Muslims in China
A Study in Cultural Confrontation

Raphael Israeli

Preface by C. E. Bosworth

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It goes without saying that research of this sort is the fruit of long, often painful, formative years of study and hard work, in which joy and frustration alternate. I feel deeply grateful to many people and institutions for alleviating my hardships and guiding me to higher scholarly accomplishments.

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ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations occur in the Notes, and further reference to these will be found in the Bibliography.

FORD Excerpts from Chinese Documents etc., edited by Joseph Ford

HMCI Hui-min Ch’i-i

NTH New T’ang History (see under Drake, F.S.)

OTH Old T’ang History (see under Drake, F.S.)

PTHF P’ing-ting Yun-nan Hui-fei Fang-lueh
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No major community of Muslims has been so little-known as those of China, not having any reliable figures concerning their total numbers ever been gathered. As a faith of the interior and the western borders with Siberia rather than of the eastern coastlands, Chinese Islam has only been able to keep in touch sporadically with the power-houses of Muslim piety in places like Northern India and Transoxiana, and relations with such a strongly Muslim region as Indonesia, with whom maritime contacts would have been easy, have been minimal. On the other hand, there have usually been Chinese Muslims enthusiastic enough to undertake the arduous journey of the Pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, and such a movement is still permitted by the present Chinese Communist régime. What we do know is that the Muslims comprised within the boundaries of historic China, and now within those of the People's Republic, are of great ethnic diversity: Chinese proper (with all the implied differences, cultural and racial, between Chinese of say Liaoning and Kuang-tung); Mongols along the borders of Inner Mongolia and Kan-su; and Turks of various tribal affiliations in Hsin-chiang or Eastern Turkestan, with numerous immigrant strains there.

A consequence of the isolation of Chinese Islam has inevitably been its comparative poverty intellectually; today, the province of Kan-su, traditionally one of the provinces with the highest concentration of Muslims, has the lowest literacy rate (2%) of China's eighteen provinces. No contributions of international significance to the great tradition of Islamic thought, its theological, philosophical and legal achievements, has ever come out of the land. The sole knowledge of the Muslim religious leaders there, the akhunds or ahungs, is normally of a few set Qur'anic texts and prayers, and virtually all Muslims east of Hsin-chiang have tended to be Chinese-speaking. Only in the 18th and 19th centuries did there grow up a Chinese Muslim apologetic literature explaining the faith and endeavouring to demonstrate a certain degree of conformableness to the mainstream of Chinese life and culture and its traditional Confucian religion; it was at this time, too, that translations into Chinese from Arabic and Persian religious literature were made.

Nevertheless, despite these handicaps of geographical isolation, limited intellectual resources, and the environment of an ancient civilization which has in the past absorbed many alien elements within the Chinese body politic, Chinese Islam has survived; and judging by the attention paid to the existence of the Muslim community by the present Communist government and detailed by Dr Israeli below (pp. 124-25), it has retained something of its stubborn vitality.

Not surprisingly, Chinese Islam has been characterized all through the ages by an attempt to retain its identity as a religious minority whilst adopting many of the outward forms of the surrounding Chinese culture and ways of life; only when the tension between these two divergent aims has become too great has the Muslim community broken out into rebellion and warfare against its Chinese overlords.
This theme, then, of the interaction of the two groups is the guiding thread of Dr Israeli's book, as he sets forth in his own Introduction. As one of the very restricted band of scholars who unites a knowledge of Arabic and classical Islam with a thorough awareness of Chinese culture, one nurtured by personal travels in those fringes of the Chinese-speaking world generally accessible to westerners, he is well-qualified to bring forward this present book as a source of illumination upon this little-known but fascinating outpost of the great family of Islam.

Manchester, 1978

C.E. BOSWORTH
INTRODUCTION

Islam, like Communism, insists on assumption of political power, as the will of God has to be worked on earth by a political system.

F. Rahman

Muslims are ideally required to live in a Muslim state. The minority that fails to do so faces very serious problems of identity. On the one hand, they are aware of their belonging to the universal Muslim community — the Umma — but on the other hand they lead a way of life (for Islam is essentially a way of life) that is bound to alienate them from their environment and engender the suspicion of, and at times confrontation with, the host culture. Suspicions create fear, and confrontation generates hostility.

The problem, which would be acute enough for any Muslim minority in the Western world, becomes more serious in China, since the estrangement between Islam and Confucianism is more tangible and concrete than the abstract doctrinal differences between Islam and Christianity.

Christianity and Islam have been at each other's throats for centuries, but while Christians may have considered the Prophet Muhammad an impostor, they still knew who he was. They may have ridiculed the Qur'anic version of Biblical narratives, but they were aware of their meaning to the Muslim believer. At any rate, both religions have been talking about the same God, whose favour they have been disputing. In China, all this was not so. The Chinese knew no God, no Prophet, and no Qur'an. Chinese Muslim scholars had to use Confucian metaphors and terminology to explain what Islam was all about to the Chinese, to the extent that they were willing to listen. To be sure, doctrinal controversy between two dogmas close to each other may generate more mutual hatred than systems of thought totally alien to each other. But in the first instance, the hatred is fed by religious indoctrination and tailored stereotypes designed to discredit a rival dogma, as in the case of European antisemitism. The Chinese Muslims, however, were discredited by the Chinese not primarily because they constituted a doctrinal threat to the Empire, but because they were socially different in the eyes of the Chinese, i.e., uncivilized and despicable.

It is true that doctrinal Islam does insist on assumption of political power, and as such it should have been regarded as undermining the Chinese political system, but there is no evidence that the Chinese at large were aware of this "threat". In any case, the Chinese Muslims have never envisaged toppling the Chinese regime altogether. To the extent that they had political aspirations, they expressed them in secessionist rather than revolutionary movements. Moreover, the sporadic outbursts of secessionist movements did not stem only from doctrinal
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conviction but from social necessity. In time of peace, survival and preservation of a way of life, not power and propagation of the Faith, were the driving forces behind their political struggles.

One of the major examples of these struggles was the Muslim state in Yunnan, founded by Tu Wen-hsiu in 1856. Surviving for about sixteen years, it may be seen as a desperate attempt by Chinese Muslims to assert their religious and cultural identity by disengaging themselves from the psychological, and sometimes physical, oppression of a greater Chinese order.

The relationship between the Chinese majority and the Muslim minority in China must be conceived in terms of interaction between two different groups, each with its own fears, suspicions, stereotypes (real or imaginary), and way of life. The Chinese Muslims, by following their dietary laws, praying in their separate mosques, holding on to their own calendar, and living in their closely knit communities, eo ipso set themselves apart from the Chinese, confident of their superiority and proud of their distinctiveness. The Chinese, ignorant of the underlying religious and cultural necessity for this self-imposed isolation, could not help but despise and ridicule those who lived in the heart of Civilization but were unwilling to partake of its benefits. Ancestor worship, for example, the very pivot of Chinese culture and tradition, was not practised by the Muslims. Then on what common ground could Muslim and Chinese meet?

The encounter in China of the enormously self-confident Chinese and Islamic cultures on a majority-minority basis and the resulting problems, ranging from acculturation to confrontation, can be analysed as a three-phased process of cultural change.

The first phase is that in which "normal" conditions prevail, namely an ostensibly peaceful co-existence between the two cultures, with each side confident of its superiority, to be sure, but avoiding a head-on collision. Due to the constant diffusion of Chinese cultural elements into the Islamic community on the one hand, and the exclusive nature of Islam on the other, Chinese Muslims were subjected to two contradictory pressures: the pressure of the assimilatory factor pushing them to acculturate to the Chinese majority culture and the pressure of the cultural specific pulling them to preserve the core of their culture and identity as Muslims. As long as the balance between the two could be maintained, Chinese Muslim society had adequate mechanisms for keeping chronic stress at a tolerable level.

As a general rule, in contact between cultures, material objects are taken over by the guest culture earlier than non-material characteristics. Tools and clothing, for example, are adopted by the recipient culture before religious ideas and social organizations. Chinese Muslims, under the stress of the assimilatory factor, were responsive mainly to the Chinese material culture but stopped short of spiritual or ideological acculturation. Their mosques borrowed the outside appearance of Chinese temples; their clothing, speech and manners became Chinese.
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But the core of Muslim doctrine and practice seems to have remained intact as far as the mainstream of Islam was concerned. To the extent that Muslim scholars attempted to present Islam to the Chinese as a close relative of Confucianism, they did so apologetically, not as a genuine expression of their own ideas and beliefs, but rather to ease the outside pressure by bridging the gap between themselves and the Chinese on the intellectual level.

In this setting, where cultural contact results in an almost unidirectional diffusion from the dominant to the recipient culture, and social interaction generates strong internal pressures for self-identity, a peculiar pattern of behaviour was adopted by the guest culture. Outwardly, they behaved like Chinese, spoke Chinese, called each other by their Chinese names and wore Chinese clothing. But inwardly they behaved like Muslims, put on special items of clothing for prayer, greeted each other in Arabic, called each other by their Arabic names, turned to Mecca for prayer and maintained a high degree of social cohesion. In short, their behaviour had an adaptive significance insofar as they attempted to be Chinese outdoors and Muslim indoors.

The second phase set in when the intensification of outside pressure on the part of the host culture was counteracted by a parallel intensification of internal pressure within the guest culture. This process was more likely to take place in areas containing the largest proportions of minority groups. In these regions discrimination and persecution against the minority were more acute, for this group constituted a major threat to the political, economic and social position of the majority. As a result of mutual prejudice and discrimination, both the majority and the minority developed a heightened awareness of the minority's distinguishing characteristics, which led to stereotyping and its corollaries - suspicion and hostility on both sides.

The responses typically open to a minority group in this situation are: avoidance of contact, acceptance of the situation, or aggression against it. In the case of the Chinese Muslims, the first possibility was not always feasible, due to the social interdependence and the unavoidable Muslim dependence on the Chinese political order and bureaucratic system. The second type of response, acceptance of the situation, is prevalent in the first phase and is exemplified in the Muslim attempts at material acculturation and outward accommodation with the host culture. But when the stress of discrimination became intolerable, the balance between inner and outer pressures was upset and the minority resorted to the third type of response: aggression or rebellion.

In this phase, which was characterized by violent antagonism between the host and guest cultures, there developed an extreme ideological polarization. In China, very significantly, the Muslims turned to mysticist and messianic Islamic doctrines. The rebellion was not solely an outburst of rage or a mere necessity of physical survival, but was the only way open to the Muslim minority to reassert its cultural identity, free from the pressures of the dominant culture.
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As in the case of Yunnan, the third phase was contingent upon the at least temporary success of the rebellion. With Muslim autonomy won and a Muslim independent political entity established, the Muslim minority became dominant over the Chinese majority. Islam, though still the minority culture, became the state religion and the culture of the ruling elite. In their attempt to reassert their identity, the Muslims, now masters of their own fate, tended overtly to return to their cultural roots and revive Muslim traditions relating to statehood that had survived in their historical memory but could never be articulated in the midst of an hostile cultural majority.

With the establishment of an Islamic state the Muslims were confronted with dilemmas such as whether they should impose their culture on the Chinese majority or, because of practical considerations of government, they should seek to accommodate the Chinese population in order to mitigate the antagonism of the past and gain popular support. The solutions of Ping-nan Kuo, Tu Wen-hsiu’s state in Yunnan, were reflected in the state’s religious symbols, the state administration, a new stratification of society, taxation, and the like. If the state were to be Islamic, what role should the non-Muslims play in it? What might be their status vis-à-vis their Muslim masters? What law applied to them, the Chinese or the Islamic? Are they a tolerated cultural group or should they be induced, if not compelled, to embrace Islam? What part of the Chinese system of law and administration, if any at all, should be preserved? Should the traditional scholar bureaucracy be incorporated into the new regime or should a novel elite be substituted for it? The inadequate solutions to these dilemmas contributed, in part, to the collapse of the Muslim independent state in Yunnan in the face of the counter-attacks launched by the Ch'ing Dynasty at the height of the T'ung-chih Restoration.

The present work will deal only with the first two phases described above, leaving the issue of the Islamic state for future research. The first phase will deal with the position of the Muslims in China and the relations between the Muslim and Chinese populations cast in terms of majority-minority groups and host-guest cultures. Although the socio-historical analysis embraces the whole span of the history of Chinese Islam, from the T'ang to the People’s Republic, it puts a special emphasis on the pre-nineteenth century period. Some of the evidence collected during the twentieth century has been projected on to earlier times because of lack of precise contemporary sociological data on matters of inter-group relationships in China. So, while the analysis may at times look a-historical, an effort has been made to synthesize historical flash-backs into the material that will hopefully add to the coherence of the story.

Against this background, the second phase will analyse eighteenth and nineteenth century developments in China which led to the rise of Muslim secessionism and the outbreak of Muslim rebellion. This part, much more solidly anchored in historical documentation, should throw some light on the nature and chang-
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ing quality of Muslim-Chinese relations in this period and on the forces which, particularly the Muslim "New Age," which, as will be argued, was the primary driving force behind the rebellions.
PHASE I

UNEASY CO-EXISTENCE
If a group sets itself apart from others by a distinctive culture and perpetuates itself in this isolated condition long enough, the social distances between itself and others may grow so great as to lead to the accumulation of suspicion, and to non-intercourse which will make it virtually impossible for members of these groups to carry on a truly collective life.

Louis Wirth

Man tends to associate culture with a group of people. People are easier to see than their behaviour, and behaviour is easier to see than the contingencies which generate it. Moreover, a cultural group defined by religion does not require geographical or racial isolation for its identification. Chinese Muslims, for example, although they live on the same territory as the Han and do not differ racially from them, are a religio-cultural group and were identified by the Chinese as non-Chinese. But not only were they truly non-Chinese in some aspects of their life; as such they were also grossly misjudged by the Chinese. Misdjudgement and prejudice are both components of prejudice, the latter being a misjudgement that one defends. Thus, when the victims of prejudice rise to defend themselves, far from convincing anybody of their "innocence" they cause, on the contrary, an intensification of the stereotyping and achieve the reverse of their defence. This appears to be more true when the prejudice is based on functional differences between the two groups in the social order or on real differences in value than when the stereotype is centred on symbols (such as skin colour). A functional difference may be a corollary of competition between the two groups — and thus mutual threat — while different physical features are guarantee enough in themselves that the "others" would be kept out of the prevailing social order.

In a majority-minority situation, where hostility between the groups is cumulative and interactive, it is important to point out that prejudice, by becoming operative, turns into discrimination. Social scientists have noted that prejudice must not be equated with discrimination, although they are closely related. Robin Williams has defined discrimination as the "differential treatment of individuals considered to belong to a particular social group." Of course, one might discriminate against a member of the minority without feeling any prejudice (e. g., for business considerations). But generally, discrimination is the overt expression of prejudice, the categorical treatment of a member of a group because he is a member of that group and supposedly, therefore, of a particular, usually degraded, type.
The distinction between prejudice and discrimination is then between potential and a real action, between the tendency to act and overt action. The transition from tendency to actuality will be important for the interpretation of the transition from hatred to oppression on the part of the Chinese and the resulting transition from unrest to rebellion on the part of the Muslims.

But before we touch on the reactions of the minority, let us try to understand the sentiments and aims underlying the majority's actions. As a rule, the majority's policies toward minorities may range from peaceful assimilation to complete extinction of the minority group. According to Simpson and Yinger's typology, six varieties of policy may be developed: assimilation, a pluralist society, legal protection of minorities, population transfers (peaceful or coercive), continued subjugation, and extermination.

It is important to distinguish whether or not assimilation is voluntary. If the dominant group adopts an extreme ethnocentrism (or culturalism in the case of the Chinese), then minorities are refused the right to practise their own religion or follow their own customs. The aim, as in Nazi Germany, is development of a monocultural, monolingual and monoracial people ruled by an authoritarian state. In this situation no assimilation can be accomplished. On the contrary, it is precisely this emphasis on ethnocentricity that deters minority groups from assimilation. On the other hand, a peaceful assimilation permits minorities to absorb some patterns of the dominant culture in their own way and at their own pace, beginning with objects of material culture and progressing toward spiritual assimilation.

Another policy of the majority may be to permit cultural variability within a range consonant with the basic tenets of the people and the security of the land. In this case (e.g., Switzerland), a strong political and economic unity overrides cultural differences. But the effective development of a pluralist society of this sort is contingent upon the elimination of the concept of nationalism (or culturalism in our case), and its monocultural ideal. The majority must give up its claim to cultural dominance and superiority, and the minority must give up its hope of political and economic separation. Cultural pluralism works effectively following many years of reduction of tension and discrimination.

A variant of cultural pluralism is the policy of protecting minorities by legal means. Legal protection implies that there are portions of the majority group who do not accept the pattern. Furthermore, in the case of non-acceptance of these patterns by large portions of the population or by the state itself, international guarantees or coercive measures might be called for to ensure respect of minority rights (e.g., Cyprus).

Sometimes a policy of population transfer may be adopted in an attempt to reduce minority problems through physical separation. Transfer, like assimilation, may or may not peaceful. In any case, it almost always expresses hostility and discrimination as a policy of the majority, whether it is direct (literally
forcing the minority to evacuate an area) of indirect (making life so unbearable that no choice is left but migration).

But if the host-culture wants neither to incorporate the minority (through assimilation or a pluralistic society), nor to drive it out ("population transfer"), there remain two further methods: subjugation and extermination. Subjugation means a continued subservience and exploitation of the minority by the majority. Extermination, on the other hand, aims at a total physical destruction of the minority, such as the "final solution" that Nazi Germany envisaged for the Jews. These six policies of the dominant groups, as will be seen in the case of China, are not mutually exclusive and may be practised simultaneously or sequentially. Sometimes they are official actions of majority or state leaders, sometimes they are day-by-day actions of individual members of the dominant group.

Typically, minority groups occupy a disadvantageous position in society. They are debarred from economic, social and political opportunities and are held in low esteem. They may be the objects of contempt, hatred, ridicule and violence. They are socially isolated and frequently spatially segregated. Moreover, aside from these objective characteristics by which they are distinguished from the dominant group, and partly as a result of them, minorities tend to develop a set of attitudes, forms of behaviour and other subjective characteristics that tend further to set them apart. Their sense of isolation and persecution generates in them a conception of themselves as more different from others than in fact they are, exactly as the majority group misjudges them as being far more distant from society than they really are. Social scientists point out that differential treatment generates a sense of inferiority in some cases, frustration and rebellion in others. The lack of intimate knowledge of, and close contact with, other groups may in the course of time generate an incapacity for mutual understanding and appreciation which inevitably allows stereotypes to arise.

Thus, what matters about minorities is not merely their objective position but also the corresponding patterns of behaviour they develop and the picture they carry around in their heads of themselves and of others. In Wirth's view, while minorities more often than not stand in a relationship of conflict with the dominant group, it is their non-participation in the life of the larger society, or in certain aspects thereof, that more particularly marks them as minority people and perpetuates their status as such.

Moreover, the extent to which a minority differs from the dominant group conditions the relations between the two. Where the groups differ widely in race and culture and are thus easily distinguishable in appearance and behaviour, the lines separating them tend to persist without much overt effort. However, when the respective groups are of the same racial stock, but differ only in language, religion or culture, the tension between them becomes more marked and the attempts at domination of the minority by the majority become more evident.
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There are apparently no halfway compatibilities between majority and minority, for stability in the relationship between them is contingent either upon total differences and unbridgeable incompatibilities or upon consistent and complete separation and exclusion of the minority from participation in the life of the dominant group. Partial compatibility and a segmental sharing of life between the two groups inevitably leads to more and more demands on the part of the minority for more and more equality.

In response to the attitudes and actions of the dominant group, minorities may take several approaches according to Wirth's typology: pluralistic, assimilant, secessionist or militant. A pluralistic minority seeks toleration from the majority for its differences, implying that various cultures can coexist side by side in the same society, a "suspicion that the other fellow might be right." Toleration requires that the dominant group feels sufficiently secure in its position to allow dissenters a certain leeway, as long as the dominant group feels that the issues at stake are not crucial to the maintenance of its dominance. The minority may pose as a champion of tolerance because that suits its purposes, but there is an underlying feeling of resignation to the situation due to its inability to change it to its own advantage (e.g., secessionism). Pluralism is sometimes the way to make the best of the situation.

The assimilationist minority desires absorption into the dominant group. Assimilation can only occur when the majority accepts the idea. If so, the minority craves the fullest opportunity for participation in the life of the larger society with a view to incorporation in that society. It seeks to lose itself in the larger whole rather than preserve its cultural autonomy through toleration. For example, whereas a pluralistic society discourages intermarriage and intimate social intercourse, the assimilationist minority encourages them.

The secessionist minority, on the other hand, seeks both cultural and political independence. This development may be generated by frustrated ambitions of pluralistic co-existence or assimilation—the minority becoming discontented with the one, antagonistic to the other. If such a group has had independent statehood in the past, the demand for its recognition as a separate political entity would be boosted by its historical memory of past glory and grandeur. In such a case, the minority's cultural monuments such as language, lore, literature, ceremony and institutions, no matter how archaic, are revivified and built up into moving and awe-inspiring symbols. In this task the leaders of the minority group play a crucial role. They apply their talent and learning for recovering and propagating the group's history and culture. Having been rejected by the dominant group from higher positions of leadership, or having found it impracticable to attain such positions due to their rejection of the dominant values of the majority, such leaders find compensation by plunging into the life of the smaller but more hospitable world of their minority.

The militant minority is in some ways even more extremist than the
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secessionist. Not content with toleration of cultural and political autonomy, it seeks to dominate others. Far from suffering feelings of inferiority, it is convinced of its own superiority. Its aspirations, as stated in public, may begin modestly, but they tend to feed upon their success, if success there be, and often culminate in delusions of grandeur.

Again, as in the case of majority policies, minority responses are not exclusive of one another. They may be regarded as marking successive stages in the life cycle of minorities, insofar as an emerging minority group may start out by seeking toleration (the pluralistic approach), go through the assimilationist stage and then, in consequence of frustration of assimilationist ambitions or rejection of the values of the dominant group, pass into secessionism or militancy.

Having set the theoretical stage for the interaction among various types of majorities and minorities, let us now observe whether and how they may be applied to Chinese society. We shall do so in three stages. First, the Chinese majority will introduce itself and its conception of the Muslims. Second, the Muslim minority will defend its views and share with us its ill-feelings about the Chinese. Last, but primary in importance and ambition, we shall attempt to present the dynamics of the confrontation between these two very self-confident groups.
CHAPTER II

Are the Hui-hui Chinese? — The Chinese Charge

Close contact with this people has given convincing proof that the line of demarcation between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese is as great as, if not greater than, that between Chinese and foreigners. . . Although the Muslims have had, in one sense, to conform to Chinese law, there is another sense in which they are always a law unto themselves. The profound teachings of Buddha and Confucius are nothing to them.

Chinese attitudes and behaviour vis-à-vis Muslims are very intricate and can be analysed, for heuristic purposes, on two different levels: the intellectual level, to show the sources of the reasoned contempt on the part of the literati (attitudes generate behaviour), and the popular level, to point out the irrational prejudices and misjudgements of the populace as a whole toward the Muslims (behaviour generates attitudes).

Exception should be made, however, for Chinese attitudes towards individual Muslims who were incorporated into the Chinese establishment. For if Islam as a religion and way of life was reprehensible to the Chinese intellectual on cultural grounds, sinicized Muslim individuals could become intellectually acceptable to the Chinese literati, not for having abandoned Islam (in fact they did not) but for having entered the Chinese realm, to wit Civilization. For this reason, despite the generally hostile Chinese attitude toward Islam, Muslim individuals were in fact found in the academies, in the civil and military services. 2 Even at the height of the Muslim rebellions throughout the Empire, under the Ch'ing Dynasty, a Muslim named Ma Hsin-i occupied the key post of Governor-General of Chekiang and Fukien and later Liangkiang (Kiangsu, Kiangsi and Anhui) and attained nationwide fame for restoring public works, for famine relief, for rehabilitating war-devastated areas, for propagating traditional (!) learning, and for reducing the size of the armed forces. 3 Success and achievement of such individuals was recognized because they were good Chinese, and no relevance was accorded to their Islamic background. This is exemplified by Mi Fei (1051-1107), the celebrated Muslim painter, whose habits of cleanliness amazed his Confucian and Buddhist friends, but whose Islamic religion remained misunderstood by them. 4

It is difficult to grasp to what extent the absence of the Confucian ideal among Muslims in China was instrumental in their estrangement from the Chinese. Let us single out, for example, the principle of hsiao (filial piety), which was for millennia perhaps the most important in the Confucian ethical system, as epitomized by Confucius’ disciple Yu-tzu in the Analects:
Filial piety and fraternal submission, are they not the root of all benevolent actions? 5

This paradigm of Confucianism in action, with its socio-political and religio-ethical ramifications, might illustrate the gap between the two cultures and help explain why Chinese Muslims could hardly be considered as Chinese by their host culture.

Chinese society has always been thoroughly under the sway of the ethical concept of filial piety. 6 Traditional habits and customs of the Chinese, collectively as well as individually, reflect the impact of this principle in the social, religious and political domains. Mencius held that “the root of the Empire is in the state and the root of the state in the family.” 7 Similarly, the Great Learning advocated that “in order to govern the state rightly, it is necessary first to regulate the family; in order to put the Empire in peace and prosperity, it is necessary first to regulate the state.” 8

Thus to put one’s family in good order is the primary stage and prerequisite for demonstrating one’s ability to hold a public office in such a way as to bring well-being to the state and peace to the Empire. As one’s parents, and by inference also ancestors, are the source of one’s life, the fundamental blood relationship legally, as well as morally, dictates the imperative rule that one owes unavoidable obligations to parents. One must first be able to uphold the responsibility to parents and family as a social unit before shouldering heavier responsibility towards society and the state.

From the Emperor and high-ranking officials down to the common people, all were taught and trained to practise filial piety. Filial piety was the main theme transmitted from parent to son, from tutor to student, and was a principle much praised by the literati, a salient topic in Chinese literature. To fulfil filial piety, one must keep oneself in sound physical condition 9 in order to preserve one’s life as handed down by the ancestors and continue the blood line by rearing one’s own sons. Thus, marriage is not a personal affair of love or desire, but a duty that one owes the ancestors.

In the religious domain, filial piety is transformed into a worship due to deceased ancestors with its concomitant beliefs and practices. Ancestor worship took place as a natural consequence of paying tribute to one’s parents. The deceased father or ancestor became a sort of superhuman force worthy of solemn rites and sacrificial offerings, to be strictly performed on a daily or periodical basis. These rituals of worship involved praying for blessings and protection, either from the ancestors themselves or from supernatural powers through the intermediary grace of ancestors.

But the world of supernatural and protective spirits was by no means limited to one’s own ancestry. As F. L. K. Hsu observed in a village in Yunnan, 10 spirits were divided into four categories: ancestral spirits (always benevolent), spirits of persons not related by kinship or marriage (at times benevolent, at times
malicious), spirit officials (a hierarchy of spirits who rule over a multitude of lower spirits—sometimes helpful, sometimes severe), and spirits of a different culture, who are irrelevant entities, neither feared nor welcomed. The essential principle of action would be never to antagonize malicious spirits, never to alienate the kindly ones. If the proper rituals and taboos are observed, one might please the spirits or at least avoid offending them. But spirits of Muslims, for example, would not have to be pleased or placated, since they are irrelevantly beyond the pale of Culture.

The political role of filial piety can hardly be overestimated. In Chinese history, the traditional ethical system lent considerable support to the government by giving supernatural sanction to the ruling groups and by reinforcing traditional values instrumental in maintaining the ethico-political order. In the classical religion of the pre-Han period, and since the reassertion of Confucian ethics during the Sung Dynasty (960-1279) following the interlude of Buddhist predominance, Chinese religious life has centred upon belief in the supremacy of Heaven and its associated deities, and their ability to bring about a united and peaceful Empire by giving mankind a “Son of Heaven.” In other words, the political order rested upon the classical blessing of Heaven on the Monarch, its Son, and the success or failure of government was contingent upon the filial conduct of the Emperor towards Heaven. The concept of the Mandate of Heaven, the symbol of legitimacy claimed by every dynastic reign, and the Imperial sacrifices to Heaven that were maintained with all splendour until the end of the Ch’ing (1644-1912), are clearly relevant to the concept of filial piety. 11

The very relationship between Emperor and subject, sanctified as one of the Five Relationships, may also be linked to the father-son relationship. Filial piety is due then not only to the biological father and his ancestry, but also to the local magistrate who is the “father and mother of the people,” and of course to the Emperor, the father of the whole realm. Filial piety in service of government was even institutionalized in the form of the *Liú-yù* (Six Edicts) of the Shun-chih Emperor (1644-1661), later expanded in the Sacred Edicts of the K’ang-hsi Emperor (1661-1722). 12

But nowhere was the Emperor-subject relationship more explicitly described than in the Yung-cheng Emperor’s (1723-1735) *Amplified Instructions* of 1724. In this document, the Emperor dwelt persistently on the cultivation of those personal attitudes and conduct that were conducive to the good order of the Empire. He argued that filial piety was not merely the love of one’s parents, but also unwavering loyalty to one’s Sovereign and punctilious fulfilment of all social obligations. A filial son should at the same time be a “dutiful and fine subject when he tills the soil, and a loyal and brave soldier when he fights on the battlefield.” (Makim 1) 13 In Wakeman’s words: “The hierarchical family was encouraged because it stood dependently obedient below the state as a miniature replica of the familistic Emperor.” 14
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In the traditional local government of China, the village elders took the place of the administration as judges, and led the observation of traditional rituals and ceremonies, thus considerably reducing the function of legal codes and institutions. Local village rule was an extension of the practice of filial piety in every good household. As a result, of course, if every village were kept in good order, the whole state would be in good order as in Confucius' saying: "By reviewing the local rule in the villages, I comprehended that the King's Way should be easy."15

From a Chinese intellectual's point of view, then, if Confucius means nothing for Muslims, this signifies that they are outside the pale of Civilization. More specifically, if they lack adherence to the Confucian principle of filial piety, as exemplified in their ignorance of ancestor worship, then all the socio-political and religio-ethical tenets that bind the Chinese together do not obtain for Muslims. That is to say:

a. If Muslims are outside the framework of the father-son relationship, then they are bound to be unruly vis-à-vis their family hierarchy, the local authority and even the Emperor. As such, they are detrimental, at least potentially, to the social order in particular and to the Chinese polity in general.

b. If Muslims do not respect the rituals due to ancestors and other spirits, they are exposed to the malicious deeds of those spirits, and thus one had better keep away from them.

c. If the blessings of Heaven are transmitted to Earth through the Son of Heaven, the Muslims, by being unfilial to the Emperor, cannot rejoice in those blessings and thus cannot partake of Chinese civilization.

d. Since the Emperor, though claiming no superiority over Heaven, is the ruler of both temporal and celestial orders, the Muslims, claiming that celestial powers are beyond the Emperor's authority, are likely to fall short of respecting the Chinese monarch and what he represents. How then can they be expected to be his loyal subjects?

e. In general, ancestor worship and filial piety imply the acceptance of the Ways of the Ancients. If the Muslims have their own calendar, celebrate their own festivals, have no special attachment to their locale of domicile, and pay no attention to the Chinese Way, how can they be considered Chinese?

Indeed, in the eyes of the thinking Chinese literati, who would formulate their objections to Muslims in intellectual and rational terms, the gap between the two communities might have looked so hopelessly unbridgeable that they could easily come under the sway of popular stereotypes, which tended to make the gap look even wider.

These stereotypes, which grew to grossly exaggerated misjudgements of
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the Muslims by the Chinese, were constantly fed by the alienation between the two communities, as reflected in contemptuous name-calling, vicious story-telling, and eventually in pogrom-style onslaughts when the opportunity arose.

One may try to trace the origins of popular anti-Muslim sentiment in China to the times of the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368), when Muslims from Western and Central Asia were brought en masse by the Mongols to China as a sort of civil service that was imposed at the top of Chinese society. Understandably, the Chinese must have identified Muslims (Saracens, in the parlance of the times), with their conquerors and oppressors. Marco Polo recorded:

All the Cathaians detested the Great Khan's rule because he set over them governors who were Tartars, and still more frequently Saracens, and these they could not endure, for they were treated by them like slaves. You see, the Great Khan had not succeeded to the dominion of Cathay by hereditary right but held it by conquest; and thus, having no confidence in the natives, he put all authority in the hands of Tartars, Saracens, and Christians, who were attached to his household and devoted to his service, and were themselves foreigners in Cathay. 17

The hatred must have been reinforced by the fact that Muslims were assigned special sections in the cities where they settled, and where they enjoyed virtual extraterritorial privileges. Ibn Battuta, who visited China in 1342, recorded that the dissonance between the Muslim sections in the cities and the Chinese sections was so great that:

The markets in the Muslim sections are similar to those in Muslim lands. In the cities there are mosques and muezzins, we heard them calling for the noon prayer. 18

Deep-seated hatred, once thoroughly established, tended to become self-perpetuating and to generate, for one, a gross misjudgement of the Muslim community by way of stereotype and rationalization. This situation is not unlike the fantastic stories circulated among the Chinese about the Westerners during and subsequent to the Opium War. 19 The hostility towards Christianity and missionary work in China was, to a large extent, a result of popular resentment of the West and the different type of life that the Europeans developed in the Treaty Ports; stereotypical attitudes consequently developed on the popular level.

Whatever the origin of prejudice, it is evident that with the spread of Islam in China, more and more Chinese in the hinterland came into contact with Muslim communities so that the stereotypes regarding Muslims became almost universal. In popular conception the Muslim was portrayed as savage, heartless, aggressive and a greedy creature, capable of the most horrible crimes to achieve his goals. A story that became a legend in Northern China relates:

During the season of the Chinese New Year, Muslims, who do not
observe the same festival, invited the Chinese in their caravan to make merry, while they would stand the night watch. After the Chinese were drunk, the Muslims rose up, pulled their tent down on them and beat them to death under it. Then, they threw the bodies into a dry well and made off with the silver. The murder was not discovered until next spring. It made a great stir, being one of the most savage crimes ever committed in the region.\textsuperscript{20}

Whether the story is authentic or not there is no way to ascertain. But its stereotypical nature is obvious, and when stereotypes are concerned, it is popular belief, not genuine fact, that matters.

Another popular stereotype is that Muslims do not take their own religion in earnest, implying that this whole affair of \textit{Ch'ing Chen Chiao} (Pure and True Religion), as the Muslims term their faith, is pure hypocrisy. They also believe that a Muslim would care to respect his religion only in the presence of other Muslims. The Chinese proverb says:

Three Muslims are one Muslim; two Muslims are half a Muslim; one Muslim is no Muslim.\textsuperscript{21}

The rationalization:

A Muslim traveller reached a town at night. ‘What meat do you have there?’ he asked the inn-keeper, pointing to a tray of hot meat patties. ‘Pork,’ said the Chinese. ‘Ah,’ he said, ‘and what is that?’ pointing to another row of the same patties. ‘Pork, of course,’ said the Chinese. ‘And these?’ persisted the Muslim, pointing to a third row. The food-seller, exasperated, muttered, ‘These are mutton. ‘Well, why did you not say that before?’ and he began to eat heartily.\textsuperscript{22}

Another gibe went as follows: “One Muslim travelling will grow fat, two on a journey will become thin,”\textsuperscript{23} the inference being that one will eat pork while two dare not.

Muslims are taken to be selfish and greedy, which of course reinforces the Chinese dislike and contempt for them. The following incident was viewed by Owen Lattimore while he was travelling with a mixed Chinese-Muslim caravan in North China:

Mohammedans broke off from the caravan to get first to the water well at the edge of the desert. The Chinese cursed them heartily, there being little affection between the Great and Little Faiths,\textsuperscript{24} saying that they had gone ahead when it was to their advantage, but would cling to us from now on, for the sake of company through the country where there is danger of raiders.\textsuperscript{25}
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The Muslims were credited by the Chinese with courage, energy and enterprise, and are said to be persuasive in talk and in blarney, but they are malign-ed for being too shrewd and sly to be dependable in business. The proverb goes: “Eat the food of a Muslim but do not listen to his talk”, meaning take what he offers but do not believe what he promises. Another popular saying: “Ten Peking slippery ones cannot talk down one Tien-tsin brawler, ten Tien-tsin brawlers cannot talk down one Muslim.”

The Chinese talked about Muslims in the way the English talk about the Irish or antisemites talk about Jews. So even admirable qualities inherent in them or in their culture are deprecated. Courage and energy are said to be channelled to evil ends; shrewdness is interpreted as slyness; and persuasive talking is seen as flattery. Even the proverbial cleanliness of the Muslims, attested to by all foreign observers, to the extent that Rev. Mr. MacCillivray called them “the Clean Sect in China” was brushed aside and interpreted as “another way of life,” rather than a characteristic with intrinsic value. “Of course,” the Chinese would say, “his house is cleaner than mine; he is a Muslim.”

The fashion in which the Chinese addressed Muslims or referred to them is another fascinating facet of the relationship between these two groups. There were both “neutral” (as opposed to polite) and overtly contemptuous references, the one being used generally in the presence of Muslims, the other in their absence. Honourable addresses were hardly ever used. The common term by which Muslims have traditionally been known in China is Hui-hui or Hui-ho, and the religion was referred to as the Hui-chiao (the Hui Sect). There are various theories regarding the origin of this term, some more fantastic than others. Suffice it to say that this term did not refer exclusively to Muslims but to Jews and some Christians alike. Deviations from these standard terms by Chinese ranged all the way from demeaning diminutives to contemptuous nicknames, even to slanderous insults.

Hui-tzu is not exactly a respectful reference, unlike Lao-Hui which one could use if one wished to show respect. The Chinese also termed Islam Hsiao-chiao, as opposed to the Chinese, who had the Ta-chiao. Incidentally, the Chinese are said to have assigned to themselves the Ta-chiao only to indicate their non-belonging to the Hsiao-chiao, not in order to indicate that they belonged to any particular sect. Another way of setting Islam apart was to refer to it as chieh-chiao, literally “the Faith apart” or the “different Faith.”

It is evident that Chinese Muslims were prone to be insulted by all of these references to them, and that they therefore adopted the formal title of Ch'ing Chen Chiao (Pure and True Religion), which is inscribed over the gates of the mosques and used in communications between Muslims. This term, like much of the Muslim liturgical terminology, was apparently borrowed from Chinese Jews.

But if Chinese Muslims found some consolation in this title, they had to
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suffer most offending and vicious addresses which harped upon the awkward subject of the pig. The Chinese, who knew perfectly well how abominable the pig was for Muslims, elected to tease them in this fashion, although they usually refrained from resorting to these extremes in the presence of Muslims. The most common insults of this sort were: ping-tsui (vase mouth), i.e., the shape of a hoguish snout; hsiao i-pa (little tail), meaning the pig's tail; chu-wa (pig's baby); and hsiao chu-tan (little pig's egg). It is interesting to note that the Chinese do not usually use the pig when they swear at each other. They would rather use sentences like "dog defiled," "defile your younger sister," or "defile your grandmother." The use of the pig was mostly reserved for Muslims, and some Chinese even found a rationale for that, claiming that this was the Muslim's holy animal, or their God.43

All this hatred and hostility was, of course, constantly fed by the ever-present gap between the two groups. Religion in China was closely intertwined with intellectual life and with the political and social institutions of the nation. Confucianism was identified with scholarship and was deeply entrenched in the habits of thought, affections, and loyalties of educated people. The state was committed to the existing faiths, especially Confucianism. Confucian classics were the basis for education and the examination system. Ceremonies were associated with Confucianism and maintained at public expense. Officials, including the Emperor, performed many of the duties usually assigned to a priesthood in other cultures. The very political theory on which the state rested derived its authority from Confucian teachings.

Religion also formed part of village life. Temples were maintained by villages, and festivals and ceremonies took place through general contribution. Guilds had Patron Gods and other religious features. Above all, the family, the strongest social unit, had as an integral part of its structure the honouring of ancestors by rites that were religious in origin and retained a religious significance.

Muslims were out of place in this setting, since their social and religious norms were so different and could not displace the already well-entrenched Chinese philosophies and traditions. They went their own way, in prayers and ceremonies, in their calendar and festivals, in their weddings and burial of the dead, in their socializing and eating habits, in their travelling and dwelling. So, no matter how much the Muslims wished to put on an appearance of being Chinese, they were and remained Hui people, that is, non-Chinese, in the eyes of the Chinese.

Though on the intellectual level there were few or no occasions for friction between the two communities, daily life necessitated contacts and their resulting conflicts. F. L. K. Hsü relates the details of a particular ceremony of spirit worship in a Chinese village, in the neighbourhood of which a Muslim minority lived. Since the Chinese wanted to drive away the spirits of dead Muslims, they used to shout at one point:
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If despicable Muslims come, give them a segment of the pig's intestine!

In that particular village, the shouters refrained from adding this sentence when the party came to a point along the route within hearing of the Muslims. But the story goes that in past years some bloody fights had occurred between Chinese and Muslims as a result of these words.
CHAPTER III

Chinese Muslim or Muslim Chinese: The Muslim Response

That who believes in Allah, denies him not if he were forced to do it, and if his heart remains steadfast in the Faith, he shall be guiltless.

Qur'an, Sura 41:5

A Chinese Muslim may or may not have been aware or concerned about the cultural pride and the self-confidence that the Chinese displayed. One thing, however, is certain: he was, and still is, as proud and as self-confident of his own culture. He was Chinese all right, but he was, first of all, Muslim. This attitude has been evinced not only by his occasionally taking a violent anti-Chinese stand when forced to make the choice between Muslim and Chinese, but, more importantly, by his constant casual way of looking down on non-Muslims and smiling with significance to himself and his fellow-Muslims, with a twinkle of deprecation in his eyes. There is a quality of arrogant serenity in the Chinese Muslims, especially when they are not in the presence of Chinese.

In interviews that I conducted in Hong Kong and Taiwan with Chinese Muslims originating in various parts of China, I sensed that air of nonchalant confidence that is so deeply ingrained in them. I put the question bluntly to a Muslim leader in Taiwan, whether he considered himself Chinese or Muslim first. He was apprehensive, he hesitated, and then he leaned toward me and murmured in a tone of confidence: “I would let my children marry any Muslims from foreign countries, but it will never be in the question for them to marry non-Muslims in China.”

No less significant is the modern Chinese Muslim attitude towards the Muslim rebellions under the Ch'ing Dynasty. All Muslims of importance that I interviewed regard people such as Tu Wen-hsiu as heroes and deplore the lack of cooperation and coordination between the three contemporaneous rebellions (in Yunnan, Kansu and Sinkiang) which might otherwise have ended successfully. They condemn in virulent terms turncoats such as Ma Ju-lung, who had helped the Dynasty to crush the uprisings.

This attitude is significant in that it runs counter to current Nationalist dogma. Chiang Kai-shek's regime and the Kuomintang have seized upon the T'ung-chih Restoration as a model for reinvigoration of the Chinese social and political system. They look to the men of moral character and insight — Tseng Kuo-fan, Tso Tsung-t'ang, Hu Lin-i, among others — for inspiration. Tseng and Hu in particular have been apotheosized because of their Confucian virtues and their embodiment of proper personal conduct. In 1933 - 4 at Lushan, Chiang took his stand not
only against the T’aiping Rebellion and the Communists, but against all rebellions in Chinese history, going back to the Red Eyebrows and the Yellow Turbans. He proclaimed: “If we do not exterminate the red bandits, we cannot preserve the old morals and the ancient wisdom handed down from our ancestors.”

In other words, any rebel who rises against the established Confucian order must be wiped out. The Muslims, then, are no exception. The Muslims of Taiwan, whose Association is part of the Chinese establishment, find themselves glorifying heroes who are deemed “bandits” by the regime on the one hand, and deprecating Chinese heroes who helped to crush the Muslim uprisings on the other hand. Even worse, they find themselves in agreement with the Chinese Communists on this score.

As Marxists, the Chinese Communist historians are committed to the proposition that social history can be understood only as the history of struggles between mutually opposed classes, in contrast to the Confucian emphasis and harmonious social relations. Specifically, they look to mass rebellions as peasant movements destined to overthrow Imperial rule. Naturally, Muslim rebellions are no exception, as evidenced by Pai Shou-i, the editor of Hui-min Ch’i-i. He writes in the introduction to this work:

It is incorrect to consider the Muslim uprisings as an ethnic movement; it is even more incorrect to consider them Han-Hui interracial struggles. We must consider them as a form of class struggle and a part of the struggle of all China against the Ch’ing.

This view is echoed by non-Chinese Marxist historians such as Imanaga Seiji, who writes:

This [Muslim] rebellion made clear the resistance against the Chinese feudal system, and manifested the emancipation of Muslims in China.

When I called the attention of a leading Taiwan Muslim to this paradox, he retorted: “Well, all that Tu Wen-hsiu was trying to do was to liberate Muslims from Manchu oppression.”

Muslims in China have not always had to be apologetic about their identity and sentiment. In the beginning of their settlement in China, back in the T’ang and the Sung, the Muslims had come as traders. They lived in China, but they remained outside it, their heart and loyalty being with the Great Islamic Empire in the far west. Under the Yuan Dynasty, although the Islamic Empire had vanished, because of the extraterritorial advantages they enjoyed, Muslims could maintain, and had interest in maintaining, their separate status. In fact, the Muslims kept their original Arabic names, and even assigned Arabic names to Chinese places, the most famous being Zaytun, the Chinese Chuan-chou. They were identified so closely with the Muslim world that they were happy to receive any Muslim visitor and “used to acclaim him because he came from the Land of Islam, and indulged in zakawat (alms) to make him wealthy like them.”
But under the Ming, contacts with the outside Muslim world became increasingly scarce, as the Arabs were displaced by the Portuguese, who took over the trade monopoly in Southeast Asia. As the policy of integration and assimilation began to press the Muslims into forced sinicization, they adopted a "low profile" stance on the outside, while focusing their identity inwards through community cohesion and activity. By trying to minimize contacts and friction with the Chinese, they could maintain the assimilatory pressure at a tolerable level.

This inward-outward dichotomy could be observed in many of the Chinese Muslim activities. During the Ming, many mosques were built in the pagoda shape of Chinese-style temples, eliminating the minarets which are typical of Muslim houses of prayer elsewhere, making them indistinguishable from Chinese temples. With the obliteration of the minaret, the Muezzin could no longer call the believers to prayer in the traditional way. But the Muezzin stood indoors, behind the entrance to the mosque, and called for prayer. And when one entered the mosque, one was struck by the traditional Muslim flavour: cleanliness and austerity. Except for the Emperor's Tablets that were mandatory in any house of prayer, there was no sign of Chinese characters or Chinese characteristics. On the walls there were Arabic inscriptions of verses from the Qur'an and the west end of the mosque (the direction of Mecca) was adorned with Arabesques. Once the believers were inside, they put on white caps, shoes were taken off, elaborate ablutions were ritually performed, and the prayers began in Arabic, with heart and mind centred on Mecca. When prostrating themselves before the Emperor's Tablets, as required, the Muslims would avoid bringing their heads into contact with the floor (which they do when they worship Allah), and thus did they satisfy their consciences in avoiding the true significance of the rite — this prohibited worship was invalid because it was imperfectly performed.

Muslims used their Chinese names and spoke Chinese in public, but with other Muslims they would use their Arabic names and speak a Chinese mixed with many Arabic and Persian words. They greeted each other in Arabic, "A-salam 'alaykum" and got the reply in Arabic, "Alaykum a-salam." This situation still persists in both Chinas of today. In 1957, an article in a Chinese Communist magazine stated:

Historical conditions made it necessary for the Hui people to use the Han language. . . But there have consistently been preserved a certain glossary of words not found in the Han language, words that belong to the Persian and Arabic glossaries, which reflect this feeling that the Hui people retain for their original tongue.

The Muslim attitude towards pork also reflects this inner-outer dilemma. Muslims were aware of the popularity of pork among the Chinese and of the Chinese ridiculing and teasing them for abhorring it. They were also aware, one might surmise, of the social alienation between the two groups that was caused by
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their inability to socialize through common meals, as is customary with the Chinese. In fact, the Chinese attach so much importance to food as a social medium of communication that they characterize some religious minorities in accordance with what they could or could not eat. Muslims were referred to as "men who do not eat pork"; Jews were "men who do not eat sinews"; and some groups of Christians were "men who do not eat animals with unclawed hoofs." One author even advanced the opinion that because Jews do not eat pork, the Chinese made little distinction between them and the Muslims.

Among themselves, the Muslims knew that the pig was abominable because it is expressly prohibited by the Holy Scriptures. Muslims who travelled a long distance took enough food with them for many days in order to avoid consuming impure provisions. Many Muslim inns were available on the main thoroughfares to provide adequate food for those who needed it. Moreover, Chinese Muslim scholars elected to tighten dietary laws beyond the prescriptions and prohibitions of the Shari'a in order to avoid potential or indirect contamination of pork. For example, they prohibited consumption of beef brains, eyes and kidneys, which are considered delicacies in other lands of Islam. Presumably, they thought that it would be impossible to ascertain the origin of unidentifiable parts of the animals, especially in small congregations where Muslims were more dependent on the Chinese majority. Otherwise, it is customary with the Chinese Muslims to have their own meat-markets. Even in Communist Chinese Muslim Communes, they maintain a separate abattoir and separate messhalls for the Muslims.

To rationalist Confucians, the Holy Qur'an would be no justification for prohibiting food. So, apologetic works of Chinese Muslims tried to rationalize the abhorrence of pork and internal parts of animals in these terms:

They are harmful to the body. . . .the pig stays in damp and dirty places and therefore, it is dirty and smells bad.

Another Chinese Muslim scholar is reported to have said:

It is incumbent upon Muslims not only to avoid eating pork but also to persuade others not to eat it as well. . . .it is poisonous and causes skin and other terrible diseases. . . .Those who indulge in eating it may become sexually impotent.

In their domestic life Muslims also adopted a double standard of behaviour. Outside their homes, they pasted up colourful Chinese posters like other Chinese, but inside usually no Chinese paintings were in sight. The scrolls that adorned the walls bore Arabic script rather than Chinese characters, specifically, verses from the Qur'an or from Islamic traditions. One of them, for example, mentions the Caliph and the Wazir, not the Emperor or the Mandarin. The same applies to Chinese Muslim objets d'art, dating from the Ming period and still treasured by Muslims in China. Their style and design are typically Chinese, but the
In the art of calligraphy also a combination of Chinese and Arabic was worked out. Muslim artists first formed the outlines of a Chinese character and then filled it with Muslim proverbs or poems in Arabic. So, in a large Chinese hu (tiger) or shou (long life), Arabic phrases could be detected on closer examination. Another form of calligraphy was the writing of Arabic words in Chinese transliteration.

While the inner aspects of Muslim life showed a high degree of concern for the preservation of the Faith, the outer aspect evinced a certain degree of acculturation, even if this was not "intentional." For, as Skinner has remarked, "a culture is not the product of a creative 'group mind' or the expression of a 'general will' . . . a culture evolves when new practices further the survival of those who practise them." The new practices, as we have seen, involved adoption by Muslims of Chinese material culture, but in the main stopped short of value transformation. Theirs was not similar to the t'\-yung (substance and function) experience of Chinese Self-Strengthening in the nineteenth century.

Chinese eclectics of post-Opium War China believed that immobility would be self-defeating, the only alternative to total destruction of Chinese civilization being selective innovation that would emphasize areas of practical, not essential, values. Western knowledge would be used, they thought, only to defend the core of Chinese civilization, and it would not impinge upon it. For Western science was valuable because it was useful; it was a means, and a means is less than an end. But Chinese learning, which was to be the t'\-i (essence) of the new syncretic culture, was the learning of a society which had always used it for yung (practice), as a passport for scaling the ladder of success. Western learning, when sought as yung, did not simply supplement Chinese learning but began to supplant it, for when the function of Chinese learning was usurped, the learning itself withered. The more Western learning came to be accepted as the practical instrument of life and power, the more Confucianism ceased to be t'\-i, the value of Civilization, and became instead an historical inheritance.

Muslim acculturation was a self-effacing process, an effort to coexist with the Chinese majority; self-strengthening was a self-asserting effort to use Western knowledge to defeat the West. The Muslims could, by camouflaging their culture from the hostile eyes of the Chinese, play the semblance of being Chinese. Self-strengtheners, on the other hand, came forward, confident of their glorious tradition, to show their different-ness and superiority to the West. The Muslims used the yung to conceal the t'\-i; self-strengtheners wanted to use the yung to defend the t'\-i in a showdown with the West.

In the hands of the Muslims, then, the yung was a means, and therefore it could remain separated from the t'\-i. In the hands of self-strengtheners, the yung had to become an end, and as such it was bound to impinge upon the t'\-i
and destroy it. In the socio-political domain, Chinese learning was prized for its practicality, and thus alteration of the yung was bound to destroy the t'i. Muslim Chinese learning had also prized Islamic t'i, but in the absence of an Islamic state, the political aspects of Muslim essence could not be put into practice. For a Muslim to achieve socio-political status in Chinese society, he had to adopt another t'i — the Chinese.

So, the t'i-yung formula, while it proved to be a fallacy for the Chinese, could be realizable for the Muslims in China. They could separate the two components they were able to use Muslim learning in an effort to preserve their essence, and the Chinese material culture to cover up their effort. But in situations of rebellion, as we shall see below, when the occasion arose to put Muslim t'i into practice, then Chinese Muslims could easily shrug off the Chinese yung. Climbing up the ladder of success in a Muslim state would entail independence from both the Chinese t'i and the Chinese yung.

Let us return to times of "uneasy coexistence." In this situation, Chinese Muslims were hard at work, as we have already seen, trying to look and act as Chinese as possible by adopting Chinese yung. But when their t'i came under attack, they naturally attempted to justify it in the eyes of the Chinese. If the Chinese were ridiculing the Hui religion and the Hui people, and stereotypical stories were circulating that were harmful to the Muslim cause, it is natural that Muslims would try to ward off these attacks. But, since they could not make their t'i prevalent in their environment, their active self-defence could only take the form of literary apologetics that attempted to show the Chinese that Islam was compatible with Confucianism. The apologia, while clearly directed at the Chinese literati, may also have been calculated as a dam to retain Muslim Chinese who were on the verge of being precipitated into the Chinese stream or were hesitating in the face of the temptations offered by Confucian Civilization, especially in the areas of small or isolated Muslim populations. Thus, aside from ostensible attempts at compromise with Confucianism, this literature comprises some of the firmest confirmations of the preferability of Islam. Here are some examples:

A Muslim author of the eighteenth century specified in the introduction to his book that he wanted to "dispel rumours and state the true facts about the Pure and True Religion." He tried to depict Islam and Confucianism as two sides of the same truth:

Those who only study Muslim books and neglect Confucian writings cannot possibly comprehend the Truth, and vice-versa. One should know both sides.

Allah, according to this writer, is not an Islamic peculiarity, for:

All religions stress worship of One God and One Truth...What we call the Creator in our religion is equivalent to what is called Shang-ti in Confucianism.
“Precedents” are invoked from Chinese history to justify Islamic tradition. For example, why should Muslims fast?

During the Sung, the Emperor left a banquet in order to send off an official for a mission and ordered the guests to refrain from eating until his return. When he came back he found the guests starving. He told them, ‘You are fat and you do not realize the condition of the poor people. Now I made you wait and appreciate the significance of food.’ The Fast in our religion has exactly the same significance. 33

In apparent response to a Chinese popular gibe, ridiculing Muslims as stingy (“Here come the stingy ones” 34) because of their custom of bringing back the empty coffin after a funeral, Ching Pei-kao worked out a “Confucian”, or at least a logically acceptable, theory:

We do not use the coffin to bury our dead, because the coffin expresses the difference between rich and poor. A rich man can have a better coffin that provides a shelter for a long time. . .The rich Chinese are buried with their jewels. This brings about vandalism. Bandits dig up the bodies and steal the jewels. . .Sometimes, merchants sell in the markets this stolen property. This not only encourages bandits to dig up corpses, but also exposes the bodies of our ancestors to vandalism. 35

The defence of one aspect of ancestor worship is involved, but only up to a point. Another aspect is summarily rejected in the justification of the Muslim non-observance of paper-money burning for dead ancestors; but the rejection is made on “Confucian” grounds:

This custom is inherited from Buddhism and Taoism, not Confucianism. My ancestors would not approve of such practice. . .Do not listen to the Buddhist absurd theory about redeeming your ancestors. 36

A Muslim author of the eighteenth century 37 attempted a systematic reconciliation between Confucianism and Islam, designed in its style to placate Chinese literati. Still another Chinese Muslim treatise of the nineteenth century 38 links Chinese mythology to Islamic history. It claims that Fu-hsi, the legendary first monarch of China, 39 was a descendant of Adam:

He came from the West and his offspring are the Chinese. The doctrine of Islam, brought by Fu-hsi, was altered in the course of time, but Confucianism is derived from it, though it has lost the notion of God, which became confused with Heaven. 40

Ma An-li, the author of the treatise, argues:

Before the Three Dynasties 41 all literati were Muslim. After King Wu of the Chou, Chinese literati were still predominantly true literati: they had not yet turned their backs totally on Islam. But after the era of
the Great Feudatories, Yang and Mo brought about confusion of the Doctrine \((Tao)\). Fortunately, our Saint (Confucius) transmitted the Book of Change, presented a summary of the Book of Poetry and the Book of History, and preserved the tradition of Shang-ti in such a way that it was no longer interrupted. He did so remarkably that the following generations were able to reassert the law of the literati and return to the Muslim cult.

The theory of the common origin of Islam and Confucianism, designed to reconcile the two cultures, was not merely a literary creation of an eccentric individual. The Sianfu Monument, which is extant in a Muslim mosque of Shensi, was written in Chinese characters (i.e., exposed to the general literate public) and bears witness to the same spirit of reconciliation and ostensible will to compromise:

Sages have one mind and the same Truth, so they convince each other without leaving a shadow of doubt. In all parts of the world, sages arise who possess this uniformity of mind and Truth. Muhammad, the Great Sage of the West, lived in Arabia long after Confucius, the Sage of China. Though separated by ages and countries, they had the same mind and Truth. The Great Western Sage (Muhammad) passed away ages ago. His teachings were: to purify oneself by bathing, to nourish one's mind by diminishing the wants, to restrict one's passions by fastings, to eliminate one's faults as the essential element in self-cultivation, to be true and honest as the basis for convincing others to assist at marriages and to be present at funerals.

Let us pause and realize how some basic tenets of Islam, such as ablutions (before prayer) and fasting, and general rules of conduct prescribed by Islam, such as honesty, elimination of sins and attending weddings and funerals, are couched here in terms that would not only be unobjectionable to the Chinese literati but might even appeal to them in the name of the Neo-Confucian principle of self-cultivation and the Buddhist principle of restricting passions and diminishing the wants. The inscription continues:

From the most ethical questions down to the smallest details of everyday life, there is nothing that is not governed by reason and covered by his teachings, and always coupled with the idea of respecting God. Though the details of his teachings are numerous, they are all aimed to attain one goal: to reverence God, the Creator of the world.

Substitute Heaven for God; would not such a statement be acceptable to a Confucian Chinese? The inscription says it explicitly:

Emperor Yao said, 'Reverence Heaven.' Emperor T'ang said, 'By reverence one improves himself daily.' Emperor Wen said, 'Worship Shang-ti.' Confucius said, 'For him who sins against Heaven, prayer
is useless.' All these sayings are practically the same. Apparently they
(Muhammad and Confucius) possessed the same convictions and
belief.\textsuperscript{47}

And finally, an apologia for a Muslim Chinese leader. After establishing
the similarity of Islam and Confucianism, it was justifiable to point out that the
Muslim literati are identical to the Chinese, for if their knowledge is the same, it
follows that those who know, know the same:

He is well versed in the Classics of his Faith. He will, as a leader, be
able to conduct the regular worship of the Holy Sect and pray for the
long life of the Emperor.\textsuperscript{48}

These manifestations of the Muslims' smoothing-over the built-in
incongruencies between their Faith and Confucianism do not necessarily have to be
conceived as a conscious diversionary tactic on the part of the Muslims, but rather
as a defence mechanism which sought to soft-pedal the intensity of hostility emanating from the dominant group. True, the Muslim attitude as manifest in the
Sianfu Monument, can also be construed as an erosion of the sense of Muslim uniqueness and identity. But, judging from the Muslim revivalism of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, which will be discussed in greater detail in the coming chapters, this erosion affected only the margins and surface of Chinese Islam, while its core retained a dormant vigour that became evident when the extreme anti-Muslim oppression of the Ch'ing necessitated a vigorous Muslim reaction.

Hostility on the part of the host culture had all along the effect of
strengthening group solidarity among the Muslims and the intensifying of their
desire to cling to their culture with even greater tenacity. While at first the Muslims
made an effort to maintain themselves as a cultural entity, the Chinese pressure
under the Ch'ing brought about a situation in which they were forced to do so by
a hostile world.\textsuperscript{49} As a result, concurrent with their efforts to appease the majority, Chinese Muslims exhibited a remarkable group solidarity that was reinforced by the majority's negative attitudes. The Muslim group solidarity was constantly fed by religious and cultural reinforcements as will be shown in the next chapter.

