MODERN NEPAL
Rise And Growth In The Eighteenth Century

D. R. REGMI

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PREFACE

This is the third volume of the series—'History of Nepal' and deals with the period between 1750 and 1800 A.D.

The present volume has nine chapters. The last chapter describes political and economic condition of the time which also applies to the half of the nineteenth century.

We have a separate volume for the period of the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814-1816. Originally this was designed to be included into the third volume as its second part. But on second thought we found that it deserved to go by itself as a separate volume, and consequently the fourth volume was planned. Further, as we have to maintain an unbroken link between all events of expansion and conquest, we have brought the entire account of such ventures together at one instance in this volume. Thus the reader will find that all description of Nepal's fight over and annexation of Garhwal and Kumaon is incorporated at one place in the present work. We did not like to deal with the phases of conquest and expansion in the manner that the same followed the chronology of the ruling dynasty. The year 1809 had seen the climax of the whole process of expansion with the boundary of the Gorkha domain fixed at Sutlej where it touched the Sikh Kingdom. But this phase finds its description in the next volume.

Prithvinarayan Shah is the maker of modern Nepal and, therefore, we begin our history with his career of conquest, and with the expansive phase of the Kingdom of Gorkha which after twenty years of incessant struggle to grow and widen transformed in its largesse to become a new state with its capital in Nepal proper. This state from its very inception came to be called the Kingdom of Nepal. We shall see later in the body of the text that this state was much different in size and population from the old entity known in ancient and medieval history by that name.

Nepal grew to an immense size expanding on either flanks, and its reputation as the home of the valiant Gorkhali fighters had spread far and wide in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The Gorkhalis were regarded as invincible warriors. The Gorkhali ruler had defeated two invasions from the south, one organised by Mir Kasim and another by the British Governor Verelst. The defeat of the English expedition had generated new enthusiasm and enhanced Nepal's prestige in the eyes of the Indian people. But their march got
checkmated once in 1792 by the Chinese army in Tibet, and at another
time about 22 years later in the Himalayan region and in the lower
reaches of the Seven-Gandaks and Kosi in the plains by the British.
On both the occasions Nepal was heavily defeated. But the second
occasion proved more critical and Nepal lost a substantial portion of
its newly added territories to the British. Since 1816 Nepal also
ceased to be a great country power.

But in its heyday Nepal lived gloriously because it kept its banner
of freedom aloft, met the enemies generously and chivalrously and
treated the vanquished with dignity and kindness.

The story told in this volume covers in detail all important events
of the most glorious chapters of the history of Nepal.

In the past the treatment of this period of history had been in the
form of a passing reference to one or two important personalities of the
time. As such it covered not more than a few pages of space. Now
we have a full volume for the same subject. During the last several
years, a number of new data had been made available, and this had
made it easy to treat the same in all its aspects, and in fuller details.

The history delineated in the third volume could be called one of
the early modern period. Here we no longer have to depend on ins-
criptions or like documents for sources. The chronicles tend to give
more or less ascertained dates as the chronicler in all cases happens
to write about events within his memory. As this period coincides
with early British rule in India, we have also in many instances British
Indian sources to verify any unascertained date figures. Other source
materials are sanads, royal and official charters, letters and memorials
and notes prepared by foreign visitors. All this makes the writing of
history of the period concerned comparatively an easy affair. The
chapter providing the account of Nepal’s relation with neighbours was
written with the help of materials mostly provided by British sources
except the section about the Sino-Nepalese War, for which we have
as supplementary evidence materials from Nepalese and Chinese sources.
To

His Majesty

King Mahendra Vira Vikrama Shaha Deva

In Token Of

High Esteem And Regard.
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ABBREVIATIONS


Kirkpatrick . . \textit{An account of the Kingdom of Nepaul}, London 1811.


NS . . Nepal Samvat.

VS . . Vikram Samvat


S. S. . . \textit{Sanskrit Sandesa}, a monthly magazine of antiquity (in Sanskrit)

KPJ . . K. P. Jayaswal

Abs. PLR . . \textit{Abstracts of Persian Letters Received}

C P C . . \textit{Calendar of Persian Correspondence}.

S C . . Select Committee.

Sec. Con. . . Secret Consultations

O. C. . . Old Correspondence.

Sel. Com. Pro. . . Select Committee Proceedings

H.D.O.C. . . Home Department Original Consultations

I.H.Q. . . \textit{Indian Historical Quarterly}.

Pol. Cons. . . Political Consultations

IHRC . . Indian Historical Records Commission.
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17. JBORS, XIX (1933), Tibeto-Nepalese War, 1788-93.
19. Nepal Sanskritik Parishad Patrika, Volumes I & II.
22. *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vols. XII, XIV (Sindhi Affairs).
30. Samual Turner: *An Account of an Embassy to the Court of Teshoo Lama in Tibet* containing a Narrative of a Journey through Bootan and Parts of Tibet, London, 1800.
34. *Vamsavali* in the possession of the author.

For Indian Sources of Anglo-Nepalese Relations in the Eighteenth Century we have used the following published materials of the Government of India, besides many unpublished papers from different District Records Rooms (Bihar), Indian National Archives (Delhi) and U.P. Central Records Office (Allahabad).


(b) George W. Forrest: *Selections from the Letters, Despatches, and other state papers* preserved in the Foreign Department of the Government of India 1772-85 in 3 Vols).
(c) *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vols. II, III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, X.

(d) *India House-Fort William Correspondence*, Volumes as referred to in our text.

(e) *Index to the Foreign and Political Department Records*, Vol. I, 1756-1780 (Published by National Archives).

(f) *Select Documents of the British Period of Indian History of the Victoria Memorial*, edited by D. C. Ganguli.

(g) K. P. Mitra's article 'Anglo-Nepalese Relations in the last decade of the Eighteenth Century' in Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, Vol. XVIII.


(j) K. K. Datta's article 'On some unpublished Records' in JBRS, XXV, Parts 3 and 4.

(k) Unpublished papers preserved in the National Archives of India (New Delhi).

   (1) *Political Consultations*, 1790-1800.
   (2) *Secret Consultations*, 1775-1800.
   (3) *Select Committee Proceedings*, 1756-74.
   (4) *Public Proceedings*
   (5) *Letters to and from the Court of Directors, etc. Home Miscellaneous and Public Series.*

CHAPTER I
THE BACKGROUND
I. EARLY HISTORY OF THE BAI SI AND CHAUBISI

The Baisi

In the 14th century several ruling families and collaterals of Rajputana were forced to leave home and take shelter in the hilly areas of what is now called West Nepal. For some time these were engaged to rehabilitate themselves and gradually they settled down but in course of another fifty years they ousted one by one the native inhabitants of the place from all positions of vantage, and in that process were born the two sets of principalities vaguely numbering 22 and 24, later known as the Baisi and Chaubisi. The Baisi occupied roughly the areas west of the River Narayani right up to the River Mahakali. The Chaubisi covered the eastern region up to the River Darraudi, some fifty miles west of Kathmandu. Later as Gorkha became a principality on its own the boundary line shifted to the river Trisuli, about eighteen miles closer to the Nepal Valley. It may be recounted here that these divisions did not mark any connotation of alliance or political constellations. These represent only geographical grouping taking the upper line of Gandak as the starting point. To take an instance of the loose character of the grouping, it so happened that in ordinary count most of them escaped notice and proper demarcation was difficult. The cause was, of course, the immensity of the problem—too many small states over a limited area and also the fact that the border principalities particularly Piuthan, Khungri and Bhingri¹ that lay in between the two territories had an unascertained location, and also in practice shifted from one side to the other.

To begin with the Baisi, first of all let us note that the number of states might not be exactly 22, and the name of the historically known group as the Baisi connotes only a vague generalisation, as is the case with its counterpart towards the east. We have attached herewith a table for each of the two groups to give an instance of how names and numerical strength differed from one list to another. On a map spread from west to east the location of these 22 principalities will appear like the following. It will appear that they were situated

¹ In Hamilton’s enumeration these two are included in the Baisi.
between the rivers Mahakali and Piuthan whose boundary touched Palpa, an important member of the Chaubisi.

To note the principalities:

1. Jumla in the extreme north-west with a large territory expanding in parallel direction in the north as well as to the east;

2. Doti in the extreme west, south of Jumla covering the middle ranges of that part of the sub-Himalayan region;

3. Bajhang in the north-east of Doti; this touched the Tibetan State near the lake Manasarovara;

4. Achham south-east of Doti at the same altitude;

5. Thallara (of the present time within the Doti division) just north of Dandeldhura, its headquarter; the area is situated between Bajhang and Doti;

6. Dailekh further east of Doti;

7. Jajarkot, south-east of Dailekh; the (6) and (7) occupied areas just below Jumla;

8. Bamphi now inside the Salliana district at the eastern extremity;

9. Dang Deokhuri, south of Salliana, occupying also a portion of the Terai as far as Tulisipur (now in Gonda District of the Indian province of U.P.);

10. Phalabhang, north-east of Dang at the Upper region; at the moment this occupies the eastern portion of the district of Salliana and is the seat of the Raja of Salliana;

11. Roalpa, north of Salliana;

12. Rukumkot, further east of Salliana;

13. Musikot now probably within the Jajarkot Raj, which has merged its identity;

14. Khungrikot on the border of the present Piuthan District and

15. Bhingrigaon further south. The last three also figure in the list of the Baisis given by Hamilton. These were ruled by Chandela chiefs. The last of the Baisis touched Piuthan and Malaibam of the Chaubisi group.

16. Jahari lies to the south-west of Piuthan;

17. Chhilli, south-east of Dang;

18. Malnetta;

19. Kalagaon;

20. Gutum;

21. Goriakot;

22. Gajur; the last four according to Hamilton constituted Sattala
with three more as per list of Kirkpatrick unnamed in some and unidentified in others.  

Contrary to what he heard in Kathmandu then, Hamilton thinks that Galkot and Malaibam should be included in this list. The states from No. 16 above onwards could not be traced in the latest map of Nepal. It is possible that these were totally forgotten by the time the map was drawn as they gradually came to be depopulated on account of the exodus after the disappearance of the local ruling chieftains, or owing to the same factor they were totally merged in one or other states each to lose its separate identity.

We give the table of the Baisi states as per lists of different individuals who collected the data, and of the chronicle, at page 4.

For the description of these states our principal authority of information is Hamilton who in 1802 made an extensive survey of the genealogies of states within the Kingdom of Nepal, while he was in the capital. The value of his account is heightened all the more because of the fact that he tried to make it as thorough as could be possible on the circumstances in his presentation, and corrected all what Kirkpatrick in 1791 had failed to grasp and produced out of misunderstanding.

Jumla was the biggest principality in the west both in point of territory and status and at the time we deal with this was the most important state for the whole of the region then occupied by both the groups. Hamilton’s authority informed him that its suzerainty was acknowledged by the entire group of states up to the river Marsyangdi.  

The Gorkhavamsavali while trying to give that honour to Gorkha cannot but put Jumla on a footing equal to that country. According to Hamilton the ruling dynasty of Jumla was the only pure Rajput family to have migrated to the hills. The first emigrant of this family arrived in Jumla some five hundred years ago.

In the beginning Jumla included also those territories now forming parts of Kumaon in the east and north-east as well a part of west Tibet around the present Manasarovar. Towards the later stage not only Kumaon portions were lost, but Doti, Jajarkot and Bajhang—all tribu-

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2 Gutum and Gajur along with Kmunri have been included in the list of Chaubisis by an anonymous writer of the 17th century (Itihas Prakas, II, 3, pp. 586-87).

3 See Hamilton, p. 283. He wrote, "We may safely, however, conclude, that his superiority was acknowledged everywhere between the Kali river and Nepal. His authority, however, was still more limited than that of the late Caesars of Germany, his subjects frequently levying war, not only against each other, but against their sovereign; nor was there any assembly of states from which he could obtain assistance against a common enemy."
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taries asserted independence and also made repeated encroachments at the cost of Jumla, for which reason it was reduced to a comparatively smaller position. But Jumla’s jurisdiction over the portion of west Tibet was maintained throughout its career as a separate entity. The last ruler of Jumla who fled the country after a hard fight against the Gorkhalis was Sobhan Sahi. It was said that for sometime Sobhan Sahi operated from his part of the Kingdom beyond the Himalayas before he was compelled to retreat to Lhasa for asylum.

In dealing with the Baisi and Chaubisi we shall avoid details and also the description of less important principalities. In accordance with what has been suggested the narrative will be as brief as possible, and we have also intended only to emphasise events as far as they relate to the later history of Gorkha in its expansive activities. We have already narrated the account of the ancient past of the region comprising the territories of those twentytwo States now known as the Karnali Pradesh. The present description covers the period since the 15th century A.D. The Rajput settlers had been permanently posted as our history started. So it becomes the history of the principalities founded by Rajput settlers.

We call the period immediately following the 14th century the Post-Malla period. Two outstanding names appear from the data of certain copper plate inscriptions recently discovered, which are variously dated Saka 1315, 1320, 1326. These names are Baliraj who styles himself as Maharajadhiraj and Medini Varma who also adopts a title of that type. Two of these copper plates are issued from Srimat Sinja (bhidhana) nagars. According to the chronicle of the Kalyalsahi family, Baliraj is the 60th in the line, and he was born in Jumla, his parents having gone there from Rajputana. Baliraj obtained a small principality to rule from the Raja of Jumla. Possibly Baliraj rose to become the ruler of Jumla after overthrowing the original ruling family of Jumla. It appears from the chronicle that Baliraj’s dynasty continued to rule over Jumla till it was overthrown by the Gorkha ruler. Batsaraj about whom we have written more below is put as his son. Salim Sahi came seven generations after. Baliraj and Medini Varma are joint signatories to a state decree issued through a copper plate dated Saka 1326 from Jumla Swarna Gramanagara (the present Sunaragoan). Another name which, however, belongs to a different place and south of Jumla, is that of Maharajadhiraj Sansar Varma who addresses in a tamrapatra (date Saka 1318) the adhikaries, Karkis, **

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4 This village is on the way to Jajarkot from Sinja. *Itihas Prakas*, II, ii, pp. 100-09.
and Thapas and Rokayas of Bhukha to inform that he has freed some families in that locality of all the 36 kinds of taxes, duties, fines, etc; the witness represented constitutes as in previous inscriptions the same Dharma and Sangha along Bhumi, the mother Earth. This suggests that up till now Buddhism was respected in some parts of the country. Bhukha is in Dullu, the Durlanghyapur of the inscriptions. But a question now comes as to the identity of the ruler. Was Sansar Varma-independent of Jumla? or he happened to be one in the line of Medini Varma? Since this time Jumla was being known as Javeswardesa.

Two inscriptions in copper plate incorporating the decree of a ruler mentioning Jumla occur again in connection with Batsaraj Naresvara. These have the same date Saka 1372. The decree is addressed to the authorities of upper and lower Jumla, (upri Jumla, tali Jumla) the Karki, Mahatara, Rokaya, Budharana, Thapa to protect the grant of a freehold to some Brahmana—we have as the witness Budha dharma Saiva dharma, etc. in continuity of the traditional usage.

Dullu and Dailekh, areas just south of Jumla, seem to have separated from the direct jurisdiction of Jumla since the middle of the 16th century. Achham, west of Dailekh, has its own King at about the same time. Each of them had its own Raja since that time, who addresses himself as the MaharajadhiraJ. Although Dullu’s ruler called himself Raskoti, both Dullu and Dailekh seem to belong to a common stock of ancestors. In the Raskoti chronicle, the two sons of Antari Malaibam are given each Dullu and Dailekh respectively. In a tamrapatrapa obtained recently Saimalsahi of the Raskoti family and Kalyalraja MaharajadhiraJ Vikram Shah pledge in the year Saka 1542 (1620 A.D.) Bhadrapada Krishna 9 to stand together in weal or woe. They had pledged not only to live together in peace but also to meet the challenge of an enemy with a combined strength of both. The former got additional territory by favours of the latter. It is said that these two rulers were cousins, sons of brother and sister. About this time the society of the place also underwent a further metamorphosis, and Buddhism in any form disappeared for good. This is reflected in the tamrapatras (copper plates) of the day, which make no more obeisance to the Buddhist trinity as was the practice earlier. It is probable that Salim Sahi who is the King referred to in a copper plate grant (of Saka 1513=1591 A.D.) started a new chapter in the history of Baliraj’s dynasty. The capital from which the decree was issued is no longer Semja. It is now Chhinasim qualified by Rajasthan. The ruler’s name is spelt in different ways in different records. He is Mukti Sahi Salim-
sahi or Sailam Sahi.

For another two hundred years the dynasty of Sailam Sahi ruled over Jumla. There are some important names of this dynasty. One such name Krishna Sahi in the middle of the 18th century is mentioned in Tibetan chronicles to have sent a trade mission to Lhasa. The decrees of these rulers bear the stamp with Sri Budri natho Jayati, Sri Muktitatho Jayati.

The reference to Badrinath is probably to suggest Jumla's hegemony over Garhwal and Kumaon at one time in the past. Similarly the adoption of invocation to Mukti inath implied control of Jumla over Mustang. Krishna Sahi's name is not traced in the chronology of the family. But he has a copper plate inscription of the year Saka 1704\(^6\) (1882) with the same invocation. The invocation to Badrinath and Mukti inath appears for the first time in copper plates since the time of Surath Shah (date Saka 1646 masa 4 etc.). This was probably re-assertion of old claims.

We close this chapter with a translation of a relevant portion of a copper plate inscription of the Kalyal Raja Sudarsan Shah. This inscription commemorates the building of the royal palace belonging to him between Saka 1667-1673. From this we obtain an idea of how wages and prices obtained in that part of Nepal in the 17th century.

"The King came, with whom as bodyguards also came Khasas and Brahmans of the 22 Sub-districts (Maujas). A big wooden pole was erected as a victory pillar. Some expert officers were directed to decorate and embellish the pillar. The total expenses required to meet the construction of the palace was what was paid to different groups of workers, e.g. Rs. 6,000\(-\) for the Khasas; Rs. 3,000\(-\) for the Jadyas (Bhotias) \ldots \ldots \ldots 25 masons were employed to lay the bricks, 40 men were to lift stone pieces from the mines and about a thousand labourers were to carry stones and timbers and render similar duties without receiving any wages. The heads of labour gangs were to receive 7 rupees each, and all of them were paid Rs. 140\(-\) plus 52 (Thàn) cloths. The masons working on earth and clay were paid in total Rs. 800\(-\) and each above Rs. 44\(-\) plus 15 x 20 pieces of cloths. Those who were not paid wages obtained in all Rs. 1400 plus 260 blankets, 140 sheep\ldots \ldots \ldots\)

"Two hundred Brahmans who performed the sacrificial ceremony were awarded Rs. 200 plus 32 than cloths worth Rs. 69\(-\) plus 9 items of fur coloured pieces of cloth worth Rs. 15\(-\), a colt priced Rs. 10\(-\) in addition to 6 x 28½ pounds of Ghee, 16 blankets, 32 sheep—paddy

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\(^6\) Itihas Prakas. II. i. pp. 135-37.
worth Rs. 44, banners and flags of 10 than pieces of cloths and cochin costing Rs. 50\text{\textcurrency}. Rings and bangles priced from Rs. 18 to Rs. 200, 4 horses and 15 colts were given as special gifts to experienced brick masons, the carpenters' share was Rs. 22 plus 9 than clothes. The overall charge for the building was Rs. 7500 and 84 maunds of iron.”

II

More about the Baisi

Having presented the ancient and medieval history of the Karnali basin, we now proceed to make a passing reference to some of the comparatively important states of the Baisi and Chaubisi, which will include the account of Palpa, Lamjung and Gorkha up till the rise of Prithvinarayan Shah.

(1) Our account begins with Doti, the State occupying an area on the basin of the Kali and its tributaries at the western extremity of the Baisi region. Doti's lineage was like that of Jumla derived from Salivahana and from Asanti and Vasanti, according to Hamilton. The forty-first name is that of Krishna Shah whose son Dip Shah lost his kingdom to the Gorkha ruler.

(2) Salliana is another important state. According to Hamilton its ruler was not of a pure Ksyatriya family. But he claimed to be a Suryavansi prince from Rajputana. The last ruler Ranabhim Shah married a daughter of Prithvinarayan Shah, and accepted Gorkha suzerainty in the next reign by concluding a treaty of subsidiary alliance. A considerable portion of Dang was attached to Salliana by Bahadur Shah as a dowry to his sister. The original principality is still known as Phalabang.

(3) The third important unit is that of Dang and Deokhuri, situated south of Salliana. The ruler belonged to Samal clan of Rajputs. The territory was not as large as that of Salliana, but from parts of Bhitri Madesh (inner Terai) fallen to its share, Dang derived a larger revenue. Dang's last ruler according to Hamilton was known as Nawab Singha. The Terai lands were held as a Zemindari under the Nawab of Oudh.

(4) Chhilli, another member of the 22, confederacy, lying towards the east, on the same altitude and location, was ruled by a member of the Dang family.

(5) Dullu-Dailekh with its capital at Bilaspur had a Khasa chief (Hamilton, P. 281). The last Raja inconvenienced the advancing Gorkhalis by frequent loots, and was put to death.

\textit{Ibid} pp. 148-149.
A chronicle provided to me by the present Raja of Salliana has the same genealogy as that of the Nepal Valley and this is true of all the periods for the time down to Harasinhadeva. It then separates the dynasty, and traces the origin of the Salliana Raja to the fourth successor of the above mentioned ruler, who was then ruling over the Terai, the other progeny having been ruling over the Nepal Valley. One of the descendants of the stock ruling over the Terai went to Udaipur. There they ruled for several generations. Then came the Muslim invasion, which compelled the ruling family to seek refuge in the Himalayan hills. Vikram Sinha Sahadeva, such was the name of the emigrant, founded a principality, which two generations later in the time of Maharajadhiraj Tula Singha Shah came to be known as the Salliana Raja. His son Sri Krishna Shah was a contemporary of Prithvinarayan Shah and it is said that he rendered a great help to the latter in his siege of Kirtipur. Prithvinarayan was so obliged that he gave his daughter in marriage to Sri Krishna Shah's son.

Having dealt with the important principalities situated in the extreme west let us now take up the narrative about the state of Piuthan which touched the Baisi at its eastern extremity. Piuthan has a confused place in the comity. It was placed either ways with the Chaubisi and Baisi. We have already said that its ruler claimed to have come of a Chandela family.

He controlled a portion of the Terai called the Tuppa of Sheoraj. For a long time it was regarded as an important principality. Tavernier notes a feud over Sheoraj ranging between Piuthan and Palpa. Hamilton says that Piuthan paid revenue for this holding to the Nawab Vazir through the Raja of Bansi. Matichandra, the last ruler, fled without a struggle before the marching Gorkha troops reached the border of Piuthan.

(7) Malaibam lay to the north of Piuthan and stretched at that latitude from east to west to touch Kaski and Jumla respectively along the stretch of the snow lines of the Himalayas.

The Raja claimed Samal origin. Hamilton says that he heard that he was born of a Bhotia woman by a Gautamia Brahman father. Hamilton thinks that Dimba Raja, the first ruler of the family belonged to the Gautam Raja branch of the Rajputana settlers. The next ruler Nagabamba exhibited his exploits at wrestling and was awarded Khillat by the Emperor of Delhi. Malaibam fought Jumla on various occasions, and it is said that he had blood relationship with the Khasa Mallas of Simja. The last ruler Kirtibamba who was very unpopular with his subjects vacated his throne when attacked by Damodar Pande. At the
time of Malaibam Malla the second in about the 16th century, the country began to be called Malaibam; otherwise it was known as Parbat till then. This principality had under its jurisdiction the area known as Mustang the whole of the upper reaches of the river Gandak and beyond upto Tinglibhot (inclusive); the latter stretched upto the last range of snowy mountains.

A chronicler of the Samal family has Deochandra as the first member of this dynasty, who was awarded this title by his grandfather, the King of Jumla. This Deochandra started his rule over a part of Jumla called Achham as his domain. His ninth successor had two sons, one of whom ruled Achham and another went to Gotam and carved out a principality for himself. From Gotam the dynasty branched further, one staying there and the other going to Rukum. Then more members of this family claimed Jajarkot, Darna and Galkot.

Another chronicler has Gorkha, Dhurkot, and Bajhang in place of Gotum, Rugum and Bhingrikot. It seems that the list excluding Gorkha was prepared before Gorkha came into existence as a separate state. But all the later notings have Gorkha in the list. As Bajhang is still existing as a principality, it surely formed a member of the Baisi.

Ambika Prasad’s ‘History of Nepal’ has Khuprikot and Bhingrikot in place of Hamilton’s Gorkha and Tarki.

According to Hamilton’s information the members of the Chaubisi federated severally into groups as follows:

(a) (1) Palpa, (2) Noakot, (3) Rising, (4) Ghering, (5) Argha, (6) Khachi and (7) Gulmi led by Palpa. Rising did not exist for more than 50 years and was also far in distance towards Tanhoun; similarly, Noakot was absorbed in Palpa.

(b) (8) Bhirkot, (9) Garahang, (10) Poiun, (11) Naya-kot (Nawakot) under Bhirkot.

(c) (12) Malaibam and (13) Galkot.

(d) (14) Piuthan leading the combination of (15) Musikot and (16) Isma.

(e) (17) Tanhoan, (18) Kaksi, (19) Lamjung, (20) Dhor (21) Satahung led some time by Lamjung and some time by Tanhoun, (22) Gorkha was all alone and independent of these. It was even outside the Chaubisi for a long time. Hamilton does not hear of Tarki, nor there was a separate principality at Pokhra (Vansittart). He also
We have the following table for the list of the CHAUBISI from various sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nepalese chronicle (a)</th>
<th>Kirkpatrick¹</th>
<th>Hamilton²</th>
<th>Vansittart³</th>
<th>Oldfield⁴</th>
<th>Nepalese chronicle (b) States Houses (dhuri)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lamjung</td>
<td>Lamjung</td>
<td>Lamjung</td>
<td>Lamjung</td>
<td>Lamjung</td>
<td>Gorkha 12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaski</td>
<td>Kaski</td>
<td>Kaski</td>
<td>Kaski</td>
<td>Tamchang 8,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanhoun</td>
<td>Tanhoun</td>
<td>Tanhong</td>
<td>Tanhoun</td>
<td>Galkot    12,000 (4000 in Terai)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Galkot</td>
<td>Galkot</td>
<td>Galkot</td>
<td>Galkot</td>
<td>Malibam   Kaski 8,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parbat</td>
<td>Parbat</td>
<td>Maliabum</td>
<td>Malibum</td>
<td>Satahun   Garhun 6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noakot</td>
<td>Nayakot</td>
<td>Nuwakeot</td>
<td>Pokhra</td>
<td>Blirkot   Dhor 2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paiyun</td>
<td>Pyoon</td>
<td>Pyug</td>
<td>Pyung</td>
<td>Rising    Satahun 6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garbun</td>
<td>Lutthoone</td>
<td>Satahun</td>
<td>Latahun</td>
<td>Dhor      Rising 600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sathore</td>
<td>Bhirkot</td>
<td>Bhirkot</td>
<td>Bhirkot</td>
<td>Palpa     Ghiring 2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rising</td>
<td>Ghiring</td>
<td>Ghiring</td>
<td>Ghiring</td>
<td>Butwal    Paiyun 2,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghiring</td>
<td>Ghiring</td>
<td>Ghiring</td>
<td>Ghiring</td>
<td>Tansen    Parvat 8,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhor</td>
<td>Dhor</td>
<td>Sathung</td>
<td>Sathung</td>
<td>Gulmi     Galkot 2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piuthan</td>
<td>Palpa</td>
<td>Palpa</td>
<td>Palpa</td>
<td>Khanchi   Palpa 24,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palpa</td>
<td>Palpa</td>
<td>Palpa</td>
<td>Palpa</td>
<td>Isma      Isma 6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argha</td>
<td>Gulmi</td>
<td>Gulmi</td>
<td>Gulmi</td>
<td>Chilli    Argha 4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanchi</td>
<td>Wigha</td>
<td>Argha</td>
<td>Argha</td>
<td>Salliana  Khanchi 4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhirkot</td>
<td>Khanchi</td>
<td>Pokhra</td>
<td>Pokhra</td>
<td>Wigha     Paiyun 4,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gajkot</td>
<td>Dang (with Terai)</td>
<td>Butwal</td>
<td>Butwal</td>
<td>Musikot 4,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Musikot</td>
<td>Muskot</td>
<td>Piuthan</td>
<td>Piuthan</td>
<td>Dang 7,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Khuprikot</td>
<td>Purthana (with Terai Sheoraj)</td>
<td>Dhurikot</td>
<td>Dhurikot</td>
<td>Isma 14,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhingrikot</td>
<td>Tarki</td>
<td>Kaikho</td>
<td>Parthena</td>
<td>Piuthan 14,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isma</td>
<td>Salliana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gotam</td>
<td>Musikot</td>
<td>Musikot</td>
<td>Musikot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugum</td>
<td>Isma</td>
<td>Isma</td>
<td>Isma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Pp. 284-85.
² P. 238. The list was supplied to him by Kanaknidhi
³ P. 4.
⁴ I. P. 97.
places Dang and Jhilli or Chhilli of Kirkpatrick's list in the Baisi table.

Deorali and Kaikho of Vansittart do not also seem to be separate principalities. To make the number 24 we have rather to include Mackwanpur and Chaudandi (Vijaypur), the two divisions of Palpa in the Terai. Butwal as will appear from the following accounts remained distinct from Palpa only for a generation and so was never counted as a Chaubisi.

In the Dastur-ul-Amal-mushtamil-ber Dastur-i-Badshahan-i-Hind (Dastur-Shahnama and Shagurf nama-i-Welayat), a Persian MS in the Patna Oriental Public Library, Prof. Askari traces references about Nepal in the current account of political and economic condition of India (on folios 22a-28a). The author of the Ms. who does not give his name but who belongs to Patna finishes his account in 1831 (1248 A.H.), and it is generally agreed that much of the information he provides should not be dismissed as something vague and inaccurate. He gives a list of the Chaubisi, which can be of some interest to us.

I. Jumla (the Raja most excellent, with his capital in Chinna-chin, he is now in Lhasa—a portion of it falls in Bhot).

II. Siddhinarsinha of Kaski, 145 kos from Kantipur and adjoining Malalibhum.

III. Gorkha, the Victor who established his sway over the whole of Nepal.

IV. Kantipur (24000 houses), Patan (22000 houses) and Bhatgaon (18000 Pucca houses).

V. Palpa, its Raja Mukund Sen had divided his principality. The daughter of the Raja Mahadutta is married to Bahadur Shah. It retained also Butwal.

VI. Malaibum; Tanhou; Makwanpur (with Janakpur); Rajpur.

VII. Khanchi; Udaipur ruled by the petty Brahman Zamindar.

IX. Urghaloo (Argha).

X. Paismana (Paiyun).

XI. Salliana.

XII. Garhan.

XIII. Musikot.

XIV. Khemjitari (Khidim).

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*of Tawaluk Beg (extracts)

*of Itesamuddin of Nadia, who was sent by Shah Alam to London to represent his case (a complete copy).

19 The entire work consists of 119 foll, lines 18; size of the written portion 10” x 6½”, 4 Proceedings of the Historical Records Commission, xviii, 1942, pp. 184-88.
BACKGROUND

XX. Bhootana (Piuthan).

XXI. .....

XXII. Ghering.

XXIII. Sambharkot.

XXIV. Raja Sewansingh (?)

XXV. Gulmi.

XXVI. Dhoar.

XXVII. Noakot ruled by Mandhata Shah. This reached Kathmandu by a bridge over a river Banasi. Gorkhanai is a walled city on Budhi Gandak with gates and bridges.

XXVIII. Lamber Jung (Lamjung).

XXIX. Roogum.

Above a few names have been misspelt. The correct spelling we have given alongside within brackets. It appears that the list has altogether 28 states, and these extend over the entire length and breadth of land between the Mahakali and Metchee. Possibly these were the only important principalities what were called the Baisi and Chaubisi. The information about Noakot (XXII) is not correct.

According to the document all these states were wiped out by Prithvinarayan. The writer gives also the facts of the last days of the Malla rulers. These tally with the general description of the events as drawn by authoritative chronicles.

The ruling families of the eight principalities, Bhirkot, Nuwakot, Garhon, Dhar, Satahun, Kaski, Lamjung and Gorkha belonged to one stock and branched off from one common ancestor as will appear from the following account.

We have no materials for a detailed history of these principalities even for the 17th and 18th centuries. The chronicles provide just a genealogy about each principality and nothing more. The genealogy itself is no better than an ordinary family chronological chart, which omits all recordable achievements and incidents. The above account, therefore, is devoid of historical setting and is useful only to the extent of enumerating political divisions that came to be set up in the worst days of feudal chaos.

III

Rise of the Gorkha Power

Evidences about the origin of the Gorkha dynasty vary greatly. The Nepalese Chronicles (e.g. Wright, P. 276 ff) trace it to one Bhupati Ranaji Rao of Chittor, whose son Fate Rana had refused to give
his daughter in marriage to Emperor Akbar and instead chose to meet a glorious end for the refusal with life. He was killed and all his territories were ceded to the victor. Chittor was thus eliminated, but two of Fatte's brothers continued to offer resistance. They were one Udayambara from Udaipur which he himself founded and another Manmath from Ujjain where he had repaired in course of the flight. According to Wright's authority and other Nepalese chronicles Manmath's son and his grandson, Bhupal Ranaji entered the central Himalayan region and reached Ridi in Saka 1417 (1495 A.D.) and pushing a little farther east carved out a principality, touching the river Seti, a tributary of the river Gandak in the east to include modern Bhirkot and adjoining areas.

Another source takes the incident of flight to have taken place at the time of Allauddin Khilzi. This is supported by Gorkha Vamsavali and R. B. Gaurishankar Hari Shankar Ojha (History of Udaipur, P. 87). Col. Tod thinks that the dynasty of Gorkha was founded by Samarssi Rana. One remarkable fact about these sources is that they agree wholly as to the Rajput ancestry of the family that at a later stage ruled over Gorkha.

Bhupal was not a sovereign of a viable state. This principality he handed over in two separate parts to two of his sons, Khancha and Micha, the latter more commonly known as Michakhan. The division reduced the size of the original state. According to some chronicles their names were respectively Harihar Sinha and Ajaya Sinha. Hamilton (P. 240) thinks that these are pure Magar derivatives suggesting the origin of the names referred to from the tribe of the same name. Hence he concludes that the Gorkha dynasty has little to do with Chittor stock. But there seems little truth in what Hamilton says. Nobody can refuse to accept the fact of immigration of settlers from Rajputana. Harihar-sinha or Kancha got Dhor, and a large portion of Magarat (the land of the Magars) including Garhon, Satahun and Bhirkot (These were dismembered at a later stage, and each constituted a self-governing principality). Michakhan in his turn became the ruler of Noakot further east. It was this branch of the Udaipur dynasty which was destined to play an important role in future. At a later date Kaski was added to Noakot and a very able successor of Michakhan, by the name Kulamandan Shah succeeded in over-throwing the powerful Magar chieftains of the north thus enlarging the domain of the emigrant Rajputs

11 Annals & Antiquities of Rajasthan.
in that part of the Himalayas. The chronicler puts that Kulmandan's title, Shah, was obtained due to favour lavished by the Delhi Emperor on him. As he stated, Kulmandan was the first ruler of a Himalayan state to obtain this title.

In the next reign Kaski had the honour of sending one of the Raja's sons to rule over another Magar principality towards the immediate east. Thus the Raja's youngest son, Yasobam Shah became the first Ksatriya ruler of Lamjung. The chronicler writes that a previous assignee, an elder brother of Yasobam was killed by some Sekhant (?) tribesmen who would not like a non-tribal over the Gaddi of Lamjung. The identity of the Sekhant tribes is not revealed. Probably it referred to the various sections of the Gurung tribes which formed the vast majority of the people living in that area. The emphasis is now shifted towards the east. The Udaipur dynasty in its expansive phase moved in that direction. Until now the base was constantly changing and the family was just branching off. When Gorkha came into existence the base became stationary and there was no further branching. Now it was Gorkha's turn to welcome the Rajput. In the 15th century the Brahman and Khasa emigrants were already active in that part of the Gandak basin. But Gorkha was not then ruled by a Rajput prince. The Khadka chief, a Khasa by caste, was not of a pure blood, and the Brahmans were conspiring against him because their Hindu sense of royalty would not tolerate to be subjected to his pretensions. The emigrants made efforts to unseat the ruler and pave the way for a Rajput prince to come and occupy the throne. The Raja of Lamjung being near at hand, they approached him, and the youngest son who had had miraculous revelations in his childhood was sent thither in fulfilment of their demands. The Khadka chief had to yield his throne to the Rajput intruder.

Unlike in Lamjung, prince Drabya Shah had not a smooth sailing in Gorkha. He had to battle his way before he could become its ruler.

Drabya Shah's accomplices were Bhagirath Panth, Ganes Pandey, Gangaram Rana, Busal Narayan Arjyal, Sarveswar Khanal, Kesava Bohra and Murti Khawas—all of them belonged to Gorkha and knew the areas, its ins and outs, intimately. First they attacked the fortress of Liglig in the north-west of Gorkha near the upper basin of the river Darraudi, and captured it as it lay unprotected because of the Gurung tribal leaders to have gone outside for an annual fair. This consolidated, they proceeded to encircle the Gorkha ridge. Gorkha fell to the invader without much difficulty on the day of Vijayadasami. Accord-
ing to a chronicle the battle lasted for fifteen days with an important place near the main fort changing hands several times.

Gorkha, thenceforth, became a separate entity, and an addition to the already existing members of the Rajput controlled states. It does not figure in the list of 24 principalities as obtained in the early days of Rajput migration. Kirkpatrick’s omission also can be explained by this fact. Drabya Shah extended the boundary of Gorkha both on the north and the east. Many Ghale chiefs were subjugated in that course and his army marched victoriously to the then strategic hill fortresses in those regions some ten miles in the periphery.

Drabya Shah’s is the first dated reign of Gorkha and of all the principalities for this period. His entry into Gorkha has been noted with particular date line, which on various evidence is Saka 1481—1559 A.D. All chronicles are silent for the regnal data of his predecessors. Drabya Shah is said to have died in 1566 A.D. (Wright, etc.) or in 1577 (Gewali). The Gorkha Vamsavali says that he ruled for 11 years (see also Wright and Gewali) and was succeeded by Purandar Shah. By this calculation he must have died in 1570. Gorkha in his time comprised a few ridges and villages situated within an area of nearly 150 sq. miles.

At the time Gorkha became a kingdom, Lamjung was being ruled by Drabya Shah’s brother Narahari Shah. According to a chronicle in the possession of S. B. Gewali, Naradeva is said to have carved out Lamjung after fighting and driving away the local chieftains, but this is not corroborated by other sources of information. This Naradeva is also not traced in the authentic chronicles of the period.

In the lifetime of Drabya Shah, Gorkha was once threatened by Lamjung whose ruler conspired to kill the brother inviting him to meet unarmed on the occasion of their father’s Sradha ceremony. The brothers met on the bank of the River Chepe on the side of Lamjung, and the ceremony over, there was some more activity deliberately introduced by the ruler of Lamjung to engage Drabya Shah’s attention, which was causing delay in latter’s departure. But in the meantime the Gorkha ruler suspected some foul game, swam across the rivulet to join his contingent, was pursued by enemies for a distance without success and fortunately saved. Since then Lamjung and Gorkha had seldom conducted friendly relations in their dealing, and military engagements took place off and on to disturb even brotherly feelings. Lamjung was always aggressive, would even at the initial stage advance

12 Ghale is a sub-tribe of the Gurungs.
to a distance when Gorkha used to be caught unawares and sometimes did not hesitate to use feelings of animosity harbourd by some other Chaubasias to wreak his own vengeance on Gorkha.

But in the beginning it cost Lamjung its own amicable relation with the immediate neighbours. The Raja had already embittered Tanhoun, and the latter now sought Gorkha’s friendship being impressed with the valour exhibited by its brave soldiers in encounters with Lamjung. Gorkha gained advantages to that extent, and another gain was the cessation of feuds with the Gurung Chief Chasya Surtan of Warpak, who controlled Gorkha’s route to Tibet. The chronicler writes that at the initial stage this chief caused to bring about scarcity of salt in Gorkha by blockading. Now his friendship being obtained supply of salt and other commodities flowed uninterrupted. According to the same authority Tanhoun had presented one elephant to Gorkha, which was an unusual sight and first of its kind in that part of the country and Surtan came to witness the same in a mood of awe with a promise to send 21 muris of salt annually (a muri equalled 160 pounds in measure).

Rama Shah was the next ruler of importance in Gorkha. According to chronicles which are unanimous on this point he was the third successor of Drabya Shah. He succeeded his father Purandara Shah in 1605 A.D. According to both Wright and Gorkha Vamsavali Purandara Shah ruled for 35 years. Chhatra Shah, his elder brother, could rule only for six months on account of his untimely death.

Rama Shah expanded his kingdom towards the east, north-east and south to cover a large slice of territory which extended up to the fringe of the Trisuli valley near to Nepal proper in its immediate west and north. These areas happened to be inhabited by the Gurungs and Tamangs whom he vanquished. Ram Shah’s exploits on the border of Tibet were also noteworthy. He had successfully laid hand on the strategic areas of Kerrong. Though he had to relinquish the occupation of this border fort due to Tibetan pressure retaining only the Rassoa Pass, the frontier was marked at a place called Kugurghat, which up till now bears the inscribed stone. This gave the merchants of Gorkha immense advantages of commercial contact. Sardar Bhawani Singha was killed in the battle, and there were a few more casualties. But the loss was well compensated. This part of the expansion opened a channel of direct contact with the areas from which Gorkha got its supply of salt and other necessities. Towards the south also Gorkha’s contact with the Terai was now uninterrupted, as the border now touched the Mahabharat ranges. The area Gorkha then comprised was about 1,000
sq. miles—about 1\(\frac{1}{56}\)th of the present day Nepal occupying the portion between the rivers Marsyangdi and Trisuli from west to east. On the other side of Marsyangdi lay Tanhoun and some Parbatiya Thakuris were ruling over the land east of the Trisuli, but the latter paid tribute to the ruler of Kathmandu.

The chronicles (\textit{Gorkha Vamsavali} and a few others) credit him to have established connection for the first time with the rulers of Delhi and Udaipur (\textit{Gorkha Vamsavali}) on the one hand and with Malla rulers of the Nepal valley on the other. Rama Shah had sent goodwill missions to these kingdoms. From Udaipur he wanted to check his own genealogy and find out how far the list in the former agreed with his own. It is recorded in the chronicle that the ruler of Udaipur was pleased to note the whereabouts of the missing kinsmen about whose migration into the hill they had heard. In Delhi also the mission received a cordial welcome, and the Emperor was pleased to honour Rama Shah by granting to him the privilege of the title of a full-fledged sovereign, and more particularly the address of “Maharaja-dhiraja Chakrachudamani”.

Rama Shah is said to have called a conference of the important chieftains of the western region, and this met at the headquarter of Galkot with the co-operation of its chief Naramalla, his uncle-in-law, (Rama Shah’s wife was a princess of Musikot, his sister’s daughter). Rama Shah had earlier undergone vigorous tapasya (penance) by fasting under a canopy of a cave in the snows whither he had gone travelling incognito in the snowy peaks of the Himalayas. According to the same sources the Gorkhali visitors impressed the Delhi Emperor with a high degree of marksmanship. Amongst the contemporaries the name of the ruler of Nepal is given as Siddhinarasinha, who was then ruling over Patan. From that time Gorkha had regular commercial relation with the valley of Nepal, and some of the Newar traders settled down in the Gorkha areas since that time. A Thyasapu states that Rama Shah and Siddhinarasinha entered into a treaty relation to live in peace and regard each other as blood relation.

Rama Shah’s rule lasted for 27 years (Wright, \textit{Gorkha Vamsavali}). He was one of the most important rulers of Gorkha who laid the foundation of an administration in that principality destined to grow into a large kingdom sometime later. He was not a mere warring chieftain. As he added more areas to his kingdom, he took care to see that these were properly looked after by an organised administration. It is said that he systematised the existing customary laws, and introduced many more in accordance with the newly developing situation. These extended
to tribal areas, and other principalities also were drawn by their merits to incorporate them. Rama Shah's contacts with his neighbours were regular and cordial, and he encouraged zonal meetings of rulers. Gorkha's lead was accepted by several princes, although we discount the story about the acceptance of Gorkha suzerainty by rulers of Palpa and Jumla as suggested by Gorkha Chronicles.

We now enumerate some of the customary rules enforced by Rama Shah:

(1) Loan taken at 10% interest gets doubled after ten years, so interest should be paid only till the expiry of the tenth year and no further.

(2) Minor cases of dispute such as violation of order of the 'first come first served' in public wells, tanks and use of canal water in proportion as the areas of the field demanded, should be settled without referring to the court, through village assemblies.

(3) For Birta lands and all other lands held by a non-tiller the rent was fixed at 1/4 of the total produce.

(4) The ownership of land was declared to vest in the ruler but the holder could dispose of it in any way he liked.

(5) Brahmans, King's collaterals, and monks and mendicants were immune from capital punishment.

(6) Public places of worship and rest, public thoroughfares and the trees lining them, grazing field (Gauchar) and woods in the vicinity of the wells—all of them were made inviolable by proclamation. A fine of Rs. 5 was imposed for any act of violation of the sanctity of these places.

To Rama Shah goes the credit of creating the rudiments of an administrative order, both executive and judiciary, in a country which so far had existed without any kind of laws and agency to enforce them. The chief officer of the state was called Chautaria, and this dignitary was always either the King's own uncle or brother or a near collateral. He was the Raja's minister. Below him were the Khazanchi (Treasurer), the Ditha (a judge assisted by a Bichari for civil cases), Kapardar (in charge of the Royal robes and kitchen), the Kazi who supervised the armed forces, Dharmadhikar (Chief Judge for criminal cases), and the Kharidar (in charge of records and external affairs). The Sirdars led the men in military engagements. These high posts alternately went to the members of the six families, (Pande, Pantha, Arjyal, Khanal, Rana, Bohara) known as Chhathar, who had earlier assisted Drabya Shah in the capture of Gorkha. These families had secured
a Sanad from the ruler that these privileges would go to their descendants as long as the dynasty of Rama Shah reigned. The administration was rough, centralized and very personal.

The territory was divided into 7 Thums, each under an Omrao assisted by a Dware (literally door keeper). The Omrao collected rent, of which he took a certain percentage in order to maintain a small retinue of armed men, and their equipment of arms, e.g. Khukri, Khuda and bows and arrows. Each Thum had also its own Tharis and Bicharis to sit in judgement over cases of local disputes. They were generally men of importance in the locality. The village Committee often sat for the purpose. The Kotwal acted as a policeman and served notice or summons on the accused.

The various state offices, however, were not always distributed according to the ranks. The highest of them, the Kaziship and Sirdarship, went to cases in recognition of meritorious services in military engagements. At a later stage the Kazi performed the work of a minister, and there were four of them but they heard judicial cases also on appeal. (For a detailed survey refer to the chapter at the end).

The Ditha came to render function of a judicial authority as Kazis were wont to assume public duties of a ministerial head.

At a later stage it so happened that the Chautaria being a hereditary dignitariam ceased to be effective in the administration specially when infants succeeded to this post. Since the one of the kazis played the role of the Chief Minister, and it was only when the Chautaria came of age that he relinquished the powers. At times there were more than one Chautaria, and in such cases the oldest of them in relationship became the chief of Chautaria. Not that all of the King's collaterals became Chautaria. This post was given to such of them as stood in the nearest relationship of kinship with him. Those who would not be Chautarias shared honours and titles with other commoners.

Although strictly speaking there was no Jagirdari system, all the high posts of the state were paid through holdings of land in lieu of monthly or annual cash salary. Hamilton (P. 107) who visited Nepal in 1801 notes the following mode of payment out of about a third of the state revenue that was divided.

(1) Chautaria . . . . 1|5
(2) Shahjada . . . . 1|5
(3) Chief Kazi . . . . 1|5
(4) Sirdar . . . . 1|10
(5) Jetha . . . . 1|20
We do not get from documents of Nepalese sources any knowledge of these assignments. What we know is that each of these dignitaries had jagir lands assigned them, from which they collected their own salaries out of the revenue yielded by them.

Rama Shah systematised weights and measures. He made weighing and measuring scales of copper sealed with his stamps, although these were very irregular, and there was no fixed measurement varying as the wooden pot (Ari or bamboo tube, Dhungri) of an individual was shaped. However, the present day system of measurement owes to his systematisation:

| 10 muthi | 1 mana (1 lb.) |
| 8 mana   | 1 pathi (8 lbs.) |
| 20 pathi | 1 muri (160 lbs.) |
| 10 lal   | 1 masa |
| 10 masa  | 1 tola (11.663 gm.) |
| 18 tola  | 1 pal |
| 27 tola  | 1 bodi |
| 4 bodi   | 1 vissauli |
| 2 vissauli | 1 Dharni (2½ Indian Seers.) |

During Rama Shah’s reign Gorkha’s relation with Patan was very intimate. Both rulers had pledged words to nominate the successor of the one in case the other died without any such issue.13

Wherever the Rajputs had settled down, the succession to gadi was regulated by a kind of law of primogeniture. The eldest son of the King born of a married wife became the Crown Prince and heir apparent. He was known as Saheb.

The system of administration outlined above prevailed in all parts of Chaubisi and Baisi, and what we have observed above must also be taken to represent the condition for the whole of this region.

It does not seem, however, that Rama Shah created this system. It must have been a pattern that was in use at the time. Rama Shah in all certainty formally announced a structure on the line and stabilised it to pass for a measure of permanent settlement in the administrative sphere.

We have noticed two main shortcomings in the settlement. (a) We find no scheme of a monetary policy and (b) there is also no provision for a policy of commerce. According to certain European travellers, the entire region was going without its currency and the monetary

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units of the Nepal Valley were employed for exchange. Obviously the area was economically much backward, and more backward than the valley of Nepal.

Rama Shah is credited to have invited the Newar traders to Gorkha to transact business and assist the flow of trade between the Nepal Valley and his Kingdom. We take it that the traders of the valley of Nepal had the field in their hand, even though it was a rural economy they had to handle in the whole of the western region.

It appears as a corollary to what we said in the above paragraph that any kind of contact between the valley of Nepal and this region began very late.

Three of Rama Shah's immediate successors according to Wright (P 279) stood in the following order:

- Dambar Shah succeeding in 1633 A.D. ruled 9 years.
- Krisna Shah succeeding in 1642 A.D. ruled 11 years.
- Rudra Shah succeeding in 1655 A.D. ruled 16 years.

We have two inscriptions of Rama Shah in Gorkha, (Pokhrithok) one dated VS 1671 Saka 1536 (1614 A.D.) and another dated Saka 1558 Asadha Suchi 10 Ravan Navami (July-August, 1636 A.D.) bhanuvara. The latter inscription provides a proof of the fact that Rama Shah was ruling in the year 1636 A.D. This also controverts the date figure above given for the beginning of the reign of Dambar Shah, which should now be corrected. He cannot succeed before 1636-37 A.D. In Gorkha Prithvipati Shah has also a stone pillar in front of a Saiva temple supporting a statue of his, which is dated Saka 1602\textsuperscript{14} asadha krisna panchami (dvandavka risksehasan, 1602\textsuperscript{15} (=1680 A.D.). Rudra Shah and Krisna Shah have been given each a reign of 16 years by the Gorkha Vamsavali. According to the same source Prithvipati Shah acceded the throne in Saka 1589 (1667 A.D.). This is also supported by another chronicle.

Prithvipati Shah ruled 47 years. If this is true then his reign must have come to an end in 1714. But from another source his grandson Narabhupal Shah appears to have ascended the throne in 1716. The earlier date about the death of Prithvipati Shah is certainly a mistake. His son Birbhadra Shah died in the life time of his father. Narabhupal succeeded his grandfather in 1716 and ruled till 1742 for 26 years. Dambar Shah is mentioned in Pratapamalla's account of victories (Inscription No. 18 of Bhagvanlal Indraji) as a ruler meeting

\textsuperscript{14} All the three inscriptions are also published in \textit{Itihasa Prakasa}, I, I, pp. 40-41.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Dvandavka rikse vasan}. 
defeat at the former's hands. It is possible that like Narabhupal who invaded Noakot in 1737 without success he was tempted to make an inroad into Pratapamalla's territories and was halted sustaining a severe reverse.

According to Rajyakalpadruma (CPMDN, I, P. 242) Rama Shah (Shahi) was succeeded by his son Dambar Shah and after him the list tallies in toto with that of Wright.

Kirkpatrick, Hamilton, and Percival Landon have omitted the account of the Gorkha dynasty altogether. So the lists are not available in their accounts. Wright's list seems to have been copied in the note prepared by Vansittart for the Government of India (P. 25, 1918). Levi seems to have followed Wright's Chronicler, and the genealogy is just reproduced.

During Prithivipati Shah's reign Lamjung made encroachments on Gorkha territories, there were 11 engagements within nine years and the areas between the river Chepe and Darraudi were actually three times occupied. It is said that the Gorkha ruler's second son Ranadurlabh Shah ingratiated himself to his uncle, ruler of Lamjung on pretexts of going against his own father, and was left in possession of the areas formerly belonging to Gorkha. Later, he invited his father to invade, and this restored them to their lawful owner. One of the invasions was frustrated by the people of the areas invaded, and another by the entire mass of the people who were conscripted for war. (See Gorkha Vamsavali for details). Wright does not mention this story, nor there is the name of Ranadurlabh Shah amongst his sons if he is not the same as prince Dal Shah, Prithvipati's second son. Wright on the other hand gives prominence to the youngest brother of Birbhadra. This man Chandrarup Shah obtained back the heir apparent, son of the eldest, for his father from the custody of the Raja of Tanhoun. It so happened that at the time when Birbhadra died and the heir apparent's mother was pregnant and had gone to live with her parents. The fact of pregnancy was known only to the prince who, however, had confided it to his trusted brother Chandrarup. The Raja of Tanhoun had his own designs. As soon as he found that he was in possession of Gorkha's heir apparent's person he began to devise plans to utilize the situation in order to expand his own frontiers further east. But very few in Gorkha knew the fact of pregnancy, and when the king's death came it caused a crisis over the issue of succession. His six sons each

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16 Levi, II. p. 262—He has omitted Prithvipati Shah.
vied against one another to claim the throne for himself, one on the
ground of seniority and another on the ground of popularity, etc. Ac-
cording to the *Gorkha Vamsavali*, the second son Dal Shah had almost
succeeded in his objective, and the issue was about to be decided in
his favour, but the timely intervention of Chandrarup turned the table
otherwise. The baby prince was lying with his mother in the safe
custody of one Gauriswar Pande, who happened to have been a very
influential man in Tanhoun being the guru of the Raja. The chronicler
writes that the queen mother being a clever woman scented dangers in
letting the baby to grow in her father’s place, and had removed him
away to save him from any evil consequences. The baby was handed
over to Gorkha on a search made for him by the party led by Chandra-
rup. Wright’s authority attributes the credit of this success to the
nurse of the infant, whom the uncle had handsomely bribed.

During the time of Prithvipati Shah, his elder son Birbhadra visited
Bhatgaon where he was a guest of Bhupatindramalla. This anecdote is
not mentioned in the annals of the Valley. Again it is said that in the
reign of Narabhupal Shah his son paid another visit to Bhatgaon and
exchanged head-dress with the crown prince to cement existing friend-
ship between the two houses of Gorkha and Bhatgaon.

To continue the narrative and the chronology, the offspring who
was born after the death of his father was Narabhupal Shah, father
and predecessor of Prithvinarayan Shah who is credited with the found-
ing of modern Nepal and the present dynasty of its rulers. Till the time
he came of age, Narabhupal’s mother supervised the administration for
her son. She was a pious lady and well known for charities and munifi-
cence. Narabhupal obtained training in her care, and grew in dis-
position to be devoted to piety, though ambitious. He wanted to push
the frontier of his dominion, but failed in his attempts. At one time
he was heavily defeated by Jayaprakasa’s force in a battle on the bank
of the Trisuli. *Gorkha Vamsavali* merely mentions the fact of ad-
vance and retreat due to bad weather and non-cooperation of the
Magars. It is also said that most of the Magars deserted Gorkha to
take refuge in Nepal. He, however, set at naught the revived efforts
of Lamjung to retake the lost territory and saved his domain from the
greedy eyes of Lamjung’s ruler Ripumardan Shah.

Narabhupal’s first wife was a daughter of the Raja of Khanchi.

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17 The Magars are a tribe of people living mostly in the basin of the Gandak,
but they are also scattered throughout Central Nepal. The Gorkhali fighters in-
cluded Khasas and Magars in general.
Later he married the niece of the Raja of Palpa by his cousin who was a daughter of Malaibam and then Tanhoun Raja’s daughter, one after the other. Prithvinarayan Shah was born of the second queen, Kausalyadevi but was bred and trained by the first queen. Prithvinarayan Shah was born on 27 Pausa of VS 1779 corresponding to Saka 1644—pausamas pa krisna amavasya (ghati 4 pala 2) tadupari pratipad18

During his last days Narabhupal suffered mental distraction. He had an obsession that he was not meant for glories and achievements that were attained by his forefathers.

Now we have a chronological list of the rulers of the present Gorkha Dynasty as it emerged after they entered into Nepal hills upto Kulmardan Shah, the Raja of Kaski:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Udaipur Chronicle</th>
<th>Rajya—Kalpadrum (CPMDN I, p. 242)</th>
<th>Chitra—Bilas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manmath</td>
<td>Manmath</td>
<td>Manmath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhopalkhan</td>
<td>Jainkhan</td>
<td>Jainkhan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michakhan</td>
<td>Sooryakhan</td>
<td>Sooryakhan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayantkhan</td>
<td>Michakhan</td>
<td>Michakhan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sooryakhan</td>
<td>Vichitra</td>
<td>Vichitrakhan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michakhan</td>
<td>Yasobhrahm</td>
<td>Yesobarman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vichitrakhan</td>
<td>Drabya Shah</td>
<td>Drabya Shah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jagdeokhan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kulmandan Shah</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yassobam Shah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Drabya Shah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chronicles give too many names for the independent line of

18 The date corresponds to some day in the second week of January, 1722 A.D.
Chittor, which is hardly believable. After tracing the descent to one
Rishiraj Ranaji who was installed by Salivahana, the chronicler names
34 kings preceding Manmath, before they left Chittor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wright(^\text{19}) (a)</th>
<th>Udaipur genealogy (b)</th>
<th>Rajya Kalpadruma(^\text{20}) (c)</th>
<th>Chitravilas (d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18. Audumbar Ranaji Rana</td>
<td>after five names come,</td>
<td>begins from Vikram (Himagirous-amagata) who came to the hills.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Bhattarak</td>
<td>Audumahar Rai</td>
<td>His son</td>
<td>who was Jit Malla Deshni-chaya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Bir Vikramjit</td>
<td>Bhatta</td>
<td>Jilla Raja, Ajit, Atallaraja, Tutha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Jilla</td>
<td>Jailla</td>
<td>Bimikraja, Hariraja, Brahmaraja, Manmath</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Ajilla</td>
<td>Ajal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Atal</td>
<td>Tutha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Tutha</td>
<td>Bhamasri</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25. Bimiki</td>
<td>Hari</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26. Hari Rangi</td>
<td>Brahwa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27. Brahma</td>
<td>Manmath</td>
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<td>28. Bakhan</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>29. Manoratha</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>30. Jaya</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>31. Jagatra</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>32. Bhoj</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Bhipati</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Udaiyabam and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mannath</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other Principalities

Scattered within an area of 2500 square miles and occupying various portions on the outskirts of Palpa and Tanhoun on three sides were the six principalities of Gulmi, Khanchi, Argha, Musikot, Dhurkot and Isma. The ruler of each claimed Rajput descent and belonged to one family. We shall hear more of these in connection with the advance of the Gorkha army in 1780-88.

We now proceed to deal with another set of principalities. These are mostly such of them as occur within the original jurisdiction of Palpa and also comprise areas in the Terai.

Uptill here only states that were situated in the valleys and uplands of the seven Gandaks have come for notice.

Palpa, which was for a long time the most important state of the Chaubisi group deserves to be treated separately.

\(^{19}\) pp. 273-75.

\(^{20}\) CPMDN, I. Preface, pp. LXXI, LXXII.
IV

PALPA AND ITS SATELLITES

Before dealing with the spectacular advance of Gorkha and its rise and consolidation as a big state, let us take a cursory glance into the position of other members of the Chaubisi group. We have seen that at least six of them besides Gorkha were ruled by offshoots of the family that landed from Udaipur on the basin of the river Seti. Most of the others were rulers in name and the state they ruled was not even worth calling a principality. But Palpa occupying the valley and adjoining ridges of the river Narayani was much different from these. With the portion of the Terai in its possession, Palpa both territorially and from the point of economic resources commanded a position of vantage much superior to any of the Chaubisis including for some time even Gorkha. Palpa was also the oldest of the Chaubisis having been in existence for a century earlier than any of the others. Its importance also lies in the fact that the ruling family of Palpa branched off in two to rule over Tanhoun further east and Mackwanpur further south-east. The latter included territories comprising the eastern-most district of the present Nepalese Terai (as far as north of Purnea).

Mukunda Sen, ruler of Palpa, is mentioned in the Nepalese chronicle to have invaded Patan in the 14th century with a large contingent of Magars. His identity is not established with reference to the Palpa chronicle.

Other details about the origin and rise of the house of Palpa are not available up to date. As Hamilton who is an important authority about the genealogy of the rulers of some of these principalities, and whom we have largely followed in present delineation, says correctly that the chieftains in their zeal to trace their ancestry to Rajputana in order to establish the fact of their pure Ksatriya birth added certain commonly understood Rajput appendages to their family surnames. Thus the Raja of Piuthan had his surname after the Chandelas, the Rajas of Khanchi and Dhurkot after Medhasi and the Raja of Parbat had a Malla surname but often said that he belonged to Samal clan of Rajputs along with the chiefs of Galkot and Ghiring. The families related to the original stock of the Raja of Gorkha called themselves Khans and Shahis, later on Shahs. According to Hamilton the rulers who called themselves Sen Rajputs at the time of Gorkha conquest of Nepal happened to be of those of Palpa, Tanhoun, Makwanpur, Rising and Paiyun. The other houses of Gulmi and Argha who had also Sen surname did not share with the rulers of Palpa any kind of colla-
teral blood relationship.

Hamilton's information is that the rulers of Gulmi, Khachi, Argha, Musikot, Dhurkot and Isma belonged to one family (Pp. 263-64) and when standing single none was important.

A genealogy prepared by Pandit Gangavisnu at the instance of Trivikram Sen in his book *Acharadipak* dated Saka 1674 (+78) =1752 A.D. lists Mukunda Sen to be the father of Bhringi who heads the family tree of the Tanhoun Kings (CPMDN, I, P. 153). The same name of Mukunda Sen occurs in the Palpa genealogy and he is said to have extended his kingdom far and wide to touch the Malla territory in the east and Moghalan in the south. In his time Palpa controlled the whole of the east Terai as far as Morang.

According to Hamilton's (Pp. 130-31) authority the ancestors of Mukunda Sen came from Chittor and settled down near the present Bettia (North Bihar) district on a site where the River Gandak enters the plain. Ajil Sen, the first emigrant to this area, killed the Bhawar Raja of Rajpur and founded the Sen dynasty which was destined in course of time to subjugate Magrat further north in the hills. Another of Hamilton's authority puts Tutha Sen and his son to have conquered the outlying Terai region and pushed into Butwal and Rising farther west and north. After giving certain names after Tutha in order of hereditary succession, the same authority mentions Dharmapala Sen, his son Anekasinha Sen, his son Ramraja Sen, his son Chandra Sen and his son Rudra Sen. Hamilton personally takes this genealogy as valid and dismisses as invalid the version which places Dambhar and Gajapati to precede Chandra Sen. Kh. Baburam (Bhanubhakta Memorial)* while agreeing with Hamilton thinks that Khan Raj (Ramraja of Hamilton) adopted the Sen appendage for the first time. Unlike the Gorkha list, the one of Palpa does in no way agree with the Sisodiya genealogy. Either it might be due to the lack of tact and foresight to adopt the schedule on the part of the chronicler or the line had originated from a stock untraced in the plains and hence the confusion.

Rudra Sen and his son Chandra Sen are the commonly accepted names for Palpa genealogy. Rudra Sen married the daughter of Piuthan ruler and founded Tansen where he established his capital. Rudra Sen ruled between 1440 and 1475 A.D.

According to one author Chandra Sen absorbed the territories

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21 The country ruled by the Moghuls.
22 The land inhabited by the Magar tribe.
23 Read an article in Bhanubhakta Memorial publication by Kharidar Baburam Acharya about the Sen dynasty of Tanhoun.
formerly belonging to the Raja of Gorakhpur-Champaran. He notes similarity in the mode of royal address of Madan Sinha the last ruler of the locality, who died issueless and as well as of Rudra Sen. (For Madan Sinha's address read CPMDN, I, P. 223.)

At the time while Rudra Sen was ruling over Palpa, there was in the areas further north and northwest the principality of Parbat in a flourishing state. The rulers claimed Rajput descent and added Malla appendage as the surname of the family. But Hamilton's informant says that like many other chieftains they were no better than a Khasa in descent. According to him the first ruler of this family was a child of a Gautam Brahman by his impure Bohra wife. Bohra is a family surname of a dynasty of Khasa ksatriya. Whatever that be, it was a fact that at one time Parbat which was also called Malaibam after one of its rulers had extensive dominion touching Jumla in the west and Kaski in the east. As we observed above Parbat also included a good portion of Tibet beyond the Himalayas. But the original territory was parcelled out to three collaterals, and shortly before Rudra Sen of Palpa started to expand his frontiers, Maliabam was rendered weak by internal dessensions. It is said that much of the territories that fell to Rudra Sen was acquired out of the domain of Malaibam. Kirtibam of that state was a contemporary of Prithvinarayan Shah.

After Mukunda Sen's death Palpa experienced the same jerk. It was divided amongst the four sons of his. The eldest Vinayak obtained the original principality, Manikya seized Butwal, Brihanga declared himself a monarch at Tanhoun and to Lahanga fell Mackwanpur. About these names one more source of information available to Hamilton (P. 170) says that it was Manikya who as the eldest member of the family inherited Palpa and Vinayak had seized Butwal. Other writers on Nepalese history follow this account as well as the history of the Tanhoun ruling family as narrated by Hamilton's authority. But a Palpa chronicle which we have followed in the main gives Vinayak as the person to inherit the original principality of Palpa.

According to a noting in an old diary written towards the end of the eighteenth century the line of succession in Palpa after the dismem-berment of the original principality stood as follows:

Vinayak Sen (1553-1563)
Jasu Sen (1563-1568)
Damodar Sen (1568-1598)
Bhalbhadra Sen (1598-1642)
Ambar Sen (1642-1693)

Ambar Sen was succeeded by Gandharbha. He is taken as a
very important personality next to Mukunda Sen I in Palpa chronicles of the dynasty.

It was said that the Palpa ruler having died without any heir, his fourth cousin of Butwal ascended the throne combining in one principality the two portions of what was previously Mukunda Sen's original domain. Hamilton's informant Samar Bahadur who was a younger brother of the last ruler of Palpa, Prithvipal Sen, says that the person concerned was Gandharbha Sen, who was his own great grandfather (1693-1756) added some more territories to his state at the cost of the Nagar chief of Balihang which was fractioned into three parts to be each incorporated into Gulmi and Khachi. Khidim, a new state, was created out of what remained on the division and a Brahman was declared to be its ruler. Gandharbha's grandson Mukunda Sen II (1756-1782) who succeeded him befriended the Nawab Vazir and secured from him the Zamindari rights over the estate of Tilpur and Rajpur situated to the west of the river Gandak in what is now called the Nepalese middle Terai. He also annexed Gulmi which was later on restored by the Gorkha king Rana Bahadur Shah to its original ruler. Mahadutta, his son, had his regime (1782-1793) too much mixed up with the events of Gorkha expansion, and therefore, is mentioned in detail in that chapter. Palpa lost its individual existence at the time of Rana Bahadur, grandson of Prithvinarayan Shah in about 1803 A.D.

V
Tanhoun

From Palpa let us come to Tanhoun, the portion that was captured by Mukunda's third son Bhringi. An ms., Acharadipika by Gangavismu gives the following genealogy after him.24

Mukunda
|
Bhringi, the chief of Kings, who became the first ruler of Trisrungadesha (1548-1571).
|
Hambira (1571-1630).
|
Tula (1630-1653). His son Pratap, a Yuvaraja, did not become King.
|
Pratap's Son.

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24 CPMDN, I, p. 153. This ms. was written in Saka 1674 Jyaistha Sudi 5 at the instance of Trivikram Sen.
Damodara, called by the poet Dayalu-Damodara\textsuperscript{25} (1653-1673).

Digvijaya (1673-1694).

Kamaraja Datta (1694-1749).

Trivikrama (1749-1765).

The last two date figures are also from Ambika Prasad.\textsuperscript{26} Hambira (d. 1630) with his capital at Sur added to his principality Rising which was previously handed over to Ram Sen, nephew of Mukunda. It was said that Ram Sen had died without a male heir, but so was Hambira and thereafter Tula Sen called Mukhiya who was the Rajpur ruler's brother according to a chronicle succeeded to the throne of Tanhoun. But from the above given genealogy of Acharadipika, Tula appears to be the son and successor of Hambira.

In the next reign the Rajpur branch disappeared altogether owing to the ruler being childless and Tanhoun also got parts of the Terai as far as the Chittaun and the Dun areas of the Rapti. The estate of Ramnagar near Bettia was included in this domain, but the Raja held it under protection of the East India Company (Hamilton, P. 182) when the latter acquired diwani over the area known as the province of Bihar.

After Digvijaya Sen (See table above) Kamaraja-datta Sen ascended the throne. According to Ambika Prasad (P. 79) he added Gorakhpur district as a Zamindari under Emperor Farrakshiar. This could not be true, for any Moghul emperor of the time had been rendered ineffective. His predecessor was often troubled by the Bettia ruler who carried raids into the neighbouring area, but his reign was comparatively calm. He died in 1749 leaving his son Trivikram Sen on the throne.

Once Trivikram came into conflict with Prithvinarayan Shah, and later he is said to have died of a panic, while the Gorkhalis were to launch attack on the west after their victory over the Nepal Valley.

Trivikram Sen was the author of a few works in Sanskrit as suggested by two mss. (1) \textit{Mantramahodadhitika}\textsuperscript{27} dated VS 1791 mar-

\textsuperscript{25} Bendall and H. P. Sastri wrongly took Dayalu, adjective of the name, to be a real name of a supposed son of Pratap. Ambika Prasad also repeats the same mistake.

\textsuperscript{26} A History of Nepal (in Nepalese).

\textsuperscript{27} Darb. Lib. Cat. I, 55.
gasirasudi, (2) Sripujatilakam,²⁸ without date but with Srimanumaharaja-dhiraja Kamrajadatta nripati suri sunu Sri Mahesvaracharanarenu Tri-vikram nripati virachita. We have already referred to Acharadipika, which was composed at his instance by a scholar named Gangavisnu (1752 A.D.).

His time coincides with the rise of the ruler of neighbouring Gorkha as a conqueror. In the latter’s expansionist activities, he came into clash with the Gorkha forces several times. His resources, however, were not strong enough to meet the challenge posed by Gorkha’s rising military strength. At a late stage he was enticed and imprisoned as a result of a plot organised by the Gorkha ruler.

But he wanted to live on amicable terms with the Gorkhalis, and that friendship existed as long as Narabhupal lived. Twice in 1715 and 1722 Tanhoun along with Gorkha also had participated in a war that was waged between the rulers of the Nepal Valley. Later Trivikram Sen added to his domain Lamidanda which was in possession of Gorkha having it captured during the aforesaid war. This Lamidanda was the cause of the trouble between him and Prithvinarayan Shah, because the latter had claimed suzerainty over the same. Trivikram refused to comply, and he was as a result captured by the Gorkhalis who detained him for some time in prison. But Tanhoun was attacked with full force in 1769. Trivikram’s son Kumaradatta Sen committed suicide while his capital was besieged by the Gorkhalis. From a Danpatra it appears the date of his death occurred sometime after the month of Vaisakh of Vikram 1831. After this incident Harakumardatta Sen purchased a peace with a pledge to follow Gorkha in all the latter’s ventures. Actually Tanhoun’s contingent joined Gorkha in the latter’s attacks further west. But Prithvinarayan virtually failed to advance as Lamjung-Kaski resisted him. Haradatta Sen heaved a sigh of relief and Tanhoun was spared for the next reign of Nepal for total subjugation and annexation.

Early in 1756 A.D., a Christian missionary Padre Tranquillo by name visited Tanhoun. He interviewed Raja Trivikram Sen, and presented to him books on Christianity. The Raja was much impressed with what he heard about the Christian faith and begged of Father Benedetto through a letter to send two priests for preaching work. Written in the Nepali language, the letter to Benedetto was addressed in the name of Maharajadhiraja Trivikram Sen with date line Magha

²⁸Ibid. I. 168.9. It appears that he had only caused the ms. Mantramahodadhi to be written.
Sudi 14 (verified for 14 February, 1756 A.D.) from his winter camp at Ghat. The Ghat probably referred to Deoghat near the confluence of the Gandak and its main tributaries, where the Raja of Tanhoun had his temporary headquarter for the three months of the cold season.

It is not known whether any Padre was stationed at Tanhoun as was the case in three kingdoms of the Nepal Valley. Probably in the turmoil which accompanied the rise of Gorkha as a power coinciding the fifties of that century, the very idea of expanding their activities at that stage beyond the confines of Kathmandu, Patan and Bhatgaon could not have strongly weighed with the Capuchin missionaries. No records are available bearing testimony to the existence of a resident mission in Tanhoun or anywhere in the realms of the Baisi and Chaubisi. It appears from a letter of Father Tranquillo that he had also visited Gorkha to secure timbers from its forest for the construction of a church building in Kathmandu (Kathmandu, 13 October, 1756). The King of Gorkha was ailing at that time and sought medical treatment by the visiting Father. The same Father Tranquillo has left us a brief account of Tanhoun, which is incorporated in the letter above referred to: "Tanhoun is at a distance of 11 to 12 days' journey from Patan. The Kingdom of Gorkha is just three days' journey from the capital of Tanhoun (Tanhounsur). The principality of Tanhoun is bounded in the north-west by Palpa whose Raja belongs to the same family. The city of Palpa is at a distance of four days' journey. To the north of Tanhoun is Kaski and Lamjung. The latter touches Tibet in the north but it has no dependents in that part. Lamjung is just close to Tanhoun only a journey of a day and a half. To the south there is Mackwanpur and Bettia. It takes 11-12 days for reaching there."

"Tanhoun is half mountainous and pretty cold as cool as Italy, though there is no snow but it receives cold wind from Lhasa. The other half is a low land which is warm. We have great jungles abounding in tigers, elephants, bears, rhinos and wild boars. Though it is extensive, it does not have more than 24,000 houses all over. There are two big rivers which join at Mukam Deo Ghat (union of a God with a Goddess). The joint stream thenceforth becomes Gandak, then it flows to Bettia, to Chappra and to Patna to join the Ganges.

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20 C. D. 38, Missionary Italiani Nel Tibet e Nel Nepal. Part IV, p. 231.
22 Actually the distance is not so much. The padre seems to have covered the distance by himself in so many days. He might have been a sick man to travel so slow. The distance is less than 10 miles.
23 The actual distance is only 6 miles.
24 The distance is about 60 miles through a circuitous route.
"In Tanhoun as in the half portion of the kingdom of Lamjung religion is Brahmanism. People are malicious but not much superstitious. They are ignorant and not at all gifted. Often the country is visited by the Brahmans of Banaras who have cast evil influence on them. The inhabitants have no books of religion. Pagodas are few,—the people worship red stones.34 In the mountains the people have a moderate complexion; they are neither fair nor dark; in the plains they are dark and all are dressed like the Hindustani. They say that there are some Musalmans in Tanhoun. Coins of Nepal circulate more than those of India. The King has only copper money. No gold and silver money are issued by him. The inhabitants are a bit given to luxury in the Terai, while in the mountains they are more simple. A regular civil war upsets social life in these areas.” (a gist of what the padre wrote. This is in the language of the author from the Italian).

Let us add a few words about the Mohamadan population of Tanhoun, which was markedly observed by the Christian visitor. The Muslims were the emigrants from the plains. They had gone to Tanhoun from Bettia invited by the ruler to trade in bangles. We have sanads in the name of some families granting them lands for services rendered to the Darbar in that course. Unlike their compatriots in the Nepal Valley the Tanhoun Muslims migrated from North Bihar. Those in Nepal came mostly from Kashmir and Punjab.

The following passages from Tavernier about the description of journey through the Terai of Gorakhpur to Palpa and thence to the Tibetan border occur in Levi, which we have thought to reproduce here for the interest of the readers:

"Let us now dwell on the road which it is necessary to follow to convey oneself from ‘Patna’ to the Kingdom of ‘Bouțan’ which journey the caravan completes in three months. It usually starts from ‘Patna’ at the end of December and reaches ‘Gorrochepour’ on the eighth day. This is, as already stated, the last town of this side of the great Mogul’s states and where merchants provide themselves with provisions for a part on the journey. From ‘Gorrochepour’ to the feet of the lofty mountains there is still another eight or nine days’ journey, during which time the caravan suffers considerably, because the country is full of forests wherein roam many wild elephants. The merchants instead of taking rest at night, keep on the alert and light a big fire while firing their muskets to frighten away these animals. As the elephant moves about noiselessly, he surprises everybody by his sudden presence

34 Either the deity Ganesha or Hanuman.
before they can be aware of him.

"It is not that the elephant intends hurting man, he is pleased to carry away victuals which he can lay hold of, for example, a bag of flour or a pot of butter of which there is always a considerable quantity. One can travel from 'Patna' to the feet of these mountains in carriages or in 'Pallekis' (Palanquin); but oxen, camels and country horses are generally made use of. These horses are so short in stature that man's feet touches the ground when he is riding but they are very strong and can run very well doing twenty leagues at a stretch and eating and drinking very little. Some of these horses cost as much as two hundred half-crowns and when one penetrates into the mountain, one cannot but use this only means of crossing the many defiles which are too narrow. Although the horses are strong and small they often find it difficult to cross these lofty mountains; '(One crosses Nepal then) the caravan having reached the foot of these high mountains, known today under the name of 'Naugrococt' and which cannot be traversed inside of nine or ten days, as these are exceedingly high and narrow with great precipices; many people come down from various places and the majority of them women and girls who come to bargain with those of the caravan, to carry the men, the victuals and the merchandises, beyond the mountains. This is the way they get about it. These women have a pad on the two shoulders to which is attached a substantial cushion which hangs on the back on which the man is seated. Three women alternate one another to carry a man by turn, and all baggage and provision are loaded on the back of goats who can carry up to a hundred and fifty pounds. Those who bring horses with them are often compelled, in narrow and dangerous defiles, to hoist them by rope; it is mainly due to this difficulty, as already mentioned, that horses are not used in these regions. They give them to eat only in the morning and in the evening. In the morning a paste made of a pound of flour with half a pound of black sugar and the same quantity of butter mixed with water, serves the purpose. At evening time a small quantity of peas, broken and allowed to soak for half an hour in water, is all they get; and this is the sum total of their nourishment in twenty-four hours. The women who carry the men only earn two rupees for the ten days of passage and the same amount is paid for each hundredweight carried by the goats or she-goats and for each horse that is brought up.

"After crossing these mountains, one has a means of conveyance upto 'Boutan', oxen, camels and horses and even 'Pallekis' (palanquin) for those who wish to travel more comfortably".

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35 Levi, i, pp. 83-84; The six voyages of Jean Baptiste Tavernier II, Chapter XV.
Although in the second paragraph we find Nepal mentioned in the itinerary, actually speaking the area referred to was not under Nepal in those days. Tavernier confused the kingdom of Palpa with Nepal due to misunderstanding on account of their geographical position.

VI

Mackwanpur

The closing of Tanhoun narrative will take us to Mackwanpur, the state of Lohanga. He had pushed his conquest towards the east and subdued half a dozen chieftains of the areas now called Mahottari and Saptari districts. (Hamilton, Pp. 134-36). Hamilton’s informant says that these were rulers of the Bhawar tribe, and in Morang a descendant of Vijayanarayan commonly believed to belong to a royal family of Assam was ruling, whom Lohanga killed with the help of the Kirata tribes living in the hills north of that place. According to an ms. of Pratapamalla’s time Mahottari was ruled by one Kirtinarayan.36 Agham Sinha, a Kirata in the service of Hamilton says that the Kiratas retained their autonomy even though submitting to Lohanga, having their own Chautaria or minister and certain other rights. Lohanga entered into an alliance with the Kirata ruler of the area, by name Libuk Hang to effect a settlement to that end. It is said that since then Maithili was adopted as official language of both the Kirata Desa and of the areas directly under the Sen rulers. As a result, we find several documents, sanads and stamped letters, written in Maithili, which supports this statement.

Lohanga’s grandson Raghav Sen adopted the title of Hindupati. He had two wives and he favoured Subha Sen his son by the younger Queen in preference to three others by the elder Queen. After his death Mackwanpur was divided into two parts, the river Kosi was the boundary; and while the western portion fell to Subha, over the eastern portion Jadubidhata, the son of Chhatrapati of another wing became ruler. Later on both the principalities were cruelly sacked by the Purnea Nawab, and a good many portions of the territories were taken and absorbed into the Nawab’s domain. Subhanga Sen himself was ransomed off by agreeing to pay annually as a tribute some elephants.37 He had three sons Mahipati, Manik and Jagat Sen, the second of whom was taken to Chaudandi by Hansu Rai, the Kirata minister of the area.

36 Darb. Lib. Cat. I. 979. This is dated 772 Chaitra sukla 15 (= April, 1652).
37 The Chronicler of the Kirata gives a different version of the story. He says that Subhanga was rescued by a combined force of Kirats and Morang which invaded Purnea. They in common plundered the Nawab’s treasury and laid hands on gold and silver worth about Rs. 3 Lakhs.
The names of the rulers at the time of Gorkha conquest mentioned by English authors are Kamadatta in Morang with Vijayapur, Karna Sen in today’s (Chhaudandi) Mahattari and Saptari and Hem Karna in Mackwanpur (Hamilton). Hem Karna had inherited the original principality of Mackwanpur. His son Digbandhan Sen was the last ruler of the line to rule the principality. He fled to British territory while Gorkha attacked Mackwanpur. Certain Kirata chiefs particularly Budha Karna Rai acting as ministers were powerful in Kamadatta’s part of the country. This Budha Karna came to play an important part in Morang. He was not on good terms with Kamadatta who was killed by the Minister’s machination, and with the active help rendered by Sikkim whose Raja had pushed his western frontier to river Kankayi. Previously, Vijayapur included all lands up to the river Tista as well as the mountainous region what is now called East No. 4, Dhankuta and Illam districts of Nepal and the western half of Darjeeling district in Bengal. It also covered all lands in the Limbuan up to the river Dudhkosi; where it touched Bhatgaon’s frontier. The Sen Chiefs were finally driven away and expelled to take refuge in the company’s territories, when the Gorkhalis reached Morang in course of their military expedition. The events are recounted at length in the chapter dealing with the life of Prithvinarayan Shah.

Another story of a Moslem invasion on Morang is narrated by the Chronicler in Kamadatta’s time (not the one mentioned above). The venue of the fight was Taxoganj (Fatehpur). It is said that the attack was repelled by a united army of the ten Tribal Kirata chiefs and the ruler of Morang. By the agreement signed after the truce the Nawab of Purnea, Ahmad Khan, pledged to respect the integrity of the domain of Morang (where lived nine lakh Hindus).

We have come across a few authentic documents related to the history of this area. These are letters and firmans issued by the concerned rulers which have been preserved up to date in the possession of the descendants of the individuals to whom they were attached. One such document purports to prove the fact of the Muslim attack in H.S. 1159. Two more documents which cover orders issued by the rulers of Morang to the ten provincial heads of the Kirata area to assemble at the headquarter gives an idea of how their country faced possibilities of occasional disturbances ((1) V.S. 1719 (1663 A.D.) (2) 1764 (1707 A.D.))\textsuperscript{38}. From a few more documents it appears that Harichandra Sen and Mandhata Sen ruled one after the other, and there were nine rulers in between Lohanga Sen and the last ruler of the line.

\textsuperscript{38} Unpublished.
In about the year V.S. 1765 a queen regent wielded enormous influence in the State.

According to the Kirata Chronicle the following points of agreement were accepted by the parties in Lohanga Sen-Kirata alliance:

(1) The Minister of the State (Diwan) will be the person elected by the ten provincial heads and people of the Kirata desa, whose tenure of office will be for five years.

(2) Any migration to this area and to Morang will be taken cognisance of and entry notified to check unauthorised person coming over there.

(3) Every tenth year a census of the population will be taken, and registered in the capital city of Morang.

(4) Every adult above the age of 18 and below 50 will undergo a military training with bows and arrows for three months at the provincial headquarter, the expenses to be met out of the general exchequer.

(5) For emergency each Rai, the head of the province, shall keep in readiness 150 men.

(6) The Government will levy taxes on lands at the rate of Re. 1/- for 1 plough.

(7) The revenue will be spent as follows:—
10% to go to the provincial executives,
45% for the maintenance of the militia and the rest to be deposited at the central treasury in Morang.

(8) The Provincial executive will try all offences except the big five ones involving heinous crimes and others amounting to moral turpitude.

(9) Whoever violates the laws of the state or rebels against the lawful authority, (the Raja of Morang or tribal heads), shall be punished with deposition and banishment.

