointed khan, Amurzana.

The mass emigration of the Mongols put an end to the Mongol influence in Dzungaria. The Qing ruler had at last gained control over the area. It was, however, not incorporated within the provincial system, but was held under the Manchu military administration.

The Qing policy to stabilize the area was to encourage immigration of various ethnic groups. The Qing administration had a favourable view of previously pacified and now loyal Mongols, such as Chakhars and Dagurs in northeastern China, and these were encouraged to move into and settle the former Oyrat territory. Also several Manchu-speaking groups, as well as Han Chinese and Turkic immigrants from the Tarim Basin—the so-called Taranchi—were allowed to settle in the area.

The recovered area, which was called Xiyu (“Western Regions”) by the Chinese, was bordered on the west by areas controlled by Kazak nomads. Along this border the Manchu authorities established guard posts, qarun, in order to prevent Kazak nomads from moving in. There were three kinds of qarun, i.e. remnant, moveable and provisional guard posts.

But after the defeat of the Oyrats, the Kazaks had already started to move in. When the Oyrats were finally driven away they left an ecological niche of pasture land open. A section of Kazaks belonging to Ulu čüz moved into the Ili River valley. They accepted the Qing Emperor as their overlord and started to pay tribute. Part of the Ulu čüz, however, were still independent in Western Turkestan. They continued to be autonomous until the 1840s when they were finally integrated in the Russian administration.

The Ulu čüz Kazaks who moved to the Ili area belonged predominantly
to the Alban and Suwan tribes, and they are still mainly distributed in the Ili River valley.

In 1771, a large group of Torgut Mongols arrived from the Lower Volga to escape from increasing taxation in Russia. They had left Dzungaria in 1630 for Russia and became vassals to the Czar in 1654. Their khans, however, continued to pay tribute to the Chinese Emperor. They came back to their old pastures in the Ili River valley and the Yildiz Plateau. The area had, however, since been taken over by the Ulu ʒü̂z Kazaks. Conflicts between the Kazaks and the Torguts led to the deaths of many Torguts. The Torguts who survived the clashes were settled by the Qing authorities in several places in Dzungaria.

Ulu ʒü̂z Kazaks under the Khan Ablay, took part in the Qing campaign to subdue the Oyrats. Ablay acknowledged himself as vassal of the Emperor Qianlong, who sent him a title as prince and a calendar reciting the conditions on which he was accepted as a subject in 1757. He also received permission to trade horses in the border area. Ablay’s relation with the Russians made the situation complicated. The Qing administration inscribed Ablay in the list of their tributary nomad subjects, but Ablay continued to play the Russians against the Chinese and remained independent. The policy of the Russian Empress was to detach Ablay from his dependence on the Qing Emperor. In 1760 the Kazaks extended their pastures into the Tarbagatai area and Upper Irtish. The Qing opposed this advance of the Kazaks into the Dzungarian territory, but their opposition proved unsuccessful and Kazak pastoralists continued to move in. The pastures within Qing Dzungaria were used as winter camps, and the Kazak nomads continued to cross the Chinese-Russian border. From 1760 onwards Kazak nomads were pouring into the Tarbagatai and Altai area.

Trading links between Kazaks and Imperial traders were established by 1758 in Urumchi, 1761 in Ili and 1764 in Tarbagatai. Unauthorized trade between Kazaks and traders occurred in several places in Dzungaria, but the Qing authorities tried to control that. In 1762 an appeal to the Emperor said that Kazaks made unauthorized trade with Khalkha Mongols in the north.

The Kazaks bought silk, satin and cloth from the Chinese and Uighur traders, while the Kazaks sold horses, oxen and sheep. The Manchu military garrisons along the border-line needed horses, so it was important for the Qing authorities to keep up trade with the Kazaks of the area.¹⁰ At the

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¹⁰. The Kazak history of Xinjiang under the Qing period has still to be written. A short account is given in Zhongguo shaoshu minzu [China’s National Minorities]. Beijing 1981.
same time they tried to keep the Kazaks outside the area administered by the Qing. The newly established guard posts along the Dzungarian border were an attempt to prohibit the movement of the Kazak nomads into Qing proper. In the 1760s, however, the Qing authorities had to allow the Kazaks to use winter camps within its territory. Consequently, the Kazaks were obliged to pay tax to the Qing authorities. The tax for using winter pastures from August to March was paid in horses and consisted of one percent of the nomad herds. When spring came again, the Kazaks had to move west out of Dzungarian proper. However, a lot of good summer pastures were available within Dzungaria. Many poorer Kazaks decided to remain within the winter camps when the summer came. Other Kazaks crossed the border into China during the summer to raid cattle and horses within Dzungaria. A few Kazaks became Qing objects during this time and were integrated into the banner-system. In 1799, however, an imperial decree prohibited Kazak allegiance and naturalization.

Kazaks continued to move between Dzungaria and the western steppes during the first half of the 19th century. Several Kazak Khans and princes were subjects of Qing for short periods. They paid tribute to the Qing authorities, but after 1822 they became Russian subjects when the Czarist authorities introduced a new system of administration for the Orta 3üz Kazaks. Some Kazak chieftains became subordinates of local rulers within Dzungaria. After the conclusion of the Protocol of Tarbagatai on October 7, 1864 the borders were established, and the relationship between the Qing-rulers and the Kazaks within the Chinese border became consolidated. The Russian Empire regarded the permanent qarun line as the de facto border line between the Qing Empire and the newly established Turkestan Government-General. Since that time, the Kazaks of Orta 3üz tribes have been accepted as Chinese subjects.


Russian Kazaks continued, however, to enter into Xinjiang from Russia from the time of the Protocol onwards. For example, in 1878 not less than 9,000 Kazaks left Russian territory for China. Many of them tried to go as far as Qitai. The Russian explorer Nikolai Przhevalsky saw a lot of rotting carcasses left by their herds which had succumbed to thirst during the move through the Dzungarian desert.  

After the abolition of serfdom in Russia 1861 peasants started to move eastward to settle and take up agriculture in new areas. The increasing number of Russian and Ukrainian peasants on the Kazak plain led to continual migration of Kazaks into the Xinjiang area. More then 500 villages were established on the steppe by the end of the 19th century. A Czarist Russian commission of 1895 established a land fund for new settlers on lands that had been used mainly by the Kazak nomads.

The Russian colonization and settlement were not the only causes of the migration of Kazaks over the border to China. Political unrest and Russian claims on Chinese lands pushed the Kazaks away from the border area. Kazaks started to move into the Barköl area in eastern Dzungaria from Altai and Taicheng in 1883, after the second Tarbagatai Treaty between Russia and China that year. The first group of about 90 households left the border area for Barköl in the first year. Between 1889 and 1890 about 200 households moved to Barköl; in 1895 another 200 Kazak households left Altai for the same destination.

**Distribution of the Kazaks 1911–1949**

After the Chinese Revolution of 1911 Kazaks continued to take new pastures within Dzungaria. These movements of Kazaks were often forced by authorities but Kazaks also moved of their own accord. At the beginning of the Republican Era, many Kazaks moved from northern Altai to take up pastures in the Qitai region. These Kazaks had been dislocated as a result of the independence of Outer Mongolia. Aurel Stein reported that fifteen hundred yurts of Kazaks had moved from the Altai Mountains on the Mongolian border to the Qitai tract. However, the area was also occu-


plied by peasants already taking up agriculture on these grazing lands and therefore many Kazaks were eager to return to the Altai.14

In Russian Turkestan, mass settlement of Russian peasants took place between 1906 and 1912, during the so-called Stolypin agrarian reform. Nearly 19 million hectares of land on the plain were set aside for the settlers. This was land that had been used as pastures by the nomads. The growing influx of Russian settlers on the plain drove thousands of Kazaks out of Russia and into China. A mass immigration took place in 1912–1914. Most of these Kazaks went to the Ili and Altai area. In 1914, Chinese authorities in Xinjiang and the Russian consul in Urumchi made an agreement which stipulated that Kazaks who had immigrated before July 1911 and had remained in Xinjiang were to be granted Chinese citizenship, while Kazaks arriving after that date were to be sent back to Russia. The Chinese authorities in Beijing, fearing that the Russians would use the Kazaks in their political claims on Ili, decided that the number of repatriates should not exceed 6,000.15

In 1916 the Czarist government decided that Kazaks and other Muslims in Russian Turkestan who, traditionally, had been exempted from military service, should be drafted into labour units. This led to a revolt on the steppe and in the Ferghana Valley. More than 50,000 rebels took part in the uprising. As a punishment, the Governor-General of Turkestan, General Koropatkin, decided to drive nomads who took part in the revolt away from their lands and to open them immediately for Russian settlers. The resettlement decision was carried out while revolt was still in progress. Just before the February Revolution about 300,000 persons, mostly Kazaks, fled to Xinjiang. Governor Yang in Urumchi was eager to get rid of them quickly, partly because of the difficulties of supporting so many refugees, and partly because of security reasons. Through negotiations with the Soviet representatives in Urumchi, Yang managed to obtain amnesty for the refugees if they returned back home. Thanks to Yang’s tactics and quick manoeuvring, the last Kazak refugees left Xinjiang during the autumn of 1918. Only a few of them remained in Xinjiang.16

Other movements of Kazaks were caused by Yang’s domestic policies. In July 1917, about 300 Kazak households fled from Yang’s taxation policy in Altai and settled around Barköl.17

Political changes which began with the establishment of the Soviet Union also caused a new influx of Kazak nomads into Xinjiang. The collectivization program in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakstan in the late 1920s led to conflict and great difficulties for the nomads there. The Kazaks were forced to settle and many nomadic families saw their herds starving on pastures which no longer could sustain them. Other nomads, facing the threat of expropriation of their animals, slaughtered their herds and escaped to Afghanistan or Xinjiang. Many Nayman Kazaks moved into

Xinjiang at this time. Some Kazaks who had been in Xinjiang at the end of the 19th century and who had moved back again to Russian territory, returned as refugees at the end of the 1920s, and included Kazaks of the Ulu Jüz who moved into the Ili region. The authorities granted these refugees pastures in Xinjiang. No figures on exactly how many entered Xinjiang during this time have ever been published. According to Republican Chinese official Aitchen Wu, thousands of Kazak refugees from the Soviet Union were still pouring into the Altai district at the beginning of the 1930s.18

After Kazak uprisings in Altai in 1933 and for some years afterwards several thousand families were driven to the Barköl area where they settled. However, the new strong man in the region, Sheng Shicai, continued to harass them even there and many Kazaks fled further to Gansu and Qinghai. Many Kazaks settled around Gas Lake in Qinghai but about 4,000 of them continued all the way down to India.19

In the 1940s there were Kazaks living mainly in the Altai, Tacheng (Tarbagatai) and the Ili districts, but there were also Kazaks living in Manas, around Bogda Ulu, Metchin Ulu and in the Barköl region north of the Barköl range. They were not allowed to use grazing lands south of the Barköl Mountains. According to the census of 1946–1947, the distribution20 of the Kazaks within Xinjiang was as follows:

Table 1. The Distribution of the Kazaks by District in 1946.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urumchi</td>
<td>47,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacheng</td>
<td>103,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ili</td>
<td>210,672</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. The census was published in a local magazine by She Lingyun, “Yi jingji jianshe jiu Xinjiang yongjiu heping.” [“Economic construction in Xinjiang as a Means to Secure Peace.”] *Tianshan Yuegan*, 1 (Oct. 15, 1947), pp. 9–15. The only copy which seems to be available for scholars, and the one which I have used, is in Hoover Institution on War. Revolution and Peace, at Stanford, cf. Linda Benson. *op. cit.*, p. xi. Oddly enough Owen Lattimore never used this data in his *Pivot of Asia*. Boston 1950, but instead used estimates gathered by Chang Chih-yi in 1943. The census figures of the total population for each county are given in Zhang Dajun. *Xinjiang fengbao qishi nian* [Xinjiang’s Seventy Years of Turbulence]. Vol. 9. Taipei 1980. However, he does not give the figures for each nationality at the county level.
Altai 69,717
Hami 6,741
Aksu 7
Kashgar 11
Khotan 58
Karashar (Yanqi) 476
Yarkand 23

Total: 438,575

The majority were living within the Ili, Tacheng and Altai districts making up almost 53% of the total population there. For the percentage of the Kazak population in each district, see map 1. Despite the fact that the Kazaks did not number more than 10% of the total population of Xinjiang, they comprised 40% of the inhabitants of Dzungaria in the mid-1940s. The census of 1946 gives the total number of Kazaks in each county. The following are the number of Kazaks in the five districts of Dzungaria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urumchi District</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urumchi City</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urumchi County</td>
<td>7,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changji</td>
<td>3,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutubi</td>
<td>10,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suilai</td>
<td>8,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiente</td>
<td>1,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukang</td>
<td>4,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuyang</td>
<td>1,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qitai</td>
<td>5,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mori (Mulei)</td>
<td>4,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanshan (Piqan)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turpan</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toksun</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. The Distribution of the Kazaks by County in 1946.

### Ili District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ili</td>
<td>22,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suiding</td>
<td>17,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gongliu</td>
<td>15,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gongha (Nilka)</td>
<td>30,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tekes</td>
<td>32,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhaosu</td>
<td>17,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ningxi</td>
<td>10,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huocheng</td>
<td>16,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wenquan</td>
<td>4,611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bole</td>
<td>7,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinghe</td>
<td>5,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinyuan</td>
<td>29,418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Tacheng District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tacheng (Tarbagatai)</td>
<td>30,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emin</td>
<td>41,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofeng</td>
<td>3,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yumin</td>
<td>12,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shawan</td>
<td>7,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usu</td>
<td>7,340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Altai District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chenghua (Sharasume)</td>
<td>16,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burqin</td>
<td>11,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeminay</td>
<td>9,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habahe</td>
<td>12,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuhai</td>
<td>7,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuyun (Köktogay)</td>
<td>5,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qinghe (Qinggil)</td>
<td>4,863</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Hami District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hami</td>
<td>1,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chenxi (Barköl)</td>
<td>4,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yiwu</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Administration of the Nomads**

During the Qing dynasty, the Kazaks within Dzungaria and Altai were regarded as tenants of the Mongols. The Qing had decreed that all the
nomad lands belonged, by right, to the Mongols. The Kazaks were, therefore, required to pay grazing fees for using pastures regarded as the property of the Mongol banners. While the Mongols in Dzungaria were ruled by princes or Wangs, who were directly under the emperor, in reality there was a high degree of autonomy within the various leagues. The Kazak leaders were considered subjects under the local amban within their districts.

At the turn of the century, the Kazaks were administered through a hierarchy established by the Manchu government. They had generic chieftains who bore the title taži. The Kazaks in the Tarbagatai were under the control of the amban of Tacheng. Below taži, there were minbasi, i.e. chiefs of one thousand, ʒüzbası — head of one hundred — etc. This system of organizing the administrative units on a series of ten was known as the bao jia-system. The purpose of the Manchu administration was to divide the nomadic groups into administrative units and to distribute political power between the different tribal segments. A taži thereby had the dual function as a lineage leader and as a Qing official. The result was a stable administrative system with far-reaching autonomy for the various lineage groups. This feature was typical for the Manchu policy of yi yi zhi yi, or divide and rule.

When the Qing dynasty was overthrown in the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, the Khalkha Mongols made themselves independent and Outer Mongolia established itself as a sovereign state. The newly appointed governor of Xinjiang, Yang Zengxin, shifted his favor from the Mongols in Dzungaria to the Kazaks. This was done to protect the border area and to prevent Dzungarian Mongols from following the example of the Khalkhas and attempting to declare themselves independent. The Manchu-educated Yang continued to rule Xinjiang in the Imperial style from the yamen in Urumchi. Ending the preferential treatment of the Mongols and favouring the Kazaks was a typical yi yi zhi yi policy toward the nationalities of Xinjiang. Traditional animosity between Kazaks and Mongols increased. The Kazaks were encouraged to retaliate against the Mongols. The Chinese allowed the distribution of arms among the Kazaks, but arms were withheld from the Mongols. The Mongols along the border area in Altai were forced to move in order to divide them from the Mongols in Outer Mongolia; the Kazaks took advantage of this and, almost unchecked, plundered the Altai area.

22. H. S. Brunnert & V. V. Hagelstrom, Present Day Political Organization of China, Shanghai 1911, p. 440.
The Manchu administrative structure among the nomads survived the Chinese revolution. In the 1940s there was in fact a Wang for the Kazaks, residing in Urumchi, and regarded as a leader of all Kazaks within Chinese territory. He was, however, only a titular leader and seems to have had little influence; he was used by Sheng Shicai to legitimize his power over the Kazak nomads. Alin Wang claimed to be a töre and a descendant after Ablay Khan of Orta 3üz who swore his allegiance to the Emperor in 1757.24 The administrative bao jia-hierarchy established by the Manchu continued among the Kazaks. The ideal was for each lineage to be headed by an hereditary taği. During the 1940s there existed about 30 Kazak taжи in Xinjiang. But in reality the power of the taği was broken during the Republican Era. Administrative reforms had cut the power of the hereditary tribal chiefs at the top of the hierarchy. Instead the nomad leaders from the mijd-basi or lower were appointed leaders over counties, the subdivision of a district or aymaq. In the 1940s several of the aymaq bastiq were in fact Kazaks. So also were many district leaders. The lower chieftains normally inherited their positions during the Chinese Republic. A nomadic mijd-basi or okurday controlled 300—600 yurts or nomadic households; under him was a zaleng or ğusbasi who had jurisdiction over 100—200 yurts, an elibasi or zangen who controlled 50—100 yurts, and a kunde or onbasi who controlled 10—30 yurts. This hierarchy was best preserved in the Altai area with its compact nomadic population.25

The various leaders within the hierarchy had several functions. As assistants the nomadic chief had as his advisers four biy who assisted in the decision-making and judgements. They were chosen by the leader himself from among subordinate mijd-basi. The chieftains at various levels had the duty of collecting taxes from the Kazak commoners and solving conflicts.26

To help them, the leaders had several other subordinates or assistants, about whom we have scant knowledge. Very important for maintaining contact between the nomadic leaders were their appointed messengers, xabarči, while the qarawlči and saqči served as guards and police. A Kazak on official duty for the administrative leadership carried a sword as a sign and emblem. This sword gave him the right to free food, lodging and trans-
port within the province. According to Lattimore this institution was officially abolished during the Republican period, but apparently it continued to function at least during the 1920s.27

Every year the aymaq bastiq called all the appointed leaders who had a rank of an elibasi or higher to an official meeting, maylis or köraltay. At these meetings disputes between different chieftains, disputes over pastures, disputes between lineages, etc. were solved. At these meetings, decrees and messages from the authorities, directives on taxes, etc. were also read and distributed.

Social Organization

The Kazaks in Xinjiang have, like other tribal groups in Central Asia, a social organization based on patrilineal descent groups. It can be characterized as a hierarchy of named segments. Historically, the Kazaks consisted of pastoral tribes of Turkic and Mongolian origin which were united in confederations in the 15th and 16th centuries. From these confederations they were developed and consolidated into an ethnic unit. The Kazaks today still regard themselves as divided in three hordes, i.e. Ulu, Orta, and Kiriş 3üz.

Like the Ulu and Kiriş 3üz, Orta 3üz consists of several kinship units called uru which can be classified as maximal lineages.28 Orta 3üz is, according to the Xinjiang Kazaks, divided into six uru, the Kerey, Nayman, Waq, Köğrat, Qıpçaq, and Aryîn. Only the three first mentioned were represented in the Republican Xinjiang.

Here I will give just a brief outline of the Orta 3üz Kazak social organization. The amount of data is still too scant for a more thorough analysis.

In the 19th century the Kerey are said to have had their pastures in the valley of the Kara Irtish River and in the southern Altai. In the mid-20th

century the Kerey Kazaks dominated in Xinjiang, and had their vast pastures on the southern slopes of the Altai mountains and in the Tian Shan. They were also to be found in the Irtish Valley, and small numbers were distributed in other parts of Dzungaria, e.g. Bogda Ulu and in the Barköl area.

The Nayman had their pastures on the west bank of the Irtish River as well as in the valley of the Kara Irtish River, the Tarbagatai basin, and the area surrounding Murka Köl. From the middle of the 20th century, they were reported as living in the Emil River valley in the frontier district of Tarbagatai in the Barlik-, Mayli-, and the Dzhayri Mountains.

The Waq Kazaks were dispersed in small contingents throughout the Kazak area in Xinjiang.29

These three maximal lineages are today distributed over vast territories even outside Xinjiang. Both the Nayman and Kerey are also found in the Soviet Union, as well as in the Mongolian People’s Republic.

The maximal lineages of these Kazaks are characterized by a consciousness of a common patrilineal origin, but exogamy is commonly not regarded at this level in the kinship system. Every uru is divided into many subgroups which can be regarded as lineages. They also are usually called uru, but sometimes el among the Kazaks. These lineages are named after a real or fictive apical ancestor. The lineage members on this level respect certain behaviour connected with the lineage, e.g. exogamy, which ties all members together. Ideally, the member should be conscious of seven forefathers.

The Waq were divided into three lineages, namely Sarî, Sarman, and Soya. The Kerey consisted of twelve lineages, the “Oneki Kerey”, i.e. the twelve Kerey: Jantekey, 3adiq, Iteli, Merkit, Molqi, 3astabaw, Kongsadaq, Siymoyin, 3abarayyur, Qaraqas, Sarbas, and Serswu. Among these lineages, which are regarded as equal to each other, the Jantekey has a special position. It is, in turn, further divided into sublineages, and the members on these levels can – but most do not – intermarry with other sublineages. It seems therefore correct to say that exogamy is demanded of the lowest lineage segment but is lesser strict higher up in the segmentary hierarchy. I have recorded the following sublineages among the Jantekey: Saqbay, Barqi, Bazarkul, Tasbike, Esayasi, Qistawbay, Esdewlet, Sekel.

Taylak, Siltaybolat, Qangeldi, Botaqara and Atantay. From a behavioural point of view the sublineages within Jantekey are regarded as equivalent with the lineages, but genealogically they are defined as subgroups.

Nayman in Xinjiang are said to be divided into nine lineages. Altay mentions the following: Törtuwil, Sadir, Matay, Qaragerey, Ergcnekti, Bayanali, Kökžarlı, Sarʒomart, and Terstanbalı which constitute “the nine dawn sons of Nayman” (Tokuz Taŋbalı). I have recorded the following lineages from a Xinjiang Kazak informant belonging to the Nayman: Törtuwil, Musqalı, Bura, Beyʒiyıt, Aqnayman, Terstanbalı, and Sarʒomart. Historically, the lineages have developed by segmentation of larger units. Far-reaching segmentation was recorded among Nayman lineages in the Russian Altai in the 1920s.

The lineages may be regarded as a kind of charter to give an individual a sense of belonging and identity. When two unfamiliar Kazaks meet each other they present themselves by thoroughly defining their own lineage through genealogies. The lineages, however, never functioned as corporate units during the Chinese Republic. The migratory groups and the administrative units did not necessary coincide with the uru.

**Household and Marriage**

The Xinjiang Kazak household consisted of the members of a yurt, üy, i.e. either a conjugal family or an extended family. The Kazaks practiced a patrilocal residence pattern, and polygyny was allowed.

Marriage involved a very elaborate system of rituals, ceremonies and exchange of gifts. No other transition rite among the Kazaks can in any way compete with the marriage and its prelude in richness and complexity. It includes a ritualized performance with matchmaking, exchange of bride-price (qalin’ mal) and dowry (šasaw), repeated reciprocal exchange of gifts, horseback racing, singing of laments, a ceremonial taking of the bridal-veil (betaSar), feasts (toy) with sheep-slaughtering and great quantities of food, etc. There is no doubt that marriage is the most important of the rituals for the Kazak society.

As already mentioned, the Kazak lineages are exogamous. Repeated...

32. Examples of bride-price are given in Aurel Stein, op.cit., p. 551; Milton J. Clark, op.cit., p. 174; Yili Hasake . . . p. 16.
marriages between two lineages create closer ties between them. Members in such a relationship refer to each other as sarsüyek quda (=yellowbone relative)."

Mixed marriages between Kazaks and other ethnic groups did occur, but there is no indication of the frequency. It was possible for Kazak men to marry Sart women, i.e. sedentary Muslims or Uighurs. Marriages with Mongols are said to have taken place, but my informants deny this, pointing out the great religious differences between Mongols and Kazaks.

The Kazaks themselves stated that bride theft was not practiced. According to a woman informant bride theft or elopement would have been punished with the death penalty, and she had not heard of any case.

There were several institutionalized forms for choosing spouses among the Kazaks. A common custom, by which they could avoid the system of brideprice and dowry, was the exchange of brides, qarşı qudaliq. Two families that have agreed to such an arrangement exchange daughters as brides for their sons.

Another institution is levirate where a man must marry the wife of his deceased brother. Sororal marriage also occurred — a deceased wife would be replaced by her younger sister. Such marriages could also imply polygyny.

Non-sororal polygynous marriages were more common among wealthier Kazaks and among Kazak chieftains. There are examples of chieftains having three and even four wives.35

According to one traveller in some places in Xinjiang it was common for young Kazak men to marry much older women. After ten years or more, the man could also marry a younger woman and the first wife received a more remote position within the household. It seems, however, that the source in this case may have been confused by the levirate custom among the Kazaks.36

Parental control in connection with choice of marriage partners was still dominant during the Republican period among the Kazaks. Young women sometimes had to become servants in their future father-in-law’s home for a year before the actual marriage.37

The Kazaks practiced patrilocal residence patterns and after marriage the young couple settled in the awil of the husband. During summer the

35. [George Fox Holmes], loc. cit.; Milton J. Clark. op.cit., p. 172.
36. Eleanor Holgate Lattimore. op.cit., p. 268.
Kazak camp was organized in a semicircle. The yurt of the head of the family group, ülkün üy, was placed in the middle. If a man had several wives they often lived in separate yurts. The yurt of the second wife was called kışi üy ("little house"). Yurts of married sons were called otaw, with the prefix ülkü ("the eldest"). ortançı ("the middle"). and kışi ("the youngest") according to seniority. The yurts of the same lineage relatives, i.e. the sons, were placed to the right of the ülkün üy. Other associated yurts were placed to the left in the summer camp."

In marriage new ties were created and manifested through an institutionalized joking relationship and through avoidance behaviour among affinal relatives. The joking relationship becomes apparent with rather coarse jokes, bold words, and even teasing with sexual innuendo between men and women in such relationships.

The women also observe some avoidance behaviour with regard to the older male relatives of their husbands. A wife will avoid using the name of her husband and his older male relatives and will use circumscriptions or euphemisms instead of their names in everyday speech. For instance, wives married with Iteli-men avoid the word it ("dog") and instead use a circumscription." A wife will also observe avoidance behaviour in contact with her husband’s father and mother and will leave the room if they enter and do not invite her to stay." Despite such ritual restrictions or rules of etiquette based on respect. the woman has an outstanding position, at least within the household. Married women join the discussions and take part in the decision making regarding the household. There are even examples of Kazak women who obtained outstanding positions among the nomads. The best example in Xinjiang during the Republican era was the Kazak leader Alin Wang’s wife. Qadiwan, who, during the 1940s, was aymaq bastiq — or District Officer — in Urumchi."!

Fictive Kinship

There existed several social relations that could be classified as fictive kinship among the Kazaks of Xinjiang. The principle of fictive kinship involves the transformation of close friendship to kinship thus giving the relationship a more binding character. But it also includes a dimension of

39. Ibid., p. 100.
voluntariness contrary to relationships by blood ties. Blood brotherhood, *tamir* is certainly the most well-known. This institution is established by certain ritualized behaviours including oath-taking (*qasam*), exchange of gifts, slaughtering of sheep, and by the dipping of hands in sheep’s blood.

The other kind of fictive kinship ties resemble the institution of godparenthood in southern Europe. This is the relationship that is established between a child and the woman who cuts its umbilical cord. This woman is called *kindik çeče* (lit. “navel mother”). This institution occurs among several ethnic groups in Central and Northern Asia but seems to have drawn little attention from scholars. Among the Kazaks in Xinjiang the *kindik çeče* acts as a midwife and cuts the umbilical cord of the newborn child. The special relationship between the child and its *kindik çeče* persists throughout life, and the child continues to address her as “mother” (*çeče*). This relationship also implies certain reciprocal duties.

**Adoption**

Adoption is a frequent institution among the Kazaks, as well as among other Central Asian peoples such as the Tuvins, Khotons, and several Mongolian groups. It also occurs among the Uighurs in Xinjiang. Among the Kazaks in Xinjiang it was a custom to offer the first-born to the man’s parents or his elderly brother. Even childless couples could adopt a child from some close relatives. The Kazaks explain the custom of offering the first-born child to their parents as a way of keeping them (the parents) young. Kazaks have a saying that a child in the house keeps it young. In the Koran an adopted child is discriminated against but the Muslim Kazaks regard an adopted child as their real child with the same rights and duties as their own. If the child is adopted by its patrilineal grandparents, his

45. The adoption custom among Kazaks before 1949 is also mentioned in *Yili Hasake* . . . p. 15. According to the cultural anthropologist Bessac the Kazaks obtained foreign children by stealing them from other ethnic groups. Frank B. Bessac, “Co-variation between interethnic relations and social organizations in Inner Asia.” *Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters*, 50 (1965). p. 378. My own information from Kazak refugees, however, makes this hard to believe. I think Bessac misunderstood the adoption custom among the Kazaks.
biological father will be regarded as his/her real brother. Although the real circumstances become apparent as the child grows up, closer contact will be maintained with the step-family, and the child will be the heir of that family, not of his biological father. An adopted child will in all aspects be regarded as a full member of its step-family."