In sum, there was a constant dialectical relationship between the
Chinese attitude and the Muslim response. Although the Chinese treated the Hui
as un-Chinese, as long as the level of hostility remained confined to the realm of
attitudes, feelings and stereotypes, Muslim defences could be postulated on white-
washing of conflicts with the dominant culture on the one hand and strengthening
of inner cohesion on the other. But when the intensification of anti-Muslim atti-
tudes escalated into outbreaks of hostility, the Muslims were able, and very remark-
ably so, to pull themselves together and fight back. Had their separate identity
been truly affected at its core, or Chinese cultural approaches, it is doubtful
whether Muslims could have reacted as uniformly as they did, because they would
have found it much easier to slip, on an individual basis, into the inviting Chinese
Culture.
CHAPTER IV

The Islamic Community in China: The Muslim Response II

I see a people who dwells alone, that has not made itself one with the nations.

Numbers 23:9

In the previous chapter, we dwelt on one aspect of the Muslim response to the Chinese challenge. The Muslims hesitantly answered the question of whether they were Chinese or Muslim by asserting that they were both, a sort of "Chinese in their Muslimness" and "Muslim in their Chineseness," although they admitted that they were more Muslim than Chinese. But, since they did not have to worry about their Chineseness— it was simply thrust upon them by virtue of their being Chinese—they turned their energies to reinforcing what did come under attack, their non-Chinese identity.

The inner-outer analytical device that was used previously was designed to show the way in which the Muslim community interacted with the Chinese majority. Stereotypes were countered by a defence mechanism; charges of foreignness were invalidated by material acculturation; suspicions of heretical doctrines were refuted by learned treatises on the compatibility of Confucianism and Islam. To be sure, these responses did not diminish, let alone eliminate, mutual hostility between the two groups, but a dialogue was going on. Communication was in process, though often in a distorted manner.

The present chapter will be concerned with the inner dynamics of the Muslim community, the internal world of Chinese Muslims. In this world, Muslim concerns were different. They strove to raise the consciousness of the Muslim individual, to strengthen their feelings of belonging, thereby to tighten the cohesiveness of the community. The ultimate goal was the survival of Islamic culture in China, no matter how acculturated individual Muslims were to the majority culture or what accommodations were worked out between the Muslim minority and the Chinese society at large.

Group cohesiveness, as Newcomb has shown, is not coterminous with individual "belongingness," although they are interrelated. An individual may have the sense of belonging to a group, which he expresses by his satisfaction in doing attractive or necessary things which one can do only as a group member; by being with people whom he knows and likes; and by finding some gratification in being recognized by outsiders as being a member of the group. A Chinese Muslim, in our case, by participating in the daily activities of his community, and thus giving daily validation to his membership, and by keeping apart from non-Muslims, was

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likely to be gratified as a member of his group. But a group is cohesive only when its members find membership in it attractive, when they are motivated to take their roles and share common understanding of the group norms. A group becomes more cohesive as belongingness increases on the part of its individual members.

The individual Chinese Muslim’s high sense of belonging to the group and the ensuing high cohesiveness of the community were the results of (a) the organizational structure and function of Chinese Islam, which made it attractive to the individual; (b) the Islamic world view, which gave the Muslims motivation to perform their role; and (c) the doctrinal reinforcement, which constantly reminded them of the norms they shared.

In Chinese society, religion has been institutionally less prominent than in European or Islamic cultures. This has been attributed by C. K. Yang to the dominance of diffused religion and the relative weakness of institutional religion in China. Diffused religion is one which “has its theology, cult and personnel so intimately diffused into secular social institutions that they become a part of the latter, thus having no significant independent existence.” Institutional religion is “a system of religious life, having an independent theology or cosmic interpretation of the universe and human events; an independent form of worship consisting of symbols and rituals; and an independent organization of personnel to facilitate the interpretation of theological views and pursue cultic worship.” In short, it is a social institution separate from the secular system.

In China, institutional religion was represented by major universal religions such as Buddhism and Taoism, while diffused religion was all-pervasive in the family (ancestor worship), patron gods of guilds and communities, etc. But there was an interdependence between the two insofar as diffused religion relied upon the institutional for the development of mythical or theological concepts, for the supply of gods, spirits and rituals, and for the services of the priesthood (e.g., priests could be used in ancestor worship). On the other hand, institutional religion was dependent for its existence upon rendering these services.

The diffusion of religion into secular social institutions and community life contributed to the stability of social institutions because of Chinese popular awe of institutionalized practices and respect for the past. Institutional religion, on the contrary, required a break with the past and participation in a new way of life (e.g., life in a monastery or temple and abandonment of the family and social ties). Thus, diffused religion was dependent upon the effective functioning of secular institutions, since its existence rested on their continued vitality. In time of social disorder, when the secular institutions collapsed, diffused religion lost the devotion of the people. By contrast, the great religions, being separate institutions of religious life, had a lasting quality. In other words, the weakness of institutional religion was its strength. Being only functionally attached to the establishment allowed it to detach itself when the structure crumbled, while diffused religion,
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being inexorably intertwined with the structure of the state, faltered with it.

Islam, an institutional religion with its own theology, worship and priesthood, could, like Buddhism and Taoism, exist independently of the state and survive after the collapse of the polity. For this reason, the Muslim community in China could lead its life separately from the Chinese establishment. But unlike the Chinese, who in time of stability could, and usually did, practise diffused religion while using the services of institutional religion, Muslims were bound exclusively to one religion -- Islam. Thus for Chinese Muslims Islam had to fill the role of both institutional and diffused religion. This may explain why Islam was a strong institutional religion in China as opposed to the relative weakness of Chinese institutional religions.

Islam, then, manifested both the structural independence of institutional religion and the functional stamina of diffused religion. But, unlike the diffused religion of China, which rested upon existing Chinese institutions (the family, the clan, the community, and the local and central political order) Chinese Islam rested wholly and exclusively on the Muslim congregation. For the Chinese, the kinship group constituted the congregation that performed the ritual of ancestor worship. Trade guilds had their gods, and the worship of these gods was part and parcel of the organization's operation. In agricultural communities, the patron-gods symbolized the collective existence of that community, and the local leaders officiated as priests. In the rituals of the state, such as those relating to Heaven and Earth, the performance of the cult was part of the administrative routine of the Emperor and his officials, while the entire public acted as the congregation. For Muslims, the community -- the Umma -- was everything, insofar as Muslims are supposed to live according to the Word of God (Qur'an), as transmitted to mankind by the Prophet of Allah (Muhammad).

The Umma, since its early inception by the Prophet, has had a dual character. On the one hand, it was a political organization, a new social organism which Muhammad had substituted for the traditional tribe. Yet, at the same time, the Umma had a basically religious meaning. Political and religious objectives were never really distinct in Muhammad's mind or in the minds of his contemporaries.5

The Prophet had also learned that religion related to social life. He realized that religious doctrines had to find ritual and social expressions in order to have any impact on the community. Hence, he instituted the Umma as the embodiment of a way of life. The Five Pillars of the religion, repeatedly practised day after day, validated the membership in this Umma. From the Muslim's point of view, the Umma was the operative group that set him apart from all non-believers and protected him against them.

In China, then, a Muslim did not practise ancestor worship in the family; his rituals were performed within the Umma. He could not worship the
god-patron of the guild or of the village, but had to set up his own guild and his own village as part of the *Umma*. He did not partake in the state cult, and did not recognize the authority of those who administered it, so he had to rely totally on the priesthood of the *Umma* — the *Imam* and the *A-hung*.

Because of its added quality as a diffused religion, Islam in China did not suffer from the weaknesses which affected Chinese institutional religions. It displayed vitality where they manifested weakness. For example, in most of the Buddhist and Taoist religious establishments (temples and monasteries) there were no priests at all; religious activities, even those centred around the temples, were conducted by the people themselves without priests in a guiding role. Thus, of course, attests to the weakness of the priesthood in organized institutional religion. Although Muslims may pray in private, a Muslim mosque cannot exist without an *Imam*. While the Buddhist priest, to the extent that there was one, had a limited responsibility in the area of ritual and none beyond that, the *Imam* acted more like a Christian Minister or a Jewish Rabbi, possessing a wide scope of authority by virtue of the charisma attached to his learning. He could give advice, interpret the *Sharî'a* for the daily needs of the congregation, settle differences between members of the community, etc. Chinese Muslims, unable to take part in many of the Chinese community’s activities, and without the guidance and authority of local Chinese leadership, had in consequence to look to the *Imam*, and to him only, for all of their needs.

Financially, clergy of Chinese institutional religions had inadequate support and controlled few, if any, sources of income except for temples and convents which had their own estate endowments. Mosques could muster financial resources from all members of the community, organized taxation in the form of *Zakat* (alms) and voluntary donations by well-to-do members in order to support varied activities in worship, education, publishing, welfare, etc. A Buddhist or Taoist priest’s livelihood depended on occasional small donations or remunerations for religious services for individuals. The *Imam* was employed by the congregation, as a Rabbi or a Minister would be nowadays. This institutionalized relationship between the *Imam* and the community made for stronger commitment on the part of both and for a higher standard of performance by the *Imam*, because generally others could be hired in his stead (although in some cases the position was hereditary).

A remarkable feature of Chinese institutional religion was the absence of a broad organized laity, except for some societies of devotees who were attached either to Buddhism or to Taoism. The secular population at large lacked a formally organized relationship with the priests and the temples. There was no membership requirement for worshipping in a temple, and the worshippers had no binding tie with the house of prayer or the officiating priest, when there was one. This was, in part, generated by the Chinese tradition of worship in different temples of different occasions. This made for the organizational fragmentation of the religious com-
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community, for there was no organic group collectively and continuously committed to a certain temple or a certain priest. In the Chinese setting, this lack of permanent organization may also have been prevented by the prevailing political outlook, which interpreted a following of organized laity as a group potentially dangerous to the political order.

In Chinese Islam, organized laity was the congregation, and every Muslim was a member. In places where more than one mosque was available, Muslims could choose to go to either, but they were generally attached to one or the other in perpetuity.

In Chinese religions the priests had low social status. Ordination to priesthood was an improvement of status for the poor, to be sure, but it was a degradation for middle and upper class individuals. If a learned priest ranked with the scholars as a member of the élite, it was because of his Confucian learning, not his priestly status. An Imam enjoyed the highest prestige in the Muslim community. Even Muslims who attained scholarly ranks and high positions in government were likely to preserve respect and awe towards the Muslim spiritual leader.

Buddhism and Taoism of the post-Sung era showed a lack of participation in education and charitable work in the community. This was due partly to the fact that education and charity were regular functions of the local magistrates in cooperation with local notables. Education was a Confucian monopoly, and because most priests were ignorant of the Confucian Classics, they were thus disqualified as teachers. Education in Confucian tradition was indoctrination on the part of the political order, and since institutional religions were detached from this order, they had no business in it even if they were qualified to teach it. Charity was organized by local officials who induced wealthy merchants and gentry to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of institutions for the destitute and disabled. In times of famine, relief was extended to the poor on the same basis. Organized religion was in no position, financially or otherwise, to take up that role, thus further weakening its position in society.

Islamic communities, even those located in the smallest villages, had an education system designed to train children in the Holy Scriptures. The interior of Chinese mosques was divided into a lecture hall, a dormitory, conference rooms, the offices of the community leaders and the "dead man's room" for washing the deceased. This meant that they had facilities to accommodate members of the community in all stages of their life (and death): prayers, religious festivals, education, weddings and funerals. There were few or no beggars among Muslims, and no Muslim girl became a prostitute. If "a Muslim female should fall into bad company, the local community would buy her freedom right away and remarry her."

It is paradoxical that those factors whose absence made for the weakness of Chinese institutional religions and whose presence made for the strength of Chinese Islam, brought about the same result: structural decentralization of both.
In Buddhism and Taoism, the inherent weakness of the organizations as manifested in the shortage of clergy, the scarcity of funds, the absence of a broad laity, and non-participation in educational and charitable systems provide adequate explanation. In Chinese Islam, on the other hand, we see elements of strength and communal cohesion that should have led to centralization.

In reality, Chinese Islam was totally fragmented. Local congregations were completely independent of each other and recognized no outside authority either in the county, the province or the Empire. The Sharif of Mecca was considered for a time as a most venerated priest of the religion, but no definite authority was attached to his special status. Occasionally, great learned scholars such as Ma Tehsin in Yunnan won recognition beyond their locality, but the deep respect stemming from scholarly authority had no real power attached to it.

We can turn the question around and ask why so decentralized an institutional religion as Islam was so strong, while an equally decentralized Buddhism was so weak. As we have seen, the explanation lies, first of all, in the vitality of Islam as a diffused religion. Secondly, it had the authoritarianism of a communal religion, although it was at the same time voluntary in form, like Buddhism and other institutional religions.

In Chinese communal religion the worship of Heaven and the sacrifices to the ancestors and deities were conducted by officials and civic leaders for the well-being of all the people in the community. Every member of the community was considered a believer by virtue of his membership of his clan or village. Regardless of his views, he benefited by the religious rites, and he was forced by group pressure to take part in ancestor worship. There was no choice in religious beliefs, but neither did it occur to the common man to make any other choice. Religious values were embedded in the traditional moral order, and religion was an integral part of communal existence, inseparable from the individual’s existence. With the rise of institutional religions in China, Buddhism and Taoism, came an element of voluntarism. Membership in the religion was no longer inherited but acquired by conversion, as a voluntary choice of the individual.

In Islam, the element of Iman (Faith) is essential. It is a revealed religion in which both the message of Allah and the Prophet who carried it to mankind are an integral part of the faith. The creed links these two fundamental verities: “I testify that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah.” This is the statement of faith that is required of converts to Islam and of Muslims, who thereby validate daily their membership of the community. This statement is “voluntary,” as is the behavior of Muslims reflected in the daily implementation of the Five Pillars of Islam. For if it is the quest for correct life that stands out as the supreme motive of the Islamic experience, and the correct life is prescribed in the Sunna, then the authoritarianism of the religion overrides its voluntarism. Doctrines and duties can be accepted as binding only when they
are imposed by, or derived from, a source beyond human questioning. Directly or indirectly, any regulation should go back to Allah, either in what he transmitted in the Qur'an, His Word, through the Prophet, or in what he caused Muhammad to do or say as his Messenger.

A Muslim is born into his community, given a Muslim name, taught Arabic, brought up as a Muslim, and educated to respect the Imam. Almost regardless of his individual will, he benefited from the protection of the congregation and submitted to communal pressure, psychological if not tangible, to participate in the common activities. A Muslim also had practically no choice in religious beliefs, because religious values were embedded in the moral order and were an integral part of the community's existence, inseparable from the individual's existence.

Just as the Chinese believed in the supremacy of Heaven and its associated deities and their ability to bring about a united and peaceful Empire, so the Muslim was permeated by a sense of the primacy of Allah, the One, the All-Powerful. However, while for the Chinese there was a direct relation between the deeds and moral conduct of the Emperor and his subjects on earth and the rewards and punishments by Heaven, Allah for the Muslim is not bound by any moral law and is in no way obliged to give man the right guidance or to reward and punish him in accordance with his obedience or disobedience. For “Allah leads astray whomever he wills and sets on the right path whomever he wills.”

The Chinese conceived the political order as part of the cosmic order, and the worthy Emperor could maintain the harmony between them by his rightful conduct and due sacrifices. The Muslim denies laws of nature or any eternal cosmic order, because Allah's majesty is unrestrained and not bound to abide by any existing order. The apparent regularity of cosmic events is due to no irrevocable law of nature, but to Allah's habitual procedure. It is precisely Allah's unpredictability that makes him so awesome in the eyes of believers and makes Islam so authoritarian.

Islam, like Chinese communal religion, is traditionalist, which makes for stability and continuity. Institutional religions in China were "revolutionary" in that they introduced the new notion of extra-establishment worship, which is potentially detrimental to the ethico-political order. Diffused religion, on the other hand, had the effect of stabilizing and strengthening social institutions by its feeling of awe towards established ways. It became a source of support for the values and traditions of the established institutions. Idealization of the past was a characteristic of diffused religion, while institutional religion often required a break with the past and participation in a radically new way of life.

Islam has always been traditionalist. The Prophet's early followers (Sahaba) were the best generation, their successors (Tabi'una) the second best, and the following generation (Tabi'u at-tabi'una) third in line. From then on, the world
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has been deteriorating and will continue to deteriorate until the appointed end. The living generation is not permitted to change the inherited ways, for change must be for the worse. Since religion deals with all matters relevant to a good life, any innovation is to be rejected. The reformer, therefore, either invokes a Prophetic or Qur'anic witness for his proposal (compare with K'ang Yu-wei reinterpreting Confucius and the Classics), or advocates the return to the Golden Age of primitive Islam (Ta-t'ung in China). The authority of tradition is best held by a formalistic approach which gives promise of eliminating the wilfulness of personal reasoning. Prayer is ritual, not merely a personal involvement with Allah. Its complicated formulas and body movements are all prescribed in detail. In short, Islam lays claim to the totality of the believer's life and thought. Since there is no separate church organization that stands apart from the body of the laity, the Umma is the true repository of the living faith. The Prophet is reported to have said, "My Umma will never be agreed on an error." Thus, social, economic, and political problems have to be decided on religious grounds.

These are precisely the values that Chinese Muslim scholars attempted to instil in their fellow Muslims, in order both to block infringement by the dominant culture on the outer fringes of Islam and to reinforce Muslims in their determination to defend the borders of their faith. Thus, in contrast to the apologetic writings which sought compromise and accommodation with the host culture, literature for Muslims was as firmly Muslim as one could expect, to the extent that many of them believed that to study Chinese books was tantamount to betraying their religion. Let us examine some examples.

A Muslim author of the eighteenth century discussed at length deeds and words that could exclude a Muslim from the Faith, followed by detailed instructions on how to slaughter animals and what parts of the animals are permissible for consumption. The book is unmistakably directed to Muslims, as far as its style is concerned. Following are some of the prohibitions listed by the author, who is said to have enjoyed great fame among his co-religionaries:

Those who tell a non-Muslim: 'either you join our religion or join another' have to be expelled from Islam, because what they say amounts to equating the false religions to the true one.

In case you quarrel with another Muslim and tell him: 'You are not as worthy as a believer of another faith', you will be excluded from Islam.

If someone says that learning for the purpose of one's subsistence is more important than learning the Holy Book, he shall be excluded from Islam, because that would amount to attaching more importance to the material world and disregarding the Sacred Book and the religious doctrines.

If you prostrate (k'ou-t'ou) before someone or let others prostrate
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Before you, you shall be excluded from Islam.  

When you talk to someone and you designate the True Religion by the formula ‘pi-chiao’ (my humble religion), and other religions by the formula ‘kui-chiao’ (your honourable religion) you will be expelled from Islam, for this would amount to giving honour to other religions and deprecating the Pure and True one. You may only say ‘wo chiao’ (my religion).

This last prescription is particularly puzzling, for it demands from the Muslim in China total deviation from the polite formulas that are customary among the Chinese. It is all the more puzzling because this kind of dialogue could only take place between a Chinese and a Muslim, thus exposing the Muslim to the usage of impolite parlance at the risk of being looked down upon by the Chinese and reinforcing the stereotype of the rough and coarse Muslims.

A more recent Muslim work deals with Muslim rituals, and plays up the same theme of the uniqueness and superiority of Islam. Here, no trace of resemblance between Islam and Chinese tradition is to be found:

Our Creed is based on Heavenly scriptures, not on what was performed by men or by saints. Qur’an is the most valuable of scriptures. It will last forever. God picked out the purest man in the world and assigned him to preach on his behalf. to interpret the correct way of life for mankind.

Of course, this daring disengagement from the Chinese tradition came at a time when Confucianism had all but disappeared as a politico-religious system. But the emphasis on Islamic values is nonetheless remarkable.

Still another example dates from the middle of the nineteenth century, and is in the form of an anonymous proclamation by a Chinese Muslim scholar, who warns his community against deviations from the Law of God. He listed fourteen articles of faith, containing some of the main prescriptions and prohibitions of Islam, and urged Muslims to abide by them and stay away from Chinese customs:

While accompanying the coffin, although incense is burned, it is nevertheless necessary to walk in an orderly fashion and to observe silence on the way. Music and fireworks are forbidden. If someone does not obey these religious laws, the Three Ecclesiastics shall jointly impose upon him a penalty. If he does submit to this penalty, the community will punish him. If he does not accept this punishment, the Three Ecclesiastics will send him with a document to the local mandarin, leaving him to the justice of the state.

Let us return to the question of ritual purity in eighteenth and nineteenth century Islam. It is important to note at this point that the community
strove to inculcate its values into its members and, to whatever extent was possible, to be its own judge. Only in extreme cases of non-compliance would a Muslim be handed over to the heathen authorities lest the community be contaminated by his heresy. As the purity of the *umma* must be preserved by excommunicating the sinner, so any Muslim girl who married a Chinese was thereby excluded from the community:

If a maiden has been given in marriage to an infidel, then that sin is as grievous as high treason. This is a sin that passes from generation to generation and cannot be expiated even by execution. The sin of the partner (to the marriage) is heavy, but the most grievous of all is that of the match-maker. On the future Day of Judgment all of them shall be interrogated.

Wine and tobacco are prohibited because "they spoil the natural condition and ruin the breathing organs. Harlots and games are forbidden." A *propos* of this, Owen Lattimore tells of Muslims in Kuihua (northwest of Peking) who had been soiled by wine, tobacco, and evil dealing. They were, therefore, considered backsliders in the community and buried in a cemetery separate from the "good Muslim" burial grounds.

The proclamation obliges everyone to pay the *Zakat* (tithe) in order to support the needy. In short, a Muslim community worthy of its name must do everything it can to preserve its cohesion and self-sufficiency because the less it depends on the Chinese society, the less likely were the Chinese to interfere in its affairs.

Thus, we find Muslims in trades that they nearly monopolized in certain areas of China – cart transportation, horse dealing and related trades that won them the nickname of *ma-fu* (horse owner). They dominated the tea trade on the Tibetan border, caravan trade in North China and beef trade in many parts of the country. When they travelled, and they had to travel extensively because of their trades, they could always find shelter in mosques or in Muslim homes. As we have already mentioned, the mosques included a dormitory for this purpose. Because of their peculiar dietary habits and the prevailing Confucian ethico-political order, they usually avoided government service, although some of them attained prominence in officialdom. In the cities, Muslims had their own trade guilds.

This self-imposed isolation could only be maintained by an extraordinary sense of superiority that made for inward cohesion and a degree of aggressiveness outward. Muslims cared for each other, as we have seen, in providing for the needy (*Zakat*), hosting guests, supporting the weak and educating the young. An event is related by Dr. Anderson, a traveller in China, that may illustrate this solidarity:

The presence of our jemadar was a great event for the Muslims, and the demand for his services at the mosque was so great that he entirely
lost the use of his voice, to the grievous disappointment of the celestial Mohammedans. My native doctor held them in extreme contempt and used to assert that they were no Mussulmans. They were full, however, of kindness to their fellow religionists in our guard without distinction, and did everything in their comfort.

Chinese Muslim communal welfare may have been one of the attractions in their covert missionary work among the Chinese. Accounts abound of the conversion of Chinese women through marriage to Muslims, of thousands of Chinese women through marriage to Muslims, of thousands of Chinese children who were bought from their parents in times of drought or other calamities and brought up as Muslims, of Muslim army officers who brought into their faith many of their subordinate Chinese, and of servants who embraced the religion of their Muslim masters. This process went on from Yuan times as reported by Ibn Battuta, through Republican times as related by Arab and European authors.

The Muslim Chinese felt that they belonged to an alien people and regarded themselves as superior to their neighbours. Just as Chinese hatred toward Muslims may be traced back to the Yuan, when Muslim bureaucrats were the masters, so the Muslims may have preserved their feelings of superiority since those days, and reinforced them by their communal distinctiveness and by their claim to be the adepts of the Word of Allah and the disciples of His Messenger. The sense of superiority may also have been developed as a defence against the contempt in which the Chinese held them, thus countering the Chinese stereotypes about the Hui by their own “One Hui equals five Chinese.” (Compare with “Black is Beautiful” in contemporary America.)

Muslim counter-contempt for the Chinese was so deep-seated that when a Chinese became converted to Islam, it was customary in many parts of China to have him eat crude soda to obtain internal purification, so that he could join the Pure and True Faith. This very term (Ching Chen Chiao) was probably coined in reaction to the gross vilification of the Muslim religion by the Chinese, as exemplified by their explanation of the Muslims’ reason for using Arabic inscriptions on their mosques in place of Chinese characters (in most cases, in fact, this is not a factual charge):

Many years ago, some evil spirit, seeing on a mosque the inscription 𒇨𒇬𒇯 (Sage of the West), hung up on a complimentary tablet outside the mosque, cut off the top part of three of the characters, thus, 𒇰𒇶𒇯 meaning the Bastards of the Four Winds of Heaven.

Whenever the Muslim was able to assert himself, he demonstrated his superiority in an aggressive manner. He was generally stronger and more overbearing in disposition than the Chinese, full of energy and enterprise, a shrewd businessman, likely to outsmart the Chinese in his dealings with them. Here are a few illustrations, the first related by Dr. Anderson as he was crossing Honan in
1895 with a Muslim carter. He reported:

Never before or since, did I accomplish a journey in such a speed. The carter allowed no obstacle to obstruct him. When the roads were impassable, through mud or water, he would dash up on the neighbouring fields, defying the angry farmers who threatened him with their pitchforks. Other carters who blocked his way when on the high roads, were frequently subjected to fierce threats, and on one occasion, when obstructed by a long string of salt carts, drawn by oxen, he actually cut a man’s face open with his lash. Though he was travelling alone and the ox carts were in caravan, he so cowed his opponents that he passed on with no protest from the offended Chinese, other than hard words. This contrast to the lethargic Chinese, who waste hours by the roadside in wranglings and disputes, was truly astounding.

Of a similar incident in Inner Mongolia, another Western eye witness relates:

The Muslim owner of the caravan took more than usual initiative in handling the affairs of the road. He seemed to be more prompt and energetic in his measures and decisions than the Chinese. Muslim caravans in Mongolia behave more freely and do not concern themselves with local customs. They take their own taboos with them and overrule the books of etiquette of local godlings.

Thus, part of Muslim aggressive frustration was directed at other minority groups, as is often the case with oppressed minorities, regardless of their inner conviction of superiority and righteousness. Chinese Muslim hostility toward the Jewish group in China was notable, although, or rather because, they were so similar that the Chinese made little distinction between them. By the same token, Chinese Jews disliked Muslims.

This is explained by the instinct to direct aggression away from the primary source of frustration because of the dangers and difficulties in attacking members of the dominant group. In Skinner’s words:

An organism which has received a painful shock, will also, if possible, act to gain access to another organism toward which it can act aggressively. The aggressive behaviour is not necessarily directed toward the actual source of stimulation, it may be “displaced” toward any convenient person or object.

We have seen so far two levels of Muslim response to the Chinese prejudice and discrimination: the majority-minority level of interaction involving the precarious balance between hostility and accommodation; and the inner level of the community, where a high degree of awareness and cohesion prevailed, with occasional outbursts of outward aggression as a safety valve.
The next chapter will deal with the Chinese Muslim and the world Muslim community, which provided another focus for the Muslim's attention, an outlet for his frustrations and a basis for his aspirations.
CHAPTER V

The Chinese Muslim and the Universal Umma: The Muslim Response III

The only political unity of Islam was the ideological but powerful concept of Dar-al-Islam, the common homeland of all Muslims.

J. H. Kramers

If the main concern of Muslims was focused on religion and their identity with the machinery of its enforcement — the Umma — then the deeply ingrained Chinese tradition of identification with the locus of domicile did not obtain with them. The specific congregation to which a Muslim belonged had for him a functional and temporary quality, not the intrinsic and immutable value that the Chinese felt for his village, county and province.

For the Chinese, attachment to the locale was part of the way of his ancestors. His life and death in the locale were irrevocably tied up with the local spirits whose protection he sought and the geomancy that he could not disturb. This deep identification with the locale was instrumental not only in the development of local patriotism, but also in the development of the spirit of association (hui) among the Chinese. Ask any Chinese about his homeland, and he will most probably give you the name of his county and province. Chinese originating from the same province or county will find each other when they live or travel outside their provinces, within or outside China, and form associations on that basis (Tu'ng-hsiang hui).

The link between the local and the universal was provided by the literati, who had provincial ties and local commitments but were at the same time the owners of the high culture that transcended the locale and encompassed T'ien-hsia, the whole civilized world. Levenson has remarked that "such ties were part of, not rival to, ecumenical Confucianism, transprovincial, or worldly and cosmopolitan. These ties formed part of the personal-relationship ambiance of Confucianism."

Chinese gentry played the double role of local social leaders and also of a trained, skilled, educated and indoctrinated pool of potential officials of the Empire. In both roles the literati were acknowledged as superior men who knew how to manage society, knew the proper rules of conduct, and could apply the ethical tenets of Confucianism to both the operation of the state and the affairs of the people. In this capacity, they provided the link between state and society. Thus, the gentry-officials, while serving the Emperor, were at the same time in opposition to him as champions of local interests. Local interests were not only
economic (as landlords) but also social (as members of clans and lineages). Because of the prestige that their Confucian training gave them, sanctioned by the state examination system, they filled various social functions that reflected both their ethical commitment to the system, as chün-tzu, and their social commitment as members of their clans and leaders of their communities. They acted as arbitrators in local conflicts, took care of the poor and the weak, organized charity and relief in times of calamity and supervised education. In other words, their state-sponsored Confucian training gave them the knowledge of the moral code that was essential for the operation of society, while their function in society provided the state with the stability and continuity in local government. It was the balanced tension between these two poles of government that enabled the hierarchical system to function effectively.

It is precisely this balance that breaks down in the relationship between the Confucian state and Muslim communities in China. The Muslim elite, i.e., the Imams, who managed the affairs of the community in the fields of social welfare, arbitration of disputes and education, were religious figures whose ideology, far from thriving on symbiotic coexistence with the state was in many ways antithetical to it. Their commitment to the community was not ordained by a social status sanctioned by the state, but by an elective office they gained through their knowledge. Their knowledge of Islam, though universal in import, was acknowledged only by their local community. Since Chinese Islam, much like the Islamic World of the post-Abbasid era, was fragmented and inchoate, no hierarchy was present to make demands on the Empire or to impose uniform rules on the people. No Islamic hierarchy could have been allowed by the Confucian state in any case, since any non-Confucian hierarchy, being outside the state and independent of it, would be deemed heretical inasmuch as it would undermine the monolithic dominance of the Confucian order.

Professor Lapidus has remarked that:

While Chinese society was formed by tensions immanent in a hierarchy of institutions, Islamic society was held together by voluntary arrangements consecrated by religious conceptions and prophetic and learned leadership.3

These different modes of social organization he attributes to the differences in cultural styles between the two civilizations, the Chinese having a hierarchical view of society, and the network concept being consistent with the mental world of Islam. This analysis seems to obtain in Chinese Islam as well.

However, Moroccan Islam could be “made, unmade, and remade” around charismatic religious figures who coalesced in fluid confederations to support the Sultan, who was also a religious figure. In Syria under the Mamluks control was fragile, allowing network systems where religious and political norms played their part to be the basic means of social integration.4 But Chinese Muslim
society was under the firm control of a non-Islamic, centralized hierarchical system, and unable, under normal circumstances, to establish a central government of its own. Therefore, short of rebellion and secessionism Chinese Muslims had no way to express themselves politically within a system with which they could not be identified and whose ideology they could not embrace. Thus, the Chinese Muslim community had to turn its attention to different quarters.

For the Chinese Muslim the local congregation provided the framework of his life and the focus of his identity. But at the same time he realized that this was only part of the universal Muslim community -- the Umma. Since the Umma had, from its inception, the dual character of a political as well as a religious organization, through it the Chinese Muslim could sublimate his political frustration in China and his political aspirations outside of it. Similarly, since the Muslim had no mystical attachment to his locus of domicile, he substituted for it Arabia, the holy place of inception of the Umma, or other loci of significance to Muslims.

Dr. Morrison, a traveller in China at the beginning of the nineteenth century, related the following:

On the evening of September 10, whilst walking on shore at a village called T’u-liao, about fifty miles from T’ien-tsin, I observed written on the lantern of a poor huckster’s shop 'A Muhammedan shop.' On stopping to ask the owner, who was an old man, whence he came, he replied: ‘From Hsi-yang.’ (The Western Ocean). When urged to say from what country of the West, he said he did not know. He understood his family had been in the place in which he now was for five generations.5

The old man’s family had been there for five generations, but he came from the Western Ocean.

Owen Lattimore, a century later, encountered the same phenomenon during his travel with a caravan to Inner Mongolia:

The talk turned on the Muhammedans. Some said that their Holy city is west of Turkestan. One of them said that he had heard the ‘Turban-ed-Heads’ (Muslims) speak of it, they called it Rum.6

In Chinese Muslim literature since 1642 (none is known to have been written prior to that date7), the centrality of Arabia was a recurrent theme. T’ien-fang (the Celestial Area) was the Chinese word for the land of the Prophet. One Muslim author of the seventeenth century boasted about his ancestors being from T’ien-fang.8 Another author entitled his treatise about Islam T’ien-fang Tian-li (Rituals of Arabia).9 Still another wrote:

Arabia, not China, is the centre of the world. Fu-hsi, the first legendary monarch of China, was a descendant of Adam who came from the West...10
The Arabic alphabet, the sacred script of the Holy Qur’an, was by derivation referred to as T’ien-fang tsu-mu (Arabia’s characters).

Since the Muslims in China were under the rule of the heathen and thus unable to put into practice the political aspects of the ideal of the Umma, they were in a dilemma as to how they should conduct themselves. Were they to rebel or to accept the yoke of their rulers? What was the limit of infringements on the borders of the Umma that they could tolerate? In case the situation became intolerable, to whom should they turn? Should they dissipate their frustration and wait for the Ta-shih (Great Enterprise) that sectarian groups in China had always been waiting for? The solutions to these problems were sought in the framework of the universal Umma, in terms of the relationships that tie Muslim communities together, their rights and obligations in the Lands of Islam and in foreign lands.

Islam seems always to have had a pragmatic approach to these questions, and no clear-cut dogma was worked out. This is understandable, since the ideal of Muslims has always been to live under Muslim government, and Muslim political theory provides comprehensive rules for the functioning of such government. If religious political theory were to lay the rules for contingencies outside the realm of the Muslim state, it would thereby have implicitly sanctioned such situations.

In Islamic legal theory the world is divided into Dar-al-Islam (Pax Islamica), comprising Islamic and non-Islamic territories held under Islamic sovereignty, and the rest of the world, called Dar-al-Harb (Territory of War). Dar-al-Islam was in theory in a state of war with Dar-al-Harb, because the ultimate objective of Islam was the world. If Dar-al-Harb was reduced by Islam, Islamic public order would supersede other orders, and non-Muslim communities either accept Islam or submit to Islamic sovereignty under unequal treaties. But until that goal might be achieved, Dar-al-Harb was not a no-man’s land, and Muslims were under obligation to respect the rights of non-Muslims, both combatant and civilian, while fighting was in progress. During the short intervals of peace, when hostilities were suspended (for a period that should not in theory exceed ten years), Islam took cognizance of the authority which existed in these territories. Cognizance does not imply recognition, because the latter would mean Islam’s acceptance of non-Islamic sovereignty as an equal entity. (This cognizance may be compared to the Chinese tributary system, which was conducted on the basis of patron and protégé, never on equality.)

Cognizance does mean that a political authority was needed (not necessarily desirable) for the existence of non-Muslim communities. It follows that if a Muslim were travelling or domiciled in Dar-al-Harb, he should not oppose the authorities of that territory, unless charged with the duty of doing so by a specific order from an Islamic authority. Moreover, if a Muslim entered Dar-al-Harb by Aman (pledge of security), he was under obligation to respect the law and
authority of that territory and abstain from committing any offence or injury to non-Muslims so long as he enjoyed the benefits of the Aman. At the same time, he was under obligation to conform to his own law, and if there were conflicts between Islamic law and the local law, there was no doubt that he should follow his own.12

This Islamic theory of international conduct is not to be found in the Qur’an or the Hadith, although its basic assumptions were derived from these sources. It was rather the product of Muslim speculation at a time when the Islamic Empire reached its full development. In response to a reality in which many cultural and ethnic groups were incorporated into the Empire, Muslim thinkers rationalized existing conditions and aspirations. Opinions of 'ulama differed as to what kind of territory would come under the definition of Dar-al-Islam, and, by exclusion, in Dar-al-Harb.

Muslim law binds individuals with respect to the Muslim community to which they belong, not to the territory in which they live. But since Muslims live in a certain territory, the law is bound to take into consideration the relation of the territory to the individuals. The law defines the status of the territory with respect to the Muslim community, not the status of the Muslims in relation to the territory. This means that the legal position of a territory would depend on the allegiance of its people to Islam, not on mere proclamations that it belongs to Islam. In this sense, any territory whose inhabitants observe Muslim law can be included within the definition of Dar-al-Islam. But what about a territory in which Muslim law is respected but the authority is in the hands of non-Muslims?

To this question there is no clear-cut answer. Some ‘ulama believe that only a territory in which Islam is accepted without restrictions and Muslim authority prevails is Dar-al-Islam. Others believe that it is enough that a Muslim should be able freely to fulfil the obligations of his faith for his domicile to come under this definition. One of the criteria for testing freedom of religion is whether the prayers of Fridays and Holidays could be performed without interference. Others say that such prayers could be held only where there was a wali (Representative of the Caliph) in whose name they were authorized, thus symbolizing the supremacy of the ruler of Islam over the Muslim community in question.13

The Hanafi madhhab (School of Law), which prevailed in China, laid down three conditions under which a Muslim territory reverts to Dar-al-Harb: first, if the law of the unbelievers is enforced; second, if it becomes separated from Dar-al-Islam by non-Muslim territory; third, if no believer or dhimmī could safely reside in the territory. Some jurists of this school insisted that enforcement of the law of the unbelievers instead of the Shari‘a is enough to put a territory beyond the pale of Dar-al-Islam. Consequently, if Muslims find it untenable to reside in that territory, they must migrate from it to Dar-al-Islam. But if they found that they could safely reside and hold their prayers, although the law of the unbelievers
was enforced, the territory might still be regarded, at least in theory, as a Muslim territory. The assumption is that the Muslims might return to it or that those who stayed might have the opportunity of persuading the unbelievers to join Islam.¹⁴

These broad definitions leave much room for interpretations as to what is Dar-al-Harb and where lay the borders of Dar-al-Islam, according to one's school of law or one's general tendency for strictness or flexibility. But one thing appears to be certain. That is, when Muslims lived in a territory that lies beyond the pale of Islam, they were not to oppose their rulers there, unless explicitly told to do so by an Islamic authority. Moreover, the Muslim was under obligation to respect the local laws as long as they did not contradict his own and as long as he enjoyed the benefits of Aman. But if they lived in a Muslim territory without Aman, then they were under no obligation at all to observe the local laws and regulations, for without Aman Muslims are, in theory, at war with that territory.¹⁵

Legally speaking, then, a Muslim dwelling in Dar-al-Harb was within his rights when he disregarded the law of the land under the following conditions: if he resided there without Aman and/or if he was not given freedom to worship. While the latter criterion is subjective and difficult to measure, the former is an accurately defined term whose applicability may be objectively examined in Islamic law.

Aman in its strict sense refers to the pledge of security accorded to the harbi (non-Muslims who live in Dar-al-Harb) who seeks protection from the Islamic state while he resides in Dar-al-Islam. Aman, then, is a temporary or transitory status, because after a year has elapsed the musta'min (secured) either reverts to his former status of harbi or becomes a dhimmi.¹⁶ The Aman was either implied in a treaty of peace or granted by the Muslim authorities. The musta'min was expected to respect the religious beliefs and practices of the Muslims and say or do nothing to harm Islam.¹⁷

The term Aman was extended by practice and reality requirements to apply to Muslims entering non-Muslim territories, with similar limitations (though these were not specifically stated).¹⁸ Thus if Muslims entered non-Muslim lands and established their domicile there, with the acquiescence of the local authorities, this could be construed as an implicit Aman accorded to them, even though the element of temporariness or transitoriness of the original Aman was no longer applicable. But due to the interpretive flexibility of the law, and the broad definitions that distinguish Dar-al-Harb from Dar-al-Islam, almost any place where Muslims reside could be defined as one or the other almost at will.

In China, for example, places where Muslims constituted the majority and Muslim worship went unhindered by the authorities could be described as part of Dar-al-Islam. Failing this, one could say that Chinese territory was Dar-al-Harb, but due to the explicit permission that was accorded the Muslims in various periods to reside in China, and the favours attached thereto,¹⁹ an Aman was implicit.
Still others could say that since China was Dar-al-Harb, and no explicit Aman was granted to Muslims (for one thing, Aman was not a part of the Chinese legal system), they were at war with the Chinese authorities. This variety of possible interpretations, under varying circumstances, may have determined whether Chinese Muslims would accept Chinese rule and abide by Chinese laws, or in contrast consider themselves in a state of war against the Chinese Dynasty, or perhaps even think of themselves as independent of China, having attained the status of Dar-al-Islam, severing themselves from and entering into conflict with Dar al-Harb.

These permanent uncertainties, far from working to the disadvantage of Chinese Muslim communities, on the contrary gave them leeway to work out rationalizations to situations they could do little to reverse in any case. In “normal” times, when law and order prevailed and the level of cultural oppression was tolerable, Muslims accepted their fate without much ado. After all, law and order have always been of great concern to Muslim communities, so any ruler was considered better than no ruler at all. Even when Muslim territory was conquered, the ulama often preached obedience to the victor in order to avoid instability. For example, when the Mongols swept Syria in 1299, the leading Muslim scholars sent a delegation to the occupying authority in Gaza to seek peace and assurances of security. They saw submission and cooperation with the conqueror as their duty.²⁰

If foreign rule was deemed preferable to lawlessness, banditry and bloodshed, it was all the more so for a Muslim minority, which stood to lose most of all in case of chaos. Rashid Rida²¹ not only recognized the necessity for Muslims to submit to non-Muslim rule but he even sanctioned their participation in wars for their land of domicile provided the war was not waged against other Muslims. The rationale was:

The Muslim’s obedience to his state serves the purpose of defending his own co-religionaries against the state’s oppression when the state is oppressive, and contributes to their equality with others, in case the state is righteous. . .It is desirable for the Muslims to participate in all social activities within the state, because a strong and proud state makes them strong and proud, too. . .Islam does not allow its followers to elect weakness and degradation over strength and pride, failing which they would fall short of preserving their religion.²²

In times of disorder such as those which prevailed in China since the end of the Ch‘ien-lung period (1736-1796), Muslims might come to the conclusion that there is no law and order anyway, that they had better take measures to protect themselves if nobody else would. Under these circumstances, if there ever were an implicit Aman, it would be void, since the state had failed to protect their freedom to practise their faith unhindered. Moreover, if Islam in China was no longer a workable way of life, then China can be said to have fallen under the definition of Dar-al-Harb. Thus, a Muslim was no longer bound to respect its laws.
and regulations, and he would be justified in rising against it.

The instrument through which Dar-al-Harb would be transformed into Dar-al-Islam was the Jihad. Jihad, in its broad sense, means the exertion of one's own power to make the Word of Allah supreme over the world, the individual recompense for which is the achievement of salvation. For participation in the Jihad, especially martyrdom, was Allah's direct way to Paradise. This end could be achieved either by violent means (war, forced conversion) or peacefully, by religious propaganda. But since no war other than Jihad was permitted by Islam, Jihad had to be related to Islamic state authority, the ultimate purpose being the establishment of Islamic sovereignty and the expansion of the area of validity of Allah's Word under Islamic political authority. The Jihad was a permanent obligation for Muslims collectively, until Dar-al-Harb would be reduced to non-existence.

The ambivalence of Jihad as either a violent or a peaceful means, or both, to achieve the universal Dar-al-Islam, facilitated and a priori justified any choice Chinese Muslims would make. When they did not rebel, they could point to their daily Jihad in converting thousands of Chinese children and Chinese women to Islam and to their literature that stood fast for the defence of the spiritual front of Islam. When they rose in arms, they were certainly justified in their effort to disengage from Dar-al-Harb and bring their country into the pale of Islam. The main conclusions from this discussion are: first, that any Muslim uprising, i. e., act of war, had to be sanctioned as a Jihad in order to be permitted. Second, any leader of rebellion had to be a religious figure, or be sanctioned by religious authorities, in order to possess the inherent authority to declare Jihad. Third, any Jihad could be declared only and solely on the premise that it had a political goal in mind. In brief, a Muslim uprising in China was, in theory, a Jihad led by an Imam or Imam--supported figure for the purpose of establishing an Islamic polity. But in practice, due to the wide range of possible definitions and interpretations of Jihad, actual hostilities could go on without their being termed Jihad, or Jihad could be said to exist even if no hostile acts were actually being conducted.

If a Muslim uprising succeeds, even temporarily, then what is attained has to be an Islamic state, governed by Islamic law, and the "liberated" territory reverts to Dar-al-Islam. Non-Muslims who live under Islamic law can either be given a temporary Aman or immediately pressed to convert to Islam, or failing these alternatives, be fought against until they submit to Islam or perish. Since the Chinese and non-Muslim minority groups in China do not belong to Ahl-al-Kitab (although they have scriptures), no status of dhimmi could be accorded to them. This broad variety of theoretical possibilities, which could sometimes materialize in reality, was present. I suggest, in the minds of Muslims in China and had the effect of lending a quality of temporariness and infinality to their communal organization and to their living in the Chinese state under non-Muslim rule.
An undefinable feeling of expectation and a vague hope were ever-present in the midst of Muslims in China. Someday, somehow, somebody might come and restore them to Dar-al-Islam and to full participation in the life of the universal Umma. This was something like the mystique of “next year in Jerusalem” which has always been present among Jews in the Diaspora, or like the millenarian expectations among Chinese sectarian movements. Not unlike these two groups, Chinese Muslims, while entertaining their deeply ingrained aspirations, went about their daily business wholeheartedly. At the same time, due to the options that were theoretically open to them, they devoted considerable attention to educating and preparing themselves for such contingencies.

This was attained by a three-pronged programme. First, the Muslims kept from becoming Chinese; this was done by reinforcing a sense of superiority and distinctiveness, and encouraging the Muslim to remain socially and economically as independent of the Chinese as possible. Second, the Muslim became a better member of his community through strong communal organization, inculcation of Islamic values, communal worship and activities, a total and unqualified identification with his fellow Muslims, and moral submission to the Imam. Third, the Chinese Muslim was made a conscious member of the world Muslim community. This was achieved, as we have seen, by cultivating in the Muslim the centrality of Arabia, Islam, and the Islamic Empire, Islamic tradition and values. But this was not all.

The daily prayers in the mosque were not only a communal worship, but also a way of identification with all Muslims who faced the same qibla (direction of prayer) — Holy Mecca, the place of inception of Islam and conception of the Prophet. Some Chinese Muslims who could afford it went on the Hajj (pilgrimage) and participated with the Muslim multitudes in common rituals that must have generated a feeling of religious exaltation. On the way to and from Mecca, some Chinese Muslim notables visited Islamic centres such as Cairo and Constantinople, and on their return home they told their fellow Muslims of the marvels of the Islamic world and of their brethren there.

Muslims from Persia, India and Turkey seem to have paid sporadic visits to Muslim communities in China. Some of them, especially scholars, stayed for long periods of time and presumably shared their knowledge with their co-religionaries. Chinese Muslims also met other Muslims in Asia on their way to the Hajj. They received hospitality in mosques in Colombo, in Singapore and Hanoi. From Yunnan, Chinese Muslims maintained a permanent correspondence with Muslim scholars in Southeast Asia and Arabia, whence they sought advice when they faced problems of interpretation of the Shari’a.

At the close of this chapter, I would like to try to dispel any implication that I may have unwillingly produced concerning the uniformity of Islam in China. The picture depicted so far, based on samplings of materials and Muslims from all parts of China, can at best reflect the broad lines of Chinese Islam and is
by no means applicable to every Muslim in every Muslim community throughout the Empire. For there remain ambiguities, uncertainties, paradoxes and puzzles that defy definition, generalization and analysis.

For example, Chinese Muslims were depicted as trying to avoid contact with the Chinese and to focus their activities, economic and social, within their communities. Yet many Muslims not only took part in the Chinese system but became prominent in it, especially (though not exclusively) in the military domain. Examples abound: Cheng Ho, the famous maritime explorer of the Ming, who preceded Columbus by almost two centuries, was Muslim. Many high-ranking Muslim officials climbed through the examination system to some of the highest posts in Chinese government, as did Ma Hsin-i, Governor-General of Fukien and Chekiang in the late Ch'ing.

Under the Republic Pai Ch'ung-hsi attained the most prestigious post in the military: Chief of Staff under Chiang Kai-shek for many years. One of the Ch'ien-lung Emperor's favourite concubines, Hsiang Fei, a woman of extraordinary beauty, was also a Muslim.

The interesting puzzle about these celebrities is that, far from being held as turncoats by the Muslim communities (unless, of course, they participated in war against their brethren, as did Ma Ju-lung during the Yunnan Rebellion), they were a source of pride for every Muslim. To this day, Cheng Ho is mentioned with veneration, Pai Ch'ung-hsi's tomb in the Muslim cemetery in Taipei is a place of attraction. Hsiang Fei, who resisted the sexual desires of a heathen Emperor, is held in high esteem by the Muslims, even though Ch'ien-lung was not just anybody.34

This ambivalent attitude can be explained in terms of the pragmatic approach of Islam to the necessities of life, because Chinese Muslims did not, indeed could not, isolate themselves from a society on which they depended in many respects. But one might also think that Muslim inroads in the highest positions of power in government, especially in the military (which was the paradigm of power), may be attributed to a sublimation of their frustrations. They could thereby show to the Chinese who despised them that they, too, could make it to the top, despite their underprivileged position. Moreover, Muslims in top positions may have been thought able to intervene from within the system on behalf of their co-religionaries, and that in itself justified their deed, since in the final analysis they helped protect and preserve Islam rather than turning their backs on it. Even the Holy Qur'an justifies such a measure: "Good deeds exonerate evil doings."35

This situation is not uncommon under colonial regimes, where "natives" enrol in the service of the occupying power without necessarily losing the sympathy of their compatriots.

The record shows that in China many Muslim communities and Muslim individuals have drifted away from their heritage and acculturated more fully to
the host culture than the main stream of Chinese Islam, especially in isolated and God-forsaken places where maintaining one's distinctiveness could become a matter of daily embarrassment and constant nuisance rather than a source of pride and superiority. So we hear of Muslims who practised ancestor and local spirit worship,36 of Muslims who adopted Chinese mourning practices,37 and even of Chinese who respect some tenets of Islam but are unaware of their Islamic origin.38 There are missionary accounts of Muslims who would gather to listen to Christian preaching and find similarities between their faith and Christianity, a thing unheard of in lands of Islam.39 These phenomena are due to the organizational fragmentation of Chinese Islam and the absence of supra-communal authority that could look after the needs of small and isolated communities and save them from extinction. For, as Skinner has remarked: “The greater the number of individuals who carry a species or a culture, the greater its chances of survival.”40

Local compromises that Islam had made during its expansion, and the incorporation of 'urf (local customs) into the Shari'a,41 had brought about the spread of the faith. But that was achieved under a victorious conquering Islam, whose self-confidence allowed it to compromise. It was a compromise by a condescending collective, sure of itself and its final victory, using accommodation and compromise as a tactic to get to an end. The Muslims who compromised with Chinese customs and values were at best tolerated in a land where they were despised, exposed to ridicule and onslaught of their hosts. Their compromise was one of individual imitation, a strategy to merge with the dominant culture, as an end in itself. Islam had gone a long way from compromise to compromise.
CHAPTER VI

Muslim and Chinese: The Formula of Uneasy Co-existence

I want you to know that we possess complete domination over your bodies, but not over your hearts. Behave properly outwardly, and that will spare you and us the trouble of your inner concerns. Show us good deeds, and if you indulge in evil Allah is helpful.

Utba Ibn-Sufyan

Exactly as Islam was not uniform in space, neither was it immutable in time. The generalizations advanced above apply, in the main, to Islam in the pre-nineteenth century period. At the turn of that century, due to the breakdown of administration, internal rebellion and external aggression which wreaked havoc on China, the Muslim community was also deeply affected. Islam under the Republic, and more so under the Communist regime, has gone through transformations that are beyond the scope of the present work.

The neatly drawn picture of Islam, moving from the phase of Uneasy Co-existence to confrontation, rebellion and statehood, should not mislead one into conceiving of its development in a linear deterministic fashion. For not all Muslims in China participated in these sweeping changes, nor did those who participated make the changes permanent. The scheme is, perhaps very appropriately for a segment of Chinese history, a rather cyclical one. Muslim rebellions recurred during two centuries under the Ch'ing, some of them more successful than others, and then the situation reverted to the first phase again. But cyclical history does not necessarily imply marking time. In Toynbee's words:

Certainly, in the movement of all these forces that weave the web of human history, there is an obvious element of recurrence. Yet, the shuttle which shoots backwards and forwards across the loom of Time in a perpetual to-and-fro, is all this time bringing into existence a tapestry in which there is manifestly a developing design and not an endless repetition of the same pattern.

Thus, though the Muslim cycle of events repeated itself in the short run, the "developing design" is clearly discernible: the "Muslims in China" of the Yuan had become "Chinese Muslims" during the Ming, and individuals who acculturated to the system even became "Muslim Chinese." Secessionist rebellions took the Muslims out of China into which they returned as "Chinese Muslims" after their failure. In the present chapter we shall try to recapitulate the main components of the "developing design" that made co-existence between Chinese and
Muslims possible during the pre-Ch'ing period and prepare the ground for the analysis of the change that came about during Manchu rule in China.

Chinese Islam was peculiar in that it was not in a usual majority-minority situation. The distinction between Chinese and Muslim was not merely cultural but, more significantly, also religious. Religious heterogeneity has always been disruptive to political stability, because when opposing beliefs about ultimate values enter the political arena, they exacerbate struggles by preventing compromises that are otherwise not impossible between various cultural groups.

In conflicts of this sort, it is the minority religion that tends to push polarization, because it is the group that stands to lose to the existing majority order, while the dominant group, comfortable in its dominance, tends to brush off the import of the religious factor and look at the problem through "merely" cultural, that is social majority-minority, glasses. For these reasons, "solutions" that are generally suggested by the majority stop short of true compromise, no compromise about ultimate values being possible or desirable from the majority's viewpoint. Only some pluralistic societies in modern times have been able to reduce, though not eliminate, their inter-religious tensions by secularization (i.e., weakening religious values in general); by compartmentalization (i.e., separation of religious from other areas of life); and by homogenization (i.e., the convergence of different beliefs toward a vaguely defined consensus).

Were these solutions applicable and applied in pre-modern China, and could the Muslims be receptive to them?

Islam had arisen in a society whose only notion of law was established custom and tradition, sanctioned by public opinion. To this, Islam added the concept of positive law as a divine ordinance through revelation, combining all three elements in the Shari'a — the Sacred Law. Its basis in revelation gave it the character of an absolute and immutable system, all-inclusive and leaving no room for any other structure of law and legislature, at least in theory. Since law was all-inclusive, it should have defined also the modalities of Islamic government and the mutual relationships and responsibilities of governors and governed. But since it went no further than defining in general terms the particular responsibilities and moral duties attached to the function of governors, it must have assumed, as Gibb has pointed out, that relations between governors and governed should be subsumed under the general categories of Muslim social conduct.

Thus, established governments in Islam, however autocratic, have generally respected religious ordinances and personal law of Islam, preserving the connecting link with the religious institutions by appointing qadis (judges) to the religious courts and associating religious leaders with the ruling administration. In return for this, the religious notables assumed the task of mediating between the ideal demands of the Law and the actual policies of the governors, so as to preserve the unity and the religious heritage of the community.
In China, the frequent association of religious heterodox movements with potential rebellions generated an attitude of suspicion, if not open hostility, toward these groupings; they were regarded as politically dangerous. Even if some sectarian groups had no political aspirations, the government persecuted them anyway, due to the age-old fear that, given a politically ambitious and talented leadership (particularly in times of unrest), such groups could easily become instrumental in rebellions.

Thus the government considered that the socio-political order was constantly threatened by heterodox movements with dissenting social and political orientations, and therefore banned their operation. Only those institutional religions that won recognition, such as Buddhism, were permitted to function, and then only under government control. The heterodox movements were confined to secrecy and organized to offer resistance to suppression, if necessary, to protect their own forms of religious life. Secrecy and readiness to resist government were particularly necessary, as Yang remarked, for the doctrines of religious sects that aimed at universal salvation usually claimed superior powers for their deities over the world order. This dogma was obviously offensive to the authoritarian temporal power, which would tolerate no doctrine superior to the accepted orthodoxy.

Chinese Islam was in a middle-of-the-road position between an institutional recognized religion and a sectarian movement. Like other sects, it was certainly heterodox, for it claimed the superiority of Allah over the world order, was ready to resist the government in order to protect its way of life and pursued universal salvation. The inextricability of the socio-political life from religious theory, as we have observed, made Chinese Muslims anticipate, at least potentially, the Ta-shih, when they would establish on earth what they had been longing for: a new relationship between governor and governed based on the Shari'a, a place for qudat and 'ulama in the system, all aimed at the preservation of the heritage of the Umma.

Islam partook not only of some of the ideological characteristics of sectarian movements, but also of some of their functions. We have already mentioned that a Muslim, like a member of a sect, could circulate throughout China and find lodging, help and protection among his fellow-sectarians everywhere. Some Muslims used secret dialects to communicate, in writing by using Arabic letters to spell Chinese words, and in speech by using many Persian words when they were in the presence of undesired Chinese witnesses.

Like secret societies, the Muslims represented a sub-system, a counter-state in the society; their religion played the role of ethnocentrism in secret society ideology. A new member of the secret society was ritually reborn by joining the brotherhood. Chinese Muslims considered Japhet the father of the Chinese and Sem as their own, although both belong to the Chinese race. They explained that by...
having changed religion, they have also changed their father. This emphasis on substituting spiritual for biological descent and family relationship was certainly a characteristic of Chinese brotherhoods. It might also have served the purpose of lending historical depth to the Hui people, thus glorifying themselves in the eyes of their history-minded hosts, who were also proud of their gallery of illustrious mythological figures. Legendary stories about the origins of secret societies also abounded, and the History of the Sect was one of the beliefs shared by the members of each sect.

A traveller in Yunnan at the turn of the century presented this impression of the Muslim community:

Muslims may be organized like secret societies, as the general custom prevails here. The majority of ma-fu (cart-drivers) belong to this religion. In their to-and-fro travels through the land, they act as ready-made agents of liaison, without raising suspicions because of their occupational cover.

This vision of an all-pervading Muslim confrerie may be exaggerated, but it certainly reflects the intensification of Muslim clandestine activity at a time when secret societies in China were operating at full swing. This is another common denominator between Chinese Islam and secret societies. Both intensified their seditious operations when dynastic crisis was evident. For when the administration became corrupt and inefficient; when irrigation canals fell into decay; when droughts and floods, famine and despair plagued the countryside — then the ground was set for the anti-state to emerge, fill the vacuum and take over the management of the people's affairs.

But, unlike the Chinese sectarian organizations such as Maitreyan Buddhism which were essentially chiliastic, striving for antinomian order, Sunni Islam (of which the majority of Chinese Muslims were part) is not a messianic religion. The Prophet of God has already come to earth, and since he was the Seal of the Prophets, no other can be expected to come. The Word of Allah has already descended to mankind; its finality and all-embracing quality allow no other to appear and be visible. True, wicked rulers may depart from the Shari'a and ill-informed peoples may distort the contents of the Holy Qur'an with their own claims to possession of holy scriptures. But Islam should not bend to these anomalies, and the devout Muslim should live up to his faith and the teachings of the Shari'a as worked out in the Qur'an, the Sunna (tradition) and the Ijma' (consensus of the community).

However, Islam has also known chiliastic experience, especially in times of instability, centred around the symbol of the Mahdi. At the end of the Umayyad period (A.D. 661-750), the coming of a divinely-guided leader who would overthrow tyranny and fill the world with justice was no vague dream, but a firm and specific promise due for imminent fulfillment. Bernard Lewis has shown that
the titles of the first four Abbasid Caliphs (as-Saffah, al-Mansur, al-Mahdi, and al-Hadi) all have messianic connotations. Their appeal was to deep-rooted anxieties and passions and to the popular beliefs and prophecies about the imminent coming of a rightful leader who would end tyranny and inaugurate a new age of justice and plenty. By conforming to the signs and portents of the approaching Golden Age, and by adopting the titles of the divinely-appointed rulers who would lead mankind into it, they tried to persuade men that their advent was indeed the fulfilment of the prophecies, the final achievement of God’s purpose on earth. In this way, the first Abbasids sought to gain, first popular support for their revolutionary attempt to seize power and then, after victory, popular consent to their legitimized retention of the power they had seized. Four times, with the ascendance of the first four Abbasid Caliphs, the Millennium was deferred to the next reign, until the process was no longer possible or necessary. The new dynasty was firmly in control, the leaders of the Revolution were dead, and the charisma became "routinized" (in Weber’s parlance). Then the Abbasids turned to Orthodoxy and Empire, their messianic titles becoming important merely as protocol. The underlying current of chiliastic sentiment remained, however, and eventually brought about the Shi’ite schism.

