KINGS, SOLDIERS AND PRIESTS: NEPALESE POLITICS AND THE RISE OF JANG BAHADUR RANA, 1830-1857

John Whelpton

MANOHAR
1991
PREFACE

This study is an edited version of my University of London dissertation completed in 1987. I have tried both to identify the basic structure of Nepalese politics before and after the establishment of the Rana regime, and also to provide a fuller and a more accurate picture than hitherto available of factional conflict during this critical period of Nepalese history. It will, I hope, be of interest both to the specialist and also to general readers.

In transcribing words from Nepali and other South Asian languages I have taken the standard, Indological system, minus its diacritics, as a basis, but also modified it either to coincide more closely with modern Nepali pronunciation or with Romanisations frequently used by the Nepalese themselves. Thus d and v are represented by r and w where the sound justifies it (e.g. in pahar or sawal), sh is used for both s and s and ch for both c and ch.

It would be impracticable to list all the friends and colleagues who helped in the research and writing, but I wish to thank individually a few whose contributions were particularly important.

Abhi Subedi first got me interested in Jang Bahadur and he and Bindu Subedi allowed me to share their home and provided constant help and encouragement during field work in Kathmandu. Madhusudan, Janardan and Priyadarshi Thakur and their families similarly made my travels in India much easier and more profitable.

Drs. Krishna Kant Adhikari, Triratna Manandhar and Rukmini Rana generously gave me access to the results of their own archival work. Among others who provided valuable advice and information in Kathmandu were Kamal Mani Dixit, Mohan Prasad Khanal, Jean-Claude Marize, Dinesh Raj Pant, Rishikesh Shaha and Chaitanya Mishra.

The descendants of many of the characters appearing in the book were able to supplement the written record with stories handed down in their families. I am particularly grateful to Pradyumna Rana, great-grandson of Jang Bahadur, who also provided me with a base during my stay at Allahabad.

I was affiliated in Nepal to the Research Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS), Tribhuvan University and in India to the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. I am grateful to
the staff of these institutions as well as those of the libraries and archives that I consulted. Bala Ram Dangol, Director of the National Archives of Nepal and Nirmal Tuladhar of CNAS were especially helpful.

I benefited greatly from the advice and support of staff and fellow students at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. I am particularly grateful to Professor Richard Burghart and to my supervisor, Professor Kenneth Ballhatchet.

Finally, I must also thank my mother and brother who, like the Subedis and Burgharts, put up with my books and papers strewn about their homes at critical stages during the work.

John Whelpton
Hong Kong
May 1990
ABBREVIATIONS

DO  Demi-official
Eng.Hist. MSS  English Historical Manuscripts
f.,ff.  folio(s)
FP  (to 1859) Foreign Political Proceedings/Consultations
FP (A,B)  (from 1860) Foreign Political Proceedings (Parts A,B)
HP  Hodgson Papers
IOL(R)  India Office Library (and Records)
JA  Jangi Adda
KKK  Kamyandari Kitabkhana
KM  Ludwig Stiller, The Kot Massacre
LJB  Pudma Jang Bahadur Rana, Life of Maharaja Sir Jang Bahadur, C.G.B. C.G.S.I. of Nepal
MSS Eur  Manuscripts in European Languages
NAI  National Archives of India
NAN  National Archives of Nepal
NJB  Krishna Kant Adhikari, Nepal Under Jang Bahadur
NR  Nepal Residency Records
RAS  Royal Asiatic Society
RIO  Orfeur Cavenagh, Reminiscences of an Indian Official
RN  Orfeur Cavenagh, Rough Notes on the State of Nepal
VS  Vikram Samvat
CONTENTS

PREFACE v

ABBREVIATIONS vii

CHAPTER ONE: KING AND STATE IN PRE-RANA NEPAL

The Kingdom of Nepal 1
Kingship as a Religious Institution 9
The Military Factor 13
Land and Central Control 14
The 'Bearers of the Burden' 19
State, Caste and Nation 24
Notes 26

CHAPTER TWO: THE FALL OF BHIMSEN THAPA: 1830-1838

Introduction 33
The Political Stage in 1830 34
The Campaign against Bhimsen and the Emergence of Ranjang (1832-1838) 38
Bhimsen's Fall in Retrospect 57
Notes 59

CHAPTER THREE: THE ROAD TO THE 'BRITISH MINISTRY'

Introduction 64
The Bharadari under Pressure 65
Crisis and Intervention 73
Notes 91
APPENDIX-II  The Alleged Rift between Jang Bahadur and Mathbar Singh  256

APPENDIX-III  The Thorseby Report and Alternative Accounts of the Kot Massacre  258

APPENDIX-IV  Letters of Jang Bahadur Written from Europe to Bam Bahadur  262

APPENDIX-V  Army Pay under Jang Bahadur  271

APPENDIX-VI  Family Trees  273

GLOSSARY  281

BIBLIOGRAPHY  288

INDEX  301

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE-I  The Caste Hierarchy in the Muluki Ain  5

TABLE-II  The Kathmandu Garrison (Kampu): 1825-1846  75

TABLE-III  Thar and Caste Distribution of Senior Personnel: 1841 and 1854  198

TABLE-IV  Kampu: Strength by Rank, 1838-1863  209
Chapter One

KING AND STATE IN PRE-RANA NEPAL

The Kingdom of Nepal

The integration of the former ‘Princely States’ into independent India almost extinguished Hindu monarchy as a living political form in South Asia. The sole survivor, however, is the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal, which had never been brought into the British Indian empire. The country today is still officially a Hindu kingdom and the present king is a tenth generation descendant of Prithvi Narayan Shah, whose conquest of the Kathmandu valley in 1769 marked the beginning of Nepal’s history as a unified state. The democracy campaign of 1990 may prove to have finally ended the political supremacy of the monarchy, but over the last forty years, as in Prithvi Narayan’s time, it has been in the royal palace that power has principally resided. During most of the intervening period effective power was held by a minister ruling in the king’s name. Jang Bahadur Kunwar (later Rana) attained this post in 1846 and succeeded in making it the hereditary possession of his family. From 1857 onwards, Jang Bahadur and his successors combined the titles of Maharaja and Prime Minister and the Rana family continued to rule the country until the ‘revolution’ of 1950/51 put the reins back into the hands of the Shah dynasty. Throughout the Rana ascendancy, the royal family nevertheless retained their formal superiority, keeping the title of Maharajadhiraj in an arrangement paralleled in a number of Hindu states, most notably in the Maratha svarajya and Vijaynagar. This study examines Nepalese politics in the crucial years leading up to and following Jang Bahadur’s assumption of power in the context of the relationship between the constituent elements of the state in comparison with the pattern elsewhere in the subcontinent and with the model of Hindu polity found in the canonical texts. The focus is on kingship itself and on the problem of maintaining central control over an extended territory.
The idea that Nepal is a microcosm of the subcontinent was encapsulated at the beginning of the century in Sylvain Levi’s famous dictum, ‘Le Népal est l’Inde qui se fait’. The progressive Hinduisation of an ethnically and culturally diverse population by the dominant Indo-Nepalese and the conflicting trends of amalgamation and disintegration of smaller political units within the Himalayan foothills aid our understanding of what happened throughout South Asia generally. The crucial distinguishing feature in the Nepal case, however, is that unity—and independence—have been maintained throughout the modern period which raises an interesting issue—whether the different outcome was owing to the geographical factors of smaller size and peripheral location or to superior political skill. Recent work on South Asian political systems has tended to downgrade the notion of a strong centre imposing its will on local interests and suggest instead a model of ritual authority more or less voluntarily accepted or of the empire itself emerging from the shifting pattern of alliances between local lords of the land. It is not impossible to detect traces of both these patterns in Nepalese history but we also have to reckon with central control which proved to be durable. It will be seen that some of the more traditional ways of looking at Indian empires fit the Nepali data better than those empires themselves particularly in relation to land ownership.

Despite such potentially illuminating parallels and contrasts, Nepali history has tended to remain relatively isolated, not forming part of the main current of South Asian historiography. However, some anthropologists, adopting a historical perspective, have made useful attempts to fit Nepal into the wider framework of Hindu polity. The most significant are the work of Richard Burghart on the relationship between Hindu ascetics and the state and that of Andras Höfer on the codification of the caste hierarchy in the 1854 Legal Code. Amongst historians considerable attention has been given to Nepal’s relations with British India and with China and Tibet whilst scholars writing in Nepali have concentrated on straightforward narrative history and on the publication of indigenous material to supplement the British records which remain the most important source for political events after the establishment of the British Residency in 1816. On economic life, particularly the land tenure system, there is the indispensable work of Mahesh Chandra Regmi, based almost entirely on Nepali government records. Ludwig Stiller’s studies of the unification process and of the twenty years following the 1814-1816 war with British India highlight the interrelationship between land, army and royal authority whilst his
publication of key British documents for the period 1840-1847 has greatly eased the task of future historians. Valuable work on the institutions of Nepal under Jang Bahadur has been produced by Kumar and Adhikari whilst Edwards has highlighted the existence of both 'traditional' and 'modern' elements in the Rana bureaucracy. Jain has analysed Jang's rise and early years, offering some rather tendentious reinterpretations but at least looking critically at the sources. The analysis offered by this author relies on all of these writers, whilst seeking to provide a fuller account of the factional politics of the 1830s and to fit Nepali developments into a wider South Asian pattern.

With the exception of the relatively small area which was to be ceded to her in 1860 in return for assistance in suppressing the Sepoy Revolt, Nepal's borders in 1830 were as they remain today. Stretching 520 miles along the southern flank of the Himalayas, the kingdom descends in uneven steps from the snow-covered peaks to the Gangetic plains. The northern border in its eastern section actually follows the crest line whilst further west it runs slightly to the north of the main Himalayan range, taking in the southern fringe of the arid Tibetan plateau. South of the mountains are 'the hills' (pahar), a confusion of interrupted ridges and spurs—which are the cultural, and political as well as the geographic heart of the country. The end of this region is marked by the Mahabharat range, beyond which lie the valleys of the 'inner Tarai', and then the low Siwalik or Chure hills, the last barrier before the plains. Nepalese territory generally extends between ten and thirty miles into the low country. Until two decades ago the prevalence of a particularly virulent form of malaria rendered this region—the Tarai proper—uninhabitable through much of the year to all but the local tribesmen who had acquired some degree of immunity. However, where the jungle had been cleared, the land was worked during the cold season, generally by peasants brought in from India. The fertile soil has made the region vital to the Nepalese economy.

Virtually the whole of Nepal falls within the catchment area of three great river systems—the Karnali in the west, the Gandaki in the centre, and the Koshi in the east. From their sources in Tibet, they flow through deep gorges across the line of the Himalayas, then traverse the hills and plains to merge eventually with the Ganges. Within the hills they decide the agricultural pattern—the valley floor providing good rice-growing land whilst the slopes above must be used for 'dry' crops such as maize.

Until the British opened an alternative route through Sikkim
towards the end of the last century, the passes formed in the Himalayas by the Trisuli (a branch of the Gandaki) and the Sunkoshi rivers were major routes for trade between India and Tibet. Situated in the hills between the Gandaki and Koshi basins, the Nepal valley, which gave its name to the whole country and which contains the capital, Kathmandu, was a natural halting point for traders travelling between the plains and one or other of the passes. This commercial importance together with the valley’s great fertility, enabled its Newar inhabitants to develop a complex urban civilisation. Outside the valley, however, the area of their control was limited, both because the difficult communication in the hills naturally favoured local autonomy and because from the fifteenth century onwards the Newars were themselves divided. Kathmandu and the neighbouring towns of Patan and Bhaktapur were the capitals of little kingdoms.

Within the hills, unification of substantial parts of Nepal had been achieved twice before Prithvi Narayan Shah: in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the ‘Malla Empire’ had covered the Karnali basin and large areas of south-western Tibet whilst the Sen kingdom established in the early sixteenth century briefly united the southern hills from Palpa eastwards. By the eighteenth century, however, this unity had long been lost. The baisi (twenty-two) kingdoms of the Karnali region recognised the formal precedence of the king of Jumla, in whose territory the Mallas had been situated but were in practice completely independent. The Gandaki basin was divided amongst the chaubisi (twenty-four) states and it was by separation from one of these, Lamjung, that Prithvi Narayan’s ancestral kingdom of Gorkha had been founded in 1559. South and east of the Kathmandu Valley were the kingdoms of Makwanpur, Bijaypur and Chaudandi, ruled by branches of the Sen family whilst most of the hills were controlled by non-Hinduised Kiranti tribesmen.

Prithvi Narayan came to the throne of Gorkha in 1743 and the following year embarked upon the first of the military campaigns which were to lead to the conquest of the Kathmandu Valley twenty-four years later. The unification in Nepal thus took place at a time when successor states to the Mughal empire were being consolidated in India, most notably by erstwhile Mughal viceroys, Sikhs and Marathas.
the hills. This total reliance on the resources of his own region set him apart from a ruler such as Martanda Varma, the first king of united Travancore, who also fought his way to supremacy over his fellow chieftains but who had obtained initial support from the Viceroy of the Carnatic and later employed mercenaries from the east coast. Prithvi Narayan did, however, follow the pattern of applying updated military technology to local conflicts, obtaining firearms on a journey to Banaras. It is also significant that he and, possibly, even his predecessors on the Gorkha throne, regarded the Mughal emperor as a potential source of legitimacy.

The conquest of the Kathmandu Valley was only the beginning of a period of rapid Gorkha expansion which carried the borders of the new kingdom to the Teesta in the east and the Satlej in the west. Control of the Himalayas as far as Kashmir might well have been attained had not an aggressive policy towards Tibet over terms of trade and control of the border passes provoked a punitive Chinese invasion of Nepal in 1792. Hostilities were concluded on terms which involved nominal Nepali submission but imposed no hardship on them other than the surrender of Tibetan gains. However, the withdrawal of forces from the far west in the face of the emergency halted the momentum of expansion. When the advance was resumed in the 1800s, their path was blocked by Ranjit Singh’s kingdom of the Panjab. A further blow was delivered in 1814 when Nepal and Britain laid rival claims to the Tarai. Her defeat in 1816 deprived Nepal of Kumaon, Garhwal and the section of Sikkim she had previously occupied—about one-third of her pre-war territory.

Even within Nepal’s restricted boundaries, the population was an amalgam of highly diverse elements. The Muluki Ain (National or Civil Code) of 1854 attempted to arrange all the different groups in one country-wide hierarchy. This structure, which also broadly corresponds with social reality today, is set out in simplified form in Table 1, adopted from Höfer’s study of the code.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1: THE CASTE HIERARCHY IN THE MULUKI AIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

* = the position (status) of the caste within the group is not precisely determined
E = ethnic group

1. Caste group of the “Wearers of the holy cord” (tagadhari) Upadhyaya Brahman
KINGS, SOLDIERS AND PRIESTS

Rajput (Thakuri) ("warrior")
Jaisi Brahman
Chettri (Ksatri) ("warrior")
Dew Bhaju (Newar Brahman) E
Indian Brahman
Ascetic sects (Sannyasi, etc.)
"lower" Jaisi
Various Newar castes *E

2. Caste group of the "Non-enslavable Alcohol-drinkers"
   (namasinya matwali)
Magar *E
Gurung *E
Sunuwar *E
Some other Newar castes *E

3. Caste group of the "Enslavable Alcohol-drinkers" (masinya matwali)
Bhote *E ("Tibetanids" and some "Tibetanoids")
Chepang *E
Kumal * (potters)
Hayu *E
Tharu *E
Gharti * (descendants of freed slaves)

4. Impure, but "touchable" castes (pani nacalnya choi chi to halnunaparnya)
Kasai (Newar butchers) E
Kusle (Newar musicians) E
Hindu Dhobi (Newar washermen) E
Kulu (Newar tanners) E
Musulman *
Mlecch * (European)

5. Untouchable castes (pani nacalnya choi chi to halnunaparnya)
   Kami (blacksmiths) ] or equal status
Sarki (tanners, shoemakers)
Kadara (stemming from unions between Kami and Sarki)
Damai (tailors and musicians)
Gaine (minstrels)
In pre-unification Gorkha, as in the other states of the Karnali and Gandaki basins, two principal elements could be identified: the Parbatiyas or 'Indo-Nepalese', divided into castes and speaking the Indo-Aryan language known in the nineteenth century as khas kura ('the language of the Khas') or Parbatiya and today as Nepali;¹⁰ and Magar and Gurung tribesmen, only partially Hinduised and speaking Tibeto-Burman languages. The main divisions within the Indo-Nepalese caste system, as it had evolved in the eighteenth century, were: Brahmans who claimed to have come originally from the old imperial city of Kanyakubja (modern Kanauj) on the Ganges; Thakuris, who included the ruling dynasty of Gorkha and of the other hill principalities and who proclaimed themselves the descendants of Rajput refugees fleeing Muslim invaders on the plains; Khas, who were mainly a continuation of the people of that name who had lived in the Himalayas since ancient times; and a number of occupational, untouchable castes.¹¹ The Indo-Nepalese had brought the Magars and Gurungs within the caste framework by granting them a position below the twice-born Khas but above the impure castes, corresponding with the category of sat Shudra found in some parts of India. Classed together with these were also castes of Khas origin whose ancestors had not been granted, or who had lost, the right to wear the sacred cord.¹²

Within this whole structure the Khas, who since Jang Bahadur's time have been officially known as Chetris (i.e. Kshatriyas), were the key element. The original Khas tribesmen are believed to have been a branch of the Aryan migration into the subcontinent distinct from the Vedic Aryans but subsequently Hinduised. From Kumaon and Garhwal they moved east into Nepal, where they were the founders of the 'Malla Empire'. It was probably this strong political position which enabled them to secure integration with Brahman and Rajput newcomers on more favourable terms than their fellows who remained in Kumaon, where the caste structure is broadly similar to that of Nepal.¹³ Though both hierarchies show a clear opposition between high-status immigrant and low-status Khas, the degree of subordination is much less in Nepal than in India. Intermarriage between immigrant and Khas in Kumaon is infrequent and frowned upon, whereas in Nepal it has been tolerated for as far back as we have any knowledge, subject only to the normal rule
of hypergamy. The offspring of unions between Brahman men and Chetri women, or between either Brahman or Chetri males and Magar or Gurung females, are themselves regarded as Chetris. Before the eighteenth century some Magars may have been accepted into the Khas ranks on the strength of cultural assimilation alone; this process would have been a replication of that by which the original Khas had been granted the right to wear the sacred cord by the baisi and chaubisi rulers. It may be assumed that, while immigration from India during the medieval period did take place, many Brahmans and Thakuris must have been basically of Khas extraction.

The unification of Nepal brought a number of new ethnic groups under Gorkha rule, in particular the Newars of the Kathmandu Valley and the Kirantis (Limbus and Rais) of the eastern hills. The Newars possessed an elaborate caste structure of their own and this was incorporated into the Indo-Nepalese one at different levels. The Kirantis were placed in the same general category as the Magars and Gurungs--pure, but not twice-born--though the question of their status may not have been consciously considered at first. Unlike the western tribes, they were not intimately associated with the Nepal state, having submitted to Prithvi Narayan in return for considerable internal autonomy, e.g., the retention of their kipat system of communal tenure. Neither Newars nor Kirantis were admitted into the army in pre-Rana times. Indeed the ban on Newar recruitment was not rescinded until the overthrow of the Rana regime in 1951. A number of Newars held administrative posts during the nineteenth century and the role of a few such individuals was to be very important under Jang Bahadur. Newars also provided almost the entire commercial class. Nevertheless their position remained that of a conquered people.

The political structure of unified Nepal was essentially that of Gorkha translated to Kathmandu though Prithvi Narayan was careful to present himself as continuing the principal ritual functions of this Newar predecessors on the throne. Gorkha forces entered Kathmandu whilst the inhabitants were celebrating the festival of Indra Jatra, during which the king received tilak (sacred mark on the forehead) from the Kumari Devi, or 'Living Goddess', who was regarded as the earthly embodiment of Taleju, the istadevata of the Newar monarchs. Prithvi Narayan at once ascended the platform erected for the ceremony and received the Kumari's recognition whilst the defeated ruler, Jay Prakash Malla, was in flight to the neighbouring city of Patan. Thereafter, the authority of Prithvi Narayan and his successors rested on Hindu notions of
monarchy as they had evolved in the Indo-Nepalese and Newar traditions; on the prestige which military conquest had conferred upon the dynasty and upon the crucial fact that land was entirely within the king's gift. These factors are inter-related, especially the second and third.

Kingship as a Religious Institution

Much ink has flowed on the question of the religious nature of Hindu monarchy. Louis Dumont advanced the thesis that the spiritual predominance of the Brahman resulted in the 'secularising' of royal power. Dumont's view has been criticised in subsequent anthropological and Indological writings and there has been a renewed emphasis on the 'magico-religious' aspect of kingship. In the process critics have sometimes overlooked the fact that Dumont himself did not deny that this aspect played an important role. Differences of emphasis are possible because, as Ronald Inden has pointed out, Indian kingship is neither fully divine (as in Japan or ancient Egypt) nor fully immanent (as in China or medieval Europe) but a mixture of the two—a situation reflected in the symbolic, cyclical alternation between the two states found in royal rituals and particularly the installation ceremony as described in early medieval texts. The form of the ceremony used by the Shah dynasty in Nepal—most recently for King Birendra's coronation in 1975—is essentially that laid down in the eighth-century Vishnudharmottara, the text upon which Inden's analysis principally relies. It is interesting that Inden ascribes its compilation to Brahmins associated with the Kashmiri Karkota dynasty which ruled briefly from Kanyakubja, claimed as their original home by Nepalese Brahmins.

The king has been projected as rainmaker, guarantor of the cosmic order and bride of the earth in Vedic texts and the mixed Vedic-Puranic royal rituals. Belief in the divine or quasi-divine nature of the king's person remains strong among many of his subjects even today. It is a commonplace of the tourist handbooks that he is an avatar (incarnation) of Vishnu and this belief, is known to date back in the Newar royal tradition to the reign of Jayasthiti Malla in the fourteenth century. The Gorkha seventeenth-century King Rama Shah is referred to as Vishnuko amsh ('a portion of Vishnu') in a nineteenth-century vamshavali (chronicle) which doubtless represents an older tradition and the title 'Narnarayan' ('the human Narayan') was included in the Gorkha king's prashasti (formal titles). It has been argued by Gérard
Toffin that the Newar king was not a full avatar in the sense that Krishna had been or that the Khmer rulers of South-east Asia were believed to be by their subjects. This is perhaps also the case with the Shah kings of unified Nepal, as is arguably attested by the very expression *vishnu ko amsh*. However, a petition from a courtier to King Rajendra, probably dating from the 1830s, could assert without qualification, ‘Your Majesty is an avatar of God’. The term avatar was used readily in royal contexts throughout Hindu India. In Darbhanga district, immediately south of the Nepal border, a Maithili bard celebrating famine relief efforts by the British government in 1873/4 described the ‘Company’ as having ‘become an avatar of part of the deity’. Popular belief in Nepal continues today to perceive the king as something more than human. Clear evidence of this is provided by the widespread conviction that just seeing the king wipes out the beholder’s sins of the day. Another demonstration is provided by the peasant farmers of Janakpur district (in the Nepal Tarai) asserting that the king shines with one half of the fiery energy of the sun (identified with the supreme soul), while Brahmans and ascetics embody a much lesser proportion of divine energy.

It must be admitted, however, that the king is at the same time dependent on the Brahmans for the assumption of his superhuman status since Brahman priests must officiate at his installation ceremony and at other royal rituals. Additionally, consistent with the practice of the hill principalities which had been amalgamated to form the new kingdom, Prithvi Narayan and his successors followed the classical Hindu pattern of reinforcing their legitimacy through extensive land grants to Brahmans.

In Vedic times, the most essential feature of king-Brahman interdependence had been what Heesterman terms ‘the marriage-like bond between the king and... his purohita’. The *purohit’s* (sacrificial priest’s) role continued to be emphasised in the *Arthashastra* and the *dharmashastra* texts, but its importance was waning by the medieval period. In Gorkha and subsequently in unified Nepal, greater importance was attached to the post of *rajguru* (state preceptor). The guru’s relationship with the king was formally established by the latter’s receiving from him either the *gayatri mantra*, a specific verse of the *Rigveda* which was given to every twice-born boy when invested with the sacred cord at his *upanayan*, or alternatively a *diksha mantra* (initiation spell), which was in principle conferable at any time. Before 1800, the functions of *gayatri* and *diksha guru* were sometimes com-
bined by a single individual, but largely because of the considerable secular influence which went with the posts, care was afterwards taken to ensure that they went to members of two different families. After the establishment of the Rana regime both roles were entrusted to a single family—the Pandes—but by now the king himself had lost effective power, so there was no longer the same need to balance one guru family against another.25

The importance of the rajguru has to be understood against the background of the heightened emphasis given to the guru-shishya relationship in sectarian Hinduism particularly the tantric tradition which had long been of great influence in Nepal. The expression diksha (initiation) frequently occurs in Vedic texts, but later came to refer pre-eminently to tantric initiation.26 With the possible exception of the Chola monarchy in South India in no other Hindu state does the institution of rajguru seem to have played the critical role it often did in Nepal.27 It is worth noting, however, that in Bengal and elsewhere, the role of the purohit as royal adviser seems to have been superseded by a dharma-dhyaksha or dharmadhi-karanika,28 and that these can probably be equated with the Nepali dharmadhikar (‘righteousness officer’ or ‘enforcer of morals’), who was normally drawn from a family which also provided rajgurus. By the mid-nineteenth century, the dharmadhikar was responsible for supervising the expiation of offences against caste but he had earlier enjoyed a wide jurisdiction over criminal cases generally.29

While the Brahman was the key religious buttress for the king, non-Brahman elements also played a supporting role. The Newar kings of Kathmandu had been closely associated with the goddess Taleju, in whose cult non-Brahmans officiated. As we have already seen, Prithvi Narayan Shah continued the custom of receiving tilak and thus reconfirmation of his royal power, from the Kumari Devi, the human Taleju. The Shah kings did not take over all the other aspects of their predecessors’ special relationship with Taleju but they had their own ishtadevata (personal deity) in Gorakhnath and patronised Gorakhnath’s devotees, the Kanphata Yogis. Members of this sect had long been closely associated with many of the ruling families in central and western Nepal.30

A number of dharmashastra texts suggest that Kshatriya status was not essential for a Hindu king. It was nonetheless certainly preferred. Kings whose shudra ancestry was beyond doubt could remedy the situation through the hiranya garbha (‘golden womb’) ceremony, in
which, with Brahmanical assistance, they underwent symbolical rebirth as members of the Kshatriya varna. Martanda Varma of Travancore was one who adopted this method.\textsuperscript{31} The Shah dynasty, on the other hand, had no such difficulties, since, in common with the ruling families of many of the hill states incorporated into the new kingdom, they had long claimed descent from Rajput refugees fleeing into the Himalayas to escape Muslim invaders. Some refugees \textit{did} enter the hills in this way and the break-up of the ‘Malla Empire’ may have been triggered by their arrival.\textsuperscript{32} However, the pedigrees advanced by numerous hill chieftains have rightly attracted considerable scepticism. In many cases they were fabrications by court bards to flatter rulers of simple Khas extraction. The specific claim of the rulers of the Shah dynasty, who see themselves as descendants of a fourteenth century prince of Mewar, the premier Rajput state, has been shown to be almost certainly false.\textsuperscript{33} However, this claim was generally accepted in Nepal and also by the Gorakhpur Rajputs with whom the Nepalese royal family inter-married. According to a famous story related by Brian Hodgson, the Shah family’s pretensions were rejected by the Mewar court itself when an envoy from a seventeenth century king of Gorkha had to confess that he himself had a Brahman name although he was of the Kshatriya order. He thus revealed that caste matters were not as regulated in the hills as in the plains.\textsuperscript{34} Hodgson stressed frequently in his correspondence that the marriage of King Rana Bahadur to a Brahman girl at the end of the eighteenth century had left an indelible stain on the Shah escutcheon as far as the more pukka Indian Rajputs were concerned.\textsuperscript{35} However, direct evidence of the Mewar attitude in the nineteenth century suggests that even if they were worried about the dynasty’s subsequent behaviour, they were inclined to accept that the two families were connected. A letter from the Udaipur ruler to King Rajendra of Nepal in 1838 referred to him as a member of his own family.\textsuperscript{36} In 1861, Prince Birendra, son of King Rajendra by the Junior Queen, applied to Maharana Sarup Singh to be allowed to visit Udaipur and be given maintenance at his court. Prince Birendra, who had been in exile in India with his mother and brother since 1846, described the Maharana as his ‘paternal uncle’. In a letter to the Governor-General’s Agent for Rajputana, through whom the correspondence was being conducted, Maharana Sarup Singh expressed willingness to invite the prince ‘as the boy is a relative of his’.\textsuperscript{37} The project fell through only because of the death of the Maharana shortly afterwards.\textsuperscript{38}
the Nepali kings also sought to play the Kshatriya role as champions of dharma. In the Dibya Upadesh, the political testament which he dictated shortly before his death, Prithvi Narayan stressed his view that Nepal was the asal Hindustan—the real Hindustan which had not fallen under Muslim domination. Long after Mughal power had crumbled, official Nepali documents continued to refer to India as Mughlana—the land the Mughals had polluted. Internally, whilst non-Hindus were by and large left free to continue their existing customs, efforts were made to prohibit cow slaughter and curb practices repugnant to orthodox Hinduism. Caste regulations, particularly in regard to commensality and sexual relations, were enforced as strictly as possible. After the establishment of the Rana regime these rules were incorporated in the Muluki Ain ('National Code') of 1854.

Despite the manifestly Hindu nature of the monarchy, reinforcement of the king’s legitimacy was sometimes sought from the mleccha power to the south. The prashasti (formal titles) of the Shah kings contained the Persian words bahadur shamsher jang ('brave with the sword in war'), granted to Prithvi Narayan Shah by the Mughal emperor, Shah Alam II, or by a local north Indian ruler claiming to act in the emperor’s name. In his 1770 letter soliciting this title, Prithvi described himself as ‘the zamindar of Gorkha’, and applied for appointment as a Mughal jagirdar. A nineteenth-century chronicle claims that as far back as the seventeenth century, envoys of King Rama Shah of Gorkha had, on the Rana of Udaipur’s advice, sought authority from an earlier emperor for an alteration in the ‘prashasti, which was at that time purely Sanskritic. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Rana Maharajas’ ready acceptance of British titles might be regarded as a continuation and extension of this tradition.

The Military Factor

Apart from other factors a ruler’s capacity as a military leader was often sufficient to secure the allegiance of followers. This was especially true of Prithvi Narayan since he was only the ruler of one amongst fifty hill principalities. The social and political structure was similar throughout the baisi and chaubisi kingdoms, so that individuals would as willingly work for one ruler as for another. Ludwig Stiller sees the secret of Prithvi’s success in a greater degree of concern for the people that he, and to some extent his predecessors at Gorkha, evinced in comparison with the Rajput rulers of other hill states. This may well be true, but it
was specifically Prithvi Narayan’s military abilities and the fact that he was successful which bound his followers to him. Other members of his family were also effective commanders, notably his second son Bahadur Shah but this was not the case with his successors on the throne. Either the fact of their being minors at the time of accession or their lack of aptitude resulted in command of the army in the field going to someone other than the king himself. Prithvi Narayan’s own exploits had been sufficient to allow his direct descendants to live in reflected glory and this is one reason for the loyalty of the army during the years of internal crisis. However, the fact that it was the family rather than the individual who attracted the army’s loyalty, made it easier for them to accept the transfer of the throne from King Rajendra to King Surendra engineered by Jang Bahadur in 1846-1847.

The senior officers of the army were drawn from the king’s own Rajput relatives and from a number of Khas families, most of whom had been associated with the Shah dynasty for several generations. Although a particular commander could enjoy patron-client ties with soldiers under him and exercise influence over them on the strength of his personal qualities, the manner in which the army was recruited and paid strengthened the direct link between soldier and king. Until the end of the eighteenth century, a large proportion of Nepal’s military force was made up of irregulars raised and maintained by officers known as umraos, who were generally Rajputs. Under Prithvi Narayan’s grandson Rana Bahadur, this system was, however, discontinued and troops raised and paid centrally, as was already the case with the regular battalions. A small number of local battalions continued to be maintained in the hills under officers of varying ranks but they were of little importance. The political importance of the regular army was enhanced after the Anglo-Gorkha war when it was largely concentrated in the capital. Also, direct control by the king—or his representative—was thus facilitated. Since payment to the military from the most senior officer to private individual was predominantly by assignment of land revenue, royal power is further considered in the context of land assignment.

Land and Central Control

The confident assertion by early European observers that the South Asian ruler was the owner of the soil was a gross simplification, stemming both from preconceptions of ‘oriental despotism’ and the
assumption that there had to be an owner in the Western sense and that, therefore, since neither the jagirdar nor the cultivator fitted the bill, the king was the owner. In fact, the indigenous concept of property in land in the early medieval period, was one of concurrent rights held by a number of parties rather than exclusive ownership by one individual, a situation resembling that seen by Bloch in feudal Europe. Although the Muslim invasions brought certain changes in the concept of land rights, the picture painted by Habib for the Mughal period is basically the same. Against this background, the frequent insistence by Mahesh Chandra Regmi, the foremost authority on Nepali land tenure, on the doctrine of state ownership is initially a little disquieting. However, there is evidence to show that the balance of rights between king, cultivator and intermediary in Nepal was indeed more firmly tilted in the royal favour in Nepal than elsewhere in South Asia. The jagir grant to an ordinary soldier, for example, was not only a transfer of the revenue right but it also entitled the beneficiary to dispossess the cultivator unless the latter’s tenure was in a special protected category. The king’s predominant land rights had long been an important strand in Hindu tradition, and the speed and completeness of the Gorkha conquest reinforced the notion in Nepal.

Conscious awareness of the king’s proprietorship as a distinguishing feature of the Nepali system is shown in Jang Bahadurko Belait Yatra, an account of Jang Bahadur’s 1850 visit to Britain written by a member of his party:

The (British) sovereign cannot confiscate anybody’s property, punish anyone, resort to violence or insult, nor hand out and cancel appointments at his own pleasure, as if he were absolute master of his own resources. His wealth in fact comes from the earnings from agriculture of the nobility, the military and the common people, who give up one half as the king’s share.

Notwithstanding the inaccuracy over the percentage of British national income taken in taxation (the figure is in fact the proportion of the crop traditionally claimed by the ruler in the hills), the author is correct in making an implicit contrast with the state ‘ownership’ of land in Nepal. In a slightly earlier Nepali account of Britain, the Inglisraiyaprabandhavamshavali, it is stated explicitly that land in Britain was mostly held
by individual members of the aristocracy as bunyadi birta. Bunyadi means basic, or fundamental and birta is the name of a Nepalese land tenure under which, contrary to the usual practice, the king granted outright possession.

Birta grants were intended especially for Brahmans and ascetics, gifts to whom had to be unconditional for the royal giver to earn full merit for his action. Grants of this type were a feature of Hindu royal practice and were probably a major cause of the 'feudalisation' of North India which developed during the early centuries AD. Land could also be gifted for the support of a temple or shrine; the tenure of this type being known in Nepal as guthi but virtually equivalent to birta in its effect on the landholding structure. In addition to grants for religious purposes, birta could also be bestowed on favoured courtiers, particularly to military commanders who had rendered exceptionally valuable service. Prithvi Narayan not only made grants of this sort to his own followers, but also frequently confirmed the birta rights granted by rulers of the pre-unification states. This was especially important for the Newar inhabitants of the Kathmandu Valley towns who were allowed to retain their sona (taxable) birta lands. These were thus regarded as their own property rather than the royal domain of the former Newar sovereigns. Though taxable, sona birta land was not assignable as jagir to state employees. This exemption also applied to the kipat lands held communally by the Kirantis. Brian Hodgson, British Resident at Kathmandu during the 1830s, classed these together with birta as private land, differentiating them from the sarkari (government) lands which were assignable and which he believed comprised three-quarters of the total agricultural land in the Valley and nine-tenths in the hills.

On sarkari land the king's subjects held land either as tenants in return for rent or as jagirdars to whom the revenue from a particular area or areas was assigned for the tenure of the appointment. Jagirs were the normal method of remuneration both for the key figures in the administration and for rank and file soldiers. Whereas more senior personnel were in effect local rulers, collecting taxes of all kinds and exercising criminal jurisdiction, the ordinary soldier, if not cultivating his jagir himself, was entitled only to a share of the main rice crop and in some circumstances, to a levy on the other produce. On land not assigned to jagirdars, the cultivators had to pay their rent, whether in kind or (as became more common as the nineteenth century progressed) in cash, to the state. Collection from land in this category was carried
out either directly by an official of the central government or by tax-farmers.

The system, similar in many ways to that of Mughal India, involved a high degree of administrative decentralisation, since a jagirdar or tax-farmer would have wide powers over the inhabitants of the lands granted to him. The building up of a strong central bureaucracy had to wait till the establishment of the Rana regime. Nevertheless, the pre-Rana system was designed in such a way that overall central control could readily be maintained. Every jagirdar or tax-farmer was liable to have his appointment or contract cancelled and thus his land rights terminated, at the pajani (annual review of appointments), a vivid symbol of the universal dependence on royal patronage. The pajani system applied to the entire army and since the majority was concentrated at Kathmandu, it was possible for the king, if he chose, to conduct it in person. Those individuals who were not confirmed in their positions for the ensuing year were known as dhakre (off-roll). The British Residency calculated in 1837 that there were enough trained dhakres available to triple the standing army of about 18,000 if the resources were made available to pay for them.55

Colonel Kirkpatrick, who visited Nepal in 1793 and later produced the Western world’s first book-length account of the country, wrote that umraos retained in service had their land assignments changed frequently so that they would not build up a potentially dangerous power base.56 This would have involved great administrative difficulties if applied to all jagirdars but even after the umrao system was ended it seems to have been continued for the more senior appointees. This practice was a standard Mughal one which had been adopted in Hindu states in the plains.57 A different method of securing the same result was to grant the jagirdar a large number of small plots in different parts of the country. This system though fully illustrated in the record of revenue assignments for 1852, six years after Jang Bahadur came to power was established well before that. During Hodgson’s time, in Kathmandu, soldiers belonging to the kampu (the regiments stationed at the capital) would typically be assigned fields in three different locations.58 Such an arrangement complicated the jagirdar’s task in realising the proceeds from his land but a number of mechanisms were available to cope with this problem. Senior jagirdars with large areas under their control could employ local agents whilst ordinary soldiers would arrange for suitably located colleagues to superintend each other’s plots or rely on the regimental accountants to collect the rent
for them.\textsuperscript{59} There also emerged a class of brokers who bought the jagirdars' tirjas (the certificates entitling them to the rent from specified lands) at a discount.\textsuperscript{60}

In contrast to a jagir, a permanent relationship with a particular locality could result where a senior Gorkha officer had been made a birta grant which passed on to his descendants or where a conquered hill chieftain had been allowed to retain his ancestral position in return for a block tribute payment. An example of the former category was the grant in c. 1772 of the revenues of Dhulikhel, a town just beyond the eastern rim of the Kathmandu Valley, to Ram Krishna Kunwar, the great-grandfather of Jang Bahadur.\textsuperscript{61} This land appears to have remained in the family until Jang Bahadur became the master of all of Nepal. The Kunwars position as virtual squires of Dhulikhel is attested by documents in which members of the family intercede with the king on the inhabitants' behalf, and by the institution in the town of a festival in honour of Jang's father, Bal Narsingh Kunwar (this festival is probably the one which is still held today but now known as the Bhagwati Jatra).\textsuperscript{62} The relationship with the family is remembered in Dhulikhel itself, albeit in distorted fashion, in the form of the local belief that the town was the maite ghar (woman's paternal home) of Jang's mother, and that Jang's own glorious future was presaged when he was discovered asleep in nearby fields with a king cobra standing guard over him.\textsuperscript{63}

Dhulikhel, however, was not sufficiently large a fief to present any threat to the central government, especially with the bulk of the Gorkha army stationed at Kathmandu, only twenty-five miles away.

The erstwhile independent hill rajas might have posed a more serious threat, but the central government was always careful to maintain its right of regulation, replacing one ruler with another where necessary.\textsuperscript{64} The largest of them, Palpa, was absorbed within the Nepalese polity early in the nineteenth century. None of the others subsequently tried to assert their independence even after Nepal's decisive defeat in the 1814-1816 war. Often surrounded by directly administered areas and aware of the size and solidarity of the Gorkha army, they had little choice but to remain loyal.

Strong support from outside Nepalese territory was required for a bid for local separatism to become effective. During the 1814-1816 war, this was provided and British success in the critical campaigns in Kumaon and Garhwal was in turn assisted by discontent amongst chieftains and people with the recently imposed Gorkhali supremacy. The war itself had been opposed by the commanders of the forces in the
west and in 1815, there appeared the possibility that one of them, Bam Shah, might be set up as sovereign of Doti, in the far west of Nepal's present-day territory, should his attempts to persuade Kathmandu to accept a settlement be unsuccessful. However, after their chastening experience of mountain warfare, the British were reluctant to enter such an open-ended commitment, whilst Bam Shah himself regarded the project only as a last resort and soon abandoned the idea. What the East India Company wanted from Nepal after the war was a clearly demarcated border and a reasonable degree of confidence that the Nepalese would not violate it. Given a central government prepared to meet those conditions, as Kathmandu always was except for a brief period of acute internal instability at the end of the 1830s, they had no wish to encourage separatism.

The ‘Bearers of the Burden’

Although the nature of Hindu kingship, the structure of the Nepalese state and the attitude of British India combined to place the king in a position of great strength, he nevertheless had to reckon with the views of his principal followers. In pre-unification Gorkha, a number of families had come to constitute an hereditary elite around the Shah dynasty and this structure persisted after the transfer of the court to Kathmandu. These were conventionally said to number thirty-six, although no complete list has been preserved. Within the group special prominence was given to six particular families, supposed to have assisted Prithvi Narayan’s ancestor, Drabya Shah, take control of Gorkha in 1559. Both the bigger and smaller groups were referred to as tharghar (‘the houses with the names’, or ‘the names in the household’). Those actually holding office under the king were known as bharadars (literally, ‘bearers of the burden’). In the nineteenth century, this expression came to denote the elite as a whole, both those currently in office and those out of public employment. The bharadari in this wider sense was reinforced by a number of families from the former baisi and chaubisi kingdoms, whose language, culture and social structure were similar to those of Gorkha. At the same time, the term tharghar, though never completely losing its wider meaning, began usually to refer to members of the inner group of six in their capacity as land survey officials, which they retained while losing their political predominance. Bharadar and the collective noun bharadari are used throughout this study to refer to members of the political elite.
Whilst in Kathmandu in 1793 on an abortive mission to establish closer political and commercial links with Nepal, Kirkpatrick was struck by the importance of the bharadari, and stressed that this rested on their family connection with the ruling dynasty rather than on the wealth or number of supporters that they possessed as individuals. His description of their role is a perceptive one which helps understand much of the country’s later history:

the leading members of this body, whether actually employed or not, appear to possess such a high authority in the state, as renders it nearly impossible for the executive government, in whatever hands that may be, to pursue any measures of an important nature, in opposition to their advice. I have even been assured that the throne of the Prince himself would no longer be secure, should the principal Thurghurs concur in thinking that his general conduct tended to endanger the sovereignty, which they profess themselves bound, as far as rests with them, to transmit unimpaired to the distant posterity of its founder, and the interests of which they do no allow to be determined by the partial views, or temporary policy of the temporary ruling individual.68

Under the traditional system at Gorkha and the chaubisi and baisi kingdoms, the most important bharadar, the chautara, was a close relative of the king. After unification, this post declined in importance, while the word itself came to be used in a wider sense as a kind of surname for collateral members of the royal family. This group retained their status as bharadars even when not holding any specific administrative position. Their Thakuri caste and relationship with the king entitled them in their own eyes to special consideration and their resentment at subordination to those they considered inferior was an important factor in nineteenth century politics.

The target of this resentment and the largest element in the bharadari were the Khas, who provided the bulk of army officers. Khas family names appear usually to derive either from titles of functionaries associated with the medieval Malla Empire or from place names in western Nepal.69 All those bearing a particular name are commonly spoken of as belonging to a particular thar, and that word is therefore often rendered into English as 'clan'. However, this is inaccurate, since the unit of (putative) common descent is the kul (lineage), a number of which make up a particular thar. All members of a kul are bound together
by the worship of a *kuldevata* (lineage deity).\textsuperscript{70} Jang Bahadur, for example, belonged to the Khandk\~{r} *kul* of the Kunwar *thar*.\textsuperscript{71} Whilst members of the same *kul* retained a residual sense of solidarity, individual families within it could be political rivals. The same applied *a fortiori* to the members of a *thar*, who shared nothing but a common name. With a particularly common *thar*, failure to remember these fundamentals can cause confusion: writers referring to the family of Bhimsen Thapa, effective ruler of Nepal from 1806 to 1837, are not always aware that another family within his Bagale Thapa *kul* was also politically important, or that the name was borne by many Khas, and also by Magars, with no connection to Bhimsen at all.

The more prominent lineages often possessed origin legends and a genealogy. Those of Prithvi Narayan’s minister Kalu Pande and Bhimsen Thapa claimed Brahman ancestry.\textsuperscript{72} By far the best known of the supposed pedigrees is that of Jang Bahadur, who, like the Shah dynasty, claimed descent from the Rana family of Mewar. Since the older a family’s connection was with the Gorkha throne, the greater consideration it attracted, the temptation to manufacture a useful past was clear. The *vamshavali* (genealogy, chronicle) material on the early history of Gorkha has to be regarded with caution for this reason.\textsuperscript{73}

Jealous of their own standing and constant rivals for power, the member of different Khas lineages struggled as families or individuals but not as a caste. Not that the Chetris were unaware of their caste status but since they formed a majority of the political elite they had no need to assert themselves as a group.\textsuperscript{74}

A number of bharadars are specifically identified as Magars in a list of prominent personalities at the Nepalese Court prepared by the British Residency in 1816.\textsuperscript{75} One of those mentioned, Abhiman Singh Rana, is frequently identified as such in Nepalese sources. However, a Residency report of the 1830s asserts that although Magars and Gurungs then made up about half of the privates and non-commissioned officers, they were not found among the officers.\textsuperscript{76} The explanation is that men such as Abhiman Singh belonged to families which had been granted the right to wear the sacred thread before caste divisions hardened but retained their Magar name and were commonly regarded as such. This hypothesis is supported by Kirkpatrick’s reference to the *tharghars* including families from ‘the Khus and Mangur tribes of the Chetree class’. The Rana family included amongst the six senior *tharghars* were presumably ‘Magars’ of this category.\textsuperscript{77} A similar explanation must apply to the occasional ‘Gurung’ found amongst the bharadari, the
most prominent being Kaji Nar Singh Gurung, a leading figure at the
turn of the century. Such individuals can be classed with the Khas for
practical purposes, but their ethnicity may have strengthened their
personal hold on the Magar and Gurung troops under them.

The Brahman section of the bharadari was considerably smaller.
Hill Brahmins had in earlier times played a significant military role,
since two of them, Ganesh Pande and Bhagirath Pant, minister and
general respectively to Drabya Shah, fought in the battles which
established Gorkha as an independent kingdom in the sixteenth
century. Prithvi Narayan Shah two centuries later had at least one
prominent Brahman officer in his army--Sardar Kalu Pande, a descen-
dant of Ganesh. However, a passage in Prithvi Narayan’s Dibya Upadesh
suggests that by his time fighting was not considered appropriate work
for Brahmins. In the nineteenth century, Hodgson noted the Nepalese
Brahmans’ lack of enthusiasm for it in comparison with their counter-
parts of the plains. Given the militarised nature of Nepalese govern-
ment, this meant that the highest positions were in non-Brahman hands.
However, the rajguru and purohit families were very much part of the
elite, wielding considerable influence both because of their special
relationship with the king and in the case of the two guru families with
strong plains connections, because of their role as intermediaries with
the British. The gurus were by far the most important Brahman element
but at a lower level of influence, other Brahman specialists also found
a position in the bharadari. Kulananda and Hira Lal Jha, probably father
and son, were representatives of this category in post-war Nepal, enjoy-
ing political consideration as revenue-farmers of the Tarai, of which
they were themselves natives.

As with the Khas, it is misleading to talk of a ‘Brahman party’ since they pursued family or individual interests rather than caste ones.
This is particularly true of the guru families who were bitter rivals and
often aligned with different Khas factions.

The lack of a strong personality on the throne after Prithvi Narayan
Shah increased factionalism among the bharadari. The accession of
Rana Bahadur Shah as a minor in 1777 produced a struggle for power
between his uncle Bahadur Shah and his mother Rajendra Lakshmi, in
which Prithvi Narayan’s old commanders generally supported the
former. The queen, like her husband Pratap Shah before her, relied more
on newer, non-Gorkha adherents. The issue was decided in Bahadur
Shah’s favour by the queen’s death in 1785 but he was weakened by the
failure of his policy towards Tibet and by his promotion of an alliance
with the British, whom Nepal had tried to keep at arm's length since the Company's ill-conceived intervention in favour of the last Newar king of Kathmandu in 1767. Shortly after the British envoy, Colonel Kirkpatrick left Kathmandu, Bahadur Shah was dismissed and imprisoned by his nephew. Rana Bahadur did not, however, remain long in charge of the government. In 1799, five years after taking power into his own hands, he abdicated in favour of Girvana Yuddha, his two-year-old son by a hypogamous (and thus, under Hindu law, irregular) marriage with a Brahman widow. His intention in renouncing the throne was to devote himself to prayers and offerings for the mother, who had contracted smallpox and also to ensure that the boy was not set aside despite his birth. Rana Bahadur was successful in the latter aim, managing to have almost all the bharadars subscribe to a document recognising his son as king. When his Brahman wife died shortly afterwards, he instituted violent reprisals against the Brahmins and the temples of the gods, who he thought had betrayed him, and also attempted to re-assert control of the government. He was resisted by his son's ministers, although these were men he had himself originally selected. He was compelled to withdraw in 1800 to Banaras in East India Company territory. In a tortuous series of negotiations and intrigues he and his advisers managed to out-maneuver both British and Nepalese opponents. The 1801 Commercial Treaty, which the latter parties had concluded and which provided for the exclusion of Rana Bahadur Shah from power, proved unworkable because of dissension within the government at Kathmandu. The British Resident appointed under the agreement withdrew after a few months only and the ex-king returned home in triumph in 1804. For two years he held no formal position in the administration and the chautaras and kajis (second grade in the traditional hierarchy) ruled in the name of his infant son. In February 1806, however, Rana Bahadur Shah was appointed mukhiyar (attorney, manager, minister) to the king. Less than a month later, he was assassinated by his half-brother, Sher Bahadur.

At this point one of Rana Bahadur Shah's closest confidants, the Khas bharadar Bhimsen Thapa, then around thirty years old, took charge of the situation and executed many of his political opponents on grounds of their involvement in the assassination plot. Lalit Tripura Sundari, youngest of Rana Bahadur's five consorts, and probably a relative of Bhimsen's, was declared Queen Regent. It is not certain whether Bhimsen Thapa himself was appointed mukhiyar at once, which would have been formal recognition of his de facto predomi-
nance over the other bharadars. However, this recognition was afforded in 1811 when he became the first Nepali to acquire the title of janaral (general). Three years later, Bhimsen Thapa led Nepal into the disastrous war with the British, yet he survived, after seeming to totter. The death of King Girvana Yuddha a few months after the conclusion of peace meant that Bhimsen was once again minister for an infant king, the two-year-old Rajendra Bikram Shah. He derived his strength from the backing of the Queen Regent, the support or acquiescence of leading bharadars, many of whom were linked in marriage with his family and his popularity with the army. With the death of Lalit Tripura in 1832, Bhimsen’s supremacy was challenged. This led to his fall and to a period of political struggle which resulted in Jang Bahadur’s emergence.

State, Caste and Nation

The political process in South Asia is often depicted as one without a concept of nation-state as a source of legitimacy and focus of loyalty. Kingdoms and empires are seen as temporary patterns in a constantly shifting mosaic of smaller units; alliances and rivalries among the latter being conducted without respect for the boundaries. There does exist an ideal order but it is a universal one, transcending individual states visualised in the classical Hindu tradition as the establishment of varnashrama (society based on caste and on the progression from student through householder to ascetic) under a chakravartin (world emperor) and in the Muslim tradition as the undivided milat-i-islam. There is a clear parallel with the medieval European concept of Christendom, contrasted with the later European order of territorial nation-states. This is a model implicit in much work on the region, but elaborated in a particularly sophisticated form in Wink’s study of the Maratha swarajya. It is a picture which can to some extent be applied to Nepal.

The full reality, however, is more complex and South Asian history also encompasses something nearer to nationalism in the modern European sense. Wink allows this for the Marathas, perhaps somewhat reluctantly, to account for facts such as the doctrine of maharastra dharma promulgated by Shivaji’s guru, Ramdas. The reference by British observers to Maratha national spirit are paralleled by comments on a similar spirit in Nepal. It is in fact arguable that, more than other units in South Asia in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, Nepal was a nation-state in embryo, with a distinct identity rooted in
territorial and cultural factors. The development of this identity through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been explored by Burghart. Two factors in particular operated from a very early date.

The first of these is the political elite's concept of the state which Prithvi Narayan had created as an entity to be protected and preserved independently of allegiance to an individual. When talking of the kingdom in this sense, the Nepali word used was not rajya, but dhunga, literally meaning 'stone'. Mahesh Regmi has pointed out that the use of this word, common from Prithvi Narayan's time onwards, signifies a contrast with the pre-unification system in which the concept of the state, as opposed to the personal bond between king and follower, had not yet emerged. This connotation is well brought out in Rana Bahadur's use of the expression just before he was cut down by his half-brother, Sher Bahadur. Accusing Sher of having acted against him during his exile in Banaras, he told him that although he had forgiven him for his offence against him personally, he still had to answer those present for his crimes against the dhunga.

The second factor lies in a sense of Parbatiya identity anchored around the Khas, whose central position in the Parbatiya caste structure has already been described and who had given their name to the language (khaskura) spoken by all Parbatiyas. This basic reality was neither altered by the Khas themselves progressively rejecting their old name in favour of 'Chetri' nor by the disdain which Brahman or Thakuri might at times show. In particular, solidarity between hill Brahman and Chetri was enhanced by many Chetri lineages claiming Brahman ancestry. The Parbatiya Brahmans were looked down upon by their counterparts in the plains, who to this day will often refuse to allow them the title brahman but refer to them instead only by the Nepali form bahun. Within the hills, however, it was the plainsman who was the inferior, as was made clear by the lower ranking of Tarai Brahmans in the hierarchy enshrined in the 1854 Muluki Ain. In this respect the Ain was faithfully reflecting a well-established view: the Shah dynasty had accepted the Mishra family of Banaras as hereditary gurus in the seventeenth century, but never admitted them to commensality as they did their purohits, the hill Aryals. Whilst many groups in the hills sought to raise their status by claiming plains origin in the distant past, it was also necessary to be fully 'naturalised' in the new environment.

Other ethnic groups in the hills were excluded from the Parbatiya identity, whilst the impure Parbatiya castes could not share it in the full sense. The whole history of the system had, however, been one of the
integration of tribal groups into the hierarchy, and although by the time of unification the situation was less fluid than it had been earlier, some flexibility remained. All who lived in the hills were, if not Parbatiyas, at least 'Paharis' ('hillmen'), with a shared sense of separateness from the plains. As the nineteenth century progressed, groups such as the Rai and Limbu were to start on the path along which Magar and Gurung had already gone.

Marginal to the nation in embryo were two non-tribal groups—the Newars of the Kathmandu Valley and the people of the Tarai. The position of both, especially the latter, remains problematic today. In the Newar case there is an irony, given that Nepal is itself a Newari word, deriving from the same root as Newar. Throughout the period of this study, the word was used to refer to the Kathmandu Valley. The Parbatiya elite spoke of ruling Nepal whilst identifying themselves as Gorkhalis. With the Tarai, the problem was of course that the area was geographically and culturally part of the North Indian plain. The boundary between Nepal and the East India Company was purely arbitrary.

Despite these difficulties, the hill base was sufficiently large to allow the overall consolidation process to continue, and, paradoxically, it was assisted in the long run by Nepal’s defeat at the hands of British India. The ending of Gorkha expansion and the loss of Garhwal and Kumaon was a devastating psychological blow, and competition amongst the elite for land assignments may have been intensified now that the supply of land was finite. However, the British decision to restore to Nepal the eastern Tarai, originally annexed under the Treaty of Sagauli, ensured that the country was not economically crippled. A western border on the Mahakali aided integration, because it excluded areas where the position of the Khas was more depressed vis-à-vis immigrants from the plains than in Nepal proper. Although the slogan of ganga sandh ('the frontier on the Ganges') retained an emotional appeal, the restriction of Nepal territory on the plains to the Tarai allowed the 'Pahari' domination to remain unchallenged. This slow consolidation was the backcloth to the more dramatic political events of the 1830s and 1840s.

NOTES

2. For examples of these two approaches, applied respectively to the Chola empire and the Maratha state, see Burton Stein, Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980), and A. Wink, Land and Sovereignty


5. In Nepali, particularly significant work has been done by Baburam Acharya (e.g. Shri Panch Badamaharajadhiraj Prithvi Narayan Shahko Samshipta Jivani, Kathmandu: His Majesty's Press Secretariat, 1967/9)); Yogi Narahari-Nath (e.g. Ititas Prakashma Sandhipatrasamgraha, Dang, 1984); Triratna Manandhar (e.g. Nepal-Bhot Vivad, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, 1984); and by scholars of the Samshodhan Mandal in the journal Purnima and elsewhere.


10. The language is also known as Gurkhi or Gorkhali. For a discussion of the use and connotation of the different labels, see R. Burghart, 'The Formation of the Concept of Nation-State in Nepal', in Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XLIV, No.1,
KINGS, SOLDIERS AND PRIESTS


12. For a more extended presentation of the system, see Höfer, op. cit., passim.


22. In Kathmandu, in 1983, an educated Nepalese friend jokingly told me that her sins for the day had been atoned for by seeing King Birendra on his way to a wedding reception. Cf. Margaret Sinclair Stevenson's remarks (on the Indian situation generally): 'Merit is...acquired...by looking at sacred people, such as Brahmins, true ascetics, Ruling Chiefs, and still more by gazing at the face of the King-Emperor' (The Rites of the Twice-Born, London 1920, p. 366); quoted in David Gellner's review of Clifford Geertz's Nagara, in South Asia Research, Vol. 3, No. 2 (November 1983), p. 139.

23. Richard Burghart, 'The History of Janakpurdham', op. cit. p. 28. Although the Tarai is outside the geographical heartland of Nepalese culture, the Mithila region, in which Janakpur is situated, has long had close contacts with the Nepali court where Maithili Brahmins were frequently employed, especially under the Newar monarchy.


28. NJB, pp. 305-307. Regmi (loc. cit.) see an analogy between the nineteenth-century division of jurisdiction between \textit{dharma} and the Nepalese courts and the Islamic dual systems of \textit{shar} (canon law) and secular law.


31. Tucci, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 130.


34. For example, Hodgson to Government, 14 January 1839, FS, 6 February 1839, No. 53.


37. \textit{Kharita} received 6 July 1861 FP(B), September 1861, No. 25.


39. See the discussion in Chapter 6, 'Sanskritization and Unity', of Stiller, \textit{The Silent Cry}, \textit{op. cit.}.


43. Stiller, \textit{House of Gorkha, op. cit.}, pp. 91-97Bulmer and Co., 1811), pp. 55-56; Francis Buchanan Hamilton, \textit{An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal} (Constable and Co.,
30 KINGS, SOLDIERS AND PRIESTS


48. Hodgson Papers, Vol. 7, f. 24, 26. The proportion of protected tenants was, however, quite high, since Hodgson states that soldiers of the Kampu (Kathmandu garrison) were free to make their own terms with the cultivator only on about a quarter of their assigned land.


51. The operation of the *birta* system for ascetics and its significance is discussed in detail in Burghart, *op. cit.*, Passim.


55. A. Campbell, 'Sketch of Relations with Nepal', in Hasrat, *op. cit.*, p. 225. *Dhakre* means 'basket-carrier', a choice of term nearly illustrating the contrast between dependence on one's own physical labour for a living and entitlement to a share of the King's revenue. For the ordinary soldier, the contrast was literally applicable: half the plots assigned to serving soldiers were cultivated by *dhakres*, Hodgson Papers, Vol. 7, f. 43.


57. For Rajput adoption of this Mughal precedent, see Norman p. Ziegler, 'Some Notes of Rajput Loyalties during the Moghul Period', in Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

58. Revenue Assignments for 1909 VS (1852/3), JA Register 2 (Main Series), Kathmandu; Hodgson Papers, *loc. cit.*


61. Prithvi Narayan Shah to Ram Krishna Kunwar, Ashwin Badi 5 (year unspecified), translated in Regmi Research Series 4, 5 (May 1972), pp. 64-69. The local inhabitants were allowed to keep their *birta* rights to non-irrigated land (*pakho*) while forfeiting the more valuable *khet* (irrigated) areas (Order of King Surendra to the Newar Cultivators of Dhuilikhel, Paush Badi 8, 1931 VS (31 December 1874), published in *Mechidekhi Mahakali*, Vol. 1 (Kathmandu: Sri Pancko Sarkar Sancar Mantralaya 2031 VS (1974/5)), p. 500.

62. Ram Krishna himself had supported the Dhuilikhel Newars' petition to be allowed to retain their *pakho* lands, and two generations later Bal Narasing secured reconfirmation of their title when they had come under threat of confiscation (Regmi Research Series 10, 1 (January 1978), pp. 8-9). The equation of the 'Balnar Sing Jatra' with the modern *Bhagwati Jatra* is made in *Mechidekhi Mahakali*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 499, though the material presented in *Regmi Research Series, loc. cit.*, provides grounds for supposing that the 'Shrikrishna Jatra', for which Bal Narasingh arranged financial provision in 1834, was later renamed after him.
63. Interview with Khoju Shrestha, Dhulikhel, October 1983. Jang's mother was in fact the daughter of Nain Singh Thapa, whose home will have been either in Kathmandu or in Gorkha district. Other versions of the cobra anecdote place the incident elsewhere. Rishikesh Shaha associates it with Jang's alleged sojourn amongst the Tharus of the Tarai (see his introduction to Whelpton, Jang Bahadur in Europe, op. cit., p. 8). The king cobra is a symbol of royal authority, since the great serpent Sesh forms the couch of Vishnu.


68. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 24


71. Baral, op. cit., p. 111. A full discussion of the origin and history of Jang's family is given in Appendix I.


73. Dinesh Raj Pant, op. cit., p. 33.

74. Khas/Chetris formed about 60 per cent of the Bharadari in the mid-nineteenth century (see table III in Chapter Six), although only accounting for about a third of the population in pre-unification Gorkha (Hamilton, Account of Nepal, op. cit., p. 244).

75. 'List of Officers of the Nipaulese Government and of the Baradars and Sirdars composing the State of Nipaul', forwarded to Calcutta, 16 June 1816, NR/5/35.


77. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 123.

78. Pande Kshatri, op. cit., p. 5.


80. Although a number of Jha Brahmans had been assimilated into the Newar community in the medieval period (cf. above, n. 20), Hira Lal Jha's possession of an estate in British India, makes it virtually certain that his family remained based in their ancestral home of Mithila.


83. Mukhtiyyar can normally be considered as (chief) minister but the actual powers that went with the title varied from case to case, being set out in each individual's letter of appointment. A document in the Nepal Foreign Ministry, as reported by Triratna
Manandhar (personal communication), applies the title to Krishna Ram Paudyal, who was at the time (Kartik Sudi 13, 1895, i.e. 31 October, 1838), responsible only for the management of relations with the British Residency (cf. FS, 21 November 1838, No.160, and 28 November 1838, No. 41).

84. The British Residency list of 1816 (above, n. 75) states that Tripura was a Rajput from Banaras. However, Brian Hodgson later described her as 'the daughter of a Thapa jemadar', and Balchandra Sharma, *Nepal ko Aitihhasik Ruprekha* (Varanasi 2039 VS [1982/3]), p. 247, also believes she was a Thapa. Both the 1816 list and Baburam Acharya, 'General Bhimsen Thapa and the Samar Jung Company' (translated), in *Regmi Research Series* 4, 9(September 1972), pp. 161-7, maintain that the marriage took place only about a month before Rana Bahadur's assassination, but this is contradicted by the discovery of a coin bearing her name issued in 1804/5 (C.V. Valdettaro, personal communication).


86. A Wink, *Land and Sovereignty*, *op. cit.*


93. Until 1967, this perception was reflected in the words of the National Anthem: 'May we Gorkhalis always maintain the Lord's command over Nepal'. 'Nepali' has now been substituted for 'Gorkhali', Gellner, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
Chapter Two

THE FALL OF BHIMSEN THAPA: 1830-1838

Introduction

Through the 1830s the forces ranged against Bhimsen in the royal family and the bharadari grew in strength culminating in his arrest in the summer of 1837. Within a few months he was released and seemingly had a chance of regaining at least a part of his former power. By mid-1838, however, it was clear that he could not recover and the focus of attention shifted to Bhimsen’s old enemy, Ranjang Pande. An emotionally committed observer of the unfolding struggle and to a degree a participant, was Brian Houghton Hodgson, the British Resident. The Residency was not the real source of political developments but it was inevitably seen as a potential ally by discontented factions. Seeking British aid could nonetheless be a two-edged sword, for suspicion of them as a common enemy could unite sentiment against a faction backed by them, as had happened both after Kirkpatrick’s visit to Kathmandu in 1793 and after Damodar Pande and his colleagues reached agreement with them in 1801. This counter-effect became very evident as British involvement became explicit. Until the end of the thirties, however, the British were avowedly pursuing a policy of non-interference and both the direct effect of Hodgson’s actions and the reaction to them were limited. Their significance is that they provide a useful window through which a historian can observe the functioning of the Nepalese political system. In the post-war years, that system seemed to possess a stability amounting almost to rigidity but Bhimsen’s fall illustrated that it depended on an equilibrium which could easily be disturbed.
The Political Stage in 1830

Whilst Bhimsen Thapa was beyond question the most powerful individual in Nepal, his position depended on his ability to conciliate important Nepalese. Foremost amongst these was the Queen Regent, Lalit Tripura Sundari, who held possession of the royal seal which had to be affixed to all *lal mohars* (decrees). A famous verse of the *Shukranitishastra*, a treatise on political science composed in the first half of the nineteenth century, declares that ‘the document signed and sealed by the king is the king and not the king himself’. This principle was used by Bhimsen too. The standard procedure during the Regency was to have 200-300 blank sheets of paper stamped with the Regent’s seal in advance and then filled out with whatever Bhimsen wanted. Lalit Tripura Sundari a child-widow when appointed Regent in 1806 was greatly under Bhimsen’s influence.

Central as the link to Lalit Tripura Sundari certainly was, Ludwig Stiller has rightly pointed out that it did not give Bhimsen unfettered power and that he relied also on his ability to balance conflicting interests within the *bharadari*. It was, therefore, an exaggeration when Brian Hodgson wrote that Bhimsen and his family ‘monopolised all the loaves and fishes’ to the exclusion of ‘ancient families... who, by the constitution of this state, are entitled to share its counsels and exercise its highest offices’. It is true that the minister and his relatives were the highest-paid *jagirdars* but important positions were also held by members of other families, in particular by men who had themselves, like Bhimsen, accompanied ex-King Rana Bahadur during his exile in Banaras or whose close relatives had done so. Prominent in this category was Dalbhanjan Pande, who was continuously in office as a *kaji*, a post ranking below *chautara* in the traditional hierarchy, from 1816 until after Bhimsen’s fall. Dalbhanjan’s uncle, Ranjit, who died some years before 1830, remained in Kathmandu during the crucial years 1800-1804 but had joined the faction working for Rana Bahadur’s return and subsequently become a close collaborator of Bhimsen and been designated *mul* (principal) *kaji*. Ranjit’s son, Birkeshar, was also employed as a *kaji* and two of his sons had married daughters of Bhimsen, as had one of their cousins. Even before Bhimsen rose to prominence, Birkeshar’s sister had already been married to his brother, Nain Singh Thapa. The members of this branch of the Pandes, known as *Gora* (fair) Pandes because of their descent from Ranjit’s light-complexioned father, Tularam, buttressed Bhimsen’s position.
Bhimsen’s relations with the *Kala* (black) Pandes, distant cousins of his *Gora* allies, were less happy. These were the sons and grandsons of Damodar Pande, staunchest of Rana Bahadur’s opponents in the government which ruled Nepal during his exile. Damodar had been executed and his lands confiscated when the ex-king, with Bhimsen at his side, regained power. The *Kala* Pandes’ hunger for revenge against Bhimsen was to become a crucial factor in Nepalese politics in the mid-thirties, yet, until then they had not been languishing in penury. Their leader Ranjang Pande served almost continuously in the army through the post-war period and his brothers Karbir and Randal were also frequently employed. However, according to Nepalese historian Baburam Acharya (writing, as he frequently did, without citing any source), Bhimsen himself was reluctant to give Ranjang any post but was persuaded to do so by his own brother, Ranbir Singh Thapa.

Another favoured family was the Basnets, in particular the sons and nephews of Kirtiman Singh Basnet whose patronage in 1799 obtained for Bhimsen his original appointment to Rana Bahadur’s personal staff. Kirtiman was one of the ministers who opposed the ex-king’s attempt to reassert political control in 1799-1800 but he was himself assassinated shortly after Rana Bahadur reached Banaras. Subsequently, Kirtiman’s brother, Bhaktawar, who was also prominent in the Kathmandu government, became a supporter of Rana Bahadur’s return. In later years, one of Bhaktawar’s sons, Kulman Singh, was appointed *kaji*, whilst another, Prasad Singh, was also always in office. Here too, a marriage connection is known though not a recent one. Kirtiman and Bhaktawar were Bhimsen’s third cousins once removed. However, Bhimsen’s addressing Bhaktawar in a letter from Banaras as *kancha baba* (youngest paternal uncle) suggests there may have been a closer, undocumented relationship.

Also of importance in 1830 was a branch of the Thapas distantly related to Bhimsen, the common ancestor being eleven generations earlier according to the Thapa *vamshavali*. The best known is Anar Singh Thapa who led Nepal’s armies to the Satlej but was later defeated though not dishonourably by the British forces under Ochterloney in the first campaign of the Anglo-Gorkha war. Amar Singh, who died in 1816, was politically opposed to Bhimsen and had argued strenuously against his hard-line policy towards the British which had led to the war. Nonetheless, Amar Singh’s sons served in high positions throughout Bhimsen’s post-war years of power and the eldest, Ranadhoj, acquired prominence.
Less influential than any of the above but intimately associated with Bhimsen was the Kunwar family to which Jang Bahadur belonged. Jang Bahadur’s father, Bal Narsingh, had at the age of seventeen, been one of the party which accompanied Rana Bahadur to Banaras. Like Bhimsen himself, he may have owed his position to the patronage of Kirtiman Singh since both his father and grandfather had been closely associated in military campaigns with Kirtiman Singh’s uncle, Abhiman Singh. The Kunwar origin legend states that the first of their ancestors to enter the hills married the daughter of a ‘Baghale Kshetri’, and this may indicate a connection with the Bagale Thapa kul to which Bhimsen’s family belonged. The connection between the two was strengthened in 1806 when Bal Narsingh killed Rana Bahadur’s assassin at the scene of the crime. Previously a sardar, he was rewarded with the post of kaji, which was hereditary. His brothers were also made kajis at the same time and Stiller’s survey of senior posts from 1816 shows both Bal Narsingh and his brother Revant continuously held office in that grade. Bal Narsingh married Ganesh Kumari, daughter of Bhimsen’s brother Nain Singh and his Gora Pande wife.

All the families so far discussed were, like Bhimsen’s, Khas (Chetri). However, also among the party at Banaras was the chautara (royal collateral) Pran Shah. Described in a British report of 1816 as ‘a great favourite of Bhimsen’s’, he continuously held the post of principal chautara (not merely bearing the word as an honorary title) until his death in 1827 when his place was taken by his son Fateh Jang. Other members of the chautara family, notably Pran’s brother Pushkar were employed in various ranks in the army and normally posted to the far west. Good as the personal relationship between Bhimsen and Pran Shah was the chautaras generally resented their subordination to a Khas minister since they were Thakuris. Thus, the safest course was to keep them at a distance.

Another important factor that Bhimsen had to reckon with was the Brahman rajgurus. The term rajguru strictly speaking denoted one who had become either gayatri or diksha guru to the king or a close relative, but it was also used to refer to any male member of a family from which the guru in the narrower sense actually came, or, more specifically, to refer to the senior member of such a family; it is this second sense which the expression ‘the Rajguru’ in British sources normally carried. In 1830, however, two different families, the Paudyals and the Mishras, were involved.

The Paudyals were hill Brahmans, originally from the former state
of Tanahu, west of Gorkha but had lived at times in India. There, one of them had assisted in the search for a bride for Prithvi Narayan and thus they were brought into association with the Nepalese royal court. As diksha guru to Prithvi Narayan’s son and successor, the unmilitary Pratap Shah, Brajnath Paudyal was an opponent of the king’s brother Bahadur Shah, and the older Gorkha commanders who supported him. He was consequently expelled from the country when Bahadur Shah took joint charge of the country on Pratap’s death in 1777. Brajnath’s eldest son Rangnath was brought up in India but when Rana Bahadur reached Banaras in 1800, Rangnath offered his services to him, assisted in negotiations with the British and finally returned with him to Kathmandu. The alliance was a natural one given that Damodar Pande, Rana Bahadur’s strongest opponent amongst the bharadari, had been a supporter of Bahadur Shah. Rangnath became personal guru to the Queen Regent, Lalit Tripura Sundari and later to King Rajendra’s Senior Queen. Rangnath’s eldest son, Jivnath, became Rajendra’s gayatri guru. Rangnath also had three younger brothers, the eldest of whom, Krishna Ram known as mahila (second senior) guru was particularly influential and like Rangnath had negotiated with the British before the 1814-1816 war.