Migratory Cycle of the Nomads

The nomadism of the Kazaks in Xinjiang was vertical rather than horizontal as it was on the Kazak steppe in the west. Their winter pastures were in the valleys and on the Dzungarian steppe, but they moved up into the mountains when spring came. Thus the Kazak nomadism of Xinjiang resembles the Kirghiz nomadism in Central Asia rather than the dominating pattern of Kazak nomadism of the Kazak steppe."

The Kazak nomads of Xinjiang moved in units called awil, which commonly consisted of groups of related households. Each migratory group was led by an awil bastiq. These leaders were responsible to the administrative organization and also transmitted messages from the juzbas. They also made decisions about the movements of the migratory group.

Larger and richer awil consisted of up to twenty households having altogether 4,000–5,000 sheep, 300–800 horses, 80–600 cattle and 60–200 camels. The poorest awil consisted of only one or a couple of households with only a number of animals."

A Soviet source divided the nomads of Tekes and Kunges Valleys into three categories in accordance with the size of the animal stock. Each category was said to have the following amount of animals:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Horses</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,000–5,000</td>
<td>300–400</td>
<td>5,000–10,000</td>
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<td>200–300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<td>15–20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50–100</td>
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Rich group leaders would let the herding be done by contracted herdsmen. In the Ili valley the Kazaks sometimes had Mongols as herdsmen. But there were also richer Kazak chieftains who were settled in towns or

46. The custom of offering the first-born for adoption still occurs among Kazaks and Uighurs in Xinjiang, according to interviews made in northern Xinjiang in 1986.
49. Quoted from Fuad Kazak, Ostturkistan zwischen den Grossmachten, (Osteuropäische Forschungen, N. F. 23), Königsberg 1937, p. 34.
villages and retained feudal ties with poorer herdsmen in a system of stock raising by shares. These absentee leaders rented their herds to poorer nomads. The growth in the herds was paid back as rent. It is also said that sedentary Dungans (Hui) sometimes leased their herds to Kazak herdsmen. Of course, these economic relations developed a kind of obligating dyad between Kazak leaders and common herdsmen. An alternative method also existed in which kinfolk could lend some milk animals during the summertime to poorer relatives. The animals were returned in the autumn without compensation.

The Kazaks had their winter pastures, qistaw, on the steppes or along the forest-clad banks of the river valleys in Dzungaria and Altai. They traditionally lived in log houses or adobe houses during wintertime. Some kin groups or individuals had the right to winter pastures in certain areas. Other nomads had to use marginal areas around marshes or along river banks.

Wintertime and early spring is the most critical period for the animals. At this time of the year they suffer from shortage of fodder and a harsh climate. In only one winter storm, the herds could be decimated so only half might survive. Owners of larger herds were liable to suffer the greatest losses proportionally, while poorer nomads could manage to feed more animals thanks to stores of hay. After such catastrophes, known as ğūt by the Kazaks, the prices of meat increased on the markets to double or more in order to cover the loss.

The time when the Kazaks would leave their winter pastures depended on when the first grass started to grow. This, of course, varied from location to location in Dzungaria. In Tian Shan the spring migrations are said to start as early as the end of March or beginning of April, while movement started much later in the Altai area. The first movement was from the winter pastures to the spring pastures, köktew, commonly a fixed place owned by certain migratory groups, where they lived in yurts. The köktew are located on lower flanks of the mountains. The migration is dramatic and heralds the beginning of the real nomadic way of life, according to Kazak standards. Owen Lattimore, who travelled in Xinjiang in the late 1920s, gives the following vivid eyewitness report of the spring migration of the Kerey Kazaks:

To force a way through the snow, they drove their pony herds before them to trample out a rough road. Then came oxen and cows, every one of them laden, some with felts and household furniture. Some served as saddle beasts, and often a baby would be strapped in its rough cradle on top of a load.

The pony herd was in charge of the youngest and most active men, and the cattle were guided mostly by women. After them came more men, in charge of the camels, which floundered with difficulty through the frozen, slippery snow, often falling into drifts and having to be dug and hauled out. The camels, being the strongest and tallest of the animals, were laden with the poles and framework of the yurts, the round felt tents. At this time of year the baby camels, only a few months old, are unable to stand the hardship of long, difficult marches; each was tied on top of the load carried by its mother.

Last of all came the great flocks of sheep, struggling and floundering through the snow. They were herded along by young boys and girls, riding young oxen and ponies; and the saddle of every child was draped, fore and aft, with exhausted lambs picked out of the snow.53

At the köktew the Kazaks also branded the animals. Every household or migratory group had their own brand, taňba, to mark the ownership of the animals. Individual animals of each member of the migratory group had their own mark, en. The larger animals were branded, while the sheep and goats were marked by cuts in their ears. This was done by using certain brand irons or with the help of two large scissors. The horses and the horned cattle were branded on the flanks, while the camels were marked on the chests. Sheep and goats were cut in the ears and the Kazaks have certain names for these marks, depending on where on the ears they were cut, kiyik en, solaq en, kez en, sidinyiš en, etc.54

In May or in the beginning of June the nomads would move to higher altitudes where they have their summer pastures, ẓaylaw. Some moved further up in July. The herds grazed the whole summer in the mountains.

Now, the animals had their milking period and several dairy products were made. The nomads also produced some clothing and tools. Traditionally the border for pasture lands was marked by stone pillars, *oba*, and claims on pastures were common sources for conflicts between the migratory groups.

Most of the men were herders, *malči* or *qoyči*. Their main duties were to guard, herd and move the animals, but also to geld them, cut the sheep, butcher, and milk the mares. Young boys started herding early. The herders spent the days herding the animals on pastures around the camps. Occasionally during the summer, men living in the camps rode down to market places in towns to buy provisions or to buy salt for the sheep."

The camp was the women’s domain. They were responsible for the work at the camp and inside the yurt. They made the food, gathered firewood

and dung for fuel, milked cows, sheep and camels, took care of the children, and had other minor obligations."

During the summertime the diet for the nomads consisted of various milk products, among others fermented mares milk or kumyss, qimiz, and sour milk, ayran. The Kazaks drank a lot of tea which was produced from brick tea obtained in the markets, and they ate bread. Beside dairy products, many nomads also consumed large quantities of meat. Poorer nomads, however, also had to live on cereals during the summertime. Vegetables did not exist within the traditional Kazak diet. The main meal was eaten during the evening."

While most of the Kazak men were herdsmen they were also fond of hunting. The game was usually deer, mountain sheep, fox, wolves, and gamebirds. Some Kazaks were specialized as hunters. They hunted fur animals and the pelts were sold on the markets. Hunters from Altai have told me about even more strange game they captured in the mountains. During a hunting expedition in the 1930s, two men of the Saqabay lineage, captured a kiyk adam ("Wild Man") which they brought to their camp." It was furious and clawed people. Its body was said to be hairy. Since it had breasts they determined it was a female. They tied her to a pole by their yurt. But the creature cried the whole night, so they felt sorry for it and released her the next morning!

In August and September the awil started to move back toward the winter pastures. They stayed one month or so on lower altitudes in the autumn pastures, kuzdew, where the sheep were sheared. Back in the qistaw some animals were sold in the markets, while others were slaughtered.

Despite the fact that some Kazaks settled as peasants in Dzungaria and a very few others specialized as smiths, saddlemakers, carpenters, and fishermen, the cultural focus of the Kazaks was nomadism, around which their basic values were generated. The cognitive orientation of the Kazaks was to a very high degree imprinted by the nomadic life style. To see their herds growing, to have many horses, to go hunting with good or well-trained hunting eagles constituted the highest quality of life for Kazak

men. But there were also other basic values connected with the nomadic life.

The Kazaks fancied freedom, bravery and martial ideals. Every Kazak man was a potential warrior, fit to defend honour, family, and livestock with his life. People who had qualified in war were lionized in folk songs and in the oral tradition. Such people were given the epithet batır ('Hero') and could claim leadership over a group of Kazaks willing to follow them. Bravery could also be expressed through theft of horses. To steal horses from others was idealized as something desirable, because in that way the young men especially could express their bravery and virility. Horse thefts were institutionalized and were called barımta. For instance, if a man did not obtain a girl promised as wife from another lineage group, it justified horsethefts in the eyes of the Kazaks. He could steal horses from the family who should have given him their daughter.

The Livestock and Its Utilisation

The largest number of animals among the Kazak nomads were the sheep. The Kazaks kept mainly the fat-tailed sheep, (qızıl qoy). They were used for milk, mutton, wool, and skin products.

According to my informants, the Kazaks of Altai had only a few goats. Some goats, designated serke (lit. ‘leader goat’) were kept together with the sheep. Their function was to guide the sheep to find grazing. The goats are regarded as more active and clever in searching for good grazing. This custom is known to exist among other shepherding people in Central and Western Asia. I have, for example, observed it among the Kara Hacılı Yörüks in Central Anatolia and it is still a common practice among the Kazaks in Bogda Ulu in Xinjiang.59 From the goats the nomads also get milk. According to one author, poorer nomads had goats instead of cows for producing milk.60

Horned cattle were held in small herds among the nomads for producing milk and skins and as beasts of burden. In the Ili valley they were kept in larger number for sale as livestock in the autumn. A problem with cattle is to keep them during the winter. The Kazaks did not produce winter fodder on any large scale, but some nomads had access to good winter pastures where the cattle could graze during wintertime.

While mare’s milk was held apart from other milk, the milk from sheep,

60. Ludwig Golomb, op.cit., p. 117.
goat, and cow could be mixed and was used for almost the same kind of products. According to a woman informant from Altai, the Kazaks utilized the biestings, uwus, freshmilk, süt, cream, qaymaq, and they also made sour milk, ayran, and a kind of thick sour milk, qat'iq. For winter supply they produced dried dairy products, dried curds, qurt, and dried cheese, irimčiq and aq irimčiq.61

The horse is the domestic animal with the highest status among the Kazak nomads. This was manifested, among other ways, by a rich treasure of songs that praised beautiful and fleetfooted horses. Horses were kept for riding and as transport animals, as well as for meat and milk producers, and for sale. During summertime, young horses and stallions grazed on the meadows while the mares were kept near the yurts. About twenty mares were kept for each stallion.62

One of my informants stated that men commonly milked the mares, but even women could occasionally perform that task. She also said that mares have to be milked very fast, otherwise no milk will come. A mare could be milked up to five times a day.

Horseflesh was a highly appreciated meat among the Kazaks. Horse-meat sausage was accounted as a great delicacy among them. Another horse meat dish was the qouwirdaq, a kind of stew.

The mountain horses from Barköl, the Ili valley and Karashar had a wide reputation and were sought after on the markets all over the province.63 The nomads often had to pay horses in tax to the provincial authorities. In one of Sheng Shicai's efforts to raise money for his government — or his own — use, he ordered that each district in Xinjiang should contribute a specific number of horses to the government in March 1944. Of course, few districts could afford to give up horses. Only the districts inhabited by the Kazaks and the Mongols in Karashar produced horses. The order stated that if a district did not have horses, they should pay Xn$ 700 in lieu of each horse; this was nearly double the price for a horse on the market at that time. The aim of the decree was certainly to collect money, rather than horses.64

61. See also Halife Altay, op.cit., pp. 59–62 for information on cattle, sheep and goats, their designations, care and various kind of illness. Dairy products are described on p. 116. Information on dairy products are also to be found in Nils Ambolt, op.cit., pp. 70–71. and Ludwig Golomb, op.cit., p. 114.
My informants from Altai have mentioned that they used camels for milking as well as for meat production. But they were also used as beasts of burden. While the Chinese and Mongols pierce the camel for the bit below the opening of the nostril, and well back, the Kazak did it above the level of the nostrils, where the cartilage is said to be much weaker. During the migration the camels carried the construction materials of the yurts. It is stated by several authors that the Kazaks had very few camels. There were ecological limitations to keeping camels. Because camels are steppe animals, the Kazaks had few possibilities of keeping them at their high altitude pastures during the summertime. In some areas, however, nomads kept camels and sold them to Chinese and Uighur caravan traders as beasts of burden. In other areas it is said that the Kazaks kept a few camels only as a kind of status symbol, an animal to look upon, and thus kept in small numbers near the nomadic campsite.

My female informant from Altai mentioned that they used to milk the camels three times a day. To milk a camel mare two person were needed: one held it, while the other milked it. Camel milk could not be fermented.

The Kazak nomads kept two kinds of dogs. One breed was to guard the stock from predatory animals, while a certain breed of greyhound called taz it was used for hunting.

Some Kazaks also had eagles, burqut, for hunting. Good hunting eagles were very expensive. One good eagle could easily cost two of the best horses. Lattimore says that good eagles were commonly not sold, but given to chieftains and other important high-ranked persons to bestow honour. Eagle nestlings, as well as falcons, were captured in nests located on mountain sides in Bogda and in Altai.

Economic Aspects of Nomadic Production

According to a Soviet estimate, the animal stock in Xinjiang declined during the Chinese Republic from 17 million animals in the beginning of the 1910s to 12 million toward the end of the 1940s. Economic mismanagement by the local Chinese rulers of the province was said to have been the main cause for this. It may be so, but in fact during the Republic Kazak animal production became more and more integrated into the market economy of the province.

65. Owen Lattimore, *The Desert Road* . . ., p. 133.
66. i.e., Ludwig Golomb, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
Xinjiang was a very isolated province within China. A small amount of trade went via the caravan routes along the Gansu corridor. The trade declined during the Republican era and it seems mainly to have existed to supply the Han Chinese rulers with goods. While trade with the rest of China was of less importance, however, trade in the western direction with Russia and, after 1917, with the Soviet Union increased in importance. The main export item was livestock and livestock products. Thus the nomads played a significant role for the trade in Xinjiang 1911–1949.

In the 1850s, Russia had already established trading offices in Ili and Tacheng. After the Russian annexation of Western Turkestan in 1865 the trade between Xinjiang and Russia increased in importance. There were

69. See figures on trade in Fuad Kazak, op.cit., p. 119.
few significant natural barriers toward Russia. While the Xinhai Revolution in 1911 interrupted most of the Xinjiang trade with China, the Russian Revolution did not stop the trade over the border to Xinjiang. Civil war, however, decreased its importance for some years. Still, in 1913, 300,000 sheep were sold to Russia from Xinjiang. The trade in sheep, skins and wool had decreased but began to recover in the mid-1920s. In 1926 around 90,000 sheep were exported from Xinjiang to the Soviet Union, which constituted 32% of Soviet purchases from Xinjiang. All livestock together accounted for 48% of that year’s trade.

During the 1930s these totals increased rapidly and between 1930 and 1933 livestock and animal products provided between 79 and 93% of the total trade with the Soviet Union.20

Official provincial figures published in 1932 in Xinjiang counted 10 million sheep, 1.5 million horned cattle, 700,000 horses, 200,000 donkeys, and 60,000 camels.21

In 1943 the livestock of the whole province was estimated at 11,720,000 sheep and goats, 1,550,000 horned cattle, 870,000 horses, and 90,000 camels. The nomads are said to have owned about two-thirds of the total number of animals.22

Further details about the distribution of the pastoral production are to be found in the provincial census from 1946 in which the animal stock was also recorded. The distribution of animals in each district was as follows:23

Table 3. The Distribution of Livestock by District in 1946.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Horses (n=1,078,908)</th>
<th>Horned Cattle (n=1,807,196)</th>
<th>Sheep (n=11,387,986)</th>
<th>Goat (n=2,862,253)</th>
<th>Camel (n=97,477)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urumchi</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ili</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacheng</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altai</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hami</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Kashgar 3 % 13.2 % 10.2 % 13.1 % 6.3 %
Aksu 6 % 11.7 % 10.1 % 15.1 % 6.7 %
Khotan 1.3 % 9.6 % 13.3 % 9.3 % 3.2 %
Yanqi 7.5 % 5.8 % 7.3 % 6.2 % 8 %
Yarkand 1.7 % 13.5 % 8.2 % 11.2 % 2 %

The districts where the Kazaks lived were clearly the major animal stock areas. The high percentage of livestock in Yanqi (Karashar) is due to the nomadic Mongols living in the northern part of that district. Detailed figures from each county prove that large numbers of animals were to be found in areas dominated by the Kazaks.74

Table 4. The Distribution of Livestock in Counties Dominated by Kazaks in 1946.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ili district</th>
<th>Horses</th>
<th>Horned Cattle</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Goat</th>
<th>Camels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ili</td>
<td>55,221</td>
<td>139,501</td>
<td>366,611</td>
<td>57,690</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suiding</td>
<td>26,383</td>
<td>23,265</td>
<td>241,905</td>
<td>26,126</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gongliu</td>
<td>26,084</td>
<td>27,117</td>
<td>117,165</td>
<td>38,516</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tekes</td>
<td>51,237</td>
<td>35,604</td>
<td>187,892</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gongha</td>
<td>60,964</td>
<td>38,638</td>
<td>254,780</td>
<td>62,046</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhaosu</td>
<td>43,953</td>
<td>44,778</td>
<td>178,740</td>
<td>25,896</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ningxi</td>
<td>21,400</td>
<td>15,778</td>
<td>70,083</td>
<td>29,449</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houcheng</td>
<td>18,171</td>
<td>17,369</td>
<td>86,612</td>
<td>21,654</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wenquan</td>
<td>9,082</td>
<td>18,078</td>
<td>238,991</td>
<td>17,073</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bole</td>
<td>9,773</td>
<td>18,392</td>
<td>158,431</td>
<td>30.748</td>
<td>997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinghe</td>
<td>99,248</td>
<td>18,758</td>
<td>89,527</td>
<td>20,361</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinyuan</td>
<td>36,639</td>
<td>23,610</td>
<td>72,713</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tacheng district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tacheng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofeng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yumin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shawan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

74. Ibid.
### Altai district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>POP 1935</th>
<th>POP 1937</th>
<th>POP 1939</th>
<th>TAX 1935</th>
<th>TAX 1937</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chenghua</td>
<td>23,358</td>
<td>27,007</td>
<td>132,881</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>5,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burqin</td>
<td>21,619</td>
<td>24,795</td>
<td>117,861</td>
<td>16,672</td>
<td>1,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeminay</td>
<td>11,588</td>
<td>14,968</td>
<td>107,802</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habahe</td>
<td>15,247</td>
<td>23,731</td>
<td>109,140</td>
<td>17,291</td>
<td>1,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuhai</td>
<td>9,995</td>
<td>8,368</td>
<td>63,400</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>3,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuyun</td>
<td>13,605</td>
<td>6,349</td>
<td>45,628</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>3,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qinghe</td>
<td>7,403</td>
<td>3,397</td>
<td>37,211</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>2,319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Hami district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>POP 1935</th>
<th>POP 1937</th>
<th>POP 1939</th>
<th>TAX 1935</th>
<th>TAX 1937</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hami</td>
<td>13,307</td>
<td>17,275</td>
<td>160,292</td>
<td>85,517</td>
<td>2,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chenxi (Barköl)</td>
<td>11,096</td>
<td>10,791</td>
<td>90,625</td>
<td>35,769</td>
<td>2,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yiwu</td>
<td>2,661</td>
<td>3,882</td>
<td>23,890</td>
<td>10,700</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures are probably not exact. It is hard to believe that the census takers were able to get the real numbers from pastoralists who had to pay taxes according to the head of livestock they owned. However, the figures at least give an idea of the importance and the relative size of the animal stock within the Kazak areas.

More specific information on trade is rare. Horses, especially the breeds of Barköl and Ili, continued to play an important role as an export product to the Soviet Union. Especially in the Ili area, the horned cattle also played an important role in exports. Furthermore, large amounts of sheep were also sold as livestock over the border. Lattimore has pointed out that the increasing demand for meat in Soviet Central Asia from Xinjiang was due to the growth of large consumer cities there. The cotton-growing regions of the Soviet Central Asia, especially Uzbek SSR, were the chief purchasers. The shift from diversified farming to specialized farming, accompanied by industrialization all over Soviet Central Asia, increased the demand for livestock from Xinjiang. This in turn increased the degree of specialization and commercialization of the nomadic economy of the Kazaks in Xinjiang. Unfortunately, few detailed figures are available on the exports. The Xinjiang provincial statistics were never systematically kept. It is said, however, that exports from Xinjiang to the Soviet Union increased from 26,665 tons in 1935 to 28,990 tons in 1937. In January—August 1937, the

following items were exported to the Soviet Union, according to official figures published in Urumchi:

Table 5. Trade with the USSR, January–August 1937.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Products</th>
<th>Tons</th>
<th>Value in thousands of rubles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Live animals</td>
<td>7,422</td>
<td>2,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>2,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td>1,872</td>
<td>2,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle intestines</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>2,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furs</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hair (mainly camel)</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw silk</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>1,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>14,189</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is obvious that the Kazak production was adapted to a market economy in which animals and animal products were sold on the market and exported to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union purchased raw materials and in return sold manufactured goods to Xinjiang. The export figures show that the nomadic production was not marginal, but of real importance for the economic life of Xinjiang. A Soviet source gives us the import figures from Xinjiang in the 1940s.

Table 6. Imports to the Soviet Union from Xinjiang 1942–1945.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wool (in tons)</td>
<td>4,864</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>2,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>18,100</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>18,300</td>
<td>4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep &amp; Goats</td>
<td>481,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>469,400</td>
<td>315,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>50,200</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>25,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large hides</td>
<td>49,800</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>5,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small hides</td>
<td>1,548,000</td>
<td>12,700</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>118,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Imports to the Soviet Union from Xinjiang 1946–1949.78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1949</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wool (in tons)</td>
<td>1,267</td>
<td>1,697</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>1,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>48,200</td>
<td>21,300</td>
<td>34,700</td>
<td>35,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep &amp; Goats</td>
<td>334,900</td>
<td>399,900</td>
<td>344,500</td>
<td>319,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small hides</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>495,000</td>
<td>379,000</td>
<td>412,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large hides</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intestines (in bundles)</td>
<td>516,000</td>
<td>829,000</td>
<td>642,000</td>
<td>631,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1942 the warlord of Xinjiang, the duban Sheng Shicai broke his alliance with the Soviet Union. As a result, in 1943 the border was closed for a while. This was certainly a primary reason for the rebellion of the Kazaks in 1944. Their production depended on open borders. They had adapted their economic life to producing livestock and animal products for export to the Soviet Union. Suddenly they faced a situation in which their products could not be sold. When the Ili rebels opened the trade again a sudden increase can be seen in the trade figures for 1945. After the establishment of the anti-Chinese rebel government in Ili, the three districts of Dzungaria bordering the Soviet Union traded as usual again. These areas were populated by the Kazaks and the Soviet Union could purchase the same products as before.

The Kazak population in Xinjiang was to a high degree a result of Kazaks escaping the decreasing possibilities for independent animal husbandry production on the steppes. As nomads, the Kazaks could support themselves with animal products in Xinjiang. But during the Chinese Republic their production was highly adapted to the market economy of Xinjiang. Although a primitive economy, it still was much influenced by the trade over the Sino-Soviet border. Traders had already penetrated Xinjiang in the middle of the 19th century. While the Soviet Union had decreased trade across the borders in the west, it continued and increased after the revolution in the east. Tatar traders, originally immigrants from Russia, brought the animals and products to the borders where they had kinship-based network contacts who took care of the animals. After 1926, however, the Soviet Union established its own trading company in Xinjiang. The Kazak nomads became highly dependent on this market. But they could, despite conflicts with the Chinese rulers and some uprisings, continue to live a rather independent way of life until the People’s Liberation Army entered the province in the end of 1949.

78. Ibid., p. 187.
In April of 1951, the Kerey Kazak leader Osman Batur was executed by the newly established government of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter PRC) as a bandit and a traitor. Thus was eliminated one of the Kazaks’ most romantic and colourful leaders – one whose career spanned a tumultuous and intriguing period of modern Chinese history.

Osman’s death marked the end of organized Kazak resistance to the imposition of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule in Xinjiang. It also left unanswered myriad questions concerning the nature of Osman’s role in China’s northwesternmost province. Today myth and legend surround this charismatic figure, whose exploits in the 1940s were still being vilified in 1985 in the PRC. Among Kazak communities outside of China, he remains a Kazak “Batur” or hero. But the historical record itself has remained unclear. Not only are Osman’s actual movements during the period of the 1930s and 1940s in some doubt, but also the very allegiance of the man himself has been open to question. Was he a “freebooter” owing alle-
giance to no one but himself, as one source has suggested? Was he the great Kazak patriot, fighting for the establishment of an independent Kazak homeland to be carved out of the Chinese province of Xinjiang? Or was he simply the bandit of the Altai Mountains, preying on unwary oases, taking what he liked and inspiring fear and hatred among Han Chinese and fellow Muslims alike?

Definitive answers to some of the questions surrounding Osman and his career will never be possible. However, today there is available a body of information that sheds new light on Osman and his role in Xinjiang’s modern history. This paper draws together information culled from sources in Turkish and Chinese, and, to a lesser extent, materials in English and Russian. Its objective is to summarize and compare available information with a view to establishing more clearly just who Osman was and what motivation led him to continue resistance to Chinese rule up to 1951, in the face of obviously impossible odds.

The life and times of Osman Batur also allow interesting parallels to be drawn with the lives of “social bandits”, so carefully documented for us in E. J. Hobsbawm’s fascinating treatise on the subject. The social bandit is distinguished from the common robber — freebooter — because he is considered a hero, a champion of the people, who aid and support him in his exploits. Such men are especially likely to arise in times of threat to the established traditional order and are, therefore, by definition, reactionary rather than revolutionary. But the transition from bandit to revolutionary is one that Hobsbawm believes is an easy one for these heroes of the people because, “It does not take much sophistication to recognize the conflict between ‘our people’ and ‘foreigners,’ between the colonized and the colonizers.”

This was certainly the case in Xinjiang where the ‘foreign’ Chinese constituted, in a classic sense, an occupying colonial force. Small garrisons of Chinese troops, scattered throughout the region, were the means of control that enabled the small Chinese minority, who in the 1940s were less than 5 % of the population, to dominate the area. The increased authority of the Chinese under warlord Sheng Shicai was a direct threat to Kazak traditional society; to confront this threat was the special province of the Baturs or heroes. These men who led armed opposition to the imposition

3. Ibid., p. 103.
of Chinese taxes and Chinese attempts to shift Kazaks from their traditional pasture lands, were referred to as bandits by the Chinese authorities, and campaigns against them were part of traditional "bandit suppression" activities of the government.

Osman's role as a "social bandit" in Xinjiang is substantiated by several sources, even by some which seek to present quite a different view of the man. But before beginning our discussion of Osman's career, a cautionary word on the nature of most of the sources is necessary.

One of the challenging aspects of writing about Osman Batur lies in the fact that almost all of the sources used have in common questionable degrees of validity. Authors who have chosen to write about this nomadic herder turned patriotic rebel have done so with a particular political objective in mind. Turkic writers seek to portray him as the ultimate hero, who sacrificed his life to free his homeland and his people. Russians write about him as a gangster and a bandit, a view shared by the present government of the PRC. To the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan, Osman was a man who bravely gave his life fighting communism, their shared bete noire. In contrast to all these views, foreign observers in Xinjiang at the time considered Osman's existence — and his role in local political affairs — as only peripheral. Indeed, Osman remained a shadowy figure in the reports of most foreign representatives stationed in Xinjiang until the Beidashan incident in 1947 brought him into prominence and attracted international attention. Such government reports appear to be the least biased material available on Osman, but, unfortunately, they are limited and give little detailed information on him, especially before 1947.

Bias being a factor in the majority of the sources, it has been necessary to do extensive cross-checking of materials. Although this has not eliminated all the inconsistencies — or even basic contradictions — among the various sources, the major events in Osman's career can now be estab-

4. Recent scholarly studies demonstrate clearly the problem of over-reliance on biased source material. For instance, a recent German publication uses only the works of Zhang Dajun and other pro-Guomindang sources, ignoring (or unaware of) relevant sources in the United States and British government archives or works in Turkish and Russian, many of which challenge the traditional Guomindang views. See Han-jing Zieman, Beziehungen Sinkiangs zu China und der UdSSR 1917–1945, Bochum 1985. Andrew Forbes' recent study on Xinjiang also has little new to say on Osman Batur or other important Xinjiang leaders in the 1940s. See Andrew Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia 1911–1949, Cambridge 1986.

Both these works demonstrate the need to take great care when dealing with highly biased materials and, equally important, to cover sources other than standard publications.
lished with a greater accuracy. A clearer record of his life and his activities emerges, while at the same time some of the claims made on Osman’s behalf by his admirers and some of the charges levied against him by various groups appear now to be apocryphal. Because of the nature of much of the source material, the footnotes include not only the usual source identification but also indicate the author’s relation to Osman and/or their political position; when there is a serious discrepancy in sources and when an important source is uncorroborated this is noted in either the footnotes or the text.

**Historical Background: Xinjiang 1900–1950**

Osman Batur was born into an era of revolution. The Qing Dynasty was toppled by the Xinhai Revolution in China when he was only twelve, followed by the October Revolution in Russia when he was eighteen. Although neither of these events had any immediate impact on Osman or his people, both were to have repercussions for Xinjiang.