The earliest messianic claims began with Mukhtar (685) in Umayyad times, followed by a long line of messianic aspirants and culminating in the Middle Ages with the establishment of the Fatimid Caliphate. The tragic death of Husayn had provided his supporters with a martyr and, inconsistently with Orthodox Islam, a mediator between man and Allah. ‘Ali and his descendants became divinely-guided and infallible imams, charged by God with expounding the True Faith. Mukhtar hailed Muhammad Ibn-al-Hanafiya as the Mahdi (the Guided One) who would usher in the Millennium and, after his death, he was widely believed to have been hidden by Allah, prepared to return in the last days.

This was the origin of the Hidden Imam in the Shi’a. The peculiar position of the Imam in Shi’ite Islam carries far-reaching implications. Since Allah spoke through the Imam, the latter tended to replace the Qur’an, the Sunna and the Ijma as the source of truth and be elevated to a virtually divine status. It is on these grounds that the Imam concept in the Shi’a and the Maitreya Buddha of the Chinese sectarian movements can be compared. Just as Chinese sectarianism flourished in time of distress, so it may be contended that Chinese Muslim sectarianism (New Sect) was generated by the same societal dysfunctions. In both cases there was an underlying sense of imminent change, of something happening that is going to revolutionize the world. In both cases new prophets appeared who claimed superpowers and possessed the necessary charisma to solve the discrepancies of the time. In both, the bad was the sign that good was just around the corner. Evil, such as war, massacres, siege and famine, was an inevitable interregnum before the end of the tunnel, the reign of Good. In both, the Faith, of which the charismatic

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leader was an essential part, was emphasized as the key to survival through the trouble.

Thus, Chinese Islam's similarities to the Chinese underworld partook of the characteristics of both secret societies and sectarian movements. In time of peace, the Muslims (like the Triads) thrived within the established system and participated in its maintenance and growth, primarily by handling sizable portions of Chinese trade. Being on the margins of Chinese society, both needed an alternative social organization to give them a sense of belonging, whether in their locality or during their travels. In this situation, the organization was emphasized, with all its reinforcing rituals, welfare programmes, clandestine relationships and an extraordinary sense of cohesion. But in time of trouble, Chinese Islam produced sectarianism which not unlike the White Lotus, became a movement, chiliastic and religious in essence, which threatened to turn the latent antistate into an overt new political reality.

Such a movement destroyed local organization and became a province-level or multi-province affair, with the masses relinquishing local loyalties and rallying around the charismatic leader. This, of course, stands in contrast with the relative strength of local organization in time of peace, when both Islam and secret societies were strong on the community or lodge level but loosely confedera-tive on the national level.

Although, as we have observed, some of Islam's activities smacked of secret societies' operational self-effacement, we must remember that while sectarian movements were totally clandestine, Islam usually operated overtly however restrained it was. More important, there were some crucial differences between Chinese Islam and sectarian movements. In the latter, the blood-brotherhood was an analogy to the Chinese family system. As any Chinese could hardly survive, let alone attain the higher echelons of society, as an individual without his socio-economic interdependence with his kin, so the confreries, despite their anti-establishment character, were "so impregnated with the idea of familism, that the very organization of revolt sedulously copied kinship and guaranteed these artificial ties with elaborate rites of passage."10 For Muslims, the metaphor of brotherhood was not familialistic but historical. It was the common father, whose name and heritage were deeply rooted in the Muslim tradition, who created the brotherly link between Muslims.

Sectarian movements could lump together all sorts of marginal discontent or déclassé elements in Chinese society: peasants, criminals, merchants, army deserters and even gentry. The more the state administration fell into decay, the more the ranks of secret societies were likely to swell. The constituency of these organizations was fluid and uncertain in times of stability, likely to dissolve when order was restored. Islam, on the other hand, including Islamic sectarianism, regularly recruited its membership exclusively within the Muslim community. In time of peace, the whole congregation operated as a quasi-secret society; in time of
trouble, some members of the same communities, or entire congregations, forswore their parochial independence and united behind a charismatic leader who led a revolutionist movement.

While dissenting groups in China were not tolerated, and those which actively pursued a heterodox ideology - be they Taipings, Triads, or Communists - were persecuted and loosely termed fei (bandits), Chinese Muslims did not automatically come under this definition. A clear distinction was drawn between Hui-min (Muslim people) or "Good Muslims" and Hui-fei (Muslim bandits). Fei were people who were situated beyond the pale of society because they did not abide by conventional social norms. Since they were not part of the society and threatened to disrupt peace and order, they should be eliminated.

Thus as long as Muslims were Hui-min they were recognized as a people and permitted to operate as such. Consequently, while almost all Chinese dynasties have suppressed sectarian movements and secret societies, no particular official governmental persecution against the Muslims, as distinguished from local individual prejudice and discrimination, was recorded until the advent of the Ch'ing. The intensification of anti-sectarian assaults under the Ch'ing, whose motives we shall explore in the coming chapters, left its mark on Chinese Islam as well. In addition to lumping the Muslim rebels together with other fei, the Chinese attached the dog radical to the character Hui in documents thus: ¼, thereby designating not only the bandits but the Hui in general. The eighteenth-century Chinese Muslim scholar Ch'ing Pei-kao pointed out the impropriety of this sacrilege, claiming that the combination of the dog radical with the character Hui has no foundation, and thus no justification, in authoritative Chinese literature. 18

Chinese sectarian movements were either restorationist or revolutiona-
ry, in both cases equally committed to toppling the existing government, but equally determined to preserve their own Chineseness. Restorationists, such as the Triads in the nineteenth century, were anti-Manchu because they wanted to rid themselves of Ch'ing oppression and restore the monarchical paradigm of the Ming. Therefore they mounted an intricate propaganda campaign against the Manchus, which went on continuously and lent visibility to the movement in the periods between their sporadic rebellions. 19 Similarly, the Ch'en-sheng and Wu-kuang Rebellion during the Ch'in (209 B.C.) aimed at overthrowing the "unprincipled government and ruthless laws" of the Ch'in. The rebels strove to put themselves in control of power, without altering the social structures or the institutional system of the time. 20 The Yellow Turbans, similarly, remained essentially Chinese in their Taoist ideology.

Revolutionaries, such as the Taipings and the Communists, also aimed at toppling the system, but in essence they also clung to Chinese values. It is true that their claims against the existing order were not that the regime had lost the Mandate of Heaven, as restorationist secret societies would have it, and it is true
that the Taiping and Communist ideologies drew on sources alien to Confucianism and designed to supersede it. But it is equally true that the Taipings retained traditional forms and vocabulary, and used Confucian rhetoric to refute Confucianism.\textsuperscript{22} The Communists likewise, in Levenson's words:

> permit iconoclasm, while sheltering an impulse to restore a tie with the past. But it is a source of strength for Chinese Communism that this impulse is not an embarrassment to it, something either to be smothered or uneasily tolerated, with a nagging sense of inconsistency. As Chou En-lai has indicated, Communist theory does not merely suffer the restoration of such a tie, it demands it.\textsuperscript{23}

In the context of Confucian China, Chinese Muslims had neither restorationist nor revolutionary aspirations. Their frame of reference was Islamic and not Confucian, so they had no interest in toppling one Confucian government and substituting another for it. Being more Muslim than Chinese, the changes they would envisage could be deemed revolutionary, but being Muslims among the Chinese they could have entertained no realistic hopes of revolutionizing the entire system. They were outside the Chinese order, and therefore they could not rebel against it. As long as the level of oppression was bearable, as it seems to have been prior to the Ch'ing, they coexisted with the system but were not within it. When the pressure became overwhelming, their only remedy was to part ways with the system, to secede from it. Chinese Muslim rebels were, however, restorationist in the context of their Islamic state if the rebellion were successful and political secession became a reality.

We have observed the remarkable phenomenon that Islam, despite its affinities with heterodox groupings, was not conceived as such by the Chinese authorities and therefore was not systematically persecuted prior to the Ch'ing. Even during the Ch'ing the distinction between "good" and "bandit" Muslims was drawn, implying that a Muslim who behaved passively and accepted the Chinese order had no reason to feel unsafe. We have also noticed that Islam operated as an institutional religion in China, although it was not officially recognized as such. Particular favours had been accorded to Muslim communities in the past,\textsuperscript{24} but they had amounted to taking cognizance of the existence of the Hui people in China, with their peculiar religion, not an express acknowledgement of the foothold that a foreign religion had taken there.

We have thus far approached the Islamic question in China in relation to, and in comparison with, institutional religion and heterodox groups, and we have concluded that Islam was neither. Rather it stood mid-way between the two, having some affinities with each but also clearly distinguished from them. Let us now analyse Chinese Islam in terms of a "national" minority group, of a people (min-tsu), like many nationalities and minorities that have always been part of the Middle Kingdom.

China was, and still remains, a multi-national state like the Soviet
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Union, with the Han majority prevailing and some fifty minority groups existing mainly on the fringes of the Empire. In Yunnan alone there are, according to a recent survey, more than seventeen different nationalities and minority groups. But, unlike the Soviet Constitution, which regards the state as a federation of supposedly independent republics, the Communist Chinese Constitution conceives of the state today as traditional China has always conceived of it—a unitary state. Under the Communist regime, democratic centralism has replaced bureaucratic and monarchic centralism, but the concept of a state within a state was and remains incompatible with Chinese political thought.

From the Chinese point of view, therefore, the distinction between the Han majority and the minority “nationalities” was grounded on an ethno-cultural, ethno-linguistic, or religio-cultural basis, not a “national” one in the modern sense. This was, of course, generated by the culturalist concept which regarded China as a culture rather than as a nation. Anybody who lived a way of life different from the Han Chinese seems to have been regarded as alien, regardless of any language or anthropological features which may have been Han, as in the case of the Han Muslims. In traditional China all minorities, whether ethnic, religious or linguistic, had to submit as far as possible to Chinese cultural values, and acculturation of minorities was regarded as one of the duties of the ruler of the Empire.

It was this basic unwillingness to let people of different habits live as they pleased within the boundaries of China proper that led to the paradoxical situation in which, on the one hand, the four major minorities (including the Hui) were recognized under the Republic as distinct components of the Chinese people, while on the other hand their sinicization was sought as an ideal.

This paradox persists under the Communists, who, despite their insistence on the unitary state, have established a series of “autonomous regions,” including the “Ning-hsia Hui Autonomous Region,” in order “to increase socialist enthusiasm and initiative of the Hui, making the Hui, Han and other nationalities draw even closer together to help each other build up this autonomous region and to make our motherland a powerful socialist state.”

These ambivalent policies toward minority groups reflect the inconsistency of Chinese attitudes toward this problem and the flexibility with which the Chinese have approached its solution through history. On the one hand, a folk-anthropological distinction prevailed in China, defining the Chinese on behavioural grounds as “Han” and thus different from the minorities. On the other hand, historical and cultural reality did not necessarily go along with this definition. Some minority populations, such as the Chuang, are indistinguishable, from a non-Chinese perspective, from the Han Chinese majority. Yet no Chinese would think of identifying them as Han. Conversely the cultural gap between Han Chinese and the minority groups is often no greater than that between Han Chinese of different regions in China. There is, as George Moseley has pointed out:
an almost continuous ethno-cultural spectrum extending from the Northern, wheat-eating, Mandarin-speaking Chinese at one end to, at the other, the dark-skinned K'awa in the South, who are food gatherers and speakers of a language of the Mon-Khmer family. In between are the more than one hundred million "Han" Chinese of South-coastal China who speak dialects other than Mandarin and who refer to themselves as T'ang-ien rather than Han-ien, and more than ten million persons of the "national minorities" in South China, who have been, to varying extents, acculturated to Chinese ways, to the point that, in some cases, they had no awareness of being a "minority" until they were informed of the fact by the Chinese Academy of Science after 1949.34

In other words, in any given minority location in China, there is a wide range of relative "Chineseness" among the inhabitants, blunting the dichotomy of Han and National Minority. But what the distinction between these two groups does reflect is a traditional Chinese attitude toward China's frontier peoples, the occupants of the zone between the Han Chinese and the outer barbarians. The distinction rested primarily on the fact that frontier people did not use the Chinese system of writing, a major ingredient of Chinese culture and the overarching roof under which all Chinese were held together, despite mutually unintelligible dialects.35

Just as the differentiation between Han and the minorities rested on the historical interaction between China and the frontier people, so the treatment of minorities in China rested on the traditional ideas of pacification of the border areas during the Imperial Era. This treatment was conditioned, to use Lattimore's terminology, by the distinction between non-Chinese (i.e., barbarians) and un-Chinese, namely people who stood in between, not Chinese yet but a new kind of barbarians, some of whom eventually did become Chinese, while other tended to shift from the vague category of being un-Chinese into a strongly non-Chinese category.36

As far as the barbarians were concerned, the Chinese since remote antiquity indulged in comparing them with all sorts of animals,37 and in stereotyping them as "having nothing of affection or friendship and [being] full of greed."38 Names of barbarian tribes were often written with animal radicals. For example, the Ti (Northern barbarians) were named with the dog radical39 and the Man (Southern barbarians) with the worm radical.40 The rationale was that in the ancient world the outermost areas were reserved for barbarians, ferocious animals, and evil spirits. The Chinese believed that barbarians were greedy and warlike and therefore closer to animals in character; and their belief was boosted by the fact that many barbarians had physical features different from those of the Chinese.41 The Tso-chuan said: "If he is not of our kin, he is sure to have a different
Different meant inferior; thus, a different race meant an inferior mind.

These ancient associations persisted during many centuries and extended the stereotypes of the non-Chinese to the un-Chinese peoples on China’s frontiers. Since the Hui were non-Chinese in extraction, they remained associated with the same stereotypes (greedy and warlike) and were treated with the same contempt (dog radical and popular gibes) as the non-Chinese, although they had crossed the line into becoming merely un-Chinese by means of material acculturation.

The traditional official policy towards barbarians was flexible and ranged from military oppression to appeasement. This policy used the parable of “bone and stick,” which went along with the metaphor of the “wild dog.” Its flexibility lay in the relative sizes of the bone and the stick and the degree to which each was to be used, depending on the ferocity or docility of the dog and other circumstances. Chang Chu-cheng, the famous Ming statesman, wrote:

Just like dogs, if they wag their tails, bones will be thrown to them; if they bark badly, they will be beaten with sticks; after the beating, if they submit again, bones will be thrown to them again; after the bones, if they bark again, then more beating. How can one argue with them about being crooked or straight or about the observation of law?43

Concurrently with the bone-and-stick policy, Confucians since Han times held that using virtue to control barbarians, allowing them to participate in the ceremonies performed at the Ancestral Shrine of the Imperial Court, would inspire in them civility and etiquette. Confucius had remarked in the Analects: “If distant people are not obedient, they should be won over by cultivating their own refinement and virtue.”44 According to this policy of propagating Chinese culture, the moral teaching of filial piety ought to be spread among the barbarians. Thus the father-son relationship was invoked in the intercourse between the T’ang Dynasty and the Turks and Uighurs; under the Sung, the relations with the Liao and Chin were grounded on an uncle-nephew relationship.45

It was under the Ch’ing that the energetic policy of sinicization began in the 1720s, directed against the un-Chinese ethnic groups who constituted a majority of the population in a number of mountainous enclaves in the southwest of China and in Hunan and Hubei.46 The core of the policy was to replace the native tribal system with Chinese local administration, and to promote an educational system that would encourage a gradual cultural assimilation of these groups. Some aborigines were picked out and sent for indoctrination to the Capital; they then returned as local officials in their native places to carry forward the work of acculturation, being themselves converted to the Chinese feeling of superiority of what they had learned over their former tribal ways. For instance, they substituted Confucian and state-approved Buddhist festivals for native observances, so that the aborigines would be drawn into the orbit of Chinese symbolism.47

During this period, limitations were imposed on the Muslims’ freedom
of worship. More specifically, in 1731 the ritual slaughtering of animals was forbidden, and under the Ch'ien-lung Emperor construction of new mosques and the pilgrimage to Mecca were prohibited.\textsuperscript{48}

This emphasis on acculturation was even more pronounced with sizable minorities which were attached to particular territorial areas, such as the Mongols and the Tibetans. For example, in Inner Mongolia the Manchus threw open large tracts of land to cultivation; thus doing violence to Mongol traditions that the earth is holy and to the ancient tribal laws that forbid the ploughing of more than the necessary minimum amount of land for two years in succession. As a result the Mongols have, in some regions, imitated the Chinese cultivators. A number of tribes have completely forgotten the Mongol speech and, except for differences in their dress, are almost indistinguishable from the Chinese.\textsuperscript{49}

From the vantage point of the national minority problem, then, the Muslims could be said to have been lumped together with the non-Chinese and, by extension, with the un-Chinese minority groups. They were victims of the same derogatory stereotypes and the same assimilatory policy on the part of the authorities. With a closer look, however, some major differences emerge that distinguish the Hui people from the whole lot.

First, the Muslims, although more concentrated in marginal areas of the Empire, were present in virtually every province and every sizable urban agglomeration throughout the country, and their presence was not merely statistical. They had large communities in the Capitals (Nanking and Peking), they handled some trades in in many places, and left their impact (though more as individuals than as a collective) all over the place. This may explain the ubiquitous nature of the hatred, jealousy and contempt in which they were held by the Chinese at large. Conversely, from the authorities' point of view, no crash programme in a certain territory could force all of the Hui to acculturate, since there was no such territory. For this reason, while the other major minorities were handled under the Ch'ing by the Li Fan which controlled them by controlling their territories, the Hui were free from such control.

Second, since the Muslims could not accept the principle of filial piety and participate in the ceremonies of the Ancestral Shrines at the Court, through which the Chinese attempted to "civilize" non-Chinese barbarians, they chose to remain outside the pale of the sought-for "refinement and virtue." Neither was the stratagem that the Ch'ing used with the un-Chinese aborigines workable with the Muslims. The Hui had their own sense of superiority, their own festivals and religious symbolism, their own learning and culture, and needed no "uplifting" to the heights of Chinese Civilization. In short, they did not yield to the mission civilisatrice of their Chinese hosts. Since the Chinese Muslims were both a self-confident socio-cultural minority and a very viable religious minority, none of the three possible solutions for accommodation suggested above (i.e., secularization,
Secularization, the weakening of religious values in general, was not realistic in a society so deeply imbued with religious belief as the Chinese were, a state in which Imperial cult had strong religious overtones, and a culture sure of its superiority and therefore intolerant of any other cultures. Had the Chinese been amenable to such a concession, that would have intensified the plight of the Muslim minority, because it would have exposed them as irreconcilable fanatics in a society that had no particular regard for any religion. (Consider, for example, the Muslims in Communist China.)

Compartmentalization, that is separation of religion from other areas of life, was even more unacceptable to both parties, religion being paramount in all aspects of their socio-political existence. Finally, homogenization, that is convergence of different beliefs on a vaguely defined consensus, was totally unthinkable because, as L. Coser put it:

If conflict centres around goals, values and interests that do no contradict basic assumptions from which society is erected then adjustments are possible. But if the participants do not share the basic assumptions social structures are threatened.

This grim picture does not leave much room for accommodation, understanding and compromise between the hosts and their permanent guests. Yet, Chinese Islam knew periods of co-existence, uneasy as it may have been, with the Chinese neighbours. I should like to suggest that the viability of the phase of "uneasy co-existence" could only be maintained by the fact that China, although it looked homogeneous to the lay observer from a distance, was a mosaic of differentiated local cultures. Thus, what is amazing about China, is not that it has frequently been divided, but that it has so often and so long achieved a high degree of unification.

As Morton Fried has pointed out, although the most general and common Chinese designation for China, Chung-kuo, has existed for a long time, neither it nor its derivative Chung-kuo jen (Chinese person) has been particularly common until modern times. Even today, many Chinese prefer to designate themselves in terms of narrower meaning, sometimes referring to regional, linguistic or cultural identity, such as min (people). In this setting, Chinese Muslims, in times of peace, could take their place in the multicolour and multifarious mosaic without causing much dissonance with their environment.

But the mosaic had a dominating pattern, whose disturbance could not go unnoticed. The pattern was conditioned by the wide diversity of institutional religions, diffused religions, covert secret societies, latent sectarian movements, a multitude of minorities, "nationalities" and aborigines and, above all, by
the particularistic identity of the Chinese in general. These components were differentiated in a clear-cut fashion; rather, they shaded off into each other, forming a continuum of basically diverse elements. So as long as the Muslims could be seen, depending on one’s vantage point, as one of these components (and they had characteristics of each and all of them), the pattern remained discernable, if not intact.

In time of unrest, however, when the mosaic was scrabbled and each of its components rallied to compose a separate pattern of its own, the differences between the heretofore composing elements became more pronounced, and social polarization became the rule of the day. Muslim rebels, like other discontented sections of the population, raised their banner of identity, making Chinese society irrelevant to them. From the Chinese government’s viewpoint, they turned from a min, a part of the harmonious mosaic, into fei (bandits), who, like the other fei coming into the open, were detrimental to the pattern and had to be eliminated.

The viability of the “uneasy co-existence” formula, then, hinged not primarily upon the potentialities implicit in Chinese Islam as an ideologically undermining and disruptive heresy, but upon its actual behaviour. The Chinese authorities were apparently not even aware of the potential threat that this foreign religion posed to their order, for they were ignorant of the doctrines of Islam. The literary inquisition under the Ch’ien-lung reign, which was directed precisely against deviationist doctrines of this sort, was helpless in the case of Chinese Islam, because the books which taught these “heresies” were in Arabic and Persian, and thus inaccessible to the inquisitors. Chinese Muslim books written in Chinese were not harmful to the establishment because of the reconciliatory stance they took towards Confucianism. Thus Chinese Muslim behaviour, not intentions or doctrines, was the criterion that determined the Chinese government’s attitude toward them. As long as they behaved properly, that is passively, and showed signs of acculturation, the Chinese, having no control of their hearts and minds, remained unmindful of their “heresy.” But when the cultural confrontation escalated into a confrontation of strength and the rebellious intentions of the Muslims became evident, they were treated (or maltreated, one might say) accordingly.

The multifarious facets of Chinese Islam were certainly instrumental in its survival. For when the Muslims were eliminated as a heterodox sect they survived as a minority culture; when they were persecuted as a secret society, they went on existing as an institutional religion of sorts; when they were reprimanded for both, they still could be seen as a min, a minority people, one of many in the Chinese mosaic. These shifting faces, it should be emphasized, had more of an impressionistic quality than one of essential change. From the Muslim point of view, these were chameleon-like adaptations to a changing but constantly hostile environment. In other words, the change of colour was an adaptive response to outside stimulation, in line with the unobtrusive stance that the Muslims adopted.
to dissipate their portion of the social pattern when it attracted too much Chinese attention. This shift was objectively perceptible, and it reflected the ups and downs in the fortunes of Chinese Islam. From the Chinese viewpoint, Islam appeared to them as a kinetic picture looks to amateurs of modern art. The pattern shifts subjectively in the eyes of the onlooker, depending on his standpoint, while the picture itself remains unchanged. Thus Islam could appear in different guises to different segments of Chinese society and Chinese government in different times and different places. Not that the Chinese were fascinated by this artistic parable, but an element that evades clear-cut identity, despite the preponderantly negative stereotypes attached to it, can also evade persistent and determined persecution. This is precisely what Chinese Muslims achieved in their relations with Chinese society up to the advent of the Ch'ing.
CHAPTER VII

Islam and Judaism in China: The Merger of Two Cultural Sub-Systems

Though no love was lost between the Jews and Muslims, non-Chinese customs common to both meant that many of these Jews, who finally assimilated, were swallowed up by Islam. Even today, there are Chinese Muslims who believe their ancestors were Jewish. The Muslims continued to flourish and increased greatly in numbers, but the K’ai-feng Jews probably never numbered more than 300 families with 1000-1500 individuals.

Donald Leslie

The amazing vitality of Chinese Islam stands in sharp contrast with the relative weakness and the total failure of Judaism there. In fact, between the first century A.D., when Buddhism was introduced into China, and the twentieth century, which saw the rise of Chinese Communism, no major foreign religion or ideological system has ever taken as strong and continuous a foothold in China as Islam. But Buddhism, which penetrated China during the cataclysm that followed the fall of the Han, had no political power behind it or attached to it. It was a salvationist religion for the individual. During the T’ang, Buddhism asserted a high degree of economic and political influence, but this was a temporary interlude that soon vanished after the Hui-ch’eng suppression in 875-76. Moreover, Buddhism attained a level of acculturation which enabled it to “move into China,” like the barbarian conquerors, and be syncretized into the predominant Chinese culture.

By contrast, the base of power of Islam and Christianity and, in a way, Judaism, remained outside China. This, in addition to Chinese religious polytheism, animism and eclecticism, as opposed to the exclusivity and monotheism of these three religions, may explain why the latter were more resilient in their resistance to acculturation than Buddhism. But it leaves unsolved the puzzle of their broadly varying degrees of resilience. Moreover, if one takes into consideration the fact that in opposition to these new religions, some already highly organized faiths with elaborate philosophies were entrenched in the traditions and the institutions of the native populace, one cannot help wondering how they succeeded in entering China at all. For, as Latourette has pointed out, any new religion in China,

if it could meet a real need and if it could tolerate the presence of existing religions, ideas and institutions, [it] might find a welcome. It would run the danger, however, of being absorbed and of losing its distinctive characteristics and even its identity. If, on the other hand,
the new religion proved intolerant of native faiths, and if its acceptance would involve any revolutionary changes in thought or in social, political and economic institutions, its path would not be smooth. It would have to attack some of the outstanding features of the nation’s life and thought and effect their destruction or transformation. This process would entail prolonged and extensive missionary work, and even then might be unsuccessful, unless other forces were to aid in the disintegration of the nation’s life.²

Although Christianity, Islam and Judaism are monotheistic religions, all emanating from the Hsi-yang (West) and possibly theologically indistinguishable to the Chinese mind, China’s response to them was different. It was different both because of the historical circumstances of their respective introductions into China and also because of their varied dialectical quality vis-à-vis the traditional Chinese concept of the orthodoxy-heterodoxy dichotomy. From these two vantage points, it appears that Islam and Judaism can be clearly distinguished from Christianity. However, important differences marked the respective and intertwined developments of Islam and Judaism inside China, differences which eventually resulted in the survival and expansion of the one and the total extinction of the other.

First, the historical background. The most striking feature of Chinese description of the coming of Islam to China was that it was conceived in terms of the coming of the Arabs (Chinese: Ta-shih³) as a “barbarian” people, not as a foreign religion.⁴ According to the T'ang Histories,⁵ it was during the second year of the Yung-hui Emperor (A. D. 651) that an Arab embassy on behalf of the Third Caliph (‘Uthman⁶) reached China. This was the first official contact between the two empires, but individual Arab traders may have reached China even before.

At any rate, the first formal encounter between Chinese and Muslims (Arabs, as the Chinese saw them) resulted in a clash. According to the Chinese histories,⁷ the event that caused the most irritation was the Arab refusal to perform the kow-tow to the Chinese Emperor. The Chinese wanted to punish them for their arrogance, but finally exempted them on grounds of “difference of custom in their country.” For the Muslims, of course, the point was religious: They could only prostrate themselves before Allah. Even more humiliating experiences for the Chinese were their defeat by the Arabs at Talas (A. D. 751) and the plundering of Canton by Arabs and Persians in 758, also recounted in the T'ang Histories.⁸

There was, however, a positive column in the Sino-Arab balance sheet—the substantial help the Chinese received from Arab troops in putting down the An Lushan rebellion (755-766). T'ang histories clearly indicate that Arab troops assisted the Chinese in recovering Ch’ang-an and Lo-yang from the rebels in 757.⁹ Some of these troops are said to have settled in China and married Chinese wives, thus forming the first nucleus of Arab settlers in China.¹⁰
These early contacts between the Chinese and the Islamic Empires, which were intensified during the early Abbasids (eighth and ninth centuries), remained, from the Chinese point of view, a matter of dealing with a foreign people, much as the not-yet-Islamized Uighurs assisted the Chinese in repressing the same An Lu-shan rebels, or embassies from tributary countries came to pay homage to the Son of Heaven. Although the Chinese were aware of the rise of Islam, Chinese histories at this period did not mention anything about the condition of the Arab settlers in China or of their religion.

The only known details in this respect come from Arab travellers. One of them related:

At Khafu (Canton) there is a Muslim appointed over those of his religion, by the authority of the Emperor of China, and he is the judge of all Muslims who resort to that area. He performs the public service with the Muslims and pronounces the Khutbah (sermon), which he concludes in the usual form with prayers for the Sultan of the Muslims. The merchants of Irak who trade thither, are in no way dissatisfied with the conduct of his administration in the post he is invested with, because his actions and the judgments he gives are just and equitable, conformable to the Qur'an and in accordance with Muslim jurisprudence.

These settlers, it is evident, considered themselves and were considered foreigners. They lived in virtual extra-territoriality, expressed their loyalty to the Muslim ruler of their land of origin, and some even returned home at the end of the T'ang when business became scarce. The Muslim settlers, Arab and Persian, not only continued to enjoy the same separate status under the Yuan, but their numerical reinforcement and their superimposition by the Mongols at the apex of Chinese society on the one hand, and the hatred that they generated among the Chinese on the other, tended to solidify their inner cohesion and independent status. Moreover, Muslims made new inroads to areas of China where there had been no Muslim settlement before. D'Ollone reported:

All the Ahungs whom we questioned were unanimous in asserting that Islam was introduced into Yunnan by Seyyid Edjell Shams a-din 'Umar, the first governor of that province after it had been conquered by the Mongols. Nasr a-din, the son of Seyyid Edjell who succeeded him, and who was the Nescridan of Marco Polo, also encouraged Islam, and his name is still popular among the Muslims there. We therefore set ourselves to investigate the monuments and inscriptions relating to the introduction of Islam, and we easily found them. Neither among the Muslims nor in their writings is there any notice of Muslims, particularly of Arabs, before Seyyid Edjell.

However, while the Mongols, who regarded themselves as conquerors
of China, were not eager to be absorbed by Chinese culture, the Muslims, who by now considered themselves settlers in China, had slowly begun to adopt some of the features of Chinese material culture. Through marriage with Chinese women and conversion of some Chinese to Islam, Chinese Islam, as it developed fully under the Ming, was on its way to acculturation during the Yuan. It was during this period that the term Ta-shih to designate Muslims was relinquished and the use of Hui or Hui-hui (or other variants) came into common language. This change of attitude on the part of the Muslims in China, which resulted in their becoming Chinese Muslims, may be explained primarily in terms of the collapse of the Abbasid Empire (1258) and its fall to the Mongols.

Ta-shih was used not merely to identify Muslims or Arabs in China but also encompassed Muslims and Arabs at large. The Abbasids, whose glory had reached China and whose embassies succeeded each other to the Court of the Son of Heaven were recognized by the T'ang as the Hei-i Ta-shih (Black Robed Ta-shih). It was natural that the Arabs and Persians who settled in China should identify themselves as members of that glorious empire.

But with the Mongol takeover, the Ta-shih Empire disappeared as a political power to be reckoned with. The Chinese, the Mongols and the Muslims in China, aware as they were of the new dominating power, set aside the outworn Ta-shih as a relic of the past and adopted the new term, Hui and its derivatives. For the Mongols this change symbolized the end of Arab rule and the beginning of their newly-won hegemony. For the Chinese, it signified the wiping out of barbarians by other barbarians, and they had no sympathy for either anyway. For the Muslims it signalled the end of the political prestige that the Abbasid Empire had won them and the beginning of a period of social retrenchment soft-pedalled, to be sure, by the predominant status accorded to them by the Yuan.

From then on, Chinese Muslims' relationship with, spiritual dependence on, and millenarian craving for the Islamic World slipped out of the realm of action. if not of consciousness. Assured as they were of their special status under the Mongols, they must have sensed the temporariness of this privileged period because of the precarious hold that the Yuan held over the Chinese people. They must have realized that, in the long run, their physical safety and spiritual integrity could only be worked out by some sort of ostensible accommodation and compromise with their Chinese hosts, who had not made a secret of their hostility.

When the Ming took over, and the advantageous status of the Muslims was repealed, the process of acculturation gathered momentum and resulted in the outwardly self-effacing, unobtrusive stance of the Muslims coupled, as we have seen, with intensified inner cohesion. The Muslim migrations throughout the empire during the Yuan that had brought Islam to the northwest and to the southwest from both Central Asia and the coastal cities now attenuated, and Muslim communities began to take root in their localities all over the country. Once their alien affiliation had been severed, they adopted Chinese names, gave their children
Chinese education and attained what some modern Chinese Muslim writers call the Golden Age of Chinese Islam.18

On the other hand, except for the interlude of the explorations which brought Cheng Ho to the Middle East and other Islamic lands, Chinese Islam during this period became increasingly cut off from its outside spiritual base. On the home front, Islam has always been isolated from the main Chinese intellectual streams, while Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism had been cross-fertilizing each other. But this isolation had been alleviated by the open channels to the world of Islam which had not been tampered with until the fall of the Yuan. Under the Ming, the double isolation within the Empire and from the outside world, the one voluntary and defensive, the other compulsory and repressive, generated the intricate relationship between Muslims and Chinese that was described in the previous chapters.

Judaism was introduced to China at about the same time and in much the same way as Islam. The first Jewish traders apparently reached China during the T'ang Dynasty through Persia and India.19 According to inscriptions in Chinese dating from 1489,20 Jews settled in K'ai-feng and numbered a few hundred families.21 Jews settled in other places as well, including Canton and Hangchow,22 and they seem to have enjoyed separate quarters (or, from the Chinese viewpoint, they were confined to special quarters) in these cities.23 Like Islam, the slow process of acculturation, which gained momentum under the Ming, was material at first, as evidenced by the structure of their synagogue, which was Chinese in style and decorated with jade and gold,24 and by their adoption of Chinese names.25 At the same time, they preserved their spiritual heritage by respecting the dietary regulations,26 observing the Sabbath and celebrating Jewish festivals,27 and clinging to Hebrew as the language of worship.28

Like Islam, Judaism initially responded in a defensive manner outwardly, while inwardly appealing to cohesion and preservation of the essence of the faith. Jewish apologetics, designed to placate the Confucian environment, were strikingly similar to the Muslim writings and inscriptions that were surveyed above. Not unlike the Sian Monument, the Jewish synagogue's inscription of 1849 reads:

The Confucian religion and Judaism agree in all essential matters. For the principles of establishing the mind and restraining the conduct are nothing more than honouring the Way of Heaven, venerating ancestors, giving high regard to the relations between ruler and ministers, being filial to one's parents, living in harmony with one's wife and children, preserving the distinction between superiors and inferiors, and having neighbourly relations with friends. In short, these principles do not go beyond the Five Relationships.29

In the Jewish inscriptions of 1512, 1663 and 1679 similar assertions were made:
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The Hebrew Scriptures, though written in an ancient script, and of a different pronunciation, are in harmony with the principles of the Six Classics, and in no case is there anything not in harmony between them. 30

The Hebrew Scriptures are essentially in harmony with the teachings of Confucius and Mencius. 31

Some missionaries reported that Chinese Jews believed that their ancestors had come to China during the Han. 32 Other findings point to the fact that Chinese Jews created a mythological link between their own traditional figures and the Chinese, 33 such as naming Adam "P'an-ku A-tan", 34 and Noah "Nu-wa". 35 We have noticed the same phenomenon in Chinese Islam.

Some scholars have interpreted these Jewish responses to Confucianism either as an attempt to "explain and endear the Jewish Faith to the Confucians," 36 or as an effort on the part of acculturated Jews to "explain and endear Confucianism to the Jews who might have looked unfavourably toward their acculturation." 37 With all due respect, I believe that both of these approaches are guilty of oversimplification and naiveté. For Judaism has never been a missionary religion, and far from seeking to endear itself to anybody it was content enough when and where it could survive. Actually, there is evidence that Judaism did not proselytize in China, 38 and that was one of its weaknesses as contrasted to other religions which penetrated China. Second, Jews who acculturated to Confucianism had become Confucian enough to do without endearing Confucianism to their late co-religionists. If anything, those Jews who were still Jewish enough attempted to explain to the Chinese, not to their fellow Jews, in the apologetic manner that we observed in Chinese Islam, that Judaism was not irreconcilable with Confucianism. After all, the inscriptions quoted above stood, like the Sian Monument, in the courtyard of the synagogue, not inside the building, and were exposed to the scrutiny of the Chinese public of literati and to Chinese officials in particular.

This outward response of Chinese Judaism was coupled, as in Chinese Islam, with a strong sense of inward concern as evinced in the energetic disapproval voiced by the religious leaders of the Jewish community regarding the spiritual acculturation of the Jews. 39 The Jews, like the Muslims, while marrying Muslim or Chinese women, did not allow their daughters to contract marriage outside their religion. 40 They maintained their dietary laws and festivals and persisted in the use of Hebrew.

The outward similarities between Jews and Muslims, such as their abhorrence of the pig, their self-asserted attribute of Ch'ing-chen Chiao, 41 and their similar apologetic responses to Chinese culture did not escape the attention of the Chinese, who considered them one and the same religion. Sometimes they looked on the Jews as a sect of the more numerous Muslims. 42 This Chinese view of the Jews as part of the Muslim faith initially may have been generated by their coun-
tries of origin, which were primarily within the Muslim world. It is probable that
the first Jewish settlers in China spoke Persian and Arabic, the languages of the
Muslim settlers; and the overseas trade that they handled originated from or was
destined for the same ports in the Islamic world used by the Arab traders. It is
also evident that Jewish settlement in China went hand in hand with Muslims. We
meet them at the same ports of Zaytun, Ning-po, Hangchow, Nanking, Yan-
chow and, finally, in the Northern Sung metropolis of K’ai-feng. It is no accident
that the only references made in Chinese sources to Jews as a separate entity
occur in the Yuan Shih (The Yuan History), since the Mongols knew of the
Jews in the conquered Middle East. Even then certain ritual prohibitions that
the Yuan are said to have imposed on the Jews applied to Chinese Muslims as
well.

I should like to advance the hypothesis that Jews in China have been
ultimately assimilated first, because of their small number, which did not allow
them to sustain indefinitely an identity of their own without reinforcement from
the outside, without close and regular ties with world Jewry and without proselyti-
ization among the Chinese, the very factors that made for the survival and expansion
of Chinese Islam. Second, their development in China was constantly hindered by
their Islamic cultural background and their lack of a separate identity.

Islam in China, which admittedly had modest beginnings, soon soared
in numbers and expanded in territory, especially under the Yuan, as described
above. It is very difficult to ascertain how many Muslims were in China at any
particular time, or even now. No reliable census has ever been taken, and evalua-
tions, some of which were made through conscientious field work, still vary greatly, from ten to eighty million, depending on the religious denomina-
tion or the political commitment of the author and on the definition of who is a
Chinese Muslim. The typical Arab-Muslim and Chinese-Muslim moderate figure
runs around fifty million. Muhammad Tawadu’, for example, wrote in the
1940s:

The total population of China amounts to 473, 237, 335 people, and
the Muslims constitute no small part of it. Their number is around
fifty million, according to the most reliable views. Some researchers
have exaggerated the figure and put it to eighty million, while others
have reduced it to a mere thirty million.

This is not the proper place to go any deeper into this question, one
which, despite the controversy surrounding it, will have to remain unanswered for
the time being. Suffice it to say that the figure of fifty million is greatly exaggerat-
ed and has, in my view, no leg to stand on. Its recurrence in Arab and Chinese
Islamic writings reflects, however, a state of mind that defies facts and reality so
long as the Muslim ego can be boosted. One thing is certain - all of these estimates
include the Muslims of Sinkiang, a Turkic ethno-linguistic group completely sep-
rate from the Hui, who have become Han in race and language. At any rate it is
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It is evident that the Hui community in China by Ming times had a membership of many millions and constituted the majority group, or a very sizable minority, in many places throughout the country. The Ming period was the crucial watershed because, due to the intensified sinicization under that dynasty, only minorities which had been numerous enough to form their own moulds of life therefore could survive the assimilatory process thereafter.

Chinese Jews, by contrast, never numbered more than a few thousand members dispersed in several locations. The figure seems to have dwindled constantly, so that by the end of the Ming the record speaks of only 200 families in one location -- K'ai-feng.\(^5\) It was under the Ming that Jews adopted Chinese names and some attained prominence in the civil service.\(^5\) This seems to have contributed to Jewish geographical mobility, which was attached to the upward social mobility of the Chinese bureaucratic system. Naturally, these Jewish individuals more likely than not became completely cut off from their communities and drifted away from their faith, as did the small Jewish communities outside K'ai-feng. Muslim individuals who enrolled in the civil service could remain in contact with their faith more easily because of the widespread Muslim presence in nearly all the provinces and the major cities.

In consequence of the policy of isolation adopted by the Ming, no new arrivals of Jews (or Muslims for that matter) came to reinforce the existing communities. This did no harm to the Muslims, for they were numerous enough under the Yuan to sustain an independent pattern of life. This policy, however, dealt a deadly blow to the Jews. Moreover, while the Muslims remained in contact with the world of Islam through the sea-routes and Muslim Central Asia until the fall of the Yuan, and through Central and Southeast Asia thereafter, Jews do not seem to have maintained such contacts, the closest Jewish community being in India. This isolation deprived the Jews of any refreshing and revitalizing interaction with their brethren and definitely contributed, in the long run, to their decline.

Finally, Chinese Muslims, as we have seen, were engaged in a covert but energetic effort to proselytize through marriage with Chinese women and the purchase of children during periods of famine. The Jews, for their part, made little headway in this respect. They also married Chinese women, but their initially small number could not be drastically increased by these intermarriages. On the contrary, mixed weddings sinicized the Jews ethnically, which added momentum to their alienation from Judaism.

And so, by the mid-Ch'ing period, we find the only surviving Jewish community in China centred in K'ai-feng in a steadily decaying condition. Jews had idols in their homes, performed ancestor worship, ceased to practice circumcision and respect their festivals, and they could not read the Book of the Law in Hebrew, though it was still in their possession.\(^5\) But, unlike the assimilated Muslims of Taiwan, who practised some Islamic tenets but insisted that they were
not Muslims. these half assimilated Jews on the contrary insisted on their Jewish identity although they knew nothing of Judaism.

Perhaps it is this last period of life of a dying Judaism that can help us throw some light on its demise. The dead Islam of Taiwan practised some tenets of the faith while seeking comfort in a hostile environment by denying its identity. But the insistence of Chinese Judaism on its identity, even to the point of death as a community, was a last attempt to disengage from its identification not with Confucianism but with Chinese Islam.

Jews who had come to settle in China originated, for the most part, in the Islamic Empire, and they brought along with them a heavy emotional and mental luggage regarding their identity and their relationships with Muslims. Basically the Jews, as members of Ahl-al-Kitab, were supposed to be protected by the status of dhimmi as long as they paid the jizyah (poll tax). But Jews under Islamic rule no doubt bore the memory of the Jewish tribes annihilated or persecuted by the Prophet in Medina, as they were aware of the derogatory references that the Qur'an repeatedly made to them. Moreover, under the Caliph 'Umar II (717-720), new regulations were enacted with regard to Ahl-ad-dhimma which imposed on them a particular way of dressing (blue garments for Christians, yellow for Jews), of building their houses of prayer, and other limitations collectively known as 'Uhad 'Umur (‘Umar's Provisions).

To be sure, these limitations were not always enforced, but periodically, under the reign of particularly fanatical Caliphs such as al-Mutawakkil (847-861) and al-Muqtadir (908-932), new restrictive laws were added that made life hardly bearable for Jews and Christians. Persecutions of Jews were intensified under the Fatimid Caliph Al-Hakim bi-amr Allah (996-1020). Genizah documents point to this Caliph's sudden volte face against the Scriptuary peoples in 1012; prior to that time he had been noted for his generosity and benevolence toward them. Under his reign many Jewish synagogues were destroyed in Egypt, Syria and Palestine, and many Christians were said to have been converted forcibly to Islam.

The dating of these events coincides with the period of the later T'ang and the Sung, when Jewish settlement in China began. Under the Mamluks, whose reign coincided with the Yuan Dynasty in China (1279-1368), persecution of Jews and Christians in the Muslim world was intensified. The Mamluk Sultan al-Malik al-Salih (ironically meaning “The Righteous King”) issued an edict in 1354 which revalidated 'Umar's Provisions and gave them a new impetus. Many more restrictions were enacted, matched only by the irritating and humiliating limitations that the Crusader kingdom of Valencia imposed on its Muslim population after the Reconquista.

Surprisingly enough the Jews, far from rejecting the Islamic culture which rejected them, on the contrary took part in it and contributed a share in
the cross-cultural fertilization that was under way between Islam and Judaism. The Arabic language, for example, became the lingua franca of Jews throughout the Islamic world. Rabbi Sa'adiah Gaon (d. 942) was the first (to be followed by many others) to use Arabic for his research and writings on Jewish Halacha. Jewish scholars participated in the creation of Islamic culture in both the philosophical and the scientific domains, the most prominent among them being, of course, Maimonides.

The rapid growth of new cities, which became intellectual as well as commercial centres, drew a wide range of scholars and entrepreneurs, among whom the Jews represented no small number. Trade extended from Basrah and Alexandria (through land trans-shipment) to the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and China, bringing back not only spices and exotic goods but also information about those far-away civilizations, information which contributed to the cosmopolitan mood of the times. When religious fanaticism gave way to pragmatic politics, Jews attained high positions in the Islamic government; one of them was even nominated to the post of Wazir in the Fatimid Court.

The point is that Jewish traders who reached China and settled there during the T'ang, the Sung and the Yuan sheltered an ambivalent attitude towards Islam and its civilization. On the one hand, they had been, at best, tolerated by it, always mindful of the inequality of their status vis-à-vis the Muslims. On the other hand, they had partaken of the Islamic culture, had mastered many aspects of it, and were probably (and rightly) proud of that. Thus when they came to China, they felt themselves closer to the Muslim settlers than to any other group, especially since their small number did not allow them to establish an independent identity of their own. In the eyes of the Chinese they were no different from the Ta-shih (Muslims) with whom they had arrived, and to whom they were affiliated linguistically and commercially.

Jews must have been tempted by the possibility of ridding themselves of their dhimmi status in China, for they found themselves under a non-Muslim rule in which scholarly merit, not birth or religion, determined one's status. They must have been attracted by the prospect of being treated on an equal footing with the Muslims who had been their masters back in the lands of Islam, without losing the pride of the Ta-shih won by the reputation of the Islamic Empire. The price that they had to pay, non-identity in Chinese eyes, was admittedly heavy, but there was little they could do to alter this situation anyway. Their separate identity vis-à-vis Muslims was quite clear to them and to their Muslim compatriots, and it could be maintained by the continuous ties with outside Jewry that the to-and-fro movement of Jewish traders provided, and by the prestige of the famous centres of Jewish learning in Palestine and Mesopotamia, whose influence and authority radiated to every Jewish community in the world of those days.

All of this began to change during the Yuan. The Crusades to Palestine, the rise of the Italian cities and the Mongol conquests, all disrupted the Middle
Eastern trade with the Far East. Jewish traders from the Islamic world were no longer able to travel to China, thus severing their ties with the Jewish community there. At both ends the Jewish communities had to relinquish their international trade activities, and they apparently suffered a state of impoverishment. For, while the Muslims in China were strong enough and organized enough to substitute internal Chinese trade and other self-supporting occupations for their lost overseas interests once their privileged status began to slip away, Jews had no choice but to merge into Muslim communities, as many did, or fall back on Confucianism, as the rest of them were to do.

For both groups, the glory of the Ta-shih having evaporated, they had to find a new identity in Chinese society which would enable them to preserve their particularism inwardly while ostensibly merging into the all-embracing Chinese pattern outwardly. This new identity could not be couched in religious terms due to the strong anti-heterodox stance of Confucianism, so they fell back on the term Hui, indicative of a people, as a convenient way out. From the Chinese viewpoint, the Ta-shih, a non-Chinese people, gradually became an un-Chinese group through the benefactive Chinese Civilization; they thus moved closer to Culture and were more acceptable to the Chinese pattern of life. In the process, Jews and Muslims remained indistinguishable for the Chinese, who were to be vindicated by the final merger of the two.

But Jewish attempts to disengage from Muslim identity persisted. Those Jews who were swallowed up by Islam still recognized their Jewish ancestry. Those who were on the verge of extinction still insisted on their Jewish identity. Paradoxically, however, while Chinese Judaism was waging a lost battle, Jews could find comfort in that they were not Muslims. Those who could disengage from Muslim particularism did so, and they chose Chinese Universalism as the lesser of two evils.

The hypothesis advanced by Song Nai Rhee, that "the primary factor directly responsible for the Jewish demise was the overwhelming impact of Imperial China's civil service and Jewish participation in the system," is misleading insofar as it implies that Chinese Jews would not have disappeared had there been no civil service. It fails, moreover, to provide an explanation as to why Chinese Muslims, who were under the same "overwhelming impact," were not overpowered by it and did not become assimilated.

Similarly, Lawrence Kramer's theory that "where they have not been subject to persecution, the Jews have tended to maintain their group identity with less vigour," disregards the fact that group identity is not only an instrument of internal group cohesion but also an external expression of distinction from others. If the separate identity of Jews was not recognized by the Chinese, then even when the Chinese were tolerant they were tolerating the Judeo-Islamic group, in which Jewish identity had been submerged. If the Chinese were tolerant, and if tolerance
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is the prerequisite for assimilation, then how do we explain the non-assimilation of Muslims in China? How do we account for the paradox that the Jews assimilated in the main to the Muslims, who recognized them as a separate faith, and not to the Chinese, who did not?

I suggest that the relatively open and mobile society of the Ming, which allowed Jewish (and Muslim) individuals to rise to prominence in the civil service on the basis of personal merit, provided the Jews in China with an alternative to total immersion in Islam. Muslims have also taken advantage of the same opportunity for advancement, as we have seen, but since they had a strong Muslim community to fall back upon, civil service did not necessarily bring about their assimilation.

For Jews who took to Confucianism, it was a break from the oppression of their identity within China, an escape from the memory of their subordinate dhimmi status in the Islamic world, and a relief from their identification with the despised Hui, which had been imposed on them against their will. Therefore, their assimilation in the Chinese system was an irreversible step.

It was, then, the small number of Jews and their inexorable identification as Muslims that prompted some of them to take to Confucianism while others merged with Islam. The Chinese civil service, while providing an escape for some Jews, was not an attraction for its own sake, and therefore not all Jews assimilated into the Confucian culture. The so-called tolerance of the Chinese in the pre-Ch'ing period, if anything, allowed peaceful material acculturation of Jews and Muslims and total acculturation of Jews who found Confucianism more attractive than Islam. Had there been systematic persecution of Jews and Muslims prior to Manchu rule in China, it is likely that Jews would have been swallowed up by Islam anyway, perhaps at an accelerated pace, while Muslims would have risen up in rebellion, as they were to do when they could no longer tolerate the oppressive Ch'ing policies toward them.
CHAPTER VIII

Islam and Christianity in China: Rivalry Between a Semi-Domesticated Group and a Foreign Heterodoxy

We are right in assuming that no missionary society organized its propaganda so well as the Chinese Muslims. They did it without any turbulence and without any encouragement on the part of foreign nations. In contrast to Christianity, because of this, they did not attract attention, even in China itself. First, the Chinese Muslim missionary is at the same time a Chinese. Thus, he is not conspicuous and knows better than any other propagandist where and when to act. He knows the spirit of his compatriots, he has the same education as they, he speaks their language and does not in the least provoke their derision because of poor pronunciation, as is inevitably the case with Catholic missionaries.

Vasili Pavlovich Vasil’ev

Basically, Christianity in China would be expected to encounter the same difficulties as Islam, inasmuch as it could hardly compromise with the already established Chinese religious system, given the ethical and socio-political ramifications of that system which we have observed in our discussion of Chinese Islam. Seen from the Chinese vantage point, both Islam and Christianity would be unacceptable as foreign systems of thought and religion; they were heterodox, and as such they were detrimental to the system. But Muslims had come to China as trading individuals or as official embassies from the Islamic Empire, and in both cases they were seen as tributary peoples in the Chinese world view. Thus when they settled in China, they were not viewed as a heterodox faith but as a barbarian group.

Muslims did not come to China with the intention of propagating their religion, although that was the result of their living in China. In time of peace they managed to avoid the orthodoxy-heterodoxy issue by their unobtrusive conduct, their covert activities and their ostensible merger into the Chinese pattern of life. Their missionary work, which focused on marrying Chinese women and purchasing Chinese children, was incidental to their living in China, although there is no doubt that it contributed to their sense of purpose and the reinforcement of their community. At any rate, the propagation of Islam, of which the outright conversion of adult individuals was not the main ingredient, went on discreetly, almost unnoticed in the process although stunningly successful in retrospect. Christianity came to China under the T’ang, when Nestorians were allowed into China from Central Asia, together with Muslims, Jews, Zoroastrians, and others. But their
missionary effort was apparently meagre, and in any case unsuccessful. Although several Chinese emperors seem to have favoured the Nestorian Church and even subsidized it at times,2 this faith disappeared from the Chinese scene with the decline of the T'ang.

Under Mongol rule, the re-entrance of Christianity to China was facilitated by the opening of trade routes to Western Asia and Europe and the enrolling of Christian bureaucrats in the service of the Yuan Dynasty. With the revival of Christianity, the Nestorian Church regained its lost foothold in several cities of China, mainly in the northern part of the country, in the Capital and in cities on the main trade arteries.

The Nestorian Church was not representative of the European-centred Christianity which had not yet penetrated into China. But this period was a preview of the struggle that European Christianity was to undergo during its penetration into China inasmuch as Nestorianism, unlike early Islam and Judaism, introduced the missionary element and thus an open rivalry between the already established Chinese faiths and an alien religion. Nestorians carried out some missionary work among the Chinese and aroused the opposition of some Taoist and Buddhist leaders, but apparently very few native-born Chinese accepted the new faith.3 This attempt failed because of the small number of missionaries, who were not backed up by a steady stream of fresh reinforcement from the outside, and, more importantly, because of the rejection of Christianity by the native faiths. So, instead of converting the Chinese, the Nestorians were themselves swallowed up by the Mongols, the Muslims, and the Chinese. William of Rubruck, who travelled in China during the Mongol rule, wrote:

There are Nestorians in fifteen cities of Cathay and they have a bishopric there in the city called Segin,4 but beyond that, they are pure pagans. There are also among them certain hermits, so I learned, in the woods and mountains, and they are of wondrous life and austerity. The Nestorians there know nothing. They say their offices and have their sacred books in Syriac, a language of which they are ignorant... and this accounts for the fact that they are completely corrupt. In the first place, they are usurers and drunkards, and some of them who are with the Tartars, even have several wives like them. When they enter the church, they wash their lower members like the Saracens; they eat meat on Fridays and have feastings on that day after the Saracen custom. The Bishop puts off coming into their regions; he comes perhaps scarcely once every fifty years. When he does come, they have all the little male children... ordained priests, consequently all their men are priests. They marry, which is clearly contrary to the decrees of the Fathers, and they are bigamists... They pay more attention to gaining money than spreading the Faith... Even the lives of the pagans are more innocent than theirs.5
European Christianity became established in China at the end of the sixteenth century, but contacts did take place between the Christian Empire and the Mongols as early as the thirteenth century. After Christian Russia had become a province of the Mongol Empire, there was a real danger of further Mongol incursion into Europe. To avert that threat, Pope Innocent IV delegated two Franciscans to the court of the Great Khan. Another embassy was sent by Saint Louis of France, but other than exchanging presents with the Khan nothing in the way of Christian mission was achieved. The Franciscan William of Rubruck was received in audience by the Great Khan and participated in a triangular Buddhist-Christian-Muslim debate.

He was followed by another Franciscan, John of Monte Corvino, who was delegated to the court of Kubilai Khan by Pope Nicholas IV. But his work in China, remarkable for a single-handed missionary, was followed up by Rome only for forty years. It failed, ultimately, because it concentrated on the ruling Mongol class and the foreign population of China, having little success among the Chinese. With the collapse of alien rule, Christianity vanished, as had previously been the case with the Nestorians under the T’ang. In 1362 the last Catholic Bishop of Zaytun was martyred when the Chinese recovered the city, and in 1369 the Christians were expelled from Peking, not to return until the coming of the Jesuits.

With the expulsion of the Mongols and the advent of the Ming, the foreign troops and the alien officials who had been employed by the Dynasty disappeared, as did the foreign traders who had flourished under its protection. We witness the second cycle of Christian extinction in China, while Islam and Judaism, which had arrived in China with the first cycle under the T’ang, avoided the fate of both Nestorians and Franciscans and survived. Why?

We have already observed that Chinese Islam’s viability was contingent upon its behaviour, not upon the potentially disruptive (from the Chinese point of view) ideology that was inherent in it as a heretical faith. The most obvious way to give expression to heretical beliefs was, of course, to attempt to propagate them, because only insofar as a heretical movement could gain widespread popular support would it be viewed as a dangerous threat to the regime. Here lies the basic difference between Christianity (in both cycles) on the one hand and Islam and Judaism on the other.

Nestorians and Franciscans came to China with the express purpose of propagating their religion, and their presence in China as foreigners was incidental to their main goal. Their religious activity was salient and made their identity as foreigners secondary in Chinese eyes. Arabs and Jews, on the contrary, came to China to trade, and their religious activity was secondary to their occupation. Their economic activity was paramount, and their image as representatives of far-away barbarians cast a shadow on their religious beliefs. Thus, while Christians appear to the Chinese as a heterodox sect, and as such resuscitated the old or-
thodoxy-heterodoxy controversy, Muslims and Jews (like barbarian or non-Chinese people) posed a socio-economic problem but not an ethico-political threat.

The orthodoxy-heterodoxy dichotomy existed in China long before the coming of Christianity. As far back as the time of Confucius heterodoxy (in Chinese i-tuan, tso-tao or hsieh) was used to label teachings and practices that deviated from a particular ideal or norm. Mencius (4th century B.C.) used these terms to characterize the schools of Yang Chu and Mo Ti; and Han Yu (ninth century A.D.) used them to vilify Buddhism. Theoretically, these terms could be used by any upholder of one norm or ideal to stigmatize those who believed in different norms and ideals. But in practice, they have been employed especially by Confucians, the upholders of orthodoxy, against all other teachings.

The first major hammering out of anti-heterodox thought in China was done by Hsun-chi (d. 547), who attacked Buddhism as harmful and detrimental to the Chinese system. He claimed that politically Buddhism subverted the power of the Emperor, usurped imperial authority and ceremonial and destroyed the Confucian concept of government by discouraging members of society from performing their proper functions. Economically, Buddhism harmed the state by wasting otherwise productive people in unproductive occupations. Socially, Buddhism was disruptive because of its advocacy of celibacy. Morally, Buddhists were accused of hypocrisy, avarice, infanticide and sexual perversion. Fu-i, a scholar-official of T’ang times, injected the element of xenophobia into his anti-heterodoxy argumentation. Chinese thought and institutions were, in his eyes, incomparably superior to those of India, while Buddhism, which he disparaged as the “barbarian miasma,” could not even lay claim to originality, being “nothing but magicians’ lore, which mean and depraved people have ornamented by copying the profound words of Chuang-tzu and Lao-tzu.”

From the ninth century on, when Buddhist influence began to wane among the educated classes and a new Confucian orthodoxy emerged, it was marked by a strong undercurrent of anti-foreignism, obviously as an ingredient of anti-heterodox thought. Han Yu, the most articulate spokesman of this new orthodoxy, argued that the penetration of Buddhism into China had brought about war, disorder and short-lived dynasties. He portrayed the barbarian origin of Buddha, whose language and clothing differed from those of the Chinese and who failed to abide by the relationships between ruler and subject, father and son.

As Buddhism remained very much alive among certain Chinese literati, it also remained very much alive as an institutional religion on the popular level and as a diffused religion in the beliefs and religious practices of the populace. More significantly for our discussion, it remained a major component in the ideologies of sectarian movements and secret societies. Ideas such as the Maitreya Buddha, activities such as chanting of charms, scribbling characters in order to invoke supernatural assistance, burning incense, concealing pictures and images,
fabricating canonical writings, gathering disciples, holding meetings at night — all were considered heretical and as such punishable with death under the Ming and Ch'ing codes.\(^\text{16}\)

Although the emphasis of the anti-heterodox attacks was placed on Buddhism, the label of heterodoxy could be applied to almost any teaching or practice which departed from Confucian orthodoxy. But it was not until the end of the Ming and the beginning of the Ch'ing that the first labels of heterodoxy were attached to Christianity. At that time the third cycle of Christianity in China began with the coming of the Jesuits. How does this square with the earlier rejection of Nestorians and Franciscans? Does this mean that the early Christians were not regarded as heterodox? Was it not the Chinese anti-heterodox stand which brought about their extinction?

The earlier cycles of Christianity in China took place under the T'ang and the Yuan Dynasties, both of which presided over a more cosmopolitan China than ever before in traditional Chinese history. The T'ang witnessed the coming of many traders, missionaries and travellers and, most importantly, the apogee of Buddhism in China. Buddhism was under attack by Confucians, but it remained temporarily dominant in the Chinese court and among Chinese literati. Those who attacked Buddhism attacked it as a major threat to the Chinese system. The xenophobic connotations attached to these onslaughts ensured that the demise of Buddhism would include all other expressions of foreign heterodoxy. Thus no particular scholarly charges were launched against Christianity at that time, although it must have been regarded as heterodox. From the standpoint of the T'ang ruling class, the very fact that Christians had adopted an alien ideology (considered heterodox by Confucians) made them receptive,\(^\text{16a}\) or at least tolerant, of other foreign ideologies as well. With the reassertion of neo-Confucianism under the Sung, the political eclipse of Buddhism brought with it the total extinction of Christianity.