The Mishras were Banaras Brahmins who had been hereditary gurus to the Gorkha royal family since the early seventeenth century but whose members were away from Kathmandu for much of the period that Bhimsen was in power. Gajraj Mishra had been involved in the 1801-1804 negotiations but had worked against Rana Bahadur and supported Damodar Pande and an alliance with the British. He withdrew to India when Rana Bahadur was about to resume power but was recalled to the Nepalese darbar in the closing stages of the 1814-1816 war when his services were required for peace negotiations. After a year in Kathmandu, during which he vied with Rangnath for influence and both considered attempting to oust Bhimsen, he died in India in 1817 while on a complimentary mission to the Governor-General. Mishra involvement in Nepali affairs then ceased for a number of years. A list of bharadars for 1824 makes no mention of the family. In October 1835, however, the name of Gajraj’s cousin, Krishna Ram Mishra, occurs amongst the counter-signatures to an important lal mohar. He was appointed diksha guru of King Rajendra at about this time and from then until 1840 he was a close political adviser to the king. He also allied with the Kala Pande leader, Ranjang, whose guru he also was.

Members of both guru families had much in common. They were
civilians not soldiers and were oriented towards the Indian plains and their outlook thus differed from that of many Nepalese notables who knew only their own mountains. Their Indian connections made them ready collaborators with the British on certain occasions—sometimes because of their conviction and sometimes owing to their wish of a comfortable retirement at Banaras under East India Company patronage.

The final element in the political equation which Bhimsen had to balance was the army, which under his stewardship, increased by 1831 to 15,000 from the 1816 total of 10,000. Further increases were made during the political struggles of the 1830s, so that by the time Bhimsen fell, the standing army numbered around 18,000. This was in excess of what the country could readily afford but it would have been politically dangerous to restrict the opportunities for military employment. Expansion of the army was a means of averting discontent. It also gave Bhimsen manifold opportunities for the exercise of patronage. After the war, he raised the proportion of the army kept at Kathmandu so as to be able to personally carry out as much as possible of the military pajani (annual reappointment or dismissal of serving soldiers and enlistment of fresh troops). Another large concentration of troops was at Palpa in the central hills, where the governor was always a close relative of Bhimsen. Such measures undoubtedly earned him popularity amongst the army but Hodgson was right in maintaining that its loyalty was rather to the sovereign than to the general. He witnessed Bhimsen, after his arrest in 1837, being ‘guarded with every sign of hearty acquiescence’ by ‘a battalion of his own previously personal troops’. Successful management of the army helped Bhimsen obtain royal acquiescence, but it could not replace royalty.

The Campaign against Bhimsen and the Emergence of Ranjang (1832-1838)

Bhimsen’s decline and fall is usually reckoned as starting from the death of Queen Regent Lalit Tripura Sundari on 25 March 1832. Even before this, jealousies within his own family gave him cause for anxiety. His brothers, Ranbir, who was employed within the royal palace and Bhaktawar, Governor of Palpa, had been disaffected for some time. The Regent’s death, however, presented an opportunity for all those who harboured resentment against Bhimsen. The crucial question was now whether King Rajendra, who had technically come of age on his eighteenth birthday the previous year, would want to take into his own
hands the authority which his minister had exercised for so long. Rajendra, a timid and indecisive man and perhaps, as alleged, deliberately brought up by Bhimsen to be so, was uncertain but several people around him wished ardently that he resume his powers. Foremost among them was his Senior Queen, Samrajya Lakshmi Devi, daughter of a Gorakhpur zamindar. A year or so younger than the King, she and the Junior Queen, Rajya Lakshmi Devi, had both been married to him on a single day in 1824. She considered Bhimsen’s power derogatory to the royal family’s dignity and she also believed the story that Bhimsen had murdered Rajendra’s parents in 1816 to ensure that the throne again passed to a minor. However, both deaths were natural.

Immediately following Lalit Tripura Sundari’s death, Samrajya Lakshmi took possession of the royal seal and tried to oust Bhimsen with the aid of his brother Ranbir who coveted the post of mukhtiyar himself. Bhimsen thwarted this move, since Rajendra did not support his wife and Ranbir had to retire from Kathmandu for some time. The struggle against Bhimsen rather became a matter of long term palace intrigue than a quick coup. It was soon joined by chautara Pushkar Shah and the mahila guru, Krishna Ram Paudyal—the main ‘players of the royal game’ as Hodgson described them in December 1833. Rangnath Paudyal and his two younger brothers were also involved. Pushkar Shah had been called to Kathmandu from his posting in Doti (far west Nepal) after Lalit Tripura Sundari’s death. Although this was supposedly because Rajendra himself wanted him as a counter to Bhimsen, it was probably Samrajya who prompted the move, especially since Pushkar had connections with her parents’ family. Rangnath also enjoyed a special link with the queen as her personal guru. Nevertheless, there was a division between Samrajya Lakshmi, who still wanted to move swiftly against Bhimsen, and the others, who favoured a more cautious strategy, taking no dramatic steps themselves but hoping to gain advantage from the increasing dissension within the Thapa family. They hoped they could weaken Bhimsen by pushing forward Ranbir, whom the British Resident described in October 1833 as the only man in Kathmandu daring openly to oppose Bhimsen.

Attempting to interpret this struggle was Brian Hodgson, who had taken over as Resident from Herbert Maddock in December 1832, having previously served in Kathmandu in a subordinate capacity in 1820-1822 and from 1824 onwards. Relations between Nepal and British India had been peaceful since the end of the war when the Nepalese were forced to accept the Residency as part of the terms
of settlement. But though Nepal under Bhimsen’s administration had scrupulously observed the treaty, she sought to preserve the isolationist policy of Prithvi Narayan that she regarded as essential for the maintenance of her independence. Hodgson was concerned at her failure to remove tariff and other barriers to large-scale trade with India, her growing military strength and the general atmosphere of hostility towards the \textit{firangis}. A poem written by Yadunath Pokhrel in praise of Bhimsen in the 1820s gives a good idea of the ruling sentiments, with its picture of the British quivering in fear at the sight of Nepal’s military preparations.\textsuperscript{37} Hodgson was torn, however, between his recognition that Bhimsen had the ability to keep hot heads in check and a belief that he deliberately preserved his countrymen’s prejudices so that he himself could pose to both Nepalese and British as an indispensable bulwark against the other side. He went on to reason that Bhimsen might, under extreme political pressure, himself unleash the forces which he had previously fostered but kept under control or that his less able successors would be unable to restrain the military machine.

Hodgson’s concern was not shared by the Company establishment. In Warren Hastings’ tenure, the East India Company had entertained visions of lucrative trade through Nepal with Tibet, exporting English broadcloth and metals in return for wood, gold, musk and borax. This prospect led the Company to despatch Captain Kinloch’s woefully inadequate force into the hills in an effort to support the last Newar king of Kathmandu against the Gorkhas, who it was feared, would ruin commerce. A similar motivation guided the 1791 commerce treaty and to a lesser extent, Wellesley’s unsuccessful attempt to take advantage of the quarrel between Rana Bahadur and his opponents. By the time of the outbreak of the Anglo-Gorkha war, however, trade was not a major consideration. It had been realised that the Kathmandu route was less important economically and with opium and cotton exports now financing the China purchases and the Company’s monopoly status under challenge, its enthusiasm for promoting trans-Himalayan trade had been reduced.\textsuperscript{38} In contrast to Calcutta, Hodgson argued that the Kathmandu-Lhasa-Peking route could be used to supply China direct with Canadian furs and English cotton goods now being marketed there by the Russians. He also remained convinced that there was a large market in Tibet for English woollen goods.\textsuperscript{39} Both his enthusiasm about this prospect and his apprehensions about possible Nepalese military adventures were generally regarded with little interest by the Governor-General. However, they coloured his reports from Kathmandu and fuelled his enthusiasm
for an activist role in Nepalese politics.

Hodgson's ability to evaluate the political scene was, of course, dependent on the structure of the Residency itself and its contacts with the Nepalese. The Residency had a normal complement of three senior European staff—the Resident, his assistant and a surgeon. After 1831 the small secretariat serving them consisted of the 'English Office' with a Head Writer and Under-writer usually both Indian, supported by a daftiri (assistant) and four peons, and the 'Persian office' with a Head and Assistant Munshi (secretary/interpreter), who were always Indian, together with a locally-employed Devanagari writer. The Head Munshi was the key member of the secretariat both because Persian was the language of formal written communication between the Nepalese and Indian governments and because he could be sent to the Darbar on the Resident's behalf. More often than not, however, it was the Nepalese who came to the Residency. The most regular messenger was the Darbar's own Head Munshi, a post held from 1830-1846 by the Newar Lakshmi Das, who was probably recruited into Rana Bahadur's service in Banaras and enjoyed a special friendship with Bal Narsingh Kunwar. Lakshmi conducted business either with his counterpart or directly with the Resident himself though on certain occasions he was accompanied or replaced by one or more bharadars. While Bhimsen was fully in control, he tried to monopolise contact with the Residency and any bharadar used as an intermediary, was like Lakshmi himself, a trusted adherent. This was the role in which Bal Narsingh came to the Residency's notice. Subsequently, the range of representatives widened, varying with the state of parties within the Darbar. In addition to such day-to-day contacts, the Resident himself, during Bhimsen's heyday, made two ceremonial visits to the Darbar each year which were reciprocated by the minister. Again, the pattern changed as the political situation became fluid and the Resident was in later years summoned frequently to the Darbar to meet the king himself.

Apart from these official contacts there were the informal ones. When the Residency was first established, Bhimsen took care to isolate its employees from the local population. These precautions were, however, gradually relaxed from the late twenties onwards. Also, since the Resident had an escort of over one hundred Indian troops and numerous servants and camp followers, channels of communication were plentiful. It thus became easier for Bhimsen's opponents to send covert messages to the Residency and for the Resident to collect
sensitive information. As Acting Resident in 1831, Hodgson was 'regularly maintaining a secret intercourse with a member of the Raja’s household.' Throughout the 1830s, a number of his letters to government consisted almost entirely of translations of ‘secret intelligence’ received. These are always clearly marked as such in the letters themselves by the use of quotation marks, but most modern writers on the period fail to distinguish between such passages and those where Hodgson was writing himself. As he was aware that the Nepalese might be spying, Hodgson sometimes wrote and despatched particularly sensitive letters without letting his own clerical staff see them and as a general rule he did not name his informants in correspondence with Calcutta. Nonetheless, a despatch of December 1833 clearly implied that someone in the section of the Darbar handling confidential Persian correspondence was providing information. In 1840, he named the brother-in-law of the head of that department as a contact. Earlier in 1839, he gave the name of Moti Singh, a jemadar in Rangnath Paudyal’s personal escort. Hodgson was thus able to obtain a great deal of information and in negotiations in the years 1837-1840 was sometimes able to disconcert the Nepalese side with revelations of what he knew.

Attempts to make the Residency more than just an observer of the political scene had in fact been made just after it was established. That was a time when Bhimsen’s position was challenged in the aftermath of the war and he was not able to assert an exclusive right of communication with the British. Shortly after King Girvana Yuddha’s death in November 1816, Gajraj Mishra had unsuccessfully sought Resident Gardner’s backing for what he claimed was the wish of Girvana’s widow that her three-year-old son Rajendra be entrusted to his (Mishra’s) protection rather than that of Rangnath Paudyal, who was allegedly being supported by Queen Regent Lalit Tripura Sundari. The following March, Lalit Tripura Sundari herself and Rangnath sent a message to the Residency suggesting obliquely that she wished to oust Bhimsen in favour of Rangnath. The Resident reported to Calcutta that he would give a clear refusal if a direct request were made but no further approach was made. Such abortive overtures were not a very promising precedent but sixteen years later Bhimsen’s opponents made strenuous attempts to enlist Brian Hodgson’s support. They did not succeed in establishing any formal alliance but the efforts influenced Hodgson’s attitude towards Bhimsen and his actions.

Before 1832, Hodgson shared the view of Edward Gardner, first Resident at Kathmandu, that Bhimsen’s predominance was a factor in
favour of peace rather than otherwise and that Nepal's isolationist and hostile attitudes would break down naturally over a period of time.\textsuperscript{48} Reporting Lalit Tripura Sundari's death to Calcutta in April 1832, Resident Maddock, who had been in the country only a month and must have relied wholly on Hodgson's views, forecast that Bhimsen's position might now be weakened, and commented that the British could not count on enjoying any longer 'the good effects produced by [Bhimsen's] influence on the foreign relations and internal Government of Nepaul'. The same tone was maintained in Maddock's final letter to Calcutta, written as he prepared to hand over charge to Hodgson after a brief eight-month tenure and there is no reason to suppose that Hodgson did not still endorse this view.\textsuperscript{49}

In the following January, however, the first indirect approach to the Residency was made by Queen Samrajya Lakshmi\textsuperscript{50} and in February Hodgson wrote an analysis of the political situation which, while still admitting that Bhimsen's 'talent and energy constitute our best stay', painted him as an usurper of his sovereign's rights and suggested that the accusation against him of murdering Rajendra's parents was well founded.\textsuperscript{51} The immediate stimulus for the letter was a visit from Bhimsen's nephew and Jang Bahadur's uncle, Mathbar Singh Thapa, who requested that the Residency Munshi should always see Bhimsen at the Darbar rather than trouble the King himself. Nonetheless, Hodgson was clearly echoing the 'royal party's' propaganda.

In June 1833, Hodgson initiated a series of small-scale negotiations with Bhimsen over various restrictions affecting the Residency, in particular the searching of the Resident's baggage in transit and the obstacles placed in the way of Indian merchants at Kathmandu when they wished to invoke their right as British subjects to seek Residency assistance. In informing Calcutta of these, Hodgson also reported a long conversation with 'one who knows [Bhimsen] as well as he (sic) hates him' and who alleged that, beset with political difficulties and realising he could not safely resign lest he be brought to account for his earlier crimes, Bhimsen was considering war as the only way out. Towards the end of the negotiations themselves, when the major point of free access to the Residency for the merchants had already been conceded, a delegation consisting of Bal Narsingh Kunwar and Krishna Ram, the 'rajpurohit' (royal priest) arrived to carry forward discussions. The former was well known as an adherent of Bhimsen while the latter was a 'royalist'. The arrival of such a combination illustrated that the King now insisted that Bhimsen no longer monopolised the conduct of
foreign affairs. The interview passed off successfully but at the end of it the ‘raj purohit’ drew Hodgson aside and whispered in his ear. Hodgson did not report what was actually said but interpreted the incident as an attempt to create the impression that he himself was supporting the King against Bhimsen. He consequently called back the court scribes who had accompanied the delegation and instructed them to tell the minister that he disapproved of the raj purohit’s action. Since Hodgson later referred to Rangnath Paudyal having tried to trick him into partisanship, it seems that the ‘purohit’ was Krishna Ram Paudyal and that Hodgson mistakenly described him as purohit rather than guru. It is, however, known that the main purohit family, the Aryals, were regarded as pro-British in 1840.

Although Hodgson rejected such crude overtures and was eager to emphasise to Calcutta that he had done so, his sentiments continued to swing against Bhimsen. In a private letter to the Governor-General the following month, he announced that ‘at the bottom of Bhimsen’s profound character I have at last discerned as I conceive, an intense hatred of us’. He now believed that Bhimsen would not actually resort to violence against the King to protect his position but was sure the minister had earlier contemplated doing so, both because this had been ‘the talk of the city’ and because Rajendra when ill the previous year had allegedly declined to be treated by the Court Physician on the ground that this man had poisoned his parents on Bhirnsen’s instructions in 1816.

Two months later, however, in a demi-official letter to the foreign Secretary, Hodgson adopted a completely contrary approach, declaring that all was well ‘and so it may possibly continue to be provided we can but keep Bhim Sen at the helm’. The reason for this change of heart had been a conversation with the minister at the Darbar the previous evening. In general conversation, one of Hodgson’s European subordinates had praised the bravery and patriotism of Amar Singh Thapa, the principal Nepalese commander in the west during the 1814-1816 war and a political opponent of Bhimsen. He had referred specifically to an intercepted letter of Amar Singh. This led Bhimsen, when later talking to Hodgson out of the others’ hearing, to say that he hoped the Resident did not believe the other parts of the intercepted correspondence in which Amar Singh and his colleagues had put the whole blame for the war on Bhimsen personally. Hodgson made a soothing reply and Bhimsen went on to say how difficult a job he had found it to make his restless countrymen preserve the peace since 1816 and that some of those around the King were now trying to make him ‘your enemy and
mine’. He promised that if he should ever find that his own advice was rejected and Nepal readied for war against the British, he would give the Resident three to four months’ advance warning of the attack. Although Hodgson had himself in earlier letters denounced Bhimsen’s tactic of trying to convince the British he was personally indispensable to the maintenance of peace, this direct and unsolicited approach by the minister had an overwhelming effect. Hodgson’s letter went on to praise ‘the perfectly satisfactory manner in which every object of the alliance with Nepal has been accomplished under the internally vigorous and just and externally pacific administration of Bhim Sen’, and concluded:

We shall probably see that to afford every reasonable countenance and support to Bhim Sen, in the possible event of his soliciting it, would be a measure as consonant to justice and to the interests of the Maharaja of Nepal as to policy and our own interests.57

This sudden change of attitude illustrates how justified Lord Auckland’s later comment was: ‘Mr. Hodgson writes so strongly from slight impressions that I have always looked at his communications with slight reserve’.58 The Resident’s judgement was now swayed by the minister’s comments just as it had been earlier by those of his opponents. Apart from Hodgson’s general impressionability, this is evidence of his obsessive fascination with Bhimsen’s personality that oscillated between repulsion and attraction.

Whatever the reason for Hodgson’s sudden conversion, it was not a lasting one. By mid-October, he wrote that the King planned to learn from Bhimsen for another year or so and would then take over from him and that the change would be to everyone’s advantage including that of the British.59 At the pajani, Bhimsen was indeed confirmed in office though only after a delay of three weeks caused by dissension within his own family. Within a few days of the reappointment, Hodgson again wrote angrily to Calcutta denouncing him for feeding the King a distorted version of recent events in Gwalior and wondering whether it would be advisable to press for direct access to the King to counteract the anti-British propaganda he was receiving.60

The belief that things could be achieved by regular and direct communication with the King was an abiding conviction of Hodgson for several years to come. He was influenced in the first place by the favourable accounts of Rajendra’s character brought to him by the ‘King’s’ men, among whom Rangnath and Krishna Ram Paudyal were
in 1833 and early 1834 the Resident’s main contacts. His thinking was also based on a theory that a sovereign had a vested interest in peace and stability whereas any military leader must always pander to the army’s warlike and xenophobic prejudices in order to retain its support.

Hodgson initially had doubts on whether actually to press for access because he feared that Bhimsen might resort to violence if he felt he was being pushed into a corner. In January 1834, however, he decided that it was after all safe to act and in a series of discussions with Nepalese representatives, asked that his munshi be admitted directly into the King’s presence rather than having to deliver his messages to the minister. By the end of the month he believed that Rangnath’s influence at court would be sufficient to carry through the proposal. Subsequently, however, Rangnath told him forcefully that Bhimsen was still successfully maintaining the illusion that he alone could ‘manage’ the British and that until the Resident acted firmly with him no progress could be made. Hodgson did not know at this stage that a letter was already on its way from Calcutta ordering him not to press the issue further and warning him to stay neutral between factions. Consequently, he summoned the khajanci (treasurer) Umakant Upadhya, a trusted lieutenant and representative of Bhimsen and spoke more strongly to him than he had done hitherto. He asked why the King was still regarded as a minor where relations with the British were concerned, when he was now directly involved in other affairs of state. He hinted that the British, who had occupied the entire Tarai at the end of the war and then returned most of it, might revoke the ‘gift’ if Nepal continued its hostile behaviour such as needlessly expanding her army and charging high tariffs on Indian goods in violation of the 1792 treaty. Hodgson had explicitly told Rangnath in January that he would not participate in the internal power struggle and had informed Calcutta in January that Rangnath understood this. Yet, by now virtually allowing Rangnath to direct his negotiating tactics he was giving the Brahman a very different signal.

After he had received his government’s orders, Hodgson could not apply further pressure but whether or not as a result of the treatment Umakant had received, Bhimsen decided that a more conciliatory line was now called for. By May, Hodgson reported that all he had asked for in January had been ‘gradually and voluntarily conceded’.

Two months later, without himself having to take any initiative and thereby risking a further rebuke from Calcutta, Hodgson was presented with an opportunity to reopen the trade issue. A Nepalese
revenue contractor who was selling timber across the border in India had complained to Kathmandu that the Collector of Murshidabad was levying a 10 per cent duty rather than the traditional 2 1/2 per cent and Hodgson was asked by the Nepalese authorities to provide an explanation. By July, he had ascertained that the increase was purely the result of an accidental omission of timber from a schedule of goods carrying the reduced rate. The British had maintained the concessional rate for Nepalese imports ever since 1792 when both Nepal and British India had agreed not to levy more than 2 1/2 per cent on each other's goods. By complaining about this increase on a single item, the Nepalese opened themselves to the counter-question of why they themselves had never implemented the treaty but continued to impose a high tariff on all Indian goods. Hodgson pressed the point during the next two months and though theoretically he now had access to the King, the latter left the negotiations in Bhimsen's hands. The minister did not refuse to recognise the treaty but gave various reasons why it was difficult for the Nepalese to implement it at once. The reasons range from a loss of face that it would entail for the king to objections from one of the gurus. In September, Hodgson appealed to Calcutta to strengthen his hand with a memorandum direct from the Foreign Secretary to the King, so that Bhimsen would not think Hodgson was exceeding his instructions. He made it clear that he saw the trade issue not just on its own merits but as a tool for weakening Bhimsen's political position. In a reply, he was told bluntly that 'it is of no concern to the British Government whether the Raja rules the minister or the minister rules the Raja' and that he should simply allow the Nepalese to say freely whether they wished to regard the treaty as valid or not. Presented with this choice Bhimsen affirmed in November that Nepal no longer recognised the treaty. Yet, despite this, on 1 December, a proposal was submitted by Nepal for a new agreement embodying during above the 1792 rates but equal to only half of what Nepal was now levying. Calcutta was so surprised by this change of tone that Hodgson was at first suspected of ignoring instructions and applying undue pressure but the Governor-General later accepted that there had been a genuine change of heart and negotiation on details began early in 1835.

Towards the end of 1834, a new approach was made to Hodgson by the 'King's' men. The Paudyal brothers receded temporarily into the background and Jit Man Singh sought a secret meeting with Hodgson. This presumably Jit Man Singh Basnet, son of the assassinated Kirtiman who thirty years earlier had obtained for Bhimsen his initial
appointment in Rana Bahadur’s entourage. Jit Man Singh had himself been appointed a *kaji* for the first time that year whilst his cousins, Kulman and Prasad Singh had been in prominent positions since the 1820s. The approach was rebuffed since Hodgson was avoiding an outright alliance with Bhimsen’s opponents. The episode, however, was significantly the first sign of open disaffection amongst Bhimsen’s principal Khas allies. Hitherto, only Brahmans and *chauraras* were involved and the 1 December proposal for the new trade agreement was actually brought to Hodgson by the *chaurara* Fateh Jang, son of Bhimsen’s old ally Pran Shah, now sympathetic to his uncle Pushkar Shah, a leading opponent of Bhimsen.

In November an open move against Bhimsen was made by a man who had little standing. Ranjang Pande, son of Bhimsen’s old adversary Daniodar, had returned to Kathmandu during the monsoon, after a long absence. He had not actually been in some kind of a private retreat as Residency reports sometimes imply but was serving in an army unit in the hills. His anti-Bhimsen sentiments were well known but he was at first not taken very seriously. The Assistant Resident Archibald Campbell described three years later how he was ‘hooted in the streets and pronounced a madman by all the descent [sic] and prudently selfish men of the place’.71 Towards the end of the year, however, he petitioned the King for restitution of his father’s property and honours, which had been forfeited on his execution in 1804. Although the petition was not granted, the King received him kindly and from then on Ranjang was an important ally of those already working against Bhimsen, particularly the Senior Queen Samrajya Lakshmi Devi.72

Bhimsen’s attitude towards the Residency now became increasingly conciliatory. There were various signs of courtesy towards Hodgson, such as the construction for him of a bungalow in the hills above the Valley and an invitation to accompany Bhimsen’s nephew and staunch supporter in internal family quarrels, Mathbar Singh, on a hunting expedition to the Tarai. In March 1835, a draft of the new commercial treaty was agreed in Kathmandu and forwarded to Calcutta for approval. However, the agreement was vetoed by the British Customs department because it introduced complications in a system that they were trying to simplify.73 Then in early May, a formal request was made to the Residency that Mathbar Singh be allowed to visit Europe ‘in order to gratify his own curiosity and that of the Darbar respecting the reported wonders of the Western world’.74 Hodgson enthusiastically recommended that his government grant the request,
seeing it as an opportunity to win Nepalese confidence and break its isolationist mentality. He was aware that Bhimsen intended the exercise to reconcile the British to the continued domination of the Thapa family in Nepal, this being precisely the motive which Archibald Campbell suggested in his diary entry recording Bhimsen’s informal broaching of the idea at the end of April. He also knew, as this is noted in the same source, that Bhimsen was pressing the king to abdicate in favour of his six-year-old son. Yet, despite all the earlier rhetoric about ‘usurpation of sovereignty’, Hodgson now viewed the continuation of Thapa power with equanimity and described Mathbar as Bhimsen’s ‘probable successor in the Ministry’.

Once again, reservations were soon to return. After the proposed visit had been sanctioned by the Governor-General, the Resident began to be worried by rumours in Kathmandu that the mission was intended to extract some specific concession—an extreme demand such as the return of Kumaon or the removal of the Residency or alternatively, a lesser quid pro quo—in return for a change in Nepal’s isolationist stance. Hodgson suggested that in the second case, it might be worthwhile considering returning to Nepal the remainder of the Tarai should she show good faith after Mathbar’s return. Even whilst still relatively well disposed to the Thapas, Hodgson was unhappy at the idea of substantial negotiations taking place during Mathbar’s trip and this attitude was reinforced by quarrels within the Darbar shortly before his scheduled departure. The Senior Queen Samrajya Lakshmi Devi and other opponents of Bhimsen resisted a demand that Mathbar be granted plenary negotiating powers and insisted that he should do no more than hand over complimentary letters from the King to the Governor-General, the President of the Board of Control of the East India Company and William IV. The drafts of these letters were shown to Hodgson before the mission set off and he insisted on their amendment to remove hints that some favour was expected. He told Bhimsen that there had rather be no mission at all than one not confined strictly to complimentary purposes. At this point, the minister and his nephew decided that there was no point in going beyond Calcutta. The project thus turned simply into a formal embassy to the Governor-General and although Mathbar and his escorting regiment were given a splendid reception, his hosts, in accordance with Hodgson’s wishes, discussed no substantive matters with him. The result was seen as a major blow to Thapa prestige.

Hodgson’s action, while not tantamount to pushing a man
overboard, was a distinct refusal to throw him a lifeline. He was now determined not to do anything that could be interpreted as political countenance for the Thapas, even though he realised that Mathbar and Bhimsen were willing to make concessions in return. Hodgson’s attitude reflected the success of Bhimsen’s opponents in convincing the Residency that the King considered negotiations between Mathbar and the British as against his interests.

After Mathbar’s return in March 1836, a renewed chill settled on Bhimsen’s relations with the Residency whilst the internal political struggle continued. In October, Ranjang accused Mathbar of cohabitation with his elder brother’s widow. It was a general custom amongst many Nepal communities, including the Khas, for a woman who did not die at her husband’s funeral pyre to be taken as a concubine by her brother-in-law. However, in July 1836, a lal mohar had prohibited the practice on pain of draconian penalties—castration in the case of most castes including the Khas though punishments of this type could probably be waived in practice. The rajgurus, whose advice on legislation of this type was crucial, were opposed to Bhimsen and the measure was probably introduced specifically to embarrass Mathbar. However, though the opposition was strong enough to bring the prosecution, they were not in a position to carry it to a conclusion. The enquiry was dropped, but Mathbar left Kathmandu for his home near Gorkha and was shortly afterwards appointed governor of that district. Ranjang was assigned the command of troops in eastern Nepal which Mathbar had hitherto held but Bhimsen himself was confirmed in office despite expectations that he would be ousted.

At this critical juncture, the Darbar submitted a request to Hodgson that rajguru Krishna Ram Mishra be allowed to succeed to the Banaras jagir granted in 1792 to his cousin Gajraj in recognition of his services in negotiating the commercial treaty that year. On Gajraj’s death in 1817, the jagir had been turned over in succession to his two widows, the second of whom had recently died. In recommending that Calcutta grant the request, Hodgson emphasised the traditional friendship of the Mishra family for the British government and the opportunity, in the present political circumstances, of favouring a man than whom the King had now ‘no more sincere and valuable adviser’. Krishna Ram Mishra had probably come up to Kathmandu from Banaras in 1834 or 1835, on the request of his shishya Ranjang Pande, and in October 1835 his signature followed that of two chautaras and preceded Rangnath Paudyal’s in the list of witnesses on a lal mohar renewing Bhimsen’s
powers and granting him the title of ‘Commander-in-Chief’. The list is probably in order of precedence and suggests that he, rather than Rangnath, was now the principal guru. This explains why Hodgson from then onwards used the title of rajguru to refer to him alone. This did not mean that Rangnath was completely out of favour, for he was, on the King’s behalf, attempting to reduce the size of inflated jagirs. Although rivalry between the two guru families was long standing, they worked together until Bhimsen’s fall.

Another significant development in 1836 was the appointment as a colonel of Prasad Singh Basnet who had served as a kaji before 1820 but subsequently in the lower rank of captain. The title of colonel had until then been reserved for Bhimsen’s blood relatives. Prasad’s 1836 salary of 18,000 rupees was more than that of any other bharadur except the chautaras and members of Bhimsen’s own family. As Prasad’s cousin Jitman had been involved in intrigue against the minister in 1834, the appointment was probably seen by Bhimsen as necessary to conciliate a potentially dangerous adversary.

At the pajani in early 1837, Bhimsen himself was yet again confirmed in office but the king acted against his supporters and rewarded his enemies. Mathbar Singh and Bal Narsingh were amongst several who lost their posts while a number of important offices went to relatives of Ranjang. Bhimsen managed to cling to power for a few more months. Hodgson’s letter to Calcutta complained of his intransigence on a range of minor matters and developed the theme that all the consideration that Bhimsen showed to the British in 1834-1835 was simply a ruse to try to gain British support in his struggle for political survival. He suggested that the raising of two new regiments from the proceeds of the pay reductions Rangnath was enforcing was a sinister development. During April he was anxious that Bhimsen might succeed in retaining power indefinitely but the following month he reported enthusiastically that a change was anticipated. Rangnath was aiming to be appointed in his place and would manage the troops, who might he unhappy with a Brahman retrencher as their commander, by making Ranjang his ‘war minister’. He stressed that neither the opposition nor Bhimsen was seeking to involve the Residency.

During the next two months, investigation of Bhimsen’s conduct of various branches of the administration—notably the mint and law courts—went ahead but in a long commentary on the situation written for Lord Auckland in June, Hodgson again seemed to be unsure about Bhimsen actually being dismissed. He wrote of the need for a ‘reckon-
ing’ with Nepal ‘if the change come not soon or come without improve-
ment’ and for a letter from the Governor-General to the King hinting
that it was time for the King to take full control, ‘if the change seem to
tremble in the balance’.91 Immediately thereafter, Krishna Ram Mishra
urged the Resident not to blame the King for foreign policy moves just
because he was now taking direct charge of the internal administration.
Mishra was apparently anxious over developments such as the reopen-
ing of a border dispute with Sikkim which the British had already
adjudicated. Hodgson had, anyway, interpreted that as an attempt by
Bhimsen to start a diversionary foreign quarrel and had asked Calcutta
not to make any move on the issue until the political situation cleared.92
Hodgson assured Mishra he would not put the blame in the wrong place
but made his own delicate attempt to assist a ‘trembling’ change:

I. . . hinted to him that should matters continue on their present
footing after the Punjunni my Government will not probably
enquire too nicely with whom in reality originate proceedings
professing to carry the name and authority of the Darbar.93

In early July, a new pajani did indeed get under way. It did not
affect Bhimsen directly but the King personally reviewed the appoint-
ment of all officers in the army, thus taking into his own hand the
patronage which Bhimsen had previously exercised.94 Bhimsen’s pres-
tige was further reduced by an order prohibiting the direct attendance on
their senior officers by army personnel. Bhimsen’s final dismissal now
seemed very near but the manner in which it actually came was totally
unexpected. On 24 July, the seven-month-old son of Queen Samrajya
Lakshmi died after taking medicine prescribed by one of the court
physicians. It was claimed that it was a murder carried out on the
instructions of Bhimsen and his relatives, all of whom—including even
his estranged brother Ranbir—were immediately imprisoned. Ranjang
Pande, who also helped make the arrests, was at once nominated
minister.

Whether the child’s death was murder and whether Bhimsen was
really involved is not known for certain. Hodgson was initially convin-
ced that the story was true but, like King Rajendra himself, he doubted
whether it could be proved. The story that he was told was that the
physician wanted to kill Queen Samrajya Lakshmi the most virulent of
Bhimsen’s opponents and had initially requested her to take the
medicine herself so that the sick child should get the benefit of it
through her milk. On her refusal to do this, he gave it direct to the child. The medicine was noticed to be of an unusual colour. During initial interrogation, he admitted that the preparation did contain poisonous ingredients but claimed he had administered it mistakenly for another potion he also had with him. When he was tortured, he confessed the Thapas had ordered him to kill the Queen.95

Hodgson was informed unofficially of what had happened by a message from Krishna Ram Mishra on the evening of the 27th. He attempted to let Mishra know that he did not want the matter to be officially referred to him but the guru claimed that the message reached him too late for him to be able to prevent Hodgson being called to the Darbar. On his arrival, all other bharadars were asked to withdraw and he found himself with the King, Ranjang Pande, Rangnath Paudyal, Fateh Jang, Dalbhanjan Pande and Krishna Ram Mishra. Despite Ranjang’s new status as minister it was Rangnath, apart from the King himself, who did most of the talking. Both monarch and Brahman evidently wanted Hodgson to recommend a course of action. He replied in general terms on the need for thorough investigation and for ‘justice tempered with mercy’ but he also hinted, without fully committing himself, that the British government might be prepared to take the prisoners into custody in India.96 Believing that it was dangerous to keep the Thapas in Nepal, even in prison and that a new round of political bloodshed could be avoided, Hodgson had already written to the Foreign Secretary asking whether such an offer could be made. The British replied that they could keep the prisoners in custody only if the King was satisfied about the proof of their guilt.97 The offer was not accepted.

In the aftermath of Bhimsen’s arrest the two senior rajgurus, Krishna Ram Mishra and Rangnath Paudyal, emerged as the mainstay of the competing factions. Krishna Ram supported Ranjang Pande’s claim to the ministry whilst Rangnath, who has been in line for the job before the dramatic events of 24 July, was backed both by the Senior Queen Samrajya Lakshmi and the Junior Queen. Queen Samrajya Lakshmi’s desertion of Ranjang is surprising considering their close association in working against Bhimsen in the past and the partnership they were to form later but it must be remembered that Rangnath was her guru and according to Hodgson, had ‘a tongue fitted to draw women’s hearts out of their bosoms’.98 Samrajya Lakshmi was influenced by the feeling of much of the bharadari that it was unwise for someone as untried as Ranjang to attain the position of minister.
the Queen’s support Rangnath soon had the better of it. Although he had been nominated as premier, Ranjang was never actually invested whilst Rangnath, who was not even nominated for the post until December, was from the start recognised as the leading bharadar.

Hodgson regarded Krishna Ram Mishra as especially reliable, trustworthy, above factional struggles and trying to serve the King’s best interest. Hence, his description of him in June as ‘wholly unconnected with politics’. In the days following Bhimsen’s arrest, he told Calcutta that the guru was the only person he could safely speak to. It might be true that Krishna Ram, as he himself claimed, had been offered the post of minister by the King and had declined but this did not make him non-partisan. Hodgson himself adopted a partisan approach once he realised that Rangnath was not only trying to establish a Bhimsen-like monopoly of relations with the Residency but also to secure Bhimsen’s release from prison to counteract the Pandes. Hodgson wanted to block anyone who would thwart his wish of direct dealing with the King and he was astute enough to realise that Ranjang, once in power, would try to do the same thing that Rangnath was now attempting. However, by using Krishna Ram as a channel ‘to denounce Rangnath’s impudence’, the Resident was, in the circumstances of August 1837, doing Ranjang’s and Krishna Ram’s work for them.

On 1 September, Hodgson had an opportunity to impress his views upon King Rajendra in person. Krishna Ram called him back for an audience at the palace from the hill bungalow where he had gone to recover from a severe bout of illness. At Hodgson’s request, Krishna Ram attended the interview but no other person was present. Rajendra said that he was being urged by some of his advisers to release the Thapas but that he himself thought this would be unsafe and wanted the Resident’s advice. Hodgson recommended that they remain in prison. The King went on to enquire about the intentions behind Mathbar Singh’s Calcutta mission. Hodgson now felt sure that Rajendra had obtained information from former Thapa adherents which confirmed his own view of Bhimsen’s ulterior motives at that time. He, therefore, all but directly told the King that there had been a Thapa plot against him and that, as the British had thwarted it, he owed them some consideration in return. He was finally asked for general advice. He told Rajendra he should retain overall direction of the administration in his own hands and deal directly with the Residency.

This interview, for a few days, seemed to tilt the balance against Rangnath and in favour of Krishna Ram and Hodgson hoped that the
latter would be appointed as the regular liaison between the King and the Residency. However, by late September, to the disgust of both Krishna Ram and the Resident, the pendulum had swung the other way. Hodgson now feared that the King had ‘no character or a bad one’ and that he was under the bad influence of Samrajya Lakshmi, Rangnath and a paramhans (ascetic) who was beguiling him with tales of an anti-British alliance being formed in the plains. The Residency was totally unable to get any of its routine business attended to and Hodgson asked the Governor-General to write directly to the King demanding improvement and hinting at possible punishment if it was not forthcoming. Ten days later, the Resident thought he saw signs of improvement. He even suggested that his severe illness had made the tone of his earlier letter unduly pessimistic but when Krishna Ram was sent by the King to solicit British permission for the Nepalese annexation of Sikkim and Bhutan, Hodgson despaired again. In mid-November, he wrote that Rajendra might conceivably be allowing each party to rear its head in turn until he was ready to assert full control himself but that he was more probably simply deluded with dreams of repeating his ancestors’ conquests. Their relations would continue to have their ups and downs but Hodgson’s hopes in King Rajendra had now effectively ended.

On 5 December, a few days after delivering a mild and friendly letter from the Governor-General to Rajendra, Hodgson left Kathmandu to seek medical treatment in Calcutta. Neither Lord Auckland nor the members of his council thought the situation called for the hard language Hodgson had demanded in September. The day after the Resident’s departure, Bhimsen and the other Thapas were released and Rangnath nominated as premier with Bhimsen’s powers and command of one of his former personal regiments. Hodgson’s faith in Krishna Ram and Ranjang survived his disillusionment with the King and Assistant Resident Campbell, who faithfully reflected his superior’s views on Nepalese politics, was indignant at this apparent end to Ranjang’s hopes. However, even though Bhimsen was received publicly by the King and his confiscated property partly restored, Ranjang and Krishna Ram retained some standing at court, the King clearly trying to maintain a balance between factions. In January several of Ranjang’s relations were given senior positions, while the Thapas were trying to strengthen their hand with fruitless appeals to Campbell for support.

A crucial element in Rangnath’s success had been Samrajya Lakshmi’s support, even after his move for the release of the alleged
murderer of her child. Besides his own personal influence, he had been assisted by Samrajya Lakshmi’s father, Prabhu Shah, whom Jang Bahadur’s uncle, Balram, had allegedly bribed on Bhimsen’s behalf. Early in 1838, however, the Queen began strongly supporting Ranjang once more. In February, she left the royal palace to take up residence at Pashupatinath (Nepal’s principal Hindu temple, three miles east of Kathmandu). This was probably a means of putting pressure on her husband to favour Ranjang—she employed similar tactics on several other occasions—although Hodgson, on his return from Calcutta, was inclined to believe that she genuinely felt that she was in danger from the Junior Queen Rajya Lakshmi and Bhimsen, whose reappointment as premier Rajya Lakshmi was now advocating.

The political situation continued to be unstable with Rangnath facing increasing difficulties. As many had anticipated, he had trouble in managing the army since he was a Brahman and also because of the pay-cuts that he imposed. Insubordination amongst the regiments increased—allegedly instigated by Bhimsen—and Ranjang, offered the premiership if he could carry the economy measures through, refused to accept it. Rangnath’s embarrassment was heightened when two lakhs of rupees—proceeds of the many bribes he had been taking—were seized on the road whilst he was having them secretly conveyed to Banaras.

Hodgson was perplexed by a flurry of Nepalese diplomatic activity now under way, involving both states outside India and British dependent allies within it. In March, Bhimsen’s nephew Mathbar set off on a journey to Lahore—it is unclear whether as an official Nepalese envoy or not—without applying for a passport at the Residency. Meanwhile, envoys who had reached Lahore earlier sent back stories of Ranjit Singh, the Panjab ruler, expressing support for the Thapas. These were probably pure fabrications but the news greatly boosted Bhimsen’s standing whilst Hodgson thought that King Rajendra had become distinctly uneasy. Mathbar’s brother-in-law Bal Narsingh Kunwar was doubtless in close touch with all these developments and it was probably now, if not in the immediate aftermath of Bhimsen’s release, that both he and Jang Bahadur regained official appointments. The father’s signature is amongst those of bharadars attesting a royal decree at the beginning of May, whilst the son is referred to as a kumbhedan (lieutenant) in a document dated 4 March. In April Bhimsen again made a bid for British support, telling the Residency that he was the East India Company’s sole friend in Nepal and that plans were being made for war with the British, if envoys now in China, the Panjab and Burma
brought back encouraging replies. On his return to Nepal in March, Hodgson had still been sympathetic to Krishna Ram Mishra and Ranjang Pande. He first began to suspect that they might be engaged in hostile activity but in early May he decided that Bhimsen and Rangnath (not, as they implied, Ranjang’s party) had been responsible for all the embassies, as a tactic to embarrass the King and to create the impression that Bhimsen enjoyed powerful support abroad.

In June, however, Hodgson changed his mind again and decided he was in need of different allies. He was told by Rangnath that the King intended to restore Ranjang’s ancestral lands to him at the expense of the present occupiers and would make Ranjang minister if he agreed to go to war. Rangnath, still nominally minister himself, promised Hodgson that he would provide information if he could be guaranteed a comfortable retirement in Banaras. Hodgson was inclined to trust him but was also sounding out as a more reliable collaborator, Rangnath’s brother Krishna Ram Paudyal, the mahila guru. All four Paudyal brothers had been described by Hodgson in 1833 as ‘shrewd’ and ‘men of the world who have been ours, aforetime, for a consideration and are ready to be again on like terms’. Krishna Ram Paudyal was thus a contrast to Krishna Ram Mishra, whom Hodgson characterised in 1837 as ‘a jewel of a man--simplehearted as a villager’ and later, less charitably, as ‘untalented and ignorant of affairs’. Nevertheless, it was the mahila guru who was to replace Mishra as Hodgson’s closest confidant and collaborator during the next four years.

The Resident’s change of allegiance corresponded to a shift of focus in factional politics. Until mid-1838, there had largely revolved around Bhimsen Thapa, the key question first being whether he could be brought down and later whether he would regain power. It was now increasingly Ranjang Pande who occupied the pivotal position. His actual power was never as much as Bhimsen’s but opposition to him was the platform on which the bharadari could unite as opposition to Bhimsen had been before.

Bhimsen’s Fall in Retrospect

In his study of Nepal under Bhimsen, Stiller highlighted two fundamental problems. The first was that the maintenance of an army larger than the country’s needs put an excessive strain on the peasant economy and the second was that the limited availability of jagirs and the consequent slow promotion rate within the bharadari led inevitably to increasing
tensions between its members. Stiller implicitly endorses Hodgson’s view that after the Treaty of Sagauli, Nepal should have reduced the emphasis on the military and concentrated on the promotion of trade and commerce. As far as factionalism in the bharadari is concerned, his analysis is corroborated by Hodgson’s successor Henry Lawrence, who summed up the situation in 1844 thus:

The country is small and poor, and there are many and hungry chiefs, squabbling for power and pelf, it is therefore their destiny to quarrel.

These factors were indeed vital but they formed the background against which every Nepalese regime had to operate and cannot, therefore, provide the explanation for the fall of a particular, dominant figure. In 1846, Jang Bahadur emerged as the new Bhimsen and established political stability with his own family raised above the level of the other bharadars, despite the fact that Nepal remained a poor country and the army actually increased in size. Bhimsen’s failure must, therefore, be seen as essentially a political one. He was unable, in the new situation after the Queen Regent’s death to manage tensions which had always been present and also failed to maintain the unity of his own family against outside contenders for power.

The coalition which operated against Bhimsen was essentially an *ad hoc* one, united by resentment against a man who so overshadowed the other bharadars. There were nonetheless, some elements of continuity in the alignments of the 1830s. One was the enmity between Bhimsen Thapa’s family and the kala Pandes dating back to the events of 1800-1804. The other was the kala Pande-Mishra axis, which went right back to the 1770s. Thus, while patterns of alliance shifted constantly as the perceived balance of advantage changed, both an inter-family feud and the guru-chela bond, could help preserve alignments.

It is largely through Hodgson’s eyes that we are able to follow the struggle but this should not tempt us to attribute more importance to his role than it actually warrants. His hands were tied by his superiors’ lack of enthusiasm for pressuring Nepal into changing her defence and trade policies. By refusing to support Bhimsen on the Calcutta embassy, Hodgson hastened his fall but it is unlikely he would have survived indefinitely. Hodgson’s specific backing for Krishna Ram Mishra and Ranjang Pande during 1837 strengthened their hand but they would have succeeded in any case. Their influence in fact increased
after he had abandoned them. In so far as Hodgson's help had been effective, he had actually scored a clear 'own goal'—he spent the next three years energetically opposing those he had previously regarded as his surest friends.

NOTES


2. 'List of Officers of the Nepaulese Government', 16 June 1816, NR/5/35.


7. Shamsher Bahadur Thapa, Ranbir Singh Thapa (Patan: Lalitpur Jagadamba Prakashan, 2023 VS (1966/7), p. 96, cited in Jain, The Emergence of a New Aristocracy in Nepal (Agra: Sri Ram Mehra, 1972), p. 6, lists Bhimsen Thapa's sons-in-law as Uday Bahadur, Shamsher Bahadur and Dal Bahadur. The first two were sons of Bir Keshar Pande and the third the son of a cousin. See B.B. Pande, Rasrahhakiko Jhalak (Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 2034 VS (1977/8)).


10. Acharya, Samksipta Vrittanlo, op.cit., p. 106.


13. HP, vol. 51, f. 175. This document is similar but not identical to that published in Itihas Prakash, vol. 1, pp. 119-121.


15. He is listed as a *sardar* in a *lal mohar* of 1804 published in Nepali, *Rana Bahadur Shah*, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-141. Ramlal, *op. cit.*, p. 48 and Pudma Rana, *LJB*, p. 9, claim the new rank was hereditary.


22. HP, Vol. 74, ff. 97-104.


28. Maddock to Government, 6 April 1832, NR/5/43.

29. Hodgson to Government, 9 November 1833, NR/5/44.


31. King Girvana Yuddha died from smallpox in an epidemic in November 1816 (Gardner to Government, 20 November 1816, NR/5/37). The death of his widow, King Rajendra's mother, the following month was officially stated to have been from the same cause, but Resident Gardner received private information that she died from a miscarriage brought on by anxiety over recent events (Gardner to Government, 17 December 1816, NR/5/37).


33. Hodgson to Government, 19 December 1833, NR/5/44.

34. Maddock to Government, 2 December 1832, NR/5/47.

35. Baburam Acharya, 'Bhimsen Thapako Patan', *op. cit.*, p. 216. Acharya is, however, probably wrong to suggest that Pushkar himself was trying to secure the premiership, since no report of this reached the Residency.

36. Hodgson, demi-official of 20 October 1833, NR/5/44.

37. Published in Baburam Acharya (ed.), *Purana Kavi ra Kavita*, 3rd edition (Kathmandu: Sajha 2035 VS (1978/91)), pp. 71-79. The editor's argument for a date in the mid-thirties (pp. 65-6) is unconvincing and controverted by the poem's reference to Edward Gardner (Resident from 1817 to 1829).


40. Interview with Nepal Man Singh, Kathmandu, 5 August 1983.


42. Maddock to Government, 9 August 1832, NR/5/43.

43. Hodgson to Government, 28 November 1831, NR/5/43.

44. Hodgson to Government, 19 December 1833, NR/5/44, and 14 August 1840, FS, 31 August 1840, No. 82 (the latter published in *KM*, pp. 25-26.)


47. Gardner to Government, 10 March 1817, NR/5/37.


49. Maddock to Government, 6 April 1832, NR/5/43, and 2 December 1832, NR/5/47.


51. Hodgson to Government, 18 February 1833, FP, 5 March 1833, No. 24.

52. Hodgson to Government, 13 (?) June 1833, NR/5/44.

53. Hodgson to Government, 28 January 1834, NR/5/44.

54. Resident's Diary, 18 April-1 May 1840 (a section of this document is preserved under the title 'Nepaul Summary 1837-40', in a manuscript volume in the John Hopkins Collection, Cleveland Library, Ohio, and available on microfilm at the IOLR (pos. no. 4218)).

55. Hodgson to Lord Bentinck, July 1833, NR/5/44.


57. Hodgson to Swinton, 4 September, NR/5/44.


59. Hodgson, demi-official of 15 October 1833, NR/5/44.

60. Hodgson to MacNaghten, 18 November 1833, NR/5/44.

61. Hodgson to Government, 19 December 1833, NR/5/44.

62. Hodgson to Government, 28 January 1834, NR/5/44.

63. Government to Hodgson, 13 February 1834, and Hodgson to Government, 22 February 1834, NR/5/44.

64. Hodgson to Government, 10 May 1834, NR/5/44.

65. Hodgson to Government, 20 and 23 September 1834, FP, 9 October 1834, Nos. 17 and 18.

66. Government to Hodgson, 9 October 1834, FP, 9 October 1834, No. 19.


69. Stiller, *Silent Cry, op. cit.*, Appendix A, 'Basnyat' Table.


71. Campbell to Colvin, 8 December 1837, NR/5/48.


74. Hodgson to Government, 10 May 1835, NR/5/47.

75. Campbell, 'Memorandum on the Calcutta Mission', FP, 24 April 1837, No. 82.
76. Hodgson to Government, 10 May 1835, NR/5/47.
77. Hodgson to Government, 24 June 1835, NR/5/46.
78. Hodgson to Government, 8 and 14 November 1835, FP, 23 November 1833, Nos. 25 and 27.
82. Lal mohar of Ashadh Sudi 7 Roj 4, 1893 VS, published in Nepali, op.cit., pp.153-154. The measure was cited by Hodgson (letter to Government, 14 July 1836, NR/5/47) as an example of the increasing enlightenment displayed by the Nepalese legal system. He was presumably unaware of the theoretical penalty for infringement, and in the same letter observed that mutilation as a punishment was becoming increasingly rare in Nepal.
83. Hodgson to Government, 17 November 1836, NR/5/47 and Acharya, 'Bhimsen Thapako Patan', op. cit., p. 219. Tickell, however, states that Mathbar was only relieved of his command in early 1837 (Hasrat, op. cit., p. 297). Mathbar had been in military charge of Eastern Nepal since autumn 1834 (ibid., p. 294).
84. Hodgson to Government, 26 November 1836, NR/5/47.
87. Stiller, Silent Cry, op.cit., Appendix A, 'Basnyat' Table.
94. Stiller, Silent Cry, op. cit., p. 275.
95. Hodgson to Government, 29 July 1837, FP, 14 August 1837, No. 35.
96. Ibid.
97. Hodgson to MacNaghten, 28 July, NR/5/48. The request was repeated in subsequent public letters and conditionally acceded to. See Government to Hodgson, 9 August 1837, No. 36.
100. Hodgson to Government, 2 August 1837, FP, 21 August 1837, No. 39.
102. Hodgson to Government, 18 September 1837, FP, 9 October 1837, No. 45.
103. Hodgson to Government, 24 September 1837, FP, 9 October 1837, No. 46.
106. Governor-General's Minute of 3 October 1837, FP, 9 October 1837. The letter to Rajendra was sent from Calcutta on 9 October, giving Hodgson the discretion whether and when to deliver it. He decided to deliver it at the end of November. See Hodgson to Secretary to Governor-General, 30 November 1837, NR/5/48.

109. Campbell to Secretary to Governor-General, 31 January 1838, NR/5/48.

110. The charge against Balram Kunwar was not brought until 1839 but it was widely believed at the time of Bhimsen's release that the latter's supporters had bribed Prabhu (Campbell to Government, 24 January 1838, FP, 14 February 1838, No. 78).

111. Hodgson to Government, 10 March 1838, FS, 26 July 1838, No. 18.

112. Hodgson to Government, 24 April 1838, FS, 16 May 1838, No. 29.


114. Hodgson to Government, 28 April 1838, FS, 16 May 1838, Nos. 32 and 33.

115. Hodgson to Government, 8 May 1838, FS, 16 May 1838, No. 35.

116. Hodgson to Secretary to Governor-General, 14 June 1838, FS, 11 July 1838, No. 12.


118. Hodgson to MacNaghten, 19 August 1837, NR/5/48; HP, Vol. 6, f. 167, a list of bharadars, probably compiled in early 1839.

119. Stiller, Silent Cry, op. cit., passim.

120. Lawrence's Diary, 17-19 December 1844 (Eur. MSS F85, No. 96, IOLR).
Chapter Three

THE ROAD TO THE ‘BRITISH MINISTRY’

Introduction

The years 1838 to 1840 saw a major crisis in Nepalese politics which almost involved the country in a war with the British. The background was provided by the adverse position in which the British found themselves on several fronts, particularly due to their Afghan entanglement. The most important reason, however, was the tension within the bharadari as Ranjang Pande sought to strengthen his position with the King by offering the prospect of aggrandisement abroad and an increase in the royal share of the revenue. An encroachment on British territory in 1840 provoked the East India Company to directly intervene in the internal struggle. Backed by a demonstration of military strength on the frontier, Hodgson insisted on the dismissal of Ranjang and his associates and the appointment of a new minister acceptable to him. Hodgson’s allies were initially only the Paudyal brothers, Krishna Ram and Rangnath but the group later included most of the leading bharadars both former staunch Thapa adherents and those who had helped bring Bhimsen down. The pattern was complicated, however, by individuals switching between the two ‘parties’, a tactic most dexterously employed by Prasad Singh Basnet, whose family’s role has not been properly recognised in accounts of this period.

The struggle was essentially one between factions of the bharadari but as tension mounted the army became involved. Actions by rank and file soldiers were largely controlled by the rival bharadars. Nonetheless there is evidence to suggest that the troops did see themselves as a group with interests potentially opposed to the bharadars. The mutiny in 1840 set a pattern which was to recur in the following years, with the army’s role seeming about to become decisive, but never quite managing the transition.
The Bharadari under Pressure

As he prepared to enter an alliance with the Paudyal brothers, the Resident did stop to consider whether the charges being made against the increasingly influential Ranjang stemmed from resentment amongst other bharadars who stood to lose financially. However, an interview with the King and Krishna Ram Mishra in early August, a few days before Rangnath's resignation from the premiership, convinced him that despite their denials they were planning to break with the British.

By this time, the situation in Nepal was causing considerable concern in Calcutta. Troop movements in the east of the country had alarmed the British military commander at Darjeeling and the imminent possibility of war with Burma plus the approaching departure of the expeditionary force to Afghanistan heightened concern for British India's relatively unprotected border with Nepal. Lord Auckland consequently gave orders for a considerable strengthening of garrisons along the Ganges. News of these military preparations reached the Nepalese authorities in the beginning of September through the Calcutta press and the resultant alarm led to the appointment of mahila guru Krishna Ram Paudyal, whose pro-British orientation was publicly known, as liaison agent with the Residency. With his help, Hodgson rapidly secured nominal agreement to withdraw Nepalese envoys from various parts of India and remedy grievances of British subjects trading in Kathmandu. The mahila guru's influence on actual policy was, however, only intermittent. His opponents in the Darbar argued that the Afghan preoccupation of the British precluded them from taking any firm action against Nepal. To counter this, the guru was eager that the Company adopt a robust approach from Calcutta. This would buttress his contention that the Company should not be provoked. Hodgson was thus provided the useful ammunition for his own frequent dispatches requesting stronger support. 'The Gooroo', he wrote to Calcutta in February 1839, 'says that his strength is mine and mine the Governor-General's: and that however wanton the Durbar's behaviour to him and to me, the Governor-General has only distinctly to support us in order to recall the vacillating young Rajah to the necessity of abiding by his recent pledges to us'.

Since October 1838, Ranjang Pande had been joint minister with Pushkar Shah, the chautara who had helped launch the anti-Bhimsen campaign in 1832 and who had just returned home after leading the quinquennial embassy to Peking. Nevertheless, the Thapas were still
politically active and their morale was boosted by the news that Mathbar had, at last, managed to reach Lahore. His release from Ludhiana had been due to a local misunderstanding of orders from Calcutta and was embarrassing to Hodgson since the Darbar received the news a fortnight before he did. The 'secret intelligence' received by Hodgson claimed that the Thapas were boasting of success over the Resident and the British government and that the King had been pleased by a letter from Mathbar reporting that Ranjit Singh was willing to negotiate an alliance with Nepal. Bhimsen consequently no longer supported Krishna Ram Paudyal's attempt to improve relations with the British. The report added, however, that Krishna Ram and Rangnath Paudyal had now ended their political differences—they appear to have been at odds since before Bhimsen's dismissal—and that they consequently 'possess a strength which renders them wholly indifferent to Pandes, Thapas, Chauntarias or any other party of the state'.

Following this reconciliation within the Paudyal guru family, there was to be in 1839 a drawing together of most of the principal bharadars in opposition to Ranjang Pande and his patron Senior Queen Samrajya Lakshmi. At the root of this development lay the government's desire to increase the resources at its command, an aim which coupled with Ranjang's blind desire for vengeance against his opponents, directly threatened the economic interests of Nepal's most prominent families.

The government's own economic difficulties had been increasing since the early 1830s, when military preparations against the British were intensified and military expenditure rose. In March 1837, three months before Bhimsen's fall, the land revenue in the eastern Tarai (i.e. the districts of Bara, Parsa, Rautahat, Saptari, Mahottari and Morang) was substantially raised and assessment in the hills also reached record levels. Even before these increases, taxes amounted probably to more than 50 per cent of the peasant's gross produce in the hills and around a third in the Tarai. Indeed, the new rents seemed unworkable even to some of the intended beneficiaries. Jagirdars with lands in the western hills petitioned the King in October 1837 for a reduction to the 1825 level. In May 1838, Rangnath, then mukhtiyar, had difficulty in finding suitable bidders for the revenue contracts for the Tarai districts whilst in August 1839, King Rajendra, in a kharita (formal letter) to the Governor-General, referred to ryots abandoning their fields because of the previous year's harsh settlement.

Coupled with the rise in rent was the constant alteration in the means of collecting them. In 1830, the government had abandoned the
use of *ijaradars* (contractors) as intermediaries between itself and the chaudhuris and other local revenue functionaries in the eastern Tarai.\textsuperscript{11} By the late thirties, however, the *ijaradar* system was reintroduced though the decisions were now taken on a year to year basis on whether to give a single individual a contract for the entire region or to appoint separate contractors for each district.\textsuperscript{12} The *ijaradars* were in principle required to levy tax at the rates laid down by the central government but in practice had a free hand. Friction arose with *ijaradars* claiming they were unable to collect the higher amounts now being prescribed.

Notwithstanding that has been said about the importance of the centre in Nepalese polity, linkages between *ijaradars* with their local base and senior *bharadars* played a part in the process: the disarray in the revenue administration reflected the intensifying factional struggle in Kathmandu. Unfortunately, information about the individuals who took the contracts is very limited. One of them, Kulanand Jha, ‘farmer-general’ for the entire eastern Tarai on at least one occasion was, however, an important *bharadar* in his own right. He was worth about half a million rupees when he died in 1840.\textsuperscript{13} Typifying the group was Girija Datt Mishra who became collector for his native Mahottari district in the 1830s under the patronage of the abbot of a local Vaisnavite monastery. He was subsequently imprisoned for withholding three years’ revenue but released and reappointed in 1843 if not earlier.\textsuperscript{14}

Given the possibility of Tarai peasants moving across the border into India if Kathmandu’s extortions went too far, the prospects of continually increasing government revenue were limited. Reduction in expenditure was the obvious alternative and Rangnath had previously attempted to carry through salary reductions. An order in June 1838 reduced the pay of non-military employees by 25 per cent.\textsuperscript{15} The army, however, was a more difficult proposition and a determined effort to impose reductions was not made until 1840.

At the end of 1838, a new source of possible relief for the treasury was found in the *birta* holdings of leading *bharadars*. Wishing to counteract the kudos which the Thapas had gained from stories of Mathbar Singh’s success in the Panjab, Ranjang made the spectacular gesture of resigning his own *birta* lands and called upon his peers to do likewise. At the same time an alarm was created by an announcement that the titles of all rent-free land were to be examined.\textsuperscript{16} Two months later in February 1839, an order was issued prohibiting new *birta* grants for the next ten years. According to Hodgson’s sources, a general resumption of tax-free lands, including even those obtained by
purchase, took place towards the end of the year. This was not fully comprehensive since the following summer the chiefs were again reported under pressure to give up lands obtained since 1803, but some grants must definitely have been rescinded as a new administration had to restore them in the winter of 1840. In any case, the apprehension of a general resumption contributed greatly to the heightening of political tension throughout 1839.

The central treasury profited greatly from the proceeds of political prosecutions. By June 1840, the confiscations reached 48 lakh rupees, equivalent to Hodgson’s figure for Nepal’s total annual revenue in 1843. Bal Narsingh Kunwar was probably a victim of this process early in 1839 whilst his brother Balram was fined 25,000 rupees for allegedly bribing Rajendra’s father-in-law to argue for Bhimsen’s release from imprisonment in 1837. By June 1839, Hodgson’s sources reported that ‘few or none of the Sardars who have held office in the last twenty-five to thirty years consider themselves free from the daily hazard of extortion’.

The severity with which this campaign was waged varied with Ranjang’s standing in the darbar power struggle. During the first three months of 1839, the King was unwilling to give Ranjang his full backing despite Samrajya Lakshmi’s once again withdrawing to Pashupatinath in protest. In April, however, Rajendra, apparently yielding to her pressure, ordered that he should be given precedence over Pushkar Shah, his fellow minister. The ‘secret intelligence’ report giving the Residency this information painted a lurid picture of the Senior Queen and Ranjang bent upon exacting vengeance against their opponents at home and abroad and also claimed that the Junior Queen was in fear of her own life and those of her children. The report concluded with this plea for British intervention:

A rash and violent women striving at uncontrolled sway governs the Darbar, and all men of experience anticipate the worst that can happen, unless renewed dread of the Company [i.e. the East India Company] should speedily recall the Raja to safe counsels and more resolution in abiding by them.

Ranjang now claimed that he could not accept confirmation as minister until ‘pro-English Thapa influence was completely removed. Bhimsen had been questioned again concerning the 1837 charge in February and despite a seeming return to royal favour in March, he was
placed under arrest in April. On 18 May, he was brought to trial, accused not only of the murder of Samrajya Lakshmi’s infant son but also of King Girvana Yuddha and his widow in 1816. No verdict was actually pronounced—under Nepalese law a confession had to be extracted before this could be done—but the King ordered him to be detained indefinitely.

Against this background, Hodgson became convinced that war was likely. The mahila guru now occupied an ever more important place in his scheme of things. In early May, he suggested securing his loyalty with financial reward. In June, he asked for the Governor-General’s instructions on how to respond to the approaches now being made to the Residency, and on 19 June, he spelt out in detail his intention, in case of war, to use the guru to secure guides for the invading British forces and organise the co-operation of disaffected bharadars.

In the same letter he requested sanction for 2,000 rupees already paid to Krishna Ram Paudyal and for payment of a further 3,000 rupees if necessary. The money for the guru was sanctioned, but instructions on the general question of contacts with the opposition were to avoid any collusion as long as Nepal and British India remained formally at peace. Prinsep and other members of the Governor-General’s Council were unhappy with this decision and in correspondence which continued into the autumn, they urged Lord Auckland to authorise Hodgson to form a ‘British party’ and back this up with the threat of an invasion if Nepal did not radically alter her policies. The Governor-General, however, remained adamant.

Hodgson made it clear that he too thought that creating a ‘British party’ was premature but that retaining the mahila guru was a different matter. The guru had already been useful in telling other discontented bharadars that they should not appeal to the Residency now and should circumstances change in future, he would be able to create a coalition with those bharadars rapidly.

The bharadars whom Hodgson believed he could rely upon are identified in another ‘secret intelligence’ report which he forwarded to Calcutta on 9 June. His informant claimed that the senior Queen Samrajya Lakshmi wished to drive Rajendra to abdication or failing that, start a war with the British in order to profit from the confusion. She had the backing of Ranjang and his family, guru Krishna Ram Mishra and chautara Kulchand Shah but was opposed by the Junior Queen Rajya Lakshmi. The Junior Queen now had the support of Pushkar Shah, Fateh Jang Shah, Dalbhanjan Pande, Bir Keshar Pande,
Bal Narsingh Kunwar, Prasad Singh Basnet, the re-imprisoned Bhimsen Thapa and Bhimsen’s brother Ranbir and his nephew Mathbar who was now in the Punjab. Also in the latter coalition were two members of the other important branch of the Thapa clan, Amar Singh Thapa’s sons Ranjor and Ramdas. The list was virtually a roll-call of all the ‘elder statesmen’ of the day and was not confined to those who had suffered directly from measures instigated by Ranjang since only the two Thapa families and Bal Narsingh were in this category.

Especially interesting is the inclusion of Prasad Singh Basnet, whose personal position was never under attack at any time in the period 1837-1840 and who actually became a close ally of Ranjang a few months later. His choice of coalition was perhaps influenced by an alliance with Bal Narsingh. This was an important factor in both families’ political conduct during the next few years. The Basnets and Kunwars had been closely associated from the time that Bal Narsingh’s grandfather Ram Krishna Kunwar, campaigned with Prasad Singh’s great-uncle Abhiman Singh, in the early days of Gorkha expansion. According to oral tradition in Kathmandu, Bal Narsingh’s son, Jang Bahadur, married an illegitimate daughter of Prasad Singh in addition to later seizing by force her legitimate half-sister, Siddhi Gajendra Lakshmi. Baburam Acharya dates the first of these events to spring of 1839 and although the marriage is not mentioned in the biography of Jang Bahadur by his son Pudma, there is good reason to accept Baburam’s testimony. Pudma’s silence can be explained by family embarrassment over anything connected with Bhim Jang, Jang Bahadur’s son by this marriage, who was allegedly killed by his father in a quarrel. Bhim Jang’s mother can plausibly be identified with the first entry in a list of Jang’s wives compiled by Pudma himself many years before he wrote his book. Acharya also claims that in return for agreeing to accept a girl whose caste status was impaired, Jang was given a commission in his father-in-law’s regiment. He is wrong in implying that Jang had not served in the army previously, but in early 1839 he had returned from a stay in Banaras, and may well have needed a highly-placed patron to help secure his reappointment. The co-operation between the two families is not mentioned in any of the standard accounts of Jang Bahadur’s life but it certainly helps in understanding ensuing developments.

The political situation continued to be unstable through the summer. King Rajendra showed signs of wishing to mend his fences with the British. There was talk of Nepal offering her troops to assist the British in Afghanistan but after news of Ranjit Singh’s death reached
Kathmandu, the prospect of a more anti-British regime at Lahore made the Nepali Darbar less anxious to placate the Company. Against this background, the drama of Bhimsen Thapa’s life was drawing to a close. In mid-July, driven finally beyond endurance by the threat that his wife would be paraded naked through the streets of Kathmandu, he attempted suicide with a khukuri. The wound turned fatal but only after an interval of nine days. In response to a plea from Bhimsen in the end of May, Hodgson had sent him a message that any intervention on his part could not help and might possibly harm him. Now, however, in a letter to the Governor-General’s secretary, he wrote that his silence over the brutal treatment meted out to Bhimsen and others was attracting adverse comment. He explained that he felt that his present instructions bound him to turn a deaf ear to the appeals of ‘old personal friends like General Bhimsen’ but that would be glad to speak out if the Governor-General could authorise it. He suggested that such action might prove politically advantageous, as well as humane. Before any reply could be received, Bhimsen succumbed to his wound. Hodgson closed his official report of this event with the oft-quoted tribute: ‘the great and able statesman who for more than thirty years had ruled this kingdom with more than regal sway’.

Hodgson had never denied Bhimsen’s abilities, so his formal praise of them was but to be expected. His reference to him as a ‘personal friend’ is a little surprising, but there had, after all, always been a certain ambiguity in his feelings towards Bhimsen, whom he had known for twenty years. The news of the death was brought to him by Lakshmi Das and Karbir Khatri, and they claimed afterwards that he wept on hearing it. Thirteen years later, Orfeur Cavenagh, Jang Bahadur’s escort on his European travels, wrote in Rough Notes on the State of Nepal that he had often heard it said Hodgson refused to speak out on Bhimsen’s behalf when a single word from him could have saved the man. On seeing the book, Archibald Campbell, Hodgson’s former assistant, asked his old superior for information on the point so that he could publicly refute the slur. In reply Hodgson referred to Campbell’s own presence at ‘that solemn debate where I made a last attempt to save the poor man’. This must, however, have been at a much earlier stage in the proceedings than the final trial, since Campbell had left Kathmandu to investigate the Sikkimese border dispute some months before Bhimsen’s death. Hodgson now made no mention of the government orders which silenced him in the last few weeks, nor of his own decision in May that his intervention would be counter-productive. He perhaps
felt a little ashamed that he could have done more than he did, especially as he had taken a very robust attitude to government instructions on some other occasions.

In the aftermath of Bhimsen’s death, negotiations between the Residency and Darbar, in which mahila guru Krishna Ram Paudyal again played a leading role, led once more to Nepal formally conceding a range of British demands but no improvement in practice. Both out of calculation and a natural tendency towards vacillation, King Rajendra was not prepared to give consistent backing either to Ranjang and his allies or the Paudyal gurus and the other principal bharadars. The economic squeeze on the bharadari as a whole continued, though it was probably not as severe as Hodgson represented it. In these circumstances, the Kunwars’ position inevitably remained precarious but no active measures were taken against them. Bal Narsingh’s name occurs in the Residency correspondence in December in a complaint to Calcutta over the continuing failure of the Kathmandu courts to enforce the claims of British subjects. The kaji had not paid the money he owed his former gardener despite a judgement given in the later’s favour three years ago. The court officials either made simple excuses or protested that Bal Narsingh would not appear before the court voluntarily and was too important a man to be coerced into doing so. The latter claim was specious but it means that Bal Narsingh had retained some standing in public affairs. This was not sufficient, however, to save one of his nephews, a son of his youngest brother Balram Kunwar, from imprisonment at the end of the year. The young man was probably an adherent of the junior Queen Rajya Lakshmi Devi and his arrest a part of a move against her by the senior Queen Samrajya Lakshmi Devi.

The new year opened with rumours of an alliance between China and Russia against the British. News of the outbreak of hostilities between Britain and China the previous autumn led to Ranjang’s investiture as mukhtiyar in early February. This formal change did not give him the complete control which he was seeking and Samrajya Lakshmi pressing for. Hodgson was right in assuming that the king wanted to use him to implement an anti-British foreign policy and at the same time deny him predominance in domestic affairs. The appointment nevertheless precipitated an important realignment which affected the Kunwars’ position. Towards the end of the month, Prasad Singh Basnet and his two brothers, Buddhiman Singh and Kulman Singh, presented themselves as allies of Ranjang. February also saw Prasad’s son-in-law Jang Bahadur appointed to
the rank of captain in the artillery. According to the family's version of events, he earned this promotion when, whilst accompanying King Rajendra on a hunting trip, he succeeded in tying together the legs of a wild elephant that had just then been surrounded. This feat was only the first of a series of acts of bravery which gained him further prestige during the coming months. These included rescuing a mother and daughter from a burning house and leaping from a roof onto the back of an elephant that had gone berserk and was rampaging through the streets of Kathmandu. Be that as it may, his promotion must also have been connected with his father-in-law's political moves, especially since he had probably been serving in a regiment under Prasad Singh since the previous autumn.

Crisis and Intervention

Anticipation of a clash with the British was now once again increasing. Mathbar, whom Ranjit Singh, in deference to British sensibilities had refused to meet, was now at Lahore. He reported that the new ruler Naunihal Singh might be willing to join hands with Nepal. Meanwhile, Rajendra had not abandoned the hope of obtaining promises of support from China. In April, Nepalese forces took control of a number of villages in Ramnagar, claiming that the area had reverted to Nepal on the death without legitimate child of the Ramnagar raja whose family had acquired it as dowry accompanying a Nepalese bride. In June, an army mutiny over proposed pay reductions almost turned into an attack on the Residency because the soldiers were led to believe that the cuts had been forced on the Nepalese government by the British. Hodgson's delivery in July and September of ultimatums from the Governor-General secured total Nepalese withdrawal from the disputed territory, apology and full compensation for damage but the British followed this up with a demand for the exclusion from the government of those responsible for the hostile acts. This led to the dismissal of Ranjang Pande and his associates and the formation of what his opponents dubbed as the 'British ministry'. All these developments have been treated in detail, in the perspective of Indo-Nepalese relations, by Ramakant, Mojumdar and Jain, whilst many of the key British documents have been published by Stiller. The present account concentrates on two aspects of particular significance for understanding the dynamics of Nepali politics at this time: the crisis in the army and the precise nature of the coalition which Hodgson helped attain power.
Brian Hodgson had estimated the total strength of the Nepal army in 1838 to be between 17,000 and 18,000 men though the detailed unit breakdown for January 1838 preserved in his own papers totals only 14,970. Military units were of two kinds, Kampani --companies of 100 to 300 men which normally had no senior officers permanently assigned to them and were under the command of the district governors in the regions where they were stationed and paltan --regiments or battalions which varied greatly in size but on average had a strength of 600 men. Those regiments which were stationed at Kathmandu were known collectively as the kampu and it was this ‘praetorian’ force which was politically important. The size of the kampu rose during the latter years of Bhimsen’s predominance, because he had deliberately concentrated troops in the capital to keep appointments under his personal control. Following his fall from power in 1837, about 3,000 troops were moved into the districts thereby reducing the Kathmandu garrison to 4,300. However, three units were brought back for the wedding of the heir apparent in May 1840. These three units were again sent out in 1841 but were back by 1843. The kampu was subsequently further expanded both by raising new regiments and by transfers from the provinces (see Table 1). The attempt at dispersal in 1837 thus proved to be only a temporary reversal of a continuing upward trend.

