THE TIBETAN FRONTIERS QUESTION
FROM CURZON TO THE COLOMBO CONFERENCE
[AN UNRESOLVED FACTOR IN INDO-SINIC RELATIONS]

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Respectfully dedicated to His Holiness, Tenzig Gyatso, Fourteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet and to the spirit of enduring freedom and independence of the people of Tibet and for my wonderful young son, Jefferson M. Greenhut
REBELLION TO TYRANTS IS OBEDIENCE TO GOD

...... Thomas Jefferson.
Third President of
the United States of
America (1743-1826)
Preface

The original impulse to undertake this study is a direct result of an interest of many years in Indian and Tibetan history. Indeed, the unique nature of Tibet’s society and culture has held a great fascination for the writer for more than a dozen years.

The research stems from an in-depth study of the history, over a number of decades, of the temporal and synchronic development of attitudes, postures and relations vis-a-vis the almost inaccessible and ill-marked border between India and Tibet. The major focus of the work lies on the development of the border dispute in the period from the years of Lord Curzon’s Indian viceroyalty to the aftermath of the Colombo Conference, but the background to those years is not overlooked.

Through the use of a characteristically historical methodology, the narrative and interpretation in this study attempt to put in proper perspective the complex and interrelated multiplicity of factors and aspects that — over the past decades — have characterized the development of this unique and important border conflict.

As is to be seen in the body of the text, it is my judgment that no single hypothesis or closely linked set of two hypotheses could be advanced which could, of themselves, suffice to explain the checkered course of events that have marked the history of the Sino-Indian border disputes. One may, however, advance certain observations regarding that border and the nature of the disagreements that have marred its long history, in the hopes that such observations can be taken as the elements of a general thesis regarding the controversy.
The first such observation concerns the effects of terrain upon the border dispute. Throughout recorded history, the isolation of much of the Sino-Indian border and the severe difficulties inherent in its effective demarcation or its actual, physical control have given to the boundary a degree of "inviolability" that could be overcome only by the most determined effort or by an advanced technology. During long centuries no nation state in the vicinity had the technology or the will-power to master that Himalayan border. Very small parties of traders could straggle through the few high passes in the appropriate seasons, but for all practical purposes that was the extent of man's physical utilization of the border area throughout most of the year. Even after a determined effort had been made by a modern nation state to mark the boundary and press effective claims of territorial sovereignty, it is clear from the records that actual physical control was minimal at best.

Closely allied to the factor of forbidding altitudes and grim terrain, just mentioned, is the fact that — through much of its long history — the states marching along the border in question have not been nations imbued with the modern, European concept of the territorial state with clearly defined and specific boundaries, whose violation is seen as an attack upon the integrity of the nation itself. Thus the border until recent years carried only minor significance, if that, to the local populations who happened to live on either side of it. In fact, a number of these people were gatherers or herders who customarily shifted their dwelling places with the seasons and lived on both sides of the so-called border at different times of the year. This pained the British who viewed such behavior as highly "irregular" but the tribals took it all very much in stride. One important consequence was that the boundary was, for many centuries not a matter over which states were wont to go to war.

After the British Government of India, and more particularly its imperious and imperial Governor-General Lord Curzon of Kedleston, became active along the Sino-
Indian border the situation changed. By this time the Imperial Chinese Government had been sufficiently "modernized" through Western contact so as to come to believe that territorial integrity was a crucial concern of the State. A new era in border affairs had been ushered in and the stage had been set for a prolonged controversy, one which has yet to be settled. That leads to a further observation.

Since the days of Lord Curzon there have been important changes of regime on both sides of the border. Imperial China became Republican China. There was an interlude of Warlordism and then the era of Chiang Kai-shek, followed in 1949 by the Peoples' Republic and Chairman Mao. In India the virtual absolutism of Curzonian times passed away with the Government of India Act of 1919 and Dyarchy, followed by a larger dose of democratization in the Government of India Act of 1935 and the Independence and Partition in 1947 and Nehru's Republic. The point is, of course, that through all of these changes in governments and administrations, the border dispute has remained virtually unaffected. It has had its own periods of lull and of explosion, but one can find no correlation whatsoever between changes in regime or government and the ebb and flow of the border dispute. The only point it seems safe to make is that a strong regime on either side of the border will seek to assert its claims of sovereignty and actual control all the way up to the border, or even to enhance its claims beyond what the other side has thought to be the line of demarcation. Since the border has been so poorly marked this kind of "misunderstanding" is always a potential for further misunderstanding and trouble. In a sense, therefore, one could argue that border claims are but one aspect of a larger and long-standing dispute between India and China, a dispute that is of long duration and has never been settled to the satisfaction of either "contestant." If that view were to be valid, one would have to observe that the continuation of disputes over the border would be anticipated until such
time as a more general "settlement" of differences between the two nations were to take place. It is beyond the scope or intent of this dissertation to speculate upon the nature, terms or prospects for such a general settlement between India and China. In fact, here it is merely adumbrated that the border dispute can be looked at as though it were one symptom of a larger and still unresolved disagreement.

Another view of the nature of the border problem would hold that it has acted as though it were a kind of vacuum. Whether accurately or not, there is a widely accepted notion that nature and, for that matter, power, abhors a vacuum. In so far as the high Himalayan region between India and Tibetan-China is a kind of vacuum, when there is power capable of filling that vacuum in its vicinity, such power seeks to fill it. In recent decades that power has come first from the Indian side of the border, then from the Chinese side. If the vacuum had been "filled" by having been clearly, fully and effectively demarcated, one may suspect, the so-called problem would have been resolved. But, as the record makes clear, the boundaries were for the most part never made clear or never properly demarcated to the mutual satisfaction of the several high contracting parties. And that remark leads to the final observation which constitutes the elements of a general thesis.

It would seem that agreement on a mutually acceptable border — even in the face of extreme difficulties of demarcation — might have been possible of achievement if there had been only two sovereign parties to the dispute. But, of course, there were never only two parties to the dispute. At the very least there were always three parties to the border issue: the Government of India, the Government of China and the regime in de facto control at any given point in time in Tibet. If the Government of India dealt with the Tibetan regime it affronted the Government of China. If the Government of India talked with the Government of China, it overlooked the pressing but indistinct claims of the
regime in Tibet. These stubborn facts created a dilemma that was never resolved effectively. Meanwhile, to make things even more murky, the Indian nationalists who were to become the successor state in 1947, resolutely refused to admit that the Government of India was authorized to speak for them and insisted that they would conduct their own diplomacy on their own account after independence was achieved. This only made it easier for China to deny the validity of those arrangements which the British had sought to finalize prior to 1947.

From what has been said, it should be apparent that a most complicated set of historical circumstances and developments shaped the course of events along the Sino-Indian border during the 20th Century. The controversy in question is, as has been noted, unique in its basic historic, geographic, cultural, religious and political origins and characteristics. The very nature of the Tibetan theocratic form of government provides a potent and highly individual ingredient, not to be found elsewhere. Its fears and apprehensions, and its desire for non-entanglements, played a key role in all efforts by the other powers to settle the border problem in one way or another.

The purpose of the research embodied in this study has been not only to clarify and place in proper historical perspective this complex dispute, but also to present the general thesis that this border controversy has persisted — as noted above — quite independently of the regimes, whether imperial, republican, democratic or communist, that have existed at various times, in India or in China. Therefore, a conclusion emerges that the dispute, in good part due to the historic nature of Tibetan society, culture and terrain, is distinct from the political ideologies or administrations of India and China.

The historical research presented is, of necessity, in a sense somewhat one-sided. I have used primarily British, Indian, Tibetan and, in a few instances, Chinese sources. These sources cannot present a picture of the history of Tibet
or of the border issue as seen from the Chinese archives or from the Chinese point of view. That the Chinese rarely agreed with the various border postures adopted by the British or by the Indians, throughout the whole period under consideration, is abundantly clear from British and Indian records used in this research; but only research into Chinese records, both official and other, can give the scholar a valid picture of the Chinese viewpoint, and that research at this time is not possible.

Although this factor places obvious limitations on a work of this nature, it surely does not preclude its general value or validity. A number of scholarly works used in this study have been faced with this same problem. Brief mention should, therefore, be made, by way of example, of several important works on or related to this subject by English (Alastair Lamb's, *The China-India Border: Origins of the Disputed Boundaries*, and *Britain and Chinese Central Asia: The Road to Lhasa 1767 to 1905*), American (John Rowland, *A History of Sino-Indian Relations*) and Tibetan (Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, *Tibet, A Political History*) writers; none of whom used extensive Chinese documentation. The last noted work, it should be emphasized, is quite unique in that it is documented with Tibetan archival sources that are no longer available and carries with it the official endorsement of His Holiness, Tenzig Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet.

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I. George N. Curzon, Marquis Curzon of Kedleston as Viceroy of India
   c. 1899
   —Collection of the author—
It is of the greatest importance, at the outset of this study to note that the present Sino-Indian border dispute is, in many significant respects, one which was not created by the present disputants. The boundary between India and China was formed under regimes which no longer exist, or which have little or no influence on the present course of relations between the disputants. The Imperial China of the Manchus has ceased to exist, and Republican China had been driven by the Chinese Communists to the island of Formosa. The British Indian Empire has also gone, but the border, in its present configuration, is very much a product of the Imperial Chinese and Chinese Republican Policies and agreements, on the one hand, and of British Imperial policies and agreements on the other. The Republic of India and the People's Republic of China are, therefore, involved with a vast problem which their respective imperial predecessors were either unwilling or unable to rectify. This border dispute, and how it has arrived at its present configuration, will, of course, be the main topic of this study.

The British, through the instrument of the chartered East India Company, first came into contact with Tibet during the late 18th century. The Company, as early as 1768, showed an interest in finding a market for English goods in Tibet and Western China. In 1774 Lord Hastings, the Governor of the Company, sent George Bogle to Tibet on a journey of commercial reconnaissance for the Company,
This first mission failed to secure any trade agreements with Tibet due to the hostile attitude of the Regent, who was under the watchful eyes of the Chinese Amban (title of Chinese Imperial official in Lhasa from 1728 until 1912 who served as chief representative of the Emperor of China). Bogle wrote in his general report that the government at Lhasa considered him "as sent to explore their country, which the ambition of the English might afterwards prompt them to invade, and their superiority in arms render their attempt successful." 1

The English also tried to open Tibet directly through China. In 1787 Charles Cathcart, M.P. and official of the Company in Bengal was asked to serve as envoy on England's first mission to China. Cathcart, however, died enroute in late December and the mission was forced to return home. 2 Later, during the Gurkha War of 1814–16, considerable thought was given to the actual annexation of Nepal, but practical considerations and the advice of Lord Hastings' adviser on Himalayan Affairs, Dr. Buchanan-Hamilton, militated against such policy. He noted that "a frontier of seven or eight hundred miles between two powerful nations holding each other in mutual contempt seems to point at anything but peace." 3 The relationship between the British Indian Empire, particularly during the time of the Curzon administration, and Imperial and Republican China, on the other, was to bear out Buchanan-Hamilton's view over and over again.

In more recent times, particularly since the flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet in 1959, the Republic of India has

1. Sir C.R. Markham, Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet and of the Journey of Thomas Menning to Lhasa (London: Trubner and Company, 1876), p.203, passim. See also p. 151 where the Panchen Lama indicated to Bogle that the Regent's apprehensions arose, not only from his own views, but from a dread of offending the Chinese, to whose empire Tibet was subject.
likewise had to cope with the problems of a far greater common border with China. In the early period of Indian independence, however, the pessimism of the difficulties experienced during the imperial era were thought by many to have given way to a period of goodwill. Indeed, on April 29, 1954 the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China signed an agreement related to "trade and cultural intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India." The major thrust of the agreement was found in the preamble where the "five principles of coexistence," or Panch Sheela, as they are called in the Hindi language were enunciated. They were: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence." So little remained of the lofty sentiments of Panch Sheela that by November 1962 a massive Chinese attack against India was taking place and the new Republic was in the midst of the greatest military debacle of its life.

This study will seek to explain this radical change that is, and will increasingly be, so important to the balance of power in Asia. The matter is of enormous complexity involving, among others, Sino-Russian relations and Chinese jealousy of Indian progress and prestige. Any meaningful bettering of relations between India and China will almost certainly contain discussions and settlement of some of the major issues arising from the boundary dispute. Such settlements would therefore involve modifications in the territory of one or both of the disputants involved. Before one can consider such an issue, however, it is necessary to have a clear idea of why the territory in question is disputed.

5. Ibid.
II  The Seal of H.H. The Dalai Lama of Tibet
   — Collection of the author—
to begin with. This requires a detailed investigation of the historical factors that led to the status of the boundary as it had become at the point of transfer of power from the British Indian Empire to the Dominions of India and Pakistan in August 1947.  

The present dispute involves more than 2,000 miles of boundary. Conflict has taken place in three general sectors. The Western Sector is the boundary between Kashmir and Sinkiang and Tibet. The Middle Sector, which is far shorter in actual length than the Western or Eastern Sectors, involves the boundary between Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh, in India and Tibet. It runs along the Himalayan crest from the area of the Shipki Pass near the ravine of the Sutlej River to the border of Nepal. The Eastern Sector, which involves the dispute over the famous McMahon Line, of which we will hear a great deal more during the course of the research, basically includes the Himalayan boundary between Bhutan and Burma. 

Sir Henry McMahon, of whom a great deal more will be heard later, in an 1935 address to the Royal Society of Arts made a significant distinction between the terms “frontiers” and “boundaries.” A frontier was used to describe a wide tract of border which, perhaps by virtue of its rugged geographic nature or other geophysical difficulties, would serve as a buffer zone between two or more states. The Pyrenees range at the neck between the Iberian peninsula and France, in the McMahon sense, provides such a frontier. A boundary, on the other hand, would be a clearly defined line, expressed in verbal terms (“delimited”) or by a series of physical markers on the territory itself (“demarcated”). The Himalayan range which separates India from Chinese Central Asia makes an excellent frontier in the McMahon

7. See Maps: Western Sector, Middle Sector: Indian and Chinese Claims.
8. Ibid.
sense. It does not, however, provide an ideal region for boundaries. A very considerable amount of the present dispute springs from this factor. The mountain ranges of the north have, on the whole, provided a fairly strong barrier against major invasions, they have not been so effective in preventing the passage of small groups back and forth in the mountainous area itself. Of this situation, and the political complexities it could produce, J.D. Cunningham noted:

A multiplicity of relations and a diversion of allegiance naturally arise during the contests of barbarous people and short lived dynasties, and such a state of uncertainty is always agreeable to the wishes of aspiring and able rulers who occasionally appear. But of late the consolidated empires of China and England have met one another along the Himalaya Mountains, and it is time that doubt should be put to an end. It is not for us to share with others the allegiance of petty princes, nor should we desire that our dependents should have any claim on the territories of other states. Our feudatories should have no political connection with strangers, although we may allow them to interchange friendly letters, and even visits, with their neighbours under the rule of others. 11

The present position of the People's Republic of China in Central Asia may be traced directly back to the Manchu conquests in the eighteenth century. The fifth Dalai Lama died in 1682 and the regent Sang-keih not only suppressed the news of his death but ruled in his name. He convinced his protege Galden, whom he had made Dzundan Kahn, to go to war with the Khalkas. When he defeated the Khalkas and invaded Inner Mongolia, the Chinese Emperor K'ang Hsi led an army and defeated him in 1696. The Emperor had long suspected that the Dalai Lama was long since dead and he demanded and received the facts from Sang-keih. 12

Sang-keih was, however, soon involved in fresh intrigues. In compliance with repeated orders from the Emperor, the sixth Dalai Lama was sent to Peking. He died on the way in Kokonor in 1707.  

A lama named Yeshes became the new Dalai Lama and although the election was confirmed by the Emperor, it was rejected by the Mongols and Kokonor tribes. The dissension increased and Chewanlaputan, Gal-den's successor, took advantage of the discord and invaded Tibet. Lhasa was taken and pillaged and the Dalai Lama Yeshes was imprisoned. This might very well have been the prelude to a Mongol Empire including Tibet under a common religion and such a thought greatly troubled K'ang Hsi. He dispatched an army that was defeated at the Kalawusu River by the Dzungars in the autumn of 1718, but a larger invasion consisting of the armies sent in 1720 drove the Dzungars out of Tibet. Yeshes was deposed and a new claimant placed on the pontifical throne. This victory, as noted by eyewitness Father Desidiri, “insured Chinese suzerainty over the whole of Tibet including Bhutan.”  

K'ang Hsi was less interested in Tibet as territory as such, but for the fact that the Tibetan Buddhist Church had considerable influence over the Mongolian tribes. From this period until 1911, although there were a series of crises during the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Chinese control of Tibet was exercised by representatives of the Manchu government supervising administration by Tibetan authorities. It was not until the beginning of the present century, and then chiefly in reaction to the “forward policies” of Lord Curzon, that China made an attempt to carry on the direct administration of Tibet. 

Tibet, and the Chinese authorities, during the nineteenth century had some measure of influence over Sikkim, 

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15. Ibid., pp.25–27.
Bhutan and, before the Dogra conquest of 1834, Ladakh. The Himalayan states of Sikkim, Bhutan, and, to a lesser degree, Nepal, fell within the general sphere of the Manchu tributary system. They were all in diplomatic relationships with Lhasa, and the Chinese Resident conferred Chinese rank and acknowledged their embassies as tribute-bearing missions. It should be noted that in Chinese traditional diplomatic theory, all foreign missions, Europeans included, were considered as tribute missions which, of course, implied a degree of political subordination. Many of these “tributary states”, however, did not allow their relationship with China to limit their sovereignty. In fact, the relationship was so amorphous that the rulers of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, during the course of the nineteenth century, all entered into relations with the British Indian Empire and many accepted, and even sought, British titles and orders. This interesting relationship had a dual nature for both China and the “tributary states.” On the one hand, the “tributary states” felt that their inclusion in the Chinese imperial system gave them a certain prestige, while on the other it could provide China, when she was powerful enough, an excuse for intervention in their affairs.

Chinese policy regarding Tibet underwent a radical change in the early twentieth century. This was due, in part, to China’s defeat by Japan in 1895. After the Sino-Japanese war, the thirteenth Dalai Lama began to think increasingly of an independent Tibetan state, and the Manchus, in the last years of the dynasty, initiated a policy of incorporating Tibet into the Chinese provincial structure. The “forward policy” of Lord Curzon and the Younghusband Mission to Lhasa in 1904 (of which we will hear a great deal later) played a large part, indeed, in the Chinese policy of incorporation of Tibet into the provincial system of the

17. An excellent account of the workings of the Manchu tributary system is found in: J. Fairbank and S. Teng, "On the Ch' ing Tributary System" "Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, VI, No.2 (June, 1941).
18. Ibid.
Chinese Empire. This policy was entrusted to Chao Erh-feng, who reduced Eastern Tibet and began the incorporation. A Chinese imperial army occupied Lhasa in 1910, and it was only the outbreak of the 1911 revolution which brought about the end of the Manchu Dynasty that prevented the completion of Chao's task. The Tibetan invasion of 1950 by the forces of the People's Republic of China and the subjugation of the country up to and after the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959 is, in many ways, a continuation of the policies of Chao Erh-feng.

The British, right up to the end of their rule in India, faced problems along the Himalayan frontiers that were of the same type that confronted the East India Company in earlier times and the Indian Republic today. From the beginning, British policy was closely related to regional politics and intrigue, though its objectives were determined, as often as not, by the broader considerations of imperial policy in Asia.

The decline of Manchu power during the nineteenth century facilitated the rise of both British and Russian influence in Central Asia and the Himalayan frontiers. A line between Russia and China, which awarded the Amur Basin to the Manchus, was finally drawn with the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, and while this agreement remained in force for nearly two hundred years, it did not indefinitely contain Russian expansion. A number of treaties were signed between China and Russia during the course of the nineteenth century that realigned China's western boundary in Russia's favor. Russian imperial expansion grew almost spontaneously during the late nineteenth century.

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kent was taken in 1864, Samarkand in 1868, Bokhara in 1869, Khokand in 1876, Merve in 1884, Pendjdeh in 1885, and by 1895 Czarist forces had reached the Pamirs and the frontiers of the Indian Empire. The present Sino-Soviet dispute is directly related to what the Chinese have termed these “imperialist expansions” and “unequal treaties,” and while this issue is not the subject of this research, it should be noted in passing as having not only great contemporary but considerable historic significance.

During the same period the British Indian Empire, first under the East India Company and later (after 1858) under the Crown, was slowly, and for a variety of reasons and causes to be discussed briefly in the concluding portion of this chapter, expanding along its northern frontiers. This was especially true with regard to the areas of Kashmir, Ladakh, Sikkim, Nepal, and Bhutan. It was, at least in large part, this expansion, together with the above-mentioned forward policies of Czarist Russia, that resulted in increased friction between Russia and England and eventually led to Lord Curzon sending the famous Younghusband Mission into Tibet in 1904. To counter Russian threats in the Pamir and Karakoram areas during the late decades of the nineteenth century, the British became heavily involved in the state of Kashmir. Kashmir, as it is known today, was the creation of the Dogra ruler of the small state of Jammu, Gulab Singh.

During the period 1819-1820 Gulab Singh aided the Sikhs of Lahore in the conquest of Kashmir. As a reward for his aid he was made ruler of Jammu. He conquered Ladakh in 1834, Baltistan in 1840, and between 1841 and 1842 made a vain attempt to take parts of western Tibet. In 1846 he aided the British in the first Anglo-Sikh war and was rewarded with the state of Kashmir and British military aid to control it. Gulab Singh died in 1858, but his heirs continued his expansionist policies and by the second half of the century

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22. Ibid. (Pierce), p.43. Note the excellent annotated map on Russian expansion in Central Asia during the late nineteenth century.
INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE

Kashmir asserted influence over Gilgit, Hunza, and Nagar. After 1846 Kashmir was allied to the East India Company, but its rulers were no British puppets. Under the terms of the treaty, the Company did not guarantee the internal security of Kashmir and hence its ability to interfere in its affairs was more limited than was the case of most states with whom the company had alliances. Gulab Singh and his heirs were guaranteed "all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the River Indus and the westward of the River Ravi including Chamba and excluding Lahul."

British involvement in Ladakh was derived from Gulab Singh of Kashmir's conquest of the area in 1834. Prior to this conquest the area had constituted a sizeable Himalayan state that included, at least during much of the seventeenth century, a considerable part of western Tibet. The power of the Ladakhi state was destroyed by the Mongols in 1682–83, and only the intervention of forces of the Moghul Empire of India saved the area from complete domination. On the one hand Ladakh found itself subject to Moghul control and on the other, by the terms of the treaty of 1683, involved in a complicated tributary status with Tibet. As a part of this earlier treaty relationship (1683 Treaty), Gulab Singh inherited a monopoly on the export of shawl wool from western Tibet, and in seeking to exploit this situation, he created a state of affairs that convinced the British that further definition of the Ladakh-Tibet border would be needed. Gulab Singh's involvement in western Tibet during 1841–1842 added to this conviction. Alexander Cunningham, a leading Company official from Bengal, regarding this


particular border situation and the fear of a repeat of the 1841-1842 invasion of Tibetan territory, noted:

It was possible also that our peaceful relations with the Chinese Emperor might be considerably embarrassed by His Celestial Majesty's ignorance of any distinction between the rulers of India and the rulers of Kashmir. . . The British Government decided to remove the most common cause of all disputes in the East—an unsettled boundary. 27

The Boundary Commission of 1846, with Cunningham and Vans Agnew, and the one that followed in 1847, did not carry out a demarcation with Chinese authorities, although this had been desired by the British. Except for the Kashmir and Spiti boundary, no real demarcation was made. The demarcation that was made, however, became a model in subsequent British efforts at boundary delineations in the entire Himalayan area. Cunningham noted:

In laying down a boundary through mountainous country it appeared to the Commissioners desirable to select such a plan as would completely preclude any possibility of further dispute. This the Commissioners believe they have found in their adoption as a boundary of such mountain ranges as form watershed lines between the drainages of different rivers. 28

It seems very doubtful indeed that the watershed concept had any sanction in local traditions or history, but equally there remains little doubt that the Commission, at least from the requirements of geography and cartography, moved in the right direction by making such a proposal.

The 1846 and 1847 Commissions produced descriptions of the Ladakh-Tibet border, especially from Panggong Lake

27. Ibid., p. 12.
28. A fine contemporary account of the boundary commission of 1846 is found in: Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1848.
to Spiti, that do not differ in any major respects from the present Indian claim line of the 1960's. The 1847 maps in fact, placed the ruined fort at Khurnak right on the boundary line which India now claims and the Chinese occupation of which led to the first Indian protest against Chinese invasion of Ladakh in early June 1858. 29

Gurkha expansion in Nepal and intervention in Tibetan territory led to a violent Chinese reaction in 1791–1792 which ended with Nepal as a tributary state sending tribute missions to China once every five years. 30 Similar expansion produced a crisis with the British in the south which culminated in the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1814–1816. British victory turned Nepal into a protected state. When the Rana family came to power in the middle of the nineteenth century as hereditary prime ministers, Nepal resolved upon a policy of close friendship.

Nepal long denied that their tribute missions to Peking implied that they were subordinate and yet these missions continued early into this century. As late as the mid-1920's China indicated that Nepal was still in a dependent position as regarded Chinese suzerainty. 31

The British, as a result of the Anglo-Burmese War of 1826, annexed Assam and came into contact with the Himalayan state of Bhutan. In 1865, after more than a half century of raids by tribals, the British imposed the Treaty of Sinchula which turned Bhutan into a protectorate and the recipient of a subsidy. 32 There was, however, no resident at the Bhutanese capital; and Chinese and Tibetan intervention continued to take place from time to time. During the late


nineteenth century Ugyen Wangchuk emerged as the most formidable power in the country. He assisted the British during the time of the Younghusband Mission and was rewarded by the British who recognized him as the first Maharajah of Bhutan. After the British withdrawal from Tibet in 1904, the Chinese made a last effort to demonstrate their authority in Bhutan, and this led to the conclusion of the Anglo-Bhutanese treaty of January 1910 in which the British increased Bhutan's subsidy, promised to refrain from interference in internal affairs of the state and were given control of Bhutan's foreign relations. 33

The tiny state of Sikkim, at the time of the first British contact in the early nineteenth century, had long considered itself, in some ways, tributary to Tibet. The British first became involved in Sikkimese affairs during the 1834-1835 Nepal-Sikkim raids, and a British military expedition in 1861 led to a treaty which, among other things, placed the foreign relations of Sikkim under British control. 34 Continuing Tibetan involvement in Sikkim's affairs during the 1880's however, led to an Anglo-Chinese crisis that culminated in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 which recognized British supremacy in Sikkim and finally defined its borders with Tibet. 35 Demarcation of the border was, however, another matter. From 1894 to 1903 the British and Chinese were unable to persuade the Tibetan authorities to accept the borders noted in the 1890 treaty. 36 Curzon strongly believed that the British should deal directly with Tibetan authorities and should pay little attention to the claims or interference of the Imperial Chinese Government with regard to Tibetan affairs, in general, on the boundary issue, in particular.

On the matter of Russian pressures in the Pamirs, and

33. Ibid. (Aitchison). pp. 102-103.
35. Ibid., pp. 66-67.
the continuing decline of Chinese power, the Indian administration concluded that it was more necessary than ever to obtain a properly defined border between the Indian Empire and Chinese Turkestan. In September 1895 Lord Elgin, in a memorandum to the Secretary of State for India, Lord George Hamilton, noted:

The present moment, when it may be possible to obtain concessions from China on account of her Treaty with France regarding trans-Mekong territory, appears favourable for settling the Chinese boundary with Kashmir, Hunza and Afghanistan, and we invite earnest attention to the possibility of effecting an arrangement whereby a definite limit would be placed to possible extensions of Russian territory towards the Mustangh and Karakoram mountains, should that Power succeed China in the possession of the tracts referred to. 37

Two rival groups rapidly developed over the exact alignment to be followed.

The moderates relied greatly on the advice of Sir George Macartney, the British representative at Kashgar who was himself half-Chinese. 38 In late 1895 and early 1896 he discussed the border situation with the chief Chinese official in Kashgar. The Aksai Chin area, being, a desert, was really a sort of no man’s land; but if a boundary should be drawn, as Macartney reasoned, then the area should be half Chinese and half British. Macartney pointed out that the area had two geographical features of note. In the northern area stands the Aksai Chin wasteland, while in the south is found the Lingzithang plateau: separating them is a line of hills running roughly east-west. These hills are referred to as the Lak Tsang range. Macartney argued that the area north

37. Foreign Office Records, 17/1255. Elgin to Hamilton, No. 186 of 25 September 1895. (To be noted as Foreign Office or F.O.)

38. George Macartney was the son of the famous Sir Halliday Macartney who served for many years as advisor to the Imperial Chinese Legation in London. Both father and son were fluent in Chinese languages, culture, and history. Few diplomats better understood British and Chinese aims and ambitions in the Tibetan border areas.
of the range was Chinese, while the area to the south was British. 39

In the summer of 1898 the Elgin administration accepted Macartney’s views and incorporated them in a proposal. The line was to run from the trijunction of Russian-Afghan and Chinese territory and, with only minor deviations, would follow the main watershed by way of the Mustangh, Kunjerab and Shinshal passes to the Karakoram Pass. From the Karakoram Pass it would run eastwards for about half a degree and then turn south to Karakash. At that point the line would follow the hills northeast to a point just east of Kizil Jilja and then run in a south-easterly direction, following the Lak Tsang Range until it met a spur south from the Kuen Lun Range which was shown on British maps of the period as the eastern boundary of Ladakh.

Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister to China, presented this description to the Chinese Department of External Affairs on March 14, 1899 and noted:

It will not be necessary to mark out the frontier. The natural frontier is the crest of a range of mighty mountains, a great part of which is quite inaccessible. It will be sufficient if the two Governments (England and China) enter into an agreement to recognise the frontier as laid down by its clearly marked geographical features. 40

The content of the note was considered and sent to Sinkiang for review, but by the time the news arrived that the Sinkiang authorities had no objection to the MacDonald-Macartney proposals, the British were having second thoughts and no real efforts were made to secure a firm Chinese reply.