After the 1911 Revolution in China, Xinjiang remained firmly under control of the old imperial-style ruler, Governor Yang Cengxin. Yang managed to balance international interests in the border region effectively and he ensured public order until his assassination in 1928. From then until the People’s Liberation Army (hereafter PLA) marched into the provincial capital in 1949, the region saw a series of major political upheavals. Yang’s immediate successor was the less able Jin Shuren, who fled at the first sign of rebellion from his subjects in 1933. In that year, the abortive first East Turkestan Republic was founded by Uighurs in the south of the province, with its center in the old city of Kashgar. This movement was crushed by the region’s military commander, Sheng Shicai, who then established himself as warlord in Xinjiang with Soviet assistance. Sheng did not make himself Governor, but rather took the title of *duban* ("Tupan") or Provincial Director, and ruled with ultimate authority.

Initially, Sheng espoused democratic rule, and, with Soviet financial aid and Soviet troops stationed as far east as Hami, he began a program of reform. Under Soviet tutelage, education and economic activities expanded. Unfortunately, the promise of his early policies was not fulfilled. By the middle of the 1930s, he had increasingly shifted toward despotic rule, marked by random, seemingly pointless arrests and executions of people

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5. On Sheng Shicai’s career and times, see Allen Whiting, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?*, East Lansing, MI 1958, and in Chinese, Zhang Dajun, *Xinjiang Fengbao Qishi Nian* [Xinjiang’s Seventy Years of Turbulence], 12 vols., especially Vols. 8 and 9, Taipei 1980.
from all nationalities in the region. His secret police were said to be all-seeing and all-knowing. Dissatisfaction with or supposed intrigue against his regime were met with severe retaliation.

In 1937, Sheng began a pacification campaign against the Kazaks. Through the use of spies and the kidnapping of respected, often elderly Kazak leaders, among other ploys, Sheng was able to force many of the Kazak groups to disarm. Some he even forced to leave the province completely.6

In opposition to Sheng's increasingly oppressive rule Kazaks began organizing groups in the northern districts of the province. Many of these groups had as their sole objective the elimination of Han Chinese from the province. As the grim resistance struggle intensified some of these movements took on nationalistic overtones: calls went out for a Kazak state to be established in northern Xinjiang. All Muslims were urged to rise against the "oppressor Chinese."7 Osman became a part of this general resistance to Sheng but he did not become a central figure in northern Xinjiang affairs until the 1940s.

As resistance intensified, so did the degree of sophistication of local nationalists' organizations. In the early 1940s a planning committee formed in the Ili region of Xinjiang. This group laid the groundwork for a second East Turkestan Republic, based in the Ili valley. The leaders of this group included educated Kazaks and Uighurs. Their ranks were increased by the eventual return of men who were released from Sheng's prisons, which were described in an American intelligence report as "a means by which it [the Chinese government] was able to manufacture whitehot opponents of Chinese rule in wholesale lots."8

While local nationalistic sentiment was taking more concrete form, Sheng began to move away from the USSR and toward the Guomindang. By 1944, the Nationalist Chinese were able to maneuver him out of the region, luring him to the national capital with the promise of a Ministry post. A new Governor, Wu Zhongxin, was appointed but before he could

6. According to interviews with refugee Kazaks, a group under Kazak leader Sultan Sherif was forced to leave Xinjiang for Qinghai, where the group remained between 1937 and 1948. Arslan Tosun interview. Taipei. Taiwan. October 1981. Cf. chapter 4.
arrive to take over from Sheng, the Ili Rebellion began in the fall of 1944. This movement against the Chinese quickly gathered support throughout the northern districts of the province. By spring of 1945, the forces of the Ili valley, now under the flag of the East Turkestan Republic (hereafter ETR) moved into the northern Altai district. The ETR government sent its representatives to the local Kazak leaders, including Osman Batur who agreed to join the new movement. Osman was appointed the Governor of Altai in return for his support. Other Kazaks were also given posts in the new government as they joined forces with the ETR.

By the autumn of 1945, the army of the ETR was within 90 kilometers of the provincial capital. However, through Soviet mediation a ceasefire was arranged. Peace negotiations began in October of 1945 between delegates from the Ili area and the Guomindang and a peace agreement was finally reached in January of 1946. A coalition provincial government was formed as a result in the summer of the same year. Osman was an official of this new provincial government, his post as head of the Altai District being recognised by the coalition.

This new government lasted less than a year. Distrust on both sides led to its collapse in May 1947, spurred on by the Central Government’s ill-timed appointment of the Uighur, Mesut Sabri, as Chairman of the Province. The Ili delegates in the government returned to Ili and the ETR from then on maintained itself as a separate territory, excluding Chinese from entering the three northwesternmost districts of China until 1950 when PLA troops incorporated them into the new PRC.

During the period of the coalition, Osman concluded that the ETR was only a Soviet puppet. This was his reason, according to several sources, for deciding to join in common cause with his long-standing enemy, the Han Chinese, against the Islamic ETR. He was still allied with the Guomindang in 1949 when he made his fateful decision not to leave Xinjiang with other pro-Chinese Kazaks, but to remain and fight. He was captured in early 1951, and was executed a few months later.

Osman Batur: The First Forty Years

Osman was the son of Besir Islerim, or, as he is called in some Turkish sources, Islam Khoja, a Kerey Kazak of the Molqi lineage. His mother’s name was Kayya. International borders in Central Asia were of little importance to the nomadic Kazaks in Czarist times and Kazak herders crossed into Chinese territory throughout the late 19th century. Like other groups of Kerey Kazaks, Osman’s family was living on the Russian side of the border at the time of his birth.

Osman himself told Doak Barnett, who interviewed him in person in his mountain stronghold in 1948, that he was 49, making 1899 the year of his birth. Given the general agreement of most sources, this year is most probably correct. If we accept it as such, however, it does cast some doubt on the oft repeated claim that Osman was especially trained in his youth by the legendary Kazak leader and hero Böke Batur. Many sources, while agreeing on 1899, also insist on the fact that Osman was trained under the hand of this warrior, the amount of time spent in training varying from 18 months to two years. This special bond between Böke and Osman is supported by such quotes as the following, in which Böke says of Osman, “Though I say it to his father’s face, and to his own, his like will never be born again. The tales for once are true.”

In an article commemorating the 30th anniversary of his death, a nationalist Turkistani journal published in Europe extolled Osman’s sacrifice for his people and also cited the role of Boke Batur in his early training, linking Osman firmly to the tradition of warrior-leaders in Kazak history.

10. According to the Turkish system of patronyms, Osman’s formal name is “Osman Islamoğlu” — or Osman, Son of Islam. His name appears in this form in most Turkish language sources. In Chinese, his names sometimes appears as “Wuseman Batulu Semayiloufu” — a rough transliteration of Osman Batur Islamolov. But in publications in the People’s Republic of China he is simply “Wuseman.”

11. The form of Osman’s father’s name also varies: he is Islam Bai or sometimes Islam Khodja. Relatives now living in Germany refer to him as Besir Islerim. Arslan Tosun interview, in Taibei, October 1981.


14. Böke Batur was, according to a Kazak source, also of the Molqi lineage of the Kerey Kazaks, making him and Osman kinsmen. Halife Altay, Anayurttan Anadolu’ya [From My Homeland to Anatolia], Istanbul 1981, p. 265. His source is Böke Batur’s kinsman, the poet Akit Haji, as well as other elderly Kazaks now living as refugees in Turkey.


A second such article likens Osman to Chinggiz Khan and Mustafa Kemal - seeking to add even further to the man's status in history.\(^{17}\)

The only discordant note in this legendary relationship comes from the Kazak author Halife Altay who gives us details about Böke Batur. After fighting the imperial Qing dynasty in China for many years, Böke Batur finally was forced to flee into Tibet, travelling via the Kazak campsite at Gasköl, a lake in far western Qinghai province. When Böke reached Tibet, he was detained by the Chinese. When in detention, he grew ill; he was eventually beheaded by the Chinese in the year 1903.\(^{18}\) If Osman was in fact born in 1899 he would have been only four years old at the time of Böke's death. Even for a Kazak hero this would have been a precocious age at which to learn to shoot, ride and to cross over the Russian border to buy guns - particularly if the process took 18 months or more.\(^{19}\)

It seems very probable that Osman's name has come to be linked with Böke Batur's in the time-honored tradition of legend building. Osman was probably born in 1899 - and was very probably trained to fight in the Kazak style at an early age - but not by Böke Batur personally. As we shall see, this is not the only relationship which may be more apocryphal than real in Osman's colourful history.

As a child, Osman moved into Chinese territory and grew up in the northern mountains of Xinjiang Province, an area we shall refer to as the Altai. Several sources on the young Osman tell us that he could read and write. One source even gives us the name of his teacher - Arul Mullah, "a religious teacher".\(^{20}\) Barnett, however, writes that he was an uneducated man.\(^{21}\) Whether he received any formal education or not is perhaps a less important point than the fact that he doubtless was taught to fight - to ride and shoot from a horse's back, and to plan his battles with skill. Most sources note that his early training was at the hands of various Kazak Bators, as would be appropriate to a Kazak boy born to a Kazak warrior line like that of Molqi.

Osman was married in 1918 or 1919 to a Kazak woman named Kaini who

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19. One Turkic author gives the birthdate of 1889 for Osman and writes that Osman was trained by Böke Batur before Böke left for Tibet. The source is uncorroborated and in the face of so much agreement between disparate sources on the 1899 date, it cannot be accepted as factual.
reportedly could read and write — and could use a sewing machine. His first son was named Serziman, born in 1920. Other children — and possibly other wives — also formed part of his immediate family, but the only other children who appear as part of available records are a daughter, Azupay, born in 1932 and another daughter who reportedly was shot at the age of six in the course of a battle with the Chinese in 1947.

In the 1920s and early 1930s, Osman’s primary concern was probably his young family and the fortunes of his people who continued herding their flocks and fighting skirmishes with the Chinese authorities — a recurrent part of many Kazaks’ lives in Xinjiang at that time. There is little information on his life until 1940 when he became deeply involved in Kazak resistance to the increasingly oppressive rule of warlord Sheng.

Kazak Resistance, 1940–1945

The Kazak struggle against the Chinese in Xinjiang received international publicity in 1951 when the magazine *Time* dramatically announced:

Twelve years ago the Russians launched a determined effort to wipe out the rebellious Mohammedans in Sinkiang. Some 10,000 Kazakhs were driven out of Barkol . . . some stayed to fight under the leadership of a tribal chieftan named Osman Batur, who, singlehanded and armed only with outmoded equipment from China’s Nationalists, declared war on the whole Soviet Union.

As with many reports emanating from Xinjiang during the 1940s and 1950s, this one has its inaccuracies, but it was correct in dating the armed resistance struggle of Osman from 1940. The first battle of what was to be a bloody and prolonged resistance movement against the Chinese took place in February of 1940. Osman himself dated his struggle from this time, but the events which led directly to Osman’s joining the resistance movement go back to the 1930s. An uncorroborated account of some of these events is given by the Turkish author Hızır Bek Gayretullah whose source of information was none other than Osman Batur’s brother-in-law, Zalabay.

24. Godfrey Lias, *op. cit.*, p. 71. Ian Morrison records the rumour that four sons and four daughters of Osman were killed by Sheng Shicai but this information is not corroborated by any other source. Ian Morrison, “Some Notes on the Kazaks of Sinkiang.” *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*. 36 (1949), p. 70.
Teyşi, who fought with Osman as a young man. Gayretullah interviewed Zalabay in Turkey in 1973 and offers his account which, with notes added from other sources, is summarized below.27

In 1934, a Kazak Congress met at a place in northern Xinjiang called Qoysu. Convened by a Kazak leader named Zayif Teyşi, this Congress first discussed and then organized resistance to the Chinese; when the various representatives left, they became a part of a widely organized underground resistance movement among the region’s Kazaks.

The Altai representatives at this Congress were Ahid Haji and Halil Tayşi. Sheng Shicai, however, had learned of the new Kazak movement and managed to apprehend the two men upon their return to Altai. People became uneasy; their fears were soon justified. Chinese followed the detention of the two men with what Gayretullah refers to as “affronts to the national honour” or “namus”. In the town of Köktogay (Fuyun) Chinese troops burned mosques, religious schools and books. At the same time they began to disarm Kazaks forcibly as part of yet another pacification campaign. In the course of this, Sheng’s men rode into the camp of Islam Bay, Osman’s father, and demanded that all weapons be handed over to the government immediately. Osman alone reportedly refused, saying that if they gave up their arms today they would give up their lives tomorrow. He then took his weapons and, accompanied by his eldest son, went into the mountains.28

Lacking leadership and largely disarmed as a result of Sheng’s campaign against them, the Kazaks were initially unable to respond to increasing Chinese power in the Altai, but at last new leaders came forward. In the winter of 1939–1940 Chinese troops attacked the mosque of the arrested religious leader, Ahid Haji, in Saritogay. A demonstration against this attack was organized by two young Kazak leaders, Iris Han and Esim Han, in February of 1940. When the Chinese authorities of the town moved to arrest them, the Kazaks fired on the Chinese. No Turks were reportedly taken prisoner or killed in the battle that ensued, but the leaders were forced to flee into the mountains. Thus the first battle of the Kazak resistance movement was fought, according to Zalabay’s account recorded by Gayretullah.29

While Osman told Barnett that his own struggle began in that same month,30 Osman is not mentioned as a participant in this early battle by any

28. Ibid., p. 89.
29. Ibid., p. 89.
source. He was, however, reportedly involved in another battle which occurred in March of 1940, at Baytik Bogdo, known to the Chinese as the Beidashan Mountains located on the Chinese-Mongolian border. At that time, Osman was in a force under the command of the Kazak leader Nogabay, who, like Osman, had refused to give up his weapons and who was leading attacks on Chinese outposts, police stations, and Russian mining operations. In the March battle, however, this force did not fare well and Nogabay was killed. His son, the young Iris Han, a leader of the February battle described above, was elected to succeed his father and Osman was elected as second in command.¹¹

Iris Han and Osman fought Sheng’s troops again in April and this time their forces fared much better. They reportedly defeated a combined force of 8,000 Chinese and Russians, plus 200 soldiers from Mongolia.¹²

As a result of this battle, Sheng decided to negotiate. Iris Han made several conditions for a peace agreement, as follows:¹³

1. The release of innocent people held in jail and return of the bodies of the dead to their families for burial.
2. The appointment of a Kazak Turk as Governor of Altai.
3. The prohibition of Russians from working the Altai gold mines.
4. An end to secret arrests.
5. An end to search and harrassment of Kazaks who had given up their guns.

Negotiations based on these points were successful and an agreement was signed in July of 1940. Osman, however, refused to be a party to any such agreement with Sheng. He took his own followers and left Iris Han, to continue his own fight in the mountains.¹⁴

That such a peace agreement was actually signed is supported by subsequent events. First, after the summer of 1940, Osman did in fact become a leader in his own right, no longer under Iris Han. Perhaps Iris, like other Kazak leaders of the period, yielded to the seemingly impossible odds of hundreds of armed Chinese troops against his own people, who often had to fight with their vulnerable flocks and their families nearby. A peace agreement with Sheng would bring respite from fighting and it appears possible that when Iris made an accomodation with Sheng, Osman chose to go his own path.

32. Ibid., p. 71.
33. Ibid., p. 72.
34. Ibid., p. 72.
Firmer evidence of an agreement is the fact that Sheng appointed a Kazak as Governor of Altai. Sheng chose the pro-Guomindang Kazak leader Janimhan to take the post of Governor in 1940. At the same time, he detained Janimhan’s sons and some of his friends - a kind of political hostage taking that would have been totally in keeping with Sheng’s policies at the time.  

Osman’s distrust of the Chinese proved to be justified. Ten months after beginning their fight against Sheng, Iris and Esim were both dead: Iris died of “plague” and Esim was killed fighting Chinese forces. Osman thus inherited the struggle and became the principal Kazak leader in the northern Altai.

In the summer of 1940, Osman had his own force of men. He was assisted by two trusted allies, Suleyman and Burktubay. By 1942, these men reportedly had a following of over 10,000 people. In the summer of the same year, Osman led his people for the first time as Commander against the Chinese and this, writes Gayretullah, made him an important leader of the Kazak people.

One of Osman’s objectives at this early stage of his resistance career was to put an end to Russian mining activities in the Altai. Sheng had encouraged the Soviet exploitation of Altai gold, among other valuable minerals, probably on a basis that was personally profitable to the Duban. Fighting against such operations could certainly be interpreted as opposing both the Chinese and the Russians, and Kazak accounts do indeed regard this opposition as proof of patriotic fervour.

If, however, we accept the view that Osman’s war on the Russians was strictly patriotic and a part of his now celebrated opposition to communism, then we cannot but be perplexed by the alliance of Osman with Mongolia, one of several alliances into which Osman would enter in the course of his career. Soviet aid to Mongolia was an established fact of political life in the region, and an alliance between the legendary anti-communist Osman and a close ally of the USSR demands some explanation.

37. Hasan Oraltay, Kazak . . . p. 73. Zhang Dajun writes that he had only ten men and four rifles and, as a bandit, sought refuge in Mongolia in 1940. Zhang Dajun, op.cit., vol. 8, p. 5188.
38. Hizir Bek Gayretullah, op.cit., p. 90. This figure could be an exaggeration, but it appears Osman must have had more than a few followers by 1942 as he was, at this point, worthy of the attention of Chinese military intelligence.
39. Hasan Oraltay, Kazak . . ., p. 73.
Osman made no secret of his partnership with Mongol leaders. When Doak Barnett visited Osman, he was told that the Kazaks had been receiving Mongol aid since January 1942. Indeed, in the early 1940s, he received more than aid. During the winter of 1941–1942 under pressure from Sheng’s troops, Osman moved across the Chinese border and head-quartered inside Mongol territory, north of Ashan at Tayingol.

Kazak authors do not shrink from explaining the seemingly paradoxical alliance. According to Hasan Oraltay, for instance, Osman needed arms desperately. While many Kazaks were joining him, swelling the ranks of his fighting force, the number of weapons was extremely limited. There was no choice, therefore, but to trade for arms from Mongolia.

According to a Chinese source, Osman signed a formal agreement with Mongolia in 1942, promising to make certain concessions to the Mongols in return for weapons. Mongolia would first receive three people from Osman “for education” in Mongolia. These three were to be Osman’s son, brother and a White Russian friend. In addition, Osman promised to control his people and prevent their crossing into Mongolia; he would accept Mongolian advisers and 200 troops; he would become recognized as the Governor of Altai once he took over the Ashan counties and would, in return, recognize Mongol rights to station men in Qinghe and Fuyun. He would, finally, promise to fight their common enemy, the Chinese.

Osman was assured of several benefits from this alliance. There would be religious freedom throughout Altai and no communist propaganda; no Kazak would be arrested (presumably for “accidentally” trespassing on Mongolian territory). Osman would receive whatever he required and would be recognized as the Chief of Ashan.

On the matter of such a formal agreement with Mongolia, Kazak sources are silent. Instead, two of the Kazak authors, in true legend building style, write that no less a personage than Choibalsan, leader of the Mongolian government in Ulan Batur, visited Osman personally in his

41. Ibid.
42. For instance, Hasan Oraltay writes that on February 20, 1942, many young fighters joined Osman’s force, but brought with them only a few guns, specifically: “Halil and his son Zayip with twenty-five friends” joined, bringing only 2 guns among them; and “Keles Batur and thirty friends” arrived but with only a total of three guns between them, and so on, Hasan Oraltay, *Kazak . . .*, p. 76.
44. Ibid.
Tayingol camp in order to negotiate an arms deal. One author notes the dangers implicit in such an agreement, telling us that Choibalsan tempted Osman with talk of creating an independent country in the Altai. This nation, he suggested, could ask for USSR protection and eventually be admitted into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

There is no extant copy of such an arms agreement, so we do not know if such a document was signed. However, Osman, according to a variety of sources, received several shipments of arms from Mongolia. Initial shipments from Ulan Batur were reportedly stored at Bulgun. Another source records that in July 1943 Osman received a delegation from Mongolia which resulted in his purchase of 50 rapid-fire weapons in exchange for horses and sheep. In 1943–1944, shipments of over 400 weapons of various kinds were sent, according to the same source. In battle with Chinese troops in later years, as we shall see, Osman also received air cover from Mongolian (Soviet) bombers. There is no doubt that Osman received and made extensive use of Mongolian assistance.

Osman’s reasons for this alliance appear to have been pragmatic. But what reasons would Mongolia have for entering into an alliance with an “anti-communist” like Osman? Kazak writers tell us that Mongolia aided Osman because the Chinese were the common enemy of the Kazak and Mongol peoples. But the reasons are more complex and lie in the tangled web of intrigue then ensnaring the people of Xinjiang.

As mentioned previously, Sheng Shicai had enjoyed a lengthy and profitable alliance with the USSR. He had used Soviet military assistance against the Kazaks, disarming many of them and driving others out of the province. However, by the time of Osman’s first major battle against Sheng’s forces in 1942, Sheng had already realigned himself with the Guomindang. The Russians in the province became persona non grata. This turnabout by Sheng was more than a mere annoyance to the USSR: it

45. Godfrey Lias, op.cit., pp. 57–58, and Hizir Bek Gayretullah, op.cit., p. 91. Burhan, in his memoirs, tells us that the Mongol representative sent to Osman was a man called Mohuaxi who, with several others, visited Osman to begin arms negotiations. See Burhan Shahidi (Baoerhan), Xinjiang Wushi Nian [Fifty Years in Xinjiang], Beijing 1984, pp. 312–313.
46. Godfrey Lias, op.cit., pp. 57–58. Lias is not always reliable and as his writing is highly tendentious it is quite in keeping with his objectives to insert such a warning against any communist and/or his allies.
47. Hizir Bek Gayretullah, op.cit., p. 91.
49. See discussion on p. 000
threatened the USSR's supply of raw materials from the province — particularly the valued raw materials and food on the hoof which had contributed to the Soviet war economy. The Soviets were pushed out of the province — but their interest in the available and potential wealth of the region was not diminished, nor was their interest in the region's political future.

While direct involvement in the region was made difficult by Sheng's change of heart, Soviet agents could use other means to disrupt Chinese plans for the region. One such means was to make use of the discontent of local Kazaks like Osman, albeit a discontent that they had directly contributed to through their support of Sheng. They could not approach a man like Osman directly, but they could still foster chaos through arming small guerrilla bands like his through their intermediary, the Mongol nationalists. In this scenario, Osman receives the arms he needs so desperately and harasses the Chinese in the Altai. At the same time the Soviets exercise control over him by controlling his source of weapons and other war materiel. If he grew to be a threat to Soviet or Mongol interests, he could also be located and eliminated, just as Soviet soldiers had eliminated organized opposition to Sheng in the early 1930s.

In this interpretation Osman appears to be riding the tiger by buying his arms indirectly from his own enemy, but he probably had no choice. Further, the Mongols, engaged in their own struggle against the Chinese, could claim a certain sympathy with the Kazaks, and it was probably on this basis that the seemingly paradoxical alliance was formed.

Osman then was a pragmatic patriot. In this light, we might turn again to one of Osman's early targets in his resistance war against the Chinese — the Russian mining operations. Could there have been a pragmatic side to these attacks as well? The mines, in remote and mountainous areas of the Altai, were vulnerable targets and attacks on these operations would also be blows at Sheng and at the Soviet Union. But attacking such small outposts and their supply routes surely also brought a more tangible benefit to the "social bandits" under Osman Batur. The supplies sent to the mines offered easy pickings to town-wary nomads. More importantly, gold bullion moving out of the Altai mines offered an extremely tempting target, the gold representing a means to secure both weapons and followers to the cause, as well as increasing the fortunes of the leader of the group. If detractors wish to suggest Osman was merely a bandit, his alliance with Mongolia and his choice of the mining operations as a target both could encourage such speculation.

By the year 1943, Osman had secured arms for his followers and had participated in enough battles with the Chinese to earn him high status
among the Kazaks of the Altai area. In honour of his role in the struggle against the Chinese, Osman was given the title of “Batur” or hero in 1943. According to Turkic sources, there was a great gathering of Kazak people in the Altai in the summer of that year; the exact location varies from source to source, but most informants say that a special meeting in honour of Osman was indeed held, after which he was known as Osman Batur. For instance, Gayretullah writes that a great feast was held in Bulgun in July of 1943; on this occasion Osman was “tossed on the felt” and was called “Khan”. He was thereafter known as Osman Batur. Other sources simply record that he was made a “Great Leader” in the summer of 1943.

The Kazak title “Batur” indicated a very special category of leader or chieftain among the Kerey. One anthropologist has described a Batur as an individual who became leader on the basis of his own merits. In other words, Batur was a title conferred on a man for special feats of bravery and leadership. Such men were outside the usual Kazak hierarchy of taژi and other hereditary nobles and were often strong individualists, going their own road and achieving recognition of their success from their peers through the title of “Batur” (batir).

Clark also tells us that the Kazak Baturs were very much a product of their times. Such men emerged “in times of stress and/or when critical threats were posed to the group or society.” Such was undoubtedly the case in the late 1930s and early 1940s in Xinjiang as Sheng Shicai increased his pacification campaigns against the Altai Kazaks.

There is a striking correlation between this description of the Batur and the circumstances in which he might emerge in Kazak society and the “social bandit” described by Hobsbawm. Particularly relevant is the type of bandit he identifies as a “haiduk” — a primitive resistance fighter who was “by definition an insurrectionary.” These haiduks were an especially common phenomenon when a people were “oppressed by conquerors of foreign language or religion,” and Hobsbawm’s description of this type of

51. Gayretullah writes that he was tossed on the felt — an activity for celebration among Kazaks, Hizir Bek Gayretullah, op. cit., p. 91. Burhan tells us Osman was made a Khan at Baitag Bogda or Beidashan. Burhan Shahidi, op. cit., p. 313. Lias gives the year 1943. Godfrey Lias, op. cit., p. 57; Hasan Oraltay writes that Osman became a “great leader” at a special meeting at Qisilqaya. Hasan Oraltay. Kazak..., p. 76.
53. Ibid, p. 4.
54. E. J. Hobsbawm. op. cit., p. 74.
“social bandit” very closely parallels Kazak Batur in Xinjiang’s Altai area in the 1940s:\textsuperscript{55}

Of course, in times of trouble for the people and crisis for authority, the number of haiduks and haiduk bands would grow, their actions multiply and become more daring. At such times, the government orders to stamp out banditry would grow more peremptory, the excuses of local administrators more shrill and heartfelt, and the mood of the people tense. For, unlike the epidemics of ordinary banditry which we retrospectively discover to be forerunners of revolution only because in fact they have preceded it, haiduks were not merely symptoms of unrest, but nuclei of potential liberators, recognized by the people as such.

In character, too, the haiduk leader resembled the highly individual and free-wheeling Batur. In both instances leaders were elected and led organized social groups rather than ragtag bandit gangs. Haiduk leaders clearly had the potential to become legendary figures among their people, as was indeed the case with the Kazak Batur.

In 1943 Osman certainly looked the part of a Kazak warrior. He was 185 cm. tall, “a huge man with a tremendous frame, ham-like hands, and a terrific ego.”\textsuperscript{56} He was “short-necked and dark-skinned, with deep lines between his eyes . . .”\textsuperscript{57} “His cool grey eyes, set lips and black beard made him look the part of a heroic warrior.”\textsuperscript{58} In character, he was “a man of action, a man not to be played with, having neither mercy nor fear for his enemy, not trustful, yet trusted by all, a man with a serious purpose who wanted nothing for himself except to do what he knew he had been born to do.”\textsuperscript{59} His objective was “to clean out the Chinese and Russians from Turkish land.”\textsuperscript{60}

That this heroic figure was indeed a social bandit is supported by reports that he also became the head of a patriotic Kazak organization in the Altai area, referred to variously as “The Save Altai Committee\textsuperscript{61}, “The Kazak

\begin{footnotes}
55. Ibid., p. 81.
57. Godfrey Lias, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 58.
60. Hizir Bey Gayrettullah, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 103.
\end{footnotes}
Emancipation Committee of the Altai or "The Association to Save the Country."

No details of a formal political program of this organization are given in any Kazak sources, but according to Chinese intelligence reports this organization was established on Mongolian (USSR) advice, with the personal assistance of a man named General Ma-ke-ji, sent to Osman by the Mongols to aid him in organizing the Kazaks. Ultimately, the group included 400 members. Osman himself reportedly wrote an open letter to the Kazaks of Xinjiang asking them to unite against Sheng and his oppressive policies. Together, he declared, the Kazaks would organize their own government and army, free all those in prison and ultimately prohibit all Chinese from entering the Altai area. There would be an end to the forceful seizure of Kazak property and free business relations with other countries would resume.

That Osman wrote such a letter is uncorroborated by other sources. But many nationalistic Kazak tracts were released in the Altai in the 40s and it is quite possible that Osman — or someone writing on his behalf — could have circulated such a letter. The references to an end to the seizure of Kazak property and the resumption of trade with foreign countries — namely, Mongolia and the USSR — attest to the economic hardship which was beginning for the Kazak people as Sheng turned away from his mentors, the Soviets. In retaliation, the USSR not only withdrew advisers, soldiers and traders, it also closed its border with Xinjiang in 1942. Soviet figures for trade with Xinjiang demonstrate the dramatic fall in trade which added fuel to Kazak resistance against the Chinese who were blamed for the closure of the border.

The trade figures suggest another element in the history of Osman’s entangled alliances during the 1940s. Over the period of Sheng’s rule, up to 1942, trade from Xinjiang to the USSR expanded rapidly. Kazak participation in this trade was innocent of ideological implications: there was simply no other feasible market for the surplus animals in Kazak herds. No train linked isolated Xinjiang to China proper but, in contrast, a railhead at Alma Ata, just across the Sino-Soviet border, allowed the relatively easy

64. Zhang Dajun, op.cit., Vol. 8, p. 5194.
65. Zhang Dajun, op.cit., p. 5194. Zhang’s source is the Xinjiang Baoan Silingbu. Heshan Bandit Suppression Document. September 1943, the text of which includes a translation of the Osman letter which had been written in Kazak. This source is uncorroborated.
Table 1. Soviet-Xinjiang Trade 1942–1944.