In principle all regiments were liable to serve anywhere in the country but in practice certain units were retained continuously in the kampu. Foremost amongst these were the Sri Nath and Letar, established by Bhimsen in the 1820s and kept under his personal command. Following a more recent British Indian model than did the other regiments, the strength of each in 1838 was 1,100 including a complement of five captains instead of one. On Bhimsen’s fall, the King himself became commandant of these. Their officers were drawn from the chautaras. Another unit with special status was the Hanuman Dal which Rajendra had founded in 1836 to serve as his khas paltan (personal guard). Five other regiments were included in the kampu through-out the period 1832-1846. The figure is seven if two units temporarily sent out in 1837 and 1841 are also included. Retention of a particular unit would not have been of great significance had the pajani ensured a general changeover of personnel each year. However, the rotation was less thoroughgoing than is often supposed. Hodgson’s evidence on the point is not entirely consistent since he wrote in July 1840 that the personnel of the Sri Nath and Later had not been changed for years yet five months later he claimed that the trouble in the summer had been
# TABLE II

**THE KATHMANDU GARRISON (KAMPU) : 1825-1846**

(adapted from Adhikari, *Nepal under Jang Bahadur (NJB)*, p. 154)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1825</th>
<th>1832</th>
<th>1838 (strength)</th>
<th>1840</th>
<th>1843</th>
<th>1844/5</th>
<th>1846 (strength)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sri Nath</td>
<td>Ram Dal</td>
<td>Ram Dal (700)</td>
<td>Ram Dal</td>
<td>Ram Dal</td>
<td>Ram Dal</td>
<td>Ram Dal (959)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumari Dal</td>
<td>Sri Nath</td>
<td>Sri Nath (1,100)</td>
<td>Sri Nath</td>
<td>Sri Nath</td>
<td>Srii Nath</td>
<td>Sri Nath (736)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devi Datt</td>
<td>Letar (1,100)</td>
<td>Letar</td>
<td>Letar</td>
<td>Letar</td>
<td>Letar (702)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajra Bani</td>
<td>Devi Datt (600)</td>
<td>Devi Datt</td>
<td>Devi Datt</td>
<td>Devi Datt</td>
<td>Devi Datt</td>
<td>Devi Datt (676)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naya Gorakh</td>
<td>Bajra Bani (600)</td>
<td>Bajra Bani</td>
<td>Bajra Bani</td>
<td>Bajra Bani</td>
<td>Bajra Bani</td>
<td>Bajra Bani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh (600)</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guru Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gora Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
<td>Kali Baksh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh (600)</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh (676)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durga Baksh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saddu (?)</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Mehar</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shan Ghoter (?)</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
<td>Purana Gorakh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Contd.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Singh Nath</th>
<th>Sher</th>
<th>Singh Nath</th>
<th>Sher</th>
<th>Singh Nath</th>
<th>Sher (676)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1825</td>
<td>1832'</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>1840'</td>
<td>1843'</td>
<td>1844'</td>
<td>1846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Singh Nath</td>
<td>1832</td>
<td>Singh Nath</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>Singh Nath</td>
<td>1840'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rana Sher</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>Sher (676)</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>Singh Nath</td>
<td>Singh Nath</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**

1. FP, 13 February 1832, No. 161, cited in NJB.
3. FS, 20 July 1840, No. 59, and 31 August 1840, No. 82; Resident's Diary, 18-26 January 1841.
4. FS, 30 March 1844, No. 31 cited in NJB.
5. Vamsavali No. 5127379 (NAN) and Sambat 1902 Salko Dwisahat Nakhal (Kausi Toshakhana Archive) cited in NJB.
6. Register No. 1, Jangi Adda.
7. This regiment may have been accidentally omitted in other years.
8. Raised by Mathbar Singh when Prime Minister, according to the vamsavali but the Kali Prasad is claimed elsewhere (HP, Vol. 13, p. 167) to be a continuation of the Hanuman Dal. Another of the five is a continuation of the Sri Mehar. This would leave three entirely new regiments, the figure given by Lawrence (FS, 21 February 1845, No. 110; KM, pp. 178-180).
caused by 420 members of those units recruited by the kala Pandes, who could have had no influence on any pajani before 1837. Nonetheless, it can be concluded that many in the lower ranks served year after year. Hodgson also noted that even in the first pajani after the 1840 mutiny, there was a complete changeover only amongst the officers. The soldiers of these two units and to a lesser extent the kampu as a whole, thus had a strong sense of identity and elite status. The surprising fact is not that the peasant farmers who made up the bulk of these units mutinied in 1840 but that they were normally so docile and that even in 1840 their action was to a large extent the product of political manipulation by a faction of the bharadari.

Although the outbreak on the night of 21 June 1840 was politically inspired, there did lie behind it real and deep-felt grievances. The background was the attempt to extend to the army the retrenchment which had already been applied to civilians and to senior bharadars. As a result of Rangnath’s 1836/1837 economy exercise, expenditure on the military was reduced by 14 lakh rupees but new rates were not imposed on ordinary soldiers. The new pay structure had, nevertheless, to be implemented. In addition to reduction in pay of one-third to 60 rupees per year for the ordinary kampu private, the aim was to curtail the patronage in the hands of senior officers by substituting a single pay rate for each rank in place of the discrimination on an individual basis practised under Bhimsen. The increased pay enjoyed by the kampu was to be done away with. At the same time, the assignments of jagirs to the troops were to be replaced by payment in cash. The latter was a less popular method than the traditional one because the jagirdar or his agent was normally able to extract more from the cultivator than the entitlement. These projected changes dove-tailed with the overall design of strengthening the monarchy’s central control over both the army and the economic resources of the nation. However, determined action to implement them was postponed until after Bhimsen’s death. In the meantime, such small changes as were made, the continued rumours of what was to come and repeated delay in the payment of money already earned, produced a sour atmosphere within the kampu.

The first real effort to enforce the reduction was made in August 1839 when the Naya Gorakh regiment was asked to serve at a rate of 40 rupees per annum. This was not only a massive reduction but also 20 rupees less than the amount prescribed in the 1836/1837 scale. The regiment, which at first reacted by piling its arms and leaving, was later coerced into acceptance but Hodgson noted the general belief that any
attempt to impose similar reductions on the whole army would provoke a mutiny. Nonetheless, in 1840, the king decided to move further, hoping that success would enable him to double the number of troops. It was felt that in view of threats of mass resignation and general unrest, the cuts should not be that draconian. Therefore, in April, Ranjang was instructed to tell the troops that rates of 60 rupees per man for the kampu and 50 rupees for the remainder were to be paid in cash, not as a land assignment. This was much the same as that had been planned in 1836/1837 though, significantly, the kampu were allowed to retain a differential. When the pajani got under way in June, the responsibility for actually carrying out these changes was thrust upon Ranjang's cousin Kulraj Pande as a condition of his appointment as head of the Sadar Daphiarkhana (Central Army Lands Assignment Office). Shortly afterwards, the pajani was suspended because of the illness--real or feigned--of Ranjang himself. The mutiny followed a few days later.

Apart from the brief notice in the vamshavali account, we are dependent for information on the outbreak on Brian Hodgson and it has been argued by M.S. Jain that the version of events he presents is severely distorted. There are ample grounds for distrusting Hodgson's later account, particularly the 'private note' of which his biographer made use but his contemporary description in official despatches to Calcutta, at which Jain actually directs his fire, is reliable. In this earlier version, Hodgson is very careful and gives evidence for his statements and to distinguish certainties from speculation and rumour and a sequence of verifiable events can thus be established.

There had been protest meetings among the soldiers for a number of days but open disobedience was triggered by a summoning of the entire kampu to the parade-ground on the afternoon of 21 June. It was generally believed that a proclamation from the King announcing pay reductions was to be read to them but instead of waiting to hear it, the troops immediately grounded arms and demanded that their grievances be redressed forthwith. These included not only apprehension about future reductions but also, as Hodgson believed even more importantly, fear that they might be deprived of arrears of pay owed to them at the moment. For the second year running, the pajani had been delayed for many months past the end of the year for which the men had been enlisted and if at this late stage they were now to be replaced by fresh troops, it was the latter who would be legally entitled to payment for the intervening period.

The demonstration, which involved all the troops in the kampu
except for Hanuman Dal (the King’s personal guard), was at first non-violent. Early in the evening, however, a member of the Residency escort of Indian sepoys was wounded by a blow from a sheathed sword when he rashly attempted to remonstrate with a group of mutineers. An apology from the palace was soon forthcoming but the troops refused to give up the culprit for arrest. Hodgson was not overly concerned about this incident, which he considered the sepoy had himself provoked, but believing that the general situation was becoming graver he sent a message to the King suggesting he disregard this relatively minor matter and concentrate on dealing with the mutiny as a whole. As the night wore on, there was talk amongst the troops of attacking the Residency and its escort was ordered to take defensive positions on the roof. However, the mutineers chose as their targets the houses of five leading bharadars—Rangnath Paudyal, Pushkar Shah (who lived only a few hundred yards away from the Residency), Kulraj Pande, Karbir Pande and Prasad Singh Basnet. Hodgson stated in his official report that the attacks were violent but not totally unrestrained. The women of the households were insulted but not assaulted and furnishings thoroughly smashed but nothing of value actually stolen. At around 2.00 am, King Rajendra went personally to the Tundikhel (parade-ground) in response to appeals from the troops and announced that the army would continue to be paid ‘according to the scale introduced by our grandfather [Rana Bahadur]’ and that the troops’ own appointments were reconfirmed. The men now returned to their stations and the mutiny was over.

Negotiations with the troops, however, continued, later on the 22nd whilst the regiments were escorting Rajendra to Thankot, a small village on the route to India where Queen Samrajya Lakshmi had moved to the previous day, allegedly with the intention to travel to Banaras. The King, the Queen and the army returned to the capital the same day. The King first bowed to the demand of the troops for the dismissal of Kulraj from his position as head of the Sadar Daphtarkhana and then, when they rejected his choice of chautara Guru Prasad Shah as replacement, agreed to nominate Ranjang’s nephew, Jagat Bam Pande. Tension remained high for a few more days, with some of the chiefs who had suffered on the 21st demanding an enquiry and compensation and the king at one stage imitating his wife’s favourite tactic of temporarily quitting Kathmandu. On 5 July, the kampu troops, their arrears paid, left to spend their furlough at their homes in the hills. Four days later, Kulraj was reappointed to the Sadar Daphtarkana, again under instructions to
implement pay reductions. He intended to thoroughly change the army personnel but although he did recruit a number of fresh troops, a full-scale rotation did not take place until the end of the year when Kulraj and other members of his family were removed from the government in response to British pressure. Pay cuts were eventually implemented though rates for the kampu remained above those laid down in the 1836/1837 scale. The change from jagir assignment to cash salaries was not implemented. Despite rumours in the latter half of 1840 that fresh disturbances were imminent, no further mutiny occurred.

A major obstacle to the proper understanding of this whole episode has been created by Brian Hodgson's own change of mind on the question whether the threats which some of the troops at one point made against the Residency were the result of a pre-conceived plan. This is a possibility which he considered only to dismiss in his 3 July despatch:

With regard to the alleged intention of the soldiery to have attacked the Residency on the night of the 21st, but for the preparation made to receive them, I confess that after comparing and tracing back numberless rumours, I see much cause to doubt the fact: and I think that, if it was so, the natural prejudices of the Gorkhas, set in motion by the collision with my sipahi, alone suggested the design, and that but momentarily, to a small knot of abandoned characters whose comrades would not second them. In short, I acquit the Darbar of any direct knowledge or instigation of so infamous an act.

Hodgson, however, went on to blame the palace for leaving the Residency unprotected when a detachment of the loyal Hanuman Dal might easily have been despatched for the purpose. He thought this conduct was serious enough to delay making further representations on the Ramnagar encroachments until Calcutta had time to consider the mutiny events also. However, there is a stark contrast between his attitude in 1840 and what he wrote in a despatch two years later:

In June 1840 a fictitious mutiny was got up among the troops (who were taught that the Resident had advised the wrongs of which the soldiery complained) in order that their instigated assault on the Residency might be covered by the pretense (sic) of being unable to restrain troops in open revolt.
This new version of events was to be fully elaborated in a 'private
note' which his biographer, William Hunter, quoted extensively. In this
document, Hodgson claimed that on the night before the mutiny, i.e. 20/21
June, he had been summoned to the palace and detained in conversa-
tion by the King and senior Queen until nearly dawn and that the Queen
had then had the troops told that throughout this period, Hodgson had
been pressing them to reduce the army's pay. The enraged soldiers had
then marched towards the Residency but had finally decided against
violating it without written orders from the palace. Hunter claimed that
only Hodgson's calm and affable manner with the Queen and his cool
courage in the face of the mutineers had saved him from William Byrnes'
fate at Kabul.73

Hodgson's modification of his original analysis was to a certain
extent the result of evidence subsequently uncovered. He learnt quite
soon after the events that the troops believed that he was involved in the
plans for pay reductions and in autumn he unsuccessfully pressed the
King to issue a formal denial of the accusation.74 In addition, he had
been informed by mid-August that a few men of the Sri Nath regiment
had been privy to a plan for 'the plundering of the chiefs and threatening
of the Residency'.75 However, neither of these circumstances is suffi-
cient to explain the change of view which stemmed rather from Hodgson's
own mental state. In 1842, seeking to justify his entire record in the
face of Lord Ellenborough's condemnation of the Residency's involve-
ment in internal Nepali politics, he naturally sought to highlight the
extent of difficulties that he had had to confront in Kathmandu. It
is understandable that he should have now begun to see as the major
element in the events of June 1840 an aspect which at the time he
correctly recognised as relatively minor. With his later 'private note',
distortion seems to have been carried further by an old man's defective
memory. The claim he now made that the disturbances were breaking out when he left the palace at dawn on 21 June directly contradicts his
July 1840 statement linking their start to a general parade ordered in the
afternoon. One must also wonder whether he really was in the palace
that night, for he could have had no reason to omit such an important
detail in his initial report to Calcutta. Hodgson may in fact have conflated
the events of the mutiny with an entirely separate episode a month earlier,
when contemporary evidence shows that he had spent most of a night
at the palace with the king and queen, discussing amongst other matters
her request for a passport to go Banaras.76 Regrettably the whole of
Hunter's stirring account of the mutiny is thus suspect, and only the 1840
documents can safely be relied on.

Although there was no real plot against the Residency, Hodgson was almost certainly correct in believing that the ‘anti-British party’ was behind the violence. In the immediate aftermath of the mutiny, he was provided with firm evidence of strong anti-British sentiments in at least one section of the army and in those trying to manipulate it. He was able to include in his July despatch the substance of notes said to have been sent by the king and queen to the troops on 23 June, and by the troops in reply two days later. The first note, actually written down by a scribe in the confidential correspondence section of the palace, ran as follows:

The English Government is mighty, abounding in wealth and in all other resources for war. I have kept well with the English for so long because unable to cope with them. Besides, I am bound by a treaty of amity and have no excuse now to break it. Nor have I money to support a war. Troops I have and arms and ammunition in plenty, but no money; and just now the marriages of my sons are costing me more than I know where to get. This is the reason why I have reduced your pay. I want treasure to fight the English. Take lower pay for a year or two, and when I have completed the marriages and got money in hand, I will throw off the mask and indulge you with a war. But now the English are my friends, and they have done me no harm. Again the bharadars [Chiefs] complain that you have plundered and insulted them. What answer must I make?77

The army’s reply was composed by the senior pay accountant of the Sri Nath, the regiment that took the principal part in the disturbances, being indeed, according to Hodgson’s informants, the only one involved in actual violence.

True, the English Government is great; but care the bwanses [wild dogs] how large is the herd? They attack! They are sure to fill their bellies. You want no money for making war. The war shall support itself. We will plunder Lucknow or Patna; but first we must be rid of the Resident. He sees and foretells all. We must be able, unseen, to watch the moment of attack. It will soon come. It is come. Give the word and we will destroy the Resident, and then war will follow of course. You want no excuse for war. There
is one ready made. Let us operate unseen, and we will soon make the Ganges your boundary. Or, if the English want peace and are your friends, as you say, why do they keep possession of half your dominions? Let them restore Kumaon and Sikkim. These are yours. Demand them back, and, if they are not given, drive out the Resident. You talk too of your Chiefs and their wrongs. Of what use are the Chiefs? We want none. We will be Chiefs and soldiers too. The Chiefs shall no longer do business with the Resident. The Munsi is enough and occasionally the Minister, but no others. In the Thapa’s time [Bhim Sen] it was so. Let it be so again. Nor should Your Highness any more than the Chiefs do business with the Resident. Leave it to the Munsi and to Ranjung [the Minister]. So it used to be. So it must be again.

Jain has challenged the authenticity of these documents, and it is true that Hodgson was unable to procure exact copies of the originals. Nonetheless, in response to Calcutta’s request for verification he did provide the names of the scribes and messengers involved and gave details of the channels through which he had obtained his original information. Hodgson also checked the report from his secret agent with several other sources, and it may safely be concluded that notes on these lines were exchanged, even if the language has been exaggerated in transmission. At what level in the Darbar the message purporting to come from the king and queen originated is, of course, a different question.

Despite this undoubted anti-British backdrop, the real significance of the mutiny lay in domestic politics. It was a combination of a protest which the troops themselves had long been planning and a calculated manoeuvre by Samrajya Lakshmi Devi and Ranjang. Hodgson argued that the army would have kept its protest peaceful but for the instigation of Ranbam Thapa, Jagat Bam Pande and Dal Bahadur Pande, all known agents of Ranjang and the Queen. The immediate aim of the plotters was to ingratiate themselves with the troops by standing up at the appropriate moment as the champions of their interests. The long term objective was to pressurise Rajendra into transferring power to Samrajya Lakshmi. In the event, Ranjang was certainly able to persuade the mutineers that he was on their side. Before attacking the house of other chiefs, the men first went to him and left after cheering him for the assurances that he provided. This interpretation of events was further confirmed by the refusal of the palace to set up a proper enquiry as
Hodgson’s analysis can be accepted as fundamentally correct, though two difficulties have to be acknowledged. In the first place, the identification of the agents provocateurs rested primarily on the testimony of soldiers who were adherents of Pushkar Shah’s family. The Resident thus received the information through Pushkar, who was hardly a disinterested party: he had been at one time more or less an ally of Ranjang’s, but had been politically opposed to him for the last few months. The second difficulty, on which Hodgson’s own silence is surprising, is that whilst two of the mutineers’ targets, Pushkar Shah and Rangnath Paudyal, were universally recognised as opponents of the Kala Pandes, the remaining three were in fact key members of the group: Kulraj and Karbir Pande were respectively Ranjang’s cousin and brother, whilst Prasad Singh Basnet, Jang’s father-in-law, had been ostensibly supporting the group since early in the year and had been virtually acting as manager of affairs for him at the start of the pajani in May. The whole weight of circumstantial evidence which Hodgson presents nevertheless prevents us from rejecting his reading of the situation: details such as the army’s insistence on the appointment of Ranjang’s nephew as their new paymaster, and Queen Samrajya’s evident satisfaction with the army on 22 June are two among many. At the same time there were clearly complexities to the situation which Hodgson did not explicitly bring out. Possibly the mutineers went further than Ranjang’s agents had intended, alternatively Kulraj, Karbir and Prasad Singh agreed in advance to act the role of victims in order to give the vandalism an air of spontaneity: the latter interpretation is perhaps supported by the fact already referred to, that nothing was actually stolen from the Chiefs’ houses. Finally, there may at the time of the mutiny have been a temporary rift between Ranjang, who although nominal minister showed a continual tendency to prefer behind-the-scenes influence to public action, and members of his group who accepted a more exposed role; Hodgson does in fact contrast the five victims of the 21st, men ‘simple or greedy enough to take upon themselves... a part or the whole of the responsibility of affairs whilst the efficient power was... in other hands, with those ‘who have ever sought to work invisibly and to lay the onus of affairs on other shoulders’. If such a breach between allies had developed it was quickly healed in the case of Karbir and Kulraj, but the ambiguous attitude Prasad Singh was to display later in the year suggests that with him the affair still rankled.

Though the finer political details remain obscure, the mutiny
episode can undoubtedly be seen as a protest movement taken over and directed for political purposes by members of the political elite. It was client-patron ties between the troops and the latter which determined the course of events. The men actually involved in violence were, it later transpired, members of a contingent brought into the army some months earlier by the kala Pandes, whilst it was the loyalty of individuals attached to Pushkar Shah’s family which enabled the Resident to uncover so many details. If the army acted in violation of the most fundamental client-patron relationship—that between subject and monarch—this was only because of the extreme situation created by the heightened rivalry among the bharadars and within the royal family.

In summer 1839, Hodgson had identified an anti-Ranjang and thus potentially pro-British party comprising almost every major figure in the bharadari with the exception of Ranjang’s own immediate clique. In the months leading up to the mutiny, a smaller group came to be regarded as attached to British interests. Apart from Hodgson’s trusted agent mahila guru Krishna Ram Paudyal and his brother Rangnath, this group consisted of the chautara brothers, Fateh Jang and Guru Prasad and the gora Pandes whose senior representative was Dalbhanjan. Also strongly opposed to Ranjang but less strongly identified with the Residency was chautara Pushkar Shah, the uncle of Fateh Jang and Guru Prasad. These were the men who were installed in office at the end of the year. Although they owed their eventual success largely to British pressure, all of them were major figures in the Darbar in their own right. It is significant, for instance, that Rangnath, Fateh and Dalbhanjan were amongst the five bharadars whom Rajendra had kept with him when he conferred with Hodgson immediately after Bhimsen’s arrest in 1837 even though they were not then seen as the Resident’s allies. Bhimsen Thapa also had previously associated with them during his rule because they had influence.

Throughout 1840 Rajendra made repeated efforts to associate members of this group with the kala Pandes in the administration, beginning with an invitation in January to Fateh Jang, Pushkar and Dalbhanjan to take office under Ranjang. The King clearly saw ‘divide and rule’ advantages in bringing such anti-pathetic elements into the government and also the possibility of pushing forward one faction or the other according to whether circumstances seemed to demand a conciliatory or a confrontational approach towards British India. This was a sound strategy but the instability of Rajendra’s own temperament and the political tensions of the day were too strong. In any case, Ranjang’s
opponents declined the offer, being unwilling to accept responsibility without power. Although Fateh Jang was prepared on at least one occasion to advise the king on appointments, he and the others generally continued to be wary of too close an involvement. In April for instance, Fateh Jang, Dalbhanjan, Rangnath and Krishna Ram Paudyal refused to help examine letters from the Resident, arguing that the task be given to those responsible for the abuses which had led to the British complaints.87

Whilst the Senior Queen and Ranjang hoped that the mutiny would strengthen their position, its actual affect was the opposite. An immediate result was Rajendra’s decision to confirm a previously mooted arrangement assigning command of three regiments—the Purana Gorakh, Sri Bani and Devi Datt—to Dalbhanjan, Pushkar and Rangnath respectively.88 In addition, the Pande’s position was undermined by disarray within their own ranks and weakening of the Queen’s support for the pro-Pande elements in the elite Sri Nath and Letur regiments when these units were accused of beating Lakshmipati, a Maithili ascetic who was a great favourite and political confidant of hers.89 Meanwhile, Ranjang himself became ill.90 His principal opponents, however, continued to refuse royal invitations to take office alongside his brother Randal or cousin Kulraj.91

Following the delivery of an ultimatum by Hodgson at the end of July, Nepalese forces were withdrawn from the areas south of the foothills which they had occupied in April.92 British pressure was, nonetheless, maintained. Calcutta formally instructed Hodgson on 27 August to present additional demands including the surrender of the fort of Someswar on the ridge overlooking the evacuated area, compensation to a British tax-farmer wounded in the occupation, and settlement of long standing claims in the Kathmandu courts involving British subjects.93 Hodgson was asked for advice on the terms to be imposed on Nepal should the latest ultimatum be rejected and war ensue. He recommended that a British subsidiary force be stationed at Kathmandu and the Resident be given the power of veto to appointments to the posts of minister and chief justice.94

The Darbar eventually complied with the British demands on 20 September in a manner acceptable to Hodgson.95 Consequently, his confidence that he could assemble a fifth column to give the British a quick and easy victory in a war with Nepal was not put to test. His papers, however, show that during the critical negotiations, plans to mobilise a ‘British party’ had been made. A list prepared in early
September gives the names of bharadars who, in case of war, were expected to prevent the Darbar from resisting the British advance and if all else failed, to cross over into the ‘Resident’s camp’ before British troops entered the hills. Foremost amongst these bharadars was the group which allied with Hodgson throughout 1840, viz., the Paudyal brothers, Dalbhanjan and his gora Pandes and Fateh Jang and his family. Also included were the Junior Queen, the sons of Amar Singh Thapa, commander of Nepal’s western forces in the war with the British and a less prominent chautara, kaji Kalu Shahi. Especially interesting was the stance of Pushkar Shah, Prasad Singh Basnet and Bal Narsingh Kunwar. They indicated that they might join the coalition but were not considered totally committed. Prasad Singh’s is the most surprising name, given his close identification both before and after with Ranjang Pande. Clearly, he was adept at adjusting to circumstances.

During September, Hodgson had suggested that even if the disputes were settled without moving troops in to the hills, it would be desirable to insist on the dismissal of Ranjang and the appointment of men acceptable to him. After the experiences of the last few months, Auckland was now prepared to listen to suggestions for interference of this sort even though his private correspondence shows that he was not confident of its results. Two kharitas from the Governor-General to King Rajendra were sent to Hodgson for delivery. They contained demands for the dismissal of the counsellors who had led the King astray. Fateh Jang’s appointment in place of Ranjang was already expected in Kathmandu at the beginning of October, more than three weeks before the first kharita was written. Hodgson, therefore, discounted this change in advance and strengthened by the deployment of British forces close to the border pressurised the King to remove all Ranjang’s associates and instal a new set of ministers to back up Fateh Jang.

The course of these negotiations is described in detail in Hodgson’s lengthy report of 4 January 1841. Although he expressed dissatisfaction that the changes achieved were not as complete as he would have wished, he was convinced that everything practical in the circumstances had been done. The new cabinet comprised Fateh Jang Shah and his brother Guru Prasad, Rangnath and Krishna Ram Paudyal, Dalbhanjan Pande, Pushkar Shah and Kalu Shahi. All of them except Pushkar were in Hodgson’s list of potential ‘committed’ fifth columnists. There was also a replacement of kala Pande supporters by more acceptable men in a large range of posts and instructions to
retire to Banaras had been issued to rajguru Krishna Ram Mishra, Hodgson’s one-time close confidant and now his bête noire.

These changes became a lengthy process because of a stubborn rearguard action mounted by Queen Samrajya Lakshmi and the Pandes themselves. Their hand was strengthened after the September crisis by the revival of Prasad Singh’s support. He joined them in petitioning in protest against Fateh Jang’s investiture as minister on 1 November.102 In mid-November, Hodgson forwarded to Calcutta the translation of an arji (petition) which Prasad Singh had presented to Queen Samrajya Lakshmi on behalf of another Pande supporter, Ranbam Thapa. The document warned her of danger to herself and to the heir-apparent now that the Pandes had been removed from office. It asserted that the British would remain a danger until Nepal went to war against them and claimed that it now appeared ‘that the Maharajah is ready to pay 4 to 6 annas per rupee of our revenues to the Company’.103 Prasad Singh’s shift of allegiance away from the Residency occurred because he was shrewd enough to realise that, despite the advance of Colonel Oliver’s forces across the Ganges and Rajendra’s consequent alarm, the British ruled out the possibility of a campaign against Nepal that winter.104

Particularly alarming to Hodgson was the Pandes’ success in arousing the army against the new administration. Inflammatory petitions and placards kept appearing constantly. One document submitted by the soldiers complained bitterly about the concessions which the Darbar had made to the ‘vile Madhesiahs [people of the plain] whom greed of gain has brought here’. These were the Indian merchants whose cause as British subjects Hodgson had constantly defended. A placard put up for the attention of the army on 20 December warned that the Queen, though wise, was only a woman. It also denounced the King as ‘a hermaphrodite who will do nothing he ought and does all he ought not to do’.105 While discussing his plans with Hodgson a few days earlier, Fateh Jang was confident that the army was still basically amenable to control by anyone given the King’s authority to do so but he stressed the need for a thorough pajani to disperse the troops to different parts of the kingdom.106 Although the opinion of the populace as opposed to the army did not generally have to be taken into political consideration, there is evidence that the strength of feeling amongst the populace was regarded as important. Fateh Jang told Hodgson that it would be unwise to insist on Jagat Bam Pande’s name being included in the written list of ‘bad councillors’ which the Darbar was being asked to prepare because of Jagat Bam’s
popularity with the people and the Palace.  

The fact that Hodgson was able to succeed despite all these difficulties was due both to the British troop movements (even if the demands of the Afghan situation made these something of a bluff) and his principal Nepalese allies, together with less prominent adherents constituting an important section of the bharadari. Amongst the bharadars, however, the situation was more evenly balanced than some of Hodgson's more optimistic assurances to the Governor-General suggested. Notes which he himself compiled in mid-autumn 1840, listing separately the 'Good, Bad and Indifferent Chiefs', show twenty-nine in the first category, seventeen opposed to him and twenty-four neutral.  

This interesting document prompts two observations about the nature of factions among the political elite. The first is that allegiances changed rapidly. This has already been seen in strong relief in the case of Prasad Singh Basnet, who joined Ranjang, became a half-committed supporter of the 'British party' when the crisis reached a head in early autumn and then swung back to support Ranjang once more. So was the case with many others. A change in the opposite direction was made by Singh Bir Pande, classed as 'neutral' in the autumn but among the 'good' when his appointment as Governor of Palpa in place of Ranjang's brother Randal was recorded by Hodgson at the beginning of January.  

Singh Bir's case illustrates the second general point, that although families tended to operate as political units, there were frequent exceptions to the rule. Singh Bir had not adhered to the 'British party' earlier, even though he was the brother of one of its prominent members, Dalbhanjan Pande. Another, and more serious rift in the 'Gora Pandes' ranks was the firm support that Dalbhanjan and Singh Bir's cousin Dal Bahadur provided for Ranjang, even though this had previously put him on the opposite side to his father-in-law, Bhimsen Thapa: Dal Bahadur had been one of the instigators of the mutiny violence and his name was included in the 'blacklist' of dismissed advisers which the Darbar submitted to Hodgson. The Basnets were also divided, with Prasad Singh's brother Kulman and cousin Jitman in the 'pro-British' camp. Bal Narsingh Kunwar was regarded as a neutral (despite his inclusion on the 'half-committed' list in September 1840), but Bir Bhadra Kunwar, senior member of another branch of the family, was unambiguously a 'good chief', and his appointment in December as head of the Daphtarkhana in place of Kulraj Pande was a significant achievement for the ministry.

What was the rationale behind a particular individuals' choice of
sides? Auckland argued in 1839 that bharadars were aligned for or against the British on grounds of tactical convenience rather than conviction and by and large this view is correct. Once one or two key figures had taken up positions, the alignment of others was often determined by existing feuds. This explained the broad pattern whereby a number of leading bharadars of the Bhimsen Thapa period gravitated towards the British in a natural reaction to Ranjang’s playing of the anti-British card. Reinforcing this general conflict were a number of family rivalries. However, in some cases members of the same family may have joined opposing sides as a concerted tactic to ensure they would have influential friends whatever the outcome.

The different factors that could determine a particular individual’s course are well illustrated by the case of Jang Bahadur’s father, Bal Narsingh Kunwar. Since both he and his brother Balram had suffered at the hands of Ranjang’s Janchkhana (tribunal of enquiry), there was little love lost between him and the kala Pandes. On the other hand, he was also linked through Jang Bahadur’s marriage with Prasad Singh who was a close ally of Ranjang throughout most of 1840, a circumstance which made it difficult for him to declare himself unambiguously pro-British party’. Additionally, since he was himself the target of legal action brought by an Indian creditor, he had no enthusiasm for Hodgson’s zealous championing of the legal rights of British subjects in the Nepali courts. It is not surprising that the Indian merchant Kasinath should have accused Bal Narsingh of helping rajguru Krishna Ram Mishra obstruct his right to a fair trial.

Bal Narsingh was further encouraged to adopt an attentiste attitude by the game which his brother-in-law, Mathbar Singh Thapa, was playing in the North-West. Mathbar enjoyed the favour of the de facto Sikh ruler Naunihal Singh who wanted to employ him in his army. However, in early 1840, he began making approaches to the British, having only recently learnt of his uncle Bhimsen’s death and hoping for British help in getting his children out of Kathmandu to the safety of India. Hodgson believed that he would make an invaluable tool in the case of war with Nepal and was eager to encourage him to re-cross the Satlej and live as a British pensioner. Yet at the same time, Mathbar was continuing to correspond with the Nepal Darbar, holding out the prospect that if his credentials were renewed, he could negotiate an anti-British alliance with the Sikhs. Preparations were made in Kathmandu to send Captain Karbir Khatri, a former protégé of Mathbar’s brother Wazir Singh, to meet a Sikh representative at
Banaras. Khatri informed Hodgson in advance of his impending departure, claiming that he himself had accepted appointment as the Darbar’s secret envoy only to escape from Nepal and that Mathbar, likewise, was not really intriguing against the British but only trying to trick the Nepalese authorities into releasing his children. At the beginning of September, Mathbar was ordered to go to Ludhiana by the Sikh Darbar—a step which he would, in any case, soon have taken voluntarily—and there he insisted that the anti-British statements attributed to him at Lahore had been made purely for Nepalese consumption in order to protect his family at home. However, Hodgson was correct in believing that both Mathbar and Karbir had in reality been keeping their options open and were prepared either to co-operate with the British or should it seem the more effective course, assist the Nepal Darbar to secure the long-sought Sikh alliance. A similar conclusion was reached by Captain Clark, the Political Agent at Ludhiana, on the basis of his interviews with Mathbar. The latter was subsequently sent to Ambala and later moved to Simla whilst Karbir, who actually reached Banaras in November, was arrested and detained as a state prisoner. The policy which both men had been following was probably one which Bal Narsingh knew and approved of.

The crisis of 1840 was thus essentially a matter of complex manoeuvring for position within the bharadari. Nonetheless, it had the potential of developing into something more. The internal political process was marked by the manner in which the lower ranks of the army entered the picture. Admittedly, their intervention was guided and to some extent instigated by their patrons amongst the bharadari but they had demonstrated a capacity and willingness to act when confronted with what they saw as a threat to their basic interests. The army was never to develop into a power in its own right as the khalsa (the Sikh community under arms) was doing at this time in the Panjub but apprehension that it might do so was to be a feature of Nepalese political life during the next few years.

NOTES

2. Hodgson to Secretary to Governor-General, 5 and 10 August 1838, FS, 22 August 1838, No. 27 and 29 August, No. 25; Rangnath’s resignation covered only his responsibility for the hill area while he retained the administration of the Tarai until the following spring. See Hodgson to Government, 14 April 1839, FS, 18 December
1838, No. 115.

3. Hodgson to Government, 8 September 1838, FS, 21 November 1838, No. 152.
5. Hodgson to Torrens, 17 February 1839, FS, 18 December 1839, No. 87.
6. Hodgson to Torrens, 30 December 1838, NR/5/49.
7. Hodgson to Secretary to Governor-General, 28 December 1838, FS, 9 January, 1839, No. 114.


10. Resident’s Diary, May 1838; King Rajendra to Lord Auckland, 14 Sravan 1839 (8 August 1839), FS, 26 December 1839, No. 157.

11. Regmi, op. cit., p. 175.

12. The post of subba (i.e. civilian district in-charge) for each district was put up for auction in 1838 (Residency Diary for May). In commenting on Rajendra’s August 1839 kharita (v. supra, n. 10), Hodgson refers to a ‘severe Khas settlement’ failing the previous year but adds that ‘the whole Tarai is now left in farm again as heretofore’. In a revenue context, ‘khas’ normally refers to direct collection by government officers. See H.H. Wilson, Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal 1968 reprint of 1855 edition, s.v.). Hodgson used it to contrast the district by district approach (even though this involved competitive bidding) with the ‘farmer-general’ system. In July 1840, the Diary records a dispute on whether Kulananda be given the whole eastern Tarai or separate subbas placed in charge of each district.

13. Resident’s Diary, December 1838-January 1839. Kulananda Jha was acting as an ijadar in Morang as early as 1816 (Regmi, op. cit. p. 160, n. 40).

14. Richard Burghart (’The History of Janakpurdham’, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1978, pp. 430-1), who records the story as told by Mishra’s descendants, suggests that both his rise and reinstatement were probably linked to Thapa influence as 1843 saw the appointment as minister of Bhimsen’s nephew Mathbar. This is unlikely, as a list of bharadurs compiled early in 1843, when Mathbar was still in India, shows Mishra already back in his post (see H.P., vol. 52, H. 169-171).


16. Resident’s Diary, December 1838-January 1839.

17. Ibid., 29 November-18 December 1839,14-27 August 1840 and 26 December 1840-10 January 1841.

18. Ibid., 23 July 1840.

19. Ibid., January 1839; Hodgson to Maddock, 1 March 1839, NR/5/49; Hodgson to Government, 25 February 1839, FS, 18 December 1839, No. 91. Hodgson’s reference (Diary, 1-19 March) to ‘real and pretended’ extortion suggests the penalties were less severe than alleged.

20. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 9 June 1839, FS, 26 December 1839, No. 131.

21. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 14 April 1839, FS, 18 December 1839, No. 115.

22. Hodgson to Government, 5 May 1839, FS, 18 December 1839, No. 118.

25. Hodgson to Maddock, 6 May 1839, NR/5/49.
26. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 11 June 1839, FS, 4 September 1839, No. 41.
27. Hodgson to Maddock, 19 June 1839, NR/5/49.
29. Secretary with Governor-General to Hodgson, 27 June 1839, FS, 4 September 1839, No. 42.
31. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 22 July 1839, FS, 26 December 1839, No. 138.
32. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 9 June 1839, FS, 26 December 1839, No. 131.
33. Interview with Rishikesh Shaha, Kathmandu, 6 June 1983.
34. Acharya, ‘Jang Bahadurko Prarambha’, Ruprekha, No. 10 (2018 VS (1961/2)), p. 44. Bhim Jang is said to have been killed when he objected to his half-brother, Ranbir, being placed on the roll of succession to the premiership in preference to himself (information from Puruswattam Shimsher J.B. Rana), or because he was discovered drinking alcohol (Pramode Shamsher, Rana Nepal—An Insider’s View (Kathmandu: Mrs. R. Rana 1978), p. 40). Pudma’s list was drawn up in the 1870’s and published in Kamal Dixit, ‘Jang Patnibanu’ in Jang-Gita (Lalitpur: Jagadamba Prakasan, 2040 VS (1983/4)), pp. 139-147. The first and second wives are unnamed, but both are described as ‘Jeetha (senior) Maharani’ and their dates of death are given as 1847 and 1850 respectively. Nanda Kumari Khatri, who had this title and according to Acharya, married Jang in 1841 must be the second because her eldest son Jagat was only born in 1848 (Nay Raj Pant, ‘Seto Baghko Aitihaski Pariksa’, Ruprekha, No. 157, Jeth 2031 (May-June 1974), p. 14). The first wife listed is, therefore, very likely Prasad Singh’s daughter, especially since 1847 is the year given for her death in oral tradition. Pudma’s later dating of the marriage with Nanda Kumari to January 1839 (LJB, p. 20) is thus a mistake, and his list omits entirely Jang’s pre-1839 marriage(s); Acharya claims Jang had two previous wives, of whom the first returned to her parents’ home and the second died, whilst Pudma’s own later account (loc. cit.) refers to one woman, a Thapa, who died whilst Jang was in Banaras.
35. Although Jang almost certainly did spend some time in Banaras after Bhimsen’s fall, the detailed, and conflicting, accounts in Orfeur Cavenagh, Rough Notes on the State of Nepal (Calcutta: W. Palmer, 1851) and in LJB are unreliable and the attempt to reconcile them in Whelpton, Jang Bahadur in Europe (Kathmandu: Sahayogi, 1983) pp. 75-6, is misguided. It is unlikely that he was ever instructed to arrest the king’s uncle, Ranodyat Shah, who was then in Banaras, and if he had been deported by the British as he claimed, this would have figured prominently in the Residency records.
37. Hodgson to Government, 30 May 1839, FS, 26 December 1839, No.115.
38. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 30 July 1839, FS, 18 December 1839, No. 82.
KINGS, SOLDIERS AND PRIESTS

41. RN, p. 222.

42. Hodgson to Campbell, 17 September 1852, Eng. Hist. MSS c. 262, p. 111 et seq.

43. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 24 December 1839, FS, 5 February 1840, No. 46. The gardener was owed 6,158 rupees for planting a garden with imported fruit trees (arji of Huldass Mali to Hodgson, 16 November 1839, FS, 5 February 1840, No. 56).

44. Resident's Diary, 19-31 December 1839.


46. Resident's Diary, 20 February-5 March 1840.

47. LJB, pp. 20-21.


51. NJB, p. 159, citing FS, 30 March 1844, No. 32; HP, Vol. 5, f. 180. The discrepancy is probably due to the existence of various irregular forces not attached to a named company.

52. Resident's Diary, 18-26 January 1841. The Naya Gorakh was back in Kathmandu in August 1839. It was the first regiment on which the imposition of pay reductions was attempted.

53. HP, Vol. 6, f. 171.


55. Resident's Diary, 5-18 July and 15 December 1840.

56. Ibid., 18 January 1841. Under Jang Bahadur in the 1860s the annual changeover was around 5.5 per cent of the total strength (Hasrat, op. cit., p. 338).

57. Stiller, Silent Cry, op. cit., p. 268; HP, Vol. 9, f. 117.

58. The scale proposed in 1836/7, with other details of the new structure, is given in HP, Vol. 14, ff. 174-175. The old rate was 80 rupees for the ordinary kampu regiments, and 100 rupees for the Sri Nath and Letar, see HP, Vol. 14, ff. 152-156.

59. Hodgson stressed that jagirs were strongly preferred to cash payment (Resident's Diary, 4-17 April 1840).

60. Resident's Diary, 1-14 August and 19 September-2 October 1840.

61. Ibid., 20-31 January 1840.

62. Ibid., 4-17 April 1840.

63. Ibid., 5-18 June 1840.

64. Jain, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

65. Hodgson provided a detailed account of the mutiny in his despatch of 3 July 1840 (FS, 20 July 1840, No. 59) supplemented by further details in his letter of 14 August (FS, 31 August 1840, No. 82) and in various entries in the Resident's Diary. The despatches are published, in edited form, in KM, pp. 14-23 and 25-26. His final version of the affair appeared in W.W. Hunter, Life of Brian Houghton Hodgson (London: John Murray, 1896), pp. 184-188.

66. FS, 20 July 1840, No. 59.
67. Lal Mohar of 6 Asad Badi 1897, Ancient Nepal 25 (October 1973), p. 7. The Nepalese date corresponds to the period from sunrise on 21 June to sunrise on 22 June 1840 and the document must, therefore, have been issued during the night of the mutiny though Hodgson implies that written confirmation of the King’s assurances was only obtained after daybreak.

68. Resident’s Diary, 5-18 July 1840.

69. Ibid., 23 August 1840 and 18-26 January 1841.

70. A Residency account of the Nepal army in 1843 (FS, 30 March 1844), cited in Adhikari, NIB, p. 189, gives the average annual pay as 72 rupees, i.e. half-way between the 90 rupees paid under Bhimsen and the 60 rupees which the government had tried to implement in June 1840.


72. Hodgson to Government, 22 June 1842, FS, 7 September 1842, No. 88, cited in KM, pp. 146-152. As evidence for this claim he cited his despatch of 30 November 1840 but this cannot be traced in the records.

73. Hunter, loc. cit.

74. Rajendra to Hodgson, October 1840, and Hodgson to Government, 9 October 1840, FS, 26 October 1840, Nos. 128 and 132 cited in KM, pp. 34-35.

75. Hodgson to Government, 14 August 1840, FS, 31 August 1840, No. 82 cited in KM, p. 25.

76. Hodgson to Government, 25 May 1840, FS, 8 June 1840, No. 125.

77. FS, 20 July 1840, No. 59.

78. Ibid.

79. Jain, op. cit., p. 23; Hodgson to Government, 14 August 1840, FS, 31 August 1840 No. 82.

80. Resident’s Diary, 20 February-4 March 1840.

81. Ibid., 20 May-3 June 1840.

82. FS, 20 July 1840, No. 59.

83. See p. 87 for Prasad Singh’s later desertion of Ranjang.

84. Resident’s Diary, 15 December 1840.

85. The Aryan rajpurohit family may also have been involved, although they were less prominent politically. Cf. Resident’s Diary for 18 April-1 May, where Ranjang is said to have told Rajendra that the Resident would quit Nepal in despair if only the pro-British sons of Pran Shah (viz., Fateh Jang and Guru Prasad), the Gora Pandes and the ‘Aryan gurus’ could be placed under arrest. However, Taranath Aryal, who was probably a member of this family, is classed as a ‘neutral’ in notes which Hodgson compiled in the autumn (‘Lists of Good, Bad and Indifferent Chiefs (1840)’, in Eng. Hist. MSS c. 262, p. 22).

86. Resident’s Diary, 4-17 January 1840.

87. Ibid., 18 April-1 May 1840.

88. Ibid., 5-18 July 1840. The Sri Bani is presumably to be identified with the regiment styled first Bajra Bani and then Badra Bani in the various army lists (see Table II)

89. Ibid., 20 July 1840.

90. Ibid. Although Hodgson believed that Ranjang’s earlier apparent mental breakdowns had been feigned to avoid responsibility, Hodgson’s own description of his condition at the end of March perhaps suggests that it was not entirely a pretense: ‘[Ranjang] is dark and confused again and so little able to express himself that people say ‘‘Bhim Sen has got him by the throat’’, i.e., Bhim Sen’s ghost’ (Diary, 22 March-3 April 1840). Ranjang had subsequently accused one of the gora Pandes of bewitching him (Diary, 4-17 April).
91. Resident's Diary, 23 July-10 August.
92. Hodgson to Government, 31 July 1840, FS, 17 August 1840, No. 70. Champaran Magistrate to Government, 12 August 1840, FS, 24 August 1840 gives the actual date of withdrawal as 11 August.
95. Hodgson to Government, 21 September 1840, FS, 5 October 1840, No. 152.
97. Hodgson to Colvin, 16 September 1840, ibid., p. 23 et seq.
98. Cf. Auckland's comments in a letter to John Hobhouse of 20 November 1840: 'It seems most wise to allow Mr. Hodgson to play his game amidst the discussions of party and that we should endeavour to establish a friendly government rather than to crush the nation. We shall probably not succeed, but the contending parties may, for a time, occupy each other'. See Private Book Vol. 13 (British Museum Add. MS 37702), p. 99, quoted in Kanchanmoy Mojurndar, 'Indo-Nepalese Relations', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, School of International Studies, 1962, p.191.
100. Resident's Diary, 1 October 1840.
102. Resident's Diary, 1 November 1840.
103. Hodgson to Government, 24 November 1840, FS, 21 December 1840, No. 108. Rajendra had been reported some months earlier as threatening to offer just such an arrangement to the British if the Queen and her allies pressed him too hard, see 'Secret Intelligence', 9 June 1939, FS, 26 December 1839, No. 131.
105. FS, 8 February 1841, No. 123.
108. Eng. Hist. MSS c. 262, p. 22, The list was compiled in late October or November since Prasad Singh Basnet is shown in the anti-British grouping.
110. Ibid., App. 1, and Hodgson to Government, 14 August 1840, FS, 31 August 1841.
111. Governor-General to President-in-Council, 18 July 1839, FS, 18 December 1839, No. 68.
113. Panjab Agent to Government, 18 May 1840, FS, 1 June 1840, No. 55. Ranjit Singh, in deference to British wishes, had not allowed Mathbar to appear publicly at his Darbar but had continually requested the Panjab Agent to give permission for him to enter his army, see Panjab Agent to Government, 17 March 1840, FS, 27 April 1840, No. 119. In spring 1840, it was believed in Kathmandu that Naunihal Singh wanted to appoint Mathbar the head of an expanded Gurkha force in order to be able to downgrade or replace his French officers who could be unreliable in a clash with the British, see Hodgson to Panjab Agent, 27 April 1840, FS, 11 May 1840, No. 90.
114. Hodgson to Panjab Agent, 11 March 1840, FS, 27 April 1840, No. 111.

115. Hodgson to Government, "Secret Intelligence", 7 July 1840, FS, 20 July 1840, No. 61. Karbir's original connection with Wazir Singh was mentioned by Mathbar in conversation with Captain Clark at Ludhiana, see Clark to Hodgson, 19 September 1840, FS, 26 October 1840, No. 129. Karbir had remained a Thapa adherent and removed his family and property to Banaras on Bhimsen's fall.

116. Hodgson to Government, 10 August 1840, FS, 31 August 1840, No. 71. The Resident had already been informed of the plan by his intelligence network, see, Hodgson to Government, 7 July 1840, FS, 20 July 1840, No. 61.

117. Panjab Agent to Government, 10 September 1841, FS, 26 October 1840, No. 141. Earlier in the year the Sikhs had urged Mathbar to return to Ludhiana to obtain a passport so that they could then employ him without creating a problem with the British but his expulsion now seems to have been part of a general dismissal of Nepalese agents from Lahore carried out at the request of the British, see Panjab Agent to Government, 13 May 1840, FS, 1 June 1840 and FS 23, November 1840, No. 64, cited by K. Mojumdar, Anglo-Nepalese Relations, in op. cit., p. 49.

118. Hodgson to Government, 31 October 1840, FS, 16 November 1840, No. 73.

119. Panjab Agent to Maddock, 23 November 1840, FS, 21 December 1840 No. 96.
Chapter Four

FROM THE ‘BRITISH MINISTRY’ TO THE DEATH OF MATHBAR SINGH THAPA

Introduction

The close involvement of the Residency in Nepalese politics lasted until 1842, when the new Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough, ordered a policy of strict non-intervention. This did not cause any worsening of Anglo-Nepalese relations, which were never to return to the nadir they had reached in 1840. Nor did the change mean that the British ceased to be a factor in the calculations of Nepalese politicians. The possibility of intervention was still feared by some and actively sought by others. The withdrawal of support increased the tension between the Paudyal guru and chaunara sections of the ministry, proving eventually to be detrimental to the political fortunes of the former even though they reacted with greater equanimity to the change than did their colleagues. In the short run, the new British policy forced the bharadari to fall back on their own resources and they responded to the erratic and violent behaviour of the Crown Prince with the ‘National Movement’ of December 1842. This was a powerful demonstration of what they could achieve if only they remained united. However, division among their ranks allowed Rajendra to escape from the restraints that the movement had sought to place on him and his son. It also paved the way for the recall and appointment as minister of Bhimsen’s nephew, Mathbar Singh Thapa. However, Mathbar failed ultimately either to conciliate the remainder of the bharadari or to retain the support of the army and thus exposed, was assassinated in May 1845 on the joint orders of the King and Queen.

The fatal shot was fired by his own nephew and erstwhile political collaborator Jang Bahadur who had begun to play a significant role after the death of his father in the autumn of 1842. Jang Bahadur’s
betrayal of his uncle was only the most dramatic of a series of tactical changes of allegiance which the Kunwars and even more their Basnet allies had performed since Bhimsen’s death. Such moves must have been typical of the adjustments which other, less documented families made and they provided Jang Bahadur with a schooling in the skills he soon employed to make himself the master of Nepal.

Politics under the ‘British Ministry’

Even before Hodgson had to abandon his active support to Fateh Jang and his colleagues, they were never in undisputed control of events in Kathmandu. Nonetheless, their position was strong enough to make them the most important faction jockeying for royal favour. Though often referred to in British sources as ‘the Chautara administration’ they were an alliance between the chautara family of Fateh Jang and his brother Guru Prasad, and the Paudyal guru family. The other members of the ministry were of considerably less importance, Dalbhanjan being valued only for his family influence. Dissension between these two principal families later became a problem as did the rivalry between brothers. Krishna Ram Paudyal, for instance, was indignant when it was decided that Rangnath’s son already gayatri guru to Crown Prince Surendra, would become guru to Surendra’s younger brother also. From December 1840 to the summer of 1842, however, they were largely able to maintain cohesion and this together with British support gained them considerable early success. Their most significant achievement was the improvement in relations with India but they also managed to reverse the steps that Ranjang had taken to weaken the economic privileges of the bharadari. In December 1840, Fateh Jang restored a number of birta grants which had been rescinded by his predecessor.

As expected, the ministry faced relentless hostility from the ousted kala Pandes and their patron Queen Samrajya Lakshmi. The latter directed a continuing campaign against them with only brief intervals of reduced pressure until she died in October 1841. The opposition’s strength lay in Queen Samrajya Lakshmi’s personal hold over King Rajendra. It was demonstrated in February when her threat to go to Banaras herself if Krishna Ram Mishra was expelled led the king to follow her South to Hetauda. She was persuaded to return to the capital and though Krishna Ram left Nepal, he was recalled in May to act as her adviser again. Every scrap of information on the Queen’s relationship with the King was eagerly seized for its political
significance and in April she was 'confidently rumoured' to have allowed him to sleep with her again for the first time in three years. Sexual dependence may well have been a key factor in Samrajya Lakshmi's and later Rajya Lakshmi Devi's influence over Rajendra since in contrast to many other occupants of the throne, he never showed any interest in women other than his wives.

Samrajya Lakshmi's position was further buttressed by continuing support for her in the army. In the pajani of the kampu Fateh Jang could not completely remove 'unreliable' elements. In the key Sri Nath and Letar regiments only the officers were changed. Furthermore, a special bond had been established between the Queen and the Hanuman Dal and Kali Baksh regiments when she was at Hetauda in March. The ministers were, however, to prevent any disturbance in the ranks by transferring of privates between regiments and granting extraordinary amounts of annual leave in the summer.

In addition to Samrajya Lakshmi's personal persuasion and the latent threat of army unrest, Rajendra's failure to back his new ministers unambiguously and his continuing desire to maintain some bridges with the dismissed Pandes was also conditioned by foreign developments. British discomfiture in China and Afghanistan and until receipt of the news of Zorawar Singh's defeat, the prospect that a Sikh victory in Ladakh might make the borders of Panjab and Nepal contiguous, combined to renew the King's hankering for foreign support as a counterpoise to the British. At the same time, consideration of the domestic balance of power made the Pandes an attractive foil to the ministers. Both groups were aware of the royal game and in mid-July both were consequently reported to be reluctant to take over at the autumn pajani. Hodgson's summary of the King's position is charged with moral indignation but can readily be read as a tribute to Rajendra's political skills:

Both parties distrusted and despised the Maharajah, yet he kept the balance between them, and probably would continue to do so. He was averse to extremes, a deep time server, and cunning and timid in the highest degree. He had one eye on Calcutta and the other on Peking and was anxious to discover whether it would be more profitable to side with the English or Chinese.

On more than one occasion during 1841 political tension rose to a point that Hodgson anticipated possible violence against the ministers.
The Resident therefore appealed to Calcutta for an explicit declaration that Fateh Jang and his colleagues were under the Governor-General’s protection. M. S. Jain and Ludwig Stiller have made much of the fact that Auckland was unwilling to comply and have stressed the gap between Hodgson’s concept of his role in Kathmandu and the real intentions of his superiors. However, the limited support which the Governor-General did provide to Hodgson was sufficient to achieve the required political result. The Resident’s recommendation in March that Colonel Oliver’s force remain on the frontier for several more months was supported by Calcutta and the kharita which Auckland addressed to Rajendra on 29 March took a strong line, emphasizing that there could be no question of withdrawing the troops until a ‘steady and consistent course of open and friendly conduct’ was shown. It also referred to the new ministers as ‘men of distinguished loyalty and wisdom who appreciate the blessings of peace, and desire the permanence of harmony and friendship between this Government and the State of Nepal’. In a Kathmandu well accustomed to the politics of nuance, this would undoubtedly have convinced Rajendra that he would have to face a crisis in his relations with the British if he moved from intermittent harassment of Fateh Jang and his colleagues to direct action against them.

Although Rajendra during this period has been rightly seen as concerned primarily in playing off ministers and kala Pandes against one another, published analyses have generally neglected the importance of other groups in the bharadari. Amongst these were the ‘good sardars’ of Hodgson’s 1840 lists who, though willing to co-operate with British policies, were not themselves a part of the inner corps of the Residency’s supporters. This group appears generally to have continued backing for principal ministers. Its two most prominent members were kaji Ranjor Thapa, a former close collaborator of Bhimsen Thapa and himself the head of the other main Thapa family and the Magar kaji Abhiman Singh Rana. The latter, in addition to his position as head of the Kausi (treasury), appears also to have had a supervisory role over the army and was very popular with the rank and file. The group had lost a third influential figure when Bir Bhadra Kunwar, appointed head of the Sadar Daphtarkhana at the turn of the year, had died in January 1841. His office was taken over jointly by his sons.

Bir Bhadra’s cousin Bal Narsingh was not his political ally and had adopted a decidedly attentiste attitude towards Hodgson and his Nepalese allies. Nonetheless, both Bal Narsingh and Prasad Singh
Basnet joined the 'good sardars' in falling in behind the ministers in the course of 1841. A *kala* Pande inspired placard set up in July included both men along with Abhiman Singh Rana, Ranjor Thapa and the ministers themselves, in a list of seventeen *bharadars* who were accused of agreeing to surrender the Tarai to the *firangis* and to pay them large sums of money in return for being confirmed in power for five years. Bal Narsingh did not hold any public office then but he was among the counter-signatories on a decree of 26 September that restored the property of one of Bhimsen's relations. Prasad Singh, who had been turned out of office at the end of 1840 because of his support for the *kala* Pandes, was in April 1841 assigned command of the Sri Mehar regiment and of Dhanakuta district in the eastern hills.

In supporting the British-backed administration, Bal Narsingh abandoned or de-emphasised his connection with his brother-in-law Mathbar Singh Thapa who was now living in exile as a British pensioner but still hoping to recover his position in Nepalese politics. At the beginning of 1841, the prospects for a Thapa revival looked slender. Although Fateh Jang had brought back into office many of Bhimsen's old adherents, this had been done on grounds of ability alone and Bhimsen's own family members in Nepal remained poverty-stricken outcastes. Mathbar's main potential ally was Junior Queen Rajya Lakshmi, who had entrusted papers to his follower Karbir Khatri when he left Kathmandu on his Banaras mission the previous autumn. However, Rajya Lakshmi was herself in a weak position in 1841. On her return from Hetauda in March, the Senior Queen Samrajya Lakshmi succeeded in persuading the king to expel her from the royal palace. The threat against her remained very real and in April, Samrajya Lakshmi was talking of the need to get rid both of her and her two sons Ranendra and Birendra.

The position of the Thapas as well as the political atmosphere eased in July when the Senior Queen's illness led her to adopt a conciliatory line. Hodgson, on Fateh Jang's suggestion, visited her and found her bent 'either upon easing her conscience by the revocation of past cruelties or upon some politic scheme of reconciliation of all domestic disputes'. The possibility of a coalition between the present ministers and the *kala* Pandes (something Rajendra had attempted unsuccessfully to achieve during 1840) was again mooted. The Queen now promised that the Thapas would be restored to their caste. Although the coalition talk came to a naught, the rehabilitation of the Thapas took place over the next three months. The first step was the
restoration of the sacred thread to the vaidyas (physicians) Ekdev and Eksurya, who had been outcasted for administering poison on Bhimsen’s behalf. Even the kala Pandes themselves now began to speak in favour of the Thapas though Hodgson dismissed this as a stratagem to lure Mathbar Singh back to Kathmandu. The formal decision to restore the Thapas to their caste was made in mid-August. At the end of the month, permission was granted to hold funeral rites which Bhimsen, as an outcaste, had been denied on his death.

It soon became clear, however, that the change in Thapa fortunes was motivated by a shrewd political calculation on the part of Rajendra and Samrajya Lakshmi Devi, apart from the latter’s desire to atone for past harshness. Although a British pensioner, Mathbar Singh was still prepared to play the anti-British card. He reportedly wrote to the Darbar contrasting its present humiliating dependence on the British with the sturdy independence maintained under Bhimsen. That was an argument that Samrajya Lakshmi herself seemed willing now to accept, declaring that ‘the Thapas alone knew how to manage the Feringis’.

The following month, Hodgson reported that Rajendra was toying with the idea of appointing a Thapa as minister even though the probability remained that he would, in the end, reappoint Fateh and his colleagues.

The reappointment was eventually made on 9 November but not before the delay had caused some anxiety both to the ministers and to the Resident. Two developments appear to have been critical in ending Rajendra’s procrastination. One was the death on 6 October of the senior Queen Samrajya Lakshmi and the other the receipt of a letter from the Nepalese vakil in Calcutta reporting that Maddock had asked to be informed within eighteen days whether the pajani had taken place. In response to the latter, a letter was sent to Calcutta on 2 October promising that Fateh Jang would be reconfirmed once the astrologers could fix an auspicious day for the pajani.

Rajendra now pressed again for the withdrawal of Oliver’s force from the frontier. The ministers had in August been anxious that the troops be left in position but they were now convinced that they themselves could gain political credit if a withdrawal was conceded and so at the end of November, Hodgson forwarded to Calcutta a kharita from the King formally requesting this together with his own recommendation for compliance. Before the Governor-General’s reply of 27 December could be received in Kathmandu, news reached Nepal of the catastrophe which had overwhelmed the retreating Kabul garrison. A council meeting on 1 January decided to respond by offering military
help to the British and this was formally communicated to the Residency on the 6th. The ministers believed that this gesture on Rajendra’s behalf was genuine since Guru Prasad Shah and Krishna Ram Paudyal, who delivered the message, appeared anxious that the king was getting so close to the Resident that their own position would be jeopardised. Nonetheless, Hodgson delayed the delivery of the Governor-General’s kharita and the issuance of the final order for withdrawal until he was sure of the king’s sincerity. It was only on 16 February that Rajendra was told the British military threat against him had finally been withdrawn.

The Emergence of Surendra

Even before his mother’s death in October 1841, Crown Prince Surendra had begun to exhibit the violent behaviour which was subsequently to increase and become the central issue in Nepalese politics. The earliest attested incident took place in May 1841 when he struck his father. This was followed the next month by his drawing a sword on him. In reporting both events, Hodgson suggested that the prince then only eleven years old, had been prompted towards such behaviour by one of his parents out of political calculation. When during 1842 Surendra progressed to outright brutality against both bharadars and members of the general public, the Resident was still inclined to interpret his activity in a similar way, believing that he was being used as a tool by his father to unnerve both the ministers and the Resident. It was certainly true that Rajendra did use the boy for that purpose, for British delay in avenging the Afghan humiliation, and alleged anti-British messages from both the Sikhs themselves and from Mathbar Singh offering himself again as the architect of a Gorkha-Sikh alliance, all combined with the continuing British embroilment in China to render the king restless again. Hodgson did, however, allow that Surendra was going further than his father intended, and the description of his actions in the Resident’s Diary, corroborated both by the vamshavali account and Pudma Rana, leaves no doubt that there was a streak of brutality in the boy’s own nature. In April 1842, for instance, the boy wounded several bharadars and their sons with a knife whilst in April one of his queens (a girl of nine years) died after he had kept her standing all day in a water tank at the palace. He amply deserved Sylvain Lévi’s general verdict on the successors of Prithvi Narayan: ‘[Il]s appartiennent plus à la pathologie qu’à l’histoire.’
In his biography of Hodgson, William Hunter portrayed Surendra as adopted and pushed forward by the kala Pandes in order to fill the gap left by the death of his mother, their erstwhile patroness. In this Hunter was a little more categorical than Hodgson had been at the time, for the latter had generally put forward the Pande connection only as a strong possibility. Nonetheless, the theory is plausible for they made natural political bedfellows and it is not surprising that Kulraj Pande was the man who, in August 1842, entertained Surendra by staging mock fights between ‘Gorkhas’ and ‘British’, in which the later were satisfyingly defeated. In addition to this probable royal alliance, the Pandes also benefited during 1842 from the news of British difficulties abroad. In July Jagat Bam Pande, Ranjang’s cousin, was commissioned to head the quinquennial mission to Peking, and the letters he carried appealed for Chinese help against the East India Company. The Pandes continued to enjoy a high degree of consideration at court until a dramatic reversal of fortune in the autumn.

For the majority of the bharadari 1842 was marked by an increasing level of insecurity. Surendra’s violence was aimed both at the ‘British ministers’ and the larger group who had been prepared throughout 1841 to go along with them. It is as a particular target of the Crown Prince that Jang Bahadur first figures prominently in the Residency Records, being mentioned in the Diary entry for 17 April 1842:

Jang Bahadur, son of Kaji Balhar [sic] Singh, and a Chief of the highest character and promise, was made to leap down a well. He was not killed as was first reported but he was badly hurt.

According to the version of the event given by Pudma Rana, the well was partly filled by buffalo bones on which Bal Narsingh managed to have thirty or forty bales of hay placed before the leap was made. Jang, nevertheless, sustained an injury to his ankle which was to give him trouble for the rest of his life. References in the Residency records indicate that similar treatment was meted out to other persons also. On 27 April, twenty ordinary members of the public also sustained injuries, four of them actually dying as a result. Forcing bharadars into water became such a common habit with the crown prince that ‘Have you drunk of the well today?’, was a regular conversational gambit when courtiers met.

Psychological pressure was maintained against the Residency
too. Shortly after the removal of the frontier force, the King was angered to learn of reports in the Indian press that Samrajya Lakshmi's death had been due to poisoning. He asked Hodgson to tell the Governor-General that there would be war unless the author of the libel were discovered and handed over to Nepal to be 'flay[ed] . . . alive and rub[bed] with salt and lemon till he die'.48 This incident, however, swiftly changed from a British-Nepalese confrontation to one between father and son, for Surendra began abusing and then repeatedly striking Rajendra in Hodgson's presence. The affair ended with an apology from the king to the Resident and a soothing kharita from the Governor-General in June, deploiring the libel but concluding 'It is unworthy of a noble mind to be affected by the slanders of the base'.49

Mean while, there occurred another clash between Hodgson and Rajendra which was to have profound consequences for the future of Indo-Nepalese relations and Hodgson. On 23 April, the King, accompanied by bharadars and backed by a regiment of troops with loaded weapons, arrived before the Residency. He demanded that Hodgson surrender to him an Indian merchant Kasinath Mull who had been living for some time within the Residency Lines for medical treatment and had failed to appear before the Kumari Chauk as defendant in an action for debt. The suit had first been brought before the Kathmandu court in 1837 and had seemingly been disposed of in the autumn of 1840 when, after Residency intervention on the defendant's behalf, an earlier finding against Kasinath had been quashed. The plaintiff, after a long absence from Nepal, had now renewed the action and the Darbar maintained that Kasinath had in 1840 given an undertaking to submit the case for fresh judgement in such an eventuality. Hodgson, however, supported the merchant's contention that he had given no such undertaking and in any case an agreement between Resident and Darbar in November 1839 had provided that suits such as this, in which both plaintiff and defendant were British subjects and the transactions at issue had taken place on British territory, should not be admitted to Nepalese courts.50 Against this background he refused to give up Kasinath, at one point throwing his arms around Rajendra and telling him, 'You take both of us or neither'.51 Surendra, who accompanied his father to the Residency, angrily urged him to seize the merchant by force. Fortunately, calmer counsels prevailed. Rajendra came away from the Residency and sent Fateh Jang and Krishna Ram Paudyal to negotiate. A compromise was now reached under which Hodgson referred the matter to the Governor-General. Kasinath agreed to attend the court and the two ministers
accepted responsibility for his personal safety. Eventually, he did suffer some ill treatment but Fateh Jang's brother and fellow-minister Guru Prasad was able to save him from serious harm.52

The episode was a humiliating one for both Hodgson and the ministers and not surprisingly, Hodgson asked Calcutta for the return of a British force to the frontier.53 At the same time, however, Surendra's behaviour was reinforcing the pro-British sympathies of many bhara-dars. Hodgson claimed in April that 'Already many scrupled not to say, and to hope, that Nepal would soon cease to be independent and would fall without a blow'.54 Such sentiments were strengthened by fear of a resurgence of kala Pande influence, especially as Sheobux, the plaintiff in the Kasinath case, was a protégé of Krishna Ram Mishra. In May, Hodgson's position was further buttressed by news of Pollock's victories in Afghanistan and Rajendra commenced conciliatory approaches through Fateh Jang.55 The ministers now no longer wanted immediate British troop movement but were content to rely upon their own internal supporters as long as they were backed up by firm language from the Government of India.56

However, the situation was dramatically changed by the attitude of Ellenborough, who had taken over as Governor-General from Auckland in February. Ellenborough was in Allahabad, away from his council, when the news from Kathmandu reached him. He considered that the Resident had gone to excessive lengths in the protection of Kasinath and instead of furnishing him with the stern rebuke to Rajendra he sent a letter even-handedly blaming both parties and suggesting there must have been a misunderstanding.57 Hodgson was instructed to hand over a translation of this letter to the premier. He believed that to do so would critically undermine the position of the 'British ministry' by giving both them and the King the impression that the Government of India was no longer prepared to give the ministers firm support. The latter would then be forced to protect themselves either by precipitate action or by abandonment of their support for British interests.58 Hodgson, therefore, immediately wrote to the Foreign Secretary, making an impassioned plea for reconsideration.

For God's sake, do not distrust your own old tried Resident whose every act heretofore you have applauded... for God's sake don't trust the Raja whose every act heretofore you have denounced... Remember that whatever has been achieved here with so much applause of the Governor-General in Council had been achieved
by and through the Ministers and against the Raja, and that to show the least distrust of the former so that the latter may perceive it, may be the death warrant or signal of disgrace of one or more of those who good faith to us has been as conspicuous as the bad faith of the Raja.\textsuperscript{59}

The Secretary, who had once been Hodgson's superior in Kathmandu, was unable to dissuade Ellenborough and the original orders were confirmed.

In the meantime, however, Hodgson had intensive consultations with the ministers, striving both to calm their impatience at the non-receipt of the firm response from the Governor-General and reconcile differences between the Paudyal gurus and the \textit{chauvaras}.\textsuperscript{60} Hinting at, but never fully revealing, the contents of Ellenborough's 8 May letter, he agreed on a plan of action with them under which his assistant, Captain Thomas Smith left to brief the Governor-General in Allahabad and he himself on 11 June sent the King through Fateh Jang a note which gave a suitably edited version of Ellenborough's sentiments.\textsuperscript{61} A little negotiation finally enabled Hodgson to extract from Rajendra on 22 June a satisfactory letter to the Governor-General, apologising fully for the events of 23 April whilst Kasinath himself was discharged and allowed to return to Banaras.\textsuperscript{62}

By this time, however, Ellenborough had decided on the basis of Hodgson's May despatches that the relationship between the Resident and Nepali ministers was fundamentally wrong. He considered that since the ministers were in constant fear about their own personal safety and unable to prevent outrages such as that of 23 April, their continuance in office could not guarantee British India any greater security than her own military strength could. He felt that it detracted from her prestige if she were required to tailor the language of her diplomacy and the deployment of her armed forces to suit the ministers' political convenience.\textsuperscript{63} On 21 June, after learning of Hodgson's deliberate disregard of his orders, Ellenborough despatched an angry letter announcing he would be relieved of his post at the earliest practical moment. Within twenty-four hours he relented, requesting Hodgson to keep the previous day's letter 'a profound secret'.\textsuperscript{64} The second letter, however, still implied, that Hodgson would eventually be relieved. After lengthy correspondence in the ensuing weeks, Ellenborough finally decided to allow him to remain in Kathmandu to carry out a policy of disengagement from his alliance with the ministers on the understand-
ing that he would quit his post at the end of 1843.65

The issues between Resident and Governor-General generated great controversy at the time, with the senior members of the Indian Civil Service mostly firmly convinced that Hodgson had been in the right and had been shabbily treated.66 Ellenborough's judgement that interference in Nepalese internal politics was counter-productive was, however, echoed in the views of Sir Henry Lawrence, Hodgson's successor as Resident, and more recently has been championed strongly by M. S. Jain and, rather more temperately, by Ludwig Stiller.67 On the other hand, Hodgson has not wanted able defenders, most notably his biographer Sir William Hunter, whose work has influenced so many others. As Stiller points out, it is difficult for Hodgson's apologists to fault in principle the arguments Ellenborough advances for a policy of non-interference, and in particular his point that 'depending for the continuance of friendly relations with the State of Nepal on a Cabinet formed on party principles places the Minister, supposed to be attached to British interests, in constant opposition to a Court party which becomes of consequence opposed to such interests'.68 Despite Hodgson's success in gaining widespread support among the bharadari for his 'British Ministry', it would probably have been better for Anglo-Nepalese relations if the East India Company had in 1840 confined itself to demanding a change of policy, and not concerned itself with the identity of the king's counsellors. The error was not purely Hodgson's, however, and Jain pushes too far his thesis that Hodgson got into a false position by exceeding Auckland's instructions.69 The Resident did indeed wish to extend his commitment to the minister personally much further than the then Governor-General had wanted, but once Auckland had agreed to insist on the dismissal of the Pandes, the state of politics in the Darbar made it unlikely that 'good' men would stand forward without explicit British backing: after the decision to challenge men as well as measures had been made, Hodgson's subsequent policy followed logically from it. A second point that must be conceded is that after the commitment had been made, political stability in Nepal might have been better served by sticking to it. After 1846, Hodgson and his apologists cited the Kot Massacre as proof that Ellenborough's 1842 decision had been a grave mistake.70 Over the longer term, though, Jang Bahadur, the man brought to power by the massacre, saw his interest in collaboration with the British and thereby could be said to have vindicated Ellenborough and Lawrence: the Nepalese political system was to find its own equilibrium and geopolitical reality, not the manipu-
lations of any Resident, would ensure that the new ruler co-operated with his southern neighbour.