At the time MacDonald was in communication with the Chinese in Peking, proponents of the “forward line” boundary theory were gaining support. The leading theoritician for this view was Sir John Ardagh. He argued that:

40. Foreign Office. 17/1373. MacDonald to Foreign Office. 7 April 1899.
If the eventual annexation of Kashgaria by Russia is to be expected, we may be sure that Russia, as in the past, will endeavor to push her boundary as far south as she can, for political reasons, even if no real military advantage is sought. It is evident therefore that sooner or later we shall have to conclude a definite agreement regarding the Northern Frontier of India.\(^{41}\)

The Elgin administration was not sympathetic with such views, but its administrative period was approaching the end and Elgin was replaced as Viceroy in January 1898 by Lord (George N.) Curzon, who had very different ideas about Russian aspirations and plans. Curzon was convinced that sooner or later Britain would have to make a stand against the Russian threat to dominate all of Asia. In October 1901 he wrote:

As a student of Russian aspirations and methods for fifteen years, I assert with confidence—what I do not think any of her own statesmen would deny—that her ultimate ambition is the domination of Asia. She conceives herself to be fitted for it by temperament, by history, and by tradition. It is a proud and not ignoble aim, and it is well worthy of the supreme moral and material efforts of a vigorous nation. But it is not to be satisfied by piecemeal concessions. neither is it capable of being gratified save at our expense......Acquiescence in the Pamirs will not save Kashgar. Acquiescence in Kashgar will not divert Russian eyes from Tibet. Each morsel but whets her appetite for more, and inflames the passion for a pan-Asiatic domination. If Russia is entitled to these ambitions, still more is Britain entitled, nay compelled, to defend that which she has won, and to resist the minor encroachments which are only a part of the larger plan.\(^{42}\)

Such views, as we shall see in the following chapter, were to have drastic effects upon the entire border dispute.

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42. Letters from India. Vol. 139, No. 1367. Minute by Lord Curzon, 28 October 1901.
This introductory chapter provides a brief look into the enormous complexities of the Himalayan border situation during the nineteenth century and sets the stage for the Curzon administration and direct British intervention in Tibet in 1904. British-Tibetan relations did not come to an end with the departure of the Younghusband Mission in 1904. Indeed, they continued to face problems not unlike those faced in the eighteenth century by the Company and by the Republic of India in post-partition days. What is important to note, however, is that relations between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China concerning the Himalayan border situation have their roots in historical relationships that existed long before the arrival of the British in India. The Curzon “forward policy” and the Younghusband Mission did mean the end of Tibetan isolation and Tibet emerged, after a brief period of Chinese consolidation that ended with the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, at least in a de facto but not de jure nature, as an independent state. It was to remain so until it was “peacefully liberated” by the People’s Republic of China in 1950. The next several chapters of the research will delve into the period from Curzon to the Chinese invasion of 1950, and the final chapters will conclude with the period from the aftermath of this invasion to the Colombo Conference in Ceylon in 1963.
CHAPTER II

From Curzon To McMahon

After the 1895 efforts to clarify the border between British India and Tibet, the British authorities encountered the increased enmity of the Tibetans. Official communications were either unanswered or, in a few cases, returned unopened. This rather curious behaviour, for a while, was not answered by any extreme measures: but the arrival of Lord Curzon as Viceroy in 1898 was to force British policy out of its state of semi-slumber. Curzon's efforts to communicate with the Tibetan authorities met with no greater success than did those of his predecessors, but he considered these rebuffs as not only personal insults, but as affronts to British prestige. The failure of these diplomatic endeavours led Curzon to believe that it would be necessary to use more forceful methods to convince the Tibetans to have the proper respect for the power which he represented.

Russia had of course become interested in Tibet as a result of her expansion in central Asia. It happened that a considerable number of the population of these areas belonged to the form of Buddhism dispensed by the Tibetan lamas and monks. Count Vladimir Lamsdorff, the Russian Foreign Minister, asserted that Russian interest in Tibet was based on religious motives due to the fact that a "large number of Russian Buriats regarded the Dalai Lama as their

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2. Ibid., p.205.
Pope." Lamsdorff was, in fact, clarifying the Russian position as one being restricted to an interest in the religious concerns of some Russian subjects. Russian foreign policy, however, began to oppose all efforts to change the status of Tibet, lest some other nation gain control to the detriment of Russian prospects both inside and outside the area. The more forceful policies of Curzon were viewed with both concern and suspicion in Russia.

In the years before 1902, Curzon considered sending a mission to Tibet to compel negotiations, to re-establish British prestige, and to act as a balm to his wounded pride. Russian interest in Tibet and the activities of a Siberian Buriat Buddhist named Dorzhev only increased Curzon's concern. Curzon was not sure if Dorzhev was a Russian agent carrying out the policies of the Tsar, but he suspected that he was. Dorzhev visited Russia a number of times, and was received by the emperor and empress. Whatever he attempted remains quite obscure, but it did seem to work upon the Dalai Lama in a favourable way as far as the Russians were concerned, especially the alluring suggestions for royal proselytizing in both the Russian empire and royal family.

Curzon sent a dispatch to London on 8 January 1903 in which he urged his forward policy be adopted to protect British interest by means of an armed commercial mission, and the establishment of a permanent Resident in Lhasa. The British government, having had no desire to become involved in a situation that might well have led to open hostilities, refused to sanction Curzon's proposals. Lord Lansdowne wrote that "it seems to me, therefore, that the decision which was arrived at must be taken, not only as

4. Ibid., no. 307, pp. 327-329.
III Edward VII, King-Emperor of India 1901-1910
The British Imperial Raj reached the apex of its power during his era.
—Collection of the author—
regulating a particular transaction, but to a large extent as
governing our future policy in central Asia." This decision
was surely a reference to Lord Curzon's desire to proceed
with his "Forward Policy" and the establishment of a
permanent British representative in Lhasa. He had no desire
to negotiate with the Chinese but wished the Younghusband
mission to deal directly with Tibetan authorities. Before the
end of the year Lansdowne was engaged in serious, but
fruitless talks with the Russians in an effort to reach a
general Anglo-Russian understanding on central Asia.

Curzon, however, never wavered in his views regarding
Russian designs. With England's position strengthened by
the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and with Russia becoming
dangerously entangled with Japan over their Far Eastern
rivalry, the British government, with the following limita-
tions, finally agreed to Curzon's desire to send a mission to
Tibet:

This step should be taken purely for the purpose of
obtaining satisfaction, that it should not be allowed to
lead to occupation, or any form of permanent interven-
tion in Tibetan affairs, and that it should withdraw as
soon as reparation is obtained. ... and His Majesty's
government are not prepared to establish a permanent
mission in Tibet.9

A mission under Colonel Francis Younghusband, a
close ally of Curzon, was quickly underway, and after a
series of clashes with Tibetan forces and efforts to negotiate
with representatives of the Dalai Lama, reached Lhasa on 4
August 1904. The Dalai Lama had fled earlier to Urga in
Mongolia, but Younghusband rounded up a quota of
representatives of the Tibetan government and the three
leading monasteries with a sufficiently important official to
affix the seal of the Dalai Lama. A convention was extorted
on 7 September 1904. The Chinese Amban, it should be
noted, refused to sign the convention. The convention

contained nine articles which compelled such concessions and imposed such restrictions upon Tibet as would insure the predominance of British influence. An indemnity of £500,000 was established and this was to be paid in seventy-five annual instalments, commencing in 1906. The British government would occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity was paid and until Tibetan trade marts were effectively opened for a period of three years, whichever date might be the later. No other state was to be allowed to intervene in Tibetan affairs, to acquire or occupy territory, to gain a right to revenues, to send representatives or agents, or to obtain any concessions whatsoever without British consent. A “Separate Article” provided for a British trade agent at Gyantse who could visit Lhasa if and when he saw fit. This was, of course, a thinly veiled proviso to have a Resident at Lhasa. Except in name, a British protectorate had been virtually established. The Chinese government was greatly concerned lest its claim to suzerainty over Tibet should disappear, and after wearisome negotiations, a convention was signed on 27 April 1906 at Peking which provided for Chinese agreement to the terms of the Lhasa convention with no important modifications in return for a British engagement not to annex any Tibetan territory, nor to interfere in the administration of Tibet.

In the years immediately following the Mission, the gains, both implied and explicit, were whittled away. The Russo-Japanese War and its outcome was, of course, to have a great deal to do with this change of policy on the part of the British government. Russia was defeated in May of 1904, and in that same month Lord Hardinge urged a more conciliatory attitude to Russia over Tibet. Lord Ampthill, the acting viceroy, urged that success in Tibet not be obtained at the cost of “implacable Russian hostility.” The

10. The text of the Lhasa Convention is to be found in: Br. Docs., Vol. IV, no. 298, pp. 314-316.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., no. 305, and enclosure, pp. 323-326.
Separate Article of the Lhasa Convention was renounced, and the indemnity was reduced by two-thirds, to be paid in three annual instalments. It was also provided that, with the payments, British forces would retire from the Chumbi Valley by 1908. In fact, the provision in the Convention that provided for the occupation of the Chumbi Valley so long as the indemnity was being paid ran contrary to the British Cabinet decision, previously mentioned, that there should be no occupation of Tibet nor any permanent intervention. As the indemnity was to be paid for 75 years, and the occupation was to last for this same period, this was obviously a disingenuous method employed to circumvent the position of the British Cabinet.

In March 1905, St. John Brodrick, the Secretary of State for India, remarked to Lord Ampthill that the Russo-Japanese War “may exhaust Russia to a degree which will render her innocuous to us for many years to come.” The Liberal government that came to power in 1906 and its foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey (later Viscount Grey of Fallodon), had no great love for the recent adventure in Tibet and wished to reach a more enduring relationship with Russia. Discussions related to Tibetan affairs opened with the Russians in June of 1906, and these talks resulted in one of the three parts that finally comprised the Anglo-Russian convention signed at St. Petersburg on 31 August 1907. This convention clarified Anglo-Russian positions towards Afghanistan, Persia, and Tibet. Regarding Tibet, both powers agreed that they would exercise no power over the political affairs of Tibet. Neither would send representatives to Lhasa, and neither would seek mineral, rail, or trade concessions. The Russians accepted the terms of the Lhasa

15. Foreign Office 17/1753, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 7 November 1904.
16. Ibid., 3 October 1904.
17. Ibid.
18. Ampthill Papers (E 233 11), Brodrick to Ampthill, 17 March 1905.
convention of 1904 and the Anglo-Chinese agreement of 1906, and both Russian and British subjects of the Buddhist faith could have religious relations with the Dalai Lama.²⁰

In this manner, then, were settled the minor matters in dispute between England and Russia, each suspicious of the presence and intentions of the other, in this remote land.

With the conclusion of the 1907 Convention, the British, being basically freed from anxiety caused by Russia, showed increased concern over the possible change in the status of Tibet as a result of assertive measures being taken by the Chinese. Chao Erh-feng was entrusted, during 1905, with the task of putting down a rebellon against the Chinese in the Marches of Eastern Tibet. The Marches area, generally between Kantze on the Yalung River and the Pome area of Tibet just north of the Assam border, was ruled by petty kings and chieftans. Some of these states were, at least nominally, under the sovereignty of Lhasa, while most were under Chinese authorities in Yunnan, Szechuan, or Kansu. Occasional crisis could usually be handled with the dispatch of a small military force from Szechuan, but no permanent military occupation was really necessary. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the thirteenth Dalai Lama began to move in the direction of independence and hence the traditional situation changed radically. Lhasa aided in rebellion against Chinese authority and Chinese power, as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, was at a low ebb. Chao, however, was both energetic and efficient, and he managed, in very short order, to galvanize Chinese troops into action that astounded most observers. The Tibetans resisted at every point,²¹ but Chamdo was taken in early 1910 and the road to Lhasa was opened. The advanced units of Chao's forces entered Lhasa on 12 February and the Dalai Lama fled south where he eventually took refuge with the British Trade Agent at Gyantse. Central Tibet was under firm Chinese military control, but a great deal remained to be

done to complete the administrative structure to consolidate these conquests. Tibet, for the moment, ceased to be a buffer state between the Chinese and the British and this was a situation that was bound to have an immediate influence on British policy.

Sir Arthur Hirtzel of the India Office put the situation very clearly when he wrote on 12 January 1911:

If anything goes wrong in Assam, there would be very voiceful public opinion against us. There are no European industries along the North West Frontier, . . . . But in Lakhimpur District there are over 70,000 acres of tea gardens turning out over 30,000,000 pounds of tea annually, and employing over 200 Europeans and over 100,000 Indians. The European capital risk in tea must be enormous, and there are other industries as well . . . . These gardens lie at the foot of the hills inhabited by savages; their defence rests with I battalion of native industry and I battalion of military police (850 men). Think of the howl the planters would let out, and the rise in the price of tea! 22

The Indian government of Lord Minto was, however, reluctant to embark upon a forward move in Assam as the bitter memories of Curzon’s policies were still vivid. The idea of advancing northward of the “Outer Line” 23 was likewise rejected. The British had no desire to aggravate Russia and thereby provide her with an excuse to abrogate any of the leading axioms of the 1907 Convention regarding Afghanistan, Persia, or Tibet. The British government took a “wait and see” position. Economic pressure, especially from the timber interests, was great and it was finally decided that a tour of the tribal areas between the two lines by Noel

22. *India Office, Political External Files 1911.*, Vol. XIII, 138 noted as 10 PEF.

23. The “Outer Line” followed the line of “the foot of the hills” a few miles to the north of what became the “Inner Line.” During the second half of the nineteenth century the problem of peace-keeping along the mountain border became somewhat complicated by commercial development, especially tea planting and cultivation. Accordingly, the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation of 1873 was introduced, creating the so-called “Inner Line.” Persons could not pass this line without a pass or license. This provided the Lieutenant Governor for Bengal with considerable power to prevent friction with the tribals of the Assam frontier and really defined the actual limits of British administration in the area. An excellent
Williamson, a political officer in the East Bengal government. In January 1911 he set out, not having awaited final orders, for Lohit “to find out as accurately as possible what the Chinese are doing round Rima,” The British were of course, particularly concerned about Chinese expansion in the Pome area under the direction of Chao Erh-feng’s generals.

In late March, at Kensing near Kebang, he was killed by a group of tribals who feared his party to be a vanguard of a British punitive mission. It is ironic that his death led to exactly such a state of affairs. In late 1911 an expedition under Major General Hamilton Bowers was sent into the Aber area to demonstrate British control of the southern Himalayan slopes. The Aber expedition led to the Miri Mission, the Mishmi Mission, and a host of border surveys that continued until 1913. These expeditions completely transformed the state of British knowledge of the entire Assam Himalayan area.

British anxieties related to Chinese expansion in the Assam Himalayan frontier area were, of course, greatly relieved by the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution in November 1911. By December the Manchu Amban Lien Yu had been deposed and replaced by General Chung Ying. Early in 1912 the situation in Lhasa got completely out of hand with active fighting taking place between Chinese and Tibetan forces. By the end of the year Chinese power in Tibet to a point slightly west of Chando had, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. In April 1913 Chung Ying fled Tibet for India, and his departure from Chumbi marked the end of Chinese military domination that had begun in early 1910 when he arrived in Tibet as the head of Chao

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25. India Office/PEF. 1910–1913, Minto to Morley, 11 June 1908. (To ne boted as I.O.)
26. Ibid., Williamson’s Diary, January-February 1911.
27. Ibid., p. 385.
Erh-feng’s “flying columns.” The Chinese did not return as rulers to Central Tibet for nearly half a century, but when they did they remembered the lesson of Chung Ying and brought with them a large army of occupation.

The 1911 revolution destroyed one of the most meaningful bonds between the Manchus and the Dalai Lamas; that of the patron-priest relationship. The Chinese, either imperial or republican, did not have such a concept of empire, and in April 1912 the new republic declared Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet to be the equivalent of Chinese provinces and thus integral parts of the Chinese state. The Tibetans did not recognize the President of China, Yuan Shih-kai, as a successor to the Manchu emperor, and while they did recognize some suzerain relationship with the Emperor, they never recognized this in the Chinese state. This interesting distinction provided them with their best case for independence.

The British were quick to grasp the opportunity presented by the decline of Chinese power in Tibet and, pressured the Republic of China to agree to a definition of the Chinese status in Tibet. On August 17, 1912, Sir John Jordan, the British Minister in China, presented a memorandum to the Chinese government which clearly stated British policy regarding Tibet. The memorandum contained five important parts:

(1) His Majesty's Government, while they have formally recognized the “suzerain rights” of China in Tibet, have never recognized and are not prepared to recognize, the right of China to intervene actively in the internal administration of Tibet, which should remain, as contemplated by the treaties, in the hands of the Tibetan authorities, subject to the right of Great Britain and China, under Article I of the Convention of April 27, 1906, to take such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfillment of Treaty stipulations.

28. See: Fairbank and Teng article on the nature of the Manchu tributary system. See also: Memo, from the British Ambassador to China F.O. 371/1326, No. 20650, Jordan to Grey, 27 April 1912.

29. I.O./PEF, 1912/69, No. 3460/12, Jordan to Grey, 17 August 1912.
(2) On these grounds His Majesty's Government must demur altogether to the conduct of Chinese officers in Tibet during the last two years in assuming all administrative power in the country and to the doctrine propounded in Yuan Shih-kai's Presidential order of the 21st of April 1912 that Tibet is to be "regarded as on an equal footing with the Provinces of China Proper" and that "all administrative matters" connected with that country "will come within the sphere of internal administration."

His Majesty's Government formally decline to accept such a definition of the political status of Tibet and they must warn the Chinese Republic against any repetition by Chinese officers of the conduct to which exception has been taken.

(3) While the right of China to station a representative, with a suitable escort, at Lhasa, with authority to advise the Tibetans as to their foreign relations, is not disputed. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to acquiesce in the maintenance of an unlimited number of Chinese troops either at Lhasa or in Tibet generally.

(4) His Majesty's Government must press for the conclusion of a written agreement on the foregoing lines as a condition precedent to extending their recognition to the Chinese Republic.

(5) In the meantime all communication with Tibet via India must be regarded as absolutely closed to the Chinese and will only be reopened on such conditions as His Majesty's Government may see fit to impose when an Agreement has been concluded on the lines indicated above.

By sending this note to the Chinese, the British were treading on delicate grounds of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 which, in theory, had sealed the Tibetan issue once and for all. The Russians, however, were deeply involved in Mongolian affairs, and the British felt that this involvement, together with the rapid decline of Chinese power in Central Asia, necessitated such a move.

30. The Mongols, under Urga Hutukhtu, formally declared Mongolia "an independent state under a new government, endowed with authority to manage its affairs independently of others." He went on to state that "we Mongols shall obey
The Chinese authorities, as might have been expected, made no efforts to reply to the Jordan Memorandum. On January 30, 1913, however, the Chinese Foreign Minister asked Jordan to discuss further the memorandum of August 17. This was no doubt the result of the state of affairs in Mongolia. By February, the notion of tripartite talks for settlement of the Tibetan problems received the blessings of the Indian Government. The Home Government finally agreed and Jordan was so informed on April 5.

On June 5 the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, wrote to the Dalai Lama requesting that he send a delegate to India for such talks. A few days later Hardinge appointed Sir Henry McMahon, the Indian Foreign Secretary, as British representative. The Dalai Lama appointed the Lonchen Shatra as his representative, and the Chinese appointed, after considerable difficulties with the British, Chen I-fan, who had recently been Counsellor at the Chinese Legation in London.

The Chinese fought hard to deny equality of representation to the Tibetans, but it was finally agreed by the Chinese Foreign Minister that:

> It has become the duty of this Government of China to order the said Plenipotentiary[Chen I-fan] to proceed to India, there to negotiate a provisional treaty jointly with the Plenipotentiary appointed by Great Britain and the Tibetan Plenipotentiary, and to sign articles which may

neither Manchu nor Chinese officials whose administrative authority is being completely abolished and who, as a consequence, should be sent home." Mongolia, of course, required aid to make such a policy effective, and this aid, for a price, was provided by the Russians. The Russo-Mongol agreement was embodied in three documents: The Russo-Mongol Agreements of October 21, November 3, and the annexed Protocol. These all provided Russia with considerable trade advantages, and with what amounted to Russian control of Mongol foreign relations. An excellent study on Russian relations with Mongolia during this period is to be found in: P.S.H. Tang, *Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911-1931* (Durham: University Press, 1959), p. 300 passim.

33. *F.O.*, 535/16, No. 294, Hardinge to Dalai Lama, 5 June 1913.
be agreed or in order that all difficulties which have existed in the past be dissolved.\footnote{36}{F.O., 371/1612, No. 36932, Alston to Grey, 10 August 1913.}

The Simla Conference opened on October 6, 1913 with Sir Henry McMahon as President of the Conference. The British role, in theory, was that of an arbitrator and hence the meeting began with McMahon proposing that a presentation of Chinese and Tibetan claims would be necessary before any real progress could be made.

Lonchen Shatra, on October 13, indicated to the British that the Tibetans wanted the following terms included in any agreement: that (1) Tibet was to manage her own internal affairs and (2) her external affairs (with reference to the British of Major issues); (3) that no Chinese Amban, officials, or soldiers would be placed in Tibet and that (4) Tibetan territory would include the eastern region up to Tachienlu, some of which had lately passed under Chinese armed control.\footnote{37}{A. Lamb, \textit{The McMahon Line}, Vol. II, pp.478-479.} On October 30 the Chinese replied and proposed the following terms: (1) that Tibet should be recognized as an integral part of the Republic of China, (2) that the Chinese retain the right to appoint an Amban with an escort of 2,600 men (1,000 to be stationed in Lhasa and the remainder wherever the Amban desired), (3) that Tibet would have no relations with any foreign power except through the Chinese, unless provided for in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, (4) that Tibet should grant amnesty to all those who had sided with the Chinese since 1910, (5) that if it were found necessary to revise the 1908 Trade Regulations, this would be done by Anglo-Chinese discussions without Tibetan participation, and, finally, that the frontier between China and Tibet should be, as indicated on a map accompanying the statement, in the general region of Giamda, where the President of the Republic of China had announced it to be, just over 100 miles from Lhasa.\footnote{38}{Ibid., pp.479-480.}

McMahon studied the two opposing views and summoned a meeting of the Conference on November 18, when
he explained to the delegates that it would be futile to study or discuss the points of obvious difference without some general agreement on boundaries between the territories of the Chinese and the Dalai Lama. The Tibetans were far better prepared to produce evidence in support of their claims than were the Chinese, and as the volume of Tibetan evidence mounted, Chen became increasingly annoyed. He asked, on December 18, that a consolidated position be drawn up by both sides and that these alone, when prepared in final form be considered by the Conference.

In an effort to resolve the irreconcilable stands of the Tibetan and Chinese representatives, on February 17, 1914, McMahon, with the approval of the Home Government, proposed a division of Tibet into Inner and Outer Zones. Such a scheme appeared rational and based somewhat on the Mongolian model. The Mongolian model, however, was one with a precedent dating back to Manchu practice in the seventeenth century. The two-zone proposal was put before the convention in the form of a map [see next page] with two lines, one red and the other blue. The red line showed Tibet as a geographical and political unit more or less on the lines suggested by the original Tibetan claim of October 6, 1913. The blue line divided Inner from Outer Tibet, and its position was based on the Chinese reply of October 30, 1913 to the Tibetan terms. Chen found the division unacceptable, as he felt it had no historical or traditional justification, not to mention the fact that it would involve the surrender of considerable amounts of Chinese territory. The Tibetans also found the division something less than satisfactory. While the division would give Lhasa a stable border with China, it would also involve the loss of substantial territory. They were also opposed to any type of Chinese overlordship which was implied in the discussions. The Conference met


40. The best contemporary source for the events of the Simla Convention is to be found in McMahon's Final Memorandum, F.O., 371/1931, No. 43390, India Office to Foreign Office, 26 August 1914.
again on March 11, and McMahon presented a draft agreement from London which was quite similar to the one he had proposed in late 1913. It provided:

**Article 1**
The Conventions specified in the present schedule to the present Convention shall, except in so far as they may have been modified by, or may be inconsistent with or repugnant to, any of the provisions of the present Convention, continue to be binding upon the High Contracting Parties.

**Article 2**
The Governments of Great Britain and China, recognising that Tibet is a State under the suzerainty, but not the sovereignty, of China, and recognising also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and appointment of the Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa.

The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province and Tibet shall not be represented in the Chinese Parliament or any similar body. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.

**Article 3**
Recognising the special interest of Great Britain, in virtue of the geographical position of Tibet, in the existence of an effective Tibetan Government, and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoining States, the Government of China engages, except as provided in Article 4 of this Convention, not to send troops into Outer Tibet, nor to station civil or military officers, or establish Chinese colonies in the country. Should any such troops, officials, or colonists, remain in Outer Tibet at the date of the signature of this agreement, they shall be withdrawn within a period not exceeding one month.

The Government of Great Britain engage not to station military or civil officers in Outer Tibet (except as provided in the Convention of 1904 between Great
Britain and Tibet) or troops (except the Agent’s escorts), or to establish colonies in that country.

Article 4
The foregoing Article shall not be held to preclude a Chinese representative with suitable escort from residing at some place in Tibet to be determined hereafter but it is hereby provided that the said escort shall in no circumstances exceed 300 men.

Article 5
The Governments of China and Tibet, engage that they will not enter into any negotiations or agreements regarding Tibet with one another, or with any other Power, excepting such negotiations and agreements between Great Britain and Tibet as are provided for by the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet of September 7, 1904, and the Convention with China of April 27, 1906.

Article 6
Article III of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 is hereby cancelled, and it is understood that in Article IX (d) of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904 the term “Foreign Power” does not include China.

Article 7
(a) The Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 are hereby cancelled.
(b) The Tibetan Government engages to negotiate with the British Government new Trade Regulations to give effect to Articles II, IV, and V of the Convention of 1904, and to appoint duly authorised representatives for the purpose without delay; provided always that such Regulations shall in no way modify the present treaty except with the consent of the Chinese Government.
(c) The Government of China is hereby released from its engagements under Article III of the Convention of 1890 between Great Britain and China, to prevent acts of aggression from the Tibetan side of the Tibet-Sikkim frontier.

Article 8
The British Agent who resides at a trade mart established under Article II of the Convention between Great
Britain and Tibet of September 7, 1904, may visit Lhasa with his escort whenever it is necessary to consult with the Tibetan Government regarding matters arising out of that Convention, which it has been found impossible to settle by correspondance or otherwise.

Article 9
For the purpose of the present Convention the borders of Tibet, and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet, shall be as shown in red and blue respectively on the map attached hereto.

Nothing in the present Convention shall be held to prejudice the existing rights of the Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet, which include the power to select and appoint the high priests of monasteries, to retain full control of all matters affecting religious institutions, to issue appointment orders to chiefs and local officers, and to collect all customary rents and taxes.

Article 10
The Government of China hereby agrees to pay compensation amounting to Rs. 4,24,840 due for losses incurred by Nepalese and Ladakhis in Tibet in consequence of acts done by Chinese officials and soldiers in that country.

Article 11
The present Convention shall come into force on the date of signature. The English, Chinese and Tibetan texts of this Convention have been carefully compared and, in the event of any question arising as to the interpretation of the Convention, the sense of the English text shall be held to be correct.

On March 20 Chen called on McMahon and informed him that his government had virtually rejected the entire agreement. McMahon replied on the 26th with what amounted to an ultimatum that implied that the British would reach agreement with the Tibetans without Chinese consultations. The meeting of April 7 resulted in a reiteration of the position taken by McMahon on the 26th of March. On April 27th, Chen indicated that he could not initial the draft and the map. McMahon indicated that

41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
unless he could bring himself to cooperate that the British and Tibetan representatives would continue and that the Chinese would be requested to withdraw. and that any agreement which might be signed in the absence of the Chinese would not contain the expression “suzerainty” as a view of China’s relationship with Tibet. The threat was clear, and Chen initialed the agreement but stated that this was being done with the clear understanding that to initial and to sign were two different actions and that his initials would not bind his Government, whose views he would immediately seek.\footnote{A. Lamb, \textit{The McMahon Line}, Vol. II, pp. 504-505.}

On April 29 the Chinese Foreign Minister repudiated Chen’s actions. China would not be bound by his initialing of the agreement and map.\footnote{F.O., 535/17, o 104, Viceroy to Secretary of State 29 April 1914.}

The British, by early June, were faced with the prospect of either letting the Conference end in such an inconclusive manner, or signing some agreement with the Tibetans alone. Jordan suggested concessions to the Chinese, and McMahon agreed to pull the Tibetan border south to the Kun Lun (or Chang Tang) area and give it to China. This move, however, did not impress or move the Chinese in any way.

The British were aware that if they signed a separate agreement with Tibet they would, in effect, be acknowledging an independent Tibet which they might soon be called upon to defend. The situation in Europe being what it was, a Sino-British conflict was quite unthinkable. Compromise was the order of the day. The British and Tibetan delegates would sign a declaration stating that they agreed to be bound by the terms of the Convention,\footnote{Convention between Great Britain, China and Tibet, initialed at Simla, 27 April 1914.} and that Chinese rights

\begin{quote}
His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, being sincerely desirous to settle by mutual agreement various questions concerning the interests of their several States on the Continent of Asia, and further to regulate the relations of their several Governments, have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have nominated for this purpose their respective plenipotentiaries, that to say:
\end{quote}
His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the Hon' ble Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Knight Commander of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, Companion of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department;

Note: The text of the Simla Convention of 27 April 1914, which was initialled by the Chinese plenipotentiary, Chen I-fan, is not quite the same as the text of 3 July, which the Tibetan and British plenipotentiaries declared to be binding, and which Chen I-fan refused to initial or sign.

The differences between the two texts are stated here in notes.

Article IX of both texts of the Convention refers to a map. This is a fairly small-scale map of Tibet, and parts of India and China, which should not be confused with the map (in two sheets) which is mentioned in the McMahon-Lonchen Shatra Notes of 24-25 March 1914. The map which accompanied the 27 April text, as well as that for the 3 July text (which is slightly different in its markings), has been printed in An Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India. Government of India, Ministry of External affairs, New Delhi, 1960.

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Monsieur Ivan Chen, Officer of the Order of the Chia Ho;

His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Dorje; who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them to be in a good and due form have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in eleven Articles:

Article I

The convention specified in the Schedule to the present Convention shall, except in so far as they may have been modified by, or may be inconsistent with or repugnant to any of the provisions of the present Convention, continue to be binding upon the High Contracting Parties.

Article II

The Governments of Great Britain and China recognising that Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and recognizing also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from all interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa.

The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. The government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.

Article III

Recognising the special interest of Great Britain, in virtue of the geographical position of Tibet, in the existence of an effective Tibetan Government, and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoining States, the Government of China engages, except as provided in Article 4 of this Convention, not to send troops into Outer Tibet, nor to station civil or military officers, nor to establish Chinese colonies in the country. Should any such troops or officials remain in Outer Tibet at the date of the signature of this Convention, they shall be withdrawn within a period not exceeding three months.
The Government of Great Britain engages not to station military or civil officers in Tibet (except as provided in the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet), nor troops (except as provided in the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet) nor troops (except the Agents' escorts), nor to establish colonies in that country.