A. Soviet Exports to Xinjiang (All figures in 1000s of rubles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount/Value</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton cloth</td>
<td>1000 meters</td>
<td>9,811</td>
<td>2,661</td>
<td>1,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>100 rubles</td>
<td>1,099</td>
<td>2,343</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td>2,202</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Value of Trade
(in millions of rubles)

21.9  11.6  3.3

B. Xinjiang Exports to the USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount/Value</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td>4,864</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep &amp; Goats</td>
<td>Thousand Head</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>469.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>,,</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>,,</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides</td>
<td>,,</td>
<td>1,597.8</td>
<td>13.34</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pels</td>
<td>Thousand Rubles</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>91.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Value of Trade
(in millions of rubles)

56.4  3.3  23.2


transport of animals and animal products to the hungry cities and towns of war-torn Russia. Soviet manufactured products reached Xinjiang by the same route. Under Sheng, the Kazak economy became geared to the export of their staple products to the USSR and to buying readily available Soviet goods.

Soviet political influence grew apace under Sheng but this influence did not impinge on the Kazaks until 1940 when Sheng signed an agreement with the USSR which granted the Soviet Union extensive privileges in Xinjiang. These included the right to prospect for and to exploit tin deposits, a provision which gave its name to the “Tin Mines Agreement.” It also allowed the USSR to build roads and establish a communications network – which could have cut through territory that was then the sole domain of

the Kazak herders. But the provision of this agreement which posed the greatest potential threat to the Kazaks was Sheng’s agreement that persons residing in lands that were earmarked for Soviet development would be removed by the Xinjiang Government.67 This agreement, with its clear threat to Kazak homelands in the oil and mineral rich northern part of the region, was kept secret. But at the same time, Sheng stepped up his campaign against the Kazaks, possibly in keeping with promises contained in the agreement. Disarming the Kazaks was certainly a first step.

By 1942, the Kazaks had been harassed by Sheng for some years, their arms seized and their honour affronted. Now they were to have their trade relations with the USSR severed, drastically affecting the local economy. This was doubtless a major reason why ordinary Kazaks now joined leaders like Osman, in order to fight against forces which they very probably did not fully comprehend.

Osman was primarily a man of action, not of words or ideas. His battles with the Chinese authorities continued in 1942 and 1943. Then, in a battle with Sheng’s troops in September of 1943 he was wounded and withdrew to a camp near the Mongolian border.68 He was in this winter retreat when Chinese troops again attacked him. In retaliation, on March 12 and 13 of 1944, Mongol planes came to Osman’s defence. According to the Soviet account, the Chinese were totally to blame for this border incident. They reported that the Xinjiang Provincial Government was forcing Kazaks to move to the south and some Kazaks, in defiance of the Chinese, fled into the Mongolian area. But Chinese planes pursued them, violating Mongol airspace. As the 1936 mutual aid pact between Mongolia and the USSR obliged the Soviets to come to the aid of Mongolia, it had done so, driving the Chinese planes away and counter-attacking.69 The Chinese government lodged an official protest over these border incursions by the Soviet Union but the incident remained unresolved and it was to be repeated, with Osman’s recurrent use of the protection afforded by the proximity of the Mongolian border.70

In 1943–44 Consular reports noted that Kazak unrest in Xinjiang had

become "endemic." In the winter of 1944, Sheng Shicai contributed to the tension by issuing an order for a horse requisition. Ten thousand horses were to be "donated" by the people of Xinjiang, the number being apportioned among the ten districts of the province. Money was acceptable in lieu of a horse, in the amount of 750 Xinjiang dollars, then far above the market value of a horse.

Sheng's intention in issuing such an order may have been to please the Guomindang with a sizeable contribution of horses to the war effort. But given the logistic problem of delivering such a number of horses to China proper there would seem to be another motive, namely an increase for the coffers of the provincial government and its chief. As the order netted far more money than horses it seems probable that this "requisition" was only a ploy to accumulate funds for Sheng himself, possibly to be used to pave the way for his re-entrance into the Guomindang fold.

Whatever Sheng's ultimate purpose in issuing such a directive, it was certain to cause opposition. By the end of March 1944, the Xinjiang Ribao published in Urumchi, announced that the Ashan district -- the Altai -- had donated a total of one hundred horses. The report notes the source of forty of these animals: the Kazak Literary Society provided half, with the rest coming from officials and other "literary" groups. There were no further reports of any contributions from the Altai area published in the papers, indicating substantial Kazak resistance to this newest Sheng directive.

In the spring and summer of 1944, Chinese efforts at "bandit suppression" increased, a response to an ever increasing number of Kazak raids on Chinese garrisons and towns. In July, Kazaks attacked the town of Jimunai, near the Sino-Soviet border. According to Chinese sources, the Kazaks received the arms for this attack from Soviet lorries that had been driven up to the very frontier in order to supply the "bandits." These

74. Rumors suggest that General Sheng made a sizeable contribution in gold to the Guomindang upon his arrival in the national capital in 1944, thereby assuring himself of a safe transition back into the party fold -- and preventing the charges later brought against him in Taipei, Taiwan, from resulting in what many would have considered well deserved punishment.
75. Xinjiang Ribao, March 31, 1944, p. 3.
Kazaks were not a part of Osman’s people, for he was then operating in the area near Mongolia, but clearly Osman was a part of widespread Kazak resistance to Sheng’s rule.

Osman continued his own fight, defeating Chinese forces in battles at Sagan and Dontu within a two week period in the summer of 1944. When reinforcements were sent out to attack him, Osman once again retreated, this time moving into the Barköl lake area, north of the oasis town of Hami, in the late summer or early autumn of 1944.77

From the base in Barköl, Kazaks, possibly including Osman’s men, raided the provincial capital itself in October of 1944. When this raiding party withdrew, Chinese troops were sent out to the towns of Qiande and Fugang to reinforce these advance guard posts against Kazak raiders. There was no pursuit of the Kazaks, however, and no additional patrols were organized to protect the capital from such bold bandits.78 To understand why no punitive action was undertaken, we turn to the situation in the provincial capital and to events far to the west, in the Ili valley on the Soviet border. These events lead to the second part of Osman’s career.

**Osman Batur: 1944–1951**

As noted previously, in the autumn of 1944 the Guomindang had finally managed to maneuver Sheng Shicai out of Xinjiang and had appointed a new governor, Wu Zhongxin, to replace him. Before Wu arrived, a major rebellion had erupted in the Ili valley, based in the Chinese garrison town of Yining, known locally as Gulja.

A principal leader of this movement was an Özbek, Ali Han Töre, who became the first President of the resultant East Turkestan Republic (ETR), an Islamic state established on November 12, 1944, in Gulja. Other important leaders in what was known as “The Three Districts Revolution” were Uighurs, Ahmet Jan Kasimi, and Abbas Emiroğlu, and the Kirghiz military leader Izhak Han Mura Haji. Government posts were also held by White Russians and Kazaks.

Using weapons purchased from the Soviet Union, the forces of the ETR moved toward the provincial capital in 1945 and also north into the predominantly Kazak Altai area.

It is unclear exactly where Osman was as the ETR army forced itself steadily north and east, defeating Chinese troops at every turn. One uncor-

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roborated source tells us that in the third week of January 1945, Osman was besieging two Chinese posts, at Jalmikli Kaysi and Sartogay. Osman had also cut these garrison's supply route to Urumchi, preventing any of his beleaguered enemies from receiving aid or escaping to the capital. In March 1945 some of the enemy broke the siege and fled; Osman was nonetheless deemed successful in this action because the two places in question were, according to this unabashedly biased source, now free of Chinese.79

While the ETR army progressed on the road to Urumchi, the new Governor took steps to try and forestall a union of the Ili rebels, as they were known to the government, and the Kazak groups to the north and east. In November of 1944, a “Special Committee of Pacification” was established in Xinjiang under the Commission for Civil Affairs, with branches set up in Altai, Ili and Chuguchak (Tacheng).80

In December, Governor Wu announced that one of the new commissioners was to be Alin Wang, a member of the hereditary Kazak nobility, who had been jailed by Sheng and who was now released by Wu.81 Wang’s official title was Vice Administrative Supervisor of the Altai.82 His first assignment was to “pacify” the Altai Kazaks, a group of whom had raided Urumchi as recently as that October — by talking with them and persuading them to support the government. He was to “promote trust” among the Kazaks and to convey Governor Wu’s pledge of religious freedom.83

In February of 1945, Wang went to the Altai area as directed, but returned to the provincial capital months later, his mission a failure, having been unable dissuade the Kazaks from joining in the ETR attack on Chinese posts. However, he did manage to meet with Osman or his representatives and this was later of importance.84

In May of 1945 there was a major attack on the Ashan district capital of Chenghua, known as Sharasüme to the Kazaks. Armed with machine guns and mortars, troops which the Chinese defenders identified as Osman’s men were involved. Chinese sources note that the fighting style of these men was, however, markedly different from the nomad’s usual battle plan. To the Chinese authorities this pointed to outside leadership — supplied,

81. Zhang Dajun, op.cit., Vol. 12, p. 6348. Wang was the husband of the redoubtable Qadiwan (known in Turkish as Hatece Kadvan Hanım) who was the Kazak District Officer (or Inspector-General) for the Urumchi District.
84. Ibid., p. 6356.
they believed, by the USSR. The Chinese repelled this attack and continued to repel attacks throughout the summer. Then, according to the same Chinese source, Mongolia and the USSR sent in reinforcements to supply and aid the rebels, leading to an intensification of the attacks. The local Chinese Commander of the garrison begged for air support from Urumchi on August 11 and 13, but the provincial authorities were slow to react. Without assistance, on September 2 the Chinese abandoned the city. The Garrison Commander, Wang Lingyun, was reportedly taken prisoner.

According to the Chinese, Osman was not there when the city fell. Instead, he had been ordered to go south to Bulgun, and to then proceed to Beidashan, presumably to act as one arm of a pincher force in the event of an attack on Urumchi. Turkic sources disagree. They tell us that Osman was present, or at least in the vicinity of the Ashan capital when it fell. Most likely, they are correct as it seems highly unlikely that Osman would have left the area he considered his rightful homeland.

Disagreement also remains on the matter of how contact between the ETR and Osman was established. Barnett, again on the basis of his personal interview with Osman, simply notes that when the ETR forces arrived at Chenghua in early September of 1945, with 6,000 men at arms, Osman formed an alliance with the ETR forces and split from his former

85. Ibid., p. 6350.
86. Ibid., pp. 6357–6358. Zhang tells us that 400 Mongols joined the attackers in May and June of 1945. 1,000 Soviet troops arrived later. Zhang does not give a source but the information is presumably based on Chinese intelligence reports.
87. Ibid., p. 6357. Other sources give different dates, but most of them place the fall of Chenghua in early September, within days of each other. Russian author Kutlukov gives September 8, citing as his source a story in Azad Şarqi–Turkistan of September 5, 1945 and October 10, 1945. This newspaper was the official voice of the East Turkestan Republic, the title translating as “Free East Turkestan.” M. Kutlukov, “The Democratic Movement of the People of South Sinkiang (Kashgaria) Between 1945–47.” Unpublished translation by M. Paulin. Scientific Works and Information, Book I, Tashkent 1960, p. 108. Turkic writer Hasan Oraltay gives the date of September 15. Hasan Oraltay, Kazak . . ., p. 440.
Map 1: The Three District under Control of the East Turkestan Republic 1944–1949.

allies, the Mongols that November.\textsuperscript{91} Gayretulla writes that after Osman took the Altai capital of Sharasüme in August of 1945, Osman sent his representatives to visit Ali Han Töre, the leader of the ETR; this resulted in a union of the Kazak leader and the ETR, an alliance so unsettling to the Chinese that they initiated peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{92}

Chinese source suggest no date for such an alliance but they do tell us that Osman signed an agreement with Ali Han, pledging his support for the ETR.\textsuperscript{93} Such a formal agreement is, however, uncorroborated by other

\textsuperscript{91} A. Doak Barnett, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 276.
\textsuperscript{92} Gayretullah writes that Osman’s representatives in talks with Ali Han Töre were Kalman Gazi, Delilhan Sukurbayoğlu, and Buka Zengi Urathan. As both leaders had the same idea, they agreed to combine in a single national movement. Hizir Bek Gayretullah. \textit{op.cit.}, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{93} Zhang Dajun, \textit{op.cit.}, Vol. 12, p. 7304.
sources. Most accounts agree that Osman did join the ETR movement in the spring or summer of 1945 and was ultimately rewarded with an appointment as Governor of Altai, with his new capital in the Kazak city of Sharasüme.94

The ETR’s forces had taken control of three of Xinjiang’s ten districts by September of 1945. These included the Ili, Tacheng and Ashan districts, covering some 20% of the province, and home to approximately 16–20% of the population. The majority of the three districts’ people were Kazaks, who constituted over half the population.

The forces of the ETR reached the banks of the Manas River in September of 1945, bringing them to within 90 kilometers of the provincial capital. In panic, the Chinese officials sent their families out to Hami and even on to China proper. It appeared that the city would fall to the approaching forces.

It did not. A ceasefire was arranged in the middle of the month through the mediation of the USSR, bringing a halt to the aggressive and victorious ETR campaign against Chinese rule. A ceasefire line was established at the Manas River, which was to remain a dividing line between the three districts and the rest of the province until some time in 1950.

Several explanations have been put forward to account for the ceasefire of September 1945, but none is entirely satisfactory. The most compelling interpretation is that the USSR used pressure on the ETR to bring about the peace negotiations which began in October of 1945 between representatives of the ETR and the Guomindang.95

Delegates of both sides met in Urumchi over a period of months from October onwards. The ETR sent as their representatives Ahmet Jan Kasimi, Rahim Jan Selim Khodja, and Ebulhayir Töre. The Guomindang sent a diplomatic and experienced negotiator, General Zhang Zhizhong. These two teams finally reached a compromise Peace Agreement, initialed on January 2, 1946. Negotiations continued on the question of military reorganization, as the ETR did not want to disband its victorious army which had won them such stunning concessions from the Chinese authorities. A supplementary agreement calling for the eventual merging of the

94. See the list of ETR government officials, in Zhang Dajun. Xinjiang Jin Sishi Nian Bianliuan Jilue [A Brief Account of Forty Years Turmoil in Xinjiang]. Taibei 1954. p. 82.
95. Since the USSR was undoubtedly the source of the ETR’s weapons, it was in a position to place pressure on the ETR government in Ili to come to terms with the Chinese. And, as the USSR became the major trading partner of the small Republic, its influence in East Turkestan was considerable by 1949. See details on the Soviet role and influence in Linda Benson, op. cit.
ETR military and the Nationalist Chinese army in Xinjiang was finally signed June 6, 1946. It appeared that the province had now embarked on a new, democratic era, for extensive political reforms were promised in the new agreement leading to a representative provincial government based on democratic principles. The “Ili Rebellion” therefore constituted an important victory for the local non-Chinese population which, on paper, was now to dominate local political processes.

A major provision of the agreement called for the establishment of a coalition provincial government, consisting of representatives from both the ETR and the Guomindang. When this government came to power on July 1, 1946, it appointed provincial and district level officials who were to govern until elections were held, within a three month period, according to the terms of the agreement. One district official appointed by the coalition government was Osman Batur, who was confirmed in his post as Governor of Ashan district — the Altai.

Other Kazaks were also named to posts in the new government; unlike Osman, who remained in the Altai, these appointees were to take up posts in Urumchi. Of greatest importance to Osman were Janimhan, former Governor of Ashan District, who became the new Minister of Finance in August of 1946, and Salis Ermek, one of two Deputy Secretary-Generals, under Liu Mengchun. Both of these Kazaks were appointees of the Chinese provincial government rather than of the Ili group; Osman, however, was nominated for his post by the Ili faction, presumably as a reward for his allegiance to their cause.

At this point in his career, Osman Batur, enemy of the Chinese since 1940 and an active supporter of the ETR movement to wrest the Altai from Chinese control in 1945, now decided to change sides. We have already encountered the paradox of Osman as the anti-communist hero joining in an alliance with Mongolia. We now see the sworn enemy of the Chinese desert his Uighur and Kazak allies to join that very enemy.

As mentioned previously, as early as the winter of 1944—45, the Chinese had approached Osman and other Kazaks through Alin Wang, the pro-Chinese Kazak who was sent on a special “pacification mission” to the Altai Kazaks in December—January of 1944—45. Wang’s mission was not altogether a failure. According to the Chinese, Wang had at that time given Osman a gift of ten rifles and indicated that Osman might tou-ming —

96. Xinjiang Ribao, June 20, 1946, p. 3.
change allegiance to the just cause, in this case the cause of the Guomindang.\textsuperscript{97}

Osman’s final change in allegiance came about at the end of the summer of 1946. The main Chinese language paper in Urumchi announced Osman’s appointment as the new District Officer of Ashan on August 20, 1946.\textsuperscript{98} According to the Chinese, when Osman heard of his appointment, his conversion to the Nationalist cause was complete; he surrendered to the government saying, “Are the Three Principles of the People so magnanimous?”\textsuperscript{99}

Not long after, Osman contacted Xinjiang’s Garrison Commander at Urumchi, Sung Xilian. In his letter, Osman vowed to uphold the Three Principles of the People, to attack any Mongols who entered Beidashan, and to protect all of Ashan’s people.\textsuperscript{100} Osman also contacted General Zhang Zhizhong, who was now the Chairman of the new coalition government of the province.\textsuperscript{101} He declared that he had opposed the Soviets in Ashan for opening mines and for other oppressions. He had fought Sheng, who had allied himself to the Soviet Union. He also stated that he had initially supported the ETR but that the ETR had cheated the people by allying itself to the USSR. Therefore, he was, he said, no longer willing to support the Ili government.\textsuperscript{102}

In an interview with the Kazak leader in 1948, journalist Ian Morrison was given a rather different view of Osman’s motivation. He was told that Osman had cooperated with the ETR until April of 1946, after which time he went to Beidashan. The ETR, however, had insisted on Osman’s attending a meeting in Ili, at which they demanded that he transfer control of his people to Ili and allow them to take over the garrison in the Altai capital. It was for this, he said, and because Kazak women had been taken to Ili (presumably for immoral purposes) that he “turned away from them.” Osman also expressed anger that over 28,000 ounces of gold had been tak-

\textsuperscript{97} Zhang Dajun. \textit{Xinjiang Fengbao} . . ., Vol. 11, p. 6177.
\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Xinjiang Ribao}. August 20, 1946, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{99} Zhang Dajun, \textit{op.cit.}, Vol. 12, p. 7306.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid. He cites the “Xinjiang Garrison Command Staff Report on Ili Military Development.” Report No. 91, undated.
\textsuperscript{101} Zhang, who writes with consistent sympathy for the Guomindang cause, is supported in his statement that Osman contacted the Chinese leaders by Burhan Shahidi, the first governor of Xinjiang for the CCP, who writes that Osman wrote to Zhang in August of 1946 and that he began secret negotiations with General Sung Xilian at the same time. Burhan Shahidi, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 313.
\textsuperscript{102} Zhang Dajun, \textit{op.cit.}, Vol. 12, p. 7307.
en by the ETR government from the Altai and that the ETR was allowing
the Russians to continue with their mining operations in the Altai.

Only after making these points did Osman give what he called his rea-
sons for continuing to fight Ili: first, he said that communism was hostile to
religion; second, that the Ili people were encroaching on Chinese national
territory; and third that the Kazak people would get “a better deal” from
the Chinese than from the Russians. Morrison, who observes that his read-
er will be sceptical of these claims, found much to admire in Osman, but
nonetheless noted that Osman appeared more interested in the acquisition
of personal power than in political ideology.103

Certainly, Osman’s explanation in this instance appears to be a justifica-
tion of his action which owed more to the fact that he was to be relegated to
a lower position in the new government’s power structure than to any
stand in opposition to the USSR. His reported concern over the Altai gold
also adds some credence to the possibility that his objections to Russian
mining operations were less patriotic fervour than interest in the material
wealth such operations yielded.

Chairman Zhang met with Osman or his representatives sometime in the
late summer or autumn of 1946, possibly more than once.104 For his part,
Zhang was evidently at a loss as to how to treat Osman’s conversion to the
Chinese side. He turned to the two Vice Chairmen of the province, Ahmet
Jan Kasimi of the ETR and Burhan Shahidi, a Chinese appointee, explain-
ing the situation and formally telling them that he would abide by whatever
decision the two men chose to make regarding Osman.105

Turkic sources also attest to Osman’s change of allegiance. Most of them
agree with Osman’s interpretation of the ETR as a puppet of the USSR.
Specifically, they point to the fact that the respected leader of the move-
ment, Ali Han Töre, disappeared in August of 1946, removed from the
scene they claim because he refused to go along with expanding Soviet
influence in the ETR.106 Ali Han’s disappearance remains mysterious, it is

103. Ian Morrison, op.cit., p. 70.
105. Ibid. Also see Xinjiang Ribao, November 25, 1946, p. 2, which gives the text of Zhang
Zhizhong’s speech of October 26, 1946, revealing Zhang’s contacts with Osman.
106. Exile Turkic sources support the view that Ali Han was kidnapped: Hasan Oral tay.
Kazak . . . , p. 101.; Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davası [The Case of East Tur-
kestan], Istanbul 1973. p. 186; Amac Karahoca, Doğu Türkistan. Çin Müstemlekesi
ham, who visited the Ili region in September of 1946, writes, “Ali Han Ture. the Uzbeg
who led the revolt, is said to have wept at the conclusion of the agreement . . . and on
the score of ill health . . . has disappeared none knows whither.” London: Public Record
Office. F15550/324/10, Graham. Urumchi, October 26, 1946.
true, and it has left observers of all political persuasions a great deal of room for speculation. However, it is also true that there was no apparent disruption within the ETR at the time of his "disappearance," implying that perhaps there was really no mystery – locally – to his absence from the scene. The ETR government continued its de facto existence under the Vice President, Asim Beg, who, like Ali Han was also a respected leader of an old Gulja family. Further, no other defections are recorded besides that of Osman’s Kazaks; the vast majority of the Kazak people remained within the borders of the ETR, evidently content enough to accept their new government and its leadership.

In fact, the ETR gained a high reputation as a model Islamic state, run without the interference of corrupt Chinese officials, and whose people enjoyed economic stability and prosperity as a result of the resumption of trade with the USSR. Such a reputation would not have been possible if Soviet influence had been in any sense oppressive. For the course of its existence, from 1944 to 1950 the ETR appears to have been an Islamic state governed by an educated Muslim elite, based on broad political appeal to local Turkic nationalism.107

Osman’s defection did not shake the ETR, but it was a matter of great concern to many Han Chinese living in Xinjiang. While Zhang and other Nationalist Chinese may have been pleased – if decidedly suspicious – of Osman’s apparent change of heart, many other Han Chinese in the province were aghast. After all, Osman had been portrayed in the press as a common bandit and certainly this was the popular conception of him among Chinese in the provincial capital where he was an object of fear, like all Kazak raiders. When the public learned that Osman’s representatives had visited the capital – and that Osman himself might visit – Zhang was deluged with questions that conveyed fear and suspicion. Why, Zhang was asked, had he invited such men to the very capital? And what was being discussed with men who so recently had been responsible for the slaughter of many innocent Chinese?

Zhang replied that Osman was the officially appointed representative of the provincial government in the Ashan and he was, therefore, to be welcomed into the capital city. He said that both the Vice Chairmen were aware of the contacts between Osman and the government and that he was fully prepared to take their advice as to how to handle the situation. He

107. Linda Benson. op. cit., especially Chapter 7.41, on the East Turkestan Republic.
added that it was only a rumour that Osman’s Kazaks had been bribed to join the Chinese or that they were being used as mercenaries. However, in attempting to deflect criticism of the new alliance of the Nationalist Government with Osman and denying any bribery being involved, Zhang opened a hornet’s nest. Had the Chinese in fact paid him off? Was the man simply a bandit now turned mercenary soldier for pay? There is no existing record of payments to Osman, though presumably he received some renumeration as the District Officer of Ashan. But the possibility that he received money is supported by two factors, albeit both circumstantial. First, there is Osman’s personal relationship with the provincial Minister of Finance, Janimhan, a man who, like Osman, was a Kazak with roots in northern Xinjiang. It is not clear how close these two men were to each other in 1946, but they did ultimately join forces in 1949, which points to more than passing acquaintance. While Osman was still involved in his secret negotiations with the Chinese, in September of 1946 Janimhan was also appointed as the head of the election committee chosen to supervise the coming elections in the Ashan district. Among the members serving on his committee were Osman Batur and his chief assistant at that time, Latif. Possibly links between Janimhan and Osman were established at this time — and possibly they also played a role in Osman’s decision to change sides at this juncture.

As Finance Minister, Janimhan was certainly in a position to send money to Osman. In fact, a good deal of money was sent to the Ashan District while Janimhan was Minister. In July of 1946 the new coalition government in Urumchi allotted $40 million for the “relief of the three districts.” As Osman was then the ranking official of the Ashan area, it would have been possible that some of this money was used to convince Osman to change his allegiance. In May of 1947, a special allotment of money was made to Ashan alone; in recognition of the past bitter years, $30 million was given to the Kazak district which was then still nominally under Osman’s control.

108. For a full text of the speech, Xinjiang Ribao, November 25, 1946, p. 2. Zhang notes the many questions which had been raised by the rumours about Osman and he replies at some length in his speech, obviously attempting to quell fears over this new ally to the Guomindang cause.
109. Election Committee officials are listed in the Xinjiang Ribao, September 17, 1946, p. 3. The Kazak, Latif, is also mentioned by Burhan, who writes that he was the person sent by Osman to contact the provincial government in December of 1946. See Burhan Shahidi, op. cit., p. 313.
111. Xinjiang Ribao, May 11, 1947, p. 3.
Such circumstantial evidence does not by any means constitute proof that Osman became a mercenary for the Chinese. It does, however, indicate a pattern of alliances which was very complex and which clearly raises the possibility that Osman could have been influenced by other than purely political or patriotic factors when he shifted to the Chinese side in 1946.

During the winter of 1946–47, the coalition in Urumchi was struggling to maintain at least a semblance of unity. Suspicion and distrust remained as underlining elements of the uneasy union of Muslims and Chinese that attempted to govern the province; local Muslims awaited evidence of reform in the government, as promised in the Peace Agreement, and Chinese uneasily observed the new defiant spirit which seemed to be growing steadily among the local population. While the promised elections were held more or less on schedule, at the same time the Chinese Nationalists were gradually increasing the number of troops in Xinjiang. The total number reached between 90 and 100,000 by 1947. The presence of so many troops quickly made itself felt. These men had to be fed and otherwise provisioned from the local economy which quickly felt the strain on its resources in the major garrison towns. Disputes inevitably arose. Accusations of exhorbitant corruption associated with the military erupted. Chairman Zhang found himself having to defend the presence of these men who became an increasing burden to the region both economically and politically.

Local nationalists played on the problems caused by the presence of troops, adding to the existing ethnic and religious divisions between Han Chinese and Muslims. During the election process, some of the ETR leaders and other Turki nationalists visited many of the towns and villages of the region, preaching a new Turki nationalism, and a new pride in Turkic history and language as well as emphasizing their shared religion, Islam.

Such speeches found receptive audiences in both the north and south. Local dissatisfaction with years of Chinese rule, coupled with new opposition to the increasing Chinese military presence and attendant economic abuses, found an outlet in a new political form – Turki nationalism.

In the winter months of 1947, calls began for the withdrawal of all Chinese troops from Xinjiang. Such calls were especially vehement in the south which had not been involved in the ETR but which now appeared to be preparing to emulate the Ili experience if demands were not met.

113. See the text of Zhang’s October 1946 speech, in Xinjiang Ribao. November 25, 1946, p. 2; also his speech in the May 13, 1947 issue, p. 3.
In February of 1947 rioters took to the streets of the provincial capital, with demonstrators divided on nationality lines; Chinese gathered on one day, local Turkis on the next, and supporters of each on successive days. General Sung, who was the highest Chinese authority present, with Chairman Zhang away in Chungking, called in the army to restore control. Upon hearing of the disorder, Chairman Zhang rushed back to Urumchi to attempt to undo the damage these riots had done to the coalition. Despite his best efforts, the coalition was in trouble.

This became clear when Zhang decided to inspect the south of the province in May of 1947. Instead of a warm welcome, Zhang was met at virtually all the cities of his itinerary by blunt demands from the public for the removal of Chinese troops. When a crowd in Kashgar nearly rioted during one of his speeches, he cut his tour short and returned to the capital, evidently shaken from his experience.114

Shortly thereafter he resigned from his post as Chairman of the province and was replaced by a local Uighur, Mesut Sabri, a medical doctor trained in Turkey who had been away from his native Xinjiang since the early years of Sheng’s rule. Mesut’s long association with the Guomindang and the central government made him suspect in the eyes of the ETR members of the coalition government. They immediately objected to his appointment, demanding instead that Zhang remain as Chairman. When it was clear that their views were not going to be respected, they withdrew from the government and returned to Ili. The borders of the de facto ETR remained inviolate and the old ceasefire line once again became the border of the now divided province.