The effects of Ellenborough's change of policy unfolded slowly in the ensuing months. Hodgson made no announcement of a change of policy to the ministers but disengaged slowly along the lines which he had himself suggested in June when he replied to a letter from Lord Ellenborough denouncing political partisanship. From June onwards, relations between the King and the Resident appeared amicable but rumours of Rajendra's possible long term intentions abounded.

Meanwhile, Crown Prince Surendra was being allowed to believe that his accession to the throne was imminent. By August, all Nepalese were required to address him as Maharajadhiraj, a title hitherto restricted to the king himself and Hodgson was formally requested to do the same. In encouraging his son in these hopes, Rajendra appears partly to have been acting out of calculation, using him to harass the bharadars without having to act directly against them himself. A belief in the sacredness of Surendra's person was also a factor which kept the court so subservient to a thirteen-year-old delinquent.

The ministers were also alarmed by the re-emergence of the Pandes and their role as Surendra's advisers. In an interview with Hodgson in September, they asked him to make an official protest against this development. The language in which the discussion was reported to the government of India was obscure even by Hodgsonian standards: he refused to make any direct intervention but promised Fateh Jang that, assuming Rajendra neither abdicated nor changed his minister, he 'should not seek to withhold from him the indirect support of my Government's auspices'. The Resident also stated that the failure of the ministers to guarantee trouble-free relations meant that the British no longer felt bound by the 'engagement' of January 1840. When Fateh Jang suggested that in that case he would have to resign the premiership, Hodgson said that he did not wish to stop him from doing so. There was a marked difference in the way Hodgson's message was received by Fateh Jang and Guru Prasad on the one hand and by Rangnath and Krishna Ram Paudyal on the other. Whilst the former were clearly dismayed, the gurus accepted the new situation with equanimity and urged their colleagues to do the same. The gurus' attitude was partly to be explained, as Hodgson suggested, by Rangnath's age and wish for retirement and by Krishna Ram's sense of being above humdrum politics. The gurus' relative sophistication and long experience of diplomacy and court intrigue made them feel more at home in a world
of 'indirect auspices'. This factor was one of the reasons for tension between the two families even while they enjoyed full British support and from now on there was to be a growing divergence between their political strategies.

In October, the tenth day of Dasai was marked by an ignominious struggle by Rajendra and Surendra over who should receive the tika first. Hodgson had to make a diplomatic retreat to the Residency bungalow at Kakani when the son invited him to receive formal news of the abdication plan and the King simultaneously sent an indirect message advising him to avoid the summons by feigning illness. A few days later Rajendra was actually expelled from the palace by Surendra. He was then heard complaining about his lot and suggesting he might have to follow Rana Bahadur's example of withdrawing to Banaras and then using that city as a base from which to regain power.74

With the struggle between father and son at this critical stage, a dramatic development occurred. The kula Pandes were accused of responsibility for the story that Queen Samrajya Lakshmi's death the previous autumn had been due to poisoning. Rajendra personally led the investigation which culminated in the conviction of a number of minor agents and one of the leading members of the Pande family, Kulraj Pande. According to Hodgson's information, Amir Singh Das, Kulraj's personal scribe, initially denied his authorship of incriminating documents but later boldly admitted it and accused the king:

He told the Maharaja that Nepal had vowed in 1819 to Baji Rao (the ex-Peswa) to stand forth as the upholder and avenger of Hindu Put; and that he, the Maharaja, was a traitor to his country and to all Hindus, and had broken all his own pledges to the Hindu states below, as well as to his only faithful Ministers, the Pandeys, who if supported, would have made the Ganges the border of Nepal during the recent troubles of the Company.75

This defiance 'made much impression' but Amir Singh was immediately sentenced to have his right hand cut off. An identical sentence was passed on Kulraj a week later though in his case it was not carried out.76 In view of the Pandes' close association with Surendra, it was probably no coincidence that the accusation against them was made just when Rajendra was being pushed further than he wanted to by his son. The King had, in effect, weakened Surendra's political position without the necessity of confronting him directly.
Surendra, however, was able to exercise the key royal function of conducting the pajani which commenced immediately after the completion of the trial. He did so in conjunction with the chautara minister Guru Prasad Shah. This collaboration in itself not a proof of any special connection between the two men. The bharadars now attended to the son rather than the father because Rajendra made no attempt to assert his rights. However, the lack of enthusiasm evinced shortly afterwards by Guru Prasad and Fateh Jang when a movement against Surendra began in earnest suggests that the brothers had contemplated accommodation with him now that their arch rivals the kala Pandes were no longer in a position to exercise influence over the prince.

No list of 1842 pajani appointments has survived but the Resident’s Diary records that Jang Bahadur was made a kaji and one of his brothers a captain. In Jang Bahadur’s case there is confirmation from Baburam Acharya who provides the additional information that he was given command of the Purana Gorakh regiment. This was a kampu unit, and it is probably this appointment which Pudma Rana refers to when he states that Jang Bahadur was appointed to the King’s bodyguard in November 1841; the date should have been 1842 since the appointment is placed after the well-jump episode which took place in 1842. Jang Bahadur’s selection took place at around the time of the deaths of both his father and father-in-law. The title of kaji may have come automatically because of a promise to Bal Narsingh that the rank would be hereditary in his family. However, the appointment marked a small but definite shift in the political balance within the bharadari, increasing the power of the Kunwar-Basnet alliance. Jang Bahadur’s prominence in Darbar affairs grew from that time onwards whilst his father-in-law’s brother Kulman Singh Basnet was appointed head of the Sadar Daphtarkhana. Both Jang Bahadur’s and Kulman’s appointments were probably also the result of their cultivating Surendra and Guru Prasad. The Resident’s Diary states that most of the appointments made at the pajani were of Surendra’s own men and for all the harsh treatment Jang had received at the prince’s hands he had apparently been a regular member of his escort and may have been regarded as one of his adherents. As for a possible connection with the chautaras, Resident Lawrence who arrived in Kathmandu at the end of 1843, was told that Jang Bahadur had been their enthusiastic supporter while they were in power.
The ‘National Movement’

Within a few days of Jang Bahadurs’s appointment there was a sea change in the bharadari. After months of grumbling and submittal to Surendra’s brutalities and Rajendra’s toleration of them, they decided to stand up. The last straw was the Prince’s order that all pregnant women and virgins of prominent families be brought to him so that ‘he might examine their development and choose himself a wife’. The bharadars resolved to petition the King for an end to Surendra’s excesses and a clear decision on whether the father or the son was to occupy the throne. The formal leadership of the movement was provided by Fateh Jang and Guru Prasad but Hodgson stressed that the chautaras were very much acting under pressure from ‘the civil and military classes’. The two had reservations because of the wish of many of their fellow bharadars, including the Paudyal gurus, to grant a major political role to Queen Rajya Lakshmi Devi as part of the settlement. The chautaras believed they could establish a working relationship with Surendra if his worst excesses could only be curbed, whilst they were afraid that the Queen might look to other bharadars for guidance rather than to themselves.

Because of this attitude Fateh Jang and Guru Prasad delayed the petition leading to widespread indignation. They then made an effort to obtain support from Hodgson thinking that British support would strengthen their hand in dealing with the King and the Prince without the necessity of mobilising domestic political forces which they might not be able to keep under control. However, Hodgson categorically declined to intervene in any way though he permitted himself to observe in the Residency Diary that ‘were he authorised to interfere as arbitrator bye and bye, he might perhaps prevent violence and bring about speedy and permanent good’.

At the end of November, a few days later Surendra foolishly increased ill-feeling against him in the army by ordering the arrest and dismissal of a guard detachment at the palace for failing to salute him when they came on duty and then by attempting to dismiss the entire kampu after some troops had been unable to find a captain and slave girl that he wanted arrested. This order was greeted by the men with loud complaints followed by laughter. A meeting between bharadars and soldiers followed and finally on 28 November a petition was presented to Rajendra demanding among other things that Rajya Lakshmi, who was then out of fear of Surendra living in Banepa just beyond the rim of the valley, be recalled and granted full rights as Queen. The petition
also stated that Krishna Ram Mishra, the Pandes’ guru ally be expelled from the country once more.91

When this petition failed to move Rajendra, a series of public meetings were held at the Tundikhel—the parade ground on the east side of Kathmandu. The participants were principally bharadars and army officers who were present as representatives of the army.92 Whilst the first of these meetings was in progress, the king unexpectedly arrived and saw a vivid demonstration of how far disaffection had spread:

His Highness, by argument, entreaty, and even threat tried to persuade the Chiefs or the officers to accept the existing state of things, pledging himself that no further cruelties or insults to anyone should result from it. He was answered separately by both bodies, who boldly told him that they could not and would not any longer obey two masters and that he had broken his word too often to be further trusted. Numerous instances were assigned in which the Raja had allowed them to be punished by his son for obedience to his own express commands. Whilst for all the murders, maimings, beatings and insults perpetrated by his son he was told that he had evaded giving or authorising atonement or prevention in any single material instance.

The debate was long and animated and had hundreds of auditors in its course from among the passers-by whose access was unmolested; and I hear that the Raja’s equivocations and obstinacy at length elicited from the crowd loud murmurs of disapprobation, amid which His Highness in vain ordered the several components of the assembly to break up and disperse. None would sever themselves nor an individual of any one body. In the end His Highness departed with but one follower for the palace, where he and his son have each four Sardars assigned for attendance on them and to prevent the access secretly of any others but not to interfere otherwise with the personal freedom of either father or son.93

At a similar meeting the following day that both Rajendra and Surendra attended, the latter appeared frightened by the gathering but gained courage to address it when encouraged by his father. He proposed that he would be content with the title of Yuvaraj (Crown Prince) rather than Maharajadhiraj (King) for the present but that his father should abdicate in his favour next April if the astrologers could
find an auspicious day or failing that, on his sixteenth birthday (October 1844). The meeting accepted an arrangement on these lines and decided that a written statement be drawn up. However, as night was approaching, this task was postponed to the following day. Many expressions of discontent were overheard from onlookers surrounding the assembly. The chautaras were criticised for leaning too much towards Rajendra’s and Surendra’s interests and for failing to involve the Queen in the proposed agreement. Guru Prasad was singled out for particularly bitter attack. Hodgson’s language in reporting these sentiments to the Government of India indicates that he himself shared them.  

Proceedings at the next day’s meeting (3 December), which neither Rajendra nor Surendra attended, accommodated these criticisms. The drafting of the petition was delegated to a committee of bharadars whose composition ensured that the final document took due account of everyone’s rights, including the Queen’s. The committee reported to the full assembly two days later and after the King and Prince, who again tried to intervene, had been sent away politely but firmly, the draft petition was adopted by the assembly. The petition was presented to the king on the 7th—the intervening day being inauspicious—and accepted by him amidst the applause of crowds around the palace and general rejoicing throughout the city. The King’s signature was immediately placed on the document and a deputation was sent to escort the Queen and her sons back into Kathmandu from her refuge at Banepa. She made a triumphal entry into the city the following day.  

The exact terms of the settlement that had been agreed were not discovered by the Resident, but it was said the government was to be conducted in general accordance with the laws of Drabya Shah, the founder of the kingdom of Gorkha. Specific restraints were placed on the Crown Prince including a ban on his possession of edged weapons and action was to be taken against Krishna Ram Mishra. However, the Queen did not acquire the political powers which were supposed to form a key part of the new order. The chautara, particularly Guru Prasad, helped the King to resist this. Joint assemblies of the bharadari and army were again held, the latter taking the strongest line. At one stage, the soldiers threatened to depose the King and ‘called the father a knave, and the son a madman, to the Maharaja’s face’. Rajendra now reportedly accepted two new documents, one placing more specific restraints on Surendra and the other giving the Queen complete control over foreign policy for a limited period. A lal mohar defining the Queen’s
position was eventually issued in January but the chautaras again ensured that its terms were less definitive than originally envisaged. The key portion of the document read as follows:

I direct... that all duties connected with the palace internally be conducted by you and that the Country and Government be managed by me with your advice and concurrence according to the suggestion of the Ministers. Should anyone come to me to complain of, or interfere with, this arrangement, let it not be attended to, and it shall be immediately enquired into by the Ministers and Chiefs, and as they decide, the transgressor will be published with your concurrence and advice, either by dismissal or any other punishment his crime deserves. In short, whatever you advise or suggest for the government and welfare of the kingdom or do in the Administration of the Palace shall not be opposed by me nor by anyone else. This order for the future government of the Kingdom according to its ancient laws, my Gurus, Ministers, Chiefs and soldiers will strictly adhere to. Should anyone disobey it, according to his caste and by your order, he shall be punished.

Scepticism about its practical effect was justified because Rajendra effectively nullified it by himself reappointing Fateh Jang as mukhtiyar. The lal mohar announcing this appointment did contain one reference to the Queen--Fateh was to present his selected candidates for public office both to Rajendra and to Rajya Lakshmi--but the comprehensive nature of the powers delegated and the fact that it was still the King who issued the decree made a mockery of the Queen’s superintendence of affairs. This decree finally separated the chautaras from the movement which they had nominally led. The movement itself was now effectively at an end. The Queen had been established as a contender for power but not given any real power of arbitration so that uncertainty was soon to be worse confounded with three rival rulers instead of two, while the unity of the bharadars had been broken.

Although the eventual results were not what had been hoped, the events of December 1842 deserve analysis for the light that they shed on the limits of the power of the monarchy under the Nepalese political system. An obvious parallel with struggles between ‘the nation’ and royal tyranny in Europe presented itself to the Western, or Western-influenced, observer. This line of interpretation is a strong factor in Hodgson’s reports, as his use of expressions such as ‘the great national
movement’ in itself demonstrates, even though later on this enthusiasm was somewhat overshadowed by his disgust at the chautaras’ breaking of a hitherto united front. His description of events up to the end of the year was mirrored in the enthusiastic response of Lord Ellenborough, who authorised him:

> on any fitting occasion to make known the feelings by which his Lordship has been impressed by their conduct and to intimate that qualities so similar to those which under circumstances of a somewhat similar character have been displayed by the people of England in their best times must tend to improve the good understanding between the two nations. 

A similar line was taken half a century later by Jang Bahadur’s son, Pudma Rana, who wrote that the petition presented to the king ‘which aimed at securing protection of life and property in Nepal, may be called the Nepalese Petition of Rights, after its famous prototype of Charles I’s reign’. Pudma also stressed, however, that in ‘the East’ a much greater degree of oppression was needed before open resistance materialised.

Such parallels prompt a natural and healthy scepticism, but they are not wholly inappropriate. The idea that there were limits which the king could not transgress was not as alien to the Hindu political tradition as implied by the European stereotype of Eastern absolutism, a stereotype which Pudma Rana, writing to establish his family in Indian princely society at the turn of the century, dutifully endorsed.

In Nepal, the concept of state, as opposed to the personal bond between ruler and subject, was well understood, whilst an embryonic concept of nation was already present. First and foremost, however, the ‘national movement’ has to be understood as a project conceived and executed by the bharadari. The other elements involved—the local functionaries of the Valley towns, the chief merchants and most importantly, the army—played only a supporting role. This is shown most clearly by the fact that the plan of action was first discussed amongst them as early as May 1842 and that there were no further disturbances amongst the army once the unity of the bharadars had been broken.

It can be surmised that the gurus played an important role in spurring the bharadari as a whole into action, but it is probable that the principal pressure came from the ‘good sardars’ outside the ‘British ministry’ but generally supporting it, whose significance was discussed
at the start of this chapter. Two key figures in this group--Ranjor Thapa and Abhiman Singh Rana--were members of the committee which drafted the petition to the King, as was Ranjor’s kinsman Bhopal Thapa. Another important member was Kulman Singh Basnet, whose political ally Jang Bahadur probably now was. Whatever their standing with Surendra at the pajani the previous month they will have been enthusiastic participants in the move against him. This is presumably the reason why the King and Prince had one of their agents give Jang a beating on the night of 30 November, just before the principal public meeting commenced. Both Kulman and Jang began now to appear as members of delegations sent to the Residency: the two conveyed official congratulations to Hodgson on British success in China and Afghanistan on 23 December, while Jang accompanied Guru Prasad and Ranjor Thapa on 8 January to announce the grant of political powers to Queen Lakshmi.

Although the army did not act independently of the bharadari during the crisis, it nonetheless played a crucial role by choosing to violently support the bharadars rather than the King. When Jang Bahadur was attacked on royal orders by Captain Jamon Singh Khatri, it was the troops who rescued him and then went on to plunder Jamon’s house. He had apparently been opposing the consensus the public meetings had reached. Subsequently, the day after the approval of the draft petition to the king, rank and file soldiers sacked the homes of four or five other individuals who, like Jamon, were believed to be trying to block the ‘national movement’. The victims then promised to cease their opposition but that night, on Rajendra’s orders, brought three hundred loyal troops onto their side and attempted through them to persuade the kampu as a whole to arrest the principal bharadars behind the petition. The result was a conclusive demonstration of where the bulk of the kampu’s feelings lay. The bharadars were easily able to thwart the plot and then had to protect the king’s agents from the anger of the soldiers.

The willingness of the army to act in this way is paradoxical in view of its normal stance of loyalty to the throne which was the principal reason why both Hodgson and the Paudyal gurus had originally opposed the idea of a petition movement including the army. A part of the explanation was that although it was the bharadars who had been the principal victims of Surendra’s atrocities, the ordinary soldiers had also suffered on occasion. When Surendra had clashed with the kampu at the end of November, the troops complained that four hundred of them had
'died like dogs' on a journey to Hetauda, a reference to deaths from malaria when the Prince had recently led a large force on an expedition to the south. In addition, defiance of royal authority became easier because Surendra and Rajendra acted in such an erratic fashion and the Queen put herself forward as an alternative focus of allegiance. A more important reason was the ties between the soldiers and particular members of the bharadari. These were either the client-patron relationships of the kind that helped determine the course of events during the 1840 mutiny or loyalty towards 'charismatic' figures amongst the bharadars. Both Abhiman Singh Rana and Jang Bahadur were the focus for feelings of the latter sort. Abhiman's popularity with the troops was emphasised more than once by Hodgson. It was strengthened amongst the tribal elements of the army because he was himself a Magar. Jang Bahadur was a popular figure because of his daredevil reputation and because he had shown a tendency to support the lower ranks in clashes with authority. The strain of Magar ancestry evident in his features meant that he too benefited from the 'Magar factor'.

The action of the bharadars and that of the army in supporting them was facilitated by a shared conception of the bharadari's entitlement to consideration from the throne. The ideology of the national movement was thus one of re-assertion of perceived traditional values, rather than of a revolutionary challenge to the existing order. The traditional rights of the bharadari were perceptively delineated fifty years previously by Kirkpatrick. For the Nepalese they were mainly an implicitly recognised set of conventions which were also believed to be embodied in certain documents. The settlement reached in December 1842 was supposedly based on the laws of Drabya Shah. No texts ascribed to this ruler have survived but possibly Hodgson's informant had in mind the edicts (tiithi) promulgated by Drabya's grandson, Rama Shah. The eleventh edict gives a right of remonstrance to the original six tharghar whose ancestors helped Drabya Shah seize control of Gorkha in 1559:

To you of the Pande, Panth, Arjyal, Khanal, Rana and Bohora thars is given the title of Six thar, for the following reason: If a chautariya, kaji, or sardar etc., should enter into an unjust or unlawful act in order to destroy the throne or impair justice, then it is laid down that the Six thar should come [forward] to explain the details to the king without bias or compassion. This order is given to you, your descendants, and their descendants, by us, our
descendants, and their descendants, for as long as you remain faithful to the throne.  

Whilst these six families no longer had special importance, the thargars in the wider sense—the principal bharadar families—regarded themselves as inheritors of their role of guardians of the state.

A final point to be noted about the whole series of events in December and January is their underlining of the overwhelming predominance of the centre in the Nepalese political equation. The whole drama was played at Kathmandu with no contribution of any consequence from the outlying districts. The leaders of the movement considered the possibility that the dhakres who had been dispersed to their homes in the hills—would be unhappy at what had happened but they believed they could be readily conciliated. The kala Pandes did attempt to excite a reaction amongst the dhakres and in the eastern districts of the kingdom but without success.

Mathbar Singh Thapa

The inconclusive ending of the ‘national movement’ produced a situation which satisfied the chautaras but not the King or the Queen and the bharadars who had been pushing her forward. The latter parties needed fresh pawn to place on the chess-board and the natural candidate for the role was Jang Bahadur’s uncle Mathbar Singh Thapa, who had been in India since 1838. Until the winter of 1842, he had continued to live at Ludhiana or Simla, receiving a British pension of 1,000 rupees per month. He presented himself to the British as their willing collaborator whilst telling a very different story in his letters to Rajendra. He admitted this double game quite freely, expecting the British to understand that whilst his children remained in Nepal he had to be on as friendly terms as possible with the Darbar. Hodgson tolerated this but Ellenborough was less sanguine and in April 1842, asked the Resident whether it would be feasible to request Rajendra to recall Mathbar to Nepal or at least transfer him to Banaras or Patna so that he could negotiate his own return more easily. Hodgson was unenthusiastic. In any case, the Governor-General soon decided that the move would be inopportune because of the crisis in Anglo-Nepalese relations brought about by the Kasinabh incident. During the summer, however, Mathbar’s friends in Nepal themselves suggested that he should move closer home. He then wrote to Hodgson that he was inclined to accept the
invitation but wanted his advice first. The Resident still believed that Mathbar’s actual return was undesirable at that moment but he was convinced that he would not actually cross the Nepalese border unless under a British guarantee. He, therefore, recommended to the Governor-General that, as both Mathbar himself and the Nepal Darbar wanted him to return, the British should put matters to the test by telling him he was at liberty to come.126 In the event, Mathbar left for Gorakhpur in December, his journey having commenced before news of the ‘national movement’ could reach him.127

Mathbar must have received up-to-date information on developments in Kathmandu from his sons and nephew who had escaped from Nepal shortly before his arrival at Gorakhpur.128 He had, however, to wait until early February for contact with a senior bharadar, the raj-guru Rangnath Paudyal who had travelled to Allahabad to meet him.129 Rangnath had told the Queen that he wanted to sound Mathbar on her behalf but his real motive was to journey to Banaras to retire there permanently.130 In any case, he was not really in a position to negotiate on Rajya Lakshmi’s behalf as he no longer retained her complete confidence. Like Rangnath’s own brother, Krishna Ram, she considered he ought to have remained at her side in Kathmandu in the current critical situation and she also suspected him of trying to reach an accommodation of his own with the chautaras.131 Nothing concrete was discussed at his meeting with Mathbar. Rangnath’s departure from Kathmandu is significant rather for marking the start of a decline in the Paudyal family’s influence at Kathmandu. Five of his relatives still held high office but their position was to weaken rapidly with the head of the family’s withdrawal from the scene.132

A few days after Rangnath’s departure, Captain Aibaran Basnet left Kathmandu to officially invite Mathbar to return.133 Rajya Lakshmi thought that the invitation was premature. Although Mathbar had throughout his exile claimed to be her partisan, she was unsure both whether she could guarantee his safety at Kathmandu and whether she could trust his intentions. Brian Hodgson, who indubitably was a fervent supporter of Lakshmi Devi, had since December been relaying advice to Mathbar, via Reade, the Gorakhpur magistrate. He now counselled Mathbar to refer both to the Queen and the Governor-General before accepting the invitation to return home.134 Accordingly, when Mathbar was met by Aibaran Basnet, he told him that he required papers from the Queen, Crown Prince and the King. As Rajya Lakshmi overcame her doubts, the necessary invitations were provided by the end of the
month. Despite this, Mathbar still hesitated. He had received no definite advice in reply to his letter to the Governor-General and he now sought Hodgson’s opinion on whether it was safe for him to return. This the Resident did not provide. Mathbar, nevertheless, finally decided that he would enter the lions’ den and crossing the Tarai a few days before the malaria set in, he reached the Valley in early April.

In February 1844, Lawrence was to claim in a letter to the government that Mathbar had returned to Nepal ‘under some sort of pledge’ from Hodgson. Though there had been no formal promise of support and Hodgson had declined to accept the responsibility of advising him to cross the Nepal frontier, in his messages to Mathbar through Reade, Hodgson continually stressed his friendly feelings towards him. ‘Give him my love and say I will be ever mindful of his interests so far as circumstances permit’, ended one such letter in January. A fortnight later, the tone was even more insistent:

Ere [Mathbar Singh] leaves you, make him understand in private that I am his sincere friend and have great hopes that his experience of the world will make him a valuable and useful man well disposed towards the British Government. Such are scant here and the Chountaras have disappointed the Queen and country and me too... But all you need say—and try to impress it—is that I am his real friend, as he will better know by and by. (Emphases in original)

Such assurances were all given in demi-official correspondence, which does not appear to have been copied to the Government of India. Furthermore, as Lawrence also points out, Hodgson was at pains to urge Mathbar to adhere to the Queen and ‘the nation’, and not to allow himself to be used by the King even if the latter seemed to offer him more rapid preferment. At the same time, though, he warned him not to interfere with the succession to the throne: Rajendra and Surendra should be put under the Queen’s control as a temporary measure only.

Hodgson stressed to Reade that this detailed policy advice, in contrast to his more general protestations of friendship, should be passed on to Mathbar as Reade’s own ideas, without any mention of Hodgson’s name. He fully realised that he was distrusted by Mathbar, who blamed him both for trying to block his 1835 Calcutta mission and for failing to prevent Bhimsen’s death in 1839.

During the nine months for which Hodgson remained in Nepal...
after Mathbar's return the two men met privately on more than one occasion but Hodgson was unable to win his confidence. Mathbar's continuing resentment of him was evident in many subsequent conversations with Lawrence and also in the vamshavali account of Hodgson, which obviously reflects Mathbar's thinking and is very hostile to the Resident.142 The vamshavali's reference to Hodgson's dismissal 'for exceeding instructions' suggests that Mathbar was aware of the policy disagreement within the East India Company and he was, therefore, hopeful of support from Resident Lawrence despite his distrust of Lawrence's predecessor.

In addition to the British, Mathbar had the constant advice of his friends in Kathmandu. Amongst these was his nephew Jang Bahadur, who had been placed in charge of the Kumari Chauk (Audit Department) at the beginning of the year.143 Once Mathbar reached Kathmandu, Jang Bahadur became one of his close associates. On 19 April, two days after Mathbar's arrival, he was accompanied on a visit to the British Residency by Jang Bahadur and Kulman Singh Basnet.144 They reported to Hodgson an initial triumph: despite earlier talk of the King insisting on Mathbar's giving up his plans for exacting vengeance on the Pandes, the latter had confessed their crimes and were to be punished.145 Proceedings against the Pandes and their allies continued over the next three months. The first executions took place at the end of April.146 It is surprising that Rajendra sanctioned this since it arguably weakened his scope for balancing one faction against the other. However, after the slander case had been brought against the Pande family in the autumn of 1842, the King had turned completely against them.

The purge covered not only members of the kala Pande family but also their collaborators. Amongst the latter was Jang Bahadur's cousin Debi Bahadur, the eldest son of Bal Narsingh's youngest brother Balram. According to a royal decree issued after the sentences had been carried out, Debi Bahadur had been involved after Bhimsen's death in producing a false affidavit aimed at destroying the Junior Queen and fomenting a quarrel between the Senior Queen and King.147

Debi Bahadur can be identified with the 'son of Balram Kower' who, as noted in the Resident's Diary, was imprisoned along with Gagan Singh in December 1839 'in connection with some infamous plot of the Senior Rani and Pande's to ruin the Junior Queen and her children'.148 In the same Diary entry Hodgson recorded that the Senior Queen had falsely accused the Junior Queen of an illicit connection with Gagan. This is the first reference in any source to the allegation which was to
play an increasingly critical role in Nepalese politics. Thus, the document which Debi Bahadur helped the Pandes prepare dates from this time and it was concerned in part with Rajya Lakshmi’s supposed relationship with Gagan. Debi Bahadur’s actions must have appeared particularly heinous to the Pandes’ opponents because he was probably an original adherent of Lakshmi Devi who deserted her.\textsuperscript{149}

In his biography of Jang Bahadur, his son claims that Debi Bahadur’s death was at Rajya Lakshmi’s insistence and that Jang pleaded with Mathbar to intervene, only to be told that royal commands must always be obeyed.\textsuperscript{150} However inconsistencies between Pudma’s story and the 1843 decree, and his obvious intention to justify Jang’s own later murder of Mathbar on Rajendra’s orders invite scepticism.\textsuperscript{151} In any case Jang did not allow the incident to hinder him from collaborating with his uncle and profiting politically from his ascendancy.

On arrival in Kathmandu, Mathbar was at once the most influential bharadar, the man to whom everyone paid court.\textsuperscript{152} However, he did not actually take charge of the army and the civil administration until September whilst the formalities of appointment as mukhtiyar were further delayed until late December.\textsuperscript{153} This was the result of Rajendra and the chautaras resisting pressure from Rajya Lakshmi and her supporters amongst the nobility for Mathbar’s appointment. The chautaras tried to block him even though Fateh Jang submitted his resignation in July. They encouraged Rajendra’s hope that Jagat Bam Pande, who was on his way back from Peking, might bring promises of military support for Nepal and thus have a claim to the ministry himself.\textsuperscript{154} Jagat Bam did not return to Kathmandu. Alarmed by the fate of other members of his family, he chose to go directly from Tibet to British India. The chautaras in early September were confronted with Rajya Lakshmi, Surendra and the bharadars all pressing for Mathbar’s appointment. They attempted unsuccessfully to win Rajya Lakshmi over to their side with a bribe of 50,000 rupees.\textsuperscript{155} Rajendra’s proposal that the chautaras and Mathbar hold the ministry jointly found no favour with either Rajya Lakshmi or the bharadars.\textsuperscript{156} He was thus influenced to procrastinate a little further. Finally, Mathbar took charge in mid-September.

Another complicating factor during the summer of 1843 was the uncertainty about the British reaction to the appointment of Mathbar. The chautaras tried to persuade Rajendra that their own dismissal would violate the understanding reached with the British in January 1841. When Rajendra personally informed Hodgson of Mathbar’s appointment, he was relieved to be assured by the Resident once more
that internal arrangements were entirely his own affair.\footnote{157}

The prospect of Hodgson's departure became a topic of direct concern during the summer. Hodgson sought to persuade Lord Ellenborough to allow him to remain for one more year in Nepal. Hodgson's own efforts were reinforced by appeals from the King and leading \textit{bharadars} for his retention. The King actually requested Hodgson in July to forward this formal request to the Governor-General:

Mr. Hodgson has recently mentioned to me his intention to retire from the service and return to Europe in the coming cold season.

Since that day I have been perpetually reflecting upon Mr. Hodgson's perfect knowledge of the customs and institutions of my Kingdom and of the Parbattiah language, and likewise upon his long and zealous, kind and patient labours in the late troubled times, whereby the designs of evil persons inimical to both governments were foiled and peace and true friendship with your State preserved.

The more I think upon these invaluable qualifications and exertions, the more am I pained at the idea of his departure. It is therefore my earnest request and hope for the benefit of my kingdom, that Mr. Hodgson may be persuaded by Your Lordship to remain a while longer with me. Let me constantly hear of Your Lordship's welfare, etc., etc.\footnote{158}

Hodgson forwarded it informally to the Governor-General, explaining that the proposal to send it had initially been made by 'a minister who has already tendered his resignation' (i.e., Fateh Jang) but was now being supported by \textit{bharadars} of all factions.\footnote{159} Krishna Ram Paudyal, the oldest political ally of the Resident in Kathmandu, was chosen by the Darbar to go to India to repeat the same sentiments to the Governor-General.\footnote{160} Ellenborough, however, did not relent and on 30 November Major Henry Lawrence arrived to take charge of the Residency.\footnote{161}

There was an element of genuine affection in the tears shed by many \textit{bharadars} when Hodgson left the country. Less personal considerations, however, also played a role. Although Hodgson assured Ellenborough that the Nepalese genuinely believed his story that his impending departure was due to ill health,\footnote{162} there is no doubt that they realised there was more to it. Shortly after his arrival, Lawrence reported to the government the belief of the King and many \textit{bharadars}
that ‘the late Resident was removed from Nepal for saving the country from invasion... and that I had been sent as a sort of punishment to them and to Mr. Hodgson’.\(^{163}\) In addition, despite the posture of studied neutrality which Hodgson had striven to adopt since the summer of 1842, many individuals did not give up hope that he might be pressed into alliance with them again. This conditioned the attitude of Fateh Jang, seemingly the main originator of the campaign on Hodgson’s behalf and of Krishna Ram Paudyal. Kaji Abhiman Singh, who was a particularly prominent member of delegations pressing the Resident to forward the kharita formally to Lord Ellenborough, appears from his role in the ‘national movement’ and his later actions to have been a strong partisan of Rajya Lakshmi and was probably aware of how well disposed Hodgson was towards her. As has already been seen, Mathbar Singh did not share this general enthusiasm for Hodgson, but he thought it politic to disguise his hostility, and when the Resident finally left Kathmandu on 5th December, he led the Kathmandu garrison to escort him a mile on his way.\(^{164}\)

During the three weeks following Hodgson’s departure, the question of whether Mathbar would be confirmed in the position he had occupied de facto since September seemed to hang in the balance. Distrust among the chiefs was a major problem whilst his failure to prevail upon Lawrence to give Surendra a duplicate of the memorandum he had submitted to the King on being received at the Darbar brought Surendra’s anger upon him.\(^{165}\) However, Surendra dropped his opposition on 24 December whilst a meeting of leading bharadars also gave their approval and he was formally invested mukhtiyar on 25 December.\(^{166}\) Mathbar’s position depended on the accommodation reached with the chautaras who had regained influence. Mathbar held discussions with Fateh Jang during the last week of December and it was agreed that the latter should receive the key provincial command of Palpa. The deal satisfied Fateh Jang and his brother Guru Prasad but was regarded as a ‘sell-out’ by the younger chautaras.\(^{167}\) The incomplete nature of Mathbar’s predominance was underlined by the fact that none of the four principal kaji appointed on 31 December were his supporters and that Jang Bahadur, his ‘favourite nephew’, was excluded from office.\(^{168}\) Jang Bahadur, who had most probably been serving as a kaji since late 1842, was reinstated shortly afterwards only to be dismissed again in March, his place being taken by Karbir Pande, nephew of gora Pande leader Dalbhanjan.\(^{169}\)

During 1843, Mathbar had at times seemed to be drawing close to
Surendra but throughout most of 1844 he threw his weight behind Rajya Lakshmi. He conspired with Abhiman Singh Rana and Gagan Singh to displace Surendra and put Rajya Lakshmi's son Ranendra on the throne.\textsuperscript{170} This decision gave him additional allies within the Darbar, for Abhiman, enjoyed considerable influence whilst Gagan was undoubtedly Rajya Lakshmi's closest confidant. However, there was no longer the unity amongst the \textit{bharadari} which had seemed to carry Rajya Lakshmi to power a year previously and Rajya Lakshmi's closest allies did not trust Mathbar. The minister accordingly made repeated efforts to buttress his position by appealing to two possible sources of support--the army and the British Resident.

There were reasonable grounds for him to expect assistance from the troops. He had been a popular commander under his uncle Bhimsen and had a major role in establishing the privileged status of the \textit{kampu} by persuading the Darbar that, in the interests of professionalism, the rank and file sepoys should not be rotated out except when unfit.\textsuperscript{171} His reputation as a soldier had been enhanced by the tales of his stay in India. He had claimed on his return to Nepal that both the Sikhs and the British had offered him large amounts of money to enter their military service.\textsuperscript{172} He had demonstrated his ability to handle the \textit{kampu} in September 1843, when he had quelled a disturbance amongst soldiers mobbing the palace by single-handedly entering the group and killing the ringleader.\textsuperscript{173} Once in full command of the army, he further enhanced his popularity by paying two lakh rupees as an advance to the troops for the money due from their jagirs in the Tarai.\textsuperscript{174} This was a timely move since the price of rice in the Kathmandu Valley had risen considerably above the usual level that year and this would have caused hardship to soldiers dependent on bazar supplies until the crop had been harvested on their jagirs.\textsuperscript{175}

During the crisis over the army pay in 1840, reductions had eventually been imposed though less sweeping than originally envisaged. Discontent over this still existed and in January Mathbar sought to exploit it by encouraging demonstrations by the troops and seeking their support for bringing Rajya Lakshmi to power. The response of the troops was not as wholehearted as he had expected--on one occasion they even protested that the King had always been kind to them.\textsuperscript{176} Mathbar attempted to use the army as a substitute for support from the \textit{bharadars} who were unwilling to give him full backing even though many were unhappy with the conduct of Rajendra and Surendra. The Resident also argued that 'Bhim Sen Thapa managed the country for
twenty years unsupported by [the bharadars] and only fell when the soldiery abandoned him'. To separate the army and bharadari in this way is, however, going too far. Patronage ties between soldiers and individual bharadars played an important role and the army's lack of enthusiasm was a direct consequence of lack of support from bharadars.

If Mathbar could secure only limited support from the army, Lawrence was completely uncompliant. He was working under instructions to follow a policy of strict non-intervention and even if his hands had been left free he would not have given the backing Mathbar sought. In contrast to Hodgson, Lawrence saw Rajendra as reacting defensively against a plot by his own bharadars to transfer power to the Rajya Lakshmi and against what he regarded as aggressive moves by the British government. Lawrence had no confidence in Rajya Lakshmi: 'Let the Rani be as virtuous as most ruling Ranis are to the contrary... she must either as Regent fall into the hand of the Minister of the time being; or if possessing the masculine qualities and ability that would render her independent, it is but natural to expect that she would destroy her stepchildren and raise her own to the throne'.

Mathbar, unaware of Lawrence's real attitude and encouraged by the counsel he had received at Gorakhpur made repeated attempts to bring the Resident into action as his ally. His efforts were assisted by the Darbar Mir Munshi Lakshmi Das who had been a protégé of Bhimsen and was now dedicated to Mathbar's interests. This was also the case with other Nepalese in contact with the Residency. The pressure was such that Lawrence regarded himself as virtually under siege. A particularly blatant approach was adopted in January by Mathbar when he sent a message that he was having to restrain the King from arresting the Assistant Resident Thomas Smith and the British ought to warn the King that unless he kept proper order, the army which had just defeated Gwalior would be sent against Nepal. Mathbar also openly talked with the Resident of his plans and difficulties and sought his advice. On such occasions Lawrence protested his neutrality but answered factual questions and sought to dissuade Mathbar from any rash or violent action. At a conference at the Residency on 27 January, Mathbar, accompanied by Jang Bahadur, Kalu Shahi and Abhiman, announced that the King had agreed to hand over power to the Queen temporarily. The regency was to last as long as his imbecility and the Crown Prince's disposition to violence persisted. Lawrence pointed out the practical difficulties. What would be the Queen's position should the King change his mind after a few days? Who was to judge Rajendra's
imbecility? Mathbar replied that the decision would be his as minister and that the bharadars had agreed that soldiers should plunder the house of anyone who broke the united front now achieved. Jang Bahadur significantly added that 'the troops would be the judges'. Lawrence continued to find difficulties and warned that if the Heir Apparent were removed from power only to regain it, the queen herself would probably have to bear the worse consequences. He also advised strongly against allowing the army to interfere: 'once the soldiers took to themselves such power there would be holding them'. In the end, however, Lawrence said that if the King voluntarily accepted such an arrangement he could have no objection. The following day, Jang Bahadur informed the Resident that the King was pleased with his approach.

The agreement which Mathbar had secured from the King and bharadari proved to be illusory and he became increasingly frustrated. On a visit to the Residency in the beginning of February, he announced that he intended to demand a decision on who was the master—King, Queen or Crown Prince. If the situation were not resolved he would resign and thereby precipitate a military revolt. Lawrence had in December sent the King a message that the Crown Prince's position be 'adjusted' but he now refused to be involved any further, merely pointing out that Mathbar knew the state of the Darbar when he agreed to accept the ministry and that it would be highly irresponsible to resign now if he believed that disturbances would result. Mathbar continued to talk frequently of resignation but continued in office for another two and a half months. During this period he was confronted with divisions within his own family. Sher Jang Thapa, his nephew and Bhimsen's adopted son, returned to Nepal from Banaras and accused him of wrongfully retaining Bhimsen's property which had been confiscated in 1839 and later handed over to Mathbar in 1843. Bhimsen's brother Ranbir Singh Thapa also increased his difficulties by telling Surendra that it was the minister's fault that his father still refused to relinquish the throne in his favour. Under these pressures, Mathbar resigned in late spring but for some time continued exercising the functions of office just as he had done for some months in 1843 prior to his formal appointment.

Through the summer Mathbar still hoped to win Lawrence's support and, as the Resident believed, deliberately slowed down the processing of the Residency's business in order to achieve this. Mathbar himself continued to see Lawrence from time to time but a key role in his strategy was played by Lakshmi Das who now became the
principal link between the Residency and the Darbar. Lakshmi Das was one of the few Newars in high profile positions in the Nepalese administration and had originally secured his appointment under the patronage of Bhimsen. According to the tradition preserved by his descendants today, he was the grandson of a prominent member of the aristocracy in the Newar Kingdom of Patan but his father had been brought up as a servant in the royal palace after the Gorkha conquest. He himself was sent as young boy to study Urdu and Persian in Banaras, where he attracted Bhimsen’s attention during Rana Bahadur’s exile. At the beginning of June, he told the Assistant Resident, Captain Smith that ‘there would never be peace and quiet in Nepal until the British Government interfered’. Reporting this incident in his Diary, Lawrence commented acerbically:

[Lakshmi Das] has never spoken so plainly to me, but several times hinted at the necessity of my being severe (sukh) with the Maharaja; with an affectation of great sincerity and plain dealing the Moonshi (though a Newar) rivals the deepest of the Gorkhas in duplicity.

In the following month, the Munshi explained the current delays in official business as the result of there being no minister and claimed that nothing would go right until Mathbar was restored to power.

In the face of all this Lawrence stuck doggedly to the policy he had been instructed to adopt and Mathbar’s position remained unchanged until the dramatic developments in the autumn. Despite the execution of the leading kala Pandes the year before, Rajendra and Surendra had continued communicating with other members of the family. In particular, the King had been in correspondence with Jagat Bam, the envoy to China who had taken refuge in India rather than return to Kathmandu. Krishna Ram Mishra was also consulted from time to time. In September, however, Pande hopes were once again destroyed when the letters brought back by Jagat Bam and claimed to have been written by the ambans (Chinese representatives) in Lhasa were denounced as forgeries. The documents had contained promises of turning over gold mines to Nepal and disappointment on this count turned the King against Jagat Bam and his relatives. Several of them were interrogated at an assembly of bharadars and--significantly--soldiers in the military cantonment, over which Rajendra and Surendra presided. Investigations continued until November, when the affair ended with the
expulsion from the country of forty-four persons, many of them the sons of men who had been put to death in 1843.193

Mathbar would have preferred more drastic punishment but the episode strengthened his hand considerably as he found himself united with the King and the Crown Prince in a common vendetta. In October, he was pressed by Rajendra to resume the premiership. In an obvious last ditch attempt to manoeuvre Lawrence into coming out in his support, he told him that he really wanted to retire to the plains and asked for advice.194 This took place against the background of rising political tension, as in addition to the Pande affairs, it was believed that the Paudyal gurus and chautaras who had been in Banaras and Palpa respectively, were about to return to the capital. Lawrence remained unmoved and complained of the attitude the contending factions took toward the Residency:

...since Bhimsen's decline and death there have been four parties aiming at the Ministry; the Pandey, Gooroo, Chountras and Thappas, all and each except the Pandey, desire and an offensive and defensive alliance with the Resident, even though they know that such confederacy would be directly opposed to the national feeling; but the nevertheless the three last have by all means set themselves to effect such an alliance, and the Pandey have only been prevented doing so, and stood for power on the national feeling, because they believed the late Resident pledged against them.195

Lawrence added the perceptive comment that Mathbar, despite his failure to recruit the British to his cause, 'has doubtless endeavoured to instill into all minds that I support him'. Mathbar's propaganda is reflected in the vamshavali claim that it was at his request that the Governor-General sent Lawrence to Nepal.196

Shortly afterwards, Mathbar accepted the invitation to become minister again and the news was given to Lawrence by Rajendra and Surendra when he was brought to witness a military parade on 18 October. Mathbar, within Lawrence's hearing, was able to extract a promise from Rajendra that there would be an end to the system of two rulers 'after the Dassera', which was then in progress and due to end only three days later.197 On securing this pledge, he immediately announced it to the assembled troops.

It was at this point that Mathbar made the crucial decision to
KINGS SOLDIERS AND PRIESTS

switch allegiance from Rajya Lakshmi to Surendra. Two days after the end of *Dasai*, he outlined his current thinking to Lawrence. The latter, having first confirmed that the King wished him to do so, had accepted an invitation to visit the minister in his home. Mathbar complained that although Surendra had been allowed to take precedence in the *Dasai* ceremonies, Rajendra had not redeemed his 'one ruler' pledge. Caught between father and son, he believed that a possible way out was the scheme then adopted in the Panjab where Kharak Singh had been made nominal ruler but actual power was held by his son Naunihal Singh. Would the British accept such an arrangement, or if they continued to hold aloof, would they be prepared to grant him asylum and a position as a revenue-farmer in their territory?, he asked. Lawrence pointed out that the Panjab scheme had rapidly led to Kharak Singh's death and that whilst Mathbar would always be allowed a refuge in India no promises of a jamindari could be made. In the same interview, Mathbar boasted of the army's loyalty to him and claimed that he could, if he wished, seize every bharadar in Kathmandu. In his report to Calcutta, Lawrence mentioned that he had heard many predicting 'another Lahore' in Nepal and expressed his own belief that the struggle could end with the army taking charge and destroying both the king and his son.

Mathbar's abandonment of the Queen was caused, in the first instance, by his belief that under her regency the real power would be in the hands of Gagan Singh and Abhiman Singh Rana, while he would have only the nominal position of minister. Surendra, on the other hand, was wooing him with the promise of powers equal to those that his uncle Bhimsen had held. Another factor, one not given due weight in studies of this period, was that feeling in the bharadari was now generally veering behind Surendra. It was after all a logical conclusion that, if Rajendra was not prepared to exercise control over his son, matters could not be made worse and might well be improved, by placing responsibility as well as power in the latter's hands. Surendra reinforced such sentiments by telling the bharadars that if they did not now help him gain what his father had solemnly promised him, then when he eventually did gain power, he would not honour the sanads (certificates) conferring jagirs upon them.

In early November, rumours spread that a hunting expedition to the Tarai being planned by Surendra was a cover for action against his father. Rajendra countermanded the orders to two regiments to move south but Mathbar assured Lawrence that if the Crown Prince took up the troops' standard and set out all would follow him. The two
regiments left for the Tarai in advance of Surendra. With them went Dil Bikram Thapa, a cousin of Mathbar, and Jang Bahadur. Although a dhakre, Jang Bahadur had played a prominent role throughout the year as an assistant to his uncle and Lawrence believed that some ulterior motive of Mathbar lay behind his departure now.\(^{205}\) He suspected that it was intended to allow a violation of British territory so that Mathbar could then claim he would be able to prevent such incidents in future if the British gave him proper backing. The minister did try to involve Lawrence once more, telling him that the Crown Prince intended to travel to Banaras and requesting his 'order' on whether he should accompany the expedition to the Tarai or stay in Kathmandu. Lawrence told him that as Rajendra evidently intended to go south with his son, Mathbar as minister ought to stay at his side.\(^{206}\) He was able to extract a promise from Mathbar that he would ensure that the party stayed on the north side of the Chure hills, the last hill range before the plains.

Rajendra, Surendra, Mathbar, most of the bharadars and the remaining troops left the capital on 4 December.\(^{207}\) At Hetauda, after a furious quarrel with his father, the Crown Prince again proclaimed his intention to cross the frontier and make for Banaras. The army and bharadars followed him and at the village of Dhukuwabas which lay south of the Chure range but within the Nepal border, all pledged 'to make him Governor of all and call him Maharajadhiraj and taking an oath by touching the Nishan (colours) wrote an agreement that they should never obey another order except his'.\(^{208}\) Later during the day (10 December), Rajendra came from Hetauda to join his son and issued a lal mohar (royal decree) which still left unclear the question of where real authority was to lie:

I have given the title of Maharajadhiraj to my son Sri Maharajadhiraj Surendra Bikram Shah. I retaining my throne and its authority, he (my son) will exercise authority over the Minister and the Chiefs and will carry on the Government. I retain the dignity and honours of the throne and the exercise of authority as was the practice of my ancestors. But he (my son) will refer to me, and receiving my orders, will issue them to the Minister and Chiefs and carry on the business of the state in the manner I have been accustomed to do.\(^{209}\)

Despite the ambiguity Surendra was on the ascendant and his accession to power was publicly acclaimed. On 14 December he returned to
Kathmandu amidst great celebrations, riding on an elephant at the head of the procession and attended by Mathbar and two of his cousins. Rajendra's elephant was in the third place, following Bhimsen's fakir brother Ranbir's, and the King was reported as 'looking sad, and... twisting his thumbs'.

Mathbar was anxious to secure British recognition for the arrangement that he believed he had achieved and he pressed Lawrence hard for this, both in person and through Jang Bahadur, who on the 13th successfully urged the Resident to come to Thankot on the edge of the Valley to greet the Crown Prince's procession. Lawrence refused to be drawn further, telling them he could make no move until he had received instructions from the Government of India. Though he was sceptical about the permanence of the new dispensation, he believed it would make Mathbar the de facto ruler and that this would be advantageous for the British. At this stage he had not been shown the la1 mohar and he believed that Rajendra had conceded more than he actually had. When a delegation of leading bharadars met Lawrence on 18 December, they confirmed his impression by telling him that '[the King] had made over all authority to his son, reserving to himself the throne, the mint, and the direction of British and Chinese correspondence'.

When this formula was reported to Governor-General Hardinge, he regarded the proposed arrangement as totally unacceptable:

...it would appear from the statement contained in your letter that all the authority of the Government with plenary powers of sovereignty are to be vested in one party while the control of foreign affairs and negotiations is to appertain to another. This is a state of affairs which cannot, for obvious reasons, be permitted. The foreign relations of a State must be vested in the Government of that State, and we can only recognise as the party with whom our affairs are to be conducted, and our correspondence carried on, the de facto ruler of the country...a distinct avowal is required formally announcing who is the ruler of Nepal, since the Governor-General in council cannot recognise the divided authority of two Rulers such as that which would virtually be created by the arrangement explained to you.

Stiller claims it was this decision by the Governor-General which stymied the 'coup' attempted by Surendra and Mathbar. In fact Lawrence did not have to demand a 'distinct avowal' from the Darbar of
who was in charge, since before the government instructions to him had been received, he had seen from the *lal mohar* that Rajendra had reserved ultimate sovereignty to himself.

From the account which Mathbar gave to the Residency Munshi the following day, it is clear that he directly ordered the army to follow Surendra from Hetauda to Banaras on 10 December, ignoring the pleas of Rajendra who even caught hold of his minister in an attempt to detain him.\(^{215}\) The bulk of the army accepted Mathbar's instructions either from personal loyalty or apprehension that the Crown Prince would indeed cross the frontier and provoke a crisis with British India. Mathbar kept the latter consideration to the forefront of the men's minds, for immediately after Surendra had set off, he read out to them the memorandum of 1841 in which the *bharadars* had pledged themselves to the preservation of good relations with the East India Company.\(^{216}\) Three *bharadars* closely associated with Rajya Lakshmi, *kajis* Abhiman Singh Rana and Gagan Singh and the junior *kumbhedan* (lieutenant) Dal Mardan Thapa resisted the move, getting a number of *hudas* (NCO's) to urge the troops to remain with Rajendra. One of these dissidents actually lunged at Mathbar with a bayonet but was overpowered in time.\(^{217}\) Sixteen 'mutineers' were arrested and later that day, after the proclamation, Surendra ordered their execution. Mathbar and Surendra were lucky that the split in the army had not been serious, for in addition to loyalty to Rajendra as the King they had to overcome the popularity with the rank and file which Abhiman had long enjoyed. In counteracting these influences, Mathbar was helped by Jang Bahadur's support, for he too was a favourite with the men.\(^{218}\)

In the immediate aftermath of Surendra's triumphant return to Kathmandu, it seemed that Mathbar had not eliminated his opponents completely. Abhiman remained prominent amongst those regularly in contact with the Residency whilst Mathbar's attempt to gain complete control of the *pajani* was resisted, as Rajendra sought to keep military patronage in his own hands.\(^{219}\) The minister, however, secured appointments for several members of his own family including Jang Bahadur.\(^{220}\) Within a few days opposition melted away entirely and Mathbar was offered appointment as minister for life which he accepted on 3 January, the actual investiture taking place at Pashupatinath on the 20th.\(^{221}\) As a further mark of distinction, the following month he received the title of *praim ministar* (i.e., prime minister).\(^{222}\) He was also presented by both Rajendra and Surendra with special medals listing his titles and guaranteeing his safety.
The trappings of power were paralleled by substance. He was in full control of Nepal-British relations, being able to conclude the final agreement of the Ramnagar border and also secure the appointment as *vakil* in Calcutta of Ram Bahadur, Jang Bahadur's brother. Everyone at Kathmandu acquiesced in his supremacy and the Paudyal gurus, who might have posed a threat had they entered the lists, chose to remain at Banaras. Others too decided that exile might be the wiser course. Abhiman, who had been appointed as a Nepalese representative on the commission delineating the border, fled to India with his colleague Bhawani Singh Khatri, persuading Fateh Jang, until then governor of Palpa, to accompany them. The Palpa post was subsequently allocated to Til Bikram Thapa, one of Mathbar's cousins. It was discovered that the *chautaras* had removed a large sum of money from the Palpa treasury before fleeing and attempts were made to get the British to induce them to return.

Realising the importance of preserving his position with the soldiers, Mathbar took three measures in early 1845 that were calculated to appeal to them. At Dhukuwabas he had got Surendra's agreement in principle to rescind the limited pay reductions put through in 1840, and in January a new pay-scale was worked out, taking effect from the harvest the following autumn. Although this development is reported in the *varshavali* and ignored in the British sources there can be no doubt that it did take place since the author of the main recension of the chronicle, Budhiman Singh, was himself involved in the exercise. Secondly, Mathbar persuaded Rajendra to agree to the raising of three additional regiments. This was done partly by the transfer of men from existing regiments but involved an increase of six hundred in total strength accompanied by an increase in promotion opportunities. Thirdly, a *lal mohar* in mid-January laid down that none of the existing *kampu* regiments were to be transferred to other stations. This was merely the ratification of what had become standard practice but it was a welcome reassurance to the men of the *kampu* that their privileged status was to be maintained.

Everything was seemingly at Mathbar's feet yet beneath the surface, his position was far from secure. Though Surendra remained totally committed to him, Rajya Lakshmi, whom he had first supported and then abandoned, was unreconciled whilst Rajendra too mistrusted and feared him. The raising of the three new regiments was seen by the King as a move by Mathbar against him. The army's support for the minister made the King reluctant to move against him.
but in April Mathbar foolishly weakened his position by ordering the soldiers to work as ordinary labourers for the construction of new barracks. Lawrence, who was ready to proffer advice although barred from partisanship, warned him against imposing what the army would see as humiliation but to no avail. On the evening of 17 May, Mathbar was summoned to the royal palace on the pretext that the Queen was ill and assassinated in her chamber.

Despite an official statement that the King had fired the gun it was rumoured within hours of Mathbar's death that Jang Bahadur was the man who had actually pulled the trigger. In reporting to Calcutta a week later, Lawrence accepted Jang Bahadur's denial: 'Poor as is my opinion of his moral character, I do believe him guiltless of the act of which he is accused.' Some years later, however, once securely in power, Jang Bahadur was to admit that he had indeed been the assassin. Despite M.S. Jain's elaborate attempts to argue the contrary, there is no plausible reason why Jang should have incriminated himself if he had not fired the gun and his involvement can be taken as proved.

The fullest account of his participation in the conspiracy is that provided by his son Pudma. This contains a number of contradictions and distortions but one can accept the core of the story that Gagan Singh suggested bringing him in as the instrument for exacting the King's and Queen's vengeance and that Kulman Singh Basnet was the intermediary who summoned him to the royal palace. These two men were the ones on whom Lawrence's informants placed the main responsibility for the killing. Additionally, Kulman, brother of Jang's late father-in-law, had long been his political ally.

The background to his action is less clear. Pudma claims that Jang Bahadur acted under threat of his own death if he disobeyed an order from the King and Queen, and also from anger over Mathbar's failure to save Debi Bahadur Kunwar from execution. He also describes a series of public clashes between uncle and nephew on other issues, and another such disagreement is mentioned in the vamshavali account, compiled by Jang Bahadur's contemporary, Budhiman Singh. However, the Debi Bahadur affair took place not shortly before Mathbar's death, as Pudma implies but two years earlier, whilst an open rift between Jang Bahadur and his uncle could hardly have been concealed from the Residency. Thus much of the detail in both Pudma Rana's and the vamshavali's versions is unreliable, probably deriving from stories which Jang himself later told to justify his action.

Whatever disagreements there may have been in private both
Jang Bahadur and his brothers continued to enjoy Mathbar's patronage at least up to the end of February. Following Jang's own appointment to office in late December, his brother Bam Bahadur was made vakil in Calcutta and the captaincy that fell vacant as a result was awarded to a third brother. Later it was rumoured that Jang Bahadur was in line for nomination as an envoy to China. What appears most likely is that Jang Bahadur made secret contact with his uncle's opponents to align himself with what he believed was to become the dominant force in Darbar politics.

In killing his uncle, Jang Bahadur destroyed a man whose general direction of Nepalese policy followed lines derived from Bhimsen Thapa, and was later to serve as a guide to Jang Bahadur himself. Like Bhimsen, Mathbar's aim was to concentrate full power within Nepal in his own hands. Externally, again like him, he was prepared in practice to seek an accommodation with British India though for domestic political reasons he sometimes highlighted this fact while on other occasions he displayed strongly anti-British sentiments. Jain has rightly emphasised the reality of his foreign policy and the fundamental misreading of it found in the works of some modern Nepalese historians who see Mathbar as a feared opponent of the British and his assassination as a conspiracy in which the Residency is implicated.

In addition to seeing Mathbar as a man they could do business with the British also came to regard him as a Nepalese receptive to new ideas and not bound by the prejudices of many of his countrymen. Such a judgement was, of course, partly the result of the tendency to class as a 'good' ruler anyone whose foreign policy largely matched British interests. Hodgson and Lawrence's view of him as a man of large horizons was nonetheless not without foundation. He saw the advantages that could accrue from a knowledge of English and European learning, remarking on a visit to the Government School in Patna in 1835 that he would like to place his two sons there for that purpose. Ten years later, Lawrence was particularly impressed by his reaction on hearing how a steam engine could transport 3,000 men at 20 mph: whilst all the other bharadars present exclaimed how useful it would be in war, Mathbar was heard to remark in Nepali to a companion, 'What an advantage it would be in a famine'. In the political sphere, Mathbar was ready to consider solutions to Nepal's constitutional problems that were drawn from both Sikh and British practice even if he did not always fully appreciate their implications.

How far did intelligence and knowledge of the world translate
into success as an administrator? Only a few days after Mathbar’s death, and with experience of Nepal only under Mathbar’s direction, Henry Lawrence opined that:

The Gurkhas... are the best masters I have seen in India. Neither in the Tarai, nor in the hills, have I witnessed or heard of a single act of oppression since I arrived here a year and a half ago; and a happier peasantry I have nowhere seen.244

Lawrence seems to have forgotten the delegation which came to Kathmandu some months previously to complain against Hira Lal Jha and whose arrival he had noted in the Residency Diary.245 Other than this incident there is no direct evidence of agrarian discontent under Mathbar’s administration but a document of December 1845 refers to hardship caused in the Tarai by a 25 per cent increase in revenue demand.246 This additional levy was probably in force during Mathbar’s premiership. Pressure on the revenue base was at a high level, given the increases in army pay that Mathbar put through and also the lavish allocations of land that Mathbar himself received: in addition to an annual jagir of 15,000 rupees, Mathbar recovered the birta lands confiscated from him when Bhimsen fell, and also got new birta grants which were worth up to 110,000 rupees a year.247 The latter amount would represent around 10 per cent of the total revenue from the crucial eastern Tarai districts.248 The government in Kathmandu thus had every reason to encourage Hira Lal to extract the maximum amount possible from the peasantry.

Mathbar’s fall can be seen as caused by the growing resentment against him both in the royal family and amongst the bharadars. He might have saved himself either by being more conciliatory or by greater ruthlessness: ‘He acted only by halves’.249 The king made his move only after Mathbar had made himself generally unpopular. His standing with the army had been undermined through his use of the soldiers as labourers, his opponents among the bharadari remained unreconciled and some of his own adherents were beginning to doubt his willingness to protect their interests.

1841-1845: Political Trends in Retrospect

The fundamental problem persisting throughout this period was the incapability of King Rajendra either to take direct and effective control
of the administration or to trust anyone else to do so. Factionalism, therefore, continued to flourish unabated both within the royal family and amongst the bharadari. Against this background, 'time-serving' became vital to political survival. It is at first hard to detect any consistent pattern at all in the Byzantine turns of Darbar politics but certain tendencies can be singled out.

These years saw the influence of the Paudyal guru family peak and then decline. This was largely because the change of the British policy in 1842 reduced their scope for acting as political brokers between the Resident and the Darbar. The importance of the institution of rajguru for religious legitimation of the political order was however, not removed.

Also persisting throughout this period was the 'national feeling' of distrust towards the British which was repeatedly violated by the efforts of rival factions to secure the Resident's support. It was this sentiment which the kala Pandes appealed to and its vitality is well represented by Amir Singh Das' outburst against the King at his trial in 1842. When combined with resentment against the bharadars as a class, as had briefly been the case with the mutineers of 1840, this was a very powerful force. Such a mixture of sentiments was to drive the Sikh army to clash with the British only a few months after Mathbar's assassination. The strength of the vertical ties between bharadars and soldiers nonetheless helped to ensure that the Panjub scenario would not be enacted in Nepal.

Whilst the army was never to get completely out of hand, its loyalty to the crown, a major force for stability, was subject in these years to an ever increasing strain. It is significant that even though Mathbar had forfeited much of his own popularity with the troops by employing them as labourers, the King nevertheless felt that the minister must be assassinated secretly rather than openly arraigned, lest there be a military reaction in his support. The possibility that the army might turn against the occupant of the throne was thus becoming ever more apparent.

NOTES

1. Resident's Diary, 27 March 1841.
2. Ibid., 26 December 1840.
3. Ibid., 20 February-10 March 1841, Hodgson to Government, 18 and 22 May 1841,
FROM BRITISH MINISTRY TO THE DEATH OF MATHBARSINGH

FS, 31 May 1841, Nos. 152 and 160.
4. Ibid., 16 April 1841.
5. Memorandum on Calcutta Mission, FS, 24 April 1837, No. 82.
6. Resident's Diary, 18 January 1841.
7. Ibid., 17 March 1841. The Hanuman Dal had not been involved in the disturbances of 1840 but as the monarch's personal regiment, it was presumably especially sensitive to palace intrigue.
8. Resident's Diary, 30 March 1841 and Wheeler (ed.), Diary of Events in Nepal 1841 to 1846 (Simla: Government Central Branch Press, 1878), entry for 14 June. The latter source is a condensed version of the Resident's Diary, the original of which is not extant for the period after April 1841. It is cited hereafter as Diary of Events.
10. Diary of Events, 12 July 1841.
14. Abhiman is described as 'in chief charge of the army' in a gloss by Hodgson on a pro-Pande placard set up in July 1841, see FS, 16 August 1841, No. 115, published in KM, pp. 113-115. Although he had not been involved in the 1840 mutiny, his good standing with the troops had led to their choosing him to transmit their letter to Rajendra, see Hodgson to Government, 14 August, 1840, FS, 31 August 1840, published in KM, pp. 25-26.
15. Resident's Diary, 20 January 1841.
18. Resident's Diary, 26 April 1841.
20. Hodgson to Government, 31 October 1840, FS, 16 November, 1840, No. 73.
21. Resident's Diary, 16 March and 13 April 1841.
23. Ibid., and Diary of Events, 25 July 1841.
25. Diary of Events, 3 August 1841.
26. Ibid., and 'Nepal Deshko Itihas', loc. cit.
27. Diary of Events, 1 September 1841.
28. Ibid., 31 August 1841.
29. Ibid., 26 September 1841. On the same day a decree was issued restoring family property to the son of Bhimsen's brother, Ranbir Singh Thapa (lal mohar of Sunday, 11 Aswin Sudi 1898, cited in Thapa, loc. cit.)
31. Vaki Lokraman Upadhyaya wrote on 23 September (8 Aswin Sudi 1898). The substance of his letter was reproduced in Kathmandu's reply of Dwitiya Aswin 2 Vadi (2 October), published in Itihas Prakas, Vol. 1, No. 1, Baisakh 2012 (April
142 KINGS SOLDIERS AND PRIESTS


33. Diary of Events, 1 and 6 January 1842 and Hodgson to Government, 7 January FS, 24 January 1842, No. 77.

34. Ramakant, op. cit., p. 195.

35. Diary of Events, 3 May and 23 June 1842. Hodgson believed that Rajendra was the instigator on the former occasion and Samrajya Lakshmi Devi on the latter.


37. Ibid.


39. Diary of Events, 1 April, 17 and 27 May.


42. Diary of Events, 16-22 October 1842. Entries earlier in the year generally accused the King, not the Pandes, of manipulating the Crown Prince.


45. Diary of Events, 27 April 1842.

46. LJB, p. 31 (misdating the incident to 1841); for an alternative version given by Jang to Orfeur Cavenagh, see Whelpton, Jang Bahadur in Europe (Kathmandu: Sahayogi, 1983), pp. 76-77.

47. Diary of Events, 27 April and 5 May 1842.


50. A detailed account of this complex case is given in Kasinath's own petition of 17 June 1842, see FS, 7 September 1842, No. 86, Further information is given in Hodgson's 29 April report to the Governor-General, FS, 3 August 1842, No. 66 and in his annotated translation of the negotiating brief provided by the Darbar to a representative sent to the Governor-General's camp, FS, 7 September 1842, No. 86. The first and third document are reproduced in KM, pp. 132-141.


52. Hodgson to Government, 29 April 1842, FS, 3 August 1442, No. 66.

53. Ibid.


55. Ramakant, op. cit., p. 205, citing FS, 3 August 1842, No. 89, and 7 September, No. 89.

56. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 16 May 1842, FS, 3 August 1842. This letter was despatched a few hours before Hodgson received Ellenborough's letter of 8 May and wrote the reply to Maddock.

57. Secretary with Governor-General to Hodgson, 8 May 1842, FS, August 1842, No. 67, quoted in Hunter, op. cit., p. 211. Hodgson himself admitted that in 1840 Fateh Jang might have secured the King's agreement to quashing the decision against Kasinath by allowing him to believe that the case could still be reopened.
Kathmandu later on, see Hodgson to Maddock (DO), 17 May 1842, FS, 3 August 1842, No. 89.

58. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 31 May 1842, FS, 3 August 1842, No. 95.


60. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 31 May 1842 and (DO), 17 May 1842, FS, 3 August 1842, Nos. 95 and 89.

61. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 5, 9 and 12 June 1842, FS, 7 September 1842, Nos. 77, 81 and 83.


63. Secretary with Governor-General to Hodgson, 5 June 1842, FS, 7 September 1842, No. 75, published in KM, pp. 145-146.

64. Secretary with Governor-General to Hodgson, 21 June 1842, quoted from Hodgson's private papers in Hunter, op. cit., p. 212. This letter does not seem to have been formally cancelled but was not entered in the Secret Consultations, see ibid., p. 222. The dismissal was effectively countermanded by Maddock's demi-official of 22 June published in Hunter, op. cit., p. 217.

65. Secretary with Governor-General to Hodgson, 8 August 1842, FS, 19 October 1842, No. 64, published in Hunter, pp. 220-221 and Ellenborough to Hodgson, 24 October 1842, FS, 8 March 1843, No. 87, published in KM, pp. 164-165.

66. See account of the whole episode in Hunter, pp. 210-26, and (on the reopening of the argument when the time for Hodgson to leave actually came) pp. 231-5.

67. Lawrence frequently expressed the belief that it was difficult to convince the Nepalese of his own neutrality after their experience of Hodgson's partisanship. See, for instance, his letter to Government of 6 February 1844, FS, 16 March 1844, No. 29 (published in KM, pp. 230-3).

68. Ellenborough to Secret Committee, 8th July 1842, published in KM, pp. 152-4; Stiller, KM, p. 145 (introductory comment to Ellenborough's letter of 5 June 1842).

69. Jain, op. cit., p. 28, fn. 5.

70. In a marginal comment on the account of the Kot Massacre in the book by his former assistant, Thomas Smith (Narrative of a Five-Years' Residence at Nepaul from 1841 to 1845 (London: Colburn 1852, vol. 2). p. 104) Hodgson wrote that 'These same doings... demonstrate the folly of Lord Ellenborough's prate about the subserviency of the Resident to the Ministers' (see the copy in the IOL).

71. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 22 June 1842, FS, 7 September 1842, No.88, published in KM, pp. 146-152.


74. Diary of Events, 13 and 16-22 October 1842.

75. Ibid., 28-30 October 1842.

76. Ibid., 7 November. The penalty had still not been inflicted when Hodgson wrote his report of 24 November, FS, 21 December 1842, No. 84, published in KM, pp. 166-167.

77. Diary of Events, 7 November 1842.

78. Ibid., 16-22 and 23-27 October 1842.

79. Ibid., 9 November 1842, and Baburam Acharya, 'Jangbahadur Ranako Prarambha', Ruprekha, No. 10, 2018 VS (1961/2), p. 44. Acharya did not see Diary of Events,
and will have been writing on the basis of oral tradition in Kathmandu.

80. *LJB.* p. 32.

81. Bal Narasinh’s date of death is given by Pudma, *LJB, loc. cit.*, as 24 December 1841, but this is again most probably an error for December 1842, the date given by Baburam; Prasad Singh Basnet presumably died before April 1843, since a list of bharadars compiled between January and April of that year describes his son Megambar Singh as ‘kaji in place of his father’ (*babu fo khayal kaji*, Hodgson papers, vol. 52, f. 69-71). *The terminus post quem for both deaths is September 1841, when both men countersigned a decree restoring confiscated Thapa property (cited in Shamsher Bahadur Thapa, *Ranbir Singh Thapa* (Lalitpur: Jagadamba Prakashan, 2023 VS (1966/7)), pp. 163-164, and Baburam is thus incorrect (though perhaps by only a few months) in claiming Prasad died in early 1841.

82. List of Chiefs in 1843’, HP, Vol. 52, ff. 69-71. This document carries the Nepali date 1899, viz., mid-April 1842 to mid-April 1843 and thus must have been compiled in the opening months of the Western year. This is confirmed by its reference to Mathbar Singh, who returned to Kathmandu in April, being in India. Most of the appointments listed thus had been made at the 1842 *pajani*.


84. Lawrence to Government, 30 September 1844, FS, 26 October 1844, No. 33.

85. *Diary of Events*, 9 November 1842.

86. Hodgson to Government, 17 November 1844, FS, 21 December 1842, No. 82, published in *KM*, pp. 165-166.

87. Hodgson to government, 24 November 1842, FS, 21 December, No. 84, *KM*, pp. 166-7; *Diary of Events*, 1 December, 1842.

88. Hodgson to Government, 17 and 24 November 1842, FS, 21 December 1842, Nos. 82 and 84.

89. *Diary of Events*, 16-17 November 1842.

90. Ibid., 27 November 1842.

91. Ibid., 28 November 1842.


93. Ibid.

94. Hodgson to Government, 3 December 1842, FS, 4 January 1843.


98. *Diary of Events*, 8 December 1842.


100. *Diary of Events*, 8 December 1842.

101. Ibid., 16-18 December 1842, and Hodgson to Government, 10 January 1843, FS, 27 February 1843, No. 73, published in *KM*, pp. 176-177.

102. *Diary of Events, loc. cit.*


105. *Lal mohar* of Paush 1 Sudi 1899 (1 January 1843), FS, 22 February 1843, published
in KM, pp. 177-178. Pudma who misdates the document to 5 January, gives a different text, involving a complete and unambiguous transfer of power to the queen (LJB, p. 36). This may reflect an earlier draft which was blocked by the chahtaras, but there could also have been deliberate falsification to support Jang Bahadur’s claim that the violent actions which brought him to power in 1846 were justified because he was following the orders of the Queen as Regent.


108. LJB, p. 35.

109. This explanation of the motivation behind the book was given by his great-great-grandson, Pradyumna Rana (interview, Allahabad, 27 November 1982).


111. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 31 May 1842, FS, 3 August 1842, No. 95. At this time it was the chahtaras who favoured a written petition to the king whilst the gurus and Hodgson wanted a more cautious approach.

112. Diary of Events, 1 December 1842.


114. Diary of Events, 30 November 1842.

115. The sackings were carried out ‘in return for low tricks, contrary to the general sentiments and endeavour’, see Ibid., 6 December 1842.


117. Hodgson to Government, 31 May 1842, FS, 3 August 1842, No. 95.

118. Diary of Events, 27 November 1842, Surendra had left the capital in September, returning in November. Hetauda is in the inner Tarai on the main route to the border and the Prince had threatened that he would cross into India without authorisation, thereby causing a crisis with the British, if his father did not abdicate. See, Ramakant, op. cit., pp. 214-215.


120. The fullest extant version of the edicts, in the form of a numbered series, is that published by Yogi Naraharinath in Itihas Prakas, vol. 2, No. 3 (Kathmandu, 2013 VS (1956)), pp.419-426, and reproduced as an appendix to the 1965 reprint of the Muluki Ain promulgated under Jang Bahadur Sri Panc Surendra Bikram Shah Devka Sasankalma Baneko Muluki Ain, (Kathmandu: Sri Pancko Sarkar, 2022 BS, pp. 695-700). The substance of many edicts has also been incorporated into the text of the vamshavali accounts of Rama Shah. A transliteration and translation of the Itihas Prakas text was published by Theodore Riccardi together with variants from two other versions in Kailas, vol. 5, no. 1 (1977), pp. 29-65. The edicts were certainly in circulation in the 1840 and confusion between Rama Shah and Drabya Shah could readily have occurred, given the divergences in vamshavali accounts of the early Gorkha rulers, see Dinesh Raj Pant, Gorkhako Itihas (Kathmandu: The Author, 2041 VS (1984-5)), Part 1, p. 34.

