This is not just another book on Tibet. The need for it is amply justified not only by my warning given in two of my articles published in the Statesman as far back as April, 1960, but also by the humiliating position in which the country has found itself as a result of its betrayal of Tibet and of Chinese expansionism. It can never be too late to own mistakes and to forge a national policy to the end that the country’s territorial integrity is restored. It is in this hope that I venture to present this book to the public.

I am grateful to Mr. N. L. Emmerson for reading the galley proofs, to Mr. Sisir Kumar Mukherjea, Barrister-at-Law, for reading the revised page proofs and for helping me in the preparation of the Index, to Mr. Khenchung Tara, formerly of Lhasa, for lending me Tibetan passports, coins as well as currency notes, to Mr. S. Chatterjee, Barrister-at-Law, for lending me Tibetan postal stamps, to my Secretary Mr. S. Ghosh, whose help in the preparation of the manuscript was invaluable, and to Mr. Biram Mukherjea for his help in piloting the book through the press.

Bar Library Club,  
High Court, Calcutta.  
May, 1964.

J. P. Mitter
POSTSCRIPT

This book was with the binders in its final phase of production when I received the sad news of Mr. Nehru's passing away. I immediately held up the work to accommodate this postscript. Had he been alive I would not have apologised for a line of what I have written as I knew Mr. Nehru to be a man of sufficient stature to accept even the severest criticism in the spirit in which it was made. I held him responsible for the Betrayal of Tibet and equally considered him to be the one person who could reverse our dangerous and humiliating policy towards that country. But now that this man of destiny is no more, I feel compelled to soften my attack upon him by explaining why I made it at all. Tibet is still and will always be a matter of grave concern to us. No policy that allows the Chinese to be paramount in this once acknowledged buffer country, will ever be in the interest of India. However misguided our Tibetan policy under the late Prime Minister may have been, however much we closed our eyes to the danger of Chinese expansionism in the interest of a non-existent Chini-Hindi brotherhood, I believe it to be of utmost importance now that we revise our policy and recognise Tibet for what it is, an independent country with a right to its own salvation. Ironically there was no greater champion of a people's right to independence than the late Prime Minister. It was he who guaranteed the entity of our tribal people and upheld the status of our Himalayan neighbours Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, besides defending the cause of oppressed people everywhere. Now a new Prime Minister, new advisers
and new ideals will shape the destiny not only of this country but of our immediate neighbours, among them Tibet. To them as inheritors of Mr. Nehru's policy, of his successes and his failures, I dedicate this book.

J. P. Mitter

Calcutta, May 30, 1964
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MAP

Map of McMahon Line
CHAPTER I

CHINESE SPRING BOARD

Tibet has been used as a base for mounting the Chinese offensive against India. Yet our ignorance of the Tibetans, their Government and their relations with China was lately so profound that what the Chinese said about Tibet was credulously accepted. We have also displayed crass ignorance about the Chinese, both past and present. To appreciate the nature and extent of the Chinese aggression, first against Tibet and then against India, and how it came about, one must have accurate knowledge of the conditions obtaining in Tibet during the last fifty years.

Tibet lies roughly between the 28th and 36th parallels of north latitude and 79th and 99th of east longitude. Its area in 1950 was about 500,000 square miles. It stretches for 2,000 miles along the northern frontier of India and for over 500 miles in the north-west. Estimates about population vary widely. The Chinese official estimate in 1951 was 3½ million. Communist China has recently published the figure as 1,274,969.

Tibetans are not Chinese. For many years China claimed Tibet as part of the Chinese Empire on the ground that the Tibetans were one of the five races who composed the Empire, the others being the Chinese, the Mongolians, the Manchus and the Mohamadans. Later Chiang Kai-shek, on realising that the Atlantic Charter would open the door to Tibetan independence, shifted his ground and took the line that the Tibetans and the Chinese were of the same race. The Tibetans cannot truthfully be described as Chinese people, either historically or ethnologically.
For 2,000 years or more, the Chinese themselves have regarded the Tibetans as a separate race. Physical Anthropologists, such as Turner, Morant, Risley and Buxton, hold that the Tibetans are a different race. Hair, eyes and colour of skin have been considered from the seventeenth century onwards to be distinctive racial characteristics. The Tibetan crania have been carefully studied by Turner and subsequently by Morant. Risley made measurements in the living. Turner says that there is a dolichocephalic race in Tibet. Warriors or fighting class in Kham are instances. The round-headed people constitutes the main stock—the Lamas. Among the Tibetan monks, whom Buxton examined, both classes could be seen, but the long-headed type attracts the attention most. Long-heads are the ‘warrior’ type, short-heads the ‘priestly’ type. Morant has also confirmed the existence of two types. According to these authorities, Tibetans belong to a tall dolichocephalic race of considerable antiquity. They had been previously called Proto-Nordics. Here again, in Tibet you find the same stock—tall, long-headed, big-boned and quite distinct from the “yellow man”. Therefore, the irresistible conclusion is that the Tibetans cannot, with scientific accuracy, be described as a Chinese people.*

The Tibetan language and script are entirely different from those of the Chinese. The Tibetan script was borrowed from India in the 7th century and resembles the northern-Gupta script of that period.

The Tibetans are civilized, if medieval. The country was governed on the feudal system. They had a well-organised administration, completely different from the Chinese. The Dalai Lama is the spiritual and temporal

*The Peoples of Asia, L.H.O. Buxton.
ruler of Tibet and his influence extends far beyond Tibet's political boundary.

Wherever the Dalai Lama and his 'Kashag' (principal Executive Body of the Tibetan Government) are physically present, they constitute the legitimate and lawful Government of Tibet. Since they embraced Buddhism, the Tibetan nation turned its face away from military matters and abjured violence and devoted most of their time to prayer and meditation. Nearly one-third of the male population are Lamas. The Tibetans are easy-going, kindly, cheerful and a contented people. All that they and their Government wanted was to lead their own life peacefully and never bothered about what other people thought of the status of their Government and country. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama on return to Lhasa in 1912 declared and reiterated Tibet's independence and concluded a treaty with Mongolia. For the next 22 years he was the absolute ruler of Tibet. There was no Chinese influence; indeed not a single Chinese then lived in Tibet. Only occasionally a few Chinese traders visited Tibet. During this period the relationship between the Government of India and the Tibetan Government was cordial. In 1917, the Governor of Szechwan, General P'eng, commenced hostilities against Tibet. The Tibetans, in alarm, appealed to the Government of India for supply of more arms. The Government of India allowed them a quantity of ammunition. The Chinese were vanquished and an armistice was signed at Rongbatsa in August, 1918.

The Younghusband Mission reached Lhasa on August 3, 1904, nearly a hundred years after Thomas Manning, the only Englishman, until that date, who had seen Lhasa. The most-hidden city on earth was unveiled. It is a convenient date from which to begin an examination of the political history of Tibet in the first half of this
century. That day, the Manchu Amban, Yu-t'ai, paid an official call on the British Commissioner. The fact that Yu-t'ai called on Younghusband before Younghusband called on him was an acknowledgment of loss of face. Of him, Younghusband wrote: "We found him to be practically a prisoner and almost without enough to eat, as the Tibetans had prevented supplies of money from reaching him and he had actually to borrow money from us."* China's power and prestige in Tibet were at a low ebb. It was manifest that Tibet was functioning as an independent country. Yu-t'ai in a telegram to Peking despatched after a Tibetan reverse expressed the hope that another British victory would bring about 'a favourable turn in the situation'. He also hoped that the British would successfully overawe the Tibetans. Such was the state of affairs in Lhasa.

The Lhasa Convention was signed on the 7th of September, 1904, without any reference to the Chinese Central Government or the Amban. Thereby, the British Indian Government acknowledged Tibet's capacity to enter into international engagements and treated her as an independent country. It is important to remember that "the making of treaties is one of the oldest and most characteristic exercises of independence or sovereignty on the part of States. The right of entering into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty."†

The second treaty between the British and the Tibetan Governments was signed in Simla in July, 1914, notwithstanding the Chinese refusal to sign the Tripartite Convention. This was a clear acknowledgment that Tibet was a sovereign power.

Reports in contemporary papers throw interesting light

† The Law of Treaties (1961), Lord McNair, p. 35.
on the relations between China and Tibet. Reuter's correspondent from Peking on the 6th of July, 1914, reported that the Tripartite Conference between British India, China and Tibet had broken up as the Chinese Plenipotentiary could not agree on the question of boundary between Tibet and China.* On the 7th of July, the Associated Press of India reported that the Chinese attitude throughout had been very obstructive and unreasonable, but that the general results of the Conference had been satisfactory as regards Tibet and India.

Thereafter, Mr. Ivan Chen, the Chinese Plenipotentiary, left Simla and arrived in Calcutta on 13th of July, 1914, on his way to China and during his short stay in Calcutta, on the 17th of July, 1914, the Chinese community in Calcutta gave a Dinner to him and Mr. Chen stated in his speech that his countrymen had no intention whatever of annexing any Tibetan territory. They only desired permission to settle down amicably and to have a share in the trade in the country. Certain objections being raised, those assembled at the Simla Conference failed to bring about a peaceful acceptance. He was now going to China where he would lay the whole matter before the Government making certain suggestions to them which he believed would in a measure smooth over the difficulty.†

On August 2, all trade between China and Tibet was formally stopped between the two countries by the Tibetan Government and it was followed by acts of retaliation by the Chinese against the Tibetan residents in the frontier towns.

The Calcutta English Daily of the time, The Englishman, in an Editorial on Monday, July 13, 1914, comment-

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* The Englishman (Calcutta), July 7 and July 8, 1914.
† The Englishman, July 18, 1914.
ed on a speech of Sir Edward Grey, the then British Foreign Secretary, on the Chinese intransigence:

Sir Edward Grey has been so mild mannered of late with the countries that have fallen into the habit of treading on British corns, that it is quite refreshing to read his warning to China. This follows, of course, the break up of the Simla Conference, which had been trying for the last nine months to define the future character of the relations between Tibet and China. Britain’s attitude has been clear throughout. She recognizes Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and the fact that both Great Britain and Russia have solemnly undertaken not to interfere in Tibet makes that suzerainty secure. But when a few years ago, China began pouring troops in Tibet with the object of asserting Chinese sovereignty, Great Britain pointed out that she could not consent to this in the case of a State enjoying independent treaty relations with her. While the negotiations have been going on in Simla, China, so far as can be gathered, has to some extent, at all events, withdrawn from military enterprise in Tibet, but the break up of the Conference has revived the fear that China will again march into Tibet with forces, whose past record in warfare in that region has made their name a terror to the inhabitants. We know what this will mean. Tibet will be plunged once more into a state of desperate fear and unrest and that part of the Indian border line which is affected by Tibetan disturbances will be restless and troublesome. We cannot tolerate this any more than we can tolerate China ruling in absolute sovereignty at Lhasa. The nearer China with its restless hordes comes to India, the greater will be the peril to the peace of India. There are, moreover, certain boundary questions that need to be settled and that quickly. Recent operations and explorations in Aborland and on the
Burmese frontier have disclosed the disquieting extent of Chinese penetration. It is necessary, therefore, that the British Foreign Minister should use plain and strong words to China. But China, the doubtful Republic, is no less dilatory in these matters than the old China of the Manchus. Dilatory tactics, however, should not turn the Foreign Office from its purpose. It would be intolerable to allow matters to grow from bad to worse while the Chinese Ministers are trying to make up their minds. Sir Edward Grey must, therefore, be prepared to act. The nature of the action, it would be premature to discuss; but it must be swift, sure and determined.

The firm attitude of the British to the Chinese claims with regard to Tibet during this period is furnished by the following memorandum of the American Legation in Peking:

The American Minister to the Secretary of State

AMERICAN LEGATION

Peking, August 31, 1912.

From the Foreign Office I learn that on the 17th instant the British minister presented a memorandum that recognizes China's suzerainty, not sovereignty, over Tibet; objects to Chinese action during the last three years in interfering in the internal affairs of Tibet; declares this interference to be opposed to the spirit of the 1906 treaty, which demands joint action by Great Britain and China; and declares that until China agrees to these demands the British Government cannot recognize the Republic and will forbid the entrance of Chinese into Tibet via India.

—Calhoun*

But for this resolute attitude the Chinese might well have overrun Tibet.

In spite of the break-up of the Simla Conference, the armed truce between China and Tibet continued, the troops on both sides holding their respective positions in Eastern Tibet. From time to time the Chinese General of Szechuan Province endeavoured to negotiate direct with the Tibetan Government by threats and promises that, unless the Tibetans came to terms with the Chinese, the Chinese would advance and devastate the land. Once the Chinese General wrote, "I will not leave even a dog or a chicken alive in the country."

The Associated Press of India reported on 8th of October, 1914: "Violent fighting appears to be in progress on the Sino-Tibetan frontier. The Tibet Government is now rapidly recruiting fresh levies from Chumbi Valley and the people are cheerfully responding to the call to arms."* When, however, the Great War broke out, the Dalai Lama, in spite of his own needs, immediately offered a thousand Tibetan soldiers to fight on the British side. He further ordered that special services for the success of the British arms should be offered in the main monasteries throughout Tibet.

The following further events confirm that Tibet continued to be an independent country:

1. There was a boundary dispute between Tibet and India in respect of some place in Tehri Garwal. In 1926 a Boundary Commission, consisting of representatives of Tibet and the Government of India, met at Nilang to settle the border dispute. It is significant that China was not represented at this Boundary Commission. This is a clear indication that the Government of India recognised

* The Englishman, October 8, 1914.
the Tibetan Government as having the capacity to settle the frontier dispute in negotiation with other states, without any reference to China.

Nilang is a small village—10 days’ march from Dehra Dun towards the north-east. It was here that Heinrich Harrer, author of “Seven Years in Tibet”, who escaped from Dehra Dun prison camp, was apprehended during his first attempt to escape from India across the Himalayas.

2. The next event of great importance in Tibetan history is the passing away of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama on Sunday the 17th of December, 1933. On the 19th of December, Sir Charles Bell, his wife and daughter were having tea with Mr. David MacDonald in the Himalayan Hotel in Kalimpong, when Sir Charles Bell was informed of the Dalai Lama’s death. He sent a telegram of condolence to the Tibetan Prime Minister and another telegram to the Tibetan Cabinet. In their replies, they said that they were “holding services with religious offerings and prayers for a speedy Reincarnation.” The Tibetan Government replied: “Conducting all foreign and internal affairs as before.”* The significance of this telegram is that Tibet continued to function as an independent country. The conduct of foreign affairs is indicative of the independence of a country.

3. In 1934, a Chinese mission arrived in Lhasa to offer condolence on the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and was permitted to stay in Tibet on the same footing as the missions from the Government of Nepal and from the Government of India.

4. During the Sino-Japanese war of 1936-45, Tibet observed strict neutrality. Normally a suzerain’s war is

*Portrait of the Dalai Lama (1946), Sir Charles Bell, p. 383.
the war of the 'vassal' state. Such was not the case here.

5. In February, 1941, differences between the Chinese and the Tibetans arose. Early in 1941, Chiang Kai-shek gave orders for the building of a road from south-west Szechuan across a corner of south-east Tibet into Assam, via the Lohit valley for supplying war materials. The Government of India suggested to China that Tibetan consent should be secured before any such project was undertaken. The British mission in Tibet approached the Lhasa Government, but it met with a firm refusal. Notwithstanding this refusal, Chiang Kai-shek sent a survey party to the Tibetan border and, when it tried to enter the country, it was turned back by the Tibetan troops. Surreptitious road building through foreign territory is not a new thing for the Chinese. Perhaps the lesson of this refusal by the Lhasa Government to build the supply route through south-eastern Tibet influenced Communist China to build a road through Aksai Chin without seeking any permission from the Government of India. Chinese infiltration to Aksai Chin might well have been frustrated had India been astute enough to prevent it by continuing the old Consulate at Kashgar in Sinkiang, as had been suggested by Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, who had been the Secretary General to the External Affairs Ministry.

6. In February 1942, Chiang Kai-shek visited India and again approached the Government of India on the subject of a supply route through Tibet. The Tibetan Government, however, firmly refused to allow China to construct any road but, at the request of the Government of India, agreed to the transport of essential supplies by mules. Tibet, however, declined to allow any military stores to go through Tibet. All this clearly demonstrates that China had no suzerainty over Tibet and that the Chinese claim that Tibet was an integral part of China
was fictitious. It must also be pointed out that the Tibetans refused to have Chinese officials in the country and declined to have direct dealings with the Chinese without British participation. For the Chinese it was a great loss of face. To avoid the crisis of transport through Tibet, the Government of the United States was approached to take an active interest in the relations between China and Tibet.

Early in 1942 the United States Government wanted to send two army officers, Captain Ilia Tolstoy and Lieutenant Brooke Dolan, to Tibet on a mission to examine the supply route. The United States Government failed to obtain their entry into Tibet through the Chinese. An extract from a letter from the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) to the Secretary of State shows that thereafter they had to secure permission for these two officers to enter into Tibet through the Government of India.

Washington
July 2, 1942.

My dear Mr. Secretary,

Two of our men, Captain Ilia Tolstoy and Lieutenant Brooke Dolan, are being sent on a mission via India and Tibet to General Stilwell (Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in China, Burma and India) in China.

This office, therefore, requests that the State Depart- ment should instruct the head of its diplomatic mission in New Delhi, India, to expedite the obtaining of a permit from the British authorities in India for Ilia Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan to enter Tibet, by way of India, and to be allowed freedom of travel in Tibet in so far as the British are able to grant it without the necessity of returning to India.

*   *   *

We are keeping this project most secret and we feel it
desirable to avoid any mention of the military status of these two men in any negotiations.

William J. Donovan.*

On the 3rd of July, 1942, the Secretary of the State wrote to President Roosevelt, that if the President gave a letter of introduction to the Dalai Lama of Tibet, it would greatly facilitate permission to enter Tibet through India and the President accordingly wrote the following letter to the Dalai Lama:

Washington
July 3, 1942.

Your Holiness,

Two of my fellow countrymen, Ilia Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan, hope to visit your Pontificate and the historic and widely famed city of Lhasa. There are in the United States of America many persons, among them myself, who, long and greatly interested in your land and people, would highly value such an opportunity.

As you know, the people of the United States, in association with those of 27 other countries, are now engaged in a war which has been thrust upon the world by nations bent on conquest who are intent upon destroying freedom of thought, of religion, and of action everywhere. The United Nations are fighting today in defense of and for preservation of freedom, confident that we shall be victorious because our cause is just, our capacity is adequate, and our determination is unshakable.

I am asking Ilia Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan to convey to you a little gift in token of my friendly sentiment towards you.

With cordial greetings, (etc.)
Franklin D. Roosevelt.

7. A further point of some considerable importance is that Chinese missions to Lhasa usually preferred not to

proceed overland from China, and were thus compelled to proceed via India and required a transit visa from the British authorities. Such applications were granted or refused according to the wishes of the Tibetan Government.

8. While Great Britain, the United States and China were considering the question of a supply route from India into China, on the 7th of August, 1942, the British Foreign Office wrote to the American Embassy in London:

"In fact the Tibetans not only claim to be but actually are an independent people, and they have in recent years fought successfully to maintain their freedom against Chinese attempts at domination. Their distinct racial, political, religious and linguistic characteristics would seem to entitle them, therefore, to the benefits of Chapter IV, paragraph 2 of the memorandum."

This fictitious claim of the Chinese having suzerain authority over Tibet could not even secure them the right of transit through the territory of the so-called "vassal". After this event, the United States correspondence with Tibetan authorities was conducted on the footing that Tibet was an independent country. The Lhasa Government protested against American aircraft flying over Tibet. Therefore, the United States Government assured Tibet that American aircraft had been ordered not to fly over Tibetan territory in future. These events led to a restatement of the British attitude towards Tibet which ought to leave no doubt that the British Government treated Tibet as a de facto independent country and would not recognise nominal Chinese suzerainty over

Tibet, unless the prescribed conditions were fulfilled by the Chinese.

The events of 1943 have shown that the Tibetan Government could and did follow a course of action completely independent of the Government of China. At about this time, the Chinese Government sought clarification of the British position and Sir Anthony Eden in a memorandum to Mr. T. V. Soong, the Chinese Foreign Minister, pointed out that Tibet had enjoyed de facto independence since 1911 and that the British Government had always been prepared to recognize nominal Chinese suzerainty over Tibet only on the understanding that Tibet was regarded as autonomous.

No foreigner was allowed to enter or travel in Tibet without a permit from the Tibetan Foreign Bureau. Capt. M. S. Wellby obtained a passport from China to travel through Tibet in 1898. He tried to enter Tibet through Rudok. The Tibetans stopped him and turned him back as the Chinese passport had no validity with the Tibetan Authorities.*

In 1948, Professor Tucci visited Tibet before the Communist occupation of Tibet. Professor Tucci mentions that two United States citizens whose application had been warmly supported by the Chinese Government were refused permission to enter Tibet. He sought permission for three of his companions to travel with him. The Tibetan Government declined to give them the necessary permits and Professor Tucci received the following telegram:

“As you are a Buddhist, you may stay in Tibet three months. Please cable the number of horses and beasts of burden required for yourself. We shall send your lam-yig to Yatung as soon as your cable it at hand.

* Through Unknown Tibet, M. S. Wellby, pp. 19 & 47.
As to your three companions, we are sorry to confirm that, as several applications by foreigners to visit Tibet have been turned down, our Government can hardly grant them a permit. Please inform them.—Tibetan Foreign Bureau.*

While the 13th Dalai Lama was in Darjeeling between 1910 and 1912, he decided to send a few Tibetan boys to England for education, in order that on their return they might introduce such Western accomplishments as would be beneficial. Soon after his return to Lhasa in 1913, the Dalai Lama selected Mondo, Rimshi Kyipup, Gongkar and Ringang, 4 boys from good families, aged 12 to 15. In the spring of that year these boys accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. Lung-shar, a Tibetan official, travelled to England on passports issued by the Tibetan Government. Mr. B. J. Gould, i.c.s., accompanied the party.

In 1948, a Tibetan Trade Mission travelled with its passport issued by the Government of Tibet, which was accepted as a valid document by the Governments of India, Pakistan, Iran, Great Britain, France, Switzerland and the United States etc. This is clear recognition of the independent status of Tibet.

Madame Alexandra David-Neel, who had travelled extensively in Tibet, arrived at Gyantse in August, 1923. She said, “Britain had no authority to deny the nationals of other power’s right to travel in Tibet, which is completely an independent country. Measures adopted by the Government of India for regulating entry into Tibet are in accordance with the wishes of Tibetan Government.”†

A very striking evidence of Tibetan independence is given in July, 1949, when the Tibetan Government asked

* To Lhasa and Beyond, Giuseppe Tucci, p. 19.
† Twenty Years in Tibet, David McDonald, pp. 288 & 290.
the whole of the Chinese official mission at Lhasa and some Chinese traders to leave Tibet.

The foregoing facts are sufficient to show that Tibet was completely independent from 1912 to 1950. Confirmation that Tibet was independent is also forthcoming from numerous personages, who were in Tibet and China:

1. Sir Erich Teichman in his *Affairs of China* wrote, "since 1912 no vestige of Chinese authority has survived or re-appeared in Tibet.

2. Sir Charles Bell in *People of Tibet* pointed out that Chinese authority in Tibet had ceased and that the Tibetans did not regard themselves as subservient to the Chinese.

3. Tsung-lien Shen and Shen-chi Lien, both members of the Chinese mission in Lhasa, have said that since 1911 Lhasa has, for all practical purposes, enjoyed full independence.

4. Mr. M. Amaury de Riencourt was in Lhasa in 1947 and has stated, "Tibet ruled itself in all respects as an independent nation." At the time that he was there, "the Government's writ ran everywhere, people were law-abiding, peace and order reigned in Tibet."

5. Mr. H. E. Richardson of the British mission who resided in Tibet from 1936-40 and 1946-50 has stated, "until the Communist invasion in 1950, Tibet enjoyed full de facto independence.

6. Mr. Heinrich Harrer and Robert Ford, who were employed by the Lhasa Government, make no mention of Chinese authority in Tibet, while they were there prior to invasion.

The Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet in a Report to the International Commission of Jurists also supported the contention that Tibet was independent:
It is therefore the view of the Legal Inquiry Committee that through the period 1912-1950 the Government of Tibet exercised exclusive authority in domestic affairs within its territory, that it successfully defended its territory against attack under colour of a claim to sovereignty and that vis-a-vis the Republic of China no act was committed or declaration made that compromised its internal independence. It is, therefore, considered that there was an effective government in Tibet, which owed no subservience whatsoever in internal affairs. It remains to be considered whether the government was similarly free from subservience in its conduct of foreign affairs.*

If a capacity to conduct foreign relations be the deciding factor of Tibet's statehood it is difficult in the light of British relations with Tibet since 1913 to resist the conclusion that British policy was based on the direct conduct of relations with the Government of Tibet, that Government was in no way subject to the direction of China in foreign affairs, and there is no indication that Tibet was acting under any authority delegated by China.

In the view of the Legal Inquiry Committee the relations between Great Britain, India and Tibet from 1913 to 1950 lead to the conclusion that the practice of the two former countries was to deal with Tibet as an independent State.

CHAPTER II

SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS

Chinese aggression on the frontiers of India demonstrates forcefully that peace bought at the sacrifice of a principle and the surrender or abandonment of a small or weak country cannot bring lasting peace. The troubles on India's frontiers are the inevitable consequences of acquiescence in Chinese aggression against Tibet in October, 1950.

Strictly speaking, India's north-eastern boundary does not meet Chinese territory at any point. A cursory glance at any map of Tibet and India will show that the north-eastern boundary of India ends a considerable distance away to the west of Chamdo in Kham Province of Tibet. In Ladakh the international boundary was confirmed as far back as 1842 by a treaty to which China was a signatory. For more than a century 2,500 miles of India's borders have been peaceful. The reasons for this tranquillity were the forbidding mountainous terrain of the Himalayas and the existence of an independent peace-loving Tibet. Owing to the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950, this natural line of defence is no longer impregnable.

Since the establishment of a Communist regime on the mainland of China, the Chinese have put forward some astounding claims, for example: (a) Tibet is an integral part of China, (b) the Chinese People's Liberation Army must liberate Tibet from British and American imperialist influence and defend the frontiers of China.

On October 7, 1950, the Chinese invaded Tibet. On
October 26, 1950, the Government of India, in a Note, deplored that, notwithstanding repeated Chinese assurances to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means and negotiations, a People’s Army unit had been ordered to advance in Tibet. Back came an insolent reply on October 30, 1950, in which the Chinese reiterated that Tibet was entirely a domestic problem of China and stated that the Government of India’s attitude was affected by foreign influences hostile to China. Chinese armed forces occupied Tibet, completely subjugated the country, and forced the Tibetan Government to sign a 17-point agreement on May 23, 1951.

In the incredibly short period of four years, the Chinese Army built a number of military roads from Chengtu to Lhasa, from Sining to Lhasa and from Taklakot to Yehcheng. These roads were subsequently pushed on further south, coming within a few miles of the borders of India and Nepal. The last road passes through 100 miles of Indian territory in Ladakh. Mr. Alan Winnington, who travelled on the Chengtu-Lhasa road and then further south to Yatung, has mentioned in his book, *Tibet*, that “the road is wide enough to take two lorries passing at any point and work was still going on widening and reducing the curves. Convoys of lorries were constantly passing in both directions.”

Tibet’s volume of trade or commerce and exploitation of her natural resources do not warrant the construction of such roads, meant only for the heaviest trucks, which are in this part of the world available only to armed forces. A heavy concentration of Chinese troops, far in excess of what is required for the internal security of Tibet, synchronized with road-building and the construction of a number of air bases.

Only a very naive person would accept the ridiculous
Chinese pretext for annexing Tibet. History cannot be distorted so easily. In August, 1947, the British left India and subsequently withdrew from Burma, Malaya and Ceylon. There were no Americans anywhere in Tibet at the time.

In August, 1949, Mr. Lowell Thomas, the well-known radio commentator, and his son paid a short visit to Lhasa. This visit had no political significance. There were only five foreigners in Tibet. Two were British—a young wireless operator by the name of Ford, who was in charge of the Tibetan wireless station at Chamdo, in the province of Kham, as an employee of the Tibetan Government; and Mr. Richardson, the British representative in Lhasa, who was awaiting the arrival of his Indian counterpart.