Mesut’s appointment was actually only the culmination of acts which were viewed by the ETR as not in keeping with either the spirit or the actual terms of the Peace Agreement. One factor that clearly was a cause of much anger and bitterness was the Chinese alliance with their former ally, Osman Batur, who, they believed, was being used by the Chinese to harass the three districts while Chinese continued to build their military strength. In February of 1947, the ETR officially rescinded Osman’s appointment as their Governor of Ashan, replacing him with their own military leader, Delilhan, a Kazak leader loyal to the ETR.115 They also sent forces against Osman, driving him out of the northern Altai.

114. For a description of Zhang’s experience in Kashgar in May 1947, see London: India Office Records, L/P&S/12/2350 Coll. 12/20A, British Consul Shipton, Kashgar, June 1, 1947. For an indication of how Zhang’s tone had changed see his May speech in Xinjiang Ribao, May 13, 1947, p. 3.

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first to Kuerte in April of 1947 and then to Beidashan on the Mongolian border, where he was still headquartered in late spring of 1947.\textsuperscript{116}

That much bloody fighting occurred during those early spring months in the Altai is corroborated by diverse sources. The local Urumchi paper reported in March that the government was much concerned over the Ashan fighting and that it had appointed an inspection team to go north to Chenghua, and report back to the government on the actual situation there.\textsuperscript{117}

Serving on this committee were Burhan, the Vice Chairman of the province, and an ETR representative in the coalition, Rahim Jan, along with other members of various nationalities. They went to the Ashan capital where they met Delilhan, the ETR man who had been sent by the ETR government to displace and then replace Osman, and they also talked with many local people. According to Burhan's memoirs, local people demanded that the government capture Osman and return him to Chenghua for trial. Specifically, he was accused of stealing 7,000 sheep and 3,000 larger animals.\textsuperscript{118} Burhan writes that the committee returned to Urumchi on April 8 and reported on Osman's illegal activities, but Chairman Zhang said only that these things were in the past and that he would handle personally any further incidents involving Osman in the future.\textsuperscript{119}

In May of 1947, newspapers in the three districts of the ETR vehemently attacked Osman for his "treachery" against the fatherland, Turkestan. His crimes were listed as opposing the Peace Agreement, destroying public order and security and co-operating with criminals like Salis, who was at that time the Deputy Secretary-General of the provincial government, and with Qadewan (Kadvan Hanim in Turkish), wife of Alin Wang and also District Officer of Urumchi.\textsuperscript{120} As we shall see, ETR accusations concerning Osman continued to remain a factor dividing the region's people.

By May Osman was cooperating closely with the Nationalist Chinese. One Turkic source, uncorroborated, states that Osman made another of his famous agreements, this time with the Nationalist Chinese, on May 18, 1947. The agreement called for the Chinese to arm Osman and his ally, Ali Beg Hakim; to include Kazak Turks in the government; and for the provincial government to force the three districts to expel all Russians.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Xinjiang Ribao, March 27, 1947, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{118} Burhan Shahidi, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 314.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p. 316.
\textsuperscript{120} See for example the attacks on Osman in the Minzhu Bao (Iining), May 19, 1947, p. 3.
The same source adds that Osman became a part of the regular Chinese army after this, even having his men wear the Chinese military uniform.\(^\text{121}\)

Osman's change of allegiance and Chinese assistance to his people led to an international incident in the early summer of 1947. June 5 through June 8 fighting occurred on the Chinese-Mongolian border at Beidashan, Osman's headquarters since being pushed out of the Altai area by the forces of the ETR. In reporting this border violation, the Chinese declared that four Soviet planes had invaded Chinese airspace and then had bombed a Chinese border post in the area, killing two Chinese soldiers.\(^\text{122}\) Mongols insisted that, on the contrary, it was the Chinese who violated the border: Chinese troops crossed into the Mongolian People's Republic (hereafter MPR) on June 5 and camped on Mongol territory. They then assaulted MPR border guards and even arrested officials who arrived at the Chinese camp to protest. In retaliation, the Mongols drove the Chinese out. They then sent an ultimatum to the Xinjiang authorities demanding the return of their detained officers within 48 hours. Garrison Commander Sung Xilian in Urumchi had, in fact, received the ultimatum but had not acted on it. As a result, when the ultimatum expired, the MPR sent planes to attack the Chinese border post; Osman was camped nearby and thus was caught up in the attack.\(^\text{123}\)

Each side denied the other's account. American representatives were wary of accepting the Chinese version, noting that first the Chinese had appeared to be unclear as to where the event actually took place, and, second, that they had evidently withheld the news from the foreign community for some days, as though to take time to prepare the story for maximum political effect.\(^\text{124}\)

In an attempt to ascertain what had actually happened — and where — the American government sent its own representative to the border site in June of 1947. The man, Major Frank MacKiernan, assigned to the US Consulate in Urumchi at the time, visited Osman's camp and verified that some kind of incident had taken place, although by the time he arrived the

\begin{itemize}
\item\(^\text{121}\) Hasan Orlatay, *Kazak . . .*, p. 104 and 109. However, the author notes, Osman hated asking his people to wear the uniform. As Osman was now a part of the 8th Kazak Turkish Brigade of the Nationalist Chinese army, he and his 3,000 men, who were being provided for by the government, were obliged to wear the uniform.
\item\(^\text{123}\) Ibid., p. 566.
\item\(^\text{124}\) Ibid., p. 559.
\end{itemize}
area was quiet. He also ascertained that the Chinese were indeed aiding Osman who was camped near the Chinese border post.125

It is still unclear exactly who attacked whom. Turkic sources support the Chinese view that it was a Mongol-USSR attack on Osman. One source claims that Osman had rebuffed overtures from the Soviets to make peace and rejoin the ETR; as a result, he was driven from the Altai by force under Colonel Leskin, a Russian, born in the Ili valley, who reportedly received military training in the USSR. This man followed Osman from the Altai to the Beidashan Mountain area and helped to organize the attack on Osman which became known as the “Beidashan Incident.”126

There were minor incidents at the same spot later that month, but the affair was soon forgotten in the course of events which swept through Xinjiang in the summer of 1947. As Lattimore notes in his book Pivot of Asia the affair was probably blown out of proportion for political purposes by the parties involved.127 Most likely, it all occurred rather as Australian observer Frank Robertson put it: the two sides bumped into each other and each assumed the other was trespassing. It is a probable explanation in an area as poorly demarcated as the rugged region on the Mongolian-Chinese border.128

By the summer of 1947, Osman had acquired powerful enemies through his shifting sequence of alliances. The Mongolians were now clearly fighting their former ally, as were the forces of the ETR, now once again a separate territory under its own, not the provincial government’s, authority. As an ally of Mongolia, the USSR was also to be regarded as Osman’s enemy. Osman had used all his political options by this point, and we shall see him remain with his newest of allies, the Nationalist Chinese, until his death.

During the summer of 1947, Osman remained at Beidashan. While he rested there, the coalition in Urumchi continued to disintegrate, finally collapsing in July. Unrest then swept through the province. In mid-July, the Chinese army was called in to quell major uprisings in the Turpan area, which were against the Mesut appointment as well as against Chinese dominance in government and military affairs. Disputes between Muslims and Chinese had now polarized the region’s nationalities. Without the mediat-

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125. Ibid., pp. 567–569.
ing influence of Zhang Zhizhong, the provincial government now took a much harder, militaristic line in dealing with the local population. General Sung’s influence became paramount, and he may have been responsible for the ferocity with which the Turpan disturbances were dealt.129

Speaking in the provincial capital in September, Sung declared that the government would no longer be soft, and that anti-government activity would not be tolerated. He publicly warned the population not to make any further demands for the withdrawal of the Chinese military in the region.130

Sung clearly saw the military as the key to continued dominance in Xinjiang. It was Sung who, in the autumn of 1947, encouraged Osman to return to the Altai once again. In August or September, Osman gathered his men together and prepared for an assault on the Altai area that had once been under his control. By the end of September, Sung reported to an American representative in Urumchi that Osman was pushing his way rapidly toward the Ashan district capital of Chenghua. According to the Chinese, Osman had already taken Chinghe and Fuyun, having killed and captured many people, seized booty and garnered support from local Kazaks who joined his banner.131

In an interview published in the Xinjiang Ribao, the provincial Secretary-General, Liu Mengchun, denied that any Chinese troops were with Osman. He defended Osman’s onslaught on the Altai by saying that Osman’s desire to return to the area was normal, for he was the district’s appointed head, and was merely returning as a part of his duty.132

As Osman stormed into the Altai area, he also began receiving a “good press” in the provincial capital. A headline on October 16 announced that Osman now wished to atone for all his past misdeeds.133 November 13 and

129. After visiting the area, the new Chairman, Mesut Sabri, reported publicly that 51 local people had died and 87 of the “rioters” had been killed. See his report in Xinjiang Ribao, November 17, 1947, p. 3. However, Burhan Shahidi writes that over 3,000 people died in these “riots” and many fled to the Three Districts for the ETR’s protection. See Burhan Shahidi, op.cit., p. 322.

130. Xinjiang Ribao, September 17, 1947, p. 3.

131. Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1947, vol. 7, Washington D.C. 1972, p. 572. Another account of Osman’s entry into the Altai is reported in the Xinjiang Ribao, of October 15, 1947, which carries a first-hand report made by Delilhan, Osman’s ally. According to his account, Osman took 700 men and started for the Altai on August 27. He gathered another 2,000 men as he moved north, taking Fuyun on September 11. But September 12 he was attacked and defeated by heavily supported ETR troops. Osman later reported that he was defeated at Chenghua by 3,000 Soviet troops on October 10, 1947. See Xinjiang Ribao, December 23, 1947, p. 3.

132. Xinjiang Ribao, October 5, 1947, p. 3.

133. Ibid., October 16, 1947, p. 3.
14 saw further articles appearing in the press, chronicling Osman’s life and his people, presenting him as a hero of the Altai peoples, and an important Kazak leader who was now loyal to the Chinese.¹³⁴

Not unnaturally, his popularity among the Altai Kazaks at this point is suspect. As noted previously, the majority of the Kazaks of the Ashan district had not changed sides but had remained allied to the ETR government based in Ili. And although the Chinese reported that he was welcomed on his foray into the north, by October his assault on the Altai was finished. He was quickly defeated by ETR forces and pushed out of the Ashan district for the last time in October of 1947.

Osman’s ignominious expulsion from the Altai does not, however, mark the end of his activities in Xinjiang. Now nearly fifty years old and a veteran of many battles, he and his followers appeared willing to accept the largesse of the Chinese government and to limit their involvement in local affairs to sending representatives to the government and maintaining contacts with other Kazak groups opposed to the ETR movement.

Osman was far from forgotten though. The Ili delegates in the coalition government, now back in Ili, began sporadic correspondence with General Zhang Zhizhong, who still nourished hopes of a resumption of the coalition government. In reply to General Zhang’s letter of September 1947 asking that they return to their posts in the government, the Ili group wrote to outline their conditions for such a return. One of their major complaints against the Mesut government was over its inciting Osman and aiding him in his attack on the Ashan district. Further, despite Osman’s illegal activity he and his supporters continued to hold their posts in the provincial government.¹³⁵

They did not at that time demand Osman’s punishment, but in a second letter written to General Zhang on February 17, 1948, they openly accused General Sung of aiding Osman and then demanded that Osman be handed over to the Ashan government for trial.¹³⁶

But by this time, Osman was the respected father of a representative to the National Assembly of the Republic of China. In December of 1947, Osman’s eldest son, Serziman, was chosen as one of Xinjiang’s delegates

¹³⁴. Ibid., November 13 and 14, 1947, p. 3.
¹³⁵. London: Public Record Office, FO 371/69624 Document Number 61770, being a translation of the letter as it was published in the Yining (Ili) newspaper “Wake Up.”
to the Assembly. Also duly delegated was a friend and fellow warrior, Hamza Uşar, as well as other Kazaks who were known to Osman.\textsuperscript{117}

In fact, Osman’s star had risen so high in the estimation of the Nationalist Chinese that, according to one uncorroborated source, Osman was openly invited to the capital city of Urumchi. According to Gayretullah, Osman visited Urumchi on the invitation of Chairman Mesut Sabri and was accorded a hero’s welcome.\textsuperscript{118} Punishing Osman then appears to have become a political impossibility; Osman had become a firm ally, and Nationalist China was by this time in dire need of all who could be rallied to a flagging cause.

Chiang Kai-shek’s government was in an extremely precarious position by 1948. Repeated military losses had made the future of his government uncertain, and Xinjiang, like other parts of the country, now awaited the final outcome.

Possibly in a move calculated to win a measure of local support for the Guomindang in Xinjiang after years of chaotic government, Mesut was removed from office and replaced with Burhan Shahidi, the Tatar who had been Vice Chairman. It was to be Burhan who would preside over the transfer of power in Xinjiang from the Guomindang to the Chinese Communist Party in September of 1949.

In the late summer of 1949, as the PLA approached the Xinjiang border through the Gansu corridor, foreign representatives in the city of Urumchi began leaving. British representation alone remained, in the hands of Dr. George Fox-Holmes, who elected to stay behind and so became one of the few foreign witnesses of Osman’s execution. American Frank MacKiernan also stayed behind when the US Consul, John Hall-Paxton, left for India, overland via the Karakorams. MacKiernan busied himself burning official papers and then turning over office equipment to Fox-Holmes.\textsuperscript{139} In October of 1949, MacKiernan headed for Osman Batur’s camp in the Beidashan; with him was anthropologist and OSS agent Frank Bessac, who had made his way to Urumchi just ahead of the PLA troops, and who, he says, was interested in the adventure of the journey as well as in furthering his own research on Manchus living in the Xinjiang area. The two men stayed with Osman the winter of 1949–1950 and when the snows began to melt in spring 1950 decided they had to leave the region as quickly as possible. With guides supplied by Osman, the two made their way to Tibet, where,

unfortunately for him and for the historical record, MacKiernan was killed, leaving Bessac to make his way alone into India.\textsuperscript{140}

We shall return to the story of MacKiernan shortly as his brief association with Osman was to become the source of CCP accusations against the Kazak leader. MacKiernan was not the only person seeking to leave Xinjiang. Various Kazak groups organized themselves to move to the remote Gasköl area in Qinghai province, an old meeting place for Kazaks in times of crisis. From there, many decided to move on to Tibet or to India. Remnants of some groups ultimately made their way to Turkey, where their sons and daughters retain a lively interest in the history of their homeland in Turkestan.

The more defiant — perhaps foolhardy — of the Kazaks elected to remain and fight until the end. Osman became the rallying point for many of these men, including numerous White Russians who added to the firepower of Osman’s Kazak warriors.\textsuperscript{141} In the summer of 1949, before the arrival of the PLA, Janimhan, former Finance Minister, and his sons joined Osman at Beidashan.\textsuperscript{142} Other leaders sent their representatives to meet with Osman and to arrange a convocation of all the Kazak leaders to discuss resistance. However, communications grew more and more difficult in 1949–50, first due to PLA entry into the region and then due to harsh winter weather. Individual leaders were left to decide on their own what course of action would be best.

When the PLA reached Urumchi in the middle of October 1949, they had sent out emissaries to the Kazaks to try and persuade them to recognize the new government, as Burhan and some influential Kazak leaders had done.\textsuperscript{143} Osman and others repeatedly refused these overtures, but by the end of the year the PLA was in Xinjiang in force and the need to come to terms with the situation now pressed heavily on Kazak leaders.

In December 1949, Ali Beg Hakim, a sometime colleague and friend of Osman, decided to leave Xinjiang and headed for Gasköl. He came to his decision after talking with other leaders, most of whom had concurred with his decision that resistance now was futile. Osman, too, decided that he would have to leave the Xinjiang area and begin the trek to Qinghai in

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\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{140} Interview with Frank Bessac, Montana, 1981.
\textsuperscript{141} See article by Walter Sullivan in the \textit{New York Times}, April 18, 1949.
\textsuperscript{142} Burhan Shahidi, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 349; Hasan Oraltay writes that he joined Osman in October of 1949. Hasan Oraltay, \textit{Kazak . . .}, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{143} Kazak leader Qatewan, also changed allegiance to the new government, along with her husband, Alin Wang. Personal communication, family/relatives of Qadiwan in Urumchi. Summer 1986.
spring of 1950. Travelling with him were Janimhan and his sons. This group was suddenly attacked in the summer of 1950 by contingents of PLA troops and although the men fought off the PLA, Janimham was taken prisoner in the attack. Disheartened, Osman’s group continued moving, now carrying numerous wounded with them.\(^{144}\)

Toward the end of 1950, they reached an area called Kanambal Mountain by the Kazaks, near Makai in Qinghai province. They camped there, waiting for the weather to improve before continuing on to Gasköl. Already at Kanambal was the Kazak leader Kaben Tayği.\(^{145}\) The leaders conferred and Kaben decided to go on to Gasköl immediately while Osman stayed behind. According to one source this was to wait for other stragglers to catch up, but it was also probably for Osman’s wounded to recuperate.\(^{146}\)

At this point, we have some first-hand news of Osman. Two of the Kazak authors who have written about Osman’s career saw him at Kanambal in the winter of 1950–51: one was author Hasan Oraltay, then with his father camped at Gasköl. Young Hasan was asked to ride over to the Makai camp to check on Osman and to ask him and his people to come quickly to Gasköl. He writes that Osman’s camp was a poor one; tents were not clean but dirty and ragged, people disheartened. Men were ill and many were wounded.\(^{147}\)

In December of 1950, a small dissipated band of Kazaks reached Osman’s camp, under the leadership of Abbas Batur. He had only twenty people with him and he reported that roads were now cut and that “Red” Chinese were everywhere.\(^{148}\) Winter had now set in and moving the wounded and ill would be difficult, so Osman decided to wait until the worst of the winter had passed before moving on to Gasköl.

It was a fateful decision. The PLA well knew that Osman would begin to move when the weather improved, so they decided to go after him, crossing difficult stretches of the Gobi in winter in order to surround Osman’s camp. Early in the morning of February 15, 1951, they surprised the Kazaks at Kanambal and Osman was taken alive.

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\(^{145}\) Hizir Bek Gayretullah, *op.cit.*

\(^{146}\) Ibid.

\(^{147}\) Hasan Oraltay, *Kazak . . .*, p. 165. His account is corroborated by Gayretullah who records a similar description given him by Osman’s brother-in-law, Zalabay, who also visited Osman’s camp.

Osman’s last fight is recounted with pride among Turki authors to whom Osman’s career remains a symbol of Kazak resistance. The story varies slightly in details from source to source but it basically goes like this:

Osman fought heroically to protect himself and his people. But at last, when he saw that all was lost, he mounted his white horse, intending to escape the Chinese who sought to take him alive. As he prepared to flee, however, he saw his seventeen year old daughter in difficulties with the enemy force. (Some say she rode into ambush, others write that she had been taken prisoner). He went immediately to her rescue, pulled her up onto his horse and rode off. To evade pursuit, Osman tried to ride across a frozen lake but unfortunately his horse slipped and fell. The two sheltered behind the fallen animal, firing at the enemy who drew ever closer. Finally, when all their bullets were gone, they were both taken prisoner.¹⁴⁹

Turkic accounts write that Osman was tortured by the Chinese and that he was forced to walk the whole distance from Makai to Dunhuang, in Gansu province where he was first taken.¹⁵¹ By the time Fox-Holmes saw him in Urumchi, where Osman was paraded through the streets prior to his execution, he was not the powerful figure described earlier, but he was defiant to the last:

I watched with pain as Osman Batur was led through the streets and lanes and as he was later shot. His hair and his beard and mustache were matted and terrible. His clothes were also in a terrible condition. It was understood that he had been tortured. He had bare feet and his hands were tied; even so, his head was straight up. On his face was no fear. He had not lost his nobility nor his courage at all. His behaviour and his walk showed this clearly. Even though his appearance was like this, he did not seem to be going to his death, but was a like a young man, going to a wedding ceremony.¹⁵²

The only picture we have of Osman in captivity shows a man with his arms tied behind his back, and held by guards on either side. A sign has been placed around his neck, giving only his name — Osman.

He was tried as a bandit in Urumchi. He was accused of an interesting variety of anti-revolutionary activities as well as of various crimes ranging from murder to theft. Specifically, he was accused of killing 230 individuals

¹⁴⁹. All of the Turkish Kazak sources cited in this paper give a similar story of the hero’s capture, varying only in small details.
¹⁵². Şirzat Doğru, op.cit., p. 13. Apologies to Dr. Fox-Holmes for any violence done to his original words, as this is a translation from a Turkish source and it is not taken from an English account of his description of Osman.
and of being responsible for the deaths of a further 1,175 people of all nationalities. Further, he was said to have stolen 340,000 animals, and vast quantities of supplies, as well as destroying the homes of thousands of people. He was, according to the PRC government, a “scourge of peaceful society.”

These accusations made him appear a common bandit, thieving and killing his way through northern Xinjiang. But there were other accusations as well, which point to a far greater influence. He was also accused of being the tool of Pan-Turkic elements like Mehmet Emin Buğra and Isa Yusuf Alptekin. This charge seems to arise more out of the association of these Uighur nationalists with the Guomindang, which had also offered its protection to Osman, rather than to any ideological connection.

A more serious accusation leveled at Osman was that he was also an “imperialist armed spy” – an agent of the US government. His main contact was supposed to have been the unfortunate Douglas MacKiernan, Vice-Consul at the US Consulate in Urumchi during its final months. In a lengthy confession Osman was forced to sign before his death, he gave a detailed description of how MacKiernan had been directing him since the June 1947 Beidashan incident. In the confession, it was MacKiernan who had organized Osman’s coordination with the Guomindang’s 5th Cavalry, under over-all command of General Sung Xilian. MacKiernan was even said to have taken part in the fighting – an impossibility if American records are correct, as MacKiernan was only sent to the area of the fighting after the affair had ended.

Osman also confessed that he had been called to Urumchi by MacKiernan to meet with Sung Xilian. The three of them then formed the “Anti-Communist, Anti-Soviet and Anti-Three Districts Revolutionary Committee.” Osman was to be responsible for gathering intelligence. Osman declared that he had been urged to go on fighting by both John Hall-Paxton and by MacKiernan in 1949 and that MacKiernan remained in Xinjiang after 1949 in order to continue directing him.

There was certainly a kind of friendship between Frank MacKiernan and

Osman. Possibly the rather romantic MacKiernan had some idea of inspiring last-ditch resistance to the imposition of Communist Party rule in the northwest. But it is highly unlikely that the accusations against Osman in this instance were founded on anything other than his own confession and the fact that he had aided Americans to escape China in 1950.

Whatever dreams Osman may have had of becoming the salvation of his people and his native land, these were put to an end in April of 1951 when he was executed, by shooting, for all the various crimes mentioned above. According to a relative of the man, his last words were, "I am not a bandit. What I did was to help my people to establish an independent country."

Conclusion

When Basil Davidson visited Xinjiang in the mid-1950s, he was told that, "Uzman [sic] was not a civilized man . . . He was a brigand without principle or political understanding; and he was the tool of the Kuomintang [sic]." Describing Osman as a brigand or bandit, or even as a great Kazak patriot and saviour of his people, does not offer us more than convenient labels for a man whose life contained elements of all these categorizations.

Only two of the proposed categories mentioned in the course of this brief study of Osman’s life offer us keys to Osman’s view of himself and of the wider perspective of history and social upheaval with which Osman’s life is inextricably bound. The first of these is his identity as a Kazak Batur.

In the concept of the Batur, we see the ultimate free spirit, a man outside the ordinary categories into which others are born. As a child, Osman was doubtless embued with the spirit and the many legendary stories surrounding his heroic forebears; he was of a warrior line and his destiny, if he chose to follow it, was to become one of the Kazak’s great individualistic leaders, victors in battle, leaders of men. This role, however, was already doomed in the revolutionary age into which the man was born. As Turkic writers acknowledge, if Osman had been born before the time of airplanes and mortars, when only guns and bold spirits determined the outcome of battles, Osman may have succeeded in gaining for his people a measure of the long-dreamt-of "freedom".

But Osman was born into a time of international rivalries that drew Xin-
jiang’s people into a web of events that few of them understood clearly. Kazaks like Osman were fighters, not ideologues or theoreticians. Osman’s shifts in allegiance are certainly a part of his attempting to come to terms with forces which he recognized to be far greater than his own. His final alliance with the Chinese brought him to the end of the road in his search for an ally that would be weak enough to allow the continuation of traditional free-wheeling Kazak lifestyle in the Altai, yet strong enough to deter more powerful neighbours like Mongolia or the USSR from threatening that same society.

That Osman made the wrong choice is clear to us, who have the inestimable benefit of history revealed. But to Osman, who saw the reform-minded government of the ETR with its Soviet advisors as a threat to his way of life, just as he saw communism as a menace, the Chinese government appeared to offer the best alternative in terms of preservation of the Kazak status quo. Once such a choice was made, once he was aligned to one of the principal players in the 1940s version of the “Great Game” in Central Asia, the dye was cast.

Osman’s situation is reminiscent of another Kazak leader, Amangeldi Iman, who led a Kazak revolt in the Tungai region of Russian Turkestan against the Czarist government in 1916. Amangeldi died fighting for the Bolshevik cause in 1919 and is now referred to in the USSR as a Batur, as are several other Kazak leaders who died “in time.” Had Osman made a different choice, or had he died while still fighting the Guomindang army in Xinjiang perhaps his epitaph today would read Osman the Hero instead of Osman the Bandit in PRC annals.

Was Osman a bandit? Earlier in our discussion we looked at Hobsbawm’s definition of a social bandit and found some correlation between Osman and his men and the groups of social bandits whom Hobsbawm has christened “haiduks.” Now that we have followed the course of Osman’s career, to the limit of available sources, the parallels between Osman’s struggle against forces seeking to control and alter the Kazak traditional nomadic life and the role of the haiduk can be drawn even closer.

Haiduks were not men motivated by ideology or by class-consciousness. Rather, they were a product of, in many cases, traditional, tribal societies, a high proportion of the men joining haiduk bands coming from herdsmen and/or cattle drovers. Because these men broke from their traditional life to fight a clearly identifiable oppressor, they had a positive reputation

among their people who supported them despite their sins or even acts of cruelty.

Haiduks formed structured groups. Osman’s people owed allegiance to him, as the Batur whom they had chosen to follow. We have few details about the social structure within the Osman group, but it appears to have followed the lines of a traditional Kazak camp, with a hierarchy of men who advised and assisted their elected leader.

A main function of the haiduk leader was to supply arms to his followers, and as we have seen, Osman was involved in securing arms early in his career. Indeed, his ability to arrange arms deals – and to ignore the provisions of any formal or informal agreement necessary to secure them – doubtless added considerably to his stature as a leader in the Altai area.

The only difference between the haiduk groups described by Hobsbawm and Osman lies in the fact that haiduks did not usually travel with families in tow and women in the groups were a rarity. But Kazak tradition was quite different from that which pertained in Europe among the haiduks and the Kazak’s practice of travelling as a unit including families was a part of long-standing tradition: women did much of the work around the camp and could fight as well if the need arose. This difference does not therefore detract from the overall similarity of Osman and his people to the free-wheeling haiduk bands.

Above all, the haiduks were, in Hobsbawm’s words:

... a more serious, a more ambitious, permanent and institutionalized challenge to official authority than the scattering of Robin Hoods or other robber rebels which emerged from any normal peasant society.\(^{161}\)

Osman’s fight was always against authority, whether it was personified by Chinese or Russians. He sought to maximize his own and his people’s position \textit{vis-à-vis} the powers which he saw as threatening the traditional life of the Kazaks. Yet, in true haiduk form, he was unable to see beyond the immediate confines of his own social and cultural frame of reference. Bound to the traditional view of the Batur as hero, even in the face of clearly impossible odds, he chose to fight and die in the way of the Batur. As a result, Osman today “rides a golden legend” that assures him, rightfully or not, of a place among that legion of men who symbolized the Kazak dream of glory in battle and the free and independent life on the mountains and plains of Central Asia.

161. E.J. Hobsbawm. \textit{op.cit.}, p. 76.
A small group of exiled Kazaks who originates from the north of Xinjiang lives in Istanbul today. Halife Altay, the speaker of the following text sample, belongs to this group. He was born in 1917 in the Altai mountains and belongs to the Kerey tribe of the Orta ʒuz. Although he has lived in Turkey for over 30 years, he still prefers the Kazak language to Turkish. In spite of some Turkish influence his freely spoken text can be regarded as typical of the Kazak language spoken in China. The text was recorded in the spring of 1984 in Istanbul.

The transcription

I have attempted to transcribe the freely spoken text according to the articulation. Different notations of the same lexemes designate allophonic variations. The system of transcription is based on the scheme recommended in the standard work Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta.¹

The translation which follows the text is meant as an aid to the reader. It follows the sentence structure of the original as closely as possible. Linguistic inaccuracies and unusual sentence structures of the original were preserved.

### Table of vowels

- a
- å
- ã
- ë
- ë
- ‚
- î
- î
- û
- o

### Table of consonants

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<tr>
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<tr>
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### Further symbols

- Length: :
- Long pause: #
- Reduction: ·
- Number of sentence: ( )
- No pause: ·
- Inarticulate: [ ]
- Short pause: |
- Accent: ‘
- Pause: ||

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Fig. 1. Mr. Halife Altay, the Kazak informant from Xinjiang, today living in Istanbul.