**Article IV**

The foregoing Article shall not be held to preclude the continuance of the arrangement by which, in the past, a Chinese high official with suitable escort has been maintained at Lhasa, but it is hereby provided that the said escort shall in no circumstances exceed 300 men.

**Article V**

The Governments of China and Tibet engage that they will not enter into any negotiations or agreements regarding Tibet with one another, or with any other Power, excepting such negotiations and agreements between Great Britain and Tibet as are provided for by the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet and the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China.

**Article VI**

Article III of the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China is hereby cancelled, and it is understood that in Article IX (d) of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet the term "Foreign Power" does not include China.

No less favourable treatment shall be accorded to British Commerce than to the commerce of China or the most favoured nation.

**Article VII**

(a) The Tibet Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 are hereby cancelled.
(b) The Tibetan Government engages to negotiate with the British government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Article II, IV and V of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet without delay; provided always that such Regulations shall in no way modify the present Convention except with the consent of the Chinese Government.

**Article VIII**

The British Agent who resides at Gyantse may visit Lhasa with his escort whenever it is necessary to consult with the Tibetan Government regarding matters arising out of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, which it has been found impossible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or otherwise.

**Article IX**

For the purpose of the present Convention the borders of Tibet, and the

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a. In an earlier draft, put before the Conference on 17 February 1914, the following was added to this Article:

"c. The Government of China is hereby released from its engagements under Article III of the Convention of 1890 between Great Britain and China to prevent acts of aggression from the Tibetan side of the Tibet-Sikkim frontier."
boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet, shall be shown in red and blue respectively on the map attached hereto. b

Nothing in the present Convention shall be held to prejudice the existing rights of the Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet, which include the power to select and appoint the high priests of monasteries and to retain full control in all matters affecting religious institutions. c

Article X

In case of differences between the Governments of China and Tibet in regard to questions arising out of this convention the aforesaid Governments engage to refer them to the British Government for equitable adjustment. d

Article XI

The present convention will take effect from the date of signature.
The English, Chinese and Tibetan texts of the present Convention have been carefully examined and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative e

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, three copies in English, three in Chinese and three in Tibetan.
Done at Simla this 27th day of April, A.D. one thousand nine hundred and fourteen. f

Initials and seals of Sir H. McMahon,
Chen I-fan g
The Lonchen Shatra

Schedule


b. See Map. This map, on a small scale, contains the only indication of the McMahon Line to emerge formally from the Simla Conference in its tripartite form.
c. The 17 February 1914 draft had this phrase to end the last sentence: “to issue appointment orders to chiefs and local officers, and to collect all customary rents and taxes.”
d. In the 17 February draft this article read as follows:
“The Government of China hereby agrees to pay compensation amounting to Rs. 4,28,840 due for losses incurred by Nepalese and Ladakhis in Tibet in consequence of acts done by Chinese soldiers and officials in that country.”

In the 3 July version of the Convention, Article X, at the request of the Russian Government, was removed: the Russians argued that it in effect conferred upon the British a protectorate over Tibet. It was replaced by the second paragraph of Article XI relating to the comparison of texts. The 3 July text is the one usually printed, e.g. in Richardson, Tibet, op. cit., pp. 268–72, and in Aitchison, Treaties, op. cit., Vol. XIV (1929), pp. 35–38. It should be remembered, however, that it was the 27 April text which the Chinese representative to the Simla Conference, Chen I-fan, actually initialled.

e. The second paragraph of Article XI was used to replace Article X in the 3 July text.
f. The text printed in Boundary Question, op. cit., does not include the section relating to dates. The wording here is taken from the printed 3 July text; hence the omission of the Chinese and Tibetan dates.
g. Chen I-fan, of course, did not initial the 3 July text.
2. Convention between Great Britain and Tibet, signed at Lhasa the 7th September 1904.

3. Convention between Great Britain and China respecting Tibet, signed at Peking the 27th April 1906.

The notes exchanged are to the following effect:

1. It is understood by the High Contracting Parties that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory.

2. After the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama by the Tibetan Government, the latter will notify the installation to the Chinese Government, whose representative at Lhasa will then formally communicate to His Holiness the titles consistent with his dignity, which have been conferred by the Chinese Government.

3. It is also understood that the selection and appointment of all officers in Outer Tibet will rest with the Tibetan Government.

4. Outer Tibet shall not be represented in the Chinese Parliament or in any other similar body.

5. It is understood that the escorts attached to the British Trade Agencies in Tibet shall not exceed seventy-five per centum of the escort of the Chinese Representative at Lhasa.

6. The government of China is hereby released from its engagements under Article III of the Convention of March 17, 1890, between Great Britain and China, to prevent acts of aggression from the Tibetan side of the Tibet-Sikkim frontier. h

7. The Chinese high official referred to in Article IV will be free to enter Tibet as soon as the terms of Article III have been fulfilled to the satisfaction of

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Declaration appended to the 3 July 1914 text of the Simla Convention j

We, the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and Tibet, hereby record the following Declaration to the effect that we acknowledge the annexed Convention as intended to be binding on the Governments of Great Britain and Tibet, and we agree that so long as the Government of China withholds signature to the aforesaid Convention, she will be debarred from the enjoyment of all privileges accruing therefrom.

In token whereof we have signed and sealed this Declaration, two copies in English and two in Tibetan.

Done at Simla this third day of July, 1914 A.D., corresponding with the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger year.

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A. HENRY McMAHON
British Plenipotentiary

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h. In the 17 February draft this was included as part of Article VII.

and privileges would be held in suspension until Peking also signed.\textsuperscript{46}

The Simla Convention that McMahon had obtained was virtually the same draft (see footnote 43, Chapter II) which Chen had initialed in late April with the exception of Articles 10 and 11. Article 10 was deleted and a second paragraph added to 11 which contained language about the comparison of texts.\textsuperscript{47}

The Convention had failed to produce a tripartite agreement, and a great deal regarding the boundary issue remained unresolved. Indeed, a legacy that continues to plague Indo-Sinic relations had been germinated at this conference. McMahon, however, was convinced that a great deal had been accomplished. Firstly, during January and March the British and Tibetans, without consulting the Chinese, had reached agreement on the Indo-Tibetan border in the Assam Himalayan area, and secondly a new set of trade regulations was signed in 1914 which replaced those of 1893 and 1908. The Assam Himalayan boundary line, known to history as the "McMahon Line," was embodied in an exchange of notes between the Tibetan and British representatives to the Simla Conference at Delhi on March 24 and 25, 1914. These notes, together with the accompanying map (reproduced on the next page) do not appear to have been discussed with the Chinese. On a much smaller map, which served the Conference as a basis for discussion over the two-zone scheme, the March 1914 line was shown as an appendix to the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet. Had the Chinese signed the Convention, they surely would

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representatives of the three signatories to this Convention, who will investigate and report without delay.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
Initials and seal of Sir H. McMahon,  
Chen I-fan,  
The Lonchen Shatra.
\end{flushright}

\begin{itemize}
\item i. Chen I-fan did not, of course, initial the 3 July text.
\item \textit{46. Ibid.}
\item \textit{47. Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
V. Map attached to the Simla Convention
have found it difficult to deny some degree of validity to the Tibet-Indian boundary. They did not, however, sign, and by 1929, when the March 1914 notes and map were first published, they were surely well aware that they were the intended victims of a British trick. This goes far toward explaining their contemporary hatred of the McMahon Line.

The Indians claim the validity of the McMahon Line on several counts: Firstly, they argue it represents the traditional boundary between India and Tibet. We have already seen that this is highly questionable.\footnote{A. Lamb, \textit{The McMahon Line}, Vol. II, \textit{passim}, and Chapter 1 of this dissertation.} They also argue that the March 1914 agreement between the Tibetans and British is binding in international law. This is also highly questionable. By 1906 the British recognized China’s right to conduct Tibetan foreign relations and had denied that they themselves could negotiate with the Tibetans beyond the scope of the Convention and trade regulations, except through the Chinese. They also claim that Chen initialed the April 27 Convention and Map and that, whatever the standing of the March 1914 agreement, this act constituted Chinese acceptance of the Convention. This is, of course, nonsense. Chen initialed, explained that he was doing so as opposed to signing, and warned clearly that he expected his government to repudiate his actions. This they did almost immediately.

It is likely that McMahon never really anticipated Indian administration right up to the geographical limits of the line, but that what he really wanted was a definition of the theoretical limits of British territory. This line was not designed to keep the Chinese out. That was to have been the purpose of the two-zone scheme, and this barrier was effectively destroyed with Chinese failure to sign the convention. It surely did not stop the Chinese invasion of Tibet in the early 1950’s, as we shall see in later chapters. The subjugation of Tibet during that era placed the McMahon Line under stresses it was never intended or, for that matter,
designed to withstand. One thing is sure regarding both the Simla Conference and the McMahon Line: little or nothing was settled and a great deal was left unfinished. The germs of future troubles had been well sown!
CHAPTER III

From World War I to Panch Sheela
1914–1954

From the end of 1914, China had one year after another of intense civil disorder. Foreign difficulties, aside from increased Japanese pressures, were alleviated for a time due to the great war in Europe, but internal disorder continued without pause. The authority of the central government, as regards the Tibetan problem, declined to a point where Tibetan forces were able to defeat the Chinese under P'eng Jih-sheng at Chamdo. By late summer 1918 the Tibetans were approaching Kanze in one direction and Ba-t'ing in another. At this point local Chinese commanders requested Eric (later Sir Eric) Teichman, the British Consular Agent at Tach'ienlu, to arrange a truce. On August 19, 1918 an agreement was signed by Teichman, Liu Tsan-ting for China and Chamha Tendar for Tibet. This agreement divided the disputed territories in such a way that China retained the area to the east of the Upper Yangtse, excepting Derge and Beyul. Tibet, however, would retain control of all monasteries in the area that passed under Chinese control. This agreement, with Teichman's direct involvement, also indicated the growing power of the British in Tibetan affairs.

A second agreement was drawn up on October 10, and this note called for a termination of hostilities and for a troop withdrawal. All of this was accomplished by October 31st.

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3. Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, *Tibet, A Political History* (London: Yale Universi-
All during 1918 the British Minister to China, Sir John Jordan, pressed the Chinese to begin negotiations for ending the Tibetan problem, but excuses were always given in the most diplomatic fashion to put off this thorny issue.

Negotiations took place during August 1919 when the Chinese finally felt under sufficient pressure to make some response to British efforts to talk. These negotiations were, however, fruitless. At one point, however, the British proposed abandoning the two zone scheme to divide Tibet, and while the Chinese government might have been interested in such proposals, popular opposition made such a move impossible. The opposition had been greatly inspired by the fall of Imperial Russia which led to a resolution on the part of the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia which revoked that autonomous outer zone scheme.

At the invitation of the Dalai Lama, Sir Charles Bell, formerly Political Agent in Sikkim, and close friend of the Dalai Lama from his days as a refugee in India prior to the Chinese Revolution of 1911, paid a visit to Lhasa in late 1920. Bell remained in Tibet for a year and not only provided the Dalai Lama with advice for dealing with Sino-Tibetan relations, but provided a useful force to counteract the Chinese mission which stayed in Lhasa from January to April 1920.4

Continuing chaotic conditions in China during this period and pre-occupation with the Washington Conference, 4 made a meaningful settlement all but impossible. Thus the issue remained in limbo, and would not come up again until the establishment of a new National Government

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*Ty Press, 1967), p. 263. This work represents one of the rare scholarly studies in English on Tibet by a Tibetan. Many Tibetan sources, no longer available, were used in this work. It is important to note that Shakabpa's work received the "blessings" of the present Dalai Lama.


5. The Washington Conference of February-November 1922 resulted in, among other things, a nine-power treaty to respect China's sovereignty, territorial and administrative integrity, to maintain the "open door" policy, and to afford China the opportunity to develop a stable government.
at Nanking in April 1927 by Chiang K'ai-shek and the conservative members of the Kuomintang.  

In late 1929, Miss Liu Man-ch'ing was dispatched on a semi-official mission to Tibet for the purpose of improving relations between China and Tibet. She arrived in Lhasa in February 1930 and met several times with the Dalai Lama and took pains to explain in detail the plans of the Chinese government for national construction and development. Miss Liu returned to Nanking in late July, after having been well received by the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government.

In January 1930, Kung-chueh-chung-ni arrived in Lhasa to discuss various political matters and the larger issue of the status of Tibet. Kung put eight official Chinese questions to the Dalai Lama, and his answer was returned with Kung to Nanking on August 30, 1930:

1. Q. How might relations between Tibet and the Central Government be restored?  
   A. If the Central Government would treat the patronage relationship between China and Tibet with sincerity and good faith as it previously did, Tibet on its part, having always shown sincerity in its dealings in the past, would from now on make an even greater effort to give full support to the Central Government.

2. Q. How shall the Central Government exercise administrative control over Tibet?  
   A. It would be advisable to work out a written understanding on the measures to be taken for securing a fundamental stabilization both in the political and the religious affairs of Tibet.

3. Q. How shall the autonomy of Tibet and its scope be defined?  
   A. As from now on, the patronage relationship

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between the Central Government and Tibet is going to be faithfully observed and the Central Government is to show sincerity to make Tibet feel safe and secure; the area over which autonomy is to be exercised should naturally be the same as before. It is expected that the Central Government will return to Tibet those districts which originally belonged to it but which are now not under its control so that a perpetual peace and harmony will surely be the result.

4. Q. Shall the Dalai and Panch'en Lamas join the Kuomintang?
   A. On account of his advanced age and the tremendous burden in managing temporal and religious affairs, and also considering the fact that he is not able to proceed to the capital until the consent of the National Assembly is obtained, the Dalai Lama is not at the present time in a position to join the Kuomintang. As the Panch'en Lama is now residing in China Proper and his duty has always been confined to the religious affairs to Tashi-Ihunpo, for he has no political affairs to attend to, he should be available for membership of the Kuomintang. It must be understood, however, that he has never had any say in the settlement of Tibetan affairs.

5. Q. Shall the relative position of the Dalai and the Panch'en Lama and their respective jurisdiction in political as well as religious affairs be maintained as before or new provisions be made?
   A. Political and religious affairs have always been administered by the Tibetan Government at Lhasa. The Panch'en Lama has had only the Tashi-Ihunpo monastery in his control. Actually the Tashi-Ihunpo monastery was built by the first Dalai Lama. It was the second Dalai Lama who entrusted the administration to a fellow monk and conferred upon the latter the honorary title of Panch'en, when he moved his seat to Lhasa. Later, in view of the tutor-disciple relationship existing in turn through generations between the Dalai and the Panch'en, the fifth Dalai Lama awarded this monastery to the fourth Panch'en Lama. If this age-old practice were
to be continuously observed, all Tibetans would be only too pleased.

6. Q. How shall the Dalai welcome the Panch’en back to Tibet and how shall the Central Government escort him?

A. Among the Panch’en’s retinue, many employed the terms “Anterior” and “Ulterior” Tibet with intent to sow discord. They disobeyed orders of the Tibetan Government and acted frequently against their superiors. Both their thought and conduct are corrupt. In the year Chia Ch’en (1904), the Panch’en went to India and conspired with the British but all his efforts were to no avail. In the year Hsin Hai (1911), he intrigued with the Resident Lien-yu and made an attempt to seize the reins of government and control of the Church during the absence of the Dalai Lama. But his efforts were thwarted by the opposition of the people and especially of the clergymen of the three leading monasteries. According to established practice, the Panch’en should contribute one quarter of the provisions for the Army. Not only did he fail to make such contributions, but also committed acts in violation of law. Had the offenders been punished strictly in accordance with the letter of the law, there would have been no such state of affairs as now exists. It is only in consideration of the long-standing and close tutor-disciple relationship between the Dalai and the Panch’en through generations that a policy of tolerance and forgiveness has been followed. Yet these people not only remained unrepentant, but further advised and urged the Panch’en to flee away from Tashi-Lhumpo. A dispatch inviting him back was soon sent to the Panch’en, but he refused to accept. He then fled to Urga and had secret dealings with the communists. Only upon the death of the Chief Lama of Mongolia, Cheputsuntanpa, was he obliged to come to China Proper. Consequently, the Tibetan Government dispatched officials to Tashi-Lhunpo to take proper care of the monastery. Now, these offenders are still conspiring and making trouble. As the matter stands, Tibet
would find it very difficult to welcome them unless they can give a satisfactory explanation as to their reason for taking to flight.

7. Q. Has the Dalai Lama the intention of setting up in the Capital an office for the convenience of keeping closer contact? As to its expenses, the Central Government is prepared to grant the necessary funds.

A. At first, offices are to be set up in Nanking, Peiping, and Sikang. If and when such offices are required for other places, applications will be filed accordingly.

8. Q. Is there anything else that Tibet expects of the Central Government?

A. For the purpose of protecting itself against aggression, Tibet's hope for the present is only that the Central Government will supply it with arms. In case any other help may be needed in the future for strengthening its security, it will make requests to the Central Government.

The above noted document is included as it illustrates clearly the obstacles to a rapprochement between Tibet and the Chinese government. Efforts at reconciliation continued during 1930, but bore no fruits.

An incident in Sikang known as the Ta-Scieh Ssu affair frustrated efforts at mediation, as it involved not only rivalry between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, but also the boundary issue. By late July of 1930 it was clear that the issue was not really one related to a disputed monastery, but was an attempt by the Dalai Lama to fix the boundary line with China by force of arms.

The Chinese government made no real attempt to settle the issue of the status of Tibet by force for any number of reasons. From a theoretical position it would have been self-defeating for the national government, which stood for

8. Shih Ch'ing-yang's manuscript, Chapter I, pp. 11a-12b, cited in Tieh-tseng Li's, The Historical Status of Tibet, pp. 153-155.
9. Li, pp. 157-159.
the equality of all nations within the Chinese Republic, to use military force to subdue the Tibetans. Quite aside from this there existed the practical considerations of having to take into account the position of the British and, to an even greater degree the Japanese.

The complexity of the border area itself was another factor of importance. The Chinese garrison troops on the Tibetan frontier had degenerated into little better than brigands, and all the roads leading into Tibet from Yunnan, Szechwan, Sinkiang or Ch'inghai, were in the hands of military administrators over whom the National Government had only the most nominal control.

After the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese in 1931, all moves of the National Government were overshadowed by this menace. Any plans for Tibet, no matter how theoretical, had to give way to the urgent preparations against new Japanese advances.

Raids and counter-raids continued during much of 1932 until on October 10 a truce was signed at Gonchen whereby the Chinese would keep to the east bank of the Upper Yangtse and the Tibetans to the opposite bank. The agreement provided, not only for reviews of the stipulations of the truce terms by the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government, but for a free flow of trade, and for the protection of monasteries and pilgrimages.

The truce remained in force, but violations continued. Quite unexpectedly, on December 17, 1933, the Dalai Lama died. Chaos seized the reins of government and the Tibetan

11. Incidents between Chinese forces and foreigners led to incidents such as those at Hankow and Kiukiang in January of 1927. These incidents first led to the sending of a heavily reinforced British fleet to the Yangtse ports. In March 1927 Communist forces, to cause problems for the Nationalists, killed a number of foreigners at Nanking and this, in turn, led to Japanese forces being landed in Shantung in May. The Japanese occupied Tsinan in May 1928 and this prevented Nationalist forces from taking Peking. During 1931-1932 the Japanese invaded and occupied all of Manchuria, establishing Henry P'u-i, the grandson of the last Manchu dowager Empress of China, as regent in March 1932.
13. Li, pp. 164-165.
political scene became so tense that civil war seemed quite likely.  

In January 1934, after months of debate, Ra-dreng Hutukhtu, of the Ra-dreng monastery, was elected regent. In April General Huang Mu-sing arrived in Lhasa as the representative of the Chinese Government to pay posthumous tribute to the late Dalai Lama and to work for the readjustment of relations between the National Government and Tibet. Huang made the following proposals:

**Two fundamental points that Tibet is asked to observe:**

1. Tibet must be an integral part of the territory of China.
2. Tibet must obey the Central Government.

**Declarations in regard to the political system of Tibet:**

1. Buddhism shall be respected by all and given protection and its propagation encouraged.
2. In the preservation of the traditional political system, Tibet shall be granted autonomy. Any administrative measures within the authority of the autonomy of Tibet, the Central Government will not interfere with. On foreign affairs, there must be unitary action [with the Central Government]. All administrative matters which are nation-wide in character shall be administered by the Central Government, such as:
   a. Foreign affairs shall be directed by the Central Government.
   b. National defense shall be planned by the Central Government.
   c. Communications shall be managed by the Central Government.
   d. The names of important officials of Tibet, after they have been elected by the autonomous government of Tibet, shall be submitted to the Central Government for their respective appointments.

The Central Government shall grant Tibet autonomy, but for the purpose of exercising full sovereignty in an integral part of its territory, the Central Government shall appoint a high commissioner to be stationed in Tibet as the represen-

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tative of the Central Government, on the one hand to carry out national administrative measures, and on the other to guide the regional autonomy.

The Tibetans avoided a categorical reply to the four points noted under point 2, and submitted the following counter proposal containing ten points:

1. In dealing with external affairs, Tibet shall remain an integral part of the territory of China. But the Chinese Government must promise that Tibet will not be reorganized into a province.

2. Tibetan authorities, big or small, external or internal, and Tibetan laws, regulations, etc., may be subjected to the orders of the Chinese Government provided such orders are not, either religiously or politically, harmful to Tibet.

3. Traditional laws and regulations dealing with the internal affairs of Tibet shall remain independent as at present, and the Chinese Government will not interfere with Tibetan civil and military authorities. On this matter it shall be in accordance with the oral promises made at different times in the past.

4. To maintain the present peaceful condition of Tibet, there shall be friendly relations with all its neighboring states and all the peoples believing in Buddhism. In the future, any important treaty making between Tibet and any foreign country shall be made by joint decisions with the Chinese Government.

5. One representative of the Chinese Government may be stationed in Tibet, but his retinue shall not exceed Twenty-five. There shall be no other representative either civil or military. This representative must be a true believer in Buddhism. When a new representative is appointed to replace the old, the route he and his retinue take to and fro must be by sea and not through Sikang.

6. Before the recognition of the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and before his taking over reins of government, the inauguration of the regency and the appointment of officials from the bKa'-blon up shall be conducted or made by the Tibetan Government as at present. Of such inauguration and appointments, the representative of the Chin-
ese Government in Tibet shall be notified soon after they have taken place.

7. Those Chinese people who have long resided in Tibet and have been under the jurisdiction and protection of the Agricultural Bureau since the Chinese-Tibetan War of the year jen-tzu (1912) shall remain under the control of the Tibetan Government and abide by the local laws and regulations. The representative of the Chinese Government shall exercise no control over them.

8. Military forces to be stationed on the borders of Tibet for defense purpose shall be dispatched by the Government of Tibet as at present. If and when there should be foreign invasion, the Chinese Government shall be consulted on military measures to be taken.

9. For permanent harmony and friendship, to avoid any possible disputes, and to maintain peace on the borders, the northeastern boundary between Kokonor and Tibet should be maintained as proposed during the negotiations of the year before last, with O-Lo which has long been under Tibet to be included on the Tibetan side. As for the boundary between Tibet and Szechwan, the territory and people, together with the administration of De-ge, Nyarong, Ta-chien Ssu, should be turned over to the Tibetan Government at the earliest possible date.

10. The Chinese Government should not give asylum to or acknowledge as representative, any Tibetan, ecclesiastical or secular, who has rebelled against the Tibetan Government and escaped to China Proper. 15

The Tibetan view showed not only a considerable lack of confidence in the Chinese Government, but the continuing shadow of British influence. Huang was well aware of the difficulties of the Tibetans, but in view of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, found it inadvisable to attempt to force the issue. Upon his return to China he noted the

15. These proposals are cited in Huang's report to the Central Committee of the National Government in the Archives of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, cited in Li, pp. 168-170.
continuation of British influence and suggested that the Panch'en Lama's desire to return to Tibet should be met, and that a large Chinese escort should be provided. This, of course, was highly contrary to the fifth point of the earlier Tibetan counterproposals.

In February 1935 the Panch'en was appointed "Special Cultural Commissioner for the Western Regions," and was given a personal escort of five hundred Chinese troops to escort him to Tibet. The Tibetans strongly objected, and the British regarded the Chinese escort as "military penetration."

Basil (later Sir Basil) Gould, the British Political Officer in Sikkim, visited Lhasa in August 1936, and persuaded the Lhasa Government not to allow the Panch'en to enter with the Chinese troops. A number of British notes to the Chinese Foreign Ministry were strongly objected to, and the Chinese demonstrated their determination to see the Panch'en return to Tibet with the escort provided by the Chinese Government. In mid-August the Panch'en arrived at the Tibetan border, but at the point the Chinese indicated that they would reconsider Tibetan objections to the escort mission. The Panch'en withdrew to Yu-shu where he unexpectedly fell ill and died on December 1, 1937.

The search for a new (14th) Dalai Lama continued under the supervision of the Regent. A candidate from Kokonor, after much interference on the part of Wu Chung-hsin, Chinese Chairman of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, was finally agreed upon. Installation took place at the Potala Palace on 22 February 1940. The complex nature of Tibetan etiquette, and the placing of Wu in a more prestigious position than that of the British representative, Sir Basil Gould, resulted in Gould

18. Li, p. 175.
20. Li, pp. 179-183, passim.
VI. Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield Prime minister to Queen Victoria. Beaconsfield was responsible for the “forward” imperial policy of British India with regard to the Frontier’s questions.

—Collection of the author—
refusing to be present. He did, however, tender his congratulations at a private audience the following day. The seating of Wu was, of course, of much more than symbolic importance, as it clearly asserted, yet again, the powerful influence of China in Tibetan affairs.

The pro-Chinese Regent Ra-dreng, in the face of increased British dissatisfaction and the opposition of the nationalistic Young Tibet group, withdrew for a time and in 1941 appointed Yun-tseng Ta-dsa as acting Regent. Ra-dreng attempted to regain his position but was defeated, blinded and poisoned in prison.

In the summer of 1943 the Young Tibet group set up a Bureau of Foreign Affairs and directly informed the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission that its business would henceforth be conducted directly with the new bureau. This act of treating Chungking as a foreign power amounted to asserting that Tibet was a fully independent state. The Chinese, of course, refused to recognize this new bureau. Relations remained strained and in August 1944 the Chinese, in an effort to improve its image in Tibet, appointed Shen Tsung-lieu to replace Kung Ch’ing-tsung. Shen immediately began talks with the Lhasa authorities, but they resulted in no progress.

The Chinese, as a result of the secret Yalta agreements, recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia. Such recognition, as had been the historical case, was bound to have a substantial impact on Sino-Tibetan affairs. The Kuomintang decided to grant considerable autonomy to Tibet and on August 25, 1945, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stated:

“If and when the Tibetans attain the stage of complete self-reliance in political and economic conditions, the Chinese Government would like to take the same attitude as it did toward Outer Mongolia, by supporting

their independence. However, Tibet should be able to maintain and promote its own independent position...

In 1947 Great Britain recognized the independence of India (and Pakistan) and this development also profoundly affected the status of Tibet. The Chinese expected this event to improve their relations with Tibet and the Tibetans felt it to be an example that would lead to a greater degree of autonomy in the truest sense of the term.

In July 1949 the Tibetan Kashag (cabinet) decided to remove all persons connected with the Chinese National Government. In view of the deteriorating position of the Nationalist forces at this point in time, it was not difficult for the Tibetan Government to get rid of these officials. The real question that remained, however, was the problem of the increasingly powerful Chinese Communist forces.

On October 1, 1949 Foreign Minister Chou En-lai announced the establishment of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). He forwarded a manifesto to the nations of the world inviting their recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. The Soviet Union extended recognition the very next day and other Communist bloc states soon followed suit.

Most of the Indian people were sympathetic to the P.R.C. They too had suffered from foreign domination and were aware of the unpopularity of the Kuomintang in China. On December 30, 1949, India recognized the P.R.C. After Burma, she was the second non-Communist nation in the world to do so.

The year 1950 was a critical one for Tibet. On the Tibetan calendar it was the "year of the Iron Tiger." For Tibet it was to be a cataclysmic year even more ferocious than the name suggested. China, as we have seen in the

previous chapters, never relinquished her claim to ultimate suzerainty over Tibet. She had, during periods of weakness and foreign difficulties, bowed to the Tibetans, but she never yielded up her claim to suzerainty. The defeat of Japan in World War II, the withdrawal of the British from India, and the establishment of the P.R.C. all destroyed the rather delicate balance of power that had enabled Tibet to resist, with a large measure of success, Chinese encroachment for nearly half a century. The P.R.C., like the Kuomintang, asserted their claim to Tibet. Unlike its predecessor, however, the P.R.C. was in a position to press the claim with direct political and military action.

Joseph Stalin had long ago established basic Communist doctrine on the questions of nationalities and minorities. In 1913 he wrote: "A nation is an historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological makeup, manifested in a community of culture." 27

Mao Tse-tung, in drawing up the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic in November 1931 noted that "all Mongolians, Tibetans, Miao, Yao, Koreans and others living in the territory of China shall enjoy the full right of self-determination." 28

Unfortunately for Tibet, as we shall see in the following chapter, Chinese doctrine on this subject shifted away not only from Stalin's 1913 statement, but from that of Mao made in 1931. 1950 would see a massive Chinese invasion of Tibet and the destruction of the Tibetan dream of independence, for this matter lay at the heart of one of China's most dangerous historic problems—Han domination of the many ethnic minorities in China.

It is indeed important to note, at this point, that early Stalinist or Maoist views related to ethnic or religious minorities quite aside. China—Manchu, Republican and

27. Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (Moscow, 1913 (?)), p. 3.
Communist—never really relinquished their claims to sovereignty vis-a-vis Tibet and that it is this point that is at the heart of the Chinese-Tibet relationship. Indeed, the Communist Chinese were as eager as any Chinese regime had ever been to reassert China's traditional "rights" over all Chinese territories—Tibet included.