In the same treaty the distribution of areas per head was arranged thus:

(1) Around Pokla Ywang Yok (fort) in present Taplejung district under Feyohang.
(2) Around Augdang Yok in Ilam under Loli Mahang.
(3) Around Feden Yok in Punch Thar (Ilam) under Papohang.
(4) Around Kurle Yok in Taplejung under Mahohang.
(5) Around Hasta pu Yok under Linse Hang.
(6) Around Pomajung Yok in Athrai (Ilam-Taplejung border) under Akluff.
(7) Around Takluk den Yok under Khecho Hang.
(8) Mering den Yok on the bank of Tamor under Sisiyen.
(9) Chenlung Yok under Maijug Hang.
(10) Takpe Suyok in the north under Samba Sreng Hang.

Although the portion of the hilly area in between the rivers Dudhkosi and Arun was within Morang's jurisdiction, the same system of tribal rule obtained there also. This was divided into twelve sections each under its own Rai Raja as was the belt between the rivers Arun and Kankayi just mentioned.

The ancient history of all these areas is, however, enveloped in darkness. Before we proceed to give anything in that direction it is necessary, therefore, to make a thorough search into their past. The basin of the river Arun appears to have held a thriving culture in its lap as did the Karnali region of the west. The search may open new fields of research and study to a historian.\(^{39}\)

The following are some of the important original documents relating to the events of the history of the Kosi basin in the 17th and 18th centuries:

(a) Sanad issued by Ahmad Khan Daulat Bahadur of Purnea in the name of certain Kirata chiefs dated Hizri 1125.

(b) A proclamation in the name of Kirata chiefs to assemble in Vijayapur, the headquarter of the Sen Raja of the region, issued by Harichandra Sen and others, which dates Vikram Samvat 1719 Pausa Sudi 4.

(c) A decree of the Sen Prince sent to all the Kirata chiefs to rise to arms against the Sikkimese proclaimed in the name of Maharani Jivadevi, dated V.S. 1763 Asvin vadi 8.

(d) Another order calling to arms the Kirata chiefs in defence of the motherland issued by Mandhata Sen, dated V.S. 1764 Asvin Sudi 5.

Nothing more could be written about these petty states ruled by the Senas. We now proceed to bring this section to a conclusion by adding a few passages from foreign accounts, which, though brief in themselves, are likely to shed further light on the economic and political condition of the localities concerned.

We have already quoted passages from Tavernier for a description of a journey to Palpa. Below we give a gist of what Father Cassino wrote about Mackwanpur. Father Cassino had walked through the territory of this principality to reach Patan along the course of the river Bagmati in about the beginning of the year 1740 A.D. The noting

\(^{39}\) A History of Kirats by Prem Bahadur Limbu (in Nepali). The author provides copies of some documents, but these have to be checked and verified.
which he made is picked up from his diary (author's translation).

"Jujur is a village belonging to Mackwanpur. There is a fertile jungle 20 kos in extension. The King gets substantial income out of the forest. He goes on a shooting and hunting expedition. He catches elephants, rhinoceroses and wild buffaloes and sells them at a heavy price. Even the smallest of elephants and rhinoceroses (tall 3 cubits) fetches each Rs. 500-/-.

If it is of longer size, the price is Rs. 500 more for every additional cubit. The customs levy is charged to a contractor who pays six months in advance to the king a portion of the amount due to him. Very often he becomes insolvent. Mackwanpur has very little of cultivable land. It is sparsely populated. The population is shifting. Most of these repair to the hills during the rainy season for fear of malarial fever."

We reproduce another passage from Levi and this one giving a description of the Terai of Mackwanpur is interesting for the many informations though brief, it provides in regard to the fauna, flora and geographical situation of the locality concerned.

"Then 'Kalpaghur' XIV; 'Barrihua' XVI; which is the frontier of the Moghal Empire? One crosses after this on the territory of the Rajah of 'Mackwanpur', and through a thick forest of 28 thousand paces in width, and 100 in length from east to west; elephants, rhinoceroses, tigers and bisons roam in there and many other wild animals so that one really runs the risk of death. At night big fires are carried on the four corners of the palanquin, then shouts, beating of drums, musket shots are resorted to, to frighten away the tigers. But the carriers and the guides who are idolaters make use of superstitious figures and of magical charms. The hunting of the wild animals gives the Rajah of Mackwanpur a profitable income. In the depths of the forests one discovers a number of ruins, they are, so rumour says, the remains of the great and antique town of 'Scimanagada'. Many stories have been woven on this town, and a plan engraved on a stone on the great square at Batgas (Bhatgaon) is still there to be shown one. Old coins are also found, but rarely, which resemble her in construction in the shape of a labyrinth.

"From Father Grueber's account it appears that the Rajah of Mackwanpur (he calls Morang but this name was applied to Mackwanpur because Morang was a part of that state, which came to the knowledge of the missionary) paid a yearly 'tribute of 2,50,000 richedales and of seven elephants' to the Moghal. In this connection Kircher's memo-

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10 Italiani Missionari, etc., Vol. II, Pt. iv, p. 15.
11 Levi, i. p. 120 (Georgi's compilation).
random adds; “The kingdom of ‘Moranga’ wedges in the kingdom of ‘Tibet’ its capital Radoc is the last station reached by Father d’Andrada in his journey to Tibet, they redound with numerous indications of the Christian faith which had planted, in the names of men still current, Dominic, Francis, Antony”.

**General Political Picture of the Units of the Baisi and Chaubisi**

The picture is characterised by

1. too many states in a limited area,
2. the average size was not at all viable for a political entity
3. The biggest of them such as Jumla, Palpa, Mackwanpur and Vijayapur contained more than 20,000 houses; the rest in varying number from 2000 to 8000 houses with the smallest 600 to 1400 hovels.
4. The income shown in a record for the most enviable of them never went beyond a few thousand rupees.
5. Thus except Jumla, Piuthan, Palpa, Tanhoun, Mackwanpur and the three states of the Nepal Valley not one of them could be called a principality even in a limited sense. The status of the ruler could as well not be greater than that of a chief of a group of villages.
6. The larger states also suffered from various deficiencies in economic resources and man power, and if it were not for the isolation nature dictated in their cases, they would have been wiped out by a superior power appearing in the neighbourhood in the Gangetic plains.
7. In their state of division and backwardness, the entire Chaubisi and Baisi region was vulnerable to any kind of pressure of a superior strategy and military strength either from outside or within itself.

Such was the situation which Prithvinarayan found himself in as he aspired to carve and consolidate a strong kingdom in the Himalayan ranges.

Thank God, Nepal had not attracted notice of a country power emerging in the plains. Otherwise, the dream of Prithvinarayan Shah would have remained only a dream or even this dream would not come to his mind. The same natural factors had precluded the possibility of territorial power in the plains to expand its sphere up the high altitude of the mountains in the lap of the snowy peaks. But this had left a vacuum which the aspiration of the Gorkha ruler could fill by creating an indigenous power within the region. Prithvinarayan’s rise to power as the head of a Himalayan state was a counteracting influence to check any design of an outsider on the mountain fastness of Nepal. His success to form a viable state of its own had, however, ultimately proved
a counterpoise to the machination of the British who wanted to penetrate into the region for their own benefits and colonial interest.

In the next chapter we shall see how Prithvinarayan Shah overcame the difficulties he encountered in the way of the fulfilment of his ambition to create a formidable political force in the central Himalayas.

The consideration of the Baisi and Chaubisi in their historical perspective as was attempted in the last few pages is herewith over.
CHAPTER II

Prithvinarayan's Early Career

We have seen how the various clans of Rajputs, some of pure and some of mixed blood had settled down in the Central Himalayan tracts and how they lived in a disturbing condition of perpetual enmity and internecine struggles. There was no strong power which could wield the split forces in a bond closely together. While collectively they owed in theory allegiance to the Moghuls at Delhi, each was almost as independant as a sovereign King and powerful to his capacity to resist encroachment and maintain freedom from another's agression. Being isolated in their mountain fastness, the situation was such as to make war natural and every little issue gave rise to occasional feudal contention amongst one another. To this was added the almost unique state of anarchy and the misrule made the life of the general mass of the people quite miserable. The Raja concluded his affairs in the capacity of a private proprietor often too much exacting, who made it a rule to plunder. While in theory he maintained a court, his Diwan called Chautaria, a Rajguru, an Astronomer Royal, some Sardars, judicial Kazis and all the paraphernalia of Moghul formality; in practice they had no functions apart from what was dictated by the master. Neither the Kazis were real judges of events and policy makers, nor the Sardars were in reality commanding armies or the Chautaria had political duty to perform which was not the bidding of his master. The Government was just there in name. Policies were determined by court intrigues, and wars were launched on personal whimsies of the rulers. Everything was feudal, clumsy and ill organised.

This was the time when the British were gradually penetrating into Indian territories. They had nearly succeeded in constituting themselves a force to be counted with. But they were so far confined to the sea shores of India. Now with covetous eyes they turned to

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1 See for details the following:
(a) Life of Prithvinarayan Shah in various chronicles.
(b) His speech already published. This gives how he built his strategy (Gorakhnath Pith).
(c) Life of Prithvinarayan Shah in the writings of foreign travellers and delegations.
(d) Asiatick Researches, Vol. II, Joseph's article.
(e) Kirkpatrick, Account of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1811 (London).
(f) Hamilton, Account of Nepal, 1819 (Edinburgh).
(g) Oldfield, Sketches from Nepal, Vol. I.
places beyond the coast lines to the great Indo-Gangetic plains and to the Himalayas. Every country lay exposed to them in these areas. Although Nepal did not face immediate dangers of penetration, the possibility of being exploited and hit hard at the weakest hour of disunity and strife was always there.

The sun of the Nepalese glory after long hours of eclipse appeared once more in full splendour in the horizon in the person of Prithviraj Narayan Shah, the Raja of Gorkha, who cherished above everything else a hope to build a united Nepal, strong enough to tie together the various split forces inside the area and organised in a way to turn down any invasion from outside.

Prithviraj Narayan Shah was born in the year 1723 A.D. in the second week of January (Pausa 27 gate, Pausa krisna amavasya titherghatya 4 pala tadupari sukla pratipad of Saka 1644 and Vikram 1779, according to Janmapatrika in the possession of F.M. Kaiser).² His was a premature birth, being born in the seventh month of conception, which created a dispute as to succession, for he had a brother only three months younger than him by his step mother and this brother was deemed his equal or senior in ordinary course of birth (because he was then in the womb in the ninth month) but he died in his very infancy, which afterwards dismissed the tough question of succession, making Prithviraj the undisputed successor to his father’s realm. According to a chronicle his brother coming in dispute about succession was Kirtimahoddam Shah, but the actual date of birth was regarded by all as the only decisive factor. His father had married four wives and from each except the first he got couple of boys out of which five survived. Prithviraj Shah being the eldest was nominated heir apparent to the throne. His mother was Kausalyadevi who was a daughter of the Raja of Palpa.

One might imagine a highly cultivated man to have attained a position which Prithviraj Shah did, but no one is prepared to accept a man of his type, one who was only literate, to have displayed a high sense of diplomatic and military skill as he seems to have done in his achievements of glory in battle fields and organisation of State. He was a master of military strategy though an intriguer, an experienced diplomat, and all in war and diplomacy he wonderfully achieved without the very rudiments of education and training. Because his education consisted of a few elementary books of the type of Saptasati and Chanakya which are regarded as help to rapid reading rather than

² Sans. Sandesh, I, 6, pp. 11-12.
imparting knowledge. Prithvi's contribution to the unity and greatness of Nepal and his rise to fame and glory are factors that certainly cannot be ordinarily conceived. He was, however, not without potential qualities of head and heart for such attainments; he was a good horseman, mountaineer, musketeer and all what a royal life in the mountains dictated; he had from his childhood displayed qualities of greatness which his guardian mother, Prabhavati, (not his own mother,) put to harness to make him an ideal king. Prabhavati gave him above all a fair understanding to enable him to grapple with his own problems. It was due to her that he developed his sense of duty as a king and he could draw his line of action in the anarchic state of that period. Prabhavati who ruled as a regent for five years during the insanity of his father instilled in him an ambition and a will to purpose, a knowledge of the sense of unity he was to achieve if Nepal were to be saved from further ruination. These proved more than what a school or a college was to provide. The training he obtained in his mother's lap could give him more than what he would have received in a school and like other figures in history—Akbar, Sivaji and a host of others, who had to compensate the absence of schooling by practical training in statecraft, Prithvinarayan Shah towered above his contemporaries despite what he lost by methodical education and he had also made up the deficiency by other factors such as fell to the lot of the boy king of Gorkha.

It was again through the persuasion of Prabhavati that the boy even though in his teens was allowed to gather experience in the odd and anarchical political stage of the valley of Nepal, where he proceeded in 1736 as a friend of the son of the Raja of Bhatgaon on invitation, the latter being anxious to be a friend of the Gorkhalis against his cousins of Patan and Kathmandu and secretly nursing an attack naturally welcomed him as his own son. During the three years of his stay in Bhatgaon he studied the hopeless state of Nepal politics, its weakness and its rapacity, the Rajas' freaks and clumsy behaviour and their attitude to one another, things which pointed out to the possibility of an easy conquest of the country, if only a strong power arose outside the valley. To the task of creating such a power his mother Prabhavati had drawn his attention adding that it was worthwhile to undertake the same himself. Prithvinarayan was not allowed to stay there for long; the war which his father waged against Dhading aroused suspicion in the minds of the Malla rulers against Gorkha and the people of Bhatgaon not liking him, he was compelled to return to Gorkha (Wright, P. 198) in 1737, but he returned as one imbued with a
thorough knowledge of the place and its environments, which in the end he put to practice to further his ideals for a strong Kingdom of all the peoples in the areas now comprising Nepal.

In 1739 he was appointed a co-regent along with Prabhavati and got practical experience of the government and was brought in close contact with some of the military stalwarts of his time. In 1737 headed by the Panthas, Khasas and Magars the army of his father Narabhupal was heavily defeated while fighting in Noakot, and his Tanhoun adventure was also frustrated in the same vein, which so disappointed him that he became insane two years later, necessitating a regency which as we have said included Prithvinarayan.

A year later Prabhavati arranged for his marriage with the daughter of Hemakarna, the Raja of Mackwanpur, who according to Hamilton was a rare beauty but apart from purely a sentimental satisfaction this marriage gave to Gorkhalis, it also simultaneously provided an opportunity to look about the importance of Mackwanpur, as the Southern gate of Nepal. There arose, however, a flimsy quarrel between the two parties at the time of celebration and though all marital rites were performed as pre-arranged, Prithvi was sent back without his bride. But this at least prevented for the time being the intended blockade of the valley by the Gorkhalis who would have asked Hemakarna to oblige him as a price for that marriage. It is said that the quarrel started over the custom of allowing the bride to remain at her father's place for sometime further, which the Gorkhalis were intending to break and in the event of the bridal party's persistent refusal they left the place. It was not, as Hamilton supposed, a controversy over racial superiority, for if it was so Mackwanpur would not have consented to the marriage before the wedding itself (Pp. 144-45). The Gorkha Vamsavali adds one more point and that was that the party of the bridegroom asked as a dowry a valuable necklace (the bride had it during the ceremony) called navlakhia and one particular elephant (Ekdantye) with one tooth, which earlier the owner had refused to present to the Nawab (Mir Kasim).

According to Gorkha Vamsavali he married a daughter of a Rajput chief in Banaras immediately he returned from Mackwanpur.

It appears that Prithvinarayan Shah with what he saw around himself in his late teens came to be seized with the idea of conquest of the neighbouring territories to carve out a viable Kingdom in the Himalayan mountains. He had shrewdly observed the condition in the country, and watched carefully how vulnerable it was. He must have surely possessed keen insight for this assessment. If the idea was born
in his brain, the way to fulfilment was shown equally by his power of understanding. For the first time after several hundred years a ruler of a mountainous principality had thought to push forward with a patriotic design to consolidate forces for the creation of a viable political unit in the area which was diseased by too many states and too many adventures. We remember Prithvinarayan Shah for the vision of a state worth the name and for the courage and statesmanship he displayed in carrying out the same into practice.

Prithvinarayan Shah understood his strategy thoroughly well to mean to conquer the valley of Nepal and from there to expand in all four directions. Therefore all his energies were directed to capturing this epicentre. Except seeking to neutralise his counterparts he did so very little in other sectors. Further, he knew that in order to bring the political forces in the Napal Valley to submission, he must isolate the land from all contacts with the outside world and cause it to collapse economically at the first instance. With this objective in view Prithvinarayan planned his course of action and eventually succeeded in attaining by patiently and arduously pursuing it.

In 1742 on the day of Ramanavami (March) Prithvinarayan ascended the throne and devoted himself heart and soul to the task of making up the reputation of his father in gaining back Noakot. This hill fortress was the gateway to Kathmandu and ever since the Gorkhalis understood the grandeur and importance of a united Nepal, they were determined to effect the capture of that place as a preliminary to further advance towards the descent to the Nepal Valley. Another gateway to Nepal was provided by Mackwanpur and with the Raja's cooperation Prithvinarayan could have attained his objective of marching towards Kathmandu. But Mackwanpur was out of the question, because the Raja was not disposed to believe the Gorkhalis and have faith in the sincerity of Prithvinarayan's action and an attempt to bring him to his fold turned a failure in 1743. He, therefore, tried to capture Noakot as a first step. Thinking that the previous attack launched by Gorkha, failed on account of his father's partial treatment of the officers of the Pantha clan, he restored the Nagars to the old position and entrusted to Kazi Vijaya Thapa the command of his forces. The Kazi, however, would not cross the river Trisuli, though there was no resistance from the Newars, because he understood that the unfavourable nature of the uplands of Noakot placed the defenders in advantage. But Prithvinarayan himself intervened and not minding the cap-

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3 This I got from a local source.  
4 Spelt Noakote, Nuakot, Nayakot, Nawakot, Nwakot.
tain's advice crossed the Trisuli with Maheswar Pantha. But like his father he was heavily defeated by Jayaprakas's army, which commanded numerical superiority and possessed greater ammunition.

A few months later, he visited Banaras out of a sense of frustration and more eager to cultivate allies and friends for his crusade. He could not give up the dream of possessing the valley. He was too enamoured of the idea to leave it at that stage. It had left a permanent impression in his mind. In his speech Prithvinarayan says that while returning from Mackwanpur he took a route to reach the summit of the Thankot ridge from where he surveyed the entire valley and this created an impression in him that he could easily subdue the region.

Noakot held out three prospects before him. Firstly, its occupation gave the invader a step to advance towards the valley of Nepal. Noakot lies on a ridge in the south-western extension of Mount Dhaibung between the river Trisuli and Tadi. It opens a path way to the valley of the river Sindhuri, which joins with the hill of Bandipur forming the outskirt of the valley. Secondly, the undulated plain between the two rivers expanding as a delta to their confluence at Debighat called Noakot Tar, provides a luxurious vegetation. This place is full of fruits and crops, which could be used with profit by a conquering army in order to launch an attack on stations lying further east and south. Thirdly, Noakot was a fortified hill as nowhere the Malla ruler of Kathmandu presumed to build one and Jayaprakas attached more than an ordinary importance to it. But the Noakot ridge had many strategic short-comings. Besides, the Kathmandu ruler was not commanding the support of the people of that area. There was ground enough for Prithvi to think that a sort of psychological breakdown was inevitable, if Noakot could be wrested from them, and he could assure himself that this fort was not invincible.

So, it was quite essential that the attempt for the capture be once more renewed. This time Prithvinarayan Shah set out on his task with courage and determination and with adequate and proper preparation. He knew that he suffered from the shortage of arms and ammunition and also lacked in man power. For this task he ordered a general mobilisation, all those between 16 and 30 years were freely recruited to the colours; and a large stock of arms to be distributed amongst the youth of Gorkha. He got them trained in the art of guns by some experienced Hindustani experts, Sheikhjabar, Muhammad Taki and Bhekh Singh. He was impressed with their skill during his engagements with Mir Kasim. The employment of non-Gorkhalis in the important posts of officers in the army naturally was repugnant to the
patriotic feeling of the Gorkhalis, but Prithvi with his intent to serve
the best interest of the motherland satisfied the opposition. His troops
consisted of several companies, each with 100 gunmen under a Subedar
and 16 Havildars (both non-commissioned officers). Besides, there
were men who used only Khuda and Khukri (daggers and swords).

His warring force consisted of the mass of the people, even though
the chief officers were his faithful followers from the select families.
But whether in the rank and with the officers, no discrimination was
made between communities. The test of recruitment was patriotism
and loyalty to his person. The entire population of Gorkha had been
up with arms to fight for a cause. Brahmans, Ksatriyas, Thakuris
and Khasas, Newar Vaisyas and peasants, Gurungs and Magars
were all enlisted. No one of them felt that he was prevented from render-
ing a duty. The untouchable tailor and bandplayer, the cobbler, the
blacksmith and the sweeper, everyone of them, had his place in the
scheme of things launched by his master. All were to render the duty
assigned to them each in his own sphere. It was a loyal and contented
band of followers that Prithvinarayan was destined to command.
Although it was a motley crowd that Prithvinarayan attracted at the
first hand, later with the training he gave to the recruits his troop became
such a formidable band of fighters that in encounter after encounter
victory came to him all by itself. His opponents had failed to orga-
nise a force like this, and they fell one by one before the conqueror.

Prithvinarayan’s next step was to mobilise resources. He obtained
contributions on a mass scale. The people were asked to contribute
to the war fund in cash or kind according to their possessions. The
chronicle states that the idea of a patriotic war of conquest had seized
the entire adult citizenry of Gorkha irrespective of caste and sect. There
were people who were physically unable to participate in the battle,
but came forward with hard cash, precious metals and jewelleries.
Many who were poor enough not to possess jewels and hard cash gave
eatables, grains, fruits and vegetables. While the battle was on, the
people waited in their villages to see the wounded return and they look-
ed after them. In the battlefield the people of the neighbouring
villages took out of their own accord whatever ration was necessary
for the Gorkha soldiers. Such was the state of preparedness with
which Prithvinarayan Shah embarked on the expedition for the creation
of a new state of Nepal.

Another act of his was to appoint Kalu Pande, a brave and Saga-
cious man, as his chief minister, whose help was valuable to him in all
matters including war strategy and his advice saved him from a good many disaster.

This was not enough. Gorkha had many enemies amongst the hill Rajas and it was not quite impossible if some of them tried to invade Gorkha when its Raja was engaged elsewhere. There was specially a deep-seated jealousy between Lamjung and Gorkha, which always weighed with the Gorkhalis in their fear of the inimical action from that quarter. To guard against such threats and dangers Kalu Pande suggested a policy of alignment with the Chaubisi, with as many of them as responded to Gorkha's offer of friendship and alliance. It was suggested that they should be enthused over the prospect of the conquest of the rich valley of Nepal and division of spoils and territories in the event of victory.

Therefore, deputations were sent to the hill Rajas; Harihar Kadaria Upadhya and Sadasaiva Upadhya to Tanhoun, Mani Kantha Rana to Palpa, Gangadhar Pant to Kaski and Ranarudra Shah, Luksminarayan Pande and Gunanidhi Pant to Lamjung. He also placed the strategic areas of Rudrabhot in the north and Dhading towards the south under expert commanders. But none of the Rajas agreed to abide by his request owing to the fear of invasion from the Tibetan Lama, who they thought would come to the assistance of his ally, the Newar Raja, with whom he had long cultural and commercial contact. They left to the discretion of the Raja of Lamjung, their leader, to reject or accept the request of Gorkha. But the Lamjung ruler in his heart of hearts was ill-disposed towards Prithvinarayan Shah. He proved adamant for some time, but Kalu Pande himself, by his resourcefulness, tact and perseverance won over him. A meeting was arranged between the Raja Ripumardan and Prithvi at the confluence of the Chepe and Marsyangdi, near Ragnas, which resulted in the amicable settlement of all disputes and bound each party to terms of mutual assistance. As a reward Kalu Pande received the post of a Kazi but Prithvi awarded him Kaziship only after ascertaining public opinion and opinions of the Baisi and Chaubisi Rajas as well as after consulting the queen mother. As it were to prove Gorkha sincerity of the acceptance of the pact, a dispute arose between Kaski and Lamjung over the ownership of Arghaun, which brought a military conflict, Gorkha appearing on the side of its ally. Though Kaski ultimately secured the place defeating Lamjung in an engagement, Gorkha nevertheless had a  

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5 According to Prithvinarayan's statement Kalu Pande obtained this august post as he proved superior in wisdom to Biraj Bakhati who was the King's first choice.
moral benefit, as it proved that it could stand by Lamjung in the latter's need. Thereafter Lamjung sincerely stuck to the last word of the treaty, though it was what ultimately appeared to harm its own local interest. Conflicts between the two were, however, common, when Gorkha occupied Sindhupalchok.
CHAPTER III

GORKHA BECOMES KINGDOM OF NEPAL

Political Affairs in the Nepal Valley

As we observed in another context matters in the Nepal Valley were running in favour of Prithvinarayan; the century old quarrel between the three rulers of Bhatgaon, Patan and Kathmandu was yet as severe as to exclude the possibility of any joint action against the invader. Fortunately for Prithvi, Ranajeetamalla, the Raja of Bhatgaon, was his god father and placed full confidence in him and in the circumstances no apprehension of a hostile act from that side was to be entertained by the Gorkhali ruler. The Patan Raja, Vishnumalla, was an imbecile being in old age. He had no sons and had appointed Rajyaprakas as his successor,¹ which fact had also gone to strain his relations with Kantipur. That also meant, if Patan could not possibly act alone, there was no occasion for it to combine with others. With this background the overall position had tended to become safe for the ruler of Gorkha to push his plan of conquest. There was also a deepseated rivalry between these rulers on personal plane, one never looked kindly to the other and on top of it conflicts were common between these rulers individually and their nobility. Kathmandu was seething in discontent as Raja Jayaprakas cruelly drove his brother Rajyaprakas out of his country (Wright, P. 223). Rajyaprakas was popular with a section of the people. Worse than that, Jayaprakas was very unpopular with his army which mainly consisted of the Indo-Mongol and Khasa clans. A section of his irregular retinue force was now conspiring with his brother to thwart his aims. It seemed that they had come at the parting of ways and Jayaprakas, therefore, had enlisted a body of plains-men, mostly from Gorakhpur and Champaran as a counter measure. But this led his Parbatiya followers to conspire more openly with Bhatgaon and later on even with Prithvi.²

Before actually embarking on the campaign, Prithvinarayan established a Council of Regency consisting of the leaders of warring wings of the army to look after the business of the Government in his absence and to defend the borders in times of external attack by the neighbours. The Council consisted among others of Rudra Shah, Maheswar Pant, Govind Joshi, Gayaram Pande and Kalu Rana and several others.

² Read the Second Volume of the series.
In September 1744 Prithvinarayan reached Khinchet on the bank of the river Trisuli with a force of 300 men. There he befriended one Kalyan Upadhyya, a much influential man of that locality, who promised to deliver him supplies and boats to cross the river.

At the time the invasion of Nepal took place, Prithvi had one more advantage to his side and that was the state of enmity existing between the three rulers of the Nepal Valley, which led one to invite the Gorkhalis against the other. A new quarrel had flared up between Patan and Kantipur. It was the time when actually the Kazis of Patan invoked his help to fight Jayaprakas and extended a promise to him as a price to be neutral in his fight with the latter. Although several times before, Patan and Kantipur could combine, they were just lately divided over the issue of Lamidanda. This area lay only a few miles in the west outside the Valley; it formed then a common meeting ground of the four states of Gorkha, Tanhoun, Patan and Kantipur. This was also a disputed spot between the two rulers of the Nepal Valley, though for long Tanhoun had occupied it having wrested from the possession of the Raja of Lalitpur. The loss of Lamidanda blocked Patan’s external outlet on that side and a great scarcity of cotton and salt was felt, and the Kazis had appealed to Jayaprakas to help them to be relieved of the distress. Jayaprakas sent Sikhwal Kazi to Tanhoun for negotiation. But a direct approach to Gorkha was made by Kazi Kalidas of Patan and Prithvinarayan obliged them by handing over the area to Patan. By this move of the Gorkha ruler Jayaprakas lost an opportunity to oblige Patan, and bring accord between the two kingdoms. Meanwhile Gorkha captured Jhiltung and again the same inconvenience to the Valley’s trade was caused. This was the second occasion the three rulers had together found their position menaced which could as well brought the entire Valley on a common front. This time the ministers of Patan were eager to forge a united stand in collaboration with Jayaprakas. But Jayaprakas who avoided Patan’s invitation to be present at Chobar for a conference prevented any agreement from being reached. On the other hand he enraged the Patan nobility by attacking certain of its outposts without any provocation.

The Vamsavali narrates an instance of a daring exploit of one Kalu Adhikari Jaisi in erecting the Gorkha flag over Noakot just before the regiment crossed the river. There was a custom amongst the hill people, according to which the flag was to precede the landing of the regiment. Ordinarily this was a very difficult task, for in the event of the enemy being extremely vigilant the result of such an adventure was nothing but death. But Kalu Adhikari pretending him-
self to have been expelled by Prithvinarayan Shah sought refuge in the enemy's camp and at a very psychological moment hoisted the Gorkha flag at the peak of the Mahamandal range to the enemy's surprise, while he himself slipped away to the river swimming back to join his own camp.

Bid To Capture Noakot

After a few days the Gorkha regiment crossed the river Trisuli on Saka 1666 Asvin 15 at an auspicious moment. To his advantage Prithvinarayan found that the defending troops had retired from near the bed of the river to the hill for fear of the ravaging malaria. But all this facilitated his movement unhindered. He crossed the river at night under cover of darkness. The Nepal defence forces were led by Jayant Rana (in speech Jyami Rana), who was earlier a Commander in Gorkha's army and who consequent to his dismissal by Narabhupala had joined king Jayaprakas of Kathmandu. This man by dint of his valued experience of fights in hilly and rugged terrains was likely to prove a very formidable opponent to the designs of the Gorkhalis. Here in Noakot he commanded a contingent of all the disgruntled elements from the Gorkha side; almost all the tribes constituting the Gorkha force were assembled there. Jayant Rana wanted to tactfully play his game and throwing down upon the Gorkhalis the entire force as soon as they began to ascend the Noakot peak, called Mahamandal, he was to deal them a surprise blow. The Gorkhalis, however, were encircling the Mahamandal ridge adopting a different tactics. They led their two wings of the armies from the north and north-east to Kachhar and Gerkhu, two adjoining hills, while Prithvinarayan himself waited to ascend Noakot after the result of the fight in those places. From Gerkhu the wing attacked Mahamandal. There was a hand to hand fight. Sankhamani, son of Jayant, was killed with several others of the defending party. The Kantipur ruler's men were dispersed and Noakot fell to the invaders. Prithvinarayan Shah shifted his quarter to the townlet of Noakot. Undaunted by this defeat Jayant Rana retired to four miles south at Belkot and there waited for reinforcement from Kathmandu.

Prithvinarayan knew his adversary and his strategy. There could be no better man for a strategist than Jayant Rana. His going over to the enemy was a great loss to the Gorkhalis and it was fraught with grave danger. If Jayant Rana succeeded, the capture of Noakot was unthinkable. So the question was to win him over to the side of Gorkha. Prithvinarayan accordingly tried to persuade him to come back. But
Jayant Rana was a valiant soldier to whom being true to salt he ate was a greater virtue than all his life and he proudly refused to accept Prithvinarayan's requests. Prithvinarayan realised the risk of leaving Jayant Rana at that stage. He grew impatient while the latter displayed adequate nerve. The king of Gorkha, thereupon, ordered to march against Belkot. Belkot offered the same facility to the defenders to strike at the foe, as it was only through a steep ascent, that the place was reached. His commanders were opposed to the plan of assault because of the disadvantage to the offenders. But Prithvinarayan in a fit of rage was unmindful of the striking power of the enemy and began to ascend the ridge, but Jayant's men poured in from all directions and embarassed the Gorkhalis so much that they began to lose courage. Prithvinarayan was about to flee for his life. Many of his soldiers and officers were killed, but his chief aide and military adviser Kalu Pande proposed at the time to attack the fort of Belkot in full vigour to compensate the failure sustained earlier. Prithvinarayan himself initiated the attack single handed and the Gorkhalis now very much encouraged by the example of their king rallied together round him. Jayant was overpowered. He was arrested and flayed alive. They said that the inexorable fate had decreed his death.

The capture of Belkot brought the invaders close to the Nepal Valley, a step further, so close that they now commanded the passage to the Kakani and Shivpuri ridges overlooking the Valley on the northern side.

The conquest of Noakot was a great gain from Gorkha point of view. The granary of the Kathmandu people was at their disposal. Now they commanded the entire supplies of Tadi, Likhu and Sindhuri valleys. They got the control of the highway leading to Kathmandu. Besides these, they also were put in control of the Indo-Tibetan trade that passed through Noakot. These were such as Jayaprakas would never allow to go to the enemies. He accordingly sent Kasiram Thapa with a big force of more than a thousand men. Ranabhim Thapa was to head this force, but he was suspected of allegiance to Gorkha. He also failed at the eleventh hour to engage the Gorkha invader who came face to face at the head of 1300 men. But in the fight at Gairithum and Halede Kasiram Thapa was defeated and thereafter all hopes of gaining back Noakot vanished for ever. Jayaprakas himself had to face a hostile nobility and a conspiracy was afoot to dethrone him as a punishment for the harsh treatment he meted out to the com-

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3 A chronicler estimated 8000, but to collect such a strength was not possible in those days.
manders of the regiment in killing their leaders. This conspiracy was all embracing. It got the help from Kazi Kalidas of Patan and some people from Bhatgaon also were a party to it. They decided to invite the Gorkhalis to fight against Jayaprakas. At about this time Prithvinarayan actually came to the Valley and conquered some villages on the eastern sector of Kathmandu in the Valley. Jayaprakas managed to offer a fight but was defeated.

At about this time he was dismissed from the throne and was succeeded by his son Jyotiprakas. After some years in exile wandering like a fugitive Jayaprakas gained back his throne. The subject of his deposition and restoration requires to be dealt with thoroughly in view of certain contradictory factors of the situation. But as this does not fall entirely within the scope of the present book, we have taken up the consideration of the matter in another volume exclusively dealing with the history of the later Mallas. According to Wright, Kasiram Thapa was killed by Jayaprakas earlier for his alleged complicity in the attempted Gorkha invasion of Noakot (P. 225).

Having consolidated his conquest of Noakot Prithvinarayan Shah then looked forward to an opportunity to bring the whole of the Nepal Valley under his control. We have seen how a few places on the eastern border of Kathmandu inside the Valley fell to him in 1746. But Naldum earlier captured by Jayaprakas was restored to Bhatgaon (1668 Bhadra 17). These, however, he had to relinquish for reasons of acute pressure by Jayaprakas and Ranajeet joining him, who immediately after in 1751 defeated him in a minor skirmish at Mahadeva Pokhri. It was felt that for the occupation of the Valley, the capture of the mountains surrounding it was absolutely essential. By 1754 Prithvinarayan Shah had occupied Dahachok on the west and Naldum on the east.

Conflicts with Chaubisi

Prithvinarayan’s success alarmed the hill Rajas of Tanhou and Lamjung. In total disregard of the treaty of 1742, Lamjung openly brought about an alignment of itself and Parbat to manoeuvre against the Gorkhalis. In a battle which was fought at a place called Sirhanchock, ten miles north-west of Gorkha, the allies were defeated in Saka 1677 Sravana chaturdasi (August, 1755). Sirhanchok was occupied by the Gorkhalis under the command of Kazi Rudravir Shah.

But the danger of a renewed attack at a crucial moment of Gorkha-Nepal conflict was always there and it had to be met. Prithvi purchased the friendship of Lamjung by promising to limit his conquest to areas west of Noakot.
But it was not what could seal the fate of his victorious career. Prithvi was not a man to bind himself by terms of treaties. Outwardly he maintained an attitude of faithfulness to the terms of the treaty and in order to prove that and to facilitate his own scheme of conquest he declared that he dissociated himself from the treaty and charged Kalu Pande to have been instrumental to the ignominous clauses. But that was just how the Gorkhalis manipulated their concern now and then, so when a declaration to this effect was made, it did not cause any surprise. Everybody was led to believe that Kalu Pande was the architect of the policy guiding the provision of the treaty. The second step was to punish the offender. Under Kalu’s own inspiration Prithvi dismissed him as a punishment so that the former could now devote solely as an exile in Lamjung to restrain the Raja of Lamjung from courting displeasure of Gorkha and thereby prevent another war (See also *Asiatic Researches*, II.P.315 ff). Kalu Pande played a very important role in Lamjung during all these days. Because he had been dismissed for bringing about the agreement, Lamjung’s ruler felt natural sympathy for Kalu Pande. In Gorkha Rudra Sahi was appointed as the Chief Kazi in his place.

Prithvinarayan thus contriving to restrain Lamjung proceeded towards south-west. A wing of the army headed by Shaktiballabh Joshi then occupied Lamidanda and Deorali, two trade outposts in that quarter. Another wing proceeded to the east and then captured Dolkha about fifty miles from Kathmandu thus shutting the states within the Valley of Nepal from the north-west and north-east. After Deorali the Bhanjyang of Bhimdhunga readily fell to the invaders, and this brought them face to face with Kathmandu in the west of it.

In the order demanding surrender issued to the Brahmans of Dolkha Prithvinarayan Shah promised safety to the inhabitants on the terms extended to the people of Chitlang, Tistung and Palung. His desire to capture Sindhu Palchok in the east was checkmated by the threat Lamjung’s Sardar Mahiman Khawas gave to him on this issue; then Lamjung was friendly to Bhatgaon, and would on no account suffer to witness Gorkha aggression on parts of the latter’s territory. Sindhu Palchok was recently captured by Bhatgaon from Kathmandu taking advantage of Jayaprakas’ absence in exile. But ultimately Sindhupalchok fell to the Gorkhalis, who also occupied Naldum in early August of 1754 (1676, Sravana 21) ousting Kazi Chigadhi Maskay who was sent by Jayprakas to fight out the invaders.

In 1756 he deceptively imprisoned the Raja of Tanhou. Tri-
vikram Sen who had come to meet him at Jyamir Ghat. The circumstances described by the chronicler are as follows. Prithvinarayan felt that although the rulers of Bhatgaon and Tanhou were supposed to be his friends, he could not completely rely on them; rather he feared that in moments of crisis they might harbour a design to harass him. Therefore, he contrived to kidnap them and place them near his camp under surveillance. He had no design to absorb the two states into Gorkha, but if he could hold the persons of the two rulers, he would certainly influence the policy of the administration in Tanhou and Bhatgaon. To this end some trusted men were sent to both the capitals. These men were to say that Prithvinarayan was too eager to meet Ranjeetamalla and Trivikram for a very urgent task. One Pandit Gaurisvara who happened to be a common friend of both Tanhou and Gorkha ruling houses was deputed by the conspirators to talk to Trivikram. The latter did know nothing of the scheme to arrest Trivikram. Gaurisvara was a priest of the Tanhou family, and therefore his advice was accepted. It was suggested that the conference would meet at Jyamir Ghat where the participants would go unarmed. But the Gorkhalis had kept hidden their arms underneath the sand to use the same as the occasion required. So while the Tanhou ruler came in all good faith, they surprised him and attacked his person. His retinue watched helplessly as the Gorkhalis unearthed their weapons, sprang on him with a show of force and made him prisoner. Thus Prithvinarayan was freed from the worries of a surprise attack from that quarter. Thereafter he proceeded to grab more lands in the Valley of Nepal, and nearly succeeded to annex in no time at least half the area there and in adjoining hills in the west of it. Trivikram Sen was later released, but he died a broken hearted man.

However, Prithvinarayan's attempt to capture the person of Ranjeetamalla had failed. But the ruler of Bhatgaon could know that the Gorkha ruler had sent men with a view to entice him to go to the area occupied by the Gorkhalis where he was to be trapped and detained. Since then as we know Prithvinarayan had a hard time to deal with Bhatgaon.

The western penetration was rapid. But there remained Kirtipur, an invincible hill fortress in between Kathmandu and Thankot. In the first week of May 1757 (19 Jyestha Saturday Dasahara 1814 VS.) he led an attack on Kirtipur from Naikap, a ridge on the north-west by its side but this was repulsed with the death of Kalu Pande and Jivan Thapa, and of several other experienced officers. The chronicler says that the battle lasted for twelve hours and the casualty on both sides
was estimated at about twelve hundred men. Gorkha sustained a loss of four hundred sepoys in those killed and seriously wounded.

The chronicler says that at the time Kirtipur was attacked, Jayaprakas called a conference of the three rulers of the Valley, and it was decided to defend Kirtipur with the combined strength of the three kingdoms. Actually, the Gorkha attack was met by the combined force of the three states of the Nepal Valley.

By the time the attack on Kirtipur was planned, Kalu Pande had already come to Noakot and his reinstatement in the service of his master was followed by his appointment as the principal commander of the Gorkha forces. But he was not in favour of an attack on Kirtipur at the time. He had felt that preparations on his side were unequal to the requirement for the assault on an advantageously situated hill fortress like Kirtipur. But Prithvinarayan was not for waiting any more. It was said that Kalu Pande had to hear harsh and unkind words from his King who was not prepared to listen to anything counselling patience. The commander had not yielded at that, but while Prithvinarayan in the heat of the moment while in a tense mood used expressions questioning his loyalty and patriotism Kalu Pande was hurt to the quick so much as to prepare for the worst to himself in order to save the honour of his King. The chronicler states that before leaving for the military engagement, Kalu Pande brought his only son to the presence of Prithvinarayan Shah and implored him to take care of the boy should anything unexpected take place. He told his master that now that his motive was questioned he was determined to meet whatever comes to him. Kalu Pande had sensed the danger of invading Kirtipur in the way his King had ordered him. He had taken leave of his wife as if he was not returning to her any more.

The worst happened, and Kalu Pande lost his life. The Newar defenders victoriously took possession of his weapons and hung them in display on the wall of the temple of Baghbhairav. These weapons, khukris, swords, belches, bows and arrows and muskets are still preserved intact and one can have a glimpse of them at the original place.

Prithvinarayan himself escaped narrowly in his defeat. Thank God, he was spared; he was almost killed. Such was the effect of a hasty and inadequate measure of offence adopted. It was said that while his army was overpowered it dispersed in confusion so much so that Prithvinarayan Shah found himself alone without a company. Luckily it was dark and the enemy did not have the idea of his situation. But he was too tired to run. It was said that a lowly man of the Putuwar caste of
the Newar community carried him on his back to Dahachok.\textsuperscript{5}

Prithvinarayan Shah had become almost hopeless at this stage after his defeat in Kirtipur. He was stricken with remorse. The loss of Kalu Pande and other officers was irreparable. He returned to Noakot much a forlorn and dejected figure. For two years he harboured no thought to renew his military excursions. He utilised his time in strengthening his position and arranging for supplementary preparations to an adequate degree in response to the need of the situation. But affairs in Patan were encouraging for him and he, therefore, did not abandon hopes of victories in the next move. The city of beauty now lay without a ruler having dispensed already with two such within a year. But what made the situation most serious was the state of siege and blockade.

Even salt became scarce, and for want of yarns the weavers became idle. Relief from such a condition was most needed. Under duress, the nobility of Patan offered the throne to Prithvinarayan who, however, sent his brother Dalmardan for the purpose. By not accepting the offer himself he had certainly acted wisely, as the other course would have exposed him to risks of a very intriguing situation. So, as the exigency determined, while Dalmardan tasted the bitters of kingly glory of Patan, king Prithvinarayan watched the events carefully from his hill fortress at Dahachok which he had built to station his troops and guard approaches to the main highways to the two cities.

By this time Prithvinarayan was also in control of the passes of Nepal's two important approaches to Tibet on the border of Kerrong and Kuti. This inflicted great hardship on the entrepot trade of the Nepal Valley, and all around in Kathmandu there was a general clamour for peace with Gorkha. As a result of this, Jayaprakas signed a pact with Gorkha to share advantages of this trade with Prithvinarayan (See below). But this pact seems to have been a short lived affair. It so happened that the Gorkha vakil Tularam Pande stationed in Kathmandu in accordance with the provisions of the pact, was suspected of conspiratorial actions to overthrow Jayaprakas, and subsequently imprisoned. This caused the treaty to lapse soon after, and Prithvinarayan was further embittered by Jayaprakas' actions in killing two of Tularam's colleagues. But after sometime Tularam made an escape to Dahachok to tell the tale of woe and inner secrets of the court of Kantipur.

Dahachok was the ruling ridge on the western outskirt of the Nepal

\textsuperscript{5} Wright, Pp. 226-27. The same authority estimates the loss at twelve hundred, the entire contingent of Sardar Saktiballav.
Valley that was in the possession of Prithvinarayan Shah. He realised that unless similar ridges on other sides were commanded, it was no use descending on the valley and contacting the enemy. Prithvi, therefore, used his resources to take possession of as many portions of the surrounding hills as could be laid hold of. His first objective after his defeat at Kirtipur was the peak of Shivapuri which fell to the invaders at midnight on Asadha 21 of VS. 1816 (=1759, July). Then his force proceeded to Palanchok, and the commanders Chautara Daljit Shah, Kazi Harkya Panth, Kapardar Bhadra Sahi and Jethabudha Rama Krishna Kuar contacted Jayaprakas’ irregulars. Palanchok was occupied on 9 of Magha. After routing the enemy the same force continued to operate in Kabhre (18 miles east of Kathmandu), which was captured in the early hours of Saka 1681 Magha 11 (=1760, January). At Kahule Jayaprakas’ remnants made a surprise attack, while the men almost naked were busy cooking food but it was repulsed.

Unable to dabble any more in Nepal intrigues, Prithvinarayan cast a greedy eye on the dominion of his father-in-law. Mackwanpur included a good portion of the Terai. It commanded a rich revenue on that account. Moreover, it had also the control of the trade route to Kathmandu passing to Tibet. For tightening the blockade of the Valley it was quite essential that Mackwanpur be controlled. Of late the Raja harboured inimical feeling to the Gorkhalis and was negotiating with the hill Rajas to fight them out. But Prithvi was too powerful a foe to be overpowered so easily. On VS. 1819 Bhadra 8 (September 1762)⁶ a strong Gorkhali contingent led by Chautarias Kirti Mahoddam, Dala Mardan, Kazis Daljit and Shah Pratap, Nahar Singh and Kehar Singh and Abhimani Basnait, Bansaraj Pande entered the valley of Mackwanpur at two engagements one at Mackwanpur and another a month later at Hariharpur, defeated the Raja, Digbandhansen who fled adding immediately all parts of his dominion to that of Gorkha, casualty on the enemy’s side was 300-400 killed. But his resistance had collapsed at the initial stage. Hariharpur came under Gorkha occupation on Asvin 22, 1684. A chronicle gives Saka 1684 Pausa 9 Saturday for the final capture of Mackwanpur. But this must be the date of the defeat of Mir Kasim. From Hariharpur Prithvinarayan’s forces advanced to Sindhuligarhi which was easily occupied. The date of the occupation of Sindhuli is Saka 1684 Asvin 9 Tuesday according to the noting of a chronicler. This secured for him the passage straight to Phulchok, one of the mountains around the Nepal Valley in the south.

⁶ On Bhadra 9 according to another noting.
Phulchok was captured while the Gorkha army advanced in its winding journey to reach the peak.

By the conquest of Mackwanpur Prithvinarayan made himself financially strong. He also got hold of a large number of arms—700 Chapawal Banduk (guns) and ammunitions and several elephants from the vanquished, which added a great deal to his fighting resources.

**Blockade of the Nepal Valley**

Within a year of that he captured places like Dhulikhel, Khadpu, Banepa and Pannauti. He also created new regiments of the armed forces, calling them Srinath, Sabuj, Gorakhnath, Kalibax and Barbajabani.

Now the Valley of Nepal was completely blocked. Prithvinarayan Shah erected temporary shelters of defence on almost all ridges of importance and the thoroughfares leading to these were carefully guarded.⁷

In a letter by Father Rovato dated 1 October, 1763, the facts of blockade have been described in details. He wrote that life was very hard because of the scarcity of essential commodities. Rovato and his friends suffered on that account in common with the peoples of the blocked areas. Although the Italian missionaries were promised exemption from all kinds of obligations due to the rules of blockade enforced nothing was done to relieve them of the distress. The writer complained of insincerity on the part of the King of Gorkha, though at times he had also appeared considerate to them. At one time, the two fathers who were on their way to Patan from Bettia were stopped at Chitlang, detained there for a few days and taken to Noakot before they were relieved to resume their journey under heavy military escort.⁸

As he could not advance from the side of Bhatgaon owing to his professed friendship with the Raja of that place, but whom he would not trust also, Prithvi had to penetrate into the Valley proper either through the north or the west. To pave the way from the western side Kirtipur had to be seized. So all resources were now utilised to capture the fort of Kirtipur and from there on to make a frontal attack on Kathmandu and Patan. Kirtipur fell to the invader after nearly 12 years of the first attack. It was subjected to a series of siege and

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⁷ From one of his letters it appears that the blockade was strictly enforced and in that course (*Itihas Prakas*, II, 3) he would not even permit the traders from Bhatgoan to conduct their business from Banepa. See his letters dated V.S. 1822, Sravana Vadi 10-6 and Marga Vadi 5-5. The decree ordering blockade-enjoined on the soldiery to prohibit entry of wool, cotton & salt into the Valley, the breach of which was punished with death.

⁸ *Documenti Italiani*, etc. by L. Petech. 11, Part II. P. 203.
blockade severe enough to exhaust the patience of the defenders. We already know how the first two attacks failed to achieve the objective and the invaders paid a heavy price. So this time Prithvinarayan proceeded with due caution. But he could not launch an attack as the plan ripened. His attention was diverted by Mir Kasim’s movements in the vicinity of Mackwanpur, and he hurriedly evacuated the siege to meet the foe in the Terai, which was necessary to defend his new acquisitions. The attack on Kirtipur was resumed after Mir Kasim’s invading force was expelled from the Terai region.

**Mir Kasim’s Expedition**

Now to turn to the account of the fight with Mir Kasim’s expeditionary force we proceed with the following narrative. So far, the Gorkha advance was not looked upon with distrust and apprehension by outsiders. They had thought that it was just a menace confined in effect to the hill areas and that all the repercussions were limited to them alone. The conquest of Mackwanpur showed that the Gorkhalis were not satisfied with gains short of the conquest of the whole of the Himalayas. This provoked the enmity of the Nawab Mir Kasim of Bengal and the English. Meanwhile, the Raja of Mackwanpur sent an appeal to Mir Kasim for immediate military help. He had escaped to the Nawab’s territory accompanied by his son and Kanak Sinha Bania, his minister. In January 1763 (Saka Pausa 1684) the Nawab actually sent an army under Gurgin Khan to invade Mackwanpur (Vansittart, *Narrative*, II, P. 189; ABS PLR, 1759-65, P. 13) while he himself watched the results from Bettia. The commander of the invading force was an Armenian mercenary in the service of Mir Kasim. Both the English and the Nawab each in his own way, coveted the natural resources of Nepal. A current report about Nepal at the time was that it was a country full of precious gold mines. Gurgin Khan heard of this from the Kashmiri merchants, and he used this information to work up the avaricious design of his master. The Nawab was also given to understand that Mackwanpur offered an advantage of a trade route and a gateway to the Valley of Nepal ordinarily in strategic terms. Mir Kasim was feeling all the time that he had only to utilise the opportunity to become the master of the region.

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9 Read for details of this event Nandalal Chatterji’s book, ‘Mir Qasim, 1760-63’ (1936, Banaras), Chapter X, Pp. 168-76 on the invasion of Nepal. He is the first and the only author to bring so far the subject to our notice, and he has described the event basing his reports mostly on original texts.

10 *Seir-ul-Mutaqherin*, P. 447.

11 *Khulasat JBORS*, V, P. 608.

From Bettia Gurgin Khan reached the Valley of Mackwanpur in no time since there was no obstruction. But as soon as he reached there he met with a serious resistance from the Gorkha side.13

Because it was so designed that before the capture of the fort of Mackwanpur, the ridge over which it stood was to be reached to facilitate ascent by the invading party a detachment was sent to contact the defenders in that area. The Gorkhalis carried on guerilla tactics, and foiled at the first instance the efforts of the Nawab's men who suffered heavy casualty. But later on in the second attempt made by the invaders the ridge (Bhanjyang) was captured, and the men from the plains though exhausted had shown admirable fortitude and courage in negotiating their course.14

N. L. Chatterji quoting the author of Muzaffarnama says that earlier to this campaign, the Nawab had sent a small force of Tilanga sepoys in an endeavour to test the enemy's strength. But this attack was repulsed with the loss of the whole of the contingent fighting there.15 In sending the detachment under Gurgin Khan, the Nawab desired to take revenge, and eliminate the Gorkhalis. Naturally he had staked everything in this campaign, the army was unusually large and he had also made up for any likelihood of financial difficulty.

The Mackwanpur ridge dominated the Valley of Kurra (Kirkpatrick Pp. 24-25). Strategically it was an important outpost that the Gorkhalis had lost to the Nawab's forces so they could certainly not afford to resign themselves to the idea of giving it up as lost for good. This victory of Gurgin Khan, however, proved shortlived, as the ridge could not be retained for more than twenty-four hours on account of a surprise and fierce assault by the Gorkha troopers on the encampment.16 Rather, the events following were so full of consequences that they led to the final withdrawal of the entire expeditionary force. Tired after the day's engagement the Nawab's forces were at the ridge below the fort. They were relaxing in a mood of fearlessness and also unmindful of the dangers that lay ahead of them. It was a dark night (Khulasat, JBORS,V,P.608) and in those hours to lie care-free in a state of fatigue and relaxation was not without risks. The account of the Khulasat further notes that the men lay unguarded because they felt that the enemy had retreated far behind. And all of them were taken

13 Vansittart said that the Nawab had stayed far behind the scene of battle because of his 'known timidity' (II. P. 187).
14 Seir-ul-Mutaqherin, P. 447.
16 Prithvinarayan got the news of the Nawab's forces being inside Mackwanpur in Harnamadi from a letter to him dated Magha sudi 1 roj Sunday 1819 VS (January, 1763).
unawares by an enemy who was watchful and agile. This was inevitable. One could not suppose Prithvinarayan to act otherwise than to take advantage of the hour while his enemy was most indifferent to his own security. Panic prevailed in the ranks of Gurgin Khan’s regiments as the Gorkhalis swooped down on them from the height of the ridge. The attack later on came from all directions including Taplakhar and old Mackwanpur as the enemies learnt of their helpless condition. They were mercilessly treated and stones, missiles and arrows were thrown on them, and as the Gorkhalis came to give them a hand to hand fight they were hit by musket bolts. The narrator of the Khulasat writing later on notes that the entire regiment in occupation of the ridge was brutally smashed and effaced out. Only a few souls could return to tell the sorrowful tale of the defeat and annihilation to Gurgin Khan who was encamping at the foot of the hill. A good deal of ammunition also fell into the hands of the Gorkhali fighters.

The Khulasat does not give the date of the battle. It was said that Gurgin Khan took his invading force into the interior of the Kurra valley sometime during December of 1762. But it was said that the battle took place on 5th of Rajab as noted by Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, (P. 782 as quoted by N. L. Chatterji). A Nepalese chronicle states that Mir Kasim was routed on Saturday (2 ghati night) Pausa 9 of Saka 1684 (last week of December of 1762). But another noting gives Pausa 27 as the date of invasion, and Magha 10 as the date of final defeat of Gurgin Khan.

According to the chronicle the Gorkhalis under Kazi Bansaraj Paade, Harkya Pant, Jivasaha, Nahar Sinha Basnait, Kehar Sinha Basnait, Ram Krishna Kunwar, Bangya Basnait and others met the enemy after seven days of the latter’s first attack which was resisted for full seven days by the local garrison (Saka 1684 Pausa 27 Magha vadi 8 roj 6). About 1700 of Gurgin Khan’s troops were killed in action and 400-500 guns captured. On the Gorkhali side casualty was 25130 killed. The officers Nandu and Asa Bhandari were killed. The invading force was totally routed.

It appears that after dislodging the enemy from the ridge on Magha 10 (last week of January), the defenders pursued them in the Valley as far as the stretch of the Bhitri Madesh (inner Terai).

The invasion was undertaken at the instance of Mir Kasim who acted under advice of Gurgin Khan and Raja Sukh Lal who was then the head of the Nawab’s army intelligence. The Nawab took an ex-

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18 Also Seir-ul-Mutaqherin, P. 447.
aggerated view of the natural resources of Nepal, of its gold and silver and relied too much on his newly constituted army whose competence was overrated but which yet had to be tested (Vansittart, II, P.185). There was a difference of opinion in his court while this question came for consideration, and a section had advised him against undertaking the invasion or do so only in collaboration with the British who too had their eyes on the treasures of Nepal and were seeking an opportunity in contemplation of the invasion. Vansittart who saw the Nawab at about this time strongly advised against the expedition (Khulasat). But the Nawab would not listen to the advice dissuading him from the path of aggression. By way of adventure he also wanted to test the capacity of the army, for which he thought the military engagements in the hills would provide suitable occasion. Probably he had also in mind troubles with the British if their co-operation was sought and so felt that the question of a joint attack did not arise. According to Khulasat (and Abs, PLR P. 13) the Nawab was reported to have been planning invasion to conquer the territory for himself as his appetite for more territories was whetted while he found himself in possession of Champaran and Bettia sometime earlier without a hard fight (Khulasat, JBORS, V, P. 608). He had also taken a very light view of his Mackwanpur campaign. He had no ideas of the immense difficulties of fighting in the hill terrain, but rather harboured an illusion that his general and army would find it an easy task to subdue the mountaineers.

This war greatly humbled the Nawab (Khulasat, JBORS, V, P.608). In the fight he lost a substantial portion of his newly organised army according also to Mutaqherin (P.447) and more than that he lost all his aspirations and ambitions. Feeling thoroughly discredited he now came to Patna. Gurgin Khan, the mentor behind the invasion, was equally discredited and for fear of courting the Nawab's displeasure would not come to him and he at long last went to the Nawab only on persuasion after a good deal of entreaties and promise of pardon. Mir Kasim had now for good given up any idea of invasion in that quarter. Therefore Gurgin Khan was sent to bide his time anywhere he liked.

As Nandalal Chatterji puts it, the campaign was ill-managed and ill-judged and hasty, and the results were what they should have been.

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20 Muzaffar-Namah, P. 334, as quoted by N. L. Chatterji.
21 Muzaffaranama, P. 335, quoted by N. L. Chatterji.
But this was a large gain for Prithvinarayan Shah, and he had gained in moral and materials to the extent the Nawab had lost them. The Nawab's defeat was a lesson to all the intending invaders from the plains. Every one of them now was compelled to think thrice before venturing to invade the hills. And the Rajas in the hills thought that they were no match against an enemy who could defeat a powerful monarch of Bengal. Later while he became the master of the Valley of Nepal Prithvinarayan inscribed an eulogy of himself in a stele, and there said that he achieved a glorious victory over Mir Kasim.

While one army was fighting Gurgin Khan, another wing was engaged in occupying certain more hillocks of the Valley, viz. Pharping, Chobar and Panga, yet a third had to deal with Lamjung whom the Gorkhalis subjugated in two engagements on Saka 1685—Chaitra 9 at Lakang and Chyamdanda.

According to the chronicle the Chaubisis were lying in wait from their bases at Harmi, Dhuwakot, Chyangli, Mirkot, Deorali and Lakang. There was a general mobilisation of all the peoples of the area on Gorkha's side and every one below 60 and above 12 joined in the fight. Sur Pratap commanded Gorkha's 8000 men. The Gorkhalis fought the Chaubisis once again at the Chyamdanda on Saka 1685 Kartik 9.

In all the engagements that followed Sur Pratap gave a defeat to the Chaubisis, and Prithvinarayan being highly pleased and impressed by his military skill transferred him to the eastern sector to invade Chaukot, Dhulikhel, Banepa and Pannauti, which were occupied on Saka 1685 Kartik 11 (1765, end of October) and subsequent dates in a month or two. The capture of the Sanga ridge brought them face to face near the Valley of Nepal on the eastern side (Saka 1685 Kartik 14). The Gorkhali lost an able commander by name Jahangir Shah in Sanga. At midnight of the same day Ranikot and Nala were readily occupied. In the encounter they killed 300 mendicants (Nagas) who came to fight on Jayaprakas' side. It should be known that as Gorkha increased its military pressure on the Valley of Nepal, the ruler of Kathmandu brought all sorts of men to fight for him. The mendicants were commonly employed as soldiers by feudal rulers of India. These were a care-free, bold and avaricious people apparently given to renunciation, but engaged in all sorts of anti-social activities as occasions needed. The Sannyasis were scattered all over northern India. But they operated mostly on frontier regions. The chronicle states that Jayaprakas could enlist the Nagas on his side because of certain landlords of the Terai who had enmity against the King of Gorkha.
A few days further, on Kartika 20 the Gorkhalis captured Pharping. Two days later they could occupy Bisankhu, which gave them an advantageous position to intercept contacts between Patan and Bhatgaon. Earlier on Bhadra 2 Tuesday Chobar, a ridge on the Bagmati which overlooks Patan on the other side, was seized. Now the Gorkhalis could also reach the vicinity of Patan and Kathmandu without facing any interception. Yet Kirtipur was the only hurdle left. However, as Panga, Nagaon close on the heels of this fortress were occupied, it was thought that Kirtipur would not be able to stand the next assault. So every effort was made, and all possible resources were directed to achieve the objective of securing conquest of that ridge.

While the invaders were at the gate of Patan in September, 1767 and were pressing for its unconditional surrender\(^\text{24}\), Prithvinarayan hastily retired to Sindhuli to deal with another impending invasion from the south, this time from the English who had marched to that place. According to the chronicle Jayaprakas had sent a Tirhutiya Brahman as his messenger to ask for assistance from the British, and they had now responded to his request by sending an expeditionary force.

An idea of the advantages the English were in need of for their commercial expansion in this part of the country shall be obtained in full details from the narrative we have produced in connection with the Nepal-British Trade Pact (See below). Here it is sufficient to mention that these advantages were such as the British valued extremely. If they thought that the Rajas of Nepal had to be extricated out of the distress and be helped to that end, it was because by this act alone the British themselves would be immensely benefited though Jayaprakas also could get the benefit of liberation. The British would have tried to secure trade facilities without going into war with the ruler of Gorkha, but it became inevitable in the face of Prithvi’s determined hostility towards them and the break their commerce sustained at his hands due to his blockade of the Nepal Valley (Bengal Sel. Com. April 30, 1767). They were not prepared to lose the voluminous trade (letter from Sel. Com. to Rumbolt, July 21, 1767), which gave them ample supply of gold (ibid) now so indispensable on account of the shortage of the same in Bengal, which also affected the annual China investment so adversely (letter from Sel. Com. to the Court, September 25, 1767). Besides, they had to protect their own frontier lines in north Bihar, which were continuously suffering encroachments. It was alleged that a large number of villages on the border specially in Bettia

and Champaran were being subjected to depredations by the Gorkhalis since 1766 (Golding to Rumbolt, April 6, 1767). Prithvinarayan had laid his claims on some of these villages. But the English were reluctant to part with them, upon which the Gorkha ruler expressed design of forcible occupation (Rumbolt, January 3, 1767). But this was to be prevented at any cost and to that end not a moment was to be then lost. All considerations, political as well as economic, demanded that the British should now fight out the Gorkhalis.

*Kinloch's Adventure.*

As soon as Mr. Golding of Bettia conveyed to Thomas Rumbolt the Chief of the East India Company's establishment at Patna the repeated requests of the Raja of Kathmandu for help against the Gorkhalis, the latter promptly transmitted the same to the Governor at Calcutta (Letter from Rumbolt April 20, 1767). The Select Committee thereupon decided to dispatch an expedition forthwith for the Raja's assistance (Select Committee, April 30, 1767) under Captain Kinloch, an officer who had recently reduced the fort of Tipperah. But not until Prithvinarayan refused to be cowed down by threats, the actual expedition was sent. Verelst was the Governor of Bengal in those days and he had hoped that the Gorkhalis would be terrified into submission by a show of arms and threat of invasion. Now the British Government on the advice of Rumbolt, Chief of the Patna Factory (Bengal, Sel. Com. April 30, 1767) intimated Prithvinarayan Shah their intention to mediate between him and the Rajas of the Nepal Valley (May 28, 1767, according to a letter from Sel. Com. to Rumbolt, April 30). This Rumbolt was the guiding spirit behind the move against Prithvinarayan Shah. He was generally regarded as an expert on Nepal affairs. He gave the authorities in Calcutta to understand that Prithvinarayan himself was anxious to cultivate the good will of the British and wanted to come to Patna himself if he was given protection. The British thought that the Gorkhali Raja was out to forestall the move of Jayaprakasmalla and with the danger of a military intervention by the British staring him, he would willingly accept the offer of mediation. Prithvinarayan Shah was, however, too clever to allow himself to be duped by this kind of overture and rely on the sincerity and good sense of the foreigners who were out to exploit the

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26 Select Committee Proceedings, April, 30.
A war with the British thus seemed imminent. Immediately afterwards Jayaprakas' deputies Fakir Ramdas and Mukhtar Umda (Muktananda) a Tirhutiya Brahman arrived at Patna and met Rumbolt and Captain Kinloch and acquainted them with the distressful situation of the place consequent on the blockade (June, 1767) by the Gorkhalis. They also had brought an assurance from the Raja of Kathmandu that the expedition shall obtain every possible help and co-operation in regard to provisions and communications.

Some Christian Missionaries had also implored in strong language for the same urgency of action on similar grounds (December 19, 1767). A draft memorandum was prepared at Captain Kinloch's behests and on the basis of the report intimated by the vakils, which amongst other things mentioned the need of a swift action if the surrender of the Valley was to be avoided, the reason being the very infirm position of the defenders and their inability to meet the exigency of the blockade longer than October. A brief estimate of the numerical strength of the enemy was there. The memorandum credits Prithvinarayan Shah to have assembled 80,000 soldiers of which about 30,000 were in the Valley. The Gorkha army had medieval and modern instruments of warfare. This account seems, however, much exaggerated as it was quite impossible to gather a huge force of 80,000 in the sparsely populated country of the Gorkhalis. But it could be explained to mean that the estimate was directed to stress the unusual gravity of the situation in Kathmandu. Captain Kinloch wanted to start soon on his expedition (July 4, 1767) and finish the job before the end of monsoon, as he thought 'the jungle choked the road then.' But the Select Committee was yet undecided. Captain Kinloch, therefore waited in Patna engaging himself in the task of preparations. This officer came all the way to Patna via Monghyr in response to the order of the authorities who had taken the decision about Kinloch without even consulting their Chief Military Commander, Colonel Richard Smith.

27 See also Joseph's report in Asiatic Researches, II, P. 318. For an account of the expedition provided by the British source materials. Read Nandalal Chaterji's Verelst's Rule in India, Chapter II, Pp. 21-41. He is the first scholar in India to bring to light this forgotten event of a British invasion of Nepal.
28 It was reported to Prithvinarayan that Jayaprakas obtained supplies of horses and presents from Udaipur (reference in his letter dated VS. 1819 Chaitra Vadi 5).
Prithvinarayan Shah was unbending to meet the British wishes of mediation. He now employed his resources to defeat British designs.

The British then gave an ultimatum to Prithvinarayan Shah to desist from encroaching on the territories of his neighbours. But it was alleged that he sent an insolent reply, and instead of complying with their request put forward a fresh demand for the surrender of Bettia on the ground that this belonged to his ancestors. About this claim on Bettia we do not know anything from the Nepalese version of the story. In any case this could be said that the Gorkhali Raja was not agreeable to listen to the British, and therefore they decided finally to send an expeditionary force against him. The Select Committee informed the Court of Directors about their decision to invade Nepal in a letter dated September 25, 1767.\(^{31}\)

Unfortunately for the British Captain Kinloch attempted to lead the invasion just at the time he wanted to avoid. For this he was not to blame. But he with Mr. Rumbolt seems to have put undue reliance on the report of the Nepalese vakils regarding the ease and facility with which they promised to escort the British contingent across the hills. (Letter to Governor, December 19, 1767). The Select Committee were informed that the invading army was to cover 96 Kos (192 miles) altogether by eleven stages, six of which lay in the hilly region.\(^{32}\) Some members in the Committee were not prepared to lend their support to the expedition unless and until a sure prospect of success was in evidence. It seems that the Select Committee were not much optimistic as to the success of the expedition and instructed Captain Kinloch to halt and encamp in Bettia if the Raja could be forced to submission. The Captain was instructed 'to proceed cautiously should he encounter unexpected difficulties due to the season, the situation of the country and the power of the enemy' (July 21, 1767).

In his high degree of optimism and his anxiety to save the Raja of Kathmandu before October, Captain Kinloch did not pay heed to the advice of the Committee. He did not even put himself in possession of full facts as regards the thoroughfare and nature of the difficulties and on the assumption that the Gorkhalis were not as inveterate as was suggested, which was in a way overestimating himself, he forthwith undertook the journey in mid rainy season (Bengal, Past and Present, Vol.XI,P.29; Barwell to his father, letter, February 28, 1768).\(^{33}\)

\(^{32}\) Letter to the Governor, July 21, 1767.  
\(^{33}\) 'the too great confidence of overcoming difficulties as encountered, grounded on a mean opinion of the courage of the nations to which our arms are opposed', thus Barwell wrote.
On the 21st of July the Committee having sanctioned the expedition, Kinloch set out immediately for Sindhuli with a view to capture the fort (Bengal Select Comm. July 21, 1767) with 2400 Sepoys (Barwell, ibid) and officers posted with men.

Although in the beginning the Select Committee thought of the doubtful result of the expedition, they were hopefully watching the progress of the force under Kinloch’s command once it marched to operate. Their hope as to the success of the expedition is expressed in their communication to the Court of Directors, dated 25 September, 1767. They wrote that the successful culmination of the step they have taken will bring immense benefit to the Company in matters of commercial advantage and more facilities in territories under Nepal’s jurisdiction both in the hills and low lands. They express the view that the step meant going against ‘the spirit of that system of politics whereby we the English proposed regulating our conduct retaining the character of merchants with scrupulous delicacy’. Yet all this had to be done in the interest of a policy designed to help the British commercial interest in Nepal.

The roads being extremely bad and interrupted by marshes and bogs as they lay across the dense forests, it being the rainy season, Captain Kinloch experienced great difficulty in taking his force to Sindhuli (From T. Rumbolt, December 19, 1767). But nothing was more serious than the scarcity of provisions. Apart from the shortage of grains available to him in the Terai, the question of assuring the porters about their safety was most vexing. The Gorkhalis were a terror to the people of the Terai and no amount of persuasion could attract the coolies to their job. The situation was so bad that not a man dared to move unless ‘he was escorted by a sufficient force’ (January 12, 1768, Bengal Sel. Com.). In these circumstances desertion was very common. Naturally the force could not march rapidly as was expected. Captain Kinloch’s was a limping movement. Often halting and waiting he was negotiating his course, which caused an undue delay in reaching the destination and was likely to frustrate the very purpose for which the expedition was undertaken.

The Captain passed from Darbhanga to Janakpur. At Janakpur he received the most flattering assurance that he would get a large supply of grains at Sindhuli but none could be delivered at Janakpur itself to relieve immediately the want of his half-starved troops. Acc-

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35 According to Joseph such recalcitrant people were hanged in a cruel manner. He says that he actually saw the hanging on the way with a rope tied round their necks.
GORKHA BECOMES KINGDOM OF NEPAL

cording to a chronicle Prithvinarayan Shah had heard that Kinloch reached Hariharpur on Asvin 9 of VS 1824 (Last week of September 1767). But there is no account of military engagement at the place. This is available only from British sources, which do not talk of fight in Sindhuli.

But hoping that the capture of an important place like Sindhuli Garhi (fortress) would place him in a position of vantage from which he could easily command provisions, he journeyed along the watershed of the Kamala river and reached Sindhuli un-opposed. Sindhuli was a fort of importance facing the inner Terai which commanded the pass to Kathmandu leading via Khurkoti, Jhanga Jholi, Dapcha and Panauti (Hamilton, pp. 168-69; Fr. Joseph, P. 251, As. Res; Letter from Rumbolt January 28, 1768). Its occupation was certainly a step further in the act of penetration towards the Nepal Valley. But the problem before Kinloch was the want of supply. The one promised at Janakpur did not reach him. Having been himself reduced to straits the Raja of Kathmandu had no power to arrange for any more provisions and supply for purposes of the British. Side by side it was no less difficult to break the line of blockade set up by the Gorkhalis who were very much particular in this matter and did not leave a single loophole to the advantage of the enemy.

The result was that the Captain’s force was put to miserable plight and suffered very much on account of food scarcity and ill-health due to inclement weather. But here no going back was possible and Sindhuli also could not be held for long.

From the local genealogical account, it appears that a fight took place at Sindhuli Garhi itself. Prithvinarayan’s policy was to allow the enemy to come up to the hills giving him a false hope of their (Gorkhalis) incapacity to resistance but making sure that no supply reached him and while on the hill overpower him by way of guerilla tactics. If Capt. Kinloch succeeded in capturing Sindhulis, it was because the Gorkhalis had abandoned that fort in order to allow him to advance further so that he might think that the enemy was weak. The scheme was to pounce on him while he came to the rugged hill areas, where the mountaineers could display their best skill. Prithvinarayan did not like to meet the enemy in the Terai. Drawn above the hills, however, he had to encounter an overwhelming opposition. The Gorkhalis were lying in ambush almost in circle around Sindhuli, while one army was under Birbhadra at Powagarhi, two miles north

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26 Also Kinloch to the Governor. 21 July, 1767.
27 In Sindhuli we have still a field gun lying in view up above the ridge. This was the field gun left by Captain Kinloch.
of Sindhuli, another was at Dhungrabas on the south-west of it. The commander in charge of the latter was one Bansa Gurung who was an experienced officer in the art of guerilla warfare. He was known as an expert hunter. From Sindhuli the Captain wanted to move towards Kathmandu to relieve the distress of his starving troops who were then on the point of deserting him (Letter to Rumbolt, January 12, 1768). In the mean time more units of the Gorkhalis army moved towards Sindhuli, and were closing round Powagarhi, which was now attacked by Kinloch's force. The Gorkhalis made a combined attack with all sorts of implements, firing bullets and throwing stones and directly hitting them with swords & arrows from above the hills and from down below it. Those inside the fortress also came out to do their bit. The British force was in a panic. The officers and men dispersed in confusion and left many wounded and dead in the field, Captain Kinloch and a few others were spared to narrate the mishap and fled with their life to Bettia. As per the estimate of Barwell, only 800 out of 2400 survived (Bengal, Past and Present, X,P.29.).

According to Percival Landon who does not of course mention his authority, the attack took place on the bank of the river Bagmati west of Hariharpur. His version is probably resting on the account of Mr. T. Rumbolt who talks of 'surprise attack' by the Gorkhalis in the area (Letter from Mr. T. Rumbolt, December 19, 1767). Oldfield does not even talk of an encounter. He says that Kinloch was obliged to return from before the fort of Mackwanpur because of sickness and want of provisions. But a noting in a diary of the time gives the date of engagement at Hariharpur, VS 1824 Asvin 24 (Second week of October, 1767).

This not only contrasts with the genealogical account we have just narrated but also with the official report submitted to Calcutta authorities, which does not mention the incident altogether. According to the letter the British force while trying to cross the swollen river by rafts met with an unfavourable accident and were compelled to retreat (Bengal Sel. Com. February 10, 1768). In Oldfield's account the British contingent appear to have retired because of the unhealthy climate of the area. This description, however, does not conform to facts and appears in the nature of a mere face saving device and there is no doubt that an encounter took place in Sindhuli resulting in the flight of the British troops. This is not only confirmed by the

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chronicles, but also by the information reaching Capuchin Mission in Kathmandu (See below). It is quite likely that a minor engagement with a wing of Kinloch’s force took place in Hariharpur. But in view of the statement of our chronicle, it will be wrong to suggest as one writer has done that Captain Kinloch himself came to Hariharpur abandoning Sindhuli without a fight.

It was said that having failed at Sindhuli Kinloch tried to negotiate the route to Kathmandu through the course of the Bagmati. This attempt he had to give up as the river could not be forded inspite of several devices. But all our information is about the occurrence in Sindhuli and Hariharpur does not figure in it.

Captain Kinloch thereafter managed to come to the Bettia Terai on the British border with the approval of Mr. T. Rumbolt and looked forward for a fresh expedition while enjoying himself in occupation of certain hill forts through which he planned to launch an attack. The land north of Bettia up to the hills was thus absorbed by him (letter from Rumbolt, January 3, 1768) including the present districts of Bara, Parsa and Rautahar (Bengal Sel. Com. January 12, 1768). It was said that he collected Rs. 20,000 as revenue for the year from this area, which was supposed to yield an annual income of Rs. 10 lakhs. But Kinloch claimed that this loss was compensated by a more secure position of Bettia resulting from the occupation, which was now free from the usual raids of the Gorkhalis.

The loss sustained through the failure of the conquest of the Valley of Nepal was expected thus to be compensated, for Mr. Rumbolt went even to the extent of cherishing hope for the renewal of the expedition (Rumbolt’s letter, January 3, 1768). But every hope excepting the safety of the district of Bettia faded away, while even that district since it constituted the lands claimed by the Gorkhalis was an object of occasional incursions at their hands ‘rendering even the task of defence financially unworkable’ (Bengal Sel. Com., August 11, 1769).

All this so disappointed the Select Committee that they gave up for good the idea of challenging the Gorkhalis and recalled Captain Kinloch to the capital asking him to appear before a commission of enquiry. (Sel. Com. December 11, 1767). They were of the opinion that ‘without being supported by a strong reinforcement would serve only

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43 Golding to Rumbolt, Select Committee Proceedings, February 10, 1768.
to expose the troops to the danger of perishing by famine and sword'.

Rumbolt had been informed that the failure of the expedition was due to 'misconduct in the officer or forgery in the letters and information of the Vakil and Fakil', and all this required a probe by a competent authority. Captain Kinloch was saved from being disgraced by a public enquiry on the intercession of Rumbolt who had vigorously defended him (his letter, January 28, 1768). The resolution ordering an enquiry into the conduct of Captain Kinloch was rescinded after a good deal of persuasion. It was said that the organisation of the expeditionary force was faulty and this lacked discipline, and one of the units was thoroughly useless for service.

Before taking up the account of the final conquest of the Valley by Prithvinarayan it is advisable that a short observation be made as to the attitude of the British towards him in 1767. It was not a fact that the British left him in quiet after their defeat in that year. They seem to have continued to harbour a deep seated grudge against the Gorkhalis, and were looking for a suitable opportunity to repeat the attempts until, of course, the hope of an attack on Nepal faded away due to Prithvinarayan's own dexterous move and his subsequent capture of the whole of Nepal. Mr. T. Rumbolt was the main architect of this anti-Gorkha move. He seems to have given the Select Committee to understand repeatedly that the Spring offensive was most opportune (January 28, 1768). Kinloch had still in his occupation a large tract of the Terai on Nepalese side near Champaran and Darbhanga borders. He could make this area a spring-board to launch an attack on Nepal proper. He assured that he could reach Nepal in five days' time. In Bettia he had the assurance of the exiles as to their full-fledged support against Prithvinarayan Shah (Letters from Golding to Rumbolt, December 25, 1767, January 3, 1768). It appears that the Raja of Tanhou Trivikram Sen whose territory touched Bettia was pursuing Golding to press the Company to open offensive without delay. Verelst was about to be swayed over to his views and he had almost convinced the Select Committee. But discretion which is always the better part of valour saved the situation. The idea of launching a second offensive was abandoned, because the Select Committee did not want to act hastily and indiscreetly.

44 Select Committee Proceedings, Vol. 13, P. 455.
49 Ibid, P. 128.
This time the Select Committee did not think it proper to under-rate the enemy's strength. For an expedition to be successful required a large contingent of troops. Rumbolt had recommended a battalion and four to six companies (February 15, 1768). This contingent was to effect a junction with Sergeant Logan who had surreptitiously entered Morang to penetrate to the eastern gateway district of Nepal from that side. But it was beyond the power of the Government to spare such a large army at a time when Haider Ali in the south was threatening the very existence of the British in that part of India and there was an urgent appeal for reinforcement from that quarter (Letter, President, Fort St. George, Secret Letter, January 9, 1768). In the meantime Kathmandu was conquered and the British who had already tested Gorkha toughness would no more dare take up the cause of the vanquished. On instruction from the Court of Directors (Letter, November 11, 1768), the Select Committee finally closed the chapter in their resolution of February 16, 1768. After a year they were even found flattering Prithvinarayan and hobnobbing with him. It was conveyed to him that his praise had travelled far and wide to reach the Court of the East India Company. Now the strategy was to resign to what was accomplished in Nepal by Prithvinarayan and to make the most out of it by humouring him and earning his gratitude. If the Gorkhali ruler proved irreconcilable, then alone conflicts would be inevitable. But they felt that this was not the time to start a conflict.

It seems that the British had not, however, renounced their claim on the Tauter Pargana (Sarlahi and Rautahar) with 23 mahals. This had kept alive mutual antagonism and suspicion for sometime more. The British said that the Pargana was forcibly occupied by Prithvinarayan Shah in 1767 and till then this was held by the Raja of Mackwanpur in payment of a tribute of Rs. 10,000 annually to the East India Company's Government who had inherited the rights of the Nawab over this area.

Although the danger from the south was warded off Prithvinarayan's plan for the capture of the Nepal Valley was delayed by a year on account of Lamjung and Parbat giving him a joint threat to invade Gorkha. He had to keep part of his force ready for any eventuality in that quarter. But Kaski standing by him, it was not possible

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54 CPC, II. 1767-69 No. 107, Letter to Prithvinarayan Shah.
for the two other states to carry out their threat into action against Gorkha.

**Fall Of Kirtipur**

Meanwhile unmindful of the attitude of the British agents in India Prithvinarayan proceeded to carry out his main task of conquering the three cities of the Nepal Valley. The Valley had been long besieged. The Gorkhalis were at the very gate of the two cities of Patan and Kathmandu by September 1768 after the fall of Kirtipur. Raja Jayaprabhas undauntingly stood to the last to save his capital, but now all was over.

The second wing now came at close quarters with Kirtipur, which was virtually besieged from all sides. We have seen how in October 1764 (Saka 1686 Asvin) the battle turned against the Gorkhalis who were themselves much exasperated and they had retired to Dahachok after sustaining severe casualties. But the blocked fortress could not carry on for long and after a protracted hardship (three years) was compelled to surrender on Pausa krisna 10 of 887 NS (December, 1767) to the conqueror. According to the chronicle the fort was attacked on nesta Chaitra sukla 9 (night) of 886 NS (Saka 1688). The chronicle says that the invader could not scale the walls of the fortress. Surapratap the commander of the invading force lost his left eye hit by an arrow from inside the fort. This time also they had to retreat, but they waited tightening the blockade, while negotiation went on for the surrender of the fort.

According to Fr. Joseph (*Asiatic Researches, Vol. II*) the surrender was made on the assurance given by the King of Gorkha that there will be general amnesty, which, however, he broke and as a reprisal ordered a general massacre of the proud defenders and had their nose cut off. The Father claims that he with his own eyes saw in 1765 all what happened to the nobility and people of Kirtipur. Joseph reported (*Ibid, Pp. 318-19*).

"But two days afterwards Prithvinarayan who was at Navacuta (a long day's journey distant) issued an order to Suruparatna, his brother, to put to death some of the principal inhabitants of the town, and to cut off the noses and lips of every one even the infants, who were not found in the arms of their mothers; ordering at the same time all the noses and lips, which had been cut off, to be preserved, that he might ascertain how many souls there were, and to change the name of the town into Naskatapur, which signifies the town of cut-noses; the

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55 Father Joseph reports 50 thousand troops on his side. But this is an exaggeration.
order was carried into execution with every mark of horror and cruelty, none escaping, but those who could play on wind instruments, although Father Michael Angelo, who, without knowing that such an inhuman scene was then exhibited had gone to the house of Suruparatna, interceded much, in favour of the poor inhabitants; many of them put an end to their lives in despair; others came in great bodies to us in search of medicines, and it was most shocking to see so many living people with their teeth and noses resembling the skulls of the deceased". This story of nose cutting is also given by Oldfield, (I, P. 272) as if it was a great event. The chronicle also supports this report and says that the total weight of the noses and ears chopped off was about 1700 dharnis (10 × 1700=17000 lbs). But all this seems unduly exaggerated, and a historian has to be cautious in giving credence to it.

Prithvinarayan Shah's army was now threatening the very city of Kathmandu. Having captured Balaju and Nagarjung ridge only a mile to the north-west of Kathmandu about a year ago, (Vaisakha krisna 14 Saturday 886), the Gorkha ruler was knocking at its very door.

Jayaprakasamalla put up a hard resistance to the best of his resources. No better example of heroic resistance appears in the history of the Malla rulers of the Nepal Valley. But that alone was not sufficient to defend freedom or to drive away an invader. In spite of his good sentiments and heroic qualities, Jayaprakas was devoid of tact. He offended his people by taking recourse to inhuman mode of reprisals and to a hasty and indiscriminate war policy.

At the last moment he so found that not a soul was left there to sympathise with him. His army had rebelled. His Ministers and noblemen were mostly dissatisfied. Finding that his own people were quite apathetic to himself he set up a regiment of the Sepoys from the Terai, which acted like a thorn to pierce the patriotic men of the Valley, who by temperament felt very much hurt by this act. Besides, an alien army of hirelings was costly. It was to be supported at a greater cost and for this he had no money, exhausted as his treasury was by a long war. He, therefore, began to appropriate the stored wealth of the temples. The exigency of the situation justified the action, but on constant instigation by the enemy the Brahmans and the people of religious temperament took it as an impious encroachment on their sacred belief and mode of worship. To a high degree of a mounting unpopularity this factor was added, which did a great deal to inflame the passion of a tired and enraged populace. According to Father Joseph the Gorkhalis also bought support of the courtiers and won over a good many of the inhabitants with vested interest in Birta lands by promises
to provide security and peace to them. Prithvinarayan Shah had won over to his side a great many of the wealthy families. From a letter he wrote to a Bhandel family reproduced in Eitihasik Patra Sangraha, (P. 23) it appears that some of these were acting as his agents creating splits and confusion in the opponent’s camp. Intrigue was so deep in Kantipur that Jayaprakas had even begun distrusting his own mother as he intercepted a forged letter from the Raja of Gorkha written to her purported to have been sent in reply. Although this was something which he could not believe, yet that was enough to create suspicion (See Prithvinarayan’s letter to Kirtiranjan Upadhya reproduced in Eitihasik Patra Sangraha P. 24).