(Photo: Ingvar Svanberg)
Halife Altay – The Flight

The reasons for our flight from the Altai were, briefly, the following: first political, second economical. The political reasons: in the years around 1933, a Chinese named Sheng Shicai came to power in East Turkestan with the help of the Soviet government; afterwards he began to terrorize the people. (2) In the years around 1932 the Kazaks led a nomadic life in the Altai and tended their livestock. (3) One year, it was 1932, a particular tribe demanded areas of settlement and pasture from Mongolia and in order to lead the herds to winter pasture climbed up the northern slopes of the Altai to the Mongolian side and spent the winter there. (4) In the following summer the Mongolians drove this tribal group consisting of five hundred families farther inland. When they arrived it became apparent that the chief of government, who had driven away this tribal group, was a Kazak by the name of Kenjebek. (5) The Kazaks, who were migrating, killed Kenjebek, fled, crossed the border and arrived in the Altai. (6) Also during the year between 1932 and 1933 it was particularly the winter in the higher Altai which caused a catastrophic loss of the livestock owned by the aristocracy. The people’s livestock were completely destroyed. All of the rich became impoverished; it was a time of famine. (7) Around the month of June five hundred families came from Mongolia to the summer pastures of the Altai. After they had crossed over to the Altai, there was a fight, a conflict between Mongolia and the Kazaks. (8) As a result of the attacks on Mongolia, soldiers and airplanes came from Mongolia in July of 1934 and attacked the camp Bayqadam which is situated at a place called Sarargol. Also many Kazaks perished. (9) That is why in that year many more people besides us moved away from the Altai; and we went to Barköl. (10) In the autumn of 1933 what I have called the political aspect was still thus: after Sheng Shicai had established himself in Urumchi and seized governmental power, he began to arrest the leaders of the Kazaks one after another and throw them into prison. (11) The father of Elisqan, our leader who had accompanied us to the Indian border, was a fearless man named Alip. (12) In order to support the national revolt against Chinese rule that had begun in 1931 in Barköl under the leadership of Qoža Niyaz and Ayembet, Elisqan’s father Alip gave some sheep and horses as aid. (13) For this reason even before Sheng Shicai, Jin Shuren’s government attacked Alip’s camp in the year 1932, killed a thousand, 105 of his people and took both his children captive. (14) That is why Elisqan was angry with China. On the one hand he supported the national revolt led by Qoža Niyaz and Ayembet; on the other hand a longing for revenge awakened in
him. He rebelled and fomented numerous revolts against the Chinese. (15) Because later when Sheng Shicai had come to power he kept an eye on Elisqan, Elisqan went across to Gansu, around 1935. (16) The place where we lived, the district of Barköl in Qumīl, was situated close to the border with Mongolia as well as Gansu. Therefore, after Elisqan had gone to Gansu, the government of Sheng Shicai had an eye on this area and arrested Ǧabdullah, Qaybar Tayği, Sāyit Nābiy and other leading men in order to gain control of the people living there. (17) For this reason we the Kerey, the nomadic Kazaks who roamed in Qumīl, followed Elisqan one by one over to Gansu in the years 1934, 35, 36 to 38. (18) If one goes by the authors or the documents of this period, the number of Kazaks who went to Gansu was 18,000. (19) The 18,000 people went to Qinghai and Gansu. (20) We stayed in Qinghai and Gansu for two years. (21) While we were living there during these 2 years the people who were resident in Qinghai and Gansu were Tibetans... They were a people who, in the past, had been attacking and pillaging each other. (22) After we had arrived, they grew angry with us, attacked us, drove our herds and livestock away and killed our hunters and herdsmen. Because they wouldn't make peace, Elisqan planned to move away from this area. (23) Especially after the child of Elisqan's close relative Kenžeḥabay had been killed by Tibetan raiders, a petition was addressed to the government of Qinghai. (24) The petitioned government of Qinghai did not give this sufficient consideration. (25) Thus Elisqan became angered, moved away from Qinghai and settled in a place named Alṭinšöke, situated outside of Qinghai. He arrived at the summer pasture of Alṭinšöke in the year 1940, and then intended to set out for India via Tibet. (26) On the way the havoc-wreaking Tibetan people awaited him. (27) They were called "Quliq". (28) These "Quliq" were a warlike people who constantly plundered and attacked their own people and the Mongolians. (29) In order to destroy these warlike Tibetans, these Quliq. Elisqan first advanced against them with a number of men, tracked them down, exchanged shots and defeated them. In the course of this someone by the name of Omar was hit by a bullet. When they returned to the camp, Tibetan and Mongolian soldiers had stormed the camp in Alṭinšöke. (30) Their leader was a Dungan named Fuluşan. He negotiated with Elisqan. What Fuluşan told Elisqan was, "We will not touch you" and both swore by the Koran. After Elisqan had fallen into their hands, he (Fuluşan) overpowered the persons called İdiriš Molda and Qoyşi, chained and fettered them. All the other leading men of the camp were abused and beaten. (31) The Dungans plundered all of the yurts and took everything of use, from the felt, the saddlery, even the whips from their hands, to the women's
bu e:ldi qaytada'n | zu:naya aydaya'n | e:lisqand'i kösköndö' | atqa' sarastap a'lip şurö'tin gi:rmä äske'r | adamd'i sö'ylöstürmeytyuyun (33) # düngönde'r şeke onimenen de qa'tmadi | qiz şatindarya' | zorduq ga'sayan | qoli bilge'n (34) # zu:lå degen şerge baryan kûnû' | altinšökedên üs kös şe'r | se:giz qiz şatindin åtin gazi'p | wosudardi bügün keşke bizge äkep be'resin | dep zo'rduq qilya'n (35) # bunu görgö'n | sol wxat:ayi elisqandan basqa qoşaqin sawirbây | savirvay | si:yaqt'ı | bastiq adamda'r | aqildas'i | solgun köterlis şasa'p | tündê aqildasip a'p | fu:lu:šanđi o:ltürü'p | so şerden qasha'n (36) # pu:šanđan basqa' | [sariuyan] deytin şan'a' | düngö:in şe:kinçi bir bastiş'i' | ol sawirbâyinı awluna şaqaqin şuiskon | sawirbayla'r | eni öltüri'p | elisqandar fu:lu:šanđi öltüretin bolyan elisqan:in ädadarı'n (37) # birä'q | sabirbayla'r | saru:yaŋdi | öltü:rmège' | nemese öltürü:den ko'rq:an (38) # sonduqtań saru:ya'n | qutulup | ketti'p | ilgerde şatqan äskerderge xavar veri'p | taŋ ata' | qaytadan çawu:l şasa'p | köp adamdı qirinî şuşişati'p | sô şerdêgi e:ldi | mali solardin qolunda yalip şâyaw şalpi | qaytip altinçoğogö üs künde' | şi:ylip bolya'n (39) # altinçoğögê kelgenden ke:yn sawirba'y | ayrilip batis şaqa:a qara'y | bügünûgü mina | kaskołin şaray kett'p | e:lisqan' | naxiaya ya'lay gelge'n (40) # ol waqta' | şinxaydet | saqa degen şe:rinde tu:ryan za:yip'a soltan şarîpke qaryanan elde' | ar türlü qazaq [šibar kerey] dep ayta'miz (41) # bul'a' | e:lisqan:in' | awulun şawu'p | malin talat'p | qiz şati'ołgala'p baryanın körődi (42) | bârimiz de körduk (43) # sonduqtań düngö:in şunj köñili yalip' | bul düngö:en:te'n bu elisqangâ istedegeniniz bizge iste'ydî (44) # elisqan:in düngöngé istegen | bir qilmisi' nemese' | şaziy şoq (45) # şayinca altinçoğögê varip oturyan elisqandi' | barîp munšaln'i qirinî şuşişatî (46) # sonduqta'n | biz de e:lisqan:in ärtinan ketü:wimiz gerek dege'n | qawiﬂ aliyp | za:yiştin e:лив | za:yipqa qaryanan el'e | sô şerdên bi'z de köş'tük (47) # bis:seaqadan köşû'p | qizîl özen dep at qoyduq | keybir xari:ta'da' oţ şördütn åtin di:maranş | dep şazadi' (48) | şö şörgê kelgende' | artimizdan düngö:n tibe’t | munugul şawî basî'p | biz çiç:xan ben miş adam edî'k | ben miş adamna'n | deş düzdey adami düötüre'p | ben düzdey ada'm tiri şolîya tûşürû:qp qa'yüştip ket:ı' (49) # qalyanimî'z | qa:lyan tört düz [adam:enen] za:lyip elî | naxşaya şaray kelgen wakî:ta' | naxşaya' | üs kündûk şerde' | elisqanga qo'spay | bizdi toqta'ptaydi (50) # tibe’t | adamarîni şe:nta:ni | aldingî | naxşada elisqan dâ oťîr | bu şerşe sender de [otip] [turînda'r] (51) # biz la:şa:ya merkezi: hökümetke' | senderdî şaxbardarîndî veremiz | şasa'miz (52) # höküme't ne deydi | senderdî lasa şolîmen ket de'y me | de'mey me oni biz bi'lmeymiz | dep bizdi [toqta:rip] [qo'ydi] (53) # tosturum:nen qoymadi' | bizdi:ın at tü:ylërlërimizdi' | kündûz tuni' tala'p |
pearls. (32) [The Dungans] drove these people back to Zuwna. On the trail Elisqan was tied to a horse and twenty soliders prevented him from conferring with anyone. (33) The Dungans, however, were not content with this and ravished the girls and women, did to them whatever they liked. (34) The day we arrived in Zuwna, a three days' journey from Altinşöke, someone wrote the names of eight girls and women and threatened us with the order: "You shall bring them to us tonight." (35) When the leading men of these days — besides Elisqan there were men like Qoğaqın, Sawitbay and Sabirbay — saw this, they conspired at night and revolted the very same day, killed Fuluşan and fled from there. (36) Besides Fuluşan, a second leader of the Dungans called Sarî Uyan was close to Sabirbay's camp. Sabirbay's people wanted to kill him. Elisqan's people had killed Fuluşan. (37) But Sabirbay's people either would not kill Sarî Uyan or else they were afraid to kill him. (38) That is why Sarî Uyan escaped and reported to the soldiers who were camped farther off. In the early morning they attacked again and killed many people. These people's livestock fell into their hands. They returned on foot and gathered three days later in Altinşöke. (39) After they had arrived in Altinşöke, Sabirbay left and went west towards present day Gasköl. Elisqan went towards Naqşā. (40) In those days the people who lived in Saqa and Qinghai were under the leadership of Zayîp and Sultan Şärî . . . We call these different groups of Kazaks the "Şibar Kerey". (41) They saw Elisqan's camp being attacked, the cattle being plundered and the girls and women being ravished. (42) All of us saw that. (43) Then the Dungans became enraged and on the following morning did to us what they had done to Elisqan. (44) Elisqan had committed no offense against the Dungans. (45) [Thus] they came to Elisqan, who had moved to Altinşöke and settled there, and they killed [many of his people]. (46) We, the people of Zayîp, decided that it was necessary to follow Elisqan. That is why we also moved away. (47) We moved away from Saqa to a place that we named "Qızıl Ozen". This place is listed on some maps as Diymarsan. (48) When we arrived there, the Dungan, Tibetan and Mongolian enemy attacked us. When we set out there were 5,000 people. Of these 5,000 they killed about 500 and moved off with about 500 who had fallen into their hands alive. (49) When the remaining 400 of us and the people of Zayîp were approaching Naqşā, we would let nothing stand in our way, at a place three days from Naqşā, until we had joined Elisqan. (50) The people from Tibet said, "Elisqan is also there in Naqşā! You settle there too. (51) We shall relay your message to the central government in Lhasa and take care of it." (52) What did the government say? "We do not know if they (the Kazaks) should be allowed
qu:wałab ayda’p | qa’sışp kete’ ve’rdič (54) # e:kinçî 자격:ya:ųina’n | tibeti:ği şerinde’ | şyaːtːin otin ʁoq | tezekte:ği: zi tava’-jmaydi (55) # tezek te’rip | bir az qamptan uzaq çiːq:ːa’n adamdardi’ da | ұsta’d (56) # sonumenen axır buyan چi:day a’lmayı | bir günû’ | tibeti ökümətine qarsı kötörülüs چasa’p | buzulu’p | batışqa yara’p kö’ştük (57) # sol köşümü’z | bir mıŋ toğuz ژۇ’z | qirqinçi ژiːlini’ң | nununu ayinda bastayan kö’ş | tibeti:ţiŋ | sarı şonîmen köşüb oturup | mıŋ toğuz ژۇ’qıɾqıɾ birinçi şilinîn toğuzunçî ayinda’ ündüstana چek arasına kelin şet:ı’k (58) # bu têbôt:ın şonunda’yı’ | qıʃ:ʃinde’ bir şu:lday | soyuspenc’ın | bir şa:yına’n | tibeti:ği ژaylawinda’yı’ | is tiːp xaqlta’r | el qirilu:mine’n | miŋday adaːm:iz ortada’ | zayá boldu | ژوq boldu’ (59) # ündüstangâ geli’p | sal’a:lyan waxıt:a’ | üş mıŋ’ınday adan qalıyan ekeːm:iz yaːni üş mıŋ ޡuz toğuz ada’m (60) # déme’k | çiːq:n šiːnxay şerden čiːq:an bes mıŋ adama’n | mıŋ adamimizdî tövöt:uŋ چek arasında’ | töbıpınen šiːnxay چek arasında’ | düngöndé’ɾ | qaytarıp | bes düzün öltürü’p | bes düzün [tiri] [aketːi] | şanâ mıŋ adamimiz’iz | bizden ayrılıp’ | basqa ژaːq:a keʃi’p | nemese ۆːlüp qirilı’ɾ | koşten yali’p | arıp čarşap ژoq bolu’p mıŋ adam za’ya bo’ldi (61) # ündüstangâ gëlc’e’n | üş mıŋ ada’m | hawa ژa’qpay keşmir şayindā qirîla’ qirîla’ | bir şıːldä’ | üş mıŋ adaman bir mıŋday adan گاːłdıq (62) # buł bir mıŋday ada’m | ündüstanda’ | paqʃ:ștanda’ | on өkî ژiː turu’p | buł ündüstandayı on өkî şilgî waːqiːya’ | oł ayanıʃtî’ | onîŋ bärin bu şerde qışqa’sa men âzır | aytu:wi mümkû’n eme’s (63) || bula’ɾ menîŋ estelik terim niːse’m | ana ژurt:an anadolu:ya degen kita:bımda’ egège’y tegège’y ژاːzîlîyan (64) # nätî:ʒädâ’ | bir mıŋ toğuz ە:ु’z | eːlu: üşünčů elu: törtünçi şil’darda | bis pâkîst’an:an türiːya’ | ge’ldîk (65) # pâkîst’an türiːya: kelgen adamimizdîn sani’ | bir mıŋ tört ە:ु’z boldí (66) # déme’k | buł on eki şil’dâ’ üş tört ە:u’zdey | bala şayamene’q qaytadan | adamimiz öskèn’ éke’n (67) # eːkinçî’ | bir mıŋ toğuz ژۇ’z eːlu: | birinçi ژili’ | ژeːkinçî göş bu qalibek qamza qusayin | sołtàn šariːp dâlıqanda’ɾ | keşmirge geli’p | woːla’ɾ | üş düz | ژeːlu: adâm edő adardîn sani’ (68) # sonuqa’tan | bir mıŋ tört düzdéy ada’m | biz pâkîst’an | üş düz elu: ada’m | ژeːkinçî koʃ | keşmirden bołi’p | bir mıŋ seːgiː düz ada’m | türiːya:ya kelin | şerlestî’k #
to pass through Lhasa or not." We were delayed by these means. (53) They were not content with delaying us. Day and night they plundered and drove our horses and camels away and disappeared in the same way they had appeared. (54) Secondly, there was no firewood in Tibet (to be found), not even dung (as fuel) was found. (55) They seized those who had gone a bit farther away from camp to collect dung. (56) Finally we could bear this no longer and one day we revolted against the Tibetan government. We were defeated and moved west. (57) Our migration began in November of 1940. We moved across the barren mountains of Tibet and reached the Indian border in September of 1941. (58) During the winter in these barren Tibetan mountains we lost about a thousand people due to the battles fought throughout the year, and also because of the decimation of the population through mountain sickness. (59) When we got through to India 3,000 of us remained — or more exactly 3,039 people. (60) That means that of the 5,000 who left Qinghai, 1,000 were sent back by the Dungans at the border between Tibet and Qinghai. They killed 500 and carried off 500; also 500 left us, went in another direction or perished; 1,000 remained behind the caravan exhausted and were lost. (61) 3,000 people went to India. [But] because they couldn’t stand the climate of Kashmir, they were decimated and, after one year, of the 3,000 people (only) 1,000 of us had survived. (62) These approximately 1,000 people lived in India and Pakistan for 12 years. The events of 12 years in India, it is a pity, all of this cannot be related briefly at this point. (63) This has been fully described in my books Estelikterim and Anayırttan Anadolu’ya. (64) Finally in 1953–54 we went to Turkey from Pakistan. (65) The number of our people who came to Turkey from Pakistan was 1,400. (66) That means that our population had increased by about 400 children in 12 years. (67) Secondly, in 1951 the second caravan with Qaliybek, Qamza, Qusayin and Sultan Şärıp Dänilqan arrived in Kashmir. There were 350 of them. (68) That is how 1,400 of us came from Pakistan along with another 350 who came with the second caravan — 1,800 in all. We came to Turkey and settled there.

KAZAK PASTORALISM IN THE BOGDA RANGE

by

Thomas Hoppe

In July 1985, I spent three weeks among the Kazaks around Bogda Köl or Heavenly Lake in the Xinjiang region of China. I stayed near the lake in a Kazak yurt with Aytumar, the Kazak veterinarian who lives there during the Jaylaw (summer) season. During my stay, I made a six-day round trip on horseback to visit the sheep and goat herds in the areas north and east of the lake. Later, we crossed the Gurban-Bogda Pass (3,645 m) west of the Bogda peaks (5,445 m) on the way to Dawancheng. From this experience, I gained some insight into Kazak pastoralism on the southern slope of the Bogda range.

In this paper, I do not try to contrast contemporary pastoralism with the "classical" descriptions of Kazak pastoralism. For such an historical comparison I would have needed data from the same local unit as a point of reference, and such information is simply not available. Also, marked historical, tribal and local differences among various groups of Kazak complicate the matter. Under the circumstances, a comparative study was not feasible. Information in this account is, therefore, primarily descriptive and will, hopefully, serve as a basis of comparison for future research among the Bogda Köl Kazaks.

There is no difficulty in reaching Heavenly Lake. Early in the morning busses leave Urumchi and arrive at the lake at 10:30 a.m. Everyday 20 to 40 busses or trucks, most of them crowded with Chinese, Uighurs, Hui and foreigners come up to the lake. The people roam about the lakeshore and take boat rides on the lake itself. The result is noise, waste, crowds, and commercialization. But one only has to stroll about a hundred meters away from the lakeshore to enjoy the quietude of the Picea schrenkiana forests

1. This article I want to dedicate to Marigul and all the children at Heavenly Lake. I am indebted to Aytumar and to Dalabai and their families for their help and hospitality. I am grateful to Volkswagenwerk Foundation and Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst for support of my research.
and the pastures interspersed between them. At about 4:00 p.m. most of
the tourists leave. Only a few, mostly foreigners, stay for a night or two in
some rented Mongol and Kazak yurts on the western shore. Until about
10:00 or 11:00 a.m. of the following day the lake seems to be left in its quiet
and naturally serene state again.

In summer Kazak awil are to be found about 500 m north of the northern
lakeshore, on the northwestern shore and at the southern end of the
lake. Kazak families who no longer herd big flocks spend the summer from
May up to the beginning of September on the northern and northwestern
fringe of the lake. Here lives the Kazak party-secretary of the brigade, the
veterinarian, the cadre of the Kazak shop, and a few families whose men
earn money by renting horses or working as alpine guides. These families
only tend a few horses and cows. The cows provide them with milk and
dairy products. Large flocks of sheep and goats do not graze in the vicinity
of the lake.

**Historical Background**

The pastoral resources in the Bogda range and the northern piedmont of
Tian Shan — between Barköl and Manas — were only marginally used af-
after the Qing troops' annihilation campaign against the Dzungarian Mon-
gols in 1757–1758. Uighur, Hui and Han settlers opened up the northern
piedmont plain of the Tian Shan. Merzbacher, who did a thorough geo-
morphological study of the Bogda range in the late summer of 1908, de-
scribed the alpine region and its valleys as almost uninhabited and ex-
pressed regret that the available resources of the region lay idle. Merz-
bacher reports that he met Kazaks from the Sayan Mountains (northern
fringe of Tannu-Tuva) who came there to spend their żaylaw-season on
long treks over the Tarbagatai. Besides them, only some specialized Ui-
gur herders let their flocks graze in the mountains. On the lakeshore
some 14–15 monks lived together with their servants. They planted bar-
ley, vegetables, and flowers and kept some animals: cattle, sheep, and
horses.

The settlement of Kazaks on the northern slope of the Tian Shan and the
southern fringe of the Dzungarian basin occurred in several surges. After

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4. awil, here meaning a group of five to seven tents, is now also used as a term designating an
administrative unit, the Chinese xiang, administrative replacement of the "People’s Com-
mune."


the Russian expansion into Western Turkestan, Kerey tribesmen from the Zajsan Nor Region moved to southern Altai in 1864; some of these later went to the northern slopes of Tian Shan. In 1903 the Chinese administration still hindered Kazaks from moving further south of the Ili river and the Tarbagatai and Altai Mountains. In 1904 Kazaks from southern Altai moved toward the northern slopes of Tian Shan between Manas and Mori. With growing Russian influence on the Altai Region at the beginning of the century, Kazaks moved into Chinese territory and to the northern slopes of Tian Shan. Between 1914 and 1916 large groups of Kazaks moved from Russian territory into the Altai region. Parts of these groups moved further south to the northern slopes of Tian Shan. The beginnings of Kazak settlement in the northern part of the Bogda range, described here, should be dated after the defeat of the Muslim uprisings in 1864–1877. Yet the pastures were not extensively used by the Kazaks even as late as 1908 when Merzbacher travelled through the region.

**Geographical Conditions**

The Heavenly Lake is situated 1,910 m above sea level, has an area of about 2.45 km² and is 102 m deep. It can store 160 million m³ of water, which flows into the Sangong river, which, in turn, runs north to Fukang. Run-off figures for the river are 50–87 million m³/a or 2.18 m³/sec (mean value). Along the lower part of the Sangong valley lie the partly dispersed and partly clustered winter settlements of the Kazaks. The houses are simple adobe structures with flat roofs. The Sangong valley is partly planted with

9. *Mulei Hasake Zizhixian*. . . . pp. 17–18: Kazak herdsmen probably also used the pastures along the northern slopes of Tian Shan in historical time. It is reported that they usually came from Altai in spring and left in autumn. But, at the end of the 19th century they began to settle in this region. An additional impetus was exerted on these movements after the Mongolian Revolution. *Changji Huizu Zizhizhou Gaikuang* [A Survey of the Changji Hui People Autonomous Prefecture]. Ürümqi 1985. p. 42. For further details on the Kazak movements into Central Dzungaria see chapter 2.
wheat, corn and fodder (rye and oat). The Kazaks work here as agriculturalists, as do Hui and Han.

The climate at Heavenly Lake has a yearly mean temperature of only 2° C, an annual average precipitation of 513 mm and a frostfree period of 88 days. In winter a thick snow-cover prevails, which will eventually be utilized for skiing-tourism. In 1985 plans leaked out that a Japanese enterprise would like to build a ski resort at the lake. In summer 1985 a small hotel was being built at the northwestern shore of the lake. The lake starts to freeze between Oct. 15—Nov. 5, whereafter it is used as a skating resort. The ice melts between Apr. 15 and May 5.

The plain near Fukang shows different conditions. It is drier (130.5–191.9 mm annual precipitation) and the annual mean temperature is higher, 6.8° C at 564.8 m above sea level. Without irrigation only steppe vegetation can grow here, which in these environs covers 70–80% of the land. Spontaneous tree vegetation grows only along the rivers, mainly *Ulmus pumila*. At heights of between 1,500–3,000 m *Picea schrenkiana* forests have developed on the northern slope, as well as *Salix xerophila*, *Populus densa*, *P. pilosa*, *P. tremula*, and *Ulmus pumila* in the ravines or as riparian vegetation. The foothill region (1,300–1,900 m) is not supplied with groundwater so its vegetation cover is extremely sparse.

Zheng and Ren (1965) divide the northern slope of the Bogda range into ten zones:

Zone I is the alpine desert zone at an elevation above 3,300 m and has an estimated precipitation of 800–1,000 mm. In zone II, 2,800–3,300 m, flocks and horses are being grazed on alpine meadows. In zone III, 1,600–2,800 m, plant communities especially apt for cattle prevail, but sheep and goats, the most common gregarious animals, also graze in this zone. Zones I (only marginally), II and III are summer pastures whilst zone IV, 1,300–1,600 m, is reserved as a winter pasture in most areas; all are supplied with surface water. Pastures in zone IV are interspersed with forested areas and shrubs. Here the annual precipitation is still 500 mm. Zone V, the foothill and hill zone, at 900–1,300 m, is an autumn and spring pasture zone.

Zone VI consists of the larger river valley flats (about 400–600 m wide) of the Sangong, the Sigong, and the Shuimo-he and starts just below 1,600

12. *Tianchi ming sheng ji*, pp. 3–4; precipitation as given by Zheng Benxing & Ren Binghui. *op.cit.*, is 686.8 mm.
Map 1. Geomorphological Conditions for Agriculture and Animal Husbandry in the Western Part of Bogda Range, Northern Slope.

watershed line  

- glaciers

Source: Zheng and Ren (1965)
m. The annual precipitation here is very variable, with a range between 200 and 500 mm. This is the agricultural and fodder cultivation zone. However, the tilled areas are mixed with pastures which are used in winter as well as during the summer.

Zone VII is the agricultural area of the sedentary Uighur, Hui, and Han populations at the southern fringe of the piedmont plain where the soils are light sierozems. North of this zone, on the outer fringe of the recent alluvial plain, there is a mixed zone for agriculture and cattle-breeding (Zone VIII), situated upon the well watered source horizon. Here Phragmites communis, Achnaterum splendens and Artemisia spp. grow luxuriously, and water reservoirs have been built. In zone IX further north, autumn and spring pastures are situated; this is the fossil alluvial plain of the rivers with only a low degree of soil salinization and alkalinization. Since the groundwater table is quite deep (about 10 m) this area was opened up as new land and provided with irrigation water stored up in zone VIII. Zone X is the desert zone with sparse zerophytic vegetation on fixed sand-dunes.  

**Composition and Size of the Herds**

The following table is a survey of the families visited, their herds and the composition of their herds. The first seven families are not herdspeople, or are at least not specialized as such. They earn a monetary income mainly from sources other than animal husbandry. These families spend their ʒay-law-season near the lake. The size of the herds may or may not necessarily be an indicator of social differentiation. Families sometimes tend the animals of neighbouring families so the apparent size of herds can be misleading.

Table 1. Survey of the households around the Heavenly Lake made by the author in July 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household No.</th>
<th>Composition and Size of Herd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Forest-officer with a wife and 7 children, residing on the lakeshore. They have 2 horses, 3 cows, but no sheep because the number of animals is limited near the lake.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Shop-cadre with a wife and 3 school-children (2 grown-up sons live in Fukang and Urumchi), residing on the northern lakeshore. They have 1 horse, 4 cows and 10 sheep. The sheep are cared for by others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Household No. 3 consists of a party-cadre with a wife and 7 children, residing on the northern lakeshore. They have 4 horses, 5 cows, 30 sheep older than one year and 70 lambs. The sheep are all cared for by others.

Household No. 4 consists of an old herder with a wife and 6 children, residing north of the lake. They have 4 horses, 9 cows and over 20 sheep. The sheep are all cared for by others.

Household No. 5 consists of a veterinarian with a wife and 6 children and a grandmother, residing on the northern lakeshore. They have 1 horse, 3 cows but no sheep.

Household No. 6 consists of a widow with 1 grown-up son, residing on the northern lakeshore. They have 2 horses, 4 cows and 25 sheep. The sheep are cared for by others and the son works as a guide.

Household No. 7 consists of a widow with 5 children. They have 2 horses, 4 cows and 30 goats and sheep. The goats and sheep are cared for by others.

Six households have their 3aylaw west of the lake at 2,100 m. elevation. They have a large herd consisting of 200 head of cattle for meat production and 700 sheep.

Herdsman household No. 1 consists of a couple with 3 children, residing northeast of the lake. They have 100 goats.

A 3aylaw northeast of the lake consists of three yurts with herdsmen (No. 2). One household consists of a couple with 3 children (2 grown-up sons, daughter-in-law, and 1 baby); one household consists of a couple with 3 children and one household with a couple and two children. They have 5 horses, 15 cows and 200 sheep and goats.

Another 3aylaw northeast of the lake consists of two yurts. The two herdsmen-couples (No. 3) have 4 children each. They have 3 cows and 120 goats including 40 milk-goats. They also have a few merino sheep.

Two herdsmen-families (No. 4) are residing in a 3aylaw northeast of the lake. One couple has 2 children. They have 4 horses, 8 cows and 70 goats.

Two yurts (herdsmen No. 5) at an elevation of about 2,400 m. east of the lake consist of one household with a grandmother and 3 grandchildren and one household of a couple with 4 children. They have 1 bull, 4 cows and 230 sheep.

Herdsman No. 6 resides in a yurt east of the lake at an elevation of 3,000 m. The household consists of a couple, 3 children, grandmother and grandfather. They have 4—5 cows, 50 sheep and 30 lambs.