There were two Austrians, Harrer and Aufschnaiter, who were prisoners of war in Dehra Dun during the last war; they escaped from an internment camp, went on foot across the Himalayas to Lhasa, and were employed by the Tibetan Government on an irrigation scheme. Geoffrey Bull, a Christian missionary, was travelling through Eastern Tibet. Yet Peking Radio frequently broadcast that the task of the Chinese Red Army in 1950 would be to liberate the Tibetans from imperialism.

The Tibetans did not invite the Chinese to liberate them. In this context the Chinese allegation is preposterous.

The Chinese claim on large tracts of Indian territory is based on two erroneous assumptions—that Tibet is an integral part of China, and that the former Tibetan Government entered into unequal treaties and abandoned territories which legitimately belonged to Tibet. These contentions are not tenable.

To appreciate the absurdity of the Chinese claims, it
is necessary to bear in mind the political history of Tibet, the Chinese aggression in Tibet in 1950 and the nature of the Sino-Tibetan relationship during the last 200 years.

There seems to be a great deal of misconception amongst Western and American writers with regard to the political status of Tibet. Tibet's boundary with China has varied from time to time, not her political status.

Ethnologically the Tibetans are related to the people of the steppes and deserts further to the north. Tibet has never been an integral part of China. China had no suzerainty over Tibet. Except for a brief period (1910-12) Tibet has always been an independent country and was so as late as 1950. In February 1910 a Chinese army marched into Lhasa on the pretext that their sole object was the policing of the main roads and trade marts. The Amban at Lhasa assured the Tibetan Government that fewer than 1,000 Chinese troops were entering Tibet for that purpose. In spite of this assurance, more than 2,000 troops appeared and proceeded to subvert completely the Government of the country. Wen Tsung-Yao, the junior Amban, resigned over this breach of faith.

The Chinese Government in Peking, in defence of its aggression, pointed out that troops had been sent to observe treaty obligations, and assured the British Government that under no circumstances would the political situation and status of Tibet be altered in any way. European writers and European Governments, owing to their ignorance of the nature of the relationship which existed between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperors, assumed that China had suzerainty over Tibet. This is historically incorrect. Even Chinese historians admit that before 1720 Tibet was clearly independent.
Tibet was ruled by lay kings from the seventh to the thirteenth century. Its authentic history may be said to have begun with the reign of King Son-tsen Gam Po in 620 A.D. Tibet was then one of the great military Powers in Asia. King Son-tsen Gam Po compelled the Chinese Emperor to give Princess Wen Chen in marriage to him. This king also married Bhrikuti Debi, daughter of the King of Nepal. These two princesses were devout Buddhists, and under their influence the King made Buddhism the State religion of Tibet. From the seventh to the ninth century Tibet and China were constantly at war. In the middle of the eighth century another famous Tibetan King, Ti-song De-ten, ruled Tibet. He introduced civil and criminal justice.

In the latter half of the ninth century, Tibet was ruled by King Ral-pa-chen, who introduced standard weights and measures. Twenty years later a Tibetan army overran China and a treaty was concluded which fixed Kokonor Lake as the north-eastern boundary of Tibet. The long line of Tibetan kings came to an end with the assassination of King Langderma. That during this period Tibet was an independent country is not disputed, even by the Chinese.

After the cessation of the rule of lay kings, the Sakya religious hierarchy ruled over Tibet for 75 years (1270-1345). Tibet was also then independent. The Ming Emperors ruled over China (1368-1644). Chinese historians admit that they never exercised any political control over Tibet.

In the middle of the fourteenth century, the religious pontiffs of Tibet came to assume unquestioned political power and replaced the Royal house and feudal lords, and Tibetan politics centred on the Dalai Lama. Including the present Dalai Lama, there have been
fourteen in that line. Tibet's modern history commenced with the rule of Lobe-Sang-Gyatso, an epoch-making figure in the history of Tibet, known as the Great Fifth.

It is necessary to point out that the Dalai Lama is the head of the Lamaist Church and is the high priest of the Lamaist world. The Mongols and the Manchus embraced this Lamaist form of Buddhism. The Manchu Emperors looked upon the Dalai Lama in the same way as the Christian monarchs looked upon the Pope. The Dalai Lama was the spiritual guide and the Manchu Emperors his lay supporters. It was the duty of lay followers to help the priests in all ways possible, but the priests did not on that account become the servant of the laymen. Whatever help the Manchus might have rendered was rendered in that capacity, which did not in any sense make Tibet a vassal State of China.

The lay followers of the high priest performed many services for the head of the Church. This might include helping the high priest in all crises, which might take various forms. Such a relationship did not make the spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet a vassal of the Chinese Emperors. There were many other independent princes in the surrounding countries who paid homage to the Dalai Lama. The relationship was between the Manchus and the Dalai Lama, not between China and Tibet. It was a personal relationship between the high priest and the disciple. In 1652 the fifth Dalai Lama, one of the greatest in that line, visited Peking at the invitation of the then Manchu Emperor. The Emperor with his Court made a four-day march from the capital to receive the spiritual head of the Lamaist world. The Dalai Lama was received as an independent sovereign and shown the respect due to the head of an independent State.
Tucci in his *Tibetan Painted Scrolls* says:

"The Emperor showed the greatest respect and confidence for the Imperial Master. The Empresses and all the princesses took the vows and used to salute the Imperial Master, kneeling to receive his blessing. In the Court gatherings, when different officials took the place allotted to their ranks, the Imperial Master sat next to the Emperor. Each Emperor on ascending the throne publicly addressed a message of praise and protection to the Imperial Master, and was bound to order the office of the Imperial treasury to present him at the same time with pearls arranged to form a design as of words. In such a fashion he showed his respect for the Imperial Master.

“When the Imperial Master was about to arrive (in the capital of China) the Emperor ordered the Prime Minister and other officials to go forth to meet him with hundreds of persons on horseback. In the places through which the Imperial Master passed (on his journey to China) the local Government of each region received him with great festivities on his arrival, offering him generous hospitality besides the expenses of his journey and honoured him on his departure. When he reached the capital, the Emperor ordered the Government to prepare half of the Guard of Honour pertaining to the Emperor to accompany him and ordered the officials of the various Ministries and public administrations to offer him ermine robes, to do him honour.”

The relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperors was described by Fr. Huc, a Lazarist, who stayed in Lhasa in 1846, as follows:

“The Tartar-Manchu dynasty, as we have already remarked elsewhere, saw from the commencement of their elevation the great importance of conciliating the
friendship of the Dalai Lama, whose influence is all-powerful over the Mongol tribes; consequently they have never failed to retain at the Court of Lhasa two Grand Mandarins invested with the title of Kin-Tcha-is, which signifies Ambassador, or Envoy-Extraordinary. The ostensible mission of these individuals is to present, under certain fixed circumstances, the homage of the Chinese Emperor to the Dalai Lama, and to lend him the aid of China in any difficulties he may have with his neighbours. Such, to all appearance, is the purport of his permanent Embassy, but in reality they are only in attendance to flatter the religious belief of the Mongols, and to bind them to the reigning dynasty, by making them believe that the government of Peking has great veneration for the divinity of Buddha-La.”*

The conferment of an honorary degree or a title on a visiting dignitary does not make the recipient a “vassal” of the donor. Delhi University, during President Eisenhower’s visit in 1960, conferred on him the honorary degree of LL.D. Surely the acceptance by the President of an honorary degree of Delhi University does not confer on India suzerainty over America!

In the past, the Pope used to receive presents from European monarchs. Could it be said that the Pope became a “vassal” by accepting these?

Thanks to Lord Curzon, Viceroy in 1903-04, and Sir Charles Bell, a personal friend of the 13th Dalai Lama and a great authority on Tibet, European and American writers became aware of the nature of the relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Manchus. Tibet having no contact with the outside world except her immediate neighbours, the Chinese spread the canard that China had

suzerainty over Tibet, and that Tibet was an integral part of China.

As a result of the visit of the fifth Dalai Lama to Peking in 1652, a new relationship—that of chaplain and disciple—was established between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperors. That this is the true position will be manifest from the statement of the 13th Dalai Lama: “I went because the Manchu Emperor had an agreement to help each other in the way of priest and layman. There is no subordination in such relationship”.

Owing to ignorance of the nature of the relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperors, the British and Russian Governments for the first time (in 1907) at St. Petersburg Convention acknowledged the suzerainty of China over Tibet. The relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperors could not be described as “Suzerainty” under international law. According to Oppenheim, suzerainty is a term which was originally used for the relationship between a feudal lord and his vassal. The lord was to be the suzerain of the vassal. With the disappearance of the feudal system, suzerainty of this kind likewise disappeared. Modern suzerainty involves only a few rights of the suzerain State over the vassal State, which may be called “constitutional rights”. The rights of suzerain States over vassal States are principally international rights.

Suzerainty is by no means sovereignty. It is a kind of international guardianship, since the vassal State is either absolutely or mainly represented internationally by the suzerain State. Thus all international treaties concluded by suzerain States are *ipso facto* concluded for the vassal State; thus again, a war of the suzerain State is an *ipso facto* war of the vassal State; and thus, thirdly, the suzerain bears, within certain limits, responsibility for the ac-
tion of the vassal State. Therefore, applying this test to the nature of the relationship between Tibet and China, Tibet does not come within the category of a vassal State.

Tibet signed treaties with Nepal, Kashmir, the Mongols and the British Government.

That China never had suzerainty is proved by the fact that Tibet refused to be bound by the Anglo-Chinese Convention, and the Chinese failed to prevent Tibetans from raiding Bhutan in 1888. The war against Maharaja Gulab Singh of Jammu in 1840-41, the war against Nepal in 1855-56, the war against Britain in 1888 and 1904, and the ancient wars between Tibet and Bhutan were all settled by the Tibetans themselves without assistance or intervention by China. Tibet had a separate mint, coinage of her own and her own paper currency. She had an army of her own as well as ammunition factories. She had her own postal system and used to issue passports for entry into, and exit from, Tibet. Again, Tibet paid no tribute or taxes to China. The Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperors used to exchange presents. With the fall of the Manchus this relationship between priest and disciple came to an end.

In 1912 the 13th Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa in state. The Chinese troops and the Amban were expelled from Tibet and, through the good offices of the British Government, were repatriated to China through India. It may be pertinent to point out that in 1855-56, when the Nepalese invaded Tibet, the Chinese did not declare war against Nepal, which China would have done had Tibet been an integral part of China. Similarly in 1903-04, when the Younghusband Mission occupied Lhasa, the Chinese did not protest.

After the withdrawal of the British from India, China in 1950 annexed Tibet. After completely subjugating
Tibet and converting it into a military base, China published maps showing large tracts of Indian territory as within China, and started a "cartographical war" on India. When the Indian Prime Minister pointed this out, he was assured by Mr. Chou En-lai that these maps were published by former Governments of China and that the present regime was too busy to revise them, but promised to do so in due course.

Since then clashes have occurred between Chinese military personnel and Indian police at two places: (a) at Longju, on the north-eastern border, two miles south of the international boundary, which is known as the McMahon Line. Longju is in Indian territory, and the Chinese attacked the Indian police outpost and occupied it; and (b) in the Ladakh area, the Chinese occupied a considerable portion of Indian territory which is sparsely populated.

In recent years the Chinese have repeatedly asserted that the border disputes with India are legacies of British imperialism in Tibet. This is false. Communists have a weakness for the word "imperialism". In the light of known facts it cannot be disputed that the British Government had no territorial ambitions in Tibet. This is confirmed in several treaties. A few Articles from some of the treaties are set out to illustrate this:

Article I of St. Petersburg Convention of 1907 states: "The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from all interference in the internal administration."

Article II of the Convention between Britain, China and Tibet in 1914 is in these terms: "The Government of Great Britain and China engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country (Tibet) and to abstain from interference in the administration of Tibet."
"The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it."

Article III.—"Recognizing the special interest of Great Britain in virtue of the geographical position of Tibet, in the existence of an effective Tibetan Government and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoining States, the Government of China engages, except as provided in Article 4 of this Convention, not to send troops into outer Tibet, nor to station civil or military officers, nor to establish Chinese colonies in the country. Should any such troops or officials remain in outer Tibet at the date of signature of this Convention, they shall be withdrawn within a period not exceeding three months.

"The Government of Great Britain engages not to station military or civil officers in Tibet (except as provided in the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet) nor troops (except the Agent's escorts), nor to establish colonies in that country."

Anglo-Chinese Convention—Article II (1906).—"The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign State to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet."

The above treaties can leave no doubt that the British Government were anxious to have an independent Tibet. Their sole object was to have a peaceful Tibet, to prevent Chinese or Russian intrigue, which might endanger the safety of the north-eastern frontier of India. With this end in view and to ensure the security of the north-eastern
frontier of India, the British Government entered into several treaties with China and Russia. These treaties, however, through errors arising out of misunderstanding of the nature of the Sino-Tibetan relationship, gave China a free hand in Tibet and during the last 200 years she has been trying to annex Tibet.

Had the British Government wanted, they could have had the whole of Tibet for the asking. The 13th Dalai Lama, when he was in Darjeeling in 1910, repeatedly asked Sir Charles Bell to induce the British Government to take Tibet under British protection and place Tibet in the same relationship as Indian princely States. The British Government, however, declined to accede to this request. Therefore, for China to allege now that the border disputes with India are a legacy of British imperialism is grotesque. The spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet, the 14th Dalai Lama, and his Cabinet are in India now. They have never asserted or alleged that any portion of their territory was taken by the British Government under pressure. In this context the Chinese claims are untenable.

There are no known instances where the British Government have repudiated solemn treaties. India should never unilaterally resile from treaty obligations. The Chinese Government, however, has unilaterally repudiated treaties and occupied Tibet, has stationed troops there and is colonizing the place.

Public opinion in the world is yet nebulous as to the historical consequences of what has happened in Tibet. The strategic potentiality of the Roof of the World has not been appreciated. Any strong Power based on the “Changtang” would control the heart of Asia. The destiny of South-East Asia is inextricably bound up with the fortunes of Tibet.
CHAPTER III

THE MYTH OF CHINESE SUZERAINITY OVER TIBET

To appreciate India's policy towards Tibet in the post-independence period, it is necessary to examine the basis of the myth of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. It should be borne in mind that Tibet had hardly any contact with outside world, whereas China had diplomatic relations with a number of countries in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Chinese chroniclers, in narrating the events of this period have often made unfounded claims in regard to many matters. It is remarkable that the views of some American and European writers on Sino-Tibetan relationship are based only on Chinese sources. The Tibetan records of this period have never been utilised; nor have the 'Veritable Documents' (Shih-Lu) of the Manchu dynasty. In consequence, it is not surprising for these foreign writers to form erroneous impressions about the exact nature of this relationship.

Rockhill, a scholar, who was for some years American Minister to China, dealt with the question of Tibetan independence of China. As a result of his researches, he came to the conclusion that the Fifth Dalai Lama, when he visited Peking in 1652, went there as an independent monarch, being at that time neither under China nor under any other nation. Western writers say, even before the fall of Manchu dynasty, the Fifth Dalai Lama went as an independent ruler. Even Li-Tech-Tseng, a zealous champion of Chinese supremacy, who makes the most of every scrap of evidence, cannot dispute this. As a result of this august visit, Priest-disciple (Guru-Shishya) relation-
ship was established between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperor.

The death of the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1682 set in train a series of events which brought the Manchu Emperor in frequent contact with Tibet and he had to render various services to his spiritual master's State.

The Sixth Dalai Lama proved to be a libertine and was removed in 1705.

Lhabzang Khan, the titular king of Tibet, had nominated a 24-year-old Lama as the Seventh Dalai Lama. This caused great discontent not only in Tibet but also amongst the Mongol followers. Everything pointed to trouble; and it was not long in coming. In 1717 the Dzungars (Mongols) launched an invasion of Tibet declaring that they came to put down Lhabzang and to restore the rightful Dalai Lama. They stormed Lhasa and killed Lhabzang. They also deposed the so-called Dalai Lama whom Lhabzang had appointed. The Mongols had the sympathy of the Tibetan people, as they were under the impression that they (Mongols) were bringing the Dalai Lama. The Tibetans, however, were disappointed when they discovered that the Dalai Lama was not with them. By a stroke of luck, however, K'ang Hsi, the Manchu Emperor, managed to get hold of the real incarnate child himself from Litang and in 1720 the longed-for child Dalai Lama was escorted by the Emperor's troops to Lhasa with great pomp and ceremony. His troops were welcomed at Lhasa as the saviour of the Tibetans, the restorer of peace and the discoverer of the Dalai Lama. The child from Litang, Kesang Gyatso, was enthroned as the Seventh Dalai Lama. In the eyes of the Tibetans the prestige of the Manchu Emperor was enhanced by this act. The influence of the Dalai Lama was the key to religious control over Mongolia. After having put the administration of
the minor Dalai Lama on a sound footing, the Manchu troops went back to China in 1723. Unfortunately, the withdrawal was followed very soon by an outbreak of civil strife. The Manchu representative left behind was powerless and intrigues culminated in a civil war which lasted from 1727 to 1728. Its effect was to throw Tibet once more into a state of confusion. As both the parties in Tibet appealed to the Emperor for help, he decided to send an army to restore order. By the time the army arrived, one of the contestants had already established his supremacy and there was no necessity for any action. So, for a second time, foreign troops arrived at Lhasa with Tibetan consent.

In 1750, a Tibetan Regent was murdered by the Ambans. A Lhasa mob worked itself into such a state of hysterical excitement that, defying the orders of the Dalai Lama, it attacked and set on fire the residence of the Ambans. The Ambans and most of their officers and men were killed. Within a short time, the Dalai Lama, who showed his ability and firmness once he had the opportunity of exercising them, succeeded in restoring order. No assistance from the disciple was necessary.

Kesang Gyatso, the Seventh Dalai Lama, died in 1757. Between his death and enthronement of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1876, during a period of 120 years, most of the Dalai Lamas died during their minorities under suspicious circumstances, and the Government of Tibet was in the hands of the Regents. During these 120 years the Dalai Lamas ruled over Tibet only for 7 years.

In 1792, the Gurkhas invaded Tibet and sacked Shigatse. The Dalai Lama appealed to the Manchu Emperor for help. At this, a large army of Chinese and Tibetans marched across the high passes and desolate wind-swept plateau of Tibet in the middle of winter, and, in one of
the most remarkable campaigns in history, defeated the Gurkhas several times and followed them down to within a few miles of their capital, Katmandu.

As long as this personal relationship between the Manchu Emperors and the Dalai Lamas lasted, on numerous occasions, missions of congratulations and condolences used to be exchanged. Presents used to be sent to the Emperor and he reciprocated lavishly. The Emperor as a devotee used to bestow titles on the Dalai Lama. On the death of an Emperor, the Dalai Lama used to offer prayers for 40 days and his blessings were sought before undertaking any new venture.

From these events Western writers have often described this relationship as 'protectorate' and 'suzerainty'. These are inexact terms borrowed from Western political vocabulary to describe the relationship between the High Priest and his disciple. It was no political relationship between China and Tibet, but a personal relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperors. China cannot produce a scrap of paper to show that the Dalai Lama or Tibet ever acknowledged Chinese suzerainty, leave alone sovereignty. Numerous instances can be cited to show that other Mongol princes also performed similar services for the Dalai Lama. In 1717, the Mongols' attempt to restore the real Dalai Lama is an instance. This relationship is easily understood in Eastern countries, but it is very difficult for the Westerners to appreciate the extent to which a faithful disciple will exert himself to serve his spiritual master. With the fall of the last of the Manchu Emperors the connected link was broken.

It is interesting to quote the comments of Sir Charles Bell on this aspect of so-called Chinese suzerainty:

"The Chinese Government, having been long accustomed to the white races and their points of view,
write in their records that Tibet is a part of China. They show it in their maps as included in China. The Tibetan Government, having had hardly any contact with the white races and being unable to speak or write any European language, have published no records. Maps they cannot make.

“What, then are the main points of the Tibetan case? The Dalai Lama and his Ministers show me clearly that Tibet, hidden away in the heart of Asia, does not think along European lines. They maintain that the Dalai Lama is the spiritual guide and the Manchu Emperor his lay supporter.”*

The Thirteenth Dalai Lama said to Sir Charles Bell:

“The reason why the exchange of presents was abandoned, was because the connection with China was the connection of the Dalai Lama with the Manchu Emperor. The Manchus were considered as Buddhists; the Chinese were not. When the Chinese revolution broke out in 1911, China deposed the Manchu Emperor. There was then no longer that connection between the two. Tibet is now completely separate from China.”†

As late as December, 1962, Sardar K. M. Panikkar broadcast from the All India Radio as follows:

“Sometimes, these claims of suzerainty are based merely on imagination, as for example over territories in the Indian Ocean visited by the Ming fleet in the first quarter of the 15th century.

Any present given is always considered as tribute and the state or ruler sending the present is entered in Chinese records as having accepted Chinese authority.

It might be of interest to remember that when the

* The Portrait of the Dalai Lama, Sir Charles Bell, pp. 355-56.
embassy of George III of England under Lord Macartney was proceeding to Peking, it had to carry before it a banner bearing the inscription, 'The tribute-bearing mission from England.' From the Chinese point of view England at the end of 18th century was no more than a tributary state of the Celestial Empire!

The situation holds true today with one difference and the difference is very significant. Under the Emperors, Chinese suzerainty was only a formal acceptance of subordination to the emperor. The so-called vassal states were left to themselves and the imperial government seldom interfered in their affairs so long as they paid their tribute and maintained the formalities of subordination.

In exchange, the emperor honoured his vassals with titles and went to their help in case of foreign invasions or internal troubles.

With new China the situation is different. She is not satisfied with vague suzerainty or claims of paramountcy. Her expansionism is nothing less than a displacement of local populations and a total penetration by the Chinese of the territories originally belonging to other nations.

The new expansionism is best exemplified in Tibet. Kublai Khan never had any pretension to territorial authority. No Chinese emperor claimed anything more than the allegiance of the ruler of Tibet and the Tibetans as a race remained apart with their own forms of religion, culture and political organisation.

The significant feature of the new Chinese expansionism is not that it has changed all this: that may be a process of historic change: but what is fundamentally oppressive and inhuman is that Tibet itself is being subjected to a large-scale occupation by the Hans so that within a short time the Tibetans as a
people would become an ineffective minority in Tibet.

India’s historian Ambassador to China in 1950 was fully aware that China had no sovereignty over Tibet and that suzerainty was imaginary. Yet to her eternal shame India recognised China’s mythical claims over Tibet.

A Half-a-Dozen British Treaties with China and one with Russia affecting Tibet between 1876 and 1907, divorced from their context and background under which they were concluded, also kept alive the erroneous impression about Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. A year and a half after the publication of Lord Curzon’s despatches, the American Ambassador in London was instructed to remind the Foreign Office that Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, however disparagingly Lord Curzon might describe it, had been recognised by Great Britain in the Chefoo Convention of 1876, the Peking Convention of 1886, and the Calcutta Convention of 1890. Such was the perplexity caused by these treaties. It is, therefore, necessary to give briefly the background of these treaties.

The treaty of Nanking in 1842 handed over to England the island of Hongkong. The ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai were to be opened to British trade and residence and trade conducted according to a well-understood tariff.

The Sikkim treaty of 1861 coincided with the final stages of the opening of China to trade and commerce. In the 1860s English merchants looked upon Western China as a traders’ paradise. The markets were there and so was the merchandise; all that was lacking was the means of access to these areas. About this time the Chambers of Commerce of Bradford, Leeds, Halifax, Liverpool and Glasgow as well as other traders were pressing the British
Government to do something about opening up Western China to British trade.

D. C. Boulger, who possessed the reputation of being an authority on Central Asian questions, wrote in his report *China via Tibet*: "When the people of Szechuen wear Manchester goods and use Sheffield cutlery, when they are forced to acknowledge that honesty is the guiding principle of English merchants, and when, on the other hand, the caravans bearing the silk and tea of China come pouring in half the time and at half the expense they do at present, through the passes of Sikkim and Bhutan, to enrich the markets of India, then we may well feel confident that the Chinese people, who are, even at this moment, progressing towards more enlightened ideas, and whose virtues we have hitherto to a great extent shut our eyes to, will be more eager to recognize our position with regard to themselves, for this perception will have been brought home to them by the most forcible of all arguments, benefit to themselves."

The tea industry in Darjeeling, the Dooars and Assam had developed and the British merchants were anxious to export Indian tea to Tibet. The Tibetans are great tea drinkers and it was found that Chinese brick tea was far inferior to the Indian tea. For the purpose of pushing English trade and commerce, various attempts were made to open routes to Western China through Sikkim, Western Tibet and the Burma-Yunan border. It will be interesting to cite a few instances of these attempts.

T. T. Cooper, who described himself as a 'pioneer of commerce', set out from Shanghai in early 1868, with the knowledge and support of the British merchant community there, to travel overland to India by way of Burma

and Tibet. He obtained the necessary passport from the Viceroy of Szechuen province, which authorised him to enter into Tibet. He attempted to travel to Lhasa in company with the Nepalese Tribute Mission. The Tibetans refused to honour his travel documents just as they were to ignore similar pieces of paper in years to come. Cooper not being daunted by his earlier failure tried again in 1869 to enter Tibet from Sadiya in Assam. He was again turned back by the Tibetans. The Dalai Lama at the time was a minor and the Regent was running the Government of Tibet.

In 1874 another attempt was made to open a trade route through the Burma-Yunan border. An exploring mission under the command of Colonel Browne was instructed to proceed along this route. Wade, the British Chargé d’Affaires, made the necessary arrangements with the Chinese authorities for passports for this Mission and deputed one of his assistants, A. R. Margary, to act as Chinese interpreter for the Mission. While travelling in 1875 Margary was murdered. His Chinese passport was no protection for him and the outcome was the Chefoo Convention of 1876.

Wade placed Tibet on the Chefoo agenda and a separate Article of the Chefoo Convention contained provisions for the sending of British Missions to Lhasa and Sinkiang. The object of this Mission was to increase British commerce with the Chinese interior. Wade persuaded the Chinese authorities to grant passports for this mission. The Convention was signed on the 13th of September, 1876, in the following terms:

Her Majesty’s Government having it in contemplation to send a mission of exploration next year, by way of Peking, through Kansuh and Kokonor, or by way of Szechuen to Thibet, and thence to India, the
Tsungli Yamen, having due regard to the circumstances, will, when the time arrives, issue the necessary passports, and will address letters to the High Provincial Authorities and the Residents in Thibet. If the Mission should not be sent by these routes but should be proceeding across the Indian frontier to Thibet, the Tsungli Yamen, on receipt of a communication to that effect from the British Minister, will write to the Chinese Resident in Thibet, and the Resident, with due regard to the circumstances, will send officers to take care of the Mission, and passports for the Mission will be issued by the Tsungli Yamen, that its passage be not obstructed.

The Tibetans were not consulted, nor were they parties to this Convention.

Colman Macaulay, a Secretary to the Bengal Government, was selected for this Mission. In the summer of 1885 he went to England on leave and was able to impress on Lord Randolph Churchill the advantages of a Mission to Tibet. He agreed to send Macaulay and advised him first to go to Peking for passports. Macaulay left England in August, 1885, picked up the famous S. C. Das from Colombo and arrived in Peking in October. Das, during his stay in Peking, lived in the Yellow Temple, one of the chief places of Buddhist worship in Peking, where he dressed and lived as a Buddhist monk. Here he met a Tibetan envoy sent by Lhasa to keep an eye on the negotiations in Peking, and from this person Das learnt that all the concessions offered by the Chinese were no more than a sham. He further learnt that the Tibetans would oppose the Mission probably by force of arms. The Chinese did not have the power to impose their wishes on the Government of the Dalai Lama. Early in 1886, the Mission assembled in Darjeeling and in July, 1886, news began to reach
Darjeeling of considerable Tibetan troop concentration in the Chumbi Valley. Macaulay took this to be a Reception Committee assembled by the Tibetans to welcome his Mission; but by the 27th of July it became apparent that the Tibetans had advanced thirteen miles into Sikkim territory across the Jelep La and had fortified a hilltop at Lingtu on the Darjeeling Road.