The Yuan were themselves foreigners, and their religion was a syncretic mixture of borrowings from Nestorian Christianity and Manichaeism.\(^\text{17}\) Hated by the Chinese, they were dependent for their rule on their international civil service, which they recruited in western and central Asia and which brought with it a flow of divergent ideas and religions. The religious establishments of the Buddhist, Taoist, Nestorian and Islamic faiths, as well as Confucian temples, were all exempted from taxation. The old religions gained from this tolerant atmosphere, and the new religions, particularly Christianity and Islam, widened their foothold in China. This time it was Buddhist and Taoist opposition that was aroused by Christian missionary activity,\(^\text{18}\) while the neo-Confucians, dismayed by these heterodox developments, were confined to silence while awaiting their hour. Upon the expulsion of the last Mongol Emperor Lamaism vanished, and the newly-regained Christian foothold, Nestorian and Franciscan alike, was eliminated by the Ming reversion to orthodoxy.
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So while Christianity was clearly heterodox by Confucian standards and would have been condemned as such, the conditions prevailing under the T'ang and the Yuan averted any such open attack on the part of Chinese literati. On the other hand, during the period which covered two cycles of introduction and elimination of Christianity in China, Islam not only remained intact but continued to grow and expand unhindered. Granted that Islam initially may have escaped attack as a heterodoxy due to the same historical conditions under which Christianity was also spared, it is evident that the growth and expansion of Islam throughout this period and beyond can only be attributed to the restraint of its overt missionary zeal.

If Muslims were disliked and despised (and they were, especially on the popular level), that was due to their foreignness, to their alien origin, to their barbarian customs — not to the heterodox faith that they professed. Though Christianity was not directly condemned as heterodox, the Chinese must have sensed its heterodox manifestations through its missionary activities which sought, from the Chinese point of view, to impose an alien way of life on them. For

The Chinese world view was an all-encompassing one, with China — the seat of all civilizations — situated in the centre, and all the other peoples on the periphery. When other countries submitted to this world view and dutifully carried out their obligations towards China, they were graciously permitted to retain their strange ways, and harmony prevailed. But when one or another of these peoples became rebellious and attempted not merely to carry on their own way of life, but to superimpose it on the Chinese way, friction developed, and a new heterodoxy-orthodoxy orientation developed, based on inter-cultural lines.

Thus, while Buddhism was opposed by the Confucians when it came from India, it was the domesticated Chinese Buddhism that opposed Christianity during the Yuan and the Ming, and it was the partly sinicized Islam which joined forces with both Confucians and Buddhists in opposition to the third cycle of Christianity in China.

In the light of its previous experience, there is little wonder that when Christianity returned to China for the third time, in the late sixteenth century, spearheaded by Jesuits, it was immediately branded with the stigma of heterodoxy. Fitzgerald has advanced the theory that the stiff treatment meted out to Western peoples by the Ming and Manchu governments, as opposed to that accorded to Persians and Arabs by the T'ang and the Sung, was primarily the consequence of the Europeans' own violence and barbarous behaviour. However, while the violent conduct of the Portuguese is well documented, I do not believe that their violence per se was the main reason for their rejection by the Chinese. Otherwise, how do we explain the fact that the admittedly generous treatment meted out to
the Arabs and Persians came in the wake of their victory over the Chinese at Talas (751)\textsuperscript{23} and their burning and plundering of Canton (758)?\textsuperscript{24} Conversely, how do we reconcile the events surrounding the elimination of Nestorians and Franciscans from China with their obviously non-violent conduct when they came to settle during the T'ang and the Yuan?

I believe that the explanation lies not in the violent behaviour which after all was expected from barbarians and was curable by the beneficent Confucian civilization, but in the Chinese rejection of any attempt at imposition of alien ideologies. Exactly as it is clear that the Persians and Arabs practised their Muslim faith without any ambitions to proselytize,\textsuperscript{25} so it is evident that the early Christians in China were active missionaries, and the Portuguese, by Fitzgerald's own account, schooled in this atmosphere of religious hatred and constant warfare, had learned to think of any non-Christian people as \textit{ipso facto} enemies, and every pagan ship that sailed the sea as a legitimate prize. . In religious matters, the Iberian peoples imported an Islamic fervour alien to other parts of Christendom. Conversion or the sword became with them a Christian doctrine, which in the East and America was ruthlessly enforced.\textsuperscript{26}

This is the reason, I think, that during the earlier dynasties, the Empire was freely opened to Muslims. They traded and resided not only in ports but also in the main cities of the interior, including the Capital. Under the Manchus, however, the Europeans were carefully restricted to one single city and its immediate environs and were positively prohibited from trade or residence in any other part of the Empire until they forced their way by the unequal treaty system and the gun-boat policy. Thus, the use of force by foreigners was doubly rebuked, not only for its own sake but because it may have been perceived by some Chinese as the Western way to force them into a foreign faith.

For the Chinese, an alien ideology was no less dangerous than a foreign power, because while the latter might be contained and "civilized," the former can pose a threat to the entire system. So even when the West attempted peaceful means of infiltration into China, such as the Jesuit episodes of the 16th century, it was regarded with suspicion.\textsuperscript{27} The Jesuits found the Chinese literati deeply alarmed about the re-entry of this new-old heterodoxy, and the Chinese people supremely disgusted after eighty years of violent Portuguese imposition of this heterodoxy. That Western aggression and heterodox faith became associated as one and the same thing in the Chinese mind was, of course, due to the "coincidence" that the aggressors were European and Christian, and the Christians were European and aggressors.

The labelling of Christianity as "heterodox" and not as "foreign" as a rationale for its rejection tends to undermine the theory that "Christianity, for
all its ecumenical pretensions, had been compromised by its character as a Western institution," and that "the early Jesuits in China, in their fear, for their religion, of its fatal indictment as a Western, passing thing, hopefully expressed it as a sort of 'perennial philosophy.'" It seems rather that it was Christianity which was rejected because it was heterodox, and the West because it was Christian and attempted to impose its heterodoxy. After all, Buddhism ultimately won ground in China despite its foreignness, and Islam held on despite its alien origin. Similarly, Western science made much more, and much faster, headway in China than Christianity, despite the foreign extraction of both.

It is thus no wonder that when the Jesuits came they posed as useful skilled technicians and scientists, not as missionaries. Mathematics, astronomy, geography, hydraulics, the calendar, the cannon, or even Italian painting were no threat to the Chinese order. In the spiritual domain, the Jesuits tried to accommodate themselves in the Confucian framework. As learned gentlemen who wore the mandarin robe and spoke Chinese, they presented themselves as candidates for possible admission into Chinese culture. Although they had some success in converting Chinese scholars to Christianity, their tactful and cautious expression of their ideas had nothing of the self-asserting arrogance of the previous Christian missionaries who had come to China, or of those who were yet to come.

Even so, both Confucian and Buddhist scholars remained unshakably opposed to Christianity, and to the Jesuits, because of the heterodox religious-political order that they represented. Yang Kuang-hsien (1597-1663) wrote a number of treatises denouncing the Christian religion and accused the Jesuits of "plotting against the state and indoctrinating the people with false ideas." Yang also attacked the Catholic convert Li Tsu-po (d. 1665) who attempted, like sinicized Muslims and Jews, to show the common historical base of Confucianism and Christianity. Li asserted that man had originated in Judea and that a branch of this early human family had then migrated to China under the legendary Fu-hsi. He also maintained that the Christian God had been worshipped in ancient China under the name of T'ien or Shang-ti, and that this worship had been lost in the Chou period and later revived by Matteo Ricci and other missionaries.

Yang's furious response to these views was aroused not so much because of the foreign origin that Li had dared to attribute to the Chinese, but because of the linking of Confucianism with a heterodox faith:

Schell's book says that one man and one woman were created as the first ancestors of mankind. He was not so bold as to state contemptuously that all the people of the world are the descendants of his religion. According to Li's book, however, our China is nothing but an offshoot of Judea; our ancient Chinese rulers, sages and teachers were but the descendants of a heterodox sect; and our Classics and sage teachings, propounded generation after generation, no more than the remnants of a heterodox religion. Are there no limits to foolishness?
Yang was, of course, an extreme case, and it would be incorrect to generalize from him to other Chinese literati. His vitriolic attacks on Christianity seem to have had no parallel in the pre-Ch'ing Chinese writings against Islam, despite their applicability to both.34 This suggests to what extent the self-effacing and outwardly sinicized Chinese Islam had succeeded in escaping the label of heterodoxy and the threat attributed to it. The wrath of Chinese scholars was unleashed against Christian heterodoxy, however, as a real menace to the Chinese way of life:

The Lord of Heaven, Jesus, was nailed to death because he broke his country's laws; this was no case of recognizing the relationship between ruler and subject. Jesus was not begotten by his father. Moreover, people who take refuge in their religion are not permitted to present offerings to the ancestral tablets. This is no recognition of the relationship between father and son.35

The same attacks against Christianity were repeated by other scholars throughout the Ch'ing and were compounded by additional charges of sexual excesses, shady activities and clandestine meetings, all reminiscent of the arguments harped upon by the Confucianists who had refuted Buddhism under the T'ang.36 It is natural that scholar-officials were the most outspoken anti-Christian activists, since the new heterodoxy posed a direct threat to them as the representatives, the upholders and the employees of the Confucian system. But the missionaries' denunciation of ancestor worship and idolatry certainly offended the Chinese populace at large. Moreover, up into the 1860s, the missionaries were the only representatives of the West in the Chinese hinterland, and their very presence as the militant messengers of a heterodox sect generated anti-foreignism, that is anti-Western sentiment. Of course, this resentment picked up more steam and became more accentuated after the Treaty of Tientsin, when the missionaries received the backing of gunboats.

In contrast, Muslims in China were not directly attacked by the literati. They were despised by the populace for being un-Chinese, for failing to accede to the highest stage of civilization. However, since they led a separate life which they did not enforce on their neighbours, they were less threatening and more tolerable than the Christian missionaries.

So, paradoxically, those un-Chinese Muslims who lived within Chinese society were deemed as much less of a menace than the non-Chinese Christians who were encroaching from the outside. This is because the Muslim insiders were truly outsiders to the Chinese regime and had no stake in its change or takeover, while the Christian outsiders made it evident that they were intent on undoing and re-doing the fibre of Chinese society from the inside. These fears have been vindicated in retrospect, of course, since the Western-style schools in China, which contributed much to the change of mind among Chinese intellectuals and to the disintegration of traditional China, were founded and directed by Christian mis-
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missionaries. The Muslims, despite their broad social welfare programme in the community, did not open any schools to "educate" the Chinese and had no significant impact, in the final analysis, on Chinese thought and institutions.

The deeper Christianity penetrated into Chinese life and transformed it, the more violently it was rejected, together with its politico-military backer - the West. The virulent attacks by Chinese intellectuals on Christianity can only be explained by imputing to them a sense of the danger which they felt approaching. They were orthodox, committed to the preservation of what they thought to be the orthodox tradition. Such a danger did not exist as far as Chinese intellectuals' attitude toward Islam was concerned. Hence the attenuated, almost silent, voice against Chinese Muslims, as long as they did not rise in rebellion and "win" the label of heterodoxy.

The sense of danger that Christianity posed to the Chinese was reinforced through the military backing of Christian intransigence by foreign powers after the Opium War. Chinese Muslims prior to the nineteenth century did not generate such a threat, since no foreign military establishment stood behind them. It was not until the turn of the century that Turkey, the dominant Muslim power of the time, became interested in Chinese Islam. Even then, this interest was mainly focused on attempts to awaken Pan-Islamism and stimulate the recognition of the Sultan as the Muslim spiritual ruler. Decaying Turkey neither would, nor could, interfere militarily to enforce its religious endeavours. True, when Muslims rose in rebellion they could muster a military force of their own, not much less dangerous than the military power of the West. But even then, this power did not undermine the Chinese socio-ethical system, inasmuch as it backed secessionist, not reformist or revolutionary, aspirations. Thus Chinese Islam, in peace and in war, remained outside the Chinese system and constituted no threat to it.

Christianity in China was determined to transform China from within by peaceful missionary means or by military intervention. The episode of the T'aiping Rebellion proved, if proof was needed, how a semi-Christian ideology, revolutionary because it was heterodox, could undermine the entire Confucian system if it obtained power. The Muslim state in Yunnan demonstrated how harmless it was to the system, even though it was termed heterodox because it was rebellious.

The broad aspects of missionary and Christian impact in China are beyond the scope of this work. But an analysis would be pertinent that would confront the foreign encroaching Christianity with the semi-domesticated Islam in terms of rivalry between them.

Before modern times, the toleration of Muslims outside Christendom, or even negotiation with them, was viewed as treasonable to the Western Church. For instance, when the Templars in Palestine were to be accused in Europe of horrifying crimes, secret agreements with the Muslims and a willingness to cede
power to Islam were listed against them. In general, friendly relations with Muslims were prohibited, while subject Muslims within Christendom were tolerated in the manner that Christians enjoyed the status of dhimmi within the Islamic state.

However, the ultimate aim in the case of the Christians was to convert the Muslims under their rule, while Christians could remain indefinitely in their tolerated status under Islam. Although insisting that Jews and Muslims must be converted, Christian missionaries were permitted to use reason and kindness in the process rather than harshness. Although Christians in general might not eat with Jews and Muslims, or invite them as guests, missionaries outside Christendom were exempted. This seeming elasticity and conciliatory approach to Islam should not, in any way, distract one from the traditional deep-seated suspicion of Islam by Christians. For the flexibility accorded to missionaries was no more than a tactical measure to attain evangelization of the Muslims as the ultimate strategic goal.

When Christians came to China to inaugurate their third cycle of missionary work they found, to their dismay, that Islam, in contrast to Christianity's repeated failures, was well established all over the country. They realized that it would not be enough to conduct missionary work among the Chinese, their raison d'être in China, but that they would have to combat Chinese Islam as well, by virtue of its being another monotheistic religion and, by that time, the religion of the materially sinicized Hui people. The self-contained quality of Chinese Islam must have contributed to this dismay, for it showed how strong, independent and viable that religion was. After all the Muslims, far from appealing to the Chinese government with requests for privileges, on the contrary made efforts to be forgotten. Not only were the Muslims not backed by any foreign power, but they could muster enough power of their own to rebel against the regime.

To judge from the volume of missionary writings about Chinese Islam, this issue truly concerned the propagators of Christianity in China. Some were literally horrified by the "danger" that Islam might sweep China, especially during the three simultaneous Muslim rebellions in the Northwest and Southwest which, if successful, would have threatened to sever from China a sizable part of its territories. Vasil’ev, the Russian sinologist who visited China in the 1860s, wrote:

Settlers of Dzungaria, the Solon and Sibo tribesmen, realized the strength of the Muslims and started negotiating with them. The Muslims then announced that they would have to adopt Islam if they wanted to remain safe. To this, the Solon and the Sibo acquiesced. Thus, if at some time, the Muslims should gain the upper hand in China politically, they would certainly approach the other Chinese with the request: and who could offer them resistance?

Sixty years later, Mark Botham, one of the foremost missionaries
advocating evangelism among Muslims, wrote:

The day of opportunity is now. For when Christianity and Islam really come to grips in China — which they have not done hitherto — there will perhaps be closed doors to be opened, instead of the doors that now stand wide open, but would almost seem to be beginning to creak on their hinges.\(^\text{43}\)

The persistent underlying fear of the missionaries generated very careful methods of dealing with Chinese Islam, very different from the blunt, and often tactless, preaching that was practised towards the Chinese public, the missionary interference in Chinese official affairs, and missionary excesses in general.\(^\text{44}\)

In some places, the Muslims seem to have received the missionaries with courteous curiosity and showed interest in Bibles in Arabic which they brought for them. Whether Muslim interest was aroused by the Bible because of its narratives of familiar Qur’anic stories, or by the Arabic script which was the language of the Holy Qur’an, is hard to determine. At any rate, it was interpreted, or rather misinterpreted, by the Christian zealots as a “hearty reception of the missionaries.”\(^\text{45}\) This illusion about the positive reception of Christianity by Muslims, which is repeatedly stated in missionary writings, was often dealt a blow when the missionaries became too intransigent.\(^\text{46}\) So besides reports of missionaries who were politely ushered into mosques,\(^\text{47}\) we read of others, less fortunate, who were hustled out of mosques.\(^\text{48}\) A missionary very appropriately remarked that:

The Chinese are more easily approached and more receptive than the Muslims. . .on the whole, the Muslim work here is beset with difficulties and needs much prayer, and blood, and tears, if the Muslims of Kansu are to be saved.\(^\text{49}\)

Although a definite conclusion must await the thorough sampling of missionary work in various Muslim communities, it seems to me that the varying response to missionaries in differing locations depended upon the size and viability of each given community. Small congregations of marginal Islam seemed to be more receptive, perhaps due to the similarity that they could find between the Biblical stories that the missionaries told them and the Qur’anic versions that they had heard but were not able to read or verify for themselves. A typical report of this sort relates:

At San-ying. . .where I spent a night, on my return, the Mullah and the principal members of his congregation came to the inn, and after listening for some time, the Mullah said: ‘The Ching (Holy Scriptures) you sold at Ku-yuan tells about Adam better than our Ching’. . .At Hui-kan-fu one remarked, holding the Bible in his hand, ‘This is the foundation of our religion.’ The Muslims are ignorant and know little more than the names and a smattering of the history of the holy men of old,
mixed with superstition.  

But, in places where Islam was strong, confident, viable, the response was utterly negative, sometimes violently so:

In Ho-chao, 190 li from Ti-chao, the majority of the inhabitants were Muslim. The southern part of the outer city is the busiest and entirely Muslim. There is a large mosque in the city and one outside too. My door was forced open by a Muslim. I was asked to leave the city by a delegation of local people, saying that there are already Muslims and other religions here, and there was no need for more.

In Tientsin, also a strong centre of Islam, a preliminary announcement of a book to be published by local Muslims said:

Since the entry of the various religions into our country, we have not had the calamity of religious controversy; for each has followed its own laws and has not attacked the others. But during recent years, the Jesus people have levelled all kinds of criticism at our religion, even going so far as to send letters to each mosque, trying to get up arguments.

It was probably the surfacing of open conflict between the two religions that prompted the missionary establishment to reconsider its strategy toward Muslims and take a more lenient and respectful line, although the ultimate goal of evangelization did not change. A report of a missionary committee appointed to deal with this problem, recommended:

If the full Gospel of God's grace is presented in a brotherly spirit, and a ministry of real friendship is steadily maintained, the outlook is bright and promising. If blighting criticism is allowed to take the field, the issue is sure to be hardening of Moslem hearts and the closing of Moslem doors.

The resolutions adopted by the conference of missionaries working in Muslim districts provide, *inter alia*, that:

Truths of our Catholic faith, while presented to the Muslims in a spirit of love, should never be toned down to avoid giving offence to them. These tracts, while correcting where necessary Muslim misconceptions of Christian truth, should, as far as possible, avoid giving needless offence by disparaging statements regarding their Prophet or Book.

But, despite the intensive work invested in Chinese Islam and the particular care accorded to training special missionaries and preparing special materials in Arabic for use among Muslims, the results seem to have been very discouraging, practi-
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cally hopeless, from the missionaries' point of view, in the great centres of Chinese Islam. One of them was to admit that

The impossibility of any one mission dealing with Islam in the larger centres, is quite clear to all.56

But during the Ch'ing, Muslim responses to Christianity's encroachments could only be manifest in terms of contact or avoidance of contact. For, if the Muslims had come out against Christianity as a heterodoxy, they would thereby have drawn undesired attention to their own Islam as another brand of heterodoxy, and it was to their advantage to avoid that image. In time of rebellion, however, latent Muslim resistance of Christianity became open struggle against it. So we learn that the Muslim rebels in Yunnan were bitterly anti-Christian, and the missionaries in that province were often in danger,57 despite the stake that the rebel government had in gaining recognition and aid from Western powers. Similarly, the Muslim rebels in the Northwest seem to have caused the Christians much inconvenience.58

After 1911, the fear of heterodox labels was removed in the new China, where heterodoxies of all sorts became the new orthodoxy. An editorial published in a Muslim magazine during the first years of the Republic, besides proclaiming that "it would not be difficult for the occult tenets of our religion to become luminous, and its great principles to be spread,"59 defied "those of other religions who deride us and calumniate us... in this age when all religions are striving for supremacy."60 Then, it denounced Christianity and the West, claiming that:

The progress of civilization of the present age is due to the Renaissance in Europe, and the Renaissance is due to the influence of the Muslims of Western Asia, for on the return of the Crusaders from their wars, the scholars of Europe became imbued with the learning of the Muslim World.61

Finally, it unleashed the most direct attack on Christianity:

Before the time of the Open Door, there were only two or three religions in China, each pursuing its own course, and there was no conflict. But with the introduction of steam traffic, Europe and America came with their ideas of usurpation, putting their religion in the forefront as an efficient means, and disseminating their doctrines throughout the land. They see in our religion a powerful enemy, and transgressing the principles of right, seek opportunity to attack us... Of late, they have still further put us down and exalted themselves, by publication of all kinds of books, in Chinese and Arabic, finding unreasonable fault with others, and praising themselves inordinately. The good name of our religion suffers accordingly. Up to the present, no one has arisen to refute this or argue with them. I do not know how many
stupid people have been deceived and led astray by this.62

The shifts of attitude in Chinese Islam toward Christianity, from shy and reserved avoidance of contact to outright confrontation, marked, as we have observed, the changing fortunes of Chinese Islam itself. As long as it was merely tolerated, because it was not relevant to the Chinese social pattern, it could not afford to bear the label of heresy. To the extent that it was successful in its expansion, it was due precisely to its ostensible Chineseness, not to its intrinsic heterodoxy. By becoming domesticated, or at least by seeming to be so, Chinese Islam gradually soft-pedalled the opposition which it would otherwise have encountered. Therefore Islam was never directly attacked by Chinese literati prior to the rebellions and, despite the popular stereotypes which victimized it, it made substantial gains on the missionary score.

Under these conditions, Islam's reserved relationship with Christianity was a reflection of its tolerant treatment by the dynasty. But when Islam rose in rebellion and appeared heterodox to the Chinese, its ill-treatment by the authorities was reflected in attacks on Christianity. Moreover, Moslem rebellions, which sharpened the acuteness of the political threat posed by heterodoxy to the Chinese system, aroused the dynasty's persecution of any and all heterodox movements. The Muslim Rebellion in the Northwest (1781-1784), for example, is said to have been the main factor behind Chinese persecution of the Catholics, as reflected in the Imperial Edicts of 1784-85.63

In 1784, Italian Franciscans who had been sent to China were on their way from Macao to their field in Shensi when, in Hupeh, they were handed over to the authorities. That was due to the recent Muslim Rebellion in Shensi, which made the Peking government especially watchful against possible unrest in that region. A vigorous Imperial Edict was issued ordering the destruction of churches, the arrest of European and Chinese priests, the punishment of officials who had permitted the foreigners to penetrate the country and the renunciation of their faith by converted Christians. As a result, Christian priests from many provinces were conveyed to Peking and cast into prison.64

Chinese Islam's open attacks on Christianity, while they could be explained in terms of the threat that the missionaries posed to the Muslims as their competitors in the field and in terms of an analogy to the mutual dislike between Jews and Muslims in China which generated "displaced aggressive behaviour" between the two groups,65 may also be diagnosed as the manifestation of an identity crisis for the Muslims. For, despite the strong antipathy shown by Islam towards Christianity, the latter was regarded by the Chinese as either the same, or similar, to the former. Therefore, Christian missionaries, despite the harsh treatment meted out to them by the Muslims, were suspected by the Chinese of being in league with the Muslim rebels.66 Hsu Chi-yu,67 a staunch opponent of Christianity, asserted that the only difference between Christianity and Islam was
that the followers of the latter did not eat pork. So, we have here a situation very similar to that observed in the misapprehension of Jews as Muslims by the Chinese.

But there is evidence to suggest that not all Muslims were lumped together with all Christians. While all Christians were still anathema, only bad Muslims (Hui-fei) were persecuted. As long as the Muslims behaved properly, they were accepted as Hui-min, while those who rebelled became associated with Christianity because their heterodoxy became evident. As we have already pointed out, Christianity in general had always encountered a hostile attitude in China because of the heterodoxy manifest in missionary work. As such it was condemned by Chinese literati and resisted by the Chinese populace.

Islam, however, has never been consistently and totally rejected by Chinese intellectuals, and it succeeded in becoming more and more bearable to the Chinese people because of its material acculturation, its subdued stance and its noncompulsive behaviour. Christian churches loomed large, proudly and prominently displaying the Cross; Muslim mosques were scattered among adjacent one-storey houses. Christian missionaries wore European clothing and spoke foreign tongues, in themselves repulsive and suspicion-raising; Muslims spoke Chinese and wore Chinese clothes. Christian missionaries, backed by Western power, bluntly and often violently imposed themselves on the country; the Muslims proceeded with their propagation of the faith quietly, almost casually, probing for soft spots and looking for opportunities. Christian missions practised the politics of the desirable, the Muslims – the art of the possible.

Catholics in China concentrated upon building up a Christian community, endeavouring to bring as many as possible into the Church, often seeking to win entire villages to the Faith. Protestants divided their energies between promoting a Christian countryside and attempting to influence the nation as a whole through education, health programmes, etc. Islam, while co-opting individuals to strengthen its community, did not attempt to create new Muslim communities, neither did it seek to change China as a whole. Being Chinese and practical, Muslims did not share the utopianism of the Christian foreigners. They knew and understood the limits of their power in China and were well content, if and when the occasion presented itself, to secede from the existing ethico-political system in China rather than attempting to transform it.
CHAPTER IX

Indian Islam and Chinese Islam: The Medium and the Receiver of Muslim Militancy?

The nature of Muslim society in particular is dynamic and congregational. Jihad is in consonance with its dynamic nature. Its neglect would amount to the neglect of essential self-defence and self-preservation, especially in a world hostile to Islam.

Shah Wali Ullah

The previous two chapters have hopefully thrown some additional light on Chinese Islam insofar as they illuminated some aspects of it as compared with Judaism and Christianity in China. It is no less important, however, to be aware of Muslim trends in neighbouring India which could conceivably have found their way to China in the nineteenth century. This possibility looms all the more realistically due to India's proximity to Yunnan, one of the centres of Muslim rebellion in China, with which contacts have existed through Tibet and Burma, all of which were within the reach of British power in that era.

Is it possible that the so-called wahhabi Islam influences might have seeped from India to China during the turbulent nineteenth century, in the course of which Muslim Jihad in India was paralleled by contemporary Muslim activity in China? Certainly other influences, also referred to as wahhabi, had penetrated to China from Central Asia. Their adherents waged a Jihad against the Russian occupation of Turkestan, independent of the Jihad launched by some Indian Muslims against the British. But because of the permanent existence of sparse Muslim communities in Burma and Tibet, and the certainty that contacts were maintained between these Muslims and some Chinese Muslim rebels, we are tempted to conclude that Muslim militancy penetrated from the concentrated solution of intensively Muslim Bengal and northern India, through the semi-permeable membrane in the buffer states, to the more dilute solution of Islam in China.

Muslim militancy in China during the nineteenth century, which culminated in the great Muslim Rebellions of the Northwest and Southwest, could also have derived some of its ideology from sectarian Islam, such as certain types of Shi'ism which are conducive to millenarian aspirations and practices. Although there is not direct evidence of causal relations between Indian sectarian Islam and its Chinese parallel, partly because such a relationship (had it existed) would have been secret and difficult to trace, it is not inconceivable that Islamic sects did penetrate to China from India.

It is equally possible that the Sufi Naqshbandi order, which was very
potent in both Indian and Central Asian Islam, made inroads into China through its powerful array of secret agents and missionaries, who initiated many Muslims in China into the Naqshbandiya. This order was known for its revivalist activism and its militant stand in political affairs, so the possibility cannot be ruled out that the influence of this movement reached China. We shall return in more detail to the inner dynamics of these streams of thought as they were manifested in China. Here, suffice it to establish in brief the basic framework within which each of them operated in India, and their convergence in Sayed Ahmad's Jihad movement.

The 1857 Mutiny, regarded as the most spectacular event in nineteenth century India, also constituted the most spectacular illustration of Muslim militancy, couched in terms of Jihad, against the British. Although the initial disaffection was expressed among the Hindu Sepoys, it was Muslim militants who:

Almost universally were regarded as the fomentors of the revolt and its chief beneficiaries. The first sparks of disaffection, it was generally agreed, were kindled among the Hindu Sepoys who feared an attack on their caste. But the Muslims then fanned the flames of discontent, and placed themselves at the head of the movement, for they saw in these religious grievances the stepping-stone to political power. In the British view, it was Muslim intrigue, and Muslim leadership, that converted the Sepoy mutiny into a political conspiracy aimed at the extinction of the British Raj. The British were also concerned that the Muslim community, though few in numbers, was far more hostile throughout the course of the uprising.

These British convictions, which conceived of the Muslim rebellion as a "political intrigue," obviously overlooked the religious motives underlying Muslim militancy. For the British were aware of the great debate that was raging within the Indian Muslim community as to the status of India. The question of whether British-held India was to be considered Dar-al-Harb, now that Islamic rule had vanished, and the ensuing duty of Muslims to revolt, became the concern not only of Muslim Indian Doctors of Law, but was referred to scholars as far away as Mecca itself. As a nineteenth-century British administrator in India put it:

The obligation of the Indian Musulmans to rebel or not to rebel hung for some months on the deliberations of these priests in the Holy City of Arabia.

The above quotations obviously referred to the so-called Indian Wahhabi movement, founded by Sayed Ahmad, who had led the anti-British Jihad since the 1830s. Well before him, however, Shah Abd-al-Aziz, the Sun of India (1746-1823), the son of Shah Wali-Ullah (the Naqshbandi luminary), sensing the approaching end of Muslim hegemony in India, uttered the same militant view of Jihad:
When infidels get hold of a Muhammedan country, and it becomes impossible for the Musulmans of the country, and of the people of the neighbouring districts, to drive them away, or to retain reasonable hope of ever doing so; and the power of the infidels increases to such an extent that they can abolish or retain the ordinances of Islam according to their pleasure; and no one is strong enough to seize on the revenues of the country without the permission of the Infidels; and the Musulman inhabitants do no longer live so secure as before; such a country is politically an area of Dar-al-Harb.  

Similarly, various sects of the Indian Shi'a advocated the necessity for *Jihad*, usually with the reservation that this duty should be performed under the guidance of the right leader. The Bohra sect, for example, required its followers:

> to fight sincerely in the *Jihad* with their wealth and their body and their lives whenever the *Imam* or the *Da'i* may required it.

Sectarian Islam has, as we shall see, built-in millenarian trends likely to produce a leader, an *Imam-mahdi* or otherwise, who would wage the Holy War to attain the sect's objectives. The *Naqshbandi* and *Wahhabi* ideologies, however, while having no millenarian ideas underlying their systems, could, as they indeed did in India, converge on the basis of their common revivalist ideology which, when brought to its extreme, demanded (or at least sanctioned) *Jihad* as a means of preserving Islamic values.

Strictly speaking, the *Wahhabi* movement was launched in the Najd, Arabia, by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab in the mid-eighteenth century and was intent on bringing about a puritan reformation which would return corrupted Islam to the simple theology of its primitive sources. Although the political dreams of the *Wahhabis* could not be realized due to the intervention of the Sultan of Turkey, their spiritual role was preserved. Pilgrims from all over the Muslim world who came to Mecca and Medina returned to their homes as zealous reformers. One of them, Sayed Ahmad, roused the Punjabi Muslims to build a theocratic state, later shattered by the Sikhs in 1830.

The *Wahhabi* sect *per se* has never been formally organized in India under this name, but the doctrines professed by Indian reformers like Sayed Ahmad and others have been close to that school, and popular belief recognized them as such. Wahhabism was widely received in India due, paradoxically, to the groundwork laid by the *Naqshbandi* order under the leadership of the great Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624), often referred to as the *Imam* al-Rabani (The Divinely Appointed Imam) and Mujaddid-i-Alfi-Thani (Renewer of the Second Millennium). In his doctrine, Sirhindi replaced the metaphysical monism of Ibn al-'Arabi with an ethical dualism, while in practice a strong emphasis was placed on the *Shar'i'a* values, reinforced through *Sufi* techniques. Sufism was thus given a new life and a new direction. Shah 'Abd al Aziz followed him, stressing the purification of the
Shari'a from un-Islamic beliefs and practices and a return to a positive teaching of Islam.

Sayed Ahmad, ‘Abd al-Aziz’s disciple, transformed this reformist school into a Jihad movement. After his travels through Arabia and Syria, where he came into contact with the Wahhabi reformers, he returned to India more disgusted than ever with the abuses and degradations of Islam which had grown up largely from contacts with Hinduism. So, inspired by his Master ‘Abd al-Aziz and moved by what he saw in other Muslim lands, he began to preach with renewed vigour, seeking to free Islam from Hindu corruption. He also preached the necessity for a Holy War, because under the British domination, India was no longer Dar-al-Islam but had reverted to Dar-al-Harb. Sayed Ahmad also professed and appealed strenuously against accretions and cults of saints, collected funds, and recruited men for Jihad in northern and eastern India. After his death (1831), the momentum of Jihad was carried on until 1890, despite the fatwas of the pro-British 'ulama who dissociated themselves from the movement.

Concurrently with Sayed Ahmad’s movement, another movement of Islamic revival was on the upsurge in Bengal from the beginning of the nineteenth century, led by Hajji Shari’at Allah, who had also visited Arabia and was influenced by Wahhabi doctrines. Shari’at Allah and his disciples advocated purification of Islam from Hindu ideas and Sufi excesses and initiated a socio-economic programme directed against rich landlords in the interest of poor Muslim peasants. They also defined India as Dar-al-Harb. thus laying the ground for Jihad. The mounting discontent among Muslims in India expressed itself in the 1857 Mutiny.

The extraordinary convergence of these streams of Islamic thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – mysticism, fundamentalism, Shi’ism – the like of which we shall observe in Chinese Islam at roughly the same time, found its expression in India in the Sayed Ahmad Movement, usually referred to as the “Indian Wahhabiya.” Parts of the Wahhabi movement in India, which had its roots in the Sufi order of the Naqshbandiya, degenerated into an esoteric Islam much akin to some sects of Shi‘i Islam. The common denominator within these prima facie disparate groupings was the idea of Jihad as professed and carried out by all three.

The gradual decay and disintegration of the Moghul Empire during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the ensuing ferment and political instability generated by the loss of Muslim hegemony over the Indian sub-continent, brought about an introspective soul-searching within the Muslim community. The ‘ulama tried to overcome these crises by re-asserting the pristine spirit of Islam, introducing a religious revival, and instituting socio-economic reforms. Orthodox Muslim decline, which prompted revivalist responses, marked the ascension of the Shi‘a. At the Imperial court, Bahadur Shah made attempts to introduce Shi‘a practices, and the regional courts of Lucknow in Oudh and
Murshidabad in Bengal were avowedly Shi’ite. Many conversions of Muslim notables to the Shi’a took place during that time, fostered by the influx of Iranians to Lucknow, itself a centre of Shi’ite religion. Many Muslim Sunnis believed that the rise of the Shi’a was symptomatic of Sunni decline, as the Shi’a flourished “when man depends on things created instead of on the Creator.”

By no stretch of the imagination, however, could those who blamed the Shi’a for Islamic decay and vigorously pushed for a revival, envision the reversion of the revivalist movements to something even worse than the Shi’a from which they sought to disengage.

The Sufi order of the Naqshbandiya, which had spearheaded the Islamic reaction against Akbar’s heresy, was particularly qualified to do so because of its closer association with Sunni orthodoxy than any other Sufi order. Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, the great luminary of the seventeenth century, who regarded the second millennium of Islam not as an era of decline but of renaissance, instilled in his followers the idea that Islam and Kufr (heresy) are opposites and therefore mutually exclusive. Since the two opposites could not integrate, one could only thrive at the expense of the other. In the Indian context, then, if the Hindus found an opportunity, they would convert Muslims to Hinduism. Therefore, the security of Islam, its very existence, depended upon the humiliation of the Unbelievers and their faith. Anyone who held the infidels in affection or esteem, or kept company with them, dishonoured his religion. He considered it binding on the Muslims to hold the infidels and their idols in contempt.

Faced with the decadence of Islam in the eighteenth century, Shah Wali Ullah completed the work of Sirhindi in that he channelled the Sufi spiritual heritage into traditional Islam. His views also echoed Sirhindi’s deep distrust and contempt for non-Muslims, which easily led him to the conclusion that Jihad is not only necessary, but it is consonant with the dynamic nature of Islamic society. For if Jihad is not pursued, this would lead, in Wali Ullah’s words, to “the neglect of the essential self-defence and self-preservation, especially in a world hostile to Islam.”

For Shah Wali Ullah, moreover, Jihad was not merely a tool of self-preservation, but also a means for the ultimate realization of the millenium. He saw history following an evolutionary pattern in which society progressed from primitive through urban to monarchical and finally universal stages. It was with this final stage, at the apex of which an overarching political order, the Khilafat, would be established, that human society would fulfill its religious obligations, and the true Islamic order would be established.

The combination of a Sunni ‘Alim, a Sufi Master and a fundamentalist reviver in Shah Wali Ullah’s persona, was transmitted to his son and successor, ‘Abd al-Aziz, whose fatwa concerning the status of India as Dar-al-Harb we have mentioned. ‘Abd al Aziz, however, only indirectly called for Jihad, while his father was more forceful on this matter:
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O ye soldiers of Islam, you were called to the ranks to wage *Jihad* in the name of God Almighty so that you may uphold righteousness and destroy the power of the infidels. Instead, foot-soldiering has become your occupation. You are no longer soldiers of Islam, you are mere mercenaries. The lofty ideas of *Jihad* no longer animate your hearts. You are only hired tyrants. How will you face your God on the day of His Judgment?25

Sayed Ahmad Barelvi, 'Abd al-Aziz’s disciple, who was not himself a scholar, nevertheless succeeded by his zeal and mystical power in drawing people to him. He also personified the combination of Sufi traditions with absolute obedience to the *Sharia* and a strong drive for religious revival. He created his own Sufi order, the *Tariqa Muhammadiya* (The Way of the Prophet), although he had been initiated into the *Naqshbandiya* and the other major Sufi orders in vogue in India, such as the *Chistiya* and the *Qadiriya*.

But, unlike his great spiritual predecessors, Sayed Ahmad injected a new element of populism into his religio-political endeavour. His activity among the Muslim masses,26 especially the lower classes and the economically deprived,27 won him a following which was inclined to see him as a saviour, not merely as a spiritual leader. The devotion and zeal with which these masses embarked on actual *Jihad* can only be explained in terms of the seeming capacity of Sayed Ahmad to realize the messianic craving that was part of the Islamic popular make-up, and in terms of Sayed Ahmad’s own conception of his mission as transcending worldly spiritual leadership, into the realm of some sort of *mahdi* figure.28

The term “*wahhabi,*” which was applied to the Mujahidi movement of Sayed Ahmad, certainly had some justification on the grounds that both the *Tariqa Muhammadiya* and the Arabian *Muwahhidun* drew their fundamental doctrines from a common source, the religious seminaries of Mecca and Medina from which both Shah Wali Ullah and Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab derived their inspiration for reform. Moreover, the tool of *Jihad*, revived and used by both to preserve the Faith (and even to impose it on others) provided a further common denominator between the movements. It is wrong, however, to identify the Mujahidi movement with the Arabian *Wahhabis*, because of their basically different attitudes toward Sufism29 and the worship of Saints, sanctioned by the former, rejected by the latter.

These basic differences also explain how the Mujahidi movement in India could drift into something less than orthodox Sunni Islam, while the Arabian *Muwahhidun* stood unsparingly by their puritanical views. Sayed Ahmad, from the very beginning of his career, won the *bai‘at* (allegiance) of Shah Abdul Hai and Shah Isma’il, son-in-law and nephew, respectively, of Shah ‘Abd al-Aziz, the descendants of the most saintly family in Muslim India, which was both fundamentalist and *Sufi*. The exemplary comradeship of these two leaders with Sayed
Ahmad and their devotion to the movement until their deaths, had a far-reaching effect on the history of the movement, inasmuch as both died as Shuhada' (martyrs) while fighting at Sayed Ahmad's side.30

Imbued with his sweeping success and encouraged by the non-conformism of his great supporter, Shah Isma'il, Sayed Ahmad himself, although still within the realm of the Sunna, began to elevate himself above the accepted Muslim conventions, thus setting in motion a process that would push his movement further apart from the Sunna after his death.31 Sayed Ahmad travelled widely, and his message was carried all over India from the Punjab to Bengal, both by himself and by his missionaries.32 During his stay in Patna, he met a group of Tibetan Muslims, six males and three females, who were on their way to the Hajj. He took that opportunity to urge them to spread his teachings in their own country. They swore a bai'at to him and were given money for their expenses on the way, after they were authorized to propagate his mission in Tibet.33 The spread of Sayed Ahmad's ideas to Bengal (and thence, presumably, to neighbouring Burma) and to Tibet is of crucial importance, as we shall see, for the substantiation of the hypothesis that these streams of thought could have seeped into Chinese Islam, which was undergoing, or would shortly undergo, similar developments.

Islam's first inroads into Tibet were launched from Kashmir in the fourteenth century,34 and to this day Tibetan Muslims are called Kachee, which is the name the Tibetans give to Islm.35 Since then, Muslims began to settle in various parts of the country and indulged in vigorous proselytizing, which resulted in a community of at least 10,000 souls in Lhassa alone by the turn of this century.36 Many Shi'ite colonies were, and are still, established on the periphery of Tibet, in places such as Baltistan and Purig, although Leh, the major city in Eastern Ladakh, remains essentially Sunnite.37

From the Chinese side of the border, there was considerable movement of Chinese Muslims in northeastern Tibet, particularly for trade, and Chinese Muslim trading centres were established in major monastery areas. Chinese Muslims intermarried with Tibetan girls and set up second homes in these centres, where their male children received adequate Muslim-Chinese education.38

The Muslim-Chinese freedom of movement in northern Tibet was facilitated by the fact that the country was within the Chinese tributary system. This situation was effectively maintained until the turn of the nineteenth century, when the declining Ch'ing power left the scene open for competition. The Nepalese Ghurkas disputed Chinese suzerainty and achieved some gains in the mid-nineteenth century. At the same time, the British began to meddle in Tibet's affairs from their Indian stronghold.39 At any rate, Lhassa, under one influence or another, remained the meeting ground for the Kashmir Muslims and their Chinese co-religionaries. They exchanged goods and "criticized one another's practices and rituals."40
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While it is evident that Tibet had been a meeting place for Muslims from India and China, it is hard to ascertain what and to what extent Indian Muslim influences did seep through to the Chinese. One can only surmise that the continuous growth of the Muslim trade centres in Tibet and the constant movement of Chinese traders to and fro must have maintained a degree of congeniality and congruence between the two branches of Islam. Tu Wen-hsiu’s appeal to Lhassa’s Muslims to assist him in his rebellion in itself tends to corroborate this hypothesis.

When we turn to Burmese Islam, things become much clearer, mainly due to a recent work on this community. On the surface, Burmese Islam is more akin to Chinese Islam, for both began with settlements of Persian and Arab traders in the ninth and tenth centuries, as is evidenced by Muslim travellers and historians. But later developments established a link between Burmese Muslims and their brothers in China and India. Indian Muslim traders also settled in Burma, and Burmese Muslims handled a voluminous trade with India, which assured a living and permanent contact between the two communities. From the Chinese end, Muslims from Yunnan (called Panthays) reached Burma as traders, and many of them were to settle there as refugees after the failure of the Yunnan Rebellion in the 1870s.

Among Burmese Muslims of Indian origin, some are descendants of men from North India who came over to Burma at the end of the eighteenth century to serve in the great Alompra’s armies in upper Burma. Others settled in the Arakan district on the Bay of Bengal, after the thirteenth century, and served as a bridgehead for Muslim penetration to other parts of Burma. From the fifteenth century onwards, Bengali influence in this area was mounting, to the point of almost total domination. Even after becoming independent of the Mogul Sultans, the Arakan kings continued to use Muslim titles, ceremonies and administrative methods of Delhi and Bengal, despite the fact that the kingdom remained nominally Buddhist. The Arakanese Muslims were Sunni, but some Shi’ite traditions gained preponderance among them. The massive immigration of Indian Muslims to Burma, however, did not take place until the beginning of the British conquest of the country in 1824. Many of them settled in the urban areas, notably Rangoon, where they handled much of the trade, and inserted themselves in other economic activities. Eventually, they organized either on the basis of their Indian districts of origin or according to their religious sects. So we find Sunni Bengalis and Shi’ite communities all co-existing and performing their rites in Rangoon and other localities.

Several hundred of these Muslims were identified as Wahhabis in the census of 1881, and since none were identified as such in subsequent censuses, one may surmise that their decline was tied up with the waning of the anti-British Jihad in India and Burma. One thing is certain, however -- that Shi’a and Wahhabi supporters had come from India to Burma, and that they were extant in both countries at the time of the Muslim Rebellions in China. Furthermore, the dis-
turbances organized and led by the Wahhabi elements in India soon spilled over to Burma. During the decades preceding the Great Revolt, from the 1820s to the 1850s, when India was declared Dar-al-Harb and Muslims were urged to join in Jihad against the British, Muslims in Burma also led a fierce anti-British propaganda campaign. Although Burmese Muslims claimed that their harrassment of the British was due to the trading competition posed by these intruders, it is quite probable that religious sentiments played a great part in this struggle.

The living contact between Indian and Burmese Muslims, who were often identical, no doubt ensured the uninterrupted flow of anti-British feelings from India to Burma, with its concomitant rebellious ferment, even if these sentiments were couched in trading and material terms. Muslim propaganda against the British, far from showing signs of respite after the defeat of the Burmese by the British (1824-26 War), on the contrary took advantage of Muslim influence in the Burmese court and pushed the country to more hostilities, which resulted in the conquest of Lower Burma by the British in 1852. Thus, on the very eve of Muslim rebellions in China (1850s), Islamic emotions in India and Burma ran high, apparently fostered by Muslim revivalist movements and, in any case, endeavouring to attain Muslim independence.

All we need to show now is the link which connected Burmese (and Indian) Islam with the Hui in China. Ma Te-hsin, the leader of the Yunnan Muslim Rebellion, had travelled in 1839 through Burma, and embarked in Rangoon with other pilgrims for Mecca. This does not necessarily mean that Ma was personally influenced by the contemporary foment of Burmese and Indian Islam, but it does suggest that Burma was a route for Chinese pilgrims going to the Hajj, and that contacts did exist which permitted the flow of Muslim ideas from Burma and India into Yunnan and the rest of China. For, after all, it was the more influential Muslims who could afford the Hajj; as such, they were probably learned enough to absorb new ideas and propagate them in their communities. Moreover, the schism that occurred in the leadership of the Yunnan Rebellion, with one party remaining obdurately insistent on Muslim separatism while the other submitted to the dynasty, may be reflective of the militant views of the Mujahidi Indian Muslims.

Indian scholars have also occasionally gone to China to instruct Muslim students, and no doubt transmitted their thoughts to them. Another substantial link between Burmese and Yunnanese Islam was provided by the Panthays, the term commonly used for Muslims of both Yunnan and Upper Burma. The Panthays are depicted as a “virile, sturdy and aggressive race,” the very same attributes used to stereotype Chinese Muslims in general. They were caravaneers and muleteers, criss-crossing the Yunnan trade routes and the wild mountain passes across the Burmese border. Although the majority of Panthays who settled in Burma have admittedly sought refuge there after the failure of their rebellion, many of them had conceivably been active on the trade routes well before the rebellions, as was usually the case with Chinese Muslims. Tu Wen-hsiu, the Yunnan
Rebellion leader, used these caravans to supply him with weapons from Rangoon. To be sure, these Panthay traders were hardly a scholarly element capable of comprehending and transmitting the controversies which tore Indian Islam apart. But they were certainly able to purchase and bring with them Muslim writings for their A-hungs, and perhaps even the feel for the religious ferment that was underway in India and Burma.

In any case, the combination of the proximity of Indian Islam, the Chinese Muslim pilgrims to Mecca through Burma and India, the Indian scholars who visited Yunnan, and the Panthay traders who maintained a regular contact with Burma, must have kept the Yunnanese (and other Chinese) Muslims aware of the great events that were unfolding in Indian Islam and the Muslim world. It is quite possible that these events may well have to do with the doctrinal developments in Chinese Islam during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which generated the bitter Old-Sect-New-Sect controversy after centuries of petrification.

The very same questions that confronted the Muslim rebels in China had their antecedents or their contemporary parallels in India. The issues relating to incompatibility of Islam with other religions and cultures, to definition of China as Dar-al Harb, to the duty of Chinese Muslims to wage *Jihad*, and to religious sectarianism — all had been experienced by Indian Muslims. It is not inconceivable that the Muslim rebels in China, when subjected to unbearable pressures under the Ch’ing, were ideologically and emotionally prepared enough, partly by their knowledge of the Indian experience, to launch their adventure of disengagement from the Chinese in the form of a *jihad* — for the prospects to achieve this end looked favourable.
CHAPTER X

Conclusion: Muslim Minorities and Islamic Rule

If you swallow something whole, you cannot digest it. You are apt either to vomit it or to suffer chronic stomach-ache.

A folk proverb

In the first chapter of this work, a sociological framework was set up to assist us in the analysis of the Chinese Muslim minority and its relationship with the Chinese host culture. Typologies of policies developed by the dominant group and of various responses open to the minorities were suggested. In the light of what was, hopefully, illuminated in the intervening chapters, let us examine whether and to what extent the Chinese behavioural pattern vis-à-vis the Muslims, and the Muslim reactions to it, fit into these categories.

From the majority viewpoint, the six varieties of policy towards the guest culture are: assimilation, a pluralistic society, legal protection, population transfers, continued subjugation and extermination. All of these, to be sure, underscore the glory of the virtues of the dominant culture which, at worse, justifies the suppression of minorities. At best, a condescending attitude toward the minority group is cultivated. In America, the normative assertion that this is a "Protestant Nation" still lingers, despite the breakthrough accomplished by the election of John F. Kennedy to the Presidency.

In India, Hindu communalists who opposed the secession of Muslims and the creation of Pakistan propounded the same religious views of nationality as the leaders of the Muslim League, insofar as they professed Hindu dominance and provided a rationale for the suppression of non-Hindu elements. When Pakistan seceded, its raison d'être was described as the existence of a state not only controlled by Muslims but also dominated by Islamic ideology, and the Hindu minority there was forced either to adjust or to depart.¹

In China, where culturalism was pronounced and all-embracing, assimilation was possible for non-Han individuals but could not be enforced for entire minority groups. It is precisely the emphasis on ethnocentricity, or culturalism, of the dominant group which deters minorities with dissenting values and religions from total assimilation. Material assimilation, however, was not only possible but almost inescapable, as we have seen in the case of Chinese Muslims. A pluralist society, though it existed in reality in the continuous ethno-cultural spectrum of such a vast country as China, was ideological anathema, however, in a unitarian state where nothing but compliance was tolerated in the intellectual and political spheres. Legal protection of the kind afforded to minorities after World War I was inapplicable in China as far as Islam was concerned, because it could
only be enforced by international guarantees, which the Chinese would not accept even if a guarantor could be found. Christians in China, who were backed by such guarantees, offended the Chinese majority rather than afforded protection to the Christian minority.

Transfer of population, like the other measures adopted by the majority, would be employed only in time of turmoil when the minority problem comes to the fore and poses a direct threat to the majority. So after the repression of Muslim rebellions in China, many Muslims were transferred by the authorities and resettled as a “pacification” measure, a measure still pursued by the Communist regime in its encouragement of Chinese settlement in the predominantly Muslim areas of Kansu and Sinkiang under the guise of “development.”

But if the host culture cannot incorporate the minority or drive it out, the only two ways open to it are subjugation or extermination, and both are troublesome. These extremes were intermittently tried on Chinese Muslims, but only under the Ch’ing, when marked official sensitivity to heterodoxy and increased pressures on the Islamic community brought about popular, officially-incited and officially-executed pogrom-style slaughters of the Muslims prior to, in the process of, and subsequent to armed risings.

Minority responses are parallel to majority policies and have been characterized as: pluralistic, assimilationist, secessionist and militant. Pluralism is usually advocated by minority groups who hope thereby to win an existence on an equal footing with the majority. But because of Islam’s peculiarities as a religion and a culture, co-existence with others could not be satisfactory in the long run, for a conversion of Dar-al-Harb to Dar-al-Islam has to take place eventually. Chinese Muslims, while seeking toleration by the dominant culture, did so not on the basis of the pluralistic “live and let live” but by dissimulating their differences and posing as Chinese outwardly. Their “pluralistic” attitude was a tactical one, a stratagem to gain time and gather strength for a possible showdown with the majority. Failing secessionism and rejecting assimilationism, “pluralism” was the way to make the best out of the situation.

The Muslim group in China, as any Muslim community anywhere, was certainly not assimilationist, although the Chinese majority accepted the idea in theory. So while most Chinese Muslims acculturated materially, the highest level of assimilation to the Chinese was achieved by individual Muslims who were co-opted into the Chinese cultural sphere through the examination system. But the Muslim community as a whole not only did not seek to lose itself in the larger whole, but made every effort to withstand the assimilatory pressure and emphasize their cultural specificity. It they encouraged intermarriages and thereby assimilated ethnically through the centuries, that was calculated to increase their community and stress their cultural uniqueness rather than merging with the majority. This tendency was underscored by the fact that other intimate social intercourse such as
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inter-dining, worshipping, membership in trade guilds, celebration of festivals, etc. was consistently avoided by the Muslims.

The remaining two responses, secessionism and militancy, were often, but not always, inter-related in Chinese Muslim behaviour. Frustrated by the unworkability of a "pluralistic" society, Muslims often became antagonistic, especially when the majority transgressed the usual limits of uneasy coexistence into outright subjugation or elimination. Since they lived with the historical memories of the Islamic Empire and felt part and parcel of the universal Umma their quest for secession from Dar-al-Harb and union with Dar-al-Islam was a conditioned reflex generated by their success in rebellion and their attainment of political and cultural independence. Then they would revive their cultural monuments - language, lore, literature, ceremonial and institutions and build them into awe-inspiring symbols, as was the case in the Muslim state of Yunnan. Under these circumstances, the Muslim leader played a crucial role in reviving old values. Even if he failed to realize union with Dar-al-Islam, the dream remained, while in the meantime, he was finding gratification in the smaller world that he had constructed.

Militancy, according to our typology, entails more extremism than secessionism. A militant group not only seeks political and cultural autonomy, but also strives to dominate others, confident of its own superiority. In Chinese Islam, we have detected the kin of these feelings and aspirations, remarking that they were realizable only when a Muslim rebellion was successful and an independent state established, as in Yunnan.

The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is: the varying Muslim responses to the Chinese majority and to other religions in China were not consistent over a long period of time or exclusive of each other at any given point in time. These responses rather marked successive stages in the history of Chinese Islam and were conditioned by the policies of the Chinese majority, for inter- and intra-group relations are in a constant feedback loop, neither existing independent of the other; a change in one immediately produces changes in the other.²

In terms of social boundary systems, which are by definition networks of social relations, a network's differentiation from others is the degree to which it is separated from them. When role performance in one network is wholly independent of role performance in any other, the network is entirely differentiated.³ According to this criterion, the Muslim and Chinese communities were certainly differentiated networks. Since both were differentiated from other networks of social relations, they took the attributes of boundary systems which had their demarcations; events took place within them; they set off their unit from all other units; and individuals and influence would pass across them or be excluded by them. Like any other network, both assumed a set of boundaries by virtue of two sets of pressures: external and internal, in juxtaposition. When either of the sets of pressures was altered, the network's boundaries changed accordingly.
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As boundary systems, both were bounded by the exclusion of other persons and influences and by the rites of passage (birth, conversion, or acculturation) which governed admission into the group. The more cohesive the community was, the more easily it could exclude unwanted people and influences. Because of its minority status, the Muslim community was more firmly bounded than the Chinese, and therefore roles within it were highly transposable with respect to the activities of that network. That is, its members could assume each other’s roles or substitute for one another in meeting the goals of the group. Chinese society, by contrast, was less bounded and therefore it was not characterized by role transposability. Unlike the Muslim system, it encompassed within itself many affiliated networks whose goals were different.

On the other hand, both the Chinese and the Muslims answered the other criterion of a bounded network, that is, the inability to tolerate sustained outspoken dissent within. In a bounded unit, the group must either eject the dissenters or legitimize dissent. The Chinese legitimized domesticated Buddhism but ejected Christianity and secret society ideologies. The Muslims were neither legitimized as a domesticated group nor ejected as a heterodox faith. Therefore, their status within China remained blurred and open to different interpretations in various socio-political contexts.

Islam in China, while maintaining a firmly bounded social network, was faced by heterodoxy from within. Had there been isolated individuals who refused to yield to the general will, they would have lost their membership in the group. But because a sizable portion of the group did not yield, the network as a whole divided, giving rise to a schismatic movement, a new sub-system, the New Sect. This new sub-system, however, was in no way a new and differentiated network, for the Muslim community as a whole, maintaining strong boundaries due to its marked differentiation with the Chinese majority, could afford weak boundaries within its component sub-systems.

The classification of Chinese and Muslim into two different networks does not mean that there was no interaction between them. After all, there was an interdependence between the two, the Muslims depending on the Chinese market for their basic needs, such as food, and the Chinese depending on Muslim traders and artisans for certain commodities. But the interaction was structured by a categorical dichotomization in the minds of both groups, of people who are like oneself and with whom one could have relations in all spheres of activities, and people different from oneself, with whom one could only interact in a limited scope of capacities.

This boundary relationship was the sum total and the outcome of the contradictory pressures to which Chinese Muslims were subjected. On the one hand, they were not pariah groups whose boundaries are usually strongly maintained by the excluding host majority. If anything, the Chinese majority would have
welcomed them, on an individual basis, into Chinese culture, and it did co-opt those who wanted to join. On the other hand, under the disability of a stigmatized identity, Muslims sought to qualify themselves as Chinese, thus developing techniques to avoid sanctions from the Chinese majority -- apologetic writings for the learned Chinese and material acculturation for the illiterate populace -- and by making efforts to show their Chineseness to all Chinese, at least in time of peace. Like the Lappish people of Norway, however, their guest relationships, their language behaviour, their dilemmas of identity, their esprit de corps, their orientations and social aspirations -- all smacked of the cultural specific.

Chinese Muslims learned to differentiate between the general public sphere and their closed Muslim space and to behave self-effacingly outside, albeit determined about their goals inside. They were like the thief in the Hasidic parable attributed to the "Maggid" of Mezeritch:

To Rabbi Zusia he gave the following advice: Listen, I cannot teach you the ten cardinal rules governing the conduct of man wishing to serve his Creator. However, there are three things you can learn from a child and seven you can learn from a thief. From the thief? First, that whatever he does, he does secretly. Two, whatever he does not obtain today, he will try to obtain tomorrow. Three, he is loyal to his accomplices. Four, he is ready to sacrifice himself for the object of his desire, even though it may have no value for others. Six, he is not afraid of hardship. Seven, nothing on earth could make him change trades; in other words, he does not want to be anyone but himself.

The fact that the Chinese Muslim wished to be nothing but himself is underscored by voluntary membership in his community, although he was naturally predisposed (by birth) to be Muslim and nothing else. But in theory and practice, horizontal mobility was possible between Chinese and Muslim communities, and the process of the former's conversion to Islam and the latter's Confucianization through the examination system was open-ended. I suggest that it was precisely the voluntary basis of membership in the Muslim community which, paradoxically, brought about polarization of the two groups instead of providing an escape valve for the accumulating tensions. For when membership is voluntary, it is correlated with a sense of superiority, developed to justify the voluntary choice. Superiority generates confrontation with others who have their own sense of superiority (e.g., Muslims and Chinese). Confrontation may lead, under certain circumstances, to rebellion and secession.

Conversely, when membership in a minority group is not voluntary (e.g., skin colour), it is usually correlated with a sense of inferiority, which generates resignation and imitation of the dominant culture with a view to total assimilation into it. However, if assimilation cannot be worked out because of the majority's negative attitudes, aggressive reactions develop within the minority group.
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Based on a psychological change of their status from involuntary to "voluntary." Then ethnic pride is cultivated, rendering membership in the group desirable. This state of mind, of course, reverses the whole cycle of development by making the new "voluntary" participation in the group comparable to the truly voluntary membership of other minority groups (e.g., religious minorities). Thus a similar point of departure is created in the direction of a new sense of superiority ("black is beautiful"), towards aggressive confrontation with the majority (Black Panthers), and even toward demands for separatism ("Black Nationalism"). Let us sum up this hypothesis in a chart:

I. In religio-cultural minorities (e.g., Turks in Cyprus, Catholics in Northern Ireland, and Chinese Muslims):

Voluntary → Superiority → Confrontation → Rebellion → Secession membership

II. In ethnic-cultural minorities (e.g., Blacks in America, Lappish in Norway):

Involuntary → Inferiority → Resignation → Imitation → Assimilation membership

When assimilation breaks down:

"Voluntary" → "Superiority" → Confrontation → Rebellion → Secession membership

If the above hypothesis is correct, then Islam in China is, by definition, potentially rebellious and secessionist, and Chinese Islam is, perhaps, a contradiction in terms. From Indian Islam one can learn not only that it may have been instrumental in the great Hui uprisings of the nineteenth century but also that an Islamic minority among any host culture can become, under intense oppression by the majority people, a prescription for constant frustration and unrest. For Islam must, in theory, assume political power in order to work out the will of Allah on earth. Hence, the friction and ensuing bloodshed which were the fate of Muslims in India, China and other places where Muslim minorities were unable to maintain or to seize a position of political dominance.