**Capture of Kathmandu**

Prithvinarayan Shah entered Kathmandu in three directions. His three pronged attack was more than a match to the already attenuated force of the Kantipur ruler. Although a year earlier Bhatgaon and Patan had pledged their words to come to the aid of Kantipur when attacked, it turned to be a smooth sailing for Prithvinarayan as none of the two kept their plighted words to turn up in defence.

On the day of Kumari Yatra celebrated up till now, which occurs on the fourteenth day of the bright fortnight of Bhadra NS 868 (September, 1768) and while Jayaprakas was undergoing an annual ceremony of enthronement in the heart of the city amidst public rejoicing (Hamilton, P. 231), the conqueror surprisingly entered the campus at the head of a substantial force which had penetrated through three ways, Bhimsen Than, Nardevi and Tundikhel from the south-west, west and east respectively. No resistance worth the name could be offered although there was a fight for 4 hours, while the people ran in panic. The whole of Kathmandu was occupied by midnight of the same day.

It is said that for some time Jayaprakas took refuge in the temple of Taleju inside the palace, and he had the routes to the Palace mined with gun powder but he did not find his refuge safe for a long siege of the enemy. Tularam Pande, a Gorkhali Sardar, was killed by the explosion of gun powder that lay spread on the path to the palace. He was grievously wounded and died at Aryaghat the next day.

Jayaprakas had a narrow escape to Patan but as the latter city surrendered to Prithvinarayan two days later because of the treachery of the Pradhans, the noblemen of that place, he retired to Bhatgaon with his comrade Tejnarsinha (Oldfield, II, P. 273) and 300 Madhesiya Sepoys. The chronicler gives the date as Saka 1690 Asvin 24 Thursday.

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66 Asvin 13, 1826 VS. according to another source, but this is wrong.
CORKHA BECOMES KINGDOM OF NEPAL

(Second week of October 1768). In Pausa two months after Prithvinarayan Shah entered Patan at the head of the triumphant procession. The chronicler states that he also caused the death of many noblemen who betrayed the Malla ruler of the area.

About the events leading to the fall of the Nepal Valley we have the following lines by Father Joseph who was then living in Kathmandu but who wrote on recollection after being expelled from Nepal. The article of Joseph appeared for the first time in English in *Asiatic Researches*, (Vol. II, 1790) by efforts of Sir John Shore.

"The King of Gorkha having made himself master of Cat’hmandu in the year 1768 persisted in the attempt of possessing himself also of the city of Lalit Pattan, promising all the nobles, that he would suffer them to remain in the possession of their property, that he would ever augment it; and, because the nobles of Lalit Pattan placed a reliance on the faith of his promises, he sent his domestic priest to make this protestation,\(^6\) that if he failed to acquit himself of his promise he should draw curses upon himself and his family even to the fifth past and succeeding generation, so that the unhappy Gainprejas and the king of Leli-Pattan, seeing that the nobility were disposed to render themselves subject to the King of Gorcha, withdrew themselves with their people to the King of Bhatgan; when the city of Lalit Pattan became subject to the King of Gorcha, he continued for some time to treat the nobility with great attention, and proposed to appoint a viceroy of the city from among them. Two or three months afterwards having appointed the day for making his formal entrance into the city of Lalit Pattan, he made use of innumerable stratagems to get into his possession the persons of the nobility and in the end succeeded; he had prevailed upon them to permit their sons to remain at court as companions of his son; he had dispatched a noble of each house to Navacut, or New Fort, pretending that the apprehensions he entertained of them had prevented his making a public entrance into the city; and the remaining nobles were seized at the river without the town, where they went to meet him agreeably to a prior engagement. Afterwards he entered the city, made a visit to the temple of Baghero (Bagh Bhairav) adjoining to our habitation, and passing in triumph through the city amidst immense numbers of soldiers, who composed his train, entered the royal palace, which had been prepared for his reception; in the meantime parties of his soldiers broke upon the houses of the nobility,

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\(^6\) Joseph reports that a large number of clever Brahmins of Prithvijnarayan’s side were employed in Kathmandu on espionage work, who, however, were trying to pass as Jayaprakas’ helpers.
seized all their effects, and threw the inhabitants of the city into the utmost consternation: after having caused all the nobles who were in his power to be put to death, or rather their bodies to be mangled in a horrid manner, he departed with a design of besieging Bhatgan, and we obtained permission, through the interest of his son, to retire with all the Christians into the possessions of the English.”

A resume of what Father Giuseppe Rovato writes to Rome on 29 December, 1769 under the date line Patna is prepared in the following paragraphs to give an idea of the happenings in Nepal in between 1764 and 1768, the years of Gorkhali invasion.58

“In the beginning of 1764 the king of Kathmandu was assailed by a combined force of Patan and Bhatgaon. But God saved him. Then taking advantage of the feud, Gorkha laid a siege on Quipolli (Kirtipur, Kipo). The attack, however, was repulsed. Prithvinarayan’s brother Surapratap was hit in the eye and was treated by Father Michael Angelo who was summoned there. Again Kirtipur was besieged. Other kings tried to help. Finally after many months of siege, the Gorkhalis won over to them men who were guarding one of the gates, through which they entered the city and announced general amnesty. But the promise was not kept. Then followed cruel vengeance, cutting of noses, etc., which contradicted their profession. The city, therefore, was called Nasikatapur. The Fathers were also worried because their profession varied with their deeds (Gorkha).

“In the Summer of 1767 the King of Gorkhas laid siege of Patan, and took 12 thanas on the eastern side of the city and destroyed all the beautiful houses therein on the outskirts. The advance came as near as the sanctuary of the mission, and the bullets fired by the Gorkha troopers were reaching our compounds. The Fathers of Kathmandu persuaded us to leave and go back to Kathmandu with the converts to save themselves from the risks of the assault. But suddenly one night the Gorkhalis evacuated all the thanas and we came to know that they had gone to meet the invasion of a small British expedition which was on the way to Nepal to help Jayaprakas on his request. The British force after taking Sindhuli Garhi (then under Gorkha) had advanced as far as the foot of the mountain close to the Valley but the Gorkhalis who had collected there in sufficient numbers repulsed the English throwing stones at them from above the hills, preventing them from climbing the mountains. The English army retreated, and was in occupation for sometime of the low lands that had earlier been conquered by the Gor-

GORKHA BECOMES KINGDOM OF NEPAL

KHALIS. But our troubles multiplied because they suspected that we were responsible for summoning the British to invade Nepal. The Gorkhalis thought that all the Europeans were of one party and of one mind and the Fathers had inspired this expedition.

"Father Marco Dolla Tomba in Bettia was anxious because he obtained no news about the Capuchin missions in Nepal. A Brahman was sent with gift of a binocular to the king to find how we were faring. This man came to Quipolli and secretly handed over the letter to Michael Angelo who was treating the King's son in the camp. After sometime, however, the fact of the letter leaked out and Michael was summarily ordered to go to Kathmandu. The Brahman later on got into trouble and was sent to Gorkha for incarceration. We did not know what fate awaited him there. As it was an unfavourable season, there was no chance of the English force to make a fresh attempt to march further. So Kinloch's expedition ended abruptly and all ideas of repeating it abandoned, and, therefore, Prithvinarayan Shah called the major portion of his troops, and collected others for his help and with them he occupied the strong points which were round Kathmandu. Then he surrounded the town, and besieged it. The Fathers in Kathmandu sent their belongings and their wards to Patan, because the Gorkhalis now occupied their cemetery, and made it a thana and the windows of their church lay exposed to firing. The Fathers, however, stayed as they had received promise of protection from Surapratap. In the month of September of 1768 the Gorkhalis entered the town. Four Brahmans were sent to our place to protect us. Poor king of Kathmandu who was abandoned by everyone, even by his own soldiers who gave no resistance whatsoever to the Gorkhalis managed somehow or other to run to Patan with 200 soldiers who stuck to him and defended him up to the last. These were not influenced by the deep and subtle intrigues and espionage of the Gorkhalis. In Patan the missionaries were apprehensive about the fathers in Kathmandu. King Prithvinarayan desired to take Patan without any fight and bloodshed. To this end he sent his master of religion, a Brahman, to negotiate with the Pradhans. But the latter feared revenge and cruel treatment and hesitated to surrender. However, on repeated assurances in writing of protection of their life and property and on swearing that malediction would fall on his 8 generations (anterior and posterior) if he failed to carry out pledges, the Pradhans gave in. The king of Patan fled to Bhatgaon where Jayaprakas had already taken refuge. After nearly a month of this conquest of Kathmandu, Patan fell to the invaders. Prithvinarayan used all devices to lay hold on Patan. Sweet words,
loud promises of kind treatment and of rewards of titles and honours and assurances of safety for life and property were abundantly extended. But once the troops occupied Patan, they deprived the Pradhans of their property and detained women and girls of their families. The latter were enslaved and some of them handed over to the lowly. The coming of the king of Gorkha spread terror everywhere. Such a big city so densely populated looked almost deserted, because either many had run away or kept themselves in hiding. King Prithvinarayan with this achievement left for Noakot where he had sent all the Pradhans made prisoner. The Gorkhali Governor left behind was a great enemy of the Europeans. He maltreated the missionaries and tortured the Christian converts. The mission was closed when the fathers secured permission from the King to go back to Patan.”

The last paragraph of the letter reads:

“To end the news about Nepal let me add, the son of the King of Gorkha after having conquered Bhatgaon, the last city which fell to the Gorkhalis, he sent to us to Bettiah the few belongings left by us in Bhatgaon through some of his people. He kept for himself whatever valuable of the goods was left there. Through these men, we came to know that he had the three kings of Nepal taken prisoner after having massacred many people. The Gorkhalis also seized the persons of many Pradhans to whom he had sworn protection. Later he massacred them all in the most horrible way. Some of them were flayed alive and yet more were tortured to death applying salt over the flayed surface of the body. The tortured died of violent pain, others were sawed and more others had their abdomen opened and intestines taken out, still more of them were cut into bits; their tongue, eyes, nose and hands one by one torn off. One cannot even imagine how terrible it was.”

The Capuchins had been forced to leave Nepal on account of Prithvinarayan Shah’s hostile feeling towards their activity. As such they were prejudiced against him and were prone to give credence to any account of Prithvinarayan’s treatment of his vanquished adversaries. So what was reported in the above paragraphs cannot be taken as something fully consistent with reality. The version is that of one who carried a telltale to give a highly inflated account of the happenings in Kathmandu after Prithvinarayan’s victory over the Raja. It was all a hearsay that had appeared in the writing. It cannot be denied that in the heat and hurry of actions while fright and confusion widely prevailed some excess was committed. Prithvinarayan Shah was also not supposed to deal leniently with those who had betrayed their masters.
Had they been spared, the very security of his hard won kingdom would have been exposed to serious risks of sabotage from within. But even all this was confined to a small number of those highly placed in the outgoing regime. The people in general were not touched at all. Therefore, there was no question of their suffering at Prithvinarayan's hands. Rather, they felt relieved of the unhappy situation which had prevailed for long in their country in the wake of court intrigues and rivalry amongst the three rulers of the Nepal Valley. It could not be said on any account that there was a feeling of discontent or hatred towards Prithvinarayan Shah. As far as the general mass of the people were concerned, his victory had only introduced a change of ruling dynasty. In place of scion of the Rajput Malla family, they were now having a descendant of the Chittor clan of Rajputs to rule over them. This did not make any difference to them. But Prithvinarayan Shah had put an end to the chaos and misrule of petty lords and restored peace and security to a consolidated kingdom. The people had now secured what was primarily necessary for their prosperity and progress.

For about a year Prithvinarayan did not interfere in Bhatgaon. Earlier in 1765 he had tried a way to imprison the old king in a place near Banepa, which greatly strained their friendly relation. The attempt could not succeed owing to unexpected circumstances. But as Ranjeetmalla was lulled into a false sense of security by his promises, he did not scent of the proposed imprisonment, while he at the same time sincerely observed his words of neutrality standing as an eye witness to the fall of his brethren. But when Prithvinarayan demanded the surrender of the refugees from Kathmandu and Patan, his sense of brotherhood rebelled in him. Yet another consideration would prevent him from giving shelter to the refugees. The chronicle narrates how he referred the matter to public approval and finding that there was a general sanction of his policy of giving protection to the exiles he turned down Prithvi's request. Thanks to his fate Jayaprakasamalla now acquired a breathing space and organised whatever remained of his army to try eventually one more fight with the Gorkhalis.

Bhatgaon was surrounded on all sides towards the end of 1769 A.D. The date mentioned by the chronicle in the possession of a Boralang Thapa family is NS 890 Kartik sudi 12. This appears almost correct as we have another source, which gives Kartika sukla 14 margaroj 1 of Vikram 1826 Saka 1691 NS 890 dina 29 Saturday (another Ranjeetmalla had issued a decree calling upon his people to go to the aid of the Gorkhalis (VS. 1830 Marga Vadi 10).
noting has 28). A few months before Bhatgaon fell to the Gorkhali conqueror, an incident took place to arouse Prithvinarayan to the action of taking arms against Ranjeet, who was all along his admirer and supporter. This was: one day while he was surveying some important outposts on the eastern border, a party of Jayaprakasa's Naga troops led by Bhavanisinha attacked him near about what is now called Hvang-hvang Pati; he was about to be killed but timely intervention by Harkha Pantha and Bijali Pantha averted the fatal blow. This so enraged him that he thought now to absorb Bhatgaon and do away with the possible threats of reprisal. He could not surely leave Bhatgaon even otherwise, as now this had become a refuge for Jayaprakasa, Tejanarasinha and others who were likely to use the opportunity to manoeuvre against him. According to Wright the occupation was effected without major resistance, the Gorkhalis having entered the palace through certain temples could easily penetrate the habitat of the refugees and suddenly overpower them. All the three Rajas were imprisoned, Ranjeet alone afterwards being treated otherwise and in conformity to his royal dignity, who then begged leave to go to Banaras.

According to the chronicle Prithvinarayan's forces advanced through two directions, east and north-east and set fire to houses in the vicinity of the eastern gate at Belakha Tola to cause panic. Ranjeet and party lay inside the palace at the shrine of Taleju, but by the time they could collect themselves the Gorkhalis under Parasuram Thapa and Surapratap had reached the main door through the shrines of Brahamaini and Dattatraya just in the east. The latter quickly scaled the outer wall and in groups took possession of the roofs of a portion of Hitichok near the gold door. Outside Jayaprakas had placed a field gun, but firing was entirely ineffective. Then Ranjeet sent a reconnaissance unit to know the movements of the Gorkhalis but they were shot down one by one in their place from a portion of the palace which had fallen to the invaders. Now the Gorkhalis reached the very roof of the Mulchok (main courtyard) from the eastern side and started shooting the inmates beneath. Two men were killed instantaneously, and there was an uproar, and was followed by 11 deaths due to another shower of bullets. The defendants thereafter left Mulchok for Choukot which was the tallest part of the building inaccessible from other parts due to its height. It was thought that this would give them a place of refuge, where no bullets from around could be fired. While Ranjeet and

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* Wright narrates a gallant resistance offered by Nam Singha Rai and Mahendra Rai at Dhulikhel (Pp. 253-54). These also belonged to the Sannyasi community.

*1 According to the same source Jayaprakas fought bravely (255).
Tejanarsinha were already there, a bullet hit Jayaprakas in his right leg as he was just getting up the stairs to join them and all outside was gruesome tragedy, murderous killing of the defendants, everywhere the invaders marched unchallenged. Jayaprakas died a brave man's death due to the wound the day after in the evening. After a while it was felt that resistance was futile, and all others surrendered. Tejanarsinha was kept in confinement where he died, while the ruler of Bhatgaon was permitted to go to Banaras.

Jayaprakas died in Aryaghat on the bank of the river Bagmati at the feet of Pasupatinath. Prithvinarayan Shah went there to see him as he lay on his death bed. The two adversaries had already faced each other once just a day earlier in Bhatgaon, while Jayaprakas was being surrendered. Prithvinarayan had then said ‘Jayaprakas, what do you think now. You boasted that you would humiliate me and put me in chains’. To this the reply was, “I accept defeat at your hands. Fate willed it so. You came out victorious and I lost. But I am satisfied that I fought to the end. I only regret that own people betrayed me. They were treacherous; they had taken impure food”. Prithvinarayan Shah was impressed with this reply of his brave adversary. While the victor and vanquished met for the second time, because the latter was dying naturally the tone was soft and words were sympathetic. But Jayaprakas proudly said that he was so happy that death came to him so soon. It would have been an insult if fate had decreed to kill him in prison after some time. He had loathed to die as a captive in the hands of his adversary and it would have been torturous to languish in prison. Jayaprakas was then asked to say if he had any wishes to fulfil. But he kept quiet indicating that a dying person had no earthly wishes. Prithvinarayan, however, insisted on getting the answer and assured him that he would fulfill whatever earthly was possible for him as the King of Nepal. The suggestion was that the dying ruler of Kathmandu should perform some rites and give alms to the Brahmans and the poor and needy. But Jayaprakas thought otherwise; his face glowing with a smile. Then he fell into a pensive mood. It appeared that he was thinking about some serious matter, and suddenly he got exited, although the last moment was almost come. Then gaping wide his mouth he said, “All right, you give me an umbrella and a pair of shoes”. At this all sitting around the sick-bed including the new King of Nepal were stunned. But Prithvinarayan calmly told him that he would not have his real demand fulfilled not until the third generation after him was seated on the throne. Nevertheless a pair of shoes and umbrella were provided to him.
It was said that Jayaprakas desired to have power to take revenge upon many of those who had betrayed him.

The chronicle gives an account of a similarly poignant scene while Ranjeet was bidding the last goodbye to Nepal. As all the elderly members of the ruling Malla families were permitted to proceed to Banaras, Ranjeetmalla was also given to know that either he should go to Banaras or live anywhere outside the limits of the three principal cities of the Nepal Valley. He chose to go to Banaras forsaking the pleasure of living in the midst of his relations and countrymen. The chronicler wrote that with his long experience of association with the administration of his country Ranjeet had grown bitter towards his former subjects. He did really feel as he had to leave his country, but he wept profusely for the fact that men here had not been enlightened enough to respect certain precious values of society. We have a song attributed to Ranjeet said to have been composed as he enjoyed the last look of his home town from the top of the Chandragiri mountain, but which severely attacks the royal family, the ministers, the priests, the officers and other leaders of the Valley of Nepal for their treacherous role during the last thirty five years.

The bewailing and desire for revenge on the part of the former Kings of the Nepal Valley against their erstwhile associates certainly reflect on the state of morality in the Valley of Nepal, which to all accounts was poor and extraordinarily poor. It is not that the defeated rulers had found a fault with someone and apportioned blame for the mishap of the failure of their own game, and we catch the issue to make a sweeping generalisation about the moral state of the people. But what was in evidence indicating a sorrowful picture of human degradation in Nepal was the fact of a series of betrayal by those surrounding these rulers, which surely was caused by a deplorable situation where morality had sunk very low. The event of the defeat of the rulers of the Nepal Valley is not so important by itself. Where two combatants stand in the field, one surely wins and another is defeated. But the defeat of a ruler at the hands of an outsider, brought about by the machination of those very persons who wielded influence in the state, is not something which we can dismiss as an affair isolated from all moral considerations.

It was said that both Ranjeetmalla and Jayaprakas warned Prithvinarayan Shah against the intriguing climate of the Valley, and it was for this reason that the latter had used the most cruel measures of killing a large number of men in an endeavour to eliminate the least possibility of a hostile underground base of intrigue against himself.
Until Bhatgaon was conquered, Prithvinarayan Shah maintained his headquarter in Noakot. But since the conquest of Bhatgaon, he shifted his camp to Kathmandu which was formally declared the capital of the new Kingdom. It was said that temperamentally Kathmandu stood to satisfy the main requirement. It was suggested that Patan was a hotbed of ministerial intrigues and its condition allowed free scope to its ministers to plot against its ruler, and Bhatgaon's people were turbulent enough to render the throne always infirm. Kathmandu, however, was free from the traditional weakness of the sort associated with the two cities. It was to guarantee his security and the security of central power in Nepal that determined this choice of Kathmandu as capital. As soon as Kathmandu was made headquarter of the Government of Nepal, Prithvinarayan added several wings to the royal palace, one of which he named Vasantpur to surpass in beauty and grandeur all that had so long appeared in building in Lalitpur, Kirtipur, Bhaktapur and Kantipur.

The chronicler states that his next step was to order a new settlement of land. By this he made uniform not only the system of land tenure but also the tax on land. This uniformity was enforced by bringing the land measurement in the Valley of Nepal in line with what obtained in the hills.

It was said that the mass of the people in the Valley were much fear-stricken because of the new master; they hesitated to appear in customary rituals. While Prithvinarayan came to know all about this, he made an announcement that all subjects of the Government were equal in the eyes of law irrespective of community and caste he belonged to. He also declared measures to assure them full rights in respect of religion, traditional rites and practices. Prithvinarayan went a step further. He himself participated in many celebrations and performances where previously the Malla rulers had figured. He also helped to repair damaged temples and donated lands for their upkeep.

_Achievement of Prithvinarayan_

In the prevailing atmosphere of the Valley mutual antagonism worked to a pitch had the only consequence, and that was to invite the Chief of Gorkha to take advantage of the situation and push his own plan of conquest in troubled waters. Prithvinarayan Shah did really succeed in taking advantage of the situation. The conquest and annexation of the Nepal Valley tended to so enlarge his domain that he could now carve out a substantially large and viable kingdom, of which he became the sovereign.
But it was all for the best that Prithvinarayan Shah was to conquer and annex a good many portions of the erstwhile kingdoms of the Himalayas. His failure would have only helped the forces of disintegration and kept the division intact, and the birth of the Kingdom of the magnitude envisaged by him as handed down to us would have never taken place. In the wake of Prithvinarayan’s defeat the British colonial interest was sure to acquire a firm footing. Nepal would not have been destined to become a unified whole as it is today. The Chaubisi, Baisi and the three Nepal Valley kingdoms—all would have been there. Our fate would have been little better than that of the small states in India in British days, where petty princes ruled the roost under British paramountcy. The example of Simla and Orissa states is before us. After all, Prithvinarayan was no alien to the peoples of the central Himalayan region. He was a true native of the soil of this region. All these states were different members of a single central Himalayan family, whether the Baisi, the Chaubisi or the so called Newar triumvirate. It would be wrong to take Gorkha conquest as an event of empire building. No alien peoples were involved. Geographically, historically and in race and culture the vast majority of the peoples all over the Himalayas are alike. Prithvinarayan Shah’s victory was in the nature of the victory gained by the King of Wessex over the Heptarchy in the British Isles.

History shall remember Prithvinarayan for keeping the name of Nepal in the map as a political entity. If Jayaprakasmalla had his way, the English would have been in the saddle in Kathmandu since 1767 with the Valley of Nepal as their first protectorate even if the Kathmandu ruler might not have liked it. The political importance of Nepal as the capital city of a large independent Kingdom in modern times owes to Prithvinarayan Shah. Under British suzerainty Nepal would have been at best another Srinagar (of Kashmir State) of a small princely state of India. Its area would have been no larger than that of a first-class district in British Indian provinces. Sikkim or Tehri would have been its nearest parallel. It would have never enjoyed the glamour of the Capital of a large country. Except for its utility as the summer resort of wealthy Europeans and Indians and as a trade centre of present Kalimpong’s importance to link India with Tibet, the Valley of Nepal would have appeared of no consequence.

Prithvinarayan Shah could be rightly called the father of Nepalese community or nation as the term is understood at the present time. Prior to his laying the foundation of a Kingdom that was destined to be the state of Nepal of the present dimension, there was actually no
community of the name suggesting the one spread over a territory which today constitutes Nepal. In the dispensation existing under the British what we might witness was the motley crowd of petty feudal dependencies, that would give a name to these individually in accordance with the situation. Thus instead of bearing a common designation of a Nepali, the peoples of this region would have been called variously after each state, e.g. the Lamjung (from Lamjung), Parbate (from Parbat), Jajarkote (from Jajarkot); Palpali (from Palpa), etc. In the late medieval age the inhabitants of the Valley of Nepal had come to be known as Newars. They spoke one language called Newari in common usage (this was designated as Deshbhasa or Nepalabhasa in inscriptions of the 16th and 17th centuries). They also shared in common certain features of social customs and manners. They could lay a claim to a sort of homogeneity over a major part of the Valley inspite of diversity of racial origin. But they could never have been equated with the Nepali as is understood in a larger context. The Nepali of today bears his name not from the Nepal of the olden times, but from the Nepal of the present which comprises at least twenty-five times its original size after the amalgam effected by Prithvinarayan and his successors. Modern Nepal appears in the capacity of a whole consisting of several parts, one of which is old Nepal. But as we have said, this old Nepal is not a large part, its importance lies only in its position as the capital of the Kingdom of Nepal. Otherwise in point of territorial stretch this looked even more insignificant because it was also divided. Thus the Nepali would have been conspicuously absent from these denominations.

This much about King Prithvinarayan at this place. We shall have occasions to say more about him.

Relation with the Chaubisi after 1768

During his engagement in the Nepal Valley, some of his officers, Kazi Bansaraj Pande, Kehar Sinha Basnyat and Sardar Prabhumalla were measuring swords with his adversaries in the west. For the time being they were successful. After defeating Tanhou and Kaski, the latter in an engagement on the bank of the river Seti, they reached the bank of the river Gandak. Rising, Ghiring and Dhor were occupied. Paiyun was occupied on Vaisakha 27 of VS 1828 and a day later the Raja of Bhirkot took to flight. But by this time Malaibam and Lamjung aroused to awareness of danger threatening them made a combined effort in collaboration with other Rajas to challenge the Gorkha
conquest. In battles which subsequently followed, in Satahun, the Gorkhalis were defeated and they were again pushed back to Marsyangdhi (VS 1828 Pausa 5). The forces were besieged in Dhor and these escaped with difficulty to the east. All the conquered areas west of the Marsyangdi had to be evacuated.

As long as he lived and for a long time more till these were eliminated the Chaubisis lived on no good terms with Gorkha, and the greater its acquisition in the east the more inimical became its relation with the west. Prithvinarayan, however, had not lost hope and he did not cease his efforts to disrupt the combination. But he failed. But in case of Jumla, Jajarkot, Salliana and Piuthan he succeeded to alienate them from the fold of the Chaubisis. To every one of these he sent deputies with presents and pledges of friendship. From a letter quoted below (to Mahant Bhagwanntnath who was of great help to him in this matter) it appears that the deputies had to take the circuitous route of Bhot as the Chaubisis would not allow them pass through their territories.

March to the East

The defeat sustained by Prithvinarayan Shah’s forces in Dhor and Satahun cost him some of his best soldiers like Keharsinha Basnait and Vansaraj Pande who gallantly died while fighting for the flag of their King. Keharsinha had also acted for sometime as the King’s Chief Minister. According to the chronicle they fell into the hands of Parbat in a serious condition of illness, on being wounded and later died.

The conquest of Bhatgaon enabled him to lay a claim on the portion of the hills right up to the river Dudhkosi. On Asvin 5 of VS 1830 the Gorkhalis occupied Dingla and places west of Arun. By March of 1772 (VS 1830-31; Marga to Phalgun) the Gorkhali army reached the bank of the river Tamor on the other side of Limbuan. The area known as Limbuan was ruled by tribal heads in ten divisions, who were called Bongbas. The leader of the Gorkha army was Abhimansinha Basnait who in Saka 1698 Pausa (Inscription at his old house in Keltole) calls himself Kirat Vijayi and Mantry belonging to the Sena dynasty. He was being ably assisted by Rama Krishna Kuar and Amarsinha Thapa. Now the entire portion of the Kirata region came under the Gorkhali ruler. On Sravana 5 of 1830 having captured Chaudandi, (Vijayapur next day) Prithvinarayan Shah could claim mastery over a large slice of territories in the Terai as far as the Kosi and upwards at least fifty per cent. of Limbuan to the line of the river Arun. In the month of March of 1773 the Gorkha army descen-
ded into the Morang area. Raja Kamadatta was the sovereign of the eastern basin of the river Tamor, which included the provinces of Vijaypur, Chainpur,62 Athrai and Morang. But owing to his enmity with a Limbu Chief, Budhakarna Rai, who was his minister, he was not in a position to offer resistance to the foe. Yet he stood with all his might against the invader and halted his progress if only for some months. A few months before the Gorkhalis attacked Vijapur, he fell a prey to Limbu treachery and was killed. This Kamadatta, while previously an exile at Calcutta, had approached the East India Company for help against Budhakarna. These papers are still available (See Persian Correspondence. Vol. II no 241; Hamilton, P. 140). According to a British source he claimed territories as far as the Gandak. He also said that he was legal heir to the deposed King of Bhatgaon. It is said that as the sanyasi robbers were often making raids into British territories for occasional plunder, and Purnea was ravaged by Budhakarna, the British authorities very much wanted to back up Kamadatta as against Budhakarna with an eye to the permanent occupation of Morang. But this calculation was upset by the timely invasion Prithvinarayan carried on that area.

If the Kirata chronicle is to be believed, the ruler who fought the Gorkhalis in this area was a Kirata, Athing Hang, who had adopted customary practices of the country of the Senas. He was defeated in battles, as he had also to fight the Bhutias in another sector in the northern part of his Kingdom, which caused a diversion leading finally to his rout at the hands of the Gorkha Commander Abhirnan Basnait.

According to the same source the Sena Raja of Morang, Bissantar Sena had died without any issue to succeed him. Therefore, Budhakarna Rai, his Minister, brought Athing Hang, an heir to the Kirata throne in Libuk Hang's line, to rule over Morang. Athing Hang was formally elected by an assembly of the tribal heads of the ten Kirata tribal provinces and eldersmen of Morang. But as Kamadatta had asserted his right over the throne, Athing Hang lost his ground and retired to his native village without any contest. A little later while Budhakarna controlled the northern portion of the principality Athing Hang was regarded as the de jure sovereign for this area.

Earlier while Morang was ruled by a Regent Queen during the childhood of Bissantar, the Sikkimese invaded the country and annexed certain portion of outlying areas in the hills and the Terai to their advantage. According to the Kirata chronicle, nine out of the ten tribal

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62 Chainpur covered a big slice of hilly territory at the north extremity from the bank of the river Arun in the west to the bank of the river Tamor in the east.
heads of the hilly region did not co-operate with the defenders owing to dissension raging in their own camp. This facilitated Sikkim’s movements, and final success.

It appears that Kamadatta often referred to in East India Company’s papers was not a direct successor to the throne of Morang. He was a member of the royal family laying claim to the throne in the situation which developed after the ruler had died childless. Initially he had some difficulty in getting his claim recognised by the ministers of the principality, but after sometime as Budhakarna was reconciled to him, he could settle down as the lawful ruler of the soil. In the final act of the drama, however, Budhakarna tried to go against him and so terribly harassed him that his initial success proved of no avail to him to frustrate the design of his adversary.

King Prithvinarayan issued a royal charter (Sanad) for the regulation of the relationship to subsist between the capital and the Kiratas. The Sanad was addressed to Kiratas from Mackwanpur under date line VS 1830 Sravana (≈1773 A.D., August) and was thus worded: You are the faithful subjects of the Raja of Mackwanpur; you ate his salt and you remained true to him till the last hour; now the Mackwanpur principality ceases to exist; we have become its sole master, and we take you under our protection; as you were the subjects of the Raja of Mackwanpur, so today you are our subjects; we have pardoned you for any offences committed in the past; so all of you live in your land without any fear whatsoever; do not have any kind of doubts about your security; we guarantee the same to you and we value your friendship and loyalty.63

Prithvinarayan Shah also proclaimed that the Kiratas will not be deprived of their kipat lands, and except under mortgage, no outsider will take possession alienating the original owner.

This Sanad guaranteeing also certain other rights to the Kiratas went a long way to pacify them, and all over the Limbuan headmen of villages pledged loyalty to him even before the ruler in Morang had been defeated. Their coming over to the side of Prithvinarayan Shah not only guaranteed a state of tranquility in that quarter but also enabled him to push ahead in his victorious march with confidence and surety.

The British had their own interest in the affairs of Morang. Having resigned to accepting Prithvinarayan’s claim over Nepal and its adjoining areas, they wanted at least to save Morang for themselves, because this region not only was important for reasons of trade of fir and other

63 Unpublished.
wood products but it also provided a passage to Tibet. North of Morang the Himalayas had a pass, Hatia by name, that was easy of access and could be used in all weathers. A flourishing trade mart called Wallanchunggola lay on this side of Nepal at the pass. The British authorities in Calcutta had thought to get hold of this pass and the mart failing to secure control over affairs in the Nepal Valley. It was said that the British desired to help Kamadatta to fight out the Gorkhalis. This was, however, not possible in view of internal squabbles at his court. At about this time again Kamadatta was living in Purnea and fighting Budhakarna on the border. The latter was in occupation of the upper portion of the area including the hills. From British records it appears that Kamadatta approached the British several times for assistance and at the last instance even went to Murshidabad and Calcutta to pursue the British to take up his cause. He also approached the Nawab of Bengal, who however directed him to the British. But the British with their experience of mountain warfare during the expedition of Kinloch hesitated. Kamadatta was returned without any assurance and a little later he was killed. After this Ajit Singh of Purnea suggested to Peacock the idea of helping Budhakarna Rai. Meanwhile the Gorkhali army overran the whole of Morang. In a letter to Prithvinarayan Shah dated August 10, 1774 the British Governor protested against the occupation of Vijaypur (Bijepur) and Amirpur claiming that these had been parts of Bengal. But the Gorkhali King replied to say that they belonged to Mackwanpur and Kamadatta was the legal heir. But as Kamadatta was dead and he had gained mastery of the area by dint of conquest, he was now the real sovereign of this tract. It was said that Prithvinarayan was prepared to acknowledge the British as the suzerain over Vijaypur (Bijepur) and Amirpur and pay to them as rent, Rs. 75,000 annually. But how the settlement was effected ultimately we do not know. The British do not seem to raise this afterwards. A little earlier there came a suggestion from a British officer that the British should back up the cause of Raghunath Sena, uncle of Kamadatta, but the Select Committee did not like to act up to this suggestion.

In October 1774 Budhakarna was expelled and the country was finally absorbed into the new state of Nepal. Budhakarna was afterwards kidnapped and killed by the Gorkhali Sepoys (Hamilton,
This is confirmed by a letter of the King to the Commander-in-charge of the operations. The same letter says that Budhakarna was kidnapped from the British territories while in flight.

Budhakarna could have menaced Gorkhali position in Morang. Therefore Prithvinarayan wrote to the British Governor requesting to withhold all help to the Kirati Chief who had usurped Kamadatta's authority over Vijaypur and Amirpur. Two Vakils, Parsodh Pandit and Aka Misr (Mishra) had come to Calcutta with the letter of the King. There was also a communication from Devadatta Shah about this affair (Dewan, CPC). They were asked to meet the Governor in Patna. The British later complained that they did not care to turn up in Patna and requested the Nepalese King to send in future persons with a greater sense of responsibility.

Karna Sena of the middle principality between the Kamala and Kosi was expelled a year earlier (Hamilton, P. 140). He was a son of Jagat, brother of Kamadatta. In British documents he is referred to as Coraine Sen. For some time the British behaved with him as if he was the lawful chief of Morang. His career ended while the British stopped their intrigue against Nepal.

Prithvinarayan Shah had in mind the elimination of the small principality of Sikkim, as he immensely desired to make his boundary contiguous with Bhutan. Towards the end of 1774 he actually fought Sikkim, the result of which was the capture of the district of Illam up to Islimba Chanthapu (Bogle, PP. 144, 149, 517). But he was too cautious to avoid a conflict with Lhasa. He had strictly ordered to stop at the original boundary of Sikkim, and not to push Nepal's frontier in that region at the cost of Tibet even to the extent of grabbing 5 inches of the former's territory.

In a letter he wrote to Mahant Bhagwantnath of Ranagram (Sallian) he says that the frontiers were pushed to river Tamor in the hills and to river Kankayi in the plains (V.S. 1831 Bhadrapada Sudi=1774, September). He was confident of vanquishing Sikkim and teaching it a lesson.

From the same letter it appears he had demanded from the Raja

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67 The chronicler of the Kiratas narrates that Budhakarna was shot down by a bullet while being pursued by the Gorkha army. He was riding an elephant attempting to escape through an easterly route along the foot of the hills. The chronicler discounts the story of Budhakarna's treachery to his master and says that he was true to him till he breathed his last.

68 Itihas Prakas, I, i, P. 14.

69 Calendar of Persian Correspondence, IV, Nos. 333, 334.


71 Itihas Prakas, Ibid.
of Sikkim the surrender of those who had escaped to that country, and in case of non-compliance and evasion war was threatened. Viswamitra Upadhya and Gangananda Acharya were being sent to negotiate a settlement with Sikkim. But a few months after Prithvinarayan died and the war in that sector came to an end. According to the chronicle he expired at Devighat, confluence of the Trisuli with Tadi on the day of Magha Sankranti, NS 895 VS 1831 = 1775 A.D., January (13 or 14 or 15). He was just fifty at the time.

Some writers particularly, Wright, Oldfield and Hamilton, have wrongly put his death in 1771. Kirkpatrick, however, who visited Nepal in early 1793 heard that he died in early 1775, and so did Bogle. Markham in the latter’s biography writes that Bogle had been informed about Tashi Lama congratulating Pratapasinha on his assumption of office in early 1775. And the man writing only after 18 years would not commit a mistake so as to write a wrong date of his death. Pratapasinha had informed the British Governor at Calcutta in a letter received on 20 November 1775 that his father died and he had succeeded to the throne.

Prithvinarayan Shah was ailing for sometime, and he was advised to pass his winter in Devighat which enjoys a warm climate. But death overtook him there without letting him complete his mission of life.

After the victory over the Rajas of the Nepal Valley he had set out to organise and consolidate his position therein. Immediately after the flight of Jayaprakas and Tejanarsinha, he had to deal with a very dangerous element of the nobility, who while carrying on treacherous negotiations with him for the betrayal of their masters were also in no mood to trust him. Prithvinarayan with his keen insight into human nature rightly reciprocated this mood in identical fashion and while affecting friendship with this element never trusted himself to their own affection.

Just as he did away with the intriguers of Kirtipur by killing them downright, a similar treatment was meted out to all those who had betrayed their country and masters. Prithvinarayan had all the chief intriguers of Patan and Bhatgaon beheaded within a few months of his conquest.

The account which finds place in Wright and Joseph is thus presented: For some time he showed himself very much favouring to them; after three months he secured the persons and their children by

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72 Bogle, P. 191.
73 Calendar of Persian Correspondence, Vol. IV, Nos. 2048, 2049.
feigning the pleasure of their company to his son; he also could send as hostages some noblemen to Noakot, as a condition for his entrance to Patan and till he returned safe to Kathmandu, but all these safety provisions were set aside when he arrested all the Pradhans when they came to meet him; he took them all to Noakot, where they were probably put to death.

For this act he is condemned by English writers, but an unprejudiced estimate of his policy leaves us in no doubt that Prithvinarayan could have done anything else at his own peril. There is a proverb in Nepali, which says that a heifer eater is also a bull eater. If an ever intriguing element of nobility would have been allowed to survive and left to pursue its old ways the great kingdom which he built would have been again treacherously shattered to pieces.

Prithvinarayan had left two sons while dying. They were both born of Queen Narendralaksmi. The first, the Crown Prince, was Pratapsinha and the second Bahadur Shah. (See the inscription of Prithvinarayan on the outer wall of the Basantapur mansion). Queen Narendralaksmi figures in a coin of her husband.

His relations with his brothers though quite intimate till his conquest of the Nepal Valley were strained as soon as he showed signs of consolidating the domains into a single state. They were five brothers born of three mothers (Dibya Upadesh and Bhaktavijaya kavya)—the eldest being Prithvi himself, was followed successively in order of seniority by Mahoddam Kirti, Dalamardan, Daljit and Surpratap. Each of these brothers was helping him in his military exploits to the best of his capacity, and risked his life and all for the sake of the common cause. The second and third of them occupied the posts of Ministers (Chautara). The fourth served the common cause in the capacity of a commander and fought several battles at a great risk, in one of which he lost his left eye. But according to the chronicle they coveted a principality for each, and when this was not possible they even went to the extent of withholding co-operation at the last stage.

So much so, that the author of Bhaktavijaya kavya locates the three of them in Noakot at the time of the attack on the city of Kathmandu. Only Surapratap had been with the invading force but he too left immediately after the conquest of Bhatgaon to domicile in Palpa. It was said in the chronicle that Prithvinarayan rewarded Keharsinha Basnait for exploits in the battle at Bhatgaon ignoring Surapratap who had outshone everybody else in bravery on the occasion. Dalamardan had in a sullen mood repaired to Katarban in the Terai, and also passed his days there. The Eitihasik Patra Sangraha gives a
letter of Prithvinarayan to show that Kirtimahoddam had written objectionable letters to some courtiers in Kathmandu, which had been intercepted. It appears that the latter was attempting to incite influential men against the King. On coming to know about the interception of his letters Kirtimahoddam hastened to write to Prithvinarayan clarifying his position. Although the letter pleaded innocence, this was enough to put Prithvinarayan on his guard as to his brothers; and both Kirti and Dalamardan were not permitted to come to the capital in the life time of King Prithvinarayan. At one time during Rana Bahadur's reign Kirtimahoddam exercised great influence at the Court. But Kirtimahoddam died in exile. Dalamardan had once succeeded in securing a passage to the favours of his nephew but was again compelled to retreat to Bettia.

**Prithvinarayan's Character**

Two European travellers, Hamilton and Kirkpatrick, who visited Nepal in the last decade of the 18th century wrote about the new ruler of Nepal in the following terms. We first quote Hamilton:

“Prithvinarayan was a person of insatiable ambition, sound judgment, great courage and unceasing activity, kind and liberal, especially in promises to his friends and dependants, he was regardless of faiths to strangers and of humanity to enemies, that is to all who opposed his views” (P. 245). This writer goes on to say that he was responsible for the introduction of firearms and European discipline in the army, but he took few Europeans in his service. This shows how distrustful he was of the Europeans and how tactfully he managed his affairs.

Here is what Kirkpatrick says:

“There are some contradictions in his character which our imperfect knowledge of his history does not enable us to clear up: thus, notwithstanding the cruelty he manifested in his treatment of the inhabitants of Kirtipur and in his ungenerous attitude towards the Patan nobilities on some other occasions, he is said to have disgraced one of his principal adherents for wounding one of the enemies while in the act of fleeing from the field of battle. In fine, we may conclude from the respect in which his memory is yet held by the Parbattias and especially the military part of them, that whatever his conduct as a conqueror or however severe his nature may have been, he was not in-

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attentive to the means of conciliating those on whose support he principally relied” (P. 271).

We may not wholly agree with the above mentioned writers in their estimate of Prithvinarayan’s character and attainments. But there was no doubt that he was one of the greatest figures of the time. His greatness was acknowledged by his adversaries, and there could be no greater tribute to his genius and achievement than the one from the writing of two European writers.

Prithvinarayan Shah was a nationalist to the core of his heart. With him if conquest was the aim of life, patriotism was the guiding factor for any action. He combined in him all roles of a patriot and a valiant soldier and an organiser and a general. That is why as he acquired territories of enormous extent he saw to it that these were well consolidated under a centralised rule, and that the various people brought into the orbit enjoyed security without any feeling of being subjugated. He was anti-British and anti-European and opposed by all means their colonial interest. We have seen how alert he was in his dealings with the Europeans. His whole being was full of distrust of their intentions. He believed that once a foreigner from off the seas set his foot on any part of the soil of Nepal, the very independence and welfare of its people lay exposed to danger. He showed intolerance of even the presence of European Missionaries whom he expelled as soon as he was in control of the Nepal Valley. He was equally opposed to granting equal rights of trade to people outside of Nepal. As soon as he was in control of the Valley of Nepal, he expelled the Kashmiri traders and Gosains. He was always for encouraging the enterprising Nepalese of all castes and sects and enthuse them with all assistance on to the path of commerce and trade and advised his countrymen to patronise native industries. In his historic speech now published there is a significant passage supporting this conclusion.

Earlier he had secured a Dharmapatra from Jayaprakas Malla about Gorkha’s trading and political rights in Tibet (VS 1814 Pausa 3 roj). Jayaprakas had conceded negotiability to Gorkhali coins in Kathmandu as a reciprocal measure, and along with this had accepted export of the former country’s coins to Tibet as well as distribution of Tibetan and Indian (Madhyesh) gold and silver in equal proportion between his country and Gorkha.

This meant that Gorkha was playing as much a dominant role in Tibetan economy as the two kingdoms of the Nepal Valley. According to another provision, Gorkha also had obtained equal rights with Kanti-
pur to intercept and confiscate contraband goods either from or to Tibet, while each of them was to give protection to legitimate trade carriers passing through their territories (Kathmandu and Gorkha).

Before his time Gorkha had no coins of its own. It depended on Kantipur and the two other kingdoms of the Nepal Valley for the supply of the medium of exchange even for internal markets. Gorkha’s first coin dates Saka 1676 (=1754 A.D.).76 The reference to Gorkha coins in the above is an evidence of the economic advancement the territory had come to secure during Prithvinarayan’s reign.77

Prithvinarayan was a master diplomat. He conducted his foreign policy cautiously and tactfully. The following extract from one of his letters is revealing for information in regard to the various missions he set up overtly or covertly in important centres outside his country. This bears testimony to an advanced system of diplomatic organisation he created, even though it was rudimentary. In a letter he wrote, “Vrihaspati Pandit has gone to Purnea, Kirtimali to Patna, Vaikuntha Upadhyaya to Nawab Sujaddaula. These persons are stationed there. Dinanath has left for Calcutta and shall reach there soon. For Lhasa we have Bhimgiri’s disciple Rajgiri and he goes there”.78

The fact of Gorkhali representatives being stationed at British headquarters is corroborated by a British source. In a communication addressed to the British Governor, Prithvinarayan Shah had informed that his Vakil would wait on him to talk about certain border disputes.79 The name of Dinanath figures as his vakil.

Prithvinarayan’s success was not the success of a single person. He had able generals and diplomats around him. We have already recounted the services of those placed in charge of military affairs. But for all these brave and honest men the series of victories over his opponents was not conceivable. The chronicle provides about fifty names including those of his brothers.

In dealing with the British in India, King Prithvinarayan Shah handled his foreign policy astutely and firmly. He knew that the British were not reconciled to the situation that had emerged after his victory over a large part of the central Himalayas now constituting the Kingdom of Nepal. He understood fully well that the British were

76 Walsh, n. 1 (Gorkha Coins). He only describes. The coins are scarcely available.
77 For the coinage of Gorkhas see Walsh, op. cit., Pp. 740-41. The first coin has on the obverse eight-petal lotus wherein is inscribed Sri Sri Sri Gorakhnath, Sri Sri Sri Bhawani, Sri Sri Prithvinarayan Shahdeva, 1676. Other coins dated 1680, 1683 and 1691 are also traced (Itihas Prakas, i, P. 117).
79 Calendar of Persian Correspondence, Vol. IV, No. 1443, November 28, 1774.
professing friendship for him only outwardly. Inwardly they nursed secret inimical feelings against him. As they had failed to acquire domination in Nepal by adventurist tactics, they had now adopted a policy of intrigues and looked for an opportunity to harass him and weaken his strength. But the English by that time were become a great power, and it was not desirable to pick up a quarrel with them at that stage unless supported by a combination of forces all over the Indian subcontinent. Therefore, Prithvinarayan too adopted a tactical policy of maintaining a show of friendship for the British while building up strength and resources in his own country.

Prithvinarayan had a clear vision of the future of his country. He felt that if he could keep Nepal free from the influences of the European colonialists, his country’s progress and security were assured. His primary objective was to avoid both conflicts and contacts with the foreigners, particularly the immediate neighbour, British. He cleverly avoided likely imbroglios. He shelved problems that would involve him to undertake near friendly intercourse with the British because he felt that any intimate conduct would give the British pretexts to interfere in his affairs. While he was prepared to discuss questions of disputes he evaded all negotiations for permanent relation of any kind between Nepal and the British. This evasive policy was almost baffling to the British. It severely taxed their patience about the question of border disputes. The British were anxious to obtain Kathmandu’s acceptance of their claims on certain areas on the border then occupied by the Nepalese. But he maintained consistently a noncommittal attitude on all questions of border dispute as it concerned the very integrity of his country. He knew their stratagem and stratagy and would not be caught unawares. The British complained that it was hard to negotiate with him because of this attitude. It was said that on a particular occasion (while negotiation about Baijitpur was being conducted) while some kind of commitment was wanted from the Nepalese Vakil, it was found that he was not acquainted with the business and had no full powers.80 To a request for suppressing the Sannyasi raiders on the Champaran border the Gorkhali King had responded by extending a claim on parts of Bettia. In both the cases the response was as good as a refusal. But all the while he pleaded with the British ‘not to be prejudiced against him by the mis-statement of his enemies’.81

At the time when Warren Hastings was hard pressed in Banaras (1772) the Nepalese Vakil even made an offer of military assistance as a ges-

80 Ibid, No. 1526.
ture of good will on behalf of his master, which, however, was not accepted. It is said that a large force of the Gorkhalis was waiting at Mackwanpur, but it returned as the Banaras revolt was suppressed. Obviously Prithvinarayan Shah was playing to appear as a friend of the British. The latter attitude smacks of hypocrisy, but Prithvinarayan had only acted in pursuance of a policy dictated by his circumstances.

His feeling towards his compatriots in India, however, was one of brotherhood. He looked upon the peoples in India as his own fraternity. The Nepalese and Indians were kith and kin of each other. The English were advancing in pursuit of a policy of military conquest and they were polluting the soil by their impure and infidelish touch. India was gradually being brought under their heels and sacrileged that way. But Nepal was saved from the British. Therefore Prithvinarayan had said about this country that it was the real ‘Hindustana’ where ‘Cows and Brahmans were duly revered, and laws of caste strictly enforced.

Prithvinarayan Shah was opposed to any kind of parochial sentiment. His nationalism was not limited by any consideration of bigotry and vested interest. It expressed the best aspiration of the people of Nepal, their desire to be happy and prosperous and remain independent. As European powers were spreading their tentacles in India, the under current of national feeling manifested through extreme hatred of them. It was not in any way directed against other country Powers of India.

In the same vein Prithvinarayan Shah tried his level best to prevent the British from gaining ascendancy in Tibetan commerce. He wrote to the Tibetan authorities requesting them not to permit the entry of English goods into Tibet. He also advised them to discourage British efforts to penetrate into Tibet.

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83 A line from his *Dibya Upadeshi*, published by M. Naraharinath.
84 A line from his *Dibya Upadeshi*, published by M. Naraharinath.
85 This information was given to Bogle by the Panchen Lama, Markham, P. 158.
CHAPTER IV

EXPANSION FROM THE GANGES TO BHUTAN

Pratapsinha

He was crowned on Mahga 2 (Mahga krisna 10) of VS 1831 Saka 1696. This was celebrated by issuing a new coin in his name. Prithvinarayan’s successor Pratapsinha reigned about three years.¹ In his time a few more areas were annexed to the newly formed Kingdom of Nepal, mainly on the west and the eastern boundary in the Terai was pushed to river Kankayee.

Pratapsinha is credited with the knowledge of Tantric Philosophy and he wrote a book on this subject.² He was engaged in constructive activities. He had renounced war to undertake a plan of rehabilitation. He also entered into an alliance with Tibet and concluded a treaty with that country pledging afresh the commitments of the Malla rulers towards the Potala.³ (For the copy of the draft see appendix below).

Pratapsinha died towards the end of 1777. Hamilton was wrong to say that he died at Devighat in 1775. (P. 247). Obviously he had confused the father’s death with the son’s. But Oldfield repeated Hamilton’s mistake (I, P. 279). According to the chronicle his death occurred on 6 Marga of VS 1834 (1777, third week of November). This is the correct date. In a copy of the ms. Karandavyuha⁴ written on Chaitra sudi 13 of 898 NS (early April, 1778). Rana Bahadur, the infant son of Pratapsinha, is referred as a sovereign.

Rana Bahadur succeeded his father Pratapsinha while he was a baby of three and half years old. His coronation took place a year after on Marga vadi 3, 1835 VS. The coin struck in his name is dated Saka 1700 (1778).

Regency

Pratapsinha’s death is followed by a period of regency which conti-

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¹ Pratapsinha was also known as Sinha Pratap in several contemporary records (See Bhimsen’s Bagmati inscriptions). But the coin, and his literary works have Pratapsinha. Kirkpatrick, P. 272: Oldfield, I, P. 279.
² Purascharryarnavah Maharajadhirajena surarjanukarina Srinad Pratap-sinhena vidyaadrepara driscenca Sanvatsare nisanathavanhinagadharankite tapasyarjuna pakse hi tithau bhaskara vasare, etc., (VS 1831 Phalgun=March, 1775).
³ This is called Dharmapatra, and the text executed in Newari.
⁴ In the possession of a monastery in Chikanvahil (Patan).
nued for full seventeen years. During this time two notable personalities of the Court, one a woman and another a man held alternately the reins of power. The Regent queen was powerful enough to issue a coin in her name (Saka 1700—1778 A.D.)⁶

Rana Bahadur, was 'an infant in arms' (born on VS 1832 Jyestha vadi 10 Thursday (=1775, May). For sometime the regency was placed in the hands of his mother. His uncle Bahadur Shah was an exile in Palpa at the time the infant King succeeded to the throne. He reached Kathmandu a little later. Bahadur Shah had troubles with his brother in the very beginning of his reign, and was compelled to leave the country. So was Dalamardan Shah, his uncle, the younger Chautara who was exiled for the second time. The circumstances in which Dalamardan Shah met his fate have been described by the chronicler thus: Kazi Swarup Karki was ably and honestly serving the Queen, and she was immensely pleased with this man; but one day the Kazi committed some errors, and the Chautaras Bahadur Shah and Dalamardan Shah complained to the King and had him imprisoned; on the Queen's intervention however, the Kazi was pardoned and released and Dalamardan Shah who was the principal hand behind the incident had his entire household and properties confiscated and himself with his family exiled. The property was given to Kazis Bhotu Pande and Jagatjit Pande.

It seems Bahadur Shah had for some time lived in Bettia, the place where most of the refugees from Nepal took shelter and then he had shifted his residence to Palpa. Bettia was then the head-quarter of a Christian Mission, and was also the seat of Mr. Golding, the English agent of the Bengal-Bihar Divani, for that area. The Missionaries and English civilians were not slow to activise the rebels if any of them wanted to hit Nepal. A letter written in 1878 by Sashidhar Upadhyaya to Pratapsinha reproduced in Eitihasik Patra Sangraha (P. 29-30)⁶ purports to show that there was a conspiracy afoot to overthrow the Government of king Pratapsinha and the conspirators were waiting for Bahadur Shah to reach Bettia and take the leadership. It is not known whether Bahadur Shah's consent was obtained for the move. But according to the information contained in the letter it was suggested that Bahadur Shah's participation was sure to attract notice of the Englishmen, and ensure their co-operation. Amongst certain facts mentioned by the letter writer the following cover main points: Dalamardan Shah admits that there was a raid on Nepalese territory; but he

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⁶ Walsh, VII. 8 (¼ mohar).
⁶ Published by Nepal Sanskritik Parishad.
did not order it; it was organised by Sanekhawas who embraced Christianity to escape penalty; others Dalmardan's sons who were in straitened circumstances were also thinking of embracing Christianity.

Dalmardan depended largely on the support of Golding. Dalmardan was approached by Ranajung and Kasinath to organise another raid, but he discouraged this idea. Some people, one Bhima and one Kashinath, were deputed to fetch Bahadur Shah whose messenger had just reached Bettia. In the above letter Dalmardan says that on no account he would harbour evil intention against Gorkha. He never thought ill of his country. He had been only misunderstood. Others, however, were preparing to enlist men for conspiratorial actions. Swarup Sinha was planning to go to Banaras. He often complained that he was punished for no fault of his.

It looks that Pratapsinha died near about the time while the plans were to mature. Bahadur Shah proceeded straight to Kathmandu to perform the last rites of his brother, probably on request by the Queen Mother. Dalmardan's confession of earlier guilt and repentance, however, was fruitless as his presence was not desired by the ruling clique. Perhaps Bahadur Shah was not in a mood to invite troubles on account of his presence. At the time his request came, two prominent figures of the court were strictly dealt with on charges of plotting against the late king, his son and his wife, now the Queen Mother; the one Pt. Braja Nath Paudel was exiled to Sindhuli and the other Parasuram Thapa was detained in military custody. Brajanath repaired to Banaras after sometime.

There is a reference to the fact of the plot being unearthed in the letter written in the name of Rana Bahadur Shah to Dalmardan Shah. Probably the hands of the exiles were suspected in the conspiracy, and therefore, Dalmardan Shah's request to go to the capital was turned down, though the pleas put forth were based on the facts of malarial season and difficulties of the proposed trip.

It appears that the case against Brajanath was cleared after some years while the king came of age, but long before that, the court was feeling that he was not treated with justice. Brajanath could not find his place back in the court, but he had the satisfaction of obtaining testimony written in terms that showed that he was unjustly treated by Bahadur Shah. Brajanath passed the rest of his days in Banaras, and we come across specimens of correspondence he had with the Palace from that quarter—he received also confidential letters from the King and his mother which shows that his innocence had been established, and he was restored to his usual position. Kirtimahoddam's two sons.
Balbhadra Shah and Krishna Shah were the only persons to be invited to reach the capital. Letters to them are clothed in words that show the high esteem they were held in at the time. Probably they happened to be Bahadur Shah's partisans as one of the letters indicates.7

Bahadur Shah had a rival in the Queen Mother as long as she lived. This lady as Kirkpatrick observed, was 'possessed of extraordinary character and talents' and gifted with the capabilities of a ruler. Her brother-in-law was no match to her in the art of intrigues. She had forced him to leave Nepal for the second time.

According to the Chronicle his sister-in-law, mother of the infant King, Rajendralaksmi, was nominated regent by the late King at the time of his death. In the beginning she was greatly influenced by Bahadur's tactful handling of the administration and by his capabilities and genial temperament. But this influence waned as soon as she realised that he was a mighty personality and she began to be afraid of him and use her efforts to oust him from the powerful seat of vantage he occupied in the realm.

The Rani had her own partisans in Sarvajit Rana and his group, to which were allied a few Basnaitis. Due to their influence she got Bahadur Shah and his sister Jethi Maiyan expelled from the realm. Jethi Maiyan was living in Thankot. It was during these days that he cultivated friendship with the Christian Missionaries. But Bahadur's expulsion antagonised a large section of his adherents, and as a result the court was divided in two groups, and as the collaterals and Pandes were together on one side, the queen had to face a formidable opposition. Daljit Shah was the leader of this group. He contrived a situation which led to the Queen's imprisonment. (Bhadra 19 of VS 1835). This was effected while her favourite Sarvajit Rana was murdered one night. Exploiting this situation Bahadur triumphantly returned to the capital and it seemed that this time he was not to meet a rebuff.8

The queen mother, however, was rescued (VS 1836 Asadha 10) by efforts of Kirti Uddam Shah, the then Chautara, and soon after she applied herself to avenge Sarvajit's death. Bahadur Shah this time was himself put into dungeon, and a host of his associates were killed including his nearest relations. Daljit had to run away to India for

7 See letters of Rana Bahadur, Nos. 6 & 7 in Eitihasik Patra Sangraha.
8 Father Joseph wrote, "but scarcely two years after on Pratap Sinha's death, a younger brother by name, Bahadur Shah who was residing with his uncle Dal-mardan Shah, at Bettia, was invited to accept of the Government and the beginn-ing of his Government was marked with many massacres. The Royal family is in the greatest confusion, because the queen lays claim to the Government in the name of her son............." Asiatic Researches, II, 1790, P. 322.
his life. Kazi Harkha Pantha was banished to Lamjung. Although Vansaraj Pande was not physically touched he fell out of grace and was forced to retire. Kazi Swarupsinha who had earlier gone to the east to avoid Bahadur returned to help the queen who had now become the regent.

Later on Pausa 15 VS 1840 (beginning of January, 1782) Kazi Vansaraj Pande was banished to Bettia. A little later Bahadur Shah escaped from detention and went to leave in Palpa. In some chronicles Vansaraj Pande has been reported as killed.

Daljit Shah, the Chautaria, was the most powerful man in this period but he could not serve his full term; he was banished to Kasi on being accused of killing a Brahman.

Meanwhile a sizable force of the Gorkhalis was watching an opportunity to grab Lamjung and its allies of the Chaubisis. In March 1777 two companies under Sardar Bali Bania and Sardar Rama Krisna Kuar advanced to Balithum where a battle was fought to the failure of the Gorkhalis (Phalgun 30 of VS 1835). According to a letter written by Rana Bahadur to Brajanath Paudel in VS 1836 (1780 A.D.) Bhadra (September) roja 1 the progress of military conquests was maintained at a level left at the time of the death of Pratapsinha. Here, however, there was a checkmate. But negotiation had started with Parbat, Lamjung and Kaski for a settlement of disputes, which, however, was abortive. Meanwhile as a result of defeat the Gorkhalis were forced to retreat relinquishing the hold of Upardanggarhi and Somesvar ranges (VS 1836, Vaisakh 13). The letter mentions Harkha Pantha confessing his guilt as a rebel, who was expelled to live an exile’s life on the other side of the river Marsyangdi. As other names given by the chronicle in connection with the aforesaid conspiracy are missing in ascertained documents it is difficult to explain the episode of Harkha Pantha’s confession and exile. But from a noting of a chronicler it appears he was connected with the activities of Bahadur Shah, who was just then thrown out of power.

**Further advance to West**

Two years after (in Pausa) another battle was fought at Sirhan Chok, but its leader Kazi Amarsinha Thapa had to retreat to this side of Chepe, though he inflicted a crushing defeat on Lamjung’s ruler Viramardan Shah.

The combined force of Lamjung and Parbat was defeated in Tarkughat whither Amarsinha had advanced through Dordor after crossing
the Marsyangdi. This helped the Nepalese to lay hold upon Kaski which was then in the hands of Viramardan of Lamjung.

Lamjung was captured in 1784 October (VS 1839, Kartik 12). Sometime back Kaski's ruler Siddhinarayan Shah had taken shelter in Gorkha under pressure from Lamjung. The Gorkhalis neutralised Tanhou by a treaty. Lamjung was to be vigilant on both counts. And to this was added the garrisoning by the Gorkhalis of a number of outposts on the frontier from which they advanced in three pronged drives; Kazi Devadatta Thapa through Bhote Woddar; Damodar Pande through Raganas; and while Sardar Pratiman Rana and Kazi Amarsinha made a direct assault from Baglungpani (north will facing Lamjung) and Lamjung fell without firing a bullet. Kazi Godutta Shah in his turn occupied Kaski in the same way in 1705 Saka, Jyestha (=May, 1782).

Further West Noakot was captured in 1782 (VS 1840 Phalgun 15) by 6 companies of sepoys led by Kazi Balabhadra Shah, and Pratiman Rana and Suba Jogamalla. The latter two were stationed there, while a wing advanced towards Palpa through the course of the River Kali Gandak and captured Paiyun, then ruled by a chief of impure descent. A few days after on Phalgun 26 Palpa Tansen fell to the advancing army without a fight. But all this was at the same time evacuated on being pressed jointly by Satahun and Parbat. In an attempt to retreat they had to evacuate Kaski also, and the Gorkhalis now assembled at Lamjung, where the wings stationed at Noakot joined. The new line of defence extended from Tanhunsur to Golekha to Manang. But advancing from the side of Tanhun Kazi Abhiman Sinha Basnait recaptured Kaski, Satahun, Bhirkot and Rising and also Noakot which greatly cleared the ground for the main troops to sprawl around the vantage points.

Death of the Regent Queen Mother

In 1708 Saka VS 1843 (1786 A.D.) Sravana 4 Wednesday the Queen Regent Rajendralaksmi died. A year and half earlier to this, compelling circumstances had removed Kazi Swarupsinha who was later killed. Swarupsinha was then leading a wing of the army. He was cut to death in Pokhra on Sravana 24 of VS 1842. This opened the door for Bahadur Shah's re-entry, and he was soon restored to power. He became the Nayab with Daljit Shah again as the Chautara for the second time.

A noting in a diary of the day puts the marriage ceremony of Bahadur Shah with the daughter of the Raja of Palpa on Magha 10,
1842 VS. In another noting, 15 Asadha of 1843 VS Bahadur is presented as escaping to Pharping where he was living in a sullen mood at the time of the death of his sister-in-law.

In the six years from 1786 to 1794 Bahadur Shah acted as regent. As soon as he became the regent, he took care to see that the adherents of the queen mother were dislodged from key positions in the administration and army. Kazi Swarupsinha was killed. But all this did not affect the hard core of the army command. For sometime there was a lull in military activity. After some days, however, the lull broke. Chautaria Jiva Shah, Kazi Sivanarayana Khatri, Sardar Partha Bhandari, Sardar Amarsinha Rana, Suba Jogamalla and others left forthwith for the conquest of regions west of the river Kali.

There was a large advance of troops in the two directions. As we saw the purges effected by the new regent did not at all touch the High Command of the army. The soldiery behaved as if nothing had occurred, which concerned them, as absolutely no new changes had taken place in the armed forces. Gulmi was occupied by a section of troops stationed in Pokhra. Later Rupakot was captured on Jyestha 30 of VS 1842. Kaski and Noakot were annexed to Nepal on Asadha 2 subsequently after. Although Noakot had to be given up for sometime it was finally ceded to the Gorkhalis. It appears from a letter of Rana Bahadur to Sashidar Khatri of Gulmi (dated 1841 Marga vadi 14) that the latter had successfully helped to maintain friendship between the ruling houses of Gorkha and Gulmi. At one time Gulmi was even tempted with the prospect of adding territories at the cost of Piuthan (Rana Bahadur’s letter, dated 1842 Sravana sud 11 roj 3). But this kind of hobnobbing with Gulmi through Sashidhar did not go further, and as soon as it was seen that the situation demanded its annexation, Gulmi’s fate was summarily decided on.9 Gulmi was merged in Nepal in Jyestha. Sardar Amarsinha tried to advance through Chandrakot with two companies; Suba Jogamalla invaded Khanchi and Kazi Jiva Shah’s target was Arghoun. These three places were soon occupied, and they jointly proceeded to Baglung after laying siege on Isma on the way. There was a two-pronged attack on Parbat. The wing that attacked through the northern sector was led by Damodar and Jagajjit Pande. Parbat was conquered without much resistance (Asvin 13 VS 1844). Through Dhurkot the latter wing advanced to Piuthan,10 which was captured on Asvin 19 (VS 1844). Jajarkot and

10 A letter of Maharajadhiraj Yurajni Vilasakumari by Rana Bahadur (Pausa 1842 VS) has lines expressing the latter’s anxiety about Piuthan.
Salliana having concluded a treaty of subsidiary alliance, the army stopped at that point, but to march again by-passing these states. In 1712 Saka (1790 A.D.) they conquered Dailekh after a hand to hand fight at Surkhet. The army command was in the hands of Sardar Amarsinha Thapa, Captain Golaiyan Khawas, Captain Ranvir Khatri, Sardar Shatrumalla.

A few months after this the advancing wing reached the river Kali conquering en route Doti and Achham; without much resistance the latter surrendered and the fate of the former was no better. Kazi Shivanarayana Khatri and Sardar Prabal Rana were in command of the forces advancing to Jumla. Through Muktinath-Tibrikot Bhakti Thapa became the Suba of that area after its fall on Asvin 9.

During Bahadur’s regime the domain carved out by Prithvinarayan Shah extended in all directions. We have already narrated the achievements of the Gorkhalis in the west. The southern frontier too was equally attended to. There was not a single instance of slightest unconcern, inalertness and negligence. From the very early days of his first Naibship (regency) Bahadur’s main concern in this sphere was to prevent the British from getting possession of the Narayani region in the plains below the Churia Range. Earlier Harakumaradatta Sena of Tanhoun had already ceded to the British a part of his territory in the Terai, now comprising the Ramnagar estate, where he maintained his own Zamindari rights under the East India Company. There was every likelihood of this Zamindari being enlarged to cover Chittaun, and if this happened, the way to further British influence in that area would have been wide open. So to foil the game of the British, Kazi Abhirnan Basnait rushed to this area from Morang and occupied Upar-dang Garhi and Chittaun in Sravana of 1777. Bahadur Shah fortified this region, and placed it under Ramakrishna Kuar and next year he sent his forces to attack Tanhou (Magha, VS 1835).

Absorption of Tanhou

Tanhou was captured but as soon as the invaders returned to Kathmandu, Harakumar came back mustering a strong force with the help of Palpa and Parbat, and overpowered the Gorkhali commander of the area, Sardar Bali Bania. After some time the Gorkhalis were compelled to evacuate Chittaun and Upardang. But this was a short lived victory for the adversaries of the Gorkhalis whose army from

11 Letter of Rana Bahadur to Bhakti Thapa dated VS. 1843 Magha Sudi 3 Roj 2.
Kathmandu recaptured Chittaun and Upardang instantaneously (Sravana 13, VS 1834=end of July, 1777).

Now the lead was taken by Mukunda Sena of Palpa. Court intrigue had removed Bahadur Shah from the Government in Kathmandu, whereupon he scanned the opportunity to finish (Hamilton, 173-75) the Gorkhalis altogether.

Through his efforts Harakumardatta got Tanhou restored to him, and he also now planned to restore the Sena Raja to the Gaddi of Vijayapur and Mackwanpur. But this could not be implemented soon, and he, therefore, organized a confederacy of himself, Lamjung and Parbat to launch joint attack on Gorkha, which was also defeated. Mukunda Sena, however, died while he was still thinking of renewing the attack. His successor Mahadutta had entered into an alliance with Bahadur Shah to whom his daughter was married. According to this alliance he had promised to render help in the latter's westward march. Thus Gorkha got an opportunity to advance again to that side, and liquidated the principalities of Galkot, Ghiring, Rising, Argha, Khanchi and Gulmi, the three last being handed over to Palpa as a reward for collaboration and a share of spoils. Although it meant annexation of fresh territories to Palpa the developments that followed proved quite unfavourable to its freedom, because even if there was actually no invasion upon Palpa by the Gorkhalis, it was threatened and was completely blocked as a result of the conquest of Doti, Jumla and Kumaon regions by them.

It appears that by 1787 the whole of the territory now comprising the independent state of Nepal had come under the Gorkhali army. In the south all the areas in the Terai, that formerly belonged to Doti, Pithuran, Mackwanpur, Chaudandi and Vijayapur were annexed to Nepal. Except in a few places the boundary all over the Terai went further south as far as 40 to 50 miles. In the northern sector not only the expansion took place along the central stretch of the Himalayan region, but the territorial conquest was pushed to the last line of the Himalayan snow, wherever this was permitted in view of the jurisdiction of the state that was absorbed. Thus the extremity of the Himalayan region falling within Bajhang, Jumla, Parbat, Lamjung, Kathmandu, Bhatgaon and the semi autonomous Limbuan were now become parts of Nepal. It so happened that the rulers in that region had established the traditional boundary with the last line of the snowy range.

It is difficult to say how far Nepal's suzerainty over the distant parts of the territories on the snow line was enforced. Perhaps except over areas lying to the immediate north of the Nepal Valley this was
not deemed necessary. But a loose hegemony nevertheless was acknowledged by the inhabitants who collectively paid a paltry sum in kind to the Nepalese exchequer with the contribution of salt as they produced locally.

While one talks of the last line of snow, it always means the last range of mountains, that touched the Tibetan hinterland of a plateau on the other side. Wherever there were juttings, as ordained by natural formation, these came within the jurisdiction of the Nepalese territory as Nepal acquired possessions by virtue of its conquest of the different states of the region.

We shall have occasion to observe more about Nepal's northern boundary while we deal with the subject of the Nepal-Tibet War of 1788-92.

*Intrigue in Palpa*

After Bahadur Shah was removed from power, the threat was all the more greater. According to Hamilton it was "Nawab Vizier's friendship that saved Mahadutta so long as he lived". During Bahadur's regency, it was all the time Damodar Pande who was entrusted with the command and diplomatic duties in regard to these states, Gulmi was allowed to retain its feudatory in the time of Rana Bahadur who married the daughter of Raja Siddhi Pratap. Palpa and further West Palpa, as we said earlier, was absorbed into Nepal in July of 1804. Prithvipal, successor of Mahadutta, was lying in virtual confinement at Kathmandu since 1796. He had gone there at the invitation of Rana Bahadur to join the celebration of Girvan's coronation and was treacherously detained, once in 1803 (January) Prithvipal had obtained his freedom as a result of intervention by the elder Maharani. But Rana Bahadur on his return again tempted him to go to Kathmandu on promise of offering more territories and of marriage with the Palpali Princess, the ruler's sister. Hamilton says that at first the Princess was sent accompanied by the Raja's younger brother, but on further insistence Prithvipal yielded to the feigned solicitation of Rana Bahadur and he was again detained. According to Hamilton, Prithvipal was killed in cold blood by Bhim Sena for his alleged complicity in the murder of Rana Bahadur, which, however, was not founded on facts. Soon after Bhim Sena became the defacto ruler in June 1804. His father Amarsinha thereafter assaulted Tansen (August, 1804) and occupied

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12 Two books in Sanskrit, one a drama and another a treatise in verse depict the scene of Prithvipal's last days in Kathmandu and of the fate meted out to him by Rana Bahadur.
the whole of Palpa. Prithvipal’s widow and son Ratna Sena fled to the Company’s territory for shelter.\(^{13}\)

In the south Palpa’s territory touched borders of Oudh in a stretch of several miles, and the area within this stretch, the whole of it in the Terai called the district of Butwal, was held by its ruler as a feudatory zamindar of the Nawab Vazir of Oudh. When on the 10th November of 1801 the East India Company became the Sovereign of the Nawab’s domain after the latter signed a treaty of subsidiary alliance, an attempt was made in behalf of the British to acquire overlordship of the said territory. The British put forth the claim as the rightful heir to the Nawab in respect of the sovereignty.

Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty an officer was sent to Butwal “with the purpose of forming a settlement” with the Raja of Palpa. But the latter was in Kathmandu ‘not having yet been released from the restraint imposed on him some years ago to reside at the Capital of Nepal’. Therefore the negotiation was conducted with Lal Bahadur, the Raja’s brother. It was said that ‘the best mode of making the cession of Butwal of value to Government would be given the confidence of Lal Bahadur and his officers by conciliation and by convincing them that...intention was to settle the Raja in possession of the Zamindari on the most just and liberal terms’. At the same time the Company’s authorities wanted to make an arrangement ‘to establish the authority of Government by committing the entire charge of the police to the Tehseeldar and by publishing rules to be observed by the executive officers of the zamindar in the realisation of revenue.

‘The amount of ceded Jumma did not appear to have been any year fully realised by the Nawab Vizier and...nothing had been paid to the Vizier’s Government for at least three years past.’ So it was an achievement for the Company’s servants to find Lal Bahadur ‘consenting to give in a Derkhest for farming the district for three years at an annual fixed Jumma of Rs. 30,000|- exclusive of Syer, Abkaree, etc.’\(^{14}\)

The district of Butwal has been described in English correspondence ‘in a high state of cultivation with ryots numerous....even though extremely unhealthy is as nearly well cultivated as Bihar or Banaras unlike Gorakhpore being an almost desert’. It appears that

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\(^{13}\) Jayaratnakaranaataka, a drama in Sanskrit, written by a Court Poet of the time has some events relating to Palpa depicted as part of the main theme of royal conquest of the Nepalese ruler.

\(^{14}\) Selections from English records, No. 2. Henry Wellesley’s correspondence (1801-03), Letter No. 22, J. Routledge, Collector to the Secretary to the Hon'ble Lt. Governor, of Commissioners of the ceded districts of Oudh, Bareilly, dated 14th December, 1802, Gorakhpore.
many families had been compelled to leave the district due to oppression of the Amils. But now with the new settlement they were expected to return, 'clear the jungle and claim their properties listed in the records of the Kanungoes'.

Further 'the Raja as the sole proprietor of the district farmed it out to the Mushtabjeers of the Kanungoes account of the Jumma... several villages (not included in Jumma) were set apart for the maintenance of the Raja's relations and payment of his mofussil establishments.'

Realisation of revenue was not the only interest of the British. They thought that cession of the district would also help them to secure alterations of the rates of duties levied by Palpa in Butwal town to the advantage of the Company’s traders. The Town of Butwal "situated at the foot of the first range of hills and on the northern banks of a rapid river... dividing the two ceded Pargunnahs of Tilpoor and Benaweekpoor from the Raja’s independent tract of country below the hills" enjoyed a unique position of a trade centre, occupied by merchants from Oudh which was regularly visited by merchants from Bhutan, Tibet and Nepal 'for the sale of gold ore, brass, iron, copper, borax, bees-wax and many other productions of the northern countries and for the purchase of coarse cotton, curwah, broad cloth and other articles, but principal cotton with which they are entirely supplied from the countries below the hills'.

The English authorities wanted to move shrewdly in the matter of obtaining a secure foothold. They would on no account disturb the arrangement by which the hill Rajas exercised the zamindari rights. Claims of the Raja of Palpa and of the King of Nepal were viewed in that light. In accordance with that policy the following taluqs were recommended to be left with the original owners:

"The Talook Kunjunee Bunder claimed by the Palpali Raja as his hereditary zamindari was situated in Ratanpur Bunder. Although in the records it was represented as united with Sheoraj Bunder, the joint produce being rated Rs. 3657/12, the income from this Talook was realised separately by the Raja's officers since 1190 Fussily, while the Raja of Nepal received the collections of Sheoraj... it will be more advisable to instruct the Resident at Nepaul to demand the revenue from the Raja than to dispossess his officers".

But eventually this attempt failed; the question of cession of the

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16 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
area became complicated as Gorkha absorbed Palpa and occupied the whole of the Butwal district soon after. As in the case of the Terai area under Piuthan, so in this case the claim of the British to territorial acquisition could not stand. In the ultimate effect it came to be narrowed down to move round the dispute over some villages on the border of the district of Gorakhpore.

Conquest of Kumaon

Kumaon was originally ruled by a prince of the Salivahana race called the house of Karavirpur (Kattyur). But since the 14th century this house got weakened by internal dissensions and an emigrant prince from Rajputana carved out a small principality, which gradually enlarged to become a strong domain under his descendant Rudra, the original Raja being liquidated. This was while Akbar was ruling in India. In the time of Baj Bahadur, Rudra’s fourth successor, more strips of territories from Doti and Jumla were included. With Almora as the capital Kumaon had become a country of considerable importance.18

But the glory soon declined. The successors were either old men or infants, and this gave an opportunity for unhealthy influences to work in the court. During the time of one Dipchandra, a Brahman, Jayakrishna elevated himself to the position of the Chief Minister. At the same time Mohan Chandra, the ruler’s collateral, had the control of the forces. There developed an enmity between these two officers, and it came to each of them to seek the help of the Rohilla chiefs of the adjoining Rohilkhand. At the first encounter Mohan was expelled, but next time it was Jayakrishna who had to leave his post. Third time, however, Jayakrishna succeeded in putting his rival to flight and finding that his country was now safe from raids of his rival began to devote himself to collecting revenues in the western parts of Kumaon, while one day Mohansinha suddenly appeared and forcibly captured power. To make his path smooth he imprisoned Harkhadeva, the nephew of Jayakrishna. But this did not save him, because the prisoner’s uncle procured Garhwals’ assistance and Mohan had to finally leave Almora. Harkhadeva escaped from the custody of his enemy joined his uncle Jaya and both of them brought Pradyumna Shah, Garhwal ruler’s brother, to the throne of Almora. Later this Pradyumna became ruler over Garhwal as his elder brother died without

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18 For the history of Kumaon in brief read R. Sankrityana’s Kumaon (Hindi); B. D. Pande’s History of Kumaon (Hindi); Hamilton’s Account of Nepal (Chapter on Kumaon); Atkinson’s Himalayan District Gazetteers, II (Chapter on History).
Parakrama, a younger brother of Pradyumna had influence over the ruler, and he got Harkhadeva dismissed and ruled for sometime in the name of the King. But Harkha returned soon and having killed Mohan Chandra, his former enemy, he could by that time become a force in the weakly ruled Kumaon. Pradyumna had to relinquish his throne of Kumaon soon after. Now Harkhadeva was playing the role of a king maker. As it happened he rose to power and eminence with the help of the Raja of Garhwal, who dethroned and drove out Mohan Chandra, a scion of the Kumaon Royal family. But Harkhadeva was not the man to acknowledge gratitude in terms that would in any way go to lessen his importance. He contrived to end Garhwal ruler's enthronement and took recourse to find out a new hand. One Sivachandra was seated on the throne as he being a member of the same royal family qualified for the job. But his was not a peaceful term. Mohan’s brother Lal Singh pestered him very much. At one time he had to leave his principality and seek refuge in Garhwal. He, however, utilised his exile to form an alliance with the Garhwal Raja's brother, and with the latter's help attacked Lal Singh's headquarters. But no amount of perseverance could secure for him the throne which he had earlier lost. By the time he reached the capital, it was announced that Mohan's son Mahendra had been accepted on the throne. Harkhadeva, however, had been dismissed and expelled.\footnote{Atkinson, Op. Cit., Pp. 594 ff. For a history of Kumaon read Hamilton Pp. 292-94; Nepal papers Pp. 243-45, 49 in Enclosure 3—letter by Fraser.}

**Nepalese Thrust Forward to Almora**

After the conquest of Doti the army moved onwards to the west of the river Kali. It was the beginning of the year 1790. The Nepalese thrust was mainly directed towards the west with aims to occupy Almora, the capital of Kumaon, one army advancing towards Sor and another to Bisung. The men in command were trusted and experienced soldiers like Amarsinha Thapa, Jagajjit Pande and Survir Thapa with 20,000 troops, of whom 12,000 had firelocks advancing from two sectors.\footnote{English Records of Maratha History, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, 1, 1784-94 edited by Sircar, 11-272, Pp. 478-79.}

It appears that just four years earlier in January 1786 (4 Marga sukla of Saka 1709), the ruler of Kumaon Maharajadhiraja Mohan Chandra had executed a Dharmapatra in favour of the King of Gorkha pledging to stand by him as an ally for co-existence and co-prosperity of the two countries. The Dharmapatra reads: the Gorkha King’s ally is our ally, our ally is his ally; Gorkha’s enemy is our enemy, simi-
larly our enemy is Gorkha's enemy; we shall mutually bide time thinking of each other's welfare.  

Kumaon was in a very helpless condition, suffering greatly from an internal disorder on account of the two houses of courtier families of Phartyal and Joshi bitterly fighting each other.

The Gorkhalis found that a good many people headed by Harkhadeva Joshi were siding with them. This Harkhadeva was a man of great ability. Harkha's role in the conflict was to collaborate with the invaders with men and money. As he found himself out of favour in Kumaon Darbar, he was now determined to avenge his discomfiture with the help of the Gorkhalis and thereby defeat his adversaries and gain back his usual advantageous position. A contingent of Kumaonis was serving under him against those who resisted the Gorkhalis. Partly with his help and with their own strength the Gorkhalis continued on their forward march. Little resistance was offered on the way except at Halwalbagh where the result went against the defenders. According to the Nepalese chronicle the Gorkhalis fought with Lalsinha at Dhauli Ka Thana, but the latter's resistance was little effective.

The Gorkha troops encountered little difficulty in capturing Almora. The entire town was panicky. This could not be retrieved by Mahendrasinha who had for some time succeeded in halting the attack from one sector. Almora fell to the invaders in March (1791 (VS 1847 Chaitra 2), the Raja fleeing to Rudrapur in Kilpuri. Although Mahendrasinha was not himself defeated, he abandoned all hopes of resistance once he knew of his uncle's flight. A few days later they evacuated Rudrapur and came to Kota. But the Gorkhalis pursued them there. The whole of Kumaon had by this time come under occupation of the Nepalese arms. Before advancing further Almora was placed in charge of Yogamalla. Garhwal was the next objective. Here they did not even encounter the little resistance which earlier the Kumaonis were capable of, the Raja of Srinagar purchasing a peace by an offer of an annual indemnity of Rs. 25,000 to the victors. Srinagar surrendered to the Nepalese troops on Asadha 12 of VS 1848 (end of June, 1791).

The fort of Srinagar was entrusted to the charge of Suba Kalu Khawas and Vira Rokaya. At Salang Garhi the enemy made a surprise attack on the new occupants, but Sardars Amarsinha Thapa and Bhaktisinha saved the position. The attack was repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy.

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21 Unpublished. Also read for extracts Sanskrit Sandesh.
From Srinagar the Nepalese thrust was directed to Sirmour at the south-east. Meanwhile Kazis Amarsinha Thapa, Kalu Pande and Chautaria Bamshah reached the bank of Alakhnanda. The local Raja Jagatprakasa took the field against the invaders, but was overpowered. All his territories to the east of the river were annexed to Nepal, and a garrison was stationed to guard against possible revolts (10 Asvin vadi VS 1849, letter of Rana Bahadur to Bisnunath Upadhyaya =1 October 1792).  

At that stage of expansion the report of a rebellion in the areas west of the Kali reached the command, and Captain Kalu Pande and Jagatjit Pande with ten companies of sepoys were despatched. The rebellion was forthwith suppressed. It is said that the Garhwalis offered a stiff resistance at Langurgarh and this fort defied the attack for about a year.