In January, 1886, Upper Burma was annexed by Lord Dufferin. He did not want to be involved in another border war by pushing the Macaulay Mission into Tibet against resistance of the Tibetans. The Macaulay Mission was abandoned.

No immediate action, however, was taken to expel the Tibetans from Sikkim. The British Legation in Peking took up the matter with the Chinese Government and asked them to persuade the Tibetans to withdraw from the Sikkimese territory. Protests were addressed to the Lhasa Government, but they remained unanswered and peaceful messengers were maltreated. The so-called suzerain of Tibet was impotent to do anything. In the meantime, a Convention concerning recognition of British supremacy in Burma was entered into with China and a clause in respect of Tibet was introduced in this Convention of 1886 in the following terms:

Inasmuch as inquiry into the circumstances, by the Chinese Government, has shown the existence of many obstacles to the Mission to Thibet provided for in the separate article of the Chefoo Agreement, England consents to countermand the Mission forthwith. With regard to the desire of the British Government to consider arrangements for frontier trade between India and Thibet, it will be the duty of the Chinese Government, after careful inquiry into the circumstances, to adopt measures to exhort and encourage the people
with a view to the promotion and development of trade. Should it be practicable, the Chinese Government shall then proceed carefully to consider trade regulations; but if insuperable obstacles should be found to exist, the British Government will not press the matter unduly.

The Tibetans were no parties to this Convention either. The development of trade was the principal object of the Indian Government's interest in Tibet.

In 1888, after an ultimatum to the Tibetan Commander and a letter to the Dalai Lama, both of which were ignored, General Graham attacked the fort, expelled the Tibetans and advanced up to the Chumbi Valley. After the first British Indian Government's armed conflict with the Tibetans came the opportunity for coming to terms with the Tibetans direct. The British Minister in Peking insisted that the Chinese should be allowed to show that they were still the suzerain power in Tibet. For this reason the Convention of 1890 was entered into with China. A British protectorate over Sikkim was acknowledged and, amongst others, the boundary of Sikkim and Tibet was determined. It is well to bear in mind the principle which was followed in determining the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet. Article I, which dealt with the boundary, is in the following terms:

"Article I: The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain-range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluence from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory."
This Convention with China was signed in Calcutta on 17th of March, 1890, and subsequently ratified on 27th of August, 1890. No Tibetan representative was present or took part in the negotiations. In 1893, the British Government and China entered into an agreement relating to trade, communication and pasturage. By this Convention certain trade marts were to be opened in Tibet and provisions were made as to how trade was to be conducted. Again the Tibetans took no part and did not sign the regulations.

These two Conventions provided for ground demarcation of the frontier by putting up stone pillars. The Tibetans did not accept the terms of the Conventions and removed the boundary pillars and prevented effectively any functioning of the trade marts. Till then British policy had been dictated by a desire to have a monopoly of Chinese trade in Western China through Tibet and not to annex Tibet or China. This was the state of affairs when Lord Curzon became the Viceroy of India, early in 1899, and the Government of India in a despatch wrote to the Secretary of State for India: "We seem, in respect of our policy towards Tibet, to be moving in a vicious circle. If we apply to Tibet, we either receive no reply, or are referred to the Chinese Resident. If we apply to the latter, he excuses his failure by his inability to put any pressure upon Tibet. As a policy, this appears to us both unproductive and inglorious. We shall be grateful for your Lordship’s opinion as to the advisability of any modification of it in the near future."* Lord Curzon summed up Chinese relations with Tibet in the following terms:

"We regard the so-called suzerainty of China over Tibet as a constitutional fiction—a political affectation.

* Bayonets to Lhasa (1961), Peter Fleming, p. 38.
which has only been maintained because of its convenience to both parties. . . . We hope that it will not be thought necessary to seek the permission or the passports of China for a British Mission to Lhasa.”*

This marked a temporary change in British policy towards China and Tibet. Lord Curzon with real foresight concerned himself with possible dangers to Indian frontiers in consequence of Russian or other intrigues. No sooner, however, had Lord Curzon’s back been turned than the British instinct for trade and commerce re-asserted itself, as can be seen from Clause 4 of the Peking Convention of April 27, 1906, which attracted the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Regulations of 1893 regarding trade, communication and pasturage.

The Convention of 1906 is in the following terms:

“Whereas the refusal of Tibet to recognise the validity of or to carry into full effect the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of March 17, 1890, and Regulation of December 5, 1893, placed the British Government under the necessity of taking steps to secure their rights and interests under the said Convention and Regulations;

And whereas the Convention of ten articles was signed at Lhasa on September 7, 1904, on behalf of Great Britain and Tibet, and was ratified by the Viceroy and the Governor-General of India on behalf of Great Britain on November 11, 1904, a declaration on behalf of Great Britain modifying its terms under certain conditions being appended thereto . . .”

The Convention amended Article IX, Clause (d) of the Convention of 1904 by deleting the words ‘foreign power’, thereby removing the obstacles to any future

* Ibid., p. 60.
Chinese aggression on Tibet. This is an unfortunate legacy of British policy of the time, based on expediency. It is at the same time clear that the British did not want to annex Tibet.

Not being satisfied with this, in order to avoid collision with Russia, Great Britain entered into a treaty with Russia relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, signed at St. Petersburg on August 31st, 1907. For the first time, in this treaty on the arrangement concerning Tibet, the following preamble was added:

"The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognising the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the status quo in the external relation of Thibet, have made the following arrangement."

For the first time Russia and Great Britain officially spoke of Chinese ‘suzerainty’ over Tibet. This was due to complete ignorance on the part of British and Russian Governments of the real relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperors. This attitude was also due to a desire to appease the Chinese with a view to getting trade. How can an arrangement between Great Britain and Russia, to which Tibet was not a party, affect the status of Tibet? It is to be remembered that the Bolshevik regime repudiated all treaties entered into prior to the Revolution of 1917.

Lastly, the two treaties which were concluded direct with Tibet, the Lhasa Convention of 1904 and the treaty made in Simla in 1914, can leave no manner of doubt that Tibet was treated as an independent country. The British Government, for the sake of capturing Chinese trade, made the mistake of entering into treaties with
China concerning Tibet, when Tibet was not a party to them at all. Tibet refused to recognise any of the agreements concluded without consulting her and it cannot be disputed that she was entitled to do so, and all the more so as she had been independent for ages. Secondly, the Tibetans were unwilling to negotiate at Peking, as they felt their representatives and the members of the staff would be subjected to pressure there. In view of their past experience, they were not prepared to trust their Chinese hosts.

The foregoing clearly establishes that Tibet was not only independent, but China had no suzerainty over Tibet. This has been summed up by Sir Charles Bell in his *Portrait of the Dalai Lama* in the following terms:

Britain and the United States, and probably most of the European nations, regard Tibet as being under Chinese rule. No doubt this is a convenient arrangement for them, as they have thus only one authority to deal with. Besides, we are always being told about the vast potentialities of trade with China. To my recollection we were told this fifty years ago, but during those fifty years no such vast development has materialised; the potentialities are still no more than potentialities. However, the foreign nations wish to gain a good share of this trade, and to that end try to please China. But it is an outrage that they should sell Tibet in order to increase their own commercial profits in China.*

That then was the position of Tibet as late as 1946.

It was a major error of British policy not to have given and obtained international *de jure* recognition of Tibet as a sovereign state and thus assured India of an inoffensive

* *Portrait of the Dalai Lama* (1946), Sir Charles Bell, pp. 352-3.
buffer state between itself and China. Lord Curzon urged that such a step should be taken, when he was Viceroy of India, but was over-ruled by the Foreign Office which regarded recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet as a harmless fiction which might as well be accepted since it would annoy the Chinese to repudiate it.

The Tibetans held Gandhiji and Mr. Nehru in great respect. Nevertheless, in 1946, when the British Government was preparing to hand over power, they naturally became apprehensive as to whether, after the departure of the British, they could count on the diplomatic support of India, they had hitherto enjoyed in their difficulties with China.

In July, 1947 the British Government assured the Tibetans that after the transfer of power, British obligations and rights under the existing treaties with Tibet would devolve upon the successor Government of India and that it was hoped that the Tibetan Government would continue with that Government the same relations as had formerly existed with the British Government. It is never to be forgotten that the British Government for all practical purposes treated Tibet as an independent country and was under a treaty obligation with her not to recognise suzerainty of China over Tibet.

In August, 1947, the British Mission at Lhasa formally became the Indian Mission at Lhasa. Thereafter the Nehru Government of India wrote to the Tibetan Government that they would be glad to receive an assurance that the Tibetan Government agreed to the continuation of relations on the basis previously existing with the British Government and suggested that the discussion about any new agreements could be taken up later, if necessary. After this assurance, the Tibetan Government informed
the Government of India of their acceptance of the continuation of the former relationship with the new Indian Government. The Government of India was the successor to the British Indian Government. The effect of devolution of British obligations and rights upon the new Government of India was that the Indian Government, besides inheriting the British frontier with Tibet, became bound by the Simla Convention of 1914 as between Tibet and India, subject to the modifications introduced by the joint British and Tibetan declarations of the same year on the 3rd of July, 1914. The British policy was continued by independent India after 1947 although it might have been hoped that a nation which had just emancipated itself from foreign rule would have been more sympathetic than a European imperial Power to Tibetan aspirations for national independence.

The provisions of the Lhasa Convention of 1904 and those of the Peking Convention of 1906 should not be overlooked. The Indian Government also acquired under these treaties extra-territorial privileges and a right to military escorts for their trade agents. The new Government of India continued, as its predecessors had done, to deal with Tibet on the basis of its de facto independence by maintaining direct diplomatic contact. In view of the unfortunate subsequent unilateral repudiation of treaty obligations by India, it is necessary to set out in the clearest possible terms what the obligations and rights under these treaties were:

1. The Government of India was under a solemn obligation not to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty over Tibet inasmuch as China had withheld signature to the Simla Convention. She was debarred from the enjoyment all the privileges accruing therefrom.
TIBETAN PASSPORT NO.:

The bearer of this passport Tsipon SHEKAPA is hereby deputed by the Tibetan Government as the leader of the special mission towards China for maintenance of Tibet's independence. We shall, therefore, be grateful if all the Governments concerned on his route to visit any country would kindly give due recognition as such, and grant necessary passport, visa etc. without detention and render necessary help in every respect.

Seal of the Tibetan Foreign Bureau, Pome, Tibet.

Kalon Lama Rampa,
(Foreign Minister)
Dated 15th of the 12th Month of Earh-Nulh Year corresponding to 2nd February 1950.

Passport issued to Tsipon SHEKAPA by the Tibetan Foreign Office.
SILVER COINS ISSUED BY TIBETAN MINT

Sung-soom

Tum-kar

Copper Coins

Shoghang

Shonga
Chinese troops occupy Lhasa
2. To give diplomatic support to Tibet in any difficulties with China.

In a speech on the 30th of March, 1958, Mr. Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha: "We could not, in conformity with our own policy, maintain our forces in a foreign country. That was a relic of British imperialism which we did not wish to continue ... so we withdrew".* No one can take exception to this withdrawal of military escorts from Tibet. At all events in 1947 when an opportunity presented itself for a generous gesture to the Tibetans by offering to give up this 'unwanted right', nothing of the sort was done. It was only withdrawn three years later under Chinese pressure. It would have been graceful to withdraw them shortly after 1947.

* India's Foreign Policy (Selected Speeches) 1961, Jawaharlal Nehru, p. 313.
CHAPTER IV

FOLLY OF APPEASEMENT

By the third quarter of 1949, the Communists succeeded in occupying the whole of Chinese mainland and proclaimed the People's Republic of China on the 1st of October, 1949. The Government of India extended official recognition to the People's Republic of China on the 30th of December, 1949. Speaking of China in the Foreign Affairs debate in the Lok Sabha, on September 30, 1959, Mr. Nehru stated, "Big changes have taken place in the world since the last war. Among them has been the rise of a united China. Forget for a moment the broad policies it pursues—communist or non-communist or whatever it may be. The fact is, and it is a major fact of the middle of the 20th century—that China has become a great power—united and strong. By that I do not imply that because China is a great power, India must be afraid of China or submit to China or draw up its policies in deference to China. Not at all."*

At a Press Conference on November 13, 1954, Mr. Nehru stated, "I happen to be rather well acquainted with China's history of the past thousand years, and I have even written something about not only Chinese history, but the history of other Asian countries."†

Mr. Nehru had probably hoped that with the cooperation of New China he would be able to eliminate Western

* India's Foreign Policy (Selected Speeches) 1961, Jawaharlal Nehru, pp. 303-4.
† Ibid., p. 308.
colonialism from Asia and bring about a new order of things.

Both the Prime Minister and India’s Ambassador were anxious to cultivate friendly relations with China. Mr. K. M. Panikkar, who was India’s first Ambassador to Communist China, even in selecting his residence had this in view, as will be seen from his own statement in *In Two Chinas*:

“I had made up my mind from the beginning to select a residence for myself outside the Legation area. I had no desire to be associated with the Quarter, which stood so much for European domination in the East.”*

Three days after his arrival he had an interview with Mr. Chou En-lai and the interview lasted for an hour and a half. Mr. Panikkar recorded his impressions in these words:

“His (Chou En-lai’s) information about India seemed to be vague, and all his questions touched on issues which were common to India and China.”†

Mr. Panikkar has also left an interesting record of his state of mind before he presented his letter of credence to Mr. Mao Tse-tung:

“I confess I was not a little excited at the idea of a talk with one who had changed the course of history so violently in Asia. Was he a new Chingiz, an emperor, thinking in terms of altering the map of a continent, or the chosen leader of a resurgent people, driving out those who had sold out the Chinese Revolution and pushing back to the sea, from whence they

*In Two Chinas* (1955), K. M. Panikkar, p. 77.
came, the western nations who had enslaved the nations of Asia?"*

A prophetic premonition indeed!
Mr. Panikkar further goes on to state:

“When I took up my political work the first thing I noticed was that apart from Chou En-lai and some of his close associates, especially Chen Chia-kang, no one in China knew anything about India. They had only vague ideas about India’s political position or historical development.”†

What Mr. Panikkar thought was his mission in China could best be described in his own language:

“When I came to Peking I had imagined my mission to be nothing more than that of witnessing the development of a revolution and of working for a better understanding between China and India. I knew, like everyone else, that with a Communist China cordial and intimate relations were out of the question, but I was fairly optimistic about working out an area of co-operation by eliminating causes of misunderstanding, rivalry, etc. The only area where our interests overlapped was in Tibet, and knowing the importance that every Chinese Government, including the Kuomintang, had attached to exclusive Chinese authority over that area I had, even before I started for Peking, come to the conclusion that the British policy (which we were supposed to have inherited) of looking upon Tibet as an area in which we had special political interests could not be maintained. The Prime Minister had also in general agreed with this view. So there was nothing which I could then foresee that would

† Ibid., p. 100.
make my mission unduly difficult, exciting or troublesome. I had every reason to feel that an excellent opportunity was given to me to watch the revolution from a vantage ground and to see an historical drama of the highest importance being acted in front of me by men and women whom I knew personally. . . . In regard to Tibet, I knew they were a little uncertain about our attitude. I expressed the hope that they would follow a policy of peace in regard to Tibet. Chou En-lai replied that while the liberation of Tibet was a sacred duty, his Government were anxious to secure their ends by negotiations and not by military action. He said that he had heard that the Nepal Government had offered to send troops to help the Tibetans and wondered if it was true! That was the state of Chinese knowledge about the conditions on the Himalayan border."*

"By the middle of October, rumours of Chinese invasion of Tibet began to circulate. Visits and representations to the Foreign Office brought no results."

The Chinese note, dated the 16th of November, 1950, stated that on August 31, 1950, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Indian Government through Ambassador Panikkar that the Chinese People's Liberation Army was going to take action soon in West Sikiang according to set plans. Mr. Panikkar, on the other hand, states in his book, *In Two Chinas*, that he learnt of the invasion of Tibet on the 26th of October, when the Chinese announced on the Peking radio that the process of liberation of Tibet had begun. In fact on the 7th of October, 1950, three crack divisions of the Chinese army had launched three-pronged attacks on Eastern Tibet.

One division had come from the direction of Jyekundo and captured Riwoche, another division had come from Kantze and after crossing the Upper Yangtse in the middle sector had proceeded towards Chamdo through Rangum and the third division after crossing the Upper Yangtse further down near Batang occupied Gartok and Markham and by the 19th of October Chamdo fell to them. There is unimpeachable evidence about this. Yet in accordance with their traditional disregard for truth, in volume II of Documentary and Chronological Index of Communist China Today, by Peter S. H. Tang, it is stated that the Chinese Communists entered Tibet on the 26th of October, 1950. It seems strange that the Government of India were not aware of the invasion of Tibet until they had seen a report in the newspapers of an official statement made in Peking to the effect that “the People’s Army Units have been ordered to advance into Tibet.” They had also not received any intimation about it from Mr. Panikkar or from the Chinese Ambassador to India.

Mr. Nehru was held in great esteem by the peoples of the small and weak countries of South East Asia. He was a source of inspiration to nationalists all over Asia. He was looked upon as a champion of the weak and an opponent of colonialism. His past record before he became the Prime Minister of India was of relentless struggle against colonialism and racialism in any shape or form. He had extended the fullest moral support to Indonesia in that country’s struggle against Dutch colonialism (1946-49). He even went to the extent of banning K.L.M. flights over India. Landing and fuelling facilities to K.L.M. planes were withdrawn and in 1949 he strongly championed Indonesia’s cause. He had in the past also championed the cause of Algerians and of the people of Indo-China.
During the Suez crisis he promptly espoused the cause of the Egyptians and denounced Britain and France as aggressors. Years earlier his reaction to Munich had been one of disgust, as he himself says:

"Before Munich I met some of the members of the British Cabinet and other prominent politicians of England and ventured to express my anti-fascist and anti-nazi views before them. I found that my views were not welcomed and I was told that there were many other considerations to be borne in mind.

"During the Czechoslovak crisis what I saw of Franco-British statesmanship in Prague and in the Sudetenland, in London and Paris and in Geneva, where the League Assembly was then sitting, amazed and disgusted me. Appeasement seemed to be a feeble word for it. There was behind it not only a fear of Hitler but a sneaking admiration for him."*

Little did Mr. Nehru then realise that he might in his turn have to face a similar situation. After he had become the Prime Minister of India, he visited America in 1949, a year before the Chinese invasion of Tibet. Addressing the Institute of Pacific Relations in New York, Mr. Nehru said:

"We are neither blind to reality nor do we propose to acquiesce in any challenge to man's freedom from whatever quarter it may come. Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral."†

The respect he then commanded was due to people's belief that his policy and actions were founded on the highest

* The Discovery of India (1946), Jawaharlal Nehru, p. 4.
† Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches (1949-63), p. 125.
moral principles which he had frequently enunciated. A time soon came to test his professions. In October, 1950, independent India was confronted with a situation very similar to the one which the British Government was confronted with in 1912. A firm policy adopted by the British had prevented China from occupying Tibet in 1912. The British had, of course, no intention of sending troops across the Himalayas to assist the Tibetans. Even Lord Curzon would not have dreamt of sending an army to occupy Tibet. On the 11th of June, 1901, he wrote privately to Hamilton, "It would be madness for us to cross the Himalayas and occupy it, but it is important that no one else seize it."*

In a statement before the Lok Sabha, dealing with Tibet, Mr. Nehru enunciated his policy in these terms:

"Our broad policy was governed by three factors, (i) preservation of the security and integrity of India, (ii) India's desire to maintain friendly relations with China, and (iii) India's sympathy for the people of Tibet."†

The first two objectives are commendable. If, however, friendship with China meant Tibet being sacrificed, the moral principles so much advertised were bound to be thrown to the winds. He has also repeatedly stated:

"We judge all issues on their merits and act in conformity with our objective."‡

The Chinese invasion of Tibet undoubtedly constituted the crime of aggression. According to Georges Scelle,

* Home Correspondence India, Vol. 196, No. 2151, Extract from Private letters from Curzon to Hamilton, June 11, 1901.
† India's Foreign Policy (Selected Speeches), Jawaharlal Nehru, p. 323.
recourse to force except in legitimate self-defence constitutes the crime of aggression. The criterion of war and the criterion of aggression are one. A peaceful, inoffensive and a friendly Tibet has been India’s immediate neighbour. The entire 2,500 miles of India’s frontiers, beginning in the north-east near Dipu Pass to Daulat Beg-Oldi in the north-west, is surrounded by Tibetan territory. It is incredible that this fact should have been overlooked. Mr. Nehru had enunciated the principle that “where aggression takes place we cannot be and shall not be neutral.”* But when aggression did take place, a year after this high-sounding enunciation of principles, except a mild note advising the Chinese that the invasion of Tibet was deplorable, he did nothing but timidly acquiesced in this aggression.

October, 1950, presented the Government of India with ample opportunity of re-examining her treaty obligations. There were three courses open to Mr. Nehru: (a) to assert the legal right arising out of the treaty of 1914, and not to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty over Tibet; (b) to decide the issue on its merits (the issue involved security and integrity of India); and (c) appeasement of China.

Under pressure from the Chinese, the military escorts were withdrawn in 1950. Mr. Nehru explained that military escorts were a relic of British imperialism and he did not wish to continue it. But he overlooked that the fiction of Chinese suzerainty was also a relic of British imperialism. Mr. Panikkar, who was India’s Ambassador in China then, knew perfectly well that the so-called suzerainty of China over Tibet was merely imaginary and the British accepted it as a policy of expediency although

* Ibid., p. 125.
they did not believe that it did in fact exist. Mr. Panikkar in his Broadcast in December, 1962, dealing with suzerainty said, "sometimes these claims of suzerainty are based merely on imagination", and he cited the example of Tibet as the best example of expansionism of New China.

The only evidence available to the public as to how this major policy decision concerning Tibet was arrived at is to be found in the four notes exchanged between India and China and the statements made by Mr. Panikkar in his book, *In Two Chinas*. An examination of these notes and the statements of Mr. Panikkar is a prerequisite to an appreciation of the manner in which a major policy-decision affecting the security of India was taken.

(a) The Indian note, dated 26th of October, 1950, deplored the Chinese invasion of Tibet, but there was not a word of protest in it. Mr. Nehru's enunciation of high-sounding principles was put into cold-storage in the case of Tibet and one has only to contrast his attitude towards Tibet with that towards the Suez episode.*

(b) China's reply, dated 30th of October, 1950, stated:

"Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory. The problem of Tibet is entirely the domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China. This is the resolved policy of the Central People's Government . . . the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of the People's Republic of China and no foreign interference shall be tolerated. . . . Therefore, with regard to the view-point of the Government of India, on what it regards as deplorable, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign

influences hostile to China in Tibet and hence express its deep regret.”*

(c) The Government of India’s Note of 31st of October, 1950, in reply to the Chinese Note of 30th October, 1950, repudiated the Chinese charge that their action had been affected by foreign influence, but did not repudiate the Chinese claim, notwithstanding the joint declarations signed on the 3rd of July, 1914, between the Government of India and the Government of Tibet. Thereafter, without any reference to the Tibetan Government, the Government of India proceeded to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty over Tibet in the following terms:

“It is with no desire to interfere or gain advantage that the Government of India have sought earnestly that a settlement of the Tibetan problem should be effected by peaceful negotiations adjusting the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty. Tibetan autonomy is a fact which, judging from reports they have received from other sources, the Chinese Government were themselves willing to recognise and foster.

“The Government of India’s repeated suggestions that Chinese suzerainty (over Tibet) and Tibetan autonomy should be reconciled by peaceful negotiations was not, as the Chinese Government seems to suggest, unwarranted interference in China’s internal affairs, but well-meant advice by a friendly government which has a natural interest in the solution of problems concerning its neighbours by peaceful methods.”†

Referring to the presence of an Indian Agent in Lhasa, the Government of India stated that they were anxious that those establishments which were to the mutual interest of India and Tibet and which did not detract in

* Ibid., p. 133.
† Ibid., pp. 133-135.
any way from Chinese suzerainty over Tibet should continue.

Thus India not only resiled from treaty obligations unilaterally but followed the British policy of expediency, which Mr. Nehru may, depending upon circumstances, describe as a relic of British Imperialism.

(d) The Chinese note in reply, dated 16th of November, 1950, reiterated that Tibet was an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet was entirely a domestic problem of China and proceeded to state:

“This point was recognised by the Indian Government in its aide memoire to the Chinese Government dated August 28 this year. However, when the Chinese Government actually exercised its sovereign rights, and began to liberate the Tibetan people and drive out foreign forces and influences to ensure that the Tibetan people will be free from aggression and will realise regional autonomy and religious freedom the Indian Government attempted to influence and obstruct the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet by the Chinese Government. This cannot but make the Chinese Government greatly surprised.”*

Mr. Panikkar’s version of the affair is as follows:

“The fat was in the fire. The Government of India was troubled about the Chinese action on the Tibetan borders and I received instructions to lodge strong protest. The Chinese reply was equally strong. It practically accused India of having been influenced by the imperialists, and claimed that China had not taken any military action but was determined to liberate Tibet by peaceful means. Our rejoinder, though couched in equally strong words, recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and disclaimed all desire to intervene in its affairs and emphasized once again our

* Ibid., pp. 135-38.
desire that the issue between the Tibetans and the Chinese should be decided peacefully and not by use of force. Both parties had made their point of view clear and were content to let it rest there."

No previous Government of India, or any other Government in the past, ever acknowledged Chinese claim of sovereignty over Tibet or that Tibet was an integral part of China. Even according to Mr. Panikkar, Kublai Khan had never any pretensions to territorial authority. It is most astounding that the Government of India tamely gave up serious efforts to vindicate their rights secured to them by the several treaties, failed to assert the falsity and untenability of Chinese claims and conceded Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Thus the liberty of a small nation was extinguished. The State whose independent existence had for long been rightly regarded as indispensable to the security of India's frontiers disappeared almost overnight. Mr. Nehru expressed himself as amazed at, and disgusted with, the Franco-British statesmanship during the Czechoslovak crisis and thought appeasement was a feeble word. In the present context, his handling of the Tibetan issue was equally reprehensible and can only be described as abject surrender to China out of fear of China.

Mr. Richardson, the former British Representative in Lhasa, stated:

"It seems improbable that they (Government of India) should have authorized their Ambassador to use the word 'sovereignty'. Possibly the Chinese in referring to the aide memoire substituted one word for another, as they appear to have done on a later

* K. M. Panikkar, op. cit., p. 112.
occasion; but there has been no official explanation of the point.”*

Such an explanation, however, would have been redundant in view of Mr. Panikkar’s categorical statement:

“Our rejoinder though couched in equally strong words recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.”†

At any rate, the Government of India have neither offered any explanation nor repudiated Mr. Panikkar’s statement as to the word “sovereignty”.

That there was no serious attempt to judge this important issue on its merits is apparent from the bewildering variety of statements made by Mr. Nehru to justify his Tibetan policy.

On the 6th and 7th of December, 1950, in his speech in Parliament, Mr. Nehru said:

“We did not challenge or deny the suzerainty of China over Tibet. . . . I was telling the House about a historical fact; I was not discussing the future. It is a historical fact, and in the context of things it is perfectly true that we have repeatedly admitted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet just as we have laid stress on Tibet’s autonomy.”‡

It is pertinent to ask why had not India challenged Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, which had no historical basis? It is equally relevant to ask why India had unilaterally resiled from the agreement signed on 3rd of July, 1914, wherein the British Indian Government pledged themselves not to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty until

‡ K. M. Panikkar, op. cit., p. 11.
‡ India’s Foreign Policy (Selected Speeches), Nehru, p. 302.
China had signed the Convention and accepted the terms? It may be asked also what historical fact Mr. Nehru was referring to? He will find no support for his statement in any history, inasmuch as there are no historical records, present or past, to show that Tibet had ever accepted Chinese suzerainty.

In the same speech he stated:

"Please note, that I use the word suzerainty, not sovereignty. There is a slight difference—though not much."*

This is indeed an astonishing proposition. Surely there is a vast difference between 'suzerainty' and 'sovereignty'.