In China, minority Islam had to bow outwardly before universalist Confucianism while inwardly building up cohesion and strength and unconsciously nurturing its own universalistic hopes for the future. In India, conquering Islam subjugated Hinduism, an essentially ethnic, not universalistic, religion. But when its power was in turn eroded by the British, it sought and achieved separation from
the Hindus rather than submission to the democratic rule of modern India, which would have allowed political domination of the Muslims by the Hindus. True, the restoration of Islamic independence voiced by Muhammad Ali Jinnah was based on Muslim-Hindu cleavages in Indian society and implied only a Muslim-majority state, not an Islamic one. But when the majority of Indian Islam parted ways with the Hindus and established its own state (Pakistan), the ‘ulama spoke of the reinstitution of the Shari'a as state law, a demand partially fulfilled in the 1956 Constitution forbidding enactment of laws repugnant to the Muslim Holy Law.\(^9\) Other Islamic states, claiming the attributes of “modern,” “democratic,” or the now fashionable “socialist” and “progressive,” while shrinking from openly characterizing themselves as “religious” have no compunctions about proclaiming Islam as the state religion.\(^10\)

The totality that Islam demands from its adherents is evident in the plight of Muslim minorities in India, Burma and China even today. In India, while Western-educated Muslim leaders were in the forefront of that country’s struggle for independence and consider themselves Indian, orthodox opinion still holds to the classical concept of the religious and political unity of Islam, distinguishing between Dar-al-Harb and Dar-al-Islam, believing in the feasibility of restoring original Islam with the Shari'a based on the Qur’an and the Sunna, and wanting to keep personal status under orthodox jurisdiction.\(^11\) These wishful thoughts are, no doubt, also nurtured by nostalgia for what had once existed in reality in India.

In Burma, where Islam has never been oppressed as its Chinese counterpart nor dominant as its Indian ancestor, Muslim dreams are much less ambitious. Unable to institute Islam as the state religion, they merely ask that no other state religion (Buddhism) be imposed on the country as a whole. When free speech was still allowed under U Nu’s democracy, U Rashid, the Burmese Muslim leader, pleaded:

I am a Muslim. As a Muslim, I believe that there should be no compulsion in religion. I have been against the idea of a state religion from its inception in 1947, and I have opposed it since the revival of the idea in 1956. . . I am apprehensive that the adoption of a state religion will have a psychological effect upon the Buddhists in the country. . . the adoption of a state religion will open the door to extremists to make more and more demands based on religion. . . Such a situation will lead to unnecessary conflicts between the various religious groups in the country. . . Any attempt by the religious majority to secure administrative, economic, social or educational advantages, based on religion, will be resisted by the religious minorities.\(^12\)

Of course, the very same things that U Rashid was warning about “as a Muslim” would be enforced if Muslims were in power. Worse, they would be enforced under an Islamic state, even if the Muslim population were a mere minority, as in the case of India. In this solipsistic view, other faiths, even if they con-
stitute the majority of the population, simply have no right to a state religion of their own.

In contemporary China, where the unitarian and totalitarian regime gives the Muslims no better chance than in traditional China, there are nevertheless signs that the feelings and aspirations of the Muslim community are still extant. The very recognition of the Hui as a National Minority, and the establishment of the Ning-hsia Hui Autonomous Region, although having no other substance than lip-service to the Muslims, attest to the compelling necessity for the regime to respond to Muslim sentiment. In fact, despite the great efforts made by the Communist Chinese to transform the Muslims, the basic Han-Hui antagonism still prevails. While temples of all sorts were closed down in Red China, Muslim mosques received preferential treatment and were allowed to retain their land “according to circumstances with the consent of the Muslims residing in the places where such mosques are situated.”

The Chinese have been sending sizable delegations of Muslims to the pilgrimage to Mecca, stopping in Arab capitals and reporting on the flourishing of Chinese Islam and the 40,000 mosques in operation on the mainland. But these propaganda feats have apparently no other design than to cover up the staunch resistance offered by the Muslims, sometimes admitted by the regime itself. Furthermore, the Muslims do not seem to have become resigned to their fate, and they maintain the same hopeful spirit which characterized them in traditional China, despite the hopelessness of their ambitions for change. A Friday khutba (sermon) included the following words of encouragement, as related by the Imam himself:

First, I outlined the historical facts of the struggles during the lifetime of our great Saint Muhammad and his final victory over tyrannical rule and evil powers. I entreated them to follow and to manifest the unconquerable and unflinching spirit of resistance of our ancestors.

In their resistance against the Communist regime, the Muslims adopt the same pattern they followed against the Ch’ing and against Christian missionaries: in some localities, because of the relatively small number of Muslims, they generally choose the passive method of resistance. But in areas heavily populated by Muslims, the resistance assumes a more violent character, and there have been instances of armed revolt. During the brief period of the “Hundred Flowers” in 1957, when open criticism was allowed, even invited, Muslims attacked the authority of the Communist Party, the flood of Han immigration into their areas, and some of them demanded self-determination for their people, even independence. An official source acknowledged in 1958 that:

The meeting of the Kansu Nationalities Affairs Committee took the view that local nationalism among the Hui was not only widespread but also pronounced in Kansu. Muslims denounced their fellow-Muslim
Communist sympathizers as traitors to Hui nationality. . .20

The Hui discredited the "Fatherland" concept of the regime by declaring:

China is not the Fatherland of the Hui Nationality. . .Arabic is the language of the Hui people. . .All the Hui people of the world belong to one family."21

Another official report revealed that:

The Hui declare that there is no living to be made in China, and even openly demanded emigration permits from the government, so that they may return to Arabia to settle down. Some of them make it known that a government of Imams will be established within an Islamic state.22

In May, 1958, the People's Daily revealed that the Hui of Honan had twice revolted in 1953 and planned to establish an independent Islamic state. In April and June, 1958, another movement, led by Ma Chen-wu, a Hui Imam of Ning-hsia, led a revolt with the reported purpose of establishing a "Chinese Muslim Republic" under the war slogan "Glory for Islam."23

This is, of course, a restatement of what the Hui had stood for in traditional China, both with regard to their internal Muslim identity and with regard to their Pan-Islamic aspirations. This outburst of Muslim sentiment, which goes far beyond what Muslims had ever dared to say in Imperial China in times of peace, shows the depth of their commitment to their beliefs and the unworkability of maintaining a Muslim minority under a repressive system for an indefinite period of time. Maulana Maudoodi, the prominent Indian Muslim modernist, has reportedly remarked:

To be a Muslim and to adopt a non-Islamic viewpoint, is only meaningless. "Muslim Nationalist" and "Muslim Communist" are as contradictory terms as "Communist Fascist," "Socialist Capitalist," and "Chaste Prostitue."24

So, Islam, as orthodox Muslims see it, is ideally an either/or affair. Either Islamic law and institutions are given full expression and dominate state life or, failing that, the state being non-Islamic, Muslims should try to reverse the situation or get out. In practice, however, things are not that clear-cut. As long as a similitude of peace and accommodation can be maintained, the Muslim community, although living with the vague hope of the fulfillment of their political aspirations at some future time, can contain the discrepancy between reality and dream, and the tension between the two can go unresolved.

But when persecution is intensified to the point where no real Muslim life can be pursued, and the practical opportunity arises, the Muslims are likely to seize it and proclaim a Muslim state, regardless of whether the Muslim population is
a majority or a minority in the territory in question. For an Islamic state does not necessitate either. Muslims had experienced both a Muslim majority in Dar-al-Harb, as in Christian Valencia where Muslims outnumbered the Christians four to one, and a Muslim minority in Dar-al-Islam during the Muslim rule in India. It is Muslim rule, then, which defines the borders of Islam, not Muslim minorities or majorities. This definition has to be kept in mind because of its relevance to the Islamic state in Yunnan, in which a Muslim minority attempted Muslim political hegemony.
PHASE II

CONFRONTATION AND REBELLION
CHAPTER XI

The Hui Under the Manchus: The Change from Toleration and Protection to Discrimination and Persecution

If politeness and ceremony be observed toward the Mahommedans, they imagine they are feared and become arrogant; but in showing severity and rudeness, they are impressed with fear and respect and they are supple and manageable.

North China Herald
August 31, 1867

This passage, which obviously reflected popular and official sentiment in China during the Muslim rebellions, epitomizes the disruption of the modus vivendi and the breakdown of the modus operandi that the Hui had worked out among the Chinese. This outright attack on the Muslims, all Muslims, was uttered in public by a prominent Chinese figure. At this time, an attempt was being made in official circles to distinguish between good Hui and evil Hui in matters of practical policy. The slogan was, "Pu-fen Han-Hui, chih wen liang-yu." ("We do not discriminate between Han and Hui, we only distinguish between good and evil.")

The implications of this attack are clear: "them" as opposed to "us". They are Hui, we are Chinese; they have definite barbarian and despicable characteristics; they are unable to grasp the meaning of politeness and ceremony. Li (ceremony) is reserved for us, the Chinese chun-tzu (gentlemen). There is no way to deal with their arrogance other than the rudeness and severity of fa (law). Only then might they become manageable like tamed animals or subjected barbarians.

The Chinese author who reasoned in this fashion in August, 1867, was certainly well within his rights. The Taiping Rebellion, essentially a Han uprising, had nearly toppled the system, but it had finally been contained. But what about these barbarian Muslims in Shensi, Kansu, Yunnan and Sinkiang? Not only were they not content with the bounty that the Emperor and the Empire had accorded them, but they, the ingrates, were now bent on wreaking havoc on Civilization and tearing apart what had been rescued from the Taipings.

To be sure, we are not speaking about an abrupt volte-face of the Ch'ing towards the Hui, a change from favouritism and harmony (which never existed) to discrimination and persecution (which did not always prevail). What generated the transition from uneasiness to confrontation was not a clear qualitative change in the attitude of the Chinese but rather a quantitative intensification of previous trends that were inherent in the traditional Chinese system and in Chinese attitudes toward foreigners. The intensification of Chinese pressure was
For the Muslims, there appear to have been three major factors which perhaps made them more responsive under the Ch'ing than before to these pressures. First, the ruling dynasty was Manchu; that is, if Muslims revolted they could always rationalize (as indeed they did) that their revolt was not directed against their hosts but against other guests who happened to have mustered enough power to rule both them and the Chinese. Second, the mounting self-awareness of Chinese Islam, generated by revivalist Muslim influences which seeped into China or emerged domestically, coincided propitiously with the mounting Chinese pressures to forgo Muslim identity. Third, Muslim rebellions in China were part of, and took advantage of, the malaise of the Ch'ing dynastic decadence and all its manifestations: population growth, economic difficulties, rebellions, breakdown of administration, etc. Granted that dynastic decline was not a Manchu novelty, it is nonetheless true that no major Muslim rebellions broke out during previous dynastic declines or during most of the period of the pax sinica of the High Ch'ing. But when rising Muslim awareness on the one hand and the intensification of Chinese anti-Muslim sentiment on the other converged with the dynastic crisis, the stage was set for Muslim uprisings on a grand scale.

Despite the nostalgia with which some Muslim writers view the "Golden Age" of Islam under the Ming, and the negative light which they throw on the Manchus as the source of all Muslim trouble in China, the picture cannot really be depicted only in black and white. During the Ming, some restrictions were imposed on Muslims (and other minorities) on the one hand, and on the other, what amounts to truly benevolent statements were made about the Hui by none other than the Manchu Emperors themselves:

For years, people have submitted memorials claiming that the Hui follow one religion, speak a strange language and wear strange clothes; they are savage and outlaws. These people requested that the Hui be severely punished and restrained... I know that the Hui inherited their religion from their ancestors... thus, the Muslims' use of mosques, different clothes and different script, must be considered as resulting from differences in custom. Things such as the Muslim religion, which are not traitorous, lawless or deceitful to the people, should not give us any concern. Living in this Empire and benefiting from our enlightened rule, their faith is not exempt from observing the moral laws of humanity and justice. Therefore, how could they but cherish goodness and urge all to act similarly? Our Court looks on them with the same benevolence as on everybody... Among the Hui, many achieved success in the civil and military

sufficient to tilt the precarious balance and set in motion the Muslim defence mechanisms which, when in full swing, followed their own dynamics and tended further to sharpen the crisis between host and guest cultures.
examinations, received office and were promoted to high ranks. They became accomplished in the rules of propriety and in literature, thus demonstrating that they are no different from others. Not all are good people, there are certainly evil persons among them; but is this not the case among the Han? Local officials must not discriminate against Muslims, but treat them as the rest of the population.

Yung-cheng's words, of course, indicate not only imperial concern for peace and quiet, an attempt to avert open clashes between Han and Muslim while affording imperial protection to the latter, but also underline the strained relations between the two communities and the demand by the Chinese populace and local officials for harsher treatment of the Muslims. The perennial quality of these two themes was in evidence when, a century and a half later, Tso Tsung-t'ang, the suppressor of the Muslim rebellions in the Northwest during the 1860s and 1870s, wrote:

Shensi's gentry manifest a profound hatred for the Muslims. When they are asked their views about the Hui, they are always of the opinion that all Muslims should be killed. I fail to understand their reasoning.

After the advent of the Manchus, the Hui problem was complicated by the fact that the dynasty did not see eye-to-eye with the Chinese on this issue. In order to try to disentangle the complex triangular relationship — Hui-Chinese-Manchu — we must analyse events from the viewpoints of all three participants in the triangle. First, the Manchu rulers.

The Manchu Dynasty did not treat the Hui and other minorities uniformly throughout its rule. At first, as foreign conquerors, they adopted the divided et impera policy, keeping a delicate balance of power between the various peoples so that they could rule them all. But with the increasing sinicization of the Manchus in the nineteenth century, Ch'ing neutrality toward disputes between Han and Hui could no longer be maintained. Moreover, as dynastic decline began its swing, the border between Manchu and Chinese became so blurred that the dynasty was pursuing a Chinese policy, and the Chinese officials employed by the dynasty were carrying out the Manchu government's policy, as was obvious during the T'ung-chih Restoration (1862-74). This situation was, of course, reversed in the 1890s, when anti-Manchu sentiment began mounting again and tearing apart the unity that had prevailed since the 1860s.

During the one hundred peaceful years which followed 1683, the exceptionally able Ch'ing rulers maintained economic abundance, tax remittances, an artistic and literary boom, and an energetic administration, all of which provided for stability, a general feeling of euphoria and self-esteem. Under the indefatigable Yung-cheng Emperor (1723-35) in particular, the administration became centralized in his own hands. He personally read and commented on numerous memorials.
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daily. His control of the officials was tight and autocratic, and enforcement of the law was inexorably and vigorously carried out. To prevent any possibility of secret opposition to his rule, he emphatically prohibited associations and cliques among scholars and officials, as evidenced in his treatise *P'eng-t'ang lun* (On Parties and Cliques) of 1725. He severely punished administrative irregularities and took egalitarian steps toward socially despised people.

It is in this light that Yung-cheng's benevolence towards Muslims must be seen. At the same time, however, the Emperor left no doubt as to his insistence on obedience to the law by Muslims and his belief that Islam should be narrowly defined as an ancestral custom and a matter of creed, nothing more:

Muslims should not set themselves apart as Muslims, but only as believers in the Muslim faith. In this way, the good will be rewarded and the evil-doers shall be punished. The Muslims in Shensi are far more numerous than in other provinces, and crimes of gambling and hiding arms are more frequent among them than in other provinces. How could I consider Muslims as a separate people from the rest of the population. Therefore, I call upon you, Muslims, to act in accordance with propriety, humility and generosity. Do not rely on strength to hurt the weak, or take advantage of the ignorant to cheat him. Wrongdoing and cruelty are not permitted by the law, or by Muslim religion. Filial piety and loyalty are extolled by all religions, of which the Muslim religion is part. However, should anyone, by claiming adherence to a separate religion, or by following an heterodoxy, wickedly pursue his own interests, there are laws and statutes to deal with him. Do not imagine that I shall show you any leniency.

It is incumbent upon all governors of the provinces where Muslims reside, to announce my intentions and ensure that they are known to everybody.

In another Imperial Edict, issued a year later (1730) in response to a proposal to oppress Muslims from an Anhui *Tao-t'ai*, Lu Kuo-hua, Yung-cheng dismissed the memorial as "reckless and outrageous," repeated his assurances coupled with warnings to the Muslims, and called Chinese officialdom to order:

The Hui, having come to China in ancient times, are part of the people of this country. They are among the children of our land. Since I have ascended the Throne, I have showed them the same favour as to all others. How could I single out the Muslim religion alone for disapproval?

. . .If the Hui transgress, they will be punished under the prevailing laws and statutes, which are not calculated to shield them in any way. But if the Hui do no evil, I shall harshly punish any official who, under the excuse of the insignificant differences which exist between [their and
our] customs, submit memorials against them...Lu Kuo-hua is a petty official, undeserving of his title of Tao-t'ai...Instead of managing local affairs, which should absorb his attention, he meddles with the Hui customs, and even urges legal action against the innocent Hui people. He is motivated either by his private feelings or by his intention to disturb the Government. It is therefore decreed that Lu Kuo-hua be arrested, interrogated and punished. 12

One cannot help wondering whether this strong position taken by Yung-cheng reflected not only his concern for law and order, efficient government and justice for all, but also his strong conviction that any corporate activity of either the Muslims or their Chinese oppressors might potentially bear the seeds of cliquism and rebellion. For the Muslims, the Emperor's insistence on their definition as a creed "emanating from ancestral customs" and his assurances that he would shield them as such betrayed his anxiety about the Muslims' forming gangs, concealing weapons, setting themselves apart, and outwitting the Chinese, especially in areas such as Shensi, where they were numerous.

Yung-cheng's concerns must have been fostered by the Muslim rebellion which broke in Kansu in 1648, during the turbulent years when the Manchus were struggling for hegemony in China. That uprising, which had spread to a substantial part of the province and had taken a year and a half to defeat with tremendous cost to both sides, 13 must have reminded the Manchu rulers constantly of the potential dangers of the Hui. The ubiquitousness of Muslims in China made the problem impossible to solve by a military campaign such as those launched against the Olöd Mongols by the first Manchu Emperors. A pragmatic solution, combining accommodation and stiff controls, was necessary. Hence the promises of protection on the one hand and threats of punishment on the other.

The danger of corporate activity by the Chinese with regard to the Hui also loomed as a reality, though very subtly so. Was not K'ang-hsi's insistence that bureaucratic disputes had weakened China 14 akin to Yung-cheng's castigation of Chinese officials who kept memorializing him about the necessity of a strong-handed policy toward the Muslims, despite his edicts to the contrary? 15 Was not the unity of action against the Hui advocated by Chinese officials from Shensi, Anhui and other places, a subtle manifestation of a corporate representation to the Throne? Even if it were not so, it might have looked so to this fanatically centralistic Emperor. Hence, his policy of dismissing these representations one by one, and even dismissing some of the officials who made them, in order to avert the potential turning of their cumulative effort into a corporate activity. The Manchu Emperors also had a positive stake in the preservation of Hui integrity because of its implications regarding their own Manchu-ness, namely their minority status. For Chinese respect for the integrity of the Hui would make an equally strong statement about the integrity of the Manchus and their ruling house.
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The Ch'ien-lung Emperor (1736-95) marked the peak of Ch'ing rule and the beginning of its decline. Splendour and literary achievement, peace and territorial conquests, were coupled with a stern literary inquisition, tight social and ideological controls, and numerous uprisings. The Emperor's own boasting, in his Shin Ch'iu'an Chi (A Record of Complete Achievements), about the pacification of the Ghurkas, the Annamese, the Muslims of Turkestan, etc., was a sad reflection of the unrest which swept the Empire, particularly after 1775, when the corrupt Ho-shen held the reigns of power. Ch'ien-lung's policy towards the Muslims remained benevolent and conciliatory on the surface, even in the wake of the Muslim uprising in Sinkiang in 1758, making good the old Chinese device of "using barbarians to control barbarians," in our case "I-Hui chih-Hui." ("Use Muslims to control Muslims.") In 1765, when Muslim unrest was again present in the Northwest, the Central Government's budget provided for stipends to be paid, inter alia, to Muslim nobles in order to ensure peace.

But while this treatment could be applied to Muslims on the fringes of the Empire, such as Turkestan, where the nomadic-tribal structure of these people allowed the Manchus to buy off their headmen, the settled and more sinicized Hui of China proper, who submitted to no central authority of their own, had to be dealt with by ideological means. When Fu An-k'ang took up the post of Governor-General of Shensi-Kansu in 1785, he required all the inhabitants of these provinces, Muslim and Chinese alike, to attend the regular hsiang-yueh sermons and, eventually in 1797, the Hui of these two provinces were brought under the regular system of the semi-monthly lectures designed for the "edification of the ignorant rustics."

Ch'ien-lung refused to yield to Chinese officials on the Muslim issue, even after the Kansu turbulence caused by the first New-Sect - Old-Sect controversy in 1781. Either because he had not yet grasped the disruptive potentialities of these religious controversies or because he was wise enough not to press the Muslims on religious matters, he turned out to be very lenient toward them, to the extent of undoing his own orders regarding the literary inquisition. While thousands of works were being destroyed by the Inquisitors because of anti-Ch'ing insinuations, heterodox references, or merely seditious and abusive language, the Emperor reprimanded Chinese officials who showed zeal in carrying out his orders and confiscated Muslim books in Chinese and Arabic. Chu Chang, the Governor of Kwangsi, memorialized in 1782 concerning the arrest of a Hui "law-breaker":

\[ ... in his luggage we found 21 books hand-written in the Hui script. but it is impossible to tell whether they contain anything illegal. ... \]

There were, however, ten copies of a book in Chinese, T'ien-fang Chih-sheng Shih-lu Nien-p'iu (The True Record of the Life of the Highest Saint of Arabia), and another called T'ien-fang San-tzu Ching (The Three Character Classic of Arabia). The presumption of the title True Record, etc. is unbearable, and its translation and printing by
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Your Majesty's subjects is lèse-majesté...

I have examined the religious books in the Hui scripts, but due to my incompetence, it was impossible to ascertain whether they are illegal. But the Chinese books contain many ridiculous passages... Moreover, since the arrested Hui was on his way from Shensi to Kuangtung, he may be connected with the rebel group of Kansu Muslims... It seems necessary to investigate and punish anyone who stirs unrest among people. I am notifying other provincial Governors to confiscate the printing blocks of the books so that they may be destroyed... and to arrest and interrogate the translators, printers, distributors and authors of the books, so that they should be punished... 26

The Emperor swiftly retorted:

The affair was mishandled... The Hui of the Old Sect are numerous all over China and in Shensi in particular... Their prayers follow tradition and have nothing seditious in them... The Rebellion in Kansu last year was a result of the feud between the New Sect and the Old Sect, but their religious books were not a bone of contention... I am not to be influenced by any prejudice in dealing with government matters. Those responsible for seditious writings should be punished severely, according to the law, but this is not the case with these Muslim books, which have been inadequately misinterpreted. I see no excess in them. Chu Chang and Pi Yuan 27 are to take no measures. When books of this kind come to the attention of Governors, they ought to take no action against them. 28

In another edict of the same year (1782), Ch'ien-lung reprimanded Sa Tsai, the Acting Governor-General of Liang-Kiang, who had acted on Chu Chang's request to punish Muslims for disseminating their books. He wrote:

Such foolishness is inconsistent with the conscientious way officials are supposed to carry out their duties... In past years, when Wang Lun in Shantung, and Wang Fu-lin in Kansu revolted, some Hui people fought bravely against them, and when Su Ssu-shih-san 29 rebelled last year, Muslims of the Old Sect helped the Government to defeat and catch the rebels... I look upon the Hui people as my children... 30

The 1790s were, perhaps, the watershed of the fortunes of Manchu rule. With the outbreak of the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804), which brought to the fore the growing socio-economic problems of China on the one hand and exposed the impotence of the Manchu armed forces to deal with the situation on the other, the ground was ripe for widespread social unrest, of which the Muslim rebellions were part and parcel. In this situation, when central power declined and security became more and more a concern of extra-Imperial organizations such as local militia or secret societies, Muslim communities, like all others, took their...
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protection into their own hands. But these organizations, being ideologically and practically undermining to the Chinese state, could, in turn, be seen only as heterodox and dangerous to the Manchu Government, which dealt with them accordingly. The more the Manchu Dynasty became unable to contain social disruption, the more intent it was on eradicating heterodoxy, a policy described by Schumpeter as the "radicalism of impotence." 31

The nineteenth century was marked by a succession of rebellions which shook the entire country. No sooner had the White Lotus Rebellion been temporarily contained than the Eight Diagrams Sect rose in 1813, followed by Muslim rebellions in Yunnan (1820-28, 1830, and 184632), then the great rebellions of the mid-century: the Taiping, Nien and the Muslims in the Northwest and the Southwest, all of them at a time when foreign powers were making inroads into China, progressing from "strangers at the gate" to "foreign devils" within the walls. How did the Manchu authorities regard these rebellions, and what could they do against them?

China's rulers have always been forced to grapple with the frustrating problem of controlling the hsieh-chiao (heretical sects), because of the difficulty of drawing a clear line between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Under the traditional authoritarian control system, religious movements which did not win recognition, as the institutional religions did, were forced to seek cover and frequently were ready to offer armed resistance to the threat of suppression in order to develop their own form of religious life. Of course, doctrines which claimed universal salvation and superior powers for their deities over the world order, a dogma implicitly offensive to the Chinese temporal power, would be considered heretical because they were subversive to the system by definition.

In Ch'ing China, the contents of government ideology were narrowed down to Confucianism of the Chu Hsi brand, despite Emperor Shun-chih's admission that all three systems of teaching—Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism—were good. Emperor K'ang-hsi himself expounded Chu Hsi and elevated him in official worship. He selected slogans from Chu Hsi's system which were elaborated upon by Emperor Yung Cheng and made a basis of continuous ideological indoctrination (Sacred Edicts). In practice, however, a wide gamut of extra-Confucian religious worship persisted, and the government had no choice but to establish a behavioural criterion for evaluating the potential or actual danger posed by heterodox groups. As long as any form of worship or religious creed appeared harmless to Imperial security, it was tolerated by the government even if it did not conform to the basic Confucian tenets. But if any religious activity of the people tended to disturb the peace, or was found to have been carried on with seditious intentions, it was branded as hsieh-chiao or yin-ssu (heretical sect) and promptly persecuted.33

The Manchus, as an alien conquering power, were aware of the resistance with which they had been met by the Ming loyalists, of the disdain that eminent Chinese scholars felt towards them (e. g., Wang Fu-chih34), and of the
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...suspicion with which the Chinese populace viewed them. Therefore, the Ch'ing Emperors, especially the early ones, were doubly vigilant with regard to manifestations of heresy among the Chinese and moved swiftly to burn heterodox books (Ch'ien-lung's Inquisition), to curtail interprovincial pilgrimages (1739), and to launch ideological war against distinctly heretical societies such as the White Lotus, as preventive measures to localize and isolate foci of trouble. But they cautioned against lumping together seditious elements with peaceful citizenry, just because they shared the same religious beliefs. The Chia-ch'ing Emperor emphasized this point in an edict of 1800:

The teachings of Confucius are honoured forever. Other doctrines, such as Buddhism and Taoism, though not orthodox, have not been eradicated since Han and T'ang times to the present. . . Even the White Lotus believers do not differ from the common people in their mode of living and dressing. Officials fail to distinguish good elements from the bad among them, and thus force them all into rebellious conduct. . . I have written in my own hand an essay 'On Heretical Sects,' in which I reiterated the principle that believers in heresies who obey laws. will not be placed under arrest, but only those who herd themselves together and break laws will be punished.36

This statement is very much akin to what Yung-cheng and Ch'ien lung had decreed about the Hui. The Imperial attitude of benevolence and relative tolerance toward the Muslims could be pursued when heterodoxy in general was at a manageable level, and the Imperial policy was meant to maintain it at that level. But with the worsening of the socio-economic conditions in the Empire during the nineteenth century, and the resulting heretical movements, heterodoxy got out of hand, and the Manchus had no choice but to order its persecution. At the same time, due to the accelerated sinicization of the dynasty, the Ch'ing came to look at the Hui problem as the Chinese of the time did, with suspicion and hostility. This approach was, in turn, reinforced by the heterodox manifestations of nineteenth century Islam -- rebellion.

The Ch'ing of the nineteenth century were no longer concerned mainly about their rule in China as Manchus, but, like the Chinese Emperors before them, they became interested in the survival of the dynasty. So while the basic distinguishing characteristics of the Manchus were no longer being cultivated and the dynasty fell back on the Chinese bureaucracy for support, the Court, in concert with the gentry, was arrayed against any group which threatened their symbiotic political hegemony. Such groups were, first of all, heterodox organizations which used armed rebellion to resist the Imperial system, or even to attempt to overthrow it. The worsening conditions of the nineteenth century made this problem particularly acute due to the success of secret societies and other heterodox groups in gaining an ever-tightening grip on the people, who fell victim to economic destitution, social disturbances and so on, to the point that they had nothing to lose by
joining a rebellion. The Taiping Rebellion, which threatened the Confucian foundations of the Empire, brought the Manchus (now "consummately Chinese in culture") closer than ever before to the Chinese gentry, who derived their status from the traditional system and had a stake in preserving it.

It we recapitulate the intricacies of Manchu policies toward the Hui, we can observe the following broad lines: At first, the Manchus struggled to establish their own rule over the Chinese amidst suspicion and hostility. The stratagem of "divide and rule" seemed to be the most workable at that point, and the Manchus made every effort to balance the Hui against the Chinese by refusing to leave the former at the mercy of the latter. Then, faced with occasional Hui uprisings under Ch’ien-lung, the Manchus began to realize the strength of this community and chose to accommodate them rather than antagonize them.

Inquisition laws were not enforced on Muslim writings, and Chinese officials who attempted to do so were unequivocally reprimanded. Even when heterodox Chinese movements were being persecuted, the Hui received a somewhat preferential treatment. It seems that over this period of time, the government was unaware of the intrinsic undermining quality of the Hui in general, and of their New Sect in particular, and dealt with Muslim local rebellions as pure outbursts of social unrest rather than heterodox groupings. Even with the rise of the New Sect during the Ch’ien-lung reign, the Emperor remained uncertain as to its goals and elected to play it down rather than drum up its importance.

But with the recurrence of Muslim disturbances in the context of the ubiquitous social unrest of the mid-nineteenth century, the Manchus came to realize the dangers of Islamic movements as part of the widespread growth of sectarian movements in general. Thenceforth, the New Sect drew the blame for the trouble, and the Muslims, although nominally differentiated into the good Hui (liang-Hui) and the bad Hui (Hui-fei) categories, became, in fact, indirectly indicted in toto as a troublesome non-Han minority and as a dangerous sectarian organization.

The Chinese were always ahead of the Ch’ing government in terms of desiring harsh policy towards the Hui. Before the mid-nineteenth century, the Manchu rulers seemed to have difficulties in preventing their Chinese officials from going too far in their over-zealous anti-Hui approach, which no doubt reflected popular sentiment. At this time, intense Chinese dislike for the Muslims may have been generated not only by the cumulative effect of the stereotypes that had accompanied Hui existence in China for centuries, but also by what social scientists have termed "displaced aggression." The Chinese, because they had to submit to the humiliation occasioned by the Manchu rule, unable to avenge themselves on their oppressors, directed their frustration away from its primary source and towards the Hui, whom they thought they could maltreat without incurring the danger of reprisal.
Another reason might be that the Chinese, by pushing the Muslims to the lowest social stratum, thereby raised themselves from that position, though they remained subjugated to the Manchus. The Imperial protection afforded the Hui certainly contributed to Chinese resentment of their guest minority, as reflected in the repeated memorials to the Throne on these matters and the ever-booming manufacture of new stereotypical tales about the repulsive nature of these people.

The fact that many Chinese Muslims were traders was not in itself conducive to harmony between the Hui and the literati either, for even during the High Ch'ing, strict Confucianists continued to believe that commerce created a class of social parasites, attracting men and goods away from agriculture, the nation's economic foundation. Trade, according to this view, also bred crime and corruption because its profits invited embezzlements, and also because it was associated with the underworld.\(^{42}\) What easier way was there to discredit the Hui than to associate them with parasites and the underworld, even though Muslims were not the only traders around?

All of these underlying tensions, although ever-present, probably had been considerably blunted by the general laxity of the High Ch'ing and the mood of self-confidence and self-esteem shared by Chinese and Manchus alike, as China entered an almost unparalleled age of peace and economic abundance. After the climax, however, the inevitable downhill journey began. In the nineteenth century, demographic pressure made itself felt due to the doubling of the population since the advent of the Ch'ing. No parallel development of resources was available to match it due to the declining waterwork systems and the lack of Imperial leadership in opening up new lands for cultivation. As prohibitive expenditure was undertaken to campaign against the White Lotus and other rebels, the inefficacy of the Manchu military system became more and more exposed. As insecurity and uncertainty prevailed, robbery and crime increased. In this situation of sauvet qui peut, as the scramble for resources became the order of the day, those who were better organized, more able to pool their resources and mount a programme of mutual help, were more likely than others to make it through the crisis. Hence, the inflation of secret societies, sectarian movements, and other groupings, each struggling on its own for its own sake.

Among those who made it through the turbulent times were the Muslims. When famine struck and scarcity caused many deprivations among the masses, the Hui communities not only survived but took advantage of the situation to purchase Chinese children and raise them as Muslims. As the have-nots usually show hostility to the haves, the Muslims were probably more intensely hated because of their success amidst widespread failure and their growth amidst death. This is a situation in which stereotypes of minority cultures are reinforced, and scapegoat hunting by the majority culture is stepped up. This is more true in areas where the guest culture constitutes a sizable minority, thereby posing a more
serious threat, economic and otherwise, to the individuals of the dominant culture. In these areas and under circumstances of sharp social unrest, time-old prejudices burst into outright persecution and covert jealousies into overt competition.

Thus, although the intensification of anti-Hui sentiment and policies was universal under the Ch'ing, we find the problem more acute in areas such as Shensi, Kansu, and Yunnan, where the Muslims constituted a high percentage of the population and where entire communities were Muslim. We have seen the insistence with which Shensi officials memorialized the Throne against the Hui of their province. Similar pleas originated in Kansu and Yunnan.

At the same time, because of the vast Muslim population and the resulting inability of Imperial troops to intervene efficiently in these regions, a contradiction developed between Chinese sentiment, which demanded total annihilation of the Muslims, and the official approach (Manchu and Chinese alike), which realized the unfeasibility of such a proposition and attempted to abide by its differentiation between good and bad Muslims. Erh-lin, the Acting Governor-General of Kansu during the Muslim rebellions of the 1860s, presented his policy to the Court, bringing this problem into focus:

There are among the Muslims evil ones, but also many who are peaceful and law-abiding. If we decide to annihilate all of them, we will be forcing the good to join the rebels, and confront us with the huge and impossible task of killing all Muslims. Almost everywhere in Kansu, there are Muslims dwelling in the cities. ... If we persecute them all, we will cause irreparable damage. ... Therefore, I am issuing orders to my troops to distinguish between good and evil Muslims. I made it clear that I would pardon all those who yield to us and kill all those who resist. However, this policy has been opposed by local Chinese. ... I am asking Your Majesty to provide a backing for my policy by announcing on your behalf the policy of 'no distinction between Han and Hui; only distinction between good and evil'. ... When this decree is copied and posted everywhere, all officials and people would know how to behave.43

In 1856, the Han-Muslim unrest in Yunnan began brewing, a censor memorialized the Hsien-feng Emperor:

In the west part of Yunnan, Han and Muslims live intermixed. During the year 1845, a quarrel resulted in mutual killings. The former Governor of Yunnan, Lin Tse-hsu, settled this feud. It appears that the Han common people go about their cultivation of the soil for a living. The Muslims, however, do better in shop-keeping and in trading with goods, which results in their becoming rich and prosperous, and acquiring the best lands. ...44

This was the economic rationale for the trouble. On top of that, the Hui were
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thought to be inherently bad and dangerous, and some drastic measures had to be taken in their regard. Another official memorialized later that year:

There are Muslims everywhere in Yunnan province. Their number does not exceed 10 or 20 per cent of the Han population but they are exceedingly strong. They are full of suspicion and hatred. Under the existing circumstances, their killings and arsons are particularly cruel and poisonous. The accumulated hatred among the Han has become outrage. People from all quarters are begging for troops to deal with the situation... I intend to investigate the situation in each location separately. If we succeed in one place, the rebels will be frightened in others. If we can force them to surrender their leaders all tied up, we shall be able to pacify the good citizenry. If we wipe them out, others will become aware of that and will be frightened...

By the time the great Muslim rebellions broke out in the 1850s, heterodox movements had been teeming in the countryside, and the Taipings were in full swing in their endeavour to topple the dynasty. Since the Imperial armies were in a shambles, the government had no choice but to entrust the task of pacification to Chinese potentates such as Tseng Kuo-fan, Hu Lin-i, Li Hung-chang, and Tso Tsung-t'ang, who raised provincial or local militias to that end. These prominent Chinese leaders, who had as much of a stake in repressing the rebellions as in preserving Confucian values, rallied around the dynasty, the symbol and embodiment of Confucian rule, because they understood that those forces which threatened Imperial rule posed as severe a threat to the Confucian system.

Thus, defence of the Ch'ing became synonymous with defence of the Chinese essence, and defeat of heterodoxy, all heterodoxy, was the means to achieve that goal. The Ch'ing Emperors, now more Chinese than Manchu, attempted to show that they were more Chinese than the Chinese, for their raison d'être at the top of the realm was preservation of the Confucian system and its defence against aggressors from inside and outside the Empire. The anti-heterodox bias, which had been traditionally Chinese, was now theirs and very strongly so, since the Chinese provincial leaders on whose support they depended were dedicated to the eradication of heterodoxy.

The convergence of Ch'ing rulers' and Chinese gentry's interests paved the way for a coordinated anti-Hui policy, which brought about the eventual repression of Muslim rebellions. To be sure, the Imperial (i.e., Chinese-Manchu) policy remained, officially, in favour of persecuting the evil Muslims and pacifying the good, probably because of the impossibility of total annihilation of large masses of people who were strong enough, determined enough, and skilled enough to stand up and fight when pushed to the wall.

Tso Tsung-t'ang and other high officials were well aware of this over-all picture and were far-sighted enough to pursue this policy fairly consistently.
Sometimes they attempted, rather naively, to identify bad Muslims with the New Sect because this concept would neatly identify Old-Sectists as good Muslims and New-Sectists as bad (because they were heterodox). But this classification was not as neat in practice as it was in the Chinese minds. Whether they were aware of this fallacy and purposely contrived this distinction in order to discourage Muslims from joining the New Sect, or because they were themselves ignorant of internal Muslim sectarianism, is hard to tell.

In practice, however, this distinction did not mean much to the Chinese anyway. Many a petty official, and sometimes not so petty, came under the sway of the anti-Hui sentiment and took advantage of the remoteness of their localities from the policy makers to support and even incite pogrom-style onslaughts against the Muslims, with or without the New Sect pretext.
CHAPTER XII

The Muslim Revival. The Way from Co-existence to Confrontation

A culture which, for any reason, induces its members to work for its survival, is more likely to survive. ... A culture needs the support of its members and it must provide for the pursuit and achievement of happiness if it is to prevent disaffections and defections.

B. F. Skinner

For the Muslims in China, communal survival in a Chinese environment had been of paramount importance throughout their history. They had always attempted to abide by their subdued image, they avoided friction with the Chinese, and they abstained from any overt missionary work which would have exposed and indicted them as heterodox. Their existence was not easy but it was not untenable. As long as they could live as Muslims in their communities, they were prepared to incur inconveniences, smooth over difficulties, and conform, at least outwardly, to the requirements of the host culture.

Two conditions were necessary for the Muslims to rise with a sense of independence. Independence naturally flowed from rebellion, when it became politically feasible to rebel and when an adequate leader was present to prove the feasibility of such an enterprise and lead his co-religionaries towards it. The task of such a leader was facilitated when a revivalist movement could provide the positive ideological framework to arouse the Muslim public. For, as C. K. Yang has pointed out:

One of the reasons why religion could serve so well as an integrating factor, was its ability to furnish a spiritual orientation as a symbol of a
social or political cause, thereby lifting the attention of the group above
the conflict of varying utilitarian interests, and focusing their views on
a lighter plane.  

From the Muslim viewpoint, the downhill decay of government which
followed the High Ch'ing period was pregnant with fears and uncertainties. As a
rule, any minority would have a stake in political and social stability because
minorities would be the first to lose in time of trouble. Chinese Muslims, then,
had every interest in the maintenance of peace, because only under peaceful condi-
tions could they fit into the Chinese pattern without raising too much undesired
attention. When protection was afforded them and they could practise their
religion without much hindrance, they could also stretch the meaning of Dar-al-
Islam to apply to them, thus justifying their passive attitude toward the heathen
rule of the Chinese Emperor. But when the declining dynasty was unable, or some-
times unwilling, to protect them, the Muslims were left at the mercy of local bu-
reaucrats. These officials were themselves under the sway of popular anti-Hui senti-
ment. What were they to do? They looked around them for answers, and what did they see?

They saw a growing population, immersed in rampant misery. They
saw an increasing competition for dwindling resources. They saw an ever-expanding
underground anti-state, under the aegis of secret societies, shaping up as an alter-
tative to shrinking central authority. They saw a vacuum being filled by local elites.
And, finally, they saw local militia taking over the business of law and order as the
Imperial troops, paralyzed by incompetence, dissolved into insignificance.

So the Muslims, even though they remained decentralized on the na-
tional level, like Chinese secret societies, began to take ideological and organiza-
tional measures conducive to the furthering of their interests on the local and re-
gional levels. Organizationally, they formed local militia which, although designed
to resist the Taipings in areas such as Shensi, 3 became tools of local Muslim policy
and, instead of fighting the rebels, became rebels themselves.

While the Chinese naturally rallied to local gentry to lead the militia,
the Muslims (also quite naturally) flocked behind their religious leaders. 4 Object-
tively speaking, this sort of organization, standing outside the established system
which was guarded by the gentry, was a heterodox one. From the Muslim stand-
point, however, the religious leader not only played the role of the gentry in the
community, but it was incumbent upon him, and upon him alone, to declare Mus-
lim persecution intolerable. Thus he set in motion the logic that turned Dar-al-
Islam into Dar-al-Harb, thereby sanctioning Holy War, i.e., rebellion.

Despite the peculiarly Islamic elements in such an organization, striking
features existed to identify it with a heterodox group and to discredit it as such in
the eyes of the Chinese establishment, inasmuch as it resembled the “community
in arms” in Philip Kuhn's typology of the heterodox hierarchies of militarization in
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nineteenth-century China. Both represented a revolutionary challenge to the order, and the success of both depended upon the conflicts endemic to society in various locales.

Just as the Taipings fed upon the social discontent of the Hakkas, members of a linguistically distinct group embroiled in constant conflict with the pen-ti (indigenous population), so did the Muslims, always culturally and religiously distinct from the rest of the population. In both cases, the local militarization was not only a matter of men who were mobilized in t'uan-lien (local militia) or regional armies, or yung (mercenaries), as in the case of "orthodox hierarchies," but rather a militarization of whole communities due to the irreconcilable differences between the dominant and minority groups. In both cases, the antagonism took the form of a general alienation from the values of the established order. Finally, in both cases, the open conflict made the populace much more receptive to ideologies which envisaged a break with the past and a purer communal life for the future.

A new Muslim ideology emerged, epitomized by what is commonly known as the Hsin-chiao (New Sect), as compared with the Chiu-chiao (Old Sect). But the mainstream of Chinese Islam also vigorously responded to the events of the time by an unprecedented intellectual revival, which was both defensive and aggressive at the same time. It was defensive in the sense that it sought to shelter Islam from the scrutiny of Chinese literati by playing down Islamic particularism and trying to reconcile Islam and Confucianism, as we have seen above. It was aggressive in the sense that it endeavoured to cement the structure of the Muslim community in order to ward off an influx of Chinese influence. To meet both of these goals, Chinese Muslims produced an unprecedented output of Islamic literature in Chinese under the Ch'ing.

In previous times, prominent Muslims had written to the Chinese public in Chinese about Chinese and general matters, and in Arabic or Persian on matters relating to Islam. Although publication of Islamic materials in Chinese had begun at the end of the Ming, it was under the Ch'ing that the major works of Islam in Chinese and Chinese-Arabic were composed. A few score of these were extant at the beginning of this century, although it is clear that the original volume of writings was much greater.

It is interesting to note that the early writings were mainly concerned with the adaptation of the requirements of the Faith to the realities of China. Preservation of the Faith in the face of increasing sinicization during the Ming (adoption of Chinese names and many features of Chinese material culture) required making Islamic education available to as wide an audience as possible in the Chinese language everyone knew, rather than clinging to the old practice of teaching Islam in Persian and Arabic, which only the learned few could read.

For example, the paradigmatic personality of the Prophet could be understood and emulated by every Muslim in the Chinese environment only if the
message of Muhammad's life could be brought, in Chinese, to every Muslim household. Liu Chih, the most famous of Chinese Muslim writers, attempted to attain precisely this goal with his *True Annals of the Greatest Saint of Arabia*, written at the beginning of the eighteenth century. He wrote:

> Of all things between heaven and Earth, man is the most noble. Among men, there are saints, sages, wise and foolish. The saints are the most honourable. Saints are classed as ordinary saints, apostles, major saints and the Most Eminent Saint. The latter is the highest, and he is Muhammad, the most honourable man of all times and all places. Therefore, he is called the Most Eminent Saint (*Chin-sheng*). In creation, the Most Eminent Saint was the most honourable. His natural endowments and gifts and his aspirations were of the highest; his family and dwelling places, the most noble and distinguished. There was not a single thing connected with him which was not most honourable, hence he is called the Most Holy Saint. The roof of Heaven bore his name, and on the gates of Heaven it was inscribed; the ancient books recorded his name and the angels and devils extolled it. . . The Most Eminent Saint's body bore the stamp of his name, and Heaven and Earth and all things were created in the likeness of his name. Who, or what, is there, in Heaven or on Earth, which can surpass the Prophet? Everything reverts to the Prophet like all streams return to the sea. Those who return to him are the correct, and those who do not return to him are the deceived.¹¹

The book goes on and on with a detailed depiction of Muhammad's ancestors, his miraculous conception and birth, wonderful legends of his infancy, his visions and all the events which brought him to grandeur. The materials were obviously taken from Muslim sources, many passages from Ibn Ishaq's *Sirat Rasul Allah* being identifiable, but the Chinese flavour of the narration and the idealization of the Prophet's image as a figure worthy of emulation are equally obvious.

For example, the apocryphal story is told of Muhammad's mission to the Sui Emperor Wen-ti in 586, during the first year of his prophethood.¹² The Mission, headed by the Prophet's uncle according to the story, presented a portrait of the Prophet to the Emperor, who worshipped it. Afterwards, to the Emperor's dismay, the picture of Muhammad disappeared from the scroll. The Emperor said, "It must surely be that he is the pure Emperor and the true prince," wherefore he built the Mosque of the Holy Remembrance in Canton.¹³ Liu Chih called upon Muslims to follow the Prophet's exemplary life by quoting Muhammad's own words of exhortation:

> ...all the followers should observe God's commands in all things, and follow the example of the Most Saintly and avoid heresy...I am to take a long farewell and go on the road ahead of you; in travelling, one
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must have road money, and the road-money of the other world is good deeds in this world. My followers! There is one road by which to revert to the Truth, and there are successive steps by which a man approaches God...

Man is the most noble of all things between Heaven and Earth... He must know God in order to find the Way and must be in accord with God in order to walk in this Way and perform its requirements. All men may do this, and all men can rise to the character of the Prophet...

...The sins of men's life will be punished hereafter, and those who have been wronged here will be requited hereafter... Those who are able to repent have no great sin, while the sin of those who are boastful and proud is by no means small...

Strengthening Muslim consciousness through emulation of the persona of the Prophet was also the reason why the green colour became a Chinese Muslim symbol, apparently during the Ch'ing. To this day, many Chinese Imams wear a green cloak, and the Chinese Muslim flag is a white crescent on a green background. The choice of this colour apparently originated from Muhammad's preference for it. It is said that when Khadijah, his first wife, asked him what garments he liked best for the angel to wear during the revelation, he answered, "White and green." In more modern times, Chinese Muslims have circulated tracts printed in green, and many of their publications bear green titles, or they are bound in green or green-fringed paper.

Early Muslim writers such as Wang Tai-yu (d. 1660) and Yusuf Ma Chu (d. 1711) also wrote a great deal, in Chinese, about the Islamic faith and philosophy. The apologetic aspects of these early writings have already been discussed, with reference to authors such as Ching Pei-kao, Liu Chih and Ma An-l'i. During the nineteenth century we find the aggressive element of Muslim revival much in evidence. In the late-nineteenth century, for example, a Muslim prayer book was published in Arabic and Chinese which, although implicitly admitting Chinese Muslims' ignorance of Arabic, was explicitly aimed at ritual purity.

The author transliterated (without translating it) the original text into Chinese. Because of the phonetical peculiarities of the Chinese language, the Chinese rendering was, of course, far from accurate, but that was the best one could do under the circumstances. Another part of the book, containing religious prescription such as ablutions before prayer was written in Persian, also transliterated into Chinese. The introduction to the book, written in Chinese, still had much of the apologetic nature that we saw in other early Chinese Muslim writings, in as much as it attributed the rites of purification to Confucius and Mencius, stressing the virtue of filial piety. But its puristic import was also unmistakable. The rites, prescribed in Persian and transcribed and commented upon in Chinese, stress ritual purification in great detail, urging Muslims in no uncertain terms to observe...
ritual purity and preserve the Faith by obliquely imputing Allah's commands to the Angels in this respect:

Beneath the A-erh-she there is the Sea of Eternity; go thither and wash your hands up to the elbows, cleanse your scalp, clean your feet, and this would be the Little Purification. When the Angels implemented Allah's command, and washed themselves, He ordered them to recite the following prayer.

The prayer in question is the standard one that every Muslim is supposed to recite daily. The Chinese transliteration makes it sound very awkward to non-Chinese ears, but the ritual purity requirement emanating directly from Allah and prescribed to His Angels, renders the prayer not only acceptable but desirable. The text is clear on this score, for as Allah forgave the Angels who purified themselves and prayed to Him, so

when the mu'min (the Faithful) practises the Little Purification and recites this prayer with the intention of repenting of his sins, even if he had committed all the sins of the world, Allah would pardon him.

The author sums up by emphasizing again the theme of ritual purity:

The significance of all this is that one should not look at anything, listen to anything, hear anything, say anything, take anything or do anything that is contrary to the ritual. If one acts in this fashion, then the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the hands, the feet, the entire body, everything will be pure.

As we advance into the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, the nature of the the writings seems to have been taking a more militant tinge, both in terms of education of the Muslim community's ritual purity and of counter-attacks against the Chinese and Christian religions, as we have previously noticed in the writings of Muhammad Yagob and the various Muslim proclamations and tracts.

The Three Character Classic for Muslims, published in Nanking at the end of the Ch'ing and designed for the education of Muslim children, extolled the greatness of Allah and His Messenger, making no secret of the Qur'an as the exclusive repository of Truth:

You, little children, are on the verge of understanding; study the simple...do not think into the deeper things. when you have made progress, then I shall teach you the Great Doctrine. The most important thing about the Doctrine is to read the Holy Book, wherein are the Holy Commandments. Everything has its essence, and the essence of the Holy Book is Islam. The Truth brings blessings; heresy, harm and evil follow falsehood.

A superficial knowledge of the Doctrine leads to the lack of worship, as a lazy person causes the ruin of his own house. The beauty of the Doctrine is purity; good behaviour purifies the body.
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Here we find no word of Confucianism, no lip-service to Chinese civilization, no attempt to reconcile Islamic and Chinese traditions. This *Three Character Classic*, despite the Chinese allusion in the title, is a purely Muslim affair. It urges the children to observe all tenets of the Islamic Faith, enumerates in detail all the rituals of worship and encourages them to abide by the Holy Doctrine alone, and to manifest if proudly to the outside world:

Should a man ask you, you can give him this answer: 'I live in the Doctrine and the Doctrine is within me without the least uncertainty or partiality. . . It has five aspects: one, what I follow is the Doctrine of God; two, what I protect is the Doctrine of the Holy One; three, what I listen to is the Doctrine of the Muslims; four, what I cast off is evil doctrine; five, what I watch against is heresy.'

If you are asked why are you a Muslim, answer:

'I am a Muslim by the grace of God.'

Little children, you must learn this thoroughly...

Ma Te-hsin (d. 1874), the great Imam of Yunnan and the first leader of the Rebellion there, wrote not only books about *Shari'a* and Islamic philosophy and history, but also about Arabic grammar and rhetoric. He wrote not only in Chinese, but also in Arabic, which perhaps indicates a radicalization of Muslim attitudes as their persecution by the Chinese and the attempts at their evangelization by Christian missionaries made them aware of the need to go back to their roots and reject compromises in order to survive.

Of course, these writings deserve a closer and more detailed study before definite conclusions can be drawn. But Ma and other Muslim writers' insistence on ritual purity, their reiteration of Islamic superiority over other faiths, and their emphasis on education of youth, all done with unprecedented conviction and vigour, seem to leave no doubt as to the great intellectual and religious upsurge which swayed Chinese Islam under the Ch'ing. The only two known Chinese Muslim works about the Islamic calendar prior to the Republic also date from the nineteenth century, one written by Ma Te-hsin and the second by a fellow-Yunnanese, Ma Yu-ling, both of whom had gone to Mecca and Constantinople in the middle of the nineteenth century before they embarked on their prolific literary careers.

It is important to note, however, that Chinese Muslim literature of the late Ch'ing, despite (or perhaps because of) its essentially revivalist nature, did not relinquish the Chinese language. Efforts were being made to revive Arabic (and Persian), but the use of Chinese both as a tool of Islamic revival and as a vehicle to carry the Islamic message to the general Chinese public remained indispensable. Bilingual texts were printed to initiate children into the Holy Tongue of the Prophet and to facilitate the constant contact of adults with Arabic.

A Chinese Muslim primer, published during the early years of the
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Republic for use by children and entitled *Back to the True Faith Earnestly*, played up the theme of inner Muslim cohesion by prohibiting disgraceful behaviour between Muslims, thereby implying, perhaps, that evil deeds against non-Muslims are allowable. All non-Muslims are doomed to end up in Hell anyway:

The ordinances of Faith consist of six things, five of this world, and one of the other. As for those that concern this world, the first is that it is not permitted for a Muslim to kill a Muslim without a just cause; second, it is not permitted for a Muslim to take the property of another Muslim unrighteously; third, it is not permitted for a Muslim to think evil of another Muslim; fourth, it is not permitted to a Muslim to transgress the rights of a fellow-Muslim; fifth, it is not permitted to a Muslim to take the children of another Muslim into bondage. As for that which concerns the other world, it is necessary for a Muslim to know surely that no Muslim shall forever abide in the Fire...

Said the Prophet, Allah's praise be upon Him: ‘When a dead person is buried, there come to him two black angels of fierce countenance, *Al-Munkar* and *Nakir*, and they interrogate the dead according to the following words: ‘Who is thy Lord and who is thy Prophet and who is thy religious leader, and who are thy brethren, and what is thy *Qibla*?’ It the dead person belongs to the happy ones, and is able to give a satisfactory reply: ‘My Lord is Allah and my Prophet is Muhammad, the Messenger of God, and my religion is Islam, and my Book is the Qur’an, and my religious guide is the Qur’an, and my brethren are the true believers, and my *Qibla* is the *Ka’ba*,’ they will say to him: ‘Sleep on like the sleep of a bride, for thy grave is one of the Gardens of Paradise.’ But if the dead be one of the wretched ones, he is not able to answer correctly, and so they say to him, ‘Thou hast not known, and thou hast not read, therefore thy grave is like one pit of Hell,’ and they will torment him with pillars of fire.

The primer, dated 1332 (*hijra*), was clearly unlike earlier Muslim books (which usually bore Chinese dating). It was an obvious message of Islamic revivalism, stating in no uncertain terms the end of Muslim cultural ambivalence. Voicing such ideas of Islamic particularism in plain Chinese, which in the past was taboo at worst, apologetic at best, now became quietly confident at best, aggressively arrogant at worst.

The pragmatic bilingual approach was applied even to the Qur’an, which has always stood at the focus of Muslim faith, devotion and worship. For Muslims, the Qur’an is not only a sacred book, but it is also the faithful reproduction of the original Scripture in Heaven. Although the Holy Book was an Arabic Qur’an intelligible to Muhammad and his people, as the Scriptures of *Ahl-al-Kitab* had been disclosed to them in their own languages, this distinction disappeared in
the religious consciousness of Muslims. The ideas of eternity and uncreatedness (ghayr-makhlûq) of the Word of Allah were applied by Muslim theologians to the original Scripture in Heaven and then, by extension, to all Arabic copies of the Qur'an. Following al-Ash'ari, orthodox Islam held the view that the written or recited Qur'an is identical in being and reality with the uncreated and eternal Word of God. Hence, the traditional Muslim reluctance to translate the Holy Book into other languages, although the Hanafi madhhab (school of law) of which Chinese Islam is part took a more liberal stand on this matter than the other madhhab.

Another reason for this reluctance is that Islam, in theory, unlike Judaism offers no facilities for those outside its pale to study its character before they embrace it. A man must become a Muslim first by pronouncing the shahada before he can learn what his obligations are. Therefore, the Qur'an may not be sold to Unbelievers, and soldiers are advised not to take it with them into hostile territory for fear that the Infidel might get hold of it. Many copies of the Book bear upon them the warning to Unbelievers not to touch, and some pious Muslims refuse even to teach Arabic grammar to non-Muslims, for fear that the rules might be illustrated by quotations from the Book.

For a pious Muslim, the inimitability of the Arabic Qur'an (I'jaz), stated in the Book itself and extolled by Muslim theologians and commentators throughout the ages, makes any translation a vain and hopeless attempt. The reality, however, is that for most Muslims Arabic is a dead language. So, while Muslim religious literature has, for many centuries, been written in languages other than Arabic (Persian, Turkish, Urdu, Bengali, Chinese, etc.), the question about translating the Qur'an itself has remained contested. On the other hand, the danger of alienating non-Arabic-speaking Muslims from the Faith has always loomed more and more threateningly. It is significant, therefore, that the revivalist movements in the Muslim world, which were concerned precisely with the preservation of Arabic as the Holy Language, also encouraged the translation of the Qur'an into other languages, something like the tense intermixture of radical fundamentalism and determined modernism which characterized Muslim reformers of the late-nineteenth century.

Thus we find such a fundamentalist as Shah Wali-Ullah in India simultaneously initiating a movement of intellectual appreciation of the Qur'an by the layman by founding a school (in 1743) where Qur'an and Hadith were taught under his personal direction, while writing a treatise on the problems of translation of the Qur'an. His son translated the Book into Urdu in a literal rendering, then a more idiomatic translation was done by another of his sons.

In China, it was Ma Te-hsin who began to translate the complete Qur'an into Chinese, but he died before he finished it. Tu Wen-hsiu, the political leader of the Yunnan Rebellion who became the champion of Yunnanese Muslims, pub-
lished the first complete Chinese edition of the Book. His personal copy, however, was in Arabic, bound in a Chinese cover, thus apparently abiding by the strictly orthodox epigram: "What lies between the two covers is the Word of God." Later on, selections from the Qur'an in both Arabic and Chinese were published as textbooks, and new full translations into Chinese abounded at the turn of the century, following similar developments in Turkey and other parts of the Islamic world.

One of the bilingual Chinese Qur'an translations deserves special attention because of its combination of Chinese form and technique with Sino-Arabic contents in order to achieve the Islamic ends that the editor had in mind. It was entitled *The Holy Book, Explained in Chinese and Clearly Divided into Sections.* It was edited like a commentary on the Chinese Classics, with the Arabic text in large print and the Chinese comment, under the heading "Chu," in small print.

The peculiar feature of this unusual publication is the Chinese phonetic rendering of the Arabic words, inserted between the Arabic text and the Chinese commentary so as to make the Believer recite, if not actually read, the original text of the Word of Allah in fulfillment of the Prophet's urging:

The most Excellent act of worship ("ibada) in my Community is the reciting of the Qur'an.

For, those who recite the Qur'an in its original wording come closest to Muhammad himself. 'Amr Ibn-al-As is reported to have said:

He who reads the Qur'an, has prophecy inserted between his sides, save only that no revelation has been given to him.