Herdsman No. 7 is residing in a yurt east of the lake at an elevation of 3,000 m. The household consists of a couple with 7 children. They have 3 horses, 7 cows, 250 sheep (including some fat-tailed sheep, i.e. qizil qoy), 70 lambs and 70 goats. The herd includes animals entrusted to them by other families. The household spends the winter in the Gurbantüngüt.

Herdsman No. 8 lives with a wife, 3 children and 1 baby (2 grown-up sons live in town) in a yurt at an elevation of 2,600 m east of the lake. They have 4 horses, 4 bulls, 4 cows, 186 sheep (including some qizil qoy) and 109 lambs. The herd includes animals entrusted to them by other families. The household spends the winter in the Gurbantüngüt.
A household (No. 9) consisting of herdsman with a wife and 7 children, resides at an elevation of 2,600 m. east of the lake. They have 5 horses, 3 cows, 7 bulls and 80 sheep.

Another herdsman-family (No. 10) resides at an elevation of 2,400 m. east of the lake. The household consists of a couple with 1 baby and 2 brothers of the husband. The grandparents reside in an adobe-house in Sangong Valley. The household has 1 horse, 2 cows, 2 bulls, 180 sheep and 110 lambs, thereof 60 sheep and 50 lambs are privately owned.

A yurt household residing southeast of the lake consists of a herdsman (No. 11) with a wife, 3 children and grandparents. They have 2 horses, 4 cows, 50 sheep, 40 lambs and 50 qizil qoy.

On the southern slope resides a peasant household consisting of a couple with 2 children and the brother of the man. They live in an adobe-house and have 2 horses, 1 camel, 2 cows and 300 sheep. The sheep are cared for by others.

A considerable number of families do not keep sheep and goat herds. They work at various jobs, but still own a number of sheep/goats cared for by neighbouring families. These semi-herdsmen spend the summer in the mountains near the lake where they tend their cows and horses. Through the ownership of their cows they have retained their traditional style of nourishment and of producing sour milk (ayran), butter and dried curd (qurt).

Horse breeding is concentrated in the hands of three families: one family specializes in the production of fermented mares milk, kumyss (qimiz), and the two others look after a herd of about 60 horses. For the other families horses serve only as a means of transport. I saw no foals among these families’ herds.

The number of children is high, 5–6 children per couple being quite common. Therefore, most of these children will not find a means of living as herdspersons but will have to look for a job outside the traditional form of Kazak life. No additional pasture can be set to use. Conditions of overgrazing could be seen already by the end of July in some areas I visited, even though the end of the growth period occurs later, at the end of August. The youngest son succeeds his father as owner of the herd and the tent. He will, in turn, take care of his aged parents.

During the summer, herding work is in many cases done by two families together, in one case by three, and in another by six families, but families living alone are also common. So, a migratory camp group in most cases comprises 1–3 households. Only at a height of 2,500–3,000 m above sea-level can we find the largest herds (Herdsmen No. 5, 7, 8, and 10 in Table 1); they are stationed near or above the timber-line. At this altitude the pastures are vast and more open than at altitudes between 1,500–2,300 because of glacial erosion. During the summer there are many people in
each camp with children of every age group helping their parents. The children of herdsman No. 7 were able to manage the huge herd for a couple of days while their parents went to a funeral. Here 9 people herd about 400 animals, while in another place (Herdsman No. 2) 14 people including younger children take care of only 230 animals. If we had more exact data about the number of people taking care of the herds in spring, autumn and winter, it would be easier to find out who are the actual herdsmen in charge. The Kazaks regard their גַּלְגָּלָש-ַרְפָּבַד as a kind of summer resort.

The main herding animal is the Xinjiang Merino sheep, but some families even specialize in goats. The average family owns two to four head of cattle, one to three horses and 20–30 sheep or goats. The differentiation of social strata, described in earlier literature, was not applicable to the situation at the Heavenly Lake in 1985. There is no stratum of rich Kazaks, but there appears to be a stratum of relatively prosperous families of the successful specialized herdsmen. Since the pastoral resources in northern Xinjiang were used only marginally at the beginning of this century, at
least the rich and the prosperous strata could become fairly successful. This is reflected by the fact that, at this time, a herdsman who owned only 10 horses, 10 cows and 30–40 sheep was labelled as “poor”, while rich Kazaks had a few thousand horses, a few thousand sheep and a few hundred head of cattle. Nowadays, there exists a new stratum of Kazak families that could be called poor: they own only a few animals and have a low monetary income from other sources.

The Ownership System

In 1985, most of the herdsmen believed that those animals that had been put into their hands after the dissolution of the strict collective ownership system would eventually become their own property; or, at least, they thought they would own part of them in return for their care and maintenance.

Even during the collective period some animals had been privately owned (in Chinese: zi liu xu). In 1985 all the herdsmen privately owned a certain number of animals, plus a number of animals handed over to them for bao qun dao hu, i.e. the “transfer of the production [herd] guarantee to the individual family.” Formally speaking that part of the herd was still owned by the People’s Commune, or, after its dissolution, by the xiang or awil. E.g. the family who specialized in kumyss-production owned four mares while the rest of the herd, ten mares, still belonged to the xiang. Herdsman No. 6 had 55 sheep over one year old as bao qun dao hu animals, but the 30 offspring of this flock were his own property.

So the individual herdsman family took care of animals reapportioned to it by the government. In return they got the usufruct of those animals: the clipped wool, the milk, and the lambs produced by them. All of these products were their own; however, this was only on condition that they sold the fleece and some slaughtered animals to the state. Apart from this, they took care of animals entrusted to them by neighbours or parents who had no access to genuine pastoral work.

16. N.V. Bogojavlenskij, op.cit., p. 62. Cf. Ludwig Golomb, Die Bodenkultur in Ostturkes-tan. Oasenwirtschaft und Nomadentum. Freiburg 1959, p. 118. N. Seeland, op.cit., pp. 42–43 gives the “class” differentiation as follows: rich, 1,000 or more sheep; elevated stratum, some hundred sheep; poor, a horse and some sheep. Wu states that poor Kazak families still in the fifties were devoid of an adequate diet, they had neither horses, nor cattle to slaughter, and no meat winter stock, so they had to survive the winter with only some millet. Meat and fat consumed in winter helped to heat the body. Wu Yonggang, Hazakezu muqu shenghuo sanji [Notes on Life in Kazak Herding Areas]. Shanghai 1956, pp. 19–20.
Some Kazaks expressed uncertainty, in the final analysis, as to what kind of ownership was practiced in 1985. In an article about the introduction of the herd responsibility system in Tekes county in 1983–1984, Shi Ruizhi affirms that a difference between collectively owned and privately owned animals does not exist anymore. Kazak herdsmen are cited as saying: “In the past the cattle was collectively owned... we always ate from the big common pot. If an animal more or an animal less was brought forth, it did not make any difference; when an animal died, we did not have to pay damages. Whether our work was done well or not, we did not feel it personally. Now it is different. We hold the responsibility for certain stock, but all of the cattle belong to us. If we do not take good care of the animals, the loss is ours.”

After the reform, formerly idle pastures, difficult to reach, were put to use; the żaylaw-period was prolonged by 20 days. The average slaughter weight of the animals was increased and fewer animals died. Their former practice of slaughtering, before the planned purchase by the administration, resulted in the killing of up to 20,000 head of cattle. This practice now has disappeared and the herdsmen can decide themselves about the number of animals to be slaughtered and sold.17

In the Sangong awıl sale obligations were taken rather lightly as each family sold as many animals as it could afford. One herdsman had lowered his obligation from sixteen head (1984) to six (1985). Wool was also sold mainly because the Kazaks cannot use the wool of the merinos for the production of felt.

During the Cultural Revolution the herdsmen could only regard their personal goods as their property, according to an old Kazak herder. They did not own any animal, not even a horse. Sales were made on a large scale and strictly according to government plans. The food situation was even worse: wheat was rare, and they ate a lot of gaoliang (Sorghum) and millet. Payment was made according to work points: counted in yuan, this amounted to about 200 yuan per year in cash. In addition to this, payment was also made in products, especially in cereals. Milk was taken from the herds freely, but meat was rarely consumed. The cadres were privileged and did not themselves take part in pastoral work. Only a tiny fraction of the former party and cadre apparatus is still working in the awıl government; most of the cadres now must work as herdsmen or take up other jobs.

Because the state owned the pastures it could always freely appropriate and occupy the land in order to convert it to agricultural land. However, the individual families apparently have had a customary claim to use the same pasture areas for generations. Some of them used the same ʒaylaw-pastures for three generations. On the whole the state aims at a quasi-private system of care in order to avoid overgrazing as well as to attain amelioration of the pasture quality."

The Cycle of Grazing and Pastoral Work

The grazing cycle and movement of a group of three families, who form one camp in summer (herdsman No. 2), with about 200 head of animals, mostly merinos and 10% goats, can be described as follows:

May – 25. June ʒaylaw I: Highest position of the camp is at about 2,300 m, as long as the seasonal water from a well-spring is available.

25. June – end of August ʒaylaw II: The group moves further down about 300 m in elevation, grazing in narrow valleys within the forest zone. At the end of August the lambs are separated from the older animals.

1. Sept. – 15. Nov. One part of the group moves with the lambs on to autumn pastures, south of the winter settlements (zone IV). The other part of the herd moves to the cattle breeding station of the awil, where the animals are inseminated artificially. From this time onwards, two camps are necessary for the maintenance of the herd.

15. Nov. – 15. March The lambs are led up to an elevation of 1,100 – 1,400 m (zones IV and V) where they graze on sunlit southern slopes. Sheep and goats over one year old graze in the Gurban-tüngüt or nearby.

15. March – May
The latter group moves up to the hill region, near the settlements (zones V and VI). The lambs of the new year are born here. The other part of the herd, now yearlings, goes down to zone IV. The herd is reunited and moves up to ʒaylaw I.

Horses are used as a means of transportation. During winter the cattle are kept in shacks within the settlement. Sometimes they are also taken to the winter camp in the desert-steppe.

Another grazing-cycle, that of Herdsman No.8, is described below:

25. June – end of August
The highest camp lies at 2,500–2,700 m east of the Bogda Köl.

Early Sept. – Dec.
Pastures in the foot-hill region in zone V and VI are used. A stop is made at the breeding station for artificial insemination.

Dec. – March
The herdsmen move to the winter camp in the Gurbantüngüt (zones VIII, IX and X). Four young men – of two families – look after the herd; they live in a small Mongolian yurt, which is easier to heat. The herdsman, his wife, the daughter and baby stay in the adobe house in the Sangong valley from where they supply the young people in the winter camp.

March – June
The herd moves up to the hill region and to the Sangong valley, near the settlements, where the best protection against frost and snow in spring can be found. At the end of this period the family moves up to its ʒaylaw-settlement.

From this we can conclude that there exists a general pattern of movement to the ʒaylaw-pastures in the high mountains in summer, to the foot-hill region during spring and autumn and to the winter camp in the desert and steppe (only some herds remain in wind-protected valleys and pastures on sunlit southern slopes within the Tian Shan mountains.) But the individual cycle of movements and stations are different.
The reproductive cycle of a herd is as follows:

Taking the flock of herdsmen No. 2 as an example, from about 200 animals belonging to three families, 30 are sold for slaughter, providing a return of about 2,700 yuan, or 900 yuan per family.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stock</th>
<th>200</th>
<th>head</th>
<th>(in spring)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>head</td>
<td>losses (illness, run away)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>head</td>
<td>sales in autumn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>head</td>
<td>winterstock for three families</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 130  | head  | flock in winter-camps |
| +     | 80    | lambs  | born in spring |

| 210  | head  | new stock |

For their own use in winter each family, if it can afford it, slaughters 10 sheep or goats. This is usually done in autumn; the meat is smoked or dried. From the remainder of the flock 80 lambs are expected; in spring the old stock with a light increment of ten animals (5% increase) is reproduced. The food requirements in meat are not very high. Merinos in Xinjiang have an average weight of 45–50 kg with a percentage of 53–56% dead weight. Meat consumption of one family would amount to 220 kg in the winter months.

When cattle are slaughtered, usually in the winter months, large amounts of meat are produced, but not all of it is consumed by one family alone.

Merinos can provide an average clip of about 3.5–4 kg of wool with a maximum of 6 kg. The group of three herdsmen families mentioned above earns about 3,000 yuan per year from the fleece of 120 animals more

19. In my estimation, a grown-up sheep fethched a prize of 100 yuan; I have used an average value of 90 yuan per animal.
20. The reproductive cycle of a herd in Western Turkestan (between Kopal and Sergiopol) in the 19th century was: a herd of 1,000 animals produced 420 lambs, of which 70 were eaten and 280 sold. This left a net increase in a favourable year of 1,070–1,100 head. Wilhelm Radloff, op. cit., p. 433.
23. Here I have used a dressing percentage of only 22 kg because lambs are also slaughtered.
than 1 year old. The state pays 5–6 yuan/kg for fleece of the best quality. Income from the clip may be between 18–25 yuan per animal.

**The Seasonal Cycle**

The grazing cycle of the Kazaks still reflects the natural grazing cycle of the animals. It is linked to the reproductive cycle of the vegetation and to the changing seasons. The nourishment cycle of the people is intimately connected with these natural phenomena, especially with the reproductive cycle of the herd and the lactation period of the flocks and herds, as is shown below:

**Summer**

The weather in the high mountains is everchanging — at times sunny, at times overcast or rainy, but never sultry; at higher altitudes (3,000 m and above) precipitation falls as snow. Small groups of families or solitary families spend the summer dispersed in the mountains. Wheat and milk products are the predominant food. About 100 kg of wheat are used per family
and month. Meat is eaten in tiny amounts. On special occasions a sheep is slaughtered and consumed by a larger group of people. Kumyss is drunk, but usually only on festive occasions and many people do not have access to it. The cows are covered from the end of July onwards. During the summer, older people and Kazaks doing agricultural work remain in the fixed settlements.

Autumn
Grazing is done mainly in the foothill region or in the Sangong valley; hay is cut and dried. It is the time of festivities, marriages, and horse races. The sheep and goats are fattened and slaughtered, and the meat is preserved for the winter. Female sheep and goats are inseminated. During this time the production of milk decreases sharply.

Winter
If the families have shared their camps up to now, in winter only the most vigorous family members go to the winter camp. The old people, the women and the children stay in the adobe houses. Average monthly temperatures are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Temperature (°C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>-15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>-13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Temperature minima are below -40°C. It is a time of strong solar radiation. Parts of the herds and flocks are fed with hay. Cows, sheep and goats yield no milk during this time.

Spring
The offspring (mainly lambs and kids) are born. In some years the herds are endangered by late heavy frost periods and by snow covered with ice, which can hit the weakened herds severely. Heavy losses occur at times,

25. For Urumchi plain, see Bruce Roberts, Die ökologischen Risiken der Stadtentwicklung und Landnutzung in Ürümqi, Xinjiang/China, Diplomarbeit. Technische Universität, Berlin 1985, p. 34 [To be published in Bremer Beiträge zur Geographie und Raumplanung].

26. According to Xu Deyuan & Sang Xiucheng, Xinjiang nongye qihou, [The Agro-climate of Xinjiang]. Ürümqi 1981. p. 56 soil temperatures below -43° (Urumchi and Shihezi were measured).

27. See Wilhelm Radloff. op.cit., p. 424 & 437. Milking of the cow continues into late autumn, but sheep and goats give milk only for about four months.
sometimes up to 20% of the total herd (including cattle) is lost. At the end of this period the sheep are clipped and the supply of milk products increases.

**Pastoral Work**

**Cattle:**
The cattle do not move far from the tents. The calves are tied up near the tents. The cow returns to its calf and to the milker. Milking is done in the morning and in the evening. The yield of milk for use amounts to 2–4 kg per cow per day in July; the calf itself consumes about 2 kg/day. The family of the veterinarian owned three cows, which together yielded only 6 kg of milk per day. From this yield 3 adults and six children were provided with milk products. Moreover, the wife of the veterinarian sold qurt and ayran to tourists.

**Horses:**
The horses are prevented from straying by ropes tied to their fetlocks. But, often the horses we were using to visit yurts nonetheless moved about one or two kilometers from the tent and we had to look for them in the morning after breakfast (they always move uphill). The milked mares of the kumyss-farm were tied up during the day together with their foals. At night they grazed freely. A large horseherd was grazing in the Dadonggou valley between the rocky and gravel slopes; tents of the Kazaks were set up in the north, controlling the outlet of the upper valley.

**Sheep and goats:**
On the northern slope (in contrast with the southern slope) the flocks are not grazed by men on horseback, and they are not even guarded all the time, but left to themselves on the pastures adjacent to the tents. At least once a day, at dawn, the animals are driven together and, if possible, counted. During the night salt-rock is put out in order to keep them near the tents. But in most cases the flock has dispersed by morning and must be looked for after breakfast. The men do all of the pastoral work themselves aided only by a wooden staff or a handful of stones. During my trip with Aytumar, the flocks were driven together shortly after our arrival for necessary treatment; this hardly took more than one or two hours. Still, more often than not animals are lost in this manner of free grazing. On long

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marches through the forests animals must be repeatedly searched for. In the case of lost animals, the herdsmen pay visits to their neighbours on horseback to ask them if they have seen them. Sometimes the neighbours give back these lost animals but sometimes they eat them.

**Veterinary Care**

Veterinary care is not paid for when preventive measures are taken. The state pays the veterinarian. The treatment of the sheep, which I saw, aimed at the prevention and healing of lung parasites (*Dictyocaulus viviparus*): Sheep more than one year of age were treated with a brown fluid of 1 g iodine and potassium iodate (1.5 g)/l water; each animal received 20 ml orally. The lambs received cupric sulfate against parasites of the maw and the intestines and an injection of 1 ml of sodium chloride (0.9%) as a preventive measure against brucellosis.

Many sheep seemed to suffer from phlegm of the nose, especially the merinos. A few Karakul-sheep appeared very unhealthy.
Income Situation and Self-sustenance

A sufficient level of self sustaining production is an important element of the income situation of a Kazak family. It mainly consists of milk, slaughter animals (winter-stock), wool (from the qi’zi’l qoy), calf and goat hair (for the production of tent ropes etc.) A family’s standard of living depends upon its size, its fixed monetary income, its earnings from sideline production and tourism, and the proceeds of the sale of wool and slaughtered animals. Since the data I received from the herdsmen were fairly rough, and I did not ask for detailed data on revenues and expenditures, the following examples are only approximations.

Example 1:
The household consisted of 9 people including 3 adults; only cows and a horse were kept. Its monetary income (wage) was 960 yuan, i.e. 106 yuan per head a year. Subsistence production consisted only of milk and milk products, no meat, no winter-stock and no wool. (If we assume ten sheep as the necessary winterstock for meat, they would have to be bought, which, considering the family income, is practically impossible since the price for one sheep is 80 yuan and 10×80=800 yuan.) Therefore, they also had to rely on selling ayran and qurt to tourists. An additional income from the rental of a horse may amount to 100-150 yuan per year. Thus the estimated total annual income may amount to 1,100 yuan a year, i.e. per capita 122 yuan a year. But there were also debts and fees to pay, such as the interest and repayment of credit for the purchase of a Mongol tent. School fees amounted to 180 yuan a year.

Example 2:
The household consisted of 5 people, i.e. 2 adults and 3 children. Again, no large herds were kept. The monetary annual income was 1,200 yuan, i.e. 240 yuan/head. The income per head was much higher than in example 1. Subsistence production consisted of milk and milk products, mainly from two cows and a little meat from a small flock. The meat purchase for winterstock is estimated at 4 sheep or 320 yuan (4×80 yuan). The additional income from tourism is estimated at 100 yuan.

Example 3:
The household consisted of 6 people, i.e. 5 adults and 1 child. The sales of slaughtered animals (80 yuan each) amounted to 800 yuan, the sales of fleece to 1,100 yuan. The monetary annual income therefore was 1,800 yuan, i.e. a per capita income of 300 a year. Subsistence production here consisted of milk, milk products, meat, winterstock, merino-wool, goat hair etc. The level of self-sustenance was higher than in example 1 and 2 as was the monetary income.

Example 4:
The household consisted of 6 people, 2 adults and 4 children. Sales of fleece amounted to 1,400 yuan, sales of medical herbs to 500 yuan, sales of slaughtered animals to 640 yuan, and the sale of a tent’s frame to 300 yuan. The total monetary annual income amounted to 2,840, i.e. 473 yuan per capita. The subsistence production consisted of milk and milk products, meat and wool (also qi’zi’l qoy wool). Additional income was made from animals kept for others. Here a high level of self-sustenance is combined with a relatively high monetary income.
The possible financial burdens were:

- expenditures for tea, sugar, cloth, shoes
- animal husbandry tax
- wheat purchases (about 1,200 kg per family a year)
- purchase of hay and fodder
- school fees
- repayments of credits
- purchases of qi'zi'l qoy wool
- brideprices (about 2,000 yuan, gifts not included. Brideprices for daughters of high district cadres can amount to 20,000 yuan.)

A family with a very low monetary income and without a sufficient stock of animals faces problems making a living. If about 40 sheep are owned together with a few horses and cows, this might be barely sufficient to secure an adequate level of self-sustenance. If animals are the only source of income it would be inadequate. Additional income from tourism, etc. would have to be earned. Herdsmen having a fairly large flock of 60–100 sheep with some additional income from other employment are better off. Sales of slaughter animals and fleece, together with a high degree of subsistence production, may on the whole secure a satisfactory level of income.

Excerpts from an official report on the Sangong awil give the following account: Sangong awil, the former Sangong People’s Commune, has a population of about 2,000 people. In the past it had been one of the poorest minority xiang/awil in the Fukang district. In 1980 the annual income per person was only 57 yuan. Since 1984 the flocks were concentrated in the hands of 112 herdsman families (formerly the animals were cared for by 309 families) and a system of specialized herding was introduced. These 112 families represent only 40% of the labour force; the remaining 60% of the labour force had to find other jobs since they no longer had access to their traditional pastures and therefore could no longer do pastoral work. As we have seen, they are still owners of a flock, but cannot herd these flocks themselves. This ‘surplus‘ labour force was reallocated work in tillage, industry and other employment.

It is not known how many people have remained ‘jobless‘ and what difficulties they might have facing the change to a proletarian way of life.

29. Cf. Li Jingui et al. op.cit., p. 25 on Mongol herdsmen in Inner Mongolia.
There are 17 enterprises in the awil engaging in coal mining, ore mining, transport, and building. In addition, within the tourism business tents and horses are rented and people work as alpine guides or in restaurants, etc. The income per head was raised to 302 yuan in 1985. According to another source it rose by 70 yuan per person in 1985 alone. According to these accounts, 76.2% of the production of the awil is produced in these industrial or state enterprises. (I assume that the subsistence production of the herdsmen and private trade/exchange with animals etc. is not reflected in the statistics.)

In 1985 revenues from all state enterprises and trades in Sangong xiang amounted to 2,028,000 yuan. Of this, 654,000 yuan came from animal husbandry. From profits realized the awil-government was able to pay for shack building, relief funds, school expenses, cadre wages, etc.

Economically as well as ecologically the role of the Xinjiang merino is new among the Kazaks. The Xinjiang merino was first recognized as a separate breed in 1954, after breeding experiments in the 1940s were made between Kazak and Mongol sheep on one hand and Russian merinos on the other. It has spread quickly ever since. This breeding is oriented towards commodity production and less towards subsistence. Yields of fleece and meat are equally high, but the fleece cannot be used by the Kazaks for their traditional production of felt. Since the Kazaks have to sell this fleece, their monetary income has become higher than that from breeding Kazak qizil qoy. But the material basis for felt production as a handicraft and as an integral part of their way of life, (i.e. the production of felt for the tents, for sirmaq-carpets, etc.) has been considerably attenuated. The declining availability of felt-material from which many of the yurts were made can be blamed on the scarcity of qizil qoy and their wool. My personal impression was also that merinos are less sturdy than the qizil qoy.

The Role of Cattle

Kazaks are often characterized as mounted nomads with sheep as the primary herd animal. On the northern slope of the Bogda, however, the ex-

34. A comprehensive monograph on the Xinjiang merino is Xinjiang ximaoyang [The Fine Wool Sheep of Xinjiang]. The Uighur version was available to me, Xinjiang inčikä yongluq qoyi. Ürümqi 1982.
traordinary importance of cattle is striking. During summer and parts of
spring and autumn, cows provide the families with their basic food, viz.
milk, *ayran*, butter and *qurt*. The cattle fall within the scope of women's
duties, since the housewife does the milking and processing of the milk.
The cattle do not stray far away from the tent. Since there are no camels in
Sangong aw'il, cattle are also used for transport.

If we compare the role of the horse to that of the cattle, the latter is of
much greater importance within the whole life-process of the family. The
horse only serves as a means of transport, and, occasionally, for *kumyss-*
production. Thus, it is rather more a part of life for the male side of the
family. The women, bound to the tent, are more sedentary. The men in
contrast keep in touch with the neighbours and make the necessary pur-
chases. In many families we visited, the husband was absent. If there is not
a sufficient number of cows to provide the family with milk and milk-prod-
ucts, sheep or goats had to be the primary means of sustenance. *Kumyss* is
no longer a basic food element. Kazak families on the northern slope may
be classified as sheep (goat) and cattle breeders with horses used as a
means of transport. Possibly this shift towards cattle breeding reflects the
limited pastoral resources, the increasing sedentarization, and the increas-
ing agricultural activity among the Kazaks of the aw'il.35 Goats were the
main herd animal in three of twenty families visited. Goats are presumably
less profitable because they provide 50% less meat than the sheep and no
fleece. But these disadvantages are compensated for by greater sturdiness,
a higher percentage of twin births (fairly rare among the sheep) and a good
yield of milk.

**Diet**

The daily diet consists of two fixed meals: breakfast and the main meal in
the evening between 10 p.m. and midnight. Other lighter meals are taken
irregularly.

The breakfast consists of salted milk tea, small pieces of dough baked in
grease, called *bawirsak*, dried curd (*qurt*) and flat bread; sometimes butter
is also offered. Milk products may consist of cows', goats' or sheep's milk
(separate or mixed). The taste and colour of the *qurt* depends on the type
of milk used and the peculiarities of processing. This basic meal is also
offered between meals as a late breakfast, sometimes at noon, in the after-

35. A.M. Khazanov says that a larger share of cattle breeding is a sign of sedentarization and
of extended agricultural production. See A.M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside
noon, evening or at the arrival of a guest. Main elements of such meals are milk tea and wheat products such as flat bread and bawirsak; these two elements are never missing. Kazaks do not always eat qurt, and butter especially is rather a delicacy. Qurt also has the character of a delicacy and is not often given to children.

Variations of these irregularly taken meals, which I have experienced, were as follows:

- cool milk (cooked and not yet sour), qurt, butter, flat bread
- milk tea with millet baked in an open fire, pieces of cold sheep’s gut, flat bread; sugared tea, (bought) dates and apricots (for lunch)
- milk tea and flat bread
- sheep’s offal, meat warmed up only slightly, flat bread and milk tea (during the evening)
- rectangular flat cake baked in grease called sälpäq, milk tea, and qurt
- small round flat cake baked in grease, called kiškene
- good quality wheat without the chaff, roasted on the fire in a pot, eaten with or without butter together with milk tea and bawîrsaq

Before the main meal late at night milk tea with qurt and flat bread is eaten as a kind of appetizer towards 9 p.m.

During my stay I ate the following main meals:

- sheep’s head, gut, sheep’s stomach, pancreas, sheep’s legs, all boiled; afterwards the broth in which the meat was boiled was offered
- lamian, i.e. wheat dough flattened and made into a roll, then cut into irregular broad strips, and finally cooked and eaten with hot salty milk
- short but large noodles made from a rolled-out dough, cut, cooked and eaten with cold milk and some bawîrsaq
- rice with mutton and sheep’s gut, called palaw
- rice with hot milk

Beef from recently slaughtered animals is apparently eaten only in autumn or winter. Certainly, in summer such a large amount of meat could not be preserved. The summer diet is largely lacto-vegetarian, with wheat

36. Zheng Chengjia. op.cit. gives a very valuable description on Kazak food habits in the Barköl district.
products, tea and milk as the central ingredients. Meat is only eaten in small amounts (5–10% of the whole diet). In 1886 Seeland estimated the daily consumption of meat to amount to 200 g/day. However, during my stay such an amount was consumed only at a feast. Seeland adds:

"Quant à la viande, la plupart des Kirghis [Kirghiz and Kazaks] en mangent peu. Les bœufs et les chevaux n’abondent pas. Un rôti de cheval, quoique objet des gourmandise est une rareté. La viande ordinairement consommée est celle des moutons."

He points out that only the rich herdsmen were able to eat meat every day. Because of the unequally distributed property, the majority of the Kazaks were not in a position to slaughter more animals. The basic food was millet and other cereals as well as milk-products. Ayran and kumyss were only consumed during the hot season. In winter they ate groats, millet and flour cakes. At that time tea was an esteemed delicacy. The Kazaks in the Sangong awil said that eating a lot of meat makes one age earlier.

**Festive Occasions among the Kazaks**

Festive occasions can be the visit of a group of cadres from Urumchi, from the district or awil administration, a party-conference or, in the case described below, a demonstration of gratitude. In this case a Kazak family expressed their thanks to their neighbours for their spontaneous help when a storm had blown down two old fir trees upon their tent.

A sheep was slaughtered and divided into pieces. The men, i.e. the husband and the best friends of the family, brought two big kettles of salted water to a boil. As soon as the water was boiling they put muscle meat into one pot and mixed muscle meat with offal in the other. Later, a third pot of water was brought to a boil, and used to cook rice. The first grey cooking foam was skimmed off. After about 45–60 minutes the meat at the bottom of the kettle was moved to the top. The meat was boiled for about two hours. During this time the guests arrived one by one. A group of women, together with the housewife, baked quadrangular pieces of dough – šälpaq.