While laurels after laurels were being added to Gorkha reputation on this side, the army engaged in the north i.e. on the Tibetan border suffered an unexpected misfortune. The Sino-Nepalese War was raging furiously, and it assumed a proportion to cause extreme anxiety to Nepal as a question threatening their very independence. Naturally the Gorkhalis could not think of conquering additional lands in these circumstances. The forces in this area were consequently withdrawn. A firman issued by the King of Nepal to Amarsinha Thapa directed him to leave Garhwal and Kumaon. The administration was to be entrusted to the Raja of Garhwal and Harkhadeva respectively. The Gorkha-China War had, however, come to an end, while the withdrawal was still in execution, the Gorkha troops had only been obliged to raise the siege of Langurgarh but they had kept intact in Almora. According to the Nepalese chronicle the main army returned to join the Tibetan expedition leaving a powerful wing under Captain Brahman Kalu Pandey and Suba Nandasahi (Narasahi). Narasahi was left in charge of civil administration. It is the same Narasahi who has been blamed by Atkinson for massacring the mercenaries and their descendants residing in Kumaon.

From a letter published in Eitihasik Patra Sangraha (Pp. 54-55) it appears that before the Gorkhalis advanced to Langurgarh, the feudatories in the Kali basin of Achham and Doti had revolted and its consequence was to cut off Kumaon and Garhwal from the base of operations in this sector. But the situation was soon retrieved and the Gorkhalis regained their position with the help of the Raja of Jajarkot who had maneuvered to facilitate the movement of troops.

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23 C P C., X. N. 835.
led by Kazi Kalu Pandey. The revolt was crushed in time.

In the absence of Jagatjit Pande the officer commanding was Kalu Pande, and we find the king directing to his feudatory allies such as the Raja of Salliana to render all possible help to him for the care of Kumaon.

To cite a Nepalese source for the treaty of subsidiary alliance entered into with Garhwal we have a letter of king Rana Bahadur Shah dated Kartik Vadi 7, Sunday of V.S. 1849 (October, 1791), which informs us that Garhwal promised to pay a sum of Rs. 25,000 annually and accepted protection from Nepal.

In the meantime, Amarsinha Thapa had kept Harkha in confinement having had doubts about his sincerity. But he escaped from prison and went to Johar where he was again imprisoned by his lifelong Phartyal adversaries. In the last resort Harkhadeva was busy intriguing from behind the bars to instal one Kuwar Padmasinha on the throne of Kumaon. This prince was deputed by the Raja to arrest Harkha at Johar but as he was won over to his side, he released the Joshi and accompanied him to Garhwal. The centre of activity shifted now from Almora to Srinagar along with Harkhadeva who was now carrying on a ceaseless intrigue against his former allies, the Gorkhals, as well as against Mahendrasinha and Lalsinha. Against the latter his whole attempt was to prevent their restoration to power. But in this activity Padmasinha could not co-operate with him as he left Garhwal and took shelter in the plains.

The two unfortunate princes of Kumaon tried to exploit the Rohilla War. When the leader of the Rohillas was lying hiding in the lower hills of Kumaon, they offered to join hands with him and immediately after when Rampur was evacuated by the British, Mahendra Sinha advanced to Almora. But Kazi Amarsinha was too cautious a person to be taken by surprise. He immediately led his army to Kilpuri and put an end to this source of danger. Further attempts to regain Kumaon through the help of the Nawab Vazir was frustrated by the latter's entry into a peace treaty with the Gorkhals. Of course, Kilpuri was returned to the Vazir but this satisfied him to feel his ground for not allowing his territory to be used as a base of activity against his Gorkhali allies and 'respect the position of the de facto rulers of Kumaon'. Atkinson writes that Mr. Cherry used his good offices to bring about this settlement.

24 H. M. Rana Bahadur's letter to Raja Gajendra Shah.
25 Letter dated VS. 1848 Phalgun Sudi 13, Roj 3.
26 Letter No. 1, Nepal Sanskritik Parishad Patrika 3-3.
Harkhadeva was not a man to lose courage. From Garhwal, he came to Lucknow and tried to instigate the Nawab Vazir and went to Banaras to meet Mr. Cherry, the political agent who treated him on friendly terms and promised help. But in 1799 when Mr. Cherry was killed by the Nawab’s successor his hope broke down. Being disappointed at Banaras, he transferred his seat to Kangra towards which the Gorkhalis seemed to proceed. Kumaon was finally absorbed into the company’s dominion in 1816.

Uptill the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-15, the British took care not to give offence to the Nepalese and not to cause the slightest anxiety or suspicion in their minds in regard to British intention about Nepal. In confirmation of this we read the following letter of A. Welland, Collector, to G. Mercer, Esquire, Acting Secretary to the Hon’ble Lieutenant-Governor, Allahabad, dated 25th February, 1803 (Billa Cawnpore).

“There is another claim, preferred to the Zamindari by Raja Laul Singh, brother of Mohan Singh, one of the last Rajas of Kumaon, previous to the conquest of the country, about 14 years ago, by the Raja of Nepal. On Sheo Laul’s observing that his claim only related to the Zamindari whereas that Raja Laul Singh being founded upon his...with the family of the...tensions to...of the country; the...his country the...and the Zamindari had ‘ever been one and the same, as there was no proprietary right to land vested in individuals, but as with the British Government, which now had an undoubted right to the Raule, the case was different, he thought he had the best claim to the Zemindari’. As far as I can now form an opinion, it does not appear to me that Raja Laul Singh’s claim is well founded. It would seem, that he either claims too little or too much. At all events, there would, I think, be considerable risk, adjudging the Zemindari right to him, since it is hardly possible, that he could be upon good terms with...stationed in the southern...part of the province...Government of Nepal...Government and...destroyer of the grandeur of his...This would, of course, give rise to constant disputes, intrigues, and frays on the borders of the two states and tend to counteract the humane desire which the Hon’ble the Lieutenant-Governor has so much at heart, of establishing such a system of friendly intercourse, as is likely to obviate, in future, the painful necessity of sending troops to that unwholesome part of the country. The continuing of Sheo Laul in the management of the district, would, I think tend to promote that truly desirable object, as he is upon very good terms with Raja Rooddur Ber Sah, the person stationed at Almorah, on the part of the...
of Nepal several of...whether to him...seen."\(^{27}\)

Earlier in January 1794, the British authorities had informed the Raja of Almora in reply to his application 'for assistance in the disputes subsisting between him and the Raja of Nepal' that 'the general principles of our conduct, as well as the friendly connection between the English and the Raja of Nepal precluded the possibility of our interference' (Corres. 6, January, Nos. 9 and 10).\(^{28}\) Even while the British knew of the excursions into and occupation of Almora by the Gorkha troops, it was hoped that 'all this would come without affecting either the Vizier's or the company's interests' and that 'the trifling difference said to subsist between the Vizier and the Raja of Nepal relative to villages situated near the Bootan (Butwal) hills' would not be 'productive of any serious or embarassing consequences'.\(^{29}\)

From a letter of King Rana Bahadur (dated VS 1832 Magha Sudi 3, roj 1 (=1795, January))\(^{30}\) to Sardar Bhakti Thapa, Baliraj Thapa, Amarsinha Bakhati and Hati Bohra it appears that the Gorkhali officers had occupied Johore Bhot previously belonging to Kumaon and settled the amount of tribute at Rs. 10 thousand worth of articles.

In this letter there is an instruction about Kewalpur which was occupied by the Gorkhali commander without reference to Kathmandu. This village was claimed by the British for Lalsinha. The Nawab of Oudh also put forward his own claim. The instruction was to the effect of holding the post if the English alone attempted to occupy it. In case there was a combined attack from the Nawab and the English, Kewalpur was to be abandoned.

**Gorkha Administration in Kumaon**

Below is the list of names of Gorkha military and civil administrators of Kumaon, which we add here for the information of our readers:

**Civil Administrators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1791-92</td>
<td>Jogamalla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1793-94</td>
<td>Narsahi and his deputy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ramadutta Shah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Military Commanders**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jagatjit Pande.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kalu Pande.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^{27}\) Selections from U.P. Records, No. 2. Henry Wellesley's correspondence (1801-03) correspondence No. 73, Pp. 106-07.

\(^{28}\) Fort William-India House Correspondence, Vol. XVII, P. 318. (Political letter to the Court of Directors, 17 January, 1794).

\(^{29}\) Ibid.

\(^{30}\) Itihas Prakas, I, Pp. 9-12.
### Civil Administrators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1794-95</td>
<td>Ajay Singh Khawas Thapa</td>
<td>Thapa and his deputy Shrestha Thapa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1795-97</td>
<td>Amarsinha; deputy</td>
<td>Govinda Upadhyya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1797-98</td>
<td>Bam Shah, deputy</td>
<td>Rudravir Shah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1799</td>
<td>Dhaukal Singh Basnait,</td>
<td>deputy Major Ganapati Upadhyya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1802</td>
<td>Kazi Gajakesar Pande,</td>
<td>deputy Krishanand Subedar.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Military Commanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jaswant Bhandari.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bhakti Thapa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rudravir Shah.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jogmalla who was the first Suba of Kumaon was responsible for the settlement of land revenue introduced a tax on land in 1791-92, by which a citizen paid Re. 1\(\frac{1}{2}\) for every bisi (nearly a British acre) of cultivable land to the Government. He also levied a kind of poll tax of one rupee each per adult-male of the population. To this was added another sum of Re. 1\(\frac{1}{2}\)\(\frac{1}{2}\) imposed on every village, which was said to be used for meeting the expenses of the suba's office. No more item of tax was added in the time of his successors in office coming after 1794 until Bam Shah made taxable all the free-holds in possession of the Brahmans. But the last measure of taxation was enforced only when the Brahman landholders were suspected of dabbling in political intrigues on one side or the other. Bam Shah had a reputation of a liberal administrator.

From 1790 to 1815, for a period of 25 years the Gorkhalis were masters of Kumaon and Garhwal. Their rule has been condemned very strongly by Atkinson and writers of his view. But it beats our comprehension to find that inspite of the alleged misrule, the Gorkhalis were commanding a great support from the general population. There might have been certain excesses in administering military laws and these become very common during a period of transition and in anarchic condition like the one Gorkhalis were put in when there was every fear of attack and counter attack, and in that condition an undue amount of leniency might have been the cause of a ruin to themselves. On the other hand, we find how the Gorkha Subedars collaborated with the local people in conducting the administration. Though Atkinson
qualifies it with Gorkha suspicion and terms it as a subordinate collaboration and lack of responsibility, the fact remains that the Gorkha administration presents a deep contrast to the succeeding British administration, where there was not even a semblance of collaboration with the people. There are many anecdotes in Nepal papers to show that Gorkha rule compared favourably with the administration the British at that time in some other parts of India.

The alleged Gorkha atrocities were as follows:

1. Undue exaction of taxes. They say that the Gorkhalis exacted Rs. 11,64,426 in a single year in 1812.
2. Abduction of girls and forcible marriage.
3. Forced work without wages (see Atkinson for Harkhadeva's memorandum to Mr. Cherry).
4. Atrocious justice accompanied by cruel penalty for any breach of discipline or harsh laws.
5. Selfish administration based on indifference to public welfare.

With all these, the English historian does not explain the reason which led the Kumaonis to side with the Gorkha invaders in the war. Until the poisonous propaganda of Harkha corroded their mind the people of the area regarded the Gorkhalis as those who rescued them out of a situation that was chaotic. Was it so because the Gorkhalis were better enemies than the British who by that time were casting a greedy eye on Kumaon and were for opening the trans-Himalayan trade route using Harkha for their purpose? It really astonishes all to read these indictments against the Gorkhalis but at the same time to have been told that the Kumaonis were even supporting the Gorkhalis to the last minute and that there was a voluntary army of the Kumaonis which served as a branch of the main force in all exigencies (See also Nepal Papers).

_Nepal's Eyes on Assam_

The men in power at Kathmandu in those days were not satisfied with acquisition of territories in the Himalayan region alone. While they penetrated beyond the Himalayas in the north, their descent to the plains was inspired with ambition to acquire further areas in the unsettled condition of the plains. In the east their eyes scanned portions as far as Assam. At one time they carried secret correspondence with the deposed ruler of that country, who promised in writing to pay annually a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs to the Government of Nepal on being restored to power. This was, however, frustrated as the ruler
Ugranath Sinha was a party not liked by the British.\footnote{\textit{Etihasik Patra Sangraha}, 17, Pp. 83-84. The Nepalese Government's instruction to the vakil to contact the other side and secure as much as possible above a sum of a lakh.}

This Ugranathsinha is no other than Prince Brajanath Gohain who was a claimant to the throne of Assam. He extended his claim for the kingship on the ground that he was the nearest on the line of succession even nearer than the man seated on the throne, i.e. Kamaleswar Sinha. Brajanath's father was the great grandson of king Rudra Sinha whose line had ruled Assam from 1714 to 1794. The last king of this line was Gaurinath Sinha whose cousin was Brajanath's own grandfather and he had died childless in 1794. In ordinary course Brajanath should have succeeded him. But like his father he was also disqualified because Laksmi Sinha had mutilated the ears of both of them as punishment. In Assam any person of the royal family who suffered from any kind of decapitation of a part of his body was ultimately disqualified for the throne. So his claims had been set aside. But he had a special reason to be aggrieved with the affairs because the man who was preferred to him was not only disqualified on account of the same condition of mutilation but he also was not as closely related to the outgoing monarch as Brajanath was. There was no doubt that Kamaleswar had been elevated to kingship under fortuitous circumstances. Brajanath's claims had been set aside because one Purnanand Gohain who was the virtual ruler of Assam of those days in the chief minister's capacity did not like him. But in making a choice of Kamaleswar for the gaddi of the Ahoms the minister had the full backing of the British. It appears that initially Brajanath appealed to the British to restore him to his rightful place. Lord Wellesley was approached on several occasions and Brajanath pursued his efforts through many channels. One of the wives of Gaurinath Sinha also made a representation to the Governor-General. This lady was Brajanath's foster mother and he obtained all the help from her. It was even suggested that Gaurinath Sinha had in his last days nominated Brajanath as his successor. But all this appeal, argument and persuasion did not carry any effect with the British authorities who were determined to maintain the status quo as far as the position of the occupant of the Ahom monarchy was concerned. In these circumstances it was but natural that Brajanath Sinha had turned to the Nepalese for assistance.

From the letters the Nepalese Vakil had exchanged with the Darbar it does not appear that Brajanath did even go to Kathmandu to another letter by the King to Dinanath Upadhaya (VS. 1855 adhik Sravana vadi 12 Roj 5 Kantipur) asks him to deliver a letter to the Assam ruler.
persuade the authorities to take up his cause. So what S. K. Bhuiyan writes about Brajanath’s going to Banaras and then accompanying Swami Maharaja Rana Bahadur to Kathmandu is not worthy of credence.\textsuperscript{32} Brajanath had never entered into a treaty relation with Nepal. The matter was in the stage of negotiation and it did not go beyond that. The letter of the Nepalese Vakil (above quoted) shows that Brajanath had offered to pay a sum of Rupees two lakhs as annual tribute to the Government of Nepal in case he was restored to the throne with their aid.\textsuperscript{33} It seems that after sometime the Nepalese withdrew from the negotiation as soon as they were convinced that it was no longer possible for Brajanath to procure British assistance. They did not like to support a party whose ascendancy would not be tolerated by the British. Brajanath’s relation with Nepal ended at that point.

\textsuperscript{32} S. K. Bhuiyan, \textit{Anglo-Assamese Relations, 1771-1826} (Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies, Assam, 1949), pp. 443-44.

\textsuperscript{33} Bhuiyan says 3 lakhs.
CHAPTER V

NEPAL AND ITS NEIGHBOURS
(1775-1800)

We devoted the concluding portion of the last chapter to a description of the military exploits of the Nepalese rulers in between 1779 and 1789 A.D.

It has so happened that from 1789 onwards the events in Nepal get quickly mixed up with British diplomacy. Whether it is Nepal's war with Tibet and China (1789-93) or King Rana Bahadur Shah’s exile in Banaras (1799-1802), the British have come in the picture in one way or another. In this period they had also succeeded in concluding two treaties with Nepal and establishing contacts with this country through various trade and goodwill missions.

Thus, any history of Nepal between 1789-1800 could not be narrated without bringing in the British to the scene.

We have planned the contents of the present chapter to cover in detail a description of how Nepal’s relation with the British had emerged at the end of the century in the background of its history.

In order to show a link with the main events it was essential to have in the beginning two sections about East India Company's trade relations with Bhutan and Tibet. Without a knowledge of the subject matter dealt with in these, the reader would not have traced the missing link of initial commercial interest of Britain in Nepal. Britain's attempts to deal with Bhutan and Tibet are much too intimately connected with their trade interests in Nepal to be isolated from the main current of history of Anglo-Nepalese relations.

British interest in trade with Nepal and Tibet arose after they came to control the affairs of Bengal and Bihar in the wake of Plassey. Before they actually moved in the matter of securing facilities for their commerce the British had sought information about the prospects of trade and state of merchandise passing between India and these countries. This was the very initial measure in the fulfilment of the objective. We shall see a little later how their intrigues had been frustrated, and their efforts to achieve the objective by military means had also failed. Bogle was the first agent of the East India Company's Government to travel to Tibet, and he reached there in 1774. Turner conducted the second mission in 1783. He was followed by others. Nepal
was visited by Kirkpatrick in 1793. These deputations were sent to explore avenues of commercial contact and negotiate trade treaties. On all these occasions the British pressed hard with the rulers of the respective countries for the opening of trade relations, but although in the beginning the course of talks had appeared to promise a successful conclusion, it ultimately ended in failure. In both Tibet and Nepal the British encountered deep suspicions and jealousy about their move, which prevented from achieving anything of goodwill in these countries.

To Warren Hastings goes the credit of conceiving the importance of commercial contact with Tibet. Lord Cornwallis pursued the same interest with the same zeal in regard to Nepal. Sir John Shore was the third Governor-General in succession to work on this line. He was responsible for sending a fresh mission to Nepal, which had gone to Kathmandu in mid 1795.

The British administrators were attracted to his area situated north of their domain for the reason that this afforded an extensive market for their produce, both of England and Bengal and also that the payment in return was made in quantities of gold and silver cheaply priced.¹

**English and Bhutanese in the 18th Century**

I

It was only in the latter part of the eighteenth century that Bhutan came in for proper consideration as a State, not to be left out of account from the sphere of British influence.² The interest of the British Government in Bhutan was of two-fold importance. Bhutan as a country occupying the midway between China and India commanded the front position of a buffer. Her close proximity to Bengal and her place in the eastern corner of the Himalayas³ were factors which determined her place in the comity of Indian provinces; and although a dependency of Lhasa,⁴ yet within the geographical confines of India, the British Government could never lose sight of her important place in view of the requirement they felt for a good neighbour to maintain

¹ Turner, *op. cit.*
² Public Letter from Court, January 7, 1774, Para 3.
⁴ Bhutan occupies a strip of territory between 26° 48’ and 28° n.l. and between 89° and 92° longitude. One of the entrances to Chumbi Valley lies on the frontier. Besides, she then controlled some passes to the hills, called doars. These are Dalimkot, Lamarkot, Chilmarchi, Lukhi, Buxa, Balka, Bara on the Bengal frontier; Guma, Ripa, Chirang, Sidli, Bagh or Bijni on the northern border of Goalpara; and Gharkola, Banska Chappagarhi, Chappa Khamari, Bijni, Buriguna and Kaling in Kamrup.
⁵ Letter of Tashi Lama to Warren Hastings, May 10, 1774; Correspondence Received, Pp. 287-9.
the safety and tranquillity of their territories. Secondly, Bhutan offered through her north-western border, an outlet to the Chumbi Valley access to which the British traders were finding impossible on account of the Gorkha conquest of Sikkim through which hitherto the merchandise passed. To the British it appeared that the acquisition of this important highway to the Chumbi Valley would compensate them for the loss of other routes; and therefore they looked to a settlement with the Bhutanese more on this account than on any other. In view of the potentiality of Bhutan and Tibet as a market for British goods, the latter aspect of the question was more important and as they were now deprived of the accessibility to the easier route through Bhatgaon which commanded the Himalayan passes of Kuti, they were inevitably obliged to fall back on the only way left for them, that is the Bhutanese route to the Chumbi Valley. It was, however, with much reluctance and after a good deal of disappointment from other quarters that they took up this course of action. First they attempted to prevent Gorkha expansion and tried to intervene on the side of the Newar rulers by organising an expedition to Kathmandu, which unluckily failed due to the inclemency of the weather and the extreme watchfulness maintained by the Gorkhalis to save their conquest. For some time afterwards they continued to back up the cause of the exiled rulers; but they experienced a sense of disappointment from that side as the prospect of their restoration dwindled away. The attempt, therefore, to penetrate through Bhutan was occasioned by failure in other quarters and the British in quest of a trade route established connection with

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5 This route itself was explored in 1769 after the Gosain traders were expelled from Kathmandu. In that year a treaty was signed with the Raja of Morang who was later on de-throned owing to an uprising of his barons, by which they secured the access to the Chumbi Valley through Morang-Teesta road. There were other routes, for example, the one leading through the river Arun to the Myong Valley and another through Pokhra to Mustang and Tsaparang (See Kawaguchi’s Three Years in Tibet); but these routes were inaccessible as they were under Gorkha occupation. The route to Tsaparang passed through Srinagar (Garhwal).


7 Report on Bhutan and Assam, HDOC., of December 9, 1771. Markham, Bogle’s Embassy to Tibet. P. 150.

8 Sgt. Logan, Ibid: HDOC., of October 31, 1769; S.B. Gewali’s Prithvinarayyan Shah (Nepali) P. 180; Markham, Ibid; Kirkpatrick. An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal, P. 315. The hope for a successful trade in Tibet was aroused in British mind by the large volume of Tibetan gold passing through Nepal, the value of which in Kathmandu was 50 per cent less than the value of similar gold in Patna.

9 The route through Bhutan to Pharjong, a border town on the entrance to the Chumbi Valley, as Bogle reports, was passable only with great difficulty.

10 The leader of this expedition was Capt. Kinloch. Bengal, Past and Present, Vol. X, P. 29; Kirkpatrick, op. cit., P. 270. Nandlal Chatterji, Verelst’s Rule in India, Chapter II; S. B. Gewali, op. cit., Chapter XVI.
Bhutan only after 1774, the account of which follows in the subsequent paragraphs.¹¹

Curiously the Anglo-Bhutanese relations emerged as a result of the war provoked by Bhutan in 1772. As this war was responsible for their future relation and determined the course of events at a later period, a detailed description of this incident would not be out of place. It should be observed here that although the British had intervened in the dispute between Koch Bihar and Bhutan, their design was to bring the principality of the Koch Raja under Subsidiary Alliance, and having obtained foothold there subjugate the Bhutanese so that they became conciliatory to the approaches of the British.¹²

In 1772 the Deb Raja of Bhutan seized Koch Bihar, made a prisoner of the Raja¹³ and established a footing there. It is said that there were two rivals for the throne of Koch Bihar, one of whom had asked for Bhutan's assistance. With the eastern part of Sikkim under his heels, he could now look forward for an expansion in the south at the expense of the British protectorate of Koch Bihar.¹⁴ Raja Deb Judhur, such was his name, had also obtained the support of the Raja of Bishnu, on the north-western border of Koch Bihar, who was formerly an ally of the Bihar Raja (Letter of Collector of Rangpur to the Council of Revenue, November 21, 1772). But all this attracted British attention to the state of affairs in that sector. The minister of the new Raja (in prison) had fervently appealed to Warren Hastings to intervene. Notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Governor-General, the Raja persisted in aggression and it was complained that he thus hampered the British administration. To Warren Hastings this afforded a cause for intervention ostensibly as a champion of the dethroned ruler. The Bhutanese were not sufficiently organised or equipped adequately to meet successfully the British pressure on the course of the conflict, but they hoped that 'from their mountain fastness they

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¹¹ Earlier in 1770 Francis Peacock was asked to visit Bhutan and on his failure Mr. Bailey, Collector of Goalpara, took up his place. But beyond collecting hearsay evidence on the State of Bhutan as a market for trade, no tangible information could be gathered and consequently the whole attempt failed owing to the disturbances on the Anglo-Bhutanese border (Public Proceedings, November 29, 1770: Public Letter from Court, January 7, 1774).
¹³ There were two rulers in Bhutan in those days for spiritual and temporal matters respectively, and of these the Deb Raja was a temporal ruler. In the minority of the Dharam Raja, he was now left all in all in Bhutanese affairs, only restrained by a nominal subjection to the Dalai Lama. The quarrel with Bhutan was very old.
¹⁴ Letter of Hastings to the Court of Directors, January 15, 1773.
could descend with all the speed of a hurricane, spread devastation and
courge in the enemy’s territories and return more quickly than they
came’. It was, therefore, a stiff problem for the British to deal with
the Bhutanese and conscious of the disadvantage of meeting guerillas
by a standing force they watched every opportunity to engage them in
a pitched battle. And luckily such an opportunity was offered by the
capture of the fort of Bihar by the Bhutanese. Now the British contin-
gents were face to face with the Bhutanese at a site in the plains con-
veniently situated to afford full play to British strategy. Accordingly,
Warren Hastings despatched Captain Jones at the head of the four
companies of Brigade Sepoys of the 6th Battalion ‘to free the zemindary
of Koch Bihar from the ravages of the Bhootaners and restore that
country to its former dependence on the Government of Bengal’.15 He
also entered into an interim agreement with the Raja’s brother, Nazir
Deo, on the question of war expenditure, by which the latter would
meet all expenses towards the restoration of the fort of Bihar, the first
instalment of Rs. 50,000 being paid in that year followed by another
of Rs. 15,000 in the next. This agreement also entrusted to the British
all defence matters of the court and some other important affairs ex-
cepting the coinage which was the Raja’s prerogative in view of the
latter’s insistence on retaining it.16 With the Raja of Baikunthapur
on their side the British line of defence was complete and Capt. Jones
besieged the fort of Bihar.17 The British had said that they had con-
sented to go to the help of the Raja ‘from a love of justice and desire
of assisting the distressed’. But it was to gain possession of Koch
Bihar and humiliate Bhutan that the British had readily abided by the
request of the Raja’s brother. This was admitted by Warren Hastings
in his memoir.18

With due precaution against desertion and with effective military
backing, with new allies and new financial help, the Government of
Bengal swiftly embarked on a mission to ‘expel the Bhootaners from
the fort of Bihar’.19 It was said that the enemy numbered nearly 4,000

15 The papers relating to the First Bhutan War are given in Forest’s Selec-
tions from the Despatches, etc. Preserved in the Foreign Deptt., 1772-85, Vol. I,
PP. 27-31.
16 The debased currency was a source of profit to the Raja (Collector of
Rangpur to the Council of Revenue, November 21, 1772; also his letter to the
Committee of Circuit, January 15, 1722); the British in tackling this question
instructed Mr. Purling, their agent in Bihar, to seek voluntary relinquishment
of the coinage, but no insistence was to be put on him.
17 This Raja paid Rs. 15,000 to the British annually.
19 Hastings’ letter to the Court of Directors, January 15, 1778; Gleig, Memoirs
concentrated round Bihar and 2,000 more in the northern part of Juhugopa. The English had, however, merely 700 men. Inspite of their resolution and bravery, and superior numerical strength the Bhutanese were poor in ammunition and it was also no longer a fight in the hills which they were facing here. It was, therefore, impossible for them to stand the quick and forceful assault of Capt. Jones who in his own words 'took them by surprise' and stormed the fort. There was nothing to prevent Bhutanese defeat. But all the same the Bhutanese have the credit for their bravery and courage. Inspite of success achieved Captain Jones' brigades lost 260 sepoys, he himself was wounded in his right arm followed by Lt. Dickinson who was hit in his breast. The Bhutanese loss was comparatively smaller, only 200 of them being killed. The position, however, after the Bihar engagement was that the Bhutanese were much intimidated by the British thrust and they avoided all contact with the British army and evacuated all passes before they retired to the hills. Thenceforth one incident of a fight which took place on the bank of the Brahmaputra is reported but it produced the same demoralising effect on the conduct of the Bhutanese.

Thus by the end of January 1773 the war with Bhutan came to an end and the application for a settlement from the Deb Raja—who was now scolded by the Tashi Lama and Prithvinarayan Shah—reached the British before long. But the British had now before them the problem of the Sannyasi robbers, equally outrageous and devastating and demanding urgent disposal until this was solved the cessation of hostilities with the Bhutanese had no tangible effect on the situation. Therefore, the British put off the question of a settlement with the Bhutanese even though two months had elapsed since hostilities had ceased. They had asked Mr. Purling to engage in talks on their behalf, and protract the negotiation on various pretexts. The Sannyasis were then in the vicinity of Patgong and after 'occupying some of the doars' they had descended on the plains to take up the war in alliance with Raja Dharamdeo of Bishnu, who was then at Lakhipur. They were

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80 Ibid, Hastings' letter.
81 Gleig, Memoirs, I, P. 279, Letter from the Committee of Circuit to the Council of Revenue.
82 Hastings' letter to the Court of Directors, March 31, 1773; Captain Jones to Hastings, December 24, 1772.
83 Letter of Mr. Purling to the Committee of Circuit.
84 Letter of Tashi Lama to Warren Hastings. The Tashi Lama had interceded with the British for the Bhutanese (Markham, LXIX, LXX).
85 S. B. Gewali, op. cit., P. 209. (He quotes an extract from the Life of Palden Eshe to confirm his statement).
in sufficient numerical strength and the veneration they enjoyed with
the masses of the people protected them from active search by the
British. But inspite of their boldness and resourceful conduct they
could not put up a strong resistance to British pressure. At Dinlah
they retired after 'throwing a few rockets' at the British and finally
fled to the other side of the Teesta. In similar other engagements they
collapsed before any offensive worth the name was begun by the British
and thus the whole of Purnea and the forts of Rohimganj and Jalpaigarhi
were freed.

In only one engagement could they be a match to the British
detachment and succeeded in inflicting severe losses on them. In a
scramble to cross a river Capt. Edward's troops gave way on account
of the pressure from the Sannyasis on the front and the rear. This
was retrieved when the wings of the regiment from Dinajpur and Rang-
pore advanced to meet the Sannyasis and they were compelled to flee
to the hills, the British leaving them alone as 'pursuit was dangerous'.

The British first dealt with the question of the Sannyasis by evacuating
them from their dependencies, for which they moved cautiously
effecting voluntary relinquishment by the Sannyasis as far as possible
and thus avoiding any undue alarm likely to affect their rank and file in
the event of any undue pressure. Even though reluctantly the Sanny-
asis had departed. From 1773 the Bhutanese question was taken up.
Koch Bihar was asked to cease hostilities with the Bhutanese, and this
done they turned to Deb Raja assuring the latter that their limit of
expansion was Koch Bihar and that they had no intention to penetrate
into the hills. The Bhutanese now recognizing the claim of Koch
Bihar upon the doars accepted the suggestion of the British and a treaty
was signed between them in April 1774, which determined their rela-
tions and connections throughout the eighteenth century.

Nothing, however, was more important than the trade article which
conferred on the British an uninterrupted right of commercial dealing
with the Bhutanese in exchange of the same privilege to be extended
to them in British territory; and the use of the road to Chumbi Valley
was secured as a corollary to the former stipulation, thus fulfilling the
long want of the British. The history of the Anglo-Bhutanese relations
hereafter covers the development of the last named stipulation.

27 Capt. Jones to Hastings January 30, 1773.
29 Ibid.
30 Hastings to George Colebrooke, March 31, 1773. The cause of this aban-
donment is said to be a change of 'intention'.
31 The interior of Sorredunga Pass was thus given over to the Bhutanese.
As has been already observed, the British Government took up the matter of opening the Pharjong route to the Chumbi, only when the attempt to penetrate to that quarter through Kathmandu failed. That fact, coinciding with the peace overtures of the Tashi Lama, which supplied the main initiative for correspondence, helped the Government of Bengal to use their predominance in Bhutan for securing commercial contact with that country and Tibet and they seized the earliest opportunity to open negotiation with the Tashi Lama. A hint to the intended embassy to wait upon the Lama was made in the reply, accompanied with assurances about the Bhutanese affair and denying all responsibility for provoking the war. Mr. Bogle was despatched at the head of the mission to Bhutan and thence to Tashi Rabgya to negotiate a trade pact with Tibet. The settlement with Bhutan was, of course, secondary; for the stipulations in the treaty of 1774 already envisaged commercial intercourse between the two countries. Mr. Bogle's presence in the Bhutanese capital helped him to secure the goodwill of the new Deb Raja who had now replaced the Deb Judhur. It was proposed that Mr. Bogle should wait for the suggestion for trade negotiations from the Tashi Lama; but it was the ardent wish of Warren Hastings not to allow time to elapse or at least to exert to evade all discouragement from the Lama whose attitude towards the mission was coloured by a fear of China. Warren Hastings had a knowledge of his sympathetic attitude towards the British. It appears from the biography of the Sixth Panchen Lama, Palden Yeshe, that he was in favour of external contacts. He was the first Tibetan authority in the medieval age to seek contacts with the Indian Princes. His deputations had twice visited Banaras to wait on Chait Singh—one in 1772 and another in 1774 (The Missions of Bogle and Turner in Tibetan Texts, T'oung Pao, XXXIX, 1949, Pp. 334-38). Warren Hastings knew all this and he wanted to secure a position before anything hostile occurred. He had therefore advised Bogle to turn a deaf ear to all kinds of discouraging suggestions. Accordingly Mr. Bogle reached Pharjong on October 13, 1774, subsequently arriving at Tashi Rabgya itself on November 8; and all was done with Bhutanese goodwill.

32 The letter of Tashi Lama was delivered on March 31, 1774 just after the termination of the war. The reply bore the date May 10, 1774.
33 The imports into Tibet from Bengal consisted of broad cloth, butter, skins, indigo, pearls, coral, amber and other beads, chalk, tobacco, sugar, Malda stripped satins and a few white clothes chiefly coarse.
34 See S. Cammann (Op. Cit. P. 24) quotes L. Petech, the author of the article.
35 Letter of Mr. Bogle, December 5, 1774. Forrest's Selections, I, P. 254.
His Tibetan mission, however, not being successful inspite of the cordiality shown to him by the Lama who accepted the proposal for a trade pact, Mr. Bogle returned to Bhutan to formally sign a trade pact with the latter country. The Raja was all attention to Mr. Bogle's request and expressed his readiness to enter into an agreement with him. The trade pact thus granted 'equal and mutual rights to the inhabitants of both countries, abolishing all import duties on goods passing between them. This also secured for them the exclusive right to use the Chumbi high road; the Bhutanese being content with the monopoly of the trade of tobacco, indigo, betelnut and redskin would not grudge this advantage going to the British traders.

Warren Hastings to whom goes all the credit of understanding the importance of Anglo-Bhutanese relations in the light of the safety of the empire and as a way of approach to Tibet and China, strove earnestly to keep the goodwill of the Bhutanese Raja. He could not forget the part that Bhutan had played in the first Tibetan mission, nor could he overlook the part that she was likely to play in the coming mission, and accordingly he deputed Dr. Hamilton to Bhutan with his message of friendship. This was the second mission of the kind sent to Bhutan. Yet a third was in the offing. In 1779 Mr. Bogle had once again reached the Bhutanese border at the head of the second mission to Tibet but having heard of the departure of Tashi Lama to Peking, he returned to Calcutta. The question of certain disputed points in regard to territorial adjustment between Bhutan and Bengal was then pending and Hamilton had only recommended certain steps. As Mr. Bogle had to break his journey at Koch Bihar, it fell to another mission to carry out the settlement. This mission reached the Bhutanese capital during the middle of 1780. In this year the Government of Bengal duly acquired the possession of the two doars formerly belonging to the Raja of Baikunthapur and for this Bhutan was conceded the right of free trade in some new districts. In 1783, Mr. Turner was deputed to enquire into the grievances of the Bhutanese merchants and signed another agreement with the Bhutanese Raja. This agreement was fol-

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37 Markham's, Bogle, P. 6. There were two more missions from the British both led by Hamilton. (LXIX-LXX).
38 As per instructions issued to Mr. Bogle by the Governor-General. The articles passing from Bengal to Bhutan were broad cloth & coral then imported from Europe (IHQ, Ibid).
39 Markham Op. Cit., LXIX-LXX.
owed by the ratification of the old treaty, the execution of which was
done in Bengali.40

The feeling of amity which was marked during all these years con-
tinued to rule their policy till 1794, and Bhutan always formed a
channel of India’s communication with Tibet till then. In 1785 we
hear of her help available to another mission in their talk with the
Regent at Terpaulating and in 1785 to Purangiri at the time of the installa-
tion ceremony of the new Lama. But for the assistance rendered by
Bhutan, the Tibetan policy of the British would not have been initiated.

So long as the hope for a settlement with Tibet was dominating
the foreign policy of the Government of Bengal in that regard, Bhutan
was the scene of occasional visits by the British representatives. There
were a series of deputations either to Bhutan or to Tibet passing through
Bhutan. The chain was broken only after 1788 owing to the Tibeto-
Gorkha conflict, which for a time diverted the attention of the Tibetans
to their own self defence and ended all hopes of settlement of other
questions. In 1792 a worse situation cropped up. The Chinese who
had hitherto exercised a vague kind of suzerainty over Tibet now sat
heavily on its chest. Their power was exercised in everything down to
details. As a sovereign power they had their own interest in the over-
all commercial transaction of the country they controlled. They want-
ted exclusively bilateral trade between China and its Tibetan region.
Naturally they disliked any idea of permitting the British to enter the
field as competitors. In 1793 by a decree the Chinese once for all
declared Tibet closed to foreigners. Bhutan, therefore, lost all gla-
mours for the British and accordingly the tempo of the Anglo-Bhuta-
nese relationship gave way to a state of restraint and enstrangement,
which in the end added to the more terrible conflict of 1864 and to the
Anglo-Tibetan tension of 1904.

APPENDIX

The treaty taken from Aitchison reads as follows.41

(1) That the Honorable Company, wholly from consideration
for the distress to which the Bhootans represented themselves to be
reduced and from the desire of living in peace with their neighbours,
will relinquish all the lands which belonged to the Deb Raja before the

40 This copy is attached to the paper of Dr. Sircar, vide, Proceedings of the
The second trade mission to Tibet reached Terpaulating in 1783. Tashi Lama
had died in 1780, and the delay of three years was due to the death of Mr. Bogle.
commencement of the war with the Raja of Cooch Behar, namely to the eastward, the lands of Chikha-Kotta and Pangola-haut, and to westward, the lands of Kyrunte, Managant and Lucky-poor.

(2) That for the possession of the Chitchacotta Province, the Deb Raja shall pay an annual tribute of five Turgini horses\(^{42}\) to the Honorable Company which was the acknowledgement paid to the Behar Raja.

(3) That the Deb Raja shall deliver up Dhujinder Narain, Raja of Cooch Behar, together with his brother the Dewan Deo, who is confined with him.

(4) That the Bhootans, being merchants, shall have the same privilege of trade as formerly, without the payment of duties and their caravan shall be allowed to go to Rangpoor annually.

(5) That the Deb Raja shall never cause incursion to be made into the country, nor in any respect whatever molest the ryots that have come under the Honorable Company's subjection.

(6) That if any ryot or inhabitant whatever shall desert from the Honorable Company's territories, the Deb Raja shall cause him to be delivered up immediately upon application being made for him.

(7) That in case the Bhootans, or any one under the Government of the Deb Raja, shall have any demands upon, or disputes with any inhabitant of these or any part of the Company's territories, they shall prosecute them only by an application to the Magistrate, who shall reside here for the administration of justice.

(8) That whereas the Sannyasis are considered by the English as an enemy, the Deb Raja shall not allow anybody of them to take shelter in any part of the districts now, given up, nor permit them to enter the Honorable Company's territories, or through any part of his, and if the Bhootans shall not of themselves be able to drive them out, they shall give information to the Resident, on the part of the English, in Cooch Behar, and they shall not consider the English troops pursuing the Sannyasis into those districts any breach of this Treaty.

(9) That in case the Honorable Company shall have occasion for cutting timber from any part of the woods under the Hills, they shall do it duty free, and the people they send shall be protected.

(10) That there shall be a mutual release of prisoners.

This Treaty to be signed by the Honorable President and Council of Bengal, etc. and the Honorable Company's seal to be affixed on the one part, and to be signed and sealed by the Deb Raja on the other part.

Signed and ratified at Fort William, the 25th April 1774.

   " William Aldersey.
   " P. M. Dacres.
   " J. Laurell.
   " Henry Goudwin.
   " J. Graham.
   " George Vansittart.

The Second Trade Mission to Tibet.

Warren Hastings with his ideas of commercial penetration by the British into Tibet and China schemed a plan for deputations to these countries. Obviously he looked to the Tashi Lama for help in this endeavour because he knew that if it were not for the good offices of the Tashi Lama, the first British Trade Mission could not have been able even to negotiate the Tibetan pathways.

The Mission which was to visit Bhutan at the first stage was directed 'to cultivating and improving the good understanding subsisting between the Chiefs of those countries and the British Government. India carried a brisk trade with Tibet, the details of which are given in the appendix. The traders who handled the dealing were mostly Kashmiri Muslims and Bengali Gosains. The latter, according to a British report, 'were the trading pilgrims of India, resorted hither in great numbers, their humble deportment, and holy character heightened by the merit of distant pilgrimages, their accounts of unknown countries, and remote regions, and above all their possession of high veneration for the Lamas, procure them not only a ready admittance but great favours. Though clad in the garb of poverty there are many of them possessed of considerable wealth. Their trade is confined to articles of great value and small bulk. It is carried on without noise or ostentation, and often by paths unfrequented by other merchants'.

The Second Trade Mission to Tibet embarked on its journey in

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43 For a detailed account of both the first and second missions read Clements Markham, *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet*, etc., (London, 1876) and Capt. Samuel Turner, *An Account of an Embassy to the Court of Teshoo Lama* (London).
44 Home Department, Public Body Sheets of 19th April, 1779.
45 Home Department O.C. No. 1 of 1st September, 1772.
1779 in the month of April under Mr. Bogle’s leadership, but hardly it had reached Koch Bihar when the news of the Tashi Lama’s departure to Peking was delivered, which caused the postponement of the mission until such time as the nature of the talk between the Tashi Lama and the Emperor would become known. Since the beginning of 1775, the time of Mr. Bogle’s stay in Tashi Limbu during his first visit, when he could impress the Tashi Lama with the friendliness of the British mission and the advantages accruing from the proposed Anglo-Tibetan Mission, the idea of an early settlement of the question of commerce had assumed a practical shape and the British Government were looking forward to catch every opportunity for negotiation. Of course, Bogle’s mission itself was a failure because there could be no negotiation as such owing to the feeling of extreme aloofness on the part of the Tibetans, of which Bogle had the bitterest experience in his earlier visit, it was such that none would dare carry his letter to the Dalai Lama. The Chinese who were the suzerain power also had exercised their influence to discourage any negotiation with the British.

It was said that the Tibetan notion of a trade pact with the British was coloured by a fear of imperialistic domination, and this was quite unjustified in view of the doings of the British in India. This might be partly true. But the real cause of their cautious attitude was the fear of courting the Chinese Emperor’s displeasure. The Chinese did not like any foreigner to set his foot on Tibetan soil. Bogle was, therefore, obliged to return to Calcutta without achieving the end of his mission; but the Tashi Lama gave adequate promises, and Mr. Bogle had come to the Governor-General with those promises, which had gone to keep warm the enthusiasm of the latter about prospects for a closer collaboration with the Tibetans in spite of adverse circumstances encountered by the first British trade mission.

The policy of isolation pursued by the Tibetan Government the British regarded as likely to undergo a change in their favour in due course, and as the Tashi Lama maintained cordial communications with them, sometimes himself requesting for certain favours like a plot of land near Calcutta, and at another time sending the Governor-General even formal salutations, they were confirmed in their belief as to the

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47 Home Department, Public Body Sheets of April 19, 1779; Markham, Bogle, P. 209.
48 Sir Francis Younghusband, India and Tibet, Pp. 6-7.
49 This is still known as Bhotbagan. An article about this place appears in the Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society, 1890, No. 1, Part I: Markham’s Bogle, Pp. 164-65; Abstracts of Letters Received 3, P. 99, April 3, 1775.
final outcome of their trade mission. Most of all, the Tashi Lama's journey to Peking was watched with care, for according to what Bogle was told by him, the fate of the Mission hung on the trend of the Sino-Tibetan talks,\(^{50}\) it was therefore not without a sufficient reason that the Governor-General complied with the Lama's requests for pearls and conch shells in all hurry and promptness.\(^{51}\)

The Government of Bengal were also fortunate in having obtained access to the Chinese court and their agent, through the goodwill of the Lama, could plead for the Emperor's assent to the Anglo-Tibetan Trade Pact.\(^{52}\) But the hope of further action on this matter was smashed by the untimely death of the Tashi Lama in Peking, and the departure of the deputies to Tashi Limbu put matters to rest for all times, at least, so far as securing China's assent was concerned.\(^{53}\) Now the very prospect of the second mission going to Lhasa looked to have receded farther. And with the death of Mr Bogle on April 3, 1781, the very idea of a proposed Second Trade Mission of 1779 came to an end, only to be retaken after four years.

Warren Hastings, however, clung to the hope of renewed negotiations with a tenacity peculiarly his own, as it was a dream of his to establish trade in that country. He also hoped that ultimately Tashi Lama's influence with the Chinese Emperor will secure for the British 'a communication with Peking';\(^{54}\) this he mentioned in a letter to the Court of Directors (19 April, 1779) adding, 'It is impossible to point out the advantages either in opening new channels of trade or in obtaining redress of grievances or extending the privileges of the Company, that may result from such intercourse'. Luckily,\(^{55}\) for this Tibetan adventure of his, which was of less hazard and of much gain to the British and, therefore, worthy of the rising State, a kind of negotiation was kept still going by the Regent of Tashi Limbu, Tashi Lama's half

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\(^{51}\) The Lama's request was contained in a letter received here on August 12, 1779.

\(^{52}\) Purangiri Gosain had gone to Peking to meet the Tashi Lama. He was presented to the Emperor by the latter. It appears from the narrative of Mr. Turner that the Emperor had accepted the idea of a pact with the British (Proceedings of the Historical Records Commission, Vol. XIII, Pp. 99 ff.).

\(^{53}\) The date of the death of Tashi Lama is wrongly put as November 20, 1780; See Francis Younghusband, P. 26; Bengal, Past and Present, Vol. XXVI, P. 195; JBAS, Op. Cit. His death occurred on July 4, 1780 as appears from a letter of Raja Irtini (TR. 19 Pp. 3-12). This letter is quoted in the Indian Historical Quarterly above referred to.

\(^{54}\) Pub. Consult, April 19, 1779.

\(^{55}\) Minute, Original Consultations. No. 1 of April 19, 1779.
brother Chanzu Cusho, through his large correspondence for all these years. Raja Irtini was another person to help him to the best of his capacity. In 1782 he supplied the Governor-General with the details of the Peking talk, which, of course, made painful reading and was disappointing because of the leader’s death, but this correspondence had opened up the vista for a fresh attempt on the part of the Bengal Government. Warren Hastings, therefore, without waiting for any invitation from Tibet, re-instituted the Second Trade Mission for the second time and placed at its head Mr. Samuel Turner of the Bengal Service, ‘with a salary of Rs. 3,000 per month. Puran Giri Gosain accompanied this mission as he did the first.

This time, the mission started with a limited aim, which the British were forced to accept by the statement of advice of Chanzu Cusho, the half-brother of the Tashi Lama. But even with limited objective the mission was checkmated in its course of action. It was not without Tibetan objections that the mission could finally enter the border. While Mr. Turner was in Bhutan, he received a letter from Raja Irtini and Jossa Lama to the effect that his mission was untimely and it was likely to face complications owing to Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. In this letter they had also expressed the feeling of the Tibetan people who appeared against sending a European envoy, and requested the Governor-General to depute an Indian who ‘is able to evade the suspicion of the people of this country’ Mr. Turner himself was dissuaded from attempting to go to Tashi Limbu, for the latter had declared in a letter sent earlier ‘the Tashi Limbu is under China, the law forbids the entry of European foreigners and the application for such entry would not be considered by the Chinese promptly’. But Mr. Turner was undaunted, and all this persuasion had no effect whatsoever. Mr. Turner replied that his mission, having once left India, would not return there and could only do so if the Governor-General intervened. The journey of the Mission was continued and, towards the end of December 1783, they reached Terpauling, the educational abode of the minor Tashi Lama who had just been ‘discovered in reincarnated form’.

With the fear of Chinese intervention, the atmosphere in Lhasa

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53 He was a minister at the court of Tashi Lama and a brother and confidant of his.
57 1782, February 12; TR 19, P. 22.
56 Home Department Original Consultations No. 3 of January 9, 1783.
59 A minister at the court of the Tashi Lama.
60 Received on March 28, 1783.
61 Ibid. 
62 Received on August 1, 1783.
court was quiet but as the isolationist party was now weakened by the death of its leader, Gesul Rimbochay, it could not protest against the arrival of the British Mission. Turner, unlike Bogle, was, therefore, in a favourable position and his negotiation with the Regent was marked by the willingness of the latter to meet his point of view. But it did not fulfil Warren Hastings' expectation, and the scope of their discussion was so narrow and limited that only a part of Tibet, covering the domain of the Tashi Lama, could come under the proposed pact. Notwithstanding this, Mr. Turner signed an agreement with the Regent and returned to Calcutta in March 1784.

In 1785 John Macherson sent Puran Giri to attend the installation ceremony of the new Panchen Lama (JBAS LIX, Part I, No. 1). This is the third mission. He reached Tashilhunpo on the 8th of May.63 In the next year, however, the Tibeto-Nepalese war had started and there was tension all over the frontier areas. Meanwhile Puran Giri retired to a private life and Warren Hastings himself had been recalled;64 thus the relationship came to an end.65

The Gorkha-Tibet war had not only disrupted the course of Anglo-Tibetan negotiations but also put an end to the very possibility of negotiation once for all. As it will follow later, the Chinese who had gained absolute powers in Lhasa discountenanced any move directed to contact the British on any account. So the attempt to seek commercial penetration into Tibet from India was given up. But the British on the suggestion of their officers in India made efforts through another channel to revive the negotiation. In the summer of 1793, a former Governor of Madras, the Earl of Macartney was deputed as special envoy to the Chinese Emperor and he visited Peking. But because of the general atmosphere of suspicion and official indifference the envoy did not make any headway in respect of negotiation, and he returned. The last attempt in this direction was made in 1795 when another mission visited China.66 The mission carried a letter of the British King to the Chinese Emperor to clear any kind of doubts about British help to Nepal in the war of 1788-92. The King wrote that the British instead of helping the Gorkhalis had attacked Nepal from the south, and compelled them to surrender to China. But this also did not cut any

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63 Turner, Pp. 419-23.
64 Hastings left India in February of 1785.
65 Puran Giri was one of those men who was a monk but 'at once a pilgrim, merchant and a soldier. The Gosains had the monopoly of Tibetan trade in their hands' (Turner, P. 370). G. Basak in Bengal, Past and Present, LIX, I, I, (1890): (Notes on a Buddhistic Monastery at Bhot Bagan, Howrah).
66 S. Cammann, Pp. 138-141.
The Chinese discouraged any talk on the issue of Anglo-Tibetan trade, and the Emperor's reply to the British King's letter refused to believe his version of the Nepal affair adding that China had defeated the Gorkhalis without anybody's help. The second mission also like its predecessor returned a failure.

The British were kept at bay from Tibetan affairs for another hundred years.

**APPENDIX**

A list of articles composing the Commerce between Tibet and the surrounding countries (enclosure in Mr. Turner's letter).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports:</th>
<th>Imports:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tibet to Nepal</strong></td>
<td><strong>China to Tibet</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold dust, diamonds, pearls, corals, a small quantity of musk, tinkle, woollen clothes, lamb skins, wood or other skins.</td>
<td>Gold and silver brocades, plain silk, plain satins, black tea of four or five different qualities, tobacco, talents of silver, quicksilver, cymbals and other musical instruments, firs, sable, ermine, black fox and dried fruits.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This trade is carried on at Shining or Sitting, a garrison town on the western frontier of China.

**Tibet to China**

Rocksalt, tinkle, gold dust, pearls, corals and a little quantity of musk, woollen cloth, lambskin and certain goods obtained from Bengal.

**Nepal to Tibet**

Silver species, coarse linen cloths, gurreetree, rice, copper. Through Nepal also pass English commodities and Bengal goods like broadcloth and the inferior sorts of which the colours in most instances are yellow and scarlet. Some few trinkets, such as snuff boxes, smelling bottles, knives, scissors, spying glasses. Of spices cloves are most saleable. They are the principal ingredients in the composition of the perfumed rods which men of rank

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67 According to S. Cammann (P. 143) Ch'ien-Lung Emperor's letter of 7th February, 1796 quoted in KTSL, 1493, 16b-18.

68 Such as conical oboes.
Nepal to Tibet

keep constantly burning in their presence. No sort of spices used for culinary purposes.

Tibet to Bengal

The articles on the opposite side are by the produce of Tibet, e.g., gold dust, musk and tinkal.

Bengal to Tibet

Nutmeg, sandal wood, diamonds, pearls, emeralds, saphires, phirosa or lapis lazuli, corals, jet, amber, chaaukshalls, kinkaab, guzesab, most valued Malda cloths, guzee Rangpur leather, tobacco, indigo, wood and other skins.

Tibet to Bhutan

Gold dust, tea, salt, woollen cloths, the manufacture of Tibet.

Bhutan to Tibet

English broad-cloth, Rangpur leather, tobacco, coarse linen, guzee, etc. coarse drapery, rice, sandal wood, indigo, minjaet.

With Assam there is no intercourse

Tibet to Ladakh and Kashmir.

The fine wool of the goats, from which shawls are manufactured.

Ladakh and Kashmir to Tibet (the former is the market between Kashmir and Teesho Lumboo).

A few shawls, dried fruits, apricots, kishmish, raisins, currants, dates, almonds and saffrons.

Khamback to Tibet.

Horses, Dromedaries (camels), Bulger hides (Russian leather).

A beneficial traffic is carried on with Lhasa in exchanging gold dust for silver bullion. Rate of carriage from Phari to Teesho Lumboo for the hire of one beast of burden that carries 200 cwt., is eight or nine Indermillies equivalent to three sicca rupees.

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69 Saffron is said to have used for dyeing the head-dress of the lamas of the Gelugpa Sect.
70 A tribe of Kalmuks.
71 Skins full of butter, religious tribute to Tashi Lama (Panchen Lama).
72 The coins of Nepal, so-called after the name of the Ruler who first coined silver rupees in Nepal. These were debased and were current in Tibet at a lower rate of exchange with the Indian rupees or even with pure Nepalese rupees.
ANGLO-NEPALESE AFFAIRS

It was no secret that the British were hostile to the growth of Gorkha power in Nepal and they had left no stone unturned to prevent it. In these circumstances it was but natural that the Gorkhalis did not trust British intentions even when the subject was innocuous. For that reason the idea of signing a Trade Pact with the British Government of Bengal was intolerable to the sentiment of the Gorkhalis and they had shunned and evaded the attempt on the part of the British to carry trade negotiations till as late as 1792. In that year, however, taking advantage of the repeated requests of the Gorkhalis for British intervention in the Tibeto-Nepalese conflict, the Government of Bengal attempted, though unsuccessfully, to impose a trade pact on Nepal, the full account of which will interest the readers. The trade pact was a culmination of a series of effort made in the direction by the British authorities to influence Nepal in so many ways, which had extended for an uncertain period of more than twenty years involving different phases of Anglo-Nepalese relation. It is now necessary to take up the account of Anglo-Nepalese relations for these years before we deal with the trade pact of 1792.

To the leader of the Gorkhalis goes the undoubted credit of foiling the British imperialist designs on Nepal. Finding that the East India Company was gradually strengthening its position in the country and showing imperialistic tendencies, Prithvinarayan Shah was all along opposed to any sort of settlement with the British and, from the very start of his career, his movements were directed to prevent their ascendancy in his domain. The grandest strategic defeat which he inflicted on the British was to drive Captain Kinloch from the fortress of Sindhuli, an event which terrified the Government of Bengal into accepting as fait accompli the Gorkha conquest of Nepal. As the present article purports to deal with the question in its full, other details will follow, but here it will suffice to note that the Shah had proved a successful conqueror whose doings had discouraged the British from at-

74 The Kingdom of Nepal became known as Gorkha on account of the ruling dynasty having captured the valley from a hill principality of that name which is situated fifty miles due west of Kathmandu.

75 Captain Kinloch was sent to invade Nepal on behalf of Raja Jayaprakashamalla of Kathmandu, who appealed for British help through the Collector of Bettia (Letter from T. Rumbolt, April 20, 1767). Refer to Bengal, Past and Present, Vol. IX, Pp. 29 ff; S. B. Gewali, Prithivinrdayan Shah (Nepali); N. Chatterjee, Verelst's Rule in India, Ch. II; P. Auber, Rise and Progress of the British Power in India, Pp. 181-206; Kirkpatrick. An account of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1811, Pp. 270 ff.
tempting military interference in Kathmandu.\footnote{Bengal Select Committee, February 16, 1768.} The British had been aware that Nepal could be touched only at a great risk and injury to British interest. But for about ten years since 1767 the British authorities pursued a policy alternating between intrigues for a dominant position in the politics of Nepal and formal peaceful approach to Kathmandu for securing commercial intercourse with this country.

After Kinloch's defeat an attempt was made to renew the expedition, but the Company's pre-occupation with Haider Ali in the South dismissed the possibility of such adventure.\footnote{\textit{A Comprehensive History of India} by Beveridge, II, P. 8.} The East India Company meanwhile tried to get an opportunity to advance its commercial enterprise. Until such time as military expedition became practicable,\footnote{Letter from Court, November 11, 1768.} trade consideration alone was to be the guiding factor. In his despatch of 16th March 1768, the Secretary to the Board of Directors of the East India Company wrote to their Council in Calcutta 'to obtain the best intelligence you can whether trade can be opened with Nepal and whether cloth and other European commodities may not find their way from thence to Tibet, Lhasa and Western parts of China.'\footnote{\textit{Fort William-India House Correspondence}, Vol. V, Pp. 10, 81, Public Letter from Court, 16 March, 1768, Para 13.} Another proposal towards seeking trade facilities in Nepal was mooted out by the Court of Directors in their letter to the President and Council of Calcutta, as they wrote 'to consider whether a scheme of cutting sticks for masts and yard and procuring pitch tar, etc in the Morang country could be implemented' (30th June, 1769 Para 30). For all this it was essential that the goodwill of the Gorkha Maharaja be obtained. But the latter was irreconcilable to any entreaty of the British, as was shown from the way he prohibited the entry of certain British traders to Kathmandu. He had also approached the Lhasa authorities not to entertain the British offer of establishing new trade relations between Tibet and Bengal.\footnote{Prithvinarayan Shah had also in mind the industrial prosperity of his country, which he wanted to use for his own ascendancy in Tibet, offering to open factories there.} The British however desired to pursue the matter irrespective of his attitude. Although even later he turned a deaf ear to the proposal for a negotiation contained in Verelst's letter to him,\footnote{Copies issued, 1769-70 Nos. 106 and 107. It appears from a letter of the Governor that the British even renounced their connection with the Newar rulers to please him (November 13, 1769).} the British had wanted to make a formal approach to him with a show
of friendship. They now despatched 'a man of high position to visit Nepal and confer with the ruler.'

James Logan’s Spy Mission.

James Logan who was deputed to do the needful in this endeavour recommended a policy of intrigues with the exiled rulers as an alternative method of rehabilitation (Letter dated August 25, 1769). This man had formed a notion that Prithvinarayan Shah would on no account encourage British trade interest in and through Nepal. Primarily Logan was entrusted with the task of carrying a letter of the Governor to the Gorkhali King as a mark of formal approach for close and friendly relations between the East India Company and Nepal. This letter assured Prithvinarayan Shah that only due to ignorance the British had assisted the Newar Raja, and now as they were fully acquainted they will on no account support any other party except the addressee. It appears that Logan did not take the trouble of delivering the letter to Prithvinarayan Shah. He was so prejudiced in the case that he advised his boss to rescue Jayaprakasamalla instead. He himself understood to go on a secret spying mission to different parts of Nepal.

Accordingly the English reverted to the old position and tried to back up the cause of the dethroned rulers and worked hard for their restoration. Logan’s mission was saddled with double objective. While he was to lure Prithvinarayan Shah by expressing friendly sentiment of the Company, he was to enlist the support of all the elements hostile to the Gorkhalis for the second attempt to bring Nepal under British orbit of influence. The first swarm of emigrants from Nepal, which mainly consisted of refugees, mostly dethroned rulers, had found shelter in the frontier districts of British India, from where a ceaseless intrigue against the Shah dynasty was being carried with the connivance of the Company. Logan’s first step was to establish clandestine contacts with the exiles. Raja Karan Singh later an exile in Bettia and then a ruler of Saptari granted permission to the British mission going thence to the Chumbi valley to use the Morang-Teesta road as a quid pro quo for the help he expected from them to meet Gorkhali attack on his domain.

This was the only route left for British merchandise to Tibet after the

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82 CPC, II. N. 1681, 1686.
83 CPC, II. N. 1686. Letter dated November 13, 1769.
84 It is not clear to which part of Nepal Logan had moved. Bogle reported (P. 158) that the Gorkhalis informed the Tashi Lama of the movement of a Firingi.
85 Vide his letter March 29, 1767; Calendar of Persian Correspondence, Vol. II, PP. 67-68; Public letter from Court March 16, 1768, para 4. J. Logan’s letter dated O.C. October 31, 1769.
Kathmandu-Kuti route was closed permanently.\[^{86}\]

While in the territory of Karan Singh, James Logan hoped also to obtain guides and intelligence 'in order to prosecute my journey'.\[^{87}\] The ostensible object of this he outlined was to gain access to Tibet where according to his information Jayaprabhasamalla was living after having fled the country on his defeat by the Gorkhalis. In 1769 Will Mirtle\[^{88}\] and in 1770 Francis Peacock and James Christie attempted to explore the regions covered by this highway on the order of the Council.\[^{89}\] These gentlemen had been instructed not to dabble in political activities. Although they could not negotiate Bhutan, Peacock, obtained from the Raja of Morang 'Coran Sing the sole right of cutting furs in his country'. It was, however, found in Calcutta that the timber 'was of inferior quality, rotten at heart and weighty'.\[^{90}\] We do not hear of Logan any more in subsequent despatches. It seems, however, that he was pursuing his line of action in the eastern part of Nepal, while pretending to contact Prithvinarayan Shah on apparently a friendly mission.

But the dread of Gorkha interference occasioned by their rapid expansion towards the east frustrated the joint labour of these Englishmen and it seemed that the last hope of a manoeuvre of the kind suggested by Surgeon Logan was now fading away.

We do not know how Logan obtained his information about the flight of Jayaprasamsamalla in Tibet. But news of the latter's death in Bhatgaon in November, 1769 must have reached Calcutta in time to prevent Logan from undertaking the arduous journey into the Himalayan region as he had planned. It is much probable that he returned from the Terai at the end of 1769.

His mission had surely failed, but he had the satisfaction of ascertaining the state of commercial transactions between Nepal and Patna. Thus wrote J. Logan in O.C. 31, October 1769: In time of peace a considerable trade used to be carried on between their city and Nepal, the chief exports of Patna in this trade were coarse woollen cloth, Patna chintzes, nutmegs, etc., the imports were gold ingots, gold dust, borax, musk, cowtails, chirres, etc. The common values of gold in Nepal, and it is chiefly brought there from Tibet is said to be 50 per cent less than it is at Patna. He added 'loaded bullocks may travel. The Gandak is

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\[^{86}\] Home Department, O.C. No. 20 of November 25, 1769.
\[^{87}\] O.C.I., October 13, 1769.
\[^{88}\] Home Department, O.C. No. 2 of 26 October, 1769.
\[^{89}\] Home Department Public Proceedings of November 29, 1770.
\[^{90}\] H.D.O.C. No. 1(a) of 1st September, 1772; O.C. No. 12 of 10 September, 1772.
navigable for big boats to within two days journey to Nepal. The Bagmati to within 20 Cos.’ (Home Department O. C. No. I of 31 October, 1769).

For sometimes since the failure of Logan’s activities, the line of action adopted by the British became obscure. Probably they would not find any line of conduct, and therefore they allowed the matter to rest at this stage.

Of course, the British were not sitting quiet on the debacle. Now that the Nepal affair was completely gone out of their hand, they were scanning prospects of alternative trade routes for their merchandise in the eastern Himalayas.

In the meantime, the sudden appearance of the Anglo-Bhutanese Pact of 1772 revived hopes in the despondent hearts of the British. But the Bhutanese route had its own short-coming. What the British wanted by a settlement with the Gorkhalis was the facility to use the road to Tibet for their merchandise.\(^1\) Bihar and Bengal had a large export trade with lower and central Tibet, which was carried from Patna through Kathmandu and its four centres Chinachin, Benisahar, Russoagarhi and Dolkha (Kirkpatrick’s Memorandum, Appendix L). It was the traditional highway which reached Kathmandu from Patna within 9 or 10 days. The same facility could not be obtained by the Bhutanese route, for there were no navigable rivers like the Gandak, Bagmati and Kosi in the Bhutanese region on this side of the Himalayas.\(^2\) However, Bhutan offered an outlet to the Chumbi Valley and for the time being fulfilled a great need of the trading community of British India.\(^3\) Due to British readiness to come to terms with the Deb Raja, no attention was given to the promotion of Anglo-Nepalese relations for that period and the prospect of rapprochement with the Nepalese was rendered all the more remote.

But to the British, because of initial difficulties, the Anglo-Bhutanese trade pact proved unworkable and further the Raja’s disposition towards the fulfilment of it was never satisfactory. Moreover, there was

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\(^1\) The merchandise consisted of woollen and cotton piece-goods, staples and pearls, which were exchanged for musk, chowrie, wax, borax and gold, the last being comparatively cheaper and therefore a source of much profit (IHQ, 1933, December); letter from Select Committee to Court, September 26, 1767; letter to the Committee August 28, 1767; Turner’s Memoirs and his reports incorporated in Forrest’s Selections from Foreign Department. Papers III, Pp. 1071-79; Calendar of Persian Correspondence, VI, P. 346; Long, A selection from unpublished Records, Vol. I, P. 230.

\(^2\) Kirkpatrick, Ibid.

\(^3\) Kirkpatrick, Ibid.
the difficult and rigorous trade route passing through the dense forest and hills of Bhutan, which admitted of no conveyance, and which greatly annoyed the British administrators. The importance of friendly Nepal was, therefore, a question never to be lost sight of, even when an amicable settlement between the two Governments appeared a remote possibility in that context. Nepal, as a traditional and ancient highway between India and North-Eastern Asia, offered the best and, so far, the only natural and the easiest opening to British commerce, which the British wanted to resume with countries in that area. Further Nepal's geographical contiguity with southern Tibet, a country of comparatively undeveloped economic life, yet with a large potentiality of an export market, gave another importance to the route and the same was the deciding factor in determining the Anglo-Nepal relations as they emerged with the trade pact. Mr. Samuel Turner who led the Second Trade Mission to Tibet and who understood the difficulties attending the opening of the route through Bhutan had written copiously, urging the Government of Bengal to secure the Kathmandu-Kuti route for that purpose.

Bogle's attempt to establish direct contact with Tibet from Bengal had failed to attain its objective. He was shunned, and the general attitude of the Tibetans was to avoid any kind of contact with British. Bogle had felt that the English were regarded as prospective conquerors of the areas round them and therefore their movement was watched with suspicion. It was in these circumstances that Bogle's eyes had also turned to Nepal and Nepalese route to Tibet (Pub. Consult, April 19, 1779).

It was said that the Tashi Lama had assured Bogle to use his influence with the Chinese emperor to allow the Tibetan Government 'have contacts with the British on commercial matters'. The Lama had also written to the Nepalese King to open the usual trade route of Nepal in order to let unhindered all merchandise passing between Tibet and India (Pub. Consult, April 19, 1779, No. 2). But we do not know if this had produced any effect on Nepalese authorities.

It appears that British wanted to cultivate good relation with Nepal at this stage. But these were impediments in the way of a rapprochement between the British and the Gorkhalis. The British had not yet renounced their claim over the disputed areas in the Terai. They had also not discarded the dual policy altogether.

Read Kirkpatrick, Appendix L. Para 9. I have added the whole report on the state of British-Nepalese trade framed by Captain Kirkpatrick at the end of the present article.
Uptill 1775 A.D. the British had not completely relinquished the intention of subjugating the Gorkhalis by a recourse to war. A suggestion by the Patna Council in June 1771 that the Tautar Paraganas, and the whole of the Terai up to Kosi including Janakpur, should be forthwith occupied by the British forces was still under consideration of the Board of Directors. The Calcutta authorities had not accepted the proposal to invade but had said that ‘we shall keep the demand to the annual tribute paid for those perganas, 12,500 thousand rupees in elephants at the customary rate’ (India Office, Public Consultations, 119-23, 147-53).

*Old Policy Discarded.*

But about this time the British had sufficiently realised the futility of a dual policy pursued so far in their dealing with the Gorkhali rulers of Nepal. This policy had not paid them any dividend whatsoever. It had only antagonised the ruling authority in Nepal without in any way influencing the events there. The Gorkhalis were growing from strength to strength, while all the partisans of the British were ousted from power and forced to live in exile. The latter were so much reduced that there was no point in supporting them as against those solidly entrenched on the soil of Nepal. Here was a situation to compel the British to have second thoughts on their policy vis a vis Nepal.

By 1774 Morang was annexed to Nepal by the Gorkhali invaders and all hopes of the British for securing a foothold on that area had vanished. We have already observed how the British authorities up to the last had tried to get hold of the two Parganas of Amirpur and Baijitpur. But they had failed. Nothing short of war would have enabled them to lay hold on the territories occupied by the Gorkhalis. In regard to Morang also there were several suggestion for a speedy military actions on their side. One Raja Ajitsinha of Purnea had offered them all help if the British would go to the rescue of Diwan Budhakarna Rai. But the British were cautious enough to reject all such advice likely to lead them to clash with the Gorkhalis. So they would not do anything more than sending a normal protest to the Nepal ruler for his occupation of Baijitpur and Amirpur.

All this however was of no avail in inducing the occupant to relinquish his hold. But the British had got to be reconciled as they were entirely helpless in the matter.

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95 CPC, IV, N. 1938. Letter of November 12.
96 CPC, IV, N. 1443.
At the end of the description about Nepal in *Dastur Shahnama*, etc, noticed in an issue of the Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, the author wrote that Raja Ranajeetsinha of Bhatgaon sought an interview with Mr. Alexander, the Chief of Patna Council of Revenue, who wrote to Calcutta. But later as Ranajeet died this matter did not come up for consideration at that level. It was said that Ranajeetsinha had wanted British help to restore his son Abdhutsinha to the gaddi. Sometime later Raja Kirtilbam of Malaibam also tried to help him. Warren Hastings was approached for 20,000 guns. Kirti promised help of his peoples to Abdhut. This man continued to represent his case to the British as late as 1788. He demanded two battalions to invade Nepal, but this was refused in view of the changed condition in Nepal. A similar request by Harakumardatta Sen of Tanhou was turned down by the Governor-General for the same reason.

It is obvious that the British had refused to involve themselves in intrigues against Nepal the more they found that circumstances had altered to the extent that such a policy was expected to bear little fruit in their favour. But it took them nearly nine years to finally disentangle themselves from the affair.

We shall find that a full realisation of the situation had come by 1776 as their attempt to build a trade route through Bhutan had failed.

While we consider British policy towards Nepal in this period we have to bear in mind two factors, 1) that the British had not at the time thought of colonising Nepal or making it a subsidiary state and that 2) their foremost consideration was to open Nepal, and through Nepal the hinterland of Tibet for their commerce. However, it did not mean that they would let slip an opportunity for gaining political ascendancy in Kathmandu.

It appears that the process of disentanglement started in 1776. Now the British authorities disavowed any intention to claim disputed territories and to involve themselves in activities against the Government in Kathmandu.

In 1776 the district of Morang was completely dropped out of British claims by an order of the Bengal Council (A.R. 3, P. 82). The exiled rulers were totally disowned and the claims forwarded on their behalf could no longer form a standing ground for British Inter-

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*7 XVIII, 1942 (vide above).
**CPC, VIII, No. 723, 1356, 1366; CPC, VII, N. 847.
***CPC, VII, N. 1381.*
vention. There would be henceforth no dispute or withholding of revenues on that account over all the lands of debatable jurisdiction. Since then in the next ten years, therefore, a background was prepared for a future move as it were to compensate the situation when the British met with disappointment from the Bhutanese quarter. Rautahar and Pachrauti were finally handed over to the Nepalese Government in 1783 as a token of strict compliance with the findings of an impartial tribunal consisting in this case of Mr. Brooke the chief of Patna Council amongst others, who had settled the dispute in favour of the Nepal Government. This in itself was not very important, but it paved the way for an amicable settlement between the two Governments and set an example for future negotiation and settlement. The British Government also assured protection to the Nepalese pilgrims coming to Gaya, who were till then subjected to molestation by one Mantaram in the service of Mr. Barkatullah at Hazipore.

Foxcroft Deputed

At about this time the British Governor-General desired to send one Mr. Foxcroft on a deputation to Nepal with presents and message of goodwill to its King and Government. We do not know as to whether Foxcroft was allowed to visit Kathmandu. But Warren Hastings’ letter to the King of Nepal, dated January 1, 1784 gives this kind of information. In this communication the Governor General urged for the establishment of friendly relation between the two countries. The British had developed close neighbourly relation with Bhutan and Tibet. Therefore, there was all the greater reason for the two countries to renew the old relation knowing by experience that trade by supplying different nations with goods which they want in exchange for those which they have in plenty is a source of blessing to mankind.

Without further information of Foxcroft’s mission, it is impossible to have an idea of the mood of the Nepalese about the intended move of the British. But the letter of the Governor-General in this regard proves beyond doubt British concern to gain commercial facilities in

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100 Mirza Abdulla was declared to have no claims over these Parganas on the ground that they originally belonged to the Raja of Mackwanpur, whose territory now formed part of the Gorkha Kingdom (Cl. 14. PP. 27-28). CPC, VI. n. 911.


102 CPC, VI, N. 949.
They had not been able, however, to cut much ice by all these efforts.

It was true that in spite of all this certain points of dispute yet remained unsolved, such as the question of the ownership of certain border villages in Tirhut and Champaran. The claim of the Nepal Government on the tappas of Rampur, Chiswan and Jamhauli near the fort of Someswar also had not been settled inspite of their repeated requests. The Nepal Government had also felt compelled to complain against the Nawab Vazir of Oudh whose men had joined hand with some of the Nepalese exiles to raid and ravage the parganna of Sheoraj. It was said that the Pargana was a disputed area, and Nepal required to establish its right over it. The British also were cautious enough to see that no arms and ammunition reached Nepal. In September, 1789 they actually stopped a consignment of 500 guns purchased by Dinanath Upadhya, while presenting a musket to the King. Although the Nepal Government was apparently reconciled to this occurrence saying 'this does not matter so long as there remains friendship between the two' yet this was enough to indicate the state of distrust between the two. But these were not such as to stand in the way of a trade pact or of any sort of rapprochement on other vital questions in view of the developments that had occurred in 1788-92.

In 1788-89 presents were exchanged between the Governor-General and the King of Nepal, and Nepalese pilgrims and merchants were assured of the most cordial treatment in Indian centres. The occasion of the King’s marriage in 1791 further was utilised by the British to send felicitations and presents to him. But now there were other developments in Nepal, which facilitated British move to negotiate a commercial settlement with this country.

It was said that the Anglo-Nepalese relation as it stood in 1788 was much favourable to the British line of policy renovated since 1776. The old bitterness in their relation was gone. The British were now absolutely reconciled to the existence of the new Kingdom of Nepal.
ruled by the Gorkha dynasty. They were only seeking trade advantages in the new situation. But the Nepalese had not totally shaken off their distrust of the British. They understood the change in British attitude towards them as dictated by changed circumstances. Although the Nepalese authorities acted subsequently to suit their needs, it appeared that their readiness to come to terms with the British even over trade matters was not devoid of reservation. As soon as the compulsion was gone, they would behave differently.

The First Anglo-Nepalese Trade Pact.

To add to their readiness or wishes to cultivate the friendship of Nepal, the British Government suddenly awoke to a new development in the Nepalese foreign policy. The Nepalese having invaded lower Tibet and plundered its monasteries came to close grips with the Chinese army, to face which was certainly a task beyond Nepal’s own resources. But unconditional surrender was what they would not conceive; this had to be averted at all cost; so the Nepalese turned towards the British. An envoy from the Maharaja of Nepal waited on the Governor-General at Calcutta and expressed on his master’s behalf his readiness to negotiate a trade pact as a condition for the British help in the war against China. It appears that on British side, Jonathan Duncan was the prime mover in inspiring and facilitating the negotiation to that end. The idea of a trade pact was already present in his mind while the talk was formally opened by the Nepalese. Because of his position as the British Resident in Banaras he had been able to conclude a trade pact with the Nawab of Oudh. As Banaras used to attract a large number of Nepalese traders, mendicants, pilgrims and exiles he also came to possess intimate knowledge of Nepal. Before the arrival of the deputies from Nepal one Rajguru Gajraj Misra had a talk with Mr. Duncan on the subject. As one having a long connection with the Regent in Kathmandu this person carried some influence at the Court of Kathmandu. In him Mr. Duncan had secured the right person to conduct negotiation. Quite possibly Gajraj Misra was the channel through which Duncan had established communication with the Nepalese authorities. From a letter sent by Nepal’s Maharaja to Cornwallis, we are led to infer that the suggestion of a trade pact as quid pro quo for British assistance in the War had come from Duncan himself. But this must not have

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10 For Tibeto-Nepalese War of 1788-91, read Kirkpatrick, Appendix No. I; Appendix No. II; *A Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Vol. XIX, Part IV, PP. 346-412. The writer has given eighteen letters on the subject, some of which were already published by Kirkpatrick.

111 See the next chapter for a reference to the letter.
occurred to him without some advice of the Rajguru, who knew the plight of Nepal, and the predicament in which the rulers were placed at the time. The Rajguru was in Nepal at the time of negotiation. We may imagine that he had gone there with a view to influence the high officers of state more particularly the Regent in behalf of Duncan. It also appears from records that Duncan wanted to make of the proposed trade pact a starting point for all negotiations of political nature that was to follow it inevitably. The trade pact has a provision by which the British were enabled to station a representative of theirs in Kathmandu. While trying for the inclusion of this provision in the draft treaty Duncan had in his mind the need of having a permanent political representative residing in Kathmandu and he had thought that the trade agent would be automatically replaced by the latter in course of time.

Fortunately for Nepal although the treaty was signed and ratified as Duncan had hoped it was not implemented. However, Duncan did not anticipate the turn of unexpected events which were fast developing to make his efforts infructuous. He thought that the proper climate for a move was there. The Nepalese, had of their own accord shown willingness to come to terms with the British. Now was the time to secure the facilities of the Kathmandu-Kuti trade route.

The first trade pact between Nepal and British India was at once taken up for discussion. Taking advantage of the deputies from Nepal arriving in Patna, Mr. Jonathan Duncan who, being the Resident in a state (Benaras), had a first hand experience of such affairs entered into discussion on the subject. From a letter dated June 7, 1791 it appears that Mr. Duncan wanted to know the state of trade between the two countries from the Collector of Saran and Champaran, who sent the needful information incorporated in a letter dated July, 1791. The Collector of Tirhut also supplied him with a list of articles forming the trade of the two countries. A little earlier the British had informed the Maharaja that the British had removed their trade checkposts on

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112 The Nepal deputation consisted of Sher Bahadur Shah, Ram Shah and Balbhadra Shah.

113 A Handbook of Bihar Records, P. 25.

Indo-Nepal border and this they had done to facilitate movement of trade on both sides even though the measure had brought a loss in revenue to them. With the knowledge of the condition of trade Mr. Duncan then proceeded to frame the clauses; and the draft was prepared. The negotiation had a smooth sailing; and Gajraj Misra was sent to Kathmandu with the draft for final talks. After some hesitation the Nepalese deputies were willing to finalise a treaty without any reservation and the first Anglo-Nepalese trade pact was signed on the first of March, 1792. It was to be ratified by the two Governments in the course of a month. The Preamble to the treaty read:

'Treaty authenticated under the seal of Maharaja Run Behauder Shah Behauder Shumshere Jung; being according to the Treaty transmitted by Mr. Jonathan Duncan, the Resident at Benaras, on the part of Right Honourable Charles, Earl Cornwallis, K. G., Governor-General in Council, and empowered by the said authority to conclude a Treaty of Commerce with the said Maha Raja, and to settle and fix the duties payable by the subjects of the respective States of the Honourable English Company and those of Nepaul, the said gentleman charging himself with whatever relates to the duties thus to be payable by the subjects of the Nepaul Government to that of the Company; in like manner as hath the aforesaid Maha Raja, with whatever regards the duties thus to be payable by the subjects of the Company’s Government to that of Nepaul; and the said Treaty having been delivered to me (the said Maha Raja) by Mowlavy Abdul Kadir Khan, the aforesaid gentleman’s vakeel, or agent; this counterpart thereof having been by the Nepaul Government, hath been committed to the said Khan, as hereunder detailed’:

The treaty was to be in operation since 9th April 1792. It enjoined, ‘the officers of both states shall, in pursuance of the strictest orders of both Governments, immediately carry into effect and observe the stipulations aforesaid, and not wait for any further or new attraction’. And for preliminary arrangements to be made in that connection one Abdul Kadir was sent to Kathmandu on deputation in the company of Guru Gajraj Misra. This man was a munsif in the Dewani Court of Benaras, and was a son of the Chief Kazi. Abdul Kadir is mentioned as Vakil in a communication sent by the King of Nepal to Ali Ibrahim Khan, Chief Judicial Magistrate of Banaras (25 April, 1792).

217 Ibid, P. 44.
218 But Aitchison’s draft the date given is 3rd Bysack 1849 of the Sambut Era.
communication also conveyed the news of the treaty being signed for ratification in Kathmandu by the King and its being consequently put into effect forthwith within Nepal.118

Ali Ibrahim Khan reported that though initially the Nepalese administration 'refused to consider such proposition, as all the people of that place shun and avoid Englishmen and their agents, but as a result of tactful persuasion, it was accepted. Abdul Kadir has returned highly satisfied and the attainment of their objective was no less due to the good offices of Gajaraj Misra'.119

Unlike temporary settlements arranged over disputed territories, this pact had one advantage from the British standpoint; it provided specially for the protection of British merchandise in Nepalese territory. In other respects, it was of little significance to the British Government. If its advantage was the securing of protection for merchandise, its disadvantage was the omission of all trade matters with Tibet, which, however, was the main consideration moving the British into accepting the treaty and therefore such an omission was an irreparable loophole. But just to fill this gap there was a proposal to send a mission to Kathmandu, headed by Captain Kirkpatrick,120 who was also entrusted with the task of bringing reconciliation between Nepal and Tibet. He was to be accompanied by Nepalese agents from Patna where they had come to invite him.121

However, before Captain Kirkpatrick started for Kathmandu, the whole background of a situation necessitating a pact with the British had undergone a change.

In October 1792 the Sino-Nepal truce had been signed.122 The War with China was now ended. There was no fear of an invasion from the north and consequently the Nepal authorities felt no need of British help. If the British had willingly sided with Nepal in the very beginning, the subsequent proposal for a closer collaboration would have found support with the Gorkhali leaders. The British proved by their attitude towards the War that they had no desire to help a single party, as they had at heart 'the maintenance of the most cordial and friendly terms with all powers....' and they declined to 'infringe rules of friendship' on that ground.123 The Gorkhali leaders had in mind

118 CPC, X, No. 361 (OR, 247; AR, 8, P. 101, N. 131) PP. 66-67. No. 362 with the same contents from Bahadur Shah.
119 CPC, X, N. 344, letter 21 April, 1792.
120 Letter dated September 30, 1792. (JBORS, 1933, P. 385).
122 Tashi Lama's letter, dated June 28, 1793; Life of Jung Bahadur by Padma Jung, P. 51.
123 Letter to the Raja of Nepal, September 15, 1792.
the hope of British assistance when they negotiated the trade pact a year earlier. Now as it had not been forthcoming and there was no need of it any more, there was little response from the Nepal Government in regard to the proposals of Kirkpatrick.

It should be borne in mind that the Nepalese authorities had never earnestly desired to promote closer understanding with the British, for they fully realised the dangers involved in such a policy. They had sought British help for Nepal, because the country was under duress. But even under duress they had no idea of getting involved in any kind of alliance with the British. It is obvious that they had put their signature on the commercial treaty, not without mental reservation. It appears that in spite of the treaty, there was no desire to implement its provisions. So when the first occasion for disengagement from the committed position was provided by the end of the war with China, the Nepalese refused to have anything to do in concrete with the British, though apparently they continued to show friendly disposition towards them. The trade pact became practically a dead letter after such a treatment.

In the meantime the enigmatic policy and the selfish attitude of the East India Company in the Tibeto-Nepalese conflict led the Nepalese authorities to form their own convictions that the British were only bent on their limited interest. In spite of certain courtiers favouring an alliance, the general opinion was against it. So when Kirkpatrick reached Nepal, he had to encounter a great opposition, which ultimately forced him out of the kingdom without achieving his mission and thus the whole series of attempts in this direction crumbled like a house of cards. The British did not profit by the other treaty either, as it was not ratified by the Nepal Government.

In truth there was no basis for the fear entertained by the authorities and the leaders in Nepal that the commercial undertaking involved
in the clauses of the treaty of 1793 was a part of defensive alliance. The British shrewdly avoided specific clauses of the nature of a defensive alliance at the first stage. The entry of a British diplomat in the capital, however, indirectly might have brought about interference by him in the administration, that was in itself likely to be followed by opposition or tacit acquiescence by the rulers concerned. If they meekly accepted British interference, then of course there was not further trouble. But the Gorkhalis would not tolerate this situation. Probably the same might have led to a war causing submission, and finally subjugation of all the anti-British elements in the country. Nepal thereafter would have been a subsidiary state. The non-acceptance of the proposed treaty of 1793 had, therefore, a greater significance than what it appeared on the surface. It kept British infiltration into Nepal in abeyance for at least another fifty years.