Certainly, reading in transliteration is not easy labour, but, as Ibn Mas'ud has said:

The Qur'an was sent down that they might labour on it, so they took to studying it as a labour, in order that one of them may recite the Qur'an from beginning to end without dropping a single letter.

And lest the Believers be induced to substitute Chinese translation for the irreplaceable text in Arabic, the Chinese commentary is a mere annotated explanation of the text written in colloquial Chinese, not a translation. In the *Fatih* which every Muslim is supposed to recite in Arabic, the Chinese commentary goes beyond the usual paraphrasing into a more expanded elaboration to stress the importance of each word and letter. For example, the verse "Malik yaum a-din" is transliterated into six Chinese characters: "ma-li-k'o yao min ting" and commented upon thus:

This verse has twelve characters. With the thirty preceding characters this makes a total of forty-two. On the basis of these forty-two characters, Allah has created forty-two kinds of diseases of the human heart. To every man who, during prayer, recites these words with true devotion, Allah will grant the cure of these forty-two illnesses.
All the verses of the *Fatiha* are commented upon in the same fashion, ostensibly in line with traditional Muslim *tafsir* but clearly designed to make the faith accessible and awesome to the Chinese Muslim.

Since Arabic is the language of the Qur'an, and the Holy Book is the Word of Allah, an extraordinary magical quality is intrinsic to the Tongue of the Prophet for any Muslim. It has been all the more so for non-Arabic-speaking Muslims, for whom the scarcity of usage of the language makes it more remote, and its remoteness renders it more mystical. Being remote and mystical, and thus mastered only by a select few, usually the learned *Imams*, it could potentially become a powerful tool to arouse religious sentiment, to command the respect and loyalty of the Muslim masses, and to claim leadership over a Muslim community by virtue of mastery of that knowledge. This might be compared to the Chinese literatus' mastery of the Classics, which gave him social prestige and designated him as a natural leader in the community.

In addition to this, Arabic, or at least some Arabic, became a powerful cohesive instrument among Muslims, not only as a *lingua franca* useful in inter-provincial communications which would otherwise be affected by dialect difficulties, but also as a sort of "secret language" whose use added intimacy and group-feeling, even it was limited, in most cases, to a few words of greeting and the like. To be sure, Arabic (and Persian) had been in use among Chinese Muslims during the Ming and before, especially in ritual. We have already noted that many Arabic and Persian words had been introduced into the speech of Chinese Muslims when conversing among themselves. But it was not until the Ch'ing that the active use of Arabic as a creative means of intellectual innovation, religious education and, eventually, political incitement became a reality. No wonder, then, that such a radical political leader as Tu Wen-hsiu used Arabic, together with Chinese, to cast his gold seal, assumed the Arabic title of Sultan Suleiman, and used Arabic in some of his proclamations to the public.

Political radicalism was not only part and parcel of the renewed Muslim awareness during the Ch'ing, but it also signalled the inevitable result when Muslim political thought was taken to its logical conclusion. The New Sect movement, which was identified with political radicalism, may therefore be seen as an avatar of Muslim revivalism in China. Although it is evident that the New Sect parted away from the mainstream of Chinese Islam theologically, it is equally certain that it gave Chinese Muslim political revivalism its greatest impetus. This is the issue we are going to explore in the coming pages.
CHAPTER XIII


I did not pray him to lay bare
The mystery to me;
Enough the rose was heaven to smell,
And his own face to see.

Ralph Hodgson¹

The “puzzle in a charade wrapped in a riddle” that was, and still is, the nature of the New Sect in Chinese Islam can hardly be solved to a high degree of satisfaction, for the scarce information that is available is contradictory, confusing, and sometimes misleading. Viewed by the Chinese, the New Sect was heterodox, suspicious, and misunderstood. In many ways, it became the scapegoat of anti-Muslim sentiment, the legitimate object of persecution (because it was labelled heterodox) and, by extension, a legitimizing pretext for persecution of Muslims in general, despite the self-righteous Chinese pronouncements of distinctions between good and evil, not Han and Hui.

Viewed by outsiders, it was a confusing mixture of mystic sectarianism, Shi'ite millenarianism and Islamic revivalism, all lumped together under the Hsin-chiao heading. Chinese Muslims themselves, both followers of the Sect and its rivals, generally speaking were and remain silent about the whole issue, electing to avoid its discussion or to renounce altogether any knowledge of it. This taboo on discussion does not, I suspect, emanate only from ignorance or politically-motivated reluctance, but also, perhaps, from the embarrassment entailed in admitting dissension in their midst. In both Chinas today,² Muslims tend to minimize the role of the New Sect in their rebellions and emphasize Ch’ing oppression as the ultimate cause.

It certainly is true that the Ch’ing heightened sensitivity to minority problems and the ensuing endorsement given to Chinese anti-Hui sentiment, coupled with the malaise of the times, contributed to Muslim resentment and began the vicious circle of rebellion-oppression-more rebellion-more oppression-secession, etc. But it is equally true that the New Sectarians, whatever their identity, were more intransigent in their uprisings, possibly indicating a compelling ideological thrust behind their rebellions. Indeed, both matters, ideology and discontent, can be related as two mutually reinforcing aspects of the same social phenomenon: discontent boosting the social in the sectarian and ideology thriving on discontent.

Ideology helps to perform two main social functions: one, directly social, of binding the community together, and the other, individual, of satisfying
Politically, it becomes significant by its relation to authority, inasmuch as the latter is legitimized on the basis of those ideologies that provide moral basis for social manipulation, or lay claim to superior planning and rationality. This does not mean, however, that traditional Chinese Islam (Old Sect) did not provide enough of an ideology for Muslim resentment to thrive upon. We have already pointed out the widespread revivalist measures taken by Chinese Muslim leaders who sought ritual purity and the restoration of Islamic values.

But that revival, important as it was, remained conservative and pragmatic insofar as it took place within the Chinese Muslim establishment, and it sought no more than a new accommodation with the Chinese system, a return to the "live and let live" formula which had prevailed prior to the late Ch'ing. Not that coexistence with the Chinese system was ideal (we have seen that it was not), but it was deemed to be the only practical way of surviving, as long as pressures were kept at a tolerable level and the environment could be said to be within Dar-al-Islam.

This may explain why various Muslim leaders of the Old Sect, including Ma Te-hsin, one of the most venerated Chinese Muslims under the Ch'ing, laid down their arms and sided with the Government once their grievances were satisfied to a minimal degree. Ma himself, in his mission to convince the recalcitrant Tu Wen-hsiu to follow suit, elaborated on the material advantages which the population would receive if peace should be restored, as contrasted with the disaster that the community would incur were the rebellion to go on.4

Ma, not only a scholar but the leader of the community, living in a secular environment, had to come to grips with the "ideal-actuality" dilemma and resolve it. As Malcolm Kerr has pointed out:

Underlying the Islamic tradition of social thought is a pessimistic consciousness of the tension between ideal and actuality, the spiritual and the temporal, virtue and power, God's command and man's behaviour. In past centuries, Muslim scholars did not customarily think it their business to reconcile these two sets of contrasting elements. Instead, they elaborated their conceptions of the ideal and left Islamic society to cope with actualities, by evolving its own practical but largely unacknowledged psychology and social mechanisms. But the spread of secular culture in the modern Muslim world has changed this. Instead of rendering the sense of tension obsolete, it has sharpened the tension and made its resolution a vital problem.5

Diehard Chinese Muslims did not subject themselves to practical considerations. Their zeal was restorationist and utopian, not merely ideological. This was not a purely nativistic movement, in the sense that Ralph Linton has defined it as any conscious, organized attempt on the part of a society's members to revive or perpetuate selected aspects of that culture.6
Naturally, all cultures seek to perpetuate themselves, and they do this unconsciously as part of the process of individual training and socialization. Conscious and organized efforts to perpetuate a culture can arise only when a society becomes conscious that there are cultures other than its own, and that the existence of its own culture is threatened by, for example, a process of acculturation to a host culture.

This definition very well suits what the general revivalist movement among Chinese Muslims was trying to accomplish. Moreover, although the professed purpose of a nativistic movement is to revive a past culture or to maintain the current one, it does not really attempt to revive a past phase of culture in its entirety, because it recognizes the incompatibility of past culture patterns with current practical conditions. These were precisely the limitations which were recognized, albeit unavowed, by great Chinese Muslim revivalists such as Ma Te-hsin. They comprehended the limitations, and therefore they did not press for carrying Muslim revivalism to its logical conclusion, the foundation of a Muslim state.

The New Sect movement can, however, be defined in terms of "magical nativism," of which Linton outlined the following characteristics:

Magical nativistic movements are often spectacular and always troublesome to administrators. Such movements are comparable in many respects to the messianic movements which have arisen in many societies in time of stress. They usually originate with some individual, who assumes the role of prophet and is accepted by the people because they wish to believe. They always lean heavily on the supernatural, and usually embody apocalyptic and millenial aspects. In such movements, moribund elements of culture are not revived for their own sake, or in anticipation of practical advantages from the elements themselves. Their revival is part of a magical formula designed to modify the society's environment in ways which will be favourable to it. The society's members feel that by behaving as the ancestors did, they will in some usually undefined way help to recreate the total situation in which the ancestors lived.

Compare this to what Tso Tsung-t'ang wrote in his memorial to the Throne on the Muslim New Sect, and note the striking similarities with Linton's definition:

Previously, in 1781, two Hui people, Ma Ming-hsin and Su Ssu-shih-erh returned from Western countries and Arabia, where they claimed they had become aware of the secret of salvation. They founded the New Sect and raised rebellions. Since Ma Hua-lung, the Sect has become widespread. Under the cloak of tradesmen, they sent out missionaries to spread this evil faith everywhere. The reason why the New Sect
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must be prohibited is that it claims its origin in God and indulges in preposterous prophesying. This Sect's conduct is strange and often lures unthinking Hui into slavery. The followers of the Sect are often unwittingly pushed into plotting uprisings, and they would be prepared, without hesitation, to face execution... which makes it a real danger to the Empire. Some captured Muslims have testified to the effect that Ma Hua-lung knows the future, can predict the number of visitors who would come to visit him from afar. Others testified that Ma often manifested his divine abilities, healed disease, accorded childbearing to barren women. Those who joined the Sect confessed their sins before Ma Hua-lung, who whipped them and granted them redemption, after he intervened with God on their behalf. Even though the Hui are usually sceptical, they change once they accept the New Sect Teaching, and seem possessed with madness. Under siege, when the Hui suffered famine and had to eat human flesh, none came out to criticize Ma Hua-lung and his family, who availed themselves of large quantities of food supplies. Even when they were in a hopeless situation, the idea that the Great Ahung would in some way save them was a comfort to them. Even after Ma gave himself up, many Muslim leaders continued to flow to him, prostrated themselves before him, and would not redress themselves unless an order came from Ma himself.

The "magical aspects" of the movement, analysed from a Muslim viewpoint, can certainly be identified with Sufi or Shi'i doctrines, but the movement's political activism and enthusiasm in warfare seem to have much in common with what is termed Wahhabism, and more particularly the Indian brand of it. True, some Sufi orders, such as the Naqshbandiya, professed and practised political militancy as well, but their work among Muslims and others was mainly missionary propagandist in nature, not military-coercive. Tso Tsung-t'ang pointed out precisely this facet of the New Sect:

If anyone hesitated to join them, they all attacked him and threatened him with their weapons until he yielded. There are even cases where sons who are believers would kill their fathers if they rejected them.

In another memorial of November, 1868, Tso wrote:

Numerous Hui people from Yunnan and Kansu, having left their homes and being full of enthusiasm over their rebellion are there [in Shensi]. Chinese who had been forced to convert to Islam are also there.

Wei Yuan reported New Sectarianism militancy against other Muslims as well:

In the 56th year of Ch'ien-lung (1781), his [Ma Ming-hsin's] disciple
Su Ssu-shih-san assembled his crew and killed over a hundred people of the Old Sect. 13

This leaves us with the unresolved puzzle of what is the New Sect after all? The source materials are so confused and contradictory that I suspect that we cannot identify one homogeneous New Sect, but must describe several Muslim sects, Sufi or otherwise, which appear in the sources under one cloak or another and bearing this or that name, but all lumped together by both the Chinese and the non-sectarian Muslims of China either through ignorance or for convenience. No wonder that numerous Western observers, some of them well versed in Islamic doctrines, gave a wide variety of reports about the New Sect, trying to fit it into the straight-jacket of Islamic or Western-invented typologies and terminologies.

I believe it is presumptuous to try to depict in absolute terms inner religious experiences, and for want of writings by the people who were themselves involved in the New Sect, whatever that means, one can hardly impute to them emotions and ideas that are believed to be part of already categorized sects or denominations. What I shall humbly attempt in the following pages, therefore, is by no means a final and conclusive characterization of the New Sect in order to make it fit into a ready-made pigeon-hole, but rather a description of some of its manifest characteristics as they relate to similar phenomena in the Islamic world. This will help us, hopefully, to grasp the outer expressions, if not the significance, of Chinese Muslim militancy and rebellion. But before we embark on this project, let us first clarify definitions of the other component of the dichotomy - the Old Sect, about which there is also no agreement.

Joseph Fletcher's work has contributed to the unravelling of some segments of the New Sect mystery, 14 in that it has identified it with the jahriya, a sub-division of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. I shall take issue with that conclusion in due course. In the interim, I should like to question Fletcher's identification of the Old Sect with another branch of the Naqshbandiya, the khufya. It is true that the two sub-divisions were virulently antagonistic in Central Asia, and one may prima facie argue that the Old-Sect - New-Sect controversy was transplanted from Turkestan to China. One might ask, what could be the reason for the jahriya's vitriolic attacks on the Old Sect, were it not a reflection of the well-established rivalry between the two sub-divisions of the Naqshbandiya? A good question indeed.

However, the immediate implication of this argument would be that all of Chinese Islam was or became Naqshbandi, which is certainly not the case. While the Naqshbandiya was pre-eminent in Central Asia, and certainly brought under its sway sizable portions of Chinese Islam (especially in the Northwest and Southwest), non-Sufi Islam had existed in China before the founding of the Naqshbandi order. I suggest that the term Old Sect (Chiu-chiao) referred to this traditional Islam, to contrast it with the newly-founded New Sect (Hsin-chiao).
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The controversies and violence involving the New-Sect – Old-Sect relationship emanated from the fact that the New Teaching, the newly-propagated religion of a Muslim minority, was regarded with suspicion and ambivalence (and sometimes as outright heresy) by the old-established Islam. This applied especially when the New Sect sought to impose itself forcefully on non-sectarians. Chinese sources clearly differentiate between the Old Teaching, referring to the masses of Chinese Muslims, and the New Teaching, referring to the new trouble-making heterodoxy. Western sources also corroborate this view.

The earliest Chinese documents referring to the New Sect did not even mention the term Old Sect, because official Chinese attention was focused on the troublesome new intruder, while “regular” Islam had been taken for granted for centuries. In a memorial by Pi Yuan, the Governor of Shensi, dating from the year 1781, the first distinction is made:

There are no less than thousands of Muslim families in Sian...and they have seven mosques, the biggest dating from the T'ang. Each of these houses of prayer has one or more religious leaders called A-hung. Each congregation of Hui goes to its own particular mosque to pray and they are independent of each other. There are none who belong to the New Sect...Hui have lived in China since ancient times, and they are no different from ordinary inhabitants. ...When the Salar tribe rebelled, the Hui of Shensi were alarmed at the prospect that they might be involved, but this having nothing to do with the Hui people of the interior, I ordered them to go about their affairs in peace...I shall keep a vigilant eye, and in case any of the New Sect or other vicious faith attempt to create trouble, they will be arrested...so that they may be totally extirpated.

Thus, the contrast was between the New Sect and the common Hui, not between two rival sects; both of them would have been evil by definition from the Chinese viewpoint, had they both been sects. One year later, in an edict of the Ch’ien-lung Emperor, the term Old Sect is used to designate the good Hui, as opposed to the evil New Sectarians:

Su Ssu-shih-san of Kansu belongs to a seditious sect in the Muslim faith called the New Sect, which has now been wiped out. The Hui of the Old Sect are numerous in all provinces and particularly in Shensi...Their prayers are traditional and have nothing seditious in them...The outbreak of rebellion in Kansu last year resulted from a controversy between the New Sect and the Old Sect.

Although fighting broke out between two sects of Islam, the Old Sect was clearly favoured as good and the New condemned as evil. Had the two sects been two sub-divisions of the Naqshbandiya, with only minor ritual differences between them, as Fletcher asserts, both would have been banished. Moreover, it
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is inconceivable that adherents of one sub-division of the Naqshbandiya would combine with the Chinese authorities against another sub-division of the same order. For all Muslims of the Sunni faith, including the Naqshbandis, recognize each other as Muslim regardless of one’s madhhab (school of law) affiliation, and one of the greatest sins for any Sunni Muslim would be to join enemies of Islam to fight other Muslims. A Sunni Muslim would join fighting against other Muslims only if the latter could be accused of apostasy, a claim that no Sufi order would level against another.

In China, fighting and killing did take place between the two sects, which suggests another kind of relationship between the two. Ch’ien-lung’s decree of 1782 expressly says:

. . .Where Su Ssu-shih-san rebelled last year, the Hui of the Old Sect led the people in helping the government troops to defeat and catch the rebels, for which I commended and rewarded them. 20

This was by no means a unique case. In both the Yunnan and the Kansu rebellions in the 19th century, Muslims of the Old Sect sided with the government in putting down New Sect led uprisings. This suggests, I believe, that the Old Sect must have regarded the New Teaching, at least in its nineteenth-century manifestations, as a deviation from the True Faith. D’Ollone reported that:

Les Musulmans du Yunnan nous ont parlé de Ma Hua-lung et de sa secte avec une horreur si accentuée qu’il n’était pas douteux que quelques uns de ces herétiques ne fussent dans la contree. J’ai eu d’ailleurs plusieurs fois l’impression qu’on m’empêchait de voir certain Musul- man notamment au village de Hui-lung, près de Ling-nan-fu. 21

Another aspect of this “heresy” in the eyes of the Old Sect was the cult of Saints, practised by a so-called New Sect in Szechwan. Had the Old Sect been another branch of the Naqshbandiya, it would have had no objection to this cult, which is practised with devotion by all Sufi orders (and not only by them). Again, D’Ollone’s testimony:

Le Hsin-chiao, appelé aussi Koumbe-chiao, religion des tombeaux, enseigne à prier sur les tombes des saints personnages, qui continuent à s’occuper des affaires de la terre et accordent leurs bienfaits. Ma Hua-lung, qui prêcha cette doctrine, est considéré par ses partisans comme jouissant d’un pouvoir surnaturel qu’il a hérité de son père. . .Les tenants de la vieille religion, Chiu-chiao ou Lao-chiao, reprouvent violemment ces doctrinés et ces pratiques. Il y a eu jadis bataille entre les deux sectes, qui aujourd’hui affectent de ne pas se connaître. Mes informateurs ordinaires, appartenent à la vieille religion, n’ont jamais voulu nous servir d’intermédiaires auprès des gens qu’ils méprisent et c’est peut-être parce qu’ils savaient nos bonnes relations avec les tenants du Lao chiao, que le chef de la nouvelle religion n’a point.
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A contemporary Chinese Muslim describes the Old-Sect — New-Sect differences as follows:

The New Sect was limited to a few large cities, while the Old Sect was dominant throughout the rest of China. The Old Sect followed the Chinese tradition of wearing white mourning garments, while the New forbade wearing special clothes of mourning. The Muslim community was divided with one side favouring reform — the New Sect, and the other opposing changes and known as the Old Sect. Each side suspected the other and accused it of heresy. It was a shame to have such a break develop.

In sum, what became known as the Old Sect had nothing akin to Naqshbandiya and had nothing to do with any sect at all. Perhaps the translation of Chiu-chiao into “Old Teaching” instead of “Old Sect” would be more appropriate to designate the established Islam of the Hanafi madhhab, to which the mass of Chinese Muslims adhered. The writings of the great Muslim authors such as Liu Chih and Ma Te-hsin are not, as far as one can tell from a superficial impression, imbued with any particular Sufi ideas, nor are these great masters referred to as sheikhs by other Muslims, which would have been the case had they been Sufi masters. They are invariably referred to as imams, the common term for a learned Muslim or an officiating leader of the community in the Chinese environment.

The question of the identity and development of the New Sect is much more complex and puzzling. If we accept Fletcher’s premise of the affiliation of the New Teachings with the Naqshbandiya, we must ask what made it possible for it to emerge at the end of the eighteenth century when the initiator of the order, Baha ad-din Naqshband, had established himself in Central Asia four centuries earlier? That the order had its eyes on China is shown by the boasting of Khwaja Ahrar, a Master of the order in the fifteenth century, who said:

If we acted only as a sheikh in this age, no other sheikh would find a disciple. But another task has been assigned to us, to protect the Muslims from the evil of oppressors, and for the sake of this, we must traffic with kings and conquer their souls, thus achieving the purpose of the Muslims. God Almighty has bestowed on me such a power, that if I wish, I can, with a single letter, cause the Chinese Emperor, who claims divinity, to abandon his monarchy and come running over thrones to my threshold. But with all this power, I await God’s command. Whenever he wills, His command reaches me and is executed.

Well, Allah’s command to propagate the order among Chinese Muslims came two centuries later, and, as the sheikh had intuitively anticipated, it was to become incumbent upon his followers “to protect Muslims from the evil of oppressors,” though the prophecy about the conversion of the Chinese Emperor can hard-
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ly be said to have materialized.

There is little doubt that Ma Ming-hsin, the acknowledged founder of
the so-called New Sect in China, was Naqshbandi; Fletcher has demonstrated this
point quite conclusively. The problem is, what happened to subsequent generations
of the New Sect which are of extra-Sufi origin, or which underwent supra-Sufi
Kubrawiya, and even Wahhabiya? Is it true that the New Sect represented only
and solely the jahriya sub-division of the Naqshbandi, as Fletcher would have us
believe, or might there have been corruptions of the faith by injections of Shi'ite,
Wahhabi and other elements?

There is evidence to support each of these hypotheses, and we shall
examine them one by one. I shall argue that the rise of the New Sect was a reaction
to the increasingly harsh conditions in which Chinese Muslims found themselves
during the late Ch'ing, and that the so-called New Sect was not one and the same in
all its manifestations. There are detectable millenarian elements in some branches
of the New Sect which are of extra Sufi origin, or which underwent supra-Sufi
metamorphosis.

The socio-cultural situation that precipitates a messianic movement has
been depicted as “harsh times,” characterized by the widespread experience of
“deprivation,” i.e., the despair caused by the inability to obtain what a culture, or
a religion, has defined as a satisfactory condition of life. The messianic doctrine,
essentially a statement of hope, attracts adherents chiefly because it includes things
of which its followers feel deprived, along with its inherent promise of restoration
of the Golden Age, during which there was no deprivation.

Of course deprivation is relative, not absolute, and is defined as “a
negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and actuality,” that is,
“where an individual or group has a particular expectation, and where this expecta-
tion was considered to be a proper state of affairs, and where something less than
expectation is fulfilled.” Furthermore, the critical feature of deprivation is that
it stems from change, actual or anticipated. It is when conditions decline in com-
parison with the past, or when they are expected to decline in the future, that the
deprivation experience becomes significant. When deprivation is experienced by a
group, and the group feels that ordinary action is insufficient to remedy the situa-
tion, then it turns to millenarian activities as a source of the supernatural.

The followers of these movements are not makers of the change; they
expect it to be brought about unilaterally from above. The radical movements
among them, however, show a strong militant ingredient which turns the followers
of the movement into active participants in it, something in the aide-toi Dieu
l'indira vein. Since the vision of redemption is both transcendent and terrestrial,
paving the way for it often entails the employment of both ritual and secular
measures. The follower-participants of the movement pit themselves, therefore,
against the forces of evil. Hoping that imminent salvation is to be brought about by
divine powers with their active support, they engage in rebellious activities.

The millenarian vision instills in the movement a sense of urgency and dedication to an all-embracing purpose. Its followers are prepared to sacrifice everything for the cause when the merger between individual and social destinies becomes complete. As most millenarian movements are messianic, redemption is brought about by a Messiah who mediates between the divine and the human. These Messiahs can be inspired leaders or prophetic figures who claim to be appointed by divine powers. Very often, the figure of the leader is distinct from that of the Messiah, the leader acting as the precursor and prophet of the Messiah. These leaders may develop their special brand of millenarianism, emphasizing millenarian elements in their culture and seizing upon millenarian elements in the host culture (in the case of a minority millenarian group) from which they seek to disengage themselves. 29

It has been made abundantly clear how “deprived” the Chinese Muslims were in general and how they became more so as the splendour of the High Ch’ing began to tarnish. In Kansu, where the New Sect was to rise, provincial authorities forbade the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam, the adoption of Chinese children, Muslim travel for prayer in neighbouring villages, and Muslim imams from outside the province from coming to teach. They halted the construction of new mosques as well. 30 Pi Yuan, the Governor of Shensi, memorialized in 1781:

Hui. . .have lived in the Chinese interior since ancient times, and they are really no different from the ordinary inhabitants. There are both good and bad among them, and they are certainly not all seditious and deceitful. In former times, the Muslims of Chang-an were involved in frequent fighting. . .and I found it was because the local authorities failed to deal properly with religious matters. . .they paid no attention to rights and wrongs and punished unfairly. . .this has caused further alienation of the Hui and generated bitter fights and wholesale slaughter. 31

Spiritually “deprived” Muslims had two choices. They could become assimilated in their environment, as many probably did, especially in those areas where Islam was numerically marginal. Or, where Muslims constituted a sizable majority (and these were precisely the areas where their persecution was the most oppressive) they felt strong enough to generate an alternative of their own, more hopeful than the one under which they lived. The economically deprived, who were among the victims of the deteriorating overall situation in the Chinese countryside, could join any Chinese sectarian movement, so they were just as well off staying with their own kin.

Martin Hartmann wrote:

It is greatly to the credit of Muslims of Kansu that only the lower
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classes allowed themselves to be deceived by this imposter (Ma Hualung) who, though he had never had the least education, appeared to know everything and had an answer for every question.32

Since Chinese sectarianism during this period was rife, as deprivation was widespread, Muslims had every reason to hope to win from a sectarian movement themselves. Ideologically, they became receptive to a message different from the old stagnant institutional Islam, which had brought them no deliverance. Organizationally, sectarianism was the only way for them to cut across the parochial lines of old Islam and pool together, under unified and authoritative leadership, the otherwise decentralized Muslim congregations.

I believe that the New Sect became awesome to the Chinese authorities not only because it was "heterodox" and as such potentially dangerous to the system, but mainly because of the aggregate power that such a movement could wield, both in terms of its regional and supra-regional distribution and the total devotion of its follower-participants, which made it look like other Chinese millenarian movements. Tso Tsung-t'ang, for example, grasped this crucial point very well, and therefore pressed for the total annihilation of the New Sect:

If we do not prohibit it, I suspect that in the future they might again rebel...I have arrested and punished their leaders...and pasted notices to prohibit it...When the Hsin-chiao is extirpated, then Shensi and Kansu can be expected to be pacified for many years to come...Since in other places the preaching of the New Sect is new, future troubles can be averted if we prohibit it now.33

The first militant sectarianism of this sort, which grew out of the needs of Chinese Muslims and was designed to meet those needs, was, as we have seen, the jahriya sub-division of the Naqshbandiya, one of the major Sufi orders in Central Asia and India. Sufism had apparently been introduced into China much earlier than the New Sect. Ibn Battuta, speaking about the Muslim community in Canton during the Mongol reign, wrote:

In Canton there is a Muslim city. They have a mosque, a zawiya (Sufi monastery) and a market. They also have a gadi and a Sheikh.34

Of course, a sheikh need not necessarily have been a Sufi master, because we learn from Ibn Battuta that in all towns of China there was a Sheikh-ul-Islam in addition to the qadi, who took care of all Muslim affairs.35 But zawiya is a distinctive Sufi institution. It is not impossible that Sufi doctrines were disseminated into China at a time when the to-and-fro movements of Muslims between the Islamic world and Cathay was quite common.

One may question with some degree of validity the identification of a Sufi-mysticist order with the revivalist movement in Chinese Islam about which we
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have been talking. Mention was made in Linton’s typology of revivalist elements that are detectable in magical nativistic movements, but in modern Islamic historiography there seems to be an inherent contradiction between mysticism and revivalism. The Wahhabis and the salafiya movements have always viewed Sufism, in Algar’s words, “as a harmful and repugnant excrescence on the body of Islam,” and it continues to be regarded as such by Islam in the Arab world. However, the inner conception of Sufism in general, and the Naqshbandiya in particular, is essentially a revivalist one. It has been defined as such by a Turkish Master of the Naqshbandi order:

True Sufism is submission to God’s Book and imitation of the sunna of his Messenger; it is reliving by inner state and outer deed the auspicious age of the Messenger and His Companions; it is the very essence of Islam. 36

Going back to the source, reviving old virtues, eliminating bida’ (innovations), and reliving the Golden Age — thus did Sufism conceive of itself, no matter how others regarded it. In Sufi thinking, the link with the past is stated in the order’s history, inasmuch as the initiatic chain of the order, the silsila, goes back to the origins of Islam, to the Prophet Muhammad himself. Even it the silsila is “proved” to be unhistorical and claimed by critics to be a retrospective attempt to legitimize the institution, the overwhelming point is that each order regarded its silsila as the true one, and this belief became part of the order’s creed.

The mystical aspects of the order drew not only on the supernatural powers of the sheikh, but also on the catering of the order to the needs of the deprived in a world of uncertainty and turmoil. Again in Algar’s words:

Insofar as the purpose of the Path is to emerge from the deficiences and limitations of one’s actual state of being, it follows that the means to be employed cannot be of one’s own making or invention. One must confess one’s helplessness and seek resources that, lying outside oneself, will enable one to emerge from oneself. It is by seeking initiation into an order, by affiliating oneself with a silsila, that this essential confession is made. Initiation alone gives the seeker access to the means of Divine Grace and succour that are transmitted by chain, and without it there can be no effective entry into the Sufi Path. 37

It is no wonder, then, that in an environment and at a time when old sectarian movements in China came back into overt activity (White Lotus) and new ones mushroomed in the countryside (Ko Lao Hui and others), and deprived Chinese found shelter and hope therein, Chinese Muslims should seek such an organization of their own, indeed demand its creation. They could not join Chinese secret societies because they made religious demands that were alien and irrelevant to the Muslim community, such as the Restorationism of the Ming loyalists, the Revolutionism of the anti-Manchu groups and the Utopianism of those who sought
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Ma Ming-hsin was the founder of the New Sect, and he introduced it into China sometime after 1761. According to the findings of Saguchi Toru, Ma started to spread his New Teaching in Kansu after his return from a period of study in Yarkand and Kashgar. Helped by Su Ssu-shih-san and Hu Ma-liu-hu, he established the order in 1762 and propagated a mystical ritualism consisting of loud chanting of the Scripture, prayers with hand-shaking and body-movement in a dance-like manner, footstamping, hand-waving and turning the face up toward Heaven, belief in miracles, visions, apparition of spirits, prediction of good and bad omens, and worship of the saints and their tombs. Additional details about the Sect are provided in Chinese and Western sources, all suggesting Sufi-dervish practices. Often, however, because of the lack of time-dimension in these descriptions, it is difficult to sort out about which New Sect, at what particular time, and in what precise place the author is talking.

The term used by some Chinese Muslims to denominate the New Sect was Che-he-lei-yeh, probably a corruption of jahiya, but some sources identify the founding master by names other than Ma Ming-hsin. One source attributes the New Sect to Liu I-chai from Nanking, who lived during the K'ang-hsi reign, another to Erh-tse-tzu, who is said to have founded the Sect following his return from pilgrimage to Mecca.

It is of substantive and substantial importance to know who was the founder, when and where he was initiated, and by whom, in order to pinpoint one or another ideological origin of the doctrine. But, since we are talking about various New Sects which drew on various sources and disseminated different doctrines, let us first return to Ma Ming-hsin's jahiya, and then tackle the others.

The jahiya, it should be pointed out, was not a mainstream in the Naqshbandiya. Jahriya implies a vocal dhikr (Invocation of Allah) usually associated with 'Ali, to whom most of the Sufi silsilas trace their descent. The Naqshbandiya, in contrast, claim descent from Abu-Bakr, who is said to have bequeathed the silent Invocation, dhikr-i-khafi; hence khufya, the Sufi school that follows this tradition, is the mainstream of Naqshbandiya. Since Ja'far as-Sadiq, the sixth Imam of the Shi'a, appears in the Naqshbandi chain of transmission, a secondary silsila is recognized by the Naqshbandis, called the Golden Silsila going back to 'Ali through the line of Imams.

This second line of descent, while it is clearly secondary in importance, is nevertheless revered in Naqshbandiya circles, and its Imams, who are Shi'ite Imams, are considered guides of the order. Here we have, I suspect, a Shi'ite element in a Sufi order, an embarrassing element for Sunni Naqshbandiya to admit, but present nonetheless. This element looms even stronger, according to Mole, in the Kubrawiya, another Sufi order also disseminated in China.

From the Naqshbandi viewpoint, both dhikrs are acceptable (shall I
say “kosher”?), since both were transmitted from the Prophet, one to Abu Bakr and the other to ‘Ali. The fact that the Naqshbandiya deliberately and insistently subordinate ‘Ali’s silsila and the ‘Alawi dhikr to Abu Bakr’s, instead of treating them with equality because of their prophetic origin, only betrays the Naqshbandiya’s own acknowledgement of Shi‘ite elements in their midst and its attempt to rid itself of the Shi‘ite stigma. In any case, the jahriya, which is inexorably ‘Alawi in descent and spirit, is much more likely than the khufi to drift to mysticism of the Shi‘ite type once its followers loosen their ties with the mainstream of the order, which is khufi (as in the case of China). Such a sect would show a propensity for creating its own order rather than remaining in a subordinate status within the original order. As the history of Islamic sectarianism shows, secessionist groups tend to more extremism than their original denominations.

Except for a few uprisings against the Chinese authorities and some feuds with their fellow Muslims, little else is known about the activities of the New Sectarians under Ma Ming-hsin’s leadership in the late-eighteenth century. It is evident, however, that the New Sect went underground because of its proscription by the Government and its quarrels with other Muslims, and that New Sect missionaries, under one guise or another, reached as far east as Tientsin, Peking, Heilungchiang, Shansi and Hupel. Tso Tsung-t’ang’s investigation revealed that these missionaries were called Ha-li-fei, probably a corruption of Khalifa (Caliph), a term used by the Naqshbandiya to designate the agents and representatives of the Sheikh of the order, one of whom may eventually succeed the Master.

It is evident, however, that these agents were sent out secretly by Ma Hua-lung, the leader of the New Sect, some three generations after Ma Ming-hsin. This raises doubts about whether Ma Hua-lung was, or regarded himself as, a follower of Ma Ming-hsin. Granted that the latter was the founder of the Sect in China, Ma Hua-lung could, at the maximum, have been the Master of the Chinese branch of the jahriya, at the minimum a khalifa of the Master who dwelt in Central Asia. If Ma Hua-lung designated his own khalifas, he must have considered himself independent of any Naqshbandiya affiliation and created a new denomination, also called Hsin-chiao by the Chinese (New Sect), not unlike ‘Ali Hamdani’s creation of the Kubrawi order, which we shall examine later in greater detail.

This by no means signifies that whatever Naqshbandi influence had been introduced into Kansu by Ma Ming-hsin or others was wiped out by Ma Hua-lung. On the contrary, the terms jahriya and khufiya continued to recur in China throughout the nineteenth century; reflecting the religious, political, social and economic strength of the Naqshbandiya in Central Asia prior to and during that period. This indicates, however, that Ma Hua-lung’s New Sect was not identical to Ma Ming-hsin’s New Teaching and that it had drifted towards extremist mystical concepts much akin to the Shi‘a. There is evidence to support this contention.

First, Sufi orders, whatever their affiliation, draw their esoteric know-
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ledge from the uninterrupted silsila of masters, who are awliya' (Allah's Friends). But their privileged status is not hereditary through the family line; it is apostolic through the silsila of masters going back to the Prophet. The Shi'ite Imam, however, also called a wali, is an infallible figure whose inspiration goes back to 'Ali through family inheritance. Ma Ming-hsin's successors in the New Teaching were other Muslim leaders, such as Su Ssu-shih-san, T'ien Wu, and others who operated in the Lan-chou area of Kansu and apparently had no family ties with the founding Master.

Ma Hua-lung, in contrast, not only operated from a different base, the Muslim city of Chiu-chi-pu on the right bank of the Yellow River, but also succeeded his father Ma Erh, who had disseminated the New Teaching together with Ma A-hung. He assigned to himself the title of Tsung-ta A-hung (The General Grand A-hung), indicating his status as a supreme Master of his New Sect. After his death (in 1871), a schism resulted from the battle over his succession in a fashion very reminiscent of Shi'ite schisms, namely what line of descent is to be acknowledged as genuine. Ma's son-in-law, Ma Ta-hsi, and his grandson, Ma Erh-hsi, disputed the sacred heritage.

Ma Ta-hsi, who was 55 years old in 1898, had the majority on his side, and his home became an important religious centre. According to one report, the New Sect's introduction to Yunnan was also carried out along family lines by Talasan, Ma Hua-lung's younger brother or nephew. Another field report of the 1930s speaks of Ma Hua-lung no longer as a successor of Ma Ming-hsin but as the founder of the sect that bears his name. Two of Ma Hua-lung's successors, Ma Yuan-cho and Ma Yuan-chang, were brothers, but no clear reference is made as to whether or not they were descendants of the Master. The leaders of the Sect in Kansu during the 1930s were the third and sixth sons of Ma Yuan-cho.

D'Ollone cites another case of a Master of the New Teaching in Szechwan who claimed to have inherited his supernatural powers from his father. Was it sheer coincidence that descendants of a Master were learned enough to inherit his position? Perhaps. But so many coincidences smack of nepotism, if nothing else, and make the usual spiritual succession among Sufis (which is exclusively based on silsila knowledge) highly inapplicable in the New Sect case.

Second, Sufi orders, including the Naqshbandiya, take pride in their relationship to the Sunna of the Prophet, insist on being Sunni and reverence 'ulama. However, some Sufi Masters, like Abu Yazid and al-Hallaj, by claiming direct union with Allah had forgone the role of the Prophet as the ultimate source of the silsila. These Sufis, typed as "antinomians," showed hostility toward the 'ulama, whom they accused of the "murder of God's lovers." Some of these Sufi orders which moved into Central Asia professed separation of the Faith from the practice of its tenets, and they showed hospitality to theosophical ideas common among the extremist Shi'ites. While Ma Ming-hsin, the founder of the New
Sect, cannot be accused of any of these heresies, as he was a fervent Naqshbandi, the same cannot be said for Ma Hua-lung.

Ma Ming-hsin, as the Master of the jahri order in China, was certainly looked upon like any other Sufi sheikh, with great admiration by his followers, who attributed to him saintly virtues and conducted themselves accordingly. An account of 1781, written about the Muslim Rebellion in Kansu, related:

When Ma Ming-hsin was taken to appear on the city wall, all the Hui who looked at him dismounted their horses and prostrated themselves on the ground. They called him a Holy Man and cried.59

But Ma Hua-lung was much more than that. Not only was he still considered the Prophet of the New Sect by his followers, but a few decades after his death he became idealized, according to one field report, as a sheng-jen (a Holy Man), equal or even superior to the Prophet.60 Another writer reporting about Ma Hua-lung's sect, said:

Ignorant members of his following held the belief that a visit to their sheikh is more important than pilgrimage to Mecca, and that the sheikh could issue tickets for Paradise. Therefore, other Muslims were so exasperated that they almost came to arms and severed all connections with them.61

Still another writer, who attempted to find out about Ma Hua-lung's followers in Kansu, reported:

It was quite noticeable that the backs of the worshippers were toward Mecca, for lower down the mountain I had seen a company worshiping in a field facing the opposite way toward Mecca. The tomb of Ma Hua-lung is an imposing affair of carved brick, but it only contains his head. The Saint's body is at Chin-chi Hsien near Ning-hsia. The Saint worship is denounced by the Lao-chiao (Old Sect) together with the practice of kneeling before human leaders.62

There is nothing extraordinary about the worshipping of saints and the attribution of miracles (karamat) to them. Many awliya' have indulged in self-glorification about their supernatural powers,63 which could be manifested by the wali transforming himself, transporting himself to a distance, speaking divine tongues, reviving the dead, producing various phenomena, raising himself from the ground, or summoning objects from a distance. He could check a flood and control rains and springs, and his blessing (baraka) could give victory in battle.64

Although the concept of the awliya' had to be reconciled with strict Sunni orthodoxy, popular sentiment has prevailed, and Muslim theologians had to put up with the canonization of saints by the populace. An important reservation has always been maintained, however. The awliya', no matter how great, are always inferior to Muhammad and other Prophets. For example, a self-glorifying wali,
al-Jilani (d. 1166), was aware of this reservation:

Before the sun rises He greets me; before the year begins it greets me and reveals to me everything that will happen during its course. . . I dive into the oceans of Allah’s sciences and have seen Him with my eyes. I am the living proof of His existence, I am the deputy of the Prophet and his heir on earth.65

In addition to this limitation, Muslim theology was careful to separate the awliya’s miracles (karamat) from the mu’ijizat of the Prophet. Both kinds of miracles are alike in that it is Allah who displays his miraculous power through the Prophet or the saints, since they do not possess any control over nature. However, according to Muslim theologians,66 the saint’s karamat consist of answers to prayer or the power to perform an act and the like, while the Prophet’s mu’izat consist of producing something ex nihilo or transforming the essential nature of an object. Moreover, the mu’iza is supposed to involve publicity because its results affect others, while karama involves secrecy because it is peculiar to the person by whom it is performed. The doer of mu’izat is sure he has wrought an extraordinary miracle, but the doer of karamat cannot be sure whether he has really wrought a miracle or whether he is insensibly deceived. He has no choice but to resign himself to God’s will and accept the ordinances that are laid upon him.

Ma Hua-lung is said to have performed miracles of the karamat type, but he also assumed powers well beyond that. Not only did he claim himself equal to or superior to the Prophet, but he purported to possess the power to grant redemption to Muslims,67 apparently changed the qibla (direction of prayer), substituted his persona for the Ka’ba, supplied laissez-passer to Paradise, received divine revelations68 and is supposed to have prohibited his followers from praying in the mosque.69 His followers believed that after his death his supernatural essence was transmitted to his descendants.

Ma’s position seems to square with extremist Shi’ite conceptions of the wali, especially because Ma was elevated to the status of qutb (pole),70 the highest in the hierarchy of saints.71 In Shi’ite Islam a descending hierarchy is established between wilaya, nubuwwa (prophecy), and risala (Mission of the Prophet). The wilaya is considered the most meritorious because it represents the esoteric aspects of prophecy. Prophecy is second in line, because it represents the esoteric aspect of the Mission of the Messenger. Since the wilaya is the core of the esoteric, it takes preference over the exoteric appearance of Prophecy. That which is closer to internal realities is more self-sufficient and closer to God.

Thus the wilaya, the quality of the Friend of God, is pre-eminent in relation to Prophecy, and the latter prevails over the Mission. It has to be pointed out, however, that in Twelver Shi’ism this hierarchy of qualities does not necessarily mean that the persona of the wali is superior to that of the Prophet and the Messenger. But since the three qualities are combined in Muhammad’s persona, his
quality of *wali* predominates over the two others. Extremist *Shi'a*, such as the *Isma'iliya*, by contrast, went further with this conclusion, reasoning that since the *wilaya* of the *Imam* is esoterically ordained, while the prophecy of the *Messenger* is exoterically ordained, and since the esoteric is superior to the exoteric, there is no escape from the conclusion that the *Imam* prevails over the Prophet and the esoteric is independent of the exoteric.\(^7^2\)

Third, the presence of the *Kubrawiya* among Chinese Muslims\(^7^3\) raises the suspicion of *Shi'ite* presence in China, although this order has not explicitly been identified with the New Sect. The suspicion is generated not only by the *jahri* nature of this-order, which may have made it indistinguishable from the *jahriya* in the eyes of uninformed Chinese Muslims, but also by the very leaning of this order towards the *Shi'a*, as has been demonstrated by Môlé.\(^7^4\)

*Shi'ism*, almost by necessity, requires the emergence of sub-sects which go beyond the pale of *Imami* orthodoxy due to the perennial failure of the Twelvers to meet the messianic expectation inherent in the belief in the eventual return of the Hidden *Imam*. Conversely, any self-proclaimed *mahdi* is bound to be denounced by *Imami* orthodoxy, for otherwise the *Shi'a* would be undermining its own messianic foundation. Therefore, any messianic movement would automatically find itself outside *Shi'ite* Islam in its strict sense and would have to be categorized as schismatic *Shi'ism*, and as such would be rejected by both the *Shi'a* and the *Sunna* as lying beyond the seventy-three sects recognized by Islam.

The *Kubrawiya* is a peculiar case in that it maintained its definition as *Sunni* by virtue of its affiliation with *jahri* Sufism, but at the same time, due to its *'Alawi* sympathies, which were brought to an extreme by some Masters of the order, the sect could incorporate *Shi'ite* ideas by transposing them on the *Sufi* level. The founder of the order, *Najm ad-Din Kubra*, was still solidly *Sunni*, as were other *jahri* orders whose *silsilas* went back to *'Ali*. But *'Ali Hamdani*, who became the "Second *'Ali*" in the eyes of his disciples, contributed to turning the order into an autonomous sect with heavy *Shi'ite* borrowings. Two generations after him, in the sixteenth century, *Muhammad Nurbakhsh* declared himself *mahdi*, the Hidden *Imam* who has returned to earth.\(^7^5\) Not only was he recognized as such by the followers of his order, but he also sought to expand the realm of his influence and indicated clear aspirations for political power.\(^7^6\)

*Kubra* and *Ma Te-hsin*, *Nurbakhsh* and *Ma Hua-lung* may be seen as analogous *Sufi-Sunni* founders of an order and mystic-*Shi'ite* distorters of the source. The founding fathers, like most of the *Sufi* Masters, had no political aspirations. Their attachment to the family of *'Ali* was sentimental and reconcilable with *Sunni* convictions. But *Sufis* who proclaimed themselves *mahdi* embarked by necessity on a political course and founded *Shi'ite* states, such as the state of *Sarbadar* in Khorasan in the fifteenth century and the *Safavid* state one century later.\(^7^7\)
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The point should be restated that, despite the 'Alawi affiliation of many Sufi orders (including the Chinese Muslim jahriya) and the strictly Sunni affiliation of their founders, the successors could, under the stress of the times and perhaps the drive of their personal ambitions, have corrupted the original teaching and drifted away from it. The presence of the Kubrawiya order in China, which itself had undergone this process though it was not identical with one of the branches of the New Sect proper, could at least have constituted a stimulus for the 'Alawi oriented New Sect to incorporate such ideas once the deprivation of Chinese Muslims created a demand for, and an expectation of, a mahdi figure. Such a movement, however, could only take place outside the realm of Imami Shi'ism, which would lend more credence to our previous argument about Ma Hua-lung's personal status as a wali.

Fourth, the reference to the term zahiriya (exoterism) by the New Sectarian Muslims to designate the other Chinese Muslims\(^\text{78}\) raises even more suspicion as to the schismatic Shi'ite nature of Ma Hua-lung's sect, and possibly of some of its offshoots. We may, of course, simply be facing a confusion of terms due to the difficulties emanating from the transliteration of Islamic terms into Chinese. While D'Ollone speaks about Tchaaierinye\(^\text{79}\) to designate Ma Hua-lung's sect, others render the term Che-ho-yeh\(^\text{80}\) or Che-ho-le-yeh.\(^\text{81}\) The confusion is compounded by the fact that a report recorded from a prominent Muslim A-hung in Kansu attributes the jahriya origin to the Caliph 'Uthman,\(^\text{82}\) not to 'Ali, while an Arabic source, citing Chinese Muslims, designates 'Umar as the father of the sil-sila.\(^\text{83}\) Was this attempt to divorce the jahriya from its 'Alawi origin generated by mere ignorance or was it calculated to declare Ma Hua-lung's version of the New Sect illegitimate by disputing its alleged 'Alawi origin?

It is hard to draw any solid conclusion on this score. However, since D'Ollone interpreted Tchaaierinye as "Exteriorist"\(^\text{84}\) without relating it to the New Sect in this context, he may have been referring to an unspecified segment of Chinese Islam who allegedly followed exoteric doctrines, i.e., zahiri doctrine, thus corroborating Shakib Arslan's information. If this is true, then the New Sectarians, who presumably referred to other Muslims as zahiri (exoteric), saw themselves as batini (esoteric) with all the implications that these dichotomous terms entail.

Sensu strictu the Zahiri school, founded by Dawud Ibn Khalaf (d. 884), was based on the principle of relying exclusively on the literal meaning (zahir) of the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet and of rejecting as contrary to true religion not only the free exercise of personal opinion, which had been customary before Shafi'i, but even the use of analogical and systematic reasoning which Shafi'i had retained. The Zahiris also held that the only legally valid ijma' (consensus) was the consensus of the Sahaba (Companions of the Prophet),\(^\text{85}\) although a great mystic like Ibn 'Arabi is said to have been "zahiri with respect to the ritual (i'badat) and batini with respect to the Faith (i'tiqadat)."\(^\text{86}\) This antithesis has even been applied to the persona of the Mahdi — implying that since the
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Mussah “will judge on the basis of religion, unobscured by the ray' (personal opinion),” he is himself a zahiri. Nevertheless, the zahiriya has been regarded as traditionalist and close to the Hanbali school.

The zahiriya has maintained cautious neutrality in religious disputes and accepted the literal meaning of the Sacred Book without going into any exegesis. Al-Maqreziz, who had zahiri inclinations, summed up this dogmatic confession as follows:

The truth that cannot be doubted is that the religion of God is a conspicuous matter containing nothing hidden, is a public matter that hides no secret. . . The Prophet has not hidden a single word of the Law, everything that he told to his most intimate circle, be it wife or relative, he would have also told to any white or black man, or any ordinary herdsman. He had no secret, no mystic allusion (ramz), nothing esoteric (batin). . . If he had kept anything secret he would not have completed the mission with which he was charged. Whoever makes such claims in spite of this is a kafir (Infidel). . . The origin of every bid'a (heresy) is departure from the words of the forefathers and deviation from the convictions of the first Muslims generations.

Although the zahiri school as such died out by the 17th century, the term possibly survived as the antithesis of the batini school (esotericists). Small wonder that the New Sect in China, supposedly batini itself, should call other Muslims who were exasperated by their conduct zahiri, even when they were not actually adepts of this defunct school.

Let us examine more closely the batini nature of the New Sect. The doctrine of the finality of prophethood with Muhammad (The Seal of the Prophets) is accepted by both the Sunna and the Iman Shii’a. In the doctrine of the latter, the cycle of the wilaya means the succession of the Prophet by the Imam, i.e., the zahir by the batin, of the Shari’a (Holy Law) by the haqiqa (Truth, or spiritual religion). Succession, however, does not mean a cleavage between the two but an ongoing combination of the two in which equilibrium is maintained within the sets of dichotomies: Prophet-Imam, Shari’a-haqiqa, and zahir-batin. But when the balance is tilted in favour of Imam-haqiqa-batin, and in consequence the Imam takes precedence over the Prophet, the haqiqa over the Shari’a, and the batin over the zahir, we find ourselves in the realm of schismatic Shi’ism, or what Corbin terms “Ultra-shi’ism,” which has always been castigated by the Twelver Shii’a as ghulat (extremist) and rejected by Sunni Islam as an imposer who “causes more damage to Islam than Jews and Christians.”

Such an extremist Shi’ite group, usually referred to as batiniya, is the Isma’iliya. Without going into the history of this sect, it is worthwhile for the sake of our discussion to isolate certain major points of congruence between it and China’s New Sect of the nineteenth century. In both, the Imam was the focus of
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the system, the doctrine, the loyalty and the action of the followers. The Imam was divinely inspired and infallible and, in a sense, himself divine, since he was the microcosm, the personification of the metaphysical soul of the universe. As such, he was the fountainhead of knowledge and authority, of the esoteric truths that were hidden from the uninformed and of commands that required total and unquestioning obedience.96

In some extremist branches of the Isma'iliya sect, the deification of the Imam, and sometimes of the Da'i (preachers), brought about libertinism — total abandonment of law and restraint to the point of ritual violation of the Law, such as the congregants turning their backs toward Mecca, the afternoon banquet in the middle of fast — marking the culmination of a millenarian and antinomian tendency.97 Men were relieved of the duties imposed by the Shari'a because in this period of the Milennium all must turn in every sense towards God and abandon the rites of religious law and established habits of worship.

We have seen that Ma Hua-lung's followers and descendants had also turned their backs to Mecca and may have forgone the duty of salat (prayer) that is binding upon Muslims as one of the Arkan (Pillars) necessary for the daily validation of one's belonging to the Islamic Umma. An interpretation of the batiniya given in al-Badadi's Farq, categorizes this sect as dahriya or zanadiqa (atheist-materialist),98 for whom prophetology is the core of the doctrine. The prophets of these sects are depicted as merely political chiefs who impose their leadership by using magical stratagems that naive followers consider miracles. (These are, incidentally, almost the same words used to describe Ma Hua-lung's followers by Tso Tsung-t'ang.99) In these sects, the Faith gives esoteric and symbolic interpretation to the Five Arkan of the religion, so that the salat (prayer) means loyalty to the Imam; the hajj (pilgrimage) is substituted for by the visit to the Imam's tomb; the saum (fast) is the “refraining from divulging the secrets of the sect.” We saw these elements in Ma Hua-lung's sect.

Moreover, the Isma'ilis were described by Lewis as having brought:
a personal, emotional faith, sustained by the example of the suffering of the Imam and the self-sacrifice of his followers — the experience of passion, and the attainment of Truth. To the discontented, they offered the attraction of a well-organized, widespread and powerful opposition movement, which seemed to provide a real opportunity of overthrowing the existing order, and establishing in its place a new and just society headed by the Imam.100

Is not all this reminiscent of what we have seen in the passion, devotion and organization of the New Sectarians? And was not the socio-economic setting that permitted the emergence of the Isma'iliya in the Islamic Empire akin to the one with which we are familiar in China? Again, in Lewis' words:

There was much that made men seek an alternative. The great social
and economic changes of the eighth and ninth centuries had brought wealth and power to some, hardship and frustration to others. In the countryside, the growth of large and, often, privileged estates, was accompanied by the impoverishment and subjection of tenants and small holders. Amid great prosperity, there was also great distress. The dry legalism and remote transcendentalism of the Orthodox faith, the cautious conformism of its accredited exponents, offered little comfort to the disposessed, little scope for the spiritual yearnings of the uprooted and unhappy. Among many, there was a loss of confidence in traditional Islamic answers, and a desire, of growing urgency, for new ones. The great Islamic consensus — religious, philosophical, political, social seemed to be breaking up; a new principle of unity and authority, just and effective, was needed to save Islam from destruction. Just as the Chinese sectarian movements brought comfort and promise of a new world order to the Chinese discontented, so Chinese Muslims sought the same within their own social and spiritual system, which, although lying outside the Chinese system, bore the impact of its general decadence. More parallels could be cited, such as the very terms “Old Teaching” and “New Teaching,” which are perhaps of Isma’ili origin, or the coercive and violent policies that the Isma’iliis adopted to win converts or to combat other Muslims — all reminiscent of what we have observed in Ma Hua-lung’s New Sect and its offshoots.

Fifth, the taqiya (simulation), which is so fundamental in Shi’ite beliefs, seems to have impregnated the New Sect in China to a great extent. The taqiya is by no means peculiar to the Shi’a, and the Qur’an recognizes the necessity of Muslims’ hiding their religion in times of danger. Islamic theology, however, prescribes that under circumstances such as threat of death, or when a Muslim cannot live openly professing his faith, he may have to migrate to other places, for “Allah’s World is wide.” Women, children, and invalids and their dependents, are permitted muwafaqa (connivance), but an individual is not justified in taqiya, nor bound to migrate, as long as the compulsion remains within endurable limits. The taqiya is, at most, permitted but not recommended or obligatory, and stories of noble martyrdom of those who proudly refused to conceal their faith are often cited as the proper conduct of paradigmatic Muslims.

It was by the Shi’ites, who were frequently exposed to danger and persecution, that the taqiya was often invoked. It was used to justify the concealment of beliefs likely to arouse the hostility of authorities or of the populace among whom they lived. In the Twelver Shi’a, the taqiya or kitman is related to the creed of the Hidden Imam. While the Prophet Muhammad is credited with the tanzil (Revelation) of the Holy Book, ‘Ali is the source of its ta’wil (esoteric interpretation). The last Imam, who is ‘Ali’s successor, is hidden, but he is omni — and ever present, and without him the world would collapse. One day he will
appear on earth, the esoteric meaning of things will become understood, and the ultimate realities can be taught to everyone. In the meantime, however, it is essential not to betray the esoteric knowledge, and it is incumbent upon Shi'ites not to avow themselves as such before the uninitiated or their adversaries.\textsuperscript{108} An \textit{Imami} theologian put it this way:

Our belief concerning \textit{taqiya} is that it is obligatory, and he who forsakes it is in the same position as he who forsakes prayer. \textemdash{} Now, until the time when the \textit{Imam-al-Qaim} appears, \textit{taqiya} is obligatory, and it is not permissible to dispense with it. He who does \textemdash{} has verily gone out of the Religion of God. And God has described the showing of friendship to unbelievers as being possible only in the state of \textit{taqiya}. And the \textit{Imam} Ja'far said, 'Mix with the enemies openly, but oppose them inwardly, so long as the authority is a matter of question.' He also said, 'Diplomacy with a true believer is a form of polytheism, but with a hypocrite, in his own house, it is worship.' And he said, 'Visit their sick and attend their funerals and pray in their mosques.'\textsuperscript{109}

This means that \textit{taqiya} is not only an obligation, but it has to be observed vis-à-vis hypocrites (\textit{Sunni}) as well as Unbelievers. Some Shi'ites say: "The \textit{kitman} is a \textit{jihad}," but with implied understanding that the fighting is against other Muslims.\textsuperscript{110} The \textit{Isma'ilis}, who were considered the masters of \textit{taqiya}, sometimes concealed themselves in the form of \textit{Sufi} orders\textsuperscript{111} or else, when they were hard-pressed by enemies, they attempted (in order to gain a breathing spell) to mislead their opponents as to their true beliefs and intentions.\textsuperscript{112}

The fact that so little is known about Ma Hua-lung and his successors, while other Chinese Muslims have left a considerable volume of writings, raises the suspicion that, like extreme Shi'ites, the New Sectarians kept their secrets and did not divulge much information about their beliefs and rituals. Like the \textit{Isma'ilis}, they were organized as a secret society and regarded by outsiders as nihilists, trouble-makers, or even unbelievers, while they considered themselves to be custodians of sacred teachings, through which they could attain salvation. The little that is known of Ma Hua-lung and his successors is so confused, and his conduct at various times seems so contradictory, that one might surmise that a kind of \textit{raqibah} was at work. For, aside from the Ma who led the rebellion, we learn that he also was:

making it appear to the Government that he was friendly and on the side of the Imperial cause. \textemdash{} just what he hoped to accomplish by playing both sides in such a manner, is one of the most mysterious features of this great and bloody rebellion.\textsuperscript{113}

Chu Wen-djang cites numerous cases of Ma and his followers' contrived friendliness and even help to the Manchus while they were conniving war and preparing for it. Ma accepted a government appointment as an official but did not seriously obey orders; he sent token supplies to the government troops to show his
loyalty, but at the same time delivered food and money to Muslim rebels. Of course, one may argue that any sensible strategist would act in this wily fashion to secure his objectives, but if we add to this evidence the contradictory reports of Ma's allowing prayer in the mosques (with other Muslims) at times and forbidding it at others, the reluctance of the New Sectarians to talk about their creed, and the inability of anyone, so far, Chinese Muslim or otherwise, to pin down exactly what this sect was all about,—all this adds up to suspicion that some form of taqiya was underlying all these phenomena.

Well, do we now know what the "New Sect" is? No, unfortunately not. But it is perhaps not so important to categorize it in precise terms as being part of this or that Islamic sect or akin to one Sufi order or another. After all, why should we be more presumptuous than the Chinese Muslim A-hung who "laughed at the notion that anyone, even a Muslim, could get all the sects tabulated and pigeon-holed"? Or the experienced missionary who, after much field research and investigation confessed that "the more one heard, the less one was inclined to know."

As one looks at the available sources, one is amazed at how different observers, some of whom were very knowledgeable and competent, could identify the New Sect with the extremes of the gamut of Islamic schools and sects, all the way from a Shi'ite or proto-Shi'ite denomination to an extension of the ultra-puritanical Wahhabism of Arabia, with various Sufi orders in between. Many have claimed, and a few have shown, that the New Sect was identical with the jahriya, while others argued, with no less authority, that the New Sect and the jahriya were separate entities, the former being reformist and the latter a Sufi sect, "the only one which was a disturbing element in China." In some provinces, the New Sect was vaguely called Hsin-chiao. In others, it was more narrowly defined: in Kansu — jahriya; in Yunnan Hsin-chia (New House [of the prophet]); in Kansu qadiriya, in Szechwan — Koumbe-chiao. Some have characterized it as conservative and puritanical, while Chinese Muslims have held it in contempt as heretical.