On January 1, 1950 the Chinese Government announced that the "liberation" of Tibet was one of the chief aims of the People's Liberation Army. Vice-Chairman Chu Teh reiterated his government's determination to "free" Tibet. This was to be done in accordance with the new policy regarding minorities and nationality as spelled out in the Common Program adopted by the Consultative Conference in September of 1949. It was to be first applied to the case of Tibet and specified that "All nationalities have equal right and duties" and declared them all to be "equal in status." 29

In the face of so menacing a situation, and realizing that the Korean War overshadowed their problem in international forums, the National Assembly convened an extraordinary session and prepared to send delegations to countries which could reasonably be expected to aid Tibet. Envoys were prepared for India, Nepal, the United Kingdom and the United States. The main hope was for Indian aid, but the Indian position was well reflected by the position of her new ambassador to China, K.M. Panikkar, who was "fairly optimistic about working out an area of cooperation by eliminating causes of misunderstanding." Panikkar believed "in general" that Prime Minister Pandit Nehru also agreed with his own view that India could not continue the old British policy of a "special political interest" in Tibetan affairs. 30

The Tibetan government was becoming increasingly aware that if any real degree of autonomy was to be saved it would be as the result of direct talks with the P.R.C. The

Tibetans finally, therefore, agreed to talks about the future of their relationship with China. The talks began in New Delhi in September, but moved almost immediately to Peking.

On October 7, however, the P.R.C. launched a full scale invasion of Tibet when some 40,000 of its troops crossed the eastern Tibetan border. On October 19, the Chinese forces defeated a major Tibetan contingent at Chamdo.

New Delhi finally reacted officially to the Chinese military action when on October 21 Ambassador Panikkar was instructed to present the Chinese with an aide memoire of concern. India, in a highly revealing passage, noted "that an incautious move at the present time, even in a matter which is within its own sphere, will be used by those who are unfriendly to China to prejudice China's case in the United Nations and generally before neutral opinion.

India learned of the actual invasion on October 25 and on the 26th sent another note stating that, "we have been repeatedly assured of the desire of the Chinese Government to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means and negotiations. To order the advance of Chinese troops into Tibet appears to us most surprising and regrettable.

The Chinese replied on October 30 to the Indian note. It warned that "No foreign influence will be tolerated in Tibet," and further stated:

Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory. The problem is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China.

32. Ibid.
34. Ibid. Apx. 1-A.
35. By this time Chamdo and Lhodzong had already been occupied.
36. Li notes the date as October 28.
Therefore, with regard to the viewpoint of the Government of India on what it regards as deplorable, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet and hence expresses its deep regret.  

Nehru dispatched a series of notes to the P.R.C. tactfully deploring their resort to force in Tibet and urging a peaceful settlement of the matter. His notes met with sharp rebuffs from the Chinese. Chou En-lai informed him that Tibet was always a part of China, that the matter was entirely a domestic dispute, and that India was interfering and encouraging certain "reactionary groups" who were resisting legal Chinese rights in Tibet.  

A Chinese note to the Indian Government of November 16, 1950 is of particular interest because of its reference to an earlier aide memoir of the Indian Government. The Chinese note stated:

The regional autonomy granted by the Chinese Government to the national minorities inside the country is an autonomy within the confines of Chinese sovereignty. This point has been recognized by the Indian Government in its aide memoir to the Chinese Government dated August 26 this year. However, when the Chinese Government actually exercised its sovereign rights and began to liberate the Tibetan people and drive out foreign forces and influences to ensure that the Tibetan people will be free from aggression and will realize regional autonomy and religious freedom, the Indian Government attempted to influence and obstruct the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet by the Chinese Government.  

From a legal point of view it is significant that the word "suzerainty" was employed to describe China's relationship with Tibet. This was, of course, the position taken by the

37. Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations, No. 1, Apx. 1-C.  
39. Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations, No. 1, Apx. 1-D.
British when they held power in India. It is also significant that the Chinese translation of the Indian note replace "suzerainty" with "sovereignty."  

As the battle of words continued the position of Tibet became increasingly difficult. On November 7, 1950, the Tibetan delegation at Kalimpong, India, received instructions directly from the Dalai Lama in Lhasa to refer the Tibetan invasion to the United Nations. They thereupon cabled the General Assembly President and complained that "armed invasion of Tibet for her incorporation within the fold of Chinese Communism through sheer physical force "was" a clear case of aggression." They included the accurate but futile assertion that "Tibetans feel that racially, culturally and geographically they are far apart from the Chinese." In the same cable they repudiated the Chinese claim that Tibet had always been a part of China.  

The major powers were all unresponsive to the Tibetan claim. Rather curiously, El Salvador requested the issue to be placed on the Assembly agenda. They called for a resolution condemning China for her "unprovoked aggression" against Tibet, and proposed a special commission to study measures which the General Assembly might take to aid Tibet.  

In the General Assembly Steering Committee, however, Kenneth Younger of the United Kingdom moved postponement of the issue because of the possibility, by this time increasingly remote, of a peaceful settlement. The Soviet Union seconded the motion on the basis that Tibet had been a part of China for centuries. Here again was the traditional Han philosophy reasserting itself. The Indian delegate, Jam Sahib of Nawanagar, also supported the motion and assured the committee that the Chinese forces had "ceased to

40. ibid.
42. Ibid.
advance after the fall of Chamdo, 480 km. from Lhasa” and that “the Indian Government is certain that the Tibetan question would be settled by peaceful means.” The Steering Committee voted to postpone the motion for discussion of the issue.

In Tibet, on December 21, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa for Gyantse. He later went to Yatung near the Indian border. Tibetan forces continued their futile opposition to their Chinese adversaries. In the spring of 1951 the Dalai Lama decided to attempt to make the best of an already miserable situation and in April a delegation was dispatched to Peking. Talks began on April 29 and lasted until May 21. On May 23 Peking announced that a resolution called Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet between the Central People’s Government and the Tibet Local Government had been concluded. The Dalai Lama did not deny that he had confirmed the treaty, but he indicated that the delegates had signed under unmistakably threatening circumstances and had been forced to affix an official seal that had been forged in Peking.

The 17-Point Agreement is significant in that it not only ended the de facto era of Tibetan independence, but gave a clear indication of China’s true nationalities and minorities doctrine. Its major provisions, briefly, were as follows:

(1) Tibet was recognized as part of China and was to return “to the big family of the motherland—the People’s Republic of China.” The opening sentence of the Agreement describes the Tibetans as “one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of China.”

44. Ibid.
49. The full text of the agreement may be found in: The Question of Tibet and Rule of Law (Geneva, the International Commission of Jurists, 1959).
50. Ibid., p. 139.
(2) China was to conduct all foreign relations and defense.  

(3) Tibetan monasteries were to be protected.

(4) A Military Area Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army and a military-administrative committee were to be established in Tibet. The Dalai Lama came very close to leaving Tibet for sanctuary in India rather than return and rule in the context of this agreement. The military stipulations of the agreement were particularly obnoxious to him and he had been desirous of avoiding a military occupation.

(5) Tibetan autonomy was recognized. In view of provision four, however, this was to be little more than an empty facade.

(6) The Panchen Lama was to be established in his traditional role.

(7) The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetans were to be respected.

(8) Reforms were to be introduced in Tibet only with the consent of officials of the Tibetan Local Government upon request of the people. This facade would, of course, be used as a cover for Chinese cultural penetration and reforms.

(9) The Tibetan Local Government was to assist the People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet and consolidate national defense.

(10) The Tibetan Local Government was to assist the People's Liberation Army in the purchase and transport of food, fodder and other necessities.

54. At this point in time the Panchen was in exile in China. This was a major concession since the Tibetan Government had heretofore not recognized him as a true reincarnation of the ninth Panchen. Under the provisions of the Agreement he was accorded full status. His return would also provide a control on the Dalai Lama and would remain as a reminder of an alternative figurehead should the Dalai Lama prove, as expected, to be uncooperative.
(11) The Tibetan Army was to be integrated with the People’s Liberation Army.  

(12) The Tibetan Local Government agreed, in principle, to a program of future socio-economic reform and promised to rid Tibet of “all imperialist influences.”

Events in the years following this Agreement were most consistent with China’s historical approach to its borders—the desire for territorial gain and the ancient Han obsession with the security of the heartland of China.

For India the significance would also be great. Curzon had long ago seen the value of a buffer state in the context of geographical realism. Such a buffer could play both a defensive and offensive role. To the British the Himalayan regions were a strong inner line of defense protected by Tibet as a buffer to imperial Chinese and Russian designs on their Indian Empire. The Chinese today see the Himalayan region as an outer line of defense necessary for the protection of Tibet. It would, offensively speaking, also be quite possible to use a buffer as an area to be crossed without giving the alarm of invasion plans. The 1962 Chinese invasion of India was to be such a case.

The Tibetan invasion strained Indo-Sinic relations a great deal during late 1950 and 1951. In October of 1951 the Chinese Mission in Lhasa issued a manifest, apparently in almost total disregard of the May 1951 Agreement, describing a series of broad economic and military reforms that were to be undertaken. All property of Tibetan nobles and officials above a small minimum was to be confiscated. A “cultural department” was to be opened to indoctrinate Tibetans in Marxist philosophy. A printing press and radio station were to be created in Lhasa to disseminate propaganda and, finally, the equal status of women was soon to be proclaimed.

57. See Chapter 1 of this research for details of Curzon’s Tibetan policies during the period 1899-1905.
58. George Ginsburg and Michael Mathos, “Tibet’s Administration in the
Thus China began her plan to integrate Tibet into the P.R.C. A policy of moderation was generally followed in the early stages to win support from the masses. Seizure of mortgaged landholding of peasants for non-payment of debts was, for example, prohibited. The accumulated grain and money debts of peasants was cut in half and taxes were reduced. 59

Integration of the armed forces with the P.L.A. was quite rapid. Early in 1952, the Chinese General Chang Kuo-hua was appointed as commander of the Tibetan Military District. Two Tibetans were named as assistants, but all other high ranking officers were Chinese. Military headquarters announced, in February 1952, that integration of the armies had been successfully completed. 60

Since one of the chief aims of the P.R.C. in Tibet was to eliminate all foreign influences there, the Government of India, by virtue of the trade and communication privileges she had inherited from the British Indian Empire, again became involved in Tibetan relations with China.

Negotiations were begun in Peking in late December 1953. While it was expected that these would be of a brief nature, they went on for some four months mostly over the issue of repeated Chinese demands for matching India's trade agencies in Gartok, Gyantze and Yatung with Chinese agencies although China wanted to show that "... India cannot inherit the traditions left behind in Tibet by British imperialism." 61 China finally agreed to offices in New Delhi and Calcutta.

Finally, on April 29, 1954, the Republic of India and the P.R.C. concluded an "Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India"


59. Ibid., p. 176.
60. Ibid., p. 172.
61. Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations, No. 1, P. 22
which enunciated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and regulated trade relations. In notes exchanged the same day of the Agreement's conclusion, India abrogated most of her British-inherited rights in "Tibet Region of China." The major provisions of the notes provided that:

1. India would withdraw its military escorts at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet within six months;
2. India would turn over its postal, telegraph and public telephone services together with their equipment in Tibet to the P.R.C. "at a reasonable cost;"
3. India would turn over its twelve rest houses in Tibet to the P.R.C. "at a reasonable cost;"
4. China would allow India to retain all buildings within the compound walls of the Indian Trade Agencies at Yatung and Gyantse and would continue to lease the land on which the buildings were constructed;
5. India would allow Trade Agencies of the P.R.C. to lease land at Kalimpong and Calcutta;
6. India and China would both render assistance to trade agencies of the other to acquire housing at New Delhi and Gartok respectively;
7. India would return all lands used or occupied in Tibet other than land within the Trade Agency compound walls at Yatung to the P.R.C.: 
8. China would contract leases with India or Indian traders if stores or buildings had been constructed on the above-mentioned land; 
9. Trade Agents of both nations would have access to their nationals involved in civil or criminal cases; 
10. Hospitals of the Indian Trade Agencies at Tyantse and Yatung would continue to serve the personnel of the Agencies;
11. China would construct rest houses for pilgrims

63. Ibid., Exchanged, pp. 102-105.
along two routes to Manam Tso while India would place "all possible facilities at the disposal of pilgrims," and

(12) Each nation would protect the property and persons of traders and pilgrims in the other country. 64

In the Agreement itself the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panch Sheela) were declared in the preamble. 65 Article I provided for P.R.C. Trade Agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong and for similar Indian facilities at Yatung, Tyantse and Gartok. Article II provided for the opening of various markets in Tibet and India for Indian and Chinese trade. Article III provided for pilgrimages to and from Tibet. Article IV provided for routes for such pilgrimages. Article V provided that diplomatic personnel, officials and nationals of both nations travelling across the border were required to hold passports issued by their own government and visaed by the other government except for certain specified exceptions. 66

The Agreement was ratified by the governments of both nations on June 3, 1954. 67

Three very significant points should be noted about the Agreement, for these were to have a great bearing on the future course of Indo-Sinic border relations, in particular, and foreign relations, in general. The Agreement included no stipulation regarding Chinese sovereignty or suzerainty in Tibet. It did, however, both in title and consistently in the text refer to the "Tibet Region of China," thereby de facto recognizing it as an integral part of the P.R.C. This was a marked departure from the old British position, and Prime Minister Nehru, in defending the Agreement against critics in Parliament, noted that "these treaties and maps". 68 were

64. Ibid., pp. 102-193.
65. Ibid., Agreement, p. 98. The principles are as follows: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence.
67. Ibid., p. 106.
68. These are obvious references to the 1914 Simla Convention, to the attached maps and to the "McMahon Line."
all prepared by British Imperialists!" \(^{69}\) Recognition of Tibet as the "Tibet Region of China" also implied China's right to conclude treaties in its behalf.

Secondly, the Agreement was not of a permanent nature, but was to continue in force for a period of eight years from the date of its ratification. Thus, unless renegotiated, it would expire on June 3, 1962. Events long before that date indicated just how hollow the Agreement really was in reality. Finally and to this author a most important feature was a serious omission in the Agreement. No mention of the border between the two nations was made. Panch Sheela was truly born with "feet of clay" as the research on the period 1954–1963, in the chapters to follow, will amply demonstrate.

\(^{69}\) Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations, No. 1, Apx. IV. p. XX.
Panch Sheela was indeed soon tested, for on July 17, 1954, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs received a relatively cordial note from the Counsellor of China in India objecting to the entry of some 30 Indian troops into “Wu-Je of the Ali Area of the Tibet Region of China.” The note stated that it hoped the Indian Government would promptly investigate the matter and order the withdrawal of the troops. “We shall appreciate it,” the note concluded, “if you will let us know at the earliest opportunity the result of steps which you are to take in the above matter.”

Thus, the actual military nature of the Sino-Indian border dispute over the Tibetan frontiers officially began. From then through January 1959, some 25 notes were exchanged concerning half-a-dozen areas of dispute. This first note was one of cordiality compared with subsequent notes which, as incidents became more frequent, as casualties on both sides resulted, and as the intransigence of both sides continued, became increasingly bitter and derogatory.

Communist China’s attitude toward Tibet and India was to be much the same as that of the Imperial Manchus—a factor that might have provided India with a body of

experience with which to judge Chinese actions. The actions of Chang Yin-tang more than fifty years ago was very much the same as those of the PRC in the era under consideration. Just as the British had refused to aid the Dalai Lama in 1910, despite repeated Chinese violations of both the 1904 Anglo-Tibetan Convention and the Trade Regulations of 1908, so Nehru, some forty-four years later, adopted a similar point of view and noted that India's posture reflected a "recognition of the existing situation there [in Tibet]." 3

In returning to the actual dispute, the Government of India replied to the Chinese note of July 17 on August 17. "As previously mentioned to the Chinese Counsellor," the Indian note began, "our further investigations have confirmed that the allegation is entirely incorrect. A party of our Border Security Force is encamped in the Hoti Plain which is southeast of Niti Pass and is in Indian territory." The note specifically denied that any Indian personnel had crossed north of the Niti Pass. 4

India, however, raised a counter-charge. "We have received reports that some of Tibetan officials tried to cross into our territory in the Hoti Plain," the note stated, "and it is requested that such entry without proper documents is not in conformity with the Agreement signed between India and China ... . It is hoped that the Government of China will instruct the local authorities in Tibet not to cross into Indian territory as we have instructed our authorities not to cross into Tibetan Territory." 5 Chinese claims and intrusions continued from this period until such incidents escalated into a full-scale boundary war in late 1962.

In October of 1954, Premier Chou En-lai visited India. 6 During Chou's visit, Prime Minister Nehru discussed various maps published in China which showed large parts of India as Chinese territory. The reply of the Chinese Premier was

3. Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations, No. 1, Apx. 1, p. XViii.
5. Ibid.
simply that the maps were based upon old maps and that the P.R.C. had not yet had time to correct them.\textsuperscript{7}

On October 14, 1954, a trade agreement was concluded in New Delhi between Kung Yuan and H.V.R. Iengar on behalf of the Government of India and China. It was to remain in effect for a period of two years, beginning on the date of its conclusion,\textsuperscript{8} but was later extended for a further period ending December 31, 1958.\textsuperscript{9}

In extending the period during which the agreement was to be in force, India and China agreed to amend Article VII regarding trade policies. As amended, payments were to be effected in Indian rupees only. Both the Bank of China “and/or other commercial banks in China” would open accounts with commercial banks in India.\textsuperscript{10} On May 25, 1959, the agreement was extended for a second time for a period ending December 31, 1959.\textsuperscript{11}

During the first 15 months after the conclusion of the agreement in 1954, China’s imports from India increased 650 per cent and China’s exports to India increased 350 per cent, according to the New China News Agency on January 17, 1956.\textsuperscript{12}

On December 15, 1955, the P.R.C. offered to export 60,000 tons of steel to India. This offer, however, coincided with the U.S.S.R.’s promise to deliver 1,000,000 tons of steel to India in the next three years.\textsuperscript{13}

The Bandung Conference held in April 1955 marked a peak in cordial Sino-Indian relations. Both Nehru and Chou En-lai played leading roles at the Conference. Practically all Indian circles and journals praised Chou’s role very highly. From then until March 1959, when the Tibetan Revolution erupted, cordial relations were maintained. Although con-

\textsuperscript{7} White Paper I. pp. 46-47.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., p. 110.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., p. 123.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., pp. 123-25.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., pp. 128-29.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
GROWING DISILLUSIONMENT ALONG THE BORDER: 1954–1959

Disputes developed. they were not made known to the public and the slogan "Hindi Chinni Bhai Bhai" (Indians and Chinese are brothers) continued to be popular throughout India until early 1959.14

This period of 1955–59 witnessed the beginnings of constitutional government as well as mounting Sino-Indian rivalry in Nepal. In 1955 King Mahendra had succeeded to the Nepalese throne at the age of 35 after the death of his father. The young king personally edited the first constitution of the country and consented to the nation's first elections. On August 1, 1955 a treaty was concluded at Kathmandu between Nepal and the P.R.C. The principles of Panch Sheela were reiterated in this treaty. Tibet was recognized as an integral part of China and provision was made for exchange of ambassadors. However, for the time being, these ambassadors were accredited to New Delhi as India desired.15

After the signing of this treaty, China began a propaganda campaign for Nepalese friendship.16 China began to offer economic aid and gifts. She began to suggest official visits and invited Nepalese peasants to Peiping for “peace” and “democratic” conferences. These propaganda activities were offset, at least partially, however, by Chinese actions in Tibet in 1959 and by various border incidents as well as by difficulties encountered by Nepalese traders in Tibet.17

On September 21, 1956, after secret negotiations in Kathmandu, another agreement was concluded between Nepal and China. Nepal was to be allowed to establish three trade agencies in Tibet in exchange for three Chinese agencies in Nepal. Personnel at these agencies were to enjoy full diplomatic immunity. Nepalese and Chinese traders were to be allowed to trade in four cities of Tibet and Nepal respectively. Border trade and pilgrimages were to be

16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 244.
allowed to continue. In notes exchanged at the time of the agreement's conclusion, Nepal was granted the right to establish a consulate-general at Lhasa and China was to be allowed to do the same at Kathmandu. Nepal was to withdraw its military escorts from Tibet. Finally, the notes eliminated the extra-territorial rights and tax exemptions enjoyed by Nepalese in Tibet. 18

This agreement and the notes accompanying it were quite disconcerting to the Indian Government. The Chinese had succeeded in circumventing the Indian position by sending several officers of diplomatic standing into Nepal and thereby establishing direct means of communication and influence in Nepal. 19 In so doing, the Chinese had opened up a new phase of Nepali foreign policy by renewing the historical policy of playing off China against India. 20

In October 1957 Nepal's Prime Minister Tanka Prasad visited Peiping. While there he was presented with a promised gift of 60,000,000 Indian rupees as a contribution to Nepal's Five-Year Plan. No technical assistance accompanied the gift, however, because, as Chou En-lai supposedly said, India is technically more advanced than China and, thus, India was the place to go for technical assistance. 21

In January 1957 Chou returned Prime Minister Prasad's visit. He was given a most cordial reception in Nepal, especially by the young intellectuals. He brought with him 10,000,000 rupees as a first instalment of the gift promised the previous October, but refused to make any guarantees about the Nepali-Tibetan border. Nepalese officials accepted the gift with gratitude but also uneasiness about possible ulterior motives behind the gift. Chinese aid, one Nepalese official commented, is "no nectar from heaven." 22

In Tibet in 1956 the P.R.C. apparently decided not to

18. Ibid., pp. 244-45.
19. Ibid., p. 245.
22. Ibid., p. 246.
further postpone the region's total integration with China. Large-scale programs of education and indoctrination by imported Chinese teachers and officials were inaugurated. Tibetan youths were encouraged to enroll in institutions for national minorities in China. Chinese banks and trading corporations began to exercise greater control over the Tibetan economy. Tibetan producers, merchants, and consumers were made increasingly dependent upon Chinese imports and outlets. Discriminatory fiscal policies were introduced to win popularity with labourers and to undermine the economic position of Tibetan monasteries and nobility: The influx of Chinese into Tibet increased to "threatening proportions." The Chinese began interfering with the Tibetan administration, introducing Chinese law, bureaucrats, and practices.  

On March 9, 1955 the State Council of the P.R.C. adopted a resolution creating Preparatory Committee for Tibet. Regional autonomy as envisaged by the 1954 Constitution of the P.R.C. was not bestowed upon Tibet as it subsequently was upon Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia where communism was relatively secure. Tibet was considered the most backward area on the Chinese mainland and, thus, deemed not ready for autonomy. Therefore, the Preparatory Committee was established to lay the groundwork.  

The purpose of the Committee was to set up the Government of a Tibet Autonomous Region. The Dalai Lama was appointed chairman of the Committee with the Panchen Lama as first vice-chairman and the Chinese Commander-in-Chief in Tibet, General Chang Kuo-hua, as second vice-chairman. In spite of its apparent autonomy, the Committee was in actuality completely subordinate to the wishes of the Central Government. Its establishment

negated all exercise of regional autonomy. "The traditional existence of the traditional organs of theocratic rule," Ginsburg states, "was tolerated by Peking only as a useful fiction serving to mask the real centers of power." 26

In October of 1957, the 740-mile-long Sinkiang Road, the world's highest motor road, was completed. Its significance for the trading practices of Tibet was revolutionary. The traders of Western Tibet were traditionally linked commercially with the Indian subcontinent, particularly with Kashmir, while Gartok on the upper reaches of the Indus River and the traditional trade communications center of the region was located at the terminal point of the new road. The result of the road's construction was that Tibet's trade was forced northward and eastward rather than southward and westward.

Greater Chinese pressures incited increased resistance from Tibetans. Throughout the 1956-58 period, there were periodic flareups of violence and sporadic armed uprisings. 28

At the same time, China began armed incursions and encroachment into and occupation of scattered districts in Northern Burma, Northern India and the smaller border states. These "periodic fits of aggressiveness," Ginsburg says, "seemed to be linked with the continuing deterioration of China's domestic situation." 29 They served to preclude receipt of foreign aid by dissident elements in China, to demonstrate the power of China's displeasure with any deviation from an attitude of friendliness for Peking, and cut off avenues of escape and infiltration from Tibet and China. 30

Although border incidents between India and China were not made public until 1959, they served to infect official Sino-Indian relations with a spirit of animosity. As a result of these border incidents, Sino-Indian relations deteriorated steadily and provoked caustic statements of outrage from

29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., pp. 348-349.
Indian leaders which would have been undreamed of at the conclusion of the April 1954 Agreement.

On June 28, 1955 the Indian Government dispatched a note to the Chinese Counsellor in India charging that a party of Chinese with five tents and 20 horses were camping at Hoti and had entered Indian territory without proper documents. "We would like to emphasize that such violation of our territory is not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly coexistence between India and China," the Indian note stated in requesting the withdrawal of the Chinese troops.\(^3^1\)

On July 11 the Chinese Counsellor replied to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. The Chinese note stated, "We wish to point out that the Chinese Government has time and again instructed the personnel of the frontier garrison not to move a single step beyond the Chinese border. . . Our investigations have confirmed that . . . there never has been any case of Chinese personnel crossing the border in the vicinity of the Niti Pass." (Niti Pass is located very near Hoti.) The Chinese note raised the counter-charge, however, that a group of more than 30 Indian soldiers had entered the Wu-Je area of Tibet on June 25 and had begun constructing fortifications "very near to our garrison forces stationing there." \(^3^2\)

A new incident arose in August 1955 and the Indian note on the subject on August 18 assumed a new tone of command. A Tibetan official named Sarji and Chinese troops, the Indian note complained, were camped at Bare Hoti on the Hoti Plain and had been collecting a grazing tax from Indian herdsmen grazing goats in the area. "This is a new development," India asserted, "which we would request the Chinese authorities to stop forthwith." \(^3^3\)

The Chinese Counsellor replied on September 26 denying the Indian charge. "Since no Chinese personnel has

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crossed the border, there could not have been such a situation as stated in your informal note of 18 August 1955, the Chinese note stated. The note also reiterated its objection that the Indian troops had intruded into Wu-je and "are incessantly carrying out reconnaissance activities on the Chinese Garrison." Wu-je, the note asserted, "has always belonged to Dabatsing of the Tibet Region." 34

The Indian reply of November 5 apparently reflects a suspicion on the part of India that the two governments were involved in areas the exact geographical locations of which were unknown to the other. "We are quite definite that our personnel have at no time intruded into the Wu-Je area. . . but have remained at Bara Hoti which is two miles south of the Tunjun La," the Indian note asserted. The note also referred to the Tunjun La as "the border pass" and mentioned that "Wu-Je was stated by Mr. Kang to be 12 kilometers north of this Pass." 35

On the same day, the Indian Government dispatched a second note to the Chinese Counsellor in which it related the first incident in which Indian and Chinese troops had openly encountered each other in a disputed area. The note stated:

On 15th September as our detachment from Hoti Plain in India was approaching Damzan, which is 10 miles south of the Niti Pass and in Indian territory, they were stopped by 20 Chinese soldiers who were trespassing on Indian territory. These Chinese soldiers sent a message to our detachment that it could not go via Damzan unless it got permission from the Chinese authorities at Gartok. Our detachment insisted on going via Damzan and told them that they were passing through Indian territory. They made it clear that if the Chinese party used force to stop our detachment from going through Indian territory they would be responsible for the consequences. The situation was such as might have led to a serious clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers but for the great restraint exercised by our detachment. The Chinese soldiers did not try to stop our detachment

34. Ibid., p. 8.
35. Ibid., p. 9.
but wanted to remain on the Indian territory at Damzan without due and proper permission from us.

We must point out that Damzan is clearly within Indian territory. It is situated at Longitude 79.51°—latitude 30.49° and is 10 miles south of the Niti Pass which has been recognized by the Sino-Indian Agreement of 29th April 1954 as the border pass between the two countries in this region.  

The Indian note concluded with a warning that "Incidents such as these may have grave consequences" and requested that action be taken against the Chinese troops involved.  

During 1956 border incidents continued and began to assume more dangerous characteristics. On May 2, 1956 the Indian Government dispatched a note to the Chinese Counsellor in India objecting to new movements of Chinese troops in territory claimed by India and enunciating for the first time the word "protest." According to the note, 12 Chinese troops, including one officer, had been seen half a mile east of Nilang on April 28. The Chinese were equipped with tommy and sten guns and telescopes.  

"We assume that movement of the Chinese troops into our territory is due to ignorance," the Indian note stated. "If, however, it is under instructions from higher authorities we wish to lodge a protest against this clear violation of the Sino-Indian Agreement of 29th April 1954... We wish to point out that failure of immediate withdrawal of the Chinese troops may lead to serious incidents which would mar the friendly relations between India and China."  

In March 1956 the Chinese began construction of a highway through the Aksaichin part of Ladakh in Northeastern Jammu and Kashmir. The road through Aksaichin constituted a section of the highway linking Gartok in Western Tibet with Rudok in Sinkiang, where it connected with roads leading to Outer Mongolia and the U.S.S.R.

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36. Ibid., p. 10.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 11.
39. Ibid.
In making possible the orderly transportation of men and material from Sinkiang to Ladakh, the Chinese gained a strategic advantage over the Indians of great significance. In Sinkiang, the Chinese built a military position second in strength only to that of Manchuria.

On June 8, 1956, the Chinese Foreign Office delivered a note to the Counsellor of India asserting that the Tunjun La was not a border pass, as India had claimed but was "proven to be within Chinese jurisdiction." The note stated China's willingness to "continue consultations with the Indian Government with regard to the method" for a joint investigation of the Wu-je dispute and suggested that, pending settlement of the dispute, "both Governments should refrain from sending troops into the Wu-Je area so as to avoid a situation in which the troops of the two countries confront each other."

On July 26, 1956 the Foreign Office of China dispatched a second note to India regarding neutralization of the Wu-je area. "With a view to facilitating the settlement of the Wu-je question," the Chinese note stated, "the Chinese Government has not sent its frontier garrisons into the Wu-je area." It stated that India had sent troops into the area and had not yet replied to its proposal for neutralization of the area.

In connection with the proposed joint investigation of the dispute, the note expressed its "pleasure" at the fact that R.K. Nehru, Indian Ambassador to China, had agreed on behalf of the Indian Government to conduct a joint investigation. However, it disputed the investigative procedure suggested by India. According to R.K. Nehru, the note said, Kang Mao-chao, former Counsellor of China in India, and T.N. Kaul, Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had agreed in 1955 conferences that Tunjun La was a border pass. Thus, R.K. Nehru had contended that the joint investigation should be limited to discovering whether Wu-Je or Bara Hoti lay north or south of the Tunjun La.

40. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
41. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
However, the Chinese note asserted, "there is no historical record showing Tunjun La to be a border pass between China and India. Hence any disputation about Wu-Je being in Chinese territory cannot be based on the ground that Wu-Je is to the south of Tunjun La." 42

It was not until October 3, 1956 that the Indian Government replied to the Chinese note. In its reply, the Government of India stated:

The district of Garhwal, in which Barahoti is situated, is, and always has been, a part of India; The historical evidence to support this goes back for many centuries; By possession and usage also Barahoti is, and always has been, part of India and Tunjun La is, and always has been the border pass... In view, however, of the mutual desire of the Governments of India and China to settle this problem peacefully and avoid any kind of clash, the Government of India agree that it would assist toward the expedition of a friendly settlement if both Governments refrain from sending troops into this area. As desired by the Government of China, the Government of India will accordingly issue the necessary order, on the understanding that the Government of China will do likewise. 43

In September 1956 a new area of dispute, Shipki Pass in Uttar Pradesh, arose. On September 8, the Indian Government delivered a note verbale to the Chinese Charge d'Affairs in India stating that, on September 1, a group of about 10 Chinese army personnel had crossed Shipki La Pass without visaed passports. They had withdrawn after being informed by the Indian Border Police that they were in Indian territory. "Shipki La Pass has been recognized as the border between India and the Tibet Region of China at that place," the Indian note stated, "by the Sino-Indian Agreement of April 29, 1954." 44

The specific provision of the 1954 Agreement to which the Indian note referred was the first paragraph of Article IV

42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
44. Ibid., p. 17.
which states, "Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route: (1) Shipki La pass, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass, and (6) Pipu Lekh pass." 45

On September 24 in an aide memoire to the Chinese Charge d'Affairs, the Indian Government related two new border incidents near Shipki La pass:

The first of these occurred on the 10th September, when a party of Indian border police on its way to the Shipki La Pass sighted a party of Chinese Military Personnel on the Indian side of the frontier. The Chinese party was commanded by a Captain and consisted of at least ten persons. The Indian patrol signalled the Chinese party to withdraw, but the latter did not do so. Thereupon, on the Indian patrol trying to advance, the Chinese personnel threw stones at it and threatened to use their grenades.

The Chinese Government will no doubt agree that in throwing stones and threatening to use hand grenades, the Chinese patrol offered such provocation as could easily have resulted in serious and regrettable incidents. However, a development even more likely to cause an ugly situation was soon to follow.

On the 20th September ... a party of 27 Indian Border Security Force came face to face with a party of 20 Chinese troops and officers two miles on the Indian side of the Shipki La Pass. The Indian Commanding Officer asked the Chinese Officer to withdraw his troops. The Chinese Officer replied that he had received no further communication from his Government. He added that meanwhile his instructions were clear, namely to patrol right up to Hupsang Khad, and in carrying these out he was prepared to face the consequences. He concluded that if the Indian party went beyond Hupsang Khad he "would oppose it with arms."

The Government of India are pained and surprised at this conduct of the Chinese Commanding Officer. It is not difficult to visualize that the natural and direct result of such attitudes, if continued, may be one of clash of arms.

45. Ibid., p. 99.
In view of the fact that Shipki La Pass is clearly the border and is acknowledged as such in the Sino-Indian Agreement of 29th April 1954, the Government of India consider any crossing of this border pass by armed personnel as aggression which they will resist. Government of India have ordered their Border Security Force not to take any action for the present in repulsing the aggression and to await instructions which they hope the Central People's Government will issue immediately. Government of India have however directed their Border Security Force on no account to retire from their position or to permit Chinese personnel to go beyond where they are even if this involves a clash.46 (Emphasis mine.)

Apparently at this point the dispute reached a stalemate. No further exchange of notes on the subject are recorded in any of the White Papers. Presumably had either India or China ordered its troops to withdraw from the area or had an armed clash occurred there, an official exchange of communications would have reflected the event.

In 1958 the border disputes attracted the attention of communications between Nehru and Chou. Various border incidents of 1958 became provocative and involved, in one case, the capture and detention of several Indian soldiers by Chinese troops. Incidents during this year centered in Ladakh and Bara Hoti.

On July 2, 1958, the Indian Government delivered a note verbale to the Chinese Counsellor in India, charging that Chinese troops had crossed the border into Ladakh and occupied the Khurnak Fort. “The Government of India are concerned,” the note stated, “at the report of the violation of the Indian frontier. They would not like to believe that unilateral action has been taken by the Government of People's Republic of China with whom their relations are of the friendliest to enforce alleged territorial claims in the region.” 47

The note also made reference to a 1924 conference held between representatives of Kashmir and Tibet regarding the
boundary between them. Although the Indian Government conceded that no conclusion had been reached at the conference, it added, "It may, however, be mentioned that even during these discussions, the jurisdiction of India over the Khurnak Fort was never disputed. Discussions took place in regard to the international boundary which was further north of the Fort. No claim has ever been affirmed that the Fort formed part of the Tibet Region of China." 48

In conclusion, the Indian note stated, "For the information of the Chinese Government, it may be mentioned that the Government of India propose to send a reconnaissance party to the area with clear instructions that the party remain within the Indian side of the frontier." 49

To this note the Chinese Government made no reply until October 1959, when it reinforced its claims to the area by an armed conflict between Chinese and Indian soldiers near the Hot Springs, a few miles to the northwest of the Khurnak Fort, which resulted in death to at least seven Indian and one Chinese soldiers. Following this incident, the Chinese Government sent a belated reply asserting its claims in Ladakh to be the entire area north, east, and south of Kongka Pass. 50

In making this claim in 1959, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China asserted as justification for its claims that the boundary line between China and Ladakh "is clearly marked on maps published in China." 51 This was a curious deviation from its previous statements regarding the validity of Chinese maps. In July of 1958 China Pictorial had published a map showing as parts of China four of India's five divisions of the North-East Frontier Agency, some areas in the Northern part of Uttar Pradesh, large parts of Ladakh,
the entire Tashigang area of Eastern Bhutan and a considerable part of Northwestern Bhutan. 52

On August 21, 1958, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs dispatched a note to the Chinese Counsellor in India objecting to the “clear inaccuracies” of the map in China Pictorial which, it noted, was printed in an official press and distributed by an official agency. The Indian note commented that, “In the past, similar inaccurate maps have been published in China” and stated:

The matter was referred to his Excellency Premier Chou En-lai by His Excellency the Prime Minister of India when the latter visited China in 1954. His Excellency Chou En-lai had at that time replied that current Chinese maps were based on old maps and that the Government of the People’s Republic of China had had no time to correct them. The Government of India recognize the force of this statement. Since, however, the present government of the People’s Republic of China has now been in office for so many years and new maps are being repeatedly printed and published in China, the Government of India would suggest the necessary corrections in the Chinese maps should not be delayed further. 53

In its reply of November 3, 1958, the Chinese Government confirmed the statements made by Chou on the subject. The Foreign Office itself reiterated the assertion that the maps were simply reproductions of old maps and described the map in China Pictorial as simply a “rough sketch.” In its memorandum to the Counsellor of India, the Foreign Office of China stated:

In the maps currently published in China, the boundary line between China and its neighboring countries, including India, is drawn on the basis of maps published in China before the liberation. This was made clear to His Excellency Prime Minister Nehru by Prime Minister Chou En-lai, when the former visited China in October 1954. Premier Chou En-lai explained then...

52. White Paper I, p. 46.
53. Ibid.
that the reason why the boundary in Chinese maps is
drawn according to old maps is that the Chinese
Government has not yet undertaken a survey of China's
boundary, nor consulted with the countries concerned,
and that it will not make changes in the boundary on its
own. 54

The map in China Pictorial and the Chinese memoran-
dum apparently prompted Prime Minister Nehru to write
Chou En-lai on the subject on December 14, 1958. In this
letter, Nehru also referred to their 1956 discussion of
Chinese maps. "You were good enough to reply to me that
these maps were really reproductions of old-preliberation
maps," Nehru stated, "and that you had no time to revise
them." 55

Nehru made specific reference to the Chinese memora-
dum regarding the map in China Pictorial and the
Chinese statement regarding boundary surveys and consul-
tations. In reference to this, Nehru stated:

I was puzzled by this reply because I thought that there
was no major boundary dispute between China and
India .... I could understand four years ago that the
Chinese Government, being busy with major matters of
national reconstruction, could not find time to revise old
maps. But you will appreciate that nine years after the
Chinese People's Republic came into power, the contin-
ued issue of the incorrect maps is embarrassing to us as
to others. There can be no question of these large areas
of India being anything but India and there is no
dispute about them. I do not know what kind of surveys
can affect these well-known and fixed boundaries. 56

Perhaps of greater significance than Chou's statements
that the Chinese maps were only reproductions of old maps
had been his statements to Nehru regarding the McMahon
Line. Nehru noted in his letter to Chou that, during the
latter's visit to India in 1956, they had discussed the
McMahon Line. "I remember your telling me that you did

54. Ibid., p. 47.
55. Ibid., p. 49.
56. Ibid., p. 51.
not approve of this border being called the MacMahon Line and I replied that I did not like that name either. But for facility of reference we referred to it as such.” 57 Nehru reminded him of his statements at that time:

You told me then that you had accepted this MacMahon Line border with Burma and, whatever might have happened long ago, in view of the friendly relations which existed between China and India, you proposed to recognize this border with India also. You added that you would like to consult the authorities of the Tibetan region of China and you proposed to do so.

Immediately after our talk, I had written a minute so that we might have a record of this talk for our personal and confidential use. I am giving below a quotation from this minute:

“Premier Chou referred to the MacMahon Line and again said that he had never heard of this before though of course the then Chinese Government had dealt with this matter and not accepted that line. He had gone into this matter in connection with the border dispute with Burma. Although he thought that this line, established by British Imperialists, was not fair, nevertheless, because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, namely India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to this MacMahon Line. They had, however, not consulted the Tibetan authorities about it yet. They proposed to do so.” 58

On January 23, 1959, Premier Chou En-lai replied to Prime Minister Nehru’s letter. In his reply, Chou made no attempt to rationalize his 1956 statements to Nehru but specifically disclaimed the validity of the McMahon Line. In his letter Chou stated.

First of all, I wish to point out that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited. Historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boun-

57. Ibid., p. 49.
58. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
dary has ever been concluded between the Chinese Central Government and the Indian Government. So far as the actual situation is concerned, there are certain differences between the two sides over the boundary question. In the past few years, questions as to which side certain areas on the Sino-Indian border belong were on more than one occasion taken up between the Chinese and the Indian sides through diplomatic channels. . . . . All this shows that border disputes do exist between China and India. 59

Chou also dismissed the McMahon Line as "a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China." He asserted that it "aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people" and that "It cannot be considered legal." He reminded Nehru that it had never been recognized by the Chinese Central Government and asserted that "The Tibet local authorities were in fact dissatisfied with this unilaterally drawn line." 60

Chou also took note of the fact that China had not raised any question of any boundary dispute during the 1954 negotiations between India and China which culminated in the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India. They were not raised at that time, Chou said, "because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement and the Chinese side, on its part, had no time to study the question." 61

In the summer of 1958, the Wu-Je area again became the subject of intergovernmental protestations. On August 2, the Chinese Counsellor in India delivered a note to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs protesting the entry of more than 20 Indian personnel equipped with arms and wireless communications apparatus into Wu-je. "They said", the note stated, "they were sent there by the Government of India to keep watch over the place." The note concluded with the statement that "The Chinese Government cannot but lodge a protest and demands that the above-mentioned

59. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
60. Ibid., p. 53.
61. Ibid.
Indian personnel withdraw immediately from China's territory Wu-Je.” 62

Six days later, the Indian Ministry replied to the Chinese note. In its note, the Indian Government conveyed a definite implication that, in referring to Wu-Je and Barahoti, the Chinese and Indian Governments were referring to a single geographical location. The Indian note stated explicitly that it was replying to the August 2 Chinese note regarding Wu-Je and in the same sentence proceeded to state that “it is a fact that a team of civilian revenue officials consisting of 21 persons sent by the Government of Uttar Pradesh have been camping in Barahoti since 8th July 1958 in connection with normal revenue settlement operations.” 63

The remainder of the Indian note discoursed upon the activities and equipment of this Indian team in Barahoti. No mention of Wu-Je by that name was made until the concluding paragraph, where it was stated that “The facts stated above furnish no support for the suggestion in the Chinese note that the Government of India are ‘attempting to change the existing situation of Wu-Je and to create a new dispute’. 64

The Indian revenue officials had every right to be in Barahoti, the Indian note asserted. It reminded the Chinese Government that on April 19, 1958, during a series of discussions in New Delhi, the Indian Foreign Minister had suggested to the Chinese Ambassador that, during the negotiations, the civil authorities of both nations should refrain from sending officers into Barahoti. The Indian Foreign Minister had pointed out, the note said, that attempts to exercise civilian control over the area would only lead to counter-attempts to do so by the other side. Fu Hao, however, had informed Shri B.K. Acharya that such an agreement was unnecessary. To this, Acharya had replied

62. Ibid., pp. 23.
63. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
64. Ibid., p. 25.
that the Indian Government would have no alternative but to send civilian authorities into the area.\textsuperscript{65}

The P.R.C. had dispatched civilian authorities into Barahoti on June 29, the Indian note stated. "The Government of India, therefore, had no option but to instruct the Government of Uttar Pradesh to send their civil officials also to the area." \textsuperscript{66}

As for the Indian officials carrying arms into the area, the note stated, "The information of the Government of India is that the Indian team of revenue officials is not carrying with it any arms like rifles and revolvers normally carried by members of the armed forces." However, it mentioned, they may be carrying weapons such as shotguns for protection against wild animals and taunted, "Government of India would be glad to receive information from the Embassy of the People's Republic of China as to whether the Chinese officials in Barahoti are carrying any arms with them or not." \textsuperscript{67}

On December 10, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs informed the Chinese Government that the only arms carried by the Indian revenue officials had indeed been only three shotguns for protection against wild animals, but these guns had been subsequently withdrawn. The Indian party had left Barahoti on September 9, but, immediately after their departure, a Chinese party carrying arms and ammunition had entered the area. Furthermore, the Indian note charged, 25 fully-armed Chinese military personnel had entered Barahoti to reinforce the Chinese already present there and had brought with them "considerable building materials like lime, beam, timber etc. which seemed to indicate that the Chinese intended to construct permanent or semi-permanent structures in Barahoti." \textsuperscript{68}

In October the center of the border dispute shifted to Ladakh. On October 18, the Indian Foreign Secretary

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 24.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Ibid., p. 25.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Ibid., pp. 30-31.
\end{itemize}
dispatched an informal note to the Chinese Ambassador protesting the construction of a highway through Ladakh which, he said, "seems to form part of the Chinese road known as Yehcheng-Gartok road or Sinkiang-Tibet highway the completion of which was announced in September 1957." "It is a matter of surprise and regret," the Indian note admonished, "that the Chinese Government should have constructed a road through indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of the Government of India and without even informing the Government of India." 69

The Indian note asserted that "The India-China boundary in the Ladakh sector as in others is traditionally well-known and follows well-marked geographical features." It stated that "the 'old established frontiers' have been accepted by the Chinese in a Treaty of 1842 as the international boundary. In an official communication, a Chinese member of the Boundary Commission of 1847-49 accepted the boundary as 'sufficiently and distinctly fixed so that it will be best to adhere to this ancient arrangement'." Furthermore, the Indian note asserted. Indian survey parties have visited the region across which the Chinese highway was built since the nineteenth century. travellers to the area have referred to it as Ladakh. and atlases e.g. Johnston's Atlas of India of 1894. and maps published by the Survey of India show the region to be part of Ladakh. 70

In its concluding paragraph, the Indian note informed the Chinese. almost as an after-thought. that an Indian party of three military officers, four soldiers, and eight civilians on "a normal patrol in this area near Shinglung" had been missing since the end of August in spite of search by air. "Since there are not Chinese personnel in this part of Indian territory the Government of India would be grateful for any information that the Chinese Government may have about the party and for any assistance that they may find it possible to give to the party to return to their headquarters." 71

70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., p. 27.
It is difficult to believe that the Indian Government was unaware until October 1958 of the construction of the highway through the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh which had been completed more than a year earlier. It is equally difficult to explain the lengthy delay on the part of the Indian Government in protesting the construction of the highway. It would appear to this writer that the Indian Government was aware of the construction activity but that to protest it would have acknowledged its awareness of this fact and thereby placed India in the uncomfortable position of having to either challenge the Chinese Government or meekly acquiesce to the Chinese demands. Since India was not prepared militarily to “force the moment to its crisis,” it apparently preferred to acquiesce in silence and without drawing attention of its humiliation. However, once the highway was finished and had become a fait accompli, the Government of India could strongly protest the action without having to enforce its protests. Furthermore, for the official record, it was probably desirable for India to officially protest the construction lest its silence be interpreted as agreement to Chinese claims upon the area.

When the party of Indians in Ladakh disappeared in August 1958, it would appear that the Indian Government suspected that they may have been captured by the Chinese in the area. On the one hand, however, it seemed hesitant to suggest this suspicion to the Chinese while, on the other hand, it could hardly request, if their suspicions were correct, their return without acknowledging that Chinese were in the area and without asserting that the area was a part of India. Thus, it would seem that the time was propitious for India to protest the highway construction through Aksai Chin.

The Foreign Office of China replied to the Indian note of October 18 on November 3. The Chinese memorandum reported that two groups of armed Indian personnel including 3 officers, 4 soldiers and 8 employees had been detained by the Sinkiang Frontier Guards on September 8th and 12th at Tahungliutan and Kezrekirekan on the Sinkiang-Tibet
GROWING DISILLUSIONMENT ALONG THE BORDER: 1954-1959

road. These Indians, the memorandum asserted, had been conducting "unlawful surveying activities within Chinese borders." The men would be deported through Karakoram Pass on October 2. The memorandum also objected to "Indian aircraft penetrating deep into the air space over the south-west part of Sinkiang of China to carry on reconnaissance and even circled low over Chinese garrisons." 72

When the Indian Government replied through a note given by its ambassador in China to the Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 8, it did so with obvious irritation. It stated that the Indian Government had informed the Chinese Ambassador of the missing Indians "as early as the 18th October." "Although the Indian party had been arrested for nearly five weeks," it complained, "no information was given to the Government of India and even then it was mentioned to the Counsellor of the Embassy only casually that the arrested persons had been sent across to India on the 22nd October . . . . The action of the Chinese Government in sending the party across the frontier without previous notice exposed the party to grave risks of life particularly in this season and it was only providential that the party could be rescued." 73

As 1958 drew to a close, two new areas of dispute, both of them near Barahoti, became apparent in the notes exchanged between India and China. 74

The year 1959 witnessed the Tibetan Revolution and its violent suppression by the Chinese Communists, the flight of the Dalai Lama across the border to India, Chinese accusations that he had been abducted there and was being held in India under duress, and a renewal of Chinese charges that India was harboring designs upon Tibet. Along the Indo-Sinic border, 1959 witnessed an intensification both in violence and number of border incidents. Border tensions finally erupted into a clash of arms in Ladakh between

72. Ibid., p. 28.
73. Ibid., p. 29.
74. Ibid., p. 32.
Indian and Chinese soldiers. Nine new areas of dispute arose. No fewer than 25 diplomatic communications regarding border incidents were exchanged during this single year, more than had been exchanged on the subject in all five previous years (23) since the first border incident occurred in 1954.

As a result of these factors, Indo-Sinic relations during 1959, already in a state of deterioration in 1958, plunged to a new depth. Bitter invectives and denunciations and acrimonious accusations and counter-accusations pervaded official communications and both the Chinese and Indian presses.

On March 22, 1959, Prime Minister Nehru was again stimulated to address another letter to Premier Chou En-lai regarding the boundary dispute. This letter, like his previous one to the Chinese Premier, was diplomatic and cordial, but a new tone of firmness could be discerned in several of Nehru's statements.

Nehru agreed that the ownership of Barahoti "which you call Wu-Je" should be settled by negotiation. However, he hastened to add that, during previous negotiations, India had "provided extensive documentary proofs that this area has been under Indian jurisdiction and lies well within our frontiers." Thus, Nehru added, "An on-the-spot investigation could hardly throw any useful light until proofs to the contrary could be adduced." He reminded Chou that India had nevertheless proposed that both nations refrain from sending civil or military personnel into the area until the dispute could be settled but that the Chinese Government had refused to accept the proposal. Since then, he had learned that "a material change in the situation had been effected by the despatch of Chinese civil and military detachments, equipped with arms, to camp in the area." If these reports the Indian Government had received about Chinese troops constructing permanent structures in Bara-

hoti during the winter were true, he added, “It would seem that unilateral action, not in accordance with custom, was being taken in assertion of your claim to the disputed area.”

Nehru again brought Chou’s attention to “continuing publication of Chinese maps showing considerable parts of Indian and Bhutanese territory as if they were in China” and stated that this was “a matter of great concern to us.” He then added that India greatly valued friendship with China, but that “It would be most unfortunate if these frontier questions should now affect the friendly relations existing between our countries.”

In his letter to Chou, Nehru also set forth justification for Indian claims that the Indo-Sinic boundary had been clearly established. “It is true that this frontier has not been demarcated on the ground in all the sectors,” Nehru conceded, “but I am somewhat surprised to know that this frontier was not accepted at any time by the Government of China. The traditional frontier, as you may be aware, follows the geographical principle of watershed on the crest of the High Himalayan Range, but apart from this, in most parts, it has the sanction of specific international agreements between the then Governments of India and the Central Government of China.”

Nehru then proceeded to specify the international agreements by which the boundary had been delimited:

It may perhaps be useful if I draw your attention to some of these agreements:

(i) Sikkim.—The boundary of Sikkim, a protectorate of India, with the Tibet Region of China was defined in the Anglo-Chinese Convention 1890 and jointly demarcated on the ground in 1895.

(ii) The Ladakh Region of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.—A treaty of 1842 between Kashmir on the one hand and the Emperor of China and the Lama Guru of Lhasa on the other, mentions the

77. Ibid.
78. Ibid., p. 55.
India-China boundary in the Ladakh region. In 1847 the Chinese Government admitted that this boundary was sufficiently and distinctly fixed. The area now claimed by China has always been depicted as part of India on official maps, has been surveyed by Indian officials and even a Chinese map of 1893 shows it as Indian territory.

(iii) The MacMahon Line.—As you are aware, the so-called MacMahon Line runs eastwards from the eastern borders of Bhutan and defines the boundary of China on the one hand and India and Burma on the other. Contrary to what has been reported to you this line was, in fact, drawn at a Tripartite Conference held at Simla in 1913–1914 between the Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of China, Tibet and India. At the time of acceptance of the delineation of this frontier, Lenchen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary, in letters exchanged, stated explicitly that he had received orders from Lhasa to agree to the boundary as marked on the map appended to the Convention. The line was drawn after full discussion and was confirmed subsequently by a formal exchange of letters: and there is nothing to indicate that the Tibetan authorities were in any way dissatisfied with the agreed boundary. Moreover, although the Chinese Plenipotentiary at the Conference objected to the boundaries between Inner and Outer Tibet and between Tibet and China, there is no mention of any Chinese reservation in respect of the India-Tibet frontier either during the discussions or at the time of their initialling the Convention. This line has the incidental advantage of running along the crest of the High Himalayan Range which forms the natural dividing line between the Tibetan plateau in the north and the sub-montane region in the south. In our previous discussions and particularly during your visit in January 1957, we were gratified to note that you were prepared to accept this line as representing the frontier between China and India in this region and I hope that we shall reach an understanding on this basis.  

79. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
On March 9, Nehru announced before the Indian Parliament that the Chinese had occupied 12,000 square miles of Indian territory. He softened the impact of this announcement, however, by adding that virtually no Indian nationals resided in the occupied territories other than summer shepherds. Then, on April 14 in Madras, Nehru attempted to interpret the significance of the Chinese occupation of Indian territories. "I do not mean to say that our security is now challenged or in immediate danger," he stated. "But we have to think of what might happen also in future."  

In Tibet during the spring of 1959, resistance to Chinese rule was steadily mounting to new heights of intensity. By the end of February, reports were available in greater detail about the rebellion of the Khampa tribesmen against the Chinese. The resistance movement was said to be well-organized and to have the support of many of Tibet's 80,000 monks. The Chinese were said to be planning a large-scale counter offensive and reports of Tibetan disturbances were confirmed by the Prime Minister of Bhutan upon his visit to New Delhi during the first week in March.

On March 10, according to the Dalai Lama, fear for the safety of the Dalai Lama erupted into demonstrations around the Dalai Lama's place in Lhasa. Street demonstrations followed.

A large number of Tibetan women appeared before the Indian Consul-General in Lhasa to importune him to accompany them to the Chinese Foreign Bureau to witness their presentation of certain demands. The Indian Consul-General informed them that he was unable to comply with their request. On March 12 thousands of Tibetan women...
demonstrated against Chinese authority in the streets of Lhasa.  

On March 17, two or three mortar shells were fired at the Dalai Lama’s Palace, but failed to hit their target. Reinforcements soon arrived to strengthen the Chinese garrisons in Tibet, particularly in Lhasa. On March 20, fighting broke out in Lhasa. The violence was so widespread that the Indian Consul-General was unable to leave the premises of the consulate.

On March 17 during an appearance before the Lok Sabha, Nehru admitted that “a new situation” had been created in Tibet but disclaimed any large-scale violence at that time. The situation, he said, represented “More of a clash of wills at present than a clash of arms or physical bodies.” “There have been difficulties and conflicts,” he continued, “sometimes on a small scale, sometimes on a somewhat larger scale. They are creating new situations. The situation is a difficult one.”

Perhaps Nehru’s statements before the Lok Sabha conveyed, however, a deeper concern and a stronger emotion than their written quotation would make it appear. At least, this was the opinion of The Delhi Hindustan Standard on March 20, which stated editorially:

On Tibet, we do not think that the Prime Minister can really want the Chinese to understand that his government’s feeling is wholly contained by the words he used on the subject in the Lok Sabha on Tuesday. Nehru not only used language to understate the situation but managed to convey the impression he was restraining himself and that the understatement was deliberate.

On March 20 the Government of India released information that widespread rebellion had exploded in Tibet. The

86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
89. Ibid., p. 235.
90. Ibid.
Khampas and Chinese were fighting both in Lhasa and in the countryside. 91

On March 23, in a joint letter to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, the leaders of most opposition parties in Parliament requested a discussion of the granting of asylum to Tibetan refugees and, on March 27, a committee was formed at Bombay for solidarity with the people of Tibet. In a statement to the Indian public, the committee called upon Indians to express solidarity with the Tibetans in their efforts to preserve their autonomy and way of life. 92

On March 27, the leader of the Sarvodaya Party in a public statement urged the Government of India to declare Tibet an independent nation and warned of the danger to India posed by Communist China:

In Tibet we see at this moment the working of a new imperialism which is far more dangerous than the old because it marches under the banner of a so-called revolutionary ideology . . . The Chinese need our friendship as much as we need theirs. But if the price of friendship is duplicity and condonation of wrong, we must have the courage to refuse to pay the price. The tragedy of Tibet will not have happened in vain. 93

The uprising in Tibet and its suppression by the Chinese did not fail to attract the deep sympathy and concern of the Indian press. The Statesman of New Delhi expressed its sentiments on March 22 as follows:

Unhappiness in India and other surrounding countries over Tibetan developments is magnified by a sense of helplessness . . . after the rebuff of 1950, when India was told by China to mind her own business, and it was insultingly suggested that Delhi's attitude had been affected by hostile foreign influences. It is clearly useless to expect Indian friendship to cause the Chinese to modify their attitude in the slightest. Sympathy will best be directed for caring for refugees if they come, and even that will be mixed with apprehension if they come

91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., pp. 250-251.
93. Ibid., p. 254.
VII  His Holiness, Tenzig Gyatso, Fourteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet
—Collection of the author—
in too great numbers and are pursued. The border states must be seriously alarmed. 94

The Delhi *Hindustan Standard* of March 24 was even more critical of the Chinese:

It should be remembered in this connection that though India's protest against the Chinese use of force in Tibet in 1950 met with a rebuff from Peking and later the Sino-Indian treaty of "the Tibet Region of China" was on the basis of formally unconditional acceptance by India of China's rights there, the treaty nevertheless was made against the background of the Chinese assurance to the Tibetans of autonomy in the most comprehensive terms. Without that background the inclusion of the Panch Shila principles as a preamble to the treaty... ironical as it has proved, would be an act of moral monstrosity.

The ordinary people—even our Prime Minister would sometimes appear to be with the ordinary people in this respect—do not care for the legal niceties of difference between "suzerainty" and "sovereignty"; but for all their friendliness for the Chinese, they cannot give up the idea that the Tibetans as a people have an inalienable right to their own way of life and a distinctive national existence if they wish to have one. 95

It was the *Hindustan Times* of March 30, however, in an editorial entitled "The Rape of Tibet," which most dramatically expressed Indian reaction to the Chinese suppression of the Tibetan Revolution.

Tibet is dead. There is nothing we could have done in material terms to save her. Let us accept that the question we must search our hearts to answer is: Can we say as much for our moral duty in the matter?

Tibet is dead. Much else could die with Tibet if we do not even now heed the warning. There falls the shadow of China in the lands all around us. It is a dark shadow for our influence. After Tibet they are bound to ask if there was wisdom in our counsel... We need a realistic reassessment of the basis of our foreign policy. To

suggest that the entire basis is in disarray is to panic. Assuredly, it is important to be friends with China. But what kind of friends? A formal politeness that inhibits the free exchange of ideas and differences cannot pass for friendship even in this age when the Communists have familiarized us with the debasing of words and values.  

On March 28, the P.R.C. made its first announcement of the Tibetan Revolution: In a Hsinhua (official Chinese news agency) communique, it was announced that the State Council had dissolved the Local Government of Tibet. "Most of the kaloons of the Tibet Local Government," the communique asserted, "and the upper strata reactionary clique colluded with imperialism, assembled rebellious bandits to carry out the rebellion, ravaged the people, put the Dalai Lama under duress, tore up the 17- Article agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet, and, on the night of 19 March, directed the Tibetan Local Army and rebellious elements to launch a general offensive against the People's Liberation Army garrison in Lhasa. Such acts which betray the Motherland and disrupt unification are not allowed by law." Therefore, the Hsinhua communique announced, as a measure to safeguard national unity, "The decision of the State Council is that from this day the Tibet Local Government is dissolved and the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region shall exercise the functions and powers of the Tibet Local Government."  

Further, according to Hsinhua, the Chinese Central Government directed the Preparatory Committee and the local command of the P.L.A. to organize self-defense armed forces of Tibetan "patriots" to replace the old Tibetan Army of a little more than 3,000 men which it described as "rotten to the core, utterly useless in fighting and have turned rebel." It asserted that the rebellion had been put down on March 20 and reported that Military Control Committees had been ordered established in every area of Tibet except at Shigatse.