In another speech on the 30th of March, 1959, Mr. Nehru again stated:

"All I can say is that we had to recognize Chinese sovereignty over Tibet."†

It may be asked why "we had to", when no previous Indian or foreign Government ever recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Not even Kublai Khan, through whom the Chinese claimed suzerainty over Tibet, ever made any territorial claim over Tibet, as has been stated by Mr. Panikkar.

In the same speech Mr. Nehru state:

"Our attitude and the position of all previous Governments in India and elsewhere has historically been recognition of some kind of suzerainty or sovereignty of China over Tibet, and Tibetan autonomy."‡

This is again a distortion of historical facts, and con-

* Ibid., p. 302.
† Ibid., p. 314.
‡ Ibid., p. 314.
tinuation of a relic of British imperialism, which he did not wish to continue even if there had been no change in Tibet.

On the 4th of May, 1950, while replying to a debate in the Rajya Sabha, Mr. Nehru stated:

“Our view on Tibet was different from that of the British Government.”*

It may be asked in what respect was it different from British Government? In the Notes exchanged, India accepted Chinese suzerainty and later on went a step further and accepted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Surely, Mr. Nehru must have known that, once he accepted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, he debarred himself from questioning Chinese action in Tibet and there was bound to be trouble on India’s far-flung frontiers. It is a misfortune of India that, more than ever before, she is inclined to entrust her fate to one man and thus incur risks as grave as they are obvious.

It would be interesting to know what advice was given to Mr. Nehru by the permanent officials of the External Affairs Ministry on this subject. Mr. Panikkar had said:

“There was also some support in the External affairs Ministry for the view that India should act vigorously to protect Tibet.”†

It is apparent that Mr. Nehru did not listen to the advice of the permanent officials.

In his speech during a Foreign Affairs debate in the Lok Sabha on September 30, 1954, Mr. Nehru stated:

“The fact is, and it is a major fact of the middle of

* Ibid., p. 327.
† Panikkar, op. cit., p. 113.
the 20th century, that China has become a great power—united and strong. By that I do not imply that because China is a great power, India must be afraid of China and submit to China and draw up its policies in deference to China. Not at all.”*

Notwithstanding Mr. Nehru’s earlier statement, one cannot help feeling that his acquiescence in Chinese aggression in Tibet was the result of timidity and fear of a powerful China and his desire for appeasement. 1950 will be treated by future historians as a milestone in the history of Asia.

Here was China which had been the victim of Western aggression for a number of years, although she did not lose her independence, she suffered great indignities at the hands of Western imperialists. In the latter part of 1949 she was able to banish imperialist influences from China and established a Central Government. India, which had been under foreign rule for such a long time, achieved her independence in August, 1947. 1950 witnessed the sorry spectacle of one resurgent Asian nation committing aggression on another peace-loving, inoffensive nation Tibet; and India of Mr. Nehru, the champion of anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and anti-racialism, connived at the wanton aggression and by his conduct abetted the subjugation of Tibet—a harmless and independent Asian country.

Mr. Nehru has a tendency to approach all public questions from his personal point of view. He appears to have an obsession that everything the British did was an act of imperialism, and whenever it suits him, either for amending the Constitution or for enunciating any policy,

* India’s Foreign Policy (Selected Speeches, 1946-61), Nehru, pp. 304-5.
he always takes upon the slogan—"It is a relic of British imperialism".

A great colleague of Mr. Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, once said:

"It will be folly to ignore realities. Facts take their revenge if they are not faced squarely and well."

Mr. Nehru did not face facts and the inevitable consequence has occurred, namely, the Chinese aggression on India. This was undoubtedly one of the major blunders of Mr. Nehru and no amount of sophistry can explain this historic error. His facts and interpretations of history were wrong. It can be safely said that he probably ignored the advice of seasoned permanent officials.

When the Chinese aggression began, the Dalai Lama appealed to India, Nepal, Britain and America for help. With Nepal, there existed a treaty of 1856 which stipulated that, in the event of Tibet being attacked, Nepal would come to her assistance. The treaty with India of 1914 entitled Tibet to diplomatic support in her troubles with China. The obligations arising out of treaties between Great Britain and Tibet had devolved on India. The Government of India made it clear that they could not give Tibet any military help and no sane person will suggest that India should have gone to Tibet 'like Don Quixote with lance in hand' against the Chinese. In the past India had sent a small quantity of arms to Tibet for her self-defence. The Tibetan army at the time consisted of 8,500 officers and men. There were more than enough rifles for them, but only 50 pieces of artillery of various kinds. They had 250 mortars and 200 machine guns. The purpose of this army was to stop unauthorised
travellers and to act as a police force. Therefore no amount of arms, even if India had a desire to give it, could have helped the Tibetans.

The explanations put forward by Mr. Nehru in Parliament and elsewhere in support of his policy as to China and Tibet are untenable. Since 1920 right up to the formation of the interim Government in 1946, he had been mainly occupied in agitation for the transference of power and had also been for a good number of years in jail. Unlike the statesmen or the politicians in England, he had had no opportunity for political apprenticeship. It is too much to expect a man to become a statesman or diplomat overnight. He was also confronted with an unparalleled refugee problem following the partition of India. There was also the vexed Kashmir question. At this time his policy of non-involvement was not fully appreciated by Western powers, but everyone in the world knew that he was pursuing a policy of peace and none questioned his sincerity on that score. The grave error which he committed with regard to China and Tibet was due to his lack of understanding of the real nature of British policy and to his failure to investigate properly the relation between China and Tibet and to appreciate the importance of the existence of an independent Tibet for the security of India. The British policy on Tibet can be classified into three phases. From the time of Warren Hastings till the end of the 19th century, the British Government’s interest in Tibet was mainly to open a trade route to Western China through Tibet, so as to obtain a monopoly of Chinese trade, and therefore, the British Government went on placating China by accepting nominal suzerainty of China over Tibet. This policy, however, was changed with the arrival of Lord Curzon.
Lord Curzon was not interested in trade. He was mainly concerned with the security of the northern frontiers of India and the British policy then was to prevent any other power seizing Tibet and using it as a base endangering the security of India. This policy was continued till 1905-06. Thereafter the British Government reverted back to the policy of making treaties affecting Tibet, but without consulting her, and acknowledging Chinese suzerainty. The third and the last phase commenced with the Simla Conference, at which Great Britain acknowledged the de facto independence of Tibet and thereafter continued to deal with her on the footing that she was an independent country. Numerous White Papers have been issued by the Government of India, but in none of them the important declaration of 3rd July, 1914, finds a place. Besides, under various treaties, China could not take unilateral steps concerning Tibet. Therefore, if Mr. Nehru was to put in practice his policy of deciding any issue on merits, here was the opportunity. This opportunity was lost.

That in 1950 there were contending claims cannot be disputed. China was claiming sovereignty and Tibet was denying the same. In these circumstances, it was clearly the moral duty of India to decide the issue on its merits. It may be asked, what could the Government of India have done? There were sound historical reasons for repudiating the Chinese claim that Tibet was an integral part of China and that Tibetan affairs were exclusively the concern of China. India in her own interest should have striven to preserve the independence of Tibet, for India’s own security. China at the time was involved in the Korean crisis. “The Chinese were,” Mr. Panikkar has stated, “not sure of India’s attitude. They were apprehending that Nepal might send 5,000 Gurkha troops
to resist the Chinese aggression."* In these circumstances, a firm attitude, even a little show of force, might well have prevented the Chinese from occupying Tibet. The British Government had no intention of sending troops across the Himalayas in 1912. But the firmness shown by Sir Edward Grey prevented the Chinese from occupying Tibet. Mr. Nehru underestimated his position and prestige in the world at that stage. Had he taken the same attitude, as he had taken in the case of Indonesia, Egypt and other countries, China would have thought twice before proceeding further.

Mr. Nehru in his speech on the 13th November, 1954, stated:

"I happened to be rather well acquainted with Chinese history of the past few thousand years."†

One does not want to hurt his vanity. Mr. Nehru himself admits in his own Autobiography: "I am vain enough in many ways." The Chinese history that he had read did not enlighten him on the Chinese way:

"The Chinese way" (observed the Thirteenth Dalai Lama) "is to do something rather mild at first; then to wait a bit, and if it passes without objection, to say or do something stronger. But if we take objection to the first statement or action, they urge that it has been misinterpreted, and cease, for a time at any rate, from troubling us further."‡

The above was the experience of an experienced man who knew the Chinese far better than Mr. Nehru. In

* Panikkar, op. cit., p. 105.
† India's Foreign Policy (Selected Speeches), Nehru, p. 308.
‡ The Portrait of the Dalai Lama (1946), Bell, p. 99.
fact the Thirteenth Dalai Lama had been the victim of Chinese aggression 52 years ago.

Mr. Nehru may fall back upon the Government of India’s Note, wherein the word ‘autonomy’ has been used. In 1925 the Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chicherin, described ‘autonomy’ as:

“Sufficiently wide to preclude any interference in the internal affairs of Mongolia on the part of China and to permit independence in its foreign policy.”

Mr. Nehru could not have had in mind this type of autonomy for Tibet, inasmuch as he recognized Chinese sovereignty unconditionally.

The British Government in their official correspondence twice described the status of Tibet as ‘independent’ and once used the word ‘autonomy’. In the context it appears, when they used the word ‘autonomy’ they meant ‘independence’ and the Government of India also from 1947 until the Chinese invasion treated with the Tibetans as if they were de facto independent.

When Tibet discovered that no help would be forthcoming from Nepal and she could not count on diplomatic support from India, in sheer desperation, while Notes were being exchanged between India and China, the Tibetan Government appealed to the United Nations on the 7th of November, 1950. Unlike India’s appeal to the United Nations on Kashmir on the ground that international peace and security were endangered by the continuance of the situation, the Tibetan Government put their case simply and clearly to the following effect:

“The armed invasion of Tibet for the incorporation of Tibet in Communist China through sheer physical force is a clear case of aggression. As long as the people of Tibet are compelled by force to become a
part of China against their will and consent, the present invasion of Tibet will be the grossest instance of the violation of the weak by the strong. We, therefore, appeal through you to the nations of the world to intercede in our behalf and restrain Chinese aggression.”*

It is difficult to see how the truth of that statement can be questioned, specially by the United Kingdom and Indian Government, which had been treating Tibet at least since 1914 as a country enjoying *de facto* independence. Both the Governments were aware that during the preceding 40 years Tibet had resisted all claims to Chinese sovereignty and that during the period in question there had been no trace of Chinese authority over Tibet. The Government of India had succeeded to this responsibility only a few years before the invasion.

The Republic of El Salvador, a small country, had the courage to move for the condemnation of the unprovoked aggression by the Chinese Communists. India, which was most vitally affected and was bound by treaty obligations to safeguard the independence of Tibet, sabotaged the move of El Salvador by suggesting that the matter should be settled by peaceful means, which would safeguard Tibetan autonomy. There are good reasons to believe that America and Great Britain would have been prepared to support the case of Tibet, had India which was vitally affected done so.

The United States delegate agreed to an adjournment solely because of the statement by the Indian representative. The debate, accordingly, adjourned and for nine years the matter was not heard. The Chinese were still

*Appeals by His Holiness The Dalai Lama of Tibet to the United Nations, November 11, 1950.*
not certain about world reactions and stopped their army near Chamdo. Thus Tibet was deprived of the opportunity to demonstrate to the world her independent status and India of the opportunity to re-consider or realise, as successor to Great Britain, her relationship vis-a-vis China and Tibet. In justifying India’s action in the United Nations, Mr. Nehru stated in Parliament on the 4th of September, 1959:

“Internationally Tibet has not been regarded as an independent country.”* 

He further stated in the same speech:

“Tibet had not been acknowledged as an independent state for a considerable time.”

Both of these statements were incorrect. In fact, the British Government and the Government of India until 1950 had treated Tibet as a *de facto* independent country. There was an opportunity to reconsider this question when the Government of Tibet went to the United Nations in 1950. It was at the instance of India that the question of Tibet’s status could not be agitated. Now for Mr. Nehru to suggest that “Tibet had not been acknowledged as an independent state for a considerable time” is a complete distortion of history. This was the second grave error made by Mr. Nehru and the responsibility is entirely his, because he is the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of India and was so in 1950 and 1959.

In Parliament, on 19th August, 1958, Acharya Kripalani attacked the Government of India’s Tibetan policy as leading to the “destruction of an ancient nation which was associated with India spiritually and culturally.”

*India’s Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, (1946-51), Nehru, p. 341.*
This criticism would have been much more severe had the Indian public been aware of the fact, which their Government never revealed, that until the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese, India had been bound by treaty obligations to even withhold the recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. The conduct of the Government of India towards Tibet had been most deplorable. The practice and the professions of this Government have been at variance with each other. India's was a moral surrender and the expectation that appeasement would establish a firm frontier with her neighbour proved an illusion.

The Government of India had, a little more than 18 months earlier, reaffirmed to the Chiang Kai-shek Government that the agreement of 1914 had been the basis of its relationship with Tibet. Yet, India took the leading part in obstructing Tibet's appeals to be heard in the United Nations. The news that the General Assembly of the United Nations had decided not to consider the question of Tibet filled the Tibetans with dismay and consternation. They had put their faith in the United Nations as a source of justice. Thus, abandoned by a country which they thought was their friend, the Tibetans had no other alternative than to accede to Nagbo Nagwang Jigma's request to open negotiations with the Chinese.

It may be mentioned that, in October, 1950, Nagbo Nagwang Jigma was the Governor of Eastern Tibet. He surrendered to the Chinese when Chamdo was captured by them. Nagbo sent two officials with the permission of the Chinese General to seek permission of Lhasa to open negotiations. Through one of the officials, the Dalai Lama and his Cabinet sent a message that Nagbo should open negotiations on the firm condition that the Chinese armies should not advance any further into Tibet.

The Dalai Lama in his memoirs has succinctly des-
cried what happened at these negotiations. Soon after the first meeting, the Chinese representative produced a draft agreement containing 10 articles ready-made. The Tibetan delegates argued that Tibet was an independent State and produced evidence to support their argument. The Chinese were not inclined to listen to it. Ultimately a revised draft with 17 articles was produced. This was presented as an ultimatum. The Tibetan delegates were not allowed to make any alterations or suggestions. They were insulted, abused and threatened with personal violence and with further military action against the people of Tibet. They were also not allowed to refer to the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Government for further instructions. This draft agreement was based on the assumption that Tibet was a part of China. That was simply untrue, and the delegation had no authority to accept such an agreement without reference to the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Government. Nagbo had been a prisoner of the Chinese for a long time and the other delegates were also virtually prisoners. Under constant pressure and coercion from the Chinese they were obliged to sign the document. The delegates still refused to affix the seals of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government, which were needed to validate the agreement. But the Chinese solved the problem by forging duplicate Tibetan seals in Peking and using the forged seals on the documents. It is necessary to state:

“All legal systems recognize the vitiating effect of force exerted in the making of a contract, under some such terms as duress, or coercion, or violence, therefore the use of threat of force in inducing a State to make a treaty has the same effect.”

*The Law of Treaties, Lord McNair, p. 107.*
These are the circumstances under which the captive Nagbo and other officials from Lhasa were forced to enter into the Sino-Tibetan agreement, dated 23rd of May, 1951.

The Chinese took this opportunity for falsifying history and justifying the use of force. The long preamble to this agreement and the principal clauses promised Tibet regional autonomy and assured that the Chinese would not alter Tibet's existing political system or the functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Curiously enough, they also promised to allow freedom of religion. It provided for the Tibetan troops to be reorganised into the People's Liberation Army and to become a part of the National Defence Force of the C.P.R., which really meant the integration of the Tibetan Army into the Chinese force. It further stipulated that, in order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the C.P.G. should set up a military and administrative committee and a Military Area Headquarers in Lhasa.

It is necessary to point out that, although the Simla Convention, after being initialled by the Chinese plenipotentiary, was not ratified by the Chinese Government, it was accepted as binding by the two other parties as between themselves. This agreement of 23rd of May, 1951, clearly violated the terms of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Simla Convention of 1914. The Sino-Tibetan agreement of 1951 was concluded without any reference to the Government of India and included provisions for the unrestricted entry of Chinese troops into Tibet and the establishment of a Military Headquarters at Lhasa—provisions which were incompatible with prior agreements as to the status of Of Tibet.

Article 3 of the Simla Convention is in the following terms:
Article 3

Recognising the special interest of Great Britain, in virtue of the geographical position of Thibet, and in the existence of an effective Thibetan Government, and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoining States, the Government of China engages, except as provided in Article 4 of this Convention, not to send troops into Outer Thibet nor to station civil or military officers, nor to establish Chinese colonies in the country. Should any such troops or officials remain in Outer Thibet at the date of the signature of this Convention, they shall be withdrawn within a period not exceeding three months.

The Government of Great Britain engages not to station military or civil officers in Thibet (except as provided in the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Thibet) nor troops (except the Agents’ escorts), nor to establish colonies in that country.

When this article is analysed, the wisdom behind it will be apparent. The intention was to have an effective Tibetan Government so as to ensure the future security of the Indian frontier. The mention of “adjoining states” obviously refers to Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim and the restriction on China not to send troops or to establish Chinese colonies was designed to have an independent Tibet; and what is more, as provided in Article 5, no agreement regarding Tibet could be entered into without reference to India. India by failing to mention the treaty-basis of its interest and its rights in Tibet, either in the exchange of Notes with the Chinese Communist Government or at the United Nations, surrendered vital rights affecting the security of Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and India.
When the Chinese found that they had obtained from Mr. Nehru without much effort the recognition of their sovereignty over Tibet, which no Government had conceded before, and noticed that the Government of India had ignored the basis of its interest in Tibet, and India and the Western countries did not support Tibet in the United Nations, they moved their army into Lhasa and other parts of Tibet. Within a short time they were in complete occupation of the whole of Tibet. Chinese troops marched into Western Tibet from Kashgar and other places in Sinkiang through the Aksai Chin and having themselves firmly established occupied all the key points throughout Tibet. In September 1952, the Government of India was pressed to withdraw their political Agent from Lhasa and in September 1952 the designation of the Indian representative at Lhasa was changed to Consul-General. The practical effect was that Tibet ceased to be an independent country. Then came the crowning folly of all, the Sino-Indian Agreement of 29th of April, 1954. The most important part of this agreement was the acceptance by the Indian Government, in the preamble, and in frequent references to “The Tibetan region of China” of the position that Tibet forms an integral part of China, a position which no Indian Government had previously accepted.

By this treaty India enabled China to extinguish the freedom of Tibet and put an official seal to it. The agreement dealt with the question of establishment of trade marts and routes through which traders and pilgrims should pass from one country to the other. It is incredible that the Government of India should have been a party to such an agreement. It is ridiculous for the Chinese to talk about pilgrimage to ‘Kailash Manas Sarav’. The passes mentioned in this agreement all belong-
ed to India and were controlled by her. It was for the first time that the Chinese were allowed to intervene in such matters. China was given the right to establish Trade Agencies in Calcutta, New Delhi and Kalimpong. These were in due course fully utilised by Communist China as a channel of finance and recruiting fifth columnists to be used against India. India’s Consulate in Kashgar was closed down. This practically stopped Indian trade in Central Asia. Kashgar was India’s observation base in Central Asia. The Chinese had good reason to put Sinkiang out-of-bounds for everybody. Kashgar was the headquarters of the Chinese army in Sinkiang. The large scale offensive against Ladakh was made from this base. Mr. Nehru, commenting on the acceptance of this Agreement before Parliament, in his speech on May 15, 1954, made the following observations:

“A very important event to which I would like to draw the attention of the House is the agreement between India and China in regard to Tibet. That agreement deals with a large number of problems, each one of them not very important in itself, but important from the point of view of our trade, our pilgrim traffic, our trade posts, our communications there, and the rest.”*

He concluded by saying:

“By this agreement, we ensure peace to a very large extent in a certain area of Asia. I would earnestly wish that this area of peace could be spread over the rest of Asia and indeed over the rest of the world.”

Wishful thinking has a limit. Mr. Nehru is not the first

* Nehru, op. cit., pp. 303-4.
timid man "to believe that sycophantic overtures to totalitarian regimes ensure genuine friendship."* He is in good company. Another distinguished Prime Minister of another country, when he arrived at the London airport, after sacrificing the independence of Czechoslovakia, flourished a Note from Hitler in his hand and said, "Peace in our time". Mr. Nehru, when he had no responsibility, thought, "Appeasement was a feeble word for it."

Noel Barber has used intemperate language in criticizing Mr. Nehru's action in sacrificing Tibet's independence: He has said in one place:

"Nehru's wickedest lie is that he has unwaveringly pretended to the world that this agreement on Chinese suzerainty was unconditional, and that it had been agreed to by both the British and the Tibetans at the Tripartite Conference at Simla in 1914. That is absolutely untrue. It was not unconditional."†

No such speech of Mr. Nehru is to be found amongst his published speeches.

China's right to enter into an Agreement affecting trade with Tibet is founded on the Sino-Tibetan 17-point Agreement dated 23rd of May, 1951. That Agreement was founded on fraud, violence and coercion and was void ab initio. Even if it be conceded that it was in the nature of a voidable agreement, the Chinese have violated every term of this agreement. They have subverted the Tibetan Government, destroyed their autonomy, desecrated their temples and places of worship, have attempted to destroy their religion in the name of reform and have massacred unarmed and peaceful Tibetans, and, in consequence of these atrocities, the agreement was formally repudiated

* The Flight of the Dalai Lama, Noel Barber, p. 88.
† Ibid., p. 24.
in March, 1959, by the Dalai Lama. The classic doctrine on denunciation of treaties is that, if one side violates its obligations under a treaty, the injured party may by its own unilateral act terminate a treaty as between itself and a State which it regards as having violated such treaty. This view has been judicially approved in three American cases and in one case before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

The Agreement of 1951 between India and China, in respect of rights affecting a third country, which was not a party to this Agreement, must, therefore, be invalid. India went through this solemn farce without considering the legal aspect or effect of this treaty.

At any rate, China has unilaterally violated and repudiated all the five principles on which this agreement was founded.

India has complained about China's cartography for including Indian territories as parts of China in Chinese maps. India herself is equally guilty of a breach of cartography in the sense that, after the 1954 agreement, in all the maps published by India 'Tibet' has been erased and 'China' has been substituted in place of Tibet. India has thereby behaved as if there is no independent country by the name of 'Tibet'! This is appeasement of the worst form.

It is thus manifest that Mr. Nehru committed grave errors in his handling of the Tibetan question. It is clear that he neglected to investigate the real status of Tibet, failed to appreciate the implications of the numerous treaties, unilaterally resiled from treaty obligations, disregarded the advice of permanent officials, prevented the United Nations Organisation from going into the question of Tibet's status, misled the Indian public, removed by his action impregnable frontiers in the north and
opened the gates of invasion by allowing the Chinese to establish a base in Tibet. Mr. Nehru has left a tragic legacy to future generations of Indians for which they will have to pay very very dearly.

Until recently, Mr. Nehru was the only oracle of India’s Foreign Policy. Now, Mrs. Laxmi Menon, a Minister of State in the External Affairs Ministry, and others are also vocal. On the 22nd of December, 1962, Mrs. Menon said in Bombay:

"India was forced to accept suzerainty of China over Tibet because of the past mistaken policies of the British. . . . The present Indian Government as the successor to the British had to accept that position."

The statements are wholly misleading. It is true that the present Government of India as successor to the British Government inherited British treaty rights and obligations. In 1950 India was an independent country. Nobody could have forced her to accept the past mistaken policies of the British. In fact, the Government of India had resented the Chinese remarks that the Government of India’s representation to them had been affected by foreign influences hostile to China and had categorically repudiated the charge. The right which India had inherited was not to accept Chinese claim to suzerainty. India went a step further and accepted Chinese sovereignty, on her own. Therefore, there was no question of any compulsion. One hopes that she has not been presenting the case of India in this manner to foreigners.

She also made in the same speech another statement:

"The British Government accepted the suzerainty of China because of the fear of Russia."

This is also inaccurate. If Mrs. Menon studied the various speeches of Mr. Nehru on Tibet, she would find that Mr. Nehru did not subscribe to her view that he had been forced to accept Chinese suzerainty. Some of the rights inherited from the British were in fact relinquished by Mr. Nehru as being relics of British Imperialism, which he did not wish to continue, such as escorts and extraterritorial rights in Tibet.

Mr. Morarji Desai, India's Finance Minister, addressing a Congress Workers' Meeting in Patna in defence of the Government of India's policy on Tibet, on January 14, 1963, said:

"When India accepted China's suzerainty over Tibet the latter agreed that Tibet would remain independent. But China had violated that agreement. India had protested against China's subjugation of Tibet."*

Both the statements of Mr. Desai are contrary to facts. He is entirely wrong when he says that China agreed that Tibet would remain independent. On the contrary, in the Notes exchanged and particularly in the Note dated the 30th of October, 1950, China clearly stated:

"Tibet is an integral part of Chinese Territory. The problem of Tibet is entirely the domestic problem of China. . . . No foreign interference shall be tolerated."

There is, therefore, no question of China agreeing to allow Tibet to be independent. India's acceptance of Chinese sovereignty cannot be described as conditional. All that India did, when the invasion took place, was to say:

"Invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable."

and subsequently added:

"The Government of India have sought earnestly that a settlement of the Tibetan problem should be effected by peaceful negotiations adjusting the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty."*

It is, therefore, incorrect to say that India had protested against China's subjugation of Tibet. A strong formal protest at that early stage might well have resulted in an immediate cessation of Chinese occupation of Tibet. That Mr. Desai's statement is not correct is reinforced by the fact that the Government of India did not support Tibet in the United Nations in 1950 and subsequently tried to prevent Tibet from taking the matter to the United Nations again in 1959.

The speeches are indicative of the belated realisation on the part of the members of the Government of India that their Tibetan policy was a grave error. These clumsy attempts to justify a wrong policy are not worthy of this country. To err is human, to acknowledge one's mistake is wisdom. Congress leaders are yet not tired of enunciating high sounding principles and of invoking the name of Gandhiji, but seldom do they follow his precepts.

CHAPTER V

CHINA PREPARES FOR WAR

The Chinese Government are quick to note the temper of the Governments with which they have to deal. After they received the second Indian note of 31st of October, 1950, they sized up Mr. Nehru. When she found that, at the instance of India, the Dalai Lama’s appeal to the United Nations was shelved indefinitely, and no other Governments were interested in espousing the cause of Tibet’s independence, China, after imposing the fraudulent agreement of 1951 on Tibet, swiftly proceeded to occupy the whole of Tibet and wasted no time in preparing for her next adventure. Mr. Nehru probably assumed that the subjugation of Tibet represented the limit of Chinese territorial ambition. In a speech he said, “We ignored, if I may say so, Tibet.”* India is now paying the price for ignoring Tibet. The Chinese lost no time in commencing their road-building programme in Tibet. They built within a short time a number of trunk roads from China to important cities in Tibet. When these roads were completed, outsiders expected that the pace of construction would slacken. Instead, it was increased. The new Chengtu-Lhasa road, instead of following the traditional and more direct caravan route, went south through even more difficult country to come within a few miles of the NEFA border. After reaching Lhasa the road was pushed through south again along the main trade route via Phari and Yatung right to the Indian border. In

* India’s Foreign Policy (Selected Speeches), Nehru, p. 322.
Shigatse, along the western trade route, a steel bridge was built across the Brahmaputra. The new road swung in a great arc along the Indian frontier in the south-west and went before going northward into Sinkiang. In 1955 the Chengtu-Lhasa road was extended to Taklakot.

These new roads in Tibet were primarily for military purposes. They were certainly not designed for local traffic of caravans and light vehicles. They were also not required for the subjugation of Tibet. There was no question of encouraging tourist traffic in Tibet either.