121. Riccardi, op.cit., p. 49. The translation given substantially follows his but gadiko sojho garamiyalamma has been understood as 'as long as [you] uphold the throne' rather than 'in order to preserve the throne'. The former is the more natural interpretation and is supported by the wording of the Gorkhavamsavali version quoted in Riccardi’s footnote.
122. *Diary of Events*, 5 December 1842.
124. Secretary with Governor-General to Hodgson, 28 April 1842, FS, 3 August 1842, No. 73.
125. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 9 May 1842 and Secretary to Hodgson, 18 May 1842, FS, 3 August 1842, Nos. 85 and 86.
126. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 20 August 1842, FS, 5 October 1842, No. 142.
127. Hodgson to Reade (DO), 19 December 1842, NR/5/125, and Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 26 January 1842, FS, 1 March 1843, No. 55.
128. Hodgson to Reade (DO), 19 December 1842, NR/5/125.
129. Mathbar informed Hodgson that he was leaving Gorakhpur for Allahabad on 1 February, Hodgson to Reade (DO), 3 February 1843.
132. Three brothers—Krishna Ram, Narayan and Vishnu—are listed in the 1843, bharadar list as mantri (ministers) whilst Rangnath's son Jivnath was gayatri guru to Rajendra and Krishna Ram's son Janardan was dharmadhikar.
133. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 6 February 1843, FS, 1 March 1843, No. 161, published in *KM*, pp. 183-185. Aibaran's political affiliation is unknown. He had been a member of the drafting commission for the 'Petition of Right, and was perhaps regarded as a spokesman for the army. He was probably not a member of Kulman Singh's branch of the Basnets (into which Jang Bahadur had married) as he is not included in the 1843 list of bharadars of that family.
134. Hodgson to Reade (DO), 6 February 1843, NR/5/125.
135. Hodgson to Reade (DO), 28 March and 7 April 1843, NR/5/125.
137. Lawrence to Government, 6 February 1844 FS, 16 March 1844, No. 29, cited in *KM*, pp. 231-233.
139. Hodgson to Reade (DO), 31 January 1843, NR/5/125.
140. Hodgson to Reade (DO), February 1843 (letter undated, but bound between letters of 3 and 6 February) NR/5/125.
141. Hodgson to Reade (DO), 28 March 1843, NR/5/125.
143. *LJB*, p. 32, implies that he received this post at the beginning of 1842 but his chronology in this section as discussed earlier, appears to be a year behind the true one.
144. Hodgson to Secretary with Governor-General, 20 April 1843, FS, 17 May 1843, No. 88, published in *KM*, pp. 193-194. This document actually states that Mathbar was accompanied by 'Kaji Jang Bahadur Basnyat', but this is probably a copyist's error for 'Kajiis Jang Bahadur and Kulman Singh Basnyat'.
146. *Diary of Events*, 1 May 1843.
147. Royal Decree to Mathbar Singh Thapa and others, published in *Itihas Prakas*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012 VS (1955), pp. 41-46. The document is undated but was issued after the execution of Randal Pande, whose trial was concluded on 9 July, see *Diary of Events*.


The change of sides is implied by the wording of the 1843 decree, if the words hanma nau (viz., the junior queen) ko hajurma rahanya are taken as qualifying Devi Bahadurya Kuvaz as well as the intervening names.


Diary of Events, 6-23 July and 5-10 August 1843.


Diary of Events, 14 March 1844.


Lawrence to Government, 13 December 1843, FS, 27 January 1844, No. 49.

Lawrence’s Official Diary, Eur. Mss F. 85, No. 96 (IOLR), 11-15 and 15-16 December 1843. This document is hereafter cited as ‘Lawrence Diary’.

Lal mohar of 4 Paus Sudi 1900 (25 December 1843), FS, 30 March 1843, No. 36. This document appears to be a condensed translation of the original Nepali text, which is given in Purnima, No. 22, Sravan-Asvina 2026 VS, (July-October 1969), pp. 140-141 and with some variations, in ‘Nepal Deshko Itihas, Ancient Nepal, No. 25 (October 1973), pp. 10-11.

Lawrence Diary, 26 and 28-30 December 1843.

Ibid., 31 December 1843.


Lawrence Diary, 14 March 1845.

HP, Vol. 7, p. 47.


175. The price of paddy normally reached its maximum during the summer months, then fell sharply with the harvest in September-October. In 1843, the summer maximum was abnormally high and the price rose until the end of October the harvest having been delayed by unfavourable weather. The October 1843 price was 50 per cent above the October 1842 price, see Hodgson Papers, Vol. 7, ff. 82-85.

176. Lawrence Diary, 30 January 1844.


181. Lawrence Diary, 10-18 January 1844.


183. Lawrence Diary, 28 January 1844.


185. Lawrence Diary, 13 March 1844.


188. Lawrence Diary, 6 July 1844.


190. Lawrence Diary, 2 June 1844.


195. Lawrence Diary, 15 October 1844.


197. Lawrence to Government, 19 October 1844, FS, 23 November 1844, No. 112, published in *KM*, pp. 241-243. *Dasai* (Dassera), the autumn festival at which appointments were traditionally made for the coming year, ended on 10 Aswin Sudi, corresponding in 1844 to 21 October.


200. Lawrence Diary, 14 March 1845.

202. *Ibid.* The 'promise' to which Surendra referred may have been the granting to him of the title 'maharajadhiraj' in the summer of 1842, or the compromise proposed during the 'National Movement' later that year under which he would receive the throne on his sixteenth birthday, which fell in October 1844.


206. Lawrence Diary, 1 December 1844.


219. Lawrence Diary, 24 December 1844.


222. *Lal mohar* of 4 Phalgun Badi 1904 (26 February 1845), cited in Triratna Manandhar, 'Jang Bahadur Kahile Praimministar Bane?', *Nepal Economist*, Vol. 1, Nos. 4-5 (July-August 1983), p. 14. Mathbar’s full title, as given in a dedicatory inscription a few weeks later, was shri praimministar yan aind Kamyandar inchiph janaral matbarsingh thapa kalabahadur, see inscription of Thursday, 5 Magh Sudi 1901 (date irregular--13 March 1845?) published in *Purnima*, No. 22, Sravan-Asvina 2026 (July-October 1969), pp. 133-4. Yan aind are two alternative transliterations of the English 'and' whilst kalabahadur was probably an imitation of the title of the Sikh sardar Dyan Singh, who was prominent at the Lahore court during Mathbar’s stay there.


225. Lawrence Diary, March 1845.


229. 'Nepal Deshko Itihas' p. 14. The Resident referred to this as if it were a new measure (Lawrence Diary, 8-15 May 1845). This was a misunderstanding.

230. There is no contemporary evidence to support Pudma Jang's claim (*LJ B*, p. 43) that Surendra, Loo, turned against Mathbar.


233. Lawrence to Government, 24 May 1845, FS, 13 June 1845, No. 17, published in KM, pp. 272-275. Pudma Rana (*LJ B*, p. 59) disingenuously quotes this remark, made in the belief that Jang was not the assassin, as proof that his father's killing of Mathbar was justified by the circumstances.


236. *LJ B*, p. 54.


238. For details of both accounts, see Appendix II.

239. Lawrence Diary, 2 February 1845.


242. Campbell (Assistant Resident), to Government, 18 December 1835, FP, 28 December 1835, No. 46.

243. Lawrence Diary, 15 January 1845.

244. Lawrence to Auckland, 25 May 1845, quoted in J.L. Morison, *loc. cit.*

245. Lawrence Diary, 23 October and 13 November 1844.


247. Mathbar's *jagir* consisted of 2,200 *ropani* of rice-lands in the hills plus other revenues of Rs. 10,120. His new *birta* grants comprised 25,346 *bighas* in the Eastern Tarai plus Rs. 10,526 in cash from villages in the central hill region, see Regmi *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38. It is not possible to give precise cash equivalents for land allocations but 2,200 *ropanis* in the hills would have realised up to 2,200 rupees in the far west (since the maximum tax rate (*ibid.*, p. 54) was 4 annas per *muri*, viz., one rupee per *ropani*), whilst land immediately adjacent to the Kathmandu Valley might have yielded between 4,000 and 8,000 rupees (using Regmi's estimate (p. 57) for 1836/7 of 20-30 pathis of paddy taken in tax per *ropani*, and a paddy price in Kathmandu fluctuating in the early 1840s between 88 and 60 *manas* (viz., 11 to 7½ pathis) per rupee (HP, Vol. 7, ff. 82-84). The 25,000 *bighas* in the Eastern Tarai would have provided an income of up to 100,000 rupees, even at the lower rates prevailing earlier in the century (the maximum had been 4 rupees per *bigha*, Regmi, *op. cit.*).
248. Eastern Tarai revenue in 1842/3 was Rs. 10,98,958, HP, Vol. 13, f. 150.
Chapter Five

JANG BAHADUR TAKES POWER: 1845-1847

Introduction

Sixteen months after Mathbar's death, the instability which had beset Nepal since the fall of Bhimsen climaxed in the massacre of many of the leading bharadars and the appointment of Jang Bahadur as minister. Jang Bahadur came to power as Queen Rajya Lakshmi's partisan but he later broke with her to back Crown Prince Surendra, whom, in 1847, he installed on the throne in King Rajendra's place. The deposition and the events leading up to it are now examined in the light of the interrelationship between the key components of the Nepal policy: throne, bharadari and army. Since it marked the inauguration of the century of Rana rule, the massacre is of key importance in the modern history of Nepal. The question of responsibility for the massacre and the details of the manoeuvring before and after have, therefore, attracted considerable scholarly attention but the conflicting stories circulated at that time and afterwards have ensured that the controversy has never been fully resolved. An account is presented here on the basis of a survey of the previously available evidence and new material recently brought to light.

Politics after Mathbar

Mathbar's death revived the hopes of the contenders for power who had been completely deprived of influence during his ascendancy. Prominent amongst those rejoining the fray were the chautara brothers Fateh Jang and Guru Prasad who had been in exile since the beginning of the year and raj guru Rangnath Paudyal, who had spent the last two years in Banaras and whom the Resident thought was the one most likely to emerge as premier.1 The spoils went in the first instance to the most
active participants in the plot against Mathbar, Gagan Singh and Kulman Singh Basnet being appointed kajis and Jang Bahadur a general. All these appointments were the Queen’s and she showed further favour to Jang Bahadur’s family by the bestowal of captaincies on four of his brothers. Not surprisingly, the junior chautaras who were in Kathmandu at that time complained that all the profit from the assassination was going to one family.² Jang Bahadur also began acting as de facto minister though he informed the Resident through a personal messenger that he had declined the King’s offer of premiership and recommended that he appoint Fateh Jang instead.³ He did, however, accept overall charge of the army with direct command of three regiments.⁴

Owing to this sudden rise to glory, Jang Bahadur’s position became precarious. He had been recruited into the plot against his uncle and subsequently rewarded so handsomely because his popularity with the army was expected to keep the soldiers content under the new regime. Real power, however, rested with Gagan, the Queen’s closest confidant and to a lesser extent, Abhiman Singh Rana, who returned from exile in early June. These two were actually directing the administration.⁵ Whilst thus in subordinate collaboration with Mathbar’s enemies, Jang Bahadur was also attempting to retain his standing with those who had been his allies. Some of the latter had found it prudent to leave the country but Karbir Khatri remained influential. Above all there was Prince Surendra whom Mathbar had championed and whose adherent Jang Bahadur was now claiming to be.⁶ Jang Bahadur’s assistance to Mathbar’s sons in escaping from Kathmandu, was part of this political strategy.⁷

A lal mohar issued at the end of May provided that the King was to issue commands to the Crown Prince who would then pass them on to the Queen and that the Queen would then give instructions to the ministers.⁸ The Crown Prince appeared to lie low whilst the King and the Queen jockeyed for power. The Queen was eager to have her own men Gagan and Abhiman receive the title of general which had already been given to Jang Bahadur and she insisted that the pajani be started in August. The King opposed this, preferring to wait until Fateh Jang returned to Kathmandu.⁹ The chautara finally arrived on 15 August. The King backed him for the premiership while the Crown Prince and the Queen supported Jang Bahadur and Gagan respectively.¹⁰ The Queen’s preference for Gagan makes it clear that her elevation of Jang Bahadur in May had rather been to conciliate the army than to give any personal favour to him.

The outcome of the argument between the King and the Queen was
the assignment of specified civil and military responsibilities to the three aspirants for the premiership and Abhiman and Dalbhanjan Pande. Fateh Jang became mukhtiyar but the title did not carry with it any real authority over his colleagues. He received command of the Bajra Bani, Sher and Singh Nath regiments, the supervision of foreign affairs and the four principal law courts and responsibility for the administration of western Nepal; the latter was to be exercised largely through his brother Guru Prasad who was appointed Governor of Palpa. Gagan was made a general and assigned the seven regiments of Letar and Sri Nath (the largest and most privileged of the kampu units), Kali Prasad (formerly the Hanuman Dal—the unit set up in 1836 as a royal bodyguard), Ram Dal (the artillery regiment), Mahendra Dal, Raj Dal and Shamsher Dal. He also received charge of the arsenals and magazines at the capital. Abhiman too became a general but was assigned only the Naya Gorakh and Sarba Dhoj regiments. He was also appointed head of the Kausi Toshakhana (treasury), a post he had held when the ‘British Ministry’ had been formed five years earlier. He was also given charge of the hills east of Kathmandu. Dalbhanjan, Bhimsen’s old colleague, who was now no longer regarded as a serious contender for power but included as an ‘elder statesman’, was allotted the Rana Priya. Jang Bahadur retained the three units assigned to him in May, viz., the Purana Gorakh, the Devi Datt and the Kali Baksh. He was also given ‘the office of Chief Judge, which he held under his uncle’—probably a confused reference to post of kaji of Kumari Chauk which also functioned as a court.11

The allocation to Gagan of seven regiments including those that had been the most politically sensitive, underlined his de facto superiority over the other ministers. Abhiman was probably second in terms of influence over the internal administration. It is surprising that he held only two regiments to Jang Bahadur’s three, since, like Jang Bahadur, he also was a favourite of the my. The explanation partly lies in his own disinclination to push his claims too strongly. Reporting the state of the Darbar a month before the formation of the ministry, Lawrence had contrasted Gagan and Jang Bahadur’s eagerness for the office of premier with Abhiman’s queasiness.12 Another reason was the unwillingness of the queen to let Abhiman secure a position strong enough to challenge Gagan. Since Jang was so much junior to Abhiman, he could more safely be entrusted with military patronage. However, Jang Bahadur was not totally trusted. Although the Purana Gorakh regiment was strongly attached to the Queen personally, she interfered in the pajani of all Jang Bahadur’s units in September to ensure that subordinate officers were
loyal to her rather than their immediate commander.\textsuperscript{13}

In the manoeuvring for position that accompanied the \textit{pajani}, Surendra put forward a proposal to recall and reconcile the Thapa and Pande exiles. This notion was particularly alarming to Gagan and Rajya Lakshmi, the latter threatening to retire to Allahabad or Banaras if the Pandes were allowed in. Rajendra too was annoyed at his son's suggestion and Surendra could do more than fulminate against Gagan as the 'slave son of a slave chobdar (mace-bearer).\textsuperscript{14} In an attempt to conciliate her stepson, Rajya Lakshmi suggested that those appointed at the main \textit{pajani} should present their \textit{najar} (ceremonial gifts) to him though he was allowed no say in the selection for personnel which was in the hands of herself and Rajendra jointly.

The \textit{pajani} itself was marked by one very significant change: the removal from the post of \textit{dharmkadhirak} of Janardan Paudyal, the son of Krishna Ram and nephew of Rangnath. Janardan thereby lost a prestigious post which carried an income of 30-40,000 rupees per annum, contrasting with the 400 rupees that went with the kajiship now bestowed upon him.\textsuperscript{15} This blow to the Paudyals came only five months after Lawrence had reckoned that Rangnath was the man most likely to become premier following Mathbar's death. Rangnath had indeed travelled up to Kathmandu from Banaras with hopes of regaining a key position in the Darbar. However, after his arrival in August, he appears to have had no influence on the course of events. There is no mention of him in any of the accounts of the struggle leading up to the installation of the 'coalition' ministry in September.\textsuperscript{16} The decline in Paudyal fortunes which the \textit{pajani} underlined was linked with the death of Krishna Ram in Banaras in April\textsuperscript{17} and the Queen's loss of confidence in Rangnath, who was her own guru. His departure from Nepal at the end of 1842 was viewed by her as a desertion and resentment of that score coupled with Gagan's efforts to ensure he had no rival as her confidant, prevented him from re-establishing himself as a political force. It was an eclipse from which the family was never to recover.

Janardan's replacement, Vijay Raj Pande, belonged to a family which had supplied the guru to Prithvi Narayan's father but had thereafter been overshadowed by both the Mishras and the Paudyals. Shortly after Rangnath and Bhimsen returned to Nepal with Rana Bahadur, the last Pande to act as \textit{dharmadhikar}, Bani Vilas, had been ousted in favour of the Paudyal brothers and for forty years no member of the family had been prominent in Nepalese public life.\textsuperscript{18} Vijay's grandfather Narayan Pande had left the hills as early as 1753, after Prithvi Narayan had tricked
him into entrapping the King of Tanahu, to whose family the Pandes had become gurus prior to their involvement with the Gorkha dynasty. According to one account, Vijay’s father spent a short time in Kathmandu after Rana Bahadur’s return but generally the family remained throughout in Banaras. Some time before 1843, Vijay came up to Kathmandu and his exposition of the puranas at a temple just outside the Hanuman Dhoka palace attracted royal attention and secured him employment as a court pandit.

Vijay’s relations with other members of the bharadari are a mystery. The family tradition just cited claims that he had entered the palace under the joint patronage of Ragnath and a man holding the rather obscure office of jetha burha (knowledgeable elder). The claimed link with Ragnath is not likely as it is difficult to see why he should thus have assisted a member of a family who were hereditary rivals. There is, however, a possibility that he was already an associate of Jang Bahadur. There is a story still told in Kathmandu according to which Vijay knew Jang Bahadur in his young gambling days and became his creditor.

At the time Vijay was appointed it was becoming clear that war was imminent between the British and the Sikhs. The prospect of becoming the only independent native state in India naturally caused grave alarm in Kathmandu. The old stock responses of having the pandits consult the scriptures to predict the outcome, and sending an appeal to Peking for assistance were both forthcoming. Our sources do not give the priests’ conclusions, but the Celestial Government returned its usual dusty answer. There remained the crucial problem of whether Nepal herself should intervene in the conflict. At the time the issue was under discussion the intelligence reaching the Residency was that ‘many ministers’, and also Prince Surendra, were for joining the Sikhs whereas the king and queen wished to preserve peace with the British. In December Rajendra himself informed Lawrence that Nepal could make 5,000 troops available to support the British in the Panjab if a month’s advance notice were given. Pudma Rana’s account claims that Fateh Jang, Abhiman and Dalbhanjan were all in favour of coming in on the Sikh side, and that it was contrary advice from Gagan and Jang Bahadur which swayed the king and queen against such rashness. Given the previous pro-British orientation of all the allegedly pro-Sikh ministers, and also their reputation for caution, Pudma is almost certainly misrepresenting their attitude, and merely reflecting an attempt by Jang to discredit his predecessors with the British. It is possible, however, that the three counselled a policy of strict neutrality whilst Gagan and Jang
Bahadur proposed the offer of assistance to the British. Furthermore Pudma’s picture of Jang and Gagan working together as allies is consistent with contemporary sources, which show both men increasingly perceived as working in tandem in the Queen’s interest.

Jang Bahadur’s new alignment was dramatically highlighted in late October 1845 when placards were displayed in Kathmandu warning Surendra to beware of him and Gagan and stating that they had murdered Mathbar Singh at Rajya Lakshmi’s instigation. This statement offended Rajendra as he had been claiming ever since the night of Mathbar’s death that he himself had killed his minister. He ordered the removal of the placards but they had the desired effect on Surendra. The following month, he first threatened to leave for Banaras and return at the head of an English army and later gave out that he now knew who Mathbar’s murderers were and would take revenge. Nothing came of these fulminations but the following February, Rajendra felt it necessary to order the arrest of three persons who had repeated to Surendra the charge that Gagan and Jang Bahadur had killed Mathbar and had also told him that the two men were now plotting with Rajya Lakshmi to put one of her sons on the throne. In the midst of this tension within the royal family, the question of a possible reduction in the soldiers’ pay to finance an expansion of the army was again raised. In stark contrast to earlier occasions, such talk did not lead to any unrest. In the same Diary entry recording the proposal, the Resident noted the presence in the pajani of 10,000 dhakres and a consequent rise in the price of rice, expressing his surprise at:

How peacefully these crowds of soldiers came and went; one set discharged, another enlisted, and a third disappointed; all with the same perfect peaceableness.

The men were quiet because no bharadar of any influence wished to rouse them. With the Pandes in exile Surendra had no real party behind him, Gagan and Jang between them held the direct patronage of the greater part of the kampu, and the other ministers would not have wanted to make a move whilst the King openly opposed the malcontents trying to stir up opposition to the queen’s faction.

In January 1846, the King issued a lal mohar granting authority to the Queen. The precise nature of the powers delegated is unknown since the document has not survived and there is no mention of it in any contemporary source. It is referred to in a lal mohar of 1868, however,
and the prominence given to it therein suggests that it provided the main case for Jang Bahadur’s claim that the Queen had been put in complete command of the state and that all his own actions in September 1846, which he maintained were performed on her orders, were therefore entirely lawful. It is likely that the 1846 document was in fact ambiguously worded, leaving the usual doubt as to where ultimate authority actually lay.

Whatever the position on paper, Rajya Lakshmi remained the dominant influence in practice, though by the end of March Rajendra seemed fully reconciled with Surendra. Within the ministry, her favourite Gagan had the strongest voice but there was a clear split between him and Fateh Jang with whom Abhiman was now aligned. Munshi Lakshmi Das attempted to draw Lawrence’s successor as Resident, I.R. Colvin, into expressing support for the Queen and thus for Gagan also—reminding him of the high opinion which Hodgson had held of her. Although for most of the year political life in Kathmandu seemed peaceful, a behind the scenes struggle continued over the appointments to be made at the next pajani. In July, writing privately to Brian Hodgson in Darjeeling, Colvin reported that Gagan’s allies were expected to win and that Fateh Jang was declining in influence. There was even talk of his brother Guru Prasad being superseded as Governor of Palpa by Jang Bahadur, who was still seen as a Gagan ally. The following month tension rose, with Jang Bahadur openly criticising Fateh in the Darbar. Shortly before the end of August, however, Fateh Jang and Gagan had a long private interview and were reported to have agreed that the present coalition arrangement would be renewed for the coming year, as the Queen wanted. Three weeks later, before the pajani actually go under way, this seeming harmony was shattered by the most dramatic episodes in Nepal’s modern history—the assassination of Gagan, the massacre of a large section of the bharadari and Jang Bahadur’s appointment as mukhtiyar by the Queen.

The Kot Massacre

Gagan was killed by a shot fired through a window of his house while he was in prayer, at around 10.00 pm on the evening of 14 September. His assailant escaped, and his identity remains a matter of controversy. The ‘official’ version, promulgated after Jang Bahadur had gained control of the government, put the blame on Lal Jha, a Brahman who had been suspected of various crimes in the past but had always avoided convic-
tion. Lal allegedly admitted his guilt in a death bed confession early in 1847 and he claimed that he had been acting for Fateh Jang, Abhiman and other ministers. His account was supported by that of a supposed accomplice Daddu Upadhyaya, who was interrogated on 4 February 1847 in the presence of the Head Munshi of the British Residency. After Surendra became king later that year, he told the Resident that Fateh Jang in turn had been acting on instructions from Rajendra. The conspiracy was said to have included all the ministers except Jang Bahadur, who was left out because of his recent identification with Gagan and Rajya Lakshmi. Rajendra's motive was alarm at Gagan's position as an 'over-mighty' subject—essentially the same consideration which had led him to act against Mathbar—and also anger over his liaison with Lakshmi Devi. The ministers, long resentful of Gagan's pre-eminence, were willing instruments of the royal vengeance.

Against this must be set the widespread tradition in Nepal which claims that either Jang Bahadur or his brother Badri Narsingh, acting on his instructions, was the murderer. This view is, however, scarcely consistent with the cautious attentiste role which Jang Bahadur had hitherto played in Darbar affairs.

A new twist to this longstanding debate had been given by the discovery of a letter written by Rajya Lakshmi to Rajendra eight months after the event. In this, she implies strongly that Jang Bahadur was indeed responsible for Gagan's death but reveals also that some time before the assassination Lal Jha had actually informed the King and the Queen that the crime was being planned. He had alleged that Bir Keshar Pande, cousin of the minister Dalbhanjan Pande, had discussed with 'Randhoj Dada' the possibility of murdering Gagan, exiling the Queen to Tibet and blinding her two sons. The conversation had supposedly taken place in the private apartments of Prince Upendra, second son of the late Queen Samrajya Lakshmi and Mathbar Singh's mother was also present. This is a similar on two counts with the story that Jang Bahadur and Surendra gave the British: in their version Bir Keshar was one of the conspirators, while Upendra, who was young enough not to attract suspicion, was used by Rajendra as the channel to convey his instructions for the murder to Fateh Jang. Mathbar's mother is not mentioned in other accounts, but she would have had an obvious motive for joining in a plot against Gagan, as he was believed to have been the leading figure behind the murder of her son. Bir Keshar was her brother, so that the plot which Lal Jha denounced—whether real or a figment of his imagination—had the appearance of a bid for family revenge.
The key to the real truth, however, is probably the story preserved by the descendants of Ransher Shah, younger brother of Fateh Jang and Guru Prasad. According to this, Lal Jha was indeed the assassin but was acting on orders from both Fateh Jang and Jang Bahadur, the two having jointly decided that morning to kill Gagan. Jang Bahadur would thus have been involved but only as a collaborator of Fateh. This theory coincides with the hypothesis put forward by Ludwing Stiller (apparently without any knowledge of the Shah family tradition) in 1981. It also reconcilable with Rajya Lakshmi’s May 1847 letter, for Lal Jha might deliberately have laid false information against Bir Keshar and his sister in order to cover himself and those for whom he was working. Whether the real originator of the conspiracy was Rajendra or (as Triratna Manandhar has argued) Fateh himself, Jang Bahadur was brought in on the expectation that he could be induced to betray Gagan as he had his uncle Mathbar and that his participation in the plot would ensure the continuing loyalty of the army.

The news of Gagan’s murder was brought to the Queen in the nearby Hanuman Dhoka palace by his son Wazir Singh. After a visit to the house, she went to the Kot, the arsenal and assembly hall by the palace and ordered Abhiman, whose house was close by, to have the bugle sounded to summon all the civil and military officials. Whereas the other bharadars came mostly unarmed and with only a few followers, Jang Bahadur brought his regiments with him, as well as his six brothers. Pudma Rana claims that he acted thus out of fear that the assassins of Gagan Singh would try to strike at him next, because he too had been seen as an ally of the Queen during the last few months. Although, as has been seen, Jang himself was very likely party to the plot against Gagan, his fear may still have been quite genuine: he will have been uncertain whether he could trust his new-found friends and also perhaps apprehensive lest the regiments that had been under Gagan’s command should turn against the surviving ministers including himself.

Because of what she had previously learnt from Lal Jha, the Queen was convinced that Bir Keshar was involved in the murder and she ordered Abhiman to place him in irons. Abhiman complied but when Rajya Lakshmi ordered him to kill Bir Keshar he refused to obey, as the King would not confirm the instruction. This angered the Queen and she told the general that she held delegated powers to act in the manner she please. Abhiman stood his ground. He was, from a legal standpoint, quite right in doing so, for notwithstanding claims to the contrary, the King had never made an unambiguous grant of regency powers to his wife. The fact
that he had so far allowed the Queen to take the lead in conducting the investigation did not detract from his own ultimate authority.

Fateh Jang had still not arrived at the Kot despite an earlier summons from the queen. The King himself now left the Kot to fetch him. The Queen meanwhile ordered all the bharadars to assemble in the large hall on the western side of the Kot and to remain in session until the murderer could be identified. She herself appears now to have retired to a first-floor room above the hall where most of the bharadars were gathered.

Up to this point the account given in a document which the Resident Major Thoresby forwarded to Calcutta in March 1847 and which has been the main source for the foregoing paragraphs, is not controverted by other evidence. Unfortunately, this is far from being the case with the critical events which followed. The best known alternative accounts are those given by Pudma Rana in the biography of his father and by Orfeur Cavenagh in the book he wrote after acting as Jang Bahadur’s guide on his 1850 European journey. A completely different view is given in the recently discovered letter from Queen Rajya Lakshmi to the King. However, the ‘Thoresby Report’ remains the most trustworthy account, as it does not rely on the testimony of any single protagonist in the crisis, and it will be followed here.

As he had announced, the King did indeed reach Fateh Jang’s house and send him and his relatives off towards the Kot but he did not return with them. Instead he rode to the Residency to try to see Captain Ottley, the sole European there since Resident Colvin and Dr. Login had departed for India a day or two previously. Ottley, who was suffering from rheumatism, refused to come out to meet Rajendra at such an hour (it was now 2.00 am) but sent out Dabi Prasad, the Residency’s Mir Munshi. The King explained what had occurred, beginning his remarks with the ominous words, ‘See things are turning out here as they have at Lahore and the ministers are continually put to death’. He urged the Munshi to return with him immediately to the Kot so that he would subsequently be able to give a first-hand report to the Resident. Dabi Prasad demurred on the pretext that his horse would take some time to be got ready and that the King would thus be delayed at a critical juncture. The King then rode back with his attendants to the Kot, only to find the gutters in the street filled with the blood flowing from it. He was prevented from entering by ‘the people about’—according to one tradition in Kathmandu it was Vijay Raj Pande who dissuaded him—and he retired to the nearby Hanuman Dhoka palace.
The sequence of events leading to the slaughter had been triggered by the arrival at the Kot of Fateh Jang. Jang Bahadur met him in the courtyard and proposed that the way to resolve matters was for them to back the queen and have both Abhiman and Bir Keshar 'made away with'. Fateh refused to take any action against Bir Keshar without a proper trial and protested that Abhiman had done nothing whatsoever to merit such treatment. He argued that they should concentrate on a thorough search for Gagan's assassin. This last statement was highly disingenuous, given that Fateh Jang, Jang Bahadur and the men whose fate they were discussing, had all been involved in the plot against Gagan. Presumably Fateh Jang was confident that it would be possible to appease the Queen by fixing the guilt on some minor member of the conspiracy. Fateh Jang's particular anxiety to protect Abhiman is not surprising since she was now generally regarded as Fateh's ally. While Jang Bahadur now went to the Queen's room above the main hall, Fateh Jang and his relatives retired to a small hall on the north side of the courtyard where Abhiman was sitting. Abhiman was informed of Jang Bahadur's proposal, as he ordered his officers to put his troops in the courtyard on alert (he was not accompanied by all his troops but had brought a small detachment to the Kot). From one of the upper storey windows Jang Bahadur saw these troops loading their muskets and he informed the Queen, who immediately descended to the main hall and demanded that the ministers reveal the name of Gagan's murderer. In her rage, she attempted to strike Bir Keshar with her own sword but Fateh Jang, Abhiman and Dalbhanjan Pande restrained her. She then started to go back upstairs and the three men followed her to the foot of the wooden steps in a dark passage room at the end of the hall. As they waited for her to go through the trap-door, shots were fired killing Fateh and Dalbhanjan and wounding Abhiman. In his covering note to the Report, Thoresby suggested that one of Jang Bahadur's brothers ordered the firing in the belief that either Jang or they were in immediate danger. The Report does not state from which direction the fatal shots were fired but it implies that Jang Bahadur had remained on the upper storey ever since leaving Fateh. Ganpat Sahai, one of the Residency clerks, asserted in a private letter written a month after the massacre that Jang and his brothers fired from the top of the stairs, on the Queen's instructions. Without being aware of Sahai's letter, the travel writer Peter Mayne has offered a very similar reconstruction but stating that it was Jang alone who was with the Queen and fired on the ministers from above. This accords slightly better with the Thoresby document which gives the impression that the Kunwar
brothers (apart from Jang himself) remained on the ground floor throughout.

Staggering back out of the darkness surrounding the steps, Abhiman tried to get through the hall to join his troops outside, ‘exclaiming that Jang Bahadur had done this treacherous act’. Before he could reach the door he was cut down by the sword of Jang Bahadur’s brother, Krishna. Fateh Jang’s son Khadga Bikram Shah attacked both Krishna and Bam Bahadur, the brother immediately junior to Jang Bahadur. He then felled a sepoy before himself being killed by a shot fired, according to Oldfield, by Jang Bahadur. He had rushed down the steps after the initial firing and arrived just in time to prevent Khadga from renewing the attack on Bam Bahadur.

Jang’s men now burst into the hall and a general massacre ensued. The official list posted in the centre of Kathmandu listed thirty important individuals killed in the Kot (two others, Gagan and Bhawani Singh Khatri, died respectively before and after the massacre). Amongst them in addition to relatives of Fateh Jang Shah and Dalbhanjan Pande were the brothers Ranjor, Nar Singh and Arjun Thapa, sons of Nepal’s most prominent military commander in the 1814-1816 war. Some of those in the hall were able to escape—allegedly with the assistance in some cases of Jang’s brothers—but the families and retainers of all those slain were formally expelled from Kathmandu later that day. Virtually every first rank political figure with the exception of Jang Bahadur was thus removed from the political stage. Shortly after daybreak, Jang’s cousin Jay Bahadur and Mir Munshi Lakshmi Das arrived at the Residency to tell Ottley that official communication with him would henceforth be in Jang Bahadur’s hands. Ottley later heard that Jang had received ‘the orders of the Maharani as well as of the Maharaja to conduct all public business’. On the following day (16 September), Jang himself went to the Residency and explained that he had been appointed ‘minister and commander-in-chief’.

The Thoresby Report presents the appointment as made by the Queen and accepted by the King under duress. It claims that she gave Jang ‘the grant of the wizarat and of the command of the sixteen regiments at the capital’ whilst the slaughter at the Kot was still in progress. When Jang Bahadur presented himself to the King in the morning, he demanded an explanation for the bloodshed and received the answer that ‘all which had been done had been ordered by the Maharani, to whom His Highness had made over the sovereign power’. The King then had a furious argument with his wife who told him that unless he placed her son Ranendra on the throne ‘more calamities would ensue’. Declaring
that he was leaving for Banaras, the King rode towards Patan, the city situated three miles south of Kathmandu across the Bagmati River. He was accompanied by Sardar Bhawani Singh Khatri and Captain Karbir Khatri, both of whom had originally been associates of Mathbar Singh. That night the King was persuaded to return to Kathmandu by one of Jang Bahadur's brothers. However, Bhawani was killed by troops acting on the Queen's orders after Karbir reported to her that Bhawani had a consultation with the King which he was not allowed to overhear.

The details of this story are open to doubt. In particular, Jang Bahadur could hardly have told the King on 15 September that the Kot Massacre was carried out on the Queen's orders, since in her May 1847 letter to her husband she emphasised that Jang did not accuse her of responsibility until some time later. However, M.S. Jain goes too far when he argues that the whole story of a quarrel between King and Queen is fabrication. At the Residency, Ottley certainly gained the impression that there was tension between the Queen and the King and that the former, with Jang as her chief supporter, for the moment held the upper hand, and he also reported rumours that Rajya Lakshmi was responsible for the massacre. The refugees who subsequently reached Sagauli in British territory all supported the accusation against the Queen, and they also expected the King to quit Kathmandu, either after abdicating or simply to build up a party of his own. Though details are uncertain, there certainly was a clash between the King and Queen.

The Queen and Jang Bahadur initially had no difficulty in asserting their authority, as the troops who had lost their commanders accepted the new arrangement without demur. Jang Bahadur told Orfeur four years later that this was partly from fear of his own regiments which were placed around the other units with their weapons primed when the army was assembled to hear the news and partly because of the prospect of wholesale promotions due to the elimination of many senior officers in the KOT. Troops were kept in position within the city for several days whilst the expulsion of the families of the dead bharadars and the confiscation of the property proceeded. Jang Bahadur was empowered to carry out the pajani of the army which was now due and he thus consolidated his position further by removing those he did not trust.

About a week after the massacre, there were signs of a reaction against the new regime though it was not effective. The King tried to reassert his authority with an order for the recall of those who had been expelled but the fugitives were in fear of their lives and refused to return. On 23 September, Jang ordered those in hiding to leave the country
within ten days. Refugees streamed across the Tarai into India, the total reaching 6,000. Dissatisfaction among the troops came to the notice of the Residency on the 24th but this too, had no concrete results. Interestingly, there was also evidence of popular opposition, though it is uncertain how reliable this is. The source was the Darbar Munshi, Lakshmi Das, who in an extraordinary interview with the Residency’s Mir Munshi on 23 September, spoke of rumours of a wholesale resumption of land grants. If this occurred, he claimed, the whole population ‘would be up’, and his own people, the Newars, would suffer the most, and would rise at his command. He added that the victims at the Kot were friends of Britain and were killed for that reason. When the Mir Munshi showed a memorandum of the conversation to Ottley the next morning, the latter lectured him on the need to stay out of internal politics and made him burn the paper. In reporting the incident to Calcutta, Ottley suggested that Lakshmi Das was less likely to be genuinely seeking British support than testing out whether their public professions of non-interference were genuine. It is in fact probable that Lakshmi Das, who had previously always proved a reliable instrument of whoever controlled the Darbar, was acting as an agent provocateur on behalf of Jang and the Queen rather than genuinely trying to protect the interests of the Newar community as a whole. There is no reason to doubt, however, that there considerable public disquiet: the confiscation of the exiles’ property had produced alarm whilst the extent of the violence which had occurred created anxiety as to how far the victors might now be prepared to go.

The Bhandarkhal Affair

A dramatic change in the political situation occurred in October. It was the result of Jang Bahadur’s decision to abandon the Queen and emerge as an ally of Surendra. Jang Bahadur thus followed the path of his uncle Mathbar and like him calculated that he would have a better chance of concentrating power in his hands by nominally serving Surendra rather than a woman as formidable as Rajya Lakshmi.

The rift between Jang Bahadur and Rajya Lakshmi began to develop soon after the Kot, for although he obeyed her instructions to keep Surendra and his brother Upendra under close watch, he prevaricated when she urged him to kill the two princes and secure the throne for her own son Ranendra. Jang Bahadur’s attitude emboldened Rajendra to take a stand and on 15 October, a lal mohar was issued authorising the minister to ban both Ranendra and his brother Birendra from entering
Kathmandu and to kill Rajya Lakshmi’s servants if they helped the two with arms and ammunition. The document was evidently not made public, for an entry in the Residency Diary the following day asserts that Rajya Lakshmi was still fully in command. On the 23rd, however, the Officiating Resident was summoned to the palace to hear Rajendra explain, in the presence of both Surendra and Jang Bahadur, that he intended to go on pilgrimage to Banaras, taking all his family with him excepting Surendra, whom he wished to be recognised as regent during his absence. He added significantly that ‘family differences’ made it impossible to refer to these details in the kharita which he was about to send to the Governor-General. Preparations for the departure went ahead and a second lal mohar was issued authorising Surendra to assume the throne should his father not return.

Rajya Lakshmi now realised that she was in danger of being decisively outmanoeuvred and she sought to save the situation with the help of a group of supporters. Chief among these was kaji Bir Dhoj Basnet who had not previously been prominent politically but who had acted with Jang Bahadur as Rajya Lakshmi’s agent in the expulsions of the previous month. Accounts of the ‘conspiracy’ differ but the group allegedly wanted to do away with Rajendra, Surendra, Upendra and Jang Bahadur. Bir Dhoj was given a document from Rajya Lakshmi promising him the premiership if he placed Ranendra on the throne but Jang got to know of this and after he had presented the information to Rajendra, he was authorised to kill Bir Dhoj and his associates. Around a dozen persons were executed and a larger number fled the city. The bharadari were then convened and a sentence of banishment passed upon Rajya Lakshmi whilst in token of his services, Rajendra granted Jang Bahadur the lands held by Bhimsen and also the title of praim mininstar. Rajya Lakshmi made preparations to leave for Banaras with her sons and Rajendra, apparently against Jang Bahadur’s advice, decided to carry out his original pilgrimage project and accompany her. Lal mohars were issued authorising Surendra to act as regent and pardoning and approving all actions of Jang Bahadur. On 23 November, Rajendra and Rajya Lakshmi departed for the plains.

Bir Dhoj’s conspiracy and its suppression is known in Nepali as the Bhandarkhulparba (‘Bhandarkhal Affair’) after the name of the palace within the Basantapur complex where the conspirators were allegedly waiting in ambush for Jang Bahadur when he surprised them with an armed force. The details of the affair given in the Thoresby Report and in Pudma’s book have aroused considerable scepticism, some writers
suggesting that there was no conspiracy against Jang Bahadur and it was a decision by him and Rajendra to launch a pre-emptive strike against Rajya Lakshmi’s supporters. It is, however, worth noting that even after Rajendra again became opposed to Jang Bahadur and was manoeuvring against him the following summer, he still accepted that his own and Surendra and Upendra’s lives had been in real danger from Bir Dhoj and his associates.

Because Bir Dhoj and eight other involved were Basnets, the whole affair has often been seen as a Basnet one. This is misleading for two reasons. Firstly, the most prominent members of Queen’s group apart from Bir Dhoj were Wazir Singh, son of Gagan Singh, and Dalmardan Thapa. Secondly, the Basnet participants were not the most prominent members of their thar. Sardar Bakht Singh Basnet, whose sons Bir Dhoj and Bir Keshar died and who himself fled the country, had indeed been one of the ninety-four bharadars who signed the 1841 pledge of friendship with the British, as had Sardar Dariyal Singh Basnet, father of another victim, but neither of them were of great political weight. Neither they nor any of the other ‘conspirators’ appear in the Basnet genealogies published by Stiller or given in the Hodgson Papers, and they are probably only distant relatives of the two most prominent Basnets at this time, Kulman Singh and Jitman, respectively brother and cousin of the late Prasad Singh, Jang Bahadur’s father-in-law. Kulman and Jitman themselves were not connected in anyway with the ‘Queen’s party’. Whilst Kulman was amongst relatives of the conspirators who were arrested in the immediate aftermath of the bloodshed, he must have been cleared of the charge of complicity. He and Jitman were amongst senior bharadars who attested a lal mohar issued nine days later. In the summer of 1847, Kulman was in command of troops sent against the refugee bharadars. The ‘Basnet-Kunwar alliance’ sealed with Jang Bahadur’s marriage in 1839 thus seems to have survived the upheavals of 1846, though the roles of junior and senior partner were reversed.

A vital factor in Jang Bahadur’s success against the Queen was the co-operation of Vijay Raj Pande, who is identified by the Thoresby Report and later sources as the man who betrayed the ‘conspiracy’ to him. The fullest account of his role is that given by Pudma, who claims that Vijay was promised appointment as rajguru as a reward for his co-operation both by the Queen’s party and later by Jang Bahadur. The vamshavali account confirms that Vijay was appointed rajguru in November 1846 but the details given by Pudma are thrown into doubt by his claim that Vijay was merely a ‘private tutor’. In fact, he had been
_dharma_dhikar_ since October 1845. Rather than a genuine conspirator who then went over to Jang Bahadur's side, Vijay had almost certainly been working together with him from an earlier date and had only feigned support for the Queen and Bir Dhoj. Vijay's early connection with Jang is confirmed by Rajya Lakshmi's reference to the two working in collaboration in the Kot on the night of the massacre, by the story current in Kathmandu today of the two being friends in Jang's youth and by the Pande family tradition according to which Vijay's dying words were 'the sin of Gagan Singh', suggesting that he, like Jang, was privy to the plot against the Queen's favourite. Vijay remained a key associate of Jang Bahadur for the rest of his life.

**Rajendra's Withdrawal and Deposition**

Immediately after the Kot Massacre, Jang Bahadur was able to place members of his family in the key administrative positions. His brothers Bam Bahadur, Badri Narsingh, and Krishna Bahadur took charge of the Kausi Tosha Wala, Kurnari Chauk and the key governorship of Palpa respectively, whilst his elder half-brother, Bhaktawar, became _karpardar_ (controller of the royal household). His cousin Jay Bahadur was appointed to head the _Sadar Daphtarkhana_. Jang Bahadur's remaining three brothers, Ranoddip Singh, Jagat Samsher and Dhir Shamsher, received senior military appointments as did his childhood friend Ran Mehar Adhikari and his brother-in-law Sanak Singh Khatri, whose sister Nanda Kumari, Jang Bahadur had married in 1841. In November, two days before the King and Queen departed for Banaras, Hemdal Thapa, whose son was to marry Jang Bahadur's daughter, was made a _kaji_. Hemdal's home was at Nava Buddha near Dhulikhel and he was an old family friend of the Kunwars although he was not related to either of the two prominent Thapa families.

A critical appointment already mentioned was that of Vijay Raj Pande as _rajguru_. The Pandes thereby attained a monopoly of the rajguruship which lasted until the downfall of the Rana regime over a century later. The path for this development was smoother because there was by this time no male member of either the Mishra or Paudyal guru families still in Kathmandu. The Mishras had been in eclipse since the final downfall of the _Kala_ Pandes. Rangnath Paudyal, who had come up to Kathmandu in summer 1845 from Banaras, had probably returned there once it became clear that he would not be able to regain his former standing. His sons had also left Kathmandu before the Kot Massacre,
while his brothers Narayan and Vishnu and the sons of Krishna Ram, Hodgson's old ally were among those expelled afterwards. Krishna Ram Paudyal himself had died in 1843. The king's purohit, Vidyaranya Aryal, probably fled the country after Bhandarkhal, and although another member of his family seems to have assumed his functions he will have lacked the standing to challenge Vijay's place as the king's spiritual adviser, with all the possibilities of secular influence which that position carried.

In addition to relatives and close personal associates (Vijay can be included in this category) Jang Bahadur also retained a number of bharadars who had previously held important posts, particularly those individuals who had been closely allied with the Thapas. Karbir Khatri, Umakant Upadhayaya, and Jitman and Kulman Singh Basnet were among these. All four continued to be in favour for many years. Hira Lal Jha, who had held revenue contracts for the eastern Tarai several times in the past few years, appears first as a trusted collaborator of the new regime and then as one of the emigres most bitterly opposed to Jang Bahadur. The reasons for this change of sides, which took place in April 1847, are not known. Hira Lal had, however, earlier differences with both Jang and Surendra: Jang probably opposed him in 1844 over complaints brought against him by cultivators, whilst several months before the Kot Massacre he had quarrelled with Surendra and had to leave Kathmandu. He had returned to the capital in mid-October, when his appointment to a lands assignment office and supervision of an arsenal was seen as evidence of the Queen's supremacy. Nevertheless, the appointment was confirmed after Bhandarkhal, and Hira Lal was made a kaji.

Individuals like Hira Lal were wanted in the administration for their personal abilities and influence, whilst in the case of the chautaras, tradition demanded that one or more of these royal collaterals be closely associated with the government associated with the government. With Fateh Jang and his brothers either dead or in exile, Jang Bahadur turned to Bir Bind Vikram Shah, the son of Rajendra's uncle Ranodyat. Bir Bind was a closer relative of the king than Fateh, and probably for that reason his name headed the chautara section in the 1841 pledge to the British, but he does not seem to have played any significant political role up to now and is unlikely to have enjoyed any real say despite his formal precedence. His son, Shamsher Jang succeeded him but the family was eventually eclipsed after the reconciliation between Jang Bahadur and Fateh Jang's youngest brother Ransher in the 1850s.
Aside from seeking to establish a bharadari which would be both personally loyal to him and provide continuity, Jang Bahadur had to maintain his hold over Surendra as regent. Jang Bahadur envisaged a lasting arrangement, for a written oath (dharmapatra) which he presented to Surendra in the first half of December committed him to lifelong (ji samma) allegiance to the regent as long as the latter did not conspire in any way with those expelled after the Kot and Bhandarkhal but ended with a blunt warning that should Surendra combine with the refugees against him, Jang Bahadur would look after his own interests and cease protecting Surendra from his enemies. After the bloodshed which had so recently occurred, the note of menace in this was unmistakable.

Fear of action against him from India by the refugees, who were now to have King Rajendra to complain to, was an overriding concern and it was to widen his political support base at home that Jang Bahadur put great stress on a programme to compensate Brahmans for land confiscated forty years earlier. The episode is of great interest, highlighting the importance of Brahmans as the recipients of royal gifts.

The background to this measure was an order issued in March 1806, confiscating or perhaps in theory merely imposing taxation on lands previously dedicated to a religious function as guthi or gifted to Brahmans as birta. This action, taken by Rana Bahadur as mukhiyar for his son Girvana, was only the culmination of a trend which had been in operation since 1787 as the Kathmandu government sought to increase revenue, bringing land gifted by previous rulers back under the normal taxation structure. The 1806 decree had dramatic effects because of outright dispossession and individuals being faced with a level of taxation on their holdings which made continued cultivation impractical.

On 15 November 1846, just one week before the royal party departed for Banaras, a lal mohar was issued in Rajendra’s name to Jay Bahadur Kunwar as head of the Sadar Daphtarkhana, ordering that land at present not under cultivation both in the hills and in the Tarai be given as compensation to those who had lost land in 1806 and that funds be made available to cover the cost of bringing the new allotments under cultivation. The preamble explained that ‘Jang Bahadur and others’ had represented that until the injustice done in 1806 was righted there could be no peace and stability within the Darbar. It went on to explain that restoration of the original land involved was not possible as this had now been allocated as jagir to the army and thus could not be disturbed.
JANG BAHDUR TAKES POWER

without undermining the bulwark of Hindu dharma.

During the next two years considerable administrative effort was put into implementation of the scheme. The tharghars assessed the value of lands originally lost and adjudicated disputes between Brahmans reclaiming land and the occupiers of adjacent plots. Yet at the end of the exercise, most of those who had lost their rights in 1806 went uncompensated, for Ranoddip, who succeeded his brother Jang Bahadur as prime minister and maharaja in 1877, had to tackle the problem all over again. His own order on the subject explained that the beneficiaries of Jang Bahadur’s programme had lacked the resources to bring the land assigned to them under cultivation. Accounts in the Lagat Phant (records section) show that as against the 250,487 rupees estimated necessary to finance the 1846 scheme, only 5,359 rupees where actually forthcoming. Neither the share of the money pledged by the Government nor the levy on jagirdars which should have amounted to almost 100,000 rupees, was forthcoming. This was despite the fact that vigorous measures had been taken to make the collection. An order to Jay Bahadur in March 1847 made army commanders responsible for obtaining the money due from their own men and liable to have the full amount realised from their personal jagirs if they failed to do so. As Regmi suggests, failure to carry through the programme probably occurred because Jang Bahadur lost interest once the threat to his own position subsided.

In launching the compensation programme, Jang Bahadur’s motivation had been complex. He personally subscribed to the assumptions implicit in the November lal mohar, believing that violation of the sanctity of birta grants could bring divine retribution. Although in British company in later years Jang might sometimes speak scornfully of some Hindu religious prejudices, in a letter to his brother he freely invoked the notion of an avenging deity, whilst even to the British he admitted a belief in ghosts. He was also the son of Bal Narsingh Kunwar, a man of outstanding piety. It would not be unnatural, therefore, that Jang Bahadur also followed the example of previous rulers in Nepal by seeking secular success through religious merit. He also had sound political reasons for taking the step. The compensation programme was initiated before Rajendra left Nepal and by suggesting such a measure to a King who set much store by religion, the minister might have hoped to strengthen Rajendra’s confidence in him. More important, however, was probably the calculation that the reaction of the Brahmans would strengthen his own position. The Brahmans did not exercise political influence en bloc since those who participated in public affairs as rajgurus or purohits
operated on a familial rather than caste basis. However, the relationship between the monarch and the rajguru was replicated at a lower level by the guru-shishya ties binding Brahman and non-Brahman families. An example of the kin of influence a guru had over bharadars is the case of Dilli Singh Basnet, who in the 1850s demolished a new house after his guru told him that the death of his son had occurred because the structure blocked the path of Nagaraja (the Serpent King). An administration which was careful of Brahman rights could therefore hope to influence the bharadari as a whole through the advocacy of their spiritual councillors. The wish to win such support was greater because the new rajguru, a Kumaon Brahman, anticipated resentment from the purbiya Brahmans who were and are still regarded as their superiors in the ritual hierarchy. Vijay played an important role in formulating the project, for the advice he gave in conjunction with Jang Bahadur is included in a list of his services presented to him by Surendra seventeen years later.

Whilst Jang Bahadur consolidated his position in Kathmandu, in India King Rajendra considered his options. He wanted to return to Nepal to take effective charge of the administration whilst protecting Surendra’s position for the longer term. At the same time, he was now open to the influence of the exiled bharadars who wished to regain their previous positions of influence and wreak vengeance against Jang Bahadur and his supporters. Foremost amongst these were Guru Prasad, Fateh Jang’s brother, who had been Governor of Palpa at the time of his brother’s death and had been able to flee the country before Jang Bahadur’s agents could arrive to arrest him. Also there were the kala Pande refugees who had been in India since the campaigns against their family under Mathbar. They were reinforced, after his break with Jang Bahadur, by Hira Lal. Rangnath Paudyal also urged the King to act against Jang Bahadur though his position appeared a little ambiguous at times. In December he gave the impression in a private letter that he was now more interested in pilgrimage than in politics, whilst in March he was acting as an intermediary for correspondence between Rajendra and Jang.

Before leaving Kathmandu in November, the King had stated he would return in Magh, i.e. by the end of January or by mid-February. Jang Bahadur was informed by his agents on the plains of the activities of the exiled bharadars and the Queen. Apprehensive that Rajendra was waiting to return together with the emigrés, he secured Surendra’s authority to send extra troops to guard the routes into the hills. On 22 February, the King left Banaras but although moving close to the frontier remained in the plains. In correspondence with Jang Bahadur and
Surendra he sought to negotiate terms for his return. The King wanted to have control of the military pajani promised to him, a condition that Jang Bahadur was unwilling to meet. The King was conciliatory in other matters. He wrote to Surendra in April that he gave him the authority to assume the throne if he should ever plot against Jang Bahadur, approved his promise to let Jang Bahadur conduct next year’s civil pajani and declared that the bharadars and the army should disregard his or Surendra’s orders that might be inconsistent with their promises to Jang Bahadur. At the end of the month, he issued a lal mohar promising that he would allow the Queen no political role. He had been in contact with the Queen in India but did not fully trust her and realised that her return to Nepal would be completely unacceptable to Surendra and Jang Bahadur. Surendra, Upendra and Jang Bahadur, all wrote to the King urging him to return at once but did not provide him with the assurances that he wanted. In his reply the King approved all actions of Jang Bahadur but pleaded that the onset of the malarial season now made it dangerous to cross the Tarai and that he was therefore going to stay at Ghusot (where Hira Lal Jha’s estate was situated). This was despite the fact that he probably knew that on 8 April, the astrologers in Kathmandu had been asked to fix an auspicious date for Surendra’s coronation. This decision had been taken, so the Residency was assured, in the hope that it would make the king return immediately and thus remove the need to go ahead with the ceremony.

The twenty day period within which the astrologers had been ordered to fix a day was allowed to elapse without the coronation taking place but a few days later, on 12 May 1847, the final break with the King was precipitated by the arrest of two ex-soldiers involved in a plan to assassinate Jang Bahadur. Would-be assassins had been apprehended before but on this occasion those arrested had with them a lal mohar of the King calling on the army to seize or kill Jang Bahadur and his relatives. Jang Bahadur had the document read out to the assembled troops and asked them whether they wished to carry out the order. The army replied that what the King now commanded was inconsistent with his earlier instructions and that they thought it right to abide by the latter. The bharadars then called upon Surendra to assume the throne. He accepted the invitation and the ceremony took place that evening.
the bloodshed in Nepal from Bhimsen’s death onwards for which Rajendra was held responsible and concluded that ‘Sri Panch Mahara-jadhiraj Surendra Bikram Shah . . . being now ruler of the Raj with the aid of the Prime Minister, we cannot hereafter act under your Highness’ orders and authority’. They offered Rajendra honourable treatment if he returned to Kathmandu but no share in the government.\textsuperscript{114}

Rajendra wrote separate letters of protest to the \textit{bharadars} and Jang Bahadur denying the authenticity of the \textit{lal mohar} found on the would-be assassins. He maintained that neither he nor Jagat Bam Pande and Guru Prasad, who had allegedly handed the men the document, had had anything to do with the affair.\textsuperscript{115} With the \textit{bharadars} he took a robust line, rejecting their accusation that he had transferred complete authority to the Queen, and suggesting that the killings at the Kot had gone beyond what the Queen had ordered. He accused the signatories of ‘setting up the flag of treason’. With Jang Bahadur he was relatively conciliatory, refusing to accept his own depositon but promising to retain the minister in favour if he disowned the \textit{bharadars’} letter and either surrendered control of the military \textit{pajani} or persuaded the Resident to allow Nepal to annex the Sikkim territory which she had held before the Anglo-Gorkha war. The \textit{bharadars} replied that all the troubles were the result of the Queen’s orders and his folly in alienating his authority to her.\textsuperscript{116} In making the latter claim, the document on which they relied, and which they offered to let Rajendra examine, was probably the \textit{lal mohar} issued in January 1846, though Pudma Rana might possibly be correct in suggesting that the earlier grant of January 1843 was still the one on which argument centred.\textsuperscript{117} In either case, the \textit{bharadar’s} claim was tendentious but there was truth in their assertion that a repetition of the divided authority that existed the previous autumn with ‘two Rajas, a Rani supreme and four \textit{mukhtiyar} ministers . . . would have caused the final ruin of the kingdom of Sri Maharaja Prithvi Narayan Shah’.\textsuperscript{118}

Shortly after receiving the news of his deposition, Rajendra summoned all the fugitive \textit{bharadars} to join him at Sagauli.\textsuperscript{119} Urged by them to act against Jang Bahadur, on 213 July he crossed the frontier with about 1,500 followers and established himself in the Tarai settlement of Alau. Troops from the Purana Gorakh regiment, with which Jang Bahadur had long been associated, were sent from Kathmandu under his brother-in-law Sanak. At about 3.00 am on the 28th, Jang Bahadur’s forces attacked, killing eighty of Rajendra’s party and taking him prisoner. Many of the dead were Rajputs from the plains, including Rajendra’s maternal uncle Ram Baksh Singh but all the principal
Nepalese refugee bharadars escaped back across the frontier. Rajendra was taken back to the Valley and installed in the old royal palace at Bhaktapur. He was treated with deference but was in fact a political prisoner and remained so for the remainder of his life.\textsuperscript{120}

Although the Resident dubbed Rajendra and his followers ‘invaders’ and accused the Champaran Joint Magistrate of negligence in allowing an armed force to assemble and cross the border, the Magistrate’s reply makes it clear that the party were not equipped for full-scale battle and expected that troops in Nepal would come over to their side.\textsuperscript{121} After his capture, Rajendra himself claimed that Guru Prasad and Jagat Bam Pande had told him they had raised several regiments and Pudma Rana alleges that the refugee bharadars had in fact received funds for this purpose but had diverted them to their own pockets.\textsuperscript{122} A further intriguing possibility is that the ex-king was deliberately enticed over the border into a trap, for the Champaran magistrate believed that it was a letter from Nepal that prompted him to leave Sagauli. A recently published \textit{lal mohar} of Rajendra’s, ordering the army and civil officers to arrest Jang and his brothers and bring them to him at Kararbana in the Terai or Chisapani within the hills, has been identified by its editor with the document found on Jang’s would-be assassins.\textsuperscript{123} However, the reference to Jang’s making the addressees sign a document repudiating Rajendra’s authority shows that the \textit{lal mohar} must in fact have been issued after, not before, the discovery of the assassination plot and the installation of Surendra on 12 May. It is probable that the \textit{lal mohar} was sent to Nepal at the end of June, after Rajendra had received the replies to his initial protests, in which case Jang could well have had a letter sent in reply, purporting to be from a section of the army willing to support Rajendra.

Thoresby had adopted a favourable attitude towards Jang Bahadur ever since his arrival at the Residency in December 1846. His despatches were consistently sympathetic to Jang Bahadur and Surendra and critical of Rajendra and he was eager to prevent British territory being used by exiles as a base for hostile activity against the new regime. His willingness to work with those in power was the logical continuation of the non-intervention policy pursued since Hodgson’s departure. It is likely, nonetheless, that Jang Bahadur made a strong personal impression upon him. His attitude was in complete contrast with the sentiments voiced by British officials in the immediate aftermath of the Kot, when Resident Colvin, following events from Sagauli, dismissed Jang as ‘too rash and too vicious to play successfully the role of a second Bhimsen’ while the Governor-General’s Agent at Banaras wrote to Brian Hodgson that he
expected Rajendra and Surendra soon to combine against the minister who would then meet a well-deserved end. This sentiment persisted in Calcutta up to the summer of 1847, for although the Governor-General authorised Thoresby to order Rajendra away from the frontier if he did not reach an agreement with his son, he initially refused to formally recognise the new regime as Thoresby had recommended at the end of June. He stated that the reason for delay was the fact that Jang Bahadur had 'obtained power by means the most revolting to humanity'. When, a month after Alau, a kharita was finally sent to Surendra recognising him as king, it contained no congratulations.

While moral sentiments may have coloured an individual's reactions, non-intervention was the British policy during the critical months. M.S. Jain has rightly pointed out that both Hardinge's unwillingness to extend recognition before it was certain that the change was permanent and his measures to restrain the exiles were natural consequences of the decision not to become involved in internal Nepalese politics. Realisation that British protestations of neutrality were genuine was the reason that neither Jang Bahadur nor Rajendra tried to enlist British support in the blatant fashion of both Rana Bahadur and his opponents fifty years previously. At the same time, the anxiety that despite everything, the other side might secure an arrangement with the Company was not entirely absent. Jang Bahadur's appeals to Rajendra to return to Kathmandu were logical, for as long as he remained in India he was a card the British could choose to play at any time. In the other camp, Jagat Bam played upon Rajendra's corresponding fears by telling him that Jang Bahadur had pledged a part of Nepal's revenue to the British. The final securing of British recognition was great relief to Jang but with many of his opponents still in India continued fostering of British goodwill was still a high priority.

Three years after the dramatic events of 1846/7 Jang was to find himself in London when a mentally deranged ex-army officer assaulted Queen Victoria. The incident led him to remark to his British travelling companion on the severity with which such a crime would be punished in Nepal, and he went on to give an interesting characterisation of political upheavals there:

Although revolution often occurred...; yet the country at large did not suffer more from such disturbances than England would from a change of ministry; as the slaughter was confined almost entirely to the chiefs and their dependants: neither the army nor the
peasantry taking any part in the disputes, and submitting without a
murmur to the dictates of whichever party might prove the vic-
tors.\textsuperscript{130}

As an analysis of the process which had brought him to power, this has
some validity, but the reality was a little more complex.

In the first place, Jang was correct in representing the change as one
essentially involving members of an existing political elite, and certainly
not a ‘revolution’ in the twentieth-century sense. As M.C. Regmi has
pointed out, it is even misleading to talk in terms of ‘the emergence of a
new aristocracy’, the thesis proclaimed in the title of Jain’s book.\textsuperscript{131} The
victims were not outsiders displacing a governing class, but themselves
established members of the \textit{bharadari}, within which Jang himself, Vijay
Raj Pande and the Basnet brothers Kulman and Jitman Singh had already
reached influential positions. Their victims were members of other
\textit{bharadar} families, in particular the Fateh Jang Shah branch of the
\textit{chautaras}, the two most prominent Thapa families, the \textit{Gora} Pandes and
a section of the Basnets. Although Jang would employ his victory in a
novel manner, establishing his own family as a new ruling elite within the
aristocracy, nothing that had yet occurred was fundamentally different
from earlier upheavals, such as those in which Bhimsen Thapa had
established his supremacy.

It was, of course, true that for the first time in the history of unified
Nepal, a king had been deposed by his subjects. However, its signifi-
cance is lessened, because throne was transferred to an heir whom the
King had on previous occasions virtually set up as co-ruler. Also, as
Kirkpatrick had pointed out half a century earlier, the loyalty of the
\textit{bharadari} was focused on the dynasty of Prithvi Narayan rather than on
any one individual descendant and it is significant that it was Prithvi
Narayan’s name that the \textit{bharadars} invoked in their reply to Rajendra’s
protest at his deposition. The willingness of both \textit{bharadars} and army to
accept the change of monarch thus did not involve any radical change in
their attitude towards royal authority. The justification for their actions,
which those at Kathmandu produced, also relied largely on the ‘exis-
tence’ of royal sanction for those actions, with insistence that until Ra-
jendra’s final unacceptable order for Jang Bahadur’s death, everything
had been done in accordance with the king’s instructions or those of a
relative to whom he had delegated full authority.

The events of 1847 were not only readily reconcilable with Nepal’s
own political tradition but also fully consistent with current Hindu
political theory. The *Shukranitisara*, probably composed only a few years previously in a Maratha state, clearly envisaged deposition as a legitimate weapon against a bad ruler:

If the King be an enemy of virtue, morality and strength, and unrighteous even though from the [royal] family, people should desert him as the ruiner of the state. In his place for the maintenance of the state, the *purohit*, with the consent of the ministers, should install one who belongs to his family and is qualified.\(^{132}\)

Jang Bahadur claimed that the role of the army, like that of the peasantry, was passive. This is slightly misleading given that he himself had appealed directly to the army in May 1847 when the *lal mohar* ordering his own death was found upon Sher Mordan and Dambar Singh. It had also been Jang Bahadur who told Henry Lawrence in 1844, when discussing a possible regency while the King’s ‘imbecility’ persisted, that the army would be the judge of when Rajendra recovered his sanity. The army’s decision on such occasions was that of its senior officers but it was being granted an authority which it might choose to use autonomously.

Another point that emerges from the crisis is that alongside the tie between king and subject and the power of the military, the concept of the state and its interest formed an undercurrent in Nepalese thinking. In writing to the deposed Rajendra of the possible final ruin of the kingdom of Prithvi Narayan, the *bharadars*, were at one level simply expressing their loyalty to the Shah dynasty. Nevertheless, the word used in the original Nepali was almost certainly not *rajya* or *rajaim*, but *dhunga*, i.e. the realm as a concrete reality rather than simply an area within which kingship was exercised.\(^{133}\) The implicit logic was that its preservation was the fundamental political consideration. This underlines that what Brian Hodgson termed the ‘eminent nationality’ of the Gorkhas retained its effect on their thinking and set Nepal slightly apart from most political units in South Asia at that time.

**NOTES**

2. Lawrence Diary, 30 May 1845.


5. Lawrence Diary, 30 June and 17 September 1845.

6. Lawrence recorded in his Diary (30 May 1845) that Surendra thought that Jang Bahadur was his friend, adding cynically, 'He will find him friend or foe according to circumstance'.

7. Ranojjal Singh and Ranjor Singh, Mathbar’s legitimate and illegitimate sons respectively, took refuge with Jang Bahadur after the murder and were escorted out of the Valley by his brothers Bam Bahadur and Ranoddip Singh, see Lawrence to Government, 24 May 1845, op. cit. and LJB, pp. 55-57.


9. Lawrence Diary, 4 August 1845.

10. Ibid., 15 August 1845.

11. Lawrence to Government, 23 September, 1845, FS 29 November 1845, No. 38, published in KM, pp. 286-287. The Kumari Chauk, which Jang had originally been given charge of in 1843 had judicial as well as audit functions and was situated off Basantapur Square in the centre of Kathmandu. It could be the Basantapur tahvil (Basantapur bureau) which the vamshavali, Ancient Nepal, 25 (October 1973), p. 15, says was assigned to him in May 1845. For the ‘coalition’ arrangements, see also Lawrence Diary, 18 September to 3 October 1845. LJB, pp. 62-63, confuses these with the appointments made immediately following the assassination.


13. Jang Bahadur had been put in command of the Purana Gorak when he was made a kaji in 1842. The Queen stopped the pajani, which he had just begun and ordered delay until after the Dasai, see Lawrence Diary, 1 October 1845.

14. Ibid., 11-20 October 1845.

15. Ibid., 16 October 1845.

16. Lawrence’s Diary for 30 June 1845 notes that Rangnath was expected in Kathmandu that day but nothing is known of his activity there apart from his participation in the Indra Jatra festival in September (Hanumandhoka Documents, No. 225).

17. Lawrence Diary, 28 April 1845.


19. Prithvi Narayan used Narayan Pande as an intermediary to arrange a meeting with the Tanahu ruler on the border of the two kingdoms and then violated a pledge of safe conduct by seizing his adversary. See Acharya, Sri Panch Badamaharajadhiraj Prithvi Narayan Shahko Samkshipt Jivani (Kathmandu: His Majesty’s Press Secretariat, 1967/9), Vol. 2, pp. 294 and 315-316.


21. Rudra Raj Pande, loc. cit. A Jetha budha seems originally to have been a royal messenger and investigator. NJB, Vol. 1, pp. 113-114.
Interview with Chaitanya Upadhyaya, Kathmandu, 31 March 1983.


FS, 28 February 1846, Nos. 21 and 24.

Diary of Events, 9 December 1845.

LJF, p. 64.

Diary of Events, 21 October, 1 and 14 November 1845.

Ibid., 9 February 1846.

Ibid., 5 December 1845.

Sri 5 kancha maharanibata hukum baksyabamo jim garnu bhan 1902 sal magh badi 9 rojka din lalmohar gari baksyakto ho ('On 21 January 1846 a lal mohar was issued providing that the commands of the junior queen should be obeyed')—lal mohar of 10 Magn Sudi 1924 (3 February 1868), published in Purnima, no. 40, 2034 VS (1978/9), p. 181.


Diary of Events, 23 and 25 August 1846.


One version is that Badri gained access to the house because he was the lover of Gagan’s daughter, see Rishikesh Shaha, in John Whelpton, Jang Bahadur in Europe (Kathmandu: Sahayogi, 1983) p. 63. Baburam Acharya rejected the story of the love affair but insisted Badri Narsingh was the assassin, see Baburam Acharya ra Uhamko Kriti (Kathmandu: INAS, 2029 VS (1972/3)), p. 35. For alternative versions giving Jang himself this role, see Pratiman Thapa, Sri Tin Maharaja Jang Bahadur Ranajiko Jivan Charitra (Babu Hari Singh Thapa, 1908), p. 47, and Balachandra Sharma, Nepalko Aitihasik Ruprekha (Varanasi: Krishna Kumari Devi, 2038 VS (1981/2)), p. 307.


KM, p. 374.


LJF, p. 68.


For a discussion of the alternative versions, see Appendix III.

Ottley’s rheumatism is mentioned only in his own despatch written later the same day
(15 September 1846, FS, 31 October 1846, No. 151), the Thoresby Report merely stating that 'he did not think proper to go out and meet the Raja at night-time'.

45. The story was told by Baburam Acharya to Tiratna Manandhar (Manandhar, 'A New Light... op. cit., p. 24).

46. Ganpat Sahai to Brian Hodgson, 15 October 1847 (Hodgson Correspondence, RAS).

47. Peter Mayne, *Friends in High Places* (London: Bodley Head, 1975), pp. 222-225. Mayne makes the cogent point that the flashes of shots from above would not have been visible in the main hall, in which case the Thoresby Report's silence on the direction of the shots is readily understandable.

48. Oldfield, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 363, LJB, p. 73, and RN, p. 233, both state that Khadga was killed by Jang's youngest brother, Dhir Shsher.


50. "Thoresby Report".

51. Ottley to Government, 15 September 1846, FS, 31 October 1846, Nos. 151 and 152.

52. Ottley to Government, 16 September 1846, FS, 31 October 1846, No. 153.

53. Bhavani Singh acted as one of Mathabar's aides during Surendra's 1844 march towards the border, see Dabi Prasad to Lawrence, 11 December 1844, FS, 28 December 1844, No. 120, published in *KM*, p. 256. Karbir was a long-time Thapa adherent.

54. Lakshmi Devi to Rajendra, 5 Jestha Badi 1904 (5 May 1847), published in Manandhar, 'A New Light... op. cit.

55. Jain *op. cit.*, pp. 74 and 76, fn. 43 and 54; Ottley to Government, 16 September 1846 and Thoresby to Government, 7 December 1846, FS, 31 October 1846, No. 153, and 26 December 1846, No. 166.

56. Ottley to Government, 15 September 1846, FS, 31 October 1846, No. 152, cited in *KM*, p. 297, and 4 November 1846, FS, 26 December 1846, No. 157. The Resident's Diary for 30 September, to which Ottley refers Calcutta for details of the accusations against the Queen, is not extant.

57. Wheler to Currie (DO), 22 October 1846, FS, 26 December 1846, No. 144.


61. Wheler to Currie (DO), 22 October 1846, FS, 31 October 1846, No. 144.

62. Ottley to Currie (DO), 24 September 1846, FS, 31 October 1846, No. 165.


65. Thoresby Report and LJB, 83.


67. *Diary of Events*, 16 October 1846.

68. Ottley to Government, 26 October 1846, FS, 26 December 1846, No. 145.


70. Thoresby Report. Bir Dhoj is listed as a captain in the order of ceremonies for Indra Jatra in 1845 (Hanuman Dhoka Documents, No. 225) and his promotion as kaji would thus have taken place under the Queen's patronage.
71. Ganpat Sahai (Residency clerk) to Hodgson, 9 November 1846 (Hodgson Correspondence, RAS).

72. Outley to Government, 2 November 1846, FS, 26 December 1846, No. 155 and (for the title) Rajendra to Darbar, 4 June 1857, FS, 31 July 1847, No. 194, published in KM, p. 344. Manandhar 'Jang Bahadur kahile... ', op. cit., points out that previously Jang Bahadur's title was mukhiyar.