97. Subhash C. Sarker, "Indian Reactions to Developments in Tibet," p. 239.
which was the seat of the Panch'en Lama. However, it was promised that "Autonomy will gradually and completely replace military control when the rebellion is put down." Furthermore, the Central Government had stated that, since the rebels had "torn up" the 17-article agreement in which China had promised not to reorganize the Tibetan army or to impose social reforms upon Tibet, China was no longer obligated to abide by the terms of this agreement.98

The Hsinhua communique also accused India of allowing the Tibetan rebels to operate from Indian soil and of interfering in the internal affairs of China. It charged that the Tibetan Revolution was being directed from Kalimpong, India, and that references to Tibetan developments on the floor of the Indian Parliament constituted interference in Chinese affairs.

These Chinese accusations against India provoked a wage of anti-Chinese sentiment throughout India "to an extent perhaps never before witnessed in the country." Individuals and newspapers which had previously restrained themselves now openly expressed suspicions of Chinese designs upon India. The Government of India denied the charges about Kalimpong and Tibetan rebels in India and, on March 30 in a speech before the Lok Sabha, Nehru proclaimed that the Indian Parliament had the right to discuss any subject it thought fit.

On March 29 a "Tibet Day" was observed in New Delhi. N.G. Goray, leader of the Praja Socialist Party, in a speech for the occasion, stated that Indian public opinion had expressed itself unmistakably and that "Whenever liberty is threatened whether by the Western imperialists or the Eastern, the voice of our people will not falter." 99

On the following day, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh staged a "Hands Off Tibet" demonstration before the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi and the Chinese Consulate in Bombay. The demonstrators in New Delhi attempted to deliver a memorandum to the Chinese Ambassador, who refused to

98 Ibid., pp. 240-41.
accept it. They then threw it into the Embassy compound. It called upon the Chinese to preserve the status quo in Tibet, thereby implying non-interference with Tibet's internal administration, and for proper respect for the person and the authority of the Dalai Lama, for withdrawal of Chinese forces from Tibet, and for non-interference in the way of life, culture, traditions, and religion of Tibet.\textsuperscript{100}

On March 31, the Communist Party of India issued a statement virtually paraphrasing the Chinese communiqué, asking the Government of India to investigate rebel activities at Kalimpong, and sent its "warm greetings to the Communist Party of China under whose wise guidance the People's Government of China is leading the people of Tibet from medieval darkness to prosperity and equality."\textsuperscript{101} Meanwhile, the Communist press in India began to allege collusion between Indian officers and "anti-Chinese spies."\textsuperscript{102}

Since the Communist Party's statement and particularly its endorsement of Chinese charges concerning Kalimpong was issued after denials by the Government of India and Nehru personally, the party aroused great resentment throughout India. Communist representatives in Parliament were isolated both within and outside the houses.\textsuperscript{103}

The Communist Party's support of the Chinese position incurred the personal ridicule of Nehru. "The Party," he stated, "shows more than we suspected, a certain lack of balance in mind and total absence of feeling of decency and nationalism. What they are, I don't know. They cease to be Indians if they talk in this way."\textsuperscript{104}

The various political parties of India became quite vocal in their denunciation of Chinese actions in Tibet. The Praja Socialist Party adopted a resolution at its annual conference in Delhi describing Chinese suppression of the Tibetan Revolution as comparable to Russian action in Hungary.

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Ibid.}, March 31, 1959.
\textsuperscript{101} \textit{The Times of India} (Delhi), April 1, 1959.
\textsuperscript{102} \textit{The Statesman}, April 6, 1959.
\textsuperscript{103} Subhash C. Sarker, "Indian Reactions to Developments in Tibet," p. 255.
\textsuperscript{104} \textit{The Statesman}, April 6, 1959.
stating that Chinese actions constituted a "direct threat" to India and criticizing the "submissive" policy of the Government of India. 105

A resolution adopted by the Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad at its annual conference in April was equally critical of China. It stated that the "Communist dictatorship of China has strangulated Tibet and begun to cast an evil eye on Ladakh. 106

The National Committee of the Praja Socialist Party expressed its grave concern over events in Tibet. Chinese action there, it said, posed a warning to all who "cherish the right of a people to shape its own destiny." Furthermore, it stated:

The entire nation with the exception of the Communists and their supporters has realized the true significance and deep-seated cause of the conflict in Tibet. Our people have been moved to deep sympathy by the agony of Tibet. They know that the true cause of conflict lies in Tibet's determination to assert her personality and preserve her individuality. 107

The Working Committee of the Indian National Congress was more moderate in its statement regarding developments in Tibet. In its resolution, it fully endorsed the policy of the Government of India regarding Tibet and declared that any event in Tibet which led to suffering there was a matter of sorrow for the people of India. 108

Even the Bolshevik Party of India was prompted to issue a statement from Delhi expressing its "deep concern at the situation in the Tibet Region." The Revolutionary Socialist Party, a Marxist group, was somewhat more outspoken than the Bolshevik Party. In the April edition of Call, its monthly organ, the Party stated:

The feudal and religious nationalism of Tibet has hardly any chance to stand up against the onslaughts of the

105. The Hindustan Times, April 6, 1959.
106. The Times of India, April 7, 1959.
Chinese Communist “big leap” for the integration of the whole of China. It was, however, expected that the Communists leaders in China will proceed warily in Tibet. That hope has been largely belied. It should not have been difficult to provide the Tibetans the fullest scope for a national self-determination that would be integrated with the cherished cultural values of Tibetan past and the Tibetan national genius. The failure to do this has clearly created a situation where imperialist provocateurs may have found scope for their activity.

But even if imperialist agents have been active behind the Khampa rebellion in Tibet, we have to put on record that we have every sympathy with the national sentiments of the Tibetan people, and we find no valid reason why the Chinese Communist Party should not allow Tibet to evolve as another sovereign “People’s Republic” as the “People’s Republic of Outer Mongolia”—as was done by the Soviet Union under Lenin’s guidance. 109

However, although there was widespread criticism of Chinese actions in Tibet, India was not unanimous in its criticism. A substantial section of the Indian people remained uncritical, while the Communists, the Socialist Unity Centre and a section of the Indian press upheld the Chinese actions. Among the periodicals which supported the Chinese Government were The National Herald of Lucknow, Jugantar, a Bengali daily in Calcutta, and the Economic Weekly of Bombay. 110

On April 3, Nehru appeared before the Lok Sabha to announce that the Dalai Lama had reached and entered Indian territory on April 1 and had been granted political asylum in India. “We had expected this kind of development.” Nehru stated, “and had instructed our border posts how to act in such a situation.” 111

Before the Dalai Lama’s arrival, there had been general agreement throughout India that, if he succeeded in reaching Indian territory, he should be granted asylum. His safe

110. Ibid. pp. 254 and 261.
111. Ibid. p. 243.
arrival and the decision to grant him asylum were heralded by all except the Communist Party of India. 112

On April 18, the Dalai Lama issued a statement at Tezpur describing the events which led to the Tibetan Revolution and to his flight from Tibet. In his statement, he emphasized, “The Dalai Lama would like to state categorically that he left Lhasa and Tibet and came to India of his own free will and not under duress.” 113 This denial of the Chinese claim that the Dalai Lama had been abducted and harassed served to incite new Chinese accusations against India. The Chinese persisted with this claim, dismissed his statement as forgery, and accused India of holding the Dalai Lama under duress and of harboring expansionist ambitions toward Tibet. 114

Nehru countered these accusations with a statement on April 24 from Mussoorie, where the Dalai Lama had taken up residence, inviting the Panchen Lama and the Chinese Ambassador to come to Mussoorie to visit the Dalai Lama and any other persons they wished to see. The Panchen Lama refused the invitation and counter-charged that India had discriminated against him during his 1956 visit to subcontinent. Chinese officials and the Chinese press continued to reiterate with great vigor the accusations of duress and expansionism against India. 115

On April 27 in a speech before the Indian Parliament, Nehru again denied the Chinese accusations. He declared that the Dalai Lama could return to Tibet of his own will at any time and that any Chinese emissary could come to India for that purpose, that India had no political interest in Tibet and that India had no desire to interfere in Tibet. However, he stated, India was greatly distressed at the plight of the Tibetan people. He expressed grave concern over the Chinese accusations against India:

All I can say is that I have been greatly distressed at

112. Ibid.
113. The Hindu, April 19, 1959.
the tone of the comments and the charges made against India by responsible people in China. They have used the language of cold war regardless of truth and propriety. This is particularly distressing in a great nation with thousands of years of culture behind it, noted for its restrained and polite behavior.  

On August 30, the Dalai Lama announced that he had decided to refer the Tibetan question to the United Nations. On September 4, during a debate over a non-official resolution in the Lok Sabha demanding that the Government of India propose discussion of the issue before the United Nations, Nehru stated his reasons for objecting to the proposal. Chief among them was the fact that Tibet had not been acknowledged as an independent state. The resolution was subsequently defeated.

In October 1959, the Tibetan issue was debated in the General Assembly with Malaya and Ireland initiating the discussion. The Indian Delegation, led by V.K. Krishna Menon, maintained a neutral position on the matter and expressed confidence that the Chinese Government would, in the course of time, adopt an attitude of reconciliation.

The Tibetan Revolution created the need for the Chinese to create new border incidents. With the Dalai Lama in India, it was necessary for the Chinese to show the Tibetans that India offered no hope for their cause. Thus, in the summer of 1959, border disputes and incidents began to recur with a theretofore unparalleled intensity.

On June 23, 1959, the Foreign Office of China delivered a note to the Indian Counsellor in Peiping protesting the "intrusion and occupation" by Indian troops "of Migyitun, Samgar Sanpo, and other places in Tibet region of China and their collusion with the Tibet rebel bandits." It charged that Indian troops numbering in the hundreds had shelled and occupied Migyitun, north of the North-East Frontier Agency, and had occupied Samgar Sanpo, Molo, and Gyala. The Chinese note stated that these areas are "indisputably territories always belonging to China" and warned that "The brazen intrusion and occupation of Chinese territory by
batches of Indian troops numbering hundreds and their unscrupulous collusion with the traitorous Tibet rebel bandits... constitute grave encroachments on China's sovereignty and flagrant interference in China's internal affairs."\(^{117}\)

On June 26, the Indian Government replied to the Chinese note, stating that it had received the Chinese charges about the Migyitun area "with surprise." It reported that Government of India had made "immediate inquiries... and are satisfied that there is no truth in them. These allegations must have been based on wrong information received by the Government of the People's Republic of China."\(^{118}\)

The Government of India agreed with the Chinese Government that each of the areas mentioned in the Chinese note were in Chinese territory according to the traditional international frontier which, it stated, "coincides with the so-called MacMahon Line." Thus, the note emphasized, "The Government of India emphatically repudiate any suggestion that their forces violated the international frontier and occupied these places which are admittedly part of Chinese territory.\(^{119}\)

The nearest Indian outpost to Migyitun, the Indian note stated, was Longju, which was located south of the McMahon Line and south of Migyitun. There is another outpost at Tamadan, several miles south of Samga Sanpo, the Indian note added, but it, like the one at Longju, was located within Indian territory and had been established peacefully.\(^{120}\)

Underlining its insistence upon the McMahon Line as the international boundary, the Indian Government stated that, "The Government of India have respected and will always respect the traditional international frontier between India and the Tibet region of China, which, as stated above, coincides with the so-called MacMahon Line."\(^{121}\)

\(^{117}\) *White Paper 1*, p. 34.

\(^{118}\) *Ibid.*


\(^{120}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{121}\) *Ibid.*
On July 30, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs delivered a note to the Chinese Counsellor reporting that an armed Chinese party of nearly 25 men had been discovered in Ladakh by a six-member Indian reconnaissance party. The last report from the Indian party had been that it was approaching the Chinese to inform them they were in Indian territory. Since the Indian party had not reported to headquarters, they apparently had been taken into custody by the Chinese. 122

The Indian note lodged a "strong protest" with the Chinese Government on this matter.123

On August 6, the Chinese Government replied to the Indian note of July 30. China stated that six Indian personnel had been discovered in Chinese territory by Chinese frontier guards west of Digra and south of Pangong Tso in the western part of Tibet. They had been advised to withdraw. When they refused to do so, they were disarmed and arrested. They were to be deported to India in the immediate future. 124

"The Chinese Government," the note stated, "wishes to point out solemnly that the area intruded by the above-mentioned Indian personnel is undoubtedly Chinese territory." The Chinese Government expressed "surprise and regret" at the Indian claims to the area. These claims, it asserted, were "inconsistent with the facts." Thus, the Chinese Government stated that "of course, it cannot accept the protest lodged by the Government of India." 125

The month of August brought with it a deluge of border incidents and violence. Chinese military activities along the border were on such a massive scale that Lamb has characterized them as an "invasion" of India. Indian public opinion toward China became even more bitter and Nehru

122. Ibid. p. 38.
123. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
was criticized repeatedly in Parliament for not taking a more adamant stand against the Chinese.  

On August 11, the Ambassador of India delivered an exceptionally curt, short and sharp note to the Foreign Office of China. On August 7 a group of approximately 200 armed Chinese troops, the note stated, had violated the Indian border at Khinzemane. When an Indian patrol had requested the Chinese to withdraw, the Chinese had replied with force and had pushed the Indian patrol back to a bridge at Drokung Samba.

The Indian note continued:

These places are admittedly within Indian territory and we have been in constant possession of it. Traditionally as well as according to Treaty Map the boundary runs along Thagla Ridge north of Mankha Chuthangmu valley and this position has been accepted in the past.

Our security forces have instructions to resist trespassers and to use minimum force necessary for this purpose if warning given by them remains unheeded. Request that if Chinese troops are still within Indian territory, they should be immediately withdrawn as otherwise this may lead to avoidable clash.

On August 25 Chinese and Indian troops engaged in combat either in the Subansiri Frontier Division or across the border near Migyitun in Tibet, according to whether one attaches more creditability to Indian or Chinese sources.

The Chinese note lodged a “serious protest” and described the Indian actions as “grave provocations” and an “unwarranted attack.” In conclusion, the Chinese note stated, “The Chinese Government strongly demands that the Government of India immediately adopts effective measures to prevent any renewal of violation of Chinese territory and armed provocations by Indian troops otherwise the Indian

128. Ibid.
side must be held responsible for all the serious consequences arising therefrom.”

The Indian account of the affair was described on the following day in a note delivered to the Foreign Office of China by the Indian Ambassador.

On August 28, Nehru announced the occupation of Longju before the Lok Sabha, describing the Chinese forces which captured the outpost as 200-300 strong. He also reported four previous skirmishes along the same frontier and confirmed reports of Chinese threats against Sikkim and Bhutan. “There is no alternative but to defend our frontiers.” Nehru declared. “Any aggression against Bhutan and Sikkim will be considered an aggression against India.

On September 1 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, in a note delivered to the Indian Ambassador, reiterated its position on the Migyitun/Longju affairs. “According to verified investigation by the Chinese Government,” the note stated, “it is confirmed without a doubt that the armed clash between Chinese and Indian troops which occurred on August 25, 1959 in the southern part of Migyitun . . . was solely caused by Indian troops’ unlawful intrusion . . . and their unwarranted provocative attack on Chinese troops.” The Indian troops, China reiterated had opened fire first and without warning. China denied arresting any Indian troops and denied the Indian statement that Chinese forces had outflanked or fired upon the Indian outpost at Longju. It countered instead with a charge that, on August 26, the Longju outpost had launched a “violent attack” in Migyitun, discharging many hundreds of rounds of rifle, sten-gun and light and heavy machine-gun shots. It further charged that, during this time, Indian aircraft had violated Chinese airspace “many times.” In spite of all this, however, the Chinese note asserted, the Chinese forces “did not strike back.” Chinese troops had subsequently occupied

129. Ibid.
130 Ibid., pp. 44-45
131. Chao, p. 358
132. Ibid.
the outpost at Longju, the note claimed, because the Indian troops "withdrew subsequently on their own accord." Thus, "it can be seen," the Chinese note asserted, "that the Chinese troops acted entirely in self-defence and to preserve China's territorial integrity and throughout the incidents demonstrated the greatest toleration and self-restraint."13

Furthermore, the Chinese note stated:

Although the Chinese troops did not cross for a single step into Longju during the incidents on August 25 and 26, it must, however, be pointed out that Longju is indisputably part of Chinese territory and that the invasion and occupation of that place and the setting up of outposts by the Indian troops constitute a grave violation of China's territorial integrity. . . . Longju is part of the Migyitun area and has all along been under the jurisdiction of the Tibet Region of China. After the peaceful liberation of Tibet, the Chinese People's Liberation Army for long stationed units there, and Chinese authorities took various administrative measures locally, including the issuance of agricultural loans. It was only not long ago that the place was unlawfully invaded and occupied by Indian troops taking advantage of an interval resulting from the shift of Chinese troops.134

The Chinese note then proceeded to reiterate China's position regarding the entire Indo-Sinic border and the McMahon line:

As the Indian Government is aware, the Chinese Government has pointed out that no section of the Sino-Indian boundary has ever been formally delimited: the boundary between the two countries is yet to be settled through surveys and discussions between the two sides. The Chinese Government has also repeatedly pointed out that the so-called traditional boundary between India and the eastern part of the Tibet Region

134. Ibid.
of China was referred to by the Indian Government i.e. the so-called MacMahon Line, was set forth in the past by British imperialists unilaterally and has never been accepted by the Chinese Government; it of course cannot be regarded as legal. Nevertheless, even by documents and maps related to this so-called traditional boundary as set forth by the British, Longju is unquestionably within Chinese territory.\footnote{White Paper II, pp. 3-5.}

The Chinese note also took cognizance of the Indian note of June 27 in which India had asserted that Tamadan, a nearby outpost, was within Indian territory. "After investigations," the Chinese note responded, "the Chinese Government is in possession of reliable materials which prove that this place likewise has long been Chinese territory, and even by the so-called traditional boundary, i.e. the so-called MacMahon Line . . . , the place is located to the north of the line." Therefore, the Chinese Government requested that India withdraw from the outpost at Tamadan.\footnote{Ibid., p. 5.}

In conclusion, the Chinese note stated that China was willing to settle the border dispute by peaceful negotiations, but warned, "No violation of Chinese territory will be tolerated. All areas that have been invaded and occupied must be evacuated. Any armed provocation will certainly meet with Chinese frontier guards' firm rebuff."\footnote{Ibid.}

Also on September 1 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China delivered a second note to the Indian Ambassador in Peiping, citing new accusations against Indian troops. It charged that armed Indian troops had entered Chinese territory at Kechiling Pasture west of Shatze on June 28 and "peremptorily set up so-called Sino-Indian boundary marks at Latze Pass which is within Chinese territory."\footnote{Ibid. pp. 1-2.}

The Chinese note rejected the previous contention of the Indian Government that the boundary ran along Thang-gia Ridge, north of Namkha Chathang-mu Valley, and that
the Chinese troops in the area had violated Indian territory. The Chinese Government considered these contentions as "totally inconsistent with the facts." 139

Finally, the Chinese note warned that it:

has been trying its best to avoid any armed clashes. However, it cannot but point out with regret that... the Indian Government, in its Note dated August 11, arbitrarily described the place within Chinese territory which had been intruded into by Indian armed personnel as belonging to India, and declared in a threatening and provocative tone that the Indian security forces had instructions not to scruple using force to prevent Chinese troops from entering this place... Should the Indian Government fail to change this decision at once, to have the Indian armed forces promptly withdraw from Chinese territory which they have seized unlawfully, responsibility for all the serious consequences arising therefrom will necessarily rest with the Indian Government. 140

On September 5 the Indian Government replied to the Chinese note concerning the Migyitun/Longju incident. It asserted that the Chinese description of the event was "not in accordance with facts," and denied that Longju was in fact a part of the Migyitun area.

On September 10 the Government of India replied to the other Chinese note of September 1 regarding alleged violation of Chinese territory and made further statements regarding the Migyitun/Longju incident. Khinzhemane, which the Chinese note had claimed as within Chinese territory, lies south of the mountain range which constitutes the international boundary and "is obviously part of Indian territory," the Indian note asserted. As for Chinese claims to Longju, the Indian Government stated that the McMahon Line runs immediately south of Migyitun and north of Longju, rejected the Chinese claim that Longju was a part of the Migyitun area, and added that India was "surprised to learn that the Chinese authorities had exercised any admini-

139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
strative jurisdiction over Longju at any time in the past. Obviously the Chinese Government have wrong reports on this point.”

The Indian note acknowledged the Chinese references to Kechilang Pasture, west of Shatze, and informed the Chinese Government that it was unable to find either place on its maps. However, the Indian note added, there is a Droksar pasture owned by the Indian village of Lumpo which is used by the Tibetan villages of Le and Timmod for which Le is paying rent to Lumpo. It is a common practice, the Indian note, commented, for a village on one side of the international border to use pasture on the other side by mutual consent but “exercise of this privilege cannot be regarded as evidence in support of a territorial claim.”

As for Tamadan being within Chinese territory, the Indian Government stated that it was investigating the claim and promised that “If Tamadan is found not to be within Indian territory the Indian post will be withdrawn from there.”

India rejected the Chinese claims that Chinese airspace had been violated by India. “When the Indian post at Longju was surrounded and attacked by a superior Chinese force,” the Indian note said, planes were sent to drop supplies to the post. However, the Indian note stressed that at no time had these planes violated Chinese airspace.

The Indian note also stated that India would not send troops back to Longju if the Chinese would agree to withdraw their forces from the outpost. “This would mean that neither side would have their personnel at Longju.”

The Indian note once again drew China's attention to its maps and commented, “it is most extraordinary that the Government of the People's Republic of China should not have found time during the last ten years to withdraw these

141. Ibid., pp. 8-10.
142. Ibid.
143 Ibid., p. 9.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid.
faulty maps. The continued circulation of these maps is a standing threat to India’s integrity and evidence of unfriendliness towards India.” 146

The issue of Chinese maps, the Migyitun/Longju incident, and the entire boundary dispute prompted Premier Chou En-Lai to prepare another letter to Nehru on September 8. As for the Chinese maps, Chou informed Nehru:

The way the Sino-Indian boundary has always been drawn in maps published in China is not without grounds. . . . . At first Indian and British maps also drew the Sino-Indian boundary roughly in the same way as the Chinese maps. As a matter of fact, it was not Chinese maps, but British and Indian maps that later unilaterally altered the way the Sino-Indian boundary was drawn. . . . . Some people in India, however, are raising a big uproar about the maps published in China attempting to create a pressure of public opinion to force China to accept India’s unilateral claims concerning the Sino-Indian boundary. Needless to say, this is neither worthy nor wise. 147

Chou then proceeded to inform Nehru that it was India rather than China which had created border tensions and incidents and particularly the affair at Migyitun. He reiterated his repudiation of the McMahon Line and described the Simla Conference as “an important step taken by Britain in its design to detach Tibet from China.” “Contrary to what was said in your letter,” Chou corrected Nehru, “the so-called MacMahon Line was never discussed at the Simla Conference, but was determined by the British representative and the representative of the Tibet local authorities behind the back of the representative of the Chinese Central Government through an exchange of secret notes at Delhi on March 24, 1914, that is, prior to the signing of the Simla Treaty.” 148

The Chinese Premier repeated his earlier assertion that the Indo-Sinic boundary had never been formally delimited

146. Ibid., p. 8.
147. Ibid., p. 30.
148. Ibid., p. 29.
and proceeded to cite his evidence in support of this contention. As for the Ladakh-Sinkiang border, he conceded that a peace treaty had been concluded in 1842 between Tibet and Kashmir. However, he asserted that the Chinese Central Government had not sent a representative to the treaty negotiations and had not later ratified the treaty. Furthermore, he said, this treaty had only mentioned in general terms that Ladakh and Tibet would abide by their borders and had not made any specific provisions regarding the location of the boundary. As for the Chinese Government’s official statement in 1847 to the British representative that this section of the Indo-Sinic boundary was clear, that statement meant only that the Chinese Government “had its own clear view regarding this section of the boundary,” Chou asserted.¹⁴⁹

A customary and historical boundary does exist between China and Ladakh, however, Chou continued, “and, Chinese maps have always drawn the boundary between China and Ladakh in accordance with this line”. The Britishman John Walker’s map of the “Punjab, Western Himalaya and Adjoining Parts of Tibet” which was attached to the British Major Alexander Cunningham’s book entitled Ladakh published in 1854, Chou asserted, corresponds fairly closely with Chinese maps. ¹⁵⁰

On September 13, 1959 the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted a resolution regarding the border dispute.

**The resolution read:**

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress expresses regret at the series of intrusions by Indian troops into Chinese territory and the anti-Chinese campaign recently fanned up by some right-wing politicians in India and expresses the hope that Indian side would swiftly withdraw from the places into which it has intruded, stop the anti-Chinese agitation

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and start friendly negotiations with China for a peaceful settlement of the boundary question.

The Western imperialist forces and their agents in India are trying to take advantage of the Sino-Indian border incidents to disrupt the great friendship between China and India and to change India's foreign policy of peace and neutrality. The Chinese people fervently hope that the Indian people will frustrate their vicious schemes, so that the common interests of the people of India, China and the other countries of Asia may be safeguarded. 151

On September 26, Nehru replied to Chou's letter, which, he said, he had been "surprised and distressed" to read and which had "come as a great shock." 153 In explaining his distress, Nehru stated:

Even when I received your letter of January 23, 1959, I had no idea that the People's Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been Indian territory for decades and in some sectors for over a century. In your latest letter you have sought to make out a claim to large tracts of Indian territory and have even suggested that the independent Government of India are seeking to reap a benefit from the British aggression against China. Our Parliament and our people deeply resent this allegation. 154

In reply to Chou's assertion that India was using pressure to force China to accept the Indian version of the border, Nehru retorted:

This is the reverse of what the Government of India did. We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without

151. Ibid.
152. Ibid., p. 34.
153. Ibid., p. 45.
154. Ibid., p. 34.
excitement on both sides. In fact our failure to do so has now resulted in sharp but legitimate criticism of the Government both in Parliament and in the press of our country. 155

As for the Chinese claim that the entire border was undelimited, Nehru stated:

All Chinese Governments have respected the Indian border. The fact that previous Chinese Governments were weak is no answer. Not even a protest was registered in accordance with established state practice in this regard, as was done in the case of Burma between 1906 and 1937. 156

Nehru expressed surprise at Chou’s description of the McMahon Line as “a product of British imperialism” and his claim that the Chinese representative at the Simla Conference did not have knowledge of the McMahon Line. In reference to the Simla Conference, Nehru stated, “At no stage, either then or subsequently, did the Chinese Government object to the discussions on the boundary between India and Tibet at the Conference. In the circumstances, the agreement which resulted from the Conference in regard to the McMahon Line boundary between India and Tibet must, in accordance with accepted international practice, be regarded as binding on both China and Tibet.” Nehru continued to flatly state that “The Chinese representative at the Simla Conference was fully aware of the MacMahon Line.” This Line, Nehru continued, “was discussed between the Tibetan and British Indian representatives but, when the draft convention emerging from the conference was presented on 22nd April 1914 for signature by the British Indian, Tibetan and Chinese representatives it had attached to it a map showing the MacMahon Line boundary as well as the boundaries between Inner Tibet and China, and Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet . . . Thereafter, on the 27th April the Chinese representative initialed both the convention and the map without any objection.” 157

155. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
156. Ibid., p. 35.
157. Ibid., p. 38.
Beyond that, Nehru took issue with Chou’s characterization of the McMahon Line as being an arbitrary product of British Imperialism imposed upon a weak China:

It is wrong to say that the frontier east of Bhutan as shown on the Chinese maps is the traditional frontier. On the contrary, it is the MacMahon Line which correctly represents the customary boundary in this area. The Water-parting formed by the crest of the Himalayas is the natural frontier which was accepted for centuries as the boundary by the peoples of both sides. . . . The Atlas of the Chinese Empire, published in London by the Chinese Inland Mission in 1906, shows as the frontier in this area an alignment which is almost identical with what was settled at Simla in 1914. The area was extensively surveyed by the Mishmi Mission in 1911-12, the Dibhing Valley was surveyed in 1912-13, and the Abor area in 1913. Captain Bailey carried out extensive surveys of the southern limits of Tibetan jurisdiction in the whole area in 1913-14. It was on the basis of all this detailed information that the boundary was settled between India and Tibet in 1914. It was clear, therefore, that the MacMahon Line was not an arbitrary imposition on a weak Tibet by the Government of India. It formalized the natural, traditional, ethnic and administrative boundary in the area.158

Nehru adamantly rejected Chou’s accusation that India was allowing its frontier outposts to be used by Tibetan rebels. He described the accusation as “wholly unfounded.” “On the contrary,” Nehru stated, “our personnel disarmed the Tibetan rebels as soon as they crossed the frontier into Indian territory and insisted on their moving well away from the frontier areas. The few who showed disinclination to do so were told that they would not get asylum in India and made to leave our territory finally.159

Nehru rejected Chou’s disavowal of the 1842 treaty between Tibet and Kashmir. The treaty had been signed, he asserted, by representatives of both the Dalai Lama and the Emperor of China. One of the signatories, Kalon Sokon,

158. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
159. Ibid., p. 43.
Nehru explained, was a Tibetan by birth but "had Chinese rank." "Even the Tibetan version of the treaty," Nehru emphasized, "makes it clear that China was a party to it." 160

As for the 1842 treaty not specifying the border, Nehru continued:

It is true that the 1842 treaty referred merely to the "old established frontiers." This was because these frontiers were well-known and did not require any formal delimitation. Even the treaty of 1684 between Ladakh and Tibet stated that "The boundaries fixed in the beginning, when Skyid-Ida-ngeema-gon gave a kingdom to each of his three sons, shall still be maintained." References in the Ladakhi chronicles of the 17th century indicate that the boundary was well-established. Cunningham, whom your Excellency has referred to with approval, toured the area in 1846. He stated in 1854 that the eastern boundary of Ladakh "is well-defined by piles of stones, which were set up after the last expulsion of the Sokpo or Mongol hordes in A.D. 1687 when the Ladakhis received considerable assistance from Kashmir." (Ladakh, 1854, page 261.) Thus it is clear that for nearly two centuries the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet was well-known and recognized by both sides. 161

As for the map of John Walker in Major Cunningham's book Ladakh, to which Chou had referred as evidence in support of China's claims to parts of Ladakh, Nehru had some additional information on the subject. Nehru referred Chou to the Compilation Index of Walker's maps in which it was stated that the document used for the map to which Chou had referred had been the "Map of Ladakh and Nari Khorsum by Captain H. Strachey." Nehru told Chou that Strachey had toured only a part of Ladakh in 1847-48, that "He knew little about Aksai Chin, having never visited the area, and drew the boundary where he thought the main water-parting, which is the natural and old frontier in this area lay." 162

160. Ibid., p. 35.
161 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
162. Ibid., p. 36.
Since survey parties were not dispatched to Aksai Chin until the 1860's, Nehru continued, accurate maps of the whole Ladakh area were not possible until 1865. "It is significant," he added, "that most of the maps since that date show the customary boundary in accordance with the line shown by us in our maps rather than that claimed by China." A later map prepared by Walker himself in 1867–68, maps attached to the Gazateers of Kashmir from 1890 onward, Johnston's Atlas of 1882 and even official Chinese maps of the late nineteenth century, Nehru stated, showed boundary lines "more or less similar to our present frontier." It is only in official Chinese maps of the twentieth century that the Chinese Government included large parts of our territory," Nehru asserted. 163

Nehru took strong issue with Chou's accusation that Indian troops had violated Chinese territory. "I am sorry to say," he told Chou, "that it is the Chinese Government who have been trying unilaterally to change the long-existing state of the border." "Nor is it correct to say," he chided, "that Chinese troops have never crossed the MacMahon Line. Both Khinzemane and Longju are south of this line." 164

Fear of future Chinese action along the frontier can be discerned in Nehru's letter:

It is not for us to comment on the reports of large-scale movements of Chinese forces in the Tibetan frontier areas. We hope that these moves do not signify a new policy of actively probing into Indian territory along the whole length of the Sino-Indian border.