The settlement that was envisaged in accordance with the provisions of the treaty was never realised in practice and the Trade Pact of 1792 was buried into oblivion in due course without even a ceremony. But an idea of the position may be obtained from the draft of the treaty as we reproduce the same in the next few pages.\textsuperscript{125}

We have reproduced the entire draft of the treaty in the next few pages as an appendix attached to this chapter. The duty on imports was levied at 2½ P.C., the price of articles to be determined at the market rate. For transgression of this provision, the either Government was to punish its officers. If there was theft or robbery, the Zamindar or proprietor of the area was to compensate for any loss thus sustained by the merchants who were to enjoy also the facilities of taking their goods beyond the frontier in case of not being sold within the country. The treaty was to be effective forthwith after the ratification.

As we have said the treaty was put into cold storage so soon after it was ratified.

The circumstances that followed the ratification, and which finally rendered the instruments ineffective have been described in a separate chapter dealing with the story of Captain Kirkpatrick’s mission.

\textbf{APPENDIX I.}

\textit{Text of the Trade Pact of 1792.}\textsuperscript{126}

\begin{enumerate}
\item [(a)] In as much as the intention to the general welfare, and to
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{125} Also read, V. A. Narain, \textit{Anglo-Nepalese Commercial Treaty of 1792}, JBRS, XLIII, Pts. III & IV, PP. 334-40.

\textsuperscript{126} C. U. Aitchison, \textit{A Collection of Treaties}, etc., Vol. II (1909), N. XXIII, PP. 103-04.
the ease and satisfaction of the merchants and traders, tends equally to
the reputation of the administrators of both Governments of the Company
and of Nepal; it is therefore agreed and stipulated, that 2½ per cent
shall reciprocally be taken, as duty, on the imports from both countries;
such duties to be levied on the amount of the invoices of the goods
which the merchants shall have along with them; and to deter the said
traders from exhibiting false invoices, the seal of the customs houses of
both countries shall be impressed on the back of the said invoices, and
copy thereof being kept, the original shall be restored to the merchants,
and in cases where the merchants shall not have along with him his
original invoice, the custom house officers shall, in such instance, lay
down the duty of 2½ per cent on a valuation according to the market
price.

(b) The opposite stations hereunder specified, within the fron-
tiers of each country, are fixed for the duties to be levied, at which place
the traders are to pay the same; and after having once paid duties and
receiving a Rowannah (licence) thereon, no other or further duty shall
be payable throughout each country or dominion respectively.

(c) Whoever among the officers on either side shall exceed in
his demands for, or exaction of duty, the rate here specified, shall be
exemplarily punished by the Government to which he belongs, so as
effectually to deter others from like offences.

(d) In the case of theft or robberies happening on the goods of
the merchants, the Foujdar or officer of the place, shall advising his
superiors or Government thereof speedily cause the zemindars or pro-
prietors of the spots to make good the value, which is in all cases, with-
out fail, to be so made good to the merchants.

(e) In cases where in either country any oppression or violence
be committed on any merchant, the officers of country wherein this may
happen shall, without delay, hear and enquire into the complaints of
the persons thus aggrieved, and doing them justice, bring the offenders
to punishment.

(f) When the merchants of either country, having paid the esta-
blished duty, shall have transferred their goods into the dominions of
one or the other state if such goods be sold within such state, it is well;
but if such goods not meeting with sale, and that the said traders be
desirous to transport their sale of goods to any other country beyond
the limits of either of the respective states included in the treaty, the
subjects and officers of these latter shall not take thereon any other
or further duty than the fixed one levied at the first entry; and are not to
exact double duties, but are to allow such goods to depart in all safety
without opposition.

(g) This treaty shall be of full force and validity in respect to the present and future rulers of both Governments, and, being considered on both sides as a commercial treaty and a basis of concord between the two states, is to be at all times, observed and acted upon in times to come, for the public advantage and the increase of friendship.

APPENDIX II.

Heads for the improvement of the Treaty of Commerce with the Nepal Government, as submitted to Bahadur Shah by Dinanath Dopadhya.

1. The Maharaja duly to consider the terms of the Commercial Treaty of March, 1791; to weigh well the advantage likely to result to his own Government, as well as to Company's from a cordial and regulated pursuit of the objects of it, and to evince his regard for the English, and his desire to cultivate their friendship by promoting to the best of his power the extension of his woollen trade, in particular into such parts of Tibet as shall appear to be easily accessible through the territory of Nepal.

2. To agree, for this purpose, to the following stipulations in favour of the English commerce, in addition to those already fixed by the aforesaid treaty.

3. To engage generally to take all traders from the Company's possessions under his protection, and to afford them every security and indulgence during the stay in his country, that the interests of the nature of his government will allow, understanding by the traders here mentioned, such as may from time to time enter the territories of Nepal for Nepal for commercial purposes under Rowannahs (licence) regularly obtained from the custom house officer.

4. To facilitate the merchantile operations of the aforesaid traders by consenting to the occasional or constant residence (as circumstances may render it necessary) of one or more native Gomasthas or agents at each of the following stations:

   i. At Pistie\textsuperscript{127} in the Kuti quarter (N).
   ii. At Dolkha\textsuperscript{128} in the N. E.
   iii. At Russoa in the Kerameg\textsuperscript{129} and Joongah (N. W.)

\textsuperscript{127} Listi or Nesti.
\textsuperscript{128} About 60 miles from Kathmandu.
\textsuperscript{129} Kerrong.
iv. At Benisahar (of Malaibum) in the Mustang quarters.

v. At Chinnachin in the Taklakh quarters (extreme N. W.)

5. To take the proper measures for securing to such Gomasthas and their servants suitable accommodation for themselves and merchandise; the Gomasthas defraying the expenses of the same, and yielding, in all respects, during their residence due obedience to the authority of the Maharaja’s officers governing in the several places enumerated.

6. To engage that the aforesaid Gomasthas, Beoparies (traders), shall be permitted to expose merchandise to sell at the several places recited above, and to deal without any restraint with such Bhote Beoparies or traders as may repair to the said frontier stations, for the purpose of purchasing or bartering their commodities.

7. To promise that the aforesaid Gomasthas or Beoparies shall be liable to no demands of any kind or on any pretence whatever, from the officers governing at the frontier stations specified or from any other officers of the Nepal Government, save and except the duties settled by treaty of March 1791, and such other additional moderate Dustoor or fees on the actual realised amount of their sales (whether in gold or silver or articles of barter) as shall hereafter be fixed to be paid to the commanding officers at the frontier places enumerated, on their receipt from the said officers of passports or Rowannahs to Kathmandu.

8. To agree to substituting in lieu of the frontier places above mentioned any others that may hereafter appear to be more favourably situated for the commercial purpose in view.

9. To engage to regulate the duties to be levied on the returning trade from Tibet whether this consists of silver or gold or grow or manufacture materials the produce of that country, on equitable principles, and in a manner calculated to guard the merchants especially from the inconveniences and losses liable to result from vexatious delay and ill-regulated imports.

10. To consent finally to the residence of an English gentleman and suitable retinue in Nepal for the combined purposes of facilitating and aiding the operations of the traders; of watching over and controlling their conduct, of endeavouring to extend the general commerce, and of improving the friendship and beneficial connection so happily commenced between the Maharaja and the Company’s Government.

APPENDIX III

According to Kirkpatrick’s sources the following is the movement
of trade between Nepal and India (P. 205):\textsuperscript{130}

Exports from Nepal to the Company’s and Viziers dominions.

Elephants.
Elephants’ teeth.
Rice of kinds.
Timbers of sorts.
Hides of sorts.
Ginger.
Kutt, or Terra Japomica, white or black.
Turmeric.
Wax.
Honey.
Behroza (or pure resin of the pine).
Walnuts.
Oranges.
Long pepper.
Long pepper root.
Ghee.
Teigh (or aromatic bark of the root of the bastard cinnamon).
Teiz-pat (dried leaf of ditto).
Large Cardamums.
Roal or Dammer.
Lamp oil.
Cotton (of the Simul-tree).
The following articles are the produce either of Tibet proper or of the Kuchar.

Tanyans, and small Turki horses of Luddakh, and other northern parts of Tibet.

Sheep.
Shawl goats.
Chowri bullocks.
Musk-deer.
Dogs.
Falcons.
Pheasants.
Chuck roars, fire-eaters.
Gold in dust, grains, and small lumps.
Borax.
Salt.

\textsuperscript{130} Also see Hamilton’s \textit{Extracts from East India Gazetteer}.
Sulphur.
Antimony.
Arsenic.
Orpiment.
Musk.
Chowris, or cow-tails.
Rugs, or coarse blankets.
Munjheet.
Raw sal
Cherris.
Bikmah.
Jaithamasi, and various other medicinal drugs.

With respect to the Munjheet, which is chiefly produced in the lower parts of the Kuchar, it would appear to be in great demand among the Tibetans, who use it in dyeing their coarse cloths and stuffs. The Nepali natives most commonly barter it for the rock salt and borax of Tibet, which, I was assured by several intelligent persons, were invariably found in the same situations, in proof of which, it may be observed that there is scarcely ever a bag of salt imported into Nepal in which numerous lumps of crude borax are not met with. There are small quantities of both salt and salt-petre made in the eastern parts of the Valley of Nepal, but the former is not so much esteemed by the natives as that of Tibet.

The following are the principal commodities exported from the Company's dominions to Nepal, either for the consumption of that country, or for the Tibet market.

Doputtahs.
Saries (worn by women).
Dhoties.
Kenkhahs.
Goolbudduns.
Bhoolams.
Mushrooms.
Oornies (or veils), and various other stuffs, the manufacture of Banaras.
Taffetas.
Baftas.
Cossahs.
Dooreas.
Chintz.
Mulmuls.
Broad cloth.
Shawls.
Jamawar pieces of Shawl.
Shawl reejais.
Raw silk.
Gold and Silver laces.
Carpets.
English cutlery of sorts.
Saffron.
Clove.
Mace.
Nutmegs.
Guzerat cardamum.
Black pepper.
Betel nut.
Red Sandal Wood.

White sandal wood.
Allum.
Vermilion.
Quick silver.
Shell lack.
Red wood.
Cotton in the pod (Kupas).
Tin.
Zinc.
Lead.
Soap.
Camphor.
Red pepper chilly.
Conch Shells.
Oud Billa.
Tobacco.

Coral.
CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST GORKHA-TIBET WAR

Gorkha Nepal came into conflict with Tibet on some occasions, in 1787-93, in 1855-57\(^1\) and in 1929-31. Except the last one, which was settled by negotiation, all these conflicts led to war between the two countries.

The important feature of the conflict in all the three cases was that Nepal always came out a winner.

The subject of the present article is the first Nepal-Tibet War.\(^2\)

Nepal.

At the time of the crisis in the relation of the two countries, the Gorkhalis ruled at Kathmandu. They were a newly born power and ever marching to new glory and acquisition. They had succeeded in carving out a fairly large state in the Himalayas extending from the River Kali to Sikkim. They had spread almost without check. All the hill chieftains had fallen before them, one by one. Only towards the south they had to be content with a little stretch of territory formerly belonging to the Rajas of Palpa, Tanhou, Mackwanpur and Morang.\(^3\) Beyond that stretch the mighty British defended the plains.

The power at Kathmandu was unified and strong. The rulers were inspired with patriotic zeal, which gave them strength and courage. The glory of their country was their sustaining power. They needed expansion to make their kingdom large and great.

Before they came into contact with the Tibetans, they had overrun Sikkim, ruled by a Raja of Tibetan origin. The actual date of the invasion is not yet known. From two letters of Mr. Pagan to Colonel

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\(^1\) This war lasted for two years and ended in the discomfiture of Tibet. The British diplomatically helped the Nepal Government. The Treaty of Lhasa signed in 1856 restored all privileges of theirs to the Nepalese. Read Oldfield’s Sketches from Nepal, Vol. II. 1-20.

\(^2\) For Chinese source we have used materials from Schuyler Cammann’s Trade Through the Himalayas, (Princeton, 1951) and Landon’s Nepal (reproduced at the end). The official Chinese document Kuo-erh-K’o-chi-lueh could not be procured in spite of best efforts.

\(^3\) Read my article in the New Review, August 1942. Reprint included in this volume. The East India Company were reluctant to cede anything but had no plausible ground on which they could oppose.
Ross, it appears they took Darjeeling shortly before 1788. The Gorkhalis invaded Sikkim with 6000 men. The Raja took shelter in Bhutan and asked for Deb Judur’s help, but before the latter could actually help him the Gorkhalis reached the gate of Bhutan. The Deb Raja hastened to conclude a treaty by promising to cede Baikunthapur, but as the victors were immediately afterwards engaged in Tibet the promise was not executed and Baikunthapur was saved. The Gorkhalis had left the civil Government in the hands of a Lepcha Chief. The overall command of the area was, however, in the hands of the Suba who functioned from his headquarter at Chainpur.

At about the same time, Damodar Pande had been able to annex Jumla, Dailekh, Jajarkot and other states further west like Doti and Achham and Amarsinha’s force had already reached Hardwar, while development in Tibetan border diverted their attention to that side. Palpa was conquered, but not annexed. The Raja had consented to remain a vassal of Nepal.

**Tibet.**

Tibet on the other hand was passing through a severe crisis and smarting under duress. There was no more the glory that was Tibet. It was a time of decadence and defeat. There was not a unified force to wield a central command. Political power was divided between the heads of monasteries and secular chiefs. The Dalai Lama was just a nominal head over them all. Even that was not as bad as the state of subjection in which Tibetans were placed after the Chinese conquest or Tibet about half a century ago. Virtually the Chinese representative at Lhasa, who was called the Amban, guided the destinies of the country and Tibetans in their own affairs enjoyed absolutely no say! The situation in Tibet was simply deplorable. But we fail to understand as to how this had opened the way for aggression by the Nepalese neigh-

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4 Quoted by Buchanan Hamilton in *Account of the Kingdom of Nepal*; also see item 66 in Enclosure 3, Nepal papers (P. 269) 1816, PP. 120-22. The second letter is dated 28th October, 1788.

L.S.S. O’Malley: *Darjeeling* (Bengal District Gazettes), 1907, P. 231.

6 Buchanan Hamilton writes that the same Civil Government was functioning in 1808, but there were Gorkha garrisons. Hamilton says that according to another letter of Mr. Pagon, the first occupation of Gorkhalis was repulsed by the intervention of Deb Judur, but in March 1789 the letter proved of no avail and Sikkim was finally annexed. This also enabled the Gorkhalis to lay hands on the low lands between the River Kankayee and Tista.

6 Buchanan says that Palpa was then independent, but this is not correct.


8 See Bogle’s Memorandum; Kirkpatrick’s *Account of Nepal*, Appendix A to E; Turner’s Report in Forrest’s *Selections from Foreign Department Papers*, Vol. III, PP. 1071-79.
bour who had little cared to note that this invasion would face a Chinese counter attack in behalf of Tibet:

The Causes of the War

As soon as the Gorkhalis captured the Valley of Nepal the tendency on their part was to claim the right to send their money to Tibet. For a long time, Nepalese Coins were the only currency in Tibet for internal and external exchange. Tibet annually contributed a fixed quantity of silver in lieu of these coins. But during the last hundred years the rulers in Kathmandu had issued debased coins which hampered the economic growth of the country. The Tibetan authorities had stopped importing Nepalese coins when they noticed the effect of such currency and this was not challenged owing to the chaos and political upheaval then reigning in Kathmandu.

The Gorkhalis reformed the currency and wanted to send the new coins to Tibet. They also said that the new coins should command a higher rate of exchange. They sent a deputation for that purpose but the authorities in Lhasa demanded the withdrawal of the debased currency in circulation in their State, before this request was acceded to or else, they said, both coins were to circulate at the same rate of exchange. It was not possible to accept this demand without incurring severe loss. Therefore Tibet’s reply went only to irritate the Gorkhalis. In the meantime, while the Lama had received a British trade deputation, the Gorkhalis felt further embarrassed at the prospect of being neglected in commercial dealings. The situation, therefore, deteriorated to cause a severe strain in the relation between the two countries.

A word is here necessary on the position of trade and commerce between the two countries. Nepal commanded the highway between

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9 The word Gorkha and Gorkhali have been used here at times in the same sense; similarly Nepali and Nepalese. All these four words again have been used to convey identical meaning.

10 According to Bogle these were fetching higher value than their intrinsic worth. The profit of minting was to the extent of rupees 100,000 (Kirkpatrick, P. 211).

11 Markham, Op. Cit, PP 128-29. Turner, Op. Cit, P. 372. The debased coins also fetched a value higher than the one indicated at their face. Both Bogle and Turner reported that they valued much more in terms of gold and silver dusts.

12 Read my article in the New Review, November 1942, about the British trade mission and the state of commerce in Tibet. It may be mentioned here that Nepal’s share in the commerce of Tibet was the largest. Also Hamilton, Op. Cit, P. 212-14.

13 The Newar traders have still a position of vantage in Lhasa. They are engaged in foreign trade.
India and China. Much of the trade passed through Kathmandu. The Nepal Government received a fair revenue out of taxes on transit goods. In addition its nationals did the agency work and to that extent it received an additional advantage. From Tibet also came gold, silver and other precious metals and wool and tea. Nepal would not easily give up this lucrative source of business, and in the face of the uncompromising attitude of the Tibetans, war was the only alternative.

It cannot be said with accuracy whether Tibet had harshly dealt with the Newar traders of this country. They had cultural affinity with the land of the Lamas. Probably they were receiving due attention on that account. What seems to have antagonised the Tibetans more than anything else was the exorbitant charge the Nepal Government levied on goods going to Tibet. Probably this was what compelled them to lend ear to the British who promised to supply goods at a cheaper rate.  

So long as the Tashi Lama was living there was still a hope of a peaceful settlement, for his personality was respected by the Gorkhalis as well. His death in Peking removed the last hope of a peaceful settlement. It was said that he was poisoned to death.

There was a bid for power in Lhasa and after a bitter struggle the sixth Panchen Lama's brother came to Nepal for fear of persecution. He is known in records as Samarpa Hutukhtu. He was also an incarnate Lama of the Red sect. It was alleged that he had told the Nepalese rulers all the secrets of the treasury and hoards of wealth in the Lamaseries of Tashilhunpo. It was said that the prospect of getting possession of this enormous riches was a further attraction to the Gorkhalis to impel them to undertake the adventure of a military campaign in Tibet. The Lhasa authorities wanted him back, but were

14 According to Wei Yuan, the Gorkhalis attacked Tibet using as the pretext the increase of taxes on merchandise and the admixture of dust in the table salt. (See Appendix II).
15 It was said that the Nepalese had proposed a conference on this question, but the Tibetans insolently refused to listen (Kirkpatrick, PP. 339-40).
16 See Palden Yeshe's Life of the Tashi Lama. George Bart Staunton, An Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China (London, 1797), 2 Vols. II. P. 52 quoted by S. Cammann; also CPC, X. P. 155, N. 745, Abdul Kadir's report, September 4, 1792.
17 Kirkpatrick's Account of Nepal, Appendix A. The letters and dispatches referred to are to be found in Kirkpatrick.
18 Shamarpa is spelt as Syamparpa in Nepal, Sumhur by Europeans and as Ssa-nua-ehr-pa in Chinese. Shamarpa's another brother Chungpa was the Regent of Tashilhunpo. According to a Chinese source, Sheng wu-chi, 5.34b, quoted by S. Cammann, Shamarpa was refused his share of the riches of the late Panchen Lama, upon which he fled to Nepal in sheer resentment, Abdul Kadir reported to the British that the Lama had given to the Nepalese particulars of hoarded riches.
refused. This set the ball rolling. The Gorkhalis had recently annexed Doti and Jumla on the Kali River and were free to embark on the expedition with full force. Thus the War started. Oldfield is wrong in saying that these principalities were independent of Nepal in 1805. From Tashi Lama’s letter it appears that Jumla had yielded in 1785.

The War

The Gorkhalis launched an offensive against Tibet in the summer of 1788. A letter of Rana Bahadur received in Calcutta on August 6, 1788 informs the Governor-General that Nepal had despatched a body of troops to Tibet, as the latter had ‘infringed the terms of the treaties and acting contrary to them’. The Tashi Lama wrote that the Gorkhalis had invaded Tibet in May (1788). Damodar Pande and Ranjit were placed at the head of the expedition. There were two wings of the army, one attacking Kerong proceeding along the river Trisuli and another marching through River Bhotia Kosi to Kuti and Sikarjong. The first was led by Sardars Amarsinha Thapa, Bhotu Pande and Kirtiman Sinha, and the second command consisted of Ranjit Pande, Kazi Sri Krishna Shah, Captain Ram Shah, Captain Sri Harka Pande and Sardar Partha Bhandari. Damodar joined sometime after, and he was leading the expedition to Djigarche, which, however, did not reach its destination and came back as the truce was signed.

Sardar Ranjit Kuar and Kazi Abhiman took the route of Thuga for the same destination. Both these were to converse in Djigarche. It seems that the Tibetans could not offer any resistance worth the name and they became panicky and capitulated when places adjacent to the border fell to the Gorkhalis. Kuti was conquered on Asadha 10 of VS 1845, and Kerong on Sravana 9 a little later. Although the Gorkhalis met with a reversal in Sikar Djong on Sravana 23, they could capture Jongka on Sravan 32. This was accomplished, however, while further reinforcement with Balbhadra Shah, Jagajjit Pande, Dhokal Sinha and Ajaya Sinha reached. The enemy also engaged them in Kerong for the second time on Kartika 2, but the Gorkhalis routed them capturing the fort as an additional gain. Kerong and Kuti were ceded to the victors (Read a letter of Rana Bahadur Shah, Sanskrit Sandesh 1-9). But Nilam and Jongka were returned to Tibet later. The negotiation in behalf of the Potala was conducted by Chhyangpo in

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19 CPC, VIII, N. 399.
20 CPC, VIII, N. 977.
21 The force is estimated at 18,000, Cf. Major Duncan’s Report: Kirkpatrick Appendix A.
Tingri Lawrl through Shamarpa Lama and their demands for a yearly tribute of Rs. 3 lakhs (Tibetan ingots of silver) was also complied with. All the previous privileges regarding coins and commerce were restored. In addition to these, Nepal acquired a right of extra territoriality, and accordingly, its Government set up their courts in Gyantse and Djigarche (Shigatse). Henceforth the Tibetan authorities were to receive an agent of the Nepal Government at Lhasa to look after the interest of their nationals and to see that the treaty provisions were not violated. The armed force of the Nepalese returned to Kathmandu on Marga 21, VS 1845 (first week of December, 1788).

It seems that with all these advantages secured to them the Nepalese had agreed to accept a stipulation under which a tribute mission from Nepal was to wait on the Emperor of China every five years. It was said that the Government of Nepal received in 1790 the stipulated amount of tribute from Tibet. Late next year a Nepalese mission reached Peking. It presented to the Chien-lung Emperor ‘tame elephants, horses, and an Orchestra’ we have this information from Ch’ing-shih lieh-chuan (27.20) and Kuang-hsu Hui-tien Shih-li 985.14 as cited by S. Cammann in his book. The fact of a Nepalese deputation to have left Nepal is also confirmed by an indigenous source (See below). For confirmation of the agreement between Tibet and Nepal S. Cammann quotes two Chinese sources, Tung-hua hsu-lu Ch’ien-lung (Chapters 108-18) and Kao-tsung Shun-huang-ti Shih-ju. Cammann thinks that throughout the time the Nepalese had invaded the border areas of Tibet, the Manchu Officials Pa-chung, O-hui and Ch’eng-te had maintained an attitude of connivance. These officers were sent to Lhasa by the Emperor to assist the Tibetans to expel the Nepalese. But instead of giving the invaders a fight they were satisfied while the

29 According to S. Cammann (P. 119), Katon Danchin Banjur, and Depon of Yutog (a military officer) negotiated.
22 CPC, IX. Ibid, P. 55 (N. 745).
24 The agent called Vakil resided in Lhasa till 1955 to look after the interest of the Nepal Government. He held judicial power in cases where extraterritoriality was involved.
26 The treaty was signed somewhere near Kerong. The Lamas in particular the Sakya Lama appear to have applied their good offices for a peaceful settlement. It appears from the Memorial that after the treaty was signed Hari Vakil, Balbhadra Khawas and 20-25 others were sent with presents to the Chinese Emperor and they reached Peking after six months. But this account lacks corroborating information from other sources (Kirkpatrick, P. 343).
29 P. 120.
27 Ibid, P. 113. These are abbreviated as TIIHIL, Cl. and KTLS, 114.29b and 1391.8b respectively. According to Cammann these documents bore the date equivalent to 15th December, 1791. They refer to the events of the year before last.
latter withdrew agreeing to a stipulation to send a five yearly tribute mission to China.

But why did the Nepalese agree to accept the position of a vassal in their hour of victory? If the price of victory was vassalage, then certainly the Nepalese had obtained a meaningless victory. We search in vain the causes that led them to withdraw to their frontier with the flush of victory that had laden their back with Chinese vassalage at the same time. But from Wei yuan's sheng-wu-chi it appears that in reality the Nepalese had only applied 'to be appointed Prince (Kua-wang) of the country' on suggestion by Pa-chung who had falsely let known the Emperor that the Nepalese had surrendered.28

But the provisions of the treaty were violated immediately after. It is not exactly known, who initiated the process. A letter written by Tashi Lama to the Governor General of Bengal accused the Gorkhalis of 'plundering a place Counca in the domain and ruining the ryots' (Secret and Political Department Consultation, 26 January, 1789). But this referred to the first incident of the first war. From the official Memorial and chronicles of Nepal we get a different story. Tibet is charged with violating the treaty, particularly the clause relating to the admission of the Nepalese Agent and with refusing to pay the annual tribute fixed by the treaty.29 This is confirmed by Wei yuan's account. Wei yuan wrote that a Nepalese envoy waited on the Amba about this matter, but the latter took no action on the matter. It seems that the Lamas were not in favour of this provision. Perhaps, the Chinese Representative at Lhasa backed them up to denounce the treaty. We find, therefore, the Gorkhalis invading again. The invasion spread over a long stretch of territory from Kerong to Shigatse (Djigarche), about 250 miles further east. It is said that this time they plundered monasteries in Djigarche30 without regard to the religious sentiments of the Tibetans and captured as hostages Dhurin Kazi, Aitu Kazi, Sardar Chyanglochan and others. The circumstances of the seize of the persons of these Kazis have been presented differently by Tibet and Nepal. The former said that the whole affair was unjustly manoeuvred and Tibet had offered least to deserve that end. But Nepal tried to justify the action on the ground that the Lama's men wanted to arrest

28 See below, Appendix II.
29 Read the memorials, 'The Tibetans paid Rs. 50,000 for the first year's tribute, but they failed to make over two years' tribute, about a lakh of rupees. Instead of explaining the cause of delay, they tried to capture Syampara Lama in the most undignified manner.
30 Abdul Kadir reported (Op. Cit.) that 18,000 men of the Nepalese army had invaded Djigarche.
Syamarpa Lama in Kuti, where negotiation was in progress, and this provoked the incident. Nepal lost about 3,000 men who perished due to heavy snow in Langur Himal (the last line of snowy range) as well as from a severe attack of small-pox.

The chronicler stated "Kazi Damodar Pande, Kazi Devadatta Thapa, Capt. Bam Shah, Sardar Prabal Rana, Sardar Pratiman Rana, Taksari Narasinha and several Omraos were sent with their regiments to attack Djigarche by way of Kuti. By way of Kharta was despatched another batch consisting of Kazi Adhiman Sinha, Brahman Captain Kalu Pande, Sardar Jaswant Bhandari, Sardar Ranjit Kuar with a big force. The first assault on Jhunga failed. But the second succeeded, and they occupied Tingri maidan. Thereafter they proceeded to Djigarche. This monastery town with fabulous riches was plundered subsequently. The Nepalese returned to Chainpur to come to Kathmandu."

King Rana Bahadur informed the British Governor-General that the Tibetans had refused to act in terms of the treaty and therefore the Nepalese troops had marched to Lhasa adding that 'should the Lama approach the British for help it should be refused' All over south Tibet there was panic. The monks deserted the monasteries. The Panchen Lama was kept in hiding and then removed to a distant place. The Chinese Amban Pao-t'ai himself was seized with terror, and under his instruction the Dalai Lama was also carried to a safe place.33

The city of Tashilumpo was left to the mercy of the enemy as the several thousand inmate Lamas behaved in sheer cowardice. Chung-pa Hutukhtu ran away with all his wealth and treasures. The other Lamas would not act in defiance because they felt that providence was against them. Not until the Emperor administered remonstrance, their spirit of resistance revived. By the winter of 1792 the Chinese forces were advancing to meet the Nepalese entering ulterior Tibet 'by way of Kokonor steppes to shorten the journey by 30 stages in comparison with the advance via Ta-chien-lu in Ssch'uan'.

It was said that the Emperor acted by changing the command of the forces. The old officers were either replaced or transferred to lead smaller units in less strategic areas.

Yet many more were subjected to humiliating treatment by the

31 The Nepalese Official Memorial, and Chronicle. CPC, IX, N. 1562. Letter received 12 October, 1791. 32 CPC, VIII, N. 609. 33 THHL, CL, 114. 18ff; KTSL 1388. 23ff. cited by Cammann, P. 121. All this is supported by Sheng-wu-chi of Wei-Yuan.
order of the Emperor. Pa-chung who committed suicide by drowning himself into a river on hearing news of the second invasion of Tibet by Nepal escaped the humiliation, but Pao-t’ai had to wear a ‘cangue’ in front of the army'.

While discussing the subject of the two British trade Missions visiting Tibet in 1778 and 1783 respectively we had occasion to make a reference to the Chinese domination over Tibetan affairs. Ever since 1722, Tibet was being regarded as a country under Chinese suzerainty, and since 1738, a wing of the Chinese army was stationed in Lhasa, under a representative of the Emperor, called the Amba. This officer not only acted to regulate Tibet’s relation with the outside world but also interfered in its internal affairs to the extent provided by a minor Dalai Lama in the Potala.

China was then being ruled by the Manchu dynasty (1644-1911). One of the early rulers of this dynasty, emperor K’ang Hsi (1663-1722) consolidated the Manchu dominance in China subduing all remnants of the Ming supporters in the Yantse region and Formosa. Since his time the Manchus also completely adopted Chinese customs and manners forgetting all their own including the language. They were now a nationalised dynasty.

Between 1690 and 1722 the emperor fought many wars on the border of the main China, and subjugated many tribes. In the expansionist war conducted in Central Asia, the Manchus had been able to possess the control of Tibet by taking advantage of the unrest following the Mongol invasion of that country in 1722.

The next Manchu ruler of note and importance was the emperor Ch’en Lung who ruled from 1736 to 1796. He fought the Kalmuks and Turks in the area that is known today as Turkestan and occupied Tarkend, Kashgar & Khotan.

It was in his time Nepal came into hostile contact with China. According to Wei Yuan, “The beginning of the hostilities between them dated from the 55th year of the Ch’en lung reign, when Nepal invaded Tibet.” (see appendix II below)

Wei Yuan, a native of the Hunan province, who died in 1856 wrote the Shen-wu-chi which is ‘a descriptive account of the military operations of the Manchu dynasty’. Giving the cause for the resumption of hostilities Wei Yuan wrote, that the stipulation which enjoined on the Dalai Lama to pay an annual tribute to Nepal was

34 A heavy square wooden collar worn as a humiliating punishment.
resented by the former. But, Pa-chung, the officer of the Guards, "Ventured to the effect that the rebels had surrendered. So far was this much being the case that he actually persuaded the Gorkha Chief-tain to pay tribute in order to be appointed Prince of the country (Kuowang). In this war not a single man was killed, but a million spent on soldier's rations".

It appears that actually the Nepalese had seized the idea of accepting the suggestion of Pa-chung only to be able in return to exact the stipulated tribute from Tibet.

It also appears that the Emperor had no desire to impose his suzerainty on Nepal at the first instance.

To resume our narrative of the course of the war, we proceed now to track the Chinese army in its onward march to the frontiers of Nepal.

**China Defeats Nepal**

Now they met a formidable foe in the Chinese who came to the aid of Tibet.\(^{36}\) Tu Thwang Chan Chwang\(^{37}\) (or Jung) was at the head of the command.\(^{38}\) According to the Nepal King's letter, the Chinese commander had reached Lhasa on 8 March 1792 (18 Phalgun, 1848)\(^{39}\) The Gorkhalis were no match for the innumerable forces of the Emperor. The Emperor had sent 10,000 of them under a Manchu officer Tu Thwang (Fou-K'ang-an) and they were close to the border.\(^{40}\) Fu-K'ang-an was assisted by Hai-lan-ch'a. The Manchu troops of Solon-tribes were mobilised. Supplies were procured from Ssuch'uan and from all over Tibet. Wei yuan reported that the provision consisted of 70,000 piculs of wheat and 20,000 cows and sheep. The Gorkhalis had to retire from Tibetan soil without fighting.\(^{41}\) Now after nearly

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\(^{36}\) In Phalgun according to Rana Bahadur's letter (No. 1-3-3 Nepal Sanskritik Parishad Patrika). The Chinese demanded from the Nepal Government the surrender of Syamarpa Lama, and two others, Dhurin Kazi and Ito Kazi who were kept in Kathmandu as hostages. But this was refused.

\(^{37}\) CPC, X, N. 848 (See below) gives the name of the Chinese General as Thung Chan Chun.

\(^{38}\) The Amban Pa-chung had committed suicide bydowning himself. Probably Chan Chwang was also to act as the new Amba. But we hear his name only from Nepalese records.

\(^{39}\) Letter dated 11 October, 1792 (23 Safar 1207 A.H.) to Gajaraj Misra N. 855, CPC, X, P. 179.

\(^{40}\) See Kirkpatrick, Op. Cit. APP.(A) 70,000 troops, according to his information and Tibetan sources. King Rana Bahadur's letter to Gajaraj Misra put the figure at sixty to seventy thousand (CPC, X, P 179). Levi says the first encounter took place in Tingri Maidan. (According to him the commander was Sun-Fo); the Chinese source for the description of this War in 4th Chengou-ki, translation by Imbault Haurt; Loc, Landon (See below). Fou-K'ang-an was assisted by Hai-lan-Ch'a. The troop were Daghor horsemen, cavalry from Koko-nor and Tibetan infantry. THHL. CL, 114.25 bff.

\(^{41}\) Ibid.
three years of struggle since the siege of Djigarche they were compelled to retreat, and passes like Jhoonga and Somgomba had to be abandoned. The reinforcement sent under Abhiman Sinha, Jaswant Bhandari and Ranjit Kuar could do little to turn the tide of the battle. At about this time (Asvin 18), Djigarche was surrendered to the Chinese, and the commanders Bam Shah, Damodar Pande, Devadatta and Pratiman returned to Nepal on 5 Magha. The chronicle says that the Gorkhalis suffered a series of defeats, one at Kerong, another at Deorali and yet another at Syapruk. Kerong was evacuated on 18 Asadha, VS 1849. Deorali surrendered to the Chinese on 13 Sravana, while Gerkhu was being attacked (Bhadra 8). They were now encamping on a parallel line extending from Ckokde (defended by Damodar) to Gerkhu (by Kirtiman Sinha) to Dudhyathunka.

In another Nepalese chronicle it is stated that four companies of sepoys under Sardar Prabal Rana, Ranakesar Pande, Bhaskara Rana and Gajabir Shahi were defeated in Deorali. Kazi Damodar Pande also suffered defeat in Dhunchhe. All of them were now assembled either in Betravati or in Kabhre.

The above account is fully corroborated by a passage in King Rana Bahadur’s letter sent to Gajaraj Misra at Banaras (vide above). The King wrote, “... thereupon the Vazir marched with his army to Nepal, and suddenly entered Kerong on 17 Asadha 1849 (6 July, 1792). The quiladar of the fort was taken unawares. He, however, put up a strong resistance but being wounded in the battle, had to leave the fort and retreat. ——-the enemy then advanced to Dhaibung which is only three stages from Nepal, and encamped in the surrounding hills. Another body of 15 or 16 thousands then entered Nepal by way of Kuti. Our forces are stationed in Noakot and other important places to check the enemy” (OR 522, TR 32, PP 561-8, No. 441; AR 8, P. 70).

Earlier the Chinese had incited the Sikkimese and Limbus to rebel against the central power at Kathmandu. A letter written by Rana Bahadur to the Raja of Jajarkot claims killing of 500 enemies near Taplejung in connection with the aforesaid event. But they had been compelled to evacuate Sikkim. It appears that the Raja of Jumla was also asked to mobilise his country against his adversaries, but he was powerless to do anything effective in that situation.
As the Chinese army came closer to the frontier of Nepal, the Nepalese Government tried hard for peace. As it appears from the letter of the Chinese Commander (See below) they sent Kazis Bhotu Pande and Narasinha as their emissaries to Kerong to contact Tu Thwang Chang Jung. They gave him presents from the King of Nepal, and in return received Chinese presents for their King. But the Commander refused to agree to their request for a cease fire and peace. In stead, the Chinese army moved into points inside the Nepalese territory.

The Chinese had demanded the refund of the property which the Gorkhalis had plundered; they also wanted them to hand over the Tashi Lama’s brother to the Lhasa authorities. But it was hurting the sentiment of the Gorkhalis to put forth such demands. They could not promise to pay such a vast amount. Long Wars had tired them. Four years in Tibet far from their country had made them worry about home and relations. If it had been an honourable peace they would have accepted, but they could not submit to undignified terms of surrender. The Nepal official Memorial says: The Chinese commander Chan Chwang would not listen to our pleading; instead, he imprisoned Gorkha Maharaja’s representatives, gone to meet him for talks and marched into the border from Lhasa, there was a fight at Kuti, which the Gorkhalis had lost.’ The Chinese had grown intransigent. They would not accept anything but absolute and complete surrender. The Nepalese representative Ranjit Pande returned to Kathmandu with a message that the Chinese wanted Noakot for them as a price. But Nepal could not surrender such a strategic outpost to the enemy. There was now no possibility of a truce in face of the hardened attitude of the Chinese (Kirkpatrick’s translation gives only a portion of the Memorial. Events after the first treaty are omitted therein. But these are elaborately dealt with in the original Memorial published in Nepal Sanskritik Patrika 3-3).

There was only one course of action left to them. They knew the British and looked to them for help at this hour. Indeed there was

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40 According to the chronology the Gorkha troops under Ranjit Kaur made a retreat to Rassuagarhi but were forced back further to occupy Dhaibung During the winter of 1792 they fought the Chinese in this part of the Himalayas and defeated them. Dhaibung is some sixteen miles north of Kathmandu. The chronology does not say anything about the British.

47 CPC, X, Ibid.

48 Rs. 52 crores according to Abdul Kadir (CPC, X, P. 156).

49 Oldfield (Vol. I. PP. 282) asserts that the Gorkhalis hastened to make a hasty and degrading treaty. This is not correct.

50 CPC, X, Ibid.
‘no other quarter to look for help’ except the British (CPC, X, N. 849). They knew that if the British were assured of their assistance being repaid, they would come to the aid of the Gorkhalis. To give the impression of a sincere offer, on their part the Gorkhalis concluded a trade pact with the British.\(^5\) Having done so, they applied for military help on the plea of friendship. The Gorkhalis understood the implication of the British co-operation which might involve some loss of independence.\(^\)\(^6\) Therefore in the beginning the request was for refusing assistance to their opponents. But now the situation had changed. British military assistance in their behalf had become absolutely necessary. So they were careful to apply only for a military contingent and ammunition at the cost of the Nepal Government. They requested for 10 guns and 10 Europeans,\(^5\) and later for ‘two battalions of Europeans and two of sepoys with munitions,\(^5\) but these were to be under Gorkha command and their expenses were to be borne by the Nepal exchequer. (Letter dated 22 Sravan 1849 VS=31 July, 1792). A letter with a similar content was also sent to J. Duncan in Banaras.\(^\)\(^7\) (N. 725, CPC, X). This request was renewed after sometime in August.\(^5\)\(^8\)

It appears that some Nepalese officers had also approached the Rohilla Chief (Nawab Faizullah Khan) for sparing 2000 sepoys to fight the Chinese, but the latter declined to comply with the request without the authority of the British Governor-General and the Nawab of Oudh saying that ‘he is forbidden to take part in any dispute of the people residing beyond the boundaries of his country’.\(^\)\(^5\)\(^7\) The Nawab informed the British accordingly (Mr. Stuart)\(^5\)\(^8\) that ‘he would not do anything without first consulting the English Government’.

Earlier, Tibet also had approached the British for help against the Gorkhalis (Cf. letter from Tashi Lama received on 22nd January,

\(^5\) Vide above.

\(^6\) Although the British had not yet received the idea of a subsidiary alliance in relation to Nepal, the suspicion of the Gorkhalis was not unreasonable. The British always began with a trade pact to attain the ultimate objective of such a treaty.

\(^7\) Letter received 22nd August, 1792. See Journal of the Bihar Research Society XIX, IV, P. 378.

\(^8\) Letter received 5 September, 1792. CPC, X, 724 (OR, 424; TR, 32, PP. 430-31, No. 346; AR, 8, P. 67).

\(^5\) IHQ, IX, No. 11, P. 379.

\(^6\) CPC, X, N. 682.

\(^7\) CPC, X, N. 473. Letter to Amarsinha Thapa, received in Calcutta, June 12,1792.

\(^8\) Ibid, N. 488, received June 16, 1792.
Two Vakils from the court of Tashi Lama had arrived in Calcutta to plead for British assistance. But the latter had politely refused to intervene in the war. They had said 'they are ever careful not to infringe the rules of friendship by interference in a hostile manner in the disputes of others. They will not give help to the Gorkhali Raja, but it is not worthy of the Company to attack the Gorkhali Raja who has given them no provocation and caused them no injury'. Now there was one more attempt to draw the notice of the British to Tibetan affairs in the name of the Lamas. Purangiri brought several letters with him. One was from the Vazir of the Chinese command. All these, however, were being sent to the British to dissuade them to fight on behalf of Nepal.

Fu-K'ang-an wrote that it was the bounden duty of the English to help the Chinese to crush the Gorkhalis or at least not to go to the aid of Nepal in the war. He also advised them to hand over any Gorkhali Chieftain if per chance he came to that territory. The letter had informed that the Nepal army was on retreat and were being pursued by the Chinese. From the Chinese source it appears that the Chinese officers in Tibet had a suspicion of British complicity in the affair on the side of Nepal. They also claimed that Nepal was their dependency and no outsider had the right to come in between them.

The Dalai Lama's letter also warned the British against any step leading to their involvement in the dispute, and as 'the Emperor was only hostile to the Gorkhas' the British were told to help the latter to punish the offenders.

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58 Two Mahommadan Vakils were sent to the British Government to plead the case. These were Mahomed Rajeb and Mahomed Walli. They first contacted D. H. McDowell, Collector of Rangpur. Read Kirkpatrick Appendix (B), Diskalkar in IHQ, IX (1933) Pp. 369-71; S. C. Sarkar in Bengal Past and Present, XLI (1931) Pp. 216-27. CPC, VIII, N. 977, 1068.

59 Secret Department, 10 April, 1789.

60 Cornwallis' letter to the Panchen Lama, (IHQ, IX, PP. 371-74, No. 6). Also CPC, X, N. 771 (Letter, 25 September, 1792; TR 39, PP. 292-7 No. 269), P. 162.

61 CPC, VIII, N. 1068, letter February 27, 1789.

62 IHQ, IX, P. 395; CPC, X, N. 497.

63 Fu-K'ang-an's letter was written in Manchu Script which as Corwallis reports (to the Court of Directors) could not be read at the time. The gist was obtained from Panchen Lama's letter (in Persian), IHQ, IX, Pp. 392-95; Also THHL, CL, 115.6-6b, 9b; KTSL, 1398-11b, 1400.7 quoted by S. Cammann, P. 127.

64 This impression was gained by Macartney; read John Barrow, Some account of the Public Life and a Selection from the unpublished writings of Earl of Macartney, II, P. 267-68; S. Cammann, P. 138.

65 CPC, X, N. 625.
British Interest in the War

The British were interested in the War because they wanted to see both rivals weakened and ready to solicit British mediation. We know what interest they had in the commerce of Nepal and Tibet. Thus far they were handicapped in their efforts to attain the objective because of Gorkha and Tibetan suspicion of foreigners and love for isolation in that context.

It was admitted that due to constant jealousy of the chiefs of these countries towards the English, the East India Company's agents knew little of the interior parts of Nepal and adjoining countries. Now, of course, was the opportunity to further their own interest and 'no pains or attention was to be spared to avail themselves of so favourable an opportunity to obtain good surveys and all kinds of information.'

Because both the combatants had come to them for help, their path was very smooth. The usual British policy of playing the role of a peace-maker was the best to be applied on such occasions, for that was the way they could befriend the opposite parties and convince them of British good intentions, thus paving the way for closer understanding in their own relations with these powers. The British were further strengthened in their belief as to the fruitful outcome of their policy by certain developments of the war. The warring parties were exhausted after six years of ceaseless fight and they desired an amicable settlement. According to the information reaching the British, the Chinese were also in no mood to continue the fight owing to the tremendous difficulties of transport. They were much harassed by Gorkha guerillas. In this background an excellent opportunity was open to the British to push their proposals in furtherance of the East India Company's trade interests.

Their eyes were specially turned on Nepal, the country which resisted every attempt at commercial intercourse with the foreigners. The British were very eager to resume their trade relations and to get the Kathmandu-Lhasa route opened for their trade.

The Gorkhalis were passing 'through a crisis and the Raja's affairs were desperate,' as was evident from his appeals. The Gorkhalis had

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67 Ibid, Kirkpatrick's Appendix B.
68 Political letter to the Court of Directors, 14 October, 1792.
69 An identical method was applied to win over Jaipur in 1806. Jaipur had a quarrel with the Mahrattas and the British were supposed to make up with them on the Raja's behalf (JBORS March, 1943).
70 Bengal Political Consultations, 3rd October, 1792.
71 Bengal Political Consultations, 3rd October, 1792.
also concluded a trade pact, and were likely to acquiesce in any proposition that would end the Chinese War. A proper and direct move to dispel doubts about their intentions was necessary and the Company's agents in India were up to such a task. They proceeded in right earnest but with an air of disinterestedness.

In their subsequent dealings with both the Tibetans and the Gorkhalis, the Company adopted a policy of extreme caution. They stressed their friendly feelings to both and assured both of their friendly intentions and regard for their sovereignty, and did not fail to mention that they were unable to come to their aid as each was a friend of the British. The British saw to it at the same time that each was satisfied that the enemy was not assisted. To the 'Nepal Raja,' particularly, they offered to come to his rescue and use their good offices to settle the disputes by sending 'a gentleman of rank and honour', to help him negotiate with the Chinese as contrary to their line of general conduct 'the Governor-General cannot send the English troops with hostile intentions against the friendly Chinese 'bound by ties of friendship and trade pact'. In a private advice 'the Raja was requested to grant proper honours to the gentleman and to comply readily with whatever he proposes during negotiations'.

The British were fully confident as to results of this diplomatic game. As was customary with them they had prepared a scheme of thorough investigations of the resources of the Kingdom of Nepal. An expert staff was to accompany Captain Kirkpatrick, the head of the deputation, to obtain good surveys and to acquire information about population and natural wealth. The acceptance of a deputation on the part of the Gorkhalis gave them further hopes. At one time they even thought they had succeeded in their ultimate objective. Hence, Duncan's instructions to the Raja of Nepal were couched in a language

72 Ibid.
73 Letter to Tashi Lama, 27 February, 1789, JBORS, Vol. IV, 1933; Kirkpatrick, Appendix D.
74 Governor-General's letter. Kirkpatrick, Appendix C.
75 Ibid. Duncan's letter, 24th September, 1792. Also read CPC, X, N. 785, 788, 789, PP. 164-65.
76 Bengal Pol. Consutations. 17 October, 1792.
77 Ibid. Duncan's letter. Duncan was the Resident attached to the State of Banaras. He was taken to be an authority on the Company's relations with the Princes; CPC, X, N. 768 (letter, September 17, 1792), N. 753 (15 September, 1792).
78 Kirkpatrick's Preface to the 'Embassy to Nepal'. The deputation consisted of, besides the leader, Lt. Samuel Scott—assistant, Lt. W. D. Knox, (in command of the military escort), Lt. J. Gerard and Adam Frere the last qualified to examine the natural products of the country.
that indicated a tone of confidence. Apart from certain other officers accompanying the mission, two companies of native sepoys and Abdul Kadir Khan, "an intelligent and zealous native of the Company who had been employed by Mr. Duncan in negotiating the treaty of Commerce (1792), and who had been on that occasion sometime at Kathmandu" were sent along with them. Kirkpatrick was "to receive a salary of 1500 rupees a month during the time of his being employed on the Commission, and charge his actual expenses upon honour".

At about this time the Dalai Lama, Fu-K'ang-an and Panchen Lama were also informed that a British Mission would shortly leave for Kathmandu to restore peace in that quarter.

But the season came to foil them. Kirkpatrick could not leave the plains till the spring of the next year. The Gorkhalis could not afford to wait for him to come and negotiate. Moreover, he was going to Nepal not to help them to fight but to mediate. The offer of mediation could not certainly serve the purpose Nepal had in view. It had only added to their feeling of humiliation which they had suffered on account of defeat in the War. The Nepalese were naturally suspicious as to the intentions behind this proposed adjudication. They felt that the British were out to exploit the situation for themselves. They, in the circumstances as it came, had no reason to apply themselves to foil the British move and manoeuvre a line of action to approach the victor and present a fait accompli before the British arrived in Kathmandu. Both the steps were fraught with dangerous consequences. But as if luck had favoured them things were shaping with a different pattern. As it came about, the war no longer protracted. According to the chronicle the Chinese were defeated in the fight on the bank of the Betravati; thereupon they sued for peace on Asvin 5 (VS 1849). In the letter of Rana Bahadur to Bisnunath Upadhaya it was said that the Chinese were defeated in engagement on 5 Asvin vadi (5 October, 1792) and they were deputing two agents to negotiate peace. Kazi Devadatta was despatched to negotiate. Tu-Thwang finally left Dhaibung on 24 Asvin. We do not know how much truth the account of the chronicle contained. But there was no doubt that the war drew to a close. It was said that Nepal hastened to sue for peace as the Chinese army had threatened to advance to the capital city. But the Chinese also were

79 CPC, X, N. 785 (21 September, 1792) also letter, N. 788 (30 September, 1792).
80 Political letter, dated 14th October, 1792. Fort William-India House Correspondence, XVII, P. 208.
81 Purangiri being sick, the letters were carried by Daljitgiri: Kirkpatrick PP. 352 (footnote), 353, 354. IHQ, IX, PP. 395-96; CPC, X, N. 823.
82 CPC, X, N. 835.
hard pressed and reluctant to fight.

Some are of the opinion that the Nepalese had forestalled a situation to frustrate British designs. But this might have been only a second thought. In a letter received by the Governor-General from the King of Nepal on October 24, 1792 it is stated that the Nepalese army had defeated the Chinese who were leaving Nepalese territory within 4 or 5 days, and that the Diwan Devandatta Thapa was on his way to Peking with presents to the Emperor (TR, 32, PP. 553-6 No. 438). Yet another letter dated 11 October puts 20 Safar 12 Fasli (October 8, 1792) for the date of an agreement terminating hostilities between China and Nepal. Details of the approach are not known. It does not seem probable, however, that the Gorkhalis were at the first instance moved by the single consideration of removing the danger from the British side, when they patched up with the Chinese. Quite likely, they had in mind both the threats, one posed by the advancing Chinese army and another posed by the British attempt to gain control of Nepalese affairs by taking advantage of the same. Indirectly, of course, the truce agreement with the Chinese made the presence of the British mission unnecessary and they naturally did also use the situation to discourage their arrival.

We need not reproduce here the whole what Wei Yuan wrote about the course of the war as the same finds place in the appendix. It will suffice to note here that while the Chinese approached the river Betrawati they encountered stiff opposition, and here was end of all their march. After a prolonged siege they were able to occupy the mountain on the northern side of the river, but they were held back over the point of the crossing, which was a bridge. Wei Yuan further wrote,

"The rebels, numbering ten battalions, were holding the mountain very strongly. Hai-lan-ch’a proposed to guard the river and make a camp there, but Fu-k’ang-an did not consent to this plan. He crossed over the bridge and attacked the enemy; then, in spite of rain, he climbed the mountain to 20 li distance and reached a very steep place. The enemy, taking advantage of his position on the summit of the mountain, poured down trees and stones ‘like rain’, and at the same time those rebels who were separated by river and mountain made an attack from three directions.

“Our troops sometimes fought and sometimes retreated. The numbers of killed and wounded was very great. Hai-lan-ch’a, from across the river, came then to the assistance, and O-leteng pao, holding

\[82\] CPC, X, N. 848, P. 178.
the bridge, fought stubbornly; and succeeded to repel the enemy.""

But the river could not be crossed.

Wei Yuan concluded that the English were also secretly planning an attack on Nepal, from the south and therefore the Gorkhas' being forced to withstand two powerful enemies, were afraid that they could not succeed in it; moreover, they apprehended that this news would rouse our troops' energy. Therefore, they again sent envoys to our camp to ask humbly for mercy.

"At that moment our troops had just suffered a reverse, whereas the enemy's country presented more and more dangers to them; besides, after the 8th month, the big snow in the mountains would make the return most difficult. Therefore, the rebels' request for surrender was granted."

The account of Wei Yuan explodes the theory that the Nepalese had sustained a humiliating defeat.

It appears on their own admission that the Chinese had also been compelled as much as the Nepalese to seek compromise over the conflict.

The truce was agreed when the Nepalese authorities promised to hand over two hostages, and also the servants and whatever property was left of the deceased Syamarpa Lama. It was said of the Syamarpa Lama that he poisoned himself at the prospect of being surrendered alive to the Chinese. Now his remains were demanded and they were surrendered. Bhalbhadra Khawas was deputed to execute the agreement, and in that course all that was promised was returned including the Dharmapatra done by the Lama who had earlier died in Kathmandu. Of the property looted in Tibetan monasteries some silver pieces were returned. The hostages were also duly handover to the Chinese commander. Nepal also agreed to accept the Chinese Emperor's suzerainty over its territory, and send to Peking a five yearly tribute mission in perpetuity.

In a letter to the British Governor-General at Calcutta dated 4 Sravan 1207 A.H. (17 March, 1793) the Chinese commander confirmed the signing of the agreement with the above terms. The first intimation of the cessation of hostilities was given to the British by the Nepalese authorities through a letter of the King to the Governor-General

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85 S. Cammann quoting a Chinese source says, one of the hostages was the Kalon Danchin Banjur, (P 131).
86 THHL, CL, 116.11b; KTSL, 1411.10b-11 quoted by Cammann.
87 A copy of this still lies with the Foreign Department of the Nepal Government.
88 CPC, X, N. 1471 (OR, 304-05; AR, 9 P. 70. N. 353 letter received June 28, 1793.)
The treaty or agreement, whatever it was called, was signed in late 1792 following the truce and the Nepalese troops celebrated the occasion with great pomp as if it was a victory celebration, a fact which confirms that the incident did not involve any kind of major defeat. But this celebration was more of the nature of thanks giving and rejoicing for deliverance from a complicated situation where the Nepalese had landed themselves in course of the Tibetan expedition.

According to Bahadur's circular asking the troops to return the agreement was referred to as Dharmapatra gha bandej done in the presence of the Amban who was there by order of the Emperor. Obviously Nepal and Tibet were signatories to the treaty, and not China to whom both the countries had pledged allegiance and loyalty in their own way. It was wrong to say that China represented the opposite party as signatory.

For the facts of truce and subsequent events we have an authentic source of information in two official documents, which are letters addressed to the King of Nepal by Tu Thwang Ta Chyan Jung who commanded the Chinese forces invading Nepal. These letters are yet preserved with the External Affairs Ministry of the Government of Nepal and are unpublished.

Although these letters talk of absolute surrender by Nepal, and do appear to have exaggerated this part of the story yet, on the whole, the account they give in regard to the terms of truce and settlement of boundary is fairly correct.

Of the two letters one was written immediately (about a month) after the truce was agreed upon. This confirms what we have already written about obligations fulfilled by Nepal to implement the conditions of the truce.

It appears that the Chinese always communicated with the Nepalese authorities in the language of the latter.

The letters begin with the expression that Sri 3 Tu Thwang Tu Chyam Jung the incarnation of Bhim, the Vazir and Commander of all forces, had been ordered to address the King of Nepal by the Sri 5 Emperor who was an incarnation of Manjusri.

We now proceed to quote in full the first of these letters, which is dated Ch'ien Lung year 57 Kartika vadi 5 (October, 1792):

"Four men including Kazi Deodatta Thapa whom you have deputed have come to me with presents. They told me that you seek the

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80 CPC, X. N. 848.
80 Unpublished.
Emperor’s protection. I am extremely pleased that you and your uncle have with one heart proposed to go to the Emperor’s protection in all respectfulness. I have already informed His Majesty about all this I am sure that he will forgive you for your past misdeeds and condescend to confer on you high rewards and honours. Henceforth with the Emperor’s grace you will look after your subjects, you will obey your Majesty’s command and all laws and conventions. You will not quarrel with your neighbours. You will remember that His Majesty treats every one equally. I, Chyam Jung the great, shall return after ascertaining an auspicious day. I have already ordered the forces with Thin Taring in Listi and Lukang to go back. The Emperor has awarded you all your territories conquered by us.

“In respect of Khasa, this area was under Tibet from the time of Thamche Khamba Ngava Tsembu Lama. Previously you had acquired it by virtue of a Dharmapatra imposed by yourself. It appears that a customary tribute was being paid to the father of the Djigarcha Lama. Now you must not claim any right of yours stipulated in that Dharmapatra. The income from the area is small, and you should not insist in getting it. The area will go to Lhasa, with which you are asked to live in friendship. You have signed a new dharmapatra, and you must abide by it to the last word in its real spirit. You are also asked to continue the traditionally carried transactions of commerce with Tibet. But you will not be permitted to send your coins, because the question of coins gave rise to so many troubles. Now Tibet has issued its own coins, which appear to be quite good. If you send the new Gorkhali mohars they will be current at the usual rate. You shall not say that they will each be equal to two mohars. As for the horses and falcons which you took from Kerong in lieu of tax up till now, you are asked to relinquish. We have returned all your areas occupied by us during the War. Why do you insist on getting a small thing like that? You are strongly advised not to claim the old exaction of horses and falcons from Kerong. We have every confidence that if you place the command of the Emperor on your heart and act accordingly, you will live happily and prosperously for ages together.”

It appears that while the truce was signed the question of the surrender of Khasa and of the Kerong tribute was kept pending. It also seems that up till the date of the letter, the Emperor had not yet given his consent to the terms of truce. Yet another factor which comes to light is that the Chinese commander had not yet left Dhaibung.

From the second letter, however, it is known that all pending questions were settled within a month or so. the Nepalese acting as the Chi-
nese had wished. It appears that the only territory they had lost was Khasa, which was now annexed to Tibet. The new settlement also deprived Nepal of the right to obtain tributes from Kerong.91

This letter addressed from Lhasa opens with lines saying that Bhotu Pande and Narasinha had waited on the addressee in Kerong, and they were despatched to Kathmandu with presents and letters, which the addressee must have received.

It then says “The peoples of your country like the peoples in other parts of the Emperor’s domains are the Emperor’s subjects enjoying his protection. Previously also you had sought protection of the Emperor. You sent your men with a petition and presents to interview him. The Emperor returned them with his own presents to you. The Emperor’s favours were always bestowed on you. But later on incitement by that low man, Syamarpa, you attacked Tashi Limbu and plundered its monasteries for no other reason than a settlement of small debts. You knew that Tashi Limbu was within His Majesty’s empire but knowingly you harassed the many peoples of this place. Thereupon the Emperor was highly displeased with you. You committed grave mistakes. Under command of His Majesty I, Chyam Jun the great, came to your country as far as Betravati with a big army. Considering what you have done, I feel that your country and your people deserve to be destroyed. But as you came to me in fright acknowledging your mistakes, and craving for pardon and to be taken under His Majesty’s protection, and as this seemed to be sincerely desired and expressed, I spared you from the consequences. It is good that you have returned all that you took away from Tashi Limbu. I note that you have also surrendered the remains of the low Syamarpa and all his family and belongings. You sent the high officer, Kazi Deodatta Thapa, with the petition and presents to negotiate the settlement. While our army was on their return march, you sent with utmost respect and hospitality adequate rations to them. A little later you deputed Subedar Bhairavasinha Khawas upto Kerong as an attendant to my person. All these facts in detail have been already conveyed to his Majesty. Now you should continue to feel that you are under His Majesty’s protection. I have also reported to the Emperor that you have pledged not do anything outside the scope of the previous Dharmapatra, not to accept any tributes including falcons and horses from Kerong that you had uptill now obtained, to surrender the jurisdiction over Khasa to Bhot in accordance with the provisions of an olden arrangement and to send presents to the Tashi Lama and Lhasa

91 As it will follow, Kerong sent to Kathmandu some horses and falcons as tribute annually
Lama. His Majesty said that you are ignorant and not knowing anything you acted on the instigation of the low Syamarpa, and did what was not desirable and did not act with knowledge. Our army has killed some 3-4 thousand subjects and soldiers of your country. But, although your subjects belong to the other end, yet we regard them as our own subjects. His Majesty has protected the peoples all the world over. Therefore as he learnt that being frightened by the advancing Chinese forces you have begged pardon and sought his protection, he has forgiven you of all past guilts and mistakes, and has taken you under his protection. He has commanded me to apprise you accordingly.

"The earlier letter was sent to you because the Emperor desired that you should be soon told that you were now under his protection. The Emperor has appreciated your sentiments and says that all of you are so good. He will surely condescend to reward you amply with a charter in Manchu character and presents. You will understand the significance of this and knowing that His Majesty had been extremely pleased with you, you will all the time obey his command. In that case his mercy will be extended to you for ages and ages.

"As for the question of the settlement of boundaries; we have conquered all the area between Hisua bridge and the Betravati; ordinarily this river should have been the boundary line; but His Majesty says that he will condescend to settle the question on the basis of the agreement reached earlier when you had sought his protection admitting your guilt. In the Kuti sector, Tibet enjoyed jurisdiction upto Khasa since before. Therefore, we shall stick to the old line. The other day I had deputed Sardar Amban Mantarin to fix up the boundary line. He visited the area and placed a stone south of Khasa to make the iron bridge as the boundary line. I am told that you promised to agree to what the Amba settled on this issue. I trust you are sincere enough in your profession. You have also told me by the reply letter sent through Bhotu Pande that you will not do anything except on my orders. As you have admitted your guilt with petition, I forgive you. You have surrendered Syamarpa's remains, and have assured me that other low men after countrywide search will also be handed over to the Chinese. I accept all this as conceived in a spirit of sincerity. I, Chyan Jung the great am highly pleased with you. I am very soon returning to Pechin with all my forces as the Emperor has commanded. Henceforth if you have to petition the Emperor, please send the letters through the Amban. Now a new Amban with greater powers is appointed. His name is Kumpu syang su Fang. He means to do good to Tibet. Anything the Amban writes, please obey. If you act in humility towards the Emperor, he will ever
be merciful to you."

The letter concluded after giving an appreciation of the services rendered by Bhotu Pande and Narasinha whose intercession had led to the agreement of the terms of peace by the Nepalese. It also informed that the tribute mission had just left Lhasa and was expected to reach Pechin by the end of Magha or beginning of Phalgun.

This letter is dated Ch‘ien Lung year 57 (1792-93 A.D.). It does not give the month under date line. But as the fact of the last paragraph indicates, it must have been written not later than early December, 1792.

In the absence of the letters sent by Nepal to the Chinese Commander, it is not possible to say that actually was proposed by the Nepalese as the terms for the signing of the truce agreement.132

In both the letters sent by the Commander he has time and often emphasised the point that the Nepalese had sought the Emperor’s protection, and that it was granted. The second letter has talked the matter in the strain that we may be led to accept the act of petitioning the Emperor by the Nepalese as a case of abject surrender.

We should not, however, take the commanding tone of the letter at its face value. Irrespective of how the other side reacted to this kind of tone exhibited in their correspondence, the Chinese had developed overbearing manners and they carried it much too far in their dealing with the foreigners. We should not be misled to think by the form and tone of the address of the letter that all that was expressed was also intended, and least of all accepted by the Nepalese.

A few words more about the tone of the letter, we have had occasion to go through some of the letters in original addressed by the King of Nepal to the Amban. It appears that these differed little in character from those addressed by the Amban to the King of Nepal. The form of address was the same in both. Possibly the Amban was treated by Nepal at the same level with its King and vice versa.

Another thing of note in this connection is that the Amban always apprised the Government of Nepal about the main occurrences of the time regarding Tibetan affairs. A letter to the Amban by Maharaja Girvan Juddha Vikram, dated Kantipur Sambat 1864 Chaitra sudi 3 roj 1 purports to show that this was a reply to the one addressed by the Chinese representative informing the Nepalese King about the installation of the new Dalai Lama, and arrival of new Ambans to replace the incumbents. From this letter it also appears that there used to be two

132 Unfortunately no copies of the letters sent to the Chinese are kept in Nepal archives.
Ambans in Lhasa to look after Chinese interests in Tibet.  

We know that the essence of the agreement did not affect the case of Nepal's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, we have to disregard the tone of the above letters in assessing Nepal's true position after the treaty. But to this we shall come a little later.

According to a letter of Rana Bahadur Shah, Damodar Pande was asked to leave for China to wait on the Emperor in response to Tu Thwang's suggestion (San. Sandesh 1-5). But it appears that this idea was later abandoned, and others were sent for the purpose.

It appears that the Chinese army began to pull out from the middle or end of October. Abdul Kadir learnt in Banaras from letters of some Kashmiri merchants in Nepal. (Letter to Duncan received at Calcutta on 16 November, 1792) that the Chinese 'had not marched out of the country altogether, and some of their troops are still in the vicinity of Dhaibung'. At any rate they had completely withdrawn by the beginning of December. The treaty was signed in Lhasa following the withdrawal. Abdul Kadir in the same letter reported that he has contacted a Pirjada (son of a Pir, a Muslim divine) who was shortly to leave Banaras for Kathmandu and from there to Lhasa to see the Chinese army. This Pirjada had told him about one Sulaiman 'a disciple of his, and a man of rank of Kashmir, who knew Chinese, Tibetan and Nepalese languages; it was through him the Chinese Vazir carried on his political negotiations with Nepal'. The Pirjada had advised Abdul Kadir to use the services of Sulaiman for any negotiation or transaction of business in behalf of the British.

Course of War with China in Nepalese Records.

An authentic Nepalese version of the account of the China-Nepal War has just come to light through a letter of King Rana Bahadur Shah to some officers fighting in Garhwal (Kazi Jagatjit Pande, Sardar Amarsinha Thapa, Captain Golain Khawas). The original of this letter with a red seal, the usual mark of the king of Nepal, is in possession of a Rana General. Recently this has appeared in print in an issue (3-3) of the Nepal Sanskritik Parishad. The letter gives a resume of the incidents involved in the War, and traces the course which led to the cessation of hostilities. It is dated VS 1849 Kartik Vadi 7 Sunday:

Leningrad Public Library, ms. Ind., II. 148.
CPC, X N. 942.
Ibid.
Facts mentioned in this letter tally almost in toto with those brought out in the Memorial. (See Nepal Sanskritik Parishad Patrika, 3-3). Date verified, October-November, 1892.
“Vazir Tu Thwang advanced further at the head of a huge force. Our outpost in Kukurghat was captured on Asadh Sudi 2 Monday. On getting information reinforcement of 2 companies was sent from Kerong by Sardar Satrubhanjan Malla. But they were caught unawares by a detachment of the Chinese Army, which lay in ambush, and Subedar Tularam with 20|25 soldiers perished. The unit then retired to Kerong. Satrubhanjan was wounded in his arm while he was engaged in a fight in a place near the Kerong outpost.

“It appears, our strength in the Kerong fort was thinning out with the result that when the enemy struck, it could not sustain as was expected, although for four consecutive days it repelled several attacks. The fort surrendered on the 5th day, but fight continued inside and the enemy met with tough resistance by the remnants. Our casualty was 200 killed. But the enemy lost four hundred and as many wounded. The next engagement took place in Rassoa Pass. But our force could not withstand the pressure and retired to Syapruk. The enemy was encamping on the other side of the river. For the defence of Syapruk Prabal Rana, Bharat Khawas, Rana Kesar Pande, and the whole of Srinath Company were ready. The enemy wanted to cross the river but on seeing our force encamped he could not. The enemy, however, crossed the river at another point, which was difficult for our men to negotiate being at a higher altitude and therefore our men and officers retreated to Dhunchay. Here waited Damodar Pande with a strong contingent. An advance party was stationed in Deorali, which was captured by the enemy after sustaining a casualty of 200 killed. Later on, when Dhunchay was also being pressed, Kazi Damodar took position in Dhaibung. Our force successfully beat down an attack on Kamaryagarh, where about 250 Chinese were killed, 50 by bullets and swords and the rest pushed to die of a fall from the precipice. The enemy was now encamping at Ramchya.87

“Meanwhile from Dhunche the enemy sent a letter with intentions to negotiate a truce. From our side Chinia Pande and Dhewa belonging to Dhuria Kazi's entourage and a prisoner Chinese carried the reply. They met Sardar Haikun and Chu Tu, two subordinate officers of Tu Thwang, and handed over the letter.

“Tu Thwang orally asked our officers to allow the Chinese to occupy Dhaibung, as Ramchya was too small a place to accommodate them. Then in response to their wishes both sides displayed flags of

87 According to Memorial, the Maharaja had sent at this stage another reinforcement with Chautara Krishna Shah, Bam Sah, Kazi Abhimansinha, Kazi Dhokal Sinha and Sardar Satrusal.
truce; and our forces abandoned Dhaibung to retire to this side of the river Betravati. On their demand, Dhurin Kazi and Ito Kazi were surrendered on Sravan 31 Saturday. The next day the delegation composed of Ranjit Pande, Bhotu Pande and Narasinha Taksari met Tu Thwang, and to these persons the Chinese reply to our letter was handed over. The Chinese now wanted to come to Noakot for talks. They also said that they would like either the king or the king's uncle to be present in person during the negotiation. If this was not possible, they wrote, some important Bharadars should be deputed. The Chinese further said that they would forcibly enter Noakot, if their request was refused. Another letter repeating the same demands was sent. Our reply was ready. We had also asked our men to strike the Chinese if they tried to cross the river in spite of our dissuasion. On Bhadra 8 Monday, 900-1000 men of the enemy's force crossed the Betravati and one wing advanced towards Chokday where Damodar Pande encamped while another took the direction of Gerkhu which was defeated by Kirtiman and yet another turned towards Dudhya Thumko. Our force pushed them back to the Betravati, where in an attempt to make a flight most of them were drowned."

Often referred to in the footnotes above we have a memorial prepared by the Nepalese authorities on the conduct of the War, which throws a flood of light about many events connected thereto. Although facts of doubtful veracity, crop up here and there, the Memorial on the whole is an important source material on the account of the Sino-Nepalese War. Some passages from this Memorial are included as appendix to Kirkpatrick's volume. But Kirkpatrick omits certain important passages. Below is a resume of these passages for the benefit of the readers. The Memorial says: The force of Gorkha Maharaj had occupied a place on a ridge at a higher altitude, so that when they descended to encounter a hand to hand fight, this gave them so much advantage that the Chinese were forced to withdraw (p. 17)...... The new bridge over the Betravati was a half measure, and therefore while the latter passed through the same it broke away and many fell into the river. The Memorial gives a gist of the facts about fight in Kuti Sector: The force in Listi wanted to advance to Khasa from where Kuti was at a distance of two days' journey. But heavy snow fall prevented them from embarking on the advance. The Chinese Commander Chaw Chwang, however, had marched to Khasa with 15-20 thousand troops, and after the snow had melted advanced further, whereupon an encounter took place. Its result was to throw Kuti to the invader's mercy. The Nepalese Subedar and some defendants were killed in action. They
fought with big guns (todewala-chapwala). But as the gun powder store was set on fire, it forced the defenders to retreat to Listi. After sometime the Chinese tried to occupy Listi and force the defenders to retreat further. But here Chan Chwang met with a strong resistance, and his advance was checked for good.

Kirkpatrick narrates the following description of the qualities of endurance and capacity of sustaining hardship displayed by Nepalese fighters as were evident during the Nepal-Tibet War in theatres which lay in the snowy ranges of the border and beyond.88 “When, encumbered with the spoils of that city, they were induced by various considerations, though the winter was considerably advanced, to take the Khartah and Huttea route, instead of the ordinary one by Koote, at the latter of which passes, the commanders, it seems, were aware they should find it impracticable to elude the examination of the officers stationed there, in order to take an account of the booty they had acquired. The perils to which they were exposed on this occasion were of a kind which it would be little imagined in Europe an Eastern army was either capable of supporting, or liable to encounter on the very borders, as it were, of Bengal. In short, it is an unquestionable fact, that in crossing that ridge of mountains which stretches in a south-east direction from the vicinity of Koote to the country of the Limbooas and of the Dewa Durmah, it was with the utmost difficulty and danger that they penetrated through the snow, with which their track was covered to a depth that proved fatal in several instances in the slightest false step. They were in this dreadful situation for five or six days, during which they were obliged to pass the night on the bare snow, after hardening it for that purpose, as well as they could, though their labour was sometimes scarcely over when a fresh fall would nearly bury them. The loss of the army in this retreat, which was conducted by Damoodur Paurdi and Bam Shah, is said to have amounted to upwards of 2,000 men, great numbers of whom appear to have been frozen to death; the remedy so common and so effectual in the northern parts of Europe and America, in frost-bitten cases, was unfortunately unknown to these people, who, on our mentioning it to them, lamented bitterly that they had not been acquainted with it at this period, when many of their companions were daily obliged to be abandoned in this wretched condition, while others deemed themselves happy to escape with the loss of their fingers and toes”.

Extent of Chinese Advance.

The extent of the Chinese advance is a debatable point. From Duncan's letter it appears that they had come as far as the upper reaches of the Trisuli Gandak. Kirkpatrick mentions a battle in Dhaibung, a mountain overlooking the same river. The Nepal chronicle alludes to a parallel fight in Laurivina at Betravati Ko Pula (bridge over Betravati) which is not far from Dhaibung, and to how a large number of the Chinese got drowned when the defenders pulled the bridge down in the midst of the fight. The Chinese had crossed the river and were encamping at Gerkhutar, while the truce agreement was signed. The chronicle added that Kazis Ranjeet Pande and Bhotu Pande were sent to negotiate in behalf of the Nepal Government. The extent of advance as above given is confirmed by the letter of the Amban to the King of Nepal (See below), in which he claims to have succeeded in crossing the river Betravati, upon which Nepal had sued for peace.

As all informations tally, we can safely infer that the last battle was fought in or near Dhaibung. A small party of the Chinese had, however, come as far as the ridge in the north-east of the valley to interview the Regent Bahadur Shah. This ridge is called Panchmane and has five stupas built by the Chinese as memorial to their coming into Nepal.

It was said that there were not many Chinese crossing the Betravati at Laurivina, as a substantial number of them had perished by drowning at the time of the encounter with the defenders. The Nepalese claimed that even the remnants encamped at Gerkhutar could be there at their sufferance. The other side of the Betravati was malarious, and so a request was made by the Chinese to be allowed to cross to Gerkhur-
tar, which had a better climate. The Chinese had been permitted to
cross the river on the assurance that they had no design to advance fur-
ther. We have no means to check up the accuracy of the claim made
by the Nepalese.

How the Chinese Withdrew.

(a) Nepalese version.

A paragraph from a letter (No. 1, 3-3 Nepal Sanskritik Parishad
Patrika) supports the view that the Chinese themselves were tired of
fighting in the rugged areas of the Himalayan region.

"On the 5th day of Aswin, Kazi Deodatta Thapa, Subba Pratiman
Rana, Jetha Budha Narsinha Taksari's son Jayanta Sahi and Khardar
Visnushankar's son Balabhadra were sent to wait on the Chinese Empe-
ror. On the 10th of Aswin they contacted Vazir Tu Thwang in Dhai-
bung, who was much pleased. The Chinese seemed very much hard
pressed at the time, and they had also lost a good number of men of
their force in battles. The entire army in operation was dispersing.
They were only collected while our men reached there on the 24th of
Asvin Saturday. Vazir Tu Thwang left Daiibung for China accom-
panied by our Mission" (VS 1849 Kartik vadi 7 Sunday).

Evidently the persons referred to in the beginning of this letter were
included in the first Mission sent to China after the War. It is good to
read the contents of the letter sent by King Rana Bahadur to Kazi Damo-
dar Pande for an idea of the Nepalese version of the account of the War.

"The Chinese Emperor is mighty, but by God's grace we could
well meet his challenge, and drive his invading force out of our territory.
Still, as Tu-Thwang wants peace and our policy is not to antagonise the
Emperor, we have decided to sue for cessation of War. In response
to the demand of the Commander, we have deputed you to lead the
mission to wait on the Emperor . . . "103

The Memorial reported that the Chinese army suffered terribly
from malaria due to the rainy season, and they also ran short of rations
—and a large number of men died of hunger and ravaging disease.

All the accounts of War in Nepalese records support the version
that China was defeated, and the Chinese army were compelled to seek
peace and retreat beyond the Himalayas.

Chinese Version.

In the appendix to the chapter we have reproduced two Chinese

103 Sanskrit Sandesh, I, 5.
official records about the war, (1) The Lhasa Pillar Inscription and (2) Wei Yuan’s account of military operations.

The account of Wei Yuan is sufficiently disparaging against the Nepalese. But it does not show that the Nepalese had been routed.

The Lhasa pillar gives a more insulting colour to the description of the defeat and humiliation of the Gorkhalis by the Chinese army (See below, Appendix I).

But was it a humiliating and dictated peace Nepal had obtained from the Chinese?

Facts show otherwise. As we shall see later, neither Nepal’s sovereignty nor its territorial integrity were affected by the result of War. They had, however, affected Nepal’s position in Tibet in an adverse manner.

If Nepal was totally annihilated by the Chinese army, the later would not have consented to quietly leave the border and become content only with theoretical acceptance by Nepal of the Emperor’s suzerainty.

From the Nepalese source materials it is gathered that an attempt to come to terms with the Chinese was being made since the very first contact with the Emperor’s army. But in their angry mood, the Chinese authorities showed little desire for cessation of hostilities. We have it from an official Nepalese letter (See below), that when the Chinese reached Dhaibung, they insolently demanded surrender of Noakot, the summer capital of the Kingdom. They would not listen to any proposal for peace unless the King of Nepal or his regent or himself came to them in a suppliant mood. It was as if telling the Nepalese ‘stand before us in sack cloth and ashes or we march onwards to your capital to destroy you’. This arrogant attitude continued as long as the rainy season had not started.

But rains seem to have had upset their schedule. They completely halted their movement. The rivers were swollen and the Chinese were unable to cross them. While waiting on the bank of the rivers, they were exposed to the attack of malaria, dysentery and other diseases. In spite of their best efforts the advancing Chinese units were not succeeding to overcome the rigour of climate and geography. The Nepalese guerillas had taken advantage of their plight. They had made surprise attacks on the Chinese camps. And when taxed beyond limit, the Chinese attempted for pitched battle, their strategy so failed that instead of successfully fording the river they found a large number of their combatants drowned in the swollen torrents.

As September came the Chinese were in a chastened mood. Their experience of War was bitter enough to discourage them from further
ventures. By now they had realised that it was a stiff problem to fight these sturdy Nepalese mountaineers. They did not wish to continue the fight. They wanted a suitable pretext to disengage themselves from the conflict.

All this time the emissaries from the Nepal side were doing their job to make the Chinese agree to peace. They were off and on visiting the Chinese commander with the King's message and renewed offer of settlement of disputes. The Chinese General had kept the Emperor informed about the peace overtures from the Nepalese. It is said that the later despatches from the army command in Dhaibung complained of adverse result of hostilities under an inclement weather and sought for the Emperor's permission to agree to Nepal's offer of a peace treaty.

All Chinese dispatches sent to the Emperor from inside Nepal since the mid-rainy season betrayed grave anxiety for safety and well being of the army which was operating in the unhealthy mountainous region of the north of the Nepal valley. Although earlier the same commanders spoke of having maintained tough attitude towards the Nepalese who were soliciting a truce, now in September, having realised the futility of prolonging the War they had begged to be permitted to compromise with the enemy.

The Emperor at long last sent a message giving his consent to the proposed peace proposals.

As we have seen the official chronicler of the Chinese, Wei yuan, is very frank in his admission that China was ultimately forced to accept truce because of the reverses on the Betravati front, and due to the realisation that if they missed this opportunity 'the big snow in the mountain would make the return most difficult.'

We have no idea of the terms of truce. The Nepalese documents which claim victory for Nepal do not talk of any terms of truce. They say that the Chinese were compelled to withdraw unconditionally. But considering the overall effect of War on Nepal, the withdrawal of the Chinese was not as simple as conceived in that spirit. I have heard of the Chinese materials on the subject, which as my information goes talk of peace parleys and terms and truce. But I have no access to them. But one thing looks very clear. It was not a peace dictated by the Chinese. The Chinese did not impose on the Nepalese such humiliating terms, which they had spurned earlier. They accepted in all good faith what was promised by the latter, and consented to go back. The Nepalese in their turn had pledged to accept the Emperor's suzerainty and renounce all privileges in Tibet.
The last phase of the negotiation was very smooth. The Chinese General on previous occasions had asked for the King's or the Regent's presence with him as a condition for negotiating the truce. But now this was waived and he agreed to talk with anyone the Nepalese deputed. Then a truce was signed with Tibet in the presence of the Chinese military authorities.

Hamilton wrote that 'the Chinese were so relieved to consent to move back without any conditions as soon as the supply of grain was made over to the army and 50 virgins to the Emperor and no stipulations were made for the restoration of the plunder'. The British writer added that the Nepalese claimed that the girls threw themselves from the precipices in order to save themselves from the impure Chinese, but he understood that they were kept in a convent near the border. We do not know how far to rely on this statement. But the whole looks a very odd piece of business, and it is difficult to reconcile the two parts of the statement—unconditional withdrawal by the Chinese and surrender of fifty virgins by the Nepalese to their Emperor. The latter story makes the withdrawal worse than conditional. Any surrender of women to the victor would go against the self-respect and dignity of Nepal which the Gorkhalis would not do at any cost.

We come to know from the following lines of Sylvain Levi how high was the opinion of the Emperor about the bravery of the Gorkhali patriots. Levi wrote:

'The Chinese Emperor learnt through official reports the indomitable courage of the small tribe who had dared to oppose him; the Ambassador Macartney sent by the British to the Court of Peking 'to carry the tribute' in 1795 confirmed and completed these information; Kieu-long held firmly to this belief and on the point of abdicating after a reign of sixty years (1736-1796) he recommended to his successor not to interfere without absolute necessity into the Gorkha affairs'.

If a humiliating act of the type as suggested by the surrender of virgins was done by the Nepalese, the Emperor would not have surely expressed the above sentiment.

Now to sum up the arguments about the terms of the truce between Nepal and China. We have to strike a balance between the two positions, that of a total defeat and that of victory for Nepal. It was absurd to suggest that Nepal had come out victorious in the War. But she was also not totally vanquished. The Chinese had failed to

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104 I. P. 181. Stannon, G. Bart: An Authentic Account of the Earl of Macartney's Embassy to the Emperor of China, London, 1797 (the author has, however, not read this book) quoted by S. Cammann gives a similar story.
secure total victory over the Nepalese. Although they had succeeded in achieving success in the initial stage and could penetrate deep into the interior, they had been eventually obliged to evacuate, and leave the border, though they did it of their own accord after a preliminary agreement on the terms of the treaty. Nepal had not ceded any part of the territory except a little stretch in the Kerong-Kuti sector, (even about this it was said that Nepal had wrested this portion and more from Tibet since the early 15th century) and no resident Amban was attached to the Court at Kathmandu to supervise its internal and external affairs. The Chinese were content to secure for their Emperor Nepal’s acknowledgement of his sovereignty, which was only nominal. All this did not at all affect Nepal’s sovereign rights to manage its own business in any sphere whatsoever. To this extent the likely adverse results of the war were offset in Nepal’s favour. But at the same time Nepal was deprived of all rights in Tibet, which it could not have willingly surrendered. It was no mean loss to the Nepalese to have surrendered the privileges they enjoyed for centuries. But they had to accept it as a price for peace. This was certainly something expressive of defeat. So was the secession of the small area on the border with Kerong and Kuti stretch, if we scrutinise the fact more closely. The only redeeming feature of the whole affair was that the Chinese army had not chosen to stay in any part of Nepal. Evidently, they had been forced to go back without leaving any trace under force of circumstances.

In the final analysis, it may be said that whatever the Nepalese records claim for the result of the war, the fact cannot be denied that Nepal was defeated by the Chinese in the war. However, we cannot forget that in this instance Nepal, a small country, was pitched against a much overwhelming force of a vastly superior enemy who was several times bigger in resources, territory and man-power. This defeat was not so ignominious as it would have been if Nepal had waged a battle with an equal.

**Overall Effects of War on Nepal**

It seems that apart from general sacrifices of a protracted war it had to make, Nepal ultimately lost nothing in territory or independence by these reverses. But on the other hand all areas in Kuti and Kerong sector that lay on that side of the Himalayas as well as a little portion on this side were finally settled in favour of Tibet much to the opposition from Nepal. Tibet was, however, required to pay Rs. 10,000 yearly as a tribute to Nepal. From a circular letter of Bahadur Shah (VS
1846 Bhadra vadi 2, roj 6) the boundary line fixed in 1788 to assign half of Kuti to Nepal was in pursuance of the old agreement referred to here that took place in Pratapamalla-Bhimamalla's time. But the agreement of 1793 did away with this provision altogether. Now the frontier line in this sector did not also follow the Himalayan heights and water-sheds to conform to the natural boundary, because Tibetan territory had here deeply penetrated far inside the Himalayan heights on Nepal's side.