73. LJ, p. 89.


75. See, for example Manandhar, 'Jang Bahadur... ', op. cit., p. 17. Some of the inconsistencies in the various accounts are discussed by Jain, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

76. Rajendra to Darbar, 4 June 1847, FS, 31 July 1847, No. 194, published in KM, p. 344.

77. Lists of those killed are given in Outley's report to Government, FS, 26 December 1846, No. 156, Ganpat Sahai's letter to Hodgson, loc. cit. and in the *vamshavali* account (**Ancient Nepal**, 25 (October 1973), p. 18). The last also gives a list of fugitives.

78. Wazir Singh escaped to the plains on the failure of the plot (Thoresby Report and LJ, p. 88). Dalmardan Thapa, who was among those killed, was probably not a member of either prominent Thapa family and should be distinguished from Jang Bahadur's brother-in-law of the same name who is mentioned in the Kamandari Kitabkhana (personnel office) Registers for 1848/9 and 1854/5.

79. Fathers of several of the victims are given in Outley's list (n. 97, below).

80. Stiller, *The Silent Cry. The People of Nepal 1816 to 1837*, Kathmandu: Sahayogi, 1976, Appendix; HP, Vol. 18, f. 5, but Bakt Singh, Dariyal Singh and a third fugitive Ranbhadra, were all sufficiently important for inclusion in the 1843 list of leading bharadars (HP, Vol. 59, f. 169-71).


82. LJ, p. 86; Oldfield, Sketches, op. cit., Vol. 1 p. 370.


84. Rajya Lakshmi to Rajendra, 5 Jestha Badi 1904. Interviews with Chaitanya Upadhyaya, Kathmandu, 31 March 1983 and Rudra Raj Pande, Banaras, 4 March 1983. Vijay's descendants also claim that he had been charged by Queen Samrajya Lakshmi before her death in 1841 to take care of her son Surendra, and that before the Kot Massacre he had induced Jang Bahadur and his brothers to sign a *dharmapatra* (written oath) that they would uphold Surendra's claim to the throne (interview with Navin Raj Pande, Kathmandu, 3 August 1983).


86. Hemdal is listed separately from both Bimsmen and Ranjor Thapa's families in the 1843 bharadar list (HP Vol. 59, f. 169-171).


88. Sundarprasad Shah, *Tripat* (Kathmandu: Suksanka Prakashan 2042 (1985/6)), p. 27. Chaturbhaj Aryal, who is listed as a purohit in the Kamandari Kitabkhana Register for 1905 VS (1848/9) attested a *lal mohar* on 6 Chaitra Sudi 1903 (22 March 1847) –*Lagat Phant*, reference supplied by Krishna Kant Adhikari.
89. Jha attested the March lal mohar but in May, King Rajendra, now hostile to Jang Bahadur was reported en route to Jha's estate at Ghusoi in Bihar (FS, 27 June 1847, No. 155-156, published in KM, pp. 354-356).


92. His name heads the list of those attesting the 22 March 1847 lal mohar.

93. Samser Jang is the sole chaulara listed in the Kitabkhana registers for 1848 and 1854 but in 1859 Ransher Shah's name is given followed by 'Shamsher Shah'.


100. M.C. Regmi, *loc.cit.*


102. *Ibid*.

103. The failure of the 1854 Muluki Ain to reflect this status difference was probably due to Vijay's influence at the time.

104. Surendra to Vijay Raj Pande, 10, II Shravan Sudi 1920 (25 July 1863).


107. Royal Order of 12 Phalgun Badi 1903 (12 February 1847), published in Manandhar, 'Jangbahadurko Uday... ', *op. cit.*, p.11.

108. Thoresby to Government, 23 March 1847.

109. Rajendra to Surendra, Baisakh Badi 1904 (first half of April 1847) in Manandhar, 'Jangbahadurko Uday... ', *op. cit.*, p. 13.

110. Lal mohar of 14 Baisakh Sudi 1904 (29 April 1847), *ibid*.

111. Thoresby to Government, 12 May 1847, FS, 26 June 1847, No. 18, published in *KM*, pp. 327-328.

112. Thoresby to Government, 8 April 1847, FS, 26 June 1847, No. 177, published in *KM*, pp. 324-328.


117. The text of the decree of banishment on the queen in November 1846 as given by Pudma, LJB, p. 88, actually cites the earlier lal mohar, but the authenticity of Pudma’s document is questionable.
122. Thoresby to Government, 9 August 1847; LJB, p. 92.
126. Governor-General to Surendra, 3 September 1847, No. 175, published in KM, pp. 362-363.
130. RIO, p. 132.
Chapter Six

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE RANA REGIME: 1846-1857

Introduction

Although it was not apparent at the time, the events of 1846-1847 proved to be a decisive turning point in Nepalese history. Unlike the ministers who had preceded him, Jang Bahadur not only managed to hold on to power for the rest of his life but ensured that it remained with the Kunwars afterwards.

The principal features of the new regime were Jang Bahadur’s relationship with the monarchy, his strategy towards and dependence on the bharadari and army, the machinery of government, the codification of Nepali law, revenue policy and the importance of the relationship with the British.

Underlying a study of these particular areas are questions concerning the general nature of the rule of the Kunwars or Ranas as they were to be known from 1848. The whole Rana period is still widely characterised in Nepal as a dark age which impeded national development. Although the regime had undeniably by its closing years become an obstacle to political and economic progress, both Nepalese and foreign historians have come increasingly to realise that there were also some positive features of Rana rule. Mahesh Chandra Regmi, Nepal’s leading economic historian, has characterised the Rana years as marking ‘the transition from the semi-feudalistic Gorkhali empire to a centralised agrarian bureaucracy’.¹ Regmi’s work has done much to make the outlines of this process clear, as have the contributions of Kumar, Jain, Edwards, Adhikari and Marize but there is truth in Regmi’s statement that ‘we remain ignorant about the nature and composition of the new power elite, and about the measures it took to achieve legitimisation and mobilise the support of the old and new political groups in the country’.²
In addition, there is the problem of whether changes under Jang Bahadur were the result of a consciously devised strategy or merely the elaboration of emerging trends requiring only administrative stability for implementation.

The Establishment of Maharajaship

Accounts of Jang Bahadur’s relationship with Surendra have stressed the close supervision of the King’s person and the element of intimidation. This was an important factor which operated right from the start, as shown by the note of menace in the dharmapatra of December 1846. It is confirmed by the observations of the successive Residents and also admitted in Pudma’s biography of his father which explains that Surendra was dissuaded from abdication in 1851 ‘partly by indirect inducements, but mostly by direct threats’.

At the same time, there is evidence that Jang Bahadur attempted to employ subtler methods too. A strong oral tradition in Kathmandu maintains that he showed great personal deference to the King, often carrying him about on his back, as bharadars had sometimes been required to do before 1846. This contradicts British records but Resident Ramsay, writing in 1863, did state that Jang Bahadur had been outwardly polite to Surendra after the marriage alliances between the two families in the mid-fifties. Perhaps Jang Bahadur displayed a domineering attitude in front of British officials and behaved more respectfully otherwise.

Jang Bahadur also repeated the well-worn strategy of influencing a king through his wives. At the time of his accession, Surendra had three queens, Trailokya Rajya Lakshmi, Sura Rajya Lakshmi and Deb Rajya Lakshmi (the fourth had died as a result of his ill treatment five years previously). At some point before November 1847, Surendra was prevailed upon to issue a firman to them acknowledging his own unfitness to rule and transferring power to them. The document provided that after the birth of a son, he would be placed on the throne and the mother would act as regent. Queen Trailokya Rajya Lakshmi bore a son on 30 November 1847 but the arrangement was not implemented and Surendra remained King. Nonetheless, the involvement of the queens in the administration continued, as in December a lal mohar stipulating that no one should contact Rajendra without Jang Bahadur’s permission also provided that Surendra’s monthly meetings with him were to be dependent on the joint advice of Jang Bahadur and
The role of Queen Trailokya was particularly important. When she fell ill during Jang Bahadur’s 1850 trip to Europe, he wrote to his brother Bam Bahadur, the acting premier, that he would forgive him anything as long as he ensured that the Queen recovered. On reaching Bombay on the return journey Jang having learned that she was dying, told a British companion that it was through her great influence over the King that he was able to guide him along the correct path. Two days later, he was in tears when he received the news of her death.

Jang Bahadur used his power over Surendra to secure a succession of royal orders which marked a definite departure from the traditional status of a minister. There was a precedent for appointment to the premiership for life in the document issued in 1844 to Mathbar and Rajendra promised as much at Jang Bahadur before he left for Banaras in November 1846. Shortly after Surendra’s accession this promise was not only renewed but extended into a commitment that the office would remain in his family. The next step was the recognition in May 1848 of the Kunwars’ claim to descent from the Ranas of Chittorgarh. Jang Bahadur and his brothers were authorised to style themselves ‘Ranaji’, to assume the title srimadraj kumar kumaratmaj (‘royal prince and descendant of princes’) and to marry as Rajputs. Since the Shah dynasty itself traced its ancestry to the Chittorgarh Ranas, the effect of the royal order was to promote the Kunwars from their status as Khas to caste equality with the royal family. This logically opened the way for marriage between the two families but this was explicitly barred by the restriction in the document on the Kunwar Ranajis marrying into any of the plains or hill families with which the Shahs themselves traditionally had marital connections. There was either definite resistance within the royal family to levelling the barrier completely, or Jang felt it advisable to advance one step at a time. The premier’s strategy was most probably devised in conjunction with Vijay Raj Pande whose approval was sought in matters of caste status.

Before further moves to enhance Jang Bahadur’s status could be made, a crisis occurred in his relations with both the royal family and his relatives. This was precipitated by his journey to Europe in 1850 which entailed his absence from Kathmandu for a year and also led to religious complications as he had to cross the forbidden kalopani (black water). Although Jang Bahadur discounted the pollution problem in advance, arguing that his caste could be readily restored by a purification ritual such as returning envoys from China underwent, the
innovation disturbed the more orthodox. During the summer, he learnt by a letter from Bam that Surendra’s brother Upendra was behaving suspiciously. He sent a curt reply ordering Bam to expel from Kathmandu anyone trying to attach himself to the prince.\textsuperscript{14} Jang returned to Kathmandu on 5 February and ten days later was informed by Bam of a plot against him involving Upendra, his brother Badri Narsingh and cousin Jay Bahadur. Also implicated was \textit{kaji} Karbir Khatri, one of Jang Bahadur’s party on the European journey who had spread stories about Jang Bahadur violating caste rules by dining with Europeans. Bam himself had been invited to join the conspiracy and had pretended willingness to do so as to know all the details. Bam claimed he had delayed informing Jang Bahadur owing to reluctance to seal Badri’s fate. Jang Bahadur learned just in time to seize the culprits who planned to assassinate both Surendra and himself the following morning. The three principal conspirators confessed after an incriminating paper had been produced and the state council recommended death or blinding as the penalty. Influenced both by the pleas of his mother and by political considerations, Jang opposed this but told the British that the \textit{bharadars} would insist on the extreme penalty unless they could be removed completely from Nepal so that those who had condemned them would not be a target of their vengeance in future. After lengthy consultation, Dalhousie eventually agreed to accept the three as state prisoners in the fort at Allahabad for five years. In Karbir Khatri’s case it was considered sufficient to deprive him of his caste by having untouchables urinate into his mouth.\textsuperscript{15} After Jay’s death at Allahabad in September 1853, Jang Bahadur requested that Badri and Upendra be released. Both of them had their property restored while Badri was entrusted with the key post of Governor of Palpa. Karbir Khatri was already back in favour before the end of 1852.\textsuperscript{16}

All of the information about this conspiracy is derived either from Jang’s account to the Resident or from Pudma Rana. It is presented at length by Jain and subjected to his standard scepticism. He argues that there was no assassination plot but that Jang moved against Badri Narsingh because of his popularity with the army, which he had commanded during Jang’s absence. It was necessary for him to remove a dangerous rival in view of the feeling against him in Kathmandu on the grounds that he had become too close to the British.\textsuperscript{17} There is indeed reason to doubt some details of Jang’s story, and it is certainly true that his enthusiasm for Britain was not universally popular but, as usual, several of Jain’s arguments are wide of the mark. He alleges, for
example, that Karbir could not have accused Jang of loss of caste by drinking wine because the purification he underwent at Banaras would have been accepted by the orthodox as wiping out any previous transgression. In fact if the purification ceremony had been regarded as a license for every infringement of caste rules, there would have been no reason for the party to take the elaborate precautions which they did against even being seen eating by the local population in London and Paris. His suggestion that Bam collaborated with Jang to bring false charges against Badri is also clearly wrong, for in 1856 the British Resident recorded that Jang had mistrusted him ever since 1851 because of the suspicion that at one stage he had actually intended taking part in the conspiracy. Jain is also incorrect in asserting that only Badri Narsingh actually confessed his guilt (a legal requirement in Nepal before a defendant could be convicted). It is in fact clearly stated in the British records that confessions were obtained from all three of the principal conspirators.

Whether or not the dissidents had laid their plans as thoroughly as Jang claimed, they certainly all nursed grievances against Jang Bahadur. Jay Bahadur had come under suspicion before, and this had been noted at the time by the British Resident. Pudma Rana is probably correct in claiming he had a grudge against Jang Bahadur since being detected accepting a bribe two years earlier; the fact that he was retained as head of the Sadar Daptarkhana while Jang Bahadur was in Europe is not the strong counter-evidence that Jain makes it out to be, since Jang probably though it would be safer to keep him in employment. Badri had been disgraced when Jang Bahadur learned on his return to Kathmandu of his accepting a 12,000 rupee bribe to reinstate a subba previously dismissed for corruption. This was presumably the case of Shivanidhi Jaisi, whom Jang had removed from office for oppressing cultivators and whose reappointment earned both Badri and Bam a severe rebuke in one of Jang Bahadur’s letters from Europe. Finally, Prince Upendra, whether or not unhappy over the size of his jagir or over Jang’s correspondence with one of his wives, was resentful of the eclipse of the royal family by the Kunwars and believed that Badri and Jay could offer him a higher status.

Jang told the British that at the council meeting to decide the conspirators’ punishment both Surendra and his father had been present and had declared that Upendra should suffer whatever penalty was fixed for the others. However, the claim that the plot was aimed at Surendra’s life as well as Jang’s is one of the more suspicious details in the
official version', and the septics are probably correct in thinking that both father and son were acting under duress. Upendra’s disgrace, following the death of Queen Trailokya Rajya Lakshmi weakened the non-intimidatory element in Jang Bahadur’s relationship with the royal family. Surendra’s attempt at abdication that summer was a clear indication of his unhappiness with the situation. Jang Bahadur’s refusal to accept it suggests both his continuing need of the monarchy as a source of his own legitimacy and his lack of confidence in controlling the surviving queens, one of whom would have to be appointed regent if the infant Crown Prince were to be put on the throne as his father wished. With plots by Jang Bahadur’s opponents continuing both inside and outside the country, this constituted a disturbing weakness in his position.

In 1854, this situation was remedied with the first of a series of marriage alliances between his family and Surendra’s. On 8 May, Jang Bahadur’s eldest son Jagat Jang was married to the King’s daughter. This was followed within a few days by Jang Bahadur’s marriage to Hiranya Garbha Kumari, the sister of Fateh Jang, the most prominent victim at the Kot and Guru Prasad, one of the leading refugee bharadars who urged Rajendra to action in 1847 and since then had been an inveterate deviser of plots against Jang Bahadur. Since Hiranya’s family were collaterals of Surendra’s, both marriages depended on the acknowledgement of the Kunwar Ranas’ caste equality with the royal family. Such an acknowledgement had been almost granted by the 1848 lal mohar but withheld by the ban on marriage which was now removed. Surendra agreed to become part of an alliance between the Shahs and the Ranas that was worked out by Jang Bahadur and Ransher, the younger of Hiranya’s two surviving brothers.

Ransher’s important role in the consolidation of the Rana regime is inadequately reflected in literary sources but can be deduced from the frequency with which his name is coupled with Jang Bahadur’s in administrative documents, from family tradition and also as the most economical explanation for developments in 1854. According to his present-day descendants, he was present at the Kot on the night of the massacre but had remained outside the main hall and was pre warns by Jang Bahadur’s youngest brother Dhir Shamsher so that he could escape. Ransher accompanied Ranjendra to Alau but escaped back to India and in contrast with this brother Guru Prasad’s attempts to procure Jang’s assassination, he remained quietly with his mother and sister at Bettiah, where many of the Nepalese refugees settled. Some of the exiles
began attempting to make their peace with Jang when he passed through Bihar on his return from Europe at the end of 1850. Family tradition claims that Ransher took Hiranya back to Kathmandu in 1907 VS (i.e., the year ending mid-April 1851), while British sources place their return in spring 1854. In fact, it must have been before January 1854, when Ransher was a signatory of the new Muluki Ain. The family maintains that the motive for the return was anxiety that a suitable husband for Hiranya be found since at twenty-three she was already well past the normal age for marriage. It is possible that the marriage to Jang was only broached after they had sought pardon and been allowed back into the country, but rather more likely that the whole arrangement, including also Jagat Jang’s marriage to Surendra’s daughter had been worked out in detail before Ransher left Bettiah.

After her marriage, Hiranya persuaded Guru Prasad also to return to Kathmandu but he refused a position in the army that had been offered by Jang Bahadur, preferring to retire into private life as a landholder in the Tarai. Ransher was made a kaji and in autumn 1856, was promoted to the rank of chautara. Meanwhile, the links between the Shah and Rana families were further strengthened with the marriage on 24 February 1855, of Jang Bahadur’s only other legitimate son Jit Jang to the King’s second daughter, Nain Lakshmi Devi. A few days earlier, Jang Bahadur’s eldest illegitimate son Bhim had married a grand daughter of Rajendra’s uncle, Ranodyat Shah. On 30 April, Jang Bahadur himself married a niece of Hiranya and Ransher, the daughter of Bir Babu Shah who had died at the Kot.

When the first marriage with the royal family took place in 1854, rumours connected it with the approval that year of the Muluki Ain (a compilation of Nepalese law). The Ain was supposed to have provided for female succession to the throne, so that if the King’s two sons died without a child it would go to Jang Bahadur’s daughter-in-law or her male child. None of the texts of the Ain which have survived contain such a provision but Jang Bahadur had certainly given thought to the rules of succession. In 1851, when the King had talked of abdication, Jang Bahadur told Dr. Oldfield, the Residency Surgeon, that if Surendra and his son (the second prince had not yet been born) died without male heirs, the English system might be followed and Surendra’s daughter accepted as successor.

If Jang Bahadur had seen marriages with the royal family as a possible way of appropriating the crown, in 1856 he adopted a different strategy of establishing his own family as royalty in their own
right. On 31 July, immediately after the conclusion of a war with Tibet on terms amounting to a qualified Nepalese victory, he resigned the premiership in favour of his brother Bam Bahadur. The resignation took Kathmandu completely by surprise, the Resident reporting that there were no rumoured explanations available other than Jang Bahadur’s own claim that he was simply tired of the burdens of office. Within twenty-four hours, however, speculation was well under way. One theory, found plausible by the Resident himself, was that Jang wished to avoid the unpopularity of rescinding 1,200 promotions which had been made during the war and for which there were no jagirs available. Dhir Shamsher, Jang’s youngest brother, who visited the Residency on 1 August, indicated what is probably the key factor, namely that Jang had resigned in order to ensure that his brothers would be kindly disposed to his own sons. This was consistent with another rumour now circulating that Bam had been promised the premiership when he revealed the 1851 plot.

Jang Bahadur’s strategy became clear on 6 August when the King issued a lal mohar naming him Maharaja of Kaski and Lamjung, two former princedoms in central Nepal with which both the Shah dynasty and Jang Bahadur’s own ancestors had been closely connected. The document confirmed Bam’s appointment as mukhtiyar and provided for that office to go in turn to each of the other Kunwar brothers and then to Jang’s eldest son. As Maharaja Jang Bahadur was to have not only total control of Kaski and Lamjung but also the right to over-rule both the King and premier in both domestic and foreign affairs. As interpreted later by Jang Bahadur’s sons, the lal mohar stipulated that the title of Maharaja should not be subject to agnate succession like the premiership but pass direct from father to eldest son. This was disputed by Jang’s brothers and there is also uncertainty over precisely what powers would accompany the maharajaship after Jang Bahadur’s death. These are key issues for understanding both the constitutional structure that Jang Bahadur was trying to set up and also the conflicts which later broke out amongst the Rana family. It is therefore necessary to look at the wording of the document in detail.

Several versions are now extant. The most authentic is the one included in the vamshavali account. This corresponds almost exactly with the ‘Abstract Translation’ which was prepared by the residency for transmission to Calcutta. The correspondence proves that the vamshavali version is only a condensation of the original document but other versions which have survived are no fuller. The vamshavali is translated
When my step mother, having received from my father control of the military and civil administration including the pajani and the power of life and death, killed our umraos and bharadars and attempted to place her son on the throne you killed her partisans and installed me on the throne.

You strengthened our friendship with the queen badshah (i.e., Queen Victoria) by paying a courtesy visit to her in Britain.

The Tibetans formerly continually intrigued against us, threatening us with the power of the Chinese emperor, but you defeated them in war, making them agree to pay an annual tribute.

When my father, plotting against you, sent men from Sagauli to kill you with a lal mohar instructing the whole army to that effect, then came himself with his principal umraos as far as Alau for the same purpose, you destroyed his army but brought him back without harm to his royal person and treated him with honour.

When my second brother tried to take your life I ordered the army to kill him but you spared his life, put him in custody for five years to remove the creature and otherwise treated him with honour.

You have conducted the premiership so as not to cause distress to the umraos, army and peasantry of our country but treat them justly and keep them content.

You have stopped the diversion of revenue by vagabonds and tricksters and by putting up taxes where appropriate, found extra resources and increased the army without touching the ordinary revenues of the treasury.

Being pleased with these services and seeing you so well-intentioned, I had taken an oath that if you gave up the premiership I should give up the throne, but when you came to resign I forgot my oath. Because I was unable to consult my Ranis and the other umraos and you requested that I give the office of prime minister to your brother, I gave it him. I left you without employment, but stayed on the throne and so went against my oath. If I keep so able
a minister without employment, I shall appear foolish in the eyes of the world. Therefore I have given you the title of Maharaja of Kaski and Lamjung. If I should oppress my umraos, peasantry of army, or jeopardise friendship with the queen badshah of England or the Chinese badshah, you as maharaja or your territory are not to allow me to do so. If when you try to restrain me I resort to force then my umraos and army should assist you. If prime minister Bam Bahadur should make any mistake in the military or civil pajani or in the work of strengthening friendship with the badshahs of England and China you are to warn him against it, and if he disregards your warning and acts violently, then I have given orders to my principal umraos and to the army to act under your instructions. Make your kingdom happy! In the administration of justice I have given you the right and the kingly authority (rajaim) to inflict the death penalty. If any inhabitant of my country attempts to act against your kingdom, title or life, I have given you the authority to inflict the death penalty upon him. Enjoy kingly authority down through the generations of your descendants (timra santandarsantansamma rajaimko bhog gara). In the roll of succession to the mukhtiyarship which we had previously established for your brothers your son Jagat Jang Kunwar is to follow Dhir Shamsher Rana. Wednesday Sravan 5 Sudi 1913 (6 August 1856).

The natural way of interpreting the penultimate sentence is, as Jang Bahadur’s son claimed, that the title of Maharaja is separate from the post of mukhtiyar and should be inherited by Jang Bahadur’s direct descendants. It is not surprising, therefore, that after the principle of agnate succession to a combined post of Maharaja and mukhtiyar had become established, the wording of the lal mohar was sought to be ‘improved’. Chandra Shamsher Rana, Jang Bahadur’s nephew and Maharaja from 1901 to 1929, provided the British Resident with an English version which stated:

In the roll of mukhtiyarship bestowed by me in regard to your brothers, after the roll (term) of Dhere Sham Shere Jung Rana, thy son Juggut Jung Bahadur Rana shall succeed to mukhtiyarship and so on your (thy and thy brothers’) generation after generation shall be made maharaja and mukhtiyar. The vague phrase ananta kal (for ever) was also used, as in a paraphrase
of the lal mohar found at the excise office at Ilam in the eastern hills.\textsuperscript{41}

It is virtually certain, then, that Jang intended the maharajaship to remain in his own direct line while the premiership was treated as the property of the Kunwar brothers as a unit. What is much more difficult to determine is whether he envisaged the supervisory powers over the government of Nepal as a whole to be inherited along with the title of Maharaja of Kaski and Lamjung. The world rajaim translated above as 'kingly authority' because of its etymological connection with raja and rajya ('king' and 'kingdom') is normally glossed as 'rule' or 'government'. It could conceivably refer either to the government of the Maharaja's own mini-kingdom or to the whole range of powers listed in the lal mohar. The other extant versions of the document opt for one alternative or the other. Kumar's translation, which is based on the same vamshavali text as is used in this discussion, has 'All this will be enjoyed by you up to offspring upon offspring' and the translation offered by Rose has 'These rights will be enjoyed...'.\textsuperscript{42} The Ilam text uses the phrase sabai ti hak (all these rights). In contrast, the British Residency's abstract translation has the more restrictive 'this territory...' (italics all supplied). Perhaps the ambiguity is one which Jang Bahadur himself had not resolved and the wording had been left deliberately vague. If, as Resident Ramsay believed at the time and most writers have assumed since, Jang Bahadur saw the title of Maharaja as merely a step towards supplanting the Shah dynasty, Jagat Jang could hope to inherit the throne of Nepal and the question of the future relationship between Maharaja and premier would not arise.

Jang Bahadur retained effective control of Nepalese policy, Bam Bahadur acting throughout in accordance with his instructions and actually signing a dharmapatra (written oath) to that effect.\textsuperscript{43} When Bam died in May 1857, the Resident could inform Calcutta with complete confidence that it would not make the slightest difference to either external or internal policy.\textsuperscript{44} The next brother in seniority, Krishna Bahadur, was appointed acting premier. Despite remaining in de facto control of the government Jang Bahadur was unable to secure any official British recognition of his special position. The Resident, determined not to provide Jang Bahadur with any encouragement to make a final move to displace Surendra, continued to insist that he was accredited to the king and could only deal with him or his minister. The situation became particularly galling to Jang Bahadur when news of the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny reached Kathmandu and discussions began with the Residency on the offer of Nepalese assistance to the
Accordingly, pleading the 'presuasion' of the King and the bharadari, he resumed the premiership on 28 June. The lal mohar of appointment gave formal recognition to the powers which he had in fact never ceased to exercise.  

The reappointment was, as Jain points out, a violation of the roll of succession to the premiership as laid down in the lal mohar of the previous summer. It was made acceptable to his brothers by allowing Krishna the commander-in-chief to continue to receive the pay he had received as premier and adjusting the salaries of the three remaining brothers accordingly. Also, Krishna was to manage internal affairs (subject of course to Jang Bahadur's power of veto) whilst Jang Bahadur was to be in direct control of external policy. This established a division of responsibility which was to hold good throughout the Rana period. Ranoddip, Jagat Shamsher and Dhir Shamsher were given responsibility for the western, southern and eastern areas of the country, an arrangement soon to crystallise into the standard Rana hierarchy of Western, Southern, Eastern and (a later addition) Northern Commanding Generals.

In terms of his formal relationship with the King, Jang Bahadur's new position was a step backwards. Although he retained his position as Maharaja, as prime minister he once again became a royal servant. He had, however, been able to reinforce the quasi-royal status of his own family by another marriage bond. On 25 June, a few days before his reappointment two of his daughters were married to Crown Prince Trailokya. The lal mohar formally proposing the alliance had been signed the previous month. It spelt out the caste equality of the partners by stipulating that the Crown Prince would accept the most ritually sensitive food, boiled rice, from his wife's hand. The fact that the point still had to be laboured suggests that the irregularity of the whole arrangement had not wholly been overcome. The doubts, however, confirmed to the rigidly conservative and no one ventured to voice them.

The relationship between the King and the Maharaja-prime minister that was established in 1857 remained in the same mould until 1951. Marriage between Shahs and Ranas continued in each subsequent generation. Also to persist throughout the Rana period was the King's formal and ritual supremacy in stark contrast to his lack of real power over the administration. Jang Bahadur and his successors as Maharaja were kings themselves but their was an altogether lower level of divinity than the Maharajadhiraj. There was thus a separation between the religious and secular aspects of Hindu kingship.
Although Jang Bahadur would have preferred to unite both religious and secular supremacy in his person and might, as Rose suggests, have declared himself king if the Tibetan war had ended in a more triumphant fashion,\textsuperscript{52} he and his successors accepted and indeed exploited the King’s ritual superiority. Belief in the King’s status as an avatar of Vishnu was deliberately reinforced by the Ranas. This approach was the one which Bhimsen Thapa had pioneered in the 1830s, when he had sought to persuade Rajendra that the King’s chief duty ‘was and ought to be the reception of his subjects’ worship and homage as God’s representative on earth and not a meddling with temporal concerns’.\textsuperscript{53} However minimal the Shah dynasty’s actual power during the Rana regime, the doctrine that the government rested on their consent was not violated. When Jang Bahadur’s sons were ousted by their Shamsher cousins in 1885, the latter took the infant King Prithvi to the army barracks to enlist the support of the troops, ‘whose loyalty to the throne’, one of the defeated party explained afterward, ‘(was) almost a passion’.\textsuperscript{54} When in 1950 King Tribhuvan escaped from Rana custody and put himself at the head of the regime’s opponents, there was no question of supplanting the dynasty, rather the Ranas tried to place his infant grandson on the throne. Tribhuvan’s victory left the monarchy in an unchallengeable position, strengthened by the Rana period because its sacred aura had been protected and indeed enhanced. Its century-long secular powerlessness absolved it from responsibility for the country’s economic backwardness and for the ‘collaborationist’ policy towards the British Raj.

Relations with the Bharadari

The killings and expulsions that marked Jang Bahadur’s accession to power in 1846 eliminated many of the leading bharadars and ensured that the newly-constituted bharadari were all men committed to his own interests. Nonetheless, they remained a potential source of opposition and maintenance of their loyalty was essential.

A convenient starting point for a discussion of the political elite in the early years of the Rana regime is the list of 219 officials who attested the Muluki Ain promulgated in January 1854.\textsuperscript{55} The signatories are listed in order of importance and the first ninety-two names can therefore be made the basis for a comparison with the list of ninety-two bharadars who signed the 1841 guarantee of goodwill for Resident Brain Hodgson.\textsuperscript{56} Table III shows the distribution of posts between the various thars and
### TABLE III

**THAR AND CASTE DISTRIBUTION OF SENIOR PERSONNEL: 1841 AND 1854**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1841</th>
<th>1854</th>
<th>1841</th>
<th>1854</th>
<th>1841</th>
<th>1854</th>
<th>1841</th>
<th>1854</th>
<th>1841</th>
<th>1854</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brahman 1845 1854</strong></td>
<td><strong>Khas (Chetri)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Thakuri (Rajput)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Magar</strong></td>
<td><strong>Newar</strong></td>
<td><strong>Caste Unknown</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aryal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaisi</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Basnet</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Shahi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rana</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jha</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Bhandari</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josi</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bista</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shahi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rana</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Bogati</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pande</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bohora</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pant</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Gharti</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paudyal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Karki</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upadhyaya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Khandka</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thar</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Khatri</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kunwar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mahat</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Majhi</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Malla</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pande</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thapa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Observations:

1. Magars and Ghartis (freed men of Khas extraction) were technically pure but non-twine born groups but individuals in high positions were probably regarded as 'honorary Chetris' and can thus be grouped with the Khas.

2. Newar castes are distributed at different points in the overall hierarchy laid down by the Ain, but were viewed as a single group in common practice.
caste groups. Members of the same thar were not ipso facto even distantly related but major changes in thar’s representation are normally the result of a change in fortune of a particular family. This is shown dramatically in the increase of the Kunwars and the reduction in the (Khas) Pandes. The stability of the Basnet total, on the other hand, reflects their ability to maintain their place through successive changes of regime.

The key feature of the new bharadari was the importance given to Jang Bahadur’s immediate relatives. Apart from receiving the most senior positions, his brothers, sons and nephews also got regular pay increases whilst the salaries of other functionaries generally remained static from year to year.57 His full brothers were included on the roll of succession to the premiership and in August 1856, in the lai mohar conferring the title of Maharaja, the King added Jang’s son Jagat Jang to ‘the roll of mukhtiyarship which I have established for your brothers’.58 A roll of thirty names, including second and in the case of Jang Bahadur’s grandchildren, third generation Ranas was promulgated in 1868.59

It has been generally accepted that the adoption of the agnative principle was intended by Jang as a device to secure the continued loyalty of his brothers.60 As a witness of the part which Ranbir had played in the downfall of his brother Bhimsen. Jang Bahadur had realised the paramount importance of maintaining family unity and the 1851 plot against him strengthened that conclusion. The wish to prevent a minor succeeding to the premiership with the consequent risk of instability may have been an additional factor, but cannot have been the decisive one; Jang was much more likely in the 1850s to have been worried about immediate political difficulties than the long-term prospects. As Jain points out, the system did not in fact prevent strife within the family after Jang Bahadur’s death but it was an adequate response to the demands of his lifetime and even afterwards, Rana solidarity remained sufficient to protect their rule from outside challenges.

Jang Bahadur’s most important non-Rana ally was Vijay Raj Pande, whose role at the Kot, in the Bhandarkhal affair and in providing legitimacy for Jang Bahadur’s claim to caste equality with the royal family has already been highlighted. In contrast with the nonchalant attitude that he adopted towards Surendra in British company, Jang Bahadur was careful to treat Vijay with respect in public. Laurence Oliphant, who had met Jang Bahadur on board the ship when he was returning from Europe in 1850 and was invited to accompany him to Kathmandu, was particularly struck by the deference he had shown
towards the rajguru at Banaras and believed that a part of Jang Bahadur’s popularity in Nepal was due to his friendship with Vijay.61 The belittling attitude towards Vijay displayed in Pudma’s book probably reflects Jang’s wish in later life to play down his early dependence on him. Regardless of what may have been discussed privately amongst family members, the special link between the Pandes and the Ranas was recognised in 1863 by an order promising that Vijay and his descendants would remain gurus to Jang Bahadur and his descendants. This paralleled a similar undertaking to the Pandes from King Surendra.62 In later years, the role of personal guru to the Ranas was in fact shared between different Brahman families, because, like the Shah kings before 1846, the Ranas thought it safer not to allow a monopoly in this sensitive area.63 On the other hand, the Pandes were permitted to retain their monopoly as personal gurus to the royal family until after the fall of the Rana regime. When the royal family no longer exercised real political power, their gurus’ role had less political significance.

While Vijay and his close relatives eclipsed the Mishras and Paudyals, another branch of the Pande family took over the role of the Aryal family in providing the King’s purohit.64 Tirtha Raj Pande appears in this position in the Muluki Ain list. In compensation, the Aryals, who had been rajgurus themselves in the earliest days of the Shah dynasty, were allowed to retain the post of khajanchi (state treasurer). Shiva Prasad Aryal remained for many years in this post which he had assumed some time before 1846, This position declined in importance with the appointment of a second khajanchi.

The chautaras as a group retained little of their former importance. Neither Shamsher Jang nor Kulchand, the latter a former ally of the kala Pandes during the turbulent 1839-1840 period, enjoyed particular influence. The number of posts held by them at lower levels in the bharadari declined spectacularly after 1846. As Table III shows, they were the group which lost the most heavily in the changes of 1846-1847. Only Ransher Shah survived the general decline. He played a major role in preparing the way for the Shah-Rana marriage alliances. Appointed a kaji in 1854, he was soon become Jang Bahadur’s brother-in-law and also the principal chautara. His place on the list of signatories to the Ain, immediately after the Rana officers and before Vijay’s family, is symptomatic of his personal importance.

A prominent place among the Khas bharadars went to relatives of Jang Bahadur by marriage. The appointments of Hemdal Thapa, father of Jang Bahadur’s son-in-law Gajraj, Sanak Singh Khatri, his brother-
in-law and Kulman Singh Basnet, brother of Jang’s late father-in-law, have already been described. The first two remained in Jang Bahadur’s confidence without a break. Kulman, on the other hand, is missing from the Kitabkhana record for 1848, probably because his nephew Meghm-bir, Jang Bahadur’s brother-in-law, was involved in the plot against Jang Bahadur in the autumn of that year. His cousin Jitman, who later disappears from the records, is shown as a kaji in his place that year. Kulman was soon back in office where he remained into the 1860s. Kulman and Hemdal are shown as colonels in the register for 1855, when a re-organisation of the hierarchy that year had downgraded the post of kaji which thenceforth carried a salary of only 3,200 to 3,600 rupees per annum. Sanak reached the higher rank of Commander-Colonel, the only non-Rana to do so.

Jang Bahadur’s childhood friend Ran Mehar Adhikari (who had played a key role both at the Kot and at Bhandarkhal) was a close associate until his death in 1852. The birta grant conferred on him in 1846 was later confirmed in his sons’ names but none of them became politically prominent. It is not known whether the Captain Juddha Bir Adhikari on the 1854 list was their relative.

A second Khas group consisted of men who had been closely associated either with Bhimsen or Mathbar. Most important was Mathbar’s adherent Dilli Singh Basnet, described by Resident Ramsay in 1852 as one of the few bharadars prepared openly to contradict Jang Bahadur’s opinions. A sardar in 1848, he was a kaji when he accompanied Jang Bahadur to Britain in 1850. Like Hemdal and Kulman he exchanged the title for that of colonel in 1855. He was made Chief Colonel in charge of the Tarai districts in the early 1860s and was succeed in this post by his grandson Bhakta Bahadur on his death in 1873. The involvement of his elder brother Bhotu Basnet in the plot against Jang Bahadur in 1852 had not shaken confidence in his loyalty.

Kaji Umakant Upadhyaya had served as vakil in Calcutta and as head of the treasury during Bhimsen’s time. Because of his activities in the latter capacity, an attempt to recover two lakh rupees from him was made by the Pande administration in 1839. Umakant, according to Hodgson, had played a central role in a system of trading monopolies set up for the benefit of Bhimsen and his closest associates. Jang Bahadur set up a similar system and part of Upadhyaya’s usefulness was due to his expertise in this line.

Another former Thapa adherent was Captain Lal Singh Khatri. He had been arrested four months after Mathbar’s death for carrying out
orders which the new administration disapproved. He was a fluent English-speaker, having been taught by Brian Hodgson when he was the subedar in charge of the Nepalese guard at the Residency in the early 1840s. He is the first Nepalese known to have published in that language, contributing a letter to the *Illustrated London News* on the Nepal-Tibet border when he was in London with Jang Bahadur in 1850. This expertise was used again in the late 1850s when he was a Nepal Government Agent in Calcutta with the rank of lieutenant colonel and then again as a full colonel when he brought news of the 1885 coup by Dhir Shamsher's sons to the British Residency.

Another clearly identifiable group amongst the *bharadari* was that of Newar financial administrators, several of whom were in 1854, serving as *subba*. Holders of this title had originally been district revenue collectors but could also hold general administrative power in their areas. By Jang Bahadur's time, *subbas* were additionally employed as the heads of certain offices in the central government. Most conspicuous were the three Rajbhandari brothers Ratnaman, Siddhiman and Meherman, the first two of whom held the higher ranks of *mir subba* and *amin subba*. None of them are mentioned in Hodgson's 1843 *bharadari* list which includes only five *subbas*, all of them Brahmans in charge of Tarai districts and no Newar other than Mir Munshi Lakshmi Das. Ratnaman and Siddhiman first came into prominence in 1845 since Jang Bahadur describes them in a letter as protégés of Abhiman Singh Rana and Gagan Singh respectively. Their appointment may well have been the result of disenchantment with plains Brahmans such as Hira Lal Jha who had fallen foul of Surendra and Motihari district collector Girija Datt Mishra, who according to oral tradition in Janakpur had managed to divert most of the revenue into his own pockets. In a letter written during his 1850 European journey, Jang Bahadur denounced both Ratnaman and Siddhiman as oppressors of the peasantry. He imprisoned Ratnaman on his return to Nepal but continued to use the family's services. Ratnaman was soon back in charge of the Tarai district of Bara and continued in that post at least until 1854/5 whilst Siddhiman took charge of the day-to-day running of the *Kausi Toshakhana* and then became one of the two *khajanchis* before returning to Tarai administration in 1858. He was made a colonel in 1861 despite the fact Newars were not accepted into the army as ordinary soldiers. Meherman was for many years deputy head of the *Mulukikhana*, the new central treasury set up by Jang Bahadur along with the old *Kausi Toshakhana*. In 1863, he was in charge of the Tarai district of Sarlahi.
with the rank of lieutenant-colonel.\textsuperscript{83}

Alongside the Rajbhandaris, other Newars such as Dhan Sundar and Hridaya Ratna worked as revenue collectors for Patan and Bhadgaon respectively. Dhan Sundar was a member of the Salmi or Manandhar (oil presser) caste. Later in the fifties, other Manandhars appear in the kit-\textit{abkhana} lists, probably all relatives of Dharma Narayan, a financier who was a close associate of Jang Bahadur and purchased many of the commodity monopolies against which the British Resident railed. Their duties were the collection of excise duties on substances such as tobacco, for which they were themselves monopoly suppliers.\textsuperscript{84}

The Newars did not entirely displace the Brahmans who had been the most frequent appointees as \textit{subbas} previously. The Brahman Lakshmipati Jaisi, \textit{subba} of Saptari district in 1843 and 1846, was collecting revenue in Morang in 1854/5 despite having earned Jang Bahadur’s displeasure for reasons similar to Siddhiman and Ratnaman.\textsuperscript{85} Jang Bahadur, however, came to place special reliance on men such as Siddhiman and Dharma Narayan. A mark of his favour was the royal order of 1848 permitting the \textit{chathariya} (of the 6 thars) Newar thars (the most prestigious section of the Shrestha Newars ranked as kshatriyas) to adopt certain marriage customs, such as the groom carrying the \textit{khalas} (sacred pot) that had hitherto been allowed to the higher Indo-Nepalese castes only.\textsuperscript{86} Both Siddhiman and Lakshmi Das, availed themselves of this privilege.\textsuperscript{87}

Jang Bahadur’s patronage of particular Newar families did not amount to a new deal for the Newars as a whole, for they remained a suspect group in Indo-Nepalese eyes. The individuals who gained the most in status were Hindu and not Buddhist Newars and they accepted a high degree of cultural assimilation. Lakshmi Das’ family, for instance, were regarded by later generations as the ‘Newar Ranajis’ in view of the assiduity with which they followed the customs of their masters.\textsuperscript{88} Oldfield, who knew both of them, wrote of Lakshmi and Siddhiman as having been ‘raised(?) from the rank of Newar to that of Parbattiah’.\textsuperscript{89} They were, nonetheless, still regarded as Newars by the dominant ethnic group. It was because of the fact that they could have no hope of reaching the most powerful position that they were confidants for Jang Bahadur.

The various groups so far identified leave unaccounted a considerable proportion of the 1854 list including most of the thirty-three captains, who will presumably have been those attached to the \textit{kampu}. In many cases they must have been relatives of the individuals already described but the links cannot be demonstrated and it must be
remembered that possession of the same thar does not in itself prove a family connection. Their loyalty was retained not so much by the level of pay they received but by the prospect of future promotion and the expansion of both the army and the civil service, which increased the chances of employment for their relatives. The army increased in size from 18,971 in 1846 to 26,659 in 1863, almost the entire increase taking place in the politically important kampu. The civil service strength increased from 2,997 to 4,226 during the same period.90 The initial support for the new regime which the many promotions following the Kot massacre had generated was further consolidated as the patronage in Jang Bahadur’s hands steadily expanded.

How far was the bharadari as a whole influential in policy decisions? An extreme view advanced by the Resident, George Ramsay, in 1864 was that it counted for nothing at all. Dismissing Jang’s claim that it was politically impossible for him to open the country to British merchants, he wrote as follows:

(Jang Bahadoor) is himself the obstacle to all free intercourse between Nepal and the British Provinces, he is the mainspring of the Goorkhas’ policy. All restrictions emanate from himself and not, as he wishes to make it believed, from the Sirdars. There is not a Sirdar in the country who has a voice in the matter. His Excellency’s power is absolute; he can do what he pleases; his word is law; his Government is the most perfect autocracy that can be imagined; he could throw open the country tomorrow to English merchants if he willed it, and without a dissentient voice being heard, but he does not choose to do so...91

It is indeed true that formal meetings of the bharadari—or ‘Grand Council’ as British sources sometimes describe it—were rare, but Ramsay’s picture is in fact a gross exaggeration, contradicting much other evidence, including that of his own earlier despatches, and explicable only in terms of his frustration at Jang’s habit of sheltering behind the bharadars’ real or imagined feelings whenever asked to do something inconvenient by the Government of India.

In the first place, whatever limitations there might be on the formal processes of consultation, Jang Bahadur always had to contend with the possibility of ‘extra-systemic’ opposition, i.e., plots and conspiracies against him, especially in the early years of his rule. These could involve both his closest relatives and the non-Rana bharadars. Basnets were
particularly prominent in this activity. As well as including the Megambhir
and Bhotu Basnet affairs already noted, there was also a plot to assassi-
nate him when he left Kathmandu in December 1857 at the head of a
force marching to assist the British at Lucknow.\textsuperscript{92} Though such activity
was not a family enterprise, the Basnets in general were particularly
liable to chafe at their subordination to the Kunwars since they were
numerous enough amongst the bharadari to aspire for higher things.

Such opposition to Jang Bahadur could to some extent be regarded
as simply the result of the ‘outs’ against the ‘ins’ but attitudes were also
shaped by policy issues, particularly Jang Bahadur’s relations with the
British. It is abundantly clear from the writings of the Britons who
accompanied Jang Bahadur back to Kathmandu in 1850 and from
Ramsay’s letters that considerable opposition to Jang Bahadur existed
and that the belief that he was too close to the British was a factor. The
role of such feeling in the 1851 plot is known and it was still causing
Ramsay considerable anxiety over a year later. He suggested in a
private letter to his cousin, the Governor-General Dalhousie, that Jang
Bahadur was showing a disregard for caste and other religious
prejudices which could result in his fall. Such a belief on the Resident’s
part had been partly fostered by Jang Bahadur telling the new arrival that
the bharadars sometimes taunted him with being an Englishman. It was
also substantiated, for instance, by Jang Bahadur’s draining Rani
Pokhari (a sacred pool in Kathmandu) and defying the ban on sexual
relations with outcastes by riding in public with a Muslim dancing girl\textsuperscript{93}. Not surprisingly, Dalhousie suggested in his reply that ‘the chief
practical result of (Jang’s) civilisation will be that he will get his throat
cut some time before that event would otherwise have occurred in the
common course of nature in Nepal’.\textsuperscript{94} In later years, Ramsay came to
believe that the picture of Jang Bahadur as a progressive ruler held
back by the prejudices of his countrymen was a totally false one deliber-
ately planted by the premier himself.\textsuperscript{95} This was only a part of the truth
since Jang Bahadur had to modify his more impetuous reactions to his
exposure to Europe in order to appease political feeling among the
bharadars.

Apart from taking into account the general climate of opinion
amongst senior office-holders, Jang Bahadur consulted them directly on
some occasions even though peremptory command was a style which
came easily to him, as the tone of his letters to his brother from Europe
shows. There was an inevitable tendency amongst bharadars to give the
advice they thought the prime minister wanted to hear but a few
individuals such as Dilli Singh Basnet were not afraid to speak their minds. Jang Bahadur’s brothers, though at times very deferential to him, once corrected him openly in front of the British Resident and privately offered frank advice. The real debate took place at an informal level with few people present and the fuller meetings of the bharadari had more of a rubber-stamp quality. This was the case with the bharadari sessions which decided on Rajendra’s deposition and the punishment of the 1851 conspirators.

This contrast between two levels is the most likely explanation of the conflict in the sources over the decision to support the British in the sepoy revolt. This was formally debated on 27 July 1857, after the first troops had been sent down to the plains but while Jang Bahadur was advocating an offer of additional troops. The meeting was attended by bharadars down to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, which included members of the Rana family and prominent non-Ranas such as Hemdal Thapa, Dilli Singh Basnet and others. Jang Bahadur asked those present whether they were prepared to support his policy, making it clear that if they did so they would have to share the responsibility should anything go wrong. The result, according to the Resident’s report sent two days later to Calcutta, was a unanimous endorsement. This is seemingly contradicted by many other accounts. According to Pudma, opinions were offered in favour of joining the British, joining the rebels and also in favour of staying neutral. The vamshavali records that all the bharadars spoke against giving support but were overruled by Jang.

One of Jang’s brothers told Ramsay in June, before the council had met, that he was under pressure from many leading men to join the rebellion. Similar sentiments were expressed to a subsequent Resident in 1877 by Dhir Shamsher, the youngest of the brothers. Rajguru Vijay Raj Pande was most conspicuous amongst those convinced that British rule in India was now doomed. Jain implies that all the accounts of opposition to Jang’s policy were fabrications aimed at persuading the British of the obstacles he was overcoming in their interest, but the more plausible explanation for these contradictions is that such opposition did exist but that no one was prepared to vote openly against Jang Bahadur once his opinion had been made clear.

The Army

The support of the army had been crucial in Jang Bahadur’s attainment of power and its continued loyalty was essential for his regime’s
survival. This was partly secured by Jang Bahadur's popularity with the troops which rested on his reputation for bravery and sympathy shown earlier in his career for the problems of the ordinary soldier. This hold over the men was commented upon by various British observers, including one who witnessed a tearful farewell at Calcutta between Jang Bahadur and his favoured Rifle Regiment in 1850 and another who, during the Mutiny, contrasted the Gorkhas' loyalty to Jang Bahadur with their attitude towards other officers regarded as less courageous.\textsuperscript{101}

There were other reasons for his popularity too: the army structure introduced by Mathbar was modified by Jang Bahadur with the reintroduction of jemadars, a large increase in the number of lieutenants, the introduction of a new rank of lieutenant-colonel and increase in the number of colonels and generals. The highest ranks were monopolised by the Ranas themselves but the total number of officers from jemadar up to lieutenant-colonel in 1863 in the \textit{kampu} was 635. In 1846, posts in the same pay range totalled only 222. Jang Bahadur's first seventeen years in power saw not only a steep rise in the number of higher-paid posts (see Table IV) but also an improvement in the ordinary soldier's perceived chances of promotion, since the ratio of posts paying over 100 rupees to the total strength of the \textit{kampu} went from 1:58 to 1:30. The strategy thus appears to have been one of securing the loyalty of the mass of the troops not by increasing their basic pay but by holding out the prospect of advancement before them. As recruitment was often from families which already had serving members, the increased prospect of employment for one's kin brought by the Army's expansion further strengthened the bond between the troops and the prime minister.

An exception to the standard pattern was made in the case of the Rifle Regiment which was set up after 1846 and became the \textit{kampu} elite. The pay of an ordinary soldier in this regiment ranged between 200 and 400 rupees per annum, placing him in a position vastly superior to his comrades in the other units. The Sri Nath and Letar regiments, which had once been the most favoured part of the Kathmandu now seem to have received no special treatment. Their loss of status probably preceded Jang's coming to power, since their numerical strength in 1846 was similar to that of the other units.\textsuperscript{102}

Jang Bahadur also sought to strengthen his hold over the army by exploiting ethnic diversity. Until 1846, troops had been recruited from only three ethnic groups, the Indo-Nepalese (excluding the low castes and comprising only Thakuris, Khas and Brahmans), the Magars
TABLE IV

**KAMPU: STRENGTH BY RANK, 1838-1863**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sardar</th>
<th>Lt. Colonel</th>
<th>Major-Captain</th>
<th>Captain</th>
<th>Lieutenant</th>
<th>Subedar</th>
<th>Jemadar</th>
<th>Havaladar</th>
<th>Amildar</th>
<th>Total All Ranks (inc. sipahi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1838</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>4,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2,750)</td>
<td>(875)</td>
<td>(675)</td>
<td>(205)</td>
<td>(80-100)</td>
<td>(75-85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(salary in brackets)</td>
<td>(3,600)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3,038)</td>
<td>(2,700)</td>
<td>(900)</td>
<td>(675)</td>
<td>(254)</td>
<td>(?126)</td>
<td>(?75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>8,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>19,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(salary in brackets)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3,038)</td>
<td>(2,700)</td>
<td>(900)</td>
<td>(675)</td>
<td>(254)</td>
<td>(?126)</td>
<td>(?60)</td>
<td>(?75)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**

i) Military return for 1838 (HP, Vol. 6, ff. 157, et seq. and 1836/7 pay scale, *ibid.*, ff. 174/5). The latter was implemented (as planned) only for officers (HP, Vol. 9, p. 117). Sardar's salary is the 1839 rate (HP, Vol. 13, f. 223).

ii) Military return for 1843, FS, 30 March 1844, No. 31 (NB: Chautaras and kajis assigned to regiments have been disregarded).

iii) *Jangi Adda*, Register No. 1 (comparative strengths and expenditure for 1845 and 1863). Salary figures for jemadar and below are unreliable. See the discussion in Appendix V.
and the Gurungs. According to Hodgson's 1839 account all the officers were drawn from the first group alone. The other two groups accounted for about half of the NCOs and privates. Certain families such as that of the Magar general Abhiman Singh Rana were treated as 'honorary Khas/Chetris' whilst the ordinary Magars and Gurungs were dispersed throughout all units of the army. In 1847, Jang Bahadur altered the traditional pattern by throwing open recruitment to the Kiranti tribes (Rai and Limbus) of the eastern hills. At about the same time he decided to segregate the different group in their own regiments. The intention, as he explained to Cavenagh during his European journey, was to minimise the danger of mutiny spreading from one regiment to the others. The account in the Resident's report of a near mutiny in 1857 makes it clear that the kampu by that time consisted of units of three different ethnic groups, the Indo-Nepalese, Gurung and combined Kiranti and Tamang. On the out break of the war with Tibet in 1854, separate corps were also set up composed of Bhotias, tribals with Tibetan cultural affinity. In Gurung regiments, officers up to the rank of captain were from that ethnic group. This was a theoretical improvement upon the situation in the 1830s when they were normally unable to rise higher than the rank of jemadar but partially offset by the 'inflation' in the rank structure which made a captain only the equivalent of a lieutenant in the earlier period. Magars and Gurungs serving in units earmarked to become totally Khas were moved out gradually. This explains the continuing ethnic mix observed by Oldfield. Segregation had still not been completed when the policy was abandoned. A royal order of 1863, conferring rewards on different groups in the country for their part in the war against Tibet in 1855-1856 and the Indian Mutiny, declared that Gurungs and Magars were both to be admitted to the roja paltan (select regiments), presumably referring to the kampu units which had hitherto been earmarked as purely Khas. The same document opened up military ranks up to that of colonel to these two ethnic groups. It also removed from the Kiranti their liability to enslavement. The number of non-Indo-Nepalese who reached senior positions remained minimal but Jang Bahadur had clearly reached the conclusion that the advantages of a fully rigorous divide and rule policy were outweighed by those of an apparent equality of opportunity.

The loyalty of the army was put to its most rigorous test in the summer of 1857, after news of Mutiny in the British provinces had reached Kathmandu. On 1 June, the day after the Nepal government had made a formal offer of help to the British, officiating prime minister
Krishna Bahadur informed the British Residency that a Gurung subedar had been arrested while attempting to incite the Rudra Dhoj regiment, a Gurung unit of the kampu, to mutiny and assassinate Jang Bahadur. His confession indicated that disaffection existed in several regiments. Jang Bahadur and the senior bharadars decided to have the document read out to the assembled troops and order them to sentence the culprit. Loaded guns were to be in position around the parade ground and if any regiment failed to call for the death sentence, the artillery would open fire upon them and the other units would be ordered to join in the slaughter. Resident Ramsay was horrified at this proposal, believing that the Gurung troops might hesitate to condemn one of their own to death even if they were loyal themselves and that ordering their comrades to open fire on them might precipitate a general revolt. Jang Bahadur and his brothers sent word that they would act on the advice. Later that day, proclamations were read separately to the Indo-Nepalese regiments, the Kiranti and Tamang units, the Gurungs, the artillery and he garrisons at the other Valley towns of Patan and Bhadgaon. The Indo Nepalese and the Kiranti units declared at once that they would accept any orders from their officers but the Gurung regiments, numbering altogether 1,700 to 1,800 men, broke ranks and formed separate pups to begin an animated discussion. The guns were in position around them but Jang Bahadur had ordered them not to be loaded. Randdip, second youngest of Jang Bahadur’s brothers, told the Resident later that he and the senior bharadars were convinced that they would be murdered. However, the discussion was allowed to take its course:

No steps were taken to excite them; they were addressed by the well-affected of their number, who pointed out to them the privileges that had been accorded to them by Jang Bahadoor; when suddenly, calling out that the honour of their caste was concerned, they made a simultaneous rush to the place where the prisoner was standing (who had been brought upon the Parade Ground to be shewn and repeat his confession to the troops) and put him to death upon the spot.\(^{111}\)

The loyalist spirit in the Nepal army had prevailed.

The background to the whole affair, according to Krishna Bahadur’s account to the Resident, had been attempts by ‘petty Mahomedan merchants and other inhabitants of the plains of India’
resident in Kathmandu to induce the rank and file of the army to persuade their officers to join the Indian revolt. The Darbar's offer of help on 21 May, which Jang and his brothers had not expected to be accepted and which was probably not yet public knowledge, is unlikely to have been a factor, so far as is known, there were no direct grievances against Jang's government involved either, but merely excitement communicated by events taking place in India. Nor can a sense of solidarity with the Indian rebels have been important, for one would have expected the higher-caste, more strongly Hindu regiments to have felt this more than the Gurungs. However, given the national sense of grievance against the British for halting Gorkha expansion, some restlessness in the army was inevitable. Although discipline was maintained throughout the crisis, it has been plausibly argued that Jang's motive in giving military support to the British was not only the prospect of reward from the victory he confidently expected them to win, but also the necessity to let the army have a part in the drama being enacted on the plains below. The temper of the army remained throughout a critical factor. Although the six regiments initially sent into India, which operated under close British supervision, proved completely reliable, there were some problems with the force which Jang himself took down in December to assist in the reduction of Lucknow. An accurate assessment of these is made more difficult because of the attempt which Jang made to have the resident, George Ramsay, recalled from his post, which meant that the latter was not inclined to put the most charitable interpretation on his actions. Nonetheless, it is certain enough that Jang was in communication with zamindars involved on the rebel side, in particular with Duman Khan, who had organised raids by Nepal-based bands against British positions across the frontier. Jang told Brigadier MacGregor, the British liaison officer with his force, that he was simply employing Khan as a spy, but Ramsay suggested in a letter to the Governor-General that Khan had in fact been used by the rebels to influence the Nepali bharadars and troops against the British, and that Jang himself had been unable to stop this happening. 'I have always represented', concluded Ramsay, 'that Jang Bahadoor, though in many respects a despot, is the mere tool of his army and holds his power only by keeping it in good humour.' Like Ramsay's later and very different characterisation of Jang Bahadur's regime as 'the most perfect autocracy imaginable' this is a distortion, but Jang Bahadur certainly could not take the army for granted.
The Machinery of Government

In conversation with Cavenagh in 1850, Jang Bahadur claimed that he exercised direct personal control over every aspect of the administration. Cavenagh was moved to write thus:

All written and verbal communication, relative to affairs Political, Fiscal and Judicial, are submitted to the Minister, who generally proceeds to issue his orders thereon without consulting the Maha Raja or... the Grand Council... The minute supervision exercised by General Jang Bahadoor over the management of all departments of the State is most extraordinary and deserving of the highest commendation, for the amount of labour thereby entailed upon him must be immense. I believe that I am fully justified in saying that not a rupee is expended from the Public Treasury, nor a merchant permitted to pass the Forts at Muckwanpore or Seesa Gurhee without his knowledge and sanction. All appointments Civil and Military are conferred by him and all complaints regarding... Public Officials are brought to his notice.¹¹⁵

Jang Bahadur also told Cavenagh that he had achieved this command of the administrative machinery despite his being virtually illiterate on entering office. He overcame this handicap and began to handle official documents adequately within one year.¹¹⁶ There is no reason to doubt that Jang did keep a very tight grip on government activity, especially appointments but there is direct evidence that Jang Bahadur had an inadequate grasp of the nuts and bolts of administration. The Resident's report of his resignation from the premiership in 1856 included the following revealing account of a discussion he had with him the previous month on the financing of Nepal's just concluded war with Tibet:

... Jang Bahadoor tried to explain to me what the War had cost his Government, but he made so many blunders and misstatements that I was able to correct him on some points, whilst his brothers, who were sitting near us, contradicted nearly every other statement he made. Amongst other things, he told me that he had raised 70 lacs of rupees by the tax of one-third on all landed produce and on Jagheres, Pay, etc. (reported in my letter to your address No. 3 of the 18th January), that his now surplus grain would sell for 20 lacs more, etc., etc. I reminded him that he had in the first
instance only estimated twenty lacs as the sum that could be raised by the tax just mentioned and that seventy lacs would be nearly double the revenue of his country. He then corrected himself and said that the amount so raised must have been only 35 lacs, and he went on to try and prove to me by adjusting the value of his Assets that the war had only really cost his Government some 5 or 6 lacs of rupees. He told me nearly two years ago that it had then cost the country upwards of sixty lacs. In fact, His Excellency seemed quite puzzled and not to have the least knowledge of what he was talking about.\textsuperscript{117}

When Jang Bahadur assumed the premiership again in 1857, it was reported that the internal administration of the country was the responsibility of his brother Krishna Bahadur as Commander-in-Chief and during the last two or three years of Krishna’s life (he died in 1863) this was the actual practice.\textsuperscript{118} Thus, by the 1860s, Jang Bahadur had stopped attempting to superintend every detail of the administration. The general lines of policy were certainly his and his letter to Bam shows how strongly he could feel on some issues but detailed planning and execution was the work of others.

The civilian government employees on whom this responsibility fell numbered just under 3,000 in 1846. The total rose to almost 4,000 by 1863.\textsuperscript{119} Most of them were employed in routine record keeping activities but certain key individuals, though not politically influential kept the administrative machinery running and pushed through major changes. \textit{Muluki Kharidar} (civil secretary) Gunavanta, who shaped the revenue system under Bhimsen, was one such administrator.\textsuperscript{120} Siddhiman Singh Rajbhandari and other financial specialists also played a similar role under Jang Bahadur. The Nepalese administration impressed Brian Hodgson who contrasted it with the difficulties often met in other natives states:

\ldots here there is an unsophisticated nobility rendering administration a comparatively easy task. We have no popular commotions, no getting into debt by the Government or any deferring of pay due to its servants, so that the administrative clock moves on almost without the touch of the Durbar’s hand.\textsuperscript{121}

Political tranquility was one reason for this state of affairs. This condition disappeared with Bhimsen’s fall soon after Hodgson wrote
these words in 1837 but was restored with Jang Bahadur's coming to power. The inherent quality of the bureaucracy now reasserted itself.

The principal government offices in Kathmandu in the early 1840s were described by Hodgson in a paper which was not published but from which extensive extracts are included in Edwards' survey of the pre-Rana administration. The most important were the Kausi Toshakhana which other than receiving the income from lands not assigned as salary, was the office through which the subbas of the Tarai were appointed; the Sadar Daphtarkhana which assigned jagirs to all civil and military employees other than the soldiers of the kampu; the Kampu Daphtarkhana which dealt with kampu assignments; the Kumari Chauk which Jang Bahadur himself once headed and which audited the accounts of all government income while also acting as a court of law for revenue and related matters; the office of the Mir Munshi which handled correspondence with the British, Tibet and China and the four principal courts of the capital, the Koti Ling, Ita Chapali, Taksar and Dhansar. Mention should also be made of the Dak Chauk Dhukuri (depository for the state reserves) which in 1843 held ten million rupees. There were many other lesser offices whose functions are not always clearly understood. Most offices were situated in or near the palace complex at Hanuman Dhoka and their names, if not descriptive of their function, referred to their location.

Jang Bahadur retained this basic structure but instituted a second treasury, the Mulukikhana, which took over the Toshakhana's function of receiving revenue and the Dak Chauk Dhukuri's function of holding the main government reserves. The Toshakhana continued to act as a channel through which payments were made, receiving funds for this purpose from the Mulukikhana. The keeping of land tax assessment records was simplified with the creation of a single Moth Addo (Register Office) in place of the previous sixteen separate offices. A number of new agencies and departments were set up for specific tasks. The most important innovation was the setting-up in 1848 of a personnel records office, the Kamyandari Kitabkhana.

The setting up of the Kamyandari Kitabkhana eased the task of control over the administration and set a trend towards systemisation. Even before Jang Bahadur came to power letters of appointment had often contained detailed instructions on the task to be performed. Now there was a proliferation of sawals, administrative manuals providing for all contingencies. A separate office—the Sawal Adda—was created to oversee their preparation. This drive for standardisation was
manifest in the production of the first comprehensive legal code for the country—"the Muluki Ain"—that was promulgated in January 1854.

The Muluki Ain

The Preamble to the Ain states that its purpose is to end the situation in which identical offenses have attracted varying penalties and to ensure that in future everyone is dealt with uniformly on the basis of his offense and caste. The Code runs into 693 pages in the 1965 printed edition (essentially a reprint of the revised version of 1867) and covers not only criminal law in the ordinary sense but also land tenure issues and offenses relating to caste which earlier fell within the sphere of the dharma dhikar. Within the last category, special emphasis is placed on punishment for sexual relations violating caste barriers and expiation required even from those who have been unwittingly polluted by the offenders. The penalties reflect clearly the strict prohibition of hypogamy and relative toleration of hypergamy that is an essential feature of the caste ideology. The same logic is extended into the treatment of homosexual relations. Cases where the active partner is of a caste lower than the passive are treated more severely than those where the reverse applies. As well as illustrating general principles, these sections of the Ain provide a wealth of detailed information on the caste hierarchy in Nepal with the relative positions of the different groups explicitly formulated for the lower castes and implied for the upper ones. The document is of immense significance for anthropologists and an extensive analysis of the Ain from this point of view has been made by Höfer. His and other discussions have highlighted two main issues: was the Ain consciously reformist or merely a codification of existing practice? Did it reflect Western influence?

Since no codification of the law on the scale of the Ain had been attempted before, it is not always clear whether particular provisions are innovations. However, Jain is right in saying that it is a fundamentally conservative document. This is clear both from the overall thrust of the code and from the fact that a relatively small number of sections are highlighted as if they were new. Jain goes much too far, however, in denying Jang Bahadur credit for mitigating the severity of the Nepalese penal system which is given to him by Cavenagh and Pudma Rana. Whilst mutilation was already rare during Hodgson’s time and though Jang Bahadur exaggerated the extent of past severity so as to appear in a reformist light, there are many instances of this penalty having been
applied in the years before the *Ain* was promulgated. This is amply documented by Adhikari. The punishments imposed in one royal order of 1838 which he publishes included castration of a Magar who had sexual relations with his patrilateral cousin and amputation of a thumb of a slave convicted of theft. As late as 1850, two untouchables were castrated for having sex with women of pure caste. The latter was at a time when Jang Bahadur was telling his British friends that mutilation was no longer practised. However, the sentences were passed in Kathmandu whilst he was in Europe. With the implementation of the *Ain*, castration was abolished as a penalty and capital punishment greatly restricted. Physical maltreatment of offenders did not cease altogether, since cutting of the nose was retained in some circumstances for women involved in adultery or theft as was branding for both sexes. Sati was not prohibited--this step was not taken until the time of Jang Bahadur’s nephew Maharaja Chandra Shamsher—but the circumstances in which it could take place were restricted. Widows with male children under thirteen, for example, were barred from ascending the pyre.

Mitigation of the severity of the earlier penal code and restrictions on sati were largely the result of British influence. Bhimsen and Mathbar realised that this could win them British approval. Already by 1832, the law prescribing death penalty for outcastes having sexual relations with pure caste females had been relaxed in practice whilst in 1836, Hodgson reported that the British presence in Kathmandu was having an ameliorative effect on the Nepalese system and that the Darbar had been careful to bring to his notice the fact that there had for some years been no case of sati amongst the families of the leading *bharadars*. Jang Bahadur too was eager to present himself to the British as a liberal and the need to protect this image helped shape his conduct.

Foreign influence helped plant the idea of codification in Jang Bahadur’s mind. Nepal’s own history, too, offered precedents, for there existed already law codes ascribed to the fifteenth-century Kathmandu ruler Jayasthiti Malla and Rama Shah, a seventeenth-century king of Gorkha. In the *Dibya Upadesh* Prithvi Narayan Shah referred to his own intention (not fulfilled) of following their example. The Jayasthiti regulations, which, as the *Ain* did, underwrote the existing caste hierarchy, were regarded by the Nepalese courts in the 1830s as authoritative for disputes involving Newars, Bhotias and lower-caste Indo-Nepalese. Jayasthiti’s and Rama Shah’s codes were on a less
comprehensive scale than the *Ain*. To understand the origins of Jang Bahadur’s more ambitious project, it is necessary to take into account both the openness to non-Hindu influence on issues of form (not content) which Nepal had already displayed and also Jang Bahadur’s own experiences in Europe in 1850. The first of these is illustrated by the wholesale adoption of Muslim and specifically Mughal terminology in land revenue and administration. Bhimsen also made efforts to learn about foreign legal systems. Hodgson was requested during the 1830s to provide the Darbar with details of crimes and penalties in British India. While Hodgson thought this was prompted by his own curiosity about the Nepalese system, Bhimsen had earlier instructed members of a mission sent to Burma to seek similar information there.137 When Jang Bahadur was in Europe, the Code Napoléon came to his attention and made a strong impression on him. The passages concerning the emperor in *Jang Bahadurko Belait-Yatra*, the account written by one of his travelling companions are especially vivid. There is an oral tradition amongst Jang Bahadur’s descendants that he regarded Napoleon as his political emperor.138 The fusion of the roles of warrior and law maker was an important element in Napoleonic legend and Jang Bahadur’s wish to have himself presented in the same light is newly illustrated by the design of his marble statue that was erected in March 1854 on the Tundhikhel. He was depicted holding a sword in one hand and a law code in the other.139 The *Belait-Yatra* mentions the *ain-kitab* (law-book) in the list of things that Louis Napoleon had suggested that Jang Bahadur might care to see while in Paris.

The possibility of Western influence in a more subtle form is raised in Höfer’s valuable discussion of the *Ain*’s relationship with Indian legal tradition. He points out that whereas the orthodox view requires the King to uphold dharma but not to interpret it, the *Ain*, a document drawn up and promulgated by the prime minister and the entire *bharadari kausal* (council of bharadars), not just its Brahman members, represents a state take-over of the latter function also. Together with this strengthening of the state’s role is an emphasis on territorial boundaries. The *Ain* demarcates Nepal from Mughlana (the India formerly ruled and polluted by the Muslims and now by the British). The *dharmadhikar*’s authority to grant *patiya* (certificate of expiation) in cases of involuntary pollution also is delegated in some circumstances to local authorities or jagirdars having tenurial authority over the area. In this Höfer sees not only a natural extension of the King’s position as protector of his people and ultimate owner of the
soil but also the influence of the modern concept of the nation-state. The suggestion is an attractive one but there are a number of shortcomings. In the first place, Höfer’s picture of the secular kshatra merely acting as the executive arm of the brahman spiritual authority is a dichotomy which fails to take into account the religious aspect of Hindu kingship itself. Secondly, though the subordination of the Brahman dharmadhikar to the secular authorities is seemingly complete (he is barred from issuing patiya without the permission of the king and premier except in bhor routine, non-intentional pollution), neither Vijay nor his successors became mere cyphers. They retained prestige and authority as brahmans and gurus. Thirdly, Höfer understates the role of the Hindu state in India. He examines the Maratha kingdom before 1818 and relying on Gune’s account of its judicial procedure, argues that in caste matters the state ‘represents merely the executive power enforcing the resolutions of the caste assembly and/or Brahmins and helps the offender to expiate and retain his caste status’. A more recent study of Maratha system has shown that the state’s role was a stronger one. Restoration of lost caste status, for example, was possible only when sanctioned by the government. Caste fellows readmitting an offender to commensality or priests performing the prayaschitta (expiation) ceremony were punished if they did so without the state’s authority. However, ‘étatisation’ was taken to further limits by the Ain; the role of caste assemblies is not even mentioned in it. Höfer’s basic contention has some validity but the gap between the Nepalese and the orthodox Hindu pattern was narrower than he suggests.

The essential feature of the Ain is not the state’s assumption of the right to prescribe a moral order but its promulgating such an order encompassing all the territory under the king’s control. Burghart has argued that at the turn of the nineteenth century there existed a clear distinction between the king’s muluk (possessions), which was simply the area happening to be under his tenurial authority at any one time, and his realm or desha, which was a region of fixed extent under the protection of the king’s tutelar deity. The obligation to maintain a moral order—and in particular the varna hierarchy—applied pre-eminently to the latter. The muluk, on the other hand, was not seen as a single moral universe, but a collection of different ‘realms’ and of different ‘countries’ (desh—vernacular form of the Sanskrit desha), the latter being geographical regions and/or the homes of different peoples. The Ain, by setting up an all-Nepal caste hierarchy, extends the desha to
coincide with the *muluk* and replaced a multiplicity of ‘countries’, each with its own customary law, by a single society of *jati*. Burghart’s analysis, like Höfer’s is pushed a little too far, since the pre-1854 state certainly sought to impose certain moral values on the areas of the country outside the *desha*, that is outside the old kingdom of Gorkha and the Kathmandu Valley and immediately surrounding hills: as Burghart himself points out, the ban on cow-slaughter was enforced throughout the country, and the king reserved to himself the right to deal with crimes held particularly polluting even when he alienated his tenurial authority in a *birta* grant to a Brahman or ascetic. Nevertheless, the *Ain* represented a significant advance towards integration of all Nepalese territory, justifying Höfer’s verdict that its society was ‘on the way to becoming a nation of castes’. The *Ain*’s role in this respect complemented the enlargement of the ethnic base for army recruitment and the levels to which members of less-favoured groups could be promoted therein.

**Revenue Policy**

Important though the legal enforcement of Hindu orthodoxy was, it was the revenue demand that was the most important element in state-citizen relations. The government’s claim on agricultural produce was its principal source of income and the first object of revenue policy was to maximise that income without placing an intolerable burden on the cultivator. This concern for the agriculturalist was motivated by the danger that he would ‘vote with his feet’ against a harsh regime by abandoning his plot. In the early Rana years, land was surplus and except in the western hills, it had no capital value. The cultivator’s interest, therefore, lay only in the standing crop. In the fertile lands of the eastern Tarai, peasants easily absconded with their harvest across the border into India, a move made easy because the frontier did not correspond to any cultural or geographical reality.