Are we facing a semantic confusion or a plurality of movements, or both? Without in any way purporting to have solved the mystery, or that the mystery is solvable at all, we can draw some conclusions from the above discussion that will hopefully throw some light on various characteristics of these Islamic movements in China which made them more receptive than before to new ideas, and more amenable to rebellion.

First, the New Sect at its inception under Ma Ming-hsin and his immediate followers was indeed a Nasqshbandi-jahriya order, as Joseph Fletcher has shown. But by Ma Hua-lung's times, and more so after his death, the original Naqshbandi teaching had been corrupted beyond recognition and drifted toward Shi'ism. Fletcher's conclusion to the contrary notwithstanding, and despite Mu-
hammad Tawadu's neat tabulation indicating Ma Ming-hsin as the first, and Ma Hua-lung as the sixth, *sheikh* in the Chinese *silsila* of the *jahriya*. I humbly submit that they were both wrong. Enough evidence has been brought, I believe, to show the scope, the extent and the depth of this degeneration. Moreover, while it may well have begun as one order, under one *sheikh*, it is evident that in different provinces, under various leaders and at varying times, it assumed or was ascribed discrepant names which reflected the intrinsic changes that the original order had undergone and the numerous schisms which it had experienced.

Second, whatever its/their identity, the New Sect(s) was/were revivalist in nature, initially striving to go back to the source and to discard *bida'*(innovations). The questions of what the source is, and what *bida'* is, and thus what revivalism is, are precisely those that the various currents of Islam -- Sunnite and Shi'ite, Sufi and sectarian -- have been debating inconclusively. Each of them saw tradition and innovation through its own glasses, and therefore each of them could speak of revivalism and at the same time conceive of a different set of ideas and ideals. We have remarked that Chinese Islam in general had been undergoing a process of revivalism to counter the delinquencies it had begun to suffer due to its acculturation to its host culture. But we have also pointed out that, while the mainstream of Islam in China followed the pragmatic course of achieving the possible, the more extremist New Sect, or parts of it, embarked on the utopian way of attaining the ideal.

Third, the New Sect was not only ideological in its ends but also militant in its means. It sought, in some cases, not only to secure religious accommodation within the Chinese milieu, but to secede from it altogether. Moreover, definite evidence exists to show that the New Sectarians adopted coercive policies toward other Muslims when they could, in lieu of the covert missionary work that non-sectarian Chinese Islam conducted among non-Muslims.

Fourth, I believe that I have shown that Shi'ite influences had penetrated into the New Sect, or its splinters. Since, by definition, any *Shi'a*-prone millenarian group is bound to be schismatic due to the inability of *Imami Shi'a* to fulfill pressing messianic expectations, it is likely that the Shi'ite elements that we have detected are from the extremist *Shi'a* camp, groups such as the *Isma'iliya* or other *batini* groups. It has also been shown that the transition from *Sufi* orders to Shi'ite sects, or the latter posing as the former, had occurred before in Islamic sectarian history, in other places, so that the early identity of the New Sect as a *Sufi* order does not necessarily detract from the feasibility of its becoming (or being at the same time) Shi'ite. We have seen that in the case of the *Kubrawiya* order, and more precedents (such as the *Bektashiya*) could be cited as evidence.

Finally, I believe that the New Sect, at least from Ma Hua-lung's time onward, definitely appropriated to itself millenarian elements, either as a result of the inherent centrality of the *Mahdi* concept in Shi'ite ideology, or in consequence
of contacts it may have had with contemporary Chinese chiliastic movements, or as the response of Chinese Muslims to the mounting persecution on the part of the Chinese, or due to the tormented Chinese milieu which encouraged the rise of such movements, or as the extension of similar movements in neighbouring India and Central Asia, or as the product of all of these combined. It is these questions to which I propose to address myself in the next chapter.
CHAPTER XIV

The Muslim Millennium: The Socio-Political Implications of the New Sect

The New Sect insists on separation from the Old, because they claim special inspiration for their views; and, they talk much nonsense about happiness and misery in the next world, thus humbugging the foolish people, very much in the way our White Lotus Society does...

Tso Tsung-t'ang

Sectarian Islam in China differed from the mainstream of Islam, as we have remarked, in its extreme militancy and utopian ideology. But this does not mean that no non-sectarians joined the ranks of rebellions initiated and led by New Sectarians, nor that all those who rebelled were adherents of the New Sect. The fact remains, nonetheless, that the main impetus for Muslim rebellions was provided by New Sect ideology, New Sect leaders provided the leadership of the rebellions, and New Sectarian group-feeling provided the necessary endurance for an armed struggle against heavy odds. For the commitment of the sectarian is always more absolute and more defined than that of a member of other religious organizations. The ideology of the sect, as Bryan Wilson has shown:

is much more clearly crystallized, and the member is much more clearly characterized than is the adherent of larger denominations...

The behavioural correlates of his ideological commitments also serve to set him and keep him apart from 'the world.' Sects have a totalitarian rather than a segmental hold over their members, they dictate the member's ideological orientation to secular society, or they rigorously specify the standards of moral rectitude; or they compel the member's involvement in group activity.

Although we have found some structural and functional affinities to Chinese sectarianism in Chinese Islam in general, it was sectarian Islam which sharpened these resemblances into more clearly definable similarities. For the leader in sectarian Islam played an overwhelming, self-appointed role in the movement morally, politically and socially — as contrasted with the organizational laxity of the Muslim community in general, which paid moral tribute to its elected Imams and to its outstanding scholars, nothing more. On the other hand, unlike schismatic sects which "usually tend to be vigorous as long as their protest against the parent body remains significant, and as long as the rival group exists as a challenge," sectarian Islam in China (although it was the rival of the so-called Old Sect from which it had emerged) directed its vigour not only against the parent body but against the Chinese state as well.

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Considering political independence as their main challenge, the New Sectarians of the mid-nineteenth century sought to obtain salvation for all their fellow Muslims. So all Muslims were implicitly included in their enterprise because they were not explicitly excluded from it.⁵ It is interesting to note in this context that in Ma Ming-hsin’s times, when the New Sect had not yet developed political ambitions of this sort and thus held no promise of cultural and political disengagement for the Muslims, its followers were few, and other Muslims co-operated with the Chinese government to put them down because their uprisings in Kansu threatened established Islam no less than peace and order in general.

In Ma Hua-lung’s time, however, when the political promise looked realizable, many Muslims (not only from Kansu and not only New Sectarians) flocked to swell his ranks, his religious convictions notwithstanding. True, in his case as in the Yunnan Rebellion, many Muslims took the government side. But, unlike the early version of the New Sect, which was alone in rebellion, there are clear indications that in both Kansu and Yunnan Old and New Sectarians joined hands at the initial stages of the rebellion against the government. Only later did the former lay down their arms when they realized the futility of the uprising. Thus, the rebellious New Sectarians have to be seen not only for what they preached, but also as a daring avant-garde, an overt manifestation of covert Muslim millenarian craving in general, a vehicle aboard which many Muslims took a “free ride” as long as it seemed to drive in the direction they desired, and from which they alighted when it seemed to be rolling inexorably down into the abyss.

It is clear that the widespread appeal that the Muslim rebels had in nineteenth-century China stemmed from deprivation and the other social, economic and political difficulties which plagued China as a whole. But what made the rebellions crystallize around the New Sect, despite its seemingly deviationist religious idiosyncracies were, basically, the concepts that are liable to stir any Muslim’s emotions — the Mahdi and the Jihad. Since these two concepts are common to both Sunni and sectarian Islam, though with different emphases and interpretations, an outlet presented itself into which all Muslims could channel their frustrations. Hence “rebel” was not necessarily identical with “New Sectarian.” Perhaps New Sectarians were more likely than others to participate in the rebellions, but not all rebels were part of the New Sect. Many non-sectarians who did not rebel probably sympathized with the rebels, but they waited to see the trend of success before taking sides.

The capacity of the New Sect to produce an over-arching organizational umbrella, tying together the scattered and decentralized Muslim community or parts of it, and the unmistakable political ambitions of this militant movement, were no doubt the traits that appealed to the anxieties and passions of the populace and to its belief in the imminent coming of a Rightful Leader who could end misery and evil, inaugurating a new age of plenty and justice. These traits formed an ideology which, according to Geertz’s definition:
bridges the emotional gap between things as they are and as one would have them be, thus realizing the performance of roles that might otherwise be abandoned in despair or apathy.6

From the Chinese-Manchu viewpoint, it was these very same traits which made Muslim sectarianism dangerous and therefore liable to persecution. Not only did the movement have a "heterodox" ideology, but it forged the organizational tool to carry it out as an extra-Imperial, and therefore anti-Imperial, corporate activity and structure. Ideology and organization, efficiently combined — that is what looked so alarming to Tso Tsung-t'ang, who could not help likening the New Sect to the White Lotus. So by both Chinese and Muslim standards, the New Sect in its Ma Hua-lung version was the thing to watch, although each side saw it in its own way. Where the former saw danger, the latter saw hope. What was eminently destructive for the one, was imminently promising for the other.

The idea of Mahdi is by no means peculiar to sectarian Islam. Although the term has Shi'ite roots and for the Shi'a it is narrowly and precisely defined as the Hidden Imam returning to earth, Sunnite popular belief demanded and gradually developed the idea of a eschatological Mahdi who would descend to the world at the end of Time and restore the Faith. This Sunnite attitude emanated from the usually pessimistic view that Islam takes of human nature, that is that men always fall away from the faith and have to be brought back. The popular belief that the act of restoration will be incumbent on the Mahdi took roots despite the view taken by Sunni Islam that the Umma itself can rule and attain Truth by its own exertions, since its qualified 'ulama, by applying the usul (Foundations) of the Faith: Qur'an, Sunna and Qiyas (analogy) -- can always come to an ijma' (consensus) which has a binding power on all Muslims.1

In Sunni Islam, infallibility having been consummated by the Seal of Prophets, the Mahdi will not enjoy this attribute because he is an ultimate successor (Khalifa) to the Prophet, nothing more. His appearance on earth will result from a descent (nuzul), as contrasted with the Shi'ite raj'a (return), and he will rule the world according to the Shari'a. There are endless hadith (traditions) regarding the coming of the Mahdi, many of which were disputed by Muslim scholars.8 In reality, however, the more Muslim masses have felt themselves oppressed and humiliated, either by their own rulers or by non-Muslims, the more fervent has been their longing for the Mahdi, the ultimate restorer of the Faith who will bring the whole world into Dar-al-Islam. Ibn Khaldun wrote:

It has been well known, and generally accepted, by all Muslims in every epoch, that at the end of Time, a man from the family of the Prophet will, without fail, make his appearance, one who will strengthen the religion and make justice triumph. The Muslims will follow him, and he will gain domination over the Muslim realm. He will be called the Mahdi. . .9
Therefore, as the need for the Mahdi has been felt among Muslim communities, **Mahdis** have always appeared, and Muslims rallied to their banners, arms in hand.

The **Mahdi** in the Sunna is also the **Imam**, the head and the leader of the Islamic community, and his function is, according to a traditional phrase, “to fill the earth with equity and justice, even as it has been filled with tyranny and oppression.”

**Sunni** Mahdism has thrived in North Africa, where it was seen as the champion of Islam against the Infidels (European powers who encroached on Muslim territory). In nineteenth-century Sudan, for example, Muhammad Ahmad, who assumed the title of **Mahdi**, led a Jihad against Europeans. Before that, he acquired a popular reputation for his personal sanctity, and he led militant propaganda campaigns to gain support. He combined a zeal to purify the Faith with recourse to arms against opponents and finally established his own state.

In **Sufi** Islam, while we are still in the realm of the Sunna, we notice a different conception of the Mahdi, closer to that of the Shi'a. The hierarchy of the Sufi saints (awliya’) headed by the qutb (pole), is sometimes complemented by the concept of Khatam-al-awliya’ (Seal of Saints), the last qutb who is identified with the Mahdi as a parallel to Muhammad’s identification as Khatam-al-anbiya’ (Seal of Prophets). In some Sufi milieus the Hidden Imam of the Shi’a is identified as the Mahdi, and from time to time Sufis have themselves presumed to be the Mahdi, thus bringing about the creation of new autonomous sects, such as Nurbakhsh’s movement in Iran in the sixteenth century and Muhammad Janpuri in India during the seventeenth century. Ibn Khaldun, referring to the messianic expectations among his contemporary Sufis, also underlined the Shi’ite roots of these sentiments and emphasized their widespread dispersion:

Most of our contemporary Sufis refer to the expected appearance of a man who will renew the Muslim law and the ordinances of the Truth. They assume that his appearance will take place at some time near our own period. Some of them say that he will be one of the descendants of Fatima, others speak about him only in general terms. We have heard them from a number of them.

A modern Arab author, Sa’d Muhammad Hasan, also points to the clear Shi’ite roots in the Sufi concept of the Mahdi. He writes:

Sufism has been in close connection with Shi’a, and drew from it much of its learning, such as the distinction between shari’a and haqiqa (Law and Truth), the zahir and the batin (exoteric and esoteric). The truth of the matter is that Sufi elements are not Islamic, but go back to Hindu, Greek, Christian traditions. Similarly Sufism appropriated to itself Shi’ite elements regarding the concept of the Mahdi, to whom they give the colouring of their qutb, who manages the affairs of the world in each generation, and without whom the Universe might collapse. And so, the Sufis, who were Shi’ite disciples, benefited from...
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the idea of the Mahdi in their ideological system, an idea which has no foundation in true Islam. 15

The Shi‘a, where the idea of Mahdi began, admits no authority of the Umma to rule itself through its own exertions, neither does it recognize the ability of its own scholars to reach the ultimate Truth through correct interpretation of the usul. Truth can be achieved only through the ta‘lim (instructions) of the Hidden Imam, who is divinely guided and therefore infallible. Shi‘ite scholars (mujahtids) are only his intermediaries with men, but they are liable to error. All error will end only with the return (raj‘a) of the Hidden Imam, who will be the Mahdi. Thus, unlike the Sunna, which merely tolerates popular sentiments about the Mahdi, the Shi‘ite creed contains the Messiah as an essential element, for the Hidden Imam is bound to reappear. This, of course, makes for more concrete expectations of the millennium among Shi‘ites than among Sunnites, for whom the eschatological Mahdi will come only before the end of the world.

The Imam Mahdi, in his return to earth, will rule (or in fact continue to rule) by divine right. His future position has been foreseen by none other than the Prophet Muhammad himself:

O ye people! I am the Prophet and ‘Ali is my heir, and from us will descend the Mahdi, the Seal of Imams, who will conquer all religions and take vengeance on the wicked. He will take fortresses and he will avenge the deaths of the Martyrs of Allah. He will be the champion of the Faith, and the drawer of water at the source of divine knowledge. He will reward merit and requite every fool according to his folly. He will be approved and chosen of God, and the heir of all knowledge. He will be the valiant in doing right and one to whom the Most High has entrusted Islam. 16

A voluminous literature of this sort, including fervent poetry, is extant in Shi‘ism,17 and has had a marked impact on the development of the Shi‘ite creed.

Sectarian Shi‘ism, such as the Isma‘iliya, went even farther with the concept of the Mahdi. Not content with the Imam Shi‘ite identification of the Mahdi with the Hidden Imam who will definitely return, though on an uncertain date, the Isma‘iliis frowned upon the Imamis‘ inability to produce the millennium despite many years of expectation and developed ideas of their own. To be sure, the Isma‘iliis were not the first to proclaim the millennium. We have seen18 that Shi‘ites such as al-Mukhtar and non-Shi‘ites such as the first Abassids had also led people to believe in the coming of the millennium. But before the nineteenth century, it was usually sectarian Shi‘ism, and sometimes extremist Sufi sects,19 who proclaimed the advent of the Mahdi, thereby implying the coming of Messianic times.

In the twelfth century, for example, Hasan as-Sabbah of Alamut frustrated by the stalemate between the Isma‘iliis and the Sunni monarchies and by the

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failure of the struggle to overthrow the old order and institute a new one in the name of the Hidden Imam, chose the middle of the fasting month of Ramadan to declare himself as the awaited Mahdi. Here is the Isma'ili account of how the proclamation proceeded:

On the 17th day of the month of Ramadan of the year 559 (Aug. 8, 1164), under the ascendancy of Virgo and when the sun was in Cancer, Hasan ordered the erection of a pulpit in the courtyard of Alamut, facing towards the West, with four great banners of four colours, white, red, yellow and green, at the four corners. The people from the different regions, whom he had previously summoned to Alamut, were assembled in the courtyard. As the pulpit faced West, the congregants had their backs toward Mecca. Then, toward noon, the Lord [Hasan], on his mention be peace, wearing a white garment and a white turban, came down from the castle and approached the pulpit from the right side, and in the most perfect manner ascended it. In a moment he sat down, and then rose up again and, holding his sword, spoke in a loud voice. Addressing himself to the inhabitants of the worlds, jinn (devils), man, and Angels, he announced that a message had come to him from the Hidden Imam, with new guidance: 'The Imam of our time has sent you his blessings and his compassion, and has called you his special chosen servants. He has freed you from the burden of the rules of the Holy Law, and has brought you the Resurrection.' Our party must obey and follow him both in religious and worldly matters, recognize his commands as binding, and know that his word is our word.

This solemn extravagance, very reminiscent of Chinese secret society rituals, meant that Hasan as-Sabbah, claiming that he had brought Resurrection (Qiyama), was himself the Qaim of Isma'ili eschatology. Hasan circulated writings in which he claimed that although he was outwardly known as the grandson of Buzurgumid, in the esoteric reality he was the Imam of the time, the son of a previous Imam of the line of Nizar. As Lewis has pointed out, it did not really matter whether the biological descent was authentic, because in the age of Resurrection physical descent was no longer significant, and spiritual filiation took precedence.

These conceptions of the Mahdi in various streams of Islam, philosophically different though they may be, bear many outward and perhaps superficial resemblances to each other. They may have been sufficient to rally the Muslim masses, who were neither capable nor likely (especially in time of crisis) of going into the bickerings and the hair-splitting theological incongruencies the argumentation of which is reserved for scholars. These similarities explain, I submit, the popularity of Ma Hua-lung in Chinese Islam. He may have been regarded, consciously or unconsciously, as a (or the) Mahdi by Muslims from all walks of reli-
region, even if many of them were explicitly non-sectarians. Let us examine the behaviour and the environment in which the paradigmatic figure of Islamic Mahdism—Ma Hua-lung—operated. The sources about him are very scarce, but from what we can piece together in terms of documents, eye-witness reports, hearsay and circumstantial evidence, a fairly clear picture can be drawn.

First and foremost, any Mahdi is believed ultimately to take temporal and spiritual power into his own hands. In other words, Mahdism, by definition, carries inherent political aspirations which, if materialized, could bring the millennium. As Molé put it:

Le Mahdisme a forcément un aspect politique, et des mystiques fonderont des états d’inspiration Chi’ite: tel cet état des Sarbadar, au VIIIe siècle de l’hégire dans le Khurasan, et surtout celui des Safavids, un bon siècle plus tard: chefs d’un ordre religieux Sunnite, les descendants de Saﬁ al-Din Ardabili, obtiennent l’adhésion des tribus turkmènes Chi’ites d’Anatolie, se proclamant descendants du Prophète, passent au Chi’isme et finissent par établir un état Chi’ite en Iran.23

Something very similar developed in China. Ma Hua-lung, admittedly the adept of a Sunni religious order, the jahriya branch of the Naqshbandiya, proclaimed himself or was believed by his followers to be the descendant of the Prophet and strove for the establishment of a Muslim state. It is hard to pinpoint any Shi’ite idiosyncracies in the Muslim state (which never came into fully crystallized being), but by Ma’s time the Shi’ite inclinations of the New Sect were made evident. At any rate, there are indications which show something about the nature of Ma’s political aspirations. A report from Chinese businessmen who visited Ninghsia in 1863 remarked on Ma’s kingly ways:

. . .On the third day, orders were shouted along the street, saying: ‘The King is coming into the city!’ All the Chinese and Muslims inside the city were called out and they prostrated themselves along the main street to welcome the King. . .They saw Ma Hua-lung, seated in a roomy sedan-chair, surrounded by numerous guards, and rushed into the government office building. . .Ma stayed in Ninghsia for quite a number of days and returned to Chin-chi only after things were put back in order. . .24

Po Ching-wei, trying to read Ma’s reasoning regarding his seemingly hesitant position between rebels and government,25 came to the conclusion that if Ma could, he would establish his own kingdom:

In case these Muslims should be defeated, I am a man who has already surrendered, and no punishment would be inflicted on me. In case they should win, I am the one who designed the whole plan and gave the orders, and the Kingdom would still be mine. . .26
Chu Wen-djang also comments that:

It was clear that he had the ambition, as well as plans, to build up a kingdom of his own. He might not mean to take over the whole Manchu Empire, but a Muslim Kingdom, covering the border provinces, similar to that of Hsi-Hsia or Pei-Liang of former days, was possible in his vision.\(^{27}\)

In fact, even without a Mahdi movement, a Muslim rebellion would almost by definition be tinged with political aspirations, as we have concluded above. The point here is to show that Ma was not merely a recognized religious leader but a charismatic figure looked upon as a saviour by masses of Chinese Muslims from many provinces. Thus, even if political ambitions had not occupied his mind initially, they would have been thrust upon him by popular expectation and demand. This essential relationship between the expectant masses and the prospective Mahdi and his propaganda was succinctly analysed by Ibn Khaldun:

The common people, the stupid mass, who make claims with respect to the Mahdi, and who are not guided in this connection by any intelligence or helped by any knowledge, assume that the Mahdi may appear in a variety of circumstances and places. They follow blindly the well-known traditions about the appearance of the Fatimid. They do not understand the real meaning of the matter, as we have explained it. They mostly assume that the appearance will take place in some remote province and at the limits of civilization.\(^{28}\)

And, as for the Mahdi figure:

If it is correct that a Mahdi will appear, there is only one way for his propaganda to make its appearance. He must be one of them and God must unite them in the intention to follow him, until he gathers enough strength and ‘asabiya (group feeling) to gain success for his cause, and to move the people to support him. Any other way, such as a Fatimid (Mahdi) who would make propaganda among people anywhere, without the support of ‘asabiya and merely relying on his relationship to the family of Muhammad, will not be feasible or successful. . . \(^{29}\)

Back to Ma Hua-lung. Not only was he regarded as a descendant of the Prophet, spiritually if not biologically (a prerequisite for eligibility for Mahdi-hood), but his divine nature, his ability to grant redemption to those who repented, his “marvellous power to sway his followers,” his kingly manners, and the awe that he inspired, made him the focus and the object of Chinese Muslim millenarian aspirations. His followers, incited by his propagandists (Khalifas) or merely stirred up by hearsay, were present everywhere from Kansu to Tientsin, from Kashgar to Yunnan. Many of them, “enjoying the excitement of rebellion,” came from outside provinces to join him. Po Ching-wei, writing about Ma’s success, commented:
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He is very much respected and trusted by the Muslims in Ning-hsia. In fact, he has sweeping influence over the Muslims of other provinces, too. During peace time, once he was accused by others in a serious law-suit and sent to the capital of the province under arrest. By paying heavy bribes, he was finally acquitted. In this case, his expenses amounted to ten thousand taels, but the Muslims of Kansu, as well as the Muslims of Shensi and Yunnan, competed in contributing to help him. As a result, when he returned home, instead of going bankrupt he returned with a fortune.35

In another passage, describing fighting between government troops and Muslim rebels, Po said:

It is clear that the Muslim rebels of Shensi and Kansu, are taking Ma Hua-lung's sect, provide them a sanctuary.36

Judging from Ma's posthumous veneration in Kansu, Yunnan and other provinces, a veneration bordering on worship, to which succeeding generations of his followers submitted to the extent that the New Sect heritage become embodied in "Ma Hua-lung's Sect,"37 one has little doubt about the tremendous impact that this leader had on his contemporary Muslims in China.

A legitimate question may be raised about the validity of identification of Ma with a Mahdi. The Saviour had obviously failed to bring the millennium and should, therefore, be regarded as an imposter or worse. How do we explain the fact that despite his failure, his followers vehemently pursued their belief in his sanctity after his death? One possible interpretation is that since Ma was executed, together with his son and entourage,38 he became a martyr. Like the death of Husayn in Karbala, which ultimately provided the Shi'a with a martyr and a mediator between Allah and men, Ma's tragic death became a symbol of martyrdom to his followers and made his tomb not only a place of ziyara (visit to the tomb of saints) but a focus of worship, a substitute for Mecca, to which the visitors turn their backs while praying at the tomb.39

The fact that Ma's successors and followers dropped their revolutionism and turned their sectarian activity inwards only proves in retrospect the millenarian import of the movement during Ma's lifetime. As Hobsbawm put it:

Some millenarians, like some revolutionaries, do indeed tacitly drop their revolutionism and turn into de facto acceptors of the status quo, which is all the easier if the status quo becomes more tolerable for the people.3 Or, what is more likely, they may withdraw into a passionate inner life of the movement, of 'the sect,' leaving the rest of the world to its own devices, except for some token assertions of millenial hopes and perhaps of millenial program.3 Others, however, may merely retire to wait for the next revolutionary crisis (to use a non-millenarian term), which must surely bring with it the total destruction of the old
world and the institution of the new.40

We have seen that Ma Hua-lung's descendants, concurrently with their tacit acceptance of the status quo (they desisted from rebellion), also continued the ritual breaking of the law (turning their backs to Mecca) that is part of the millennial practice.

Another peculiarity of the figure of the Mahdi is the general mood of the environment in which he appears and the symbols that are produced to uphold and encourage that mood. Both Sunni Muslim belief that the eschatological Mahdi will be the harbinger of the end of Time, and sectarian Muslim identification of the return of the Imam with the millennium, can accord with the conditions that prevailed in China during the late Ch'ing.

Not only were the Muslims oppressed (or subjected to deprivation) and therefore a fertile ground for the blossoming of such a movement, but the Chinese environment as a whole was impregnated with millenarian ideas which could not have passed unnoticed by Chinese Muslims. The intense activity of the White Lotus Society, for example, which expanded over North China (including Kansu41) and professed the idea of the awaited Maitreya, the Lord of the World, might possibly have induced the Muslims to produce their own "Maitreya" lest their millenarian expectations be engulfed by heterodox Chinese ideology with which they could not affiliate.

At the same time, the intensified activities of sectarian movements in China, bent on what they believed to be the liberation of the Chinese populace from the Manchus and the occupation of large territories by these movements by force of arms42 in order to attain that goal, provided an example for the Muslims, who wished to obtain the same ends by the same means. Both invoked a theocratic ideal as their driving force, the Muslims substituting the divine mission of their Mahdi for the Mandate of Heaven that their Chinese counterparts claimed for themselves, T'ien (Heaven) being always the Supreme Being in Chinese popular consciousness regardless of religious affiliation.43 Both wanted to establish a new order of equity, justice and plenty.44 As we have previously remarked, however, Chinese sectarians aspired to topple the dynasty and to institute or restore another,45 while the Muslims, being outside the system, could only disengage from it and part ways with it. A Chinese Maitreya, then, could not provide them with the salvation that a Muslim Mahdi would.

At the same time, however, Ma Hua-lung (as a symbol) had to relate to, and make sense in, the Chinese context as well as the Muslim. Paradoxically, only if he resembled one of the Chinese sectarian Lords could he be trusted by his Chinese Muslim followers as their Maitreya. Only if the symbol was a Chinese one as well as a Muslim one was it likely to be a living symbol, through which Chinese Muslims would share the experience of the Chinese sectarian movements at large. For:
religious symbols are not tales about exterior happening but rather imaginative modes of talking about the human condition. A living participation in these symbols tends to unify a fragmented existence and opens into creative relationships with others and the world. The criteria for adequacy or worth of these symbols is their ability to move men toward the transformation of themselves and their society in life-giving directions.46

So, while Ma Hua-lung adopted the awesome Muslim title of Tsung-ta Ahung (General Grand A-hung), thus transcending the worldly title of A-hung common to any Chinese Muslim Imam, his very Chinese name as written in Muslim sources meant “The Horse Became a Dragon.”47 The dragon, which was a rain-giving deity from Shang times onward,48 recurred in Chinese mythology as a re-incarnation of former rulers49 and as the male-positive yang in traditional thought.50 In Taoist philosophy it became the symbol of the Tao, in the sense of cosmic all-pervasive force which man can never master. For the Taoists, it was emphasized as the guarantor of physical potency, the expression of a drive towards life and vitality that is an extension of the life man knows.51

In popular Chinese myth in general, the Emperor was the incarnation of the Dragon, because as the most powerful living creature, the mythological Dragon dwelt in the clouds and was intimately associated with the heavenly forces that controlled rain and other climatic elements so essential to agriculture. The use of the Dragon as a decorative motif in Imperial robes, palace buildings and objects used by the Imperial household was a traditional means of association of Heaven and its forces with the Imperial power.52

The myth of the Dragon permeated into some secret societies as a powerful symbol, as in the case of the Lung-hua Hui (Society of the Dragon Flowers)53 or the title of Lung-t’ou chih lung-t’ou (Dragon Head among Dragon Heads) used to designate dignitaries of the Ko-Lao secret society.54 In sectarian symbolism, the dragon probably combined the traditional opportune meaning of the term with a challenge to the monopoly of its use by the Imperial House, a challenge that is implicit, in any case, in the very existence of a secret society. This is the significance of Ma’s use of this symbol. One might also speculate that the lung symbol was an added manifestation of the iconoclastic attitude of millenial movements, another aspect of the ritual breaking of the law, part of which was the non-attendance of prayers in mosques and the change of the qibla.

The significance of Ma’s crowning as a lung certainly did not escape the attention of such astute Chinese as Tso Tsung-t’ang, and the fact is that the word lung (meaning “dragon”) was dropped from the government documents and replaced by a meaningless homonym lung.55 Moreover, the Chinese officials, aware of the power of words as symbols of charisma or stigma, tried to turn things around by naming the Muslim Mahdi “Ma Ch’ao-ch’ing,” meaning “The Horse Turns to
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Thereby they hoped perhaps to erode Ma’s charisma by trumpeting his “betrayal” of his cause, or to shift Muslim opinion toward favouring the government side. This policy also implicitly admitted that while other sectarian movements should be persecuted to annihilation, evil Muslims could perhaps be re-educated and turned into good Muslims — by abandoning the New Sect and re-entering the “Old Sect” — through a process of pacification and resettlement such as the one carried out by Tso Tsung-t’ang in the aftermath of the Muslim Rebellion in the Northwest.

The broader question remains, however, whether the Chinese Muslim messenarian movement may or may not have drawn directly from popular Chinese millenarian movements. Certainly the borrowing of the dragon symbol may be an indication in this direction, but no clear-cut evidence exists to relate the two movements. It is possible, however, to extrapolate such a relationship from the comparable situation that existed between Buddhism and Taoism in China. It is clear that although these two religions were structurally separate, because they were both institutional religions with separate systems of belief and priestly hierarchies, they interacted as diffused religions on the functional level and cross-fertilized each other. This was, of course, due to the fact that on the popular level no clear distinction could be made between the philosophical intricacies of the two. The result was that a Chinese could be both a Taoist and a Buddhist at the same time, visit a Buddhist temple for prayer and call in a Taoist priest to perform magical rituals for healing the sick or mourning the dead.

Sunni Islam in China, being structurally an institutional religion and at the same time banning its followers from participation in any religious activity other than the prescribed tenets of the Faith, constituted an effective block against any interaction with the Chinese religions, either on the institutional or on the popular levels. Such an interaction could only be made possible by an Islam which could be independent of the structural strait-jacket, either as a result of de-institutionalization of the religion or in consequence of an outright iconoclastic rejection of its orthodox origin. I suggest that the New Sect was precisely such a type of Islam. Because it was de-institutionalized, it could be receptive to diffused popular ideas such as those which prevailed in Chinese sectarian movements. For example, while Chinese Muslims had usually been attached to a particular mosque, Ma Hualung renounced this necessity by allowing his followers to pray anywhere or not to pray at all. The ritual law-breaking that has been mentioned above must have contributed to the de-institutionalization of sectarian Islam in some ways.

In this fashion, one may speculate, popular millenarian ideas which were current in the Chinese environment and cut across Buddhist-Taoist (and sometimes Confucianist) lines, may have found their way into millenarian Islam as well. The use of the lung symbol by Ma Hua-lung, the ostensible similarities between the Mahdi and the Maitreya figures, the timing with which both appeared on the Chinese stage, the stimulation and encouragement that one may have found in the
success of the other, the apparently common goal that both entertained—changing the existing order into a better one—and the means of armed rebellion that both used, most likely resulted in the one reinforcing the other and drawing them closer together. Even if such a flow of ideas was unconscious and imperceptible, it could very well have taken place as unconsciously and as imperceptibly, but as effectively, as the interaction between Buddhism and Taoism. If we take the White Lotus as an archetype of Chinese millenarianism, with the Maitreya Buddha at its apex, we might very well comprehend why Tso Tsung-t'ang took it as a frame of reference to define the archetype of Chinese Muslim millenarianism as the New Sect, with the Mahdi at its head.

Graphically, the picture may look as follows:

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Legend:

- **Functional relationship (permeable)**
- **Structural relationship (impermeable)**
- **Developmental relationship**
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Summing up the Mahdi movement in China we may conclude, with a reasonable amount of certainty, that:

1. the oppression of the Muslim community in China probably produced a state of mind among the Muslims that required the coming of a Saviour to relieve the people from their misery;
2. the Chinese socio-economic and political environment at the beginning of the Ch'ing decline provided favourable grounds for the emergence of a Mahdi movement among Chinese Muslims;
3. if the New Sect did indeed develop (or degenerate) into a Shi'ite-prone ideology, and especially if it were extremist Shi'ism of the Isma'ili type, then it was ideologically equipped to produce a Mahdi forthwith, without waiting for the return of the Hidden Imam or the coming of the eschatological Mahdi;
4. it is not impossible that sectarian Chinese Islam had absorbed local mystical elements, a not extraordinary eventuality in the history of Shi'ism:

A recurring feature is the cult of Holy men, Imams and da'is, who were believed to possess miraculous powers and whose doctrines derived from Gnosticism, Manichaeism, and various Iranian and Judaeo-Christian heresies. Among the beliefs attributed to them, are those of reincarnation, the deification of the Imams, and sometimes even the da'is, and libertinism — the abandonment of all law and restraint. In some areas, as for example among peasants and nomads in parts of Persia and Syria, distinctive local religions emerged, resulting from the interaction of Shi'ite and earlier local cults and creeds.

5. as Mahdism is, by necessity, a political movement aspiring to both spiritual and temporal power and the creation of a political entity under the aegis of the Mahdi, and as that goal be achieved by armed rebellion, it is necessary that Mahdist Muslims wage war.

The waging of war brings us to the concept of Jihad, which has already been discussed at length as far as its Sunni interpretation was concerned. In essence, it developed into a fard-kifaya, a duty for all male, free adult Muslims who were sane in mind and body and had means enough to reach the Muslim army. But it was not necessarily a duty which bound every Muslim individual, for if the duty had been performed sufficiently by the community, there would be no need for further individual Jihad. Theoretically, the duty of Jihad has to be continued until the whole world is under the rule of Islam, and it must be controlled or headed by a Muslim religious leader.

In practice, however, Sunni Islam has shown a sense of adaptation to circumstance, and Jihad laws generally have been put in abeyance. Muslim theolo-
gians have permitted the delaying of the war when the Muslims are weak, but even in situations where a Muslim minority is strong enough to rebel, it does not always do so as long as religious persecution is not untenable and the environment of relative freedom of worship can be said to be within Dar-al-Islam.

In Imami Shi'ism the Imam, the prospective leader of the Jihad, is hidden, so there can be no Jihad until his return. As late as 1871, the heads of Indian Twelvers reiterated this position after much deliberation, laying down in the process seven conditions without which a Holy War would be unlawful for the community:

First, when the Rightful Imam is present and grants his permission. Second, when arms and ammunitions of war and experienced warriors are ready.

Third, when the Jihad is one against mutineers and enemies of Allah. Fourth, when the Jahid (one who wagers the Holy War) is in possession of his reason, when he is not lunatic or a man of impaired senses, and when he is neither sick, nor blind, nor lame.

Fifth, when the Jahid has secured the permission of his parents. Sixth, when he is not in debt.

Seventh, when he has sufficient money to meet the expenses of his journey and of the inns by the way, and to pay for the maintenance of his family.

Essentially, then, in addition to the exclusive imputation of the right to declare Jihad to the Imam, Shi'ite Islam imposes even more restrictions than Sunni Islam on its feasibility. Theoretically, the first condition should have been sufficient; when the Imam (being infallible) would return, no restrictions should be imposed on how or under what circumstances he should conduct Jihad. The restrictions were instituted, nevertheless, apparently to discourage potential followers of claimants to the title of Imam Mahdi, who by necessity could only be non-Imamis. At any rate, these restrictions made any Twelver Shi'ite Jihad even less likely than a Sunni-incited one.

With non-Imami Shi'ism, however, the situation is different, because the Imam of the time, be he the Mahdi or otherwise, is the ruler of the sect to whom everyone owes obedience, including obedience in waging a Holy War. So Fatimid ideology made it mandatory to fight a Jihad "against the people who turn away from religion," provided this duty was discharged under the guidance of the Rightful Imam. Other Shi'ite sects, such as the Indian Bohras, required their adherents to "fight sincerely in the Jihad, with their wealth and their bodies and their lives, whenever the Imam or the da'i may require it." This we find, then, an interesting convergence of views between Sunni Islam and extremist Shi'ism on the feasibility of Jihad, although they differ, of course, as to the identity of the Imam who is eligible to declare it.
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Having taken note of the extreme Shi'ite ideas that were preponderant in Ma Hua-lung's sect, one would have no difficulty in understanding that any war led by Ma, the Imam, would implicitly be conceived of as a Jihad, whether or not it was explicitly declared as such. But one may question the eligibility of Ma as a Jihad leader in the eyes of non-sectarian (Old Sectarian) Muslims, who constituted the majority of Chinese Islam. Why should they trust him? Why would his rebellion be viewed as a Holy War by other Muslims (for if they did not view it as such, they would not follow him)?

One obvious reason would be that the popular acceptance of Ma as a Mahdi entailed his recognition as the titular head of Jihad. But there was more to it than that. Sunni Islam itself, having put in abeyance the practice of Jihad after the end of the Islamic conquest in the Middle Ages, began to revive the idea in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, primarily through what is known as the Wahhabi movement and some of its offshoots.

I suggest that the spread of these ideas to China -- possibly directly from Arabia, probably through India and Central Asia--was likely to heighten the propensity among Chinese Muslims to take a militant attitude towards the heathen, or at least to rally around those who seemed to do so. Moreover, the Naqshbandi order, which had considerable influence in India and West China, was itself an exponent of militant resistance to oppression of Muslims or to their domination by non-Muslims, as exemplified by their relentless struggles in India and their founding of a short-lived Muslim republic in the Caucasus in the mid-nineteenth century.

Both the Naqshbandiya and the Wahhabiya stood for the supremacy of the Shari'a and the ascendancy of the Islamic ideal, and vigorously campaigned against bida' (innovations, heresies), and both often chose the militant path to attain those ends. Thus it is possible that they were confused in the minds of the common people, especially in the further lands of Islam, as Central Asia, India, and West China, and the one might have been mistaken for the other.

So, for the purposes of our discussion, we are again confronted with names and labels which, although less important than qualities and trends, are in themselves powerful symbols likely to attract sympathy and arouse emotion, or to invite hostility and cause antipathy. For example, what was termed the Wahhabi by Europeans and opponents of the movement has called itself Muwahhidun (Unitarian). Some of the self-confessed Naqshbandi luminaries in India were termed Wahhabi by others, and the Naqshbandi-originating New Sect in China has also been labelled Wahhabi.

The overarching quality of all these terms and labels is revivalism of one sort or another, a return to the source and the means necessary to achieve this end. The Muwahhidun of Arabia revived Ibn Taimiya's (d. 1328) interpretation of the Hanbali madhhab (school of law), which had remained aloof from theological rationalism and professed traditionalism. Ibn Taimiya had abominated the cult of
saints as an idolatrous *bid'a*, and even prohibited visits to the tomb of the Prophet. He came out strongly against the *Sufis*, claiming that man's purpose is not to know God but to obey Him. He limited the principle of *ijma* (consensus) to such matters that may be textually backed by the Qur'an and the Hadith, thus rejecting all innovations that had been incorporated into Islam. He considered *Jihad* as one of the *'ibadat* (acts of cult) and thus binding on each Muslim individually, as contrasted with the collective obligation on the *Umma* professed by the Sunnites. Ibn Taimiya wrote:

Anyone who performs his other duties and does not fight the Holy War, sins; and everyone must act according to his ability, as the Prophet said: 'whoever sees something reprehensible, let him change it with his own hands, and if he is unable — with his tongue... So if it is thus, it is known that the bidding to God and the rejection of the reprehended, together with completion, the Holy War, is one of the most important things we are ordered to perform."

Ibn Taimiya's views of *Jihad* fall only slightly short of the *Khawarij*, who incorporated *Jihad* as the sixth Pillar of the Faith and sanctioned Holy Wars against other Muslims — all this the result of a deep devotion to the Qur'an. Abu Hamza, their leader, said in a famous sermon:

As for us, we have not taken up arms lightly or frivolously, for play and amusement, or for a change of government in which we hope to immerse ourselves, or for the revenge that was taken from us; but we did it when we saw the earth had grown wicked, and proofs of tyranny had appeared, and religious propagandists increased, but men did as they pleased and laws were neglected...and we heard a herald calling us to Truth and the Straight Path, so we answered the Summoner of God...and by His Grace we became brethren. Oh people of Medina...you have hearkened to your readers and your lawyers, and they cut you away from the Book that has no crookedness...so that you stand away from the Truth and become dead and unfeeling...0 people of Medina...how sound were your roots and how rotten are your branches! Your fathers were men of certainty and religious knowledge, and you are people of error and ignorance...The Muslims entrusted Abu Bakr with the matters of the low world, since Allah's Messenger had entrusted him with the matters of his religion. He fought the people of apostasy and acted in accord with the Book and the Sunna.

Since the *Khawarij* themselves pushed their moral strictness to the point of refusing the title of believer to anyone who had committed a serious sin (*kabira*) and regarded him as a *murtadd* (apostate), the way was open to them — indeed the duty fell upon them as was the case with Abu Bakr — to fight the apostates. Moreover, the *Khawarij* were prepared to draw political conclusions
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from their militant views and occasionally established Kharijite states, like the one in North Africa which lasted for one hundred and thirty years (776-909). To this day they constitute a substantial portion of the population of ‘Uman and Muscat on the Arabian Peninsula.

It was in eighteenth century Arabia, where according to a Muslim writer many Arabs “reverted to the rituals of their ancestors and were bent on the worship of tombs and saints...and even stones and trees,” that Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab emerged. Essentially, he preached Islam as promulgated by the Prophet Himself, striving to “bring the eighth century back to life in the eighteenth.”

‘Abd al-Wahhab ordered the destruction of mosques built on the tombs of the Sahaba (Companions of the Prophet), the uprooting of the trees which had been objects of worship, severe punishment of sinners according to the prescriptions of the Qur’an— all in the name of the absolutely fundamental tenet of the Muwahhidun: Allah is One, and no shirk (polytheism), bida’ or leniency would be tolerated. The only way to enforce these views was to wage a Holy War against the Infidel, and particularly against Muslims who had fallen away from the True Path. ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s generals Ibn Sa’ud (d. 1765) and his son ‘Abd al-Aziz after him -- pursued the same policy. Once, before attacking a tribe of backsliders, ‘Abd al-Aziz addressed them:

. . if you listen to my words, you will be spared, but if you despise them, you shall collapse under the burden of the Divine wrath... Whereupon the Arab tribe surrendered. ‘Abd al-Aziz went on with his sweeping victories and, in the process, the Wahhabi chief became the governor of the greater part of Arabia, just as the Prophet Muhammad had operated in his times. It became a practice for Ibn Sa’ud and his son, when they captured a place, to build a fort at some distance from the original citadel with a moat around it (if the soil were suitable), and the forts were garrisoned. They were dreaded in all Arabia, because:

in propagating their creed, the Wahhabs have established it as a fundamental rule, to kill all their enemies found in arms, whether they be foreign heretics...or Arabs themselves, who have opposed the Great Chief or rebelled against him.

These militant traditions of the Wahhabiya were current until well into the twentieth century. In 1926, Arab tribes owing allegiance to Ibn Sa’ud demanded permission to wage Jihad against all non-Wahhabis and for the abolition of all Western innovations.

An interesting institutional arrangement was worked out whereby ‘Abd al-Wahhab was the Sheikh, the spiritual leader of the movement, while the title of Amir, military commander, went to Ibn Sa’ud, his lieutenant, who was a man of action ( Sahib a-sayf). After Ibn Sa’ud’s death (1765), when his son ‘Abd
al-Aziz took over the Amirship, the same arrangement was maintained, and 'Abd al-Wahhab was kept as the religious guide of the movement. The Sheikh was the supreme judge in matters of religion, and religion ruled the state. So while the Amir conducted military campaigns and political activities, there was a true sharing of theocratic rule between Sheikh and Amir.

Although the first Wahhabi Empire came to an end with the capture of Dar'iya, the Wahhabi capital, by Ibrahim Pasha and the execution of the Wahhabi ruler 'Abd-Allah (1818), a new state was re-established in 1821 with the capital in Riyadh, whence it expanded eastward and survived in various forms into the twentieth century.

It is important to note, however, that the Hijaz, where the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina are located, was not subjugated by the Muwahhidun until the turn of the nineteenth century. This, of course, prompted the Ottoman Empire to counterattack in order to liberate those cities. The rule of Mecca until the Unitarian occupation was in the hands of a line of Sharifs. But even before Wahhabi occupation of Mecca, Unitarian pilgrims did take the long trip from the Najd to Mecca, and some of them were boldly outspoken in their views. Some of them were arrested by Sharif Mas'ud in 1749, and Unitarian pilgrimage to Mecca was barred thereafter for 20 years until 1768, when 'Abd al-Aziz was permitted in again. In 1770, the new ruler of Mecca, Sharif Ahmad, invited the Muwahhidun to send a mission to the Holy City to expound Wahhabi beliefs.

When Sheikh Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab died in 1792, he left a state that rested on two foundations: the beliefs of its people and the arms they bore. The Sheikh had proclaimed the Faith and trained others to carry it out. What directly concerns us, however, is the spread of Wahhabi-type ideas and practices, and especially the Jihad, into the further lands of Islam: India, and thence to China. The above brief account of Unitarianism in Arabia was designed as a springboard and frame of reference to launch us into, and define for us, the revivalist movement in China and the activities of the New Sect, especially the Jihad.

We have already discussed at length the introduction of the so-called Wahhabi movement into India and the Jihad it waged against the British, roughly contemporary with the Muslim rebellions in China. The important facet of these events, however, is that Sayed Ahmad Barelvi, the acknowledged initiator and leader of the Jihad movement in India, was a disciple of Abdul Aziz, the son of Shah Wali-Ullah, the great luminary of Indian Naqshbandiya. Because of the resemblances of the Mujahid (Holy Warrior) Movement with the Muwahhidun in the Najd, it was labelled Wahhabi. This label may not be unjustified, for Shah Wali-Ullah may have studied under the same scholars in Medina as his contemporary Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, so that the two systems that these divines of Islam worked out drew on the same source of inspiration going back to the orthodox and fundamentalist disciples of Ibn Taimiya.
‘Abd al-Wahhab’s system and Shah Wali-Ullah’s teaching, which were similar in their concern for Islamic purity and religious revivalism, actually merged in Sayed Ahmad, whose militant zeal won him the title of Wahhabi. During his hajj in Mecca in 1822-23, he apparently came into contact with the Muwahhidun of Arabia, which would explain the strikingly Wahhabi characteristics of his political ideas. For not only was he a relentless mujahid, but he also envisaged the establishment of a Muslim state co-governed by an Imam and a Sultan, with overall supervisory function for the former similar to the arrangement that was worked out between ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his Amir.

In a way, though Sayed Ahmad remained distinguished by his obedience to the Shari’a, his movement went through some of the same changes as the New Sectarian development in China, namely a propensity for Shi’ism. There is apparently some inexorable drift from certain types of mysticism which have particularly high regard for ‘Ali, towards Shi’ite ideologies which cultivate those regards to their highest culmination. Once Shah Wali-Ullah, himself a mystic, rejected the position of those Sunnis who labelled Shi’ites as kafirs (infidels) and supposedly excelled the Shi’a in praising ‘Ali, then the idea was bound to undergo many metamorphoses at the hands of groups like the jahriya sub-division of the Naqshbandiya, particularly in China. Sayed Ahmad himself was not a scholar, yet his mystical powers drew people to him. He created a mystic order of his own, the Tariqa Muhhammadiya. He nominated Khalifas in various districts in India, and took on kingly manners:

His disciples rendered him menial services in acknowledgement of his spiritual dignity, and men of rank and learning ran like common servants, with their shoes off, by the side of the palanquin.

Somewhat reminiscent of Ma Hua-lung? There is more:

In Calcutta, the masses flocked to him in such numbers that he was unable to go through the ceremony of initiation by the separate laying on of hands. Unrolling his turban, therefore, he declared that all who could touch any part of its ample length, became his disciple.

Sayed Ahmad also asserted descendence from the Prophet, and even went into trances which reminded his disciples of Muhammad and attracted them to him. Moreover, his adepts came to believe that he was the promised Imam al-Mahdi, and there are indications that he himself finally yielded to their arguments. Even worse (or more convincing), after his death in 1831, two of his khalifas from Patna circulated the doctrine that Sayed Ahmad was not dead, but was merely hiding in order to reappear at a suitable time. Even if the departing point is purist and puritanical Wahhabism, when an idea journeys through a mystical order, especially of the ‘Alawi-prone type, it can be transformed into a Shi’ite-like ideology. Thus Jihad, which had been restored by Arabian Unitarians as a practical tool of Islamic revivalism, could be transformed at the hands of mystics into a tool
of eschatological Mahdism. Even though Sayed Ahmad stirred considerable emotion among Indian Muslims and won a huge following, his *Jihad* ended as being denounced by the Muslim establishment of India, much as *was the New Sect* in China. 96

What happened in India to the idea of *Jihad* and its relationship to the *Mahdi* certainly suggests a parallel to what occurred in China. Perhaps there is more than a parallel, for the contemporaneity of the events in the two countries may indicate Indian influences which seeped into China through Tibet and Burma. There is no doubt that in both places the *Naqshbandiya*, in itself a strong revivatal factor, was very much in evidence. Even the term *Wahhabism*, used derisively by Muslims in India to designate Sayed Ahmad’s movement, 97 was mentioned in China as well, in the context of the New Sect, at least in its original puritanical version in Ninghsia:

Chatting with the headmaster of the Muslim middle school here [Ninghsia], he says that the New Sect is an extension of the *Wahhabi* movement, and arose out of visits from Muslims and the decadence of Islam in China. . . 98

Moreover, the rough contemporaneity of Shah Wali-Ullah and Ma Ming-hsin, the puritanical reformers in their respective countries, and their visits to Arabia at a time when they could conceivably have absorbed *Wahhabi* ideas, may explain the fundamentalist activism of the “*Naqshbandiya Reaction*”99 in India and the parallel onslaught of the initially fundamentalist New Sect in China against adherents of the Old Sect, who had fallen into decadence by, for example:

wearing white for funerals and reading the Qur’an in a fashion similar to Buddhists and Taoists, for money. 100

Exactly as Shah Wali-Ullah’s reformism sought to eradicate the Hindu elements that had invaded Indian Islam and to return to pristine Islam, so the New Sect manifested a spirit of conservatism and the desire for extirpation of Chinese elements that had encroached upon Muslim ritual. 101 Two generations later, we witness again the simultaneous activities of a corrupted form of this revivalism in both India and China, Sayed Ahmad’s *Tariqa Muhammadiya* in India and Ma Hualung’s New Sect in China. True, Ma began his activities after Sayed Ahmad was killed, but his rebellion reached its peak when the *Mujahidi* movement in India was in full swing and beginning to drift toward Shi’ite ideologies after the death of the founding father.

But even if the purely circumstantial indications of a possible relationship between Indian and Chinese Muslim revivalism are inconclusive, the Indian parallel is instructive in yet another way: it illustrates the inner dynamics of Muslim sectarian groups, by which even a puritanical orthodox movement can be transformed into a mystical-heterodox sect. Thus the story can be told of how this development might have worked out in China, independent of the Indian parallel without, of course, ruling out the latter’s possible influence.
Ma Ming-hsin certainly went to Kashgaria in 1761 or thereabouts, when an intense ferment was rising among Muslims against the Ch'ing occupation, and the Khoja (Khwaja) Muslim leaders were organizing invasions into this area from Khokand – what they termed a “Holy War” against China. In Kashgaria, they found cooperation among their fellow-Muslims, and in 1760 the Kashgar Rebellion broke out, followed by many others. All this, then, was going on while Ma was personally in Kashgaria, and he must have absorbed into his thinking the Jihad concept in connection with Naqshbandi Sufism, to which he was admittedly initiated at that time.

Ma Ming-hsin had also gone to Arabia, probably around 1760 according to some sources, around 1780 according to others. I tend to support the latter version for two reasons: one, because other sources which mentioned Ma's trip in 1760 limited it to Central Asia only; second, Ma's trip to Arabia has been linked with Su Ssu-shih-san, Ma's co-leader in the 1781 Kansu Rebellion who surfaced in the records in connection with that rebellion, not before.

The dating of Ma's visit to Arabia is important because in 1761, the Muwahhidun were barred from Mecca and Medina, as we have seen, and he could not have met them there if he had gone on pilgrimage during that year. But around 1780 the Muwahhidun’s fortunes had improved, for they were admitted into the Holy Cities and even permitted to propagate their ideas there. If we accept the latter version, then some seemingly Wahhabi elements in the Chinese New Sect might be explained in this way.

First, the concept of the dual leadership of the movement, the Sheikh and the Amir, the like of which we saw in both Arabian and Indian Wahhabism, may have been transplanted into China in Ma Ming-hsin’s time. So although the latter was acknowledged as the founder and the spiritual leader of the sect, it was Su who, according to Chinese sources, was the military leader of the rebels after he came back with Ma from his visit to Arabia. At the same time, Ma Ming-hsin remained the Holy Saint before whom his followers prostrated themselves. By Ma Hua-lung’s time, however, when the Shi’ite-like concept of the Imam-Mahdi had taken root, the leader of the rebellion emerged as the absolute spiritual, political and military leader, all combined in one.

Second, the coercive activities of the New Sect towards both Muslims and Chinese could only be explained by the Muwahhidun zeal which considered mushrik (polytheist) all those who would not join them. Coercion by the sword, rationalized in terms of Jihad, was pursued from Ma Ming-hsin’s to Ma Hua-lung’s times.

Third, Ma Hua-lung’s tactics of state-building and war were also strikingly similar to those of the Muwahhidun of Arabia. Even though Ma had admittedly drifted from the puritanical ideas of Arabian Unitarianism, he might have preserved the political militancy and the tactical heritage that Ma Ming-hsin had
presumably imported from Arabia. The Wahhabis of Arabia built forts surrounded with moats. Ma Hua-lung, according to a Chinese source, did likewise:

When our army advanced to Ch'iang-chia-sha-k'o, a place still more than ten li from Chin-chi, we suddenly discovered that there were fortifications all around, standing solidly like mountains. The moats were wide and the water was deep. It would be very difficult to attempt a crossing...our soldiers looked at each other and turned pale...

Finally the very existence among Chinese Muslims of groups who staunchly denounced the worship of saints and the visit to their tombs, as we have previously seen, suggests that some Unitarian type puritanical ideas had penetrated into China and survived the transformation of the various New Sects into different mystical groups as a separate ideal.

All these similarities, of course, prove nothing in and of themselves. For one may well point to other traditions in which these same elements can be identified: militant Naqshbandi states in Central Asia which fought a Jihad against China, a duality of leadership in the traditional division of power between Caliph and Wazir in the Islamic Empire, fighting between Muslims since the inception of Islam, and the usage of this or another military tactic God knows where. The point is that the cumulative effect of these indications (not proofs) may well help to orient us to the possible sources of the religio-political militantism of New Sectarians in China, whether they be drawn directly from Arabian Unitarianism, from Central Asian Naqshbandiya, through Indian Muslim revivalist movements, or from a combination of them all. No matter what the source was, the stream of revived Muslim militantism, usually rationalized as Jihad, began definitely to flow again after the seventeenth century, turning at times into a torrent of Muslim rebellions.

This discussion was not designed to seek an adequate label for the New Sect, but to detect, isolate and pin down, to the extent possible, the characteristics of that movement which made it (or made it look) revivalist, and therefore appealing to the Muslim masses in China. Our use of conventional terms such as Shi'a, Isma'iliya, Sufi, Naqshbandi, Wahhabi and the rest was intended only to provide a frame of reference, sets of supposedly well-defined ideas, against which the New Sect could be analysed and to which it could be compared.

The New Sect fits none of these definitions, neither was it uniform and monolithic in time and space. In various provinces it took various names, usually patterned after some of its behavioural idiosyncrasies. In various times and under changing leadership it espoused different ideas, some of them common to other Islamic ideologies. But all of these groupings were lumped together, both in Chinese Muslim consciousness and in Chinese governmental circles, under the “New Sect” heading, which, though inaccurate, was nevertheless indicative of the emergence of a new kind of Islam, different from the traditional mainstream of Chinese
This new Islam, which started by disseminating Islamic puritanism among Muslims, partly through the use of *Jihad*, turned into an extremist *Mahdi* movement which attempted to use *Jihad* (mainly against non-Muslims) to bring the millennium, and ended up as a multifarious range of sects and sub-sects which, in effect, set themselves apart from Islam and turned to ritual introspection.
Subjects will be rebels from principle, when kings are tyrants from policy.  

The extraordinary confluence of events that we have observed -- the Chinese became more extremist towards the Muslims because of their domination by the Manchus, the latter embarking on a more militant oppression of the Muslims because they wanted to be more Chinese, and the state of socio-economic turmoil symptomatic of dynastic decline -- all contributed to the polarization of the Han-Hui antithesis and brought about widespread Muslim rebellion. A Muslim rebellion on a large scale, however, was contingent upon a new militant ideology combined with a cohesive organization under charismatic leadership, which could sway the emotions of the Muslim populace at large. While the receptivity of the new ideology was conditioned by the general revivast trend among Chinese Muslims, it was the militancy of the New Sect and its offshoots which constituted the driving force and the avant garde of the rebellions, and crystallized the religious symbols of the Mahdi and the religious means of Jihad, around and through which many Muslims could at least temporarily rally.

We have also noticed that while Muslim disaffection in China was universal and generated millenarian cravings in all parts of Chinese Islam, it was in areas where Muslims constituted a major portion of the population that the Han-Hui confrontation was the most acute. Thus, invariably, major Muslim rebellions in China took place in the Northwest and the Southwest, where the sizable Muslim population was both something of a threat to the Chinese host culture and numerically strong to initiate a rebellion and maintain a revolutionary (if we can use a non-millenarian term) élan. It was no coincidence that Lan-chou, the “Mecca of Chinese Islam,” which was largely populated by Muslims and situated in a heavily Muslim area, was also the scene of the inception and growth of the New Sect. It was also no coincidence that some of the great luminaries among the Hui, including Ma Te-hsin, who played a prominent part in the revivalist movement of Chinese Islam, were from the densely Muslim province of Yunnan.

The Northwest in 1974 and 1781, and again in 1862-76, Yunnan in 1820-28, 1830, 1846, and again in 1855-73 were the staging areas of the momentous Muslim uprisings which cost millions of lives, and at times seemed on the verge of sweeping much of the Chinese Empire under the sway of Islam.

There is little doubt that the rebellious wave, which was prompted in Central Asia around 1760 by Muslim Khojas who raised the banner of Jihad
against the Chinese, was transmitted through the medium of the New Sect to Northwest China and thence to the Southwest. For it took half a century of New Sectarian ferment in Central Asia and the Northwest before the rebellious (or shall we say “revolutionary”? ) impulse reached Yunnan. This may be explained in terms of the proximity of the Northwest to Central Asia, where rebellion was rife. By contrast, adjacent to the Southwest is India, where the revivalist movement of Shah Wali Ullah was contemporary with the Chinese Muslim revivalist movement in general, which took a less militant stance at the outset and stressed ritual purity and the restoration of old Islamic values.

But by the time the so-called Wahhabi influences reached India, and Sayed Ahmad espoused the rebellious cause, Yunnan also began to experience armed rebellion (1820s). Of course, geographical proximity does not explain it all. Kansu was also the seat of the New Sect, the spiritual descendant of the Central Asian-based Naqshbandiya, while the Southwest, although admittedly in contact with Muslims of other Chinese provinces, apparently maintained its spiritual link with the Muslim world at large through neighbouring Burma and Tibet, and thence India.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, when persecution of Muslims by both the Manchus and the Chinese reached its peak, the junction was made between Chinese Islam in the Northwest and Southwest, and the rebellious movement, under the unifying symbols of the Mahdi and Jihad, finally took the shape of a full-blown Chinese versus Muslim struggle. Thenceforth, it was no longer a question of mere military rebellion to defend Islam and preserve it, or an internal strife between the New and the Old Sects, but a definite trend of Muslim separatism, imbued with the militant ideas that had seeped through to Kansu from Central Asia (be they Naqshbandi, or Wahhabi, or both) and to Yunnan from Kansu and the so-called “Indian Wahhabiya.” The whole Muslim East was in turmoil, and a contagious sense of unfolding fateful events must have swept the Muslim community from the Indus to the Huang-ho.