This was, however, true of only the eastern sector. In the West the old boundary of Nepal was regarded as to have held good. Its jurisdiction over Mustang and similar other juttngs was not questioned. In the middle sector that had witnessed a scene of Chinese incursion the demarcation was otherwise not conforming to its original line.

The Government of Nepal lost the right of coinage. Ordinarily in this matter Nepal would not have been a total loser, because of the economic supremacy its currency had the same negotiability in terms of exchange. But all import of Nepalese currency was prohibited and similarly the entry of Nepalese into Tibet was banned. Nepal's economic advantages were now rendered ineffective by these measures of the Chinese Government. For sometime at least Nepal was practically cut off from Tibet and its trade in that area had entirely ceased to exist. By a special clause of the treaty signed between Nepal and Tibet that was to follow all these settlements, Nepal was also required to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Emperor of China and it appears that the King did acknowledge Chinese overlordship even though nominally for a long time. Further, while acknowledging Chinese suzerainty, Nepal renounced its conquest of Sikkim which now became a vassal of the Emperor. Of course, these provisions were designed to work against Nepal's interest both materially and psychologically and no doubt they succeeded. As a result of the reverses Nepal came to be totally sterilised vis a vis the northern neighbour. Now in that relationship Nepal's lot was cast for the role of a vassal of China. Nepal also undertook to send a regular five yearly tribute to China consisting of elephants, horses, peacocks, rhinoceros horns, and peacock plumes. Hamilton says that with regard to this aspect of Gorkha-Chinese relations the feeling in Nepal had been to take it as a friendly

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106 THHL, CL, 116-12b-13, 37b; KTSL, 1411-38b-15, 1418-9b-10.
107 THHL, CL, 118-9b. 11 quoted by S. Cammann, P. 132.
108 Kuang-hsu Hui tien, 67. 13b quoted by S. Cammann.
alliance. In accordance with the statement of Chinese sources the status of Nepal was to be like that of China’s many other dependents like Korea, Annam, Siam and Burma. It was understood that Chinese sovereignty in these countries was so little exercised that its acceptance did not mean curtailment of their own sovereign rights to any degree. Except five yearly tribute, no other obligations were to be discharged by these countries. Beyond this the status involved only an acknowledgement in perpetuity of the suzerainty of the Chinese Emperor. In fact, in that context Chinese suzerainty was meaningless and Nepal was as independent as ever. The events following prove that Nepal was free to pursue its own course and most of all it fought battles with external powers, which a vassal could not have fought.

One could not say that Nepal came out of the ordeal unscathed. It had surely involved tremendous loss of valuable lives, years of fighting labour and above all a proud country’s prestige. But the end had left Nepal practically where it had been before the war with the same territorial possessions and sovereign powers. However, with the Chinese Emperor accepted as overlord the final upshot of the war certainly reflected unfavourably on the fair and proud name and credit of the Nepalese patriots even if it had not affected its total independence and territorial integrity.

As a result of the war, the Tibet-Nepal boundary was also defined and marked off here and there by piled stones (“Obos”). But this kind of delimitation was done only in Kuti and Kerong areas. Else-

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109 Ibid. Kirkpatrick, however, says (Preface): It was in other respects, by no means honourable to the rulers of that country, especially if it be true, as was affirmed at the time by some intelligent persons, that a little more firmness on the part of the Regency would speedily have compelled the Chinese (who had suffered greatly from sickness and scarcity, and were not less impatient to quit Nepal than the Nepali to get rid of them) to solicit the accommodation which they were permitted to make a merit of granting.

110 Kuang-hsu Hui-tien, 67.13b; THHL, CL, 116.12b; KTSL 1411.14b quoted by S. Cammann.

111 The Nepal Government used to send five yearly deputation with presents to the Chinese Court till 1912. The first mission led by Kazi Devadatta Thapa and Pratiman Rana reached Peking in 1714 Saka (1792 A.D.).

112 Hamilton, P. 249. “The tribute agreed upon has never even been demanded much less expected, and the Gorkhalis are in the habit of saying, that, should they have any dispute with the English, their only formidable neighbour, they will claim the protection of the Chinese, with whose influence over the Company they seem to be much better acquainted than one would have expected”. From an unpublished letter written to the King of Nepal by Chyan Jung, dated Ghyalung 57 (in the custody of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Nepal Government) it appears that the Chinese returned all the conquered territories within Nepal to the latter, and this letter contained a sort of undertaking to that effect.

113 THHL, CL, 116. 14b ff; KTSL, 1411. 24b, 1412. 25ff cited by S. Cammann.
where the boundary was left vague. A kind of rough demarcation, however, followed in 1857.

In Kerong and Kuti the Tibetan territorial limit was pushed to about ten miles within the Langur Upland. Russoa was the last Nepalese outpost in the former, and Kodari in the latter. Both these are situated on this side of the Langur a bit inside as we have just shown. It seems that before the war, the traditional boundary of Nepal was at Khasa in the Kuti sector and the Nepal Government obtained tributes from the Kerong tract. In the settlement that followed Khasa was ceded to Tibet and Nepal also had to give up its right to obtain tributes from Kerong. For about 16 miles in each of these, there is the river as the frontier line at the moment. In Kerong the Bhotia Kosi and Linde Khola form the boundary and in Kuti another river, by name Bhotia Kosi runs to demarcate the boundary. All this demarcation was done in course of the new settlement. Elsewhere the mountain was the acknowledged barrier of demarcation between Nepal and Tibet. Kuti and Kerong provided the traditional highways between Nepal and Tibet. By controlling these, the Chinese were to regulate the flow of trade between the two countries. But all kinds of commercial transactions came to a stop as the Chinese extended their control over this area.

The First Nepalese Mission to Peking

We read from the Nepalese sources that the mission had started from Dhaibung as soon as the truce was signed, and this was led by Kazi Deodatta Thapa. It appears that the same delegation which had negotiated the truce was sent to Peking to wait on the Emperor of China.

The following excerpt from a letter written by the delegation from Djigarche to king Rana Bahadur Shah on their return journey gives further details about the first Mission and the route travelled by them. The signatories to this letter are Deodatta Thapa, Pratiman Rana, Jayanta Shahi and Balbhadra who composed the delegation.

"Starting on the 16th of Bhadra from Lhasa we reached here on the 26th Bhadra. We met the Lama. So far no arrangement has been made for horses. We shall not be able to reach there before Dasahara. We might arrive 5 or 6 days thereafter."

"Your Majesty shall remember that we were accompanied by two Kashmiri interpreters on our way to Peking. These have also come back along with the Mission, three Chinese officers and three Dhewas of Lhasa shall come to see us off as far as Kerong at the instance of
the Amban. To the Jamadars of the attendant force we have awarded some prizes of swords and Khukris. . . . . . . . . . The Dhewas also deserve rewards from Your Majesty, but as they are deputed to wait on you by the Amban, Your Majesty shall confer on them prizes when they reach the court.”

It appears that the total time taken by the mission to reach Peking and be back to Kathmandu was nearly a year. The mission stayed in Peking for about five months.

**Effect of the War on British Diplomacy**

As soon as the truce was agreed, the British were told not ‘to send the mediator to such far off place since there was no need for such occasion as the Chinese had withdrawn’. This was in October, 1792. Their attitude remained the same up till January, 1793. To meet a request from Kirkpatrick that he had come as far as Patna, and he had with him a letter of the British Governor-General in furtherance of mutual friendship, Bam Shah and Dinanath Upadhaya were sent thither, but at any rate he was not readily accepted. Not until certain preliminary objections were raised and satisfied he was allowed to proceed. We shall take up the subject of Kirkpatrick’s mission in the next chapter.

The British attempt to penetrate into Tibet also collapsed as a result of the war. Tibet was now virtually closed. The Lamas were deprived of powers to communicate with the foreigners. Now the Chinese authorities were the sole repository of these powers. But they were least communicative. Even as a consequence of this the British mission in China led by Lord Macartney, also failed. The leader of the mission reported that on account of their non-committed attitude in the dispute the British were regarded as ‘to have given assistance to an enemy of the Chinese’.

**A Costly and fruitless venture**

We have seen what the war cost to Nepal in terms of the loss of human material, suffering undergone and prestige impaired in the course. We have also seen what this country obtained in return. The balance weighed heavily against Nepal. Today after nearly 175 years we have a full picture of the whole affair and judging from a study of

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114 Nepal Sanskritik Parishad Patrika, No. 3, 3.
115 Letter of the Raja of Nepal to the Governor-General, CPC, X. 23.
116 Secret Department, 17 January, 1793; Letter of the Raja, Received on 2nd January 1793.
117 Secret Proceedings, 29 September, 1794.
all aspects of the event it has to be admitted that the Tibetan war of the Nepalese was a costly and fruitless venture.

There is one thing more. The Chinese Commander had erected a memorial pillar in Lhasa inscribing lines much derogatory to the fair name of the Gorkhalis. The inscription abuses them, and calls them names, barbarians, cheats, etc. It further says that the Gorkhalis were let off only while they pledged words to become a vassal of the Emperor. Whatever argument might be put forth to justify Nepal's stand in acknowledging Chinese suzerainty, the fact remains that Nepal was never a vassal state of China even though its vassalage was just in theory. It was claimed later that the Nepalese could use their dependence on China to demand protection if the British thought at any time to invade Nepal. The Nepalese Bharadars and officials do not also seem to have attached more than a passing significance to their relation with China. Nor any idea of ignominy associated with vassalage had ever weighed with them. This was so because in practice there was no loss of independence. But who can deny that Nepal had to pay a heavy price for the war and it extricated itself out of the situation with extreme difficulty and while the peace returned Nepal became a vassal state of China? No independent country voluntarily agrees to become a vassal of another, howsoever great. It had obviously afforded no pleasure to Nepal to sign a treaty acknowledging Chinese suzerainty. Undoubtedly Nepal had acted in that connection under compulsion of particular circumstances. But nevertheless it was a price that Nepal paid for its defeat in the war.

According to Chinese and Tibetan sources Nepal had consented to become a vassal of Tibet for a period of sixty years in between C. 64 A.D. and C. 705 A.D. Once again, a country from beyond the Himalayas was destined to play a dominant role in the war and as a result secure position of a suzerain power in regard to Nepal. This time it was Manchu China which had imposed its vassalage on this country. History had repeated itself after nearly eleven hundred years.

It was said by Kirkpatrick that a little more patience on the part of Nepal might have saved them from a humiliating treaty as the Chinese were much too exhausted to be prepared for a protracted peace parley and in an endeavour to see a quick solution would have dropped the clause requiring the Gorkhalis to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty. But even earlier while they were having an easy time in South Tibet just at the end of the first phase of the war, the Gorkhalis had not hesitated to accept the suzerainty of the Chinese Emperor. We surmise that while the final agreement was concluded, the former draft had
been produced in toto and thus the particular clause about China’s suzerainty came to be adopted. The Nepalese negotiators could not have objected to that clause having accepted it already three years back. But if there was no such pressure exerted on them for acceptance, there must be some other reason for it. It is said that the Nepalese plenipotenciaries had thought that unless China’s suzerainty was acknowledged, the benefits of the treaty entered upon with Tibet could not be availed of. One may ask, why should they covet certain advantages in Tibet and accept a vassal’s status to enjoy the same? Were they so invaluable as to impel one to go to the length of compromising one’s independent status? But this also does not seem to be a sufficient ground to justify Nepal’s line of action in that direction.

A probable explanation for the conduct of the Nepalese in accepting a subsidiary place vis-a-vis China is that on both occasions having overrun parts of Tibet they were afraid of reprisals by the Chinese and they thought much as Chinese suzerainty was too vague and ineffectively exercised, they could avert the risk by accepting to become China’s vassal. But then their Tibetan raids could be branded as thoughtlessly undertaken.

Whatever the explanation Nepal did not fare well by the war in Tibet.

The aftermath was even more complicated. The Nepalese immediately faced the British mission. This question tackled, there was internal crisis born of disunity amongst the nobility. This crisis further deepened and it was to give rise to worst kind of political instability. Nepal had now become totally static. Its usual vitality of a newly rising state was gone. Its march onward was held up. We shall deal with these while proper occasion comes. For twelve years Nepal seethed in agony and troubles, its progress arrested and all activities at standstill and it was rescued as the strong personality of Bhimsen Thapa emerged in the scene asserting vigorously to put down with iron hand all that tended to weaken and disorganise the country.

This much for the final comment on the Tibetan War of the Nepalese. There was one redeeming feature. Thanks to China’s stupendous ignorance of the world outside and to the geographical barrier represented by the high snowy peaks of the Himalayas, Nepal was not touched by the Chinese once they had crossed over the passes after the truce was concluded in the winter of 1793. The Nepalese had also maintained the continuity of the five-yearly mission to impress the Chinese that Nepal had not shaken off its status of the Emperor’s vassal. After all China had obtained its suzerainty over Nepal not to
effectively exercise it. The Chinese knew that the brave Gorkhalis had
taxed their patience in the fight and given them sufficient embarrassment.
They had no desire to exasperate them and drive them into a desperate
situation renew the grim struggle. They wanted to forget Nepal for
the four years of the mission’s five years wanting to seek reminder only
in the fifth at the very end of the term.

Nepal sent last mission in 1908. In 1912 a great revolution
uprooted the Manchu dynasty, and a republic saw its birth. Since
then there had been no tributary mission from Nepal. After some time
the vassalage of Nepal was looked upon as a matter of history. In the
thirties the foreign Ministry of China had no knowledge of Nepal being
their tributary. In 1956, the Peoples’ Government of China recog-
nised Nepal as a sovereign and independent country.

All this shows that Chinese suzerainty was resting on artificial
foundation and not only nominally exercised, it was also inconsistent
with the inexorable needs of geography, history and culture as it was in
the case of Burma, Thailand and Indo-China.
APPENDIX 1

Appendix to the Memorial.

According to or recorded in the Account Book of income and expenditure at the time of an assault on Tibet.

The Year 1845. (Vikram)

Presents offered on behalf of the nine hundred subjects of Kerong through Kaji Jagatjeet Pande.

on Bhadra Sudi 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rs. 254|8.
Silver Tolas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rs. 1221|-
For 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5|
Rs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001|-
For 10 horses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224|8
For 1 tea cake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
For 1 Cuchin Than . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Year 1846.

Presents sent by the Vakil (representative) of Sakya of Lhasa on Magha Sudi 7.
Silver Tolas for 3 Dhoje . . . . . . . . . . . 482|-
21 Khagam for two violet Kuchin Than . . . .
12 Khagam for one white Kuchin Than . . . .
11 Khagam for one brown Kuchin Than . . . .
11 Khagam for one green Kuchin Than . . . .

For one pair Doshalla presented by the Vakil come from Lhasa on Magha Sudi 4.

The Year 1847. (Vikram)

Token of presents offered at different times from Bhot on Chaitra Sudi 15 totalled to 151|5|4 tolas of gold amounting to 151-8 Asarfi (Gold Mohar) the value of 10 Dam at 15-8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rs. 2348|14|3.
The value of 10 Dam at 15-8 from Djigarcha Silver Tolas 2086-8 and economical (cheap) mint silver tolas, silver tolas 116-8 totalling to 2203 tolas at Re. 1 per tola

The Year 1849. (Vikram)

Presents taken from Tun Thuan Chinia through Kapardar Bhotu Pande and Narsingh.

To His Majesty Sree Panch

Dark Violet coloured coat (Bakhu) ..... 1.
China Bubhal glass ..... 2.
Red Cuchin Than ..... 2.
Flower spotted Cuchin Than ..... 2.
Black coloured small Gaha Cuchin Than ..... 1.
Saffron coloured Cuchin Than ..... 1.
Tammak Khalada number ..... 6.
Red Violet and (black) coloured Cuchin Than ..... 2.
Red Ghadwal Cuchin Than ..... 2.

Ash coloured Gaha Cuchin Than small ..... 3.
Violet coloured check designed Gaha Cuchin ..... 1.
Ting Shyan Than ..... 4.

To Shree Mahila Saheb

Dark violet coloured coat (Bakhu) ..... 1.
Pink coloured Cuchin Than ..... 1.
Black coloured Cuchin Than ..... 1.
Violet coloured Cuchin Than ..... 1.
Saffron coloured Cuchin Than ..... 1.
Ash coloured Cuchin Than ..... 1.
Tammak Khalada number ..... 4.
Green coloured number ..... 1.
Red coloured number ..... 1.
Violet coloured number small ..... 1.
Ting Shyan Than ..... 4.

Amount received through Siri Pande, Jasadhar Panta Sinha from Kuti as instalment due of the year 48 on Magha Sudi 3-1038-8.
(2)

Recorded in the Account Book of 1845, the expenses incurred for different needs during the attack of Bhot...
The gift offered to the deities on the conquest of Jhunga on Bhadra Vadi...
Doshallas given to the headman of Jhunga Kerong together with Ganga Dhar Padhya (for 2) amounted to 85\.
Found in the Account Book of 1847...
Monthly salary to the servant of Chinia come from Calcutta on Kartick Vadi 1...
The daily food expense to the Bhot of Lhasa on Chaitra Vadi 6...
Traced in the Account Book of 1849...
The reward given to the interpreter accompanying Chinia on Jestha Vadi 4...
Present offered to the Raja of Dharma through Dinanath Padhya on Jestha Vadi 4...
For 1 Kin Khap Than...
For 1 Kin Khap Than...
For 2 Adharsa (white cloth) napkins...
For 2 oil cloth...

The expense incurred for twenty-one persons for carrying the present 1 consisting of water melon to Tun Thuan on Aswin Vadi 5...
The expenses incurred for coolies for carrying Shyamarpa Lama’s belonging to Dhaibung on Aswin Vadi 5...
The price of the goat required while sending friendly token to Tun Thuan on Aswin Vadi 11...
The red broad cloth as cover to chest to contain the pearl necklace to be presented to the Emperor of China on Aswin Vadi 12...
Mahasudi cloth...
Covering of the letter required to despatch to Tun Thuan...
For 1 oil cloth piece...
For 1 Khasa cloth piece...
For 1 Account Book...
For 1 Embroidery thread...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presents sent to Uzir Tun Thuan to Dhaibum through Raja Abhiman Sinha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For purchase of articles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten Pathi of cumminseeds</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pathi</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten pathi or 4 dharni of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten pathi or 50 dharni of ghee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten pathi or 50 dharni of sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten pathi or 5 dharni of black pepper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten pathi or 5 dharni Asafoteada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ten pathi or 7 dharni desert nut</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten pathi or 5 dharni sweets (Battama)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Garlic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 500 Kabataras of curd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 3 muri of wine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 25 pigs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 15 muri of pulse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 5 muri of smitten rice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 100 cocoanut</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 5 dharni of almond</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 30 dharni of salt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 5 dharni of white cardamon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 5 dharni of black cardamon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 2 dharni of cinamon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 6 dharni of Alaichidana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Black cardamon covered with sugar)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 55 buffaloes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumpkin, cucumber, snakegourd and bean, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 muri of rice</td>
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<td></td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Pathi of turmeric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Goats</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The expenses of coolie for carrying presents to Dhaibun on Aswin Vadi 13       318|- |

The dress carried by the delegation of Ram Dayal's son going to China on Aswin Vadi 14       |

For 2 Kasiwal Than       |

For 1 Kasiwal violet coloured Dupattas       |

For 2 than of embroidered turbans           47|- |

For lining of the Jama (frock) 1 than of red cloth       |

For ½ than of red chibuli cloth (white and fine)       |
For 2 red Malmal than

For 1 embroidered Kasiwal Dupatta

For 2 embroidered Jamewal than

For 1 white Asavari Dupatta of Dhurakpur

For 1 violet

For 2 Asaveri Jamewal than

For Chira Turban than

For 1 silver handled sword to be sent as present to Chanchun on Falgun Vadi 5.\textsuperscript{118}

\textbf{APPENDIX II}

According to Sylvain Levi we have from the Chinese sources the following account of Sino-Nepalese War:\textsuperscript{119}

"The cup was overflowing (January 1792). K'ieu-Long ordered the 5,000 soldiers of the principalities and military colonies of Kin-Tchoan to rally to the help of the 3,000 regulars in garrison at Tibet; and to oppose to the (tested) tried valour of the Gorkhas, strong adversaries, he raised amongst the faithful Manchurains, a force of 2000 men recruited amongst the warlike, tribes of Solon, on the boundaries of Argoun; time had to be gained; they were taken through the path of Kou-Tsieu-Lou, but bristling with difficulties and impediments. In May 1792, the contingents were united under the leadership of Fou-Hang; the Chinese army comprised only 10,000 men, to the testimony of the Chinese historian; the Tibetan relation (chronicle) attributes it 70,000 men, divided into two divisions.

"A first encounter took place at Tingri Maidan, between Shikar-joung and Kuti; the Gorkhas vanquished after a terrific struggle, fell back in retreat. Fou-K'ang occupied without a struggle, the Kirong pass (July 1792) but the mountain cost the invaders more men than battles; the avalanche and the precipice were more deadly than Gorkhas. One by one the Gorkha positions fell in the hands of the Chinese; Fou-K'ang had at his disposal of light artillery which worked wonders, leather canons which fired five or six bombs which burst afterwards. Finally the Chinese army appeared on the height of Dhebang about Noakot at a day's journey from Kathmandu (30 kilometres) on the 4th September 1792. The massed Gorkhas attempted a supreme effort; but Fou-K'ang rushed his troops on them helped and supported by his artillery which

\textsuperscript{118} Nepal Sanskritik Patrika 3-3.

Also read the king's order for the purchase of certain articles to be presented to the Chinese Emperor in VS. 1875 (Iitias Prakas, I, P. 144).

\textsuperscript{119} Levi, II, P. 181.
he had placed on the rear, according to the Chinese method, against the enemies and against the runaways."... Levi further writes about the diplomatic missions: (P. 184).

"Every five years, Nepal was obliged to send to Peking an Embassy composed of several high dignitaries assisted by an escort. The Embassy pays respects to the Bodhisatwa Manjusri in the person of the Emperor and deposits between the "five claws of the Dragon" a petition written on gold leaves together with different gifts. The number of persons composing the embassade is fixed and constant; it must not sin either through shortcoming or excess. If by an unfortunate accident one of the members of the Mission falls grievously ill on route, he is not allowed to stop or abandon the journey but is carried on a palanquin and if one is not available, is tied to the saddle of his horse. The journey must be completed in a given time, by determined stage. The difficulty of organising relays all along this vast stretch of ground explains this intransigent severity. Besides the path is made easy as far as possible, even agreeable. Distractions are found of a most intimate order and the members of the Mission do not disdain them. In twelve stages; the mission reaches the frontier of Tibet at Kuti (or Nepal) of which the Gorkhas are masters since 1853. A Chinese officer then takes care of the convey and directs it in twenty-eight stages to Lhasa through Tingri and Shigatze. There is a halt of one month and a half at Lhasa. The Imperial commissary proceeds to the inventory of the gifts, ascertains they are consistent with the stipulations of 1792 and has them carefully packed. He then instructs the delegates of the rites to follow in the presence of the Emperor, hands them their indemnity of the journey, and also little presents of a personal nature (silk, satin, padded clothes). The delegates in return give him, and the Dalai Lama the personal gifts of the Nepalese king. From Lhasa the delegates are directed to Ta-Tsien-Lon, frontier of China and Tibet, in 64 stages be detained Dezong, Gya-h, Gyando Dozong, Artsa, Lha ri, Alamdo, Chor-Kong, la, Lhatse, Maganda, Lagong, Tchamdo, Tag-yab, Nyeba, Batang and Litang. The escort which came from Lhasa stops at Ta-Tsien-Lon, and the mandarins of Sse-tchaon then take the direction and the responsibility of the Embassy. In seventy-two stages, it reaches Peking through Hona, after eight long months of journeying.

"The Embassy so-journs forty-five days in the capital and its chiefs are allowed to prostrate themselves once before the Emperor in person, then it turns by the same way but it crosses over the Himalayas by the Kirong pass. The barbarous soil has soiled the Gorkha envoys, they are obliged to stop for three days at Noakot to undergo the ritual of
expiations which will return them, together with the legal purity, the lost caste. As a public consecration of their recovered purity, the king offers them water from his own ewer. A state procession goes then to receive the Imperial missive which the Embassy has brought back. The king leads the way, accompanied by fifty nobles on horse-back; the counsellors and the king are riding on elephants. Three thousand soldiers surround the cortège. At a league from the capital, the king comes down from his elephant, he takes the missive which the envoy carries round his neck, hanging in a sheath covered with brocade, a cannonade salutes this solemn moment. The king hangs back the letter to the neck of the envoy. The envoy then gets on an elephant and takes in his turn the lead; till the entry to the palace."\textsuperscript{120}

\textbf{APPENDIX III\textsuperscript{121}}

Two Records of the invasion of Nepal by the Chinese in 1792.

I

Written by the King, and engraved upon a stone slab below the Potala, Lhasa:

Now that the Gorkhas have submitted to me, the Imperial army has been withdrawn, and the completion of this brilliant tenth achievement has been set out in the letter. Though the fame of this matter was great, it has not been fully manifested. Therefore, the proclamation has been inscribed on this monument, that the monument may serve as a moral for the minds of men.

It comes to my mind that my mind was formerly attached to the Yu-kur writing. According to the writing of Che-u-kur the acts of the respectful and sympathetic Amban, and of the owner of the country, able to perform all things, are set down here. It is written in a chapter of the Lu A-u that, when the mind is in a good state the mind and the deeds are joined together. However, he who acts in accordance with the above precepts will obtain the approval of the Heavenly Protector\textsuperscript{122} and will gain reward. As my conduct was on those lines, I gained all

\textsuperscript{120}In connection with the Mission at Peking. Read Cavenagh, 63-66 (after the Nepalese officers); Hodgson; Miscellaneous Essays, 11, 167-190 (Nepalese itineraries); Hunter, Life of Hodson, 'P. 78 (Reception of the Embassy at Kathmandu); Imbault—Haart,' an episode of diplomatic relations between China and Nepal in 1842 'in Review of the Far East,' 111 (1887), 1-23; Rockhill, 'The Land of the Lamas'—London, 1891 (interview with the Embassy).

\textsuperscript{121}Appendix XXI, Pp. 272ff, Vol. II by Landon. Cammanu holds that this translation is incovect at many places.

\textsuperscript{122}i.e., Emperor of China.
The merits necessary for carrying out the ten wars to a successful conclusion. It is fitting that they should be carved on this monument.

The merits of the ten times are as follows:
Two victories over the Chung-kar.
One victory over Hu-i Se.
Two victories over Tsa-la and Chu-chen.
One victory over Ta-i Wan.
Two victories over Mi-han-tan and An-tan.

Now I have fought twice with the Gorkhas. I have made an end of them, and they have tendered their submission to me. This completes the ten times. Three of the internal victories are of lesser importance.

Now as regards the submission of the Gorkhas in the Female Earth-Bird year. Although they brought troops for looting U123 and Tsang (two provinces of central Tibet), the A-u Hu-i not daring, Pa-chung did not go into the matter thoroughly, but arranged it in a hurry. So the Gorkhas were not frightened.

Again, having obtained loot last year, they came back. The wicked minister was degraded, and the famous Chang-chun was sent. The latter arranged on a large scale for provisions and wages. Fu-kang men appreciated my gifts highly, and did not consider fatigue or fear.

During the winter of last year additional soldiers of Solon and Szechuan came quickly, batch by batch, along the Sining road, and arrived in the country of the thieves (i.e. Gorkhas) during the fifth month of this year. Immediately on their arrival they retook the country of U and Tsang, and captured the territory of the thieves. They traversed the mountains, so difficult to push through, as though they were moving over a level plain. They crossed rivers with great waves and narrow gorges as though they were small streams. They climbed up the peaks of mountains and descended again in the pursuit. They captured the important places and at the same time captured the roads in the gorges. Not considering injuries to hands or feet, they fought seven battles and gained seven victories. The thieves were panic-stricken.

After that, when the troops arrived close to Yam-by (i.e. Kathmandu) the chief leaders of the thieves were sent. They submitted respectfully and represented that they would conduct themselves according to our orders. Although they carried out the orders of the great Commander-in-Chief, they were not allowed to enter our encampment. The reason for this was that last year they seized Ten-dzin Pal-jor and

123 Chasaisin i.e., and Shigatse is in Tsang.
those with him by means of a falsehood; and so they were not allowed to enter.

Owing to the great heroism of the mighty army the thieves were helpless. He could have had them removed from his presence, and could have made an end of them, letting not even one of them escape. However, that was not the wish of the Heavenly Protector (i.e. Chinese Emperor). Even if all those territories had been obtained, as they are more than a thousand distances from the frontiers of U and Tsang, it would have been difficult to cultivate them and to guard them. As for ordinary, simple people, even if they obtain a thing, the end will not be gained. Therefore, orders were given, the respectful submission was noted, and the army was withdrawn. Thereby the work was completed.

Formerly, in the time of King Thang Tha-i Tsung, there was a conference with the Chi-li (the English). As it was shown that they (the Gorkhas) were conquered and powerless, he (the Chi-li) said that they would always remain on good terms (with China). It is not fitting to take the Chi-li as an example. The frontier of U and Tsang are not near to China. They (the Gorkhas) fearing to lose their lives, were compelled to submit respectfully. A pretended submission, made in order to obtain peace, will not suffice. A great victory has now been obtained. The thieves have offered a heart-felt submission, and this is believed and accepted. Affairs have been arranged in accordance with the three points of King Tha-i Tsang of Thang-gur.

Need I write the former affairs of the Tor-go, (another tribe) how they became afraid of us and followed us. How they came to agree with us and to follow us, this has all been written already. Now the Gorkhas having admitted their fault, and wishing to save their lives, fear us and follow us. Thus agreeing with us and following, the two qualities are complete. The failing was theirs, and they have admitted their fault: that is how the matter stands.

If this matter be considered, it will be seen that the people of U, abandoning military pursuits, devote themselves solely to literature. Thus they have become like a body bereft of vigour. This is unfitting. If a people abandon military pursuits and make literature their chief object, they become unable to safeguard their former position. This should be known.

The manner of going and the manner of returning are clearly written in the book entitled 'The planets and Stars'. Now understand this and do not forget it. It is to be considered again and again at the time of making war, that it may be of advantage.

These were the envoys of Tibet to talk peace with Nepal.
Owing to the knowledge gained during fifty-seven years of warfare these ten deeds have been fully completed. This is the gift of the Heavenly Protector. Thus the kindness of the Heavenly Protector is exceedingly deep. I also have faith in it. They (the Gorkhas) thought they could achieve a great deal by violence, but the favour of the Heavenly Protector remained. It is hoped that this will tend to turn people into men of complete justice. Besides this, there is nothing to be said.

This has been written by the King on an upper date in the first month of winter in the fifty-seventh year of the reign of the Heavenly Protector, that is to say in the Male Water Rat year.

II

A descriptive Account of the Military Operations of the Sacred (Manchu) Dynasty (Sheng-wu-chi),\textsuperscript{125} compiled by Wei Yuan, native of Shao-yang (Hunan Province). The expedition against the Gorkhas (Nepal) in the Ch’ien-lung reign. Literally translated (1926) by Mr. H. S. Brunnert.\textsuperscript{126}

Wei Yuan (T. Mo-Shen) died A.D. 1856. He served as a magistrate in the provinces. He wrote the “Sheng-wu-chi,” a descriptive account of the military operations of the Manchu dynasty, and also the “Hai-kuo t’u-chih”, a record of foreign nations, founded on the notes of Lin Tse-ksu.

To the west of the province of Ssuch’uan and Yunnan lies Wu-ssu Tsang-Tibet;\textsuperscript{127} to the south-west of the latter Gorkha (Nepal), and to the south-west of Nepal—“The Five Indies”.

India is the Ancient Buddhist Kingdom. It lies to the west of Onion Range,\textsuperscript{128} (Ts’ung-ling shan) and, on the south, is bounded by a big sea and the distance between India and Tibet is fully equal to 2,000 li. The opinion hazarded by some persons that Tibet is the Ancient Buddhist Kingdom is not true.

If one is journeying from Ta-chien-lu, in Ssuch’uan westwards, there are more than 20 stations to Anterior Tibet, 12 stations more to Central Tibet, another 12 stations to Ulterior Tibet, after 20 stations more is situated the iron suspension bridge at Chi-lung.\textsuperscript{129} which is the remotest frontier place in Ulterior Tibet; to the west of this bridge lies the land of Gorkhas (Nepal).

\textsuperscript{125} Landon, PP. 275ff. Appendix, XXI (II).
\textsuperscript{126} Chapter V of the Account translated by C. Imbault Huart.
\textsuperscript{127} Central Tibet.
\textsuperscript{128} The Belurtagh Mountains in Turkestan.
\textsuperscript{129} Kerrong.
The original name of Gorkha is Pale-pu country. In old times it was divided into three parts or tribes: Yeh-leng-pu, Pu-Yen-pu and K'u-mu-pu. In the ninth year of Yeh-cheng reign (1731) each tribe presented to the Throne memorials written in golden characters, also native products, in token of tribute, but afterwards the three tribes were amalgamated into one, and this country then become the neighbour of Ulterior Tibet. Its dimensions are: from east to west—several thousand li; from South to North—more than one thousand li. The capital is called Yang-pu; it lies approximately at 11-12 days' journey from the frontier. This country also has some Buddhist monuments; therefore, the Tanguts yearly came in pilgrimage to worship at the pagodas and whitewash them.

From ancient times Nepal had no relations with China; the beginning of the hostilities between them dated from the 55th year (1790 A.D.) of the Ch'ien-lung reign, when Nepal invaded Tibet.

In the 46th year (1781 A.D.) of the Ch'ien-lung reign the Panch'en Lama of Ulterior Tibet came to the Capital of China to congratulate the Emperor on the occasion of his 70th anniversary; donations to the Pontiff came from ‘inside and outside’, (capital and provinces) like seas overflowing and mountains ‘heaping’. When the Panch’en Lama passed away in the Capital, his remains were escorted back to Tibet. As to his treasures, they all became the property of his elder brother Chung-pa Hutukhtu. But the latter gave no donations either to the monasteries or to the Tangut soldiery; besides, he declined the claim of his younger brother She-ma-rh-pa to have his share in the division of treasures, on the ground that he (She-ma-rh-pa) had embraced ‘the Red Religion.’ Angered by this refusal, She-ma-rh-pa brought his complaints to the Gorkhas, and used the hoarded treasures of Ulterior Tibet and the Chung-pa's arrogance as incitements to them to invade this country.

In the 3rd month of the 55th year (1790 A.D.) of the Ch'ien-lung reign, the Gorkhas, using as the pretext the increase of taxes on merchandise and the admixture of dust in the table-salt, sent troops and invaded the frontier area. The Tangut soldiers were not able to make any resistance. As for the officers whom the Government appointed, in order to help in the extermination of invaders—e.g., officer of the Guards Pa-chung, Tartar Generals Ao-Hui, Ch’eng-te and others—they tried to settle the matter amicably and to get peace through bribery.
So they secretly advised to the Tibetan Abbots and other ecclesiastics privately to pay the Gorkhas a yearly subsidy of 15,000 in gold in order to stop the military operations.

At that time the Dalai Lama could not agree to the suggestion. Nevertheless, Pa-chung ventured to deceive the Emperor by presenting a memorial to the effect that the rebels had surrendered. So far was this from being the case that he actually persuaded the Gorkha chieftain to bring tribute, in order to be appointed Prince of the country (Kuo-wang). In this “War” not a single soldier was lost, but a million was spent on soldiers’ rations.

In the 7th month the Gorkhas sent an Envoy to Tibet to bring the tribute and to present a letter to the Imperial Resident there, requesting that the stipulations of the Treaty (with Pa-chung) be complied with. But General Ao-Hui, fearing the disclosure of the above mentioned facts, put this letter aside and did not memorialize the Throne.

Next year (1791 A.D.) Tibet again did not observe the Treaty, as regards (?) in spite of the receipt of) the yearly subsidy. In consequence, the Gorkhas again raised troops and penetrated deeply into Tibet, under the pretext of punishing the country for the breach of the Treaty.

To the south-west of Tashilumpo, in Ulterior Tibet, are situated: Ch'u-to-chiang-kung—to the East, and a mountain range, bearing the name of P'eng-ts'o-ling—to the West, both possessing important strategical positions, consisting of sheer precipices, successive ridges and defiles. The rebel infantry, to the number of several thousand, debouched from a place, named Nieh-la-mu. At that time, the Government troops, both Tibetan and Chinese, had only to divide themselves into two detachments, the one defending Ch'u-to-chiang-kung, to prevent the enemy from advancing; the other making a detour to the P'eng-ts'o-ling mountain range, in order to cut off the enemy’s retreat. In that case, the Gorkhas (who had invaded the country very deeply, but unable to get reinforcements, would be forced to disperse without a combat.

But Pao-t'ai, the Imperial Resident in Tibet, on learning about the rebels’ advance, in the first place had the Panch'en Lama removed to Anterior Tibet; then, panic-stricken by the rebels’ movements, he memorialized the Emperor, supplicating to have both Pontiffs removed out of Tibet: Dalai Lama—to Hsi-ning, and Panch'en Lama—to

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124 Ruler.
125 Nilam.
126 In Kausu.
T'ai-ning respectively, being ready to abandon the Tibetan territory to the rebels.

As the city of Tashilumpo is situated on a mountain and has a river in front of it, thus possessing a strong strategical position, the Lamas, to the number of several thousands, had only to occupy the city walls and guard them, waiting for the reinforcements to arrive. But Chung-pa Hutukhtu had already fled, taking with him all his treasures. As for Chi-lung Lama and other ecclesiastics, they all alleged that, as their divinations had showed, the Heavenly Mother was against fighting. In consequence, the population became quite downhearted, and the rebels succeeded in plundering the city of Tashilumpo mercilessly. This caused great consternation throughout the whole of Tibet, and both Pontiffs urgently memorialized the Throne about the critical state of affairs.

The Officer of the Guards, Pa-chung, was just then accompanying the Emperor to Yehol, and hearing that the rebels had invaded Tibet, he committed suicide by throwing himself into the river. At that time Ao-Hui held the post of Governor-General of the province of Ssuch'uan and Ch'eng-te that of Tartar General there. Both shifted all the guilt on Pa'-chung, saying that, being master of the Tangut language, he had conducted privately all the negotiations, so that he alone was responsible, and that they had no knowledge of them at all.

When the Emperor ordered them to proceed to Tibet to exterminate the invaders, they advanced by easy stages and were in no hurry to enter the Tibetan territory. But His Majesty knew that both were quite unreliable. So he commanded Duke Fu-K'ang-an to assume the post of Tartar General and Duke Hai-lan-ch'a to be his Military Assistant; also, to mobilize the Manchu troops of the Solon tribe and the native drilled forces for the extermination of rebels. As for the supplies of the drilled forces for the extermination of rebels. As for the supplies of the army the Emperor ordered them to be provided: by Sun Shih-i, the Governor-General of the Ssuch'uan province; for the Eastern region of Tibet, by the Imperial Resident in Tibet, Ho-Lin, for the Western region of Tibet, i.e., for the area lying outside the frontier place of Chi-lung, by the former Governor-General of the Ssuch'uan province, Hui-Ling. Pao-t'ai was ordered to wear the cangue in front of the army. Moreover, the main forces were to enter Tibet by way of Kokonor steppes, thus shortening the journey by 30 stages, in comparison with the advance via Ta-chien-lu in Ssuch'uan.

137 Chief Counsellor.
138 From the region of Amur.
139 A heavy square wooden collar worn as a humiliating punishment.
The rebels, relying on the precedent of the last year’s war, when peace had been obtained through bribery, returned to their country, taking with them all the booty and leaving one thousand men to guard the frontier.

Ao-Hui, Ch’eng-te, and others, though at the head of 4000 soldiers, neither attacked the enemy’s forces laden with booty, nor routed the rebels left for the defence of the frontier; they only reduced the small fortified place of Nieh-la-mu, held by about a hundred rebels, and then memorialized the Throne to the effect that the enemy had retreated. They intended that the matter should be regarded as closed, and did not mention the presence of the rebel forces at such two places as Chi-lung and Yung-hsia. But the Emperor rebuked them and refused to act upon their suggestion.

In the 2nd month of the next year (1792 A.D.) the Tartar General and his Military Assistant, advancing through Kokonor entered the territory of Ulterior Tibet.

In the 4th intercalary month 2,000 Solon soldiers also 5,000 soldiers quartered in Chin-ch’uan (Ssuch’uan), all assembled on Tibetan territory. To these numbers are to be added 3,000 Government troops from Tibet itself; 70,000 piculs of wheat, and more than 20,000 cows and sheep were bought on the spot to secure, for one year, the provisioning necessary for 10,000-15,000 soldiers, so as to avoid any uncertainty about the transportation of supplies from the interior of China.

During the 5th month the rebels, who had been left to guard the frontier, were several times defeated, and the Government troops completely recovered the Tibetan territory. In the beginning of the 6th month the main forces penetrated deeply into the enemy’s territory.

Out of fear that the rebels might make an encircling movement and attack our troops in the rear, the Commandants of Forces Ch’eng-te and Tai-sen-pao and Brigadier-General Chu-shen-pao began to advance by the eastern and western roads respectively, in order to divide the enemy’s forces; while the main army began its advance by the central road. Hai-lan-ch’a formed the vanguard from 3 detachments of troops; Fu-K’ang-an followed him with 2 detachments.

At the iron suspension bridge, 80 li distance from Chi-lung, they approached the enemy’s first mountain pass. The rebels broke the bridge and made a resistance, using the natural advantages of the place. While Fu-k’ang-an, with the main force, was standing in front of the enemy, Hai-lan-ch’a, using bamboo rafts, crossed the river up-
stream and making a detour through the mountains, appeared above the rebels’ camp. Fu-k’ang-an, on his side, immediately took advantage of the situation thus created to construct a bridge. Then, having captured the enemy’s post, they made a joint attack on the rebels’ camp and pursued them for a distance of 160 li to the place named Hsieh-pu-lu. As on the road there existed no place suitable for a camp, they did not meet a single enemy.

After pursuing the rebels another stretch of 100 and a few score li they reached the mountain-range Tung-Chueh-ling, where two cliffs, “standing like walls,” were separated by a river, with deep water and a swift current. Our soldiers climbed them by by-paths, braving dangers equal to those presented by the iron suspension bridge. Then, taking advantage of a dark and rainy night, they divided their forces into two parts and both up and down stream threw bridges across the river made out of dead trees, which enabled our troops to cross and capture an important strategical position.

On the 9th day of the 6th month our troops reached the Yung-ya mountain. The Gorkha barbarians, stricken with consternation, then despatched envoys to our camp, offering submission, but the Tartar General and his Military Assistant sternly rejected this offer and for several days did not send any answer.

Afterwards our troops again attacked the rebels from three directions, routing them in six engagements, and then passed over the big mountain. Successively they killed 4,000 rebels and invaded more than 700 li of their territory. Our troops were by this time nearing the enemy’s capital city, Yang-pu (Kathmandu).

Up to this moment they had the mountains on their eastern and western sides, these mountains being separated by a river; but after they had reached the Yung-ya mountain, they had now mountains on their southern and northern sides, these mountains also being separated by a river. The rebels were holding both mountains, and in the centre there was a bridge.

In the beginning of the 8th month our troops made an attack from three directions, took the mountain on the northern side of the river, and routed the rebels to the north of the bridge. The enemy’s capital was then situated beyond the big mountain on the southern shore of the river forty or fifty li away.

The rebels, numbering ten battalions, were holding the mountain very strongly. Hai-lan-ch’a proposed to guard the river and make a camp there, but Fu-K’ang-an did not consent to this plan. He crossed

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141 Dhaibung.
over the bridge and attacked the enemy; then, inspite of rain, he climbed the mountain to 20 li distance and reached a very steep place. The enemy, taking advantage of his position on the summit of the mountain, poured down trees and stones “like rain,” and at the same time those rebels who were separated by river and mountain made an attack from three directions.

Our troops sometimes fought and sometimes retreated. The number of killed and wounded was very great. Hai-lan-ch’a from across the river, came then to the assistance, and O-le-teng-pao, holding the bridge, fought stubbornly; and succeeded to repel the enemy.

At that time the enemy’s country bordered, on the southern side, upon an Indian land named “P’i-leng”; this land had long ago become Britain’s dependency and repeatedly had quarrels with the Gorkhas. When Fu-K’ang-an, at the head of his troops, had entered the enemy’s territory, he sent to all the countries bordering upon the Gorkhas, i.e., Che-meng-hsiung (Sikkim) and Tsung-mu-pu-le-k’e—on the south-east, Pa-tso-mu-lang—on the west, China-ka-rh and P’i-leng—on the south—the intimation to attack the Gorkhas simultaneously promising to divide between them the Gorkhas’ lands, after peace had been restored.

About this time the Gorkhas also had addressed themselves to P’i-leng, asking to help them in their critical situation. But P’i-leng, pretending that they would come to the assistance with their soldiers, in reality invaded secretly the Gorkhas’ frontier.

The Gorkha barbarians, being forced to withstand two powerful enemies, were afraid that they could not succeed in it; moreover, they apprehended that this news would rouse our troops’ energy. Therefore, they again sent envoys to our camp to ask humbly for mercy.

At that moment our troops had just suffered a reverse, whereas the enemy’s country presented more and more dangers to them; besides, after the 8th month, the big snow in the mountains would make the return most difficult. Therefore, the rebels’ request for surrender was granted.

They gave back the former treaty; restored all the treasures, plundered in Tibet: the golden spires of pagodas and the golden tablets, seals, etc.; released Tan chin, Pan-chu-rh, and others, formerly held by them; gave back the corpse of She-ma-rh-pa and promised to present, as tribute, tame elephants, horses, and musicians asking the eternal observance of the stipulations and the withdrawal of our troops.

142 Firing.
Originally our Emperor had intended to divide the Gorkha country between the chieftains of various native tribes and to bestow the title of Prince of the 2nd degree on Fa-k’ang-an, but on hearing that the rebels’ request for surrender had been granted he gave his sanction to this settlement (and withdrew his army), leaving behind 3,000 Tibetan soldiers and one thousand Chinese and Mongol soldiers to guard the Tibetan frontier. From that time began the garrisoning of Tibet by the Government troops.

There is a big road leading from Ulterior Tibet to Gorkha, via Ting-chieh143, but persons using this road must make a detour through Pu-lu-k’e-pa and other tribes, and it takes more than a month’s time. Therefore our troops, advancing from Chi-lung, took the nearer road, along which there were precipices on the left and torrents on the right; it was impossible, even for a single person, to ride: the Tartar General himself and his Military Assistant also were walking on foot all the time. As the tame elephants which had been sent as tribute used the big road, they arrived in Ulterior Tibet in the spring only of the next year.

As for the Wu-la-ling mountain-range, one must spend a whole day’s time to cover the distance of 120 li in order to ascend and descend it; as soon as it is getting slightly dark, instantly it is impossible to find the right road; moreover, the accumulated snow forms walls, “like the covered way through a city gate”, to the depth of several tens of chang.144 Men going to and fro do not dare to utter a word, otherwise an avalanche “as big as a house” would crush them to death. When the Gorkhas, after having plundered Tibet, were returning to their country, nearly all 2,000 persons, who had passed over this mountain-range were frozen to death; indeed, to the south of the Onion Range. Merciful Heaven has put a boundary between the centre and the west. The dangers are doubled as compared with those of Chin-ch’uan, and surpass by far the dangers presented by Turkestan. The military forces of the Han and T’ang dynasties had not reached this region. Fortunately their (Gorkha) officers and men were going barefooted; they had the habit previously to agree upon a date and then to retreat after a slight engagement, whereas our troops, regardless of this usage, were first in making surprise attacks on the enemy and, in the long run, came out victorious in several engagements.

Beginning from that big punitive expedition and till now the Gorkhas have been bringing us tribute uninterruptedly.

143 Tingri Maidan.
144 A measure of ten Chinese feet.
Their (Gorkhas) country borders: on the west—upon Cashmere (Kashmir) of Northern India and to the south—upon Chia-ka-rh of the Eastern India, named in the Annals of the Ming Dynasty “Pang-ka-la,” alias “Meng-chia-la”—an old dependency of England, with a capital city named “P’i-leng” (author’s note: alias Ka-li-ke-ta, Bengal).

In the 60th year (1795 A.D.) of the Ch’ien-lung reign, the English Ambassador (Earl Macartney), who was bringing tribute, himself made the following declaration: “Two years ago, when your Tartar General, leading the troops, had reached the land of Ti-mi tribe, situated to the south-west of Tibet, our country’s soldiers also rendered assistance. If, in future, you again stand in need of employing foreign troops, we are willing to exert our strength.” Then for the first time did our Government learn that, during the previous punitive expedition against the Gorkhas, they also had troubles from foreigners on their southern frontier.

When, in the 20th year (1840 A.D.) of the Tao-kuang reign, the English barbarians had invaded the provinces of Kuang-tung and Chekiang, the Gorkhas, on their side, also sent Envoys to the Imperial Resident in Tibet, to make the following declaration: “Our country borders upon the land of P’i-leng, which is a dependency of Li-ti, and at the hands of which it repeatedly suffered insults. Now, upon learning that hostilities have commenced between Li-ti and the Metropolitan Dependency, and that the latter has gained several victories, we are willing to lead our troops to make an attack on the Dependency of Li-ti, in order to render assistance in the punitive expedition undertaken by your Emperor”. At that time the Imperial Resident in Tibet did not know that “Li-ti” meant “England;” or that “the Metropolitan Dependency” meant “the Kuang-tung province of China;” or that, in consequence, “A Dependency of Li-ti” meant “Bengal (Meng-chia-La) of Eastern India.” Therefore, he rejected their offer, answering that “the barbarians were attacking one another, and that the Heavenly Dynasty never interfered in such a matter.”

The capital city of England is situated beyond a great western ocean, but England’s Dependency—India—borders upon the land of Gorkhas. As there was a hereditary enmity between these two countries, and the English barbarians did not fail to seize their opportunity when China attacked the Gorkhas—the Gorkhas, on their side also, were willing to assist China when this country attacked the English barbarians.
APPENDIX IV

Text of the Dharmapatra signed by the King of Nepal and the Dalai Lama in N.S. 895 Bhadra pada sukla (≈1775, August):\(^{115}\)

We, the Lama and king Sinhapratap execute this deed to maintain and continue abiding friendship between Tibet and Nepal, the same friendship of which the foundation was laid at Khasa by an agreement entered into by Ramashah and the then Lama Thancho Khembo.

The vakils of both sides (here are enumerated names) concluded talks on Wednesday 13 Sravana sukla. The main points of agreement are the following: (1) that all merchandise between Nepal and Tibet should pass through specified routes of Kuti and Kerong, (2) that gold and silver bullion was subject to confiscation by appropriate authorities in case of contravention, (3) that all counterfeit coins imported into Lhasa was to be made over to Nepal authorities, and (4) lastly, the Nepal Government undertook the responsibility of minting coins with minimum alloy content commonly agreed by the two parties.

The penalty for breach of this deed to whosoever was responsible is 50 dharni of gold.

The following is the original in the Newari Language.

\(^{115}\) Unpublished.
Two letters of the Chinese Commander to the King of Nepal sent immediately after the truce agreement.

146 The text is taken from a chronicle.
सबै लाग बरोबर गरी वसन्त भयाको मन्ना समृष्टि वसन्त उपानित म चाँज्नु बडा पनि बढिया दिन हेरि फिर जाबुना बाकी धितारीको पटडा लिखित र लुका २ को पटडको फौज पनि सबै फकूलभनी पठायाको छु बाकी हास्ना फौजले मार्ग लियाको अभिल जति आफुलाई वस्त्याको छु-आफुनु अभिल संबोध गर बाकी बाला भन्ना अधि पाल्ने खेमा ज्वाला छब्बै लामाका खाला देखि भोक्टो हो तिमीहरुले अधि आफ्नो मनोजों धर्मपंथ लेखि अभिल गरि लियाको हो रेद्देला भन्ना दिपकुलाका लामाका बालाई लियाको रेद्देला मन्ना जति निर्देशी होत पनि ल्यो धर्म पत्रमा लेख्याको सहि गर्नै छ। हिजो तिमीले पिछा परि धर्म पत्रको केहि गर्या छोट मनी पिछा पराय-कोमा ल्यो रेद्देला बहिङ्स लाई दियाहो दिया पछि तिमीले एकैक रिष्केगरी पिछा पत्राको र मिलन जाता भिलाङ्खु (.........) बुझानौ होला हास्ना फौजले मारी लियाको मुक्त को सफाई दियौ र तिकि रिष्केदा दस्तुरमा समात वाचन लग गर्नै बडो ठुलो चैत्य होखन र ति लाहान्सा लाई सौझि देखौ... राजा प्रांको अभिल भोट संग का अभिल मा पनि परवरा का रिष्क तल माध्यम नगरि सांख सिमाना गरी रहनौ बाकी हिजो ल्यो धर्म पत्र सौझिमा ल्यो बालाइको (.........) दियाहाइ ती भन्ना तिमीहरुले जानने जानी गरया छौ थिक।... का सरण मा पिछा जति परि सक्नया पछि ति धर्मपत्रको कुरौ एउटा पनि पत्रजुग सम्म नगर (सग्रह नगरि भोट) सित पनि अभिल रिष्क दिया संग बनेकेका ओहर बोहर गर्नै बाकी जैत्यहो मसी लाहान्सा मार्याको मोहर पनि नमना बढिया छुनौ बाकी गोखाउका नया छाप (को मोहर लहानभामा) पत्राय भन्ना अधि रिष्क ज्या भयाको बमोजि चलन गर्नौ एक मोहर को ठुलो मोहर गर्नै भयाको परसम जुग्नुभूत तथा भन्ना ल्यो बालाइको मानिला भयो (केठने) ले अधि तेला लाई घोरा बाज दि राधाको कुरोलाई आज फौज आई केठने लियौ अधि तिमा अभिल देश घेरे लियौ ति लियाको अभिल देश तिमीहरु पिछा पनि (आयाको हुनौले) फिराइ दियाको छ तसय अब उपानित घोरा बाज ल्यौ मनी भन्न पाऊन तसय तिमीहरुलाई अतिदि सिकाइ लेखि पठायाको छ बुझानौ होला थिक।... पत्राको पर २ सम्म जुग सम्म चर बहाइ सहि मान रहनौ वसन्त वाकिक अकोला चिस्का महत बालाइक गर्नौ तसय थिक।... का हुकुम न्या मानी रहया जग २सम्म सानउ मुख होला तसकार पत्रायाहरूहो छर्तयु ५७ सार्थ कातिक विदै ५ रोज शुभमौ।

श्री ५ वादशाह

स्वस्ति श्री श्रीमान्याश्रीमानु श्री अवतार चैत्याहरुका हुकुम भै आयाको सहदेव निधिक सब लक्षर फोजको सदरी भिमालाउत बजीिर श्री श्री म दुड्डावर्ता ध्याज्ञु बडा देवानाका कथि पत्रमौ... स्वस्ति श्री ५ रण बहादुर शाहदेव केशि... उपानित म ध्याज्ञु बडाले अधि केठि आई वस्ता-तीनी-भोपुर्ककिसिलाई ताहाको काठामध्य बिदा गरी पठाउव्द्वा, आफुलाई चिठी पनि सर सीमात समेत वस्ती पठायाको आफुलहातमा पुरूषो होलाभि तिमीहरुको अभिल भिरको सब प्रजार प्राणी... का सरतह प्रजा भयाको हो, अधि पिछा तिमीहरुले... का सरणमा पिछा पत्राको हो। पिछा परि अर्जि पत्र समीमात गरि मानिस पठाई दस्तन गर्न पठायाको हो बाकी आफुलाई पनि बालको छोटेको बढाइ दिन लाई बालाई छोटेको निर्माणको विवाहमा पूजा चतुर्या रायानुको नरु छाप लागाद, फिन-जित जिंतु दिनु कुरोमा तसी जिंतु आद-लुदू ले गयादी पनि रत्नलिखी भयाको श्री... को अभिल हुनौ। सो जानिनी बढाई प्रत्राणी लाई दुहु दिया छो।

तेसो गर्दौ... बाट रिसानी भयाको हो। तिमीहरु पनि ठुलो विराहाको हो।

तत्त्वा विचामा... का हुकुमले म ध्याज्ञु बडा ले लक्षर फोजक ली तिमा अभिल
बेगाबरी सम्म आयाको हो तिमीहुँ गराया को देखता त मुक्त माछ्ने सब धोस्त पारी संयार गर्न् योग्य हो तर तिमीहुँको हामिले विरायाको हो भनि जानी बहुते दहसत मानिन मुक्त र पेट एक विचार गरी हास्रा हुँमा पिछा पन्न आयेछ। बाँके तासीमिबु लुङ्गिको धन माल पन चढाया छौ। अफ चिटियाँ माछ्ने स्यान्सको घाडी गरी कुल कविता चारके धन माल पन चढाइ पताया छौ, बाँके हास्रा पिछा दरण हितो होला भनि विचार पर्न। छौ पिछी बाँडो गरी ताहाका ठुङ्गा काजी देवदत पाथालाई पिछा पर्न एर्जी पन सरसोगतकी चढाउन पताडा दिया छौ, बाँके फोज किया नाक मा पन तिमीहुँ बडो भाव सम लक्षराल जेपाती खान्या चौ गरायाको पिछा हास्रा पतापतार लाई मुदेदर भक्तिपूर्ण नसा लाई केहुँड सम्म पताडा दिया छौ। तो सब विभाग म चयानुव बनाठे... का हुँमा विचार गरी मवैँ: को छ बाँके तिमीहुँ दरण पिछा पर्न एर्जी भनि मानी रह्नु बाँके अधिको धम्ममत्र को कुरा देख बाहरे अब उपान गन्या छौ भनि-विचार गरायाको बाँके केहुँडार्ज बाँड घोडा दलनुर्ति राजस्यको यो पन अब उपान लिया छौ पन भनि विचार गरायाको बाँके पालको अवल अधिक। वॉसियम भोटेलाई सोयु भनि विचार गरायाको बाँके लासाका लामाजुङ तासीमिबु लुङ्गुलाई धन सयोगत गरी मानस पटाकला भनि विचार गरायाको तिसब... का हुँमा विचार गरीबक्षाको उपाल... बाँड तिमीहुँको नजङ्गा रक्षा चाराकुङ चाँदिका कुरा पिछी लागादा न हन्दो, गन्या, पस्तुक, तिमीहुँ, जान्ने, जानी गरायाको धोनुन हुँकुङ भयो बाँके तिमीहुँ प्रजा सिपाही पन हारार 314 हास्रा फोजले धोस्त पारी माराय पर्नुत पिछा अभर भर को प्रजा प्राणी, पन सब पला छुका, माछ्ने छुनु, भहिन। पन... को प्रजा वासनाको मान्या को छुन पर्नु भरी... भन्ना, सन्तार धौलालाई, रक्षा उदार गन्या, भयोको छ, तस्य तिमीहुँ लाई, पिनिर्मल तपारी बढै समाभर रांगि-बाँके फोज देख बढै, तिमीहुँको मन्ना दराई, हामिले विरायाको हो भनि जान्ने जानी एक विचार गरी हास्रा सरण पिछा पर्ना को सब जान्ने जानी गरायाको रह्देछ, अब उपान त्या गन्या बाझ्र काज काम हुँकुङ बाहेक गन्या छौ भनि विचार गरायाको तिसब बढैया गन्या भएछ पर्नुत... तस्य तिमीहुँलाई सब मान्या पिछा पिंडयाला पिछा रिनु हुँकुङ पर्नुत... ले पन तिमीहुँलाई मान्या पिछा तिंडयाला होलै तिंडरो अभर भर समाभर मरोलाई हिनुभन्ना को छ उपाल... बाँड पन हामिलाई हुँकुङ आयेछ ताहा तिमीहुँलाई चिचिया पन पटाउ भनि हुँकुङ आउदा चाँडो गरी तिमीहुँलाई ल्यो पन पटाको हो तिमीहुँ पन बढैया हुँकुङ भनि हुँकुङ भयोको छ बाँके तपारा मानी पन पिचिया पुण्या पिंड तिमीहुँलाई मन्ना अक्षर बडो मान प्रसाद गरी बढै बससी हुँकुङ छुन होला तिमीहुँलाई पन... बाँड बढो क्याको मान भएछ भनि जानी मन्ना रात्ती छ... का हुँकुङ मानी रह्नु पतसो गराया पर सम्म मुक्त भरी... को कह्ना बडो देख छुन हुँकुङ उपाल साध सिमानाको कुरोलाई पुन्यासुवङ्सा सांझ ब्यानकुङ देखिए बेतान्तनस्र सर पर्यायार गाउँ अबल सब हास्रा फोजले जिती लियाको हो राहा भन्ना वेजाबरको साध गन्या हो तर... का हुँकुङ भयोको तिमीहुँलाई अधि हामिले विरायाको हो भनि जानी एक विचार गरी पिछा पने अधि रिंट साध सिमाना गरिबक्षस्तु भयोको हो बाँके कुर्ना को पत्ती साध पाला साध अधि देखेको हो तस्य अधि को रिंट साध बोट्को भनि साध अबल गराला बाँके अक्षर म चयानुव बनाठे सदैर मौलिकलाई साध सिमानालाई पताया को हो आए पाला दिलब फलाम सामु बाँडको साध गरी छौ गाडी सिमाना गरायाको हो उपाल तिमीहुँ पन मौलिरिन अन्मा छेड़ विचार
गरेक्षु ज्या अभ्य ले ग्याको हामी मान्याको भनि विन्न गरेक्ष ति देखि तिमीहुने सांचो गरि पिड़ाप्याको हो भनि ठान्याको छ उपान्त म च्याज्ञन बढाइले भोट पाप्देका हाल पठाई दियाको उतरा पप्ना पनि पर सम्म युग भरि म च्याज्ञन बढको हुकुम बाहेक आको तरह गन्धी छौन भनि विन्न गरि रेखाइले बाँकि च्यासारू गरयाको देखि दमना रिसर्व अधियाय फेरियाको सीटा अर काही घटिया मान्नेका बाँकि रहाको भया स्वभं्य बोजन लाइ राखायको छ पाया देखि चाहेक पठाउला भनि रेखाइले। त्यो सबै दस्तुर जान ले जानी ग्याको को रहेक त्यस्ते जानी ग्याको भया अधि बिराया को पनि विन्न ग्याको सुझाइ माफ गरिएको। बाकी तिमीहुँ म बिराया को आफु लाई दीघ लाखायको सब तिस्तार तथा अर्जि पनि म विन्न लेखायको देखा म च्यान जनु बढा को मन मा बढैते बढैहुँ चूजी भज्। उपान्त म च्यान-जुन बढा पनि बिलम्ब न गरी सब लस्तूर पौजीली लासा देखि जाउला... को हुकुम बमोैजम म चाडोगरि जाउला उपान्त तिमिहुँको पाठ अर्जी पनि केहि चढाई पद्धता मोँट रहन्याको अर्जी मार्फतगरि चढाई पठाई बाइक आज भन्या... को हुकुम हो आज राखाको बोटका काम जागा गण्या बुपुरायाङ्गुलयो तारिक भाव्यका अंबा हुने तिनी अंबाँ... को हुन्याँ पनि ज्या विन्न गरि पनि लाग्न्या बढो दयाको माँछे हुन्नहो लुम्बाका पनि सब प्रजा दुगलाडाँदा दया गाँव सुख दिलाउला भनि आयाको हो दुम्नियाल प्रजाले पनि तिनी अर्जी मानी रहन्याँ विनि गण्या जान्या भनि मानाको छ तसै बिचारको जस्तो काम गण्या बोटका अंबा होइने बाकी आज भोको अंबाले तिमीहुँलाई निचि पनि पठाई सब काम कठाया गरि गर्न होला तेसी गरि आफु बाँडाई पनि बल्लो निको हुन्याछन्... भयाको जगत पृथ्वीको चाडामाण हुन साख लाई रकागरी हुकुमला संगार गरि सरणमा नोडेको गरि पिड़ा पनप्ना लाई बढो मान दयागरी बक्सीसह हुन्याछो... को सरणमा मान्छे म रिड़ा पर याको पनि परंत सम्म बढो दया कलागरी बक्स्यायाङ्गुलन तस्तो अर्जल भर्यका प्रजा प्रफान लाई रक्षा उदार हुन्याछन्न सुख होला उपान्त भोट पाठे र नस्ले विनि पनि पनि चढाई पठायाको हेरिअर मालुम भयो-बैक-ति-टीढ जना-आफ्र ठानामा आई, पिड़ा पनि आयाको हो आउदा म च्याज्ञन बढाले तिन हुढ लाई काठउमाङ्गो बिदायारी पठायाको हो। पठाउदा, तिमिहुँको पनि तिन २ जनाले सरसोगत रागाई आयाछो, सबक भयाका तेसवे हुन ति। हुढ जनालाई, भयाका काजी बिट्ल्यो, बढो मान सित रिचर्चव गर्न्या, भनि लेखा छो, बाँकि नित्रो गोर्खा भित्रार मान्यादृश ठुलासाना मध्ये तिन २ बाइक चैनल्यो बुढे तोसो नियार्नी तस्य भोडो हुन्या सब तिस्तार निकोिगारी विनि गर्दी... को पिरणिर तर सम्म युग-भरि, गरेलो भनि विन्न गर्दी, सब बस गन्धी, बनेने, पेल्चन जान्या काजी देवलगर धाटा हुण्ण प्रेसाना आई अर्ज गोण्डीहुँ राखा बाटाएला पनि चाकर धारख लाई पनि निक अनाद गरि मुख सित गयाको छ, पठायाको छ, परलु गयाको लेखाथानी निसलेको माल लाइदो फागुनमा भोकिन्या पुण्याछुन्न... को दया धापानि, नजीकामा गुम्यो को छ बौकि तिमि ले र भोट पाठे काजी देवलगर धाटा लाई। पठायाको, चिठ्ठी २ काजी को घर घरको पनि । सबै पेल्चन पठाई काजीहो दुप मुप्ने देउ भनि पठाई दियाको छ। उपान्त लाईहाउ बाटाथामा। हिँउँ पद्मा आत्माया बढ़न भयाको छ:---भयोता पनि तिमि लाई, चौल पनि भोकियो हाल गरि पठायाको छ, बाँकि यसपला तिमि लाई पनि चिन्न बहुत भैनें, आपुलाई, कोलिन धार २ काका लाई कोलिन धार २ भोकुदैन्द्र लाई धार कोलिन २ निसलाई कोलिन २ गरि पठायाको छ। बुझिएउ पत्त्री अर्य बुझि काम काम गर्न होला तम्य तिप्राल्पमा भयो, निस्लु, सम्बन्ध छैलाउँदै वर्ष, ५५ साल।
CHAPTER VII

TWO BRITISH MISSIONS

Kirkpatrick’s Mission

The motive of the mission was selfish, it was designed to influence Nepal to put itself under British protection but those who were responsible had thought that they would be able to achieve their objective by giving a different colour to the whole issue and held out a prospect to save Nepal from total destruction. In the event of the British mission succeeding in its designs what would have been the fate of Nepal nobody knows, but the cessation of hostilities turned the channel of Nepalese history into a different course. The Nepalese authorities were as much opposed to the British at this juncture as on previous occasions. At this stage they had further reasons to reject the British as the help they demanded from the latter were not needed. They could not allow them to probe into the unknown. Therefore at the first instance the invitation was withdrawn.

The first letter which the British received from Nepal intimating them about the truce with the Chinese contained also a request asking not to depute the mission in the altered circumstances. The Nepalese were not prepared to receive Captain Kirkpatrick, and were reluctant to allow him to visit Nepal. He was, therefore, told not ‘to put himself to the inconvenience of the journey’.

In accordance with the wishes of the Nepal Government the British Governor-General readily withdrew the mission and an intimation was conveyed to the Nepalese authorities in that light. Captain Kirkpatrick was asked to return to Calcutta.

But the British had not given up the idea of a mission to Nepal, for so soon after the acceptance of Nepalese wishes, another letter was sent to the King of Nepal by Duncan saying ‘as a mark of friendship, the Raja should have received the mission in a befitting manner. His lordship had taken the step (of deputing the mission) at a considerable expense for the benefit of Nepal. ... But the present behavior of the Raja will make it difficult for the writer to comply with any request for help, should the Raja require in future which God

1 CPC. X. N. 849 to 852.
2 Ibid. N. 873.
Meanwhile Gajaraj Misra was approached to write to Kathmandu to persuade them to invite the British mission. He wrote a strong note to the King repeating all that had been said in Duncan's communication and adding that 'it was necessary in the interest of the Raja himself to keep the British satisfied.' (November 7, 1792).

While putting all kinds of pressure to have the mission sent to Nepal, the British were also trying by every word and deed to assure the Kathmandu authorities 'of the Company's adherence to all their engagements'. It appears that the ex-Raja of Mackwanpur was occasionally raiding certain border areas in Nepal and the King of Nepal wrote to the Governor-General complaining of all this and 'asking the British to punish him'. This complaint was contained in a letter which Gajaraj Misra received sometime in the middle of December, while on his way to Kathmandu. This very letter had also complained that 'the Company's officers did not allow the transportation to Nepal of the muskets which were purchased in the British territories by Bishen Nath Upadhya'. The above assurance was conveyed to the King in response to this letter and it seems that the grievances were immediately redressed.

We find that the British had vital stakes in respect of the mission as the same was expected to straighten out matters between the two Governments concerning several subjects including the trade treaty. Gajraj Misra was told that 'his good name, and reputation were involved'. He was also to convey to the King of Nepal 'nothing contrary to the articles of treaty takes place so far as trade from any part of Bengal, Bihar or Banaras is concerned. Should the Nepal Government neglect this point it would not be in their interest. The English always stick to their treaties and engagements and they cannot see any breach of their treaties by others, nor can they bear such conduct of the Nepal Government patiently'.

Such was the attitude of the British authorities. The Nepalese on the other hand were not anxious to entertain the mission. In their eyes the treaty had also lapsed. It was reported that the usual high duty on imported goods, 'the Sair and rahadari' continued to be levied by

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3 CPC, X. 884 (1), Letter November 7, 1792.
4 Ibid, N. 884 (2).
5 Ibid, N. 884 (6).
6 CPC, X. N. 1003 (Ibrahim Khan's letter to the Governor-General, 19 December, 1792).
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, N. 897, 12 December, 1792.
the local customs of Nepal on the Purnea-Morang border in spite of the provision of the treaty for its reduction. This instance of the non-compliance of the treaty provision came to light when one Mr. Pagan, a merchant and cultivator, wanted to send some merchandise for Tibet. From a letter of Gajraj Misra it is known that he promised 'to speak of this incident to the Raja, and get the persons responsible for this incident severely punished.' Gajraj Misra hoped at the same time 'several refractory dependents of Nepal had taken to plundering during the retreat of the army of China, but now as the army of China had left the country such people will be brought to book and with them the disorderly people of Morang will also be punished.' We do not know how his Government reacted to all this. But it will appear later that despite his initial success in being able to take Kirkpatrick to Kathmandu, Gajraj Misra eventually failed to give life to the treaty. Threats and persuasions could not carry the matter further than what was achieved in obtaining as access to Kathmandu for an interview with the King.

The mission was already in Patna while the message of the Government of Nepal was conveyed. Kirkpatrick informed the authorities in Nepal that he was going back 'although it prevented him from fulfilling his cherished desire of seeing the Raja, enjoying the sceneries of the country and becoming an instrument of cementing the foundations of the bond of friendship of which have been happily laid between the two countries' (Letter, November 13, 1792).

It is obvious that the British had reluctantly given up the idea of sending Kirkpatrick to Nepal.

But the letters of Duncan and Gajaraj Misra were sure to produce their desired effect. However, not content with sending a letter Gajaraj Misra undertook a journey to Kathmandu where he arrived on the 13 of January. After a good deal of persuasion, the authorities in Kathmandu were agreeable to receiving Kirkpatrick. The letter of acceptance was received in the middle of January, and Kirkpatrick began his preparations of the journey immediately after, (Also vide ante). Uptill the first week of January they were evading the issue. A letter of Rana Bahadur dated 12 Pausa 1849 VS (December 27, 1792) stated

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10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. N. 933.
12 Ibid.
13 CPC, X. N. 898.
14 CPC, X. N. 1003, 1175.
that 'Kirkpatrick may not proceed to Nepal in view of the heat and troubles of journey.' The King of Nepal repeated 'by the grace of God and your Lordship’s auspices a firm accommodation has taken place between the Chinese and me' and hence there was no need of a person sent 'to undertake an accommodation between us'. From the same letter, it appears that Dinanath Upadhaya and Bam Shah were sent 'for exchange of views and sentiments between the two Governments'.

Dinanath informed Kirkpatrick (17 December, 1792) that he was coming to see him in Patna. Probably they met subsequently after in the last week of December. After this meeting it was said that 'the Maharaja has since changed his mind and now desires Captain Kirkpatrick to proceed to Nepal. They found the Captain to be a very wise and good man' (Letter to the Governor-General received on January 11, 1793). Subsequently a request was made to the Governor-General to rescind the earlier order withdrawing Kirkpatrick’s mission.

Captain Kirkpatrick obtained fresh instruction from his Government. Apart from stressing the need of friendly ties between Nepal and East India Company, Kirkpatrick was asked to persuade the Nepal Government ‘to give effect to the treaty of 1792 and report about the possibility of further trade and about the state of communication, topography and manners and customs of the people’; with these he was also to enlighten his Government about the causes of the Tibet-Nepal dispute, so that ‘the Company might in any future occasion in case of a revival. might act as a mediator’ Kirkpatrick was to refer anything to Calcutta by a code message if secret consultation was desired.

Kirkpatrick left Bankipur on the 7th of February, and reached Baragarhi on the 15th after about a week’s trek.

Kirkpatrick carried with him articles to present to the important persons in Nepal, the value of which had exceeded Rs. 5,000. There was a standing order, which restricted the limit of presents to Rs. 5,000. He had begged the Governor-General to acquit him ‘in the event of his being reduced to the necessity of contravening order in the matter of presents’.

On the border Kirkpatrick was well received by the officer in charge of the district, whose name appears in records as Sooar Khawas and by Rudravir Shah at the head of two or three hundred sepoys. The latter
together with his men was despatched from Nepal 'for the express purpose of waiting my arrival here, and of escorting me to the court of his master'\textsuperscript{22} Kirkpatrick was highly impressed with the reception accorded to him, and he reported 'it was incumbent on me to say that I have observed from the moment of my crossing the Bagmutty the most earnest and uniform solicitude in my conductors to afford me in all respects the completest satisfaction\textsuperscript{23} Earlier while he was to leave Patna, two senior members of the royal family, Bam Shah and Baju Sher met him as they were returning home from Gaya. Kirkpatrick reported that they were much impressed with what they saw in Danapur of the British artillery establishment.\textsuperscript{24} It was his hope that Bam Shah in particular was much impressed 'with the alacrity and unreservedness of the officers who took them round the establishment, and this was bound to 'create corresponding spirit of confidence in him, and perhaps, through his influence in the rest of his countrymen'.\textsuperscript{25}

Ordinarily the permission granted to the British mission to enter the country might have been withdrawn for good. But the Regent Bahadur Shah thought it impolite to refuse admittance at that stage. It seems that Gajaraj Misra had to make fresh efforts to persuade his Government to accede to British proposal. At long last the Nepalese authorities were agreeable to the prospect of Captain Kirkpatrick visiting Nepal 'in order to strengthen the ties of friendship between the two states' (Letter received, 24 February, from the Raja of Nepal to Dun-can).\textsuperscript{26} Kirkpatrick, therefore, could go to Nepal but not without vigilance by the Gorkhalis.\textsuperscript{27} Obviously, the Nepalese authorities were now pursuing a policy designed to keep the British in humour, but all the same they were determined to yield no ground to them on any issue whatever. Lt. Frere and his associate officers attached as surveyors were not allowed to accompany him, the idea being to discourage the mission from undertaking the exploration of that kind.\textsuperscript{28} Indirectly, there was every impediment put in the way. Kirkpatrick himself was not taken to Kathmandu at the first stage. He saw the ruler at Noakot some eighteen miles north-west of the Valley\textsuperscript{29} being escorted through a circui-

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., Sec. Dept., 25 February, 1793, No. 40.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Sec. Dept., 25 February. 1793. No. 40.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} CPC, X,N. 1181, P. 255 (TR. 35. PP. 166-8. N. 103: AR, 9, P. 49). 1180.
\textsuperscript{27} For a detailed account of the journey read his Account of the Kingdom of Nepal: Political letter to the Court of Directors. 18th May, 1793.
\textsuperscript{28} Pol. Cons., 4 January, 1793.
\textsuperscript{29} Noakot is situated on a ridge overlooking the river Trisuli. Kirkpatrick was conducted by a deputation of the Nepalese authorities 'consisting of Bam Shah (a member of the Government, his brother Rodur Beer Commander of the Raja's
tous route through Chitlang-Tistung-Dhunibesi. Noakot was then the summer residence of the ruler of Nepal and it was the 7th day of the month of March when he reached there. According to the chronicle he reached Noakot on 24th Chaitra 1850 VS. The King was already there having gone to celebrate the holi. But Bahadur Shah alone was left to conduct the negotiation with him, the King having left for Kathmandu 'under necessity of returning to his capital'. Kirkpatrick had audience of the King only once. Gajraj Misra was present at the time of interview, and he introduced Captain Kirkpatrick to the King.\(^{20}\)

Except exchange of formal courtesies, no serious talks followed. Abdul Kadir saw the King for the second time on the 15th of March. Within a few days Kirkpatrick also was brought to Kathmandu presumably 'for talks on the subject of cementing friendship between the two Governments' as the King wrote to Lord Cornwallis.\(^{31}\) But this never materialised. It appears that the object of the Nepal Government in permitting the British mission to go to Kathmandu was to oblige them to that extent, and the Nepalese never intended to open up trade talks with them. As a last measure Kirkpatrick discussed with the Regent 'adjustment of all questions relating to boundaries and commercial intercourse between the two countries,' but these were never conclusive. Kirkpatrick stayed in Kathmandu for a week, and he was provided residence close to the eastern spur of the Swayambhu hillock.

The Regent was well-disposed towards him,\(^{32}\) but the vast majority of the Gorkha nobility were anti-British. The day Kirkpatrick arrived in the capital, he had learnt from Guru Gajraj Misra that his 'continuing in Nepal beyond the end of March was a matter not wished for by the Darbar'.\(^{33}\)

Kirkpatrick in his memorandum speaks of their hostile attitude which was uncompromising. There was negotiation on a pact of political nature. His last attempt for the implementation of the trade pact entered into in 1792 was made without success. In the atmosphere guards) and Dinanath Upadhaya, the Nepal Vakil, usually resident at Calcutta. This deputation was further reinforced while in Nepal by Bajoo Seer, half brother of the Raja and a very promising youth, together with one or two other relations of the Raja, who had been on a pilgrimage to Gaya. Kirkpatrick's Preface to the 'Embassy to Kathmandu'. Also CPC, X, N. 1196. P. 258.

\(^{30}\) CPC, X, N. 1295.

\(^{31}\) Secret Department, 1 May, 1793 N. 14.


\(^{33}\) About Bahadur Shah it is said that he had lived with the missionaries in Bettia during his exile. For that reason he was inclined to treat the foreigners kindly. He had invited Christian Monks at Kathmandu twice in 1793 and 1795 even to the displeasure of some of men. (*Catholicus*, March and April, 1942, Patna Mission Letter).
obtaining then nobody would deal with the British. For days together Captain Kirkpatrick tried in vain to have opportunity to show them the draft of the treaty, but he was kept at bay. The Regent was rebuked for giving him encouragement and asked to send the Mission back. He would have continued the negotiation at a great risk to himself and provoked his nephew to take the Government into his own hands and thereby mar his future. Beyond acknowledging the friendly advice of the Company’s Government, and expressing sense of obligation for our wishes to bring about an accommodation with the Chinese nothing was offered. It was gathered that there was a feeling of disappointment at not having received the assistance requested from the British Government. Kirkpatrick emphasised that his Government’s policy was to keep neutrality in all disputes between their neighbours. But all this was of no avail to induce the Nepalese authorities to change their mind. The attitude of the Nepalese authorities towards the mission was expressed in the King’s letter to G. T. Cherry and in Abdul Kadir’s paper transmitted through Kirkpatrick. This attitude was outlined in the passage that the King wrote, that ‘The small obstacle was removed. This obstacle was his (Kirkpatrick) seeing the places and roads of my country and those urged by the cordiality of our mutual regard I did not refuse to show him, because I considered the English as noted for their adherence to their word, and the sincerity of their friendship’ but ‘because of the hot season and unwholesome winds, he (the Raja) would not give Kirkpatrick further trouble of detaining in Nepal,’ and that he ‘would wait for another occasion, should both parties agree, and providence did not oppose a meeting, it might take place at another time’.

In his substance of a conversation between the King and himself on the 15th of March Abdul Kadir had reported that ‘because of the hot season and unwholesome winds, Kirkpatrick would not be given the further trouble of being detained in Nepal’. This made it clear that as soon as Kirkpatrick reached Nepal, the authorities were anxious to send him back to Patna. There was not the least desire to negotiate with him on any subject whatsoever. Kirkpatrick’s proposal for negotiation on the subject of trade was turned down on the ground that ‘for

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34 Political letter, 18th May 1793. *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, VI, p. 268.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Sec. Consult, No. 14, 1 May, 1793.
40 Secret Department, 1 May, 1793. No. 14.
sometime the road to Bhoot, owing to the disputes with the Chinese, had been totally shut up and the trade with that country, in consequence, shut up'.

Further Captain Kirkpatrick ‘availed himself of the approach of the unwholesome season as a pretext for soliciting permission to depart’. He thought ‘it must be suitable to the dignity of his Government’ to undertake himself to leave in this manner. Probably his stay for any time longer would have created troubles. For the last time on the 24th March he interviewed the Regent. This interview took place in Kathmandu. According to the despatch from Calcutta (18th May, 1793) ‘in the interview Bahadur Shah renewed his former professions of friendship and attachment and expressed some solicitude lest a future English Government should not exert themselves equally with the present in maintaining the friendship’ formed with the Government of Nepal to which he received for answer that as the maintenance of the Company’s true interests must always be the object of every English Government, and as the cultivation of a friendly intercourse with Nepal was blended in an intimate degree with that object he might be assured that there never could be a British administration in India who would so far forget their duty as to act upon different principles.

Kirkpatrick left Noakot on the very day he had an audience of the Regent. He was granted all facilities for comfortable and safe journey back to the border. Otherwise, he returned empty-handed. Not one purpose was fulfilled, not one objective was attained.

It appears that British attitude towards the Nepalese conflict was so dubious that while it befriended no party it went ultimately to augur ill for the success of the objective they had in view. The proposal of mediation by the British was not liked by both parties. This had only augmented suspicion of British interests. Even the sympathetic Regent of Tashi Lhunpo expressed his disapproval of the British mission going to Nepal. The outcome of the war on Tibet was to place Tibet under complete subjugation of China. In all matters of administration the Amban had come to be the final authority in the State. The vague kind of suzerainty was now turned into the most absolute overlordship that the Emperor exercised. The Chinese had much disliked British at-

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41 Ibid.
42 Pol. Letter 18 May, 1793. Fort William-India House Correspondence, VI, P. 268.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Political letter, 18th May, 1793.
48 THHL, CL, 116. 14-14b; KTSL, 1411. 24-24b cited by Cammann (p. 133).
tempts to penetrate into Tibet. Now they could effectively spurn them from any kind of ventures. Tibet was finally closed to British traders.

However, it was claimed that 'Kirkpatrick's visit to the Court of Nepal has conducted extremely to remove the shyness which till lately marked the deportment of the Nepal Government in its occasional communications with ours' (Letter of Sir John Shore to the Court of Directors, 10th November, 1793). This was one point of gain. It appeared that the British authorities were no less satisfied with the prospect they had obtained to examine the many parts of the country as they passed through. Their despatch said: "It is of no small importance to us to have commenced an immediate intercourse with that Government, and to have had an opportunity of making observations on the manners of the people and the real situation of that country by the means of our servants" (Political letter, 18 May, 1793).

Indeed, his 'Account of Nepal' is the first document providing information in detail about trade and commerce of the country as well as its geography, history, politics and military affairs. Above all his report had gone a considerable way to remove misunderstanding about the state of trade in Nepal that it was importing bullion from Tibet.

Although the sentiment expressed above does not indicate anything of an achievement it nevertheless proves the tenacity and doggedness of British policy in India. But having nothing immediate in hand, the British authorities now onwards 'were watching to improve an opportunity that may offer for confirming this favourable disposition, and for opening by that means new channels for the British staples to the extensive regions of Tibet' (Political letter, 21 August, 1794).

Meanwhile Cornwallis had retired and Sir John Shore stepped into the musnad in the British domain of India. The East India Company's agents in India had not forsaken the idea of 'extension of commerce and sale of manufacture in Nepal'. The treaty of commerce entered into with Nepal had not lapsed. They thought that with this treaty in the background the way to further their trade interests was still open. They had felt that the ignorance of Nepalese authorities about actual trade benefits to Nepal. Through the deal as envisaged had stood in the way of the agreement being implemented. The only thing needed, therefore, was to render 'the advantages and practicability of the commerce apparent so that the merchants would be induced to avail themselves of the trade facilities'. In this direction the Governor-General made a move 'in order to set on foot the trade' and after proper enquiries

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*Fort William-India House Correspondence, XVII, P. 269.*

*Ibid, XVII, P. 83.*
decided to send Abdul Kadir Khan, the person who was twice earlier employed\(^{50}\) in negotiating the treaty to Nepal now in the capacity of a merchant with the articles which he has pointed out, giving him also recommendatory letters to that Government.’ The proposition of a mission to Nepal was so important to the British that they were even prepared to face the risk of failure provided it was undertaken. Sir John Shore had observed in this connection. ‘We doubt not...the magnitude of the object furnishes a sufficient authority for the expense of undertaking which, even, if it eventually fails cannot occasion any considerable loss.’