Since more than 40 people had to be entertained, they had to eat in two tents. The old and young men were served in one, the women and girls together with the little children in another. Before sitting down on the floor, one had to wash one’s hands with water. The tent, where the men were having the feast, received a big tray with pieces of meat, offal, the

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sheep's head and rice. The eldest, an Uighur friend of the family, took the sheep head, cut off a little piece, removed the ears and gave them to the children. Then he passed the head over to his neighbours. Everybody ate meat, offal and rice with their hands. Later the hands were washed again. Then soup, tea (without milk), little biscuits and šalpāq were served. Only when the guests had finished eating their meat and rice could the hosts and their children start to eat. After the meal the guests returned to their tents.

The Preparation of Food and its Instruments

Nan (flat-bread)
Wheat-flour, water, a little salt and preserved yeast are mixed, kneaded and then kept warm. A little piece of the fermented dough is always kept for the next day. The rest of the dough is kneaded again, rolled out into a round, flat shape bread and put into the greased pan. The pan is covered with a sheet of metal and put into the hot ashes outside or inside the tent. The metal sheet is also covered with ashes. After 15–20 minutes the bread is ready to be taken out of the pan and to be cooled. The girls do this job. Kazaks, who spend each summer at the same place near the lake, form a little āwil, and bake their bread in a commonly shared oven, similar to the Uighur bread oven. When the oven is hot, fermented dough is moistened and glued to the hot innerwall of the brick-kiln. This method is only worthwhile when several families bake bread in the same kiln at the same time. But normally only two pieces of bread with a weight of about 500 g each are baked per family per day or every two days.

Ayran, Butter, and Qurt

All these products can be processed from cow, goat or sheep milk; these different kinds of milk can be taken by themselves or mixed together. Ayran, butter and qurt are simply three different stages of one and the same process.

After milking, the milk is filtered, poured into a kettle and boiled for a short time. The milk slowly cools down to a temperature of about 25° C, then 200 g of sour milk, ayran, is added and this mixture is covered with a lid. Its temperature may not fall below 20° C. After four hours this mixture has developed into ayran and is poured into the milk-sack. It remains in the milk-sack for 3–4 days, until enough ayran has been collected to make qurt and butter. From time to time the ayran inside the milk-sack has to be stirred. Temperatures must be kept constant between 25–30°. In the evening the milk-sack is taken inside the tent. Under conditions of cold weath-
er it must be covered and kept warm, or, if necessary, the content must be warmed up in a kettle. The Kazaks consume ayran, but I did not see this very often. At the Heavenly Lake it is sold to tourists as a refreshing drink or meal.

After 3–4 days the butter is churned with a butter pestle, a job that takes 3–4 hours. Women, girls and boys all take their turns at this task. Finally, the butter floats on top of the fluid and is taken out. The butter must be washed 6–7 times with fresh water, then it is salted and kept in an earthen vessel.

The remaining skim-milk ayran is the basic material for producing qurt. It is poured into a big kettle and cooked for 2–3 hours, usually in the afternoon over a small fire. It is stirred slowly. The fluid becomes lumpy. After cooking, the whole content is poured into a coarse woolen bag, through which the liquid can flow while the solid components are held back within the bag. All this happens outside the tent where the bag hangs between two short pegs rammed into the earth. Over night the bag remains outside the tent and by the next morning a fairly solid lump of moist qurt has deposited itself at the bottom of the bag. In the morning the housewife divides this lump into small pieces. These are then spread on a mat made of šiy (Achnatherum splendens), and lifted onto a rack of boughs about 1.60–1.80 m. off the ground. The qurt is dried partly by ventilation and partly by the sun. The drying process continues over three or more days depending on the weather conditions. At night the qurt is put back into a bag, stored in the tent and then spread out anew the next morning. Finally, the dried qurt is stored in a little bag inside the tent.

During each meal, e.g. breakfast or in-between ‘snacks’ with milk-tea, a Kazak man or woman consumes between 0–2 pieces of qurt per meal, each weighing about 50 g, so that an adult consumes between 150 and 300 g of qurt per day. Children receive qurt as a special treat and they are not allowed to serve themselves freely. The children of friends or relatives are often given several pieces of qurt as a present.

Older qurt becomes very hard and can hardly be chewed, so that it must be dipped in tea. Butter is a delicacy too. Since it accrues only in small quantities it is only served on special occasions. Butter is drunk in the tea, or eaten together with bread, bawirsaq or with qurt.

Mare’s Milk

The mares at the kumyss-farm near Heavenly Lake were bound to a long rope. Their foals were fastened near them. Every two hours they were milked, i.e. 8 times per day. About 3–5 kg of milk per day were obtained from each mare. During the night the foals were allowed to drink and the mares could graze freely. Three people were required to do the milking. A boy released the foal from the long rope and let it suck at the udder just for a moment. Then, the foal was taken away and attached by its halter to the rope again. Meanwhile the milker, usually a woman, had started milking, while a third person, usually a man, kept the mare calm holding its neck with a rope. With certain mares he had to prevent them from kicking with their left hind legs. In doing so he uttered soothing sounds such as: “uru”, “zou-zou”. The women, half-kneeling, milked 350–600 ml. of milk into a small tin bucket. By the end of July the kumyss family had moved to the southern end of the lake where the grass cover had diminished so far that they had to let the mares off the rope throughout the day.

On the first day the mares’ milk is poured into a big milk-bag attached to the sun-lit southern side of the yurt. On the second day the kumyss seemed to be ready to drink. I could not ascertain whether the milk had fermented for three or four days before it was drunk as, for example, Zheng mentions in his account.1

The kumyss must be stirred all the time, otherwise it begins to curdle and loses its taste. While we were drinking our kumyss the husband constantly stirred the kumyss with a scoop to prevent it from curdling. Kazaks from the surrounding area came to fetch kumyss in big plastic containers, or they came into the yurt of the kumyss-producing family to have a drink. The family I visited complained that many people did not pay for being served. Here specialization and monetarization are in conflict with the traditional right to hospitality.

In the heat of the day the drinking of kumyss has a cooling effect on the body and “opens up” the stomach, according to information given by some of the Kazaks. Drinking huge amounts of kumyss is still regarded as very masculine.

On the whole the significance of mares’ milk as a basic dietary element has diminished in the Bogda range.2

The Role of the Women

The woman is the centre of the family within the yurt, kiygiz üy. She takes care of the children, she prepares and processes the food. Milking the animals is her task. The production of felt, the manufacture of ropes and webbings for the yurt from wool, goats’ or calves’ hair, the spinning of wool, and the manufacture of the Kazaks felt carpets, called sirmaq, are part of her duty. She puts up the frame of the kiygiz üy and covers it with the felt, often without any help from the men.\(^{43}\)

She embroiders curtains and cushions, sews the beds and the covers filled with cotton, produces the šiy-mats and winds coloured wool around the šiy-sticks.

According to Wu, when the family moves from one place to another, the transportation work is also her responsibility. For example, she does the loading and unloading of the animals and the driving of the herd.\(^{44}\)

All this happens without haste in a silent, continual flow of activity. Sometimes what we would consider labour seems to them to be a pastime, e.g. when two women of the same awil come together after breakfast and after the first clean-up of the yurt to have a chat and to spin a bit of wool. The women seldom just sit around and talk without doing anything.

Compared to the role of the women, the men’s work seems less significant. They are responsible for the herd and take care of the sheep and goats together with teenage children who assist them. They have to look for lost animals and to work on the adobe house, the stables and the pens. The clipping of the sheep is a man’s job, still done by hand. The man builds the frame of the yurt, but usually the most difficult parts of the task are done by specialists. Other male activities are specialized handicap like furniture construction, saddlery, and ironwork. Agricultural work, too, is men’s work. Nonetheless, there is much cooperation and mutual help between the sexes in some families, though not in all.

Crafts

I was able to observe only the production of ropes from goats’ hair, the weaving of webbings, spinning and some stages of sirmaq-manufacturing.

Other craft-type jobs are the construction of adobe houses, winter log cabins, fences and stables for the winter. Some of the numerous wooden


\(^{44}\) Wu Yonggang, op.cit., p. 89. Cf. N. Seeland, op.cit., p. 89.
items made by the men are small items of furniture, tools or utensils such as batter bowls, baking boards, low tables, dough rollers, mortar and pestle, boxes studded with metal or painted, transport saddles for the cattle, milk pails, and feeding troughs, etc.\textsuperscript{45}

The Conditions on the Southern Slope of the Bogda Range

In order to show the strong adaptation of the Kazak culture to changing local conditions, I would like to give a short account of the impression I got while crossing the Bogda range from the north (Heavenly Lake) to the south from July 29th to August 1st. During this ride I was able to gain insight into the farming and pastoral area of the Animal Husbandry Farm "Tianshan", operated by Kazak families.

From the southern end of Heavenly Lake the path continues a bit to the south, then turns east into the valley of the Dadonggou river. This valley leads southeast, then bends south. Here the last Kazak tents were to be seen at an approximate altitude of 3,000 m. Crossing the pass under good weather conditions is not difficult. One kilometer further south the western flank of the Bogda peaks extends 2,000 m upwards; here it became harder to find our way and to push or pull the horses up and down paths of stoney rubble and debris.\textsuperscript{46} Further on the way was marked by cairns.

On the southern slope, the Sarsayden River\textsuperscript{47} valley and its surroundings are only used in the month of July as a summer pasture. The first people we met were Chinese glaciologists from Lanzhou, who spent the summer there doing field-work. They said that since their arrival nobody had crossed the Gurban-Bogda pass in either direction. It seems like there is hardly any contact between the people on the northern slopes of the Bogda main peaks and the people of the southern slope. The grass here as everywhere further south was extremely short and the slopes of the valley showed only a very sparse vegetation, at least in comparison to Merzbacher's description, which mentions a rich and beautiful alpine flora in the valleys at an altitude of about 3,200 m.\textsuperscript{48}

For this reason the Kazaks in the upper valley of the Sarsayden River were about to move their camps. The first yurt we saw was at an altitude of about 3,000 m. It was of the simple kiygiz ýy-type without latticework.

\textsuperscript{45} Hasake minjian tuan ji\textsuperscript{[A Collection of the Kazak Folk Art Designs]}, Ürümqi 1980, gives an impression of the possible scope of Kazak material culture in China.

\textsuperscript{46} Cf. Gottfried Merzbacher, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 161ff. 182ff.

\textsuperscript{47} Kazak toponyme. Gottfried Merzbacher, \textit{op.cit.}, gives the name as "Gurban-Bogdo".

\textsuperscript{48} Gottfried Merzbacher, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 183.
Three herdsmen were living there on the eastern bank of the river. On the western bank there was another dwelling, an adobe shelter, where two other men lived.

The herdsmen’s mode of living is very simple. They have no milk or milk-products because there are neither cattle nor women. Their meals consist only of bread, tea and meat, but even so their hospitality was very warm. Immediately upon our arrival, a lamb was slaughtered and cooked.

The Kazaks here told me that only last year the herds of the Animal Husbandry Farm had been redivided among the members of the Farm. Each family received 300 merino sheep including lambs. The families own the usufruct of the herd (wool and lambs) while the stock of ewes and rams are still state property. Now the herdsmen are able to earn an average income of about 2,500 yuan per family per year. In 1985 they did not receive any wages from the State Farm. Formerly they were paid a monthly wage of between 50–120 yuan per month which amounted only to 600–1,440 yuan a year. In July I could see the flocks of 12 families being
grazed, altogether 3,600 sheep, in the upper part of the Sarsayden-river valley.

Here on the southern slope of the Bogda the collective traits of animal husbandry were still recognizable: several families join together to do the pastoral work. Further south we also came across some traditional camps with individual families. The yurts had wooden lattice frameworks. The women and children moved together with the men. Compared to the northern slope the landscape is much more open, the distances between inhabited points are longer, the vegetation less rich, and huge flocks are herded on horse-back. There are no cattle on these mountain pastures. The camel is an important transport animal. The cycle of nomadic movements differs from that of the northern slope. Summer pastures at an altitude between 2,500 and 3,200 m are used for only 3–4 weeks in July, then the camps are moved into the gobi (gravel desert) at an altitude of about 1,000 m. In autumn, grazing takes place in the harvested fields of the agricultural part of the state-farm and in the ameliorated pastures which are close to the centre of the state-farm at an altitude of about 1,000–1,600 m. The winter-camps, set up during the months December to March, are situated in an intermediate position between 1,600–2,300 m on the warm, sunlit slopes east or west of the Sarsayden river valley. The division of labour between the Kazaks doing agricultural work and those working as herdsmen is clearly marked. Some Kazaks said they preferred being agriculturalists, partly because they had become accustomed to peasant life, and partly also because spending the severe winters in a tent was very hard to endure. Another reason given was that they did not own a tent or other necessary 'tools' to do pastoral work. Rahmêt, who was my guide for two days on the southern slope, cultivates 20 mu of peas which are used as fodder. His relatives, working as herdsmen, graze the 300 sheep allotted to him among the others. Money is used to settle accounts. Rahmêt himself would prefer to work as a herdsman. He wants to return to the traditional mode of Kazak life, which is quite possible under the now prevailing political conditions. He owns a very solidly built adobe house with two rooms, but at the time he was also constructing a kiygiz üy frame. He owns two horses, two cows and a camel together with the 300 sheep mentioned above.

Land use encompasses nine zones between the Gurban-Bogda pass and Xigou — the southernmost Kazak settlement.49

1. 3,800–3,200 m Alpine stone desert with narrow V-shaped valleys, rubble accumulations; from 3,400 to 3,200 m the landscape is partly marshy, partly dry with scanty pasture vegetation, very short due to grazing.

2. At an altitude of 3,200 m the valleys widen and the grass cover is scanty or well developed depending on contact with groundwater or rivers. Higher up on valley slopes the vegetation is extremely sparse. It becomes denser, forming fine green strips in small erosion channels where the precipitation flows off on the surface. Slopes and valleys are intensively interspersed with rubble.

3. At altitudes between 2,300–1,000 m winter camps are situated. We passed a solid house, where a Kazak family spends the winter. There was a fold for the animals nearby. Vegetation is slightly meager but still seems to thrive on the sunlit southern slopes when there is enough precipitation.

4. Between 1,800 and 2,000 m the river divides into different branches; at the fords these branches are about 1.20–1.30 m deep. In the non-irrigated parts of this region the desert vegetation is predominant. Where rivulets or small artificial channels transport water to dense grass covers, poplars and willows grow to form tiny oases amidst the desert. Here we met a family with wife and children living on such a green irrigated patch, an idyllic scene in strikingly contrast with the surrounding desert.

5. Only a bit further south at about 1,600 m we came across the first ameliorated pastures and a few fields. These are irrigated by little channels leading away from the river. Here the soil was still interspersed with debris. Wheat was planted in some of the more favourable places. These pastures and hay-crop areas were first cleared and leveled during the Cultural Revolution. The main job was to remove the rocks and to dig the small canals. No seeds had been sown, according to the information I got. The alfalfa had apparently spread out spontaneously. The agricultural teams of the state-farm were working hard to bring in the hay, which is cut once a year. The Kazaks still cut the hay by hand with scythes, then bind it together into sheaves. The smell of *Artemisia* filled the air. Even here the water of the river still had a milky white colour and was not very suitable for irrigated wheat cultivation on account of its hardness. Barley was not cultivated either. Irrigation methods are simple and not very efficient. Waterlogged patches with sorrel were scattered everywhere. The covering rate of these ameliorated meadows is still quite sparse, each plant growing at a distance of 5–7 cm from each other. The Kazaks cut the grass at a height of 5–7 cm, leaving the lower part of the plant for grazing.
6. The centre of the state-farm is situated at about 1,300 m. Adobe houses stand in straight rows. Immediately north and south of this settlement the most intensively cultivated fields are to be found; peas, wheat and alfalfa are planted among oats, which grow wild. The landscape and the architecture resemble that of the Sangong valley, but the whole settlement is arranged geometrically, rather following Chinese construction principles.
The individual houses have little ‘gardens’ – like those of interior China, which are enclosed by fences made of branches. These gardens are not used for vegetable or flower cultivation, but for sheltering the animals. In the centre of the settlement there is also a small shop.

7. South of these zones lies the Sarsayden River delta which nurtures a splendid riparian forest. The Sarsayden then turns west and falls out into several branches. The forest seems perfectly untouched and has a rich variety of forms: groves with poplars, willows, and a few elm trees, meadows with sorrel and *Artemisia*, boggy areas, and also some smaller cultivated areas where wheat and horse-beans are grown. At the fords the river has a depth of 1.20–1.30 m. Rahmêt lived in a little Kazak settlement 4 km west of the centre of the state-farm, at the northern fringe of the virgin forest. His adobe house, built in 1973, had walls 70 cm thick. His wife and the children sleep in one room, he and his brother in another. For the meals we sat down on a wooden platform similar to a *kang*.

Rahmêt also had a “real” garden. I saw onions, carrots and sunflowers growing there. The camel strolled around the house and bellowed mournfully.

8. South of this area of abundant vegetation, the *gobi* begins abruptly, and the water ceases after draining into the debris. A well developed xerophytic semi-shrub vegetation about 50 cm high, grows here. On the banks of smaller brooks, which gradually dwindle as they flow along, elms and different kinds of grass are growing. Distances seem huge and the landscape very barren.

9. This last zone begins in the northern Kazak production brigade of Xi-gou. Fertile pastures with horse and cattle raising are interspersed with agriculture on irrigated fields of wheat (mixed with wild oats), alfalfa, horse-beans, rape and potatoes. The fields are often framed by lopped elms (*Ulmus pumila*). Elm leaves are an important fodder for sheep, camels and cattle. In the small Kazak settlement, houses are spacious and have little courtyards.

The main village of Xigou, 2–3 km south, is home to Han Chinese and Hui peasants.

Discussion

Repercussions from the interventions and the impact of the Party and the

50. Further south in Xigou these platforms were made of adobe, as in Uighur houses or in China proper: *sirmaq* carpets were spread over it.
government can be felt everywhere, on the northern slope as well as on the southern slope. The loosening of state control and a return to private care, private responsibility and private usufruct of the flocks and herds is perhaps only a more efficient way of arriving at a compromise of mutual economic benefit between the herders and the state. It is also a reaction to the exaggerated demands put on the herders during the Cultural Revolution. It seems to me that the ownership system is not private and exploitation remains under the control of the government. In a certain sense the situation in 1985 even marked a step further into state ownership of the herds. The People's Communes have never been a form of state ownership. Even when they were very strictly guided and controlled by the Party it was a system of collective ownership. In 1985 the flocks of adult animals were said to be state-owned because the People's Communes do not exist anymore. In fact, as of 1985 there existed an odd and diffuse conception of mixed ownership, that divides the herds in two groups and assigns to each a different form of property. On one hand there is adult animal stock which was "expropriated" by the state but put back into the hands of a certain number of herders (that have access to pastoral resources) for care. On the other hand are the offspring of these animals, which are considered to be privately owned. In January 1986 this uncertain situation became "clear". In 90% of all animal-husbandry areas in Xinjiang the herds have been evaluated in monetary terms and the herders, to whom the "state" herds had been handed over, had become debtors to the state. They are expected to pay back the cost of "their own" herd within ten to fifteen years (on top of paying animal husbandry tax and a grassland fee). So the expropriation of the former collectives (People's Communes) by the state has now been given a monetary expression. The monetary returns from these liabilities were supposed to be invested in the improvement of the animal husbandry infrastructure and can not be transferred to other fields of investment or expenditure. The individual herdsman families were made responsible for the maintenance of the pastures. The wool price was "adjusted", that is, lowered. 70% of the fleece has to be sold to the state, and 30% can be sold on the free market or used for self-consumption.

For those families able to remain herdspeople, the situation has certain-

51. Tömür Dawamat. "Jinyibu luoshi zhengce, jixun shenru gaige, tuidong nongcun jingji chixu wending xiediao fazhan (Zai Zizhiqu dangwei nongcun gongzuo huiyi shang de baogao)" [Step by step carry out policy, continue further reforms and improve steadily, solidly and harmoniously the expansion of the rural economy (Report given to a conference on work in the countryside of the Autonomous Region's Party Committee)]. Xinjiang Ribao, February 20, 1986, pp. 1–2.
ly improved. But the majority of families in the Sangong awil have been pushed out of their pastoral work and, consequently, their traditional way of life. They cannot keep up with the newly introduced pattern of specialized division of labour. But, here two separate tendencies seem to come together: on the one hand there is the guidance of the state towards a highly effective, commodity-producing, surplus-producing sector of the provincial and national economy, viz. animal husbandry; on the other hand, there is the growth of the Kazak population vis-à-vis the limited availability of pastoral resources. There is certainly an ulterior aim pursued by the state since 1949, i.e. to pressure the Kazaks into sedentary life and thereby abandon their original cultural identity. This kind of treatment of nomadic minorities is not peculiar to the Chinese government.

Another development which expedites cultural disintegration is tourism. The first sign of this process can be readily observed at Heavenly Lake. The access road, which was just widened in 1985, literally and metaphorically cuts deep into the pastoral landscape.

In 1985 I could compare the two forms of life, viz. that of the Kazaks and that of Han Chinese working on two building sites near the lake and on the new road leading up to the lake. On the one hand I could see the Kazaks surrounded by their animals and nature, self-confidently producing their own food and reproducing their own means of subsistence. On the other hand I watched the Han Chinese toiling, sweating and suffering at jobs that in comparison seemed dull and alienating. From this, one can imagine what it means to a Kazak to become a worker and to be pushed out of his own traditional way of life.

Most of the Kazak young people will have to take up a job, study or do something outside their traditional way of life. The Kazak people as a whole is divided into those who try to keep their traditional way of life despite the pressure of the state, and the growing portion who work at part time jobs in restaurants or as guides or at full-time jobs as government employees, teachers, industrial workers or cadres. The suicide of a young Kazak, who drowned himself in a drunken condition not far from the tent where I lived, probably gave expression to these social contradictions and to the loss of identity; that particular young man had worked in a yurt restaurant on the lake’s shore.

Concerning the dwindling natural resource base of the pastoral economy, I ask myself the question whether the shrinking of the pastoral resources, especially of the winter and spring pastures which are situated in the piedmont plains of Xinjiang, poses a real threat to Kazak, Kirghiz or Mongol nomadism/semi-nomadism in Xinjiang. Herdsmen in Sangong
awil denied that the shrinking of pastoral areas due to the expansion of farmland on the southern fringe of the Dzungarian basin was a severe problem for them. However, concerning Xinjiang as a whole, the figures of animals which perished, and figures of deteriorated or opened up pastures seem, on the contrary, to imply that there is a problem at hand. Between 1950 and 1979, for instance, 62,570,000 head of cattle perished and only 47,070,000 animals were sold to the state. Often three years are necessary for the herds to recover from the severe winters. Since 1949, 3.4 million hectares of grassland have been lost in the process of opening up new agricultural land; a further 4.7 million hectares of grassland have deteriorated due to sand encroachment, salinization and soil degradation.

Another aspect of the increasing destruction of the pastoral resources is shown by the following accounts. In the years before 1984, 1.5 million hectares of wild liquorice were destroyed because the plants were dug out by the root, sold and exported to China proper or to foreign countries.

Janabil [Jianabur] describes the development of the pastoral resources since 1949 as follows:

Xinjiang has large pastoral areas, but the seasonal division of pastoral resources is unbalanced. There are fewer pastures for the cold season than for the warm season and the carrying capacity of winter pastures is lower than that of summer pastures by about 50%. Besides, since liberation the number of cattle has increased by more than 150%, but the grassland area has decreased by more than 50,000,000 mu [3.3 million hectares], sand encroachment, salinization and degradation have affected another 70,000,000 mu [4.7 million hectares], insects and rodents harmed about 200,000 mu [13.3 million hectares]. Therefore, the carrying capacity has decreased. Whole mowing areas have been opened up for agriculture...

This proves that the pastoral economy, expressed by the number of animals, has increased beyond its natural resource base, which is constantly dwindling.


54. Hou Xueyu, op.cit., p. 3.

Yan and Fen give the following account of the actual state of the grassland in Xinjiang for about the time of 1984–1985:

Table 2. Actual state of the grassland in Xinjiang 1984–85.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential grazing area</th>
<th>warm season</th>
<th>cold season</th>
<th>spring/autumn</th>
<th>whole year</th>
<th>mowing area</th>
<th>total area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 Million mu</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Expressed in million hectare]</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>carrying capacity (10,000 sheep)</td>
<td>5.500</td>
<td>3.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the light of the increasing number of animals it is easy to understand the growing imbalance, if one realizes that 3.3–3.4 million hectares of the best winter pasture areas have been lost during the land reclamation campaigns. It should be pointed out that the figures given by Yan and Fen, do not even reflect the quality let alone the availability of the grass cover. Considering the lacking grass production rate in winter, the figure for the cold season actually needs to be much higher than that for the warm season. Furthermore, the carrying capacity of spring and autumn pastures is also lower than that of the summer pastures due to the fact that they are used shortly after or before the growth period of the vegetation. This seems to add to the deficit. In Sangong awil even the summer pasture was not sufficient and showed signs of overgrazing.56

The size of the flocks decreases between spring and beginning of winter by about 25–30% (see reproduction scheme above).

One of the most striking examples of the transformation occurring within the extensively used Kazak pastoral land is the establishment of the state-farm complex in the Manas-Shihezi region. The transformation as a whole, including the drying up of the Manas River’s lower reaches and its

56. According to the Kazaks the productivity of the pastures around Heavenly Lake had decreased considerably in the last decades.
natural lakes, comprises an area of about 20,000 km², and this in a region
where, up to 1949, only 16,000 hectares had been intensively cultivated by
peasants. Now 300,000 hectares of crop-land have been reclaimed. Of
these, 250,000 hectares are cultivated. The Kazaks have become marginal-
ized but are integrated into the whole state farm system as herdsmen. The
state farm No. 151 in the foothill region is inhabited mainly by Kazaks who
still perform the traditional transhumance process between the summer
pastures in the mountains and the winter pastures in the Dzungarian basin.
But the area as a whole has been transformed into an agricultural "produc-
tion base" in the hands of the Chinese Production and Construction
Corps.  

The essay presented here is only a preliminary approach to a description
of the whole ethnographical complex of Kazak pastoral society. It would
have been preferable not to divide this complex as a whole into the various
rubrics such as "animal husbandry", "habits", "social structure", "history",
etc. For the Kazaks living in the Sangong awil life is certainly more
than "a distinct form of food producing economy," 58 or only an ingeniously
adapted form of animal husbandry. If we are to understand the spiritual
and emotional qualities of this form of life, then its literature, poetry, mu-
sic, and art may tell us much more about this complex society than the
material discussed here. Finally, it would also be necessary to know more
about the fate of the large portion of Kazaks living in the village settle-
ments and cities today.

57. Personal communication Dirk Betke 1987; Cf. George Moseley. A Sino-Soviet Cultural
58. A.M. Khazanov, op.cit.
GLOSSARY

(K. = Kazak; Ch. = Chinese)

awil (K.) – nomadic camp; administrative unit equivalent to xiang
ayran (K.) – sour milk
aymaq (K.) – district, in Chinese qu
bawīrsaq (K.) – fried bread in small pieces
bao jia (Ch.) – administrative system by organizing the units on a series of ten
didi (Ch.) – lit. “little brother”, Chinese term in the political rhet used for ethnic minorities
kang (Ch.) – heatable brick bed
kiygiz үү (K.) – yurt
köktew (K.) – spring pasture
minzu (Ch.) – nationality
onbasi (K.-) – administrative leader, head of ten households
qūmū (K.-) – fermented mares’ milk
qızıl qoy (K.) – fattailed sheep
qurt (K.) – dried curd
sirmaq (K.) – Kazak felt carpet
šälpaq (K.) – a kind of fried bread
taźi (K.) – Kazak leader
uru (K.) – lineage
xiang (Ch.) – small administrative unit, township
xian (Ch.) – County
xiaoshu minzu (Ch.) – minority nationality
yiyi zhiyi (Ch.) – “to divide and rule”
yuan – Chinese currency
ţaylaw (K.) – summer pasture
zhou (Ch.) – Prefecture
zizhiqu (Ch. – Autonomous Region
ţüzbsi (K.) – administrative leader, head of hundred households
This bibliography includes only the more important works on the Kazaks and especially the Kazaks of China. Full references to this book are, however, to be found in the footnotes to each chapter. Listed in the bibliography is also literature on Chinese minority policy. For further literature on Kazaks and on Xinjiang see the bibliographies compiled by Hoppe (1987), Lee (1983), Loewenthal (1957), Saribaev (1956), Sinor (1963) and Yuan (1961). Good bibliographies on Kazaks and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang are given in Benson (1986), Dabbs (1963), Saguchi (1963/1984), and Schwarz (1984); and the vast literature in Russian on Kazaks is dealt with in the bibliographies of Bacon (1966), Khazanov (1984), Krader (1963), Krader & Wayne (1955) and Olcott (1987).

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This book falls within the framework of the research project “The Kazak Minority of Xinjiang” sponsored by the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Within this project the following studies have been completed:


Ingvar Svanberg, *Kazak Refugees from Xinjiang. A Study of Cultural Persistence and Social Change*, (Studia Multiethnica Upsaliensia) [forthcoming].

Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, “The Russian in Xinjiang. From Immigrants to National Minority,” *Central Asian Survey* [forthcoming].


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