It was an age of unique opportunity for Chinese Islam to rise and take its fate into its own hands, when the feasibility of secession loomed favourably due to the breakdown of the Chinese bureaucratic system and the impotence of the Imperial Chinese troops. It was an era of widespread rebellion in China, of mushrooming secret society activities, of socio-political fragmentation and power devolution which made possible, indeed necessary, the emergence of particularistic new forces under charismatic leadership to fill the vacuum. So Chinese Muslim separatism, while it was generated and nurtured by its particularistic inner dynamics, was certainly not incongruent with the outer Chinese context in general.

Thus one cannot simply credit a movement, a situation, a rebellion or a revolution exclusively to a leader, nor can one impute the emergence of the leader exclusively to circumstances, in the vein of the old argument over whether
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the leader makes history or history makes the leader. Recent scholarship has shown that leadership, in its broad sense, is a relationship rather than a Divine Gift. McGregor traces four major variables known to be involved in leadership:

(1) the characteristics of the leader;
(2) the attitudes, needs and other personal characteristics of the followers;
(3) the characteristics and nature of the organization, such as its purpose, its structure, and the type of task to be performed; and
(4) the social, economic and political milieu.5

All this amounts to saying that leadership is not simply a characteristic of the individual leader but a complex relationship among these variables, making the situation and the leader essentially related in a circular fashion. The demands of a socio-politico-economic situation enable him to emerge, but do not produce him; he furthers the fulfillment of those needs by his actions, but he is not the master of their course. In other words, it is the need that warrants leadership, and the leader thrives on that need. In this symbiotic relationship, if need should disappear the leader would vanish; as long as the leader exists, his existence is symptomatic of the need.

This definition of leadership can perhaps be instrumental in explaining why it was not possible for a Muslim revolutionary leader to rise in China prior to the Ch’ing and rally his co-religionaries around him in an endeavour to create a separate Muslim political entity. Muslim leaders were certainly not wanting at any time in the history of Chinese Islam. In fact, we have seen that many of them attained prominence either in their communities or in the Chinese bureaucratic hierarchy. What was wanting prior to the Ch’ing were attitudes and needs of the Muslim masses that would warrant the emergence of a saviour, be it a Mahdi figure or otherwise. Not that Chinese Muslims were happy with their lot from the T’ang through the Ming periods, but their latent messianic expectations, which are inherent in any Muslim community under non-Muslim domination or under evil Muslim rule, were deeply buried under the contingencies of everyday life and buttressed by the accommodating modus vivendi that had been worked out between the host and the guest cultures.

Popular Chinese ill-feeling towards the Muslims was omni- and ever-present, but the restraining policies of the Imperial authority soft-pedalled these attitudes and made them bearable. In this situation, Chinese Muslim leaders either climbed their way up the Chinese ladder of success, and as such had to play down their Muslim particularism, or remained strictly parochial headsmen catering to their communities’ needs, which did not usually transcend the religio-cultural sphere. The relatively congenial environment and the aspirations of Muslim individuals, which were usually confined to socio-economic survival due to the absence
of any direct threat to the culture as a whole, did not warrant the rise of a charismatic Muslim leader of revolutionary import. Had he risen, little credence would have been given him, inasmuch as he would have been considered a trouble-maker, disturbing the similitude of harmony existing between the majority and minority groups.

During the late Ch'ing, in sharp contrast, all the circumstances not only made the emergence of such leaders possible but indeed required it. The social, political and economic milieu had grown more hostile to the Muslims than ever before; Muslim attitudes and aspirations, both on the communal and individual levels, had undergone a deep process of change insofar as they became more attuned to an acute sense of religio-cultural survival of the group. As a consequence, the characteristics of the Muslim population shifted from an unobtrusive and self-effacing group into a community in arms. Since the purpose of mere individual socio-economic survival was insufficient because it was no longer relevant, the new task was to assume a totally independent self-identity.

The ideology was provided by Islamic revivalism, and especially its vanguard — the New Sectarians. What was needed to bring the circle to a full circuit were charismatic leaders, *Mahdi* figures in Muslim parlance, and sure enough these appeared on the scene. One of them was Ma Hua-lung, with whom we have already become acquainted. Ma was certainly the most formidable revolutionary figure in nineteenth-century Chinese Islam, although, due to the relentless onslaughts of his determined and resourceful adversary in Kansu-Shensi, Tso Tsung-t'ang, he could hardly bring his *Jihad* to its logical conclusion — the creation of a Muslim state.

In other parts of China, though, similar Muslim leaders rose under similar conditions and did succeed in achieving Muslim political autonomy, temporary as it was, in the areas of Yunnan and Chinese Turkestan. The former was led by Tu Wen-hsiu, the latter by Yakub Beg. A vast difference existed, however, between these two cases of Muslim rebellion. While Yunnan was within the pale of China Proper and populated by Hui Muslims, Kashgaria, where Yakub Beg established his Muslim kingdom, was situated on the fringes of the Empire, and its Muslim population was Uighur, an ethnically Turkic group. The dissimilarity lay in that the rebellious Yunnanese Hui, being merely un-Chinese, were considered internal rebels, while the Uighurs, as non-Chinese, belonged to the category of rebelling tributary barbarians, and their case required a totally different treatment.

When the Manchus conquered Kashgaria in 1755, the Khojas, who were regarded by the local Muslims as their legitimate rulers, were captured by the Ch'ing authorities and made vassals of the Chinese Emperor. When, in 1757, the Khojas refused to pay their tribute and claimed independence, the Ch'ien-lung Emperor, considering rebellion from a vassal intolerable, sent an expeditionary force against them and destroyed the two Khojas who had rallied effective Muslim
opposition to Chinese rule. Moreover, the Manchus had bought the loyalty of local Kashgarian Begs, as we have seen, by delegating the authority to govern by Islamic law to them, and by paying them annual stipends.

Because the Begs owed their power to the Manchu rulers, they had a vested interest, naturally, in maintaining their symbiotic relationship with their Ch'ing overlords. By the 1820s, however, Muslim Khojas took advantage of the growing internal strife in China and began to harass Chinese-ruled Kashgaria. Jahangir Khoja was captured and executed by the Manchus in 1828, but the head-on clash between the Empire and Khokand went on unabated, and in 1830 the Khanate declared a Jihad against the Ch'ing and invaded Kashgaria.

From then on, Khokadian forces, taking full advantage of the Ch'ing weakness, carried out inroads into Kashgaria (1847, 1855, 1857, and 1862), stirring up revolt against Chinese rule at a time when Muslim and other rebellions in China Proper were also in full swing. In 1862, when the great Muslim Rebellion in Shensi and Kansu flared up, Kashgaria became virtually cut off from the Empire by a series of Muslim-held territories stretching across Northwest China. At this juncture Yakub Beg, a Muslim leader from Khokand, overran Kashgaria and established an independent Muslim state there. When the Ch'ing finally counter-attacked in 1878 after the suppression of the Kansu rebels (1876), they found themselves faced with the expanding Russian power in Central Asia and the ensuing Ili Crisis. Consequently they summarily eliminated the rule of the Begs in Kashgaria and incorporated East Turkestan into the Chinese administrative system as the new province of Sinkiang.

It is evident that the independent Muslim rule of Yakub Beg constituted a clear challenge to the Ch'ing Empire, although it is doubtful whether the Chinese government ever understood the significance of Jihad and its socio-political ramifications. But it was of much lesser significance to the Manchus than the Muslim rebellions by Hui Chinese inside China itself. For while the former certainly amounted to a nagging military harassment on the far extremes of T'ien-hsia, detrimental no doubt to Imperial prestige but by no means insurmountable, the latter took on the perilous importance of a domestic uprising which, in aggregate with the widespread rebellion all over China, put into serious question the viability of the system as a whole. This was where the old Chinese parable of "sickness of the heart," as compared with "sickness of the skin," could apply.

Thus the Muslim rebellion in Turkestan, although it brought about the creation of an independent Muslim state which temporarily survived in collusion with Khokand, carried no novel message in its essence. Central Asian Khanates had existed within an alternately expanding and shrinking perimeter for centuries before the Ch'ing, and the re-emergence of Muslim rule in Kashgaria during the late Ch'ing can be seen as no more than a swing of this historical pendulum, which was finally brought to a halt by the outright Chinese annexation of this region to the
Empire. In this respect, the Uighur-Muslims of Turkestan were no different from the Mongols of Mongolia or the Tibetans of Tibet.

Having eliminated the Northwestern rebellion under Ma Hua-lung as a model of a successful Muslim rebellion because it fell short of establishing a Muslim state, and having discarded the Turkestan Muslim uprising because it was not representative of the Hui Islam of China Proper, even though it achieved statehood, we are left in all of Chinese history (to the best of my knowledge) with one single illustration of the workings of a Muslim rebellious state in China, that of Yunnan (1856-73). This Muslim state, which took the Chinese name of Ping-nan Kuo but was headed by a fanatical Muslim bearing the Arabic title of “Sultan Suleiman,” was a strange hybrid creature, perhaps unique in the annals of both Confucian and Islamic civilizations.

How could a state of this sort come into being, when other attempts had failed? How did it function as a Muslim state in Confucian China? How did it come to grips with the incongruencies inherent in the Confucian institutions from which it sought to disengage and the Islamic ones which it sought to cultivate? How did it sustain the allegiance of the traditional Chinese elite amidst its iconoclastic efforts to depart from Chinese traditional statecraft and espouse its Islamic counterpart? How did revived Islamic laws and fiats displace, supplement or supplant Chinese living customs and traditions? And how, finally, did this sixteen-year experiment collapse before it could attain maturity?

Very intriguing and challenging questions indeed, deserving of a full-fledged separate study, which may corroborate or refute, in the microcosm of the Muslim community in Yunnan, the macro-historical hypotheses outlined in the above chapters.
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INTRODUCTION:


PHASE I: UNEASY CO-EXISTENCE

Chapter I:

7. Ibid, p. 27.
8. Ibid, p. 35.

Chapter II:

3. M.C. Wright, p. 76.
5. Legge, p. 124.
6. The following discussion is based on Hsieh, pp. 167-187.
8. Ibid, pp. 4-5.
9. The Classic of Filial Piety says that "the body with its limbs and hair and skin comes to a person from their father and mother, and it is on no account to be spoiled or injured."
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11. For a detailed discussion of this question, see C.K. Yang, Chaps. V, VI, XI.

12. The Liu-yu (Six Edicts) prescribed: "Perform filial piety to your parents." The Sheng-yu (Sacred Edicts) text reads: "Perform with sincerity filial and fraternal duties in order to give due importance to social relations." See Hsiao, p. 187.

13. Hsiao, p. 188.

14. Wakeman, History and Will, etc., Chap. I.


17. Polo, p. 153.


19. Wakeman, Strangers at the Gate, pp. 55-6.

20. Lattimore, The Desert Road, etc., pp. 165-6.

21. See Broomhall, p. 244.

22. Lattimore, The Desert Road, etc., p. 184.

23. Broomhall, pp. 244-5.

24. "Little Faith" is the term used by some Chinese to denominate Islam. The Chinese is the "Great Faith".


27. Broomhall, pp. 224-5.

28. For example, see Gamble, p. 373.


30. Lattimore, The Desert Road etc., p. 203.

31. Probably originating from the Chinese term for Uighurs, who were also Muslims.

32. "Sect" is the Chinese equivalent of "religion".

33. For example, see Broomhall, Chap. x. See also Bretschneider.

34. Moule, p. 33.

35. Tzu is a diminutive which shows indifference or disrespect.

36. Lao (old, venerable) is a prefix indicating respect.

37. Literally "Little Faith", but carrying a diminutive connotation.

38. Literally "Great Faith". As opposed to "Little Faith", it may connote a degree of self-aggrandizement.
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39. Lattimore, *The Desert Road* etc., p. 203.
40. Chinese Muslims also sometimes transliterate Islam into the Chinese language as *I-ssu-lan chiao*.
42. Lattimore, *The Desert Road* etc., p. 205.
44. Latourette, p. 8.
45. F. L. K. Hsü, p. 197.

Chapter III:

1. From an interview in Taiwan with a leading figure in the Muslim community, held in Taipei in January, 1971. The man did not ask me to withhold his name, but due to my interpretation of his oblique statement, I think it is unfair to embroil him with his authorities.
2. This view was reconfirmed to me in interviews I conducted in Taiwan and Hong Kong in July, 1973.
3. M.C. Wright, Cap. XII.
6. This means literally "The Righteous Uprisings of Muslims"; it is a four-volume collection of documents relating to the Muslim Rebellions in the Northwest and the Southwest. It was published under the auspices of the People's Republic of China in Shanghai in 1953. Hereafter, *HMCI*.
8. Imanaga, p. 5.
9. See Chapter II.
10. Ibn Battuta mentions Muslim dignitaries with whom he met in China such as Taj ad-din al-Ardawili; Sharaf ad-din at-Tibrizi; Kamal ad-din 'Abdallah al-Isfahani. It is perhaps significant that all names mentioned by Ibn Battuta bear a *laqab* indicative of the place of origin (Tibriz, Isfahan, etc.). This may have been a means of identification with the Fatherland, as another device to preserve foreign distinctiveness.
12. According to one report, Muslims were forced to marry Chinese. See Pai
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Shou-i, Chung-kuo etc., p. 27.
13. Vasil'ev, p. 34. See also H. Smith, p. 164; Broomhall, p. 184; and Cordier, p. 79.
16. de Thiersant, p. 218; Broomhall, p. 190.
18. White, pp. 33, 42. "The Jews do not eat sinew" is, of course, a reference to the story of Jacob, who found the thigh sinew shrunken after wrestling with the angel.
19. Moule, p. 31.
23. de Thiersant, pp. 199-201.
24. See, for example, the pictures in Chung-kuo Mu-ssu-lin etc., p. 47.
28. The following discussion is based on Levenson, Confucian China etc., I, Chap. IV.
29. Ching Pei-kao.
32. Ching Pei-kao, p. 5.
35. Ching Pei-kao, p. 15.
36. Ibid, pp. 36-7.
37. Liu Chih in his treatise Wu Kung Shih-i. This work was not available to me, but it is cited in Vissiere, I, p. 117.
38. Chu T'ien Ta-tsan chi-chieh. Cited by Vissiere, I, p. 120.
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39. Fu-hsi was canonized during the Han as the oldest of the Three Sovereigns. He came to be described as having a dragon's body and a man's head. His birth, like that of the founders of the Great Dynasties, was miraculous, his mother conceiving him by stepping on the footprint of a giant. He invented the Eight Trigrams and nets for hunting and fishing. (See Watson, p. 12.)

40. Vissière, I, pp. 120-1.

41. The first three Chinese dynasties: Hsia, Shang, Chou (approx. 2200-200 B.C.).

42. These apparently refer to Yang Chu (fourth century B.C. Confucian philosopher) and Mo-tzu (a fifth century B.C. utilitarian philosopher).

43. Cited in Vissière, I, pp. 120-1

44. The date of the monument is uncertain, but it goes back apparently to the late Ming. For details on this controversy and the full text of the inscription, see Broomhall, pp. 83-98.

45. Broomhall, pp. 84-5.

46. Ibid, p. 85.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid, p. 86.


Chapter IV:

1. This was Bil'Am's characterization of the Children of Israel.


3. C.K. Yang, Chap. XII. Part of the following discussion is based on this chapter.


5. Lewis, Arabs in History, pp. 44-5.


8. One-fortieth (1/40) of every Muslim's income was supposed to be donated to the community treasury. (Broomhall, p. 250.)


10. Lo, p. 159.
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12. Even today, one cannot help but notice the honour that the highest lay leader of the Muslim community in Taiwan pays to his Imam.
13. See Eaton, p. 45 for an example.
15. Ibid.
17. Part of this passage is based on C.K. Yang, pp. 110-2.
18. For this discussion, see Von Grunebaum, pp. 36-68.
19. According to Sheikh Rashid Rida (1865-1935), basing himself on Shafi'i, it is the duty of every Muslim to know Arabic. See Al Manar XVII, 1914, pp. 589-92.
21. The Buddhist tonsure and the Taoist hairdo, the priestly robe, vegetarian diet, assumption of life in a temple or monastery, the forsaking of the family — all severed one's ties with the past and the established ways accepted by society. See C.K. Yang, pp. 298-9.
22. Compare with Judaism, in which, although antiquity is the mark of truth, some changes for the better are recognized — revelation is at the same time immutable and progressive. See Pallière, p. 250.
24. Pai Chung-hsi, p. 3.
27. Ma She-chun, p. 8a.
29. Apparently the reference is to those who adopt Chinese learning for the sake of bureaucratic advancement.
30. Ma She-chun, p. 9b.
31. The author refers to the Chinese custom of prostration before superior officials. He may even be making an oblique reference to the prostration before the Emperor's Tablets in the mosques which, as we have seen, was not wholeheartedly respected in any case.
32. Ma She-chun, p. 10a.
33. Ibid.
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34. Yagob.
35. Ibid, pp. 3-5.
36. The proclamation was handed over in 1862 by Archimandrite Palladius (the head of the Russian Orthodox mission in Peking) to the Russian sinologist Vasil'ev, who translated it, edited it, and published it in *Islam in China*, pp. 29-35.
37. These are customary in Chinese funerals.
38. The Imam, the Khatib, and the Muezzin.
40. Ibid.
42. Lattimore, *Desert Road* etc., p. 14.
43. Hartmann, p. 850. See also H. Smith, p. 164. The name Ma for Muslims ("nine Ma in ten Muslims") may have derived from their horse-related trades and their peculiar love for this animal. (See Ting, p. 349.)
44. Chan, p. 190.
47. *Jemadar* was the rank of the native second-in-command of a sepoy company in India. Dr. Anderson had borrowed a Muslim jemadar from the British authorities for his trip to China.
48. Sanguinetti and Defremery.
50. For example, D'Ollone, Broomhall, de Thiersant, and various missionaries.
51. Broomhall, p. 227. This theme will be elaborated in the next chapter.
52. I heard this gibe over and over again from several Chinese Muslims.
54. The "Sage of the West" refers to the Prophet Muhammad.
56. Anderson.
57. Lattimore, *Desert Road* etc., pp. 144, 203.
58. White, p. 21.
59. Moule, p. 31.
60. Ibid.
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62. Skinner, p. 27.

Chapter V:

1. Kramers, p. 94.
2. Levenson, "The Province, the Nation . . .", pp. 287-8.
3. Lapidus, "Hierarchies and Networks . . .".
4. Ibid.
6. Lattimore, Desert Road etc., p. 56. The city referred to as Rum was probably Constantinople.
7. See Vasil'ev, p. 22.
10. Ma Nan-li. See Vissiere, p. 120.
11. For example in Liu Chih's T'ien-fang Tzu-mu Chieh-i (Explanation of the Arabic Alphabet). See Vissiere, p. 133.
12. For this discussion, see Khadduri, "The Islamic Theory . . .", pp. 24-39.
13. This passage is based on Khadduri, War and Peace etc., pp. 155-7, 170-3.
16. Dhimmi are members of tolerated communities within Islam, such as Ahl-al-Kitab (Scriptuary People). Dhimmi were subjected to the poll tax as the price for their toleration and protection by the Islamic state.
19. Wang T'ai-yü, a Muslim writer of the seventeenth century, mentions the favours accorded to his ancestors, who came from Arabia to the Ming court. See Vissiere, p. 107. See also Vasil'ev, pp. 29-30, in which a Chinese proclamation is quoted recounting the favours of the T'ang monarchs, especially T'ai-tsung, towards Islam, and the permission he granted for building a mosque in his capital, Ch'ang-an.
20. Lapidus, Muslim Cities etc., pp. 131-4.
21. Rashid Rida (1865-1935), one of the great figures of Islam at the turn of the century. He was a man of outstanding learning and recognized as such by Muslim communities throughout the world. The following quotation is from a fatwa he gave in answer to a Russian Muslim scholar who inquired about the status of Muslim soldiers who died during the Russo-Japanese War (1904).


24. Shakib Arslan says that Chinese Muslims preferred to marry Chinese women, hoping that Allah would open their hearts to Islam. See Arslan, II, p. 238.

25. Vasil'ev, pp. 6-8, a visitor to China in the 1860s at the height of the Muslim Rebellions in the northwest and southwest, spoke about the "danger" of Muslim takeover of China and emphasized the Muslim zeal and vigour which might have made that possible.

26. Arslan, II, p. 239.

27. For example, see Broomhall, p. 185. As early as the sixteenth century, Chinese Muslims were known to have gone to Mecca for Hajj. See also Chan, p. 199.

28. D'Ollone says that at the turn of the century, thirty Muslims from Yunnan alone went to Mecca every year. Mission D'Ollone, p. 4.

29. Ma Te-hsin, one of the initial leaders of the Muslim Rebellion in Yunnan, is known to have visited Mecca and Constantinople. Vissière, p. 113.

30. See Sanguinetti and Defremery, and Vasil'ev, p. 15. D'Ollone speaks of Indians from the Punjab and Turks from Turkestan who visited Kansu (p. 250), and of Arabs and Turks who came regularly to Szechuan and Yunnan (p. 5).


32. D'Ollone, Mission D'Ollone, p. 5.

33. Muslims whom I interviewed originated from various parts of China, from Yunnan to Manchuria, from Fukien to Turkestan.

34. The exoneration of Queen Esther by Judaism, though she shared King Ahasuerus' bed, is strikingly similar. Queen Esther even won inclusion in the Bible as heroine of the Jewish people, and she is remembered yearly in the festival of Purim.

35. Sura 11:115.

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37. Ting, p. 369.

Peter Gowing relates that in Taiwan some families do not eat pork, others preserve Qur'an books in Arabic, still others observe Muslim funeral customs. But all insist that they are not Muslims. See "Islam in Taiwan".

39. G. Parker, p. 11.


41. See Schacht, p. 62.

Chapter VI:

1. 'Utba Ibn-Sufyan was Governor of Egypt during Mu'awiya's reign. Upon his arrival, he gathered the Copt leaders and lectured to them; much in the same style Zyad Ibn-Abih warned the Iraqis at the same period, and al-Hajjaj was to threaten them in Abd-al-Malik's period. At-Tawhidi, II, pp. 210-1.


3. Consider, for example, the conflicts in contemporary Ireland and Cyprus. See Webb, pp. 89-131.

4. This terminology is taken from Alford, p. 367.

5. Gibb, "Religion and Politics . . .", pp. 8-12.


9. Wakeman, Strangers at the Gate, p. 120.

10. Japhet is not mentioned in the Qur'an, but its exegesis and popular legend within Islam deal with the three sons of Noah: Sam, Ham, and Yafith. The Biblical story (Genesis IX, 20-27) of Ham's sin and punishment and the blessing given to Sam and Yafith, is known in Muslim tradition. Al Kisai reported that Noah had uttered the following blessing and curse: 'Prophets shall be born descendants of Sam, kings and heroes of Yafith and black slaves of Ham.' (Al Kisai, p. 99). Yafith is regarded as the ancestor of Yajuj and Ma'jjuj (Gog and Magog), and often of the Turks and Khazars. Persia and Rum are traced sometimes to Yafith. Sam is the father of the Arabs. Semitic tradition, of course, prefers Sam, and Yafith is sometimes spoken of unfavourably, as in Tabari (I, p. 223), who said that nothing could come out of Yafith and his descendants are deformed. On the other hand, the seventy-two recognized languages are divided: 18 to Sam, 36 to Yafith. See Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, pp. 637-8.
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12. See the case of the Triads in South China in Wakeman, *Strangers at the Gate*, pp. 118-9.
15. This discussion is based on J. Saunders, pp. 126-7.
16. Wakeman, *Strangers at the Gate*, p. 120.
17. See *HMCI* for numerous examples.
18. Cited by Vissière, p. 120.
27. The groups, in order of size, are: Hui, Yi, Miao, Chuang, Tai, Pai, Li-su, Na-si, Wa, Laku, Ching-po, Nu, Tu-lung, Ha-ni, Pu-mi, Ku-tsung, Sa-ni. Although the survey is recent, it is probable that the same minorities have always been there.
28. See Article 2 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic.
29. Franke, p. 42.
30. The others are: Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans.
31. The flag of the Republic had five stripes representing the Han and each of the other national groups.
32. See *Ning-hsia Hui-tsu etc.*, p. 6.
33. Fried, p. 343.
34. Moseley, pp. 8-9.
37. For example, the *Tso-chuan* compared the Ti and the Jung to “wolves to whom no indulgence should be given” (*Tso-chuan*, p. 149) and to “beasts and
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"birds" (p. 424). Both quotations are taken from Lien-sheng Yang.

38. Tso-chuan, p. 424, cited by Lien-sheng Yang, p. 27.
39. 土 radical.
40. 木 radical 142.
41. Lien-sheng Yang, p. 27.
42. Ibid.
43. Cited by Lien-sheng Yang, p. 31.
44. Analects 16:1.
46. Ho, "Salient Aspects . . .", pp. 4-5.
47. A. Wright, "Comments . . .", p. 38.
50. This office controlled Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang (Uighur-Muslim minority as contrasted with the Hui Muslims in China proper).
52. Fried, p. 352.

Chapter VII:

3. The Chinese characters are 大, 大, as distinguished from the Great Expectation (Ta-shih 大 ) mentioned above.
5. Old T'ang History (henceforth OTH) 198.28b regarding Ta-shih Kuo (the Muslim State) and Yung-hui Erh-nien (The Second Year of Yung Hui). In the New T'ang History (henceforth NTH), see 221 下: 19a regarding ta-shih Kuo. Ta-shih Kuo.
6. In the Chinese sources 'Uthman is termed the "Fourth Ruler", apparently beginning the count with the Prophet, since in the line of Caliphs, 'Uthman was the third.
7. OTH 198.29a.
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8. NTH 5.24b, 221 15b.
9. NTH 6.4a.
11. OTH 10.6b.
15. D'Ollone, "Recherches . . .".
16. For the unfathomable controversy surrounding the origin and meaning of these terms, see Broomhall, Chapter X.
17. Drake, p. 34.
18. Ting, p. 350. Ting suggests that the peace and prosperity which brought about the flowering of Islam in Ming China were due, in part, to the fact that the Ming founder, T'ai-tsu, was a Muslim. His wife, Empress Ma, was also Muslim, as were many of the responsible officials. T'ai-tsu, according to this report, never worshipped in a temple after his accession (which, of course, could not be true), forbade drinking of wine and composed a hymn of praise to Muhammad which may still be found in the main mosque in Nanking. Others mention that T'ai-tsu had alien anthropological features attesting to his foreign blood, Persian or Arab (pp. 350-1). This harmonious picture is, of course, contradicted by Pai Shou-i, the most authoritative Chinese Muslim historian, who speaks of attempts at forced sinicization under the Ming. (See Chapter III, note 12 above.) These two writers may be referring to different periods under the Ming, but they do not say so.
22. Adler, p. 100.
23. See, for instance, Ibn Battuta's description of Khansa (Hang-chow): "In the second division are the Jews, Christians and Turks; these are numerous and their number is not known; theirs is the most beautiful part of the city. Their streets are well disposed, and their great men are wealthy."
P'an-ku was the first being brought into existence by cosmological evolution, according to Chinese mythology. See Giles, p. 1607.

Nu-wa was one of the line of Chinese mythical sovereigns, said to have been the successor of Fu-hsi (2738 B.C.). According to MacGillivray (p. 31), Nu-wa was chosen because he was fabled to have mended the skies with five-coloured stones and stopped the flooding waters, something of a feat like Noah's rainbow, as a pledge that no more floods would destroy the earth.

When Hulagu conquered Baghdad in 1258, he recognized the nominal head of the Jewish community, Shmuel Ben-David, whose descendants continued to fill this function until the reign of Timur (1401).

The references in the Yuan shih, dated 1280, 1329, 1340, and 1354, concern the prohibition of ritual slaughtering of sheep by Jews and Muslims because of Mongol tradition, a levy of taxes on dissenters, prohibition of the levirate to Muslims and Jews, and the summoning to Peking of wealthy Muslims and Jews to serve in the army. (See Kramer, p. 4.)

Muhammad Tawadu', described as the "Head of the Chinese Mission in Egypt", is a Chinese who mastered both Chinese and Islamic learning. His book in Arabic, As-Sin wal-Islam (China and Islam) was published by the
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Muslim Brothers' Press in Cairo in 1946.

49. Tawadu', p. 63.

50. Laufer, p. 166.


52. Muller, p. 189.

53. See Chapter V, especially note 38.


55. Some scholars have identified the origin of Chinese Jews in Persia and the Yemen, according to their prayer texts and other rituals. But it is possible that North African, Iraqi and Egyptian Jews were among the first settlers, since many who originated from these countries lived in Fustat and Basrah, from whence they handled trade with India and China. See Hirschberg, "The Jews Under Islam," pp. 309-10.

56. See Chapter V, note 16 above.

57. Hirschberg, pp. 270-1.


59. See the Genizah text in Hirschberg, p. 272.

60. The text of the Edict is in Meir, "The Jewish Condition Under the Mamluks," p. 162.


62. The Arab geographer Ibn Khurdadhbih (d. 912) gave considerable description of the Jewish traders who knew many languages and could roam the seas of the world importing and exporting goods from one end – Europe – to the other – China. See Hirschberg, pp. 308-9.


64. For Jews in the Islamic world at this time, see Hirschberg, p. 312. The situation of Jews in China is extrapolated for lack of clear evidence.


66. Ibid.

67. Song, p. 119.

68. Kramer, p. 18.

Chapter VIII:

2. Latourette, pp. 57-8 (especially fn. 59).
3. Ibid, pp. 64-5.
4. Apparently Hsi-chin, the pre-Mongol name for Peking.
5. Dawson, pp. 144-5.
7. Joinville, p. 149.
10. This discussion is based on P. Cohen, pp. 4-20.
13. Ibid.
15. Welch.
16a. Some T’ang rulers gave subsidies to the Nestorian Church. Latourette, p. 57.
17. Lattimore, p. 83.
18. Latourette, pp. 64-5.
22. Fitzgerald, pp. 474-86.
24. OTH 198.26b (re: P’o-ssu Kuo) relates: “In the first year of Ch’ien yuan Persians and Arabs together ravaged Kuang-chou; they plundered granaries and stores, burnt houses and dwellings, and then embarked upon the sea and departed.”
32. P. Cohen, p. 25. See also Rowbotham, pp. 122-3.
34. The following quotation attacks the lack of filial piety in Christianity with all that it implies: lack of ancestor worship and lack of loyal relationship between subject and ruler, the very same "sins" that the Muslims could have been blamed for, but were not.
38. This discussion is based on Daniel, pp. 114-7.
41. Such missionary periodicals as the *Chinese Recorder*, the *China Review*, the *Moslem World*, and the *Revue du Monde Musulman*, *China's Millions*, and *Friends of Muslims* contain hundreds of articles, field reports, and advice for missionary work among Chinese Muslims.
42. Vasil'ev, p. 131.
43. Botham, pp. 169-70.
44. P. Cohen, Chapter V.
45. G. Parker, p. 11.
46. See, for example, Easton, pp. 16-8.
47. Easton, p. 18.
49. King, p. 284.
50. G. Parker, pp. 11, 37.
51. Easton, p. 58.
52. Cited by Botham, p. 172.
54. "Resolutions on Work Among Moslems . . .", p. 634.
57. Pourias, pp. 70-7. See also *Annals etc.*, XXIV, pp. 312-323.
NOTES

58. *Annals* etc., XXVIII, pp. 69-91.
59. Cited by Mateer, p. 77.
60. *Ibid*, p. 78.
61. *Ibid*, p. 79.
63. P. Cohen, p. 33.
64. Latourette, p. 172.
65. See Chapter IV, note 61 above.
67. A geographer-official of the Ch'ing, lived 1795-1873. For his complete biography see Hummel, pp. 309-10.
68. P. Cohen, p. 41.
70. Latourette, p. 829.

Chapter IX:

2. Schuyler, cited in Margoliouth.
3. F. Rahman, pp. 252-3.
4. Tu Wen-hsiu, for example, sent an appeal, in Arabic, to Tibetan Muslims to dispatch reinforcements to Yunnan.
5. T. Metcalf, p. 298.
6. Hunter, p. 11.
8. This question will be tackled in more detail in Phase II, Chapter XIV.
15. Titus, pp. 190-1.
NOTES

16. F. Rahman, p. 251; see also Hunter, App. I and II.
18. Muin ud-din Khan, Ahmad.
22. B. Metcalf.
23. See note 1, above.
24. B. Metcalf.
25. Malik, p. 137.
27. W. C. Smith, pp. 159-62.
30. Q. Ahmad, p. 27.
31. For example, Sayed Ahmad disregarded the prevailing social taboo among the Muslims against widow-remarriage and married the widow of his elder brother. Q. Ahmad, p. 29.
33. Q. Ahmad, pp. 36-7.
34. Francke, p. 134.
36. Muir speaks of 2,000 families in Lhassa and several hundred in other locations. Broomhall, p. 206.
38. Griebenow, p. 127.
40. Griebenow, p. 129.
41. Yegar.
42. Yegar, p. 2.
44. Yegar, pp. 18-9.
NOTES

46. Yegar, pp. 30-45.
47. Ibid, pp. 115-22.
51. The origin of this term is unclear. Some think this is the Burmanized form of Pan-si, the name Yunnanese Muslims use for themselves. (Hanna, "The Panthays . . .", p. 69) Others believe it to be the deformation of the word Parsi (Anderson, pp. 224-5). Still others have expressed the view that the word is the distortion of Pathi or Puthee, a Burmese word for these Muslims (Yule and Burnell, p. 669).
52. Hanna, "The Panthays . . .", p. 70.
54. Yegar, p. 46.
55. McAleavy, p. 89.

Chapter X:

2. Y. Cohen, p. 103.
3. Ibid, p. 104. The following discussion is based on the same, pp. 104-16.
4. See Y. Cohen, p. 111.
5. See, for example, the research conducted among the Fur and Baggara in Western Sudan in Haaland, p. 61.
8. Wiesel, p. 71.
10. In the constitutions of almost all Arab countries, including such "progressive" and "socialist" states as Syria and Iraq, Islam is proclaimed as the state religion.
13. See, for example, Kao. I interviewed the Imam in person at his residence in Taipei, Taiwan.
NOTES

15. *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 31, 1955.
16. I-fan Yang, pp. 69-82.

PHASE II: CONFRONTATION AND REBellION

Chapter XI:

1. At the height of the Muslim rebellions in Yunnan (1856-1873) and the northwest (1862-1878), the North China Herald's editorial quoted a "popular Chinese author" as having said this.
2. Chu, *Muslim Rebellions* etc., p. 7. The author's translation of this slogan has been revised.
3. For example, see Ting, pp. 350-1; Pai Shou-i, *Chung-kuo* etc., p. 28. Many Chinese Muslims whom I interviewed in Taiwan hold the same view.
4. Pai Shou-i, *Chung-kuo* etc., p. 27.
5. This was an edict issued in the seventh year of the Yung-cheng Emperor's reign (1729), concerning the Muslims of Shensi. The text is cited in Fu T'ung-hsien, pp. 116-7.
NOTES

12. Ibid.
15. Yung-cheng made no secret of his resentment on this matter. In his Edict of 1729 he wrote: “For years, people have been submitting memorials stating that all Muslims, etc. . . .” and in the 1730 Edict: “The Muslims have been condemned in many earlier memorials, and I have strongly reprimanded Ch’en Shih-kuan for a memorial he submitted in 1723. . .” (See Fu, pp. 116, 118.)
16. Li, p. 7.
18. Ibid.
22. See “Muhammadanism,” in Encyclopedia etc., p. 894.
23. Justifications for book destruction included: “although there is nothing to show evidence of treason in this work, still the words are, in many cases, lying nonsense, fishing for praise. It should be burned,” or “This belongs in the class of fiction. Its words are very confused, it ought to be destroyed.” Cited by Fairbank and Reischäuer, p. 382.
24. A biography of Muhammad, known in its Western versions as “The Life of Mahomet,” published probably in the late 1770s by Liu Chih, the most prolific and venerated Chinese Muslim writer. See D’Ollone, Mission D’Ollone, p. 413.
25. Also attributed to Liu Chih. Its name derives from the fact that it resembles in form the Chinese “Three Character Classic,” in that it is composed of three-character sentences. The book is a compendium of the creed and ritual practices of the Islamic faith.
26. The text of this and other documents, drawn from Wang Tai-yu’s Cheng-chiao chen-ch’uan and Liu Chih’s T’ien-fang Chih-sheng Shih-lu were kindly brought to my attention and made available to me by Mr. Joseph Ford of Wimbledon, England. Hereafter I shall refer to these documents as Ford’s, for want of more precise references for the time being.
27. The Governor of Shensi, who had also memorialized the Throne on the same matter in 1781.
NOTES

29. A disciple of Ma Ming-hsin, the founder of the New Sect, who was responsible for the New Sect — Old Sect feud in Kansu in 1781. See de Groot, p. 312.
30. Ford documents.
34. Wang Fu-chih is reported to have remarked that even barbarian poetry is stained by the smell of sheep.
35. Hsiao, pp. 230-1.
37. During the T'ung-chih Restoration, the Banner system lost almost all of its significance as a barrier between Manchu and Chinese, and the Manchus rapidly lost their special position in the bureaucracy. The general ban on intermarriage with the Chinese lost much of its effectiveness, the Chinese population in Manchuria grew steadily after the eighteenth century, despite Imperial prohibition. The Manchu language ceased to be a useful tool of the administration, and the hunting expeditions to Manchuria wound down to insignificance. See M. C. Wright, p. 52.
38. Wright, Mary C., p. 53.
39. Chu, Muslim Rebellions etc., p. 22, says that "at this time, the Manchu government would have liked to destroy all Muslims, but was short of the necessary force to carry it out."
40. See Simpson and Yinger, pp. 239, 248-51; and Skinner, p. 27.
41. The Manchus, for example, imposed the wearing of the queue on the Chinese under the threat: "Keep your hair, you'll keep your head; cut your hair, you'll lose your head."
42. Wakeman, "High Ch'ing . . .", p. 21.
43. Cited by Chu, Moslem Rebellions etc., p. 57. The translation has been slightly revised.
44. P'ing-ting Yun-nan Hui-fei Fang-lueh (hereafter PTHF) I, pp. 82-3.
45. This estimate seems to be much lower than the real figure. It may have been deliberately played down by the officials in order to avoid accounting for massacred Muslims.
46. PTHF I, pp. 102-3.
Chapter XII:

3. Chu, Muslim Rebellions etc. p. 15.
7. Sa'ad Allah (1300-1360) had excelled in landscape painting and in Chinese poetry. Shams ad-Din (1278-1351) wrote an array of books on philosophy, history and literature, mathematics, and engineering. Li Chih (1527-1602), an historian and literary critic, is said to have written over 200 volumes critical of the system, most of which were burned. See Pai Shou-i, "Historical Heritage...", p. 38.
8. Pai Shou-i, Chung-kuo etc., p. 36.
9. D'Ollone, who researched this particular aspect of Chinese Islam during the years 1906-1909, identified 36 works on this matter. See Mission D'Ollone, pp. 393-417.
10. Rev. Mr. Ogilvie lists 94 titles of books and magazines, some of them from the post-1911 period. See Moslem World VIII, 1918, pp. 74-78. Rev. Isaac Mason lists more than 300 titles, many of them journals and tracts from the Republican era. See Journal of North China etc., 56, 1925, pp. 175-215.
11. Liu, T'ien-fang Chih-sheng etc. This book was completed in 1724 but remained unpublished until 1779. It was translated by Rev. I. Mason and published in Shanghai in 1921. Pp. 1-2.
12. Of course, this story could not be true, as Muhammad was at that time only seventeen years old, and his first visions did not begin until he was forty. See also Broomhall, p. 73.
15. I was unable to find any written reference to this, but Chinese Muslims whom I questioned on this matter could only point out the fact that the green colour was a Hui colour, and that it was adopted as such some time during the Ch'ing.
18. See, for example, the publications of the "Chinese Muslim Association in Taiwan" such as Chung-kuo Hui-chiao or the periodical of the Chinese

19. See, for example, the covers of various editions of the Qur'an in Chinese, and other publications about Chinese Islam, such as *Hui-chiao Lun-tzu*.


21. See Phase I, Chapter III.

22. See the facsimile of the publication in *Revue du Monde Musulman IV*, 1908, p. 531.


25. In Muslim ritual, the Little Purification consists of the cleaning of the head, the mouth, the feet, the hands, and the sexual organs.


30. See Phase I, Chapters IV and VIII.


32. *Ibid*.

33. *Ibid*.

34. Pai Shou-i, *Chung-kuo etc.* See also the list of Ma's extant books in D'Ollone, *Mission D'Ollone*.

35. Vissière's list contains such works as "Songs for the Studies by the Youth of the Sources of the Faith and of Arabia," by Ma Te-hsin, in which the tenets of Muslim religion are depicted in superlatives as compared with Chinese religions.


38. Munkar and Nakir are the two angels who examine and, if necessary, punish the dead in their tombs. To this examination both the Faithful and the Infidel are liable. They are set upright in their tombs and must state their opinions regarding Muhammad. The righteous answers that He is the Messenger of Allah, then he will be left alone until the Day of Resurrection. The Infidels will have no satisfactory answer, and the Angels will therefore beat them, as long as it will please Allah, except on Fridays. The names of these
Angels do not appear in the Qur'an, although some allusion to the idea may be found in various suras (6, 8, 9, 23, 47, 52), but the whole story appears in the Hadith in various versions. See the old *Encyclopedia of Islam* III, 2, pp. 724-5.

39. Islam in China is called the Pure and True Religion (Ch'ing-chên Chiao).
40. See the *Chinese Recorder* XLVIII, pp. 661-2; and *Moslem World* VIII, 1918, pp. 71-3.
42. Margoliouth, cited by S. M. Zwemer, p. 244.
43. "Truly if man and jinn (Devil) agree to produce the like of the Qur'an, they will not produce the like of it." (Sura 17:90)
44. For example, Tabari wrote: "Among the miracles of the Prophet is the Qur'an . . . I have never met a book written by an Arab, or Persian, or Greek, which contained, like the Qur'an, unity and glorification of the Most High God. . . Who has ever written, since the creation of the world, a book with such prerogatives and qualities . . . while the man to whom it was revealed was unlettered, not even knowing how to write. . . ." Cited in von Grunbaum, *Medieval Islam*, pp. 97-8.
45. Note the similarity with Reform Judaism in America, which maintains schools to teach Hebrew to the young, but recites the ritual in English during services.
47. Ahmad, pp. 205-6.
48. According to the *Encyclopedia of Religions* etc. X. p. 50 Wali-Ullah himself translated the Qur'an into Urdu in 1790.
49. Ahmad, pp. 205-6.
51. *Ibid*.
52. The facsimile of Tu's personal Qur'an is in HMCI II, p. 4.
55. *Ibid*.
56. *Ching Han* etc., author unknown. Facsimile of the title page and other pages in Farjeneel and Bouvet, pp. 540, 547.
57. ㄗ ㄑ (chu) – commentary.
58. See the facsimile in *Revue du Monde Musulman* IV, p. 547.
NOTES

60. Jeffrey, p. 62.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
64. Namely, the number of letters in the original Arabic script: ماالك يوم الدين
65. The preceding verse totals, in Arabic script, thirty letters: ﺖﺴﺮب الامراء الرحمن
67. For usage of Chinese terminology in the philosophical cosmology of Chinese Muslims, see de Thiersant, II, pp. 48ff.
68. See Rocher, I, title page.

Chapter XIII:

2. For Muslims in Taiwan, see Phase I, Chapter III. For Muslims under Communist rule, see Pai Shou-i, Hui-min min-tzu etc., p. 43.
4. Rocher, II, p. 83. Rocher's narrative is based on his personal interview with Ma Te-hsin and on excerpts from Ma's diary.
6. Linton, "Nativistic Movements," pp. 230-40. The following remarks are based on this article.
7. Linton, "Nativistic Movements."
8. There is no agreement in the sources as to when Ma Ming-hsin returned from his trips to Arabia and Central Asia. Two dates are mentioned, 1761 and 1781; the importance of the exact dating will be discussed below.
9. Tsō k'o-ching Po Tsou-kao 38.62-5. For translations of this memorial, see also Chu, Muslim Rebellions etc., pp. 156-8 and E. H. Parker, pp. 258-9.
10. HMCI III, pp. 9-10.
11. Cited by Chu, Muslim Rebellions etc., p. 129.
12. Wei Yuan (1794-1856), the famous historian, geographer and official of 19th century China.
NOTES


14. Fletcher, “Central Asian Sufism . . .”, unpublished manuscript. This paper was graciously made available to me by the author.

15. The Salars are Muslims of Central Asia, who were identified with the New Sect movement under the leadership of Su Ssu-shih-san.


17. The Emperor refers to the Salar Rebellion of 1781, which had been suppressed.

18. Ford documents.


24. This quotation and most of my information on the *Naqshbandiya* was kindly and generously made available to me, orally and in writing, by Prof. Hamid Algar, Department of Near Eastern Studies, University of California at Berkeley, the leading authority in the field. He is, of course, not responsible for my misinterpretations of what he wrote or said to me.

25. These following remarks are based on Barber, pp. 506-13.

26. See Aberle, p. 538.

27. *Ibid*.

28. This and some of the following remarks are based on Talmon, pp. 522-30.

29. Talmon.

30. Fletcher, “Central Asian Sufism . . .”

31. Ford documents.

32. Hartmann, pp. 852-3.


34. Sanguinetti and Defremery, p. 273.


36. This quotation was made available to me by Prof. Algar.

37. This quotation was made available to me by Prof. Algar.

NOTES

39. See, for example, HMCI III, p. 9; Tso, Memorials, 38.62-5. Bales, pp. 216-8; Broomehall, Marshall, de Thiersant, and many others.


41. HMCI IV, p. 311.

42. The vocal dhikr is what Chinese and Western sources referred to as "loud prayers."

43. This contention is rejected by Prof. Algar, the rationale being that the Naqshbandis are, and they are indeed, vehemently anti-Shi'ite. They hold the Imams innocent of what the Shi'a has been evolving in their names.

44. Molé, "Les Kubrawiya . . .", pp. 61-142. It was Prof. Algar who kindly drew my attention to this article.


47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Mole, Les Mystiques Musulmans, p. 117.

51. A-hung is an honorary title for Chinese Muslim scholars or officiating leaders of the community; it is often interchangeable with Imam.

52. Tso, Memorials, pp. 61-2. Also quoted from the Nien-p'u by Bales, p. 218.

53. Hartmann, pp. 850-1.

54. Ibid.


57. J. Williams, pp. 135-141.


59. HMCI III, pp. 9-10.

59a. This is, incidentally, another piece of evidence arguing for the changing nature of the New Sect.

60. D'Ollone, Mission D'Ollone, p. 274.

61. Moslem World XXVI, p. 69.


63. See, for example, Idries Shah, pp. 367-88.

64. Shorter Encyclopedia etc., pp. 629-30.
The saints (awliya') have been classed in a hierarchy. There are always saints on earth, but their sanctity is not always apparent, neither are they always visible. But their hierarchy goes on, and they are replaced upon their death so that their number is always stable. Four hundred live hidden in the world and are themselves unconscious of their state. Some know each other and act together. In ascending order of merit, these are: three hundred akhyar, forty abdal, seven abrar, four awtad, three nuqaba', and one Qutb (pole) who is unique. Every night the awtad (four) transverse the universe in thought and inform the pole of any defects in order that he may remedy them. Shorter Encyclopedia etc., p. 629.

72. Corbin, pp. 69-71.
73. Fletcher, "Central Asian Sufism . . ."; see also D'Ollone, Mission D'Ollone, p. 276.
74. Molé, "Les Kubrawiya . . ." The following discussion is based on Molé's work.
75. See also Molé, Les Mystiques etc., p. 117.
78. Arslan, p. 286.
80. Chan, p. 194.
81. HMCI IV, p. 311.
82. The statement was recorded in Mission D'Ollone, p. 276.
83. Arslan, p. 236. This author may have drawn his information from D'Ollone and confused the terms in the process.

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89. Shorter Encyclopedia etc., p. 650.
90. The reference here is probably made to Shi'ite Hadith, which were related to the Prophet through isnads (transmission chains) unacceptable to the Sunna.
94. Corbin, p. 46.
95. Laoust, p. 43.
96. Lewis, The Assassins etc., p. 27. The following discussion is based mainly on this work.
97. Ibid, pp. 24, 73.
98. Laoust, pp. 45-7.
99. Tso, Memorials.
100. Lewis, The Assassins etc., p. 27.
101. Ibid, p. 29.
102. Da'wa jadida (New Preaching), initiated by Hasan as-Sabbah, as opposed to the Old Preaching, which failed with the dismemberment of the Fatimid Empire. See Lewis, The Assassins etc., pp. 37, 62.
103. Lewis, The Assassins etc., p. 44.
104. Sura XIV: 106: "If anyone is compelled to confess unbelief with his tongue, while his heart contradicts him, in order to escape his enemies, no blame shall fall on him, because Allah takes his servants as their hearts believe."
105. Shorter Encyclopedia etc., p. 561.
107. Lewis, The Assassins etc., p. 25.
108. Molé, Les Mystiques etc., p. 79.
109. J. Williams, p. 216.
110. Shorter Encyclopedia etc., p. 562.
111. J. Williams, p. 218.
112. See, for example, Lewis, The Assassins etc., pp. 53-4.
115. W. A. Saunders, VIII, 1934, p. 69.
NOTES

116. Ibid.
117. Hartmann.
119. Ting, p. 363.
120. D'Ollone claims that this was the term used for the New Sect in Yunnan, p. 275.
121. Qadiriya is the oldest Sufi order, which was established well before the Naqshbandiya. D'Ollone, *Mission D'Ollone*, p. 276.
122. The term has been explained by D'Ollone as “religion des tombeaux” (p. 316). It may have derived from qubur (the Arabic word for tombs), or, as Prof. Algar suggested, from gumbet (the Turkish word for domed tombs).
124. Tawadu', p. 117.
125. The Bektashiya, said to be an offshoot of the Yasawi order, was fully established at the end of the fifteenth century in Anatolia, and was a peculiar syncretism connected with esoteric Shi'ism. Some of their ritual is believed to have much in common with popular Christianity. They disregarded Muslim cult duties, such as prayer, and they attained political prominence due to their connections with the Janissaries. See Gibb, *Mohammedan*, pp. 159-60; also *Shorter Encyclopedia* etc., pp. 61-2.

Chapter XIV:

2. Wilson, p. 484.
3. See Phase I, Chapter VI.
5. Wolff, p. 36p: secret societies, in the strict sense, exclude everybody who is not explicitly included.
7. These and some of the following remarks are based on *Shorter Encyclopedia* etc., pp. 310-3.
9. Ibid. p. 156.
NOTES

13. Mélé, Les Mystiques etc., p. 82.
17. For example, see Hasan, pp. 149-69.
18. See Phase I, Chapter VI.
19. Mélé, Les Mystiques etc., p. 82.
22. Ibid, p. 74.
25. In the previous chapter, that hesitation was explained in terms of a form of taqiyah, a simulation, to put the enemy in disarray.
27. Chu, Ch’ing Policy etc., p. 350.
29. Ibid.
30. See Phase II, Chapter III, especially Tso’s memorials cited therein.
33. W. A. Saunders, p. 69.
34. Tso, Memorials, No. 29, p. 30.
35. Po, p. 347.
37. W. A. Saunders, p. 69, says that when he visited Kansu in 1934 to inquire about Islamic sects, he found the “Tomb of Ma Hua-lung, the founder of the sect that bears his name…”
38. Chu, Muslim Rebellions etc., p. 142.
41. Shih, p. 475.
NOTES

42. Iliouchetchkine, pp. 117, 130.
43. Dunstheimer.
44. The equity and happiness alluded to in the writings of Chinese and Muslim movements are strikingly similar. For Muslims, see Hollister, pp. 47, 93; and J. Williams, p. 214. For the Chinese, see Shih, p. 359; and Chesnaux, p. 69.
45. See Phase I, Chapter VI.
47. HMCI IV, p. 305. The name was written: 
48. Creel, p. 117.
50. Fitzgerald, p. 113.
51. Levenson and Schurmann, p. 128.
53. Chesnaux, p. 442.
55. It carries no particular meaning.
56. For the discussion of some aspects of this matter, see Chu, Ch'ing Policy etc., pp. 344-5.
58. See Phase I, Chapter V.
59. Shorter Encyclopedia etc., p. 89. See also Levy, pp. 194-254.
63. Da'i (preacher or summoner) is part of the Isma'ili hierarchy. The organization and activities of the sect, and the custodianship and propagation of its teachings, were in the hands of the da'is, ranked under one Chief Da'i, Da'i ad-du'at, the immediate helper of the Imam. See Lewis, The Assassins etc., pp. 24, 34.
64. Hollister, p. 263.
65. Algar.
67. J. Williams, pp. 200-4.
69. Rihani, p. 25.
70. Rentz, Introduction
71. Rihani, p. 28.
73. K. Williams, p. 33.
74. Raymond.
76. The full story of the growing power of Ibn Sa'ud and his descendants may be found in Philby.
77. Burckhardt, p. 176.
78. K. Williams, pp. 208-9.
80. Rentz, p. 140.
81. Bammate, p. 525.
82. Mas'ud (1734-1752); Musa'id (1752-1770). See Rentz, p. 175.
83. Rentz, pp. 176-81.
84. Ibid, pp. 258-300.
85. See Phase I, Chapter IX.
86. The most comprehensive work on this subject is Q. Ahmad.
87. A. Ahmad, pp. 209-10.
88. Ibid, p. 201.
89. Q. Ahmad, pp. 332-3.
90. B. Metcalf, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Chapter I.
91. Titus, p. 191.
92. Ibid, p. 189.
93. Hunter, p. 5.
95. Shorter Encyclopedia etc., p. 621.
96. Hunter, Appendix II. The full text of the decision of the North Indian Muslims to condemn the Jihad is printed there.
97. Titus, p. 190.
98. Taylor, pp. 31-2.
99. A. Ahmad, pp. 182-90.
NOTES

100. Taylor, pp. 31-2.

101. For details see Ting, pp. 362-3; and Chan, pp. 192-3.


103. According to Fletcher, Ma Ming-hsin returned from Central Asia and Arabia in 1761.

104. According to Tso Tsung-t’ang, Ma “returned from Western Countries and Arabia in 1781” (Memorials).

105. See Saguchi.

106. Tso, Memorials.

107. In Ch’ien-lung’s Edict of 1782, Su Ssu-shih-san was mentioned as the actual leader of the rebellion. Ford documents.

108. Ford documents.


110. Cited by Chu, Ch’ing Policy etc., p. 348.

Chapter XV:

1. This is an inversion of Edmund Burke’s famous dictum: “Kings will be tyrants in policy, when subjects are rebels from principle.” (Reflections on the Revolution in France.)


4. See Chapter IV, note 102.

5. McGregor, p. 73.

6. The terms are Lattimore’s; see Part I, Chapter VI, note 34.

7. This discussion is based on Fletcher, “China . . .”

8. See Part II, Chapter I above.
Chinese sources relating to Islam in China, and Arabic sources written by Chinese Muslims, constitute a peculiar and complex problem. In the first category, we find numerous Arabic terms and titles, which when transliterated into phonetic monosyllabic Chinese characters, are at times hard to decipher. For example, terms such as "She-le-erh-ti", "Tse-k'o-te" or "Je-he-lin-ye", respectively meaning "Shar'ia", "Zakat" and "Jahriyya", are at times given to different interpretations, which can come to a wide gamut of meanings, unless the specific meaning can be pinned down. In the second category, i.e. Arabic sources written by Chinese Muslims, some words, especially names of persons and places, are written in Chinese characters within the Arabic texts, while others are written in Arabic script but carry no meaning either in Arabic or in Persian. They must be either transliterations of Chinese words or expressions drawn from local dialect, but not necessarily Chinese or Arabic. Arabic and Arabic-script written documents are scarce, but Chinese sources written by Chinese Muslims or related to them are to be found in abundance. It is in this category that I wish to elaborate in some detail.

1. The Hui-min-ch'i-i (HMCI) is by far the most comprehensive collection of Chinese documents and other materials relating to the Muslim rebellions in China. Even though the collection covers only four rebellions which occurred within a period of 25 years (1854-78), it provides a large variety of documents, bound in four volumes, amounting to about 2000 pp. of Chinese characters. The first two volumes pertain to the Yunnan Rebellion (1855-73), with the exception of one item containing materials in the Kweichow Uprising (1854-73). The other two volumes cover the Kweichow, Kansu and Sinkiang Uprisings (1854-1878). Besides reprints of well-known materials, such as excerpts from local gazeteers providing accounts of local campaigns, and selections from published papers of Imperial officials, the collection abounds in other less-known materials such as documents engraved on stones, and documents from Moslem sources. The latter are of particular importance because they state the case for the Muslim viewpoint, in contrast to the Chinese view as reflected in Imperial or official documents. The Muslim documents contain also very important information related to the Muslim State organization set-up in Yunnan in the course of the Muslim Rebellion there. These documents include lists of officials, laws and regulations, public works, political decrees, etc. Other important Muslim materials are post-factum reports written either by old eye-witnesses who had lived through the rebellions, or by biographers of the prominent figures of the rebellions.

The collection, although edited by an eminent Chinese Muslim historian, Pai Shou-i, under the Communist Chinese regime, has nevertheless many shortcomings, stemming mainly from the communist historical concept of the editor. In fact, historiography has persistently considered rebellions in Imperial China (Taip-
CHINESE SOURCE MATERIALS

ing, Boxers and Muslims) as "class struggles" between peasants and the landlord ruling class. The editor had, accordingly, to interpret Muslim Rebellions as a form of class struggle among the Chinese people. Moreover, the editor, being committed to take the rebels' side, either may have excluded from the collection important materials bearing evidence contrary to his concept, or added apologetic introductory notes to documents that seemed to prove the Imperial Government's case. Therefore, the editor, despite his reputation as an historian and an expert on Moslem affairs, cannot claim objectivity (who can?) either in his choice of the materials or in the judgements he delivers on materials that he did include in the collection. The very title of the collection "The Rightful Muslim Uprising", implies his obvious a-priori bias. As a whole, however, the HMCI, if read with care, provides much valuable information not only about the Muslim rebellions in nineteenth-century China, but also about the Muslim community in China in general.

2. P'ing-ting Yun-nan Hui-fei Fang-Lueh (a Strategy for the Pacification of Muslim Rebels in Yunnan) in 5 volumes, is a collection of government documents on the suppression of Muslim Rebellions in Yunnan. One fifth of this collection was included in HMCI, Vol. I, whose editor admits (Vol. I, p. 304) that omissions of some government documents from his collection were based on his subjective judgement. The lacunae in this collection, occasioned by its official nature, are in part filled by a collection of Records of Yunnan Muslims, compiled by Ma Sheng-feng, a native of Yunnan (1874-1935) who, through the Yunnan Muslim Advance-ment Association, collected materials and especially reports from elders who told the compiler what they knew, saw or recorded about the Yunnan Rebellion. Many of these stories were reprinted in the HMCI, some of them are of great importance, such as a memoir written by a Muslim who was a close associate of Ma Ju-lung, one of the rebel leaders.

3. "Ford Documents" - Mr. Joseph Ford, of Wimbledon, England, who has been studying Chinese Muslims, for many years, kindly brought to my attention and made available to me Chinese source materials that he drew mainly from two sources:


b. T'ien-fang Chih-sheng Shih-lu (Biography of the Highest Saint of Arabia), compiled by Liu Chih, the most prolific Chinese Muslim author. The book was published in 1770.

Mr. Ford has translated these and many other documents related to Chinese Muslims. I made only slight alterations to his translated text, which could hardly be improved upon. I have been informed recently by Mr. Ford that his translations are about to be published in print.

4. A great deal of Chinese Muslim materials are known by their titles only, through different compilations made by Westerners. The most comprehensive
bibliography of this sort was compiled and published by Dr. Claude Pickens of Annisquam, Mass., who had spent many years in China during the 1930s and 1940s as a missionary, and became intimately familiar with Chinese Muslims and their writings. His compilation is now under revision and will be published when completed. I should like to refer here to other compilations of this sort, some of them are quoted in this book.

a. Captain D'Ollone's Report of his Mission to China at the beginning of this century, lists 36 works of Chinese Muslims, which he traced. (See pp. 393-417 of his Mission d'Ollone). Some of them are available in Western libraries, but most of them are apparently extant only in the possession of Chinese Muslims in Mainland China.

b. Rev. Mr. Ogilvie lists 94 titles of books and magazines, some of them from the post-1911 period (See Muslim World, VIII, 1918, pp. 74-78).

c. Rev. I. Mason lists more than 300 titles, many of them tracts and journals from the republican era (See Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, LVl, 1925, pp. 175-215).

d. A. Vissière, in his Etudes Sino-Mahometanes, 2 vol., published in 1911, picks up D'Ollone's list but gives very valuable excerpts of the books themselves. Some titles and quotations used in the present book are taken, as indicated, from his compilation.

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