Abdul Kadir’s appointment for the job was dictated by two considerations, (1) that he had experience of negotiating a treaty with that country and that (2) he was an Indian of a high family. Sir John Shore had a notion that the Nepalese with their deep distrust of Englishmen would be influenced by the choice to exclude a European.

Abdul Kadir’s journey was delayed for about a year as the Government of Nepal initially was disinclined to accept him\(^{61}\) for reasons of their own.\(^{52}\) Perhaps they were averse to the very idea of a mission from the British so soon after Kirkpatrick took one there. At about this time the King had assumed powers of state in his own hands having dispensed with the regency of his uncle. King Rana Bahadur was advised not to entertain the British mission. The reply to the request of the British Government though not in the form of a flat denial was enough to discouraging them from the venture. It was suggested that the War with China had laid waste a great portion of Tibet and the entire country was not open for trade activities “There was no one there to be desirous of purchasing imported goods. The loss upon the goods and the expenses of carriage on the road will be excessive.”\(^{53}\) The King wrote ‘I am, therefore, induced by the Union and attachment subsisting between the two states to write to you that you by no means whatever bring merchandise to this quarter as it will hurt my reputation and occasion loss in the article and a heavy expense for carriage.’\(^{54}\) But later on by Guru Gajaraj Misra’s efforts, the proper ‘invitation from the

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\(^{51}\) Ibid.  
\(^{52}\) Pol. Consult. N. 23 (2) March 20, 1795.  
\(^{53}\) Ibid.  
\(^{54}\) Ibid.
Nepal Raja to Abdul Khauder was procured'. (Political letter of 12 May, 1795 to the Court of Directors).

The Resident at Banaras 'who had been in correspondence with the Nepaul Raja for several years' sent Guru Gajaraj Misra, 'to remove the scruples or apprehensions' obtaining in the minds of the authorities in Nepal and this had succeeded. The Guru set out from Calcutta with a letter of J. Duncan, the Resident in Banaras to the Maharaja (1 May, 1795) which said 'acting contrary to engagement among rulers high in place was disgraceful.' The letter further stated that there should have been no objection as M. Abdul Kadir was going to Nepal primarily with Khillats from the Governor-General and Nawab Vizier and to pay respects to you (the King) and to discuss 'boundary disputes in Morang and Purnea and adjustment of Nepal's claim over Cossipur and Rudrapur.' The Agent General made it clear that 'concern of trade interest' was secondary and Abdul Kadir Khan was carrying the goods with him 'on his own account.'

It appears that the British authorities had felt that the Nepalese were now willing to accept the mission as they sensed that questions other than those of commercial interest were not covered in its objectives. Duncan's letter and Guru Gajraj's persuasion produced their effect as normally the Nepalese leaders felt that nothing harmful was done by this step.

The request for the despatch of the mission was granted readily after the receipt of this letter. The British attributed the Raja's earlier apparent disinclination to deal with the British partly 'to the intrigues and influence of Durmanant Appadiah (Dinanath Upadhyaya) the Nepalese representative at Calcutta, 'who was jealous of any intercourse between us through other channels than his own and partly to a general feeling of distrust entertained in the high circles at Kathmandu.' Dinanath Upadhaya, according to the British information was acting also in furtherance of the interests of the many merchants who had a monopoly over Indo-Nepalese commercial business. Of course, the attitude of the Nepalese authorities in accepting the mission after the initial refusal betrayed their vacillation, and state of conflicting minds in the inner circle as one Nepalese writer put it. Their reply had argued to justify their previous stand that 'they had apprehended nothing but loss upon the enterprise and no motive but that of attachment and purity.

65 Fort William-India House Correspondence, XVII, P. 425.
66 Political Consultation, 10 November, 1794, No. 29.
67 Pol. Consul. 10 Nov., 1794.
68 Political Consultation, 1 May, 1795, No. 7.
69 Ibid. No. 7.
70 Ibid. No. 7.
of intention had actuated them and this the British could verify from merchants of both countries, while agreeing that 'whatever two Sircars wish shall be done' and 'the Maulavi should be now despatched'.

This was not a tough line to be adopted in dealing with the shrewd diplomacy of the British in India. Another thing, the same also shows what a tremendous influence J. Duncan and Gajaraj Misra wielded at the Court in Kathmandu.

In his minute Sir John Shore had said that Dinanath Upadhaya was also interested in preserving the monopoly of trade in his own hands and therefore no effectual assistance could be expected from him. Bahadur Shah, the uncle of the Raja, 'who is stated to have had more liberal and extensive views of the advantages of commerce than any other person of the court had resigned his regency some months ago'. Therefore, 'the only channel through which the British Governor-General hoped to make any favourable impression on the Raja of Nepal was a Brahman of the name of Gujraje Misser living then in Banaras, who had been always disposed to promote our views and whom Captain Kirkpatrick found possessed of great influence with the court of Nepal'.

Now that the Nepal Government were prepared to accept Abdul Kadir, 'it afforded an encouragement to hope that the objects of the expedition may be ultimately fulfilled'. The object was now more clearly defined. 'This communication applies to the subject into two points of view. The measures to be adopted for ascertaining the value of trade with Nepal assisted by an actual experiment on a very moderate scale and the mode of giving a permanent establishment to it by the residence of an agent on the part of his Government at Nepal if the commerce should be found on enquiry of sufficient importance to render it expedient'.

The Governor-General knew that ever since the 'unfortunate expedition of Kinloch' the Nepal Government was jealous of the movements of the British. He, of course, felt that since then the British had afforded no grounds 'to perpetuate or renew that distrust,' but it was there and 'until lately all access to the territories of Nepal was debarred even to the natives of these provinces, and an attempt to open it under the administration of Mr. Hastings was ineffectually made'. So when the Nepal Government expressed its willingness to receive the proposed

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2. Ibid., No. 29.
4. Select Documents, etc. Doc. No. 51 shore's of the 10th Nov. 1794.
5. Select Documents, etc. Doc. No. 51 P. 131.
mission, the news had come as a happy augury of a better future to the British.

The British were also prepared to consider the question of Parganas Rudrapur and Kasipur (Coshapur) ‘without offering any determination on the proposition it may become the subject of further enquiry, and I propose writing to the Resident at Lucknow to procure information on the disposition of the Vizier to oblige the Nepal Raja, or the annual equivalent which he would expect for the Parganas supposing them to be held at rent by the Nepal Raja and whether the possession of them by the latter would be productive of danger or inconvenience to the Vizier’.66

Earlier Kirkpatrick had been requested by the ‘Nepalese Vakil in Calcutta to obtain the possession of these areas to Nepal, and there was casually a talk about the problem between the Governor-General and the Vazier’s representative.67 But it was thought imprudent ‘to urge the point with the Vizier, immediately on accession and some apprehension from admitting so close a vicinity on the Rajas of Nepal to the Vizier’s territory’.68

Now Abdul Kadir was instructed to negotiate about this issue (Political Consultation, May 1, 1795, N. 12) and also that of the adjustment of the disputed areas on the Purnea-Morang border (Political Consultation, March 1, 1795).

Abdul Kadir’s Mission.

The published materials about this Mission incorporated in works cited above take us only thus far. Now we have to look into unpublished records for the account of the Mission’s activities and experience in Kathmandu and of subsequent events related to the same. Fortunately, some documents of our concern are preserved under separate classification in the collection of the U.P. Government Records Office at Allahabad. Our perusal of these papers has certainly helped us to add to what we have already written about Abdul Kadir’s mission in Kathmandu, which follows hereafter. But for these the account would have remained incomplete.

From a letter in the Volume of correspondence for 1795 from Edmonstone, Fort William, dated the 27th May, 1795, to the Resident

67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
at Benaras, it appears that Maulavi Abdul Kadir Khan was given:—

1. Ten bales broad cloth, arora
2. Four bales broad cloth, red
3. Five bales broad cloth, ordinary blue
4. Two bales broad cloth, green
5. One four barelled gun
6. Two pieces of gold muslin
7. Four pieces of flower muslin
8. Ten yards double coloured cloth, scarlet and blue
9. Thirteen strings of coral containing 520 beads
10. One silver pocket compass
11. One spying glass
12. One packet of pistol
13. One piece of green broad cloth
14. One piece of scarlet broad cloth
15. One bundle of coral -576 beads
16. (a) One bundle of 612 beads Rs. 701|14|3
   (b) One bundle of 294 beads Rs. 155|13|6
   (c) One bundle of 688 beads Rs. 688|6|3

   Total

Rs. 9,807|1|
Rs. 700|
Rs. 437|8|
Rs. 32|
Rs. 36|
Rs. 325|

In the minute of Sir John Shore we have the following estimate of the articles and cash that Abdul Kadir was to take with him.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broad Cloth red</td>
<td>Rs. 5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; blue</td>
<td>Rs. 5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Coral</td>
<td>Rs. 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmira broad (white) cloth</td>
<td>Rs. 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirzapur Chintz and Guzzies</td>
<td>Rs. 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Cash</td>
<td>Rs. 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Advance</td>
<td>Rs. 5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maulvi Abdul Kadir's journey was carefully watched. J. Duncan in a letter dated the 21st June 1795 informed that Abdul Kadir Khan had safely arrived at Kathmandu. Probably he reached in June. Immediately after his arrival he interviewed the King and delivered the presents. This the Maharaja acknowledged in a letter to the Governor-General which assured best consideration to anything said by Abdul Kadir in the latter's behalf. Abdul Kadir Khan was given for his protection a properly equipped posse of men enlisted from the 21st Battalion of the 4th Brigade (stationed at Choonar).

As suggested in the above pages Abdul Kadir Khan's mission was

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70 Pol. Consult. 24 September, 1795 No. 20.
71 *ibid*
undertaken with a view to promote trade relation of the East India Company with Nepal, and through the latter with countries beyond the Himalayas. The British authorities were very careful to clear any suspicion on that account. Last it may be treated as a diplomatic drive in disguise, Abdul Kadir was strictly enjoined to avoid doing anything likely to cause doubts about the purpose of his visit. He was to regard himself just 'essentially as a traveller and a trader' and no more and no less than that. It was made clear to him that he was never to behave as an accredited representative of a Government. His conduct was regulated by specific instructions and he had no authority to commit himself in any issue whatsoever. Sir John Shore had indicated the line in his minute drafted by him on the proposed deputation of Abdul Kadir to Nepal for the purpose of carrying on a commercial trade. Abdul Kadir was to be given a recommendatory letter 'for the Nepal Government and his instructions in general for his guidance' and nothing more than that. He was, however, to report about the attitude of influential people in Nepal towards the British. Obviously, this expresses their intention to find out which of the Nepalese personalities were friendly to them and which of them were hostile. This Abdul Kadir was to achieve 'at any cost even by giving valuable and rich present to the Raja and his ministers.'

In the Central Records Office at Allahabad there is a document (No. 50), which is the translation of the report prepared by Maulvi Abdul Kadir Khan on his return. This report bears the date line the 6th of January, 1796. In this report Kadir Khan suggested that broad cloth and other articles produce and manufacture of Europe, which were imported from there on account of the Company and were in demand in Tibet should be lodged at the undermentioned places:

1. Near the borders of the Buxaduar district of Kooch Bihar.
2. In Sarkar Champaran.
3. In the Nawab Vizier's dominion adjoining Bhootawal.
5. On the most westerly boundary of the Nawab Vizier's dominion towards Shrinaggar.

Kadir Khan's idea was that these five factories should control the entire trade to Tibet and Nepal by their own channel with regard to

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72 Letter from J. Lumsden, A. G. G., Banaras dated 22nd January, 1798 to Sir John Shore (Allahabad Records Office No. 48).
73 "Pol. Consult. 7 March, 1796, 402.
74 Also read Political Consultation March 7, 1796 (N. 3, 4).
trade to Tibet, he thought that the stations indicated would attract the Tibetans in winter and thus commercial transactions would be conducted 'without the intervention of others'. Kadir had in mind the Nepalese middlemen who made an enormous profit out of the entre pot trade passing through Nepal. He suggested that the Nepalese merchants should be left only with their own trade. The factories would account for the purchase and sale in each month and accounts would be sent to Tibet and China regularly. He suggested that no Perwanah should be issued for such articles as would be dealt with by the factories without the seal and signature of the Gumastas of the five factories. He mentions "but this plan can only be expected to come gradually into effect from the result of my enquiry, I have found that the exports to Nepal from the dominion of the Company and of the Nawab Vizier at present amount to about four or five lakh rupees per annum....."

As the places above noticed are not distant from Hindustan and the produce of the country in consequence of its being in the Company's possession could be transported either without any trouble or vexation, the merchants are well placed. Broad cloth may also be transported to Saling (?) through China but the expenses of conveyance through that route are much greater. Goods of this description may also be sent to Yarkand from the westward through Bokhara but from the expense of transportation and apprehension of attacks from the Turcomans and Calmacs this does not answer. For these reasons I have found that it would be much preferable that the articles could be introduced into those countries by merchants from the Company's and the Vizier's dominions with the concurrence of the neighbouring hill Rajas and if it shall please God after sometime these Rajas will not have in their power to throw any obstacle in the flow of their trade which may be carried on by the merchants of the Company's Provinces and those of China, Tibet, etc, without any intervention on their part."

*Specification of articles of merchandise proper for exportation from Hindustan to Nepal*

Broad cloth.............. All colour except yellow which is in demand throughout Tibet and particularly black—after deducting all costs and charges, if it is sold in Nepal the profit will be 4 ans. in the rupee and if at Lhasa 10 ans. in the rupee.

Coral—Required by the Army and Sardars of China. The charges of transportation of these articles are trifling and one lakh rupees worth may be disposed of annually. The profit was 37 P.C. if sold in Nepal, but in Lhasa it amounted to 75 P.C.
Pearls, not round and of different colours like coral, were also much in demand, and profit earned was as large as in the case of coral.

Cotton cloth, the manufacture of Mow. The profit if sold in Nepal is 4 ans. in the rupee and 10 as. in the rupee if sold at Lhasa after deducting all costs and charges.

Sunk, Conch cells for ornaments. profit if sold in Nepal will be 4as. in the rupee and if sold at Lhasa hundred per cent.

Bengal raw silk...the profit exactly the same as in cotton cloth.

Woollen carpets, asun, looking glasses, knives and scissors—the produce of Europe, the profit in Nepal will be 4as. in the rupee and 100 per cent at Lhasa.

Brass, scales and weights, nut-meg, cardamun, mace, sandal wood, Googool, alum chhohara, Banaras Kumkum, silk piece goods, cotton, Banaras sugar, tobacco, karrua cloth profit on these is 4 as. in the rupee in Nepal and 10 as. in Lhasa.

Indigo—the profit in Nepal may be 4 as. and 100 per cent at Lhasa.

Cuff of Diamond the profit stands as in the case of Indigo.

Articles of merchandise for importation from Tibet into Hindustan: Gold silver, sohaga, cow tail, chow-rie, musk, coarse sal, China silk, sal blanket.

Articles of Nepal for importation to Hindustan Munzeet, wax, wood fit for mast of ship, tarpentine. Silver and lead mines are found in Nepal but the natives do not understand working them although they do work some of their copper and iron mines.

Abdul Kadir's early impressions have been given in his letter which he wrote from Kathmandu as soon as he reached there. Amongst other things he wrote to say that he heard of complaints by the Nepalese authorities about Kasipur and Rudrapur. At the initial stage he seems to have been quite moving. But the advent of the winter caused him physical ailment, and his movements slackened. Since then for about two months till he left for Banaras he had various troubles on account of himself and his staff. All of them were suffering from chronic malaria. Although, he received attention and care of his host, there was nothing that he could do to free himself and his men from the malarial fever. As a consequence three persons of his entourage had

76 To sit on while praying.
77 Kora (unbleached).
78 Hira Kashi (ferous sulphate).
died, and he himself ran a risk of that fate. At long last he was compelled to quit Kathmandu.79

Abdul Kadir reported that the King was indisposed due to some ailment, and he could have little personal contact with him save the audience which he was given on arrival.80 The chronicle which, however, does not say anything about Abdul Kadir notes that King Rana Bahadur suffered for eighteen months since immediately after he took over the reins of Government on Jyestha 27, 1851 VS (middle of June, 1794). It seems that while Abdul Kadir reached Kathmandu, the King was ailing.

**Kadir Returns**

Abdul Kadir returned to Banaras before the end of September or early October after a fairly long stay in Kathmandu.81 Of course, as was inherent in the nature of the mission, except the factual report they obtained of the condition of the court in Nepal nothing was achieved by the British authorities beyond what was desirable within limits of their instructions to Kadir Khan.

According to the letter of J. Lumsden above quoted “of the several articles exported through Abdul Kader, the broad cloth was the only one which had been sold.82 The coral was unsaleable in consequence of the high price and bad selection of beads. No articles from the produce of Nepal and Tibet had been purchased as the Maulvi was advised by the Agent at Patna that at present they would be sold at a loss in the Company’s provinces.”83

It does not appear whether the boundary disputes in respect of Morang and Purnea was settled, although we find that the Nepal Government was let to know of the instructions the British authorities sent to the Collector of Purnea for effecting such adjustment as was sought by the Nepalese Government. We also do not see in the documents relating the mission of Abdul Kadir anything to show that the dispute regarding Cossipur and Rudrapur was settled. Of course, this question

79 Political Consultation, 21 September, 1795, No. 20.
80 Ibid.
81 Bishnupada Chakravarti in Calcutta Review, 86, January 1943 (Pp. 43-49) writes that he returned in the last week of December or latest first week of January.
82 Costing Rs. 9807-1-0 was sold at Nepalese Rs. 14065. The ratio between the Banaras Sicca and Napalese Sicca was 100 to 115. Thus the actual price fetched was Rs. 11955-4-0 Banaras rupees, profit being Rs. 2148-3-0 (Pol Consult, March 7, 1796 (No. 1)).
seems to have been raised in the interview which Abdul Kadir had with the King in Kathmandu.

Abdul Kadir on his way back to India for the express purpose of negotiating with the A.G.G. in Banaras in regard to the possession of these territories. In a letter which Rana Bahadur sent to J. Lumsden through Abdul Kadir it was said that the Mission had made a commitment on that issue. But Abdul Kadir denied to have done anything in the matter, and this was supported by Gajaraj Misra who said 'if there was any misapprehension it was due to the misrepresentation of Deenanath Upadhyaya whose object was to interrupt harmony between the two sirkars'. The British Governor-General finally clarified their attitude saying that the matter did not at all fall within the scope of their authority. It also appears that the Nepalese attempted to make a direct approach to the Nawab Vazir for securing the two talukas.

So on all accounts even the minimum expectation about the mission's usefulness had not been fulfilled.

Yet, the British authorities thought that as one more link in the chain which they wanted to set up in their relation with Nepal, it had served its own purpose. It had gone at least to preserve a facade of cordial relation between the two Governments: Gajraj Misra had also written to them that Kadir Khan's mission had worked to 'dispel any doubts in the minds of the Sardars, and the Maharaja was convinced about the expediency of the strongest cordiality and friendship, subsisting between the two Sirkars'. Although, with this assurance, the chapter of friendly intercourse was closed, at least for a period of another five years, this was something which sustained the East India Company's Government in their endeavour to promote their interest in Nepal.

Sir John Shore's observation shows that the British did not regard the result of the mission as something of a total failure and they still hoped for a better future.

"Of the results of the mercantile transactions entrusted to the conduct of M. Kadir, we are not yet qualified to form a judgement... but considering the commercial as well as political information derived from his deputation it cannot be deemed useless and unimportant. This communication has enabled us to open some judgement of the charac-

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84 Political Consultation, September 21, 1795 (No. 20).
85 (a) Nos. 35-36 of the Allahabad Records Office.
86 (b) Its copy attached to the Letter No. 69 of J. Lumsden to Sir John Shore.
88 Pol. Consult, March 7, 1796 (15).
89 Ibid. Gajaraj Misra's to Lumsden.
ters of the Raja and his principal officers and to ascertain their disposition towards this Government. . . . the political impediments resulting from the character and conduct of the Raja are of more consequence and whilst these exist, the commerce must remain in a feeble state. We ought to look forward to a period of better administration in Nepal and immediately to promote our connection with the Raja."

We intend to conclude this section with the political report of Abdul Kadir, which he prepared about the condition of the Court of Kathmandu. Even if this may appear a bit out of place, it is hoped that the following quotation will supplement the narrative on the subject we have provided in the next chapter. The report is expected to shed much light on the current political situation in Nepal.

**Political situation in Nepal as Kadir Found**

Molvi Abdul Kadir in document No. 56 in the volume of *Premutiny Records* (Letters issued by the Agent to the Governor-General, Banares, October, 1795 to December, 1795) has given his ideas regarding the Raja of Nepal and the state of affairs in that country. He mentions that from the time of his accession to the Mu.mad the Raja had listened to the advice of the lowest class of people and employed his time in attending to singers and in dissipation. ‘At the advice of his low-minded friends the Raja’s uncle, Bahadur Shah had been disgraced and Bahadur Shah was now entirely devoted to religion. On this account Bahadur Shah, Abhiman Singh, Damodar Pare and Gujeraj Misir were much distressed. Gujeraj Misir had some influence on the Raja but the Raja did not always follow his advice.’ The Raja entertained a great antipathy to his uncle and suspected him of his being in concert of the Sardars of neighbouring countries for dispossessing him of the Lauje. The rulers of China were well pleased with the Raja’s uncle, Bahadur Shah, and had recommended to the Raja that Bahadur Shah should be appointed as the Naik. The Raja in reply wrote that he had dismissed his uncle as he had commenced hostility with the people of Tibet without his consent. The reply from China to this message had not yet come. The Emperor of China also wrote to the Raja to recommend attention to merchants trading to Nepal, a revision of revenue from the raiyats of Newar caste and to propose the introduction of the Chinese coins into Nepal. The Raja had objected but Abdul Kader was convinced that his objection would not be allowed. ‘The Raja has retained in his service three Firingees in the 90 Political Consultation, 7 March, 1796, No. 23.
91 P. C. Roychaudhury’s noting.
charge of his artilleries. One of them, a Frenchman, was very skilful in his profession and was entertained in the Raja's service by Deenanath Upadhya's brother in Calcutta. While Bahadur Shah was in office this man received 500 rupees per month and was employed in casting canon. 200 canons had been cast and several Nepalese learnt the art and the Frenchman’s salary had been stopped. The Frenchman wanted to escape but he was apprehended and was put in confinement. He again escaped and was seized and put in iron and was treated so harshly that he (Abdul Kadir) thought he was dead. The Bhootawal Raja was in terms of friendship with the Nawab Vizier and was a brother-in-law of the Raja's uncle, Bahadur Shah. The Raja wanted to confine his son and many of the old Sardars. The son had escaped and many of the Sardars were under perpetual apprehension.” Abdul Kadir Khan found Nepal in a sort of ferment. Many of the big men and raiyats of Nepal were friendly to Bahadur Shah who was in good terms with Gujeraj Misir and the other men of understanding in the country. Bahadur Shah was anxious to cultivate the friendship of the Company. Abdul Kadir Khan hinted that if Bahadur Shah be restored to power the friendly intercourse between the two states would increase. “Even Abhiman Singh, the Dewan wanted to quit Nepal and reside in the Company's territories if he be given some malgoozaree lands,” he reported.

The report further mentions:—“The Emperor of China has distributed his forces from the hill Ghats to the southward of Tibet, to the westward as far as his boundary of Kashmir and to the eastward as far as the country of Debraja and has established large depot of grain at all the Ghats. A greater portion of armymen and also of grains were stationed at the Ghats bordering on Nepal than elsewhere and what happened will be seen hereafter. The son of the Raja of Jumla hill adjoining to the eastern boundary of Kashmir whose country has sometimes been annexed to Nepal went to China to complain of the Raja of Nepal. He returned from thence with a confirmation of his Raj and resided at the fort of Kottee. ‘But the Raja of Nepal has not made over to him the possession of Jumla. It will, hereafter be seen what orders the country of China will send in consequence or whether the Chinese troops will put the Jumla Raj into possession. There is no amity between the Raja of Nepal and the Sovereign of China.”

92 Abdul Kadir in another letter writes to say that the Emperor wanted the Raja of Nepal to reinstate the Raja of Jumla in his possession and in case of non-compliance had threatened to invade Nepal with 80,000 troops. The Raja of Jumla had his own force of 10,000 assembled in Kuti (J. Lumsden, Letter No. 115 of the Allahabad Records Office).
Under these circumstances it is my advice that in the first place friendly letters may be written from the Huzoor to Gujeraj Misir and to Abhiman Singh who is a well wisher for the Sarkars and wishes to get Bahadur Shah and Damodar Pare steady in the good offices. It is also proper that letters should be written to Tribhuvan Singh and to the Raja in terms of goodwill and if the Nawab Vizier will be brought to consent to their wishes respecting Roodrapur and Cossipur, it will be expedient that they should be gratified in order to satisfy the Raja and his ministers of the sincerity of the English Government. It will be also right that letters should be written to the Subedar of Lhasa and to the Dalai Lama by Mir Baha-ud-deen who last year brought letters and presents from the Dalai Lama at Lhasa to the Governor-General and to Mr. Duncan. A letter should also be sent to Mr. Cherry from Calcutta to pay attention to the Vizier to the Raja of Bhootawal whenever he attends to pay his compliment to him the regard, which the English gentlemen entertain for Gujeraj Misir and for Bahadur Shah, his master's relation. All this is expedient and proper.”

It was stated that Guru Gajaraj Misra pinned a hope on the possibility of Bahadur Shah’s restoration to the helm of affairs so that in the days to come the British objective of consolidating friendship with Nepal succeeded.

From 1796 to 1800 the British had no contact with Nepal. They were careful not to offend the Gorkhalis at a time when wars were raging in the South and in the West. They quietly allowed the trade pact with Nepal to lapse and made no attempt whatever to reintroduce the subject. But they did not cease to work for an opportunity. In 1800 they again offered a treaty, which was like a treaty of subsidiary alliance.

The trap they laid down was, however, smashed; hardly was the ink of the treaty dry that the Government of Nepal repudiated their commitments. The British came away, again disappointed.

In this and other instances the Gorkhalis acted with the utmost
wisdom. Any other course involving concessions to the British, even though they be in respect of matters commercial, would have brought in its wake domination of the Company's Government. It certainly reflects credit on the sagacity and far-sightedness of the Gorkhali rulers to have set aside the advances made by the British.

The credit of holding high the banner of freedom goes to a host of young men at Kathmandu. These men in spite of their youthful love for adventure were nevertheless remarkably sagacious in conducting their relations with the British. They were imbued with the highest ideal of patriotism and were brave and strong men. They were above all perfectly honest and would not stoop to greed or temptation. As long as the policy remained in their hands, Nepal was very far from the disaster which at last betook her in 1814.

A survey of events in Nepal during that period will show that they had to work against heavy odds. Because a minor was on the throne, forces were let loose, which fostered intrigues and, very often, women came to control the affairs. Stability of administration was the exception rather than the rule. It is said that Bahadur Shah himself was subjected to untold harassment as a result of Court intrigues and he had to leave his country twice on that account.

Similar was the fate meted out to many others. Only in one case the woman, Queen Rajendra Luksmi, seems to have undone the web of intrigues around her and discouraged the malice and jealousy amongst the nobility, although she was not at all fair to her brother-in-law, Bahadur Shah.

Other women, down to the queen of King Rajendra who foolishly wrecked the structure of the Shah power, have been responsible for weakening the Gorkha Kingdom. But even in those circumstances these valiant sons of Nepal acted in the best interest of the country above jealousy and rancour, often, isolating the palace for that purpose. To their credit they annexed in this period Tanhu, Palpa and the forty-six hill principalities between the Rivers Mahakali and Krishna Gandaki (Gandak). Sometime after, the Gorkhalis marched up to river Ganges occupying Kumaon and Garhwal. A setback came only after the Tibet war, and more when Rana Bahadur began to rule directly without his uncle. Rana Bahadur acted much unwisely while he ruled, and at last he abdicated his throne, and went to live in Banaras. But even there in his exile he acted so indiscreetly that the British had almost succeeded in imposing a Resident in his otherwise free country.

*Oldfield, I, Pp. 286-88.*
Anglo-Nepalese Relations, 1796-1800 A.D.

The account of Abdul Kadir’s mission carried the thread of the general narrative of Anglo-Nepalese relations to 1796. In the present section we propose to continue the narrative to include events up to 1800. Here we start with the description of the working of the Nepalese foreign mission, which often came in the picture.

The Nepal Government had a representative in Calcutta. He performed several functions. He watched the British. He watched the Indians. He gave all sorts of information to his master. In his correspondence he touched all aspects of life from personal disposition and character of the Governor-General down to the details of intrigues in the British camps and in Indian Courts. He was asked to be polite, and avoid anything likely to cause misunderstanding. Through him Kathmandu contacted Indian princes: contacts with the Marathas and Sikhs became regular as the time approached the Anglo-Nepalese War. Secret agents were stationed in Gwalior and Lahore with numerous other subordinate agencies in several more states. Padma Pani represented his country in Sindhia’s Capital, and it was a full-fledged embassy functioning openly which he managed. We have the following lines in a letter to the Governor-General by the Resident at the Gwalior Court about the Nepalese mission.

“Padma Panie, the Gorkha agent to this court, is represented to have requested for his dismissal and the motive assigned for this is His Highness’s neglect to perform his promise in regard to the obtaining of the mission of a man of rank from Nepal to be present at the ceremony of his daughter’s nuptials. He was disposed to the court while the war continued. A person about the Darbar is employed to receive the Gorkha’s communication and to convey to His Highness.”

From a letter (No. 17) it is clear that the Government of Nepal used to apprise itself of all the events occurring in India and near about. In this letter Rana Bahadur refers to affairs in Hyderabad and issues

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08 Letter No. 16 Eitihasik Patra Sangraha about Lord Wellesly.
09 Instrument of instruction to Kharidar Prithvivilas by Amar Sinha dated V. S. 1871 Maghavadi 13 roj 3 (first published by Chittaranjan Nepali) Letter No. 294 from the resident to J. Adam. No. 319 of the same. Letter of Padma Pani to General Bhimsen Thapa and Kazi Randhwaraj Thapa dated V. S. 1871 Sravana vadi 1 roj 2 address Gwalior (reproduced) in Bhimsen Thapa and His Times by Chittaranjan Nepali.
05 ‘Priti Paul, though some call him Priti Ram Beelas’ No. 266, from Resident with Sindha to J. Adam (Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV., 1809-18).
00 Eitihasik Patra Sangraha.
some instructions to his vakil. The vakil had in his own way informed him of happenings in Egypt and how the French invaded Egypt and were themselves under siege when the British warships arrived on the sea shore.

Letter No. 20 gives a resume of what Dinanath, the Nepalese vakil in Calcutta, wrote to his Government about the victory of the company's Government over Tipu Sultan, "Srirangapatanam was under siege because Tipu would not listen to the British who had repeatedly dissuaded him from aligning with the French. Tipu appeared in a mood to fight the British. Therefore, General George Harris and others were sent to meet the challenge. There were two engagements. The second took place on Vaisakh Vadi 30 Saturday at 2-30 a.m. For five hours they fought and Tipu was vanquished and killed. The entire family and their treasury fell into the enemy's hands." \(^{100}\)

The Nepalese were keen to maintain friendly relations with the British and took meticulous care to avoid any occasion likely to rouse misunderstanding about their intention. In the same letter Rana Bahadur expressed himself to say: "The victory of our friend has made us happy. We are happier that after Tipu's defeat the prestige of the British has gone high." \(^{101}\) This no doubt, shows the desire on the part of the Nepalese authorities to impress on the British with the feelings of friendship and amity, as could exist between two neighbours.

The Government of Nepal also seems to have promised help to the British in preventing Ghoolam Mohummad, the Rohilla Chief, from getting an asylum \(^{102}\) in Almora (30 December, 1794, Political letter to the Court of Directors) in response to the request made by the British Resident in Lucknow (Correspondence, 17th October, Nos. 17-32). This should go to disprove the charge of complicity of Nepal in anti-British activities. The Kathmandu authorities were ever alert to avoid giving remotest cause of suspicion to the British on that account.

A letter of Rana Bahadur Shah to Dinanath Upadhya informed him that the Government had instructed all its officers in the Palpa-Butwal area not to give shelter to Wazir Ali Shah of Oudh (Letter No. 18, Eitihasik Patra Sangraha). Wazir Ali's accession to the throne was contrived by his supporters against the wishes of the British whose pre-

\(^{100}\) Dated V.S. 1856 Jaista Sudi 13 Saturday. Also see his letter to Dinanath Upadhya dated V.S. 1855 Phalgun Vadi 14 roj 3.

\(^{101}\) Also his letter to the Governor General, July 18, 1792 (TR 32, pp. 291-4. No. 218) and to Mr. Stuart (OR 388, AR 8, P. 120. No. 208). CPC, X, No., 569, 572, PP. 114-15.

\(^{102}\) Fort William-India House Correspondence, Vol. XVII, P. 982; Ibid, P. 404; Political letter dated 4 February, 1795.
ference for Sadat Ali had become known at the time. This man, Wazir Ali, son of Asaffuddaula, was deposed on the first of January in 1798 after some months of restless rule, (Mirza Sadat Ali, his uncle was put on the throne of Oudh) and thereafter was kept in Banaras under surveillance, from where he escaped to the border of Nepal. It appears from the letter that Wazir Ali escaped after killing four European officers including the Resident, G. T. Cherry and while on the border areas was engaged in collecting forces and arms to use against the British. Wazir Ali had conspired and when this was disclosed and the British wanted to remove him to Calcutta he had rebelled. He had murdered G. T. Cherry in the latter's apartment when he was being received. This was on the 14th January 2 days previous to the date fixed for his removal to Calcutta. The letter further instructed “even if the British did take no notice of the affairs, it is our duty to check all incidents in pursuance of our usual policy of maintaining friendship at any cost. Take care to impress them boldly that we mean nothing but friendship, you will also counteract any mischief our adversaries might create. We have also directly written to the Governor-General.”

The Governor-General communicated their concern about Wazir Ali in their communication in reply to the King’s letter and requested the Nepalese authorities to help them to round up the fugitive. In yet another letter to Dinanath Upadhya (No. 19, dated VS 1856 Vaisakh sudi 14) Rana Bahadur assures the British of the support in the campaign against Wazil Ali. It seems that all outposts on the border as far as Kumaon had been alerted. There were also a few engagements

The letter also reports Wazir Ali's attempts to force unity with local landlords.

The Nawab Vazir had assured the Government of Nepal to grant the Jagir of Cossipur and Rudrapur plus 50 thousand rupees in lieu of the support in his case (letter No. 20, Rana Bahadur Shah to Dinanath). In another letter (VS 1855 Phagun) Wazir Ali has been reported to have entered the jungles of Gorakhpur. But all this proved ineffective to tempt the Nepalese officers who had cared little for reward of that nature. They always stood by what they had promised to the British earlier. They had sent their men to apprehend Vazir Ali irrespective of what the Nawab Vazir had offered them or the English had expected of them.

104 Political Consultation, April 22, 1799, No. 9.
105 Also see Rana Bahadur's letter, Political Consutation, March 1, 1799, No. 7.
It appears that Vazir Ali was taking refuse in Ajamgarh and Gorkhapur forest areas, so no trace of him was found within Nepal. He also came incognito to Lucknow to seek help, but no one was prepared to side with him. For sometime thereafter he lived in Rajputana. Later in September 1799 he fell into the hands of the British who detained him in Fort William Calcutta till June 1816, when he breathed his last.¹⁰⁶

Even when there was a movement of troops, for instance, of the removal of 5 companies from Morang to the border of Purnea, intimation was given to the authorities across the border, so that they might come to know the real purpose of the steps taken by the Nepalese Government.

The Nepalese authorities did not seem to desire to give the slightest ground of suspicion to the British on any ground whatsoever.

_Further Account of Border Disputes with the British._

Although an account of the border disputes on the south had found place in the narrative dealing with the events leading to the Anglo-Nepalese trade pact, yet this was not complete. Now we intend to close this chapter with an additional account of the border disputes between Nepal and the British in the last decade of the eighteenth century.

In 1791 Dinanath Upadhya complained to the Governor-General that one Abdulla Beg had unlawfully occupied Rautahat (Rotihutt). The Governor-General referred the matter to Maxwell, the Chief of Patna Revenue Department. Abdulla Beg who resided in Patna was summoned and the case was thoroughly examined. He produced a Sanad from the late Raja Kaur Kunan Singh (Kanak Sinha) of Mackwanpur. He said that he was in possession of the area for the last 30 years. Earlier Abdulla Beg was almost dispossessed, but Rumbolt’s intercession had saved him (Maxwell to David Anderson, President and members of the Revenue Board, Fort William, 10 July, 1781, Shahbad records) Abdulla Beg’s contention, however, was not accepted and the possession of Rautahat was given to the Nepalese. About a year later the dispute in regard to Rautahat was again revived. But this time the collector of Champaran neutralised the area, and prevented either party from taking possession.¹⁰⁷ Rautahut was restored to Nepal after some-

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¹⁰⁷ CPC ix No. 7.
time on representation to the Governor-General.\(^{108}\)

In 1814 troubles about certain border areas led to war between Nepal and the British. But these troubles existed in one form or another since the early seventies of the eighteenth century. They were of two kinds. One involved disputes in regard to certain areas over which the British laid claim for possession. The second related to instances of raids carried by the inhabitants of one country on the territories of the other as it was alleged. The disputed areas all lay inside what was called the territory in the possession of the Gorkhali ruler. These extended from the Gandak to the Tista. At one time the whole of the Terai from west to east between these two rivers were claimed by the British on the ground that they formed parts of the Bengal—Bihar Diwani. Later, however, good sense prevailed on the British authorities and they gave up pressing their claim. By 1785 the situation had so changed that nobody on either side talked of a dispute regarding territorial claims.

From District Records of the Bihar frontier we know that the Sanyasi robbers often raided villages on the British side, and decamped with the booty to the neighbouring places inside the Nepal border and made themselves safe there. The Sanyasis had become a problem for the British. This problem was raised by the Governor in his correspondence with King Prithvinarayan Shah (vide ante). Later while they were vanquished, there were other factors that continued to keep the troubles very much alive. Both the parties, the British and Nepalese, each complained of raids on one’s territories either by Zemindars or by Amalis of the other. Between 1787 and 1792 there were several complaints of this type on Champaran, Tirhut and Purnea borders. The Nepalese alleged that certain Zemindars from across the British territories had been actively engaged in dacoity. In 1792 they had also approached the British officers to prevent the fleeing Limbus from being engaged in activities against Nepal\(^{109}\). In reply the British sent their own complaint alleging that Nepalese Amalis had violated the areas in their jurisdiction. In 1793 the Fakirs created troubles in Darbhanga district. Their leader Kurram Shah, used to operate from a jungle at the Kosi waste land. The British had alleged that the Fakirs were instigated by the Nepalese officers of Morang, who wanted to bully them into accepting certain points of their seeking in the boundary dispute. In April 1794 the Darbhanga treasury was looted, and a year after the Collector of Purnea had a narrow escape from the marauding


\(^{109}\) Letter of Dinanath to Mr. Pagan, received on May 14, 1792.
stroke of the assailants. The British had by that time stationed 32 battalions of sepoys under a British Captain all over the Purnea border in order to prevent operations of the anti-social elements operating from the other side. But the presence of troops on the border had not been conducive to the restoration of normal relation between the two countries. Two notorious robbers by name Ajodhyaram and Mirzapat Sarda were acting in Morang and the Nepalese Vakil in early 1792 had represented to the Governor-General the urgency of taking action against them. It was said that after some delay these bad characters who were previously in the service of the Raja of Sikkim were arrested by the Collector of Purnea (Letter, 20 July, 1792). Only after 1795 troubles on account of raiders had come to an end.110

Boundary disputes in regard to Morang and Purnea have been referred to in several communications sent to British Officers by the King of Nepal.111 (Letter of July 18, 1792 to the Governor General, etc.). The British proposed a boundary Commission through a letter of one Mr. Stuart to the Nepal Government (May 8, 1792)112, which had earlier represented its case through its Vakil Bisnunath Upadhya. A letter in the name of Rana Bahadur Shah to the Governor General complains of hostile activities of the exiled Raja of Mackwanpur, who had carried raids into the Nepalese territory adjoining Champaran and recommends drastic action by the Collector of the district of Purnea to chastise the raiders (dated 20 Agahan, 1849=4 December, 1792).113 In November of 1792 the British made a complaint that the Nepalese customs office at Morang had tried to level the usual high rates of duty on goods entering Nepal from British areas in India (the goods were sent by one merchant Mr. Pagan) notwithstanding the provision of the Trade Pact of 1791.114

In another letter to Rana Bahadur the British requested him to instruct his officers in Morang and Goorea districts ‘not to afford shelter to the bodies of Kakirs, who find safe retreat there’. These Fakirs often raided the outlying British areas in Purnea and harassed the people.115

Later in 1795 when Abdul Kadir was sent on deputation to Nepal, he was asked to apprise the Government at Kathmandu about the con-

112 CPC, X, No. 391, P. 71 (CI, 24-5, PP. 239-42, No. 138; TI, 38, PP. 53-71 No. 143.
113 CPC, X, No. 979, PP. 213 14.
115 Secret Department, July, 1794 No. 28 Letter, 27 June, 1794.
cern of the British in regard to the Fakir menace in the border districts.\textsuperscript{116} The Nepal Government was requested to take prompt and drastic action to meet this menace and punish the offending ‘gang of Kurreem Shah and Sobhan Ali Shah’.\textsuperscript{117} It was said in behalf of the Nepalese authorities that they had sent troops to the areas infested by the raiders and killed many of them,\textsuperscript{118} but they were unable to deal with those who operated from the bases on the British side of the border in Purnea.

King Rana Bahadur writes a letter\textsuperscript{119} Dinanath Upadhya asking him to write to the Suba of Vijayapur (Dasarath Khatri) to arrange for the officers of the Company to meet the Nepalese officers somewhere on the border so that the accused arrested on charges of dacoity on the other side might be properly checked and stolen properties discovered on their confession (the term used for exacting confession was सार्वित्त क्यूरे कायल भरावने). The king wants Dinanath to impress the Company’s authorities that surrender of the prisoners would not be effected by methods which were not regular (बेरित्त) and which would look undignified (हलुकापये). What was promised was the surrender of stolen properties whatever could be discovered. The men arrested were mendicants and hillmen (फँकार र पवँता).

In Guru Gajraj Misra’s letter to the British Resident in Banaras (document 72 of Allahabad office in the Banaras Records) the same readiness to oblige the British by going to the extent possible is expressed. The letter mentions the Fakirs and Darvishes molesting the inhabitants in the Company’s territories from their bases inside Nepal, whom the Nepalese authorities had decided to expel, although their religion forbade actions in this regard.

At another instance, the Nepalese did not hesitate to interpret an act of espionage by a British agent (W. Moorcroft) in a different manner as if it was just an unintentional walkover. This, they did in spite of the fact that the said agent was captured by a Gorkha outpost in Garhwal while trying to escape.\textsuperscript{120}

Obviously, the Nepalese in their efforts to maintain friendly relation with the British would not be provoked by covert actions, even if these were designed to injure them.

Disputes over areas on the border were settled by a Commission as was proposed to be done in the case of the two Parganas of Juvijam

\textsuperscript{116} Political Consultations, March 20, 1795.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Dated V. S. 1855 Sravana.
\textsuperscript{120} Letter of Chautara Bam Shah to Vakil Mahila Guruji in Calcutta, VS 1869.
and Koilia along the Darbhanga frontier. The method of settlement was an examination of the question through public enquiries by the Nepalese officer in charge of the settlement division and by one Mr. Smith (इस मिट्र साहिब), Haricharan Kanungo and Rajendra Rai Amin in behalf of the British and the issuance of the decree thereafter followed an agreement on oath (Haribans and Saligram, per Charter to Kazi Abhiman Basnait; Itihas Prakas, I, P. 15). This is confirmed by materials belonging to British sources. Yet another dispute was settled with the same method in regard to the adjustment of boundary between ‘Tera Cordeh and Morang’ on 23 September, 1789 (A letter to Kirkpatrick by the Collector of Purnea). Earlier in August of the same year it was alleged that 600 Gorkha soldiers with Bhutia irregulars had attacked Tera Cordeh and caused panic by plundering crops and movable properties of the peasants.

\textsuperscript{121} K. P. Mitra's Article on Anglo-Nepalese Relations in the Last Decade of the Eighteenth Century in Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, Vol. 18 (1942), P. 161.
CHAPTER VIII

SIX YEARS OF RANA BAHADUR AS RULING KING

End of Regency

As Rana Bahadur approached his twenty-first year of birth, he declared himself a ruling King. In consequence the regency of Bahadur Shah had ended.

Bahadur Shah was the central figure of the drama during all the fateful years between 1786 and 1794. In the final phase of his career Bahadur Shah guided the destiny of the country this time uninterrupted for seven years. But on all occasions he assumed powers of Regent his powers were not as absolute as those of a dictator, and they were not as much adequate to effectively promulgate and implement schemes of social and economic reforms. There were checks on his powers even otherwise; during his regency on both the occasions he had the misfortune of being checkmated by personalities beyond his control, who were moved solely with a motive to thwart him.

On the first occasion Queen Rajendralakshmi was a drag and she played her part to that end, later Bahadur experienced that for the duration of the second term his opponents would give him little quiet all but in the beginning and this developed to active and constant interference in administration towards the end as the King grew youthful in age, which eventually led to the Regent’s downfall. Bahadur’s regime consequently saw little of achievements by way of reforms, all his energies being diverted to maintaining his position through superior intrigues.

However, in his time Nepal absorbed various districts comprising the states of the Baisis and Chaubisis and Kumaon and Garhwal in the west and Sikkim in the east. All these were conquered and a greater portion of Tibetan Kachhar also fell to the arms of the Nepalese.

The account of the expedition has been already provided in the previous pages. Bahadur Shah with all his statesmanship and administrative ability could steer clear of difficulties, and stresses of circumstances.

About the alleged illicit connection between Bahadur Shah and Rajendralakshmi as mentioned by Hamilton (P. 247), there is no tangible proof to establish any fact of such a relationship. Rather the
truth was that with the queen mother he was at cross purposes; he did not certainly owe his ascendancy to her favour and efforts. Each time he obtained hold of the Government, it was because others had regarded him indispensible. Hamilton disbelieves the story, but he says that it might have originated from those who wanted to vilify Bahadur Shah in the eye of his nephew. In the story Hamilton heard about this affair, it was said that actually 'in times of reconciliation the two regents were thinking of a proposal of marriage'. But this was absolutely untrue. Such a marriage was prohibited by scriptures and unthinkable. Similarly it would be wrong to say that Bahadur Shah was intending to keep his nephew even under his personal surveillance and invited the consequences.

Oldfield wrote (I, P. 284) that Bahadur had kept his nephew purposely 'in a state of profligacy and ignorance' and the latter had suspected a design on the part of his uncle to 'keep him in perpetual pupilage if not actually to usurp the throne.' Kirkpatrick had observed in 1793 that Sher Bahadur, Rana Bahadur's half illegitimate brother 'had exhibited such superior symptoms of genius as have induced the Regent to pay particular attention to the cultivation of his mind' (P. 272). Kirkpatrick's observation implies that Bahadur had been partial to Sher Bahadur to the neglect of Rana Bahadur. But all this opinion is based on conjecture. The fact that Bahadur Shah was suddenly dismissed in mid 1796 (VS 1853 Jyestha) is no ground sufficient to help anybody to build such premises, rather one could say without fear of contradiction that Bahadur's dismissal was a natural sequel to Rana's attaining majority. Bahadur Shah had no intention of usurping the throne, nor he desired to keep his nephew in 'perpetual confine' as it was alleged. He could have usurped the throne, while the King was in his infancy. All these days Bahadur acted like a trustee. He had to give up powers while the King attained majority. And this was perfectly normal. No ruler tolerates a regent in his manhood and least of all one, like Rana Bahadur who was aspiring to enjoy an absolute and autocratic regime. But more than that Rana Bahadur had been instigated by Bahadur's opponents to dispense with the uncle. The prospect of wielding absolute ruling powers tempted him to listen to this advice.

Bahadur Shah was not only dismissed but as it is said he was confined and died after four months as a prisoner. The imprisonment came a little later.

Rana Bahadur was a lad of twenty while he took powers to himself. Knowing his tempers Bahadur Shah thought to yield to his desires. But this was not so simple a matter and it was not to escape from other
developments that followed. On suggestions from quarters hostile to Bahadur, the nephew instituted enquiries into the doings of the late Naib who was alleged to have depleted the treasury to squander money for himself. Bahadur very much desired to clear the charges, but to no effect'. Before, however, truth could be established in regard to these charges, Bahadur breathed his last in the prison.

In a noting of a chronicle Rana Bahadur is shown as having assumed powers on Jyestha 27 Saturday of VS 1853 (second week of June, 1796). At the time Abdul Kadir visited Nepal, Bahadur Shah was living in retirement solely devoted to religious practices. But subsequently after towards the end of February, 1797 (Phagun 11, VS 1853) he was suddenly arrested at night under mysterious circumstances. He languished in confinement for four months. In a letter he wrote to Rana Bahadur Shah from the prison he warns the latter but does not plead for his release. The wording of the letter shows that Bahadur Shah had replied to his nephew's. It is suggested that Rana was seeking reconciliation with his uncle.

Ultimately he died in Aryaghat still a detainee on Asadha 14 Saturday of VS 1854 (end of June, 1797). Rana Bahadur informed the British Governor-General of his uncle's death in a letter which reached Calcutta on 14 August 1797 (Political Consultations, 1797).

Kirkpatrick wrote about Bahadur Shah (P. 273): "He was a man of exceptional quality—a man of enlightened views and possessed of administrative skill, and whatever he learnt out of his association with the British, while in Bettiah, he wanted to exert his views on the various problems of Nepal in their line like the much wanted reforms on judiciary and army. That opportunity, however, would not come, resistance being the less enlightened colleagues who not only distrusted the English but also conceived of their political systems in not less hostile terms." Hamilton called him a prince of great vigour but extremely superstitious. All the same he was friendly to the British. (P. 250).

The Patna Mission letter calls Bahadur as friendly to the Missionaries, "friend enough to visit them in Patna, offer them three Nepalese to become good Christians, also calling them to come again to Nepal . . . . . . The British Missionary was called to Kathmandu because of his renown as a physician. . . . . . . the Mission obtained annual presents of elephants, silk and ponies" (Reprint Catholicus, March, 1942). Copious references to Bahadur Shah's solicitude for the missionaries have been also made by one. Padre Juvenal who was in Nepal for some-

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1 Eitihasik Patra Sangraha, I, Letter No. 15.
time in 1794. (This man had prepared a dictionary of Nepali language which is lost.)

With these two observations Bahadur Shah’s end is ascribed to the machinations inspired by anti-British sentiment of the nephew. But there is nothing on record to indicate that the action taken by the King against his uncle had anything to do with the latter’s attitude towards the British. Most of all, there is little truth in the allegation that Bahadur Shah was pro-British to the extent of becoming their tool to further their imperialist interest in Nepal.

It was also said that Bahadur Shah was much disliked by his own people because he had forced to submit to the indignities of defeat at the hands of the Chinese (Hamilton, P. 249).

According to the chronicle Bahadur Shah had ordered a fresh survey of cultivated land in the country, and thus had provoked the goddess Earth.

Amongst this tangle of conflicting views on the downfall of Bahadur Shah it is difficult to say as to which factor was solely responsible for the situation. But one question comes to our mind. Did Rana Bahadur need any cogent proof of guilt to oust his uncle? The fact that no charges were preferred, and Bahadur languished in prison to die a cold death shows that his adversaries had acted without any thought of evidence against him.

As we have already observed, there was nothing to cause surprise in the fact of Bahadur’s removal from the scene of power. Bahadur’s removal came on Rana’s attaining majority. As soon as the King assumed powers to rule by himself, the regency automatically ended. Up to this, everything proceeded normally. But Rana’s action in imprisoning his uncle and allowing him to die in detention does not normally fit in the process. There must be some explanation for this action of Rana Bahadur. What led him to mete out this sort of treatment to his uncle? Bahadur Shah was sent to prison not immediately after his removal from regency but after two years of retirement. Obviously the charge of misappropriation was an after-thought concocted by his enemies of the Court. The real cause of his imprisonment must be something else. It is suggested that as Bahadur’s imprisonment coincided with the pregnancy of the illegitimate queen of Rana Bahadur, it had something to do with the question of succession. At the time of his detention Bahadur was the sole legitimate survivor of Prithvinarayan Shah’s successors besides the reigning King. As we shall find later Kuldip Shah, another legitimate scion of the family, was debarred from the succes-

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2 The annotator. *Etihasik Patra Sangraha* No. 15.
sion as he had become deformed having lost one of his eyes, and it was widely suspected that Rana Bahadur had manoeuvred to cause this end. We shall see how determined he was to enthrone his son by the Brahman lady. So King Rana Bahadur might have got annoyed with the idea of seeing Bahadur Shah as a legitimate successor to the throne and contrived to bring about his death. But this argument though convincing to some extent seems a little far stretched. Rana’s action in imprisoning his uncle looks well calculated, and did not come all on a sudden in 1797. A year earlier to this Abdul Kadir had reported that Bahadur Shah was living completely estranged from his nephew. Abdul Kadir had also noted while in Kathmandu that Bahadur Shah was popular with the responsible elements of the Court, and some of them would welcome to see him back to power. It is not impossible that Rana Bahadur acted in concert with his uncle’s adversaries to meet the challenge of the opposite group. We have no doubt that Bahadur met his end in prison for political reasons. King Rana Bahadur was worked up to feel that Bahadur Shah left free would ultimately become the rallying point of all the forces hostile to his erstwhile supporters. He must have been given to understand that if Bahadur Shah obtained back his powers, the King would be reduced to a puppet. In the circumstances the King would deal leniently with his uncle only at a great peril to himself. If his supporters were displaced, he would also cease to become a ruling King. All this consideration led him to imprison his uncle.

After the removal of Bahadur Shah

With all his great qualities Rana Bahadur was a man of unstable temper. He was nicknamed a mad King by his adversaries. He displayed often weakness of mind and ungovernable temper although essentially he was judicious and loving. He was surrounded by a coterie of young and irresponsible elements of the aristocracy, who encouraged his harmful disposition. But all he had imbibed in his character and habits were due to either lack of education or faulty training he received. His basic goodness was not allowed to develop. For this the regent of the Kingdom, particularly, Bahadur Shah himself was responsible. Rana Bahadur was 12 years of age, while his uncle had become regent after the death of the queen mother. But he had neglected the education and training of his nephew allowing him to drift in the luxuries of a palace habitat.

It so happened that Rana Bahadur commenced his reign with no awkward or unhappy incident but ended with all the violence and act of
indiscretion not expected of a sovereign. As he was young and enamoured of a lady he had become indiscreet and he perpetrated acts which could not be characterised as not harmful to a larger interest of the country. His conduct became more reprehensible in subsequent days. Eventually this led to his abdication and consequent exile to Banaras. Again, while in Banaras he would not sit quiet but indulge in activities against his adversaries in Nepal, and this gave an opportunity to the British to play up their game in Nepalese politics, which had greatly endangered the country's independence.

The power of the state was now contested by the two families of barons, the Pandes and the Thapas who had entered the arena very late with the first queen of Rana Bahadur, the Princess of Gulmi. The Pandes and Basnaits, often warring between themselves were earlier reconciled on the intervention of the King who had arranged a marriage between a son of the Kazi Basnait and a daughter of the Pande nobleman. But the animosity was only subdued, and not entirely extinguished. Even then, there were the Thapas who had their own axe to grind both against the Pande family and Basnait courtiers. The collateral Chautarias were no mean contestants for powers. They banked on their being blood relations of the King. But they also added their share to deepening the intrigue, and confuse the situation. Although everything was suppressed at the surface, the underneath was a smouldering fire. It would flare up on slightest provocation, whenever occasions arose. Rana Bahadur was 'an infant in arms of about four years' when he became King in 1777 and after his father Pratapsinha's death. Bahadur was appointed Regent because of the influence he wielded on the queen mother. His own brother had dreaded his presence in Kathmandu and had him exiled to Palpa. Through her influence he staged a come back but it is said that he had to make exit for the second time also mainly due to her machinations. He could not survive his third term of exile and detention. Bahadur on all accounts was a man of great ability and possessed administrative talents, but was least fitted for the type of intrigue then dominating the Court and this eventually overpowered him. He met an untimely end, but when he left for heavenly abode the Court had been reduced to a play-ground of unhealthy forces. The contest between different groups of courtiers was very much undesirable at the time, because sane and wise counsels could least assert in the situation and the removal of Bahadur Shah withheld a sobering influence from Rana Bahadur who would have

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been restrained and diverted away from a line of irresponsible conduct. As a result the general line of administration and pace of military conquest did suffer and came to a halt; Rana Bahadur's handling of the affairs of state and his bad temper brought in consequences which but for the wise statesmanship exercised by our patriots would have been disastrous for the independence and advancement of the country. As appears from an intimate study of the court intrigues which were now let loose in the absence of a strong royal power, the state of affairs in the Government at Kathmandu was assuming a serious and ugly turn.

The King neglected his first wife, who was legally married to him and entered into cohabitation with two concubines, Suvarnaprabha and Kantidevi. The first was a daughter of a Basnait Sardar while the second happened to be a daughter of a Maithili Brahman. By the first one, he had already a son. Rana Bahadur had made the Brahman lady his wife against the orthodox and conventional notion of propriety. She was the youngest of his wives. There is a difference of opinion as to the status of the Basnait girl. The Basnait belonged to a clan of Parbatia Chhetri, and therefore, Dr. Oldfield, an English historian, regards her as the King's legitimate wife. According to him her son Ranaudit Shah was a rightful heir to the throne. But the prevailing notion about legitimacy was contrary to accepting the Parbatia lady as the rightful queen, and naturally, therefore, her son's claim to the Nepalese throne was not held valid.

Although in the prime of his life King Rana Bahadur was much agitated over the question of succession. He wanted a son of his own to succeed him, and a legitimate son had not seen the light of day as yet.

Rana Bahadur was never quite healthy in physique and since he assumed powers, his health further deteriorated. He was almost confined to bed for about a year and half since early 1796. The ailment was not so serious, but he was growing physically weak day by day. About this time Rana Bahadur contracted habits, which ultimately made him indifferent to the affairs of state. We have already reproduced what Abdul Kadir Khan had to say about his palace. To amuse himself on his sick bed he collected a group of comedians, dancers and musicians round himself, and not all of them were good characters. His youngest wife, whom he loved to distraction, was already claiming much of his attention and time. Now with the spare hours spent in the company of entertainers, Rana Bahadur had already no time left to run his Government. But nothing was so serious as all this telling on his mind. A delicate life of ease and comfort away from pursuits requiring physical

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and mental efforts always tends to make a person abnormal, and Rana Bahadur became extremely superstitious and fickle and lost all vigours of his youth.

He was hardly twenty-two, but he developed an obsession that he was destined to die at an early age. It was said that this feeling seized him following a prophecy made by an astrologer. The idea quickly acted on his weak mind, and it grew into an obsession. Ever since the feeling of death came to his mind he got anxious about his successor. The absence of a legitimate son was a source of constant anxiety to him. But the possibility of having a legitimate son was distant because he was not living with his married wife. Secretly he desired his youngest wife to bear him a son, so that he could bequeath the throne to him and be relieved of the fear of dying without an heir. In early 1797 Kantidevi was pregnant and the King thought that his dream was going to be realised.

But he knew that the issue born to him by Kantidevi would not be accepted as legitimate, and it would require super-human efforts to make him acceptable to the Court as his heir-apparent. But he was not so assured as yet if the issue would be a male one to raise all the problems. Nevertheless, whatever happened, he was determined to clear the path for the eventuality.

First of all, he had to see that there was no legitimate rival to the throne.

_Rana Bahadur Abdicates_

Hamilton reported that the King caused his cousin Kuldip to become blind of the left eye, lest the throne might revert to him in the event of his not having a legitimate son. We could not say it with certainty whether it was the King himself who was responsible for the loss of the Prince's eye sight, but it was generally suspected that Kuldip had lost it because Rana Bahadur desired it so. The throne could not devolve on a person who was rendered physically incapacitated. It was said of Rana Bahadur that he wgarted to get rid of all the rival claimants to the throne, and he took recourse to any means to attain this object. Besides the King himself, Kuldip was the only legitimate remnant of the descendants of Prithvinarayan Shah. With his disinherance, the problem was solved for Rana Bahadur. Guarded on this account Rana Bahadur waited for events to take their own shape. As he wished, Kantidevi bore him a son. Ordinarily, the birth of another illegitimate baby had no meaning. But it was otherwise in this instance. To Rana Bahadur this offspring was more than an illegitimate issue. The son,
later known as Girvan Juddha Vikram, was born on Asvin śukla 12 of 1854 (October, 1797). Rana Bahadur publicly favoured the infant to become his heir apparent as it was a wish cherished by him since long, and for sometime this question was seriously being considered at the highest level. Ultimately the proposition was accepted by the nobility and men placed in position of responsibility. But while the infant's coronation as Yuvaraj was being celebrated the mother got an attack of tuberculosis. Her condition became worse in a few days, and it was suggested that the King was to be prepared for the final separation with his beloved. This was too much for him to stand. He grew impatient. A grave sense of grief overpowered him, and he thought of renunciation and sanyas. In this mood Rana Bahadur got his infant crown-prince crowned a King for all eventualities on Phalgun 28 of 1855 VS (the second of March 1799)7 Rani Suvarnaprabha was made regent and obtained the status of a queen (Maharani).

Oldfield (I, PP. 285-86) gives a different story. He writes that Rana Bahadur had to abdicate because of his people growing hostile on account of his having cohabited with a Brahman girl and 'in consequence of various outrages perpetrated against their sacred body and religion, on the occasion of his Brahman paramour having poisoned herself, after recovering from an attack of small-pox, when she found that she had lost her beauty and with it her influence with the King.' Oldfield suggests that the King's abdication was mainly due to Damodar Pande 'backed by the nobility' and came about 'while he was decidedly insane after ruling for some years with tyranny and being guilty of most violent and atrocious acts.'

A current note from Nepal informs the British Governor-General that Girban Juddha Vikram was crowned, and demanded that henceforth the British should extend their friendship to his Government (Pol. Cons., 3 September, 1799 N. 7 and 8). The Governor-General reciprocated the feeling and assured the resigning King that his Government would have the most friendly dealing with his son's Government. The youngest queen (Kanchhirani) died of tuberculosis some eight months after plunging her husband in grief and despair.

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6 In a letter addressed to Subha Dinanath Upadhya, dated VS 1855 Phalgun vadi 14 roj 3, Rana Bahadur informs him to be loyal to his son who was to be crowned king on Friday Phalgun 28 as he had decided to renounce the throne and live in retirement. He has also named Ramaudit Shah as the first Chautaria and Bidur Shah and Sher Shah as Chautarias and had appointed Kirtiman Sinha as the Mulkazi in place of Abhiman Sinha.

7 A copper plate inscription preserved in Pasupati's shrine show that Rana Bahadur had obtained the consent of all the prominent office holders of the valley for this act on Magha sudi 15, Samvat 1855 (1800 January-February). The Raja of Palpa also put the mark of royalty on the baby King's forehead.
It is said that Rana Bahadur avenged the death of his Brahman wife by confiscating properties of the priestly Brahmans and desecrating sacred images, whose intervention he had earlier invoked for the cure of his wife's illness. In this act of defilement even the shrine of Pasupatinath and Swayambhu Stupa did not escape unhurt. But the Raja's fury did not abate and he exhibited signs of excesses likely to injure the royal tradition of piety and compassion. The Council of administration, therefore, had to exert pressure on him to mend his ways which he resisted for a long time agreeing ultimately to repair to Banaras as a measure of penance. Yet another report has it that under pressure he had abdicated in favour of his son who succeeded him as the lawful sovereign of the country.

In the chronicle his intention to abdicate is voluntary, and he had done so for two reasons, (1) he had a premonition that he would die soon and (the astrologers had predicted that he would meet with a crisis, Khadgo, in his twenty-fourth year); (2) he wanted to keep his word pledged to Kantidevi, who had demanded the crowning of her son. Kantidevi was ill for sometime past and she was herself 'facing a crisis of a severe malady'. By abdicating Rana Bahadur wanted to devote himself heart and soul to the care of his wife and at the same time relieve her of the anxiety at her son's future.

According to the chronicle the king at the time was living a life of renunciation in nearby Patan (Pulchok) becoming a sanyasi (mendicant) after handing the administration over to a Council of administration, which included amongst several others his own half brother and collaterals Krishna Shah and Balbhadra Shah and Kazis Ranjit Pande, Nara Sinha Gurung, Kirtiman Basnait and Tribhuvan Sinha Pradhan.

In spite of his best attention and medical care Kantidevi died on Kartika Sukla 4 Friday, NS 920 (November 1799) about eight months after his abdication. Rana Bahadur lost his patience.

A copper plate in the collection of Pasupati with date VS 1855 Magha sudi 15 roj 4 refers to the arrangement under the red seal. This is a long document, and contains instructions to his officers, men and the people in general to be followed by them as he abdicated. In the preamble the document has 'Now I want to renounce this world of my own accord, and in order to improve my lot in the next I want to devote myself to the service of Gods. For the care of the kingdom I give my throne and monarchy to Girvan Juddha Vikram Shah, son of the Kanchhirani (youngest queen) and till he comes of age the Jetharani (the

*He had assumed the name, Nirvanananda Swamiji for himself and called his wife, Kantidevi, as Swamini.
elder illegitimate queen) is to act as Nayab (regent) keeping him in her lap.

King Rana Bahadur executed another copper plate in the name of Sardar Angad Khawas on the same day and pledged his words to abide by the declaration he made while abdicating. The writ ran, "If ever I acted or exhibited a tendency to act in disregard of the arrangement I made in accordance with the copper plate executed to enthrone Maharaja Girvan Yuddha Vikram, may my family deities, also Lord Pasupatinath and Guhyesvari curse me, and all my ancestors, myself and my descendants, may they live in hell like insects for millions of lives to come." In the same copper plate Sardar Angad Khawas also pledged, "I shall ever be faithful to the arrangement you have made in handing over the throne to Maharaja Girvan Juddha Vikram. Its violation by me in any form or degree will invite malediction on me and my descendants. This will stand until the Maharaja comes of age."

Other officers of state had also pledged to honour the arrangement executed by Rana Bahadur Shah.

Whatever might have been his intention later, Rana Bahadur abdicated of his own accord. About this, there seems little doubt.

Up to this, the report sent by Captain Knox in 1802 supports the statement of the chronicle. The circumstances of his departure to Banaras are however, differently stated in the British official account. It was said that Rana Bahadur wanted to vest all powers of state in his hands, and attempted to supersede the administration he earlier constituted. But because of his actions in defiling and desecrating the images and torturing the Brahmans, he had grown immensely unpopular, and his opponents used this situation to dissuade him from adopting the intended course of action. As a consequence he was disowned by his army and for fear of life he fled to Banaras.⁹

Revolt

Hamilton narrates an incident of a conflict between the King and the able commander Damodar Pande who was earlier connected with the exploits of the battle in Tibet and Kumaon.¹⁰ He was popular in the army, and enjoyed the support of the officers. According to Hamilton, the King had changed his intention to quit for Banaras and had insisted to assume the entire power of administration. It was, however,

⁹ Secret Consultation, No. 42, 43, 26 June, 1802.
¹⁰ P. 252.
foiled by the consistent opposition of Damodar’s group backed by many others, whose popularity then at its height discouraged Rana Bahadur to pursue his intention.

According to materials at our disposal Rana Bahadur tried to incite rebellion, and functioned for sometime as the sovereign from Patan. Rana Bahadur issued coins. A decree issued in his name by some officers dated VS 1857 Vaisakha sud 1 Thursday called upon the entire inhabitants of Ajirgarh (near Gorkha) to come to Patan with all available arms for his help. The signatories were Chautara Balbhadora Shah, Chautara Bidur Shah, Chautara Gyan Shah, Kazi Pratiman Rana, Kazi Rana Kesar Pande, Kazi Jahar Sinha, Sardar Kalu Pande, Sardar Amarsinha Thapa and Bhairav Sinha. This was followed by a more comprehensive decree requiring all adult nationals to come to Patan on 19 Vaisakha. If the chronicler were to be believed, Rana Bahadur’s revolt started from the understanding that he was going to be taken prisoner by his son’s Government and there was a conspiracy afoot designed to this effect, which fact was made known to him by Balbhadora Shah (on Chaitra 20) who said that he had personally verified the report. But this decree was counteracted by another issued from Noakot in the name of Girvan Juddha Vikram, who had been earlier removed to that station as the chariot of Matsyendranath had broken to cause foreboding of evil days to come.

Rajeswaridevi, the eldest queen of Rana Bahadur, does not seem to have run a government of her own as is tried to make out by some writers. The documents attributed to her, which is a decree issued to a regiment Sardul Jung Company (dated Vaisakh vadi 13 roj 2 of 1857 VS) does not usurp the authority of the Swami Maharaja. She seems to have issued another decree calling upon Purano Srinath regiment to take care of the person of the King at Noakot. Both these decrees were worded to say, ‘If you acknowledge Swamiji’s authority and have in your heart the welfare of our son Girvan Juddha Vikram Shah and ours, then you disown these who had rebelled against Swamiji’. Obviously Rajeswaridevi was acting in concert with her husband and as an abettor.

It was said that the Swami Maharaja’s supporters were determined to fight and fortified their position in Pulchok having as their first line of defence the outskirt of the city of Kathmandu.

All this, however, was causing annoyance to the Council of adminis-

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11 The Chronicle.
12 One Chittaranjan Nepal, the author of a book on the life of Bhimsen Thapa, tells me that he is in possession of the actual copies of these decrees. But I have not seen them. I have obtained my information from the chronicle.
tration. From Noakot emissaries were sent to Pulchok explaining their position. As a precautionary measure armed pickets were posted in Jitpur to prevent the Swamiji from reaching Noakot should he attempt to take possession of the person of his son.

For sometime more till he realised the futility of such steps the Swami Maharaja was even active in preparing for large scale hostilities with the Government of his son, but he left suddenly at night (Jyestha 8, 1857) for Banaras reaching there ten days after (Jyestha 17, 1857 VS). From the Nepalese source it appears that with him reaching Banaras were the eldest Maharani, and 3 concubines, Balbhadra Shah and Bhimsen Thapa. According to British source he reached Banaras on May 27 1800.\(^\text{13}\) He was accompanied by Balbhadra Shah (Bulbudder Shah), Kuldip Kaur (Kuldirp) 'a person of rank', four equipage of females and 50 men.\(^\text{14}\)

The chronicle states that the Swami Maharaja dreaded that all that was to result after what was being done on both sides would cause civil war and bloodshed. As soon as he heard that the Sabuj Company was being sent to take possession of Kantipur, the awareness of the impending disaster became clearer to him. Then he felt that he was playing into the hands of wrong advisers. The regent Maharani had arrived in Patan about this time. Rana Bahadur gave up the idea of fight, and sad in heart left for Banaras.

As the King suddenly escaped to the frontier of India, all hostile activities against the Government ended, and the baby King was brought back to Kathmandu the next day.

In Banaras, of course, Rana Bahadur was not keeping quiet. He was intriguing mostly with the British authorities who had kept him under surveillance. All this gave his country-men sufficient worries. But to this we shall come later in the next volume.

The intelligence report from Banaras (28 May, 1800) reaching the British Governor-General at Calcutta said that Rana Bahadur had left as the Government of his son wanted to arrest and imprison him.

"He wanted to resume his seat on the Musnad of Nipaul, but the ministers, the Canzee, the Raun and Ca observed to him that he voluntarily abdicated the Government in favour of another and his resumption of it was inadmissible. This incensed the Raja greatly against the officers of Government, and he gave orders for beating some and putting others to death. They and the body of the people, have in consequence of all this denounced him as a madman, and declared that

\(^{13}\) Sec. Consultations, 26 June, 1800 (No. 70-71).

\(^{14}\) Ibid.
he ought to be confined; the Raja hearing of this, quitted Nipaul and
repaired to Banaras."\textsuperscript{15}

Another information one Thakur Vaidyanath transmitted through
the Collector of Bareili stated "his (Rana Bahadur's) conduct had been
marked with violence and cruelty and that they (the people) would not
acknowledge his authority."\textsuperscript{16}

It appears that news of his doings had passed beyond the frontiers
of Nepal. A Christian Missionary wrote from Bettia:

"Nepal is on the very verge of conversion. Recently the King of
Nepal has entirely forsaken the false God. The assertion is at least
unexpected; but the proof follows. In 1898, his wife whom he tenderly
loved was seized with the small-pox. She got cured fortunately but
her face bore indelible traces of that awful disease. Vain as she was,
the queen could not resign herself to this disfigurement and in a moment
deeply moved; his anger at first swept fiercely over the doctors. This did not satisfy him. In
his fury, he ordered the removal of all the idols from the temples into
the open and exposed air. Then he brought loaded cannon and com-
manded to open fire on these false gods. The gunners became pale
with amazement in hearing this criminal order. They refused to obey.
The king then condemned several of them to death and had them execut-
ed on the spot. The resistance of the others was broken. A terrible
report was heard. The idols flew to atoms and fell back pulverised to
the ground. This even is perhaps the first step in Nepal of her con-
version to Christianity."

Just as the East India Company's political agents were consider-
ing to take advantage of the situation in their own way (see below),
their padres also wanted to exploit the same to resume their activities.
The latter, however, had wished too much in taking the incident as
something to signalise maturing of conditions in Kathmandu for the
reception of Christianity by the Nepalese. In fact there was absolutely
no ground for such a presumption. Rana Bahadur's act of defilement of
images of orthodox religion was motivated not by a conscious desire
of a would-be convert but by a sense of personal vengeance. Any idea
of religious conversion was totally absent from his mind.

We now stop with the general history and proceed to give an
account of the general condition of Nepal in this period. The rest of
Rana Bahadur's history is deferred to the chapter, which also deals
with the subject of Knox's mission in Nepal.

\textsuperscript{15} SCC. Cons., 26 June, No. 70-71.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
Let it be said that from the point of view of progress, Rana Bahadur's accession to power presented a period which was practically without big events in favour of the Nepalese. Nepal, on the other hand, got itself immersed in internecine strife and the court wallowed in miserable performances of the worst type of court intrigues. As we will come to know from the following discourse, even Nepal's independence was threatened on account of the degradation the politics of the day underwent in that atmosphere. Bahadur's removal from the field tended to move Nepal to undesirable channels from which it was rescued by Bhimsen some ten years after.
CHAPTER IX

ADMINISTRATION, POLITY AND ECONOMIC CONDITION
(ABOUT 1800 A.D.)

In this chapter we propose to deal with the problems of administration, polity and economic condition as they obtained at the end of the eighteenth century.

As the system in vogue in that period represented the type practised for the whole of the latter half of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century, the significance of this chapter in the history of Nepal under review is greater than what would ordinarily appear.

The Government

Lawrence’s concluding letter to Lord Auckland about the condition of Nepal reads: “It is only justice to the Gorkhas to say that, bad as is their foreign and their Darbar policy, they are the best masters I have seen in India. Neither in the Terai nor in the hills have I witnessed or heard of a single act of oppression since I arrived a year and a half ago; and a happier peasantry I have nowhere seen “(quoted by Morison in his book ‘Lawrence of Lucknow’ P. 142).

This remark of Lawrence should satisfy all those who had been raising doubts about the merits of the administration the Gorkhali rulers maintained. By this at least the allegation that the regime was discriminately oppressive has been refuted.

Immediately below we cite a passage from another authority who had the opportunity to look into the picture as intimately as could be done by an alien visitor. Although this forms an estimate made fifty years earlier, the description by no means offers an opinion not different from those expressed by Lawrence as above quoted.

“It is formally and in a great degree essentially despotic; but its despotism is, on the one hand, modified and in some measure ameliorated by certain observances enjoined by immemorial usage, and not to be disregarded with impunity even by the most powerful prince; while, on the other, it is controlled by the active influence enjoyed and occasionally exerted by the aristocratic order already mentioned, under the appellation of Thurgurs. But at the same time that it may reasonably be doubted whether the body of the people ever derive the best advan-
tage from the political struggles of these chieftains, it is also obvious that
the extent of the authority possessed by the latter, must always materia-
ly depend on a variety of contingencies liable to constant fluctuation:
hence it would not be safe to deduce the general spirit of the Govern-
ment from its present condition, especially since it is certain that
although the administration of Bahadur Shah, during the minority of
his nephew, has on the whole been tolerably agreeable, yet considera-
tions of expediency, suggested by a solicitude to maintain himself in his
situation, have often compelled him to conciliate his colleagues, by com-
pliances, which according to the declaration of an intelligent person
who communicated with me very freely on this subject, have reduced the
strength and energy at the Gorkhali dominion to the mere shadow of
what it was under the more rigorous, or, properly speaking, the most
arbitrary sway of Purthi Nerain."

No doubt, the agency called the Government of Nepal, was nothing
but a medieval structure of administration based on the personal rule
of the king, who was at the top. No doubt, the way this Government
functioned could not but be called curious judged from a modern stand-
point. It shared all the blemishes and demerits of a feudal state. But
this was what every country, in India, however advanced at that age,
had been made to appear. No charge that could not be levelled against
others applied to Nepal. Rather, Nepal could escape many such
charges attributed to them if judgment was to be confined to actions'
strictly within the spheres marked for this country.

There are foreign and indigenous documents to show that the
Gorkhalis never interfered with the customs and usages of the people
they conquered. They never laid hands on individual properties. The
Birtas, Dan and Databya upheld by the previous regime were always
respected. Even the practices of the far northern region invoking
Lamaist deities for rainfall etc. found favour with them, and they were
not eliminated; instead the state helped them to be observed.²

The King

(a) At the head of the administration was the King. When of
age he ruled by himself. In his minority, either his mother or his uncle
or the nearest collateral ruled in the name of the Regency Council.

It was not an organised administration which the King was head-
ing. The machinery was not at all elaborate. It was a sort of personal

¹ Kirkpatrick, P. 196.
² See various orders issued, No. 2 & 3 of Itihas Prakas.
rule with two-fold objective: one, realisation of taxes and another, defence of the country. Short of that the Government had no functions. The problem of law and order was simple. In similar fashion law and justice were upheld. No welfare activities came under the scope of the very limited administration of the state except when it was called upon to help to build public inns, public tanks and public canals and thoroughfares. Even this, however, was taken to be the personal concern of the King as was his duty performed for the upkeep of the temples and of sacred shrines and sites.

The King as the head of state performed several duties. He appointed and dismissed all those in Government service. He declared war, sued for peace and signed treaties. He prepared accounts of income and expenditure, allocated revenues at his own sweet will, distributed favours and made grants of land to whomsoever he pleased and audited the expenditure by himself. Thus he enjoyed absolute powers, which, however, were always exercised, through high ranking officers of his choice, who appended their signatures to any document issued under the red seal.

The King functioned also as the law-giver. He issued codes defining what constituted crimes and what should be meted out as punishment. He promulgated regulations, which were called sawals for the guidance of departments and offices concerned. In short, the tradition of absolute monarchy with its Hindu conception had yet continued to prevail in the country, and had remained without diminution of vigour and strength natural to this institution.

The Regent was called Naib. In the infancy of the King he enjoyed all the powers and prerogatives of the King. If the Regent was too old or a woman, the Mulkazi or whosoever enjoyed his or her confidence exercised authority in behalf. There was a succession Act framed by Prithvinarayan Shah, under which the Regent was appointed.

The succession to the throne was governed by a kind of a rule of primogeniture. The eldest son of the ruler invariably became his heir-apparent. He was called the Saheb ever since the beginning of the Rajput settlement. Probably this expression originated from a Persian term Shahjada translated as ‘the son of the King’. Other sons of the King were also known as Saheb but there was always an adjective added to show how they stood in the order of birth. The word Saheb used singly applied to convey the meaning of a crown prince. The Saheb was also a powerful man in the court if he was of age. In times of emergency such as while the ruler became insane or bed-ridden with grave illness he became the regent if he had come of age.
In case there was male heir to succeed, the daughter automatically obtained the right of succession, but no women ever came to be seated on the throne.

The following was the law of Royal Descent as enacted by Prithvinarayan Shah (Landon, I, Appendix IV).

1. The King
2. His sons and grandsons in the same order of succession, as that which prevails in Great Britain, i.e., the eldest son of the King's son would succeed his father or grandfather even if he happened to be born in point of time after the eldest son of the King's second son.
3. The King's brothers and their sons in the same order
4. His wife
5. His daughters in order of their birth and their sons
6. The King’s uncle.

**Officials**

In an order of King Rana Bahadur Shah are mentioned the different dignitaries of the state along with petty officials and village headmen and others: Bhaiyat Gotiya, Chautaras, Kazi, Sardar, Khazanchi, Kapperdar, Dharmadhikar, Kharidar, Dwarya, Suba, Subedar, Jamadar, Sardar, Pharas, Omra and Ijaredar.

The Chautarias, the Kazis, the Sardars, the Khazanchis, the Kapardars and the Dharmadhikars constituted the order of Bharadars, which meant those on whom the responsibility of running the affairs of state had devolved.

The order of Bharadars was the aristocracy Nepal had in that period. These together ran the administration, fought battles, manoeuvred diplomacy and concluded or broke pacts and treaties in the name of the King.

Sometimes, when the King was an infant or an imbecile, the most powerful of them dominated the scene. But in this condition there used to be much of mutual recriminations and bickerings, which in the end led to a very undesirable kind of intrigues likely to jeopardise the interest of the state.

Kirkpatrick (P. 197) classifies the various state officials in the following manner according to seniority of rank:

1. **The Chautara**, who often acted as the Prime Minister, specially when the Regent was not powerful.
2. **The Kazis**, 4 civil administrators who supervised all civil and military affairs.

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*a* VS. 1853, Kartik Sudi 15, *Itihas Prakas*, I, i, 129.
3. **Sirdars**, military commanders, who only seldom managed civil affairs.

4. **Kharidars**, functioning as secretaries in political and external departments.

5. **Kappardars**, in charge of the Raja's wardrobe, jewels, etc., who also audited his accounts.

   All these 6 officers were deemed as Bharadars.


8. **Dharmadhikar**, to try civil and criminal cases as the highest judiciary.

9. **Bicharis**, who helped the Dharmadhikar in investigation and trial.


11. **Jaitha Bura**, elders and aged, wise men whose counsel was invited for important decisions.

12. **Subbas**, governor of districts.


The Chautara was a sort of 'Comptroller General' over various inferior departments of administration. Through him all files involving appointment or dismissal of public servants were disposed of. He signed all commissions and orders. The authority vested in him was called akhtyari-mukhtyari which he executed by means of a seal granted to him by the King. But the Chautaraship lost all the weight of office after Sinhaparatap died. For another 17 years the regents exercised both the functions. The Chautara was reduced to figurehead.

Later with Bhimsen Thapa in power there was a special post to perform similar duties called Mukhtiaari. The holder of this post, the Mukhtiar, became the most powerful man in the realm. Between 1768 and 1804 the Mulkazi was at least in theory the principal authority of the state below the Chautara. Up till Bhimsen's advent the man who acted as Hajuria (Secretary) to the King or the Regent was sometimes more powerful than the Mulkazi. But it all depended on whether the Mulkazi enjoyed that confidence himself. If he did, the Hajuria played the second role.

The Kazis, although each of them a civil authority in charge of the management of jagirs and revenue, sometimes captained a team of the army.

The Dharmadhikar appointed subordinate judges called Dithas in moffusil areas.
All posts including that of Chautara were renewable after a year and this system was called Pajani.

Even the King's collaterals were promoted to the posts of Kazi and Sardar.

All these officers 'received feifs or jagirs in virtue of their office'. But as Kirkpatrick said they also were entitled to a commission in the following order:

- The Chautara for every kaith (100 muris cultivated land)
- Each Kazi (100 muris cultivated land)

The Kaith referred to means a khet, a cultivated field of about 2.12 acres of land. The commission assigned was realised from such lands as formed the jagir of the official concerned. Until he held the post, the jagirdar was the proprietor-cum-revenue collecting agency for the jagir land. The commission was realised in lieu of the revenue and this certainly was higher than what in ordinary cases was paid to the Government as revenue. Besides commission, the Jaghirdar obtained several other benefits through imposition of extra levies, most of which were made over to him in kind.

In some cases the man who got a jagir was asked to keep in readiness certain number of armed personnel (Ithas Prakas, Vol. 2, No. 2).

Every employee of the state was a jagirdar in the sense that he got jagir on lands, the taxes of which he realised in lieu of his salary.

Although in theory the upper grade posts were open to all irrespective of birth, it was however, in practice limited to certain families. The appointment to these was regulated by precedents and also by sanads granted by monarchs. The sanads in turn had helped to set up the precedents.

We have a decree of Bada Maharaj Prithvinarayan Shah which distributes various offices of state in the following manner:

Kappardari for Kalu Pande's descendants and Kaziship to the Basnaitis; in foreign affairs, relation with the south was to be regulated by Sivaram Basnait's progeny and affairs with Bhot were to be always settled by the Pandes; members of the Pantha and Magar families, and the Chautarias as well as members of the Basnait and Pande families were to serve as commanders for the armed forces.

*The Bharadari*

From the above it should be clear that various offices of state had

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4 Kirkpatrick, P. 197.
5 Ithas Prakas; Ibid. (Vol. II, No. 2).
been assigned to different members of the order of nobility, and these came from families which were closely associated with Prithvinarayan Shah in his victorious career.

Now a paragraph about the council called Bharadari, which was composed of the above noted dignitaries. The passage quoted from Hamilton's observation will show the character and function of this council at the time.