Even before the main highways were completed, spur roads were built to strategic points on the border. Chinese army surveyors explored the valleys leading into Nepal and made plans for a more direct highway from Shigatse to Nepal. One such road reaches within a few miles of the Indian border in the Chumbi valley. Also, as these branch roads were built, strong garrisons moved into border posts. Even large contingents were stationed at Gyantse, Phari, and Yatung, the market centres for the Indo-Tibetan trade. In Tradum, at the head of an important pass into Nepal, new permanent barracks were built and filled with Chinese troops. Taklakot, a Tibetan village near the border of Nepal and the state of Uttar Pradesh, became a fortified city with more permanent barracks, heavy guns emplacements and even a military airfield. From Gartok and Rudog, equally fortified Chinese army centres along the western frontiers, mounted patrols searched India’s border hills and the Ladakh region of Kashmir. In every village along the border at least a squad and usually a platoon of Chinese troops were stationed. These forces also patrolled constantly and often crossed the borders. The entire Chinese forces were linked efficiently by radio-telephone to the Headquarters at Lhasa.
Chinese military activities did not stop with concentration of troops. Powerful transmitters were installed in the border garrisons. By the end of 1956 the road-building programme was nearly complete. An extraordinary feature of these road-building activities was the Chinese desire to conceal them from outsiders. Sydney Wignall and John Harrop of the Welsh Himalayan Expedition throw interesting light as to the reasons for the secrecy. Wignall and Harrop while camping in Nepal, near the Tibetan border, were suddenly without any warning raided by armed Chinese soldiers and captured. Notwithstanding their protests they were taken to Taklakot and were detained. Wignall, in his book, *Prisoner in Red Tibet*, has made the following interesting observations:

“I was convinced that their actions and attitude were those of people who definitely had something to hide. The restrictions on the making of maps; the tightening up of security measures; the objections to pilgrims, and the banning of cameras added up to something important which they were determined to conceal.”

Accidentally, they discovered a well-kept Chinese secret from a 23-year old soldier, guarding them:

“And there it was! An innocent young soldier had given away the one thing the Chinese were trying to hide from us and which their High Command believed to be the reason for our being there. Had we been the espionage agents the Chinese imagined us to be, then our mission could not have been more successful.

“In two years’ time a strategic highway would link Lhasa and Taklakot, and extension of the Chungking-

*Prisoner in Red Tibet* (Hutchinson), Sydney Wignall, p. 144.
Chamdo-Lhasa road, that would enable the Chinese to establish a huge army within 250 miles of Delhi, the capital of India and Asia’s economic and intellectual centre, once called the brightest jewel in Britain’s crown. Now we understood why West Tibet had been declared a security area. We understood, too, the build-up of forces, the new barracks and radio station, and the interference with the rights of Indian pilgrims travelling to Manaswarowar and Kailas. If the Governor had known we possessed such information our lives would not have been worth a dud rupee.”*

These roads alone should have given notice of the Chinese design. This road-building synchronized with the construction of military airfields. By the time Taklakot was linked by road, the Chinese had seven major airfields in Tibet—at Tachienlu, Nagchuka, Gartok, Lhasa, Chamdo, Kanoe and Litang. In addition to these, 18 other airfields were constructed in close proximity to the Indian border.

**Chinese Army**

There was heavy concentration of Chinese troops along the strategic parts of the Indian border. According to the estimates of Indian and Nepalese nationals, returning to India, nearly 100,000 Chinese troops, suitably armed for mountain warfare, were garrisoned in south Tibet along the Indian border. In fact, it is no longer a secret that China brought 18 to 20 Divisions to Tibet. The Government of India could not have been ignorant about this.

Like all other Communist countries, the precise strength of China’s regular military forces is not made public, but enough information trickles through the bamboo curtain

* Ibid., pp. 186-187.*
to enable certain deductions to be made with some accuracy. Knowledgeable persons estimate the strength of the Chinese standing army to be in the region of 4½ to 5 million, of which 2½ are their combatant elements. The transport corps have one million men and the line-of-communication units may have some 3 to 4 million personnel, to which will have to be added the air force and the navy. A Chinese infantry Division has 14,000 to 15,000 men.

Some people have an idea that a Chinese soldier, on only a bandolier of rice which he carries himself, can march and fight on almost indefinitely. This is not true. He can only march for short distances and fight for short periods on such a Spartan diet. Unless he can live off the country or further supplies are brought up to him, he will come to a sudden stop as surely as any Western soldier in similar circumstances. It is a fallacy to assume that the Chinese army does not need a conventional line-of-communication.

A regular soldier is cared for quite well. He has two uniforms, a padded one for the winter and another lighter material for the summer. He has sufficient food and is well fed by Chinese peasant standards. There is apparently a saying in China now that, "If you want a good meal, join the army."

Air Force

The Chinese Air Force consists of 100,000 officers and men and 3,000 aircraft.

In March 1951 deliveries of MIG-15s were made. The first batches of Russian aircraft were fighters. But in 1953 China turned her attention to the building up of a small bomber group and transport command. Precise details are not known, but most reports indicate that China has
now at least 3,000 ‘fighter interceptors’ and several hundred light jet bombers and transport aircraft as well as a handful of other sorts of planes, such as reconnaissance planes and helicopters—all Russian types. The bulk of the fighters are still MIG-15s, but the proportion of MIG-17s is growing and a few MIG-19s have made their appearance. The bombers are mainly Illyushin-28s.

**Equipment**

Compared with modern armed forces of the major world powers, such as America and Russia, China is badly off for military equipment, and it can be said that, comparatively, her army is still at the “small arms” stage of development. The Chinese are still experimenting and have not yet come to any firm decision as to which small arms should be adopted universally. On the whole, China is producing ample infantry weapons of conventional types—such as, rifles, sub-machine guns, machine guns, mortars, bazookas, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines—for her regular standing army, as well as for the trusted elements of the militia. Small recoilless anti-tank guns are making their appearance in large numbers also.

Ammunition remains a problem, one that has plagued the Chinese army of many years, primarily owing to the diversity of types of fire-arms in use, and perpetuated to some extent by the fact that the Chinese have not made up their minds on standardization. Russian guns were received during the Korean war. Now the Chinese are successfully manufacturing small field guns of different sorts, but have not yet produced those of large calibre themselves. Heavy artillery is still scarce. Several thousand Russian vehicles were sent during the Korean war and afterwards, but they were but a few drops in the ocean.
An effort was made and now China both assembles certain Russian models under licence and produce trucks of her own. She is not yet able to manufacture her own tanks, although she is experimenting and has produced light armoured vehicles. The majority of the armour she possesses today is Russian, received mainly at the time of the Korean war, and consists of slightly out-of-date models such as the early Stalin tanks and SU5s and T-34s.

**Conscription**

The conscription Law of China came into effect in July, 1955, embracing all males. The conscript is called up at the age of eighteen and serves for three years.

The military hierarchy is ageing, lives in the past, is guerilla-warfare minded, is cautious and reluctant to change with the times.

During the British regime, India had a small but first class Intelligence Service. Early in 1930, a top-ranking officer of the British Intelligence Service paid a visit to Delhi and expressed the view that India's Intelligence Service was in no way inferior to that of the British. It is hoped that this excellent service has not been scrapped as a 'relic of British Imperialism'. In these days, when something goes wrong, the Police and the Intelligence Service are always blamed. For instance, when extensive rioting took place in Assam over the question of language, an attempt was made in Parliament to put the blame on the Intelligence Service for their failure to warn the Home Ministry prior to the disturbances. It is unbelievable that the Government of India were not aware of the Chinese war preparations in Tibet. Mr. Wignall has observed in his book that their release after two months of captivity was due in no small parts to the efforts made by the British
Foreign Office and the Governments of Nepal and India. He added:

"To them we owe our gratitude, our freedom and perhaps our lives."

When Mr. Wignall and his party returned to Delhi they reported their experience to the authorities. The Dalai Lama visited India in 1956 and had long talks with Mr. Nehru. Therefore, Mr. Nehru could not have been completely unaware of what was happening beyond the Himalayas.

The Chinese commenced these activities in 1952. For three years following the 1954 Sino-Indian agreement, India was engaged in courting China's goodwill. Mr. Nehru paid a visit to China in October, 1954 and on his return stated:

"I am convinced that the people of China like the people of India are devoted to the cause of peace."*

India has paid dearly for this complacency. Mr. Chou En-lai paid three or four visits to India between 1954 and 1957. On his return, reporting to the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Committee, he said:

"Wherever we went, we heard hearty cheers, Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai."†

Those of course were the years of the Sino-Indian honeymoon.

Soon after the Chinese occupation of Tibet, Chinese writers and Chinese Army men gave sufficient indications that they did not consider the border between India and

† Current Background, No. 439, 8th March, 1957.
Tibet to be inviolate. Late in 1951, Tsung Lien Shen, a Chinese scholar and one-time Resident Chinese Commissioner in Lhasa, expressed the view that both geographically and ethnologically the Western boundary of Tibet should be Jojila pass. He also gave indications that the boundary between Tibet and India demanded a settlement. General Wang Tsen, the Head of the Chinese Army in 1950, made one of Communism's biggest indiscretions when he publicly, if thoughtlessly, announced, "Between Peking and Delhi there is no large river. We can approach Delhi easily through Kashmir." It should be remembered that, after the closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar, Sinkiang was also converted into a military base and every student of Communist literature knows Lenin’s famous dictum:

"The way to Paris lies through Peking and Calcutta"

It is only hoped that Mr. Panikkar, India’s Ambassador in China at the relevant time, did not feed the Government of India with his thesis that "Communist China was primarily Chinese and only remotely Communist."

All this massive build up of forces and strategic highways in Tibet could not have misled anybody as to what they portended for the future of India. The writings were on the walls. Against whom were these preparations made? Did the Chinese seriously believe that they expected an attack on China through Tibet from India in conjunction with Western nations? The implications, of course, were absurd, as anyone with an elementary knowledge of modern military tactics know. The Chinese feared no such attack. The irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that these preparations were a prelude to the Chinese aggression against India.
The first duty of a Government is to protect the frontiers of the country. The Government of India must have known from these preparations beyond the Himalayas that, sooner or later, India would be involved in a deadly combat with China. It was futile to speculate as to Chinese motives for this aggression. China's intention was hostile. The first duty of any Indian statesman was to render any such hostile intention futile. The debacle of the Indian army in NEFA and the reverses in Ladakh show that the Government of India had completely failed to discharge its primary duty of protecting the frontiers of the country. Over 12,000 square miles in Indian territory have been under Chinese occupation for over 5 years. Government spokesmen have from time to time talked about the difficulties of the terrain and the unexpected Chinese treachery in invading India. These are flimsy and untenable excuses to explain away their complete lack of foresight and complacency in the face of grave danger to the country. The people of the country were completely misled by false assurances that India's defence preparations were adequate to meet any challenge. It now transpires that the army was ill-equipped and was overwhelmed and outnumbered by a larger enemy force.

To resist aggression on a frontier 2,500 miles in length requires a larger army. The Indian army, with all its differences of race and creed, is unitary and completely non-political. By a firm tradition, resolutely observed, from the time of its first constitution, it was absolutely aloof from politics. It has always been a very disciplined army and its valour and endurance in the field earned for it a unique reputation. The army was, and still is, the greatest political unifying force in India.

The strength of India's military force was far too inadequate to repel the Chinese aggression. To raise an army
takes time. To train a combatant soldier requires at least three years. To support a soldier in the field, other trained personnel is also necessary. Increasing the size of the army is a matter of political decision by the Cabinet. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the Government and not merely that of an individual Minister of Defence.

The recent operations have disclosed that the Indian army was not properly equipped with the requisite type of modern weapons. The defence of a country costs money and it has been a short-sighted policy of the Government to leave the army ill-equipped. The Military Missions which visited India from England and America have praised the courage and fighting qualities of Indian troops and attributed the reverses to lack of weapons. Surely this could have been foreseen and necessary arms procured to avert the disaster.

The difficulties of the terrain could have been solved preferably by procuring in sufficient strength helicopters and not necessarily by building a network of roads which might fall into enemy hands. The Government of India had at least 10 years' notice of what was coming. May it not be legitimately asked, what preparations were made to meet this menace?

In the Western sector there existed an all-weather motorable road from Srinagar to Sonmarg; and from Sonmarg to Kargil there was a jeepable road. From Kargil to Leh there was a track which was only completed as a jeepable road towards the middle of 1960, when China had already been in occupation of 12,000 square miles in Ladakh.

In September, 1962, the Government of India organised a trip for 9 or 10 members of Parliament to Ladakh. This delegation, curiously enough, included a lady M.P. They returned to Delhi and complained bitterly that they
were not shown anything and that they were denied the opportunity of meeting the troops whose morale they expected to raise by speaking to them. They were told that the roads were bad. They were also not taken to the check-posts. In a Press Conference they ventilated their grievances. That was the net result of the conducted tour.

The road from Leh to Chusul, where India has an airfield, was under construction. Apparently, the M.Ps had not the slightest idea as to what the check-posts in the frontier were. It would have taken them several days' march to reach there. Some of these check-posts in Ladakh are at heights varying between 12,000 and 16,000 feet above sea-level. It would have been foolhardy to cart a woman to that height. It was unwise to permit a lady to go to that area. This episode shows complete absence of awareness of what a war is.

Bomdila in the Kamang frontier division has been very much in the news lately. It was the fall of Bomdila that shook the Government out of its complacency and then there were frantic efforts to obtain arms and equipment from friendly countries. A jeepable road to Bomdila was completed in 1959. It was subsequently pushed on to Tawang. From Tawang to Bumla is about 30 miles and 6 to 7 days' march. It appears now that the Chinese built a road from Tawang to Bumla in a fortnight. India's road-building programme should have been on a war footing and not in the happy-go-lucky manner in which P.W.D. works are done. The Government's anxiety not to divert the limited resources of India from nation-building projects is understandable, but the defence of the country should have topmost priority.

Speaking before the Constituent Assembly (Legislative)
on the 27th of November, 1947, Prime Minister Mr. Nehru remarked:

"First things must come first and the first thing is the security and stability of India."*

Chinese activities beyond the Himalayas since 1952 were ominous for India. Mr. Nehru and his Government paid not the slightest attention at the time to meet the aggression against the security of India. What was required all these years was not too many flamboyant speeches, but action.

India's distinguished President, Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, on the 24th of December, 1962, at Anand, stressed the need for the people of India to talk less and to act more. He added:

"We are wonderful in tall talk. It was absolutely essential that every Indian made it a practice to put into action carefully what he said:"†

Little more than 60 years ago, Swami Vivekananda had said:

"There is too much talk, talk, talk! We are great, we are great! Nonsense". We are imbeciles; that is what we are."

These words of wisdom were forgotten by the leaders of the Government.

The spectacular advance of the Chinese in NEFA and Ladakh was only the second phase of Chinese expansionist design against the countries of South-East Asia. To be deceived by the Chinese offer of cease-fire would be a

CHINA PREPARES FOR WAR

folly. It will not be surprising if aggression takes place in other sectors also in the near future. The massive attacks in NEFA and LADAKH were preceded by some astounding statements by Mr. Chou En-lai. On the 23rd of January, 1959, he wrote to Mr. Nehru:

"Historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary has ever been concluded between the Chinese Central Government and the Indian Government."

It is to be seen presently if there could have been any occasion for such a treaty. In the same letter Mr. Chou En-lai stated:

"McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression and juridically too it cannot be considered legal."

Yet two years prior to that he had given Mr. Nehru to understand that he was prepared to accept the McMahon Line as the boundary between Tibet and India. In his letter to Mr. Nehru of the 8th of September, 1959, he made the further astonishing statement:

"McMahon Line has never been recognized by any Chinese Central Government and is therefore decidedly illegal."

Pravda's comment on the Sino-Indian border dispute that "it is a legacy of those times when British colonizers were ruling on Indian territory" shows that the mendacious

* Notes Memoranda and Letters exchanged and Agreements signed between the Governments of India and China, 1954-59.
† White Paper, pp. 52-53.
‡ White Paper No. II, p. 27.
Chinese propaganda has also misled the Russians. Any one familiar with the technique and methods of the past or present Chinese Governments could not have been surprised or shocked at these developments. China has treated this subject with the customary Communist frenzy and exaggeration. China is a Communist country and Russia has some affinity with her on that account. But it is well for our Russian friends to remember that the Chinese are obdurate irredentists, have an infinite capacity for misrepresentation and that the Chinese authorities are in the habit from time to time of making statements which are deliberately untrue. For instance, when the Dalai Lama was in exile in India during 1910 to 1912, the Chinese Amban violated the Trade Regulations of 1908 by forbidding the Pan-chen Lama and his officials to communicate with the British Trade Agent at Gyantse. The Chinese denied that this had been done, but, when the British Government obtained a photograph of the prohibitory order, the denials ceased. Many years after the Younghusband expedition had returned to India, false reports were frequently circulated by the Chinese that a fresh British army had invaded Tibet; every one of these reports was completely untrue. China has a population of six hundred and seventy three million and the population is multiplying every year. There is great pressure on land. Russia has vast territories adjoining Sinkiang and Mongolia, very sparsely populated. Is there any guarantee that these Chinese irredentists will not turn towards the north at a suitable time? The past may not point to the future, but it should not be ignored. The lesson of Chinese history is that whenever she has been powerful she has indulged in an expansionist programme. With a view to removing the confusion which the Chinese have created by false propaganda, it is necessary to consider objectively
the genesis of the McMahon Line and the truth or otherwise of the various statements and allegations made by Mr. Chou En-lai.

What is the ‘McMahon Line’? It is that portion of the frontier between India and Tibet from the north-eastern corner of Bhutan to Isu Razi Pass in the north-east of India, a distance of eight hundred and fifty miles along the crest of the Himalayas. It might well have been called ‘Lon-chen Shatra Line’ after the name of the Tibetan plenipotentiary. The north-eastern boundary of India extends to L.96° 5' East and Lat.29° 28’ North and thereafter runs in a southerly direction. In this sector the McMahon Line, after crossing the Karpo Pass (L.96° 5’ East and Lat.29° 13’ North) crosses the Lohit River, a few miles south of Rima and ends at the tri-junction of the Indian, Burmese and Tibetan boundaries near the pass mentioned at L.97° 23’ East and Lt.28° 13’ North. North of this region is Tibet and not China and Tibet’s south-eastern boundary with China is approximately at L.99° 20’ East and Lat.29° 28’ North. (In this sector Tibet lies between Lat. 29° and 36° North). Therefore it is quite clear that never in history until 1950 had India any frontier with China. Naturally, therefore, there was no occasion for any treaty or agreement between the Government of India and the Chinese Government. This important fact should not be overlooked by those who wish to form an impartial opinion as to the border dispute. China never had any frontier with India either in the north-east or in the north-west of India. China had never set foot on these regions nor did she have any administrative control over these parts, which accounts for Chinese confusion over names of villages in these high regions.

The recent novel claim of China is founded on the his-
torically incorrect assumption that Tibet was an integral part of China and that the Tibetan Government was not competent to enter into treaties with foreign powers. The validity of the Chinese claim depends on the correct answers to the two questions:

(a) What has been the political status of Tibet?
(b) What was the political boundary between Tibet and China until 1950?

It was apparent to the British Indian Government towards the closing years of the 19th century and the beginning of the present century that Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was no more than a political fiction. All treaties or engagements to which Tibet was not a party were not recognised by the Tibetans who simply ignored them and China was not in a position to enforce the provisions of those treaties. In these circumstances, the then British Indian Government decided that the only hope of a solution of the Indo-Tibetan problem was to have direct communication with the Tibetans themselves. The Young-husband Mission in 1903 and 1904 was the result of this decision. Ultimately on the 7th September 1904 the Lhasa Convention was signed between Great Britain and Tibet. The principal clauses of the Lhasa Convention concerned the settlement of the Sikkim-Tibet frontier and the opening of trade marts at Gyantse, Gartok and Yatung. Article I of the Convention is in the following terms:

“The Government of Tibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, as defined in Article I of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly”.
The next important Article is Article IX:

“The Government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government,
(a) no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power;
(b) no such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs;
(c) no Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet;
(d) no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government”.

The treaty as signed was a clear acknowledgment of Tibet’s direct power to make treaties and it contained nothing whatsoever to suggest the suzerainty of China or even any connection with China. If Tibet was really an integral part of China or China had suzerainty over Tibet, China certainly would have resisted the British expeditionary forces to Lhasa. She would also have protested against British action. At any rate, this was not the first time that Tibet entered into a treaty with a foreign power. In 1856 she entered into a treaty with Nepal after the second Gurkha invasion. Again, on this occasion China never protested or resisted the Gurkha invasion. Reference may also be made to the next treaty between Great Britain and China, signed at Peking on 27th of April 1906. The first Article of the Anglo-Chinese Convention is in the following terms:

“The Convention concluded on September 7, 1904, by
Great Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are attached to the present Convention as an annexe, is hereby confirmed, subject to the modification stated in the declaration appended thereto, and both of the High Contracting Parties engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified therein.”

Therefore, China explicitly admitted the right of Tibet to enter into treaties. Article 2 is as follows:

“The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.”

These provisions in Article 2 make it abundantly clear that the British Indian Government had no territorial ambition in Tibet and therefore it is ridiculous to suggest that the British Indian Government had aggressive designs on Tibet. On the contrary, by Article 3 of this Anglo-Chinese Convention, Great Britain abandoned the privileges she had secured by the Lhasa Convention and left Tibet at the mercy of China and bequeathed to India a legacy of serious trouble. Tibet was neither consulted nor informed about the new Anglo-Chinese Convention. The British troops withdrew from Tibet after the Convention was signed. In 1909, contrary to all assurances given to the Dalai Lama, General Chao Erh-feng invaded Tibet from the south-east and burst into Lhasa in February 1910. Then began continuous Chinese intrigues in Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim and the British Indian Government was obliged to tell the Chinese that their claims on these states
could not be recognized and that any attempt to put them into effect would be resisted. During Chao Erh-feng’s march towards Tibet the Chinese forces arrived at Rima in Tibet near the Mishmi border and ordered a neighbouring Mishmi chief to cut a track from Tibet to India. In December 1910 the British Minister in Peking informed the Chinese Government that Nepal and Bhutan were both independent of China. The Chinese occupation of Tibet was shortlived and when revolution broke out in China in 1911 the Chinese troops in Lhasa mutinied. The Tibetans fought and expelled them. Ultimately the Chinese were repatriated through India. The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa in 1912 and proclaimed Tibet’s independence and since then, as in the past, till its illegal occupation by China in October 1950 Tibet had been an independent country.

Relations between Tibet and China continued on the footing of undeclared and desultory war. In the summer of 1912 the Government of Szechuan Province despatched a force to Tibet. Great Britain thereupon addressed a memorandum to China to the effect that she would not recognize the right of China to intervene in the internal administration of Tibet. She also would not agree to the stationing of an unlimited number of troops in Tibet. A written agreement on the foregoing lines was asked for. China sent an equivocal reply. The British Government was not prepared to the upsetting of the peace of northern India by causing unease and disturbance along the Himalayan frontier and called a tripartite conference of Great Britain, China and Tibet to settle the Sino-Tibetan boundary dispute and the relationship between China and Tibet. After some months of argument, the Chinese Government agreed to a tripartite conference at Simla. The Chinese plenipotentiary Mr. Ivan Chen arrived in
Simla on the 6th of October, 1913. Tibet was represented by Lon-Chen Shatra, a leading Tibetan minister, and the British Government was represented by Sir Henry McMahon, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, each of whom was a properly accredited plenipotentiary, whose powers were accepted formally by the other participants in the Conference. It is important to bear in mind that all the three plenipotentiaries had equal status. Lon-Chen Shatra was the plenipotentiary of an independent Government and not that of a vassal state. The Tibetan plenipotentiary submitted a statement asking for acknowledgment of the independence they had re-established by the eviction of Chinese troops and officials. They wanted the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 to be declared invalid and the Trade Regulations revised. They also pressed for the acceptance of a frontier with China from a line running from Tachienlu to Koko Nor. The Chinese, on the other hand, claimed sovereignty over Tibet, resting it on the conquest of Chingis Khan. They also claimed a frontier along a line running through Giamda, only sixty miles east of Lhasa. The Tibetans surprised both the other parties by the careful and voluminous documentation of their claims. They exhibited revenue records, list of houses, officials and headmen, charters, agreements and other materials relating to disputed districts. Against all that, the Chinese could produce little but verbal statements including the above-mentioned allegation for which there was no historical foundation whatsoever. Sir Henry McMahon was, for much of the negotiations, in the position of a mediator trying to find some common ground between two widely divergent claims. In order to reconcile the two irreconcilable claims Sir Henry McMahon suggested a division of Tibet into two Zones, Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet.
The former is the part nearer to India, including Lhasa, Shigatse and Chamdo. The latter part is nearer China, including Ba-tang, Li-tang and Tachienlu. At the suggestion of Sir Henry McMahon the Tibetans were persuaded to accept nominal Chinese suzerainty over Tibet on condition that China engaged not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet. The British Government also suggested as a compromise the historic boundary running roughly along the upper waters of the Yangtse, which had existed at least since the time of Manchu dynasty. After negotiations lasting for six months the various proposals were embodied in a draft tripartite convention. The chief provisions of this convention were as follows:

(1) Tibet was divided into two zones, Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet;
(2) nominal Chinese suzerainty was recognised; China engaged not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province;
(3) Great Britain agreed not to annex any portion of Tibet;
(4) China agreed to abstain from interfering in the administration of Tibet; she agreed also to abstain from sending troops to Tibet; she promised not to establish Chinese colonies there;
(5) by Article IX the proposed boundary between Tibet and China was drawn on a map which was initialled by all the three plenipotentiaries.

In March, 1914, before the draft of the tripartite Convention was completed, direct negotiations took place between British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries. The Chinese were not invited to take part in the discussions
about the Indo-Tibetan frontier and their specific acceptance of it was not sought, but they were provided with information about it. The Chinese Government was not interested in the border between India and Tibet. The now well-known McMahon Line was fixed roughly along the crest of the Himalayas from the north-east corner of Bhutan to Isu Razi Pass in the north of Burma. It was drawn on a map in two sheets attached to the exchange of Notes and sealed by both plenipotentiaries. The McMahon Line was later embodied, on a reduced scale, in the maps showing the proposed boundaries between Tibet and China under Article IX of the draft Convention. The draft Convention was initialled by Chinese and Tibetan representatives. The Chinese Government, two days after, declined to accept the Convention. The sole reason given then, and to be repeated later was the inacceptability of the provisions regarding the Sino-Tibetan frontier. Sir Henry McMahon informed the Chinese that if they would not sign the draft Convention, a direct agreement would have to be concluded with the Tibetans. The Chinese reiterated that the frontier between Tibet and China was the only obstacle and asked for the continuation of Sir Henry McMahon's mediation. On the 3rd of July 1914, Sir Henry McMahon and Lon-chen Shatra signed the Convention. Both the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries also signed a very important declaration on the same day in the following terms:

"We the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and Tibet hereby record the following declaration to the effect that we acknowledge the annexed Convention as initialled to be binding on the Governments of Great Britain and Tibet and we agree that so long as the Government of China withholds signature to the
aforesaid Convention, she will be debarred from enjoyment of all privileges accruing therefrom, in token whereof we have signed and sealed this declaration, two copies in English and two in Tibetan. Simla, 3rd July 1914”.

The advantages which the Chinese were thus deprived of by not signing the Convention were:—

(2) The recognition of Chinese Suzerainty over Tibet.

The result of the Simla Conference as affecting the three parties appears to be as follows:—

The Chinese Government gained nothing but the retention, which proved to be for a short time only, of a strip of territory between Salween and Mekong, formerly administered by the Tibetan Government but occupied by Chao Erh-feng in 1908/1909.

The Tibetans, by the failure of the Chinese to sign the Convention, were released from the offer, made under British persuasion, to accept nominal Chinese suzerainty in return for Chinese guarantee of their autonomy and their joint frontier. They also secured British recognition of their autonomy and the assurance that the British Government would not acknowledge China’s suzerainty over Tibet unless the Chinese Government fulfilled their side of the bargain by signing the Convention. The Tibetans could also expect British diplomatic support and a modest supply of arms.