The second object of state policy was to manage the relationship with the intermediaries, whether holders of land grants from the central government, collectors or farmers of the revenue. These groups had to be both conciliated and prevented from becoming too powerful. They were also to be prevented from frustrating the government’s first objective by oppressing peasants and diverting revenue into their own pockets. Here again, in the Tarai the chaudhuris responsible for collection at the pargana level had the advantage of greater local knowledge.
than the central authorities and like the peasants beneath them, easily absconded across the border where they kept a large part of their assets.\textsuperscript{148} Where people of Tarai origin occupied higher positions in the revenue structure, as was the case with Hira Lal Jha or \textit{subba} Girija Datt Mishra, the danger was greater.

After many years of frequent changes in revenue demand and collection mechanisms, Jang Bahadur put in place a more lasting structure. A key part of this strategy was long-term settlements. In the hills, surveys between 1854 and 1868 fixed taxation levels which remained broadly unchanged for the rest of the century. Previously jagirdars were entitled to oust tenants if they received an offer of higher rent from another peasant but this practice was forbidden by the \textit{Ain} for land other than under \textit{birta} tenure. Even though the sale of land in the central and eastern hills remained illegal, the granting of security of tenure led to the emergence of a \textit{de facto} market in land, especially after the 1870 edition of the \textit{Ain} laid down that whoever paid tax on a plot would be registered as the holder. In contrast to such moves which paved the way towards private ownership of land and later in the century, growing subinfeudation, Jang Bahadur also maintained the \textit{raibandi} system which had first been introduced in the late 1830s. Under this system, the government reserved the right to redistribute ricelands amongst families which were already holders in order to ensure that each retained a viable unit. However, although there is evidence of redistribution actually taking place among families with \textit{rakam} tenure, that is holding land direct from the government in return for labour services, its use does not appear to have been widespread.

Regmi estimates rent was about one-third of the crop in the Tarai and the west, and one-half or more elsewhere. In the former areas assessment was normally in cash and paid by zamindars or independent peasants (\textit{chuni}) whereas elsewhere the registered land-holder was normally a peasant termed \textit{mohi} (‘tenant’). The \textit{mohi} worked on the holding himself while both zamindar and \textit{chuni} had their land cultivated by the \textit{adhiyar} (sharecroppers). The revenue burden on the actual tillers was thus much the same all over the country.\textsuperscript{149}

Under Jang Bahadur’s rule, the level of rents remained broadly the same as that reached in the early 1840s except that in the Tarai he did away with the 25 per cent surcharge which had been imposed on the region during that period and had led to the flight of many peasants across the border. The tendency for intermediaries in the revenue hierarchy to extract more from the peasantry than they were legally
KINGS, SOLDIERS AND PRIESTS

entitled to persisted but Jang Bahadur’s measures to prevent this were more whole-hearted than they had previously been. He launched tirades against oppression of the peasantry in the letters written home from Europe and, on his return to Nepal, arrested and imprisoned Ratnaman Singh Rajbhandari for that offence. This incident made a great impression both in India and Nepal. Oliphant on his way back to the plains from Kathmandu was escorted by the guide who gave that as his reason for moving from East India Company territory into Nepal. Instructions issued to Jagat Shamsher as Governor-in-Chief of the Tarai in 1856 specified that if peasants deserted their fields an enquiry be held and any local official found guilty of oppression be punished. Jang Bahadur’s wish to reduce pressure on the peasantry resulted in the temporary abandonment of the jhara system of pressed labour though this was re-introduced during the war with Tibet and retained thereafter. The Ain also ended enslavement for debt. However, the peasant still bore some risk for crop failure, for the Ain permitted an adjustment of the revenue demand only if the yield was at least 25 per cent below the level assumed for tax calculations.

Earlier, on land where the state had alienated its claim to the revenue, either on a temporary or permanent basis, that is on territory under birta, guthi, or jagir tenure or included within a dependent rajya, the collection of all dues was the responsibility of the grantee. Elsewhere, the central government employed a number of different collection systems. In the hills, there was a division between khet (irrigated) lands, where collection was normally the responsibility of local officials known as jimawals and pakho (dry) lands, which were taxed on a homestead basis. Homestead dues were collected either by contractors or through the mukhiya (village headman). In the Tarai, different methods were employed, with the chaudhuris at pargana level handing over their collections variously to salaried government employees, a single contractor-general for the whole Tarai or contractors at district level. Jang Bahadur continued the same policy in the hills but radically revised the system in the Tarai. The revenue farmers were phased out in favour of direct collection by salaried subbas (later lieutenant-colonels) responsible to the Tarai governor, normally a member of Jang Bahadur’s family. These officials were generally from either Kathmandu or the hills, so their assets were readily confiscable. Also, they were prohibited from trading or owning land in the area for which they were responsible. Under military discipline and subject to the control of the pajani and the new personnel department, they were
unlikely to emulate the exploits of Girija Datt Mishra. Local people were brought into the hierarchy only at the pargana level, where the chaudhuri system was continued. To tighten arrangements lower down, Jang Bahadur in 1861 instituted the jimidar system at mauja level. Jimidars collected the revenue within their area, receiving as remuneration land calculated to provide 5 per cent of the total collection (10 per cent in the far western Tarai returned to Nepal in 1860). This land was to be worked compulsorily by the peasants from whom they collected revenue. The arrangement was intended partly as an insurance against absconding cultivators, for the jimidar was personally liable for the revenue on the land which remained uncultivated. The new system included a provision of financing the peasantry as one of their responsibilities. Jang Bahadur wanted them to operate not only as collectors but also as ‘improving landlords’. The logic behind the arrangement was thus similar to that of the Bengal Permanent Settlement. However, their role as entrepreneurs became of little significance once the supply of reclaimable land was reduced and they ‘only combined the functions of tax collector, rent receiver and money lender’.152 Towards the end of the century, they emerged as virtual landlords, with the sale of jimidari rights known to have occurred as early as 1885. The system thus depressed the position of the chuni peasants who had hitherto dealt independently with the chaudhuris. Politically, however, the arrangement had the advantage of tying the interests of local ‘big men’ closely together with those of the central government. Though appointments as jimidar were made by the local authorities in the 1860s, by 1890 the role had been taken over by Kathmandu directly. As a collection mechanism, the system appears to have worked satisfactorily. Although flight across the border remained a problem at first, to diminished after the British agreement in 1866 which made revenue embezzlement an extraditable offence.153 The problem further reduced in gravity as land acquired capital value.

The payment of government employees through jagir assignments both eased the burden on the central authorities and gave the jagirdar the opportunity to realise more than the theoretical amount due to him. Jang Bahadur retained the system but imposed a number of restrictions. In 1852/3, the use of Tarai land for jagirs was abolished. This was a reversion to the situation in the early 1830s but constituted a major change from the practice in the intervening years, as Hodgson’s statistics for 1842/3 show that half the assignments to civilian bharadars and one-sixth of those to the kampu were then in the Tarai.154
The hills were consequently given over almost entirely to jagirdars, and in 1852/3 less than 1 per cent of the 2.1 million assessment for the region actually reached the treasury.\(^{155}\) The jagirdars' rights were reduced somewhat by the new security of tenure given to the cultivator whilst the juridical powers which officers held over their tenants were limited by a ban on their trying cases involving claims over 500 rupees. Jurisdiction in serious criminal offences attracting the punchkhat (five severest penalties) remained reserved with the centre as before. The expansion of adalats (district courts) in the hills made it easier for the aggrieved tenant to exercise his right of appeal against the jagirdar's decision.

The gifting of land as birta was prohibited by the Ain in areas already under cultivation and such grants were reserved as an inducement for the development of new lands. In practice, however, Jang Bahadur violated this rule in his own interest and large grants were made to himself and to members of his family, particularly in the western districts which were returned to Nepal as a reward for assistance in suppressing the Indian Mutiny.\(^ {156}\) In other areas, Jang Bahadur sometimes paid for land transferred to him but his Rana successors discontinued the practice and received grants as outright gifts from the state. By 1950, the year before the fall of the Rana regime, over a third of Nepal's total cultivated area was under birta tenure and three-quarters of this in the possession of Rana family members.\(^ {157}\) The birtadar was placed in an especially favoured position by the Ain. In addition to permanent possession he was allowed to oust a tenant who failed to match an offer of higher rent from another peasant. It should be noted, however, that the state retained the right to levy tax on birta holdings in extremis and this was done in 1855 to meet the cost of the war with Tibet.\(^ {158}\)

Similar in position to large birtadars were the rulers of the various rajyas not fully integrated into the regular administration. The original rajyas were pre-unification states which had been left with internal autonomy in return for tribute. Under Jang Bahadur and his successors, rajyas were set up or abolished as reward and punishment. The rajas generally either enjoyed autonomy on the old pattern—the one followed when Jang Bahadur was named Maharaja of Kaski and Lamjung in 1856—or merely birta rights plus the title. However, the preponderant power of the central government was never jeopardised. Rulers of major established rajyas such as Sallyana or Phalabang also intermarried with the Ranas, further confirming that the Kunwars enjoyed Thakuri
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE RANA REGIME

status.159

The kipat (communal tenure) system principally involving the Kiranti of the eastern hills, was continued. The Ain allowed the mortgaging of individual plots but recognised the reversionary right of the community as a whole by providing that after the debtor’s death or abscondence, his creditor no longer had any claim on the land but only against him or his estate. The Kiranti had surrendered to Prithvi Narayan on agreed terms and subsequent administrations respected their rights. Jang Bahadur, who had spent a part of his childhood at Dhankuta in Limbu country and his associate Hemdal Thapa, who had many years of experience on the eastern border, were especially aware of the situation in this part of the country. Their sympathy for the Kiranti as well as the ‘divide and rule’ policy lay behind their admittance to the army in 1847. Such sympathy did not, however, halt a trend towards de facto alienation of land to non-Limbus which continued through the nineteenth century, for in 1901-1903 the Limbus had to seek legislation banning further alienation of cultivated rice lands. Individual kipat holders were no better off by Jang Bahadur’s time than their counterparts on raikar (ordinary crown) land, for kipat was taxed on a homestead basis and progressive subdivision of holdings boosted the proportion of the crop actually given way as tax. Land settlements were made by the central government not with each individual holder but with headmen who were known as zamindars. They distributed land amongst their fellow tribals while often having their own plot cultivated for them on a sharecropping basis.160 Life for the average Limbu or Rai cultivator was thus not one of tribal communism. The problems were compounded by a growing land shortage in the eastern hills which led to large scale migration from the 1830s onwards.

The surest way to increase state revenue without putting undue pressure on any level of the tenurial hierarchy was to expand agricultural production. This was mostly done by expansion of the area under cultivation. The greatest scope for this was in clearing the forest which covered much of the Tarai, a process which the pre-unification state of Palpa, Makwanpur and Vijaypur had already begun with the assistance of cultivators from India and which continued under Prithvi Narayan and his successors.161 Under Jang Bahadur, the policy was pushed forward with renewed energy. Individual rayats were allowed land on favourable terms and given the building materials to construct homesteads. The main thrust, however, was provided by the jimidars who brought in cultivators to open up large areas. In 1854, the Ain
offered them either a three year tax holiday on new land together with birta to the value of 10 per cent of the extra revenue thereafter generated or a five year tax free period without any birta grant. Revenue regulations issued in 1861 for the eastern Tarai offered a better deal: no tax for ten years plus a birta grant and the right to retain the holding even if they committed a criminal offence. The result was the migration from India on a large scale with continued throughout the Rana period. The financial terms and security of tenure offered on the Nepalese side of the border contrasted favourably with the Bengal tax and tenure regime and even more with the vulnerable position of Oudh rayats vis-a-vis the taluqdars whose rights were reinstated in the wake of the 1857 rebellion. The pressure on the peasantry from the indigo planters was also the major reason for the large number of rayats crossing over from Champaran in 1866. The success of Nepalese policy is in ironic contrast to Kirkpatrick's prediction when he visited the Tarai in 1793 that the blessings of the Permanent Settlement would soon lead the Nepalese ryots to flock into India.

There were no improvements in basic agricultural techniques. Other than land clearance, irrigation remained the only means of boosting production. In the eastern Tarai, the government met half of the cost of irrigation works constructed by peasant farmers or jimidars and in the late sixties the government ordered the local authorities to undertake such projects themselves and extract a 50 per cent contribution from local revenue functionaries. The local administration in the naya muluk (western Tarai) was instructed to construct facilities if these increased the revenue. Regmi suggests that despite such edicts from the centre, relatively few improvements were actually made and that most of what was actually constructed was nothing more than temporary channels and earthen embankments which did not outlast the first monsoon.

On one occasion Jang Bahadur seriously considered a more elaborate irrigation project involving the use of imported technology. His objective was to use the water of Phewa Tal, the large lake in the Pokhara Valley, to irrigate the surrounding the country which is at a considerably higher level. It was calculated that the resulting increase in revenue would be between 5 and 6 lakhs rupees per year. Oldfield claimed that the project was not implemented because of Nepalese unwillingness to allow foreign surveyors or engineers into the hills. This was a factor but lack of enthusiasm on the British side was also partly to blame. Whilst in London in 1850, Jang Bahadur requested the East
India Company to purchase on his behalf a steam pump and piping for this purpose and there was extensive correspondence on the subject during the next three years. In the spring of 1851, Jang Bahadur asked the Resident to provide an engineer to operate the steam engine and construct a road into the hills to allow the engine to be brought in from the plains. The Governor-General offered to provide an engineer for the road project but later refused to make one available for the survey of the Pokhara Valley. The Finance and Home Committee in London provided an estimate of the cost of the steam pump and associated equipment together with the salaries of the engineers needed to supervise its setting-up and operation. The full bill was around £10,000 (equivalent to one lakh Indian rupees, rather more in Nepalese currency). Jang Bahadur finally told the Resident that in view of the heavy expenditure and the fact that one in Nepal would be able to operate the machinery, he was cancelling his order. As the investment involved would have been swiftly recouped by the increase in revenue, reluctance to allow foreigners into the hills may have been the real reason for the change of plan. Jang Bahadur, however, proceeded with an order for a rice-threshing machine which had been part of his original 'shopping order' and this reached Kathmandu in January 1855. It had been despatched without operating instructions, which the Resident now requested. It is not known whether the machine was ever actually assembled and put to use.

Jang thus toyed with the idea of applying to agricultural production the technology which he saw on his visit to Europe. Did foreign models influence in any way the revenue arrangements which have been described above? Bhimsen Thapa had certainly been interested in learning details of the relationship between peasant and government in other states, as this was one of the topics the mission to Burma in the 1820s was asked to investigate. In a passage which is probably based on Jang’s own lost diary, Padma Rana includes the ‘relation...between public and private rights in land’ as one of the things Jang was interested to learn when he travelled to Britain. As with the question of foreign influence on the Ain, there is no way of being certain, but it is conceivable, for example that the jimidari system introduced in the eastern Tarai, with its expectation that the jimidars would play the role of ‘improving landlords’, owed something to the thinking behind the Permanent Settlement. The model was certainly not followed in detail, however, one vital difference being that the jimidars lacked the right to evict their ‘tenants’ or to increase rents, except on their own birta
Although it has attracted less attention than direct agricultural taxation, tradition, trade was an important source of government revenue. Excise duties were one part of this picture, but increasingly during Jang Bahadur’s rule, the sale of monopoly rights over particular commodities brought in substantial income. The lynch-pin of these arrangements was Jang Bahadur’s Newar associate Dharma Narayan Manandhar, whose activities aroused widespread hostility. By the 1870s, government monopolies included raw cotton, tobacco, fish, salt, opium, grain and ghee. It is unclear whether the grain monopoly included rice, the staple of most inhabitants of the Kathmandu Valley. In the mid-sixties, a proposal to place the commodity in Dharma Narayan’s hands was mooted but Jang Bahadur was persuaded by his brothers that such a move, with the consequent rise in price, would lead to a popular revolt. Feelings on the issue reached such a pitch that King Surendra, normally prepared to follow tamely his prime minister, roundly abused Dharma Narayan at an audience and struck him on the arm with the flat of his sword.

British indignation on the subject sprang from the restrictions placed on British Indian merchants and from their free trade ideology. The tone of Ramsay’s complaints to Calcutta echoes that of Palmerston’s diatribes against similar practices in the Pasha’s Egypt. Jang Bahadur’s policy was partly founded on the fear that giving a free rein to British subjects to trade in Nepal would compromise the country’s independence, but more fundamental was a view of trade as a direct source of government revenue rather than an engine of economic growth. Government monopolies went hand in hand with widespread participation by Jang Bahadur, his family and leading bharadars in trading ventures, in which they were normally sleeping partners with Newar merchants. The regime’s commercial policy raised the cost of living of the ordinary citizen and although it ensured that profit went to Nepalese merchants rather than Indian, it did not prevent Nepalese craftsmen suffering the inevitable result of competition with a more advanced neighbour. In 1861, Ramsay reported that ‘the very inferior manufactures of Nepal . . . are annually deteriorating rather than improving, and are gradually giving way before our own manufactures’.

On its own terms, however, Jang Bahadur’s management of Nepal’s finances was successful. Revenue from the eastern Tarai for example, doubled between 1852 and 1862 whilst total revenue across the country rose from 47 lakh Nepalese rupees in 1843 to 115 lakh holdings.
rupees in 1877.\textsuperscript{178} The increase accrued largely from the expansion of the area under cultivation including the addition of the western Tarai, formerly part of Oudh, in 1860. Improvements in the collection machinery were another factor. The expense of the Tibet war--27 lakhs rupees or more\textsuperscript{179}--was thus absorbed without much dislocation though the strain in the short term was considerable. As government revenues increased, so did the personal income of Jang Bahadur and his family.

The total impact of Jang Bahadur’s regime on the well being of individual Nepalese is difficult to assess in the absence of reliable figures for total national income and population. Assuming that the elimination of some of the worst abuses of the revenue system outbalanced the effects of the monopoly system on those who had to buy their food, the average standard of living showed a slight increase. Such improvement was not dramatic and Regmi’s harsh verdict is substantially correct: Jang Bahadur and his family were principally concerned to use the surplus they obtained from the peasantry for conspicuous consumption, and they protected their dominant position by allowing a share of the proceeds to go to the landowning elite--the jagirdars and non-Rana birtadars--as well as to the village-level functionaries on whom the system depended. There was no substantial investment in agriculture which would have enabled the population as a whole to climb above subsistence level.\textsuperscript{180}

In accepting Regimi’s analysis, however, it is necessary to enter two caveats. First, it is wrong to suppose that all measures which favoured the peasant were simply the result of the Jang Bahadur’s desire to protect revenue levels over the long run or to curb the power of jagirdars and other intermediaries. This was undoubtedly the main motive but it was not the only one Jang Bahadur’s letters to his brother, documents which were certainly not intended to be made public and are therefore free from propagandist distortion, show that he did accept that the function of government was to promote the happiness of the governed: ‘God put us where we are in order to protect the common people.’\textsuperscript{181} This was a realisation which he attained intermittently and which was over-ruled when in direct conflict with his self-interest. However, at times he was capable of seeing government as something more than a system for battening on the producers.

Secondly, just as Jang Bahadur’s performance bears comparison with that of previous Nepalese regimes, his record was no worse than other South Asian native rulers. The defects of the Nepalese political economy were those of the traditional South Asian order. Everywhere
in the subcontinent, those at the top of the social pyramid were content to maintain their status and comfort within a relatively static society and import from Britain or British India those products of Western technology which they wanted for their own consumption. Western methods of military organisation and military hardware were adapted as far as possible--Panjab under Ranjit Singh had been the most successful--but the spirit of post-Meiji restoration Japan or of Attaturk was nowhere in evidence.

Jang Bahadur shared to an extent the general view of the Nepalese elite that an opening up of the country, such as the widespread application of modern technology would entail, and endanger the country's independence. Yet the enthusiasm with which Jang Bahadur initially viewed the steam pump irrigation project suggests that he was not pretending to a degree of enlightenment which he did not really possess, but rather that he was emotionally oscillating between conflicting ideas. This trait in his character is illustrated by his toying with the idea of actually giving up his position in Nepal in order to remain in Europe as permanent Nepalese ambassador to Britain.\textsuperscript{182} With Jang Bahadur himself in two minds, it was indeed the isolationism and conservatism of the bharadari generally which proved decisive. Nepal under his rule saw a strengthening of the state machinery with consequent increased potential for change in the long run but no immediate attempt to transform the nation's productive capacities.

The British Connection

Whilst continuing the isolationist policy which Nepal had followed since the days of Prithvi Narayan, Jang Bahadur and his successors made a firm alliance with British India the bedrock of their foreign policy. In so doing, they followed the practices adopted during the final years of Bhimsen's predominance and under Mathbar Singh. However, the contrast with the pretence of hostility that Bhimsen had maintained for internal purposes and with the real tensions during the kala Pande ascendancy was a marked one. Not surprisingly *The Times* remarked during Jang Bahadur's 1850 visit to Britain that 'the Court of Kathmandu was almost the last in India from whom but a few years back any mission of amity or compliment might have been reasonably expected'.\textsuperscript{183} The bond between the British Indian government and the Rana regime grew stronger under the Jang Bahadur's successors, as the British came to see the traditional regimes of the subcontinent as natural allies
against the rising nationalist challenge and regarded Nepal's insulation from 'progress' as politically advantageous. Consequently, a belief developed amongst the Nepalese intelligentsia that Jang Bahadur had been a British puppet whose rise to power was engineered by the Residency. This view is still widely held by educated Nepalese today despite its demolition by archival research since 1951.

Jang Bahadur's policy was dictated by the belief that British power was irresistible and that collaboration was the surest means of securing advantage in the short term and of postponing the absorption of Nepal in the British Empire, a probability in the long run. His offer of support in the second Sikh War was a natural consequence of this belief and his conviction was strengthened by what he saw during his 1850 visit to Europe.

Jang Bahadur's journey, which he made in the capacity of ambassador from King Surendra to Queen Victoria and which involved an absence from Nepal for a year, was proposed as a fact-finding mission and accepted by the British as such. Though this was part of the real reason, most important was the wish to demonstrate Nepal's goodwill towards the British in the aftermath of the annexation of the Panjab and to strengthen Jang Bahadur's position at home by creating the impression that he enjoyed a special relationship with the British. In addition, he wished to obtain three specific concessions from the authorities in London: extension of the existing extradition agreement to cover civil offenders, in particular absconding revenue collectors; permission to employ British engineers on irrigation and military projects and the right to correspond directly with London should he be dissatisfied with the Resident in Kathmandu.

The British Home authorities referred him back to Kathmandu on all the points that he wished to discuss and the visit became essentially a public relations exercise. The British were anxious to impress Jang Bahadur with their industrial and military strength and Jang Bahadur, the first Hindu of such political importance to visit Europe, became the sensation of the season both in Britain and subsequently in France.

Although the embassy had thus been a success of sorts, it did not do Jang Bahadur any political good at home, at least in the short term. The conspiracy against him and the general atmosphere after his return suggest that the negative reaction was predominant. However, approaches for a reconciliation were made by some of the Nepalese refugees as he returned home through India. His treatment as an honoured guest by the British perhaps helped to convince them that
they could no longer hope for a change of regime.

As far as Anglo-Nepalese relations are concerned, the effects were positive. Improved extradition arrangements were eventually conceded, albeit after lengthy negotiations. With assured peace on his southern border, he took advantage of the Taiping rebellion in China to return to the 'forward policy' towards Tibet which Nepal had to abandon after the Chinese intervention in 1792. Logistical difficulties limited his advance and led him to give up the aim of wrestling control of the frontier districts of Kuti and Kyrong. The war, however, ended with Tibetan agreement to pay an annual tribute to Nepal and with increased extra-territorial privileges for the Nepalese merchant community in Lhasa. Jang Bahadur's opportunity to participate in a more decisive and financially more profitable campaign came with the Mutiny. After providing troops who held Azimghar and Jaunpur districts against the rebels, Jang Bahadur took to the field personally at the end of 1857. He told Sir Colin Campbell, with whom he had participated in the assault on Lucknow, that had it not been for his visit to Britain, he would now be fighting against the British not alongside them. The intervention did not make the difference between British victory and defeat but it eased their task considerably. In their despatch to Canning authorising the return to Nepal of four districts of the Oudh Tarai annexed from her in 1815, the Company did not try to minimise the significance of the Nepalese contribution:

We are unwilling to imagine the position in which we should now have been without this aid from the Maharajah—and still less of the course which events must have taken had the Maharajah taken advantage of our distresses, and directed against us the force he has employed in our defence.

The fact that Jang Bahadur's 'collaborationist' policy brought concrete results was a powerful justification from the Nepalese viewpoint but it did not entirely resolve the contradiction of a professedly Hindu state aiding the mleccha conqueror of the Hindus of India. Even though the Nepalese, then as now, thought of themselves primarily as such and not as 'Indians' or 'South Asians', the religious tie, and the racial factor meant that they had a sense of solidarity with the peoples to the south. Clear evidence of this is provided by one of Jang Bahadur's travelling companions on the European trip who wrote that on reaching Bombay on their return journey, the party felt as if they were
back in their own homes. Jang Bahadur had to take this into account in the presentation of his policies.

The problem was similar to that which had long faced Hindu rulers in the plains when they accepted service under the Mughal emperors against their co-religionists. A partial solution had been found through the incorporation in 'Rajput ideology', during the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, of the theme of service to one's overlord which allowed a non-Hindu suzerain to be accommodated. However, this model was not appropriate for Nepal because though Jang Bahadur airily declared to a British visitor that Queen Victoria 'has not got a more loyal subject than I am', he did not acknowledge that Nepal was a vassal of Britain. He, therefore, concentrated instead on two other themes stressing that even if not part of a general Hindu crusade, Nepal's conduct always reflected the demands of dharma on a Hindu ruler and exploiting the hillman's sense of separation from the plainsman. Both gestures of independence from the British such as granting asylum to Rani Chand Kunwar of the Panjab after her escape from Allahabad in 1849 and collaboration with British were portrayed as having been dictated by Hindu principles. The vamshavali account of the decision to assist in 1857 has Jang Bahadur argue that it is a Hindu's duty to avenge murder of women and children such as the sepoys had committed.

The evidence for the second ploy is not so explicit but prejudice against madeshis (plainsmen) was too marked a feature of Nepalese psychology for its usefulness to be ignored. Hill superiority was implicit in the ranking of jati (caste, ethnic group) in the Muluki Ain which counted plains Brahmans for some purposes below Thakuri and Rajput. Such feelings helped quell any misgivings felt by the Nepalese troops who fought alongside the British in 1857-1859.

Apart from these considerations of realpolitik and national psychology, there is an important aspect of the British connection which has largely been ignored in the various studies of Indo-Nepali relations--the personal relationship established by Jang Bahadur with the principal British officials with whom he came in contact. In memoirs published shortly after Jang Bahadur's death, Cavenagh records a conversation on board the ship at the start of the return journey from Europe. Jang Bahadur apologised to his companion for any inconvenience he had caused him and told him that although even brothers sometimes had disagreements, he had looked up to him as an elder brother. By his choice of words Jang Bahadur was explicitly placing himself in a junior position. This was a pattern of apparent
dependence which he repeated with other individuals. Brigadier MacGregor, who was attached to Jang Bahadur’s force during the Gorakhpur and Lucknow campaign of 1857-1858, rapidly developed close rapport with him which he described in a letter to Brian Hodgson:

I get on capitally with Jang. We are already the best friends in the world. . . He leans very much upon me, indeed almost too much so, but this I consider to be a fault on the right side.  

There were also frequent occasions on which Jang Bahadur accepted the advice of Resident Ramsay. The most crucial of these was during the near mutiny by a Gurung regiment in 1857, an episode already analysed in detail. Ramsay had earlier been consulted often in connection with Tibetan affairs. In 1852, Ramsay persuaded him against threatening hostilities over Tibetan encroachment on a border tract of little economic value. One year later, when war had begun but Jang Bahadur had realised that he would be unable to secure the cession of Kuti and Kyrong districts, he discussed with the Resident his anxiety for the fate of local people who had collaborated with the invading Nepalese force and against whom the Tibetan commander-in-chief was now said to be planning vengeance once the war was over. One of Ramsay’s suggestions was of making a promise of no reprisals a condition of the peace settlement and a clause to this effect was included in the Nepal-Tibet Treaty of 1856.  

Interpreting Jang’s real attitude to such situations is difficult because of his talent for telling people what they wanted to hear: he was certainly subtle enough to realise that a relationship which was friendly but in which they themselves could feel the superior partner was what the usual British official would most prefer. After Ramsay had effectively blocked his plan to wield supervisory authority while not holding the premiership, Jang’s continued protestations of friendship towards him were certainly insincere, for the grudge he conceived against him led him in 1858 to seek his removal as a favour from Lord Canning and to fabricate various charges against him to that end. Having insisted that it would be an unbearable personal humiliation if Ramsay, who had temporarily left Kathmandu, were to return, Jang nevertheless accepted the situation once it was clear that the Governor-General would not give way, and thereafter he once again treated the Resident in an ostensibly friendly manner. Flattery could therefore often be insincere, but at the same time it is clear enough that at times Jang Ba-
hadur genuinely welcomed and respected advice from individual Britons such as the Resident. Though deference towards the representatives of a state more powerful than his own came naturally to a man accustomed to view both family and political relations in hierarchical terms, he expected the Resident, unlike many of his Nepalese counsellors, to give advice without fear of favour on any issue where the interests of Nepal and British India were not directly opposed.

Conclusion: Continuity and Change under Jang Bahadur

The establishment of the Rana regime was undoubtedly a major turning point in Nepalese history but the elements of continuity have not always been given sufficient weight. Despite the elimination of many leading bharadars at the Kot, the new elite was an outgrowth of the old. Jang Bahadur’s family overshadowed the others but great care was taken to bind the latter to the Kunwars. In addition to various known marriages, there were many undocumented alliances, so that by the 1870s, a Residency Surgeon could claim that the Ranas’ interests were ‘interwoven with those of almost every other family, from that of the king down to the lowest officials’.199

In caste terms, power remained as before in Chetri (Khas) and Thakuri hands, with Brahmans providing legitimacy and advice. There was, however, an important shift in the relationship between the first two. Though claiming caste equality with the royal family and thus Rajput status, the Ranas still remained in some sense Chetris, both receiving brides from and giving them to Chetris. The Chetri caste, which had always been the most numerous element within the political elite, now felt even more strongly that they were the dominant caste. The Ranas thus relied on Chetri solidarity that remained virtually intact up to the overthrow of the regime in 1950-1951.200

The relationship of the regime with the masses remained fundamentally the same as before and the major policies with Jang Bahadur followed were similar in their objectives to those of Bhimsen and Mathbar. Extraction of the maximum revenue without driving the population beyond endurance had always been the guiding philosophy of Gorkha administration whilst from Bhimsen’s later years onwards most contenders for power had realised the necessity for good relations with the British. Jang Bahadur did not so much innovate in these spheres, as display a greater finesse and determination in implementing them. The notion of promoting radical change did occur to him but
more in passing than as a settled determination. Jang Bahadur's achievements were rather that he stabilised the political structure, ensured that Nepal survived as an independent country and allowed the consolidation and strengthening of the central government and the continuance of the trend towards national integration already in operation.

NOTES

3. LJB, p. 162.
7. Lal mohar of Paush Badi 1, 1904 (22 December 1847).
9. RIO, p. 162.
12. Lal mohar of Baisakh 13 Sudi 1905 (15 May 1848), published in translation (and misdated to 1849) in Kumar, op. cit., pp. 158-159. Lal mohars of 1851 and 1868, published respectively in NJB, p. 60 and Purnima, no. 40 (2035(1978/9)), pp. 178-181, refer to similar orders issued on Baisakh 12 Badi and Jestha 2 Badi 1905 (30 April and 20 May 1848). It is unclear whether there were in fact three separate documents, or only later confusion over the date.
14. Jang Bahadur to Bam Bahadur, undated. For translation, refer Appendix IV.
18. Ramsay to Government, 1 August 1856, FS, 29 August 1856, No. 51.
19. Jain, op. cit., p. 113, fn. 56; Erskine to Government, 18 February 1851, FS, 28 March 1851, No. 11.
21. Also known as Chyangre Kausi and therefore must be referred to by Oldfield's description of Jay Bahadur as 'Head of Changra Duties', op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 398.
22. Erskine to Government, 17 February 1851, FS, 28 March 1851, No. 10
23. Jang Bahadur to Bam Bahadur, undated. For translation, see Appendix II letter 5.
29. Ramsay to Government, 20 May 1854, FP, 1 June 1855, No. 12 and (for the promotion) *lal mohar* of appointment, Ashvin 5 Sudi 1913 (4 October 1856), published in *NJB*, p. 137.
30. Ramsay to Government, 10 March 1855, FP, 5 April 1855, No. 22.
31. Ramsay to Government, 12 May 1855, FP, 1 June 1855, No. 12.
32. Ramsay to government, 15 April 1854, FP, 28 April 1854, No. 28.
33. Oldfield, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 402. Jang Bahadur presented this as only one possibility, the other being that the bharadari would select a male successor.
34. Ramsay to Government, 1 August 1856, FS, 29 August 1856, No. 51.
35. Ramsay to Government, 2 August 1856, FS, 29 August 1856, No. 52.
36. Jang held both the traditional title of mukhtiyar and the newer one of praim minister.
38. FS, 29 August 1856, No. 61, published in *NJB*, pp. 61-63.
39. Daya (‘compassion’) in the Nepali text is an obvious misprint for daga (‘plot’).
40. Information furnished by Triratna Manandhar.
48. For a fuller discussion of this hierarchy, see Kumar, pp. 96-99 and *NJB*, pp. 93-98.
51. Rose, *Strategy etc.*, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
52. Campbell’s Memorandum on the 1835/6 Mission, FS, 24 April 1837, No. 81.
55. FS, 25 January 1841, No. 121, published in *KM*, pp. 72-76.
56. *NJB*, Vol. 1, p. 188.
57. *Lal mohar* of Shravan 5 Sudi 1913 (6 August 1856).
238 KINGS, SOLDIERS AND PRIESTS


61. Laurence Oliphant, A Journey to Kathmandu with the Camp of Jung Bahadur (London: John Murray, 1852), p. 120, and RN, p. 55.


63. Rana prime ministers after Jang seem to have received the diksa mantra from the Adhikaris (gurus of the family from before Jang Bahadur's time), or the Satyals. See Prakash E. Raj, Vidvaccharami Hemraj Sharma, (Kathmandu: the author, 2035 VS (1978)), p. 17.

64. Information from Ishwari Raj Pande.


69. Ramsay to Dalhousie (personal), 14 April 1852, GD45/6/164 (Dalhousie Muniments).

70. NJB, p. 219.

71. Details of the plots are given in Ramsay to Government, 29 November 1852, FS, 39 December 1852, No. 199.


73. Hodgson to Government, 20 September 1834, FP, 9 October 1834, No. 17.

74. Lawrence Diary, 4 September 1845.


77. NJB, p. 109.

78. That the three were brothers is confirmed by Ratnaman's grandson, Ananda Man Rajbhandari (interview, Kathmandu, 15 August 1983).

79. Jang Bahadur to Bam Bahadur, undated. For translation see Appendix IV, letters.


81. Jang Bahadur to Bam Bahadur, loc. cit. and RN, p. 54.

82. Edwards, op. cit., p. 128. From the mid-fifties onwards, military titles were extended to many functionaries whose duties were largely or purely administrative.

83. NJB, p. 219.


85. 1843 bharadar list, HP, Vol. 52, f. 171; Register No. 1, JA; Nijamli Kamyandari Kitab Register, 1911 VS.

86. 'Nepal Deshko Itihas', Ancient Nepal, No. 25 (October 1873), p. 20.

87. Oldfield, Sketches, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 411. There is a disputed tradition that Dharma Narayan's Salmi caste was raised from impure to pure non-twice-born status by Jang as reward for services in the 1855-6 war with Tibet (Gopal Nepali, The Newars
As Dhan Sundar’s position as subba in the early 1850s would have been impossible for a member of an impure caste, the tradition must be a confusion based on the low status of the corresponding caste in India. If the Nepal Salmis were regarded as impure at one time, their elevation must have taken place much earlier (M. Gaborieau, *Le Népal et ses populations* (Brussels: Editions Complexes, 1978), p. 203).

91. Ramsay to Government, 6 July 1864, FP (A), August 1864, No. 51.
93. Ramsay to Dalhousie (personal), 14 April 1852, GD45/6/154 (Dalhousie Muniments).
94. Dalhousie to Ramsay (personal), May 1852, GD45/6/82 (Dalhousie Muniments).
96. Ramsay to Dalhousie, *loc. cit.*
99. Ramakant, *Indo-Nepalese Relations 1816-17* (Delhi, S. Chand, 1968.)
102. Register No. 1, JA.
103. HP, Vol. 6, pp. 175-176. ‘Officer’ in this context probably meant rank from subedar upwards. The term *pagari* is used in official documents to refer only to these whilst the subedar/jemadar dividing line was observed when the 1836/7 reduced rates were introduced for senior personnel only (HP, Vol. 13, f223).
106. Ramsay to Government, 2 June 1857, No. 129.
110. Royal Order of Kartik 9 Badi 1820 (5 November 1863), published in Naraharinath, *Sandhipatrasamgraha*, *op. cit.*
111. Ramsay to Government, 2 June 1857, FS, 26 June 1857, No. 129.
112. *Ibid*.
117. Ramsay to Government, 1 August 1856, FS, 29 August 1856, No. 51.
118. *NJB*, p. 96.
119. Register No. 1, JA.
120. Gunavanta’s role is eulogised in the *vamshvali* (*Ancient Nepal*, no. 25 (October
240 KINGS, SOLDIERS AND PRIESTS


121 Hodgson to Colvin (DO), 24 June 1837, NR/5/48.


123 Hodgson contradicts himself on this point, starting first that the Kampu Daphiar-khana dealt with all kampu units but later that it handled only those regiments which were 'non-assigned' (i.e., not under the commander of a particular bharhar?).

124 NJB, pp. 68-69, 80-81 and 84-85.

125 Ibid., p. 89.

126 Nepal, Ministry of Law and Justice, Sri 5 Surendra Bikram Shahdevka Shasankalma Baneko Muluki Ain (Kathmandu, 2022 VS (1965/6)), printed from the 1867/8 version of the Ain.


130 RN, pp. 62-63 and LJB, p. 159.

131 Royal Order of Srawan 1 Badi 1895 (8 July 1838) and Srawan 12 Badi 1907 (5 August 1850), published in NJB, pp. 327-328 and 330.


133 Maddock to Government, 9 August 1832, NR/5/43 and Hodgson to Government, 31 July 1836, NR/5/47.

134 Oliphant, Journey to Kathmandu, op. cit., p. 90.


138 Interview with Pradyumna Ratna, Allahabad, 27 November 1983.


141 Ain, p. 379.


145 Ibid., p. 113.


149. Regmi, *Thatched Huts*, op. cit., p. 52 et seq.


155. Regmi, *Land Ownership*, op. cit., p. 82.

156. The recovered territory (see Nepal map) constituted the district of Banke, Kailali, Kanchapur and Bardia. Bardia was made over as birta to Jang Bahadur and his family (Regmi Research Series, vol. 13, No. 7 (July 1981), pp. 110-112. This corrects his erroneous statement in *Thatched Huts*, op. cit., p. 44, that the whole naya muluk was included in the assignment.


158. Royal Order of Baisakh 1 Sudi 1912 (17 April 1855), cited in Regmi, *Land Ownership*, op. cit., p. 36.


160. These zamindars are probably to be identified with the Rai and Limbu subbas, who were recognised as local administrators by the government and whose functions are discussed in NJB, pp. 236-240.


163. Resident Lawrence to Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, 28 March 1868, FP (B), April 1868, No. 12.


168. Finance and Home Committee to Governor-General, 18 May 1853, FP, 22 July 1853, No. 30; Ramsay to Government, 21 October 1853, FP, 16 February 1855.

169. Court of Directors to Governor-General, 20 May 1854, FP, 11 August 1854, No. 14 ('Keep With'); Ramsay to Government, 25 January 1855, FP, 16 February 1855.


172. This was the situation in the eastern Tarai. In the west, *jimidar* had actual ownership and could charge rents in excess of government taxes, though the cultivator still had considerable security of tenure (Regmi, *Land Ownership*, op. cit., pp. 112-4).

173. Girdlestone to Government, 9 June 1974, FP (A), March 1875, No. 30; Henvey to
Government, 26 March 1877, FP (A), May 1877, No. 61. Dharma Narayan may have helped Jang Bahadur financially in his early days; see Daman S.J.A. Rana, Nepal-Rule and Misrule (New Delhi: Rajesh, 1978), pp. 212-213.

Ramsay to Government, 6 July 1864, FP(A), August 1864, No. 51.


Girdlestone, loc. cit.

Ramsay to Government, 18 June 1861, FP(B), July 1861, No. 250.

Regmi, Thatched Huts, op. cit., pp. 147 and (for the country-wide figure), HP, Vol. 13, ff. 47-48; D. Wright, History of Nepal (Kathmandu: Nepal Antiquated Book Publisher, 1972, (reprint)), p. 50. Wright actually gives a figure of 96 lakhs in Indian currency which equates to 115 lakhs Nepalese at the exchange rate indicated by his table on p. 297. It is uncertain, however, whether the two figures are strictly comparable, as Wright’s may not include an allowance for birta holdings.

The figure is given by the Buddhiman Singh vaṃśavāli cited in Prem R. Uprety, Nepal-Tibet Relations (Kathmandu: Puga Nara 1980), p. 78 and also quoted by Maharaja Chandra Shamsher in an interview with the Resident in 1912 (ibid., Appendix J).

Regmi, Thatched Huts, op. cit., pp. 153-158.

Jang to Bam Bahadur, undated (see Appendix II, Letter 5).

Whelpton, Jang Bahadur, op. cit., p. 124.


ROI, pp. 175-176.

For a full account of the visit, see Whelpton, Jang Bahadur, op. cit., passim.

For an account of the war, see Prem R. Uprety, Nepal-Tibet Relations, op. cit., passim.


Mangles to Canning, 17 March 1858, Secret Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 1933 of 1858, published in A. Husain, British India’s Relations with the Kingdom of Nepal (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), pp. 77-78.

Whelpton, Jang Bahadur in Europe, op. cit., p. 218.


Oliphant, Journey to Kathmandu, op. cit., p. 143.

Inscription dated Caitra 15 Sudi 1931 (20 April 1875), published in Nayaraj Pant, ‘Ranarajyabyavastha’, Pragya, 8, 1 Shravan-Asoj, 2036 (July-October 1979), p. 97.

RIO, p. 157.


Ramsay to Government, 27 June 1855, FS, 27 July 1855, No. 65. An English translation of the treaty is given in FS, 30 May, No. 27 and the terms summarised in Uprety, op. cit., pp. 77-8.

For detailed accounts of the quarrel between Jang and Ramsay, see Jain, op. cit., pp. 154-9, Ramakant, op. cit., pp. 291-3, and Hussain, op. cit., pp. 87-91. Though Canning later denied it, it is probable that he did give Jang to understand at Allahabad
that he would withdraw Ramsay simply as *persona non grata*, and it was only when it became clear that this would not happen that Jang resorted to a list of largely unfounded complaints against him (Hodgson to Princep, 16 September 1858, Hodgson MSS 9, pp. 103-4).


NEPAL AND HINDU POLITY

This study has shown how different elements of the Nepalese polity functioned during a period of acute instability and how that period closed with the inauguration of a new regime which, nevertheless, retained the same basis of legitimacy and the same relationship with the mass of the population. The Rana regime did not prove totally immune to the strains which had earlier beset the Nepalese monarch and bharadari, for there was a violent upheaval in 1885 when the sons of Dhir Shamsher, Jang Bahadur’s youngest brother, assassinated their uncle Maharaja Ranoddip Singh and killed or exiled Jang Bahadur’s sons. The coup was completed before non-Rana contenders for power could enter and Dhir’s descendants ruled Nepal until 1951, the combined office of maharaja and prime minister being held in turn by five of his sons and two of his grandsons. The basic structure established by Jang Bahadur was maintained throughout and can be seen as remaining in the tradition of Hindu kingship, leaving the path fully prepared for the resumption of power by the kings themselves after the end of the Rana regime.

Jang Bahadur’s system rested essentially on the same three pillars that supported the king’s authority. The religious aura of kingship continued to be important with Jang Bahadur too in his capacity as maharaja acquiring a lesser but significant degree of royal divinity. The separation of the principal sacredotal and administrative aspects of kingship had the advantage of allowing Jang Bahadur and his Rana successors more flexibility with regard to religious observance than would otherwise have been the case. Jang Bahadur’s European journey for instance, unsettling as it was to the orthodox, would have been impossible for the King himself. The military factor became more important, because Jang Bahadur, like the founder of the Shah dynasty, projected himself as a charismatic military leader. Control over land continued to be crucial, Jang Bahadur reinforcing this through a reduction in the power (though not the income) of jagirdars. The extensive birta grants to himself and
members of his family and the extension of the rajya system did not pose a threat to central control since the overwhelming military predominance at the centre was an insurance against this. The central focus shifted from the maharajadhiraj to the maharaja and there was a steady strengthening of the state machinery. Nepal remained a Hindu monarchy under a system of government that European observers described as autocracy. Nevertheless, there were limits to this autocracy, which call for consideration in the context of both the traditional Hindu state and the new influences acting on it.

The hereditary premiership was itself claimed as check on autocracy by members of the Rana family. This view was put forward by Dhoj Narsingh, son of Jang Bahadur’s younger brother Ranoddip in a memorandum presented to the Indian government in 1888. Dhoj had fled Nepal three years earlier when the sons of Dhir Shamsher staged their coup. The refugees sought British assistance against the Shamsher and, therefore, tried to present Jang Bahadur as a reformer who ended despotism in Nepal by introducing ‘with the assent of all the Estates of the realm . . . a Constitution, which, while it upheld the dignity and supremacy of the Crown, at the same time curtailed the power of the Sovereign by vesting all executive authority in the hands of his ministers’. The analogy was with the combination of hereditary minister and titular monarch found in other Indian states, most notably in the Maratha confederacy and Vijaynagar. The arrangement can also be seen as an instance of dvairajya--dual monarchy--which had been a recurrent feature in earlier periods of Nepalese history both in the medieval Newar kingdoms and in the concurrent reigns of Licchavi and Gupta kings in the seventh century AD. As a term in Indian political theory, dvairajya first occurs in the Arthashastra and later features in Kalidasa’s Malavikagnimitra. Jayaswal sees it as true joint sovereignty, an extension into the realm of politics of the legal principles evolved to accommodate the Hindu joint-family system and as a counter-instance to the ‘Hobbesain doctrine of indivisible sovereignty’. In its practical working, however, dvairajya rather confirmed that doctrine, for either one of the partners held the real power and the other a formal title only or both were dependent on some third party. Kalidasa’s jointly ruling brothers fall in the second category, having been placed on the throne by a foreign suzerain whilst the Nepalese Guptas, like the Ranas, had effectively appropriated the power of the dynasty on the throne. If one is looking for the influence of the joint-family on the political world, then the earlier attempts by Rajendra to associate the Queen or Crown Prince with his
own royal authority are more promising candidates. That division of power manifestly failed to work, however, and the bharadars and troops clamoured for 'one master', just as many greeted the news of Jang's title of maharaja with the comment that 'there cannot be two swords in one scabbard'. The maharajaship worked because for practical purposes there was indeed only one master.

The de facto restraints on Jang Bahadur's freedom of action were the bharadari, army and local elites, all of whom had to be conciliated. It would be stretching the meaning of the word to describe such restraints as constitutional, for fear of provoking revolts acts as a check even on the most absolute of despotisms. Nonetheless, the Muluki Ain in its original version theoretically circumscribed the authority of both king and prime minister, providing specifically that the law bound them too. These provisions were violated in practice and repealed in a subsequent edition but they show that the rule of law was at least an ideal at which the government was supposed to aim. It is possible to see here influence from Jang's European journey, for the Belait Yatra stresses the subject of both monarch and premier to the law as laid down by parliament. But it is equally legitimate to view the provision as a natural development of the traditional Hindu view that the king is subject to the rule of dharma. This theme is stressed particularly in Manu's seventh book, acting as a counter-balance to the same text's insistence on royal divinity. This tradition was alive in nineteenth-century Nepal, as is demonstrated by the dharmapatra to which the bharadars subscribed in 1799 and which provided for the regulation of the kingdom during the minority of King Girvana Yuddha:

Let the Raja observe justice and equality... and cherish his able and faithful servant... Let the Raja, if he can, exceed in act what is enjoined in the inscriptions in copper; and if he violates that engagement let his authority cease.

The effectiveness of such doctrines as a check on the abuse of authority was weakened by the implication that retribution would rather be provided by the king's karma than by his subjects exercising a right of revolt. There has been, however, a more activist strand in the tradition: The Mahabharata laid down in one passage that an oppressive king should be killed like a mad dog and Jang Bahadur himself advocated in 1843 that the army should be the judge of King Rajendra's fitness to rule. Orthodox political theory also requires the king be guided by the
advice of his ministers. The *Arthashastra* recommends that when any non-routine question arises, the king should convene his council and follow the opinion of the majority. More pertinent to the case of Nepal is the *Shukranitisara*, a nineteenth-century text combining traditional material with newer influences. It also lays down that the wise king always follows the advice of his councillors. In Nepal in the period under review, the adviser's influence was often paramount. When Jang Bahadur though technically still the King's minister, became the de facto king, he too relied to some extent on his bharadars. Even if the debate was not always extensive and free, it is significant that Jang Bahadur felt the need to obtain formal bharadar endorsement of his policies at critical moments, such as when the decision to help the British in 1857 was taken.

In contrast to senior bharadars or even lower level administrators, the ordinary citizen normally had no role in the affairs of state. This absence of a democratic element explains readily why the author of *Belait Yatra* was unable to perceive this aspect of the British constitution and therefore presented Parliament as a purely aristocratic institution. Yet closer examination shows that there were traces of popular involvement both in political theory and practice. In the first place, the traditional Indian view is that government is for the people though not by them. The myths of the origin of kingship presented in the *Aitareya Brahmana, Mahabharata* and Buddhist sources depict men as deciding on the need for a king either to lead them against their enemies or to maintain law and order. The word raja itself was believed by ancient Indian scholars to derive from the verbal root *ranch* (to please), the king being someone who pleased his people. In one sense the king did this by ritual incorporation of the whole community so that, as the *Mahabharata* put it, 'the whole community is pleased by his, the one man's pleasure, and when the one man is in distress all become distressed'. The persistence of this notion in Nepal lies behind the *Belait Yatra*’s inclusion of ‘always being happy’ in its list of the functions of the British monarch. More important in the Indian tradition, however, was the king’s obligation to provide his subjects with direct benefits rather than vicarious satisfaction. This too was fully reflected in the Nepalese political consciousness. Prithvi Narayan characterised his newly-created kingdom as ‘a garden of the thirty-six castes’. The *lal mohar* appointing Jang Bahadur Maharaja of Kaski and Lamjung included the instruction ‘make your subjects happy’ whilst Jang Bahadur himself wrote to his brother in 1850 that ‘God put us where we are so that we could protect
the common people'. Actual practice did not always correspond with theory but consideration for the public good did have some effect on Jang Bahadur's policy. It is also significant that even in the relatively disturbed political conditions of the early forties, the regime's treatment of its subjects struck Henry and Honoria Lawrence as superior to the general South Asian level.

Indian political theory extends the notion of government in the public interest to include government in accordance with public opinion, even where that opinion is not on a sound footing. A classic example is provided in the Ramayana where Ram, though himself confident of his wife Sita's chastity, rejected her because his subjects believed it had been lost. In the same vein, the Mahabharata advises the appointment of ministers who enjoy the people's confidence. Respect for public opinion in Hindu states is also evident in the king's function of providing royal sanction for regulations which a particular caste or community devised for itself. Jang Bahadur's letters to Barn parallel the thinking behind Ram's treatment of Sita, with the dramatic assertion that 'if it will please the people, [a ruler] should even have his own son killed'. Endorsement of a community's self-regulation was also common both before and after Jang Bahadur's coming to power. The rules for the Gurung tribe promulgated in 1867/8, for example, were drawn up by leading Gurungs themselves.

The Shah period in Nepal provides little that can plausibly be described as self-government but there is evidence that the Newar kingdoms of the Kathmandu Valley did allow a role in the administration to panches (committee members) representing a particular town or area. The panchayat democracy, which, after the monarchy itself, was the major feature of Nepal's 1962-1990 constitution, involved elected bodies at village, town, district and national levels. It was nevertheless contrasted with alien multi-party democracy as continuing an indigenous tradition and there was therefore a tendency for Nepalese scholars sympathetic to the official ideology to exaggerate the importance of panchayats and similar institutions in earlier periods. Nonetheless, contemporary sources from the Licchavi inscriptions (fifth-eighth centuries) onward attest their existence. After the Gorkha conquest, panchayats continued to play a role in the judicial system. In the politically sensitive case of the Indian merchant Kasinath, a panchayat of merchants was instructed to look into the evidence whilst panches representing the lower and upper sections of Kathmandu were involved in disputes between Newars. There are also indications
that *panchas* had a hand in administrative as well as judicial affairs. In 1775, *panchas* were included in the Nepalese delegation negotiating a treaty with Tibet.\footnote{The precise mechanism by which *panchas* were selected in the Newar and early Shah periods is unknown but it can be assumed that they were drawn from the dominant castes and the wealthiest families. The local communities that they represented cannot be portrayed as models of egalitarianism and consensus democracy. Nonetheless, their existence did at least mean a wider sharing of power than one confined to the king and his nobles.} After the execution of a leading *bharadar* in 1778, the regent Bahadur Shah had to allay the suspicions of the Kathmandu *panchas* by showing them his nephew, King Rana Bahadur, from the window in the Hanuman Dhoka known as *panchijhyal* ('pancha window').\footnote{There is no evidence of any role for the *panchas* under Jang Bahadur, other than a subsidiary one in the judicial process. Direct popular participation in politics, in so far as it occurred was extra-systemic, as in the 1850 riot by Bhotiya (Tibetan) inhabitants of Nuwakot district against miners brought into their village by an *ijaradar* or in the 1776 revolt by Magar supporters of a man claiming to be an incarnation of the god Lakhan Thapa.} The privileges of the *panchas* and the citizens were respected and their assent fervently sought when disunion at the highest level caused contenders for power to bid against each other for support. When Rana Bahadur abdicated and then attempted to reassert his authority over *bharadars* claiming to act in the name of the infant King Girvana Yuddha, the latter issued an appeal to the *panchas*, *mahajans* (merchants) and people of Bhadgaon (the third of the Kathmandu Valley towns) to support them and promised to confirm the addressees' old privileges.\footnote{The influence of the army, however, remained important and the nearest approach to a representative assembly that the period provides is the gathering of officers from jemadar upwards to which Jang Bahadur unsuccessfully appealed in 1863 to forgo their salary for a year.} Whilst these privileges were eroded in the nineteenth century, during the 'National Movement' against Crown Prince Surendra's excesses at the end of 1842, town functionaries and the merchants were amongst the signatories of the petition presented to King Rajendra.

The precise mechanism by which *panchas* were selected in the Newar and early Shah periods is unknown but it can be assumed that they were drawn from the dominant castes and the wealthiest families. The local communities that they represented cannot be portrayed as models of egalitarianism and consensus democracy. Nonetheless, their existence did at least mean a wider sharing of power than one confined to the king and his nobles.

There is no evidence of any role for the *panchas* under Jang Bahadur, other than a subsidiary one in the judicial process. Direct popular participation in politics, in so far as it occurred was extra-systemic, as in the 1850 riot by Bhotiya (Tibetan) inhabitants of Nuwakot district against miners brought into their village by an *ijaradar* or in the 1776 revolt by Magar supporters of a man claiming to be an incarnation of the god Lakhan Thapa.

The influence of the army, however, remained important and the nearest approach to a representative assembly that the period provides is the gathering of officers from jemadar upwards to which Jang Bahadur unsuccessfully appealed in 1863 to forgo their salary for a year. In the years before 1846, the role of the army was crucial. The authors of a study of the panchayat system have rightly pointed out that the maintenance of a standing army and its concentration at the capital naturally resulted in the troops assuming in relation to the Gorkha government the
position which the leading citizens of the Valley towns had enjoyed vis-a-vis the former Newar sovereigns. Whereas in Newar times the army—generally consisting of non-Newar mercenaries—had been of little political significance, Nepal now came closer to a newer pattern. This was also reflected in extremity in the dominance of the khalsa in the Sikh state in the Panjab.

The army at Kathmandu, though it had special interests of its own, was not entirely unrepresentative of the castes from which it was drawn. Though he enjoyed some of the rights of a jagirdar, the ordinary soldier was peasant farmer in origin and became so again at the end of his service. The tenants who worked on soldiers’ plots were often themselves former soldiers. The largest single element in the army was Khas or Chetris as Jang Bahadur ordered them to be styled. They were also the largest community in the country and the one from which the bulk of the political and military leadership was drawn. This was in stark contrast to the medieval Indian pattern in which soldiers were drawn from lower castes and criminals. This did not make the regime under Jang Bahadur or his predecessors democratic but it meant that the danger from a sense of alienation between rulers and upper and middle caste ruled was reduced.

Nepal under Jang Bahadur continued as a traditionalist Hindu monarchy but latent within that tradition were elements contrary to the model of ‘oriental despotism’ which is sometimes foisted upon it. Since the tradition is a complex and diverse one, the question of ‘modern’ influence on his policy, which arises particularly in relation to the Muluki Ain, becomes extremely difficult to answer categorically. When the Ain lays down specifically that all religions, including Christianity, may be freely practised in Nepal, subject only to the ban on cow slaughter, how far was this simply a natural development of the tolerance implicit within Hindu notions of hierarchy and how far was it a response to ‘liberal’ ideas from the outside?

Nepal illustrates the inadequacy of any analysis which sharply contrasts traditional and modern. This point has been argued by Edwards in the context of the Nepalese bureaucracy, a study of which he made the basis for a critique of the Weberian dichotomy between patrimonial and bureaucratic administration. Its applicability can, however, be extended to the whole range of political thought and behaviour in nineteenth century Nepal. The patterns which have been read into Nepali history either by the too ready application of foreign parallels, as in Hodgson’s seeing a shade of 1688 in the events of 1842 or by more recent
scholars eager to find a pattern of democratic monarchy to fit the Shah dynasty’s current ideological needs, are over-simplifications. However, they contain an element of truth: the traditional view of politics encompassed more than an injunction to obey the autocrat and his tax-gatherers.

The Rana regime was strong enough to ensure that the more ‘liberal’ tendencies inherent within the traditional system remained largely below the surface. It did, however, allow the process of creation of a Nepalese sense of identity to continue. The self-conscious fostering of a ‘Nepalese nationalism’ should be seen as starting only in the time of Maharaja Chandra Shamsher (1901-1929) under whom the word ‘Nepali’ was adopted as official title of the Parbatiya language.35 Nonetheless, steps such as the promulgation of the Muluki Ain and the admission of the Kiranti to the army reinforced older factors such as the relatively porous barrier between the key Khas/Chetri caste and the main western hill tribes and the hillman’s sense of aloofness vis-a-vis the people of the plains. The process was one which did not embrace all groups equally and the impure Indo-Nepalese castes and the people of Tarai are still not fully included today. However, the elements working towards unity were strong enough to require us to view nineteenth century Nepal as a nation in the making as well as representative of wider South Asian patterns.

NOTES

1. Whereas a number of Maithili Brahmans emigrated into Nepal to avoid pollution from the visit to Europe of the Darbhanga Maharaj at the beginning of this century, Jang Bahadur’s earlier trip had no such repercussions ‘because at the time King Surendra... remained the ritual source of authority in Nepal’ (Richard Burghart, ‘History of Janakpurdham etc.’ unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1978, pp. 514-515 fn).


5. Ramsay to Edmonstone (DO), 7 August 1856, FS, 29 August 1856, No. 56.

6. M.C. Regmi, Preliminary Contributions to Nepalese Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June
252  KINGS, SOLDIERS AND PRIESTS

1975), and Notes on the Nature of Rana Law and Administration, pp. 110-111.
13. Whelpton, Jang Bahadur in Europe, op. cit., p. 111. The Belait-Yatra’s mistake is, of course, more pardonable when it is remembered that in 1850 the franchise was restricted to 5 per cent of the adult male population.
15. Whelpton, Jang Bahadur, op. cit., p. 177.
17. Lalmohar of Shravan 5 Sudi 1913 (6 August 1856) and Jang Bahadur to Barn Bahadur, undated (Appendix IV, Letter 5). The Nepali word used in such passages is generally raji, derived through Urdu from the Arabic razi.
24. Ibid., pp. 213-216.
25. Ibid., p. 217.
26. Ibid., pp. 210-211.
27. Ibid., p. 219.
32. Derrett, op. cit., p. 69.
33. Ain, p. 379.
APPENDIX I

JANG BAHADUR’S FAMILY

The earliest reference to Jang Bahadur’s supposed descent from the Ranas of Mewar is in the *lal mohar* of 15 May 1848, authorising his family to style themselves ‘Kunwar Ranaji’. An account made available to Daniel Wright (Residency Surgeon, 1863-1876) and published in translation in 1877, names the ancestor who entered the western hills as Ram Singh Rana and implicitly links his arrival with the fall of Chittorgarh in 1569.¹ A more elaborate family history was published in 1879 by Jang Bahadur’s former servant Ram Lal. This places the departure from Chittorgarh in the twelfth century and also traces the Rana line back to the hero of the *Ramayana*.²

Baral has argued that the claim to Rana ancestry was made only after Jang Bahadur became prime minister, since his original *kul* name was not Rana but Khandka.³ However, Rana was a long established Magar *thar* and those who bore it in the 1830s certainly claimed descent from Chittorgarh.⁴ Jang Bahadur’s ancestry probably included Magar Ranas on the female side and his own physiognomy suggests Magar blood. This connection and the imitation of the Shah dynasty’s claim, perhaps prompted the family to devise the story before 1846.

The family’s purported genealogy is even less reliable than that of the Shahs and the first ancestor who can be accepted as a historical personage is Jang Bahadur’s great-great-grandfather, Ahiram Kunwar, who moved from the *chaubisi* kingdom of Kaski to Gorkha in the reign of Prithvi Narayan’s father Narbhupal Shah. Ram Lal’s 1879 account, which is closely paralleled by Pudma Rana,⁵ gives Ahiram’s son Ram Krishna and grandson Ranjit, central roles in the conquest of the Kathmandu Valley and subsequent campaigns. While not the key figure that his family claimed, Ram Krishna’s contribution was significant enough for Prithvi Narayan, in 1772, to grant him the revenues of Dhulikhel and to tell him that ‘to reward you in proportion to your efforts, not even half my kingdom would be sufficient’.⁶ Ram Krishna’s son Ranjit was
similarly less prominent than the Rana family historians suggest but took part in the campaigns against Tibet and the Chinese invaders in the 1790s. Both Ranjit and his father were associated in military operations with Abhiman Singh Basnet, and this link, or, less probably, an already established alliance with Bhimsen Thapa’s family, may have been the reason for Ranjit’s son Bal Narsingh Kunwar gaining an appointment to the staff of ex-King Rana Bahadur and subsequently accompanying him to Banaras.

The family’s political importance rose with Bal Narsingh’s appointment as a kaji after he struck down Rana Bahadur’s assassin in 1806. Ranjit was at that time serving with the Nepalese forces in the far west. His grandson Jang Bahadur told the British Resident in 1852 that he died in the fighting at Kangra, the fortress on the west bank of the Satlej which the Gorkhas besieged in vain for four years. However, Ranjit is mentioned as on active service in a document of May 1814, over four years after the Nepalese had abandoned the territory beyond the Satlej to Ranjit Singh’s Panjab kingdom. In the 1852 interview, Jang Bahadur also mentioned the death at Kangra of his maternal grandfather, Bhimsen’s brother Nain Singh Thapa. This death has been independently attested.

Other Kunwars were also prominent in military operations in the west in the early years of the nineteenth century, particularly Ranjit’s cousin, Chandrabir and his sons Bir Bhadra and Bal Bhadra. Chandrabir was married to the daughter of Kaji Amar Singh Thapa, overall commander in the west. Amar Singh was politically opposed to Bhimsen, and the rivalry between the two Thapa families was reflected in continuing tension between the two branches of the Kunwars. Following Nain Singh Thapa’s death in the winter of 1806/7 a compromise with the ruler of Kangra was provisionally negotiated but eventually rejected on the advice of Amar Singh. Ranjit supported the compromise whereas a contemporary Garhwali poet writing under the patronage of Bir Bhadra accused the Nepalese who negotiated the agreement of having taken bribes from Sansar Chand. Thirty years later, Bir Bhadra refused to give help to Bal Narsingh when the latter was in financial difficulties after his dismissal from office. Jang Bahadur retaliated after coming to power by treating Bir Bhadra’s son less generously than his other relatives. Jang Bahadur also never told the British that Bal Bhadra, the gallant defender of the hill fort of Kalunga against them in 1814 who had won their admiration, was a Kunwar and his own cousin. They continued to believe that ‘our gallant adversary Bulbudder’, was a Thapa.
NOTES

3. Leelanteswar Baral, 'Life and Writings of Prithvi Narayan Shah', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1964, p. 111; K.B. Bista, *Le Culte du Kuldevata etc.* (Paris: Editions Nove (C.N.R.S), 1972), p. 27, argues that Rana was the original lineage name but elsewhere (ibid., p. 43, n. 2) admits that the case for 'Khandka' is supported by the story of the Kunwars who in this century declared themselves as 'Khandka Kunwar' being admitted to the 'Rana Kunwar' *kuldevata* ceremony at Panchitani temple in Kathmandu.
5. The correspondence was first pointed out by J.C. Marize, 'Les Rana et le Pouvoir', unpublished thesis, University of Rouen, 1980, p. 64. It is most likely the result of both men having translated the same Nepali source.
APPENDIX II

THE ALLEGED RIFT BETWEEN JANG BAHADUR AND MATHBAR SINGH

It was argued in Chapter 4 that the accounts given by Pudma Rana and by the vamshavali of public disagreement between Jang Bahadur and Mathbar Singh are unreliable. However, although Jang Bahadur’s own role is distorted, some of the incidents mentioned have a basis in fact.

The first clash is reported by Pudma as follows:

Some tenants of the crown lands applied to the council (viz. the bharadari sabha) for remission of revenue on the ground of the crops having been damaged by frost. The Prime Minister passed orders that the remission applied for could not be granted. Jung Bahadur, who was also a member of the Council, opposed the Premier, by declaring that the matter must be investigated into before any order should be passed. Upon this Mathbar grew crimson with rage and exclaimed ‘‘You are a mere stripling, how dare you speak so insolently in such an august assembly!’’ Jung Bahadur promptly replied, ‘‘I am not a child; it is the rest of the councillors who are acting childishly’’. The King and the Prince (i.e. Surendra) put an end to the altercation by declaring that Jung Bahadur was in the right and that enquiries should be made.¹

Although Pudma implies that the incident took place after the December 1844 expedition to the tarai, it should be linked rather with the visit to Kathmandu in October 1844 of three hundred Tharus (the indigenous people of the tarai) to complain of oppression by Hira Lal Jha, who held the revenue contract for the region.² Hira Lal was probably a protégé of Mathbar, since he had considerable difficulties with the new government following his death and five years later, was described by
Jang Bahadur as a ‘tiger’ unleashed on the peasantry by Mathbar. Thus during the October debate, some bharadars may well have tried to attack Mathbar through the contractor. It is inconceivable that Jang Bahadur should have spoken out in 1844 as boldly as Pudma claims, but, if he was at all genuine in the indignation he expressed in 1850 over Hira Lal’s and Mathbar’s conduct, he must have strongly disapproved of his uncle’s action.

In the vamshavali account, Buddhiman Singh also portrays a public split between uncle and nephew in the last years of Mathbar’s life, but the selection of incidents is different. Most space is devoted to a clash when Mathbar was instructed by Surendra to bring before him for punishment all the bharadars who had participated in the petition campaign against him at the end of 1842. Jang Bahadur put himself forward as spokesman of all those under threat and, despite Mathbar’s opposition, appealed successfully for clemency. The Residency Diary confirms that in the last week of his life, Mathbar was given such an order by the Crown Prince, and that the investigation ended with the imposition of small fines. As with the earlier tenants’ appeal, Jang Bahadur must in fact have sympathised privately rather than taken the lead in the bharadars’ defence. In recounting his own role in both incidents, Jang seems to have described what he ought to have done rather than what he actually did.

The influence of Jang’s self-justification is also seen when both Pudma and the vamshavali report Mathbar’s telling Jang that a man must be prepared to kill even a close relative if ordered to do so by the king.

NOTES

1. LJB, pp. 343-44.
2. Lawrence Diary, 23 October and 13 November 1844.
5. Lawrence Diary, 8-15 May 1845.
APPENDIX III

THE THORESBY REPORT AND ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF THE KOT MASSACRE

In addition to the document submitted to Calcutta in March 1847 by the Residency (the ‘Thoresby Report’), detailed accounts of the Kot Massacre are also provided by Cavenagh in Rough Notes on the State of Nepal and by Pudma Rana in his biography of his father. In Cavenagh’s version, Jang Bahadur attempted on his own initiative to arrest Fateh Jang as the three ministers started to follow the Queen to the upper floor of the Kot and the violence started when Fateh Jang’s son Khadga responded with an attack on Bam Bahadur. According to Pudma, the Queen descended to the courtyard when she saw Jang Bahadur and Fateh Jang conferring together. After she had been persuaded to return upstairs, Jang Bahadur told her that Abhiman was talking with Fateh Jang and that 300 of Abhiman’s troops were approaching the Kot. She ordered Jang Bahadur to arrest Abhiman, but this instruction was changed to one for his death when she was told he was trying to leave the hall and he was killed at the door by one of Jang’s sentries.

Both Cavenagh and Pudma relied mainly, if not entirely, on Jang Bahadur’s own testimony. M.S. Jain and Ludwigh Stiller have argued that the Residency document, too, originated with Jang Bahadur but internal evidence makes this highly unlikely. The Thoresby Report does not explicitly state who fired the volley of shots which it claims began the violence, but the details presented make it easy to infer, as was first done by Thoresby himself, that Jang’s own partisans were responsible. The document is thus plainly inconsistent with Jang’s own statement to the Officiating Resident two days after the massacre that the first blow had been struck by Fateh Jang’s son, Khadga. When the Thoresby Report was submitted, Jang Bahadur’s position was still far from secure, and he must therefore, have been particularly anxious to convince the British of
the legitimacy of his position and would certainly have stuck to his original story. It follows that although the Thoresby Report may have been based partly on information obtained directly or indirectly from Jang Bahadur, it drew on other sources for key details, and is thus more reliable than either Pudma’s or Cavenagh’s accounts.

There remains another, more fundamental difficulty. Despite many differences between them, the Thoresby Report, Pudma and Cavenagh all agree in presenting Jang Bahadur’s actions at the Kot as a response to a perceived threat after the bharadars had assembled, and not as a pre-arranged plot. They also coincide in asserting that these actions were approved at the time by Queen Rajya Lakshmi, a contention which is also supported by the account in the Buddhiman Singh vamshavali.\(^5\) This leaves intact Jang Bahadur’s defence that he had her authority for what he did. However, suspicion that the real truth may have been different has often been expressed, and has, of course, been heightened by the fact that he himself originated mutually contradictory accounts: in addition to the stories already mentioned, in 1856 he had it given out that the slaughter had actually been ordered in writing by King Rajendra.\(^6\) Lakshmi Devi’s recently discovered May 1847 letter to her husband appears at first sight to provide damning confirmation that Jang acted entirely on his own initiative. The critical passage runs as follows:

On the night of Ashvin Badi 9 (14 September) you and I installed ourselves at the Kot. [We asked] who had killed General Gagan Singh by firing a shot from the roof and for what [alleged] crime he had been killed. We declared that those in the conspiracy to murder him, as well as the actual assassin, must be identified and arrested. The search for the murderers began, but at that moment, Vijay Raj Pande and Jang Bahadur deceitfully submitted that all of them [i.e. they and the other bharadars] would sit in council together and would discover the murderer and that you and I should leave and take our rest. I then went inside the kothari while you set off for the palace. Meanwhile, Jang Bahadur surrounded the palace with his officers. NCOs and men of the regiments under his command, created confusion and killed the bharadars, then drove out their wives and children.\(^7\)

Elsewhere in the letter, Lakshmi Devi repeatedly emphasises that she gave no orders for violence to be used against anyone except Bir Keshar Pande, Mathbar Singh’s mother and two others all of whom had
been denounced by Lal Jha as involved in a plot against the Queen's party. Lakshmi Devi also claims that in the days immediately following the massacre, Jang Bahadur had explained his action purely as self-defence and said nothing about orders from herself. It is not surprising, therefore, that Triratna Manandhar, the Nepalese historian who discovered the letter in the Foreign Ministry archives, should have concluded that the standard accounts of the massacre would have to be radically revised.

Some revision there must undoubtedly be, but a critical examination of the document shows that reliance on the Thoresby Report does not have to be abandoned as a consequence. In the first place, the kothari to which the queen said she retired is clearly to be identified with the chamber on the first floor of the Kot where the Report, Pudma and Cavenagh all agree she remained as events reached their climax. Contrary to Manandhar's apparent belief, Lakshmi Devi does not claim that she quit the scene entirely, only that she had left the main hall where she has ordered the bharadars to remain when the King set off to summon Fateh Jang.

Secondly, and crucially, Lakshmi Devi was far from being an impartial witness and her assertions can only be regarded as authoritative on points which were clearly within the knowledge of the recipient of the letter, Rajendra. Thus it must be accepted that Vijay Raj Pande and Jang Bahadur tendered joint advice to the royal couple before the King left the Kot, but the Queen's denial of responsibility for what subsequently happened carries very little weight.

NOTES


3. Thoresby to Government, 18 March 1847, FS, 27 March 1847, No. 112.


9. *Kothari* means a small room, especially one which is difficult of access or which is dimly lit, see Balkrishan Pokhrel et al., *Br̄ihat Nepali Shabdakosh* (Kathmandu: Royal Nepal Academy, 1983/4), s.v. It would be quite appropriately applied to a room reached by steep wooden steps and a trap door at the end of the main hall (c.f. Oldfield, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 361).
LETTERS OF JANG BAHADUR WRITTEN FROM EUROPE TO BAM BAHADUR

LETTER 1

We have heard the news of the mahila saheb's death and this has distressed us all very much.