"These chief officers now form the Bharadari or the great council of the Raja, which attends him in the Durbar, Rajdani or palace to transact business, and which frequently acts without his presence. It ought to consist of these twelve members; but some of the places are often vacant, and, at other times, the persons who hold them have so little influence, that they neglect or avoid giving their attendance. At other times, again, on business of the utmost emergency, a kind of assembly of notables is held, in which men who have neither office nor any considerable influence in the Government are allowed to speak very freely, which seems to be done merely to allow the discontent of the nation to evaporate, as there is not a vestige of liberty in the country, nor does the court seem ever to be controlled by the opinions advanced in these assemblies."

Dharmadhikar

The fee of Prayaschitta was charged to the share of Dharmadhikar. All cases of castes, touchability etc. involved Prayaschitta. It was compulsory to confess all sins of omission and commission, the latter of course, indeliberate and pay the fine and any breach of this rule was punished with expulsion from touchability (panibahek). The Dharmadhikar got all such fines and payments as could be realised. The decree of appointment of a Dharmadhikar was addressed to prominent persons both officials and non-officials, district-wise to the Suba, Faujadar, Subedar, Jamadar, Peskar, Munsif, Chaudhari, Kanungo, Mahalden, Kakaddeun, jeth ryot, ryot, national and alien traders and to peoples of all castes and four varnas. (The decree of the king appointing Daibangnya Kesari addressed to Mohottari and Saptari districts, VS. 1865—Phalgun Vadi 2 roj 5).

The Kappardar

Dated V.S. 1859 Jestha Sudi 11 roj 7 the following 16 clause Sawal (Regulation) issued to Kappardar Bhotu Pande will sum up the various functions of this dignitary as then outlined:

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Hamilton, P. 108.
1. The Kappardar was to superintend on his own authority the annual renewal of all the employees in Hitichok (pajani) Kotbhandar, Cowshed, Gunpowder store, Sormahal and collection of Sera for the entire country. He was to collect all the papers and documents of accounts at the end of the year and refer these to His Majesty for final clearance.

2. In case of corruption in discharging the above mentioned duties, the subordinate officers were to be fined thrice the amount misappropriated.

3. Grains (Sera ko Anaj) to be accounted in Basantpur (जंकि गर्मी जंकि गार गर्मी गारु) and distributed. Any amount to be disposed of from Hitichok was to be made over to it after careful scrutiny. The Kappardar had been empowered to increase or decrease in his discretion the quantity of rations allotted to the Ketis, Serala and Gothala.

4. On the demands of the menial employees of the palace (Keta-keti) and of the respectables the Kappardar could give grains in a quantity within Manapathi and Muri as he thought proper according to the status of the persons concerned. For excess he was to apply to His Majesty, who would clear the account.

5. For disposals done out of time on religious and similar purposes, the Kappardar was to provide grains through a reliable person whose name was to be noted in the account. His Majesty would grant clearance as well remit the excess to the Rakamdar’s monthly salary.

6. The Ghiukhani of Sera and amounts realised out of the sales of straw should be spent to make silver utensils and these are to be shown to His Majesty before being sent to the general store.

7. The Kappardar was to do pajani of the staffs in the Barudkhan of Kathmandu and Noakot and look after the manufacture and production of the gunpowder.

8. If any Kazi or Bharadar has occupied a Khet of Sera and Khwa of Khet, the Kappardar would not relinquish his hold until properly compensated.

9. In Mahottari and Bara districts the Pajani of the Mehtars of Sora mahal was to be done by him.

10. All cattle sheds to be looked after by him, and he was to present to the palace he-buffaloes of an age above 3 years.

11. In Sera an impartial examination of crops affected by flood, landslide and other natural calamities should be conducted and
remission of land revenue conceded to the Rakamdar.

12. The Kappardar was to make payment of the revenue annually towards the wages and salaries of the Newa, Tamot, Lukarmi, Dhakarmi, Goli, Tailor, and to employ them in the palace if and when they were needed.

13. He was also to do pajani of all the Damai, goldsmith, Kusalya, Lahetya, Thekarya, washermen, Chamara and supervise their work and look after their interests in matters of caste.

14. The Kappardar was to supervise the preparation of dresses for the palace and for troopers.

15. He was to take charge of all the pieces of lead to be stored in the palace. The extraction was to be reported to the kais.

16. The Kappardar's last duty was to arrange for the Chir (pieces of cloth) for the Holi.\(^7\)

- Total income for the period from 1853 Vaisakh Vadi 1 to 1858 Bhadra Vadi 4 (5 years 5 months and 5 days) charged to Kappardar Bhotu Pande from different sources, Tusal Dhansar, Paisa Taksar and Beni Paisa Taksar (Grain stores and mints)\(^8\) amounted to Rs. 37,865-12-9.
  - Total for . . . . . Rs. 32,038-12-9
  - Income for 1853 . . . . Rs. 5,527-14-9

**Expenses**

1. Through Shyamlal Khajanchi for the purchase of cover for the queen's Dandi . . . . . . Rs. 80
2. Through MaJudhai pearls for the queen's kantha . . Rs. 100

**Sardar**

We reproduce below two regulations issued to two Sardars, addressed separately to regulate their conduct and functions. From these we obtain an idea about the nature of the duty they were to perform. This shows how the function of a judge overlapped with that of a military commander. But it has been said that this did not come to prevail in the capital.

Here is a letter of appointment of Kanak Sinha Bogati to the post of Sardar as well as to function as a judge in the local court of law; he would realise as his salary the following incomes, he would have under him one company of sepoys for the internal defence of locality.

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\(^7\) Read for the original, *Itihas Prakas*, I, P. 130.

\(^8\) King Girvan Vikram's decree. *Itihas Prakas*, I, 135.
Salary of the post . . . . . Rs. 3,600
(of Paltan) Subedar Khanki . . . Rs. 675
Fines realised from courts . . . Rs. 2,925
Ordinary income . . . . . Rs. 240
Clothing for Dasahi . . . . Rs. 80
Sitakala Kapada . . . . . Rs. 80
Phagu Ko Kapada . . . . Rs. 80

The instruction ran: do not vitiate justice by partiality, do not take bribe, always be in readiness to serve His Majesty on tour or hunt and war and battles.

The Sawal⁹ to Dalbhanjan Pande, dated V.S. 1883 Phalgun Sudi 7 roj 5

He was empowered to hear cases, against any officer including Guru Purohit, Chautara Kazi, Sardar, Suba, Daftarkhanaka, Srikumarichok, Subedar, Jamadar, Amali, Izaradar, Rakami and Sipahi irrespective of rank or status. He was to give a decision then and then, in case he thought it to be a serious matter for reference to the King, he was to do accordingly.

If he could not decide on his own, he was to sit in judgment with General Bhimsen. Any offence involving confiscation of property, incest and divorce should be made over to Intachapli’s Ditha for trial.

The same sawal regulated thus the salaries paid to the staff:

2 Bicharis . . . . . Rs. 700 per annum.
2 Bahidars . . . . . Rs. 288
2 Tahabildars in charge of stores and records . . . . Rs. 300
1 Tahaluva or Peon . . . . Rs. 36

In addition to the above they were to take 1/10th of the income and ordinary fee called dastur.

Taksali

The superintendent of the mint obtained commission of the duties ‘levied on imports from Tibet’ and ‘a share of a tax payable by all merchants, natives of Nepal, on returning thither after a residence in any part of Tibet. This was about 7 tolas of gold, and exacted with much harshness¹⁰.

The areas outside the capital were looked after by an officer called the Suba, who was assisted by a military commander known as Omra. The demarcation of the area under the Suba was not strictly defined,
but it roughly came to be settled on the basis of the original territories covered by the Baisis and Chaubisis as separate principalities.

The Suba was an officer of revenue, justice, and police and in fact, always farmed the whole royal revenue of his district. He sometimes collected the different branches of revenue on his own account by means of subordinante officers named Fouzdaras and sometimes farmed them to Izaradars. In the Terai, the Fouzdar was a sort of deputy collector. He was also charged with the affairs of a subdivision, in which function he was assisted by one or two Chaudharis in charge of manors (in Parganas) and Mokuddums for villages.

_Fouzdaras and Omras_

The order appointing an individual to the post of the Fouzdar was made by the area commander. He was to be in charge of law and order for the area assigned to him. Ordinarily the Fouzdar functioned in a subdivision of a district. Also, he tried judicial cases, and looked after the prisoners. As the head of the area he helped recruiting to the Paltan. He executed all orders sent from the Centre. Anybody not complying with what the Fouzdar desired in the execution of his duty was severely dealt with by him under a decree issued in his name. His salary was obtained not from jagir land but it was made up by certain levies imposed in his locality.11

Along with the Fouzdar the Omra was another important officer in charge of internal defence of the same area. But in many cases he looked after the defence of a district directly under the Suba. Let us quote a passage from Kirkpatrick's book to have an idea of the functions rendered by an Omra:

"The Omra are everywhere wholly independent of the Civil Governors; their garrisons too, are chiefly composed of troops raised and formed by themselves, the regulars or those of the line, being only occasionally employed under them: they have lands assigned them for the support of themselves and men, are ranked very high among the orders of the State. They are distinguished by the simplicity or what may (in contrast to the refinements elsewhere observable even in Nepal) be called the clownishness of their dress, wearing short jamas, wide drawers or trousers and white turbans carelessly and inelegantly folded. Their arms consist of matchlocks, broad-swords, bows and arrows, and their class is determined by the number of Kohras or swords which they muster. They are never allowed to remain a long time together in the command of the same place, being relieved for the most

part yearly and not infrequently in the moment that they are about to reap the harvest of their lands. The same policy, however, is discernible in all the other arrangements of the Nepal government with regard to its delegated authorities, and the jaghire lands, both of which are constantly passing into new hands. The Omras serve very commonly in the armies, but preserve with jealousy their usages. Their respective forces are generally composed of their own kinsmen; and they affect to despise even the highest situations in the regular troops. They are all, with few exceptions of the Rajput Tribe.  

Subordinate Officers

We have already said that the policing of the area was done by the Fouzdar and Omra. Now we come to the State agencies of the villages. We postpone the consideration of the revenue administration to the last section of this chapter.

The office of the Dware in the hill areas and of the Chaudhary in the Terai was created for two purposes:

(i) to look after law and order position at the lowest level and
(ii) to collect land revenue from a group of villages under him in an area called Ilaka. His remuneration consisted of income from a jagir land called Khetkuwa, plus one-sixth of the total revenue he collected from the villages in his charge.

In times of war and emergency the Dware or the Chaudhary had to help the Subas, and Omras in recruiting soldiers for the armed forces.

The Army

The disbursement of major portion of public revenue went to maintain the army, to provide them arms and clothing.

Kirkpatrick reported 5 to 6 companies of troopers ‘containing no less than 140 firelocks and each commanded by a Subedar, all indisciplined but brave and capable of sustaining hardships’ (P. 215). According to him they had no general uniforms, each wing having his own colour, ‘besides matchlock, they were also armed with bows and arrows’ the troops were spread all over the country stationed in “Kotes” (forts). ‘A collection of the Nepal Papers’ published by the Government of India in 1825 nine years after the Anglo-Nepalese war has a memoir giving in details the various units of the Nepalese army

12 Kirkpatrick, P. 55.
13 A decree issued on Asadh Sudi roj 4 of VS. 1845.
and the strength of each with their total, which follows:

"The following is a list of the army of Nepal, as it existed about fifteen years ago; and it may, probably be more to be depended on than the vague accounts of population and the levy en masse.

"A standing camp at Caleejung\textsuperscript{14} in the Nepal Valley, near Kathmandu is said to consist always of about 18,000 men. It was then formed of the following corps:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
Calee Bux pultoon or 
battalion & 6,000 & B. F. 33,800 
Suboorj, or green & 4,000 & Burujnat Co. 100 
Sreenath & 4,000 & Ram Dull Co. 240 
And the Goruck Pultoon 
or Gorkha Battalion & 4,000 & Tara Dull Co. 200 
which has several times 
since the Relak's time (?)\textsuperscript{15} & & Lew Dull Co. 100 
been raised and renewed 
(There is also another). & & Mai Bux Co. 100 
Sreemuhur Company & 2,000 & Bhu Dull Co. 100 
Debee Bux Company & 1,000 & Siree Dull Co. 100 
Sreejung Company & 1,000 & Bughotee Dull Co 100 
Sulg (Stationed at 
Palpay) & 4,000 & Gorukh Co. 100 
Birjahance Company & 500 & Nyagoruk Co. 100 
Calee Dull Company & 500 & Myeesereemekin Co. 100 
Suttur murdun Company & 500 & Doorga Bux Co. 240 
Jung Bahadur Company & 200 & Byhroom Co. 200 
Mja Seereenath Company & 500 & Reepoomurdum Co. 100 
Runajung Company & 500 & Rumbheem Co. 100 
Tripoora Dull Company & 100 & Buttook Dull Co. 100 
Singanath Company & 200 & Juleberjung Co. 100 
Baruk Company & 300 & 36,280 
\hline
33,800 & & 
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{14} It must be the present Chhadni in the Kalimati Area.

\textsuperscript{15} Sign of interrogation, because this name is so badly spelt that it cannot be identified.
There was no separate company of troops for the artillery. Both the infantry and artillery were mixed up in the same wing. Although, each unit was known as the Company, it functioned more or less in the nature of a regiment. It seems that the number of soldiers in the regiments as given above in the ‘Nepal Papers’ is not in keeping with facts. Of course, the number differed from one regiment to another but it always ranged between 400 minimum and 1000 maximum. In giving the number beyond these figures, the author of the paper mentioned above has certainly erred.16

It is difficult to observe as to when the standing army of Nepal came into existence. While Prithvinarayan pushed his conquest he had with him a rudiment of a standing armed force. At about this time, the rulers in the valley of Nepal had also possessed some sort of army personnel, which could be called as ‘standing’. These were the men who fought the Gorkhalis, and they were recruited from within and outside the country and kept in a state of preparedness to meet the contingency of an external attack. The Nepalese army of the day obviously grew out of the rudiments assembled by Prithvinarayan Shah.

All these were said to have been well armed with English muskets, in good order and with swords. The ‘Subahadars and Jamadars’ carried bows and arrows, and spears; and they were said to have been regularly paid. Another report added, ‘The excellent effective state of their arms is certainly greatly exaggerated’.

Lord Moira in his secret letter states (August 2, 1815) that ‘beyond 12,000, all others covered a rude and hastily collected militia: brave, indeed and hardy but ill-trained and without discipline.’

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16 The subject of the organisation and discipline of the Nepalese army is more fully discussed in the next volume.
Hamilton (P. 112) reported that in years before the Nepal war, the country had 25 companies of armed men in the vicinity of Kathmandu, 15 companies in Tansen and 20 to 25 companies in advance to guard the newly conquered territories beyond the river Kali up to Kangra.

We reproduce another report on this subject from the same 'Nepal papers' for the nature of emoluments paid to the various ranks of officers and men of the Nepalese army:\footnote{No. IV, Muster Roll, referred to in page 10, \textit{Nepal Papers.}}

"Of a Company of Gorkhas, under command of Soorbeer Ghertee Siribahadar, in charge of the fort of Choupal (surrendered to the irregular force sent into Bootwal) and entertained in British pay.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Annual Emolument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Soubahdar</td>
<td>700 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Jamadars</td>
<td>820 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Adjutant</td>
<td>125 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Major</td>
<td>125 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Coleen, or quarter-master</td>
<td>135 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Colours</td>
<td>135 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Havildars</td>
<td>560 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Umildars, or naiks</td>
<td>520 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85 Soldiers</td>
<td>4,250 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Ammunition</td>
<td>240 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Trumpeters</td>
<td>90 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Drummer</td>
<td>50 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Kettle-drums</td>
<td>90 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Marfee</td>
<td>80 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Fifer</td>
<td>35 rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Smith</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Shoemaker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7,955

And further in terms of income from Jagir lands we have:

"Each Subadar commanding a company now receives 400 or 500 rupees a year, and 15 khets or fields, each of which is estimated to produce 100 muris or 234.1|2 Winchester bushels of grain, of which, if the land is let, he will obtain one half worth almost 72 (71.7|8) rupees for every Pati of squad of from 20 to 25 fuzileers—there are one Jamadar, one Havildar and one Amildar. The first of these receives 7 fields of land and 200 rupees in money. A major keeps the accounts
of the company, and his Jamadar's allowances. Each company, has five or six squads besides officers and music. The privates have each three fields, and 25 rupees a year. Such are the accounts that I received. Those given to Kirkpatrick differ somewhat, making the allowance of the superior officers higher and of the privates lower than that what I have stated."

We have three categories of officers at the top, the Kazi Sardar and Captain. The last usually obtained a jagir which ordinarily brought him about Rs. 3,000—4,000 in cash and kind. The officers of the two grades received each 6,000—7,000 rupees including grains to cover a part of his income as he customarily was entitled to.

The following is an estimate of the arms and ammunition at the disposal of the Nepalese armed forces prepared by Dr. W. Moorcroft for the year 1809 (Moorcroft’s letter, 35, Enclosure No. 2):

"There are two power magazines at Lagantole and near the Palace. Brass cannons were cast. At one time one was cast every day, later it turned out to be six in a month. A Frenchman named Dilhousee by the Nepalese erected these magazines. ‘The machinery is put in motion by the water.’ Rudra Vir Shah superintended over ‘a manufactory of musketry’. This information was supplied by one Francis Neville, ‘the son of a Frenchman by a native’. The Frenchman was in the employ of Raja Prithvinarayan. According to this information the number of armed men was as follows:

‘at Palpa 1,200, Chisapanigarhi 200, Mackwanpur 200, Bonat 1,20020 Volunteers in Kathmandu 1,000 with 700 nekly recruited’.21

Fifty years after Hamilton, Captain Smith has the same thing to say about Gorkha arms. He reported that the Gorkhalis were much expert in manufacturing excellent steel, they cast brass canons, mostly 12-pounders.22 The inhabitants also used swords, daggers (Khukris), spears, choppers, axes and belchars of different shapes, size and utility, all made by their blacksmiths.

From the above we have seen that the army had not adopted the European pattern of military organisation as yet. This was done by Bhimsen Thapa while he became the Mukhtiar. But it appears from some English records that the Gorkhalis had some Frenchmen as their

19 Nepal Papers.
20 Probably Piuthan, which had an arsenal and strategically controlled the whole of Far West including Doti and Kumaon.
21 Papers relating to Nepal War, P. 80.
military advisers. It was possible that the advice the French tendered was in regard to the use of European weapons and technique of warfare rather than to the organisation of the force.

Always while in march the army mobilised mass support. The Commander as ever obtained assurance of the support from the people of the area before it was invaded. The people also went into action to offer help in case of revolts or of enemy action.

Gorkhali troops were accompanied by settlement officers, and these were in charge of revenue matters. The troops were asked not to resort to extortion and harassing the people of the occupied areas (see letters, Nos. 9 and 10, in *Eitihasik Patra Sangrha*—the *firmans* issued by the Kazi and four Sardars asked the people to abide by the settlement made by Kharidar Laksmipati Pande and pay their share of revenue to him and his agents).

The present revenue courts and treasury offices called Mal Adda had not developed as yet. As appears from Hodgson’s account it had not come into existence till 1836, the year when he wrote his article on judicial system of the country.

The Paltan used to be in charge of the areas as they occupied. They registered lands, collected revenue, settled judicial cases through the Ditha and Bichari and realised fines to be deposited at the Company’s treasury. (Letter by Rajendra Bikram—*Itihas Prakas* Vol. 2, No. 2).

**Courts and Justice**

The territorial limits of metropolitan courts were the Dudhkosi in the east and Trisuli Ganga in the west as in the case of purely administrative system.

But Bhatgaon and Patan had their own courts within their jurisdiction.

Justice in all the administrative limits outside Kathmandu was administered by a Fouzdar assisted by two Bicharis.

There was also a system of mobile court for hearing complaints against the district courts and governors. Two Bicharis accompanied the touring officer to decide judicial cases. But major complaints were transferred to Kathmandu for disposal.

There were 4 Metropolitan courts:

I. (1) Kot Linga (2) Inta Chapli (3) Taksar (4) Dhansar. These exercised both civil and criminal jurisdiction. Below these in the Capital we had

II. (1) Kausi (also called Bharadari), (2) Bangyabaithak (Kumarichok) for accounts and auditing,
(3) Chhibandel conducted disputes relating to private or Government buildings.
(4) and Daftar Khana investigates jagir lands of the soldiery. The (3) was the supreme court for all revenue cases. Inta Chapli had criminal jurisdiction over all cases of (3) and (4) of the list II.23
Kot Linga was the supreme court of the land and all other courts were subordinate to it.
No courts could inflict any punishment involving death or cutting of limbs or confiscation of Sarbaswa24 or jat pani without the approval of the Bharadari Sabha, which was a sort of judicial committee of the King’s council.
All the appeals even against the decision of the Premier were heard by the Bharadari composed of 4 ministers, Sardars, one Ditha and one Bichari.
All disputes relating to caste or transgression of the rule of caste came before the Dharmadhikar who realised Prayaschitta in cash (fee for penitence). In the words of Hodgson, the procedure adopted was as follows:
"The Ditha decided, the Bichari conducted interrogation and also wrote fajsala,25 where in the former put his signature; the Bahidar writes Kailnama;26 the Arzwegi is the superintendent of the jail; the Naikas effect the Kora (P. 216); 25 sepoys under a Jamadar keep themselves ready to execute the sentence."
In the Terai and the capital the Kharidar was the Ditha's (Fouzdar) assistant, whose signature was essential in the judgement. This officer along with the Bichari could write a dissenting note. In case of lack of unanimity, the case was sent for appeal to the Sadar Court.
The courts maintained their own armed personnel to guard the premises and help them to execute the sentences. There were no policemen. The armed forces did patrolling and other duties. The Tahbildar was the treasurer, to whom all payments of fine were deposited. He also kept the record of prisoners. Fouzdar Tahsil was a section of the same court to which the Tahbildar was attached. The Tahbildar was essentially the trusted man of the Ditha, and he was in charge of stamps, stationery, furniture and other valuable stuff. The Bahidar also registered all complaints filed before the court. In the Valley there were separate courts for Bhatgaon, Patan and Kathmandu as aforesaid. The judges received salaries in jagir lands and fees from the litigants.

23 ‘Hodgson’s Miscellaneous Essays’; (System of Law and Justice) P. 212.
24 The entire property of an individual.
25 Judgement.
26 Admission of guilt.
The Pancha system also played an important part as they did in villages of India, and in settling disputes of caste and water amongst certain communities taken individually.

Even for proved offence, the confession had to be extracted and this was done by beating, whipping being very common. "That confession is strongly sufficient; without it, no quantity and quality of evidence will justify a condemnation; a strange prejudice, producing all that harshness towards the accused, which (omitting the folly of ordeals, and that the people seem to love more than their rulers) is the only grave defect in the criminal judicatures of the country."27

About the trial by ordeals Hodgson writes, "they, however, whether for proof of innocence or for the clearing of the accuser, are rare extraordinary and seldom or never admitted where there is sufficient testimony of witnesses to be had."

Nepal did not have public prosecutors. All prosecution depended on the testimony of the informers who, however, were subject to punishment in case the charge proved false in the court. To quote Hodgson for a description of Procedure (Law and Legal Practice, Pp. 248-49):

"In Nepal, when the arraignment of the prisoner is completed, he is asked 'for his answer,' and if he confesses his confession is recorded, he is asked to sign it and the judgement is at once passed. If he dies the fact, the assessors of the judge call upon the prosecutor to come forward and establish his charge. A very animated scene then ensues, in which the parties are suffered to try their strength against each other to produce their witnesses and counter witnesses, their presumptions and counter presumptions. The result of this conflict is usually to make the guilt of the accused very evident and he commonly confesses when the trial is closed. But if the accused persists in refusing confession, the assessors of the judge then go formally 'into the evidence' and urge upon the accused all the criminating circumstances and all the weight of testimony. If these be strong and decisive and he still deny, he is browbeaten, abused, whipped till he confessed; or if all will not do he is remanded indefinitely to custody."

And further,

"If there be no eye-witness but the informer, or if the informer be not himself an eye-witness to the crime and have no external witness to back his charge, he must at all events be furnished with strong presumptive proof (for woe betide him as he well knows if he have neither) wherewith to confirm his accusation. This proof is vehemently urged upon the prisoner by the court and by the accuser; and if the accused

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27 Read Hodgson.
prevaricate or be sullen, he is scolded and whipped as before till he confesses. If he cannot thus be brought to confess and there be but the accuser's assertion to the denial of the accused, the accuser if he professes to have been an eye-witness is now expected for his own credit's success to make the appeal to the God of Truth, that is to demand ordeal. The accuser if he be a man of eminent respectability tenders afresh on oath his evidence; and if his evidence be positive and circumstantial and in harmony with the probabilities of the case, his single testimony will suffice for the conviction of the court which will commit the prisoner indefinitely till he confesses.

According to Hodgson in 'Law and Legal Practice' (P. 246);

"The round of operations by which a judgement is reached in a Nepalese court of law is precisely such as a man of sense, at the head of his family, would apply to the investigation of a domestic offence; and the contracted range of all rights and wrongs in Nepal renders this sort of procedure as feasible as it is expeditious and effectual. The pleasing spectacle is, however, defaced by the occasional rigour arising out of the maxim, that confession is indispensable and by the intervention, in the absence of ordinary proof, of ordeals and decisory oaths.

"Upon the whole, though it be a strong spectacle, and a revolting one to see the judge urging the unhappy prisoner with threats, abuse and whipping, to confess and be hanged; yet it is clearly true, that whipings and hard words are light in the balance, compared with hanging."

We have the following passage from the same author for the form of the ordeal, which was practised widely.

"The names of the respective parties are described on two pieces of paper, which are rolled up into balls, and then have puja offered to them. From each party a fine or fee of one rupee is taken; the balls are then affixed to staffs of reed, and two annas more are taken from each party. The reeds are then entrusted to two of the havildars of the court to take to the Queen's Tank; and with the havildars, a bichari of the court, a Brahman, and the parties proceed thither, as also two men of the Chamakhalak (or chamara) caste. On arriving at the tank, the bichari again exhorts the parties to avoid the ordeal by adopting some other mode of settling the business, the merits of which are only known to themselves. If they continue to insist on the ordeal, the two havildars, each holding one of the reeds, go, one to the east and the other to the west side of the tank, entering water about knee deep. The Brahman, the parties, and the Chamakhalaks all at this moment enter

28 An article on the system of court and police in Nepal incorporated in his Miscellaneous Essays, Pp. 221-22.
the water a little way; and the Brahman performs puja to Varuna in the name of the parties, and repeats a sacred text, the meaning of which is that mankind know not what passes in the minds of each other, but that all inward thoughts and past acts are known to the Gods Surya, Chandra, Varuna and Yama and that they will do justice between the parties in this cause. When the puja is over, the Brahman gives the tilak to the two Chamakhalaks, and says to them, “Let the champion of truth win, and let the false one’s champion lose.” This being said, the Brahman and the parties come out of the water, and the Chamakhalaks separate, one going to each place where a reed is erected. They then enter the deep water, and at a signal given, both immerse themselves in the water at the same instant. Whichever of them first rises from the water, the reed nearest to him is instantly destroyed together with the scroll attached to it. The other reed is carried back to the court where the ball of paper is opened and the name read. If the scroll bears the plaintiff’s name he wins the cause; if it be that of the defendant, the latter is victorious. The fine called Jit-houri is then paid by the winner, and that called harouri by the loser; besides which, five rupees are demanded from the winner in return for a turban which he gets, and the same sum, under the name of Sabhasuddha (or purification of the court), from the loser. The above four demands on the parties, viz., jithouri, harouri, pagri, and sabhasuddha are government taxes; and, exclusive of these, eight annas must be paid to the mahamas of the court, eight annas more to the Kotwal, eight more to the Kumhalnaikias and, lastly, eight more to the Khardar or registrar. In this manner multitudes of causes are decided by nyaya (ordeal) when the parties cannot be brought to agree upon the subject matter of dispute and have neither documentary, nor verbal evidence to adduce.”

The trial by ordeal was called literally entering into justice by the Nepalese. Originally this was devised to answer any grave allegation affecting the moral character of an individual. The previous consent of the governor of the area had to be obtained before one entered the path of ordeal.

An auspicious day was chosen for the purpose, and the performance was done before a large gathering. In this connection one would get more information to read a note by Chautara Bam Shah to a Pandit instructing to choose a day for ordeal to be undergone by a Brahman lady to meet certain allegation (Itihas Prakas II, 3, P. 585). This note reveals also certain minor details regarding the aforesaid practice.
Civil Procedure

The courts tried to bring rapprochement between parties in cases involving Civil suits. In the event of failure witnesses were examined on oath. But the finale was reached through ordeals of various kinds as cited above. The Panch also had a deciding voice in civil disputes.

**Trial by Panch**

In most of the civil cases, there is also a method of trial by Panch i.e. arbitrators. These had to be acceptable to both the parties in dispute. Their decision was binding unless proved mala fide by the court. 'Old, honest and experienced men' whose disinterestedness had been proved in the past were chosen for this job. According to Hodgson, 'Where there is affirmation and denial by the parties and the trial of right must be had, then the charge called Geri and Kaspan (5 rupees from both) attach.'

The court charged small fee called pan phul when the parties arrived at a settlement of their own accord. It was about 5 to 10 p.c. of the amount involved.

Hodgson speaks of Jitauri and Harauri as fees realised from the plaintiff and the debtor respectively of the extent of 10 p.c. and 5 p.c. of the total sum.

**Jail**

In the jail the prisoner got daily two pounds of rice for his diet and one anna for other expenses.

If the prisoner was awarded capital punishment, he was beheaded at Bhatakusi (near the confluence with Bisnumati).

**Perjury**

*How the oath was administered*: For this we reproduce a passage from Hodgson:

"An oath is never tendered to a witness in the first instance but if his evidence be contradictory unsatisfactory to either of the parties, he is then sworn and required to depose afresh on oath. If he is a Sivamargi or Brahmanical Hindu he is sworn on the Hari Vansa; if a Buddhist, on the Pancha Raksha; if a Musulman, on the Koran.

"The form of swearing on the Hari Vansa is thus described. The Bichari of the court, having caused a spot of the ground of the court to be smeared with cow dung and spread over with pipal leaves, and a necklace of tulsi beads to be placed on the neck of the witness, places
the witness on the meaning is 'who-so-ever gives false evidence destroys his children and ancestors both body and soul, and his own earthly prosperity,' holding the Hari Vansa all the while on his head, and thus prepared he deposes. If there be reason to suppose that a witness is prevaricating or concealing some part of what he knows he is imprisoned until he makes a full revelation.'

Local courts of the Malla period were extant in about 1800 A.D. as reported by foreign visitors.

Hodgson listed the following courts personnel for Patan and Bhatgaon and other local areas where the Newar community lived.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Dwaria</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>Mahanaikas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bichari</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Mahanias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pradhans</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kotwal Naikiahs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bahidar</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Kotwals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Patwari</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Potadar Jaisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tahbildar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chaudhary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Si-chandel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Ditha was introduced by the Gorkhalis with their conquest. Bhatgaon's original court for survey and revenue affairs was known as Lusal. The Naikay was the headman for the village. The staff from the Kotwal downwards existed only in the courts.

Appeals

In the above pages we have dealt at length with the character of original courts and the procedure they were subject to in the settlement of judicial cases. Now we take up the appellate side of the judiciary for consideration. In this regard one has to bear in mind that appeals against the decision of any court in districts lay with the king's court in Kathmandu. This law court was presided over by a palace dignitarian of the rank of Chautara or Kazi. Sometimes the king himself intervened and gave judgement.

The Sadar Appellate Court also reviewed all major cases of criminal nature referred to it for final decision called Sadhak Faisala.

To quote Hodgson,

"The appeals from the local courts of the interior lies in the first instance to Kot Linga and thence to Bharadari. But the circumstances that in appeals from the province the parties and witnesses must all repair to Kathmandu; the extreme difficulties of the way; and lastly the impression naturally produced by the known fact that the local court

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(in all those grave cases wherein alone appeals might be resorted to) has already referred its judgement to render appeals to the Supreme Tribunal very rare.30

Those Rajas of the Chaubisi and Baisi groups who had been retained were deprived of charges of military affairs, but their right to hear judicial cases were not done away with, although appeals against the decision of his court always lay with the Chief Court in Kathmandu. The Raja also reaped benefit to the extent of realising and reimbursing to his revenue whatever fine was levied by the court in his jurisdiction against offences.

The Gaundas had their own appellate courts at Silguri, Palpa and Dhankuta with their jurisdiction defined and limited.

In the Limbuan area, the tribal heads of Ilakas enjoyed powers of an ordinary judicial court, but all cases involving imprisonment were sent to the Government authority in the headquarter for final approval.

**Jurisprudence**

In Nepal the first codified law appeared in 1853 through efforts of Maharaja Jung Bahadur, who was the Prime Minister. Till then the courts followed certain conventions and these were as valid as any codified laws.

These conventional practices were based on the following principles of Jurisprudence,

1. the onus of proof always rested on the accused.
2. the court not only assisted the prosecution but itself played the part of a prosecuting authority.
3. the presiding officer of the lower court always met with a punishment if the higher court reversed its decision and the punishment ranged from fines to rigorous imprisonment for 2-4 years.
4. all courts functioned as a tribunal consisting of three or more members.
5. the King was the highest judicial authority of the land.

**Penalties**

In feudal ages the dictum that an eye compensated for an eye and a tooth for a tooth was generally applied in awarding punishment. But this was a little softened as the medieval age closed on to the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Consequently, crimes like theft and robbery

were not met with punitive measures which meant decapitation of limbs. Likewise, assault, forgery and swindling were considered not as so severe as would require rigorous punishment; usually the practice was to inflict sentence of imprisonment or fine or both as deterrent and as sufficiently compensating the financial loss involved.

According to Hodgson "the great crimes (technically Panch Khat)—killing of father, preceptor or an elder, killing of woman, infanticide, cow-killing and incest are those to which some of the following punishments are applied: confiscation of a man's entire property, cutting off ears and nose, amputating hands and feet, putting out eyes and emasculating, hanging, flaying alive, death by decapitation with the enslaving of wives and family”.

Sacrilege, abortion, arson and seduction were enumerated as heinous crimes which were punished with extreme severity. Cohabitation between a low-caste man and high-caste woman was considered as incestuous as between persons within prohibited degree of relationship.31

The Panchayat

The village courts of the interior were attended by the Tharis and Bhaladamis, of the village. These were the elders and nobility, if any. The Mukhia or Jimawal represented the revenue authority in the meeting. The Dwaria was a link with the Police administration, who enjoyed certain judicial powers in minor offences. The Kotwal who belonged to the untouchable class of tailor helped to call the assembly.

According to Hodgson “the Dwaria assisted by the Mukhia or head villager also collects revenue and settles all village disputes. . . . His cognisance extends over all cases not included in the Panchhkat, nor touching life or limb or the substance of a man's property.” The village Panchayat could award simple punishment in the nature of fine or beating with Korra.

Having described in detail the system of law and justice, we now close this section with an observation by a foreign visitor on the nature of justice administered.

"Of their general spirit and defects, a reference to the publication of Mr. Halshed will enable us to judge with sufficient accuracy while, with regard to their execution, it will be fair to conclude that the criminal branch, at least, is administered with as much energy and probity, as in other eastern countries; the more especially as there is good reason to believe that theft, in particular, is an offence very little known in Nepal. Whether, however, on the other hand, we consider

31 Hamilton, P. 103.
the general scope, in a judicial light, of the Dhurma Shaster itself, or the suspicious nature of the courts established for giving effect to its institutes, there is not perhaps the same ground for drawing so favourable an inference with respect to the civil department of their law; and it was probably, indeed, a consciousness of some glaring imperfection in the latter, that suggested at one time to Bahadur Shah the design of applying to our Government for a code of laws, with a view to the better regulation of his country."

Although not so relevant a few words about the state of slavery will not be inopportune at this stage of our narrative.

Slavery

Both Kirkpatrick and Hamilton have reported about the existence of slavery. According to them the average sale-price of an adult working young male slave was Rs. 12|-, and of the female slave of the same type Rs. 5|- or 10|- more. The usual method of sale was the custom of mortgaging one's issues prevalent amongst certain tribes in the western hills. The process started with the mortgage and ended in the complete sale, when the debt was of a proportion which could not be paid back and was declared as such. According to a Lal mohar of the year VS. 1893, (=1836 A.D.) amongst the tribes the Magars were the most suffering victims of the custom of slavery. The Magars and others who mortgaged their children were economically handicapped. They were dependent on the landlords who made a provision of grains to them in times of stress. In lieu of interest which was exorbitant sometimes ranging to 300 p.c. the mortgage was made.

Once a mortgagee signed a sale deed, he lost his freedom of ransomng his mortgage, and thereafter became a slave. It is notable that king Prithvinarayan had prohibited mortgaging of human being in some areas since VS 1830, but this had not been strictly enforced.

The Language

Even before the new Kingdom of Nepal was born, Parbatiya held the dominant position of a language that was used in the inter-state communication amongst the various principalities of the Baisi and Chaubisi as well as of the Nepal Valley.

Ever since the 12th Century A.D. Parbatiya came to be used is a medium in the royal records in the Karnali basin. As the Baisi and Chaubisi came into existence, they also adopted Parbatiya as their

Kirkpatrick.
This was the dialect which was commonly understood by the local peoples of all castes and communities. In the Nepal Valley, Newari was the official language as well as a common dialect called Deshbhasa. In the Terai official records were maintained in the local dialects, e.g. Bhojpuri and Malthili and this was done irrespective of the fact that the rulers without exception spoke Parbatiya in their courts. But Parbatiya held the field as the common language in interstate commercial dealing and political parleys and transactions.

As Prithvinarayan Shah created the new state of Nepal, the language known as Parbatiya came to occupy the position of an official language of the country. It also came to be called Nepali in conformity with its position as the language commonly spoken and understood by a vast majority of the people in the new state of Nepal.

**Administrative Divisions**

Besides the central range, there were altogether five divisions in the hilly region and six divisions in the Terai.

The river Dudh Kosi was the eastern boundary of the central section. From there to the last extremity in the east, it was called Purbi Gauda with Dhankuta as headquarter.

The western section had three divisions: (1) the doab of the rivers Kali and Bheri with headquarter at Doti, (2) Palpa with its headquarter at Tansen, (3) Majhkhand with Pokhra as the headquarters.

The extreme western division of Doti, and the divisions of Palpa and Dhankuta were known as Gaunda with superior status and powers.

Chainpur was made a separate district in the early years of the 19th century covering the areas between the rivers Arun and Tista, '80 to 90 miles from east to west' and '60 to 70 miles north to south'.

In the Terai there were 5 districts subdivided into 27 parganas, (1) Saptari bound on the east by Kosi and on the west by the river Kamala, (2) Mohottarri, west of Saptari, (3) Rouhatar or Rohtut in which Katharban is included, west of Mahottari, (4) Bara, (5) Parsa extends to the westward as far as the Chittaun upto the river Gandak.

Apart from these divisions of territories within the former Baisi and Chaubisi regions there were Kumaon, Garhwal and the farther western unit from the Sutlej up to the River Ganges, all acquired and annexed in course of the war since 1788.

Hamilton noted that the Governor paid Rs. 2 lakhs to the Government at Kathmandu for these five districts situated between the Gandak and Kosi in the Terai, but he realised at least the double. This obser-
vation is confirmed by a letter of Prithvinarayan to the Suba of the area (document unpublished).

East Terai (Morang) paid only rupees 1½ lakhs, and this area also constituted a separate administrative unit. So was the area between the rivers Gandak and Rapti, which was known as Sheoraj-Butwal district annexed to Nepal in 1802 A.D.

The Government derived its revenue from land taxes, customs and other kinds of levies. Before we describe the nature of taxation, we give below the total revenue in the account of the State. Our authority is Kirkpatrick and he gives his computation for the year, 1788-89.33

Total Revenue

Sair, including profits on elephants and duties on the export trade, from . . . rupees lakhs 3 to 4. Mint, including imports levied on the import trade from Tibet (the reason of these duties being received at the mint, is that the returns from that country consist chiefly in gold and silver bullion) from . . . rupees lakhs 7 to 8. (Formerly the profits on the silver coinage alone yielded a lakh of rupees annually; but since the war with Tibet, this branch of the revenue has been much less productive. Should the Tibetans, conformably to ancient custom and treaties, continue to supply themselves with a silver currency from Nepal, it is probably that the mint revenue will soon be restored to the standard it was usually as anterior to the war.)

Mah, including duties on salt, profits on salt-petre (which appears to be a monopoly); profits on copper and iron mines, and land tax, from . . . rupees 15 to 18. From copper coins . . . one lakh of rupees.

The annual income of the Government never exceeded rupees 30-31 lakhs. The customs for the Nepal Valley area yielded about Rs. 8,000. The entire territories being for the most part parcelled out in jagirs the land revenue was much less.34

According to W. L. Gardner's letter to Colonel Nicholson Bam Shah estimated from the three administrative units west of the Kali as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Rupees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kumaon</td>
<td>. . .</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garhwal</td>
<td>. . .</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamuna and Sutlej</td>
<td>. . .</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have no such figures for the years preceding or following. There was no such thing as budgetting of revenue and expenditure. The

33 Kirkpatrick P. 211.
34 These figures are for the year immediately precedings the Nepal-British War.
king maintained all public accounts, as if they were his personal concern through his nominees. He himself was responsible for audits. This responsibility he charged to one or two of his officers who gave clearance to items of expenditure after a thorough check-up subject to the king’s approval. The audited papers bore the king’s seal before they were deposited for filing. It should be noted that the very concept of public expenditure was unknown. The king regulated the expenditure in the same way as he did his private purse. He made a gift of public lands and forests to whomsoever he pleased. Besides, he also maintained his own earnings and fortune. He had his personal estate, which was managed by the court staff under his direct supervision. All this was rent free. This was known as Sera.

**Taxes**

We reproduce below in detail passages from Hamilton and Kirkpatrick to get an idea of taxes as they obtained in three different places inside the territories under the jurisdiction of the Nepal Government at the end of the 18th century. The nature and extent of tax liability varied from place to place.

In classifying the areas, to start from the western extremity we have first Kumaon. Kumaon was no better placed than an occupied area. If the tax pattern was elaborate and rules thereto had been strictly enforced in Kumaon, it was because of its unstable and shifting position. Then came the Terai. The Terai area as the second unit has been treated separately because of its special position being situated on an undemarcated border. Together with the forest belt, this northern extension of the Gangetic plain touching the Churia hills yielded more than 50% of revenue to the Government. Kathmandu and the entire hilly region forming the third category were free from most of the taxes that have been enumerated in case of the other two, and this is the reason we put them as a different unit for our discourse.

We have no indigenous source materials at our disposal to describe the nature of the tax system. We have to solely depend on the two foreign observers above named for information on the subject. We have therefore quoted all the facts in detail from their observation.

It will appear that the Government derived a portion of its income from levies on animals and birds domesticated as well as out of the proceeds of fines imposed by the courts on adultery and similar punishable offences.

Although we have brought in the hilly region in our estimation above, we do not intend to deal with the tax pattern of the area in this
section. We do not find here the levies of the type applicable to the Terai and Kumaon. The taxation related only to land, though outside of Kathmandu some of the levies were concurrently being introduced.

According to E. Gardner, the Commissioner of Kumaon Division during the Nepal War, we have the following statistics in regard to the Sair duties in force in that area while the Gorkhalis ruled.

The nature of duties varied from article to article. If in some it was ad valorem, in others it was per specified quantity weighed in standard measurement. Many articles paid their share of duty per load borne by the carrier, whether buffalo or bullock. When it meant taxing animals and birds, the levy was per each individual animal or bird as the case may be. This rule applied also to slaves. On a few more items like woodsticks for fuel, bamboo baskets and earthen pots there was a surcharge per each individual item, faggot or otherwise.

(A) 88

(1) Nubessa (zedoany) sundoor, Julwah, Kakra singhee and certain poisonous herbs on each load for a man, from thirty seers to one maund 0 4 0

Drugs:

(2) Bulchar Spikenard, Kootkee, saffron, chebis etc. each man's load .... 0 0 3 (A)

Medicinal and other drugs:

(3) Cinnamon, Charchebellah, lulcurru, kyee, gum, nuspuat, cullah each load .... 0 0 0½
(4) Beharah, moomlah, dowlah, kutchor, nugarlee, ginger, each load .... 0 1 0 (B)
(5) Borax and Kutah (teria japonica), each load 0 0 2
(6) Walnuts and hill pomegranates on each load 0 0 3
(7) Wax, each seer .... 0 1 0
(8) Musk deer and pods, each .... 0 4 0 (C)
(9) Cowtails (Chories) on each .... 0 0 1
(10) Charus (an intoxicating drug) per each seer 0 2 0
(11) Gunjee (coarse cloth) one piece out of five on each load .... 0 8 0
(12) Bung (an intoxicating drug) each load .... 0 8 0
(13) —do— (an inferior sort) each load .... 0 0 0½

85 Gardner to the Governor-General, 24 May, 1815.
86 A few words being mis-spelt are understood with difficulty.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rs. As. P.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Hemp</td>
<td>0 0 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ghee, honey, chook, lemon-juice, if in cupees each</td>
<td>0 0 0 ½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—do— if in earthen pots each</td>
<td>0 0 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—do— if in tankees each</td>
<td>0 0 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Tar, each earthen pot</td>
<td>0 1 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Flour, rice and different kinds of grain, four seers taken from each load</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Copper and brass each seer</td>
<td>0 2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Iron, each load</td>
<td>0 0 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Iron pots, each load</td>
<td>0 4 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Hawks of different descriptions each</td>
<td>1 4 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Minas (birds) each</td>
<td>0 4 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Parrots and bhukoors, each</td>
<td>0 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Timber each hackney load</td>
<td>0 2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Worked wood, each load</td>
<td>0 2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Hill ponies, tiny horse each</td>
<td>1 4 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Slaves, Male and female each</td>
<td>2 8 0 (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Elephants caught in pits</td>
<td>2 0 0 (E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Bamboo baskets each load</td>
<td>0 0 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Chulme each load</td>
<td>0 0 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Chunam, each buffalo load</td>
<td>0 0 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Bamboos and timbers each cartload of four bullocks</td>
<td>0 8 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—do— two bullocks</td>
<td>0 4 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Babur (a grass used as rope) a man’s load</td>
<td>0 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—do— a cart load</td>
<td>0 4 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Rice and wheat a buffalo load</td>
<td>0 4 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Khuss, a cart load</td>
<td>0 12 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Ginger (raw) a man’s load</td>
<td>0 1 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Titpaut (a bay leaf) a ditto</td>
<td>0 0 0 ½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Cashuphul, a —do—</td>
<td>0 0 0 ½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Bhoojputta, a —do—</td>
<td>0 0 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have the following table for duties levied on imports from the plains.³⁷

(1) On white cloth, silks etc. Rs. 32 p.c. on the invoice, or on each rupee’s worth | 0 0 0 ½(F) |
(2) Blankets each | 0 0 2 2

³⁷ Secret letter, dated June, 1, 1815, Enclosure No. 31, Nepal Papers.
(3) Sheep and buffaloes each ........................................ 0 1 0
(4) Soap, each load ........................................ 0 4 0
(5) Oil, on each Kuppu ........................................ 0 0 2
(6) Almonds, cloves, nutmegs, ginger, cocoanuts, pepper, on each load ........................................ 0 4 0
(7) Tobacco, smoking on each rupee’s worth .............. 0 0 1
(8) Mong (a grain) each load ................................ 0 0 1
(9) Salt, on every rupee’s worth ............................... 0 0 1
(10) Koochees (used by weavers) each ...................... 0 0 1
(11) Kunch, a man’s load .................................... 0 0 2
(12) Tobacco, dry for chewing each load .................. 0 0 7

Below the revenue of the districts in the Terai is given district wise along with the tax pattern quoted in full from Hamilton’s book ‘Account of Nepal’ (P. 153).

(B) Morung:

1. \{ Nangang and Dhapar, land rent, Rupees 5,000 \} Sayer, 1,300
   Beli, ........................................ 600
   \{ Futehhari, ................................ 4,500
       Gogra .................................... 7,500
       Hathiya Simar ............................ 450 \}

2. Mangar ........................................ 250
   Beliya ....................................... 700
   Kuthor \}
   Bariyati .................................... 12,500

3. \{ Harchand garhi ................................ 14,500 \}
   Kerayan, .................................... 1,125
   Atmauza ..................................... 7,000
   Mechpali and Latang, .......................... 400

Rs. 54,025 Rs. 7,500

Total land rent, ........................................ 54,025
Do, Sayer ........................................ 7,500
Kascharai, or rent for pasture, .......................... 24,000
Khayer Sal, or duty on Catechu, .......................... 3,000
Kathmahal, or duty on timber, ............................ 38,000
Chiriyyamahal, or duty on birds, .......................... 500
Customs at the Golas, Chatra, (given to a temple) Rs. 1,500
Vijayapur . . 2,000
Raksa . . 800
Latang . . 600
Rotoya . . 1,000 4,400

Total 131,425

Hamilton further said in that connection, "The land rent was levied by so much on each crop, by a bigha of nine common cubit the Katha, equal to 72,900 square feet. The following was the rate at the time when I procured the account. The chief of the village (Mokud-dum) was allowed five bighas free of charge for every hundred bighas of land paying rent, that used to be in his charge." The following will show the sums collected on these heads in the year Sambat 1867, (A.D. 1809).\textsuperscript{38}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zila.</th>
<th>Saptari</th>
<th>Land-rent</th>
<th>Marriages</th>
<th>Concubines</th>
<th>Adulterers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pergunah</td>
<td>In Rupees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalisa</td>
<td>10,013</td>
<td>75\frac{1}{2}</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagadal</td>
<td>2,485</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12\frac{1}{2}</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakri</td>
<td>13,345\frac{1}{2}</td>
<td>55\frac{1}{2}</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maljhunna</td>
<td>754\frac{1}{2}</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayjhunna</td>
<td>941\frac{1}{2}</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7\frac{1}{2}</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakuya</td>
<td>855\frac{1}{2}</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gudagari</td>
<td>501\frac{1}{2}</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7\frac{1}{2}</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rampurbehara</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahishan</td>
<td>501\frac{1}{2}</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5\frac{1}{2}</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khonvaghni, Majhoya, Dhanchhoyar, Vihar</td>
<td>Totally waste.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Rs. 29,881</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{38} Hamilton, P. 161-61.
Hamilton says commenting on the above:

"The establishment is nearly similar to what is maintained in Vijaypur. A great part of the rents are farmed. The rent is paid by so much a bigah for each kind of crop. The bigah is of the same size as in Morang". The following was the rate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Land rent (in rupees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mahatari</td>
<td>9,115½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korari</td>
<td>10,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khesraha</td>
<td>11,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pihan</td>
<td>7,855½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Rupees</strong></td>
<td><strong>38,208</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to country measure. According to Calcutta measure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rs.</th>
<th>As.</th>
<th>As.</th>
<th>Pies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice, (Sali)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustard, (Turi)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corocanus (Maruya)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco and Kitchen Garden</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9½</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hamilton continues the description, "All ranks pay the same rate. Tradesmen pay a ground rent for their houses of rupees 5.10 included in the land-rent, and a capitation tax to the Sayer of rupees 1.10, those who have regular shops in the market places pay to the Sayer Rs. 7.10 and nothing for ground rent. Washermen, barbers, tailors and shoemakers, pay no capitation."

In every district the Sayer, consisting of the capitation on tradesmen, and of the duties levied on goods sold, and grain exported, was farmed to 'two men for Saptari one paying 3254 rupees and the other 3135½; and for Mahatari to one man paying 6595½'.

Again the following from Hamilton will be more enlightening:

"The rents on the pasture of buffaloes is farmed at 1431 rupees for Saptari, and 3956.1½ rupees for Mahatari.

"The duty on those who make catechu is farmed in Saptari for 1015 rupees, and in Mahatari for 1212 rupees.

"The duties on timber are farmed in Saptari for 2462 rupees, and in Mahatari for 2225 rupees."
"The duties on boats loaded with timber are farmed in Saptari for 2441 rupees, and in Mahatari for 345.

The duty on birds for both is farmed at 698½ rupees.

"The duties levied at the Golas, or custom houses, have been farmed for three years at 100,000 rupees or 33,333.1½ a year; but in this bargain are included the duties at Varaha Kshatra and Vijayapur, for which the renter pays 1,500 rupees annually to the priest of the former place, and 2,000 to the Suba of Morang; so that the customs here are actually farmed at 29,833 rupees a year.

The person who has farmed these rents, Achal Thapa, resides at Bhangraruya on the Kosi, and has endeavoured to secure a monopoly; but his plans have not been very successful, and he will be a heavy sufferer by the interruptions of commerce that have ensured in consequence of the disputed frontier."39

The total revenue collected by the Suba was as follows for the tract noted in the foregoing paragraph.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land-rent and several casualties</td>
<td>68,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasture</td>
<td>5,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catechu</td>
<td>2,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber cutters</td>
<td>4,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duties on boats loaded with timber</td>
<td>2,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duties on birds</td>
<td>698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs at Golas</td>
<td>29,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duties on markets or Sayer</td>
<td>12,985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

127,559

The above gives only the total realisation on each head of revenue. It does not provide information as to the rate of impositions. The articles listed for taxation are cereals, products of orchards, catechu, timbers, cotton, tobacco, mustard, birds, hides and skins. The tax on these was a kind of local excise. Two more items ganja and opium could be added to this list. Pasture land paid a separate levy. The Government also realised taxes from the plot of land where the weekly market was held. Import and export duties were collected in goalas fixed up in market centres on the border.

**Land System and Land Tenure**

There were three types of land system, (1) the Birta (2) the Zamindari (3) and the raikar. The Birta was a freehold granted by

the King either as a reward for services or made over to a Brahman as a gift. The tenants in Birta land paid his rent to the Birtawl. He had no permanent tenancy right over the land. The landlord could eject him at his will. In the Zemindari area the Government got its revenue from the Zemindars who had their own right over the land apart from the tenancy right of the tiller. The tenants could not be ejected from his holding except through a judicial decree on default of payment of annual rent. In the raikar land the tenant himself was the master and he paid his rent to the Dwaria in charge directly to be deposited in the treasury.

The Birta land was spread over the entire length and breadth of Nepal. But the Zemindari obtained only in west Terai between the rivers Rapti and Narayani.

The Birta holder exacted from the raiti several kinds of dasturs. So did the holders of Khuwa land. The latter was obtained as a Jagir by an individual while in office. Each important office had its own Khuwa land. A tenant in Birta and Khuwa lands paid his rent in kind. In addition to the rent, he had also to surrender to the Birtawl or the Jagirdar a part of the products of his orchard, and of his breed of animals if he maintained any. In festivities the tenant gave olok of seasonal fruits, ghee, sacrificial birds and animals. He also paid a nominal rent for pasture land, fuels and timbers.

Prithvinarayan Shah had guaranteed by a sanad the rights of a Limbu over his Kipat in the tract between the rivers Dudhkosi and Tamor. No commitment on his part, whatsoever could alienate a Limbu from his Kipat land. In Limbuan the tax assessed was per house where the raiti lived irrespective of the area of land the owner possessed. The Kipat land, however, could be mortgaged. When subdivided and fractioned each plot bore the same amount of tax as the whole if it came to erect a house to inhabit. Ordinarily the Kipat was mortgaged to the non-Kirati settlers who lent money.

In the whole of Limbuan the revenue was collected for the central authority by the headman of a group of villages, who held a hereditary job and styled himself a Suba for that area to look himself as much a dignitariant as the Government appointed official bearing the same designation. The Suba also received in practice all respects and presents informally tendered to the latter by his subordinates and prominent citizens.

We have the following paragraph about the nature of land tax in Almora according to Hamilton:

"In Almora (and the other estates did not materially differ) the
rent was fixed by the Visi, which on an average, may be taken at 10 Calcutta bighas, or 3 \( \frac{1}{10} \) English acres; but the Visis varied a good deal in size, especially in such as were exempted from assessment, which were in general much larger than such as paid it. The extent of 10 bighas for the Visi is chiefly applicable to the latter. The rent was paid partly in kind, partly in money. Each Visi in October paid 28 seers of clean rice (Calcutta weight), 4 seers of the pulse called urid, and 2 seers of Ghiu or oil: in May it paid 28 seers of wheat, 4 seers of Urid, and 2 of Ghiu: in August it paid one rupee in money. On each of the two holidays called Dasahara, there was besides a kid offered to the sovereign for every 10 Visis. The possession of a convenient number of zemindars formed a gram or gang and one of them held the hereditary office of Pradhan, entirely analogous to the Umra of the eastern parts. The Pradhan was allowed a deduction of rent and enjoyed some honourable distinction and, when the heir was in any manner incapacitated, a relation was appointed to act for him. The representations of the other zamindars or farmers in the same gram were usually considered as the most just criterion of this incapacity.”

In the Terai land tax was realised per acre, which was about Rs. 3\(-\) on the average. In the hills the rates differed from paddy yielding low lands to cultivable uplands higher up. The latter paid a nominal rent, but on the former the rate of taxation was higher than what obtained in the Terai. In the Kathmandu Valley the rent paid to the Government per ropani was about Re. 1\(-\). But the Birta lands paid six times as much.

**Forced labour (Beth-begari)**

The system of Beth-begari, i.e. forced labour existed since a very long time. This was not only conventional, but was also enforced through royal decrees.

The Government exacted forced labour from all the land holders except the Birtawals. Forced labour was employed to carry Government cash, to build and repair public thoroughfares and to help in the military operations in times of conflict.

Forced labour was also exacted by Birtaholders, and this if not wholly legal was connived at by the Government authorities.

**Bandha (Semi-enslavement)**

In the preceding section we spoke of slavery. Besides slavery, we have also a kind of semi-slavery called the Bandha system. This

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40 Hamilton. P. 112.
entailed servitude to the money lender. The difference in status between a slave and a *bandha* was that whereas the former could not purchase his liberty, the latter could do so. The *bandha* mostly performed domestic work, but at times was employed as a field labourer. The *Bandha* did not exist in the valley of Nepal and Terai. The system like slavery was confined to the hilly tracts. Invariably the *Bandhas* like the slaves came from the tribes and low caste groups, whose members in general were forced by poverty to seek livelihood and deliverance from crushing obligations that way.

*How the revenue was collected*

Land tax was collected by the Government directly through its own agencies. For this purpose, the military command of the area concerned had an office under a Kharidar who kept himself in contact with those entrusted with the task of realisation at the lower stage. The work of collecting land revenue from the *raiti* (the subject) was performed by the *Dwaria* in a group of villages in the hilly tracts, while in the Terai the Kanungo and the Chaudhary did the same kind of service.

All other revenues were farmed out to contractors. Into this were included Sayer duties, excise on liquor, ferry service, sale of timber and customs on imports and exports except those passing through the main road leading to Kathmandu. The contract was charged to the highest bidder.

If the area was not settled, the military commander sent his Ditha and Bichari to realise direct from the citizen all the dues he had to pay to the Government, and this practice continued until a settlement was made and a contractor obtained.

The rent on land in the hills whether in the paddy yielding low lands or cultivated uplands was of one kind. The tax was called *tiro*. The latter paid *serma*, which was comparatively light. In the Terai land revenue per acre amounted less than in the Valley and hills in terms of *muri* or *ropani* but the surcharge on tobacco, mustard and other extra crops added to ordinary taxation made up the gap.

*The Rajas*

Not all the Baisis and Chaubisis were done away with. Those who collaborated with the Gorkhalis had been retained. But all of them lost their sovereign rights. Those who were retained also found their areas shrinking. From a consideration of strategy some portions
of the territories forming the Raj of these Chieftains were added to the kingdom of Nepal. It appears that the remnants of the Baisi and the Chaubisi groups were allowed only to enjoy zemindari rights over the land within their jurisdiction. A few, however, like Bajhang, Jajarkot, Saliana and Galkot did also enjoy the powers of a Suba in both executive and judicial spheres.

What is of interest to us here is the revenue aspect of the problem. The Rajas were required to pay tributes to the king, and this ranged from Rs. 5,000 in case of the Saliana Raj to Rs. 3,300 in case of Jajarkot. The payment was regulated by a royal charter under a red seal. The charter was revised by successive Governments. When occasions arose, sometimes even on demand by the subjects of the Raj concerned.

It was complained that the Rajas used their judicial authority to exploit their illiterate and simple raities by awarding sentences which involved heavy fines accruing to the treasury.

_Agriculture and industry_

In the Terai and hills, the main crops were paddy, wheat, maize, millet and barley. The Valley produced in the main paddy, maize, potato, onion and garlic.

The plough was not used by the Newar cultivators in the Valley, who prepared their ground for rice by digging to a certain depth with a sort of spadeku, turning up the soil in ridges, as in potato plantations, leaving the whole for some time until well flooded, and finally levelling the field. Elsewhere ploughing by bullocks was common.

Sugar-cane was cultivated in the valley of Mahesh Khola and Balambu. Oranges were abundant in eastern and western hilly tracts.

In the words of foreign observers the country was rich in minerals. Copper, iron and mica were in abundance. A huge forest yielded different kinds of woods and timbers. The same nursed rhinoceros, elephants, tigers, deer, etc. Yak and musked deer so important for commercial reasons were found in the Himalayas amidst snowy vegetation.

And further, “The cattle of Nepal, generally speaking, are not superior to those commonly met with in Bengal; and the Chowry cow, and Changra or shawl goat, are only to be found among the mountains bordering on Tibet. The inhabitants of the latter country use sheep as beasts of burthen, for the transporting of salt into Nepal; of which each is said to carry 42 pounds avoirdupois. This district does not abound
much with game; and the fish, from the transparency and rapidity of the stream, are very difficult to catch with the fly. The sarus, ortolan, wild goose, and wild duck, appear in Nepal only as birds of passage, making a stage of it between Hindostan and Tibet. Copper and iron are found here; the latter of an excellent quality. Oude was formerly supplied with copper from this country; but of late the European copper, by underselling, has driven the Nepal copper out of the markets. The gold imported to Bengal from Nepal is not the produce of the country the quantity procured from the rivulets flowing through the territory being extremely small. The gold is received by the Nepalese, from Tibet, in exchange for goods”.

The peasants of the Nepal Valley wove a coarse kind of cloth partly for home use and partly for export to Tibet. Cotton they received from Noakot or the Terai. Almost all the poor and lower middle class people wore the native cloth.

The Nepalese made their own paper. The paper was made from bark of seid-burroa or Kaghazipat.

We quote the following two paragraphs from Hamilton for more information about the industries and manufactures of the Valley of Nepal.

“The Newars worked on iron, copper, brass indigenous, and in carpentry without saw using chisel and mallet. They export brass utensils. They gild extremely well and construct bells of so large a size as five feet diameter.

“From rice and other grain they distil spirits and prepare a fermented liquor from wheat, mahua, rice etc., which they name Pham; it is made in the manner of our malt liquors, which it resembles. They make cutlery, swords and daggers, and also some firearms but not successfully” (Hamilton, Pp. 232-33).

Different kinds of Land

There were four categories of lands under cultivation. The nomenclature used for these categories was the same as in the Moghul dominion. The terms used variously were awal, dvyam, svayam and chahar. Taxation on land varied from land to land according to classification. The awal paid the highest rent, while the Chahar land paid the lowest. In between came the other two categories, the records of surveys and settlement were maintained. In the hills the

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41 Hamilton in *East India Gazetteer*.
42 Kirkpatrick, P. 200.
43 Hamilton in *East India Gazetteer*. Hamilton, P. 252.
measurement was done by *muri* standard, in the Valley of Kathmandu by the *ropani* and in the Terai by *bigha*. A *muri* is equivalent to $4 \times 4$ cubits, and $4$ *murus* made one *ropani*, while $13\frac{1}{2}$ *ropanis* measured a *bigha*. The Nepalese *bigha* covered an area as much extensive as an English acre. The military command of the area surveyed and measured lands in its jurisdiction in course of the settlement process.

The charges for cultivation of a *khet* of $2.1\frac{1}{2}$ acres given below quoted from Kirkpatrick will help us to understand the nature and cost of cultivation:44

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plough</th>
<th>Rs. As.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55 ploughs at 12 ploughs per rupee</td>
<td>. .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Purthijoah or first turning up the soil</td>
<td>. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Oakhacuna or second ploughing</td>
<td>. 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Heelo or Kadokurna or third ploughing</td>
<td>. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Schano or fourth ploughing</td>
<td>. 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55

| 82 labourers at 1 rupee per 24 labourers | . 3 7 |
| For seeding | . |
| For conducting and distributing the water from the adjacent springs or rivulets called Ahree Chatna | . 10 |
| For mounding or clamming the Ahrees | . 10 |
| For plucking & binding the first shoot of rice | . 12 |
| For transplanting —do— | . 2 |
| For levelling & clearing the field | . |
| For removing the first shoots for transplantation | . 3 |

82

| For one day’s diet to labourers, 24 pathies of coarse rice at 10 pathies per rupee | . 2 6¼ |
| For seed, viz. Moories at 15 pathies per rupee | . 6 10¼ |
| For Salami or fine paid by the farmer or undertaker to the jagirdar or proprietor | . 2 8 |

Total Rupees . . . . 19 9¼

Thus it will appear that the cost of cultivation was comparatively less burdensome to the peasantry even in the hilly tracts.

44 Kirkpatrick, P. 99.
The wage labour was paid at the rate of \(-2\) annas per day for ordinary labour. Carpenters, blacksmiths got \(-3\) and bricklayers \(-2\frac{1}{2}\), goldsmiths were paid a little more.

The rate of interest for debt of cash was 10 p.c. and of grains was 25 p.c. The price of rice was 8 pathis for one rupee in payment of revenue. The measurement was uniform. Each pathi measured eight annas, while one mana measured ten muthis (handful). This system laid down by Rama Shah was followed.

The Birtawal or the Khwaholder called Talsing was required to accept payment in kinds. The rates differed from land to land according to the productivity of each assessed by the surveyor.

In Kathmandu the Government levied water cess at the rate of 4 manas paddy per Ropani of irrigated lands. This was realised by a group of persons, 6 or 7 in number, called Dhalwa who made over the amount to Isardar to be remitted to the treasury. The canals were well maintained; whoever was found tampering with it was handed over to the Inta Chapli for punishment. The Dhalwas were freed from forced labour (ज़ारा बेट बेगारी उसाँही पसाँही). Similarly tanks and fishing ponds were well preserved and these were looked after by Guthiyar Dhalwas under a Lalmohar.

In times of famine hoarding was strictly prohibited, and the following price schedule was fixed for different kinds of paddy and rice. Failure to submit correct reports of hoarding resulted in confiscation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathilmana</th>
<th>For Re. 1/- Paddy (marsi)</th>
<th>6(\frac{1}{2})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; &quot; Hakuwa &quot;&quot;</td>
<td>7(\frac{1}{2})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; &quot; Tauli &quot;&quot;</td>
<td>7(\frac{1}{2})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Rice Marsi</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; Tauli &quot;&quot;</td>
<td>3(\frac{1}{2})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Hakuwa</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; Tauli &quot;&quot;</td>
<td>3(\frac{5}{2})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; &quot; Hakuwa &quot;&quot;</td>
<td>3(\frac{6}{2})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the above schedule was prepared for the period 40 years later, this can be readily taken to have been obtaining even for the period under consideration. The following price schedule provided by a royal decree of the king VS 1853 Aswin Vadi 11 (=1796 A.D.) empowering an officer to purchase certain specified articles at the rates shown in the margin enables us to find out the values of precious metals and articles.

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45 Derivative of the Sanskrit word Talaswami.
46 From a published Lalmohar document. (Itihasa Prakas).
47 Published in Itihasa Prakas.
From this schedule it appears that gold was cheaply priced, and all gold plated articles were sold at a favourable price to the purchaser.

The following chart of requirements for various festivities sanctioned by the Maharaja out of the proceeds of Bilweswar Pargana show the price schedule of different articles of common use prevailing in the very early 19th century. This might be taken as representative of the price structure for the whole of early Gorkha period.48

We have reproduced the relevant portion of the document from the 13th line onwards. This reveals a state of cheap prices even in case of precious and valuable goods. Goods of day-to-day consumption were sold at a price within reach of those of humble means.

13 The total income (assessed in the form of tax) of Pargana Naubisi : 701\sfrac{1}{6}
14 For daily worshiping : 613\sfrac{1}{3}
   By the rate of one seer of sacred rice for one day, the cost of 360 seers for one year @ 4 pathis per rupee : 11\sfrac{1}{4}
15 By the rate of one goat per day the total number of goats required for one year being 360 (Rs. 1\sfrac{1}{4} each) : 450\sfrac{1}{4}
16 By the rate of one seer of barley per day for the total quantity of barley required for one year 360 seers costing @ 6 pathis per rupee : 7\sfrac{1}{8}
17 By the rate of 1\frac{1}{4} seers of ghee per day for Akhanda Deepdan, the cost of 450 seers of ghee for one year @ 8 seers per rupee : 56\sfrac{3}{4}
18 By the rate of 4 seers of wheat flour per day Bhog the price of 1,440 seers of flour for 1 year @ 6 pathis per rupee : 30\sfrac{1}{4}
19 By the rate of one seer of ghee for Bhog per day the cost of 90 seers for one year @ 8 seers per rupee : 11\sfrac{1}{4}

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48 Document unpublished.
The amount of one year for burning thread: 2/-

By the rate of one pao (¼ lb.) of salt for Bhog per day, the cost of 90 seers for one year (w 12 seers per rupee: 7/8

For paste the cost of sandal wood for one year: 5/-

For paste the cost of red sandal wood: 3/-

The price for the essence of raisin to be used daily: 29/3

The expense of Pancha Parbi (five main festivals): 88/2

By the rate of 12 seers of rice for Bhog of one Sankranti, the total seers of rice for a dozen Sankrantis is 144 seers costing in total @ 4 pathis per rupee: 3/10

By the rate of 5 seers of wheat flour for Bhog of one Sankranti the price of 60 seers for 12 Sankrantis: 1/4

By the rate of 1 ½ seer of ghee for Bhog of one Sankranti, the price of 6 seers of ghee for 12 Sankrantis: 12

By the rate of 1 ½ seer of salt for Bhog of one Sankranti, the price of 6 seers of salt for 12 Sankrantis: 8

By the rate of 12 seers of rice for Bhog of one Astami, the price of 288 seers of 24 Astamis @ 4 pathis per rupee: 7/2

By the rate of 5 seers of flour for Bhog of one Astami, the cost of 120 seers of 24 Astamis @ 6 pathis per rupee: 2/8

By the rate of 1 ½ seer of ghee for Bhog of one Astami, the price of 12 seers of 24 Astamis @ 8 seers per rupee: 1/8

By the rate of 1 ½ seer of salt for Bhog per Astami, the price of 12 seers of 24 Astamis: 1/-

By the rate of 12 seers of rice for Bhog of one Chaturdasi the cost of 288 seers of 24 Chaturdasis @ 4 pathis per rupee: 7/2

By the rate of 5 seers of wheat flour for Bhog of one Chaturdasi the cost of 120 seers of 24 Chaturdasis @ 6 pathis per rupee: 2/8

By the rate of 1 ½ seer of ghee for Bhog of one Chaturdasi, the cost of 12 seers of ghee for 24 Chaturdasis: 1/8

By the rate of 1 ½ seer of salt for Bhog of one Chaturdasi, the cost of 12 seers of salt for 24 Chaturdasis: 1/-

The cost of 35 goats to be sacrificed on the Navaratri of Aswin Dasai @ 3 Sukas (=12-) per goat: 26/1
39 By the rate of 2 annas for one recitation of Chandistotra, the total amount given to Brahmin for reciting 27 Abritis: 39
40 To 9 virgins cash and food together: 40
41 The cost of 21 goats to be sacrificed on the Navaratri of Chaitra Astami @ 3 Sukas (|-12|-) per goat: 1512
42 By the rate of 2 annas for one recitation of Chandistrotra, rupees given to Brahmin for reciting 27 Abritis: 39
43 To 9 virgins cash and food together: 40

(issued through Dalbhanjan Pande, Bahadur Bhandari, Balnarsinha Kuar, Pransah, Bhimsen Thapa and Randhoj Thapa on Roj 2 Chaitra Sudi 11 of VS 1868=April 1811).40

One more chart from a published document gives a list of articles purchased by Ranjore Thapa at the prices noted, which were deposited at Tosakhana. The price schedule is of interest to the readers for more valuable stuffs.50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rupees.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For 9 packets of black Kochin cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ,, ,, red Kochin cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ,, ,, scarlet Kochin cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ,, ,, bluish violet Kochin cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ,, ,, reddish violet Kochin cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 white long coat of tash or kinkhap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 white cloth (,, )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 tiao (,, )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Ablakh (black and white pony)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 set of enamelled teapot (with cups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 packets of ash coloured Kochin cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 packet of greenish Kochin cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 packets of sky coloured Kochin cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 packet of pink coloured Kochin cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ,, ,, same ,,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 long coat of brown coloured tash cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 packet of coloured cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 pairs of Chinese cup and plates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Chinese photos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40 Itihas Prakas, I, P. 35.
50 Itihas Prakas, I, P. 144.
4 thans (packets) of Bhotia velvet to be used for charpate . . . . . . 67 8 0

The price of one leather cover for the chest (Sanduk) 3 5 0
(Aswin Vadi 6 roj 2 of Vs 1875 (1812 A.D.)

From the above it will appear that the cost of living was cheap. Although purchasing power was concentrated in the hands of high officers and Birta-owners, life was also not miserable to a person belonging to low income group, because of cheap living. The peasant had enough to live on and spare. The field labour got his wages in kind, which was enough to sustain him. In rural areas money circulated to the extent that exchange involving only large sums necessitated, but not otherwise and there were very few centres which could be called really urban. Barter was the common practice in villages. Exchanges through the medium of currency came into play in busier localities. But there also as we have seen prices of articles did not touch a level likely to cause hardship to those of poor means.

Rice sold at the rate of 4 pathis (10 seers) per rupee, wheat flour at the rate of 6 pathis (18 seers) per rupee, ghee at the rate of 8 seers per rupee and salt at the rate of 12 seers per rupee. The price of a goat was about 3 rupees. As for price of clothing, it was not such as to make the ordinary coarse variety outside the reach of poor class citizens. Up till then Nepal manufactured its own cloth out of its own cotton; this was known as Gharbuna, which signified a ‘sense of being woven at home’. But all this did not mean that the condition of existence of the general mass of the people was happy and contented. If the cost of living was not high, it did not mean that the standard of living was high at the lower level. The people in general lived in penury, although none of them literally starved and went naked. Money fetched high value in terms of the articles of consumption, but wages were too low, and prices of grains and other agricultural products, which were hardly remunerative, gave the peasantry limited amount of purchasing power. This certainly did not allow for a higher standard of life as far as the bulk of peasantry and low paid employees of the Government were concerned. The class which stood to benefit by this situation was the one of Bharadars and Birtawals, whose earning in terms of purchasing power was such as to place all that they wanted within their reach.

The Government encouraged new settlement in barren lands.

For about 20 years Kazi Abhiman was charged with duties in this sphere for the districts of Saptari, Bara, Parsa, Rautahat and
Morang. He had the sole discretion in matters of allotment of plots. The Mokaddam from across the border lost his right on the land if he failed to turn up in time in the sowing season, and the allotment was made to any one who appeared to use the land in the way prescribed. Every one was warned of this rule. The Birta holders could plough the Kalabanjar and get the land registered in their name. The Kazi nominated the Kanungo and Chaudhari and Mahaldar for the area thus recovered and this was approved by the king. These posts carried with them 1-2 maujas of Kalabanjar for which the holders obtained titles (Patta) from the officer. Canals were constructed by the Government at their own cost to irrigate the newly ploughed fields.

The Sawal in this was issued by the King. All subordinate officers derived their authority from the Sawalwala.

(Read Girvan Judha’s Sawal to Abhiman Basnait, Itihas Prakas, 1, Pp. 15, 130).

For newly settled lands (halubadi) the cultivator paid -|8|- annas per bigha for the first year and Rs. 3|- for subsequent years.

**External trade and Commerce**

According to Hamilton who visited Nepal in 1807 salt and borax was brought to Kathmandu from a lake situated in Tibetan territory just north of the capital at a distance of about 15 days’ journey.

The traders engaged in the carrying of commodities were the Newars of Kathmandu, the Tibetans of the border areas and Kashmiris, the last taking over all the agencies for the part of commerce in relation to India, either imports or exports.

The Tibetans brought to Kathmandu for sale paper, coarse woollen cloths, horses, small goats (long haired), common goats, sheep, chauri cattle, chauries (chaugwari or chaungri), musk, salt, sal ammoniac, hurtal or yellow arsenic, borax, quicksilver from China, gold-dust, silver, preserved fruits such as almonds, walnuts, raisins and dates and drugs—in transit, Chirata and Charas (extract of hemp). (Hamilton Pp. 212-13).

Some of the above articles were exported to India, particularly musk, chauris, hurtal, borax and bullion.

The eastern trade routes passed through Wallanchung and Hatia.

The goods imported at these places from Tibet were salt carried on sheep, gold, silver, musk, and musk deer skins, the tails called Chauris, blankets, borax, Chinese silks and medical herbs. The goods sent from Chainpur were rice, maruga (synosurus corocanus) uya (a grain), oil, butter, iron, copper, cotton clothes, broad cloth, catechu,
myrobalan (harrahabora), planks of the Dhupi, pepper, spices, tobacco, hides, otters' fur, sugar candy, extracts of sugar-cane, and occasionally some papers.\footnote{Hamilton, P. 157. Also see letter of the Collector of Purnea, 19 July, 1799.}

The district of Morang exported paddy and timber to Purnea on the other side of the frontier. A letter of the Collector of Purnea speaks also of 'a grazing fee charged from the herdsmen who sent their cattle to the fields in Morang' (13 August, 1790).

The British authorities complained of severe restrictions on the movement of trade between Nepal and neighbouring countries. In this connection Hamilton said:

"The restraints in trade are due partly to the jealousy and ignorance of the Nepal administrators but also, in a great degree to monopolies which certain uluts or mercantile Gosains and a few other merchants, have been long in possession of and which they labour to observe by every insidious and corrupt means in their power."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}

The trade was extensive and beneficial both to the Government of Nepal and the East India Company.

Restriction was put on the carrying of a particular variety of Indian rupee (बनारस कलशर पटना रुपया) by passengers who were permitted to leave or enter the country under a system of regulated passports.

From a letter of the Collector of Chapra dated 17th July, 1791 to J. Duncan, Resident at Banaras, it appears that the Government of Nepal collected a duty both on exports and imports at the following stations at the rates noted in the margin:

- Garhparsa: Rs. 1\textsuperscript{1}8 for every package without distinction of its size or the quality of merchandise.
- Bhichhokhori: -\textsuperscript{2}1- each package.
- Hetaunda: Rs. 1\textsuperscript{1}8-.
- Chitlang: Rs. 1\textsuperscript{1}8-.
- Nepal (Kathmandu): Rs. 3\textsuperscript{1}- per cent.

According to the information provided by a Banaras merchant the duty was estimated to amount to Rs. 9\textsuperscript{1}- per cent on an average. Luggages were opened and checked by Police Chowkies at many places.

A common grievance of the Indian traders was in regard to the duty and wages of the Bharia (labourer) which they said were very high out of proportion to the rate of profit they earned out of the sale proceeds.\footnote{\textit{Banares Affairs} (1788-1815), Vol. I, Pp. 169-78.}
According to Kirkpartrick from Garhparsa 'the trip to Kathmandu is from 3½ to 3½ days, from Hetowra 1½ to 1½ NRS, each man carries about 45 seers (18 dharnis) exclusive of his provisions.' Hamilton says that the hire was 4 annas a day and a porter carried 120 dharnis in 5 days.

Again it was among obligations of the tenants of jagirs and other landed estates to perform the service of bearers occasionally for the proprietor. Ordinarily a dandi was obtained for 12 rupees.54

In contemporary documents of the East India Company it was said that the rulers of Nepal since the advent of the Gorkhalis did take little care to promote the trade of the country. The British complained that the Nepalese authorities afforded little protection to their agents conducting business in Nepal. As we have touched this point in the last chapter while discussing Nepal's eighteenth century trade policy, we do not need to pursue the matter here. It will suffice to bring in a passage from Kirkpatrick's account in refutation of the allegation, which because it comes from an Englishman of his status must represent a correct and unbiased view of the position.

"It is proper nevertheless to observe here, that notwithstanding the narrow spirit which directs the commercial concerns of this people, the government affords, on the whole, considerable protection to foreign merchants, rendering them in all cases, it would appear as strict and prompt justice as the imperfect nature of its general polity will admit".55

Currency

Kirkpatrick presents the following computation in regard to the currency of the time he visited Nepal:

'Weight of 5 siccas, or whole rupees, 75 annas, sicca weight, i.e. 15½ annas each.

'Weight of 5 mohrs or addheedas, 37 annas 7½ pice, Calcutta sicca weight, i.e. 7 annas 6 1½ pice each.

'Weight of 5 quarter mohrs, or 2 anna pieces, 9 annas 3 pice i.e. 1 anna 10.1½ pice each weight of gold rupee, or usharupee 15 annas.

'The standard of the silver coins is 7 rupees 13 annas per cent worse than Calcutta sicca standard. The standard of gold coin is 2 per cent worse than that of the Calcutta mohr.56

According to Hamilton the mohr i.e. ¼ rupee was 'the common silver currency in use'. It weighed 84½ grains when fresh from the mint.

54 Kirkpatrick, Pp. 29-38.
55 Kirkpatrick, P. 201.
56 Ibid, P. 219 ff.
and was worth 6 annas 10\textfrac{1}{2} pices' or 43\textfrac{1}{100} of the Calcutta rupee.\textsuperscript{57}

Another silver coin equally used was the Suka, \frac{1}{4} of the rupee.

Prithvinarayan took the Malla coinage as his model for coining his money. The same fractional pails were adopted. But he dated his coins in the Saka era. This dating continued for the whole of the 19th century. Every coin of his dynasty bears the family title Shahadeva.

Gold and silver were imported from Tibet and their export was restricted. All private import of silver as that of gold went to the mint. The merchant obtained silver coins in place of bullion. In minting silver coins the Government derived a profit of 12 p.c., 4 p.c. as charges and 8 p.c. out of alloys. Gold was purchased at the rate of Rs. 8 per tola, and after minting the coin fetched Rs. 14\textfrac{1}{2} in the market and this gave the Government a profit of Rs. 6\textfrac{1}{2} for every tola.\textsuperscript{58}

Both gold and silver coins were in circulation but gold coins were very rare.\textsuperscript{59} Silver pieces of 8 annas, 4 annas and 2 annas were also current.

A copper coin of the denomination of a pice came also to be current. But the copper coin, Hamilton (P. 215) says 'on an average the pice may be taken at 162 grains troy weight'. There were half paisa and quarter paisa.

The Collector of Tirhut reported that the Nepalese copper coins with the legend \textit{Sitaram} inscribed circulated in his areas. It is not known whether Patna silver coins were current as legal tender inside Nepal.\textsuperscript{60}

Prithvinarayan Shah issued gold coins of the following denominations:

- Gold mohr called \textit{Patla asarfi}
- Gold half mohar
- Gold eighth mohar

Pratapsinha issued also a double tola as \textit{Asarfi} in addition to above. Rana Bahadur has all these and a gold dam weighing less than a grain.

For a description of the Gorkha coinage we have reproduced the following passages from E. H. Walsh.\textsuperscript{61}

"The design of this mohar (No. 1; Pl. VII, Fig. 1) which has continued to be the standard design ever since, was also taken from the Newar coins. The design of the obverse, a square divided by a Swas-

\textsuperscript{57} Hamilton, Pp. 209-11.
\textsuperscript{58} Hamilton, Pp. 211-12.
\textsuperscript{59} These were in use till very late up to the twenties of the present century.
\textsuperscript{60} N. K. Sinha, \textit{Economic History of Bengal}, P. 133.
tika having probably been suggested by the coins of Yoga Narendra-
malla of Patan (Pl. V; Figs. 5, 6 and 7) combined with the small cen-
tral circle containing a trident with streamers on the current coins of
Ranajitmalla (Pl. II. Fig. 5) with which Prithvinarayana was familiar,
owing to his long residence with Ranjitamalla at Bhatgaon. The re-
verse is also a copy of the obverse of a coin of Yoga Prakasamalla of
Patan (Pl. VI. Fig. 3), and is similar to several of the later coins of
both Kathmandu and Patan; even the two horizontal lines in the central
circle being reproduced from the meaningless imitated Persian charac-
ters on these coins.

"In the half mohars (suka) and quarter mohars (Suki) too, the
designs of the Newar coins were followed, and the same symbol, the
sword and wreath as the emblem of sovereignty. The trident, the
offering vase in form of stupa (Pl. VII. fig. 3) and the cakra on pedestal
(Pl. VII. Fig. 8) were adopted. The lion, as a rebus for the name
"simha" was also used by Pratapa Sinha Saha (No. 17; Pl. VII Fig. 5
and others of his coins). The Malla coins from which the different
Gorkha coins were taken are noted in the list of Gorkha coins. The
Gorkha coins also bear the symbols of the Sun and Moon; as the
Gorkhas claim to be descended from both the Solar and Lunar races.

"In the gold coinage, however, the Gorkha kings introduced coins
of new denomination and of new designs, some examples of which are
illustrated (Pl. VII, Figs. 4, 7 and 9). The copper coinage of Suren-
dra Vikrama Shah (Pl. VII, Fig. 11) and of Prithvi Vira Vikrama
Saha (Pl. VII, Figs. 12 and 13) are new; with their devices and in the
latter a new symbol is introduced in the Paduka (footprints of Visnu)
and the crossed Kukhris, the national Gorkha weapon.

"The names of deities also appear on the coins, though here the
name of Gorakhanatha, the patron deity of Gorkhas, is the one that is
borne on all the mohars. But the name of Lokanatha also appears on
some mohars of Prithvinarayana (No. 3) and that of Guhyesvari on that
of Pratapa Sinha Saha, the name being spelt in the Gorkha coins with
hy instead of jh as on the Newar coins (No. 12). In the latter
Mohars, however, the only names that appear are those of Bhavani
and Gorakhnath."
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