Reports have reached us that some Chinese officers in Tibet have repeatedly proclaimed that the Chinese authorities will before long take possession of Sikkim, Bhutan, Ladakh and our North-East Frontier Agency. I do not know what authority they had to make these remarks but I would like to draw Your Excellency's attention to them as these remarks have naturally added tension on the frontier. 165 (Emphasis mine.)

163. Ibid., p. 37.
164. Ibid., p. 42.
165. Ibid., p. 43.
In October 1959 a new border incident in Ladakh involving the deaths and detention of several Indian soldiers fired border tensions and anti-Chinese emotions to a new pitch. The first official communication regarding the incident came on October 22 in a Chinese memorandum to the Ambassador of India.

On October 23, the Indian Government replied to the Chinese memorandum. The Indian note stressed that the location of the incident was “40 to 50 miles west of the traditional Sino-Indian frontier” and challenged the truth of the Chinese allegation that the Indians arrested on October 20 had refused to withdraw.

On October 25 the Chinese Government delivered a note to the Indian Ambassador defending its previous memorandum as “strictly based on facts” and asserting that the clash had taken place on Chinese soil. “The Kongka Pass near place of the incident,” the Chinese note asserted, “is a border pass. The places to the south, north and east of the Kongka Pass have always been Chinese territory.”

On November 4 the Indian Ministry of External Affairs delivered a note to the Chinese Embassy repudiating the Chinese version of the incident as “a travesty of truth.” In rejecting the Chinese accusation that the Indians fired first, the Indian Government stated:

The Government of India not only reject the factual account given by the Chinese Government of this incident but also repudiate certain assumptions underlying it. The suggestion made that the Indian police party armed with rifles only and in a disadvantageous position would attack a heavily armed Chinese force strongly entrenched on a hill top above them and equipped with mortars and hand grenades, cannot be accepted by any reasonable person. All the circumstances concerning this incident as well as the detailed information that we possess contradict the version which has been supplied by the Chinese Government.

166. Ibid. p. 16.
167. Ibid. p. 19.
168. Ibid.
The Indian note condemned the Chinese action as aggression and charged that the Chinese-provoked border disputes "are reminiscent of the activities of the old imperialist powers against whom both India and China struggled in the past." "It is a matter of deep regret," the Indian note continued, "that the Chinese Government, which has so often condemned imperialism, should act in a manner which is so contrary to their own assertions. It is a matter of even deeper regret that the Five Principles as well as the Declaration of the Bandung Conference should thus be flouted by the Chinese Government." 169

In another memorandum to the Indian Ambassador on November 14, Chinese Vice-Minister Chang Han-fu stated that the Deputy Commander of the Indian force and others who were detained or captured had admitted to the accuracy of the Chinese version of the incident. They had also admitted that an Indian soldier had fired first. 170

On November 24, after the return of the captured Indians, the Indian Government delivered a note to the Chinese Embassy which charged:

The prisoners were kept in torn tents in bitterly cold weather and without any bedding for four days. As a result of this, the leader of the party Shri Karam Singh, and three constables were severely frost-bitten. One of the prisoners, Constable Abdul Majid, who had a bullet wound on his back, received no medical attention until the fourth day. Besides, the prisoners were subjected to continuous interrogation from the time of their arrest till the time of their release. They were asked under threats and pressure to make statements to the effect that the Indian party had gone forward knowingly into Chinese territory and that they had sent two constables and a porter the previous day to carry out espionage there.

The Government of India strongly protest against the deplorable treatment to which the Indian Personnel were subjected while in Chinese custody. Under Article

169. Ibid., p. 22.
17 of the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, a prisoner of war is only bound to give his surname, first names and rank, date of birth and army regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. Whether or not the Geneva Convention applies to the Indian personnel . . . . , it is obvious that they should not have been subjected to treatment worse than that to which prisoners of war are entitled. 171 (Emphasis mine.)

The Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister replied to the Indian note on November 28 and asserted that they had been treated well.

On December 13, the Indian Government responded with a note to the Embassy of China charging that “the treatment which the Indian prisoners received was most harsh and inhuman and opposed to all canons of civilised behavior.” 172

The end of 1959 found China in control of 10,000 square miles of territory claimed by India. Some 13,000 Tibetans had fled to India and more were still coming. Sino-Indian relations had plunged to new depths, but the period 1960-1962 would see the relationship brought to the brink of full-scale war. This period, the Colombo Conference and its aftermath will be the subject of intensive investigation for the concluding section of this work.

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171. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
172. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
Sino-Indian border recognized by India. The McMahon Line. Based on the exchanges March 24-25, 1914 and on the Simla Convention of April 27, 1914. See Chapter II for details.

This is the same "illegal McMahon Line" shown on Chinese maps of the early 1960s.

Chinese claims Longju, Khinzesmane and other small areas are north of the line.

Sino-Indian border recognized by China.

Chinese claims of India's territorial claims on Chinese territory "occupied as of November 7, 1959."
Areas occupied, according to India, by the Chinese before September 7, 1962.

Areas occupied by China, according to India, during the October 1962 invasion.

Western and Middle Sector border recognized by India (1960).

Western and Middle Sector borders recognized by China (1962).

IX Indian and Chinese Territorial Claims in the Aksai Chin Area Resulting from the 1962 Chinese Invasion
CHAPTER V

The 1960s: Hostilities, and the Colombo Conference

During the early 1960's the emotional outrage provoked by the specific incidents at Longju/Migyitun and near Kongka Pass subsided, but new border incidents, derogation of India and Nehru in the Chinese press, and various other issues kept relations between China and India at a low ebb.

Even visits by Khruschev and Chou to New Delhi during the first half of 1960 were unable to restore cordiality to Sino-Indian relations. A new spirit of firm resolution to defend its borders against Chinese claims had been injected into Indian life.

The border incidents had added what the United States Government described as "greater sophistication to Indian policy with regard to Communist China." Yet the impact of the incidents and the future Chinese threats did not cause India to end its policy of non-alignment or to enter into any defense alliances with other nations. India, with its armed forces of 500-600,000 men, remained anxious to avoid war with China, which has approximately 2,500,000 men under arms. India was equally anxious to defend her borders against Chinese aggression, nonetheless. Ambassador to the United States, M.C. Chagla, eloquently expressed these dual desires of the Indian people and the Indian Government in Philadelphia in February 1960:

Even the threat to our frontier has not induced us to succumb to the temptation of entering into defence pacts or military alliances with powerful countries. We still believe as we believed in those far off days when we were struggling for freedom, that the greatest strength of a country is the determination of its people. We believe that if we have to fight China—and fight we will if the sanctity of our country is violated and every inch of our country is sacred—we will fight her with all that we possess—our large population, our army, our air force, our arms and armament. If this is not enough, we will buy more from here and elsewhere. But we will not permit foreign armies to fight from our soil or to make our country the base for attacking another country . . . . And even while we are preparing ourself against any further aggression from China, we have not given up our belief in the peaceful approach. We are prepared to negotiate with China. The Conference Room is always open.¹

In January 1960 India received reports that Chinese troops were being concentrated near Tibet's 140-mile border with Sikkim. India began rushing troops and armaments into Sikkim and speedily constructing roads into the small protectorate, particularly into its northern valleys.²

On April 4, just before the arrival of Chou En-lai in New Delhi, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs delivered a major note to the Chinese Embassy. It protested 49 specific violations of Indian airspace by Chinese aircraft from Tibet between December 6, 1959, and March 9, 1960.³ The Chinese Government did not reply until April 26, after Chou’s departure from India. China simply denied the charges.⁴

During April 19–25 Chou and Nehru conferred in New Delhi on the border disputes. Their efforts at negotiation

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⁶ Ibid., p. 24.
were futile. Indeed, they could not even agree on what to negotiate about. Chou maintained that the area west of Karakoram Pass in Northern Jammu and Kashmir could not be discussed since that would involve China in the Indo-Pakistani dispute about the legal status of that area. Chou also maintained that the northern boundaries of Bhutan and Sikkim were likewise beyond the scope of the conference.7

India, on the other hand, contended that "The Chinese side were doubtless aware that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India" and that the Government of Bhutan had requested India to "draw the attention of the Chinese Government to certain errors in their understanding of Bhutan's external boundaries."8

After Chou's departure, Nehru told the Lok Sabha that India and China during the conferences "always came up against the hard rock of a different set of facts."9

On November 10, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs delivered to the Chinese Embassy a note of particular significance because of its forcefulness and choice of words:

In 1957-58 while China was still bound to India by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, Chinese forces marched in and occupied Indian territory at Aksai Chin. Since then they have extended their occupation further into Ladakh. Solemn assurances and official statements of the Chinese Premier notwithstanding, Chinese forces have gone even beyond the limit which Premier Chou En-lai had arbitrarily claimed for China in India's Ladakh up to 1959-60...

There is very little criticism of China per se in the Indian press although the Indian press naturally reacts to the national preoccupation and concern over the threat posed by China to India's territorial integrity. As the Defence Minister put it, India is determined not to negotiate a surrender." How could this sentiment be

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8. Ibid.
objectionable to the Chinese Government unless it wants India to acquiesce tamely in the occupation of India's territory? ¹⁰

By 1962 China had occupied 14,000 square miles of territory claimed by India. India had begun to purchase military supplies from the U.S.S.R. On January 31, 1962 India ordered 16 additional high-altitude helicopters and eight additional turboprop transport planes from the Soviet Union. These aircraft are ostensibly to be used to develop communications along the Indian frontier but could very possibly be used against Chinese forces in border incidents. The military goods being purchased from U.S.S.R. are in exchange for Indian commodities which Western aircraft suppliers will not accept as payment.

In January of 1962, Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy, president of the Indian National Congress, in a speech opening the 67th annual convention of the Congress, declared that India was "prepared to take all steps to recover territory occupied by China. The Government and the people of India will not remain quiet and will do their best to get this aggression vacated. We want the Chinese to quit our territory peacefully as we do not want conflict." ¹¹ Reddy's statement was described by the New York Times as the strongest statement to have theretofore come out of the Congress Party. ¹²

Border issues were not the only issues to disrupt Indo-Sinic relations during the early 1960's. Propaganda activities of the Chinese press, attacks upon Nehru by the Chinese press, and expulsion of certain Chinese nationals from India served to encourage animosity between the two governments.

It is of the utmost importance to bear in mind that of all of China's neighbors, with the obvious exception of the Soviet Union, only India has the power potential to be a

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¹² Ibid.
rival, and given that fact it has appeared to be essential to China that India be put in a subservient position, one way or another. Peking's border agreements with Burma, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan would suggest that territorial expansion is less of a dominant motive than ideological and hegemonial types of expansion. An examination of, for example, the agreement with Burma of January, 1960, may well shed some light on the motives of Peking's dispute with Delhi. For in the Burmese negotiations, each specific proposal regarding the exchange of territory was the result of Chinese initiative. Similarly, China has taken the initiative with India very consistently. In both these cases China's offensive position has been a concrete demonstration of her superior power, though India's responses make it quite evident that the gap is much smaller. A second note-worthy feature of the Burmese negotiations is the evidence that China did stray from her own claims and maps in the final settlement and both sides in this case made valuable concessions to each other. This was, in part, because the settlement may have been intended to demonstrate China's reasonable attitude and her sincere desire to settle her borders. It was also one aspect of China's strategy to isolate India in her unmoving stand of "no negotiations without vacation of aggression."

Negotiations with her smaller neighbours indicated Peking's disposition to trade a border alignment for a political advantage and they were in a sense preparatory for talks related to a settlement with India. While Peking could presumably afford to make concessions to states which were in no position to challenge her, her rivalry with India allowed less room for concessions although there was and may still be the Chinese willingness to accept the McMahon

Line if India accepts Chinese claims in the North West Frontier area.

These factors point to the fact that the actual negotiating of an "unequal treaty" has been China's fundamental motive throughout her dispute with India. The 1962 invasion, though certainly complex in design, was to a considerable degree a punitive expedition to demonstrate to Delhi the imperative of fresh negotiations, with China holding the power position held a half century earlier by the British Empire in India. It would appear that Peking may have desired negotiations not simply formally to acquire territory which she already held through de facto advances, but tacitly to demonstrate India's subservience and thus injure her image among the Afro-Asian nations as well as damage her position of non-alignment.

The timing and strategy of the invasion depended upon more complex motivations than weakening India's image, and one should therefore look to China's subsidiary motivations to find additional clues to the compulsions and restraints which may ultimately determine the basis for a settlement. In the spring of 1962 China faced a severe economic crisis at home as well as tensions in the Taiwan Straits, Southeast Asia and on her borders with the Soviet Union. Both Sinkiang and Tibet were in a state of turbulence and the U.S.S.R., it seemed to Peking, had sold her fraternal brothers down the river on the issue of "peaceful coexistence." Under the circumstances Nehru could hardly have picked a worse time for a diplomatic offensive against China. Probably it seemed to Peking that the inspiration for these initiatives had come from Moscow and Washington who sought to take advantage of China's internal crisis. The factor of paranoia cannot be discounted in its effect on either Indian or Chinese policy. It is an element which would have to disappear before an equitable settlement could be reached.

14. On October 12, Nehru gave the command to drive the Chinese out of the N.E.F.A., apparently in response to the Chinese occupation of the Thagla Ridge.
With the decline of tension in the Taiwan Straits, Peking was freed to look at her southern borders and under the increasing pressures of isolation she apparently decided to act to save face. The attack itself was a very delicate operation for it was designed to have multiple effects. The most vital, of course, was to bring India to the negotiating table, a victory which would certainly injure India’s prestige, in general, and Nehru’s personal image, in particular. As Nehru’s power declined, it was calculated, Mao’s would rise and China would demonstrate, for the benefit of her people, the Afro-Asian nations, the Soviet Union and the West, that, as in the past, she was a force to be contended with, internal crisis or no. In addition the timing of the attack would seem to say to Moscow that they had little control over Chinese actions, a message which would certainly not have added to Nikita Khrushchev’s prestige in international communist circles. At this juncture the move could certainly be interpreted as an attempt to redivide the world by sabotaging the supposed U.S.-Soviet detente.

The attack had to be very carefully controlled, for if it grew beyond limited dimensions it could produce serious negative results. Clearly, China at this point was domestically unready for any kind of major war and outside support was very dubious. When Chinese forces invaded India in October 1962, and as fighting continued into November the danger of a confrontation with the United States and the possibility of American bases facing her from India for an indefinite period became very real. In addition, though her military prowess over India was clear to all, China was not helping her isolation problem in the least. The Soviet Union was taking a very ambiguous and nearly pro-Indian position and the Afro-Asian nations were not responding to Chou’s pleas in the manner he had hoped for. For all these reasons China announced her unilateral cease-fire and

intention of withdrawal on November 21, 1962. The Chinese had carried the war as far as they could without seriously damaging their own prestige and rallying world opinion vehemently against them. They had unquestionably succeeded in diminishing India's prestige, in proving that their claims were in fact modest in comparison with what they could take, and in demonstrating their independence and power to the world. In addition, from a geo-military standpoint, they had demonstrated that they could mount an offensive in the world's most difficult terrain and that no Asian nation was immune from Chinese power for reasons of geography. Their withdrawal added the finishing touches by demonstrating their "peace-loving nature." Significantly, it coincided with renewed Chinese interest in the Afro-Asian nations.

Chou's letter to the Afro-Asian nations of November 16, 1962 was clearly a political and not a juridicial appeal. India was throughout depicted as the aggressor with China merely acting in self-defense. India, the transgressor of the Bandung spirit, was contrasted with friendly states such as Burma and Nepal, and the factual issues (aside from the inclusion of a number of maps) were dealt with in a very scanty way. The border dispute was the "legacy of British imperialist aggression," but India's intransigence demonstrated her "covetous desires toward the Tibet Region of China." 16 Chou was playing on the scars of imperialism in his attempt to rally the Afro-Asian nations to his cause. Of considerable significance was Chou's final indication that a settlement must be achieved by direct negotiations as this was essential in order to "cope with the main enemy." 17 This would seem to have been a sign that what Peking was seeking was not mediation but Afro-Asian pressure on the Indians to settle directly. With occasional minor modifications for the benefit of her international image, this has remained Peking's stand to the present.

17. Ibid.
Paradoxically, the major shortcoming of the Chinese invasion was that it failed completely to entice the Indians to the negotiating table. In late November, India found her position of non-alignment shaken to the core; her policy of moral containment had failed miserably in her own backyard, and her prestige had declined markedly. Negotiations in such a position apparently appeared to the nation as the final denigration of Indian honor, a "straw" which would have damaged both Nehru and the Congress Party. The maintenance of world peace was a major goal of India's foreign policy but only one among others. Where her vital national interests were at stake, it had to be sacrificed.

Nehru's foreign policies were in large measure based upon the realities of India's power situation. Non-alignment, moral containment and mediation for the sake of peace were in many ways designed to compensate for India's poverty and lack of armed strength. Very possibly, non-alignment was the only real course which India could take without risking serious internal dissension. 18

Nehru believed strongly that the avoidance of alignment and alliances decreased the military insecurity of weak nations, but China's continuing threat has forced India to modify this position, though they cling tenaciously to the old slogans. Perhaps this modification is a step towards greater realism in Indian foreign policy which may protect her from the lack of such realism which left her unprepared for the Chinese attack. Until 1962, India was perhaps too concerned with her moral position, with maintaining the idealism of Panch Sheela, to react consistently in a manner appropriate to an obvious situation of power politics.

The origins of the Indian border dilemma may be traced back to her acquiescence in the Tibetan invasion of 1950. Despite her apprehensions as we have seen, her protests were weak and her confusion evident. Among Indian intellectuals, including Nehru himself, there was an idealized image of China which made much of their cultural

affinity and their anti-colonial heritage and views, while overlooking the buffer of Tibet as a vital factor of peace. Perhaps because of his own affinity for, and interest in, socialism, Nehru failed to realize the potentials of the communist ideology in China. This oversight was more directly tied to Nehru's dreams of being the international arbitrator for peace and of leading the movement for Asian solidarity. To achieve these aims it was essential to be on good terms with China.\(^19\) The 1954 Trade Agreement was India's first formalized defeat at the hands of China. Paradoxically, the document which was to establish "friendly relations" between India and China was also virtually an acceptance of Chinese aggression in Tibet. Considering that there was no clear agreement on the delimitation of the boundary, the Panch Sheela was no more than a collection of platitudes, although Nehru considered it in effect a non-aggression treaty. And because it was hailed as the greatest foreign policy achievement of independent India, China's smaller neighbors were weakened in their efforts to resist communist pressure.

The extension of the Panch Sheela into the "Bandung Spirit" was seen in India as a moral and public restraint on China's militant communism and clearly, Nehru leaned heavily on this belief. Chinese occupation of Tibet should have given Nehru a substantial clue that Peking attached great importance to the realization of an ancient Han pretension, but instead the Prime Minister abandoned all meaningful efforts to vindicate India's legal claim in the face of Chinese determination. India's failure to push forward her challenge at this point was later a major factor in determining her defensive posture in the border dispute.\(^20\) This seems to be related to an almost apologetic attitude India has had about her borders. "Emotional and imprecise slogans condemning colonialism as 'permanent aggression'

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had produced a false impression of a dilemma concerning the legitimacy of the territorial legacy.” In retrospect it is not easy to understand why India gave up her treaty rights in Tibet without trying to gain Chinese recognition of the McMahon Line. But this in turn was due to a failure to recognize the Chinese tactic of expanding influence step by step, carefully consolidating each gain. 22

From the Indian White Papers one gathers that at least through 1958 Nehru was almost deferential. His response to the construction of the Aksai Chin Highway invited further Chinese moves, for, initially, he made no demands for the discontinuance of its use, instead basing his complaints on the fact that this was a violation of the Trade Agreement. 23

Certainly such hesitation reflects the fact that India was in no position militarily to force the issue but it was much more basically a failure to realize the challenge that was upon her. For Nehru did have weapons at hand, had he chosen to use them. The most powerful of these would have been public opinion both in India and among the Afro-Asian countries where China was carrying out a grand diplomatic offensive. Nehru’s secrecy until 1959, even to his own parliament, undoubtedly inspired Peking to continue its probings. Nehru’s comment after the Tibetan revolt was indicative of how much he was at sea in the world of power politics: “If we believe in Panch Sheela, we follow it, even if no country in the wide world follows it.” 24 In 1960 he was confident that India had a “strong case” but what tribunal did he have in mind? To the political observer it should have been clear that China had no intention of putting her case before the world. The “entente cordiale” was however, too basic a part of India’s self image in the world to put aside. 25

21. Ibid., p. 192.
22. Ibid.
24. Van Eekelen, p. 87.
The invasion brought about a sudden awakening in India. Nehru finally admitted to the Lok Sabha in October that "we are getting out of touch with the realities of the modern world. We were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation and we have been shocked out of it." From July to October, 1962, Nehru had met the fierce opposition of most of the parliament to his policies of "appeasing the aggressor." He had assured them on August 3 that the present defense was adequate to meet any aggression in Ladakh and the North East Frontier Agency; when he was proved so very wrong in October his whole government came into question. For a brief moment India was united in her determination to resist Chinese aggression. The challenge was finally clear to all, and Nehru categorically refused to talk under the threat of force. He had no choice as the integrity of India was at stake.

Peking, with their cease-fire and proposal for negotiations, was offering Delhi security in exchange for amenability. In Delhi, however, they had learned a lesson: the meaning of the confrontation came into focus. All Indian opposition parties, with the exception of the Communists, issued a joint statement expressing the belief that the Chinese unilateral cease-fire was only another manoeuvre, calculated to gain time. Feeling in the Congress Party also ran high against the Chinese "offer", which was actually not an offer but a statement of intention. Nehru's letter of December 1, 1962 to Chou En-lai expressed five principles as a basis for resolving their differences:

1. "We should create a proper atmosphere for peaceful settlement of our differences."
2. "We should settle our differences in a friendly way through peaceful talks and discussions. If we fail we can consider what other agreed peace-method of settling our differences should be adopted."

27. Van Eekelen, p. 118.
3. "There should be no attempt to force any unilateral demand on either side on account of the advances gained in the recent clashes."

4. "The necessary preliminaries for talks and discussions on both sides should be consistent with the decency, dignity and self-respect of both sides."

5. "The implementation of these proposed arrangements will not in any way prejudice either side in regard to the correct boundary alignment."

In the remainder of his letter he pointed out that the Chinese withdrawal was inconsistent with principle 1. While the Chinese were claiming to be moving back to the line of control of November 7, 1959 (before the Indians had started advancing and gained forty-three out-posts in Ladakh), they were actually, according to Nehru, attempting to retain possession of territory which they had never controlled before the October 1962 conflict. The actual line of control of November 7, 1959 was quite different from that which the Chinese maps of November 16, 1962 depicted to the Afro-Asian countries. He made it clear, moreover, that India would seek the restoration of the line of September 8, 1962 in any negotiations.

The opposition parties sought to make Nehru take a still harder line against China. Sinha of the PSP (socialist) said, "We must not be a party to any negotiations which start on the basis of accepting the Chinese occupation of certain parts of our territory. It is the duty of the people to prevent the government from doing so." Vajpayee of the Jana Sangh, referring to Nehru's July 26 note which proposed "to create a climate for peaceful discussion," said, "If the non-communist opposition parties do not present a united front and if the people are not roused to the impending danger, India will have lost her position in Southeast Asia, apart from loosing her own territory and national honor."
is no question that the significance of this confrontation had been realized and that Nehru's options were severely limited.

The Chinese, of course, were thoroughly annoyed with India's obsession with her "honor". To get the benefits of a continuing threat as well as a cease-fire they reserved the right to fight if the Indians failed to cease firing or advanced at all from their positions at the end of the conflict. Thus they maintained their offensive position and continued their efforts to bring India to the conference table.

The situation, then that faced the six non-aligned nations that met in Colombo, Ceylon, on December 10, 1962 was a virtual deadlock, with China determined to obtain direct negotiations in which she would hold the trump cards and India equally determined not to be forced into submission. The six Colombo powers, Ceylon, Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma, the United Arab Republic and Ghana, were in an extremely delicate position. Pressure from both China and India was strong and the mediating nations desired, at all costs, to avoid alienating either of them. Among the six, however, there were strong differences of opinion on which power it was most important to humor. Ne Win and Sihanouk were in no position to antagonize China, and the Egyptians were equally eager to stay on the good side of India. Clearly, however, Chou had the advantage when the conference opened. Not only was Chinese power very evident, but the delegates were to some extent stacked in their favor. Moreover, India had allowed the fact to emerge in preliminary manoeuvres that she had never really wanted the conference. She accepted it only if it did not compromise with aggression and expanding imperialism and "that the gain of aggression must be given up before both parties try to resolve their dispute." Despite the Chinese shadow behind the conference India could have expected from the

31. Van Eekelen, p. 117.
33. Van Eekelen, p. 120.
beginning that the Colombo proposals would not be seriously to her disadvantage. The participating nations, and this was a strong point for India, had in common a desire to salvage the concept of non-alignment. To do this India had at least to be allowed to save face. All of the six wanted to avoid any further division between China and India, for if they were forced to choose between the two, their national interests could be brought into conflict with their policy of neutrality. In keeping with this, it was made very explicit from the beginning that the conference was for the purpose of mediation only, not arbitration, and that they would refuse to define rights and wrongs. One delegate summed up the problems of the conference neatly:

If we restrict ourselves to a simple appeal, it would appear that we back Peking. However, we cannot support India unequivocally, because Peking would then reject our proposals outright, and Nehru needs our help more than China does. While we cannot get back for India what she lost on the battlefield, we can try to save Nehru’s face by providing the basis for an honorable settlement which he can successfully sell to his people. Fortunately, Peking does not want to push India into the Western camp. So we must exploit this advantage and evolve a formula for compromise.

One suspects that Nehru too, in private, recognized that India could not regain entirely what she had lost in battle despite his statement that there could be “no compromise with aggression.” The latter position was required verbally for the benefit of the Indian people and parliament and to make the ultimate acceptance of the Colombo proposals appear to be a concession on India’s part. Even Nehru seemed to have learned a part of the Chinese game.

The real issue of the proposals at Colombo was in Ladakh, for here they would mean that except for two or

35. Ibid., p. 1210.
three posts in the southeast, Chinese troops would be withdrawn from the entire area where Indian posts had previously existed; in the southeastern corner they would be withdrawn even beyond the international boundary. Nehru's prime argument to parliament in favor of the entire acceptance of the proposals was that they even offered some advantages over the September 8 line. Despite this, all the opposition leaders except the communists indicated that they would vote against the proposals on the grounds that they did not require China completely to undo her aggression of October and November, 1962. Nehru avoided having his hands tied by the parliament by making a bargain with the opposition leaders that he would not push for the acceptance of the proposals if they in return would not propose any substitute resolutions against a government resolution calling only for "consideration of the proposals." This put the responsibility of the proposals squarely on Nehru. After a three-day parliamentary debate India's preliminary acceptance of the proposals "in principle" became acceptance "in toto" on January 26, 1963.

With India's acceptance of the proposals there began the extraordinary political game on both sides of trying to exonerate one's self from the charge of intransigence.

During 1963 the exchange of notes dealt mainly with different interpretations of the Colombo proposals. India persisted in arguing that China must first accept the proposals without reservations and then officials could meet to decide on questions left by the Colombo powers. If no settlement could be wrenched on the boundary question, India was prepared to put their differences before the International Court or some other arbitrator. Peking adamantly rejected arbitration because such complex questions could only be solved "through direct negotiations between the two parties concerned. . . ." as they involved national sovereignty.

Both sides were, in fact, very close to the substance of the proposals, but they were equally unwilling to make any further concessions which might affect their relative power positions. China was apparently eager to negotiate, but only from a position which would quite clearly make India the loser. Indeed, it would seem that the territorial compulsion in regard to negotiations was secondary to China’s desire to put India symbolically into the same category as Burma, Nepal and Afghanistan. This may well lie at the heart of the dispute.

In line with these motivations, China proceeded to use virtually every manoeuvre possible to bring India to the conference table without injuring Peking’s image and her own offensive position. To accept the proposals “in toto” would be to weaken their hand. To reject them would be to weaken their image. The way out of this dilemma was the doctrine of interpretation. And so the Chinese attempted to reclarify the clarifications, demanding that Indian troops should maintain their positions along the entire border rather than just in the west (this would give China a position in the east to negotiate from), and allowing that China would not set up “civilian” posts on her side of the actual line of control (in the twenty kilometer demilitarized zone) as long as India did not reenter this area. Indeed, China’s real objection to the proposals was that they allowed Indian outposts on her side of the actual line of control, for this would have symbolized the beginning of an Indian advance. Both sides seemed to operate on the assumption that a nation competing with another cannot afford to grant concessions unless they are willing to concede supremacy in the area of competition. Concessions, at least in this conflict, will not satisfy a competitor; they merely bring him closer to victory.

40. Ibid., p. 123.
In 1963, India expected little from bilateral talks and made no substantial effort to bring them about. China, on the other hand, probably had intended her show of force primarily for this purpose. When this failed the Colombo interlude was accepted as a possible avenue toward direct negotiations, although the internationalization of the dispute and the fact that more concessions were demanded from China than from India must have raised grave doubts in Peking. For the PRC wanted to gain her own credit for the conciliatory moves. A full acceptance of the proposals would have appeared to be too much submission to international pressure. Thus, in 1963 Peking began to turn away from the international approach toward direct bilateral negotiations, though this had to be done with subtlety in order to avoid alienating the Afro-Asian nations. 43 Again, we have evidence of Peking's tactic of putting negotiations forward under the guise of a concession rather than as the ratification of authentic territorial rights.