Therefore, the Chinese objection, on which the Conference eventually broke down, did not relate to that part of the frontier in which, since their eviction from Tibet, they had no practical interest, but was solely concerned
with the proposed boundaries between China and Tibet northward from the Burmese border. In the Simla Conference Sir Charles Bell was appointed to assist Sir Henry McMahon on the Tibetan side of the case. Sir Charles Bell who had intimate knowledge of these negotiations has left a record on this point, viz., that the negotiations with China broke down on one point only, namely, the frontier to be established between China and Tibet. He has further stated:

"In the end, Tibet proved willing to accept the British award in order to arrive at a settlement. China remained obdurate, but notified Britain, except as regards the boundary between Tibet and China, she was willing to accept the Convention in all respects."

Sir Eric Teichman has also dealt with this matter and stated as follows:

"Though no settlement had been arrived at, China formally notified Great Britain that the only point in the draft Convention which she was unable to accept was that affecting the boundary and gave an assurance that the Chinese troops stationed on the frontier would not advance beyond the position they held, provided they were not attacked by the Tibetans, both sides awaiting a final settlement by diplomatic means."

Subsequently, the question of boundary between Tibet and China came up for discussion, but at no stage did China take any exception to the Indo-Tibetan border known as the McMahon Line. It is relevant to set out below the notes exchanged between Sir Henry McMahon and Lon-Chen Shatra:

* Tibet Past and Present, Sir Charles Bell, p. 157.
† Travels of a Consular Officer in Tibet, Sir Eric Teichman, p. 46.
"India-Tibet Frontier 1914. Exchange of notes between the British and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries:

To
Lon-chen Shatra, Tibetan Plenipotentiary.

In February last you accepted the India-Tibet frontier from the Isu Razi Pass to the Bhutan frontier, as given in the map (two sheets), of which two copies are here-with attached, subject to the confirmation of your Government and the following conditions:—

(a) The Tibetan ownership in private estates on the British side of the frontier will not be disturbed.

(b) If the sacred places of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa fall within a day's march of the British side of the frontier, they will be included in Tibetan territory and the frontier modified accordingly.

I understand that your Government have now agreed to this frontier subject to the above two conditions. I shall be glad to learn definitely from you that this is the case.

You wished to know whether certain dues now collected by the Tibetan Government at Tsona Jong and in Kongbu and Kham from the Monpas and Lopas for articles sold may still be collected. Mr. Bell has informed you that such details will be settled in a friendly spirit, when you have furnished him the further information, which you have promised.

The final settlement of this India-Tibet frontier will help to prevent causes of future dispute and thus cannot fail to be of great advantage to both Governments.

A. H. McMahon,
British Plenipotentiary.

Delhi, 24th March, 1914.

The map referred to in this and the succeeding note was published for the first time in an atlas of the Northern Frontier of India, issued on 15 January 1960 by the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India.
To
Sir Henry McMahon,
British Plenipotentiary to the
China-Tibet Conference.

As it was feared that there might be friction in future unless the boundary between India and Tibet is clearly defined, I submitted the map, which you sent to me in February last, to the Tibetan Government at Lhasa for orders. I have now received orders from Lhasa, and I accordingly agree to the boundary as marked in red in the two copies of the maps signed by you subject to the condition mentioned in your letter, dated 24th March, sent to me through Mr. Bell. I have signed and sealed the two copies of the maps. I have kept one copy here and return herewith the other.

Sent on the 29th day of the 1st month of the Wood-Tiger year (25th March 1914) by Lon-chen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary.

Seal of Lon-chen Shatra.

Mr. Nehru pointed out in his letter to Chou-En-lai dated 26th of September, 1959, that before the negotiations between Tibet and India "the area was extensively surveyed in 1911-13. The Lohit area was surveyed by the Mishmi Mission in 1911-12, the Dibhang Valley was surveyed in 1912-13, and the Abor area in 1913". Capt. F. M. Bailey and Capt. H. T. Morshead carried out extensive surveys of the southern limits of the Tibetan jurisdiction in the whole area in 1913 and 1914. It was on the basis of this detailed information that the boundary was settled between India and Tibet in 1914 from north-east of Bhutan to Isu Razi Pass. It is manifest, therefore, that the McMahon Line was not an arbitrary imposition on Tibet by the Government of India. It formalized the natural, traditional, ethnic and administrative boundary in that area. It represents correctly the customary and the traditional boundary in this area. The water parting
formed by the crest of the Himalayas is the natural frontier which was accepted for centuries as the boundary by the peoples of both sides. It must not be overlooked that Tibet was an independent country and a sovereign State and entered into a solemn agreement with the British Government. Next, the Chinese Central Government were fully aware that such a treaty had been entered into between Tibet and Great Britain. China at no time questioned the competency of the Tibetan Government to enter into such a treaty and after fifty years now they suggest that the McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression and that juridically too it cannot be considered legal. The legal validity of this treaty cannot be questioned by China on any ground. The validity of the McMahon Line does not depend on recognition by any Chinese Central Government nor are they competent to question its legality. The Tibetans have a profound respect for treaties and never questioned the validity of the frontier to which they had agreed in 1914.

These then are the true facts concerning the McMahon Line. The proceedings of the Simla Conference and the records of the negotiations between Sir Henry McMahon and Mr. Lon-chen Shatra are in existence for the world to see and to judge whether the aspersions cast by China on the British Indian Government that the McMahon Line was the product of British aggression on Tibet is true or not. These proceedings were printed in Aitchison’s Treaties as far back as 1929 and the McMahon Line was shown in the official maps. These maps were circulated widely but neither then nor subsequently was any objection raised by the Chinese authorities. The Chinese Central Government were fully aware of the negotiation between the British Government and the Tibetan Government and they never took any exception to it because they
knew that they had no right, title or interest in Tibet.

It appears from Mr. Nehru's letter to Mr. Chou-En-lai dated 14th of December 1958 that he was under the impression that there were no border disputes between India and China. In fact he thought that the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954 had settled all outstanding problems between the two countries. Some time later, his attention was drawn to some maps of China which included Indian territory. During his visit to China in October 1954, Mr. Nehru mentioned this matter to Mr. Chou-En-lai when he was told that the maps were reproductions of old pre-liberation maps and that the Chinese Government have had no time to revise them. Thereafter in 1958 the Prime Minister's attention was again drawn to a map of China published in the magazine *China Pictorial* wherein a large part of the North-Eastern Frontier Agency of India as well as some other parts of the country were shown to be parts of Chinese territory. The attention of the Chinese Government was drawn to the last-mentioned map and a Chinese Note sent to the Government of India stated that the Chinese Government had not yet undertaken a survey of China's boundary or consulted the other countries concerned. Mr. Nehru was puzzled at this reply. This attitude on the part of the Chinese Government should not have surprised or puzzled the Prime Minister if he had only been aware or been informed of the old technique of China of making false maps to grab other people's territories. This technique of fabricating false maps had been employed for over two centuries as will be borne out by recorded history.

In 1708 the Chinese Emperor K'ang Hsi commissioned two Peking-educated Lamas (not surveyors) to prepare a map of the Celestial Empire. These two personages in due course produced a map which included quite a
number of Tibetan districts. A copy of this map was sent by the Chinese to the King of France. D'Anville prepared his atlas in 1733 on the basis of this map prepared by these two Lamas, which held the field until the second quarter of the 19th century. The Tibetans who had been the victims of this cartographical aggression of China on numerous occasions can throw a flood of light on the subject. Notwithstanding the change of political set-up, this habit of the Chinese of making false maps has not changed at all. The boundary of Tibet in 1717 in the south-east extended to L.99° 20' east. Then it ran along a line to the north to Tsaka Lho; thereafter it ran east to a point L.103° east and from Techienlu it ran in a north-westerly direction to Donkyr, approximately to L.100° 3' East. Thereafter it went through the Koko Nor region. This was the eastern boundary of Tibet and the western boundary of China. In 1718 K'ang Hsi found an excuse that the Mongols and the Tibetans might combine against China and in pretended anticipation despatched an army in 1718 to occupy the districts shown in the false map. By 1727 the Chinese succeeded in occupying some of the eastern districts of Tibet shown in the Lamas' map and pushed the boundary to the west from a line running from L.99° 20' East, going north-westwards, and this remained the boundary of Tibet and China between 1717 and 1910, thereby wrongfully occupying Ba-tang, De-ge, Gomchen and Reyu, which had been Tibetan territories. In 1909-10, Chao Erh-feng known as Butcher Chao for his atrocities in Tibet invaded Tibet and wanted to create a new province called Sikang which was to include parts of Szechuan and considerable areas of Tibet extending to Giamda, almost sixty miles east of Lhasa. This proposal never received the assent of the Chinese Central Government. Nevertheless, the frontier according to Chao's blue-
print may be seen in Chinese maps published in the present century and many British maps accepting the fictions of Chinese cartography without scrutiny showed a similar line. This can be seen from an atlas published by Odhams Press Ltd., London, W.C. 2 in 1938. After the breakdown of the Simla conference on the question of Sino-Tibetan border, the Chinese recognized their own claim and published their map for the whole world to see. China had diplomatic relations with other nations of the world. Tibet had not. The Chinese map was followed by map makers in other countries including Britain.

During 1917, General P'eng, breaking the truce which had existed since the Simla conference, advanced with his army into Tibet. This time Kalon Lama, the Commander-in-Chief of Tibet, with comparatively modern arms and trained troops, defeated the Chinese and drove them beyond Chamdo and would have occupied Tachenlu but for the intervention of Sir Eric Teichman. The Chinese were driven east of Drechu River and this remained the boundary between Tibet and China until 1950. Yet, the Chinese maps showed these areas recovered by Tibet as Chinese territory. Robert Ford, who was a Radio Operator in Chamdo at the time of the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950 has an interesting story to tell. In connection with a radio contest called “Worked All Zones”, the whole of Tibet was classed as Zone 23. Ford’s assertion that he was in Chamdo and therefore in Tibet was often challenged on the authority that Chamdo had been shown in maps as being in China. Ford sent a message to the Radio Society of Great Britain and the Radio Relay League in America pointing out that the atlases were wrong. “What is your authority for saying Chamdo is in Tibet?” one contact asked him. “I am in Chamdo, and I am employed by the Tibetan Govern-
ment. I am the first European to stay here after over thirty years. The last was Sir Eric Teichman, and the boundary-lines on his maps are still pretty well right. Yours were always wrong.” “Who put them in, then?” The answer was: “The Chinese.”*

The first principle of the much-vaunted Agreement between China and India was “mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.” It was ratified on June 3, 1954. Barely had six weeks elapsed when the Chinese made a claim to Barahoti in Uttar Pradesh in India. In June, 1955, the Chinese troops actually penetrated into Barahoti. They also entered Damzang in the same State. In April, 1956, an armed Chinese party camped near Nilang. Yet it was not until December 14, 1958, that Mr. Nehru in writing to Mr. Chou En-lai said: “No border questions were raised at that time and we were under the impression that there were no border disputes between our respective countries. In fact we thought that the Sino-Indian Agreement, which was happily concluded in 1954, had settled all outstanding problems between our two countries.”† It now transpires that from 1955 the Chinese began a series of sporadic intrusions into Indian territory. By 1957, the Chinese completed the construction of a highway from Tibet to Sinkiang which runs across the Aksai Chin. In order to ascertain the alignment of the road, two reconnaissance parties were sent out in the summer of 1958, an army party towards the north and a police party towards the southern extremity of the road. The army party was arrested by the Chinese. In October, 1957, the Chinese entered Walong in the Lohit Frontier Division. In July, 1958, the fort of Khurmank in Ladakh was occupied by the Chinese soldiers. It is

* Captured in Tibet, Robert Ford, p. 88.
† White Paper on China, p. 48.
pertinent to point out that violations of Indian territory continued even after Mr. Chou En-lai visited Delhi in November, 1956, when he had discussions with Mr. Nehru.

In any event, by the middle of 1958, the Government of India were fully aware that the Chinese had evil designs in three sectors of the Indian frontiers with Tibet, namely, in Ladakh, in the middle sector and in the North Eastern Frontier Agency. From 1954 onwards the Government knew that the Chinese maps were in circulation which included nearly 50,000 square miles of Indian territories in these three sectors. In NEFA alone the Chinese maps claimed well over 30,000 square miles of Indian territory. The people of India are entitled to ask, except lodging numerous protests, what practical steps were taken by their Government to prevent further unauthorised intrusions into Indian territory? Apparently, no such steps were taken. Indeed, these facts were concealed from the Indian Parliament and the public. Why?

A reference has already been made to Mr. Nehru's letter of December 14, 1958. Mr. Chou En-lai's reply, dated 23rd of January, 1959, could have left no doubt in the minds of the members of the Government of India that China was not prepared to respect the territorial integrity of India. In fact, Mr. Chou En-lai referring to the border question cynically stated:

"This was because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement."*

The implication of this statement is obvious. China was not ready to attack India until 1960.

On the 25th of August, 1959, a large detachment of

Chinese troops crossed the frontier in the Subansiri Division of the North East Frontier Agency and opened fire on a small detachment of Assam Rifles, killing some of them, and occupied the Indian frontier post at Longju, which is south of the McMahon Line. In that area, it was only after this incident that the Indian Army was given the responsibility of protecting that frontier. Yet no steps were taken to eject the trespassing Chinese troops. On the 20th of October, 1959, the Chinese military forces advanced 40 miles into Indian territory in the Chang Chenmo valley in Ladakh and, encountering an Indian patrol near the Kangka Pass, opened fire, killing 9 and capturing 10 members of the Indian party. Those captured were subject to harsh and inhuman treatment before being released.

It has been admitted by the Government of India that between June, 1955, and June-July, 1962, the Chinese troops had intruded into Indian territory on 30 occasions and had occupied well-over 12,000 square miles of Indian territory.

During these seven years, while China was nibbling away Indian territory and killing Indian troops, the Government of India was engaged in exchanging with China nearly 700 Notes. The Indian army remained on the same strength. Their armament was not modernised and as for lines of communications, the road-building programme did not commence until 1959-60 and that too in a most leisurely fashion. The public were kept completely in the dark about India’s unpreparedness, although certain assurances were given, which turned out to be false. It seems incredible that the Government of India did not realise that the longer the Chinese were allowed to be in occupation of Indian territory and to consolidate their position, the more difficult it would be for India to dis-
lodge them. Yet at no stage during these 7 years did the Government make any attempts to vacate the aggression on Indian territory. It would have been easier to throw out the Chinese from Indian territory at an earlier stage and a little firmness then would have prevented further encroachment. In fact, a former Commander-in-Chief suggested at the time that unless the Chinese aggression was nipped in the bud, it would be difficult to throw them out later. No one paid heed to this wise counsel.

What mattered—what always matters on a frontier—was prestige. The Government of India is a tiny oligarchy controlling a huge sub-continent. Once it had asserted its rights in Ladakh, in NEFA and in the middle sector, there was a point beyond which Chinese intransigence and its own forbearance could not be allowed to go. In September, 1962, the Chinese made an attempt to dislodge Indian troops from Dhola post and severe fighting broke out in NEFA on or about 12th of October, 1962. About that time, when on his way to Ceylon, Mr. Nehru stated:

"The armed forces have been ordered to throw the Chinese aggressors out of NEFA. Our instructions are to free our territory."

This decision to throw out the aggressors was three years too late. One cannot imagine a more indiscreet statement from a Prime Minister on a matter of military operation. It was no secret that the Chinese had moved more than one crack division from the north which passed through Lhasa and was heading for North Eastern Frontier Agency. Forewarning an enemy by such a Press statement is to give him notice to prepare and take battle positions.

On the 20th of October, the Chinese launched a massive attack on both fronts simultaneously and occupied Dhola and Khinzemane and penetrated deep into Kameng frontier division and in Ladakh they were within a few miles from Chusul. At this advanced stage the Prime Minister realised:

"This is not a mere boundary dispute or a question of small territorial frontier adjustments."*

He went on to say:

"Massive attack along the entire India-China frontier which started on 20th October, resulted in serious conflicts, has brought matters to a crisis. This crisis is not only of India but of the world. . . . We cannot submit to this law of jungle which affects our integrity and the honour of our motherland."†

The realisation came rather late, although it should have dawned on him long ago. The serious situation could no longer be concealed and there was such restlessness among the Congress Members of Parliament that Mr. Nehru was compelled to replace Mr. Menon. In Mr. Menon the Government found an easy scapegoat for their gigantic failure to anticipate and prepare for this onslaught on India. The Government cannot, however, escape the responsibility for its failure to perform its first duty, namely, to protect the territorial integrity of India. The Congress is a monolith political party. There is no effective opposition in Parliament and the Press in India is ostensibly free but not independent. Therefore, the Congress mem-

* Chinese Aggression in War and Peace—letters of the Prime Minister of India, p. 33.
† Chinese Aggression in War and Peace—letters of the Prime Minister of India, p. 33.
bers of Parliament were expected to be more vigilant about the doings of their Government. The Congress Members of Parliament cannot also escape the criticism that they had been relying far too much on their brute majority in Parliament and utterly failed to discharge their obligations to the country.

In this critical situation Mr. Nehru sought both help and sympathy of friendly foreign Governments. The United States, Great Britain and other countries promptly rushed arms and equipment to India without any strings attached to them. Thereafter, the Chinese unilaterally announced a ‘Cease Fire’ and promised to withdraw to “positions 20 kilometers behind the line of actual control which had existed between India and China on November 7, 1959,” from 1st of December, 1962, but threatened India with dire consequences if she dared send her troops into the territories to be vacated by China. It is unnecessary to speculate about the motive for this generous gesture of the Chinese.

Shortly thereafter, six non-aligned Powers, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, Ghana, United Arab Republic and Cambodia, convened a Conference to bring about peaceful negotiations between China and India as to the border disputes.

Mr. Nehru paid a visit to Santiniketan before the end of the year and had an hour’s talk with Acharya Vinoba Bhave, before he returned to Delhi. Shortly thereafter, on the 30th of December, 1962, The Amrita Bazar Patrika published an article entitled ‘Sino-Indian Conflict—The Right Approach’ by Acharya Vinoba Bhave. In this article Acharya Bhave stated:

“We have just been witnesses of a very significant happening in the Sino-Indian conflict. A victorious army
has withdrawn, declared a cease fire, proposed negotiations and invited its opponents to the conference table.”

He further stated:

“Has anyone ever heard of a victorious army which, when the way was clear for advance, did not advance but withdrew? What does all this mean? It means that today a ‘world conscience’ is taking shape.”

Therefore, the Acharya makes a special plea for negotiating with China and at the end he adds:

“China could have occupied Tezpur and possibly the whole of Assam. But they could not pin their faith to the armed forces which they employed, because other kinds of force are now at work in the world to which they feel that an appeal must be made.”

Acharya Bhave does great injustice to the gallant Indian army if he believes that the Chinese could have occupied Tezpur and the whole of Assam. This article shows complete lack of understanding of the mentality and the methods of the Chinese and the reasons for their withdrawal. His opinion on the Bhoodan Movement is entitled to great respect, but his appreciation of the Chinese motives and the forces which compelled China to act in this manner are entirely erroneous. His article is a special plea for going to the ‘Conference Table’ without any pre-condition. His is also a plea in support of non-involvement.

China, however, has not yet accepted the Colombo proposals with the clarifications.

*The Statesman* of the 28th of January, 1963, reported what purported to be Mr. Nehru’s end-of-the-session speech to Congress members of Parliament with a head-
line, "It Was A Small War, Says Nehru." Only a very short time ago, in his appeal to the Heads of Governments of various countries he made out that the Chinese attack was a serious one affecting the policy of non-alignment and of Afro-Asian solidarity. As soon as the immediate danger was over and India's unpreparedness exposed, he said:

"No power on earth can defeat India, whether she is armed or unarmed."

and Mr. Nehru added:

"He felt humiliated to hear people bewail that the entire nation had been humiliated. It was a small battle and a small disaster which should not be exaggerated."

Once again is not this sheer complacency? The extent of the Chinese aggression and the threat not only to India but to other Asian countries involved belie the philosophy of an unarmed country being able to defend its freedom. The people of this great country and its great army, from top to bottom, irrespective of rank, have been greatly humiliated and they say so. Yet the Prime Minister would have us believe 'It is a small war and that in fact the country has not been humiliated'. It is India's misfortune that her Prime Minister should talk far too much, in season and out of season, and on every conceivable subject on earth, and what is worse, without prior preparation or thought.
CHAPTER VI

AFTER CHINESE INVASION

The unwarranted and wanton Chinese aggression against India has raised doubts in some minds about the efficacy of Mr. Nehru's Foreign Policy. Mr. C. Rajagopalachari has criticised it in the following terms:

"Whether the Foreign Policy of the regime is right or wrong is no longer an academic issue. The pudding has proved to be bad. There can be no further doubt about it. All our neighbours are either against us or have lost confidence in us. We have failed in our Foreign Policy by any test."

Mr. K. Hanumanthaiya, a former Congress Chief Minister of Mysore, in the All India Congress Committee meeting held on 6th of April, 1963, said:

"This policy landed India in all sorts of degradation and dishonour."

and advocated a change of this policy.

These are rather sweeping statements and cannot be of much assistance in assessing the Foreign Policy of a country like India. What then is the test of an effective Foreign Policy? A sound Foreign Policy is one that serves the interest of a country best. The Foreign Policy of a country is conditioned by its geographic position, its economic condition, its political institutions, etc.

India achieved political freedom in 1947 enabling her

† The Statesman, Calcutta, April 7, 1963.
to tackle the economic problem. India’s main problem was eradication of poverty, raising the standard of living of masses of people, and providing shelter over their heads. These could only be done by economic development and industrialisation of the country. The pre-requisite to the implementation of these schemes was peace at home and abroad. No economic development of India is possible if there is no peace in the world.

It is well to bear in mind the conditions obtaining in India during the first three years of independence, when she was confronted with several gigantic problems. India was industrially an undeveloped country and military weakness followed from it. The Indian army was modelled on the British system. For the equipment of the army, she was dependent on Great Britain. India’s foreign trade was predominantly with Commonwealth countries and the United States of America. It should also be borne in mind that foreign capital plays an important role in the development of India’s economy. Lastly, India’s political institutions are modelled on the Western democracies.

Napoleon once declared that the Foreign Policy of a State derived essentially from its geographic position. While this is no longer entirely accurate, because of the revolution in technology during the past century, the bare facts of geography do limit a state’s freedom of action in foreign affairs. No Indian statesman can ignore the compelling fact that the two Great Powers of the Communist world stand at the gates of the Indian sub-continent. Russia is India’s immediate neighbour and although China had no frontier with India, she belongs to the same land block. It cannot also be ignored that in terms of sheer military and industrial power the Soviet-Chinese block is vastly superior to India. Therefore, this permanent feature of India’s geo-political landscape must occupy the
key place in the calculations of India’s policy-makers. Powerful neighbours must not be provoked or alienated. At the same time, the vital interests of the country must be protected. India’s geographic position also dictates a policy of friendship with Russia, China, Burma and other countries.

India’s Foreign Policy is said to be one of ‘non-involvement’ or ‘non-alignment’. On ultimate analysis, it simply means ‘no prior commitment’. It further means that she reserves to herself the right to act independently and to judge each issue on its merits. In other words she does not want to commit herself in advance. She wants friendship with all countries and wishes to be clear of all entanglements. Dispassionately looked at, this Foreign Policy is unexceptionable, provided it is implemented in the spirit in which it was conceived. Mr. Nehru has made many mistakes, but his Foreign Policy is certainly not one of them. His mistakes on Tibet cannot detract from the merits of this policy.

India’s Foreign Policy is very similar to the American Foreign Policy of the 18th century. On the 19th of September, 1796, George Washington said:

“Observe the good faith and justice of all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony toward all. An attachment for one nation or another produces a variety of evils. It is our true policy to steer clear of all foreign entanglements.”

This may properly be said to be the Foreign Policy of Mr. Nehru. That there is better understanding of this Policy is clear from following statement of Mr. Averell Harriman as to India’s Foreign Policy:

“Independence for themselves and independence for
other peoples. Non-interference from any quarter. Not to take sides, to see the best in others, even your enemies.”

The Chinese never agreed with the Foreign Policy of India. According to them, a Foreign Policy that was independent of the two blocs was irresolute and this was neither desirable nor possible. Mao Tse-tung made China’s policy clear in a message he sent to the India’s Communist Party on October 19, 1949. After pointing out that he considered the Indian Government as “Agent of the Imperialists”, he stated:

“I firmly believe that relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators. Like free China, a free India will one day emerge in the Socialist and People’s Democratic Family; that day will end the imperialist reactionary era in the history of mankind.”*

India failed in 1950 to implement her Foreign Policy in regard to Tibet. She did not decide the Tibetan issue on its merits. India’s official recognition of China’s claim that Tibet was an integral part of China was hardly the way that non-involvement was meant to be practised. She yielded to Chinese imperialism by blaming past British imperialism, and gained nothing out of it and has suffered grievously.

Naturally, European commentators have observed that India’s ‘non-involvement’ was on the side of the Communists on account of her indifference towards Chinese aggre-

* The Silent War in Tibet, 1959, Lowell Thomas Jr., p. 212.
ssion on Tibet and Russian action in Hungary. These criticisms are justified but do not disprove the merits of this policy.

An alignment with either of the two blocs may well entail a restriction on India's sovereignty. A country as vast as India, with her large population, can well afford to pursue a policy of non-involvement. Nevertheless, Mr. Nehru and his Government utterly failed to realise that non-involvement is a policy which requires military strength to make it effective. As an uncommitted country, India can perform and has performed in some measure the necessary task of building a bridge which otherwise would not exist between the two blocs.

Recent events have proved the correctness of this policy. Russia has remained neutral so far in the Sino-Indian border dispute and most of the Communist countries have disapproved of the Chinese action. The United States of America, Great Britain, Canada and many other Western countries have come forward with military and other aids to India. If India was committed to one bloc or the other, she would not have received the sympathy and aid which she has received from all quarters. Mr. Nehru's Foreign Policy has not prevented India from obtaining the necessary military aid to enable her to resist Chinese aggression. The fact that smaller countries, like Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia and others have not condemned China as an aggressor is understandable. This is to avoid any conduct unfavourable to China, which may otherwise upset their non-alignment. In order to expand Communism—and her own power—China endeavours to remove from Asia all Western influence.

The reverses suffered in NEFA and Ladakh in 1962 did not demoralise the people of India. On the contrary, the spirit of unity and enthusiasm shown by them proved
their determination to resist the Chinese aggression. People in all walks of life came forward to make necessary sacrifices for the defence of the country. Voluntarily and spontaneously they contributed money, jewellery, gold, etc. and offered their services to the Government for the defence of the country. Employees in private enterprises and Government servants offered to work extra hours and promised not to indulge in any kind of agitation or dispute. The country achieved remarkable unity following the Chinese aggression, which even surprised the enemy. Unfortunately, the Government failed to sustain this public enthusiasm.

Reverses in one or two battles do not mean defeat, nor do initial successes inevitably lead to ultimate victory. Knowledge of military history and experience of generals convince one that war is not won by sitting on the defensive; wars are not won by evacuation. Victory over an enemy can be gained only by vigorous offensive action by all means at one's disposal.

The Government's greatest mistake was military unpreparedness which caused these reverses. Mr. Menon tried to destroy the authority of senior officers to the detriment of the morale of the Army. It is, however, unnecessary to go into details. The people of the country have condoned these errors as well as lapses, but it is unlikely that they will do so in the future. It is now for the Government to give effect to the people's determination to bring this undeclared war to a successful conclusion.

The gulf between the Chinese claim and India's territorial integrity is unbridgeable. It is not a question of a mile here or a mile there. China has occupied thousands of square miles of Indian territory. Preparations must be made to enable the Army to recover the territories in
Aksai Chin. This area may be of vital importance to China because it connects Tibet and Sinkiang. That is no reason for making a present of this area to China. Excuses have been put forward, namely, that it is a bleak and a barren area, where not a blade of grass grows, where no human being can live. This region may be bleak but is certainly not barren. It is rich in mineral resources and has great strategic importance.

It has been stated that India is raising 6 more Divisions. Are six Divisions adequate to drive the Chinese out of Indian territory? The frontier stretches for 2,640 miles and no profound knowledge of military science is necessary for saying that the least that India should have is 30 Divisions and that there must be a corresponding increase of the Air Force with the latest aircraft and weapons. The Navy also must not be neglected, inasmuch as the Chinese have a number of submarines.