I cannot now give you precise instructions. It is not possible for me to say what troubles will arise before my return. You must act as you think fit.

It is a fine thing that Shri Krishna Sahi has been made a captain because he paid court to you and a fine thing that Indrabir Khatri and Sanman Khatri have been made lieutenants! (It is fine that) the Singhdal Company have been given 40 rupees! The four kajis, the three lieutenants and the subbas with me are very happy to see these promotions. They say that Barn Bahadur and Badri Narsingh are as wise as Bharat and Chaturghan for they reckon that since you have shown so much kindness to people of little account, they themselves, after working like younger brothers, sons or slaves, will certainly be allowed to keep their positions. The people here have said that my brother the minister (viz., Bam Bahadur) used to tell us he would only dismiss an office-holder for an offence and that he would only promote a man if he was able to increase the area of land under cultivation or was energetic in support of the King's throne or the minister's life. [In practice,] they say, you are more liberal than that. Surely the minister cannot have made promotions on the principle that we are all members of one family who should promote ourselves with care and must fill the army with our own sons and nephews! People are saying that 'Bharat' and 'Chaturghan's', intelligence has led them to promote flatterers and to divert to brothers and sons money that should have gone to the treasury.

When the council recommended the death penalty for Chandrabir
Basnet for disobeying your orders you spared his life for his exertions beyond the Trisuli Ganga. A fine decision! You put him in irons, fined him and then turned him loose. Dhir Shamsher said to me that it was wrong for you to become angry with a dependent of his just on the word of a Newar, and to put him in fetters and fine him, and that, if he had to be fined, at least you ought not to have cashiered him. I replied: If after punishing so severely one whose only offence was to assist the foolish *mahila saheb*⁴ Bam Bahadur was equally harsh with a worthless man, who failed to submit his accounts, embezzled money and violated my laws and regulations, if Bam refused a jagir to a man who failed to submit his accounts, then he acted in accordance with the law. But if Bam dealt thus only with Chandrabir, then you may assume that he acted merely out of anger against a dependant of his brother; that he is incapable of performing the role of minister; that he pays heed to the word of worthless people. If, on the other hand, he has treated everyone equally, then you can assume that the people will regard your brother as very intelligent and capable minister.’ That is the reply I gave to Dhir Shamsher.

Ramu Ale killed a man with two shots, but when this came before the council you reckoned it only a misdemeanour, fined him 2,000 rupees and then reappointed him. A fine act! If you follow the advice of those counsellors of yours, then deserving people who give noteworthy service will find themselves in irons! How well these counsellors have spoken! Chandrabir’s capital offence has been punished by loss of his position, imprisonment and abuse, Ramu Ale’s by a two thousand rupee fine and reinstatement. Just think what that means. What will the people say? What will God say? How can the state endure if all the peasants are to be killed? Bhairab Singh Kharka’s services were no less than Ramu Ale’s, yet you know I ordered Satram to execute him.

Write to me about Badri Narsingh’s intention to give Lakshmipati a jagir. What does Badri mean by ‘On consultation with my second eldest brother (viz., Bam Bahadur), I dismissed the *kharidar* who had arrested Lakshmipati’? If any soldiers talk angrily about myself they are to be dismissed. If your astonishing behaviour will solve problems in the future, too, it will be right. If I had hankered after the office of premier, then even though I gave you the routine work, I would not have given you the right to make appointments to the *kampu*. Your actions do not please me, your eldest brother, nor your two other brothers here. How can they please the common people?

Give Parsa district to Bhairab Lal Jha at a commission of 900 rupees and take a share (of the revenue) of 400,000 rupees. If he does not
pay the dues then dismiss him on the ground that he has shown no regard for his own honour or for the King's territory, and that he has regarded revenue collection as only child's play.

How could the people expect justice if, after dismissing Muktinath for being responsible for oppression of peasants, you then appointed as subba a man without any household standing. You should realise that when the cultivators saw he had been given the position in violation of your elder brother's arrangements, they must have suspected that you had been bribed to make the appointment or that if you yourself were innocent then it was the man who recommended the appointment who was corrupt. If you were both guiltless, and hadn't, as the saying goes, 'tasted forbidden fruit', then why did you put a basket of shit on your head [viz., act in a way to arouse suspicion?]

When a cultivator's complaint against Shivanidhi was received, you dismissed it on the grounds that the petitioners would not accept the *lal mohar* on allocations. Why was Bir Bhadra Majhi dismissed before his time had expired? What was his offence? How can you entrust work to a man without standing, to someone who can only give verbal assurances. Who should take the blame now that something has gone wrong?

You extended the appointment of Bal Bhadra Majhi after he had remained at home for three months claiming to be ill, yet you dismissed Bir Bhanjan Majhi who worked among the cultivators night and day. Sometimes stability is threatened by the failure to punish, and sometimes it is imperiled by punishing in error. For example, Rajendra Bir Bikram Shah punished Bhimsen in error while he pardoned the men who had contrived his own grandfather's exile. After inflicting such punishment on Bhimsen, the mighty king lost his throne and had to sit wiping flies from his face. [In comparison] we are mere gnats: when *dawa* (the medicine)\(^5\) was opened Bhimsen was ruined, when the secret is out you will be surprised by what hits you. (DELETED: Whether my brother proves himself redundant or becomes popular with the people, the army and the King, I am observing everything from far away.)

A man who aims to make a name for himself must renounce greed and adopt compassion. He should not be pleased by worthless men paying court but he should entertain only deeds. If it will please the people he should even have his own son killed. He should do whatever makes the majority happy, overcoming his anger and love of wealth. He should try to form a council of good persons of high status but should not be concerned with his own status. He should give the people the
impression that he regards everyone's problems as his own. Since lying is sometimes necessary in politics, if you are able to keep the people happy by deluding them, it is easy to be a minister; if not, the task is very difficult. Acts which displease the people will soon produce a dangerous situation. You will say that I have written too much, but I have described things as I see them. Act as seems best to you.

You write that you have carried out the pajani of the army. If you have dismissed men with an eye to making savings on salaries you will earn the same bad reputation as Badri Narsingh has already done. If you have made dismissals for faults committed then you have strengthened your position. If you dismiss kamis, sarks, damais or karmis, then your capabilities will be undermined and the arsenals will be ruined. Do not dismiss kotes, pipas, jemadars, khalasi jemadars or pipa khalasis. Dismissing then is folly as they do a lot of work at little cost.

LETTER 2

If an officer counters your orders to the army, remove his insignia at once and place him in irons. If four (or more) persons gather in anyone's house, arrest them at once. If anyone, whether out of or in service, Brahman or an Indian, pays court to His Highness the mahila saheb without your permission, then if he is a parbate [hill man] put him across the Trisuli and if he is a deshwala [Indian] put him beyond Sisa Garhi (a fortress controlling the main routes from the plains to Kathmandu).

LETTER 3

Jang Bahadur sends greetings to Shri Barn Bahadur: Ramu Ale's killing a man is not a 'misdemeanour'. You heard me order Satram to execute Bhairab Singh Kharka for just such an offence. Remove Ale's badges of rank and put him in irons. Murder should not be readily forgiven. If you pardon this man what would you do if your own brother or son committed a murder? Give him a reward? Suspend his jagir. I will decide his case after my return. Although you have already fined him, put him in irons. His guilt is serious, all the people would be pleased by his punishment. Remove his badges of rank even if you have confirmed his office; place him in irons even if you have fined him.
LETTER 4

Shrimadrajkumar Kumaratmaj, Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief General Jang Bahadur Kunwar Ranaji sends greetings to his brother, the most auspicious, thousand times blessed and long-lived Shrimadrajkumar Kumaratmaj Commander-in-Chief General Bam Bahadur Kunwar Ranaji. All is well here and I hope it is the same with you. Your letters of Jeshtha Badi and of Friday, Jeshtha Sudi 5 [6 June 1850] reached me on Shravan Sudi 2 [19 August] and on Friday, Bhadra Badi 1 [23 August] respectively and I have noted the contents. After taking leave of Queen Victoria, I embarked for Paris on Tuesday, Shravan Sudi 13 [20 August] at seven ghadis before sunset, and arrived there on Wednesday, Shravan Sudi 14 [21 August] at eight ghadis before sunset. Paris is situated 157 kos (a unit of about 2 miles) south-east of London. I have met the Paris minister [the French premier] and will now leave for Bombay after seeing the President.

(You write that) Kharidar Lilanath Pande’s daughter-in-law has been defiled and his wife had been refused the prescribed ritual of purification as she is suspected of having been aware of the offence. I have learnt from someone else’s letter that troops going into Mahottari district to collect the revenue beat and killed a peasant. A mother conceals the fact if a daughter loses her purity, but a mother-in-law will not do the same for a daughter-in-law. Pande’s wife should therefore be allowed the ritual of purification. If the soldiers who killed the peasant in Mahottari did so on the orders of Subba Girija Datta Mishra, then confiscate his property. If he did not issue any order and the troops acted on their own initiative, then submit a report to the King and have the men responsible hanged on the spot where the murder took place.

Kharidars Deva Padhya, Manohar Padhya and Lakshmibhakta Padhya are sending me regular reports of all happenings at home, great and small. Therefore at the next tuladan (giving a present equal in weight to the donor) Kharidar Deva Padhya is to receive two to three hundred rupees, Manohar two hundred, and Lakshmibhakta one hundred.

After you have written that Her Majesty the Queen has fallen ill, what does it matter if you have completed hundreds of tasks or if you have struck gold! If anything happens to Her Majesty, then I was wrong to come away leaving you as minister. A long as you are able to claim that you have made the Queen well again, I shall be perfectly happy for you to ransack the treasury or to surrender the country to foreigners! Then only will I praise your work there, them my faith in you when I came
away leaving you as minister will prove well-placed,

[You write that] the Resident has asked for 800 Gurkha troops—Magars and Gurungs. [Tell him that] your elder brother will return in Paush (December-January) and the matter can be dealt with then. Say that a summons to the off-roll men has gone out, but that grain stored from the Mangsir (November-December) harvest will last them until Paush [i.e., they will have no incentive to enlist until then]; say that you will give facilities to anyone who does want to enlist; [point out that] troops have to be paid even if they remain at home all months and prove it by showing him the three categories of certificate issued to the Letar and Sri Nath regiments. Make promises to the Resident, but do not actually provide any troops.

You need not write to me about other trifles happening in Nepal, write daily with news of Her Majesty’s health. You do not know the meaning of ‘politics’. Everyone else has mentioned her condition openly in their letters whilst yours contained nothing on the subject. Does it mean you will be happy if something happens to the Queen? If anything happens to her while you are acting as minister I will hold you to blame. You will so prove your clothes, your deeds and your stomach are all black and of no use. Understand this, then employ vaidyas (doctors) from anywhere in the world, jhanhis (spirit healers) from all over the country. Use the resources of the treasury, put the army officers on the task and make the Queen well. If you behave indifferently acting high and mighty, if you do not nurse your benefactor (the Queen) and if anything happens to her person and I have to see misfortune come upon the sahebjyus, (sons or brothers of the king, or members of the Shah lineage outside the royal family) then you know what my anger will be like. I will never look at your face again. Paris, Saturday, Bhadra Badi 2, 1907 (24 August 1850).

Postscript (in Jang’s own hand): I have been given a reply to the Kings’ kharita. You will learn the contents from the Resident’s report to the King. The letter itself is with me.

LETTER 5

Carrying out the civil pajani is not like carrying out the military one. It should be done very carefully. If Hemdal Thapa, Ratnaman Singh Rajbhandari, Lakshmipati Jaisi, Shivanidhi Jaisi, Balbhadra Josi and the rest had not oppressed the peasants, why would I have dismissed them? Everyone in the three cities [Kathmandu, Patan, Bhaktapur] knew they
were intelligent office-holders. Why would I have replaced them by unknown persons? You may say that your giving a post to Shivanidhi was no different from my reappointing an old subba like Tara. [In fact] I gave the position to Tara because in 1905 [1848/9] he had not molested the peasants whereas when 500 peasants by God’s will came to the Valley to put their complaints to Shivanidhi, that Ramakanta shot at them. Ratnaman sent a company of troops from Bhikshakhor to arrest and turn back peasants who were coming to present their grievances. Hemdal Thapa has not yet presented his accounts and was dismissed for irregularities. So that the peasants should be prosperous even if the King’s revenue declined, I entrusted administration in the districts to a man with no standing. I am happy that you have given Butwal to Shivanidhi. The credit for the suffering of the peasants there and for the King’s loss of revenue belongs to you and to Badri Narsingh.

Reappoint all the old officials in the area of Udiya. I agree with you putting Kesar in charge of Morang. You have done well. Kaji Hemdal Thapa and Amin Subba Siddhiman Singh Rajbhandari told me that if I gave them a five year revenue contract for the seven districts between Udiya and Mechi, they would raise 52,000 rupees to cover the cost of the journey to Europe and run the finances in a way that would maintain good relations with the English and keep the peasants happy. I replied: As long as you have not submitted your accounts and have not obtained clearance certificates and after you forcibly turned back the peasants with troops brought from Bhikshakhor, it is wrong to entrust districts to old rogues like you. Now, if Hemdal Thapa earned even two paise, it would not be Thapa himself but the children of our own little sister and daughter who would get the benefit of it. As for Siddhiman, you know that up to now he has served me well. You know also that Ratnaman Singh did similar good service at Aulai [i.e., Alau??] After refusing appointments to men who had always been so dear to me, I could not have given them to other former subbas until after they had presented their accounts and received their clearance certificates.

God put us where we are so that we could protect the common people. It is right to find some work or other for old subbas so as to provide a living for them, but it is also necessary to protect the people. God will not tolerate a man who knowingly unleashes a starving tiger on the peasants, his flock. God did not tolerate Mathbar Singh’s unleashing the tiger Hira Lal, whom he made- his personal retainer. Bhimsen Thapa was induced by greed to unleash the tiger Kulanand on the peasant flock and God did not tolerate it. Nor did he tolerate Abhiman’s making
Ramaman and Lakshmipati his agents and unleashing those tigers on the flock. Nor did God tolerate Gagan Singh’s making Siddhiman his agent and setting that tiger on the peasant flock. Because I seized those tigers, placed them in a cage and fed them meat, the good wishes of hundreds and thousands of peasants prevented any harm coming to me from my having killed hundreds of men in various ways. Thus I reached this splendid position.

If the peasants see that you are confirming the arrangements your elder brother made, your task will be easy. If a man has not rendered his accounts he should be dismissed, be he umrao [a district governor], general or pipa. Whether he is the King’s man, my man or your man and even if he possesses thirty-two virtues and can carry out seventeen functions he should still be dismissed. You may ask how you can carry on the administration if you dismiss such capable men. For military work, you should select herdsmen from Motitar belonging to a caste eligible for army service. You may ask who should be the replacement on the clerical side for a man who does not submit his accounts. As clerks in the Kumari Chauk you should find and appoint sturdy men, of fair complexion, good-looking and with broad foreheads. Have nothing to do with men who cheat and lie and embezzle government funds. Carry on the administration with true and honest men.

When you carry out the pajani of district administration for the west and east and of civil officials for the Nepal valley, do so with integrity and without regard for self-interest. As for the army, you should dismiss anyone, general or private, who does not wear uniform, fails to perform drill or guard duty, evades work, speaks deceptively, or who cheats, even if he has beheaded hundreds for you and is dear to you like your own brother. Appoint others in their place. As for men whom I myself have appointed in the army, whatever their rank, you are to defer confirmation. As you suggest, after my return in Paush I shall be able to confirm appointments myself on the spot. If khalasis, jemadars or huda khalasis, pipas, jamadar pipas, sarkes, kamis, karmis, dakarmis or bajrakarmis fall ill, then even if they have been away from duty three months and have had one month’s home leave, they are all to be reappointed. Do not dismiss anyone. Confirm their positions.

Postscript (in Jang’s own hand): If you enlist infirm or cowardly soldiers and not sturdy youths, their salaries will be deducted from yours. You may ask where you should put your off-roll men, ranging from jemadar to private, who have gone to Pachilaghat. See to the Kathmandu garrison and find recruits for that. The less sturdy off-roll men [?


you accept] in your usual way on the advice of your companions, should be put in the Sher regiment. If anyone unsuitable is put in the Riphal, Letar, Raj Dal, Sri Nath, Mahi Dal,\(^6\) Kali Baksh or Purana Gorakh companies, you will be in trouble.

**NOTES**

3. Characters from the *Ramayana*.
4. Surendra's brother, Upendra.
5. Possibly a reference to the charge against Bhimsen of poisoning Queen Samrakya's child in 1837.
APPENDIX V

ARMY PAY UNDER JANG BAHDUR

Rates of pay for the army, and particularly the kampu regiments was a major source of contention during the early forties but by December 1843 the normal pay for a kampu private had been brought down to 72 rupees per year compared with the rate of 80-100 rupees per year prevailing under Bhimsen. The data for rates under Jang Bahadur are regrettably rather less clear. The table presented by Orfeur Cavenagh, the liaison officer who accompanied Jang Bahadur on his 1850 journey to Europe and returned with him to Kathmandu, has sepoys receiving between 100 and 300 rupees whereas the calculations of the cost of the increase in army strength in 1863 as given in a register at the Jangi Adda imply a figure of only 50 rupees for the kampu. The same register does, however, give 110 to 120 as the rate for privates in the rissala (cavalry) regiment, whilst the Rifle Regiment, Jang's own elite corps which was raised after 1846, paid between 200 and 400. Cavenagh had therefore presumably taken preferential rates for standard ones. The Jangi Adda (War Office) register is in fact consistent with other evidence indicating that the pay of privates outside Kathmandu did range between 36 to 50 rupees. The rate for the kampu must, however, have been substantially higher than this; the December 1843 rates were increased under Mathbar and although there was talk of reductions in 1845, there would surely have been some record in the sources if this had actually been implemented. A kampu private's actual pay under Jang may well have been close to the 110 rupees received by cavalry troopers. The Jangi Adda register's implied rates for privates, and also for non-commissioned officers (up to jemadar) are unreliable.

As with private soldiers, the pay rates recorded for officers show wide discrepancies. Cavenagh's figures are again far too high with captains, for example, ascribed a salary of 3,000 to 4,000 rupees whereas the Kamyandari Kitab Khana record for 1863 shows lieutenant-colonels only receiving from 1,800 to 4,366. In contrast, the Jangi Adda analysis
of the kampu gives figures for captain and lieutenant, 900 and 675 rupees respectively, which tally with those for these ranks in regiments outside the capital given in the Kitab Khana documents and also for the cavalry regiment (part of the kampu) in the Jangi Adda register itself. There is no evidence that kampu officers, as opposed to private soldiers, necessarily received more pay than their non-kampu equivalents, and it must therefore be assumed that these figures are correct. The rate for a captain is thus less than one-third of the pay for that rank prescribed by the reduced scale brought in 1836/7. This is explicable if one takes into account the effective downgrading of the rank which had occurred in the meantime: whereas Hodgson in 1843 could write of a Nepalese captain as the equivalent of a British colonel this had changed with the introduction of the new grade of the 'major captain' between 1844 and 1846. The 1863 lieutenant’s rate of 675 rupees was 200 less than 1836/7 salary, but was the same as the old subedar’s rate, presumably because subedars had been given a notional promotion to lieutenant when ‘major captains’ were introduced. In a similar fashion, the subedars shown by the Jangi Adda register on 254 rupees equate to the 1837 jemadars on 205.

NOTES

1. See the salary figures given in Chapter V, Table IV.
2. RN, p. 7; Jangi Adda Register no. 1 (tables on pp. 25-31 show an increase in the number of privates of 3, 187, entailing an extra expenditure of 159,350 rupees).
3. FS, 23 February 1855, No. 44, cited in NJB, vol. 1, p. 188.
4. Ibid., pp. 190-1901.
5. Nijamci Thamauti register 1920 (KKK).
6. Register no. 1, Jangi Adda and NJB, loc. cit.
7. A rate of 2,750 rupees is given in the list in HP, vol. 6, ff. 174/5.
8. Hodgson to Government, 6 June 1843, Nepal Residency Records R/5/53. The new rank is not mentioned in Thomas Smith’s ‘Return of the Nepal Army for December 1843’ (FS, 30 March 1944, No. 30), but is included in the 1846 complements listed in Jangi Adda Register no. 1.
APPENDIX VI

FAMILY TREES

These tables are not fully comprehensive but designed only to show the connections between individuals mentioned in the text. Principal sources are the tables in Ludwig Stiller, The Silent Cry etc., Kathmandu: Sahayogi, 1976; Bhim Bhadur Pande, Rastrabhakaiko Jhalak, Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 2034, VS, (1977/78) and the Hodgson Papers.
SHAH (ROYAL FAMILY)  

names of kings are accompanied by the regnal years)

Prithvi Narayan (1742-1775)

Pratap Singh (1775-1777)

Rana Bahadur (1777-1799)

Ranodyat

Girvana Yuddha (1799-1816)

Bir Bind Vikram

Rajendra (1816-1847) = (1) Samrajya Lakshmi = (2) Rajya Lakshmi

Shamsher Jang

Surendra (1847-1881)

Upendra

Ranendra

Birendra

Tarakumari KUNWAR = Trailokya Lalitkumari KUNWAR

daughter =

Jagat Jang KUNWAR

Prithvi Bir = (1881-1911)

daughter =

Jit Jang KUNWAR

Tribhuvan (1911-1955)

Mahendra (1955-1972)

Birendra (1972 to date)
2. Son by daughter of Ransher SHAH.
4. Daughter of Hiranya Garbha Kumari SHAH.
SHAH (FATEH JANG CHAUTARA)

- Shah
  - Jiba
    - Pran (third cousin of King Pratap Singh)
      - Fateh Jang
        - Guru Prasad
          - daughter = Jang Bahadur KUNWAR
        - Bir Bahu
          - daughter = Jang Bahadur KUNWAR
        - Ransher
          - daughter = Jang Bahadur KUNWAR
      - Pushkar
        - Hiranya Garbha Kumari = Jang Bahadur KUNWAR

BASNET (PRASAD SINGH)

- Shiva Ram = Supravabati (d. of Vijay THAPA)
  - Abhiman Singh
  - Kirtiman Singh
    - Jitman Singh
      - Prasad Singh
        - Meghambir Singh
          - daughter = Jang Bahadur KUNWAR
      - Kulman Singh
    - Bakhtawar Singh
      - daughter = Jang Bahadur KUNWAR
      - Buddhiman Singh

1. Great-great-grandfather of Bhimsen THAPA
PANDE (KHAS/CHETRI)

(i) 'GORA' PANDE (DALBHANDANJAN)

[Tularam]

[Jagjit]

[Dalbhanjan] [Singh Bir]

[Bir Keshar]

[Uday Bahadur =Lalit Kumari]

[Shamsher Bahadur =Janak Kumari]

[Ranakumari= Nain Singh THAPA]

[Ranjit]

[Bhotu]

[Garuda Dhoj]

[Dal Bahadur =Dirgha Kumari]

[THAPA]

(ii) 'KALA' PANDE (RANJANG)

[Bamsaraj]

[Ranasur]

[Damodar]

[Kalu]

[Shamsher Singh]

[Kulraj]

[Ran Keshar]

[Ranjang]

[Jang Keshar]

[Karbir]

[Randal]

[Jagat Bam]
THAPA

(i) BHIMSEN

Vijay

Bikram

Bir Bhadra

Amar Singh

Bhimsen

Nain Singh=Rana Kumari PANDE

Ranbir Singh

Bhaktawar Singh

Lalit Kumari =Uday Bahadur PANDE

Janak Kumari =Shamsher Bahadur PANDE

Dirgha Kumari =Dal Bahadur PANDE

Mathbar Singh

Ganesh Kumari =Bal Narsingh KUNWAR

Ranojjal Singh

Ranjor Singh
(ii) **KAJI AMAR SINGH**

- Ranadhoj
- Narsingh
- Arjun
- Ram Das
- Ranjor
- Ambikadevi=Chandrabir KUNWAR

(iii) **HEMDAL SINGH**

- Hemdal Singh
- Gajraj Singh=Badan Kumari KUNWAR
GLOSSARY

This list includes terms from Nepali and other Asian languages used in the text and not naturalised in English. There are also a number of words (non-italicised) which are well established in English usage in South Asia, but may not be familiar to readers outside the region. Some of the definitions of measurements and revenue terms have been adapted from the glossary in M.C. Regmi, *An Economic History of Nepal 1846-1901*, Varanasi: Nath Publishing House, 1988.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>adalai</td>
<td>district court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adhiyar</td>
<td>share - cropper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>amildar</td>
<td>military rank, roughly equivalent to corporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arji</td>
<td>request, petition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asal</td>
<td>real</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avatar</td>
<td>incarnation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baba</td>
<td>father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>badshah</td>
<td>emperor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bahadur</td>
<td>brave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bahun</td>
<td>Brahman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baisi</td>
<td>twenty-two (conventional number for the pre-unification statelets of the Karnali basin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bajarakami</td>
<td>cement worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhagwati Jatra</td>
<td>'Festival of the goddess' celebrated in Dhulikhel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bharadar</td>
<td>(literally, 'burden bearer') member of the Nepalese political elite (bharadari), present or former holder of senior office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bigha</td>
<td>measure of land, approx. 5/8 acre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>birta</td>
<td>land granted outright to an individual, normally free of tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>birtadar</td>
<td>holder of birta land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bhor</td>
<td>loss of ritual purity by unintentional pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>buniyadi</td>
<td>basic, fundamental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chakravartin</td>
<td>universal emperor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chaubisi</td>
<td>twenty-four (conventional number for the pre-unification statelets in the Gandaki basin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chaudhuri</td>
<td>Traditional holder of the revenue collection right at</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
pargana level

chautara
originally the title of the senior bharadar, later used for any collateral member of the royal family

chuni
peasant land holder in the Tarai

Chyangre Kausi
alternative name for Sadar Daphtarkhana (q.v.)

Dak Chauk
depository for the state reserves

Dhukuti

chauri
builder

damai
tailor, member of Damai caste

Dasai
the most important Nepalese festival, normally falling in October; the pajani (q.v.) was often held at around this time

dawa
medicine, drug

desha
country, realm

deshwala
Indian

dhakre
off-roll, out of government employment

Dhansar
one of the four principal Kathmandu courts

dharmadhikar
righteousness officer, enforcer of morals (title of Brahman in charge of enforcing caste regulations)

dharmadhikar-anika
--do--

dharmapatra
written oath

dharmashastra
science of right conduct, text expounding this

dhunaga
stone (used metaphorically for realm or state)

diksha mantra
initiation spell or formula (used in tantric initiation)

firangi
Englishman

ganga sandh
frontier on the Ganges (popular slogan during the period of Nepalese expansion)

gora
white, fair

gayatri mantra
a verse of the Rigveda given to twice-born Hindu boys at their investiture with the sacred cord

guthi
land gifted by the state or individuals for religious or charitable purposes

havaldar
(Nepalese army) military rank roughly equivalent to sergeant

hiranya garbha
(literally, 'golden womb') ritual of symbolic rebirth as a member of a higher caste

huda
N.C.O.

ishtadevata
personal or patron deity
Ita Chapali
One of the four main Kathmandu courts

jagir
land assigned in lieu of salary to a government employee

jang
war

Jangi Adda
War Office (Army Headquarters)

janaral
general

janchkhana
tribunal of enquiry

jati
caste [referring to the smaller, present divisions, not the four varnas (q.v.), ethnic group

jemadar
military rank above havaldar and below subedar

jetha budha
(literally ‘knowledgeable elder’) royal messenger and investigator

jhankri
spirit healer

jhara
forced labour

jimawal
local official responsible for collection of tax on khet lands in the hills

jimidar
official instituted responsible for collection of land revenue in the tarai at mauja level

kaji
second grade (below chautara) in the traditional hierarchy (a loanword from Persian (through Hindi) originally meaning ‘judge’)

kala, kalo
black

kalas
sacred vessel

Kamyandari
Personnel Office

Kitabkhana
blacksmith, member of Kami caste

kancha
youngest, youngster

kampu
Kathmandu garrison

Kampu
Daphtarkhana office dealing with land assignments for the kampu

karmi
artisan

Kausi
Treasury

khalasi
army bearer or labourer

kharidar
secretary

kipat
system of communal tenure traditional among the Kiranti of east Nepal

khajanchi
treasurer

khalsa
Sikh community in its military role

kharita
letter (the term is Persian, and was used to refer to
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>khas kura</td>
<td>diplomatic communications written in that language (literally, 'Khas speech') early name for Nepali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khukuri</td>
<td>Nepalese curved knife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khet</td>
<td>irrigated land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kote</td>
<td>arsenal worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kothari</td>
<td>small room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koti Ling</td>
<td>one of the four main courts at Kathmandu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kshatra</td>
<td>secular authority wielded by Kshatriyas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kshatriya</td>
<td>member of the second (warrior) caste in the Vedic hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kul</td>
<td>lineage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kuldevata</td>
<td>patron deity of a lineage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumari Chauk</td>
<td>Audit Office (also with some judicial functions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kumbhedan</td>
<td>lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagat Phant</td>
<td>Records Section (of the Finance Ministry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lal mohar</td>
<td>(document bearing) the king’s red seal; royal decree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>madeshi</td>
<td>plainsman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mahajan</td>
<td>merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharajadhiraj</td>
<td>(literally, 'Great King of Kings') title of the King of Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mahila</td>
<td>second eldest, second in seniority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mahila saheb</td>
<td>younger brother of the crown prince</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>man</td>
<td>1/8th of a pathi (q.v.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>milat-i-islami</td>
<td>Islamic community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mantri</td>
<td>minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mauja</td>
<td>basic unit for fiscal administration in the Tarai and Inner Tarai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mir Munshi</td>
<td>Principal Munshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mohi</td>
<td>tenant farmer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moth Adda</td>
<td>Register Office (for land tax assessment records)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mughlana</td>
<td>realm of the Mughals (early Nepali term for India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mukhiya</td>
<td>village headman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mukhtiyar</td>
<td>attorney, minister; used as title of the king’s principal minister from the early 19th century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mul</td>
<td>main, principal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>muluki ain</td>
<td>national or civil code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulukikhana</td>
<td>central treasury established by Jang Bahadur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munshi</td>
<td>clerk proficient in Persian, the official language of diplomacy between Nepal and British India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>muri</td>
<td>measure of capacity for grains (about 2.4 bushels)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nagaraja | King of the Nagas (serpent gods); the Nagas are important objects of worship in the Kathmandu Valley
---|---
najar | ceremonial gift presented by a newly-appointed subordinate to his superior
naya muluk | (literally ‘new country’) the western Tarai districts returned to Nepal in 1860
nijamti | civil, civilian
nishan | (military) colours, standards
pagari | officer of the rank of subedar or above
pahar | hill(s)
pajani | annual review of appointments
pakho | non-irrigated land
pancha | member of a panchayat
panchayat | committee (literally, ‘group of five’)
panchkat | In the Muluki Ain, crimes attracting the five severest penalties under the traditional legal system: death, shaving of the head (for Brahmans in lieu of capital punishment), branding, reduction to a lower caste and loss of caste
pani | water
paramhans | ascetic
parbate | hillsman
pargana | a subdivision of a district for revenue purposes, consisting of several maujas (q.v.)
pathi | 1/20 of a muri (q.v.)
patiya | certificate of expiation for infringement of caste rules
pupa | sacrificial priest
prashasti | formal title(s)
prayaschitta | expiation
raibandi | system of redistribution of irrigated land to maintain viable holdings
raja | rule, kingly authority
rajguru | royal or state preceptor; guru to a member of the royal family
rajpurohit | royal purohit (q.v.)
rajya | kingdom
raikar | the standard form of land tenure, under which the land holder paid rent to the government
rakam | land held in return for providing labour services to the
government

**Rigveda**
earliest Indian religious texts

**rissala**
cavalry

**ropani**
area of land yielding 4 *muri* (q.v.)

**ryot**
peasant

**Sadar**

*Daphtarkhana* Central Army Lands Assignment Office

**sahebjyu**
title given to sons or brothers of the king and some members of the Shah lineage outside the royal family

**sanad**
certificate, agreement

Sannyasi ascetic order

**sardar**
rank below *kaji* in the traditional hierarchy; sometimes used for senior officials generally

**sarki**
cobbler, member of Sarki caste

**sawal**
administrative manual

**Sawal Adda**
office for preparation of *sawals*

**shamsher**
sword

**shar**
Islamic religious law

**shishya**
pupil (used especially of an individual in relation to his guru)

**Shudra**
member of the lowest (cultivator) caste in the Vedic hierarchy

**sona birta**
land which is recognised as an individual’s rather than as government land, but which is still liable to some taxation

**subba**
chief district administrator (in Nepal the term also came to be used for a grade in the administrative hierarchy not tied to specific duties)

**subedar**
junior military officer (immediately senior to jemadar)

**svarajya**
autonomous state

**Taksar**
one of the four main courts in Kathmandu

**Taluqdar**
title of traditional major landowners in Oudh

**thamausti**
renewal of an appointment

**thar**
(literally ‘houses with the names’) group of families traditionally associated with the Shah dynasty in Gorkha; the term was used both for an inner elite of six families and a wider group, and was later the title of a category of land surveyor.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tilak</td>
<td>mark made on the forehead as part of a religious ritual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tirja</td>
<td>certificate of entitlement to rent from a specified plot of land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tithi</td>
<td>arrangements, regulations; edicts embodying these</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tuladan</td>
<td>ceremony in which donor gives a present equal to his own weight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>umraos</td>
<td>officers who, in the early post-unification period, raised and maintained their own troops; the term is also sometimes used later to refer to senior military commanders generally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upanayan</td>
<td>ceremony at which a male member of a twice-born caste is invested with the sacred cord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vaidya</td>
<td>physician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vamshavali</td>
<td>genealogy, chronicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>varna</td>
<td>caste (one of the original four Vedic divisions: Brahman, Kshatriya, Vaishya, Shudra)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>varnashrama</td>
<td>maintenance of caste divisions and of progression through prescribed life-cycle stages from student through householder to ascetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vishnuko amsh</td>
<td>portion of Vishnu (description used for Nepalese kings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuvaraj</td>
<td>Crown Prince</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zamindar</td>
<td>landlord</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Unpublished Records and Manuscripts
   a) India Office Library and Records, London
      Foreign Political Proceedings
      Foreign Secret Proceedings
      Henry Lawrence’s Nepal Diary (Lawrence Papers, Eur. MSS.F. 85, No. 96)
      Hodgson Papers
      ‘Nepal Summary 1837-40’ (Resident’s Diary), on microfilm (Pos. No. 4218) from an original in the John Hopkins Collection, Cleveland Library, Ohio.
      Nepal Residency Records
   b) Library of the Royal Asiatic Society, London
      Hodgson Correspondence
   c) Bodleian Library, Oxford
      English Historical Manuscripts, C. 262.
      Hodgson Manuscripts
   d) Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh
      Dalhousie Muniments
   e) National Archives of India, New Delhi
      Up to 1859:
      Foreign Miscellaneous
      Foreign Political Consultations
      Foreign Secret Consultations

(Note: The ‘Original Consultations’, kept in loose folders, are the originals of the Proceedings which were kept in bound registers and of which a copy was sent back to London. The numbering of both Consultations and Proceedings is identical and in the footnotes reference is made simply to ‘Foreign Political’ and ‘Foreign Secret’ irrespective of whether a document was seen in Delhi or in London.)
   From 1860:
   Foreign Political Proceedings: Parts A and B

(Note: These are printed copies of the original correspondence. A full set of Part A was provided for London and a summary of Part
B, which comprised matters judged less important.)

f) Uttar Pradesh State Archives, Allahabad
Department XXXIII, File No. 6.

g) National Archives of Nepal, Kathmandu
Kamyandari Kitabkhana (Personnel Office) annual registers for
1905, 1911, 1915, 1920, 1925 and 1930 VS (1848/9, 1854/5, 1858/9, 1863/4, 1868/9 and 1873/4).
Inglisrajyapravandhavamsavali (Chronicle of the Institutions of the English Kingdom), Bir Library, MS 3/84.

h) Jangi Adda, (Army Headquarters) Kathmandu
Register No. 1 (main series)
(Comparative statement of civil and military staff levels and costs for 1846 and 1863).
Register No. 2 (main series)
(Revenue assignments for 1852/3).

i) Archives of the Foreign Ministry and Lagat Phant (records section) of the Department of Land Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Kathmandu
Lal mohars (royal orders) and other documents (not consulted directly but copies or summaries supplied by Krishna Kant Adhikari and Triratna Manandhar).

j) Library of the Research Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur
Hanuman Dhoka Documents (discovered during restoration work on the Hanuman Dhoka royal palace).

k) Papers of Sundar Prasad Shah, Kathmandu
Note by Toran Bahadur Shah on the Kot Massacre.

l) Collection of Mohan Prasad Khanal, Kathmandu
'Sri Tin Maharaja Jang Bahadur Rana' (an account of Jang Bahadur's early life and assumption of power, probably written in the 1930s).

II. Books and Articles (Nepali and Hindi)

———Nepalko Samkshipta Vrittanta (Condensed Account of Nepal) (Kathmandu: Pramod Shamsher and Narbikra ‘Pyasi’, 2022 VS (1965/6)).

Baburam Acharya ra Uhamko Kriti (Baburam Acharya and His Work) [Kathmandu: Nepal ra Asiyali Anusandhan Kendra, 2029 VS (1972/3)].


Bajracharya, Dhanbajra and Shrestha, Tekbahadur, Panchali Shasan-Paddhitiko Aitihasik Vivechna (Historical Account of the Pan-chhayat System of Government) [Kirtipur: Nepal ra Asiyali Anusandhan Kendra, 2035 VS (1978/9)].


Dikshit, Kashinath, Bhaeka Kura (Bygone Things) [Kathmandu: Narendra Mani Diksit, 2031 VS (1974/5)].

Gyavali, Suryavikram, Itihaska Kura (Matters of History) [Kathmandu: Nepal Rajakiya Pragyapratisthan, 2034 VS (1977/8)].


Mechidekhi Mahakali (From the Mechi to the Mahakali), 4 volumes [Kathmandu: Shri Panchko Sarkan Sanchar Mantralaya, 2031 VS (1974/5)].

Sri 5 Surendra Bikram Shahka Shasankalma Baneko Muluki Ain (National Code Compiled in the Reign of His Majesty King Surendra) [Kathmandu: Kanun Tatha Nyaya Mantralaya, 2022 VS (1965/6)].

Naraharinath, Yogi, Itihas Prakashma Sandhipatrasamgraha [Collection of Treaties and Letters in Illumination of History), Vol. 1, Dang, 2022 VS (1965/6)].

‘Nepal Deshko Itihas’ (History of the Land of Nepal), vamshavali published serially in Ancient Nepal, Nos. 12-27, July 1970 to April 1974. From No. 24 onwards (including the period of this study) the text is printed from a manuscript formerly in the collection of Hemraj Pande and appears to be an adaptation and extension of the
vamshavali compiled in 1878 by Buddhiman Singh.


Pant, Naya Raj, *et al.* (eds.) *Shri Panc Prithvinarayan Shahko Upadesh* (Counsel of His Majesty King Prithvi Narayan Shah), vol. 3 [Kathmandu: Jagadamba Prakasan, 2025 VS (1968/9)].


Pant, Naya Raj, ‘Rana Rajyavyavastha’ (Rana Political Order), *Pragya*, vol. 8, no. 1 (Sravan-Asoj 2036 VS (July-June 1979)), pp. 95-111.

Pokhrel, Balkrishna, *Panch Say Varsha* (Five Hundred Years)[Kathmandu: Sajha Prakashan, 2031 VS (1974/5)].


Raj, Prakash E., *Vidvacchiromani Hemraj Sharma* (Crest-jewel of Scholars Hemraj Sharma) [Kathmandu: the author, 2035 VS (1978/9)].


Sri Ramlal, *Nepalasya Suryavamshi Sisodiya Rana ki Vamshavali arthat Shrimaharaja Jangbahadurke Gharanka* (Geanology of Nepal's Sisodiya Ranas or of the Family of Maharaja Jang Bahadur Rana), 1879 (place of publication and publisher not given).


Thapa, Pratiman, *Shri Tin Maharaja Jang Bahadur Ranajiko Jivan Charitra* (Life of His Highness Maharaja Jang Bahadur Ranaji) [Calcutta: Babu Hari Singh Thapa, 1908].

Thapa, Shamsher Bahadur, *Ranbir Singh Thapa* [Patan: Jagadamba Prakashan, 2023 VS (1966/7)]


III. Books and Articles (English and French)


Bayly, Susan, ‘Hindu Kingship and the Origin of Community: Religion,


Gaborieau, Marc. Le Népal et ses populations (Brussels: Editions Complexes, 1978).


Grierson, George, Introduction to the Maithili Language of North India, Part II (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1882).


Hasrat, Bikrama Jit (ed.), The History of Nepal as Told by Her Own and Contemporary Chroniclers (Hoshiarpur: V.V. Research Institute, 1970).


——— ‘Some Account of the System of Law and Police as Recognised


Oliphant, Laurence, A Journey to Kathmandu with the Camp of Jung Bahadoor (London: John Murray, 1852).
Prinsep, Henry T, History of the Political and Military Transactions during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings, 1813-23 (London: Kingsbury, Parbury & Alen, 1825).
———Review of Jain, Emergence of a New Aristocracy in Nepal, Regmi Research Series, vol. 6, no. 6 (June 1974), pp. 115-118.


Sharma, R.S. Indian Feudalism, 2nd edition (Delhi: Macmillan 1980).


Smith, Thomas, *Narrative of a Five Years' Residence at Nepaul from 1841 to 1845*, 2 volumes (London: Colburn, 1852).

Stein, Burton, *Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980).


IV. *Unpublished Dissertations and Papers*


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acharya Baburam</td>
<td>35, 70, 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adalat</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhikari (Chetri thar)</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhikari guru family</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhikari, Juddha Bir</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhikari, Krishna Kant</td>
<td>185, 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhikari, Ran Mehar</td>
<td>168, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adhiyar</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administrative system</td>
<td>209-212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>64, 65, 70, 89, 100, 104, 107, 118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aitareya Brahmana</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alau</td>
<td>174, 176, 190, 193, 268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ale (Magar thar)</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ale, Ram</td>
<td>263, 265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allahabad</td>
<td>108, 121, 155, 188, 233, 243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambala</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambans</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>amin subba</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Gorkha Wars</td>
<td>5, 14, 18-19, 24, 25, 35, 37, 40, 44, 174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Sikh Wars</td>
<td>156, 230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arjyal tharghar family</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>army (organisation)</td>
<td>14, 38, 74-77, 136, 208-210, 269, 272; (pay) 16-18, 56, 67, 74-80, 127, 136, 157, 170, 208-209, 271-72; (political importance) 13-14, 64, 74-85, 99, 113-20, 127-129, 132, 140, 157, 177, 178, 205, 207, 211, 212, 244, 246, 249-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthashastra</td>
<td>10, 245, 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aryal guru/purohit family</td>
<td>25, 44, 95, 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aryal thar</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aryal, Chaturbhaj</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aryal, Shiva Prasad</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aryal, Taranath</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aryal, Vidyaranya</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aryan migrations</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ascetics</td>
<td>2, 6, 10, 55, 67, 86, 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>astrology</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland, Lord</td>
<td>45, 51, 55, 65-66, 69, 73, 87, 89-90, 101, 103, 104, 107, 109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aulai (=Alau?)</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avatar</td>
<td>9-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azimghar</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badi caste</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badra Bani regt.</td>
<td>95, see also &quot;Bajra Bani&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagale Thapa Kul</td>
<td>21, 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajra Bani regt.</td>
<td>75, 95, 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bahun, see 'Brahman'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baisi kingdoms</td>
<td>4, 13, 19, 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banepa</td>
<td>113, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banke district</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Buddhism, 204, 247
bunyadi birta tenure, 16
Burghart, Richard, 2, 25, 219, 220
Burma, 56, 218, 227
Butwal, 268
bwaneses, 82
Byrnes, Sir, William, 81

Campbell, Archibald, 48, 49, 55, 71; Sir Colin, 232
Canada, 40
Canning, Lord, 232, 234
Carnatic, 5
castration (as punishment), 50, 217
Cavenagh, Orfeur, 71, 161, 164, 210, 213, 216, 233, 258, 259, 260, 271
chakravartin, 24
Champaran, 175, 226
Chand, Sansar, 254
Charles I, King of England and Scotland, 117
Chatariya thars, 204
Chaturghan, 262
Chaubisi kingdoms, 4, 13, 19, 20
Chaudandis, 4
Chaudhuris, 220, 222
Chepangs, 6
Chetri caste, 6-8, 21, 25, 36, 198-9, 210, 235, 250, 251 (see also 'Khas')
China, 2, 5, 9, 40, 56, 72, 73, 100, 104, 105, 118, 130, 134, 138, 156, 187, 193, 194, 215, 232, 254
Chittorgarh, 187, 252
Cholas, 11
Christendom, 24
Christianity, 250
chuni, 221, 223
Chure Hills, 133 (see also Siwalik Hills)
Chyame caste, 6
Chyangre Kausi, 236 (see also Sadar Daphtarkhana)
Clark, Captain, 91
Code Napoleon, 218
Colvin, I.R., 158, 161, 175
Commanding General system, 196
Commercial Treaty of 1801, 23
cotton, 40, 228
cow slaughter, 220, 250
Dabi Prasad, 161
dak Chauk Dhukuti, 215
Dalhousie, Lord, 188, 206
Dami caste, 6, 265
Daphtarkhana, see Sadar Daphtarkhana
Darbhanga, 10, 251
Darjeeling, 64, 158
Das, Amir Singh, 111, 140
Das, Lakshmi, 41, 71, 83, 128, 129, 130, 158, 163, 165, 204
Dasai, 111, 132
desha, 219
Devi Datt, 75, 86, 154
Dew Bhaju, 6
dhakre, 17, 120, 132, 157
Dhankuta, 101, 225
Dhansar, 215
dharma, 218
dharmadhikar, 11, 146, 155, 168, 216, 218, 219
dharma dhikuranika, 11
dharma dyaksha, 11
dharamashastra 10, 11
Dhobi caste, 6
Dhukuwabas, 133, 136
Dhulikhel, 18, 168, 253
dhunga, 25, 178
Dibya Upadesh, 13, 22, 217
diksha guru, 10, 36, 37
diksha mantra, 10
Doti, 18, 39
Dumont, Louis, 9
Durga Baksh regt., 75
dvairajya, 245

ganga sandh, 26
Ganges, 3, 4, 7, 26, 65, 83, 88, 111
Gangetic plain, 3
Garhwal, 5, 7, 18, 25
Gardner, Edward, 42
gayatri guru, 10, 36, 37, 99
gayatri mantra, 10
Gharti thar, 197
Gharti caste, 6, 198
ghee, 228
Ghusot, 173, 183
Gora Baksh regt., 75
gora Pandes, 34, 58, 85, 87, 88, 95, 126,
177, 277
Gorakh regt., 75 (see also ‘Purana Gorakh’)
Gorakhpur, 12, 39, 121, 128, 234
Gorakhnath, 11
Gorkha, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 19, 20,
21, 22, 25, 37, 50, 70, 115,
130, 156, 212, 217, 220, 235,
248, 249, 253
Gorkhalis, 26 (see also ‘Gorkhas’)
Gorkhas (ethnic label, also spelt
Gurkhas), 40, 80, 130, 140,
208, 254 (see also ‘Indo-
Nepalese’)
Gorkha Vamshavali, 28
grain, 228
Grand Council, 213 (see also ‘bharadari kausal’)
Gunavanta, 214
Gune, V.T., 219
Gupta dynasty, 245
Gurkha recruitment for British army,
267
Guru Baksh regt. 75
Gurungs, 6, 7, 8, 21, 22, 25, 210, 211,
234, 248, 267
guru-shishyas relationship, 11, 173
guthi tenure, 16, 170, 222
Gwalior, 45, 128

East India Company, 19, 23 25, 38,
40,49,56,64,68,71,88,105,
109, 123, 135, 176, 222, 227
(see also ‘Britain-relations
with Nepal’)
Edwards, Daniel, 3, 185, 215
Egypt, 9, 228
Ellenborough, Lord, 80, 98, 107, 108,
109, 110, 117, 120-122, 125,
126
England, 116, 175, 193 (see also ‘Brit-
ain’)
English language, 203
Europe, 9, 15, 24, 48, 125, 187, 188,
189, 191, 200, 217, 218, 222,
227, 231, 244, 262, 271
extradition, 223, 231
famine, 138
feudalism, 15, 16, 185
firangis (also spelt ‘Feringis’), 40, 102,
103
Foreign, Ministry Archives, 260
France, 96, 231, 266

Gaine caste, 6
Gandaki basin, 4, 7
Gandaki river, 3
Habib, Irfan, 15
Hanuman Dal regt., 74, 75-6, 79, 80, 100, 154
Hanuman Dhoka, 156, 160, 161, 214, 249
Hardinge, Lord, 134, 176
Hastings, Warren, 40
Hayu, 6
Heesterman, J.C., 10
Hetauda, 99, 100, 102, 119, 133, 135
Himalayas, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 12, 40
Hinduisation, 2, 7
Hinduism (political aspects), 8-13, 24, 117, 171-72, 177-8, 196-197, 218-19, 233, 243-45, 246, 247, 250
hiranya garbha ceremony, 11-12
Hodgson Papers, 167
Hodgson, Brian, 12, 16, 33, 34, 38-131 Passim, 138, 158, 175, 178, 197, 202, 203, 210, 214, 215, 216, 218, 223, 234, 249, 250, 272
Hofer, Andras, 2, 5, 216, 218, 219, 220
homosexuality, 216
Hunter, William, 77, 80, 105
hypogamy, 7, 216
hypogamy, 23, 216
ijaradar system, 67, 249
Ilam, 195
‘Ilayachi Kothi’, 148
Illustrated London News, 203
Inden, Ronald, 9
India, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 16, 25, 37, 38, 47, 65, 74, 90, 99, 125, 127, 130, 136, 139, 165, 170, 176, 190, 205, 211, 218, 219, 222, 225, 226, 230, 232, 250
Indian Mutiny, 196, 207-8, 210, 212, 224, 232
Indigo, 226
Indo-Aryan languages, 7
Indo-Nepalese, 210, 211, 218, 251, see also ‘Parbatiyas’
Indra Jatra, 8, 179, 181
Inglisrajayaprabhandhavamshavali, 15
ishtadevata, 8, 11
Ita Chapel, 215
Jagir system, 16-18, 77, 80, 171, 221-224, 229, 244, 250
Jain, M.S., 3, 73, 78, 83, 101, 109, 137, 138, 164, 176, 177, 185, 188, 196, 200, 207, 216, 258
Jaisi Brahmans, 5
Jaisi thar, 198
Jaisi, Lakshmipati, 204, 263, 267
Jaisi, Ratnaman, 269
Jaisi, Shivanidhi, 189, 267, 268
Janakpur, 10, 203
Janchkhana, 90
Jang Bahadur Belai Yatra, 15, 218, 242, 247
Jangi Adda, 271, 272
Japan, 9, 230
jati, 220, 233
Jaunpur district, 232
Jayaswal, K.P., 245
jetha burha, 156
Jha thar, 198
Jha, Bhairob Lal, 263
Jha, Hira Lal, 22, 139, 169, 172, 173, 203, 221, 256, 257, 268,
Jha, Kulanand, 22, 268
Jha, Lal, 158, 159, 160, 260
jhankris, 267
jhara system, 222
jimawals, 222
jimidar, 223, 225-27
Josi, thar, 198
Josi, Balbhada, 267
Jumla, 4
Kabul, 81, 103
Kadara caste, 6
Kailali district, 241
Kakani, 111
*kala* Pandes, 34, 58, 66, 76, 84-88, 90, 99-114, 120, 123, 130-131, 140, 157, 168, 172, 201, 202, 230, 277
Kali Bahadur regt., 75
Kali Baksh regt., 75, 100, 154, 270
Kali Prasad regt., 75-76, 154 (see also 'Hanuman Dal')
*Kalidasa*, 245
*kalopani*, 187
Kalunga, 254
Kami caste, 6, 265, 269
*Kampu*, 17, 74, 77-80, 100, 112, 118, 127, 154, 157, 205-211, 215, 263, 271, 272
*Kampu Daphtar* Khanka, 215
*Kamyandari Kitabkhana*, 202, 204, 215, 271, 272
Kanauj, 7
Kanchapur district, 241
Kangra, 254
Kanphata Yogis, 11
Kanyakubja, 7, 9
Karbi *thar*, 198
Karkota dynasty, 9
Karmis, 265
Karnali basin, 4, 7
Karnali river, 3
Kasai caste, 6
Kashmir, 5, 9
Kasinath, 90, 248
Kaski, 192, 194, 195, 224, 247, 253
Kathmandu Valley, 1, 4, 5, 16, 18, 25, 37, 113, 117, 122, 127, 134, 175, 220, 228, 248, 249, 250, 268
*Kausi Toshakhana*, 101, 154, 168, 203, 215
Khadka *thar*, 198
*khajanchi*, 46, 201, 203
*khajis*, 23
*khalas*, 204
*khalsa*, 90, 250
Khan, Duman, 212
Khanal *thar*, 198
Khandka *kul*, 21, 253
Khanka *kul*, 253
Kharka, Bhairab Singh, 263, 265
*Khas*, 7, 8, 12, 14, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 187, 198-9, 201, 202, 208, 235, 250, 251
*khas* (revenue term), 92
Khatti *thar*, 198
Khatti, Bhawani Singh, 136, 163, 164
Khatti, Indrabir, 262
Khatti, Jamon Singh, 118
Khatti, Karbir, 71, 90, 91, 102, 153, 164, 169, 188, 189
Khatti, Lal Singh, 202, 203
Khatti, Nanda Kumari Sripali Tandon, 93, 168, 275
Khatti, Sanak Singh Sripali Tandon, 168, 174, 201, 275
Khatti, Sanman, 262
*khet* land, 222
Kmers, 10
Kingship, 1-26 passim, 247-248; religious aspects, 8-13, 196, 244, 246
Kinloch, Captain, 40
*kipat*, 8, 16, 225
Kiranti, 4, 8, 16, 211, 225, 251
Kirkpatrick, William, 17, 20, 21, 23, 119, 177, 226
*Kitabkhana*, see 'Kamyandari Kitabkhana'
Kot Massacre, 109, 152, 158-65, 168-70, 174, 175, 190, 191, 200,
Koti Ling, 215
Krishna, 10
kshatra, 219
kshatriyas, 7, 12, 13, 204
kul, 20-21, 253
kuldevata, 21
Kulu caste, 5
Kumals, 6
Kumaon, 5, 7, 18, 25, 49, 83
Kumaon Brahmans, 172
Kumar, Satish, 3, 185, 195
Kumari Chauk, 106, 154, 168, 215, 269
Kumati Chauk, 106, 154, 168, 215, 269
Kumari Dal regt., 75
Kunwar thar, 198
Kunwar (later ‘Rana’) family, 99, 168, 185, 187, 189, 195, 200, 206, 225, 235, 253-54, 275
Kunwar, Ahiram, 253, 275
Kunwar, Badan Kumari, 275
Kunwar, Badri Narsingh, 159, 168, 188-89, 262, 263, 268, 275
Kunwar, Bal Bhadra, 254, 275
Kunwar, Bal Narsingh, 18, 36, 41, 43, 51, 56, 68, 70, 72, 87, 89, 90, 91, 101, 102, 105, 112, 171, 254, 278; date of death, 143, 144
Kunwar, Balram, 56, 68, 71, 90, 123, 275
Kunwar, Bhakta Bir, 275
Kunwar, Bhaktawar, 168
Kunwar, Bhim Jang, 70
Kunwar, Bir Bhadra, 89, 101, 254, 275
Kunwar, Chandrabir, 254, 275, 279
Kunwar, Debi Bahadur, 71, 123, 124, 137, 275
Kunwar, Dhir Shamsher, 168, 181, 190, 192, 194, 196, 203, 207, 244, 245, 263, 275
Kunwar, Dhoj Narsingh, 245
Kunwar, Girvana Kumari, 275
Kunwar, Jagat Jang, 93, 190, 194, 195, 200, 274, 275
Kunwar, Jagat Shamsher, 168, 196, 222, 275
Kunwar, Bhim Jang, 70
Kunwar, Jang Bahadur, 1, 7, 8, 14, 15, 17, 18, 21, 24, 43, 55, 58, 84, 90, 98, 109, 118-120, 124, 126, 128-29, 133, 135-36, 138, 152-276 passim
marriage to daughter of Prasad Singh Basnet, 70
captain in artillery, 72-73
alleged exploits, 73
marriage to Nanda Kumari Khatri, 93, 168
appointed kaji and commander of Purana Gorakh, 112
appointed to Kumari Chauk, 123
leaps into well, 105
assassinates Mathbar Singh, 137
appointed prime minister, 163
journey to Europe 187, 188, 199, 202, 203, 210, 222, 227, 230-232, 244, 246, 262, 266, 268, 271
resignation and appointment as maharaja, 192-95
resumes premiership, 196
in Indian Mutiny, 210-12, 232
attitude towards British, 230-235
religious beliefs, 171
possible westernisation, 206
as administrator, 213
Kunwar, Jay Bahadur, 161, 168, 170, 171, 188, 189, 275
Kunwar, Jay Krishna, 275
Kunwar, Jit Jang, 191, 274, 275
Kunwar, Krishna Bahadur, 164, 168,
195, 196, 211, 213, 275
Kunwar, Lalit Kumari, 274, 275
Kunwar, Ram Krishna, 18, 70, 253
Kunwar, Ranbir, 93
Kunwar, Rani Chand (of Punjab) 233
Kunwar, Ranjit, 253, 254, 275
Kunwar, Ranodidip Singh, 168, 171, 179, 196, 211, 244, 245, 275
Kunwar, Revant, 36, 275
Kunwar, Tara Kumari, 275
Kusle caste, 6
Kuti, 232, 234
Kyrong, 232, 234

Ladakh, 100
Lagat Phani, 171
Lahore, 56, 66, 71, 73, 91, 132, 149 161
Lakshmipati (ascetic), 86
Lamjung, 4, 192, 195, 196, 224, 247
land revenue, 213
land tenure, 14-19, 66-68, 139, 169-71, 215, 220, 222-229, 244, 256
Lawrence, Henry, 58, 76, 109, 112, 122-158 passim, 178, 248
Honoria, 248
legal system, 189, 216-220, 224, 248-249, 262, 265
Letar regt., 74, 75, 94, 100, 154, 208, 267, 270
Levi, Sylvain, 2, 104
levirate, 50
Lhasa, 40, 130, 232
Licchavis, 245, 248
Limbus, 8, 26, 210, 225
Login, Dr., 162
London, 176, 189, 203, 227, 231, 266
Lucknow, 82, 206, 212, 234
Ludhiana, 67, 91, 120

MacGregor, Brigadier, 212, 234
Maddock, Herbert, 39, 42, 103, 108
Madeshis (also spelt 'madesiahs'), 88, 233
Magars, 6, 7, 8, 21, 22, 26, 101, 119, 198, 199, 208, 249, 253, 266
Magazine regt., 75
Mahabharata, 246-47, 248
Mahabharat range, 3
Maharajaship (establishment of), 192-97
Mahakali river, 26
maharashtra dharma, 24
Mahat thar, 197
Mahendra Dal regt., 75, 270
Mahi (= Mahendra?) Dal regt., 270
mahi la guru, see 'Paudyal, Krishna Ram'
Mahottari, 67, 68, 266
maite ghar, 18
maize, 3
Majhi thar, 198
Majhi, Bal Bhadra, 264
Majhi, Bir Bhadra, 264
Majhi, Bir Bhanjan, 264
Makwanpur, 4, 213, 225
Malavikagnimitra, 245
Malla thar, 198
Malla, Jayasthiti, King of the Kathmandu Valley, 9, 217
Malla, Jay Prakash, King of Kathmandu, 8
'Malla Empire', 4, 7, 12, 20
Manandhar caste, 204
Manandhar thar, 198
Manandhar, Dharmanarayan, 228
Manandhar, Sundar Dhan, 204
Manandhar, Triratna, 160, 260
Manu, 246
Marathas, 1, 4, 24, 179, 219, 245
Marize, Jean-Claude, 185
Matwali castes, 6
mauja, 223
Mayne, Peter, 163
Mechi river, 268
Meiji restoration 230
Mewar, 12, 21, 253
INDEX

milat-i-islam, 24
Mir Munshi, 215
mir subba, 203
Mishra guru family, 25, 37-38, 58, 155, 168, 201, 280
Mishra, Batakhnath, 280
Mishra, Gajraj, 37, 42, 50, 280
Mishra, Ganpat, 280
Mishra, Girija Datt, 67, 203, 221, 223, 266
Mishra, Harsha, 280
Mishra, Krishna Ram, 37, 50-55, 57-58, 65, 69, 88, 90, 99, 107, 114, 115, 280
Mishra, Nanda, 280
Mithila, 10, 86, 251
mohi, 221
monopolies, 204, 228, 229
Morang, 66, 204, 268
Moth Adda, 215
Motihari district, 203
Motitar, 269
Mughal Empire, 4, 13, 15, 17, 218, 233
mughlana, 13, 218
mukhiya, 222
mukhtiyar, 23, 39
Muktinath (revenue collector), 264
mui khaji, 34
Mull, Kasinath, 106, 107, 108, 120
muluk, 219
Muluki Ain, 2, 5, 13, 25, 191, 197, 198, 201, 216, 217, 219, 220-22, 224-25, 227, 246, 250, 251
Mulukikhana, 203, 215
Murshidabad district, 47
musk trade, 40
Muslims, 6, 7, 12, 15, 24, 206, 211, 218
Nagaraja, 172
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 218
Narayan, Dharma, 204
‘Narnarayan’ 9
national anthem 32

national identity, development of, 24-26, 178, 219-20, 251
‘National Movement’, 98, 113-20, 249, 257
Nava Buddha, 169
Naya Gorakh regt. 75, 77, 143
naya muluk, 226
Nepal
pre-1830 history, 2-9
historiography, 2-3
Nepal-China War (1792), 2, 5, 254
Nepal Valley, 269, see also ‘Kathmandu Valley’
Nepal-Tibet War (1791), 254
Neal-Tibet War (1855-6), 192, 197, 210, 213, 222, 229, 232, 234, 239
Nepali language, 7, 179, 251
Newars, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 16, 23, 26, 40, 130, 165, 198-9, 203, 204, 217, 228, 245, 248, 250
Nuwakot district, 249

Ochterloney, Sir David, 35
Oldfield, H.A., 163, 191, 210, 226
Oliphant, Laurence, 200, 222
Oliver, Colonel, 88, 101, 103
opium, 40, 228
‘oriental despotism’, 14, 117, 250
Ottley, Captain, 161, 163, 164, 165
Oudh, 26, 229, 232

Pachilaghat, 269
Padhya, Deva, 266
Padhya, Lakshmibhakta, 266
Padhya, Manohar, 266
pahar, 3
pajani, 17, 45, 51-52, 74, 77-78, 84, 88, 100, 103, 112, 135, 153-154, 158, 173, 193, 223, 267, 269
pakho land, 222
Palmerston, Lord, 228
Palpa, 4, 18, 38, 89, 131, 136, 154, 158, 168, 172, 188, 225
KINGS, SOLDIERS AND PRIESTS

panchas, 248, 249
panchayat, 248, 249
panchijyal, 249
panchkhat, 224
Pande thar (Brahman), 198
Pande thar (Chetri), 198, 200 (see also ‘gora Pandes’ and ‘kala Pandes’)
Pande guru family, 11, 155, 168, 201, 280
Pande tharghar family, 119
Pande, Bamsaraj, 277
Pande, Bani Vilas, 155, 280
Pande, Bhotu, 277
Pande, Bir Keshar, 34, 69, 159-160, 167, 259, 277
Pande, Bir Singh, 89
Pande, Chitra Devi, 276
Pande, Dal Bahadur, 59, 83, 89, 277, 278
Pande, Dalbhanjan, 34, 53, 70, 85-87, 89, 99, 126, 154, 156, 159, 162-163, 277
Pande, Damodar, 33, 34, 37, 48, 277
Pande, Ganesh, 22
Pande, Garudadhoj, 277
Pande, Gauriswar, 280
Pande, Jagan Nivas, 280
Pande, Jagat Ram, 79, 83, 88, 105, 124, 130, 174, 175-176, 277
Pande, Jagjit, 277
Pande, Jang Keshar, 277
Pande, Kalu, 21, 22, 276, 277
Pande, Karbir, 35, 79, 84, 126, 277
Pande, Kulraj, 78-80, 84, 86, 89, 105, 111, 277
Pande, Lilanath, 266
Pande, Nageshwar, 280
Pande, Narayan, 155, 280
Pande, Rajivalochan, 280
Pande, Ram Hridaya, 280
Pande, Ran Keshar, 277
Pande, Rana Kumari, 159, 259, 277,

278
Pande, Ranaasur, 277
Pande, Randal, 35, 86, 89, 146, 277
Pande, Ranjang, 33, 35, 37, 48, 50-8, 64-69, 72, 73, 78, 79, 83-85, 87, 89-90, 105, 277
Pande, Ranjit, 34, 277
Pande, Shamsher Bahadur, 59, 278
Pande, Shamsher Singh, 277
Pande, Singh Bir, 277
Pande, Tirtha Raj, 201
Pande, Tularam, 34
Pande, Uday Bahadur, 59, 278
Pande, Vijay Raj, 155, 156, 161, 167-69, 172, 177, 187, 200, 201, 207, 219, 259, 260, 280
pani nachalnya castes, 6
Panjab, 5, 56, 68, 91, 100, 132, 140, 156, 230, 231, 233, 250, 256
Pant thar, 198
Pant, Bhagirath, 22
Panth tharghar family, 119
Parbatiya language, 251 (see also ‘Nepali language’)
Parbatiyas, 7-9, 25, 26, 265
pargana, 221, 223
Paris, 189, 266, 267
 Parsa district, 66, 263
Pashupatinath, 56, 68, 135
Patan, 4, 8, 130, 164, 204, 21, 267.
patiya, 218, 219
Patna, 82, 120
Paudyal, Brajnath, 37, 280
Paudyal, Janardan, 146, 155, 280
Paudyal, Jay Mangal, 280
Paudyal, Jivnath, 37, 146, 280
Paudyal, Krishna Ram, 37, 39, 44, 45, 57, 64-66, 69, 72, 85-87, 99, 104, 106, 110, 121, 125, 126,
Residency, British organisation, 41
intelligence sources, 41-42, 83
Resident's Diary, 104, 112, 113, 123, 139, 166, 257
revenue collection, 67-69, 203-05, 215, 222-229, 256, 264, 267-269
rice, 3, 127, 150, 157, 196, 227, 228
Rifle (Riphal) Regiment, 208, 270, 271
Rigveda, 10
Risala Paltan, 76
roja paltan, 210
Roll of succession, 194, 196, 200
Rose, Leo E., 195, 197
Rough Notes on the State of Nepal, 71, 258
Rudra Dhoj regt., 211
Russia, 40, 72
Sabuj regt., 76
Sadar Daphtarkhana, 78, 79, 89, 102, 113, 168, 170, 189, 215,
Saddu(?) regt., 75
Sagauli, 164, 174, 175, 193
Sagauli, Treaty of, 26, 58
Sahai, Ganpat, 162
Sahi, Shri Krishna, 262
Sallyana, 224
Salmi caste, 204
salt, 228
Sannyasis, 6
Saptari district, 66, 204
Sarba Dhoj regt., 76, 155
sarkari Land, 16
Sarki caste, 6, 265, 269
Sarlahi district, 203
Satlej river, 5, 35, 90, 254
Satram, 263, 265
 sai Shudras, 7
Satyal guru family, 238
Sawal Adda, 215
Sen kingdom, 4
Sepoy Revolt, see 'Indian Mutiny'
Shah Alam II, Mughal Emperor, 13
Shah dynasty, 1, 9-12, 14, 19, 21, 25, 156, 177, 178, 187, 190, 192, 196-98, 201, 244, 251, 253, 267, 274
Shah, Bahadur, 14, 22-23, 35, 37, 249, 274
Shah, Bani, 19
Shah, Bir Bahu, 91, 276
Shah, Bir Bind Vikram, 169, 274
Shah, Birenda (son of Queen Rajya Lakshmi), 12, 102
Shah, Birendra Bir Bikram, King of Nepal, 1, 9, 274
Shah, Deb Rajya Lakshmi, Queen of Nepal, 186
Shah, Drabya, 19, 22, 115, 119
Shah, Girvana Yuddha, 23, 24, 39, 42, 69, 170, 246, 249, 274
Shah, Hiranya Garbha Kumari, 190, 191, 275, 276
Shah, Jiba, 276
Shah, Khadga Bikram, 164, 258
Shah, Kulchand, 69, 201
Shah, Lalit Tripura Sundari, Queen Regent of Nepal, 23, 24, 37, 38, 42, 43, 58
Shah, Mahendra Bir Bikram, King of Nepal, 274
Shah, Nain Lakshmi Devi, 191
Shah, Narbhupal, King of Gorkha, 253
Shah, Prabhu, 56
Sisa Garhi, 213, 265
Sita, 248
Siwalik hills, 3
slavery, 222
Smith, Thomas, 108, 128, 130
Someshwar, 86
sona birta tenure, 16
South Asia, 1-3, 14, 15, 24, 229, 230, 232, 251
South-East Asia, 10
Sri Bani regt. (= Bajra Bani?), 86
Sri Mehar regt., 75-6, 102
Sri Nath regt., 74, 75, 81, 82, 94, 100, 154, 208, 267, 270
Sripali Tandon, Nanda Kumari Devi, see ‘Khatri Nanda Kumari Devi, Sripali Tandon’
Sripali Tandon, Sanak Singh, see ‘Khatri, Sanak Singh Sripali Tandon’
Sri Ram Lal, see ‘Ram Lal’
Stiller, Ludwig, 2, 13, 34, 36, 58, 73, 101, 109, 160, 167, 258
subba, 203, 204
Sunkoshi river, 4
Surya Dal regt., 76
tagadhari castes, 5
Taiping rebellion, 232
Taksar, 215
Taleju, 8, 11
taluqdar, 226
Tamangs, 210, 211
Tanahu, 37, 156
tantricism, 11
tax-farming, 16 (see also ijaradar system)
technology transfer, 227, 230
Teesta river, 5
Thakuris, 6, 7, 8, 20, 25, 36, 198, 208, 225, 233, 235
Thankot, 80, 134
Thapa thar, 198
Thapa family (Bhimsen), 49, 66, 93, 102, 103, 131, 155, 168, 169, 177, 202, 254, 278
Thapa family (Kaji Amar Singh), 35, 168, 177, 279
Thapa vamshavali, 35
Thapa, Amar Singh (Bhimsen’s father), 278
Thapa, Amar Singh (Kaji Amar Singh), 35, 44, 70, 87, 254, 279
Thapa, Ambikadevi, 275, 279
Thapa, Arjun, 163, 279
Thapa, Bhaktawar Singh, 38, 278
Thapa, Bhopal, 118
Thapa, Bikram, 278
Thapa, Bir Bhadra, 278
Thapa, Dalmardan (partisan of Queen Rajya Lakshmi Devi), 135, 167
Thapa, Dalmardan (brother-in-law of Jang Bahadur), 182, 275
Thapa, Dil Bikram 133
Thapa, Dirgha Kumari, 277, 278
Thapa, Gajraj Singh, 201, 275
Thapa, Ganesh Kumari, 36, 275, 278
Thapa, Hemdal, 168, 201, 202, 207, 225, 267, 268
Thapa, Janak Kumari, 278
Thapa, Lakhan, 249
Thapa, Lalit Kumari, 278
Thapa, Nain Singh, 34, 254, 277, 278
Thapa, Narsingh, 163
Thapa, Ram Das, 70
Thapa, Ranadhoj, 35, 279
Thapa, Ranbir Singh, 35, 38, 39, 52, 70, 129, 133, 140, 200, 278
Thapa, Ranjor, 70, 101, 102, 118, 163, 182, 279
Thapa, Ranjor Singh, 179, 278
Thapa, Ranojjal Singh, 179, 278
Thapa, Sher Singh, 129
Thapa, Supravabati, 276, 278
Thapa, Til Bikram, 136, 278
Thapa, Vijay, 276, 278
Thapa, Wazir Singh, 90
Thapas, 254
thar, 20, 21, 119, 197, 200, 204, 205, 253
tharghar, 19-21, 119, 171
Tharus, 6, 256
The Times, 230
Thoresby, Major, 161, 162, 175, 176
Thoresby Report, 161-63, 166, 167, 258-60
Tibet, 2-5, 23, 40, 159, 192, 193, 197, 210, 213, 215, 222, 229, 232, 234, 249, 254
Tibeto-Burman languages, 7
tilak, 8, 11
tirja, 18
tobacco, 228
Toffin, Gerard, 10
trade, 40, 46-8, 58, 88, 90, 106, 204, 205, 228, 232
Travancore, 5, 12
Trisuli (or ‘Trisuli Ganga’), 4, 263, 265
Tundikhel, 79, 114
Udaipur, 12, 13
Udiya, 268
umraos, 14, 18, 193, 194
untouchable castes, 6-7
Upadhyaya Brahmans, 5
Upadhyaya, Daddu, 159
Upadhyaya, Umakant, 46, 169, 202
upanayan ceremony, 10
Urdu language, 130
Vaidya, Ekdev, 1-3
Vaidya, Eksurya, 103
vaidyas, 103, 267
Vaishnavism, 67
vamsavali, 21, 77, 104, 123, 131, 136, 137, 192, 206, 232, 257, 259
Varma, Martananda, 5, 12
Varna, 219
Vedas, 9-11
Victoria, Queen of the United Kingdom, 176, 193, 231, 233, 266
Vijaynagar, 1, 245
Vijaypur, 225 (see also ‘Bijaypur’)
Vishnu, 9, 197
Wellesley, Lord, 40
western influence, 138, 217, 219, 250
William IV, King of the United Kingdom, 49
Wink, Andre, 9
Wright, Daniel, 253