The wider significance of Chinese "reservation" about the Colombo proposals is closely allied to the question of power and competition. They meant that even if China came to the negotiating table with concessions to make, no one was going to make them for her. When negotiations opened, they would do so on the basis of the demands of a powerful China, not in terms of a compromise put forth by other parties. 44 Since India's resolve not to place herself in this relationship remains strong, a consideration of the basis that could be found for a settlement is by necessity provisional. Such a settlement presupposes a basic change in the configuration of power and interests in Asia.

Significantly, China originally made some fairly substantial concessions to India, though they were not among those advocated by the Colombo powers. By March, 1963 China had not only completed her announced withdrawal but also had refrained from establishing civilian outposts in

43. Van Eekelen, p. 125.
four of the disputed areas even though this was permitted by the framework of the Colombo proposals. 45 Chou then proceeded to point out his own model attitude of conciliation to the world press.

These concessions were part of China's elaborate manoeuvring to get around the politically difficult point that she still refused to accept the Colombo proposals. Her tactics here may be to allow a long enough period to elapse without crisis while she manoeuvres India into the belligerent role and gradually reasserts her territorial position. Evidence for this thesis can be found in her treaties with Pakistan and Mongolia, the former illustrating also her continuing policy of isolating India in Asia while avoiding the same fate herself.

China seems to have found that there were many beneficial side effects to prolonged inaction. After the war India's military expenditures were projected to quadruple, 46 a substantial economic diversion which was bound to slow down her modernization process to China's advantage, and perhaps add to problems of internal stability. Moreover, the aid she has been "forced" to accept from the West has weakened her non-aligned position and injured her image among the Afro-Asian nations. The unsettled status quo certainly offered Peking greater opportunities for consolidating the gains made in the 1962 attack than any settlement available on the basis of Colombo proposals. For example, the PRC has been able to draw Sikkim and Bhutan into "direct and subservient contact" proportionally to India's decline in military prestige. 47 Most interesting of all are the more recent suggestions that China is preparing to make claims to larger portions of Ladakh. Her refusal to allow Indian civilian outposts in the demilitarized zone, her construction of new roads parallel to the original with branches to advanced military outposts and the establishment of "civilian" outposts in the demilitarized zone which

47. Watson, p. 162.
began in 1964 (negating her concession of 1963) suggested the real possibility of this conclusion. 48

Peking's letter to Nehru of March 3, 1963 indicated that she had already shifted her policy towards the "long wait." While China maintained that direct negotiations "could and should begin at once," it allowed that "if the Indian Government, owing to the needs of its internal and external politics (a jibe that was deeply resented in Delhi,) is not yet prepared to hold such meetings, the Chinese Government is willing to wait with patience." 49 He left the case decidedly open by adding, "As long as India refrains from further provocation... the eased border situation will not become tense." 50 Given China's liberal interpretation of the origins of provocation, this clause kept a threat in suspension over India.

1963 was also a year of intense Chinese diplomatic activity among the Afro-Asian nations. Chou En-lai's personal visit to a great number of developing countries indicated, among other things, a shift in the Chinese approach to mediation and negotiations, from an immediate pressing concern to a long range goal. In the interim, the Chinese would evidently attempt to line up the Afro-Asian nations against India by means of a second Bandung Conference. In his travels, Chou was walking the delicate path of avoiding mediation while simultaneously maintaining the image of a peacemaker by shifting the burden of intransigence upon India. While visiting Burma in April, for example, Chou was quoted as saying that though he refused to accept the Colombo proposals as a "verdict," he was sure a peaceful settlement would eventually be reached.

The beginning of 1964 saw renewed Chinese efforts to bring about a settlement through direct negotiations. On January 16, 1964, Chou En-lai and President Nkrumah of

50. Ibid.
Ghana issued a joint communiqué in which they expressed their determination to support such peace efforts as the Colombo Conference “aimed at bringing about direct Sino-Indian negotiations.” In February such a peace effort materialized (undoubtedly as a result of Chinese initiative) with Ne Win’s proposal to have direct Sino-Indian border talks in Rangoon. Nehru refused the invitation, reiterating his demand for prior acceptance of the proposals by Peking.

Ne Win’s half-hearted intervention was evidence that the border dispute was injuring Chinese advances in the Afro-Asian countries. It also indicated that a final settlement of the dispute may come when China finds that the political fruits to be reaped among the developing countries by a genuinely conciliatory attitude are greater than the power increment that could be gained by a full victory over India. It would seem quite probable that the cold war that was being carried on between China and India in 1963 and 1964 was essentially a contest for the leadership of the Afro-Asian countries. The primary weapon that each side was trying to develop was a conference which would exclude the participation of their rival. Burma’s coolness to both the Chinese and Indian proposals for a conference and their refusal to be turned into a real mediator of the dispute indicated the desire of the non-aligned countries to remain as neutral as possible. In fact, Chou’s goodwill tour had not been the success that Peking had envisioned.

It would appear that in the beginning of 1964 China must have reassessed her position, for she shifted to a somewhat harder line on the border issue. During Chou’s visit to Ceylon in February, Mrs. Bandaranaike made the recommendation that China abandon her seven military outposts in Ladakh. Their final communiqué, however, indicated a negative Chinese response to this by saying only that China would continue to seek direct negotiations. In April and May of 1964 Nehru picked up Mrs. Bandara-

naike's suggestion and announced that India would negotiate if the Chinese withdrew their posts and accepted a completely demilitarized zone. Ironically, this was very close to the initial concession China had made in early 1963 and had later backed down on. In 1964, when the concession was not a result of Chinese initiative it was apparently not even considered. Nehru's announcement had included the phrase, the "initiatives must come from China." From the Chinese point of view this amounted to an ultimatum which was totally unacceptable, for it put the burden of the next move upon China while simultaneously telling her what that next move had to be. Consequently, the Chinese reaction to Nehru's overtures was to start setting up stonecairns marking their actual line of control.

By 1964 India's demands were getting smaller and yet the need to take a firm stance was ever present. Of course India would have to solve her dispute with Pakistan to make a firm stance in any way militarily effective, but Nehru indicated the Indian approach to wooing the Afro-Asian nations. The blame was put on China for the continuing dispute and India's decreasing demands were given as evidence of her conciliatory attitude and genuine desire to solve the dispute in a peaceful manner. At the same time India made periodic pronouncements that would seem to bear this out.

China's shift to a harder line in 1964 seemed to indicate that she had reassessed the Afro-Asian situation and decided that a show of her conciliatory frame of mind was less effective than a show of power. Possibly too, it was the result of changing strategic requirements. No doubt China wanted to put a quick end to India's threatened advances. In August the Chinese announced that they were continuing to set up "civilian posts" in the demilitarized zone. And with their refusal to withdraw them, India's stand, formulated since June 8 by Premier Lal Bahadur Shastri,* seemed to harden towards talks.

* Lal Bahadur Shastri became Prime Minister of India following the death of Pandit Nehru in 1964.
1965 saw the transition in China from the "hard line" to overt military threats along her borders with India. Though the interval since the war had been punctuated by not infrequent protests of intrusions, these had generally been fictitious Chinese charges to keep India straining until a military burden and remind her of the perpetual insecurity that an unsettled border involved. For, until 1965, China was too preoccupied with her Soviet borders and her diplomatic thrust in the Afro-Asian countries to seriously reopen the military threat. With the Chinese shift to a harder line in mid-1964, however, their military buildup along the border began at full speed. At the beginning of 1965 the head Lama of Ladakh reported that the Chinese had reinforced their position in Ladakh and had built a number of feeder roads and airstrips.

The antagonisms between China and India reached a climax in September with the onslaught of the Indo-Pakistan Kashmiri war. On September 8, China charged India with violating the Sino-Indian border in conjunction with her moves in Pakistan. Peking demanded that India

"dismantle all the aggressive military structures that she has illegally built beyond or on the China-Sikkim border, withdraw her aggressive forces and stop all her acts of aggression and provocation against China in the Western, Middle and Eastern Sectors of the Chinese-Indian border... India must bear the responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom." 53

This was indeed a major threat for India to face at this time, for the strategic effect of Chinese intervention in Sikkim would have been tremendous on the war with Pakistan. On September 16 China followed up her first ultimatum with a deadline of three days for the dismantling of Indian military bases along the China-Sikkim border. Significantly, the heaviest concentrations of forces were along the McMahon Line and the Sikkim border. The

reassertion of the old Chinese claim that India had been illegally occupying 90,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory south of the McMahon Line and Peking’s statement that “she forever retains the right to settle these questions” would seem to indicate that the PRC was again seeking negotiations that would be humiliating to India and in which Peking could use the N.E.F.A. for bargaining leverage. Further evidence for the thesis that the military threat being brandished was not being considered for actual use was given on September 19 when China extended her deadline in Sikkim three more days. Ironically, India had from the beginning denied occupying the structures in question, and to prove it she proposed that a neutral investigating team be sent to examine Chinese complaints. Peking, as expected, rejected the recommendation.

Throughout this crisis there was little indication that China was seriously considering an attack. On September 22 she said that her demands had been met by India. An article in Jenmin Jih Pao of the 23rd was extremely revealing regarding the purposes of the September confrontation. Peking said that while India had retreated before the Chinese ultimatum, the matter was “far from closed.” They further observed that some of the installations had not been demolished perhaps because Indian troops had to leave with such haste, in which case it was “excusable”. “In the end,” the article claimed, “they lost all face.” 54 As China’s complaints were apparently structured by the tacticians in Peking, it would appear that one of the primary purposes of her demands and subsequent elaboration of how India had retreated, was international effect. Again, China’s offensive was kept well under control to prevent American and Soviet involvement and to maintain a powerful but not overly bellicose image among the Afro-Asian countries.

In addition, China’s assessment undoubtedly saw that this time the military threat need not be activated to impress upon India her insecurity. For the mere thought of a two

front war along her northern frontiers must have been appalling to Delhi. Indeed, the Chinese threat, even though it never materialized, required Indian military preparedness which diverted her energies from Kashmir, and from badly needed economic development. This was no doubt one of China's primary motives, for it had become an imperative of her foreign policy to maintain her friendship with Pakistan. Such a friendship, supported by concrete backing, created a split in the Asian subcontinent which prevented China's complete isolation and, at the same time, put a tremendous psychological strain, military and economic, on India.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the 1963 proposals of the Colombo powers were politically inopportune. As we have already seen, China balked at having others make her concessions for her. The proposals themselves, however, remain the most realistic basis for a final settlement that has yet appeared.

In the North East Frontier Agency, the Chinese refusal to accept the McMahon Line reflects, as has been noted, a denial of the implications of the Simla Convention regarding the status of Tibet, more than a disagreement on the logical nature of the watershed boundary.

The dispute in Ladakh, on the other hand, can only be effectively solved when India agrees to cede all the territory through which the Chinese highway runs. Five years ago, it was commonly accepted that the rest of the Plateau could be divided along the Macartney-MacDonald alignment of 1899, leaving the road on the Chinese side and following the watershed along the Indus and Terim Basin. Such an argument, however, has become virtually academic as the Chinese have penetrated deeper. Today, the "line of actual control" represents an occupation of territory in Ladakh much broader than earlier Chinese strategic assessments had considered necessary. Gradual advances since 1962 have greatly complicated any further implementation of the

Colombo proposals, for there is virtually no "demilitarized zone" anymore.

On the extremely complex matter of a final settlement one assertion seems sure and that is that any political conclusion to the dispute will require substantial changes not only in the configuration of power and interests in the area, but also in considerable historical territorial adjustments on the part of both disputants. That time, however, has yet to arrive.
In concluding this study we find India and China involved in what initially appears to be an ideological struggle determined more by the realities of contemporary political power and alignments than by the historical processes which have brought these problems into being. This is surely not the case with the historically complex Tibetan frontier question.

Tibet as a separate entity is almost a forgotten factor in the power struggle between these two contemporary Asian giants. The present struggle finds a major foci in what is frequently simplistically labelled the “Indo-Sinic border dispute.” One conclusion emerges, on this point, from the factors as they have unfolded in this research and that is that a breakdown of meaningful communications took place between India and China, particularly during the 1954–1962 period. Nowhere do the facts lead to any other observation but that unlike the British and Imperial and Republican Chinese attempts to deal with the dispute, the post-British Indian and Communist Chinese regimes became so concerned with fears of one another, particularly as regarded the question of secure borders, that they lost touch with the complex historical factors that had led to the very development of the dispute.

The study, among other things noted in this conclusion, attempts to bridge this communications gap by reorienting the dispute with its historical origins. Certainly this dispute is
a part of the power struggle between India and China, China and Russia and China and Tibet, and yet it is distinct in itself. One can only follow the complex history of the dispute with difficulty and it becomes quite apparent that no single hypothesis could simplify the understanding of a situation that involves the development of what might be considered to be several distinct stages in the history of this issue; namely, colonial, imperial and post-colonial, anti-imperial regimes and their attitudes towards this persisting problem.

Lord Curzon's fear and suspicion of supposed Russian designs in Central Asia and Manchu China's concern and apprehension over increasingly cordial British Imperial Indian and Tibetan relations is not unlike the more contemporary problem of Nehru and Chou's suspicion of the power motivations of one another. The thread of continuity can be characterized by a breakdown in communications caused by anxiety, fear and suspicion as opposed to caution and reservation. This thread has shown itself at various times over the historic period under consideration and should be kept in mind in any review, past or future, of the issues.

From Lord Curzon's viceroyalty to the aftermath of the Colombo Conference, without overlooking in any significant respect the critically important historic background to these years, a major border dispute developed. This work has, in large part, concerned itself with placing the dispute in its proper historic perspective, for without such, it is of little practical significance and of less academic intelligibility.

It is of the greatest importance to note that the present Sino-Indian dispute over the almost inaccessible and ill-marked borders between India and Chinese Turkestan and Tibet was formed under regimes which either no longer exist, or which have little or no influence over the present course of relations between the disputants. The Imperial China of the Ch'ing (Manchu) Dynasty has long since ceased to exist, and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang has been driven by the Chinese Communists to the island of Formosa, where the Nationalist Chinese regime has resided since 1949. The British Indian Empire has also gone, but the border, in
its present configuration, is very much the product of Imperial Chinese and Chinese Republican policies and agreements, on the one hand, and of British Imperial policies and agreements, on the other. The Republic of India and the People's Republic of China are, therefore, involved, in large measure, with a vast and unusually complex problem which their respective imperial or republican predecessors were either unwilling or unable to rectify.

The narrative and interpretation, through the use of a characteristically historical methodological approach to the subject matter, has attempted to place in proper perspective the complex and frequently interrelated multiplicity of factors and aspects that, over the past decades, have characterized the protracted development of this highly unusual and important border conflict.

As has been seen in the body of this work, it has been my judgment that no single hypothesis or closely related set of two hypotheses could have been advanced which would have, of themselves, sufficed to explain the checkered course of events that have marked the history of this dispute. A number of observations related to the border and the nature of the disagreements that have so often marred its long and difficult history have, however, been advanced in the hopes that these findings may be taken as the elements of the general thesis of the research regarding this controversy. A review of these factors follows.

An initial observation concerns the effects of geography and terrain upon the dispute. Throughout recorded history, the isolation of much of this border and the severe difficulties inherent in its effective demarcation, delimitting, or its actual physical control have given to the boundary a great degree of "inviolability" that could be overcome only by a most determined effort or by an advanced technology. For many centuries no state in the area had the technology or will-power to master that formidable Himalayan border. Traditionally, small parties of traders straggled through the few high passes in the climatically appropriate seasons, but for all practical purposes that was the extent of man's
physical utilization of the border area throughout most of the year. Indeed Tibet has long been known to the world as a forbidden land fortified by natural ramparts of snow-covered mountains. On its border with Nepal stands Everest, the mightiest mountain peak in the world; and common to the border of Nepal, Sikkim and Tibet is Kanchenjunga. The southern and western border areas, with which this study is concerned, is formed by the great Himalayan and Karakoram ranges. Even after a determined effort had been made by the British Indian Empire to mark the boundary and press effective claims of territorial sovereignty, it is clear from the records detailed in the text, and elsewhere, that actual physical control was minimal at best.

Sir Andrew Henry McMahon, who was so deeply involved in the border demarcation issue during the British period, in an address to the Royal Society of Arts in London in 1935, noted an interesting and very significant distinction between the terms “frontier” and “boundary.”¹ A frontier, he noted, would normally consist of a wide tract of border land which, perhaps by virtue of its ruggedness or other geophysical difficulty, served as a buffer between two or more states. The Western Desert between Libya and Egypt, in the McMahon sense, provides such a frontier. A boundary, however, was a clearly defined line, expressed either by verbal description, in which case it would be characterized as “delimited,” or by physical markers on the terrain, in which case it would be characterized as “demarcated.”

The Himalayan and Karakoram mountain ranges, which separate the Indian subcontinent from Chinese Central Asia,² was an excellent frontier in the McMahon sense. They are not, however, even in this modern age, ideal areas for boundary making. A great deal of the present dispute stems from these important factors.

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Closely allied to the above considerations is the fact that through much of its long history, the states along the border in question have not been nations imbued with the modern, European concept of the territorial state with clearly defined and specific boundaries, whose violation would be seen as an attack upon the integrity of the nation itself. Thus the border until quite recent times has carried with it only minor significance, if that, to the local populations who happened to live or graze herds on either side of it. In fact, a number of these people were gatherers and herdsmen who customarily shifted their dwelling places with the seasons and lived on both sides of the so-called border at various times of the year.

This situation in many areas of the mountain barrier resulted, politically, in what Cunningham described in 1842 as "a multiplicity of relations and a diversion of alliance." It is certain, in any case, that an arbitrary formula for demarcation, as for example the claim, already noted as highly questionable in this study, that the true boundary follows this or that watershed, will usually clash with existing relationships among the peoples of the areas who, in all probability, have never seen a map and who surely do not know or care what a watershed is. This pained the British who viewed such behavior as highly "irregular" but the tribes of the border areas took it all very much in stride. One important consequence was that the boundary was, for centuries, not an issue over which states were wont to go to war.

In modern times this situation has radically changed. The question of why naturally arises.

After the British Government of India, and more particularly its imperious and imperial Viceroy Lord Curzon of Kedleston, became active along the border the situation changed radically. During the period of loss of Chinese power in Turkestan in the late nineteenth century, the Russians undertook rapid advances into the khanates of Central Asia. As their means of countering the Russian "threat" in the Karakoram and Pamir areas, the British
made full use of Kashmir, which, since 1846, had formed a part of British India under the Dogra Maharajas.

By this time the Imperial Chinese Government was busily involved in the process of reorganizing the Kashgaria region, which had been briefly created into a “kingdom” by the Kokandi adventurer Yakub Bey, but because of the almost incredible energy and determination of Tso Tsung-t'ang, 4 had been reconquered and proclaimed the province of Sinkiang by the Manchus. Through western wars and contacts, however, the Chinese Government had also become sufficiently “modernized” and concerned with the territorial integrity of the state.

Chinese policy regarding Tibet also underwent a radical change in the early twentieth century. This was due, in large part, to China’s defeat by Japan in 1895. After that war, the thirteenth Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatso, began to think increasingly of independent Tibetan state, and the Manchus, in the last years of the Dynasty, initiated a policy of incorporating Tibet into the Chinese provincial structure. The “forward policy” of Lord Curzon and the Younghusband Mission of 1904 played a very large part indeed in this policy of incorporation. The implementation of this policy was entrusted to Chao Erh-feng, who reduced Eastern Tibet and began the incorporation. A “flying column,” under Chao, occupied Lhasa in 1910, and it was only the outbreak of the 1911 revolution which brought about the end of the dynastic system of Chinese Government that prevented the completion of his task.

The fall of Chinese power in Central Tibet in 1912 led inevitably to the Simla Convention of 1913–14 which, in turn, led to the McMahon Line. The controversy over these issues ushered in a new era in border affairs and the stage was set for a long controversy, one which has yet to be settled.

Since the days of Lord Curzon there have been impor-

4. For an excellent account of his life see: W. L. Bales, Tso Tsung-t'ang: Soldier and Statesman of Old China (Shanghai, 1937).
tant changes in the regimes on both sides of the border. Imperial China collapsed in 1911 and gave way to Republican China. There was an interlude of the warlordism and then the era of Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang, and the Japanese War followed in 1949 by the People's Republic under Mao Tse-tung. In India the virtual absolutism of Curzonian times passed away with the more liberal administrations of Morley and Minto, and Montagu and Chelmsford. The Government of India Act of 1919 introduced Dyarchy, followed by a larger dose of democratization in the Government of India Act of 1935 and finally by Independence and Partition in 1947 and Nehru's Republic. The main point is, of course, that through all of these changes of governments and administrations, the border dispute has remained virtually unaffected as far as its resolution is concerned. It has had its own periods of lull and explosion, but one can find no real correlation between these changes in governmental structures and the ebb and flow of the dispute.

It should be noted, as illustrative of this point, therefore, that although a relative quiescence prevails, and may continue to do so indefinitely, the Chinese attitudes that she intends to retain the territory presently under her _de facto_ control in Eastern Ladakh and Western Tibet, that the McMahon Line is rejected as the legal basis for her boundary with India in the eastern sector of the dispute and, that pending satisfactory negotiations of all standing boundary differences with India, she proposes to maintain the _status quo_, have persisted despite changes in the vigor or vehemence of the Chinese argument, which reflected varying degrees of politico-military tension. These are basic positions that would have to be taken into consideration by any Chinese Government, Republican or Communist, regarding

5. This statement amplifies the basic proposition expressed in the resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, September 13, 1959: "The Chinese Government has consistently held that an overall settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question should be sought by both sides; taking into account
a settlement of the issue. These attitudes are, of course, the product of the Chinese historical positions reviewed in the text which evolved into the following major points: firstly, that the entire border has never been formally delimited by any binding treaty or agreement; secondly, that the "traditional line" was formed gradually by the extent up to which each side had administrative jurisdiction and it could therefore not be mechanically defined by a geographical principle; thirdly, that the traditional boundary had changed continually with the changing strength of disputants in the area; and lastly, that British power had distorted the line during their period of rule in India. The Indian Government, on the other hand, maintained that the entire dispute has been a striking instance of historical delimitation along the well-established watershed principle of geography in all sectors and that such traditional boundaries did not naturally change. Formal delimitation under these circumstances was, therefore, at least as related to the position of the Government of India, an optional process. Neither the Simla Convention nor the Colombo Conference resolved these major historical differences and consequently the dispute continues.

In addition it should be noted that at various times the situation in Tibet, over the historic period under consideration, developed as though it were a kind of "vacuum." Whether accurately or not, there is a widely accepted notion that nature, and for that matter, power, abhors a vacuum. In

the historical background and existing actualities and adhering to the five principles, through friendly negotiations conducted in a well-prepared way, and step-by-step. Pending this, as a provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the longstanding status quo, and not seek to change by unilateral action, still less by force; as to some of the disputes, provisional agreements concerning individual places could be reached through negotiations to ensure tranquility of the border areas and uphold the friendship of the two countries." (Peking Review, No. 37, September 15, 1959, p. 5: also in American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 592, p. 13)

so far as the Himalayan region between India and Tibetan-China is a kind of vacuum, when there is power capable of filling that vacuum, such power seeks to do so. That power came first from India, then from China. If the vacuum had historically been “filled” by having been clearly, fully and effectively demarcated and administered by any one of the disputants, one may well suspect that the so-called frontiers question would have been resolved. But, as the record makes abundantly clear, the boundaries were, for the most part, never made clear or demarcated to the mutual satisfaction of the several high contracting parties.

Although China’s occupation of Tibet during the 1950’s and its extension of military road networks southward to the Himalayas has, as far as Indian strategic considerations are concerned, destroyed Tibet as a “buffer zone” and moved the competition for primacy in the area to the Himalayan border states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, the border dispute remains as far from resolution as ever. This significant change in the power structure of the area provides a striking illustration of thesis that while the basic dispute over the Tibetan frontiers question persists, that its significance to the disputants has been in a state of flux relative to the ebb and flow of their respective political and military objectives and strength. As seen from India this area is no substitute for the vast and difficult terrain of the Tibetan plateau, which, during the British period, acted as a buffer for the Indian Empire. This buffer was, however, the artificial creature of British power in India, Chinese internal chaos and disorder and collusion between the authorities in Tibet and the Indian Empire, all of which has been discussed in detail in the text. This delicate balance, which in many significant respects contributed to de facto Tibetan independence from 1911 to 1950, was destroyed with the withdrawal of British power from the Indian subcontinent in 1947 and the emergence of the People’s Republic on mainland China in 1949. What is important to note is, of course, that while the dispute remained, its strategic importance frequently
changed as the political and military power of the various disputants ebbed and flowed.

It would seem, however, that agreement on a mutually acceptable border, even in the face of extreme difficulties of demarcation, already noted, might have been possible of achievement if there had only been two parties in this dispute. At the very least there were always three: the Government of India, the Government of China and the complicating factor of the regime in \textit{de facto} control at any given point in time in Tibet. If the Indian administration dealt with the Tibetan regime it affronted the Government of China. If the Government of India talked with the Government of China, it overlooked the pressing but indistinct claims of the Tibetan regime. These irreconcilable facts created a dilemma that was never resolved effectively. Meanwhile, to make things even more complicated, the Indian nationalists who were to become the successor state with partition in 1947, resolutely refused to admit that the Government of India was authorized to speak for them and insisted that they would conduct their own diplomacy on their own account after independence was achieved. This only made it easier for China to deny the validity of the myriad of agreements and conventions which the British Empire had sought to finalize prior to the partition of the subcontinent in 1947.

From all that has been noted, it should be apparent that a most complicated set of historical circumstances and developments shaped the course of events along the Sino-Indian border during the first half of the 20th century. The controversy is virtually unique, unusual in many of its basic historic, geographical, cultural, religious and political origins and characteristics. The "unique" nature of the Tibetan theocratic form of government, particularly the monarcho-religious status of the Dalai Lama, provides a potent and highly individual ingredient, not to be found elsewhere in the world. The present Chinese position in Tibet and Central Asia can be traced back to the conquests of the Manchu
Emperor K’ang Hsi early in the eighteenth century. Generally speaking, however, it seems clear that K’ang Hsi was interested far less in Tibet as a geographic area than as the home of the Tibetan Buddhist Church which had considerable influence over the powerful tribal groups of Mongolia, particularly the Dzungars of Eastern Turkestan who were a constant potential threat to Chinese power. The Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1718–20 was, therefore, in theory, undertaken to “rescue” the Dalai Lama from the Dzungars. In 1720 the Dalai Lama was escorted back to his capital by Manchu forces. From that date until 1911 Chinese influence was exercised by various representatives, particularly the Chinese Imperial Amban, who had considerable supervisory powers over government by Tibetan authorities. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, however, China made no attempt to carry on the direct administration of Tibet. As long as the powerful spiritual apparatus of the Tibetan Buddhist Church, in general, and the offices of the Dalai Lama, in particular, was “on their side,” they were content.

The 1911 revolution destroyed one of the most meaningful parts of the unique relationship between Tibet and China and surely between the Chinese emperors and the Dalai Lamas; namely, the patron-priest relationship. Although the Dalai Lama owed personal allegiance to the Chinese Emperor in the traditionally flexible bond between patron and priest, he paid tribute only once every three years, a much more vague relationship than that between China and Mongolia. While the suzerainty relationship was frequently unclear, one must acknowledge that the Chinese had no real need to fit a satisfactory or traditional relationship into the mold of British legal terminology until 1911 when the traditional relationship collapsed in revolution. The Chinese, either imperial or republican, did not have this concept of government, and in April 1912 the new republic

7. The complicated affairs leading to K’ang Hsi’s invasions of Tibet are well elucidated in: H.E. Richardson, Tibet and its History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962)
declared Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet to be the equivalent of Chinese provinces and thus integral parts of the Chinese state. The Tibetans, however, did not recognize the President of China, Yuan Shih-kai, as a successor to the last Manchu emperor, and while they did recognize some suzerain relationship with the Emperor, they never recognized this relationship, let alone one of sovereignty, in the Chinese state. This interesting and highly unusual distinction provided Tibet, during the period 1912-1950, with their best legal case for independence. While the era of de facto Tibetan independence ended with the 1950 Chinese invasion, the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, where he presently resides in exile, has been yet another unresolved factor which continues to aggravate Sino-Indian border relations.

By December 1911 the Amban Lien Yu had been deposed and replaced by General Chung Ying. In late 1912, however, the Tibetan revolt against Chinese influence had reached a point where for all practical purposes Chinese power had ceased to exist. In April Chung Ying fled Tibet for India, and his departure ended the Chinese military occupation begun in 1910 by Chao Erh-feng. The Chinese did not, of course, return as rulers for nearly a half a century, but when they did they remembered the lesson of Chung Ying and brought with them a large military force to subdue and occupy Tibet.

In conclusion, it should be finally noted that the basic purposes of the research embodied in this study have been


9. The case for Tibetan independence in international law has best been stated in the 1960 report to the International Commission of Jurists by the Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet which stated: "The view of the Committee was that Tibet was at the very least a de facto independent State when the Agreement on Peaceful Measures in Tibet was signed in 1951 [Chapter III of this Book contains the details of this Agreement], and the repudiation of this agreement by the Tibetan Government in 1959 was found to be fully justified . . . Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the conditions of statehood as generally accepted under international law." For details see: International Commission of Jurists, Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic (Geneva, 1960), p. 5, passim.
Lord Lytton as Viceroy of India, C. 1876 The brilliant and eccentric Lytton served as Viceroy under Disraeli and carried out his 'forward' Frontier policies. Lytton was Viceroy when Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India

—Collection of the author—
not only to clarify and place in proper historical perspective the complex factors involved in the disputes, its development, and persistence, but to present the general thesis, with all of the related factors already noted here and in the body of the work, that the controversy has persisted, because of the factors, quite independently of the regimes, whether imperial, republican, democratic or communist, that have existed during the historical periods under consideration, in India or in China. It is of the utmost importance in this regard to note, however, that the strategic importance of the dispute has changed, often drastically, as with the fall of the Manchus in 1911, with the ebb and flow of the political and military power and objectives of the various disputants. India, for example, which in military terms was generally on the offensive during the British era has, in recent times, been very much on the defensive. The withdrawal of British power from India and Pakistan in 1947 and the consolidation of mainland China under Mao in 1949 have, in large measure, been responsible for this power shift. It becomes evident, therefore, that in large part due to the historic and highly individualistic nature of Tibetan society, terrain, religion, culture, and culturally related governmental institutions, especially the unique institutional position of the Dalai Lamas, that this dispute remained quite distinct from the political ideologies or administrations of either India or China.
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