The Government of India have hitherto completely ignored the Chinese Defence Budget. The Defence allocation of the Chinese both in 1959 and in 1960 was Y. 5,800 million—about U.S. $2,300 million dollars. Their Defence spending has been running at about this level since 1954. The level of Defence spending in the Chinese regime is considerably greater than what the Soviet Union's was at comparable stages of development. China has acquired heavy military superiority over her Asian neighbours, although so far she has apparently not begun production of atomic weapons.

The military, in a democratic set-up, are subordinates of the chosen representatives of the people and can, therefore, only advise their political chiefs. In any military appreciation, the first consideration is the objective; when that is decided, everything is concentrated on gaining it. It will, therefore, be foolhardiness on the part of any
Defence Minister to interfere with actual military operations.

Some critics of the Government have suggested the termination of the State of Emergency. Sino-Indian relations are not likely to be normal for a long time to come. As long as the Chinese are in occupation of Tibet and a considerable portion of Indian territory, the State of Emergency should continue to exist. The Chinese have built up a strong striking Force beyond the Himalayas. Preparations made in Tibet could only have been intended for aggression against India. Therefore, the Government must be armed with Emergency powers to make war efforts more effective, to mobilise all necessary resources for defence and for the recovery of Indian territories. It would be a short-sighted policy to terminate the State of Emergency now or in the near future.

The Emergency, however, should not be used for political benefits of the ruling party nor should these wide powers be abused. In an Emergency it is not enough for the Government to preach austerity. They must themselves practise it. There should be drastic reduction in the size of Ministries of different States. Each State has between 30 to 40 Ministers. This may be a good device to keep the warring factions of the Congress Party pacified by giving employment to incompetent persons as Ministers. Their salary may be a comparatively negligible amount, but other perquisites, such as, travelling expenses, electricity, telephone charges, motor car allowance, furnishing of house, should be considerably pruned.

Defence against the Chinese involves mobilization of fantastic resources. A war cannot be fought by voluntary contributions of money or gold. Therefore, if the Government seriously believes that the State of Emergency should continue, the expensive fad of prohibition should be
abandoned forthwith during the period of Emergency. Revenues lost and expenses incurred to enforce it during the last few years, at a modest estimate, are over 330 crores of rupees a year. This madness is also causing serious loss of Foreign Exchange, which could be earned by increase of tourist traffic. In important cities, like Delhi, Bombay and various other places, restrictions in hotel bars and restaurants have scared away tourists. Foreigners who come to these cities are compelled to drink in their bedrooms. They are not permitted to entertain their friends and fellow travellers in the dining rooms or bars. After this experience, they never visit this country again. India could have easily learnt from the experience of America that people cannot be made virtuous by legislation. In most of the provinces illicit distillation has become quite a major industry and the strongest supporters of prohibition are bootleggers, having great influence with some politicians. People are in consequence drinking all manner of poisonous stuff which affects their health. As recently as 9th of February, 1964, 18 people died of alcoholic poisoning in Howrah following consumption of illicit liquor.*

One does not dispute that more revenue is necessary for the defence of the country. Instead of forcing poorly-paid people to invest money in Compulsory Deposits, which they can ill-afford to do, and which has caused great discontent in the country, this alternative source of revenue should have been resorted to.

It is not suggested that any of the essential projects under the Third Five-Year Plan should be abandoned. Development of military potential cannot be achieved without simultaneous industrialisation of the country.

The lesson of Indian history is that whenever the Central Government in India has been weak or unjust India has disintegrated. A strong Central Government, the English language, an independent and incorruptible judiciary, and rapid means of transport and communication made India into a political entity during the last 150 years. These forged unity in the country, notwithstanding its diversity. During the last 17 years, however, the Congress Government, without forethought, have taken many steps which have released forces of disruption. The Chinese invasion has been a blessing in disguise in that it has for the first time united the whole country. The significant fact that emerged during 1962 crisis is that Mr. Nehru was obliged to replace the Defence Minister, the Chief of Army Staff and other commanders without upheaval. The challenge to his leadership at that time did not come from the Army or from the people, but from his party. This augurs well for the country. The Government, as it is constituted, has had a propensity for amending the Constitution to justify its ill-conceived actions. In the absence of an Opposition, the burden of restraining such propensity falls on the public. India has no effective Opposition, or an independent press or any informed public opinion.

What India needs in this Emergency is a strong Central Government composed of the best talents in the country. There is no dearth of men of integrity and ability, but they are not necessarily to be found in the Congress or amongst the Members of Parliament belonging to other political parties. In such an Emergency, as exists now, there should be a Government which commands the respect of the entire country. That there has been a diminution of the public confidence in the Government cannot be denied. The country is above any political party. A
party-Government is not the best Government at a time when the enemy is poised for an attack and a considerable portion of Indian territory is under their occupation. At one time the Central Cabinet included non-Congress talents, such as, Mr. C. D. Deshmukh, Dr. John Mathai. The Congress Working Committee on 9th of August, 1963, decided to recommend to the All India Congress Committee acceptance of Mr. Kamaraj Nadar’s proposal that senior Ministers both at the Centre and the State should quit office. The All India Congress Committee has accepted the recommendation. This is undoubtedly an admission that all is not well with the Congress Government. In more than half-a-dozen States squabbles have been going on between the Ministerial parties and those who wish to be Ministers. In the circumstances, the larger interest of the country will be served better if the Central Cabinet is now reconstituted by Mr. Nehru by inviting men of integrity and talent who will, by their proved ability and character, be able to extricate India from the mess in which she is.

It should not be overlooked that unilateral cease fire by the Chinese has saved the Congress Government for the time being. The Chinese withdrew from NEFA, but it is reported that they are within 5 miles of the McMahon Line. They have not accepted the Colombo plan. The Government of India must appreciate that China is following the 2,000-year old Chinese policy—fight a while—then talk a while and repeat the process.

Party interest must now be subordinated to the interest of the country. When this Emergency is over, the country may revert back to normal party system of Government.

It has been suggested in some quarters that India should undertake the liberation of Tibet to prevent further Chinese aggression against India. It is easier said than
done. We have failed to prevent Chinese intrusion in NEFA and also found ourselves powerless to vacate Chinese aggression in Ladakh during the last five years. In these circumstances, to undertake the liberation of Tibet would be a military misadventure. It is not a practical proposition now. The Chinese are at India's doorstep in consequence of Mr. Nehru's erroneous policy towards Tibet. India did grievous wrong to Tibet by unilaterally resiling from treaty obligations, which ultimately resulted in Tibet losing her independence. The least the Government of India can do is to undo this grievous wrong. India should champion Tibet's cause of independence and mobilise the public opinion of the world in favour of the continued existence of Tibet as an independent country. It is a matter of profound shame that when Tibet brought the case of Chinese aggression before the United Nations, India failed to support her. If and when this subject comes up again before that body, India should support her. In her own interest India should recognise the Dalai Lama and his cabinet as the lawful Government of Tibet. This would strengthen the morale of the Tibetans to resist the Chinese. Such a step would no doubt antagonise China still further, but is India to be deterred from doing the right thing for fear of China? The Dalai Lama's influence extends to many countries beyond Tibet. India should also place at the disposal of the Dalai Lama facilities for broadcasting so that the Tibetans and his followers beyond Tibet may sustain their morale and devote themselves to the cause of Tibet's independence. In this war in defence of India, the Government should have no scruples in utilising every possible opportunity of harrassing the enemy. Appeasement of China or Pakistan is not going to pay any dividend. The Sino-Indian treaty of 1954 has lapsed. China had violated every term of that treaty during its
existence. India is, therefore, free to re-assess her attitude towards Tibet which was founded on the misrepresentations of Mr. Chou En-lai and wrong reading of history. To some people liberation of Tibet may seem to be an impossibility. But then history records such occupation and also retreat by China. In the past Tibet was occupied by the Chinese twice and each time the Chinese were driven out.

Nemesis inevitably overtakes the wrong doer. Chinese Communists used only brute force to maintain their political powers. They proved the hitherto incredible fact that a small group can achieve complete control over 673 million unwilling people. This achievement is based on lies, fraud and violence. The tradition, the culture, the values of the geographical area called China, have all been completely stamped out. The area has been converted into a huge concentration camp. Conditions in China are such that if the Communist authorities granted exit permits the vast majority of 673 million Chinese on the mainland would escape if they could. The “blossom” campaign had revealed the people’s violent hatred of the regime and for that very reason the authorities used even greater violence to suppress it. Contradictions inherent in the present Communist system will ultimately lead to its collapse by internal revolt. The commune system has completely disrupted the family life in China. The difference in status between a slave and a member of a Chinese Communist commune is indiscernible. A very well-educated Chinese, Mr. Robert Loh, actuated by patriotism went back to Communist China to serve the country, much against the wishes of his father, and after working with the Communists for number of years stated:

“Anyone who believes that ‘brainwashing’ or
'thought-reform' were used successfully to make 650 million Chinese believe in Communism needs only to read the Chinese newspapers for May, 1957."

This was 'blossom' period.

The revolt in Hungary frightened the Chinese authorities and they realised that, despite continual use of brute force to suppress the masses, the Communist regime was not secure from mass uprising. To forestall such an uprising in China, the authorities acted upon the idea that permitting the people some kind of emotional catharsis would release harmlessly any latent impulse to violence. They also apparently believed that after years of enforced subservience the people must be docile enough so as not to dare voice criticism of the regime in any extreme fashion. What the authorities did not realise was that even a slight release of pressure was almost sure to have an explosive effect. Within two weeks, therefore, the 'speaking out' developed into an hysterical scream of protest.

Mr. P. K. Kai, who had pioneered the "new education", graphically described the hunger and raggedness of the masses in contrast to the luxuries enjoyed by the Party members. He ended with the comment:

"The truth is that the masses want to overthrow the Communist Party and kill all the communists."†

Student leaders charged the Communists with "suppression of freedom and democracy in all the country's educational institutions."

No Chinese is allowed to possess any arms. There is restlessness among the junior officers in the army. There are authentic reports that the Chinese army in Sinkiang

*Escape from Red China, 1963, Robert Loh, p. 224.
†Escape from Red China, 1963, Robert Loh, p. 225.
defected and 8,000 of them went over to Russian territory adjoining Sinkiang. There is a limit to the suffering of the masses. The Communist hands are stained with blood of innocent Chinese, Tibetans and Muslims of Sinkiang and it is a question of time when these atrocities will recoil on the heads of the Chinese Communists.

Dr. Lea E. Williams, who worked in Chungking during World War II and lived in Shanghai after the war and has recently travelled widely in Indonesia and other parts of South-east Asia, has stated:

"The record of Chinese Communism during its first ten years of power cannot simply be calculated in terms of steel production and kilowatt-hours of electricity. It must be considered in human terms, and by these standards the cost of a decade of Communist rule in China has been appalingly high."*

Dr. S. Chandrasekhar, a prominent Demographer, after extensive travel in China, has stated:

"Men and women will have no choice of freedom and the entire population will be reduced to the level of robots that respond to the radio. When that day arrives China will have ceased to be a civilised country of human beings."†

The Chinese occupation of Tibet and their treatment of the Tibetans are the worst forms of colonialism and imperialism that the world has seen. Mr. Khruschev and the Russian Government are anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist. Since the Russian Government believe in anti-colonialism they should not hesitate to denounce Chinese aggression in Tibet. There can be no peace in South-east

* A Decade of Mao's China, p. 12.  
† A Decade of Mao's China, p. 32.
Asia, unless China can be confined with her own territory and forced to vacate her aggression wherever it has taken place. A peaceful and independent Tibet is essential for the maintenance of peace in this vast region. Therefore, if public opinion in the world is sufficiently mobilised, combined pressure of the Western Powers and Russia may ultimately force China to leave the Tibetans alone. China depends solely for her aviation fuel on Russia. There are reports that China is not receiving the same support that she received from Russia at an early stage. In recent years China has been circulating spurious maps claiming a considerable amount of Russian territory in the north and north-west of China. No one can be dogmatic that China will continue to occupy Tibet. The legitimate interests of India demand that the Tibetan resistance movement is not extinguished. China’s line of communications from the rail head at Chengtu to Lhasa is 1,413 miles over several mountain ranges and a number of big rivers. The route from Sining to Lhasa is over 1,600 miles. Supplies for military build-up in Tibet have to be carried over these long routes. It was a short-sighted policy not to have disrupted this tenuous line of communications during the invasion in October and November, 1962. The disruption of lines of communication and the destruction of ammunition dumps are legitimate methods of crippling an enemy. If an army based in a hostile country is harassed at its base, it is difficult for that army to mount any offensive elsewhere.

Napoleon once said, “Let China sleep, once she wakes the world will be sorry.” Napoleon’s prophecy is coming true now. Public memory is too short and politicians’ shorter still. Mr. Panikkar, India’s first Ambassador to Communist China, gave his first reaction to the new regime as follows:
"I confess I was not a little excited at the idea of a talk with one who had changed the course of history so violently in Asia. Was he a new Chingiz, an emperor, thinking in terms of altering the map of a continent. . . ."

Chinese cartography and the Chinese road-building programme furnish convincing proof of their objectives. When the Chinese Communist Government was founded on 1st of October, 1949, its announced intentions in foreign affairs were to protect China's independence, freedom and integrity, amongst others. The first point meant that the regime's authority had to be extended into those parts of China which were still under Nationalist control, but the Chinese Communist leaders also had apparently in mind the recovery of authority over areas which had become detached from China in the past and which the Nationalist Government had not regained. Later it became clear that the Communist authorities were thinking in particular of certain border territories, controlled by India, Burma, Mongolia and Korea. The Chinese also had in mind the absorption of South-east Asia as an area of former Chinese suzerainty. Modern Chinese history furnishes conclusive proof of the above ambition. The present day Chinese historians divide the modern history of China into three broad periods. The first period, according to them, began with the Opium Wars of 1840 and ended with May Fourth Movement in 1919 which is called the "Old Democratic Revolutionary Era". The second period ends with the establishment of the "People's Republic" and is known as "The New Democratic Revolutionary Era" (1919-1949); and the third period is

the “Era of Socialist Construction”, which has just begun.

Under the treaty of Chuguchak in 1864, Russia annexed Kazakhstan, Kirghiz and Tajikistan. In 1896, Britain and Russia secretly divided between them the Pamirs. Under the treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860) huge areas of north-east China were given to Russia. Nepal went under British influence after ‘Independence’ in 1896. Sikkim was occupied by the British in 1889. Bhutan went under British influence in 1865 and proclaimed independence. The whole of Assam was given to Britain by Burma in 1826. Burma became a part of the British Empire in 1886. The Andaman islands went to Britain. Malaya was occupied by Britain in 1895. Thailand was declared independent under joint Anglo-French control in 1904. North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were captured by the French in 1885. Taiwan and P’enghu islands were relinquished to Japan in accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, in 1895. Su-Lu island was occupied by the British. The Kurile islands were divided between Japan and Russia.

These territories, according to the Chinese historians, were taken by the Imperialists in the ‘Old Democratic Revolutionary Era’. The task of the Chinese in the ‘Era of Socialist Construction’ is to recover these territories seized from China in the distant past which is set out in Brief History of Modern China by Liu Pei-Hua, published by Yi-Chang Book Company in 1954. A map in this book shows the extent of Chinese claims to territory.

It is clear, notwithstanding ideological affinity with Russia, that China has not abandoned her claims to Kazakhstan, Kirghiz and Tajikistan in the north-west of China, and huge areas of the Soviet Far East and Kurile Islands, which are Soviet territories. Since 1960, there has been a considerable amount of friction between
China and Russia over the leadership of the Communist world. Once China succeeds in dominating south-east and central Asia, and can command the resources of these countries, she will be powerful enough to challenge Russia's claim to territories, which she alleges to have been seized from her in the distant past. The inevitable consequence will be an armed clash between two giants. This cannot be dismissed as fantastic speculation, as the events of the last twelve years have proved. China has already begun to station frontier guards in Sinkiang and along the Russian border.

Like Tibet, China has converted Sinkiang into another military base, and has colonised the place extensively, suppressing the local Muslim population. In Sinkiang also they are applying the same method as in Tibet.

The feverish road-building activities in China during the last two or three years have brought out the highly significant fact that much of these road-building is concentrated in Chinese provinces bordering Kashmir, Burma, Laos, Vietnam, South Korea, U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic.

Another interesting fact which emerges from this study is that much effort at road-building has been devoted to those areas of China which are inhabited by Chinese national minorities, with the object of maintaining and strengthening the Chinese Communist hold over the people of these areas. In recent years China has concluded agreements with several neighbouring states, such as Laos, Burma, and Nepal, to build roads which will lead well into these territories.

Under their road-building agreement with Laos, the Chinese have undertaken to bear all costs and also themselves to execute the construction work on the connected road inside Laos territory "with no conditions attached."
China's agreement with Burma provides for the construction of a 265-mile road by the Chinese Government inside the State of Burma. In the case of Nepal, China has agreed to build a road connecting Tibet with Kathmandu, and it is said that China will give Nepal equivalent to 47 crores for the construction of the portion lying within the Nepalese territory.

The study of their programme shows that in Yunan, a mountainous province inhabited by various national minorities of China and bordering on Burma, Laos and Vietnam, the road mileage has increased more than eightfold since the Communist took over China in 1949. In another national minority area, the Kuang Chauhang autonomous region, there are now 12,000 kilometers of roads, which are officially claimed by Chinese Agencies to be 60 times as much as in 1949.

In Sinkiang, which lies next to Kashmir, the Mongolian People's Republic and U.S.S.R., the Chinese have officially claimed that 150,000 kilometers of roads were built in 1958 alone, which is stated to be more than double the total length in the whole of China in 1949. In the Chinese province of Kirin, which has a frontier with North Korea, over 4,800 kilometers of roads have been built or improved. Modern roads have also been built in Changpai mountain frontier area. An article published in China Pictorial some time ago claimed that the Changpai range of mountains is in China, whereas Soviet Atlases show these mountains located inside Russia.

Modern armies move on wheels and the movement of wheels requires roads and it may be pointed out that these are all military roads.

This picture of the dream of China will not be complete without mentioning an event which has occurred recently. A vast mausoleum to house the remains of Chenghis Khan
has been erected by the Chinese. The mausoleum has been built in the traditional style, with blue and yellow tiled roofs at Ezen Horoo in the Ordos Region of inner Mongolia. It is reported to have cost some $10,000,000. The remains of Chenghis Khan have been brought from their resting place at Tsinghai to Ezen Horoo. The mausoleum is equipped with a Chenghis Khan memorial hall, exhibition rooms and two hotels, one for proletarian pilgrims and the other for the Communist Chinese officials. Exhibition rooms are lined with maps, showing the routes taken by the Mongolian hordes and the countries they conquered—including China, India, Iran, and much of Russia. Mao Tes-tung has ordered thousands of Chinese intellectuals, workers, and farmers to visit the mausoleum and to pay homage there to the memory of the Mongol conquerer.

The three circumstances mentioned above, cartography, road-building and now a mausoleum of Chenghis Khan as a place of pilgrimage, should leave no manner of doubt in the minds of the thinking section of the people in South-east Asia about China’s expansionist designs. The pattern of this expansionist movement may be changed, but the ultimate objective is clear. China will, by subversion, infiltration, indirect and direct aggression, try to achieve this objective. One must also not overlook the fact that 14 years ago the Communists came to power in China through a long and bloody civil war. They did not come to power through elections or in peaceful manner. Force is obviously their weapon in settling national and international issues. In 1938, Mao Tse-tung said, "Political power comes out of a barrel of a gun."

From 1954 onwards their pretended adherence to peaceful co-existence was merely a subterfuge to disarm the suspicion of credulous politicians in India and other
countries. The Asian non-involved countries are extremely vulnerable to Chinese pressure because of their lack of solidarity with each other and because they are reluctant to receive help from the West. This is Communist China's challenge to the democratic way of living.

In resisting the Chinese, India is fighting not only to protect her territorial integrity, but fighting to protect democracy and advance the cause of the free world. Notwithstanding clear indications of Chinese intentions, the Prime Minister of India appears to be unable to read the Chinese mind and there are various speculations about the motive of China in attacking India. Some think China wishes to demonstrate her military strength to impress other Asian countries; in some quarters it is thought China wishes to obstruct India's economic progress; others think Mao Tse-tung wants to force India into the Western block to prove to Russia that India is merely an agent of imperialism. These are merely speculations. The attack on India is definitely not the result of any international Communist conspiracy. The Russians are against this attack on India's territory. No Communist state except Albania has supported China in her aggression. Russia has remained scrupulously neutral and in fact has offered to set-up an aeroplane factory for India and promised to supply high altitude helicopters for the Indian Air Force. The attack on India, therefore, clearly has no connection with international Communist aspirations, but is clearly Chinese irredentist imperialism. It is the second phase of Chinese expansionist design. If India can be eliminated, the rest of South-east Asia can be dominated. The extent of the Chinese peril will be apparent from the cursory perusal of the population figures of South-east Asia in 1962, which are set out hereinafter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>20,662,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>6,909,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>4,952,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>15,917,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(north)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>15,502,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(south)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>92,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>9,651,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Colony States</td>
<td>7,139,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and protected States:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Guinea</td>
<td>716,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>25,520,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>27,456,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>226,024,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the population figures of India, Pakistan and China are added to this, the total population of these countries would be nearly 1,500 million, which is a formidable number. If the natural resources of all these countries were mobilised, and the huge population were forced to work for China, it would produce a force to be reckoned with by the rest of the world. It would not only extinguish the infant democracies in this part of the world, but would ultimately be a serious menace to the rest of world. The Chinese by their intransigence in recent months have shown that they have no love for peace; otherwise, it is incomprehensible how they could decry the attempts made by Russia and the Western Powers to come to some sort of a working arrangement by test ban treaties, to preserve world peace. The terrifying thing about Communist China is not her military might, but the
total ignorance of those who exercise power: the power to send a huge army over a frontier at word of command, the Korean War being a classic example. The aid given to India to resist the Chinese is an insurance against the peril of Chinese irredentism. It was a monumental folly to have appeased China in 1950, which has jeopardised the freedom of countries in South-east Asia.
This is an exact reproduction of the original map showing the McMahon Line as well as the boundary between Tibet and China, signed by Sir Henry McMahon, Ivan Chen and Lon-chen Shatra. The line running north from Markham was in blue. The McMahon Line was in red.
APPENDIX

Exchange of notes between the Governments of India and of The People's Republic of China concerning the advance of the Chinese Army Units into Tibet.

(a) **Indian Note, dated 26th of October, 1950.**

We have seen with great regret the report in the newspapers of an official statement made in Peiping to the effect that 'People's Army units have been ordered to advance into Tibet.'

We have received no intimation of this from your Ambassador here or from our Ambassador in Peiping.

We have been repeatedly assured of a desire by the Chinese Government to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means and negotiations. In an interview which India's Ambassador had recently with (China's) Vice Foreign Minister, the latter, while reiterating the resolve of the Chinese Government to 'liberate' Tibet had expressed a continued desire to do so by peaceful means.

We have informed the Chinese Government through our Ambassador of the decision of the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peiping immediately to start negotiations. This delegation actually left Delhi yesterday. In view of these facts the decision to order the advance of China's troops into Tibet appears to us most surprising and regrettable.

We realise there has been a delay in the Tibet delegation proceeding to Peiping. This delay was caused in the first instance by an inability to obtain visas for Hong Kong for which the delegation is in no way responsible.

Subsequently the delegation came back to Delhi because
of the wish of the Chinese Government that preliminary negotiations should first be conducted in Delhi with the Chinese Ambassador.

Owing to the lack of knowledge on the part of the Tibetan delegation of dealing with other countries and the necessity of obtaining instructions from their Government who in turn had to consult their Assemblies certain further delay took place.

The Government of India does not believe that any foreign influences hostile to China have been responsible for the delay in the delegation's departure.

Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by the Chinese Government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronised with it and there naturally will be fear on the part of Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events, invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgment of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or Peace.

The Government of India can only express their deep regret that in spite of friendly disinterested advice repeatedly tendered by them the Chinese Government should have decided to seek solution of the problem of their relations with Tibet by force instead of by the slower and more enduring method of peaceful approach.

(b) Chinese reply dated 30th of October, 1950.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China would like to make it clear:

Tibet is an integral part of Chinese Territory. The problem of Tibet is entirely the domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people and defend the fron-
tiers of China. This is the resolved policy of the Central People's Government.

The Central People's Government has repeatedly expressed hope that the problem of Tibet may be solved by peaceful negotiations and it welcomes, therefore, the delegation of local authorities of Tibet to come to Peiping at an early date to proceed with peaceful negotiations.

Yet the Tibetan delegation, under outside instigation, has intentionally delayed the date of its departure for Peiping. The Central People's Government, however, had not abandoned its desire to proceed with peaceful negotiations.

But regardless of whether the local authorities of Tibet wish to proceed with peace negotiations and whatever the results may be achieved by negotiations, the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of the People's Republic of China and no foreign interference shall be tolerated. The particular problem of Tibet and the problem of the participation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations are two entirely unrelated problems.

Therefore, with regard to the viewpoint of the Government of India on what it regards as deplorable, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet and hence express its deep regret.

(c) Second Indian Note, dated 31st of October, 1950.

India's Ambassador at Peiping has transmitted to the Government of India a note handed to him by the Vice Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China on October, 30. The Government of India have read with amazement the statement in the last paragraph of the Chinese Government's reply that the Government of
India’s representation to them was affected by foreign influence hostile to China and categorically repudiates it.

At no time has any foreign influence been brought to bear upon India in regard to Tibet. In this, as in other matters, the Government of India’s policy has been entirely independent and directed solely towards the peaceful settlement of international disputes and avoidance of anything calculated to increase the present deplorable tensions of the world.

The Government of China equally is mistaken in thinking the Tibetan delegation’s departure for Peiping was delayed by outside instigation. In previous communications, the Government of India have explained at some length the reasons why the Tibetan delegation could not proceed to Peiping earlier. They are convinced there has been no possibility of foreign instigation.

It is with no desire to interfere or gain advantage that the Government of India have sought earnestly that a settlement of the Tibetan problem should be effected by peaceful negotiations adjusting the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty. Tibetan autonomy is a fact which, judging from reports they have received from other sources, the Chinese Government were themselves willing to recognise and foster.

The Government of India’s repeated suggestions that Chinese suzerainty (over Tibet) and Tibetan autonomy should be reconciled by peaceful negotiations was not, as the Chinese Government seems to suggest unwarranted interference in China’s internal affairs, but well-meant advice by a friendly government which has a natural interest in the solution of problems concerning its neighbours by peaceful methods.
Wedded as they are to the ways of peace, the Government of India had been gratified to learn that the Chinese Government were also desirous to effect a settlement in Tibet through peaceful negotiations. Because of this the Government of India advised the Tibetan Government to send their delegation to Peiping, and were glad that this advice was accepted in the inter-change of communications which had been placed between the Government of India and the Government of China, and the former had received repeated assurances that peaceful settlement was aimed at.

In the circumstances, the surprise of the Government of India was all the greater when it learned that military operations had been undertaken by the Chinese Government against peaceful people. There had been no allegation that there had been any provocation, or any report as to non-peaceful methods on the part of the Tibetans. Hence there was no justification whatever for such military operations against them. Such a step, involving an attempt to impose a decision by force could not possibly be re-conciled with a peaceful settlement. In view of these developments the Government of India are no longer in a position to advise the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peiping unless the Chinese Government think it fit to order their troops to halt their advance into Tibet and thus give a chance for peaceful negotiations.

Every step that the Government of India has taken in recent months has been to check the drift to war all over the world. In so doing they often have been misunderstood and criticized, but they adhered to their policy regardless of the displeasure of great nations. They cannot help thinking that military operations by the Chinese Government against Tibet have greatly added to the tensions of the world and to the drift towards general war,
which they are sure the Government of China also wish to avoid.

The Government of India has repeatedly made it clear that they have no political or territorial ambitions as to Tibet and do not seek any novel privileged position for themselves or for their nationals in Tibet. At the same time, they pointed out, certain rights have grown out of usage and agreements which are natural between neighbours with close cultural and commercial relations.

These relations have found expression in the presence of an agent of the Government of India in Lhasa, the existence of trade agencies at Gyantse and Yatung and the maintenance of post and telegraph offices at the trade route upto Gyantse over forty years. The Government of India are anxious that these establishments, which are to the mutual interest of India and Tibet and do not detract in any way from Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, should continue. The personnel at the Lhasa mission and the Agencies at Gyantse and Yatung accordingly, have been instructed to stay at their posts.

It has been the basic policy of the Government of India to work for friendly relations between India and China, both countries recognising each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and mutual interests.

Recent developments in Tibet have affected these friendly relations and the interest of peace all over the world; this the Government of India deeply regrets.

In conclusion, the Government of India can only express their earnest hope that the Chinese Government will still prefer the method of peaceful negotiations and settlement to a solution under duress and by force.

(d) *Chinese reply dated 16th of November, 1950.*

On November 1, 1950, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the People’s Republic of China received from His Excellency Ambassador Panikkar a communication from the Government of the Republic of India on the problem of Tibet.

The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, in its past communications with the Government of the Republic of India on the problem of Tibet has repeatedly made it clear that Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China. This is the firm policy of the Chinese Government. According to the provisions of the Common Programme adopted by the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the relative autonomy granted by the Chinese Government to national minorities inside the country is an autonomy within the confines of Chinese sovereignty.

This point was recognised by the Indian Government in its aide memoire to the Chinese Government dated August 28 this year. However, when the Chinese Government actually exercised its sovereign rights, and began to liberate the Tibetan people and drive out foreign forces and influences to ensure that the Tibetan people will be free from aggression and will realise regional autonomy and religious freedom the Indian Government attempted to influence and obstruct the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet by the Chinese Government. This cannot but make the Chinese Government greatly surprised.

The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China sincerely hopes that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army may enter Tibet peaceably to perform the sacred task of liberating the Tibetan People and defending the frontiers of China. It has therefore long since
welcomed the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet which has remained in India to come to Peking at an early date to proceed with peace negotiations. Yet the said delegation, obviously as a result of continued outside obstruction, has delayed its departure for Peking. Further, taking advantage of the delay of negotiations, the local authorities of Tibet had deployed strong armed forces at Changtu, in Sikang Province, in the interior of China, in an attempt to prevent the Chinese People’s Liberation Army from liberating Tibet.

On August 31, 1950, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Indian Government through Ambassador Panikkar that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army was going to take action soon in West Sikang according to set plans, and expressed the hope that the Indian Government would assist the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet so that it might arrive in Peking in mid-September to begin peace negotiations. In early and middle September, the Chinese Charge d’Affaires, Shen Chien, and later Ambassador Yuan Chung-Hsien, both in person, told the said delegation that it was imperative that it should hasten to Peking before the end of September, otherwise the said delegation should bear the responsibilities and be responsible for all the consequences resulting from the delay.

In mid-October, Chinese Ambassador Yuan again informed the Indian Government of this. Yet still owing to outside instigation, the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet fabricated various pretexts and remained in India.

Although the Chinese Government has not given up its desire of settling the problem of Tibet peacefully, it can no longer continue to put off the set plan of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to proceed to Tibet. And the
liberation of Changtu further proved that through the instrument of Tibetan troops, foreign forces and influences were obstructing the peaceful settlement of the problem of Tibet. But regardless of whether the local authorities of Tibet wish to proceed with peace negotiations, and regardless of whatever results may be achieved by negotiations no foreign intervention will be permitted. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the liberation of the Tibetan people are also decided.

In showing its friendship with the Government of the Republic of India, and in an understanding of the desire of the Indian Government to see the problem of Tibet settled peacefully, the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China has kept the Indian Government informed of its efforts in this direction. What the Chinese Government cannot but deeply regret is that the Indian Government, in disregard of the facts, has regarded a domestic problem of the Chinese Government—the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet—as an international dispute calculated to increase the present deplorable tensions in the world.

The Government of the Republic of India has repeatedly expressed its desire of developing Sino-Indian friendship on the basis of mutual respect for territory, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, and of preventing the world from going to war. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is exactly aimed at the protection of the integrity of the territory and the sovereignty of China. And it is on these questions that all those countries who desire to respect the territory and the sovereignty of China should first of all indicate their real attitude towards China.

In the meantime, we consider that what is now threatening the independence of nations and world peace is
precisely the forces of those imperialist aggressors. For the sake of the maintenance of national independence and the defence of the world peace, it is necessary to resist the forces of these imperialist aggressors. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is thus an important measure to maintain Chinese independence, to prevent the imperialist aggressors from dragging the world towards war, and to defend world peace.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China welcomes the renewed declaration of the Indian Government that it has no political or territorial ambitions in China's Tibet and that it does not seek any new privileged position. As long as our two sides adhere strictly to the principle of mutual respect for territory, sovereignty, equality, and mutual benefit, we are convinced that the friendship between China and India should be developed in a normal way, and that problems relating to Sino-Indian diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations with respect to Tibet may be solved properly and to our mutual benefit through normal diplomatic channels.


**Extract**

Her Majesty's Government having it in contemplation to send a mission of exploration next year, by way of Peking through Kansuh and Kokonor, or by way of Szechuen to Thibet, and thence to India, the Tsungli Yamen, having due regard to the circumstances, will, when the time arrives, issue the necessary passports and will address letters to the High Provincial Authorities and the Residents in Thibet. If the Mission should not be sent by these routes but should be proceeding across the
Indian frontier to Thibet, the Tsungli Yamen, on receipt of a communication to that effect from the British Minister, will write to the Chinese Resident in Thibet, and the Resident, with due regard to the circumstances, will send officers to take care of the Mission, and passports for the Mission will be issued by the Tsungli Yamen, that its passage be not obstructed.

2. *Convention relating to Burmah, and Thibet, July 24th, 1886 (between the British Government and Government of China).*

*Extract*

Inasmuch as inquiry into the circumstances, by the Chinese Government, has shown the existence of many obstacles to the Mission to Thibet provided for in the separate article of the Chefoo Agreement, England consents to countermand the Mission forthwith. With regard to the desire of the British Government to consider arrangements for frontier trade between India and Thibet, it will be the duty of the Chinese Government, after careful inquiry into the circumstances, to adopt measures to exhort and encourage the people with a view to the promotion and development of trade. Should it be practicable, the Chinese Government shall then proceed carefully to consider trade regulations; but if insuperable obstacles should be found to exist, the British Government will not press the matter unduly.

3. *Convention of March 17th, 1890, between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet (Ratifications exchanged at London, August 27th, 1890).*

*(English Text)*

WHEREAS Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India,
and His Majesty the Emperor of China, are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exist between their respective Empires; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the said relations, and it is desirable to clearly define and permanently settle certain matters connected with the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject, and have, for this purpose, named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, His Excellency the Most Honourable Henry Carles Keith Petty Fitzmaurice, G.M.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.M.I.E., Marquess of Lansdowne, Viceroy and Governor-General of India;

And His Majesty the Emperor of China, His Excellency Sheng Tai, Imperial Associate Resident in Tibet, Military Deputy Lieutenant-Governor

Who, having met and communicated to each other their full powers, and finding these to be in proper form, have agreed upon the following Convention in eight Articles:—

I. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain-range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory.

II. It is admitted that the British Government, whose Protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recognized, has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State,
except through and with the permission of the British Government neither the Ruler of the State nor any of its officers shall have official relations of any kind, formal or informal, with any other country.

III. The Government of Great Britain and Ireland and the Government of China engage reciprocally to respect the boundary as defined in Article I, and to prevent acts of aggression from their respective sides of the frontier.

IV. The question of providing increased facilities for trade across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier will hereafter be discussed with a view to a mutually satisfactory arrangement by the High Contracting Powers.

V. The question of pasturage on the Sikkim side of the frontier is reserved for further examination and future adjustment.

VI. The High Contracting Powers reserve for discussion and arrangement the method in which official communications between the British authorities in India and the authorities in Tibet shall be conducted.

VII. Two joint Commissioners shall, within six months from the ratification of this Convention, be appointed, one by the British Government in India, the other by the Chinese Resident in Tibet. The said Commissioners shall meet and discuss the question which, by the last three preceding Articles, have been reserved.

VIII. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible after the date of the signature thereof.

In witness whereof the respective negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quadruplicate at Calcutta, this 17th day of March, in the year of our Lord 1890, corresponding with
the Chinese date, the 27th day of the second moon of the 16th year of Kuang Hsu.

LANSDOWNE.
Signature of the Chinese Plenipotentiary.

4. Convention between Great Britain and Tibet, signed at Lhasa, September 7th, 1904.*

WHEREAS doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Thibetan Government under these agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Thibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following Articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government, and on behalf of that said Government, and Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three monasteries Se-ra, Drepung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Thibet:

I. The Government of Thibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Thibet, as defined in

Article I of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II. The Thibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which all British and Thibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyangtse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Thibetan Governments, apply to the marts abovementioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Thibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III. The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Thibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorised delegates to negotiate with representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV. The Thibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V. The Thibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyangtse and Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyangtse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Thibetan agent who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over
British trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Thibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Thibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.

VI. As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the dispatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for breaches of Treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Thibetan Government engages to pay a sum of £500,000—equivalent to 75 lakhs of rupees—to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate, whether in Thibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual instalments of one lakh of rupees each on the 1st January each year, beginning from the 1st January, 1906.

VII. As security for the payment of the abovementioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid, and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII. The Thibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhasa.

IX. The Government of Thibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government—

(a) No portion of Thibetan territory shall be ceded,
sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power;

(b) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Thibetan affairs;

(c) No Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Thibet;

(d) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such Concessions being granted, similar or equivalent Concessions shall be granted to the British Government;

(e) No Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power.

X. In witness whereof the negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa, this 7th day of September, in the year of our Lord, 1904, corresponding with the Thibetan date, the 27th of the seventh month of the Wood Dragon year.

(Thibet Frontier Commission) F. E. Younghusband. (Seal of the Dalai Lama affixed by Colonel, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche.)

(Seal of British Commissioner) British Commissioner

(Seal of Council) Dre-pung Sera Ga-den National Monastery.) Monastery.) Monastery.) Assembly.)

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the representatives of Great Britain and Thibet declare that the English text shall be binding.
The Convention was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Simla on the 11th day of November, 1904, subject to reduction of the indemnity to Rs. 25,00,000 and a declaration that British occupation of the Chumbi valley would cease after payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity, provided that the Tibetans had complied with the terms of the Convention in all other respects.

(e) Convention between Great Britain and China respecting Tibet. Signed at Peking, April 27, 1906 (Ratifications exchanged at London, July 23, 1906).*

[Signed also in Chinese]

WHEREAS His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exist between their respective Empires;

And whereas the refusal of Tibet to recognise the validity of or to carry into full effect the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of March 17, 1890, and Regu-

lations of December 5, 1893, placed the British Government under the necessity of taking steps to secure their rights and interests under the said Convention and Regulations;

And whereas a Convention of ten articles was signed at Lhasa on September 7, 1904, on behalf of Great Britain and Tibet, and was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India on behalf of Great Britain on November 11, 1904, a declaration on behalf of Great Britain modifying its terms under certain conditions being appended thereto;

His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have for this purpose named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland
Sir Earnest Mason Satow, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, His said Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of China;

And His Majesty the Emperor of China:
His Excellency Tong Shoa-yi, His said Majesty's High Commissioner Plenipotentiary and a Vice-President of the Board of Foreign Affairs; who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them to be in good and true form have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in six articles:

I. The Convention concluded on September 7, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are attached to the present Convention as an annexe, is hereby confirmed, subject to the modification stated in the declaration appended thereto, and both
of the High Contracting Parties engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified therein.

II. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.

III. The Concessions which are mentioned in Article IX(d) of the Convention concluded on September 7th, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet are denied to any state or to the subject of any state other than China, but it has been arranged with China that at the trade marts specified in Article II of the Aforesaid Convention Great Britain shall be entitled to lay down telegraph lines connecting with India.

IV. The provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and Regulations of 1893 shall, subject to the terms of this present Convention and annexe thereto, remain in full force.

V. The English and Chinese texts of the present Convention have been carefully compared and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

VI. This Convention shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both countries and ratifications shall be exchanged at London within three months after the date of signature by the Plenipotentiaries of both Powers.

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, four copies in English and four in Chinese.

Done at Peking this twenty-seventh day of April, one thousand nine hundred and six, being the fourth day of
the fourth month of the thirty-second year of the reign
of Kuang-hsu.

EARNEST SATOW
(Signature and Seal of the Chinese Plenipotentiary)

Notes were also exchanged by which the Chinese un-
dertook not to employ any foreigners in Tibet.
The Tibetans took no part in this Convention and its
terms were never formally communicated to them.

(f) *Convention between Great Britain and Russia relat-
ing to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. Signed at St.
Petersburg, August 31st, 1907.*

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond
the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor
of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to
settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning
the interest of their States on the Continent of Asia, have
determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent
all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and
Russia in regard to the questions referred to, and have
nominated for this purpose their respective plenipotentia-
ries, to wit:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond
the Seas, Emperor of India, the Right Honourable Sir
Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty’s Ambassador Extraordi-
nary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of
All the Russias;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master
of his Court Alexander Iswolsky, Minister for Foreign
Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their full
powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:

Arrangement concerning Thibet.

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognising the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations of Thibet, have made the following arrangement:-

ARTICLE I

The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in the internal administration.

ARTICLE II

In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Thibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Thibetan authorities provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet of the 7th September, 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April, 1906; not does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Buddhism in Thibet; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, as far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present arrangement.
ARTICLE III

The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send Representatives to Lhasa.

ARTICLE IV

The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any Concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Thibet.

ARTICLE V

The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Thibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

Annexe to the Arrangement between Great Britain and Russia concerning Thibet:

Great Britain reaffirms the declaration, signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratification of the Convention of the 7th September, 1904, to the effect that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by British forces shall cease after the payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity of 25,00,000 rupees provided that the trade marts mentioned in Article II of that Convention have been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Thibetan authorities have faithfully complied in all respects with the terms of the said Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood that if the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces has, for any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russian Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the
ratification exchanged at St. Petersburg as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at St. Petersburg, the 18th (31st) August, 1907.

(g) Convention between Great Britain, China and Tibet, Simla 1914.*

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, being sincerely desirous to settle by mutual agreement various questions concerning the interests of their several States on the Continent of Asia, and further to regulate the relations of their several Governments, have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Knight Commander of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Emperor, Companion of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Secretary to Government of India, Foreign and Political Department;

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Monsieur Ivan Chen, Officer of the Order of the Chia Ho;

* Whereas the Simla Convention itself after being initialled by the Chinese Plenipotentiary was not signed or ratified by the Chinese Government, it was accepted as binding by the two other parties as between themselves.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Dorje; who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them to be in good and due form have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in eleven Articles:

ARTICLE I

The Conventions specified in the Schedule to the present Convention shall, except in so far as they may have been modified by, or may be inconsistent with or repugnant to, any of the provisions of the present Convention, continue to be binding upon the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE II

The Government of Great Britain and China recognising that Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and recognising also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa.

The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.

ARTICLE III

Recognising the special interest of Great Britain, in virtue of the geographical position of Tibet, in the existence of an effective Tibetan Government, and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoining States, the Government of China engages, except as provided in Article 4 of this Convention, not to send troops into Outer Tibet,
nor to station civil or military officers, nor to establish Chinese colonies in the country. Should any such troops or officials remain in Outer Tibet at the date of the signature of this Convention, they shall be withdrawn within a period not exceeding three months.

The Government of Great Britain engages not to station military or civil officers in Tibet (except as provided in the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet) nor troops (except the Agents’ escorts), not to establish colonies in that country.

**ARTICLE IV**

The foregoing Article shall not be held to preclude the continuance of the arrangement by which, in the past, a Chinese high official with suitable escort has been maintained at Lhasa, but it is hereby provided that the said escort shall in no circumstances exceed 300 men.

**ARTICLE V**

The Governments of China and Tibet engage that they will not enter into any negotiations or agreements regarding Tibet with one another, or with any other Power, excepting such negotiations and agreements between Great Britain and Tibet as are provided for by the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet and the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China.

**ARTICLE VI**

Article III of the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China is hereby cancelled, and it is understood that in Article IX(d) of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet the term ‘Foreign Power’ does not include China.

Not less favourable treatment shall be accorded to
British commerce than to the commerce of China or the most favoured nation.

**ARTICLE VII**

(a) The Tibet Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 are hereby cancelled.

(b) The Tibetan Government engages to negotiate with the British Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Articles II, IV and V of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet without delay; provided always that such Regulations shall in no way modify the present Convention except with the consent of the Chinese Government.

**ARTICLE VIII**

The British Agent who resides at Gyantse may visit Lhasa with his escort whenever it is necessary to consult with the Tibetan Government regarding matters arising out of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, which it has been found impossible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or otherwise.

**ARTICLE IX**

For the purpose of the present Convention the borders of Tibet, and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet, shall be as shown in red and blue respectively on the map attached hereto.*

Nothing in the present Convention shall be held to prejudice the existing rights of the Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet, which include the power to select and appoint the high priests of monasteries and to retain full control in all matters affecting religious institutions.

*Published for the first time, by the Government of India in “An Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India”, January 15, 1960.*
ARTICLE X

The English, Chinese and Tibetan texts of the present Convention have been carefully examined and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

ARTICLE XI

The present Convention will take effect from the date of signature.

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, three copies in English, three in Chinese and three in Tibetan.

Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D. one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the Chinese date, the third day of the seventh month of the third year of the Republic, and the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger year.

Initial* of the Lonchen Shatra (Initialled) A.H.M.
Seal of the Lonchen Shatra Seal of the British Plenipotentiary.

SCHEDULE

1. Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet, signed at Calcutta the 17th March, 1890.

2. Convention between Great Britain and Tibet, signed at Lhasa the 7th September, 1904.

3. Convention between Great Britain and China respecting Tibet, signed at Peking the 27th April, 1906.

The notes exchanged are to the following effect:—

* Owing to the impossibility of writing initials in Tibetan, the mark of the Lonchen at this place is his signature.
1. It is understood by the High Contracting Parties that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory.

2. After the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama by the Tibetan Government, the latter will notify the installation to the Chinese Government whose representative at Lhasa will then formally communicate to His Holiness the titles consistent with his dignity, which have been conferred by the Chinese Government.

3. It is also understood that the selection and appointment of all officers in Outer Tibet will rest with the Tibetan Government.

4. Outer Tibet shall not be represented in the Chinese Parliament or in any other similar body.

5. It is understood that the escorts attached to the British Trade Agencies in Tibet shall not exceed seventy-five per centum of the escort of the Chinese Representative at Lhasa.

6. The Government of China is hereby released from its engagements under Article III of the Convention of March 17, 1890, between Great Britain and China to prevent acts of aggression from the Tibetan side of the Tibet-Sikkim frontier.

7. The Chinese high official referred to in Article 4 will be free to enter Tibet as soon as the terms of Article 3 have been fulfilled to the satisfaction of representatives of the three signatories to this Convention, who will investigate and report without delay.

Initial of the Lonchen Shatra
Seal of the Lonchen Shatra

(Initialled A.H.M.
Seal of the British Plenipotentiary.)
Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (17-point Agreement of May 23, 1951)

The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of China and, like many other nationalities, it has done its glorious duty in the course of the creation and development of the great Motherland. But, over the last 100 years or more, imperialist forces penetrated into China and in consequence also penetrated into the Tibetan region and carried out all kinds of deceptions and provocations. Like previous reactionary Governments, the Kuomintang reactionary Government continued to carry out a policy of oppression and sowing dissension among the nationalities, causing division and disunity among the Tibetan people. The local government of Tibet did not oppose the imperialist deception and provocation and adopted an unpatriotic attitude towards the great Motherland. Under such conditions the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the depths of enslavement and sufferings. In 1949 basic victory was achieved on a nation-wide scale in the Chinese people's war of liberation; the common domestic enemy of all nationalities—the Kuomintang reactionary Government—was overthrown and the common foreign enemy of all nationalities—the aggressive imperialist forces—was driven out. On this basis the founding of the People's Republic of China (CPR) and of the Chinese People's Government (CPG) was announced.

In accordance with the Common Programme passed by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the CPG declared that all nationalities within the boundaries of the CPR are equal and that they shall establish unity and mutual aid and oppose imperia-
lism and their own public enemies, so that the CPR will become a big family of fraternity and co-operation, composed of all its nationalities. Within a big family of all nationalities of the CPR, national regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated and all national minorities shall have freedom to develop their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits and religious beliefs, and the CPC shall assist all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural and educational construction work. Since then, all nationalities within the country—with the exception of those in the areas of Tibet and Taiwan—have gained liberation. Under the unified leadership of the CPC and the direct leadership of higher levels of people’s governments, all national minorities have fully enjoyed the right of national equality and have exercised, or are exercising, national regional autonomy.

In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet might be successfully eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the CPR accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan nationality and people might be freed and return to the big family of the CPR to enjoy the same rights of national equality as all other nationalities in the country and develop their political, economic, cultural and educational work, the CPC, when it ordered the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to march into Tibet, notified the local government of Tibet to send delegates to the central authorities to conduct talks for the conclusion of an agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. In the latter part of April 1951 the delegates with full powers of the local government of Tibet arrived in Peking. The CPC appointed representatives
with full powers to conduct talks on a friendly basis with
the delegates with full powers of the local government of
Tibet. As a result of the talks both parties agreed to
establish this agreement and ensure that it be carried into
effect.

1. The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out
imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan
people shall return to the big family of the Motherland
—the People's Republic of China.

2. The local government of Tibet shall actively assist
the PLA to enter Tibet and consolidate the national
defences.

3. In accordance with the policy towards nationalities
laid down in the Common Programme of the CPPCC,
the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national
regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the
CPP.

4. The central authorities will not alter the existing
political system in Tibet. The central authorities also
will not alter the established status, functions and powers
of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold
office as usual.

5. The established status, functions and powers of the
Panchen Ngoerhtehni shall be maintained.

6. By the established status, functions and powers of
the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni are
meant the status, functions and powers of the thirteenth
Dalai Lama and of the ninth Panchen Ngoerhtehni when
they were in friendly and amicable relations with each
other.

7. The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down
in the Common Programme of the CPPCC shall be car-
rried out. The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the
Tibetan people shall be respected and lama monasteries
shall be protected. The central authorities will not effect a change in the income of the monasteries.

8. Tibetan troops shall be reorganised step by step into the PLA and become a part of the national defence forces of the CPR.

9. The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock-raising, industry and commerce shall be developed step by step and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

11. In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities. The local government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and, when the people raise demands for reform, they shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.

12. In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-Kuomintang officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the Kuomintang and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past.

13. The PLA entering Tibet shall abide by all the abovementioned policies and shall also be fair in all buying and selling and shall not arbitrarily take a needle or thread from the people.

14. The CPG shall have centralised handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighbouring countries and establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality,
mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.

15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the CPG shall set up a Military and Administrative Committee and a Military Area HQ in Tibet and—apart from the personnel sent there by the CPG—shall absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the Military and Administrative Committee may include patriotic elements from the local government of Tibet, various districts and various principal monasteries; the name-list shall be set forth after consultation between the representatives designated by the CPG and various quarters concerned and shall be submitted to the CPG for appointment.

16. Funds needed by the Military and Administrative Committee, the Military Area HQ and the PLA entering Tibet shall be provided by the CPG. The local government of Tibet should assist the PLA in the purchase and transport of food, fodder and other daily necessities.

17. This agreement shall come into force immediately after signature and seals are affixed to it.

Signed and sealed by delegates of the CPG with full powers: Chief Delegate—Li Wei-Han (Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs); Delegates—Chang Ching-wu, Chang Kuo-hua, Sun Chih-yuan. Delegates with full powers of the local government of Tibet: Chief Delegate—Kaloon Ngabou Ngawang Jigme (Ngabo Shape); Delegates—Dazasak Khemey Sonam Wangdi, Khentrung Thupten Tenthar, Khenchung Thupeen Lekmuun, Rimshi Samposey Tenzin Thundup. Peking, 23 May, 1951.
APPENDIX

Sino-Indian Agreement 29th April, 1954

AGREEMENT

Between

THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TRADE AND INTERCOURSE

Between

TIBET REGION OF CHINA AND INDIA

The Government of the Republic of India and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China

Being desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India

Have resolved to enter into the present Agreement based on the following principles:

1. mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
2. mutual non-aggression,
3. mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
4. equality and mutual benefit, and
5. peaceful co-existence.

And for this purpose have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:

who, having examined each other’s credentials and finding them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

**ARTICLE I**

The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to establish Trade Agencies:

1. The Government of India agrees that the Government of China may establish Trade Agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong.

2. The Government of China agrees that the Government of India may establish Trade Agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall be accorded the same status and same treatment. The Trade Agents of both Parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while exercising their functions, and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood freedom from search.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall enjoy the privileges and immunities for couriers, mail bags and communications in code.

**ARTICLE II**

The High Contracting Parties agree that traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India may trade at the following places:

1. The Government of China agrees to specify (a) Yatung, (b) Gyantse and (c) Phari as markets for trade. The Government of India agrees that trade may be carried on in India, including places like, (a) Kalimpong, (b) Siliguri and (c) Calcutta, according to customary practice.

2. The Government of China agrees to specify (a)
Gartok, (b) Pulanchung (Taklakot), (c) Gyanima-Kharga, (d) Gyanima-Chakra, (e) Ramura, (f) Dongbra, (g) Puling-Sumdo, (h) Nabra, (i) Shangtse and (j) Tashigong as markets for trade; the Government of India agrees that in future, when in accordance with the development and need of trade between the Ari District of Tibet Region of China and India, it has become necessary to specify markets for trade in the corresponding district in India adjacent to the Ari District of Tibet Region of China, it will be prepared to consider on the basis of equality and reciprocity to do so.

ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties agree that pilgrimage by religious believers of the two countries shall be carried on in accordance with the following provisions:

(1) Pilgrims from India of Lamaist, Hindu and Buddhist faiths may visit Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and Mavam Tso (Manasarovar) in Tibet Region of China in accordance with custom.

(2) Pilgrims from Tibet Region of China of Lamaist and Buddhist faiths may visit Banaras, Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi in India in accordance with custom.

(3) Pilgrims customarily visiting Lhasa may continue to do so in accordance with custom.

ARTICLE IV

Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route:

(1) Shipki La pass, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass, and (6) Lipu Lekh pass.

Also the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Shangatsangpu (Indus) River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.
ARTICLE V

For travelling across the border, the High Contracting Parties agree that diplomatic personnel, officials and nationals of the two countries shall hold passports issued by their own respective countries and visaed by the other Party except as providing in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this Article.

1. Traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood and their attendants will be allowed entry for purposes of trade into India or Tibet Region of China, as the case may be, in accordance with custom on the production of certificates duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and examined by the border checkpoints of the other Party.

2. Inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries who cross the border to carry on petty trade or to visit friends and relatives may proceed to the border districts of the other Party as they have customarily done heretofore and need not be restricted to the passes and route specified in Article IV above and shall not be required to hold passports, visas or permits.

3. Porters and mule-team drivers of the two countries who cross the border to perform necessary transportation services need not hold passports issued by their own country, but shall only hold certificates good for a definite period of time (three months, half a year or one year) duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and produce them for registration at the border checkpoints of the other Party.

4. Pilgrims of both countries need not carry documents of certification but shall register at the border check-
posts of the other Party and receive a permit for pilgrimage.

5. Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs of this Article, either Government may refuse entry to any particular person.

6. Persons who enter the territory of the other Party in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs of this Article may stay within its territory only after complying with the procedures specified by the other Party.

ARTICLE VI

The Present Agreement shall come into effect upon ratification by both Governments and shall remain in force for eight (8) years. Extension of the present Agreement may be negotiated by the two Parties if either Party requests for it six (6) months prior to the expiry of the Agreement and the request is agreed to by the other Party.

Done in duplicate in Peking on the twenty-ninth day of April, 1954, in the Hindi, Chinese and English languages all texts being equally valid.

Sd: NEDYAM RAGHAVAN Sd: CHANG HAN-FU
Plenipotentiary of the Plenipotentiary of the
Government of the Central People’s Gov-
Republic of India. ernment, People’s Re-

public